copyright 2002, 2009 by lidija rangelovska please see the rich text file (rtf) for the content of this ebook. transcriber's note: every effort has been made to replicate this text as faithfully as possible. italic text has been marked with _underscores_. god: outlines of the new theology. god: outlines of the new theology, based on facts, science, nature, reason, intuition, revelation and common sense. by t. d. curtis, author of "the nazarene," "cross and crown," "resurgam," and other poems. chicago: published by the author 1889 copyrighted by the author, t. d. curtis, of chicago, in the year 1889. preface. the new theology is a gathering up of the fragments, antagonizing none of the old theologies, while harmonizing the essential parts of all, by omitting excrescences and supplying deficiencies. all others have failed because they are fragmentary and narrow. they do not recognize the female principle of being and its true relation to the male. they do not recognize the results of endless progression, or the outcome of an infinite and eternal sexual union of the primal principles love and wisdom, which generates the motive power of being and causes evolution and all the innumerable manifestations of progressive existence. they do not explain the origin of the idea of a personal god, nor of the doctrine of emanation from him, or the god-pair. they do not explain whence the idea of a non-personal being, pervading everything. none of them catch a glimpse of the conjugal pair unfolding and rising to godhood, when their sphere becomes the parent of universes, by natural development, thus completing another of the cycles of being, as we see in two infants growing into the adult estate and becoming the parents of other infants. in place of the rule of law and order, rising into the rule of equity and love, they substitute the arbitrary rule of a monarch, full of partiality, favoritism and vindictiveness. the time has come for something more humane, consistent and rational, more progressive, comprehensive and complete. this the new theology supplies to the advanced mind. mankind are sloughing off the old theologies, and coming up higher. we are at the turn of the tide, and the new theology is a safe craft on which to ride the spiritual waves, in the light of a new and better era, to a higher condition. the author. god. 1. of all that is incomprehensible the name--in english language known as god, the force of which all forms and things are full- the source of being--otherwise were null all things that now exist--at whose great nod the universes come to light--whose will omnipotent rules with discretion's rod of love and mercy, equity and skill:- thou art my theme--into my brain thy light instill! 2. others have speculated on this theme; then why not i, who feel impelled to try my feeble power upon the waking dream of all the ages? though presumptuous seem my efforts, there can be no reason why the least may not divulge the thoughts that rise within the soul so eager to descry, as wide it opes its ever-straining eyes, the visions that might daze the more profoundly wise. 3. throughout all animated nature we behold the presence and the power of sex; from man to lowest forms of life we see all things are joined together sexually for reproduction; simple or complex, 'tis evolution's ever-acting law; we trace through brutal matter the reflex of this all-potent force, and view with awe the deep conclusions which from it we're forced to draw. 4. female and male all things at last appear; thus sex thro'out all nature's realms controls; from lowest upward to the highest sphere, so far as mortal eye beholdeth here, through sex conjunction everything unfolds; as positive and negative, when met in union chemical, the union holds true to proportions which the law hath set for simples, and they thus new elements beget. 5. together these two forces act as one; without the one, the other were as nought; they are the heat and light thrown from the sun which warm and vivify the earth as run the planets in their courses; nor is ought upon the face of earth they did not bring; through these life-giving rays to us are brought all earthly blessings--life and every thing that blooms and fructifies to which we fondly cling. 6. our sun, like every other sun we see, is a reflex of its great prototype, the spirit sun, from which perpetually is drawn all that is possible to be- that is, all primal principles, when ripe are the conditions for them to descend into this outer sphere, where pan's rude pipe breaks forth in music, as the forces tend to consummate through nature being's aim and end. 7. the home of god, as it to me appears, is the great spirit sun, whence emanate all things beheld by scientists and seers- the births of countless myriads of years wherein the sexual forces procreate the suns and universes, and the forms that naturally fill each vast estate, preparing, through each sun that lights and warms, abodes for future life's innumerable swarms. 8. god is a highly conjugated pair, once lowly born and dwelling on some earth so far remote that no one may declare or comprehend the stretch of time, or dare to picture them at the domestic hearth, where first they felt the flame of love divine to which their dawning future gave the birth; then through their consciousness began to shine their vast unfolding, as their lives should intertwine. 9. they too sprang from a god who had before been born as they, and like to them did grow a mutual pair, unfolding being's door for earthly suns and planets to outpour and then become with light and life aglow; as closer still their sexual union grew, life and intelligence unfolded more, until the pair we call our god, with due and orderly succession, sprang to earthly view. 10. they lived and died, as men and women now are seen to live and die, in earthly sense; they entered spirit life, and then the vow of love renewed was made, and on each brow the blazing star of faith shone most intense; they rose to higher spheres, and all aglow they moved in love's own aura, issuing hence and forming round them in a glorious bow, until a sun began its radiance to throw. 11. the elements of being evermore joined in a closer union, as they must; as they recede, they form a darksome shore like what remained when earthly life was o'er and the god-pair behind them left their dust; upon this outer sphere, surrounding all, the only sphere where burneth selfish lust, the inner heat of life began to fall and suns to burn and throw off earthly ball on ball. 12. thus came our universe with all its stars, its suns and planets--all that these contain; our earth rolls on among the planet-cars, freighted with life and death, with peace and wars, with all the good and evil in its train; and we, the tiny mortals struggling here, hoping and fearing, vexing heart and brain, have much our weary, drooping souls to cheer- for what is mystery now will soon be plain and clear. 13. our destiny is that which is our god's, who has so many ages gone before; the heights sublime whence he now smiling nods one day we all shall reach, though great the odds now stretching out from hence to that bright shore; for time and space are nothing; the same laws that governed him, unfolding evermore those sprang from him, still working without pause, must lift us to his plane, as end doth follow cause. 14. meantime, he will go on as we come up, since our unfolding must depend on his; for we must drink from out the self-same cup, and at the self-same table we must sup; but he, gone on beyond to higher bliss, will be our leader still, above all strife; we from his realm, as now we do in this, like branches of the tree with sap grown rife, draw elements of fruit, which sprout new shoots of life. 15. but, did our heavenly parents not progress, there would be no progression for us here; all stagnant would become, and motionless, with utter silence and obliviousness as infinite as being's boundless sphere; progress for one involves progress for all, as long as love its mate delights to cheer; as long as love responds to love's sweet call, no cataclysmal force can being's tide forestall. 16. but does it seem too much for mortal hope to dream of a career so far above and still advancing as conditions ope the way of endless progress? who can cope with infinite progression, born of love, and say where it shall end? our destiny, with all eternity in which to rove, must have unbounded possibility; oh! glorious broadening ages that are yet to be! 17. we only have a glimpse, and yet behold how vast the scene stretched out before our eyes! we start from seeming nothingness of old; as we our dawning consciousness unfold, what strides we make! how vastly do we rise from knowing nought to science quick with sight to penetrate the earth and scan the skies, so eager is the soul in search of light, full of its destiny to grasp the infinite! 18. who cannot see eternal progress must have infinite results, and no one can e'er be so far advanced beyond the dust that, progress ended, he will stop and rust mid evolution's ever-onward plan? if dreams of a progressive life are not a vain delusion, then must rising man become more than the mind conceives of what befits a god--beyond all reach of earthly thought. 19. and who shall say it is so very strange that suns and systems should be born and reared amid the ceaseless and unfolding change through which evolving souls are made to range in their progression, marvelous and weird, when mere conjunction of the sexes gives to human beings form and life endeared to parents and to other relatives- the highest type of being here on earth that lives? 20. the emanations from the wedded pair, when truly wed, forever conjugate; in closer union constantly they are combining in the form of substance rare, and building of the aura they create a sphere around the couple joined as one, which ever is extending as they mate in their unending journey here begun, until their sphere is a prolific spirit sun. 21. we are unable here to further trace their grand career beyond this spirit sun; we have no evidence on which to base their further progress, nor a clue to place conjecture or belief upon; but none can doubt the bliss and glory of the vast unfolding of the future here begun; it seems impossible for seers to cast their vision farther on; it stops with god, at last. 22. nor can we farther backward go than this, our earthly plane, which emanates as waste from the god-pair, while every atom is instinct with all that an analysis could find in highest forms of what is chaste; though seeming void, chaotic, without trend, as water seeks its level in its haste to be at rest, so these rude atoms tend to reproduce the human form--their aim and end. 23. but this is clear, what _is_ forever _was_, so far as actual substance is concerned; we need not look for any primal cause of being, nor of any of its laws; they _were_, and _are_, and _will be_, when is burned the last of all we now behold below- _will be_ when countless cycles have returned, and countless others shall return and go; all _was_, and _is_, and _will be_--more we cannot know. 24. two principles we recognize as first; these primal principles unite as one; all being dual is; the sexual thirst felt by all sentient beings here is nursed by virtue of these principles, which run each into each as naturally as the elements of water run, or sun draws up the waters for the thirsty grass, or streams to join the ocean ripple as they pass. 25. the swedish seer went not astray when he named these two principles wisdom and love; their junction formeth all that e'er can be, spirit or substance, matter, all we see, or feel, or think, or hope for from above; their union, growing closer hour by hour, oped infinite conditions when they clove unto each other with resistless power that moves all being--each the other's living dower. 26. to show that being must be dual, let us for a moment brief only suppose one man alone, one sentient being, set in utter nothingness, with nought to fret or to disturb the silence and repose- he could not even know he lived at all! 'tis moving contact that to each one shows he has existence. if stark darkness fall, one cannot feel his hand without some motion small. 27. love sleeping all alone could never wake; wisdom in lone repose could give no light; the two brought into contact, love would quake with thrilling tremor that would warm and wake wisdom to knowledge and a joyous sight of his companion blushing to be seen; the mutual recognition would be quite a startling revelation in the sheen of light and life gendered by touch the two between. 28. then think with what attractive force the two great principles of being would be drawn together, with no other thing in view to militate against the union true of every eager atom, which would yawn with the intensest hunger to be wed to its twin atom, waiting in the dawn of resurrection from the rayless dead, to thus be on its everlasting journey sped! 29. an illustration feeble this of how the principles of love and wisdom blend in mutual accord, and thus endow the pair with the capacity to grow into a fonder union without end, evolving from their conscious being all the forms and forces which forever send the tide of life through all that soar or crawl, wherever the conditions infinite may call. 30. it matters not what we may choose to name the element which we now contemplate; it is the all-pervading vital flame and moulding force that from the union came of love and wisdom, which forever mate; if we so will, we may suppose it mind, and all things manifold and correlate so many thoughts projected and defined for use and contemplation of our human kind. 31. so far as we can see, the moving force comes through and issues from a human pair who lived long ages since, and in the course of evolution, have become the source of our vast universe, and to it are as parents to their children, by a law of higher, broader scope, that may compare with procreation here, but which may draw from deeper source than even gods themselves e'er saw. 32. man is the aim and end of what exists; as forces at his earthly birth prepare for him the needed food, and he subsists within the womb as kindly nature lists, so love and wisdom, present everywhere, provide the suns and earths for his abode while, all unconscious, he is unaware of his condition, or whence leads the road that he henceforth must tread, as others erst have trode. 33. what love suggests wisdom is prone to do, as far as laws eternal will permit; pervading all and ever working to whatever object seen they can pursue, they find the highest form and type most fit in man and woman, whom they ever aim to reproduce and then unfold to sit in higher realms, with love and light aflame, whence they survey new fields and those through which they came. 34. the emanations from the parent pair at first take forms of very low degree, according to conditions, to prepare the way for higher forms, which ever are ascending toward the human, as we see; the motion of the atom designates condition and its due activity; sub-union of the elements creates varieties of forms and motions, and of states. 35. though being is but one, within its scope it takes on countless forms, ascending still to higher harmonies, where new fields ope to higher beauties and to brighter hope; as music's octaves rise, progressive will ascends from sphere to sphere, thro' endless range; the higher motion makes each sphere to thrill with higher life and glories new and strange, perfection nearing through an everlasting change. 36. "is this the lot of all?" some one may ask; "if so, how can there be the room for each to thus unfold eternally and bask in glory e'er increasing, with the task of guiding all in such a boundless reach?" do _my_ thoughts clash with yours, or yours with mine? have you not room to think, and act, and teach, because the world is full of thoughts that shine in other brains or firmaments, which them enshrine? 37. in spirit, there is room enough to think; the mental realm has no material bound; to space there is no all-confining brink, or wall of adamant against which clink the thoughts of men and useless fall to ground; yet thoughts are things substantial as the rock, but only tho'ts from higher source are crowned supreme and lasting; these, as real, knock against our weaker conscious being, shock on shock. 38. well the psychologist knows how he can create what seem material things unto the sensitive whom he controls, and plan surroundings real to him as god's to man; his thoughts, more positive, come into view as actual objects to the subject's mind; so in our little realm, by law as true as life, our consciousness is all confined, and we behold god's thoughts in matter's form designed. 39. we nothing add and nothing do we take by our unfolding, which but changes what already has existence, as we wake from our unconscious state and slowly shake the sleep of ages from our eyes, our lot to find ourselves upon a higher plane of active life, which we had heeded not, because we had not risen yet, through pain, unto the higher level it was ours to gain. 40. our life henceforth is one eternal _now_, based on the past, with all it has achieved, and looking to the future with a brow beaming with keen anticipation's glow; however in the past we may have grieved, now comes a state where grief is all unknown; we rise above the brutal plane, relieved from its relentless rule; we gladly own affection's sweeter sway, and ever cease to moan. 41. as the conditions change, we rise to higher enjoyment of the life which they unfold; we are not torn by false or vain desire, nor tortured with the slow but cleansing fire that burns the dross and purifies the gold; but calmly and serenely on we keep our course to beauties and to joys untold; no more our eyes are called upon to weep, no more we sink in dull and all-unconscious sleep. 42. our life, as then we find it, still unfolds through the resistless tide or undertow of an involuntary force, which holds us in the true unerring course--controls the flow of voluntary, as below, yet gives a sense of acting from free will; but well we know the power to will must flow, with all our opportunities, from still profounder prior source, whence we derive all skill. 43. 'twas always so, and will be without end; we cannot pierce eternity of past to find beginning, nor the future rend to find the final goal to which we tend, but be content to know that, first and last, all was and will be as we find it now, changed only in condition, which is fast revolving the kaleidoscope to show how multiform the being first on earth we know. 44. mankind are gods in embryo, and gods are wedded pairs advanced to higher life; all are one substance, and the seeming odds are in conditions; he who patient plods through this dull sphere of ever-active strife, where hope and doubt a balance keep with fears, will one day join his true allotted wife, and they together rise, as blend their spheres, to god's estate and its unfolding lapse of years. 45. all the surrounding vast array we meet, the sphere of god and present home of man, is part and parcel needed to complete the home that every conscious life must greet- as in the womb the infant but a span has there prepared a world to meet its needs till nature has completed every plan for its reception, and where too she breeds all things required to aid the destiny that leads. 46. behold, oh! man, how glorious a thing it is to be! thou art the type supreme of all that is; and couldst thou only bring thine eyes to see the grandeur which i sing, thou wouldst not grovel in thy waking dream, but rise to higher, nobler, juster aims, and make the very vaults of heaven gleam with smiles of angels, whose prolonged acclaims would shake the earth, aglow with their ethereal flame. 47. but now my task is done. i drop the pen and turn to earth, where bodily affairs call me to tussle with my fellow men for my small share of sustenance, and then essay to help the weaker gather theirs; would that i had the power to clearer make the meaning of my theme; but all my prayers are vain to help my cause, or even wake one echo in the mind that feels no thirst to slake. 48. perhaps some day some abler hand will string the lyre to loftier, clearer, sweeter tones, and of man's joyous destiny will sing, and o'er the earth its thrilling echoes fling, waking responsive feeling in the zones, while listening from my spirit mansion i- who long since in the ashes left my bones- will smiling hear the notes that rise on high, and fill with rapturous music the o'ervaulting sky. spirits in bondage a cycle of lyrics by clive hamilton [c. s. lewis] in three parts i. the prison house ii. hesitation iii.the escape "the land where i shall never be the love that i shall never see" historical background published under the pseudonym, clive hamilton, spirits in bondage was c. s. lewis' first book. released in 1919 by heinemann, it was reprinted in 1984 by harcourt brace jovanovich and included in lewis' 1994 collected poems. it is the first of lewis' major published works to enter the public domain in the united states. readers should be aware that in other countries it may still be under copyright protection. most of the poems appear to have been written between 1915 and 1918, a period during which lewis was a student under w. t. kirkpatrick, a military trainee at oxford, and a soldier serving in the trenches of world war i. their outlook varies from romantic expressions of love for the beauty and simplicity of nature to cynical statements about the presence of evil in this world. in a september 12, 1918 letter to his friend arthur greeves, lewis said that his book was, "mainly strung around the idea that i mentioned to you before--that nature is wholly diabolical & malevolent and that god, if he exists, is outside of and in opposition to the cosmic arrangements." in his cynical poems, lewis is dealing with the same questions about evil in nature that alfred lord tennyson explored from a position of troubled faith in "in memoriam a. h." (stanzas 54f). in a letter written perhaps to reassure his father, lewis claimed, "you know who the god i blaspheme is and that it is not the god that you or i worship, or any other christian." whatever lewis believed at that time, the attitude in many of these poems is quite different from the attitude he expressed in his many christian books from the 1930s on. attempts in movies and on stage plays to portray lewis as a sheltered professor who knew little about pain until the death of his wife late in life, have to deal not only with the many tragedies he experienced from a boy on, but also with the disturbing issues he faced in many of these early poems. prologue as of old phoenician men, to the tin isles sailing straight against the sunset and the edges of the earth, chaunted loud above the storm and the strange sea's wailing, legends of their people and the land that gave them birth- sang aloud to baal-peor, sang unto the horned maiden, sang how they should come again with the brethon treasure laden, sang of all the pride and glory of their hardy enterprise, how they found the outer islands, where the unknown stars arise; and the rowers down below, rowing hard as they could row, toiling at the stroke and feather through the wet and weary weather, even they forgot their burden in the measure of a song, and the merchants and the masters and the bondsmen all together, dreaming of the wondrous islands, brought the gallant ship along; so in mighty deeps alone on the chainless breezes blown in my coracle of verses i will sing of lands unknown, flying from the scarlet city where a lord that knows no pity, mocks the broken people praying round his iron throne, sing about the hidden country fresh and full of quiet green. sailing over seas uncharted to a port that none has seen. part i the prison house i. satan speaks i am nature, the mighty mother, i am the law: ye have none other. i am the flower and the dewdrop fresh, i am the lust in your itching flesh. i am the battle's filth and strain, i am the widow's empty pain. i am the sea to smother your breath, i am the bomb, the falling death. i am the fact and the crushing reason to thwart your fantasy's new-born treason. i am the spider making her net, i am the beast with jaws blood-wet. i am a wolf that follows the sun and i will catch him ere day be done. ii. french nocturne (monchy-le-preux) long leagues on either hand the trenches spread and all is still; now even this gross line drinks in the frosty silences divine the pale, green moon is riding overhead. the jaws of a sacked village, stark and grim; out on the ridge have swallowed up the sun, and in one angry streak his blood has run to left and right along the horizon dim. there comes a buzzing plane: and now, it seems flies straight into the moon. lo! where he steers across the pallid globe and surely nears in that white land some harbour of dear dreams! false mocking fancy! once i too could dream, who now can only see with vulgar eye that he's no nearer to the moon than i and she's a stone that catches the sun's beam. what call have i to dream of anything? i am a wolf. back to the world again, and speech of fellow-brutes that once were men our throats can bark for slaughter: cannot sing. iii. the satyr when the flowery hands of spring forth their woodland riches fling, through the meadows, through the valleys goes the satyr carolling. from the mountain and the moor, forest green and ocean shore all the faerie kin he rallies making music evermore. see! the shaggy pelt doth grow on his twisted shanks below, and his dreadful feet are cloven though his brow be white as snow- though his brow be clear and white and beneath it fancies bright, wisdom and high thoughts are woven and the musics of delight, though his temples too be fair yet two horns are growing there bursting forth to part asunder all the riches of his hair. faerie maidens he may meet fly the horns and cloven feet, but, his sad brown eyes with wonder seeing-stay from their retreat. iv. victory roland is dead, cuchulain's crest is low, the battered war-rear wastes and turns to rust, and helen's eyes and iseult's lips are dust and dust the shoulders and the breasts of snow. the faerie people from our woods are gone, no dryads have i found in all our trees, no triton blows his horn about our seas and arthur sleeps far hence in avalon. the ancient songs they wither as the grass and waste as doth a garment waxen old, all poets have been fools who thought to mould a monument more durable than brass. for these decay: but not for that decays the yearning, high, rebellious spirit of man that never rested yet since life began from striving with red nature and her ways. now in the filth of war, the baresark shout of battle, it is vexed. and yet so oft out of the deeps, of old, it rose aloft that they who watch the ages may not doubt. though often bruised, oft broken by the rod, yet, like the phoenix, from each fiery bed higher the stricken spirit lifts its head and higher-till the beast become a god. v. irish nocturne now the grey mist comes creeping up from the waste ocean's weedy strand and fills the valley, as a cup if filled of evil drink in a wizard's hand; and the trees fade out of sight, like dreary ghosts unhealthily, into the damp, pale night, till you almost think that a clearer eye could see some shape come up of a demon seeking apart his meat, as grendel sought in harte the thanes that sat by the wintry log- grendel or the shadowy mass of balor, or the man with the face of clay, the grey, grey walker who used to pass over the rock-arch nightly to his prey. but here at the dumb, slow stream where the willows hang, with never a wind to blow the mists apart, bitter and bitter it is for thee. o my heart, looking upon this land, where poets sang, thus with the dreary shroud unwholesome, over it spread, and knowing the fog and the cloud in her people's heart and head even as it lies for ever upon her coasts making them dim and dreamy lest her sons should ever arise and remember all their boasts; for i know that the colourless skies and the blurred horizons breed lonely desire and many words and brooding and never a deed. vi. spooks last night i dreamed that i was come again unto the house where my beloved dwells after long years of wandering and pain. and i stood out beneath the drenching rain and all the street was bare, and black with night, but in my true love's house was warmth and light. yet i could not draw near nor enter in, and long i wondered if some secret sin or old, unhappy anger held me fast; till suddenly it came into my head that i was killed long since and lying dead- only a homeless wraith that way had passed. so thus i found my true love's house again and stood unseen amid the winter night and the lamp burned within, a rosy light, and the wet street was shining in the rain. vii. apology if men should ask, despoina, why i tell of nothing glad nor noble in my verse to lighten hearts beneath this present curse and build a heaven of dreams in real hell, go you to them and speak among them thus: "there were no greater grief than to recall, down in the rotting grave where the lithe worms crawl, green fields above that smiled so sweet to us." is it good to tell old tales of troynovant or praises of dead heroes, tried and sage, or sing the queens of unforgotten age, brynhild and maeve and virgin bradamant? how should i sing of them? can it be good to think of glory now, when all is done, and all our labour underneath the sun has brought us this-and not the thing we would? all these were rosy visions of the night, the loveliness and wisdom feigned of old. but now we wake. the east is pale and cold, no hope is in the dawn, and no delight. viii. ode for new year's day woe unto you, ye sons of pain that are this day in earth, now cry for all your torment: now curse your hour of birth and the fathers who begat you to a portion nothing worth. and thou, my own beloved, for as brave as ere thou art, bow down thine head, despoina, clasp thy pale arms over it, lie low with fast-closed eyelids, clenched teeth, enduring heart, for sorrow on sorrow is coming wherein all flesh has part. the sky above is sickening, the clouds of god's hate cover it, body and soul shall suffer beyond all word or thought, till the pain and noisy terror that these first years have wrought seem but the soft arising and prelude of the storm that fiercer still and heavier with sharper lightnings fraught shall pour red wrath upon us over a world deform. thrice happy, o despoina, were the men who were alive in the great age and the golden age when still the cycle ran on upward curve and easily, for them both maid and man and beast and tree and spirit in the green earth could thrive. but now one age is ending, and god calls home the stars and looses the wheel of the ages and sends it spinning back amid the death of nations, and points a downward track, and madness is come over us and great and little wars. he has not left one valley, one isle of fresh and green where old friends could forgather amid the howling wreck. it's vainly we are praying. we cannot, cannot check the power who slays and puts aside the beauty that has been. it's truth they tell, despoina, none hears the heart's complaining for nature will not pity, nor the red god lend an ear, yet i too have been mad in the hour of bitter paining and lifted up my voice to god, thinking that he could hear the curse wherewith i cursed him because the good was dead. but lo! i am grown wiser, knowing that our own hearts have made a phantom called the good, while a few years have sped over a little planet. and what should the great lord know of it who tosses the dust of chaos and gives the suns their parts? hither and thither he moves them; for an hour we see the show of it: only a little hour, and the life of the race is done. and here he builds a nebula, and there he slays a sun and works his own fierce pleasure. all things he shall fulfill, and o, my poor despoina, do you think he ever hears the wail of hearts he has broken, the sound of human ill? he cares not for our virtues, our little hopes and fears, and how could it all go on, love, if he knew of laughter and tears? ah, sweet, if a man could cheat him! if you could flee away into some other country beyond the rosy west, to hide in the deep forests and be for ever at rest from the rankling hate of god and the outworn world's decay! ix. night after the fret and failure of this day, and weariness of thought, o mother night, come with soft kiss to soothe our care away and all our little tumults set to right; most pitiful of all death's kindred fair, riding above us through the curtained air on thy dusk car, thou scatterest to the earth sweet dreams and drowsy charms of tender might and lovers' dear delight before to-morrow's birth. thus art thou wont thy quiet lands to leave and pillared courts beyond the milky way, wherein thou tarriest all our solar day while unsubstantial dreams before thee weave a foamy dance, and fluttering fancies play about thy palace in the silver ray of some far, moony globe. but when the hour, the long-expected comes, the ivory gates open on noiseless hinge before thy bower unbidden, and the jewelled chariot waits with magic steeds. thou from the fronting rim bending to urge them, whilst thy sea-dark hair falls in ambrosial ripples o'er each limb, with beautiful pale arms, untrammelled, bare for horsemanship, to those twin chargers fleet dost give full rein across the fires that glow in the wide floor of heaven, from off their feet scattering the powdery star-dust as they go. come swiftly down the sky, o lady night, fall through the shadow-country, o most kind, shake out thy strands of gentle dreams and light for chains, wherewith thou still art used to bind with tenderest love of careful leeches' art the bruised and weary heart in slumber blind. x. to sleep i will find out a place for thee, o sleep- a hidden wood among the hill-tops green, full of soft streams and little winds that creep the murmuring boughs between. a hollow cup above the ocean placed where nothing rough, nor loud, nor harsh shall be, but woodland light and shadow interlaced and summer sky and sea. there in the fragrant twilight i will raise a secret altar of the rich sea sod, whereat to offer sacrifice and praise unto my lonely god: due sacrifice of his own drowsy flowers, the deadening poppies in an ocean shell round which through all forgotten days and hours the great seas wove their spell. so may he send me dreams of dear delight and draughts of cool oblivion, quenching pain, and sweet, half-wakeful moments in the night to hear the falling rain. and when he meets me at the dusk of day to call me home for ever, this i ask- that he may lead me friendly on that way and wear no frightful mask. xi. in prison i cried out for the pain of man, i cried out for my bitter wrath against the hopeless life that ran for ever in a circling path from death to death since all began; till on a summer night i lost my way in the pale starlight and saw our planet, far and small, through endless depths of nothing fall a lonely pin-prick spark of light, upon the wide, enfolding night, with leagues on leagues of stars above it, and powdered dust of stars below- dead things that neither hate nor love it not even their own loveliness can know, being but cosmic dust and dead. and if some tears be shed, some evil god have power, some crown of sorrow sit upon a little world for a little hour- who shall remember? who shall care for it? xii. de profundis come let us curse our master ere we die, for all our hopes in endless ruin lie. the good is dead. let us curse god most high. four thousand years of toil and hope and thought wherein man laboured upward and still wrought new worlds and better, thou hast made as naught. we built us joyful cities, strong and fair, knowledge we sought and gathered wisdom rare. and all this time you laughed upon our care, and suddenly the earth grew black with wrong, our hope was crushed and silenced was our song, the heaven grew loud with weeping. thou art strong. come then and curse the lord. over the earth gross darkness falls, and evil was our birth and our few happy days of little worth. even if it be not all a dream in vain the ancient hope that still will rise again- of a just god that cares for earthly pain, yet far away beyond our labouring night, he wanders in the depths of endless light, singing alone his musics of delight; only the far, spent echo of his song our dungeons and deep cells can smite along, and thou art nearer. thou art very strong. o universal strength, i know it well, it is but froth of folly to rebel; for thou art lord and hast the keys of hell. yet i will not bow down to thee nor love thee, for looking in my own heart i can prove thee, and know this frail, bruised being is above thee. our love, our hope, our thirsting for the right, our mercy and long seeking of the light, shall we change these for thy relentless might? laugh then and slay. shatter all things of worth, heap torment still on torment for thy mirth- thou art not lord while there are men on earth. xiii. satan speaks i am the lord your god: even he that made material things, and all these signs arrayed above you and have set beneath the race of mankind, who forget their father's face and even while they drink my light of day dream of some other gods and disobey my warnings, and despise my holy laws, even tho' their sin shall slay them. for which cause, dreams dreamed in vain, a never-filled desire and in close flesh a spiritual fire, a thirst for good their kind shall not attain, a backward cleaving to the beast again. a loathing for the life that i have given, a haunted, twisted soul for ever riven between their will and mine-such lot i give white still in my despite the vermin live. they hate my world! then let that other god come from the outer spaces glory-shod, and from this castle i have built on night steal forth my own thought's children into light, if such an one there be. but far away he walks the airy fields of endless day, and my rebellious sons have called him long and vainly called. my order still is strong and like to me nor second none i know. whither the mammoth went this creature too shall go. xiv. the witch trapped amid the woods with guile they've led her bound in fetters vile to death, a deadlier sorceress than any born for earth's distress since first the winner of the fleece bore home the colchian witch to greece- seven months with snare and gin they've sought the maid o'erwise within the forest's labyrinthine shade. the lonely woodman half afraid far off her ragged form has seen sauntering down the alleys green, or crouched in godless prayer alone at eve before a druid stone. but now the bitter chase is won, the quarry's caught, her magic's done, the bishop's brought her strongest spell to naught with candle, book, and bell; with holy water splashed upon her, she goes to burning and dishonour too deeply damned to feel her shame, for, though beneath her hair of flame her thoughtful head be lowly bowed it droops for meditation proud impenitent, and pondering yet things no memory can forget, starry wonders she has seen brooding in the wildwood green with holiness. for who can say in what strange crew she loved to play, what demons or what gods of old deep mysteries unto her have told at dead of night in worship bent at ruined shrines magnificent, or how the quivering will she sent alone into the great alone where all is loved and all is known, who now lifts up her maiden eyes and looks around with soft surprise upon the noisy, crowded square, the city oafs that nod and stare, the bishop's court that gathers there, the faggots and the blackened stake where sinners die for justice' sake? now she is set upon the pile, the mob grows still a little while, till lo! before the eager folk up curls a thin, blue line of smoke. "alas!" the full-fed burghers cry, "that evil loveliness must die!" xv. dungeon grates so piteously the lonely soul of man shudders before this universal plan, so grievous is the burden and the pain, so heavy weighs the long, material chain from cause to cause, too merciless for hate, the nightmare march of unrelenting fate, i think that he must die thereof unless ever and again across the dreariness there came a sudden glimpse of spirit faces, a fragrant breath to tell of flowery places and wider oceans, breaking on the shore from which the hearts of men are always sore. it lies beyond endeavour; neither prayer nor fasting, nor much wisdom winneth there, seeing how many prophets and wise men have sought for it and still returned again with hope undone. but only the strange power of unsought beauty in some casual hour can build a bridge of light or sound or form to lead you out of all this strife and storm; when of some beauty we are grown a part till from its very glory's midmost heart out leaps a sudden beam of larger light into our souls. all things are seen aright amid the blinding pillar of its gold, seven times more true than what for truth we hold in vulgar hours. the miracle is done and for one little moment we are one with the eternal stream of loveliness that flows so calm, aloft from all distress yet leaps and lives around us as a fire making us faint with overstrong desire to sport and swim for ever in its deep- only a moment. o! but we shall keep our vision still. one moment was enough, we know we are not made of mortal stuff. and we can bear all trials that come after, the hate of men and the fool's loud bestial laughter and nature's rule and cruelties unclean, for we have seen the glory-we have seen. xvi. the philosopher who shall be our prophet then, chosen from all the sons of men to lead his fellows on the way of hidden knowledge, delving deep to nameless mysteries that keep their secret from the solar day! or who shall pierce with surer eye! this shifting veil of bittersweet and find the real things that lie beyond this turmoil, which we greet with such a wasted wealth of tears? who shall cross over for us the bridge of fears and pass in to the country where the ancient mothers dwell? is it an elder, bent and hoar who, where the waste atlantic swell on lonely beaches makes its roar, in his solitary tower through the long night hour by hour pores on old books with watery eye when all his youth has passed him by, and folly is schooled and love is dead and frozen fancy laid abed, while in his veins the gradual blood slackens to a marish flood? for he rejoiceth not in the ocean's might, neither the sun giveth delight, nor the moon by night shall call his feet to wander in the haunted forest lawn. he shall no more rise suddenly in the dawn when mists are white and the dew lies pearly cold and cold on every meadow, to take his joy of the season early, the opening flower and the westward shadow, and scarcely can he dream of laughter and love, they lie so many leaden years behind. such eyes are dim and blind, and the sad, aching head that nods above his monstrous books can never know the secret we would find. but let our seer be young and kind and fresh and beautiful of show, and taken ere the lustyhead and rapture of his youth be dead; ere the gnawing, peasant reason school him over-deep in treason to the ancient high estate of his fancy's principate, that he may live a perfect whole, a mask of the eternal soul, and cross at last the shadowy bar to where the ever-living are. xvii. the ocean strand o leave the labouring roadways of the town, the shifting faces and the changeful hue of markets, and broad echoing streets that drown the heart's own silent music. though they too sing in their proper rhythm, and still delight the friendly ear that loves warm human kind, yet it is good to leave them all behind, now when from lily dawn to purple night summer is queen, summer is queen in all the happy land. far, far away among the valleys green let us go forth and wander hand in hand beyond those solemn hills that we have seen so often welcome home the falling sun into their cloudy peaks when day was done- beyond them till we find the ocean strand and hear the great waves run, with the waste song whose melodies i'd follow and weary not for many a summer day, born of the vaulted breakers arching hollow before they flash and scatter into spray, on, if we should be weary of their play then i would lead you further into land where, with their ragged walls, the stately rocks shunt in smooth courts and paved with quiet sand to silence dedicate. the sea-god's flocks have rested here, and mortal eyes have seen by great adventure at the dead of noon a lonely nereid drowsing half a-swoon buried beneath her dark and dripping locks. xviii. noon noon! and in the garden bower the hot air quivers o'er the grass, the little lake is smooth as glass and still so heavily the hour drags, that scarce the proudest flower pressed upon its burning bed has strength to lift a languid head:- rose and fainting violet by the water's margin set swoon and sink as they were dead though their weary leaves be fed with the foam-drops of the pool where it trembles dark and cool wrinkled by the fountain spraying o'er it. and the honey-bee hums his drowsy melody and wanders in his course a-straying through the sweet and tangled glade with his golden mead o'erladen, where beneath the pleasant shade of the darkling boughs a maiden- milky limb and fiery tress, all at sweetest random laid- slumbers, drunken with the excess of the noontide's loveliness. xix. milton read again (in surrey) three golden months while summer on us stole i have read your joyful tale another time, breathing more freely in that larger clime and learning wiselier to deserve the whole. your spirit, master, has been close at hand and guided me, still pointing treasures rare, thick-sown where i before saw nothing fair and finding waters in the barren land, barren once thought because my eyes were dim. like one i am grown to whom the common field and often-wandered copse one morning yield new pleasures suddenly; for over him falls the weird spirit of unexplained delight, new mystery in every shady place, in every whispering tree a nameless grace, new rapture on the windy seaward height. so may she come to me, teaching me well to savour all these sweets that lie to hand in wood and lane about this pleasant land though it be not the land where i would dwell. . xx. sonnet the stars come out; the fragrant shadows fall about a dreaming garden still and sweet, i hear the unseen bats above me bleat among the ghostly moths their hunting call, and twinkling glow-worms all about me crawl. now for a chamber dim, a pillow meet for slumbers deep as death, a faultless sheet, cool, white and smooth. so may i reach the hall with poppies strewn where sleep that is so dear with magic sponge can wipe away an hour or twelve and make them naught. why not a year, why could a man not loiter in that bower until a thousand painless cycles wore, and then-what if it held him evermore? xxi. the autumn morning see! the pale autumn dawn is faint, upon the lawn that lies in powdered white of hoar-frost dight and now from tree to tree the ghostly mist we see hung like a silver pall to hallow all. it wreathes the burdened air so strangely everywhere that i could almost fear this silence drear where no one song-bird sings and dream that wizard things mighty for hate or love were close above. white as the fog and fair drifting through the middle air in magic dances dread over my head. yet these should know me too lover and bondman true, one that has honoured well the mystic spell of earth's most solemn hours wherein the ancient powers of dryad, elf, or faun or leprechaun oft have their faces shown to me that walked alone seashore or haunted fen or mountain glen wherefore i will not fear to walk the woodlands sere into this autumn day far, far away. part ii hesitation xxii. l'apprenti sorcier suddenly there came to me the music of a mighty sea that on a bare and iron shore thundered with a deeper roar than all the tides that leap and run with us below the real sun: because the place was far away, above, beyond our homely day, neighbouring close the frozen clime where out of all the woods of time, amid the frightful seraphim the fierce, cold eyes of godhead gleam, revolving hate and misery and wars and famines yet to be. and in my dreams i stood alone upon a shelf of weedy stone, and saw before my shrinking eyes the dark, enormous breakers rise, and hover and fall with deafening thunder of thwarted foam that echoed under the ledge, through many a cavern drear, with hollow sounds of wintry fear. and through the waters waste and grey, thick-strown for many a league away, out of the toiling sea arose many a face and form of those thin, elemental people dear who live beyond our heavy sphere. and all at once from far and near, they all held out their arms to me, crying in their melody, "leap in! leap in and take thy fill of all the cosmic good and ill, be as the living ones that know enormous joy, enormous woe, pain beyond thought and fiery bliss: for all thy study hunted this, on wings of magic to arise, and wash from off thy filmed eyes the cloud of cold mortality, to find the real life and be as are the children of the deep! be bold and dare the glorious leap, or to thy shame, go, slink again back to the narrow ways of men." so all these mocked me as i stood striving to wake because i feared the flood. xxiii. alexandrines there is a house that most of all on earth i hate. though i have passed through many sorrows and have been in bloody fields, sad seas, and countries desolate, yet most i fear that empty house where the grasses green grow in the silent court the gaping flags between, and down the moss-grown paths and terrace no man treads where the old, old weeds rise deep on the waste garden beds. like eyes of one long dead the empty windows stare and i fear to cross the garden, i fear to linger there, for in that house i know a little, silent room where someone's always waiting, waiting in the gloom to draw me with an evil eye, and hold me fast- yet thither doom will drive me and he will win at last. xxiv. in praise of solid people thank god that there are solid folk who water flowers and roll the lawn, and sit an sew and talk and smoke, and snore all through the summer dawn. who pass untroubled nights and days full-fed and sleepily content, rejoicing in each other's praise, respectable and innocent. who feel the things that all men feel, and think in well-worn grooves of thought, whose honest spirits never reel before man's mystery, overwrought. yet not unfaithful nor unkind, with work-day virtues surely staid, theirs is the sane and humble mind, and dull affections undismayed. o happy people! i have seen no verse yet written in your praise, and, truth to tell, the time has been i would have scorned your easy ways. but now thro' weariness and strife i learn your worthiness indeed, the world is better for such life as stout suburban people lead. too often have i sat alone when the wet night falls heavily, and fretting winds around me moan, and homeless longing vexes me for lore that i shall never know, and visions none can hope to see, till brooding works upon me so a childish fear steals over me. i look around the empty room, the clock still ticking in its place, and all else silent as the tomb, till suddenly, i think, a face grows from the darkness just beside. i turn, and lo! it fades away, and soon another phantom tide of shifting dreams begins to play, and dusky galleys past me sail, full freighted on a faerie sea; i hear the silken merchants hail across the ringing waves to me --then suddenly, again, the room, familiar books about me piled, and i alone amid the gloom, by one more mocking dream beguiled. and still no neared to the light, and still no further from myself, alone and lost in clinging night- (the clock's still ticking on the shelf). then do i envy solid folk who sit of evenings by the fire, after their work and doze and smoke, and are not fretted by desire. part iii the escape xxv. song of the pilgrims o dwellers at the back of the north wind, what have we done to you? how have we sinned wandering the earth from orkney unto ind? with many deaths our fellowship is thinned, our flesh is withered in the parching wind, wandering the earth from orkney unto ind. we have no rest. we cannot turn again back to the world and all her fruitless pain, having once sought the land where ye remain. some say ye are not. but, ah god! we know that somewhere, somewhere past the northern snow waiting for us the red-rose gardens blow: --the red-rose and the white-rose gardens blow in the green northern land to which we go, surely the ways are long and the years are slow. we have forsaken all things sweet and fair, we have found nothing worth a moment's care because the real flowers are blowing there. land of the lotus fallen from the sun, land of the lake from whence all rivers run, land where the hope of all our dreams is won! shall we not somewhere see at close of day the green walls of that country far away, and hear the music of her fountains play? so long we have been wandering all this while by many a perilous sea and drifting isle, we scarce shall dare to look thereon and smile. yea, when we are drawing very near to thee, and when at last the ivory port we see our hearts will faint with mere felicity: but we shall wake again in gardens bright of green and gold for infinite delight, sleeping beneath the solemn mountains white, while from the flowery copses still unseen sing out the crooning birds that ne'er have been touched by the hand of winter frore and lean; and ever living queens that grow not old and poets wise in robes of faerie gold whisper a wild, sweet song that first was told ere god sat down to make the milky way. and in those gardens we shall sleep and play for ever and for ever and a day. ah, dwellers at the back of the north wind, what have we done to you? how have we sinned, that yes should hide beyond the northern wind? land of the lotus, fallen from the sun, when shall your hidden, flowery vales be won and all the travail of our way be done? very far we have searched; we have even seen the scythian waste that bears no soft nor green, and near the hideous pass our feet have been. we have heard syrens singing all night long beneath the unknown stars their lonely song in friendless seas beyond the pillars strong. nor by the dragon-daughter of hypocras nor the vale of the devil's head we have feared to pass, yet is our labour lost and vain, alas! scouring the earth from orkney unto ind, tossed on the seas and withered in the wind, we seek and seek your land. how have we sinned? or is it all a folly of the wise, bidding us walk these ways with blinded eyes while all around us real flowers arise? but, by the very god, we know, we know that somewhere still, beyond the northern snow waiting for us the red-rose gardens blow. xxvi. song faeries must be in the woods or the satyrs' laughing broods- tritons in the summer sea, else how could the dead things be half so lovely as they are? how could wealth of star on star dusted o'er the frosty night fill thy spirit with delight and lead thee from this care of thine up among the dreams divine, were it not that each and all of them that walk the heavenly hall is in truth a happy isle, where eternal meadows smile, and golden globes of fruit are seen twinkling through the orchards green; were the other people go on the bright sward to and fro? atoms dead could never thus stir the human heart of us unless the beauty that we see the veil of endless beauty be, filled full of spirits that have trod far hence along the heavenly sod and see the bright footprints of god. xxvii. the ass i woke and rose and slipt away to the heathery hills in the morning grey. in a field where the dew lay cold and deep i met an ass, new-roused from sleep. i stroked his nose and i tickled his ears, and spoke soft words to quiet his fears. his eyes stared into the eyes of me and he kissed my hands of his courtesy. "o big, brown brother out of the waste, how do thistles for breakfast taste? "and do you rejoice in the dawn divine with a heart that is glad no less than mine? "for, brother, the depth of your gentle eyes is strange and mystic as the skies: "what are the thoughts that grope behind, down in the mist of a donkey mind? "can it be true, as the wise men tell, that you are a mask of god as well, "and, as in us, so in you no less speaks the eternal loveliness, "and words of the lips that all things know among the thoughts of a donkey go? "however it be, o four-foot brother, fair to-day is the earth, our mother. "god send you peace and delight thereof, and all green meat of the waste you love, "and guard you well from violent men who'd put you back in the shafts again." but the ass had far too wise a head to answer one of the things i said, so he twitched his fair ears up and down and turned to nuzzle his shoulder brown. xxviii. ballade mystique the big, red-house is bare and lone the stony garden waste and sere with blight of breezes ocean blown to pinch the wakening of the year; my kindly friends with busy cheer my wretchedness could plainly show. they tell me i am lonely here- what do they know? what do they know? they think that while the gables moan and easements creak in winter drear i should be piteously alone without the speech of comrades dear; and friendly for my sake they fear, it grieves them thinking of me so while all their happy life is near- what do they know? what do they know? that i have seen the dagda's throne in sunny lands without a tear and found a forest all my own to ward with magic shield and spear, where, through the stately towers i rear for my desire, around me go immortal shapes of beauty clear: they do not know, they do not know. l'envoi the friends i have without a peer beyond the western ocean's glow, whither the faerie galleys steer, they do not know: how should they know? xxix. night i know a little druid wood where i would slumber if i could and have the murmuring of the stream to mingle with a midnight dream, and have the holy hazel trees to play above me in the breeze, and smell the thorny eglantine; for there the white owls all night long in the scented gloom divine hear the wild, strange, tuneless song of faerie voices, thin and high as the bat's unearthly cry, and the measure of their shoon dancing, dancing, under the moon, until, amid the pale of dawn the wandering stars begin to swoon. . . . ah, leave the world and come away! the windy folk are in the glade, and men have seen their revels, laid in secret on some flowery lawn underneath the beechen covers, kings of old, i've heard them say, here have found them faerie lovers that charmed them out of life and kissed their lips with cold lips unafraid, and such a spell around them made that they have passed beyond the mist and found the country-under-wave. . . . kings of old, whom none could save! xxx. oxford it is well that there are palaces of peace and discipline and dreaming and desire, lest we forget our heritage and cease the spirit's work-to hunger and aspire: lest we forget that we were born divine, now tangled in red battle's animal net, murder the work and lust the anodyne, pains of the beast 'gainst bestial solace set. but this shall never be: to us remains one city that has nothing of the beast, that was not built for gross, material gains, sharp, wolfish power or empire's glutted feast. we are not wholly brute. to us remains a clean, sweet city lulled by ancient streams, a place of visions and of loosening chains, a refuge of the elect, a tower of dreams. she was not builded out of common stone but out of all men's yearning and all prayer that she might live, eternally our own, the spirit's stronghold-barred against despair. xxxi. hymn (for boys' voices) all the things magicians do could be done by me and you freely, if we only knew. human children every day could play at games the faeries play if they were but shown the way. every man a god would be laughing through eternity if as god's his eyes could see. all the wizardries of god- slaying matter with a nod, charming spirits with his rod, with the singing of his voice making lonely lands rejoice, leaving us no will nor choice, drawing headlong me and you as the piping orpheus drew man and beast the mountains through, by the sweetness of his horn calling us from lands forlorn nearer to the widening morn- all that loveliness of power could be man's peculiar dower, even mine, this very hour; we should reach the hidden land and grow immortal out of hand, if we could but understand! we could revel day and night in all power and all delight if we learn to think aright. xxxii. "our daily bread" we need no barbarous words nor solemn spell to raise the unknown. it lies before our feet; there have been men who sank down into hell in some suburban street, and some there are that in their daily walks have met archangels fresh from sight of god, or watched how in their beans and cabbage-stalks long files of faerie trod. often me too the living voices call in many a vulgar and habitual place, i catch a sight of lands beyond the wall, i see a strange god's face. and some day this work will work upon me so i shall arise and leave both friends and home and over many lands a pilgrim go through alien woods and foam, seeking the last steep edges of the earth whence i may leap into that gulf of light wherein, before my narrowing self had birth, part of me lived aright. xxxiii. how he saw angus the god i heard the swallow sing in the eaves and rose all in a strange delight while others slept, and down the creaking stair, alone, tip-toes, so carefully i crept. the house was dark with silly blinds yet drawn, but outside the clean air was filled with light, and underneath my feet the cold, wet lawn with dew was twinkling bright. the cobwebs hung from every branch and spray gleaming with pearly strands of laden thread, and long and still the morning shadows lay across the meadows spread. at that pure hour when yet no sound of man, stirs in the whiteness of the wakening earth, alone through innocent solitudes i ran singing aloud for mirth. till i had found the open mountain heath yellow with gorse, and rested there and stood to gaze upon the misty sea beneath, or on the neighbouring wood, --that little wood of hazel and tall pine and youngling fir, where oft we have loved to see the level beams of early morning shine freshly from tree to tree. through the denser wood there's many a pool of deep and night-born shadow lingers yet where the new-wakened flowers are damp and cool and the long grass is wet. in the sweet heather long i rested there looking upon the dappled, early sky, when suddenly, from out the shining air a god came flashing by. swift, naked, eager, pitilessly fair, with a live crown of birds about his head, singing and fluttering, and his fiery hair, far out behind him spread, streamed like a rippling torch upon the breeze of his own glorious swiftness: in the grass he bruised no feathery stalk, and through the trees i saw his whiteness pass. but when i followed him beyond the wood, lo! he was changed into a solemn bull that there upon the open pasture stood and browsed his lazy full. xxxiv. the roads i stand on the windy uplands among the hills of down with all the world spread out beneath, meadow and sea and town, and ploughlands on the far-off hills that glow with friendly brown. and ever across the rolling land to the far horizon line, where the blue hills border the misty west, i see the white roads twine, the rare roads and the fair roads that call this heart of mine. i see them dip in the valleys and vanish and rise and bend from shadowy dell to windswept fell, and still to the west they wend, and over the cold blue ridge at last to the great world's uttermost end. and the call of the roads is upon me, a desire in my spirit has grown to wander forth in the highways, 'twixt earth and sky alone, and seek for the lands no foot has trod and the seas no sail has known: for the lands to the west of the evening and east of the morning's birth, where the gods unseen in their valleys green are glad at the ends of the earth and fear no morrow to bring them sorrow, nor night to quench their mirth. xxxv. hesperus through the starry hollow of the summer night i would follow, follow hesperus the bright, to seek beyond the western wave his garden of delight. hesperus the fairest of all gods that are, peace and dreams thou bearest in thy shadowy car, and often in my evening walks i've blessed thee from afar. stars without number, dust the noon of night, thou the early slumber and the still delight of the gentle twilit hours rulest in thy right. when the pale skies shiver, seeing night is done, past the ocean-river, lightly thou dost run, to look for pleasant, sleepy lands, that never fear the sun. where, beyond the waters of the outer sea, thy triple crown of daughters that guards the golden tree sing out across the lonely tide a welcome home to thee. and while the old, old dragon for joy lifts up his head, they bring thee forth a flagon of nectar foaming red, and underneath the drowsy trees of poppies strew thy bed. ah! that i could follow in thy footsteps bright, through the starry hollow of the summer night, sloping down the western ways to find my heart's delight! xxxvi. the star bath a place uplifted towards the midnight sky far, far away among the mountains old, a treeless waste of rocks and freezing cold, where the dead, cheerless moon rode neighbouring by- and in the midst a silent tarn there lay, a narrow pool, cold as the tide that flows where monstrous bergs beyond varanger stray, rising from sunless depths that no man knows; thither as clustering fireflies have i seen at fixed seasons all the stars come down to wash in that cold wave their brightness clean and win the special fire wherewith they crown the wintry heavens in frost. even as a flock of falling birds, down to the pool they came. i saw them and i heard the icy shock of stars engulfed with hissing of faint flame- ages ago before the birth of men or earliest beast. yet i was still the same that now remember, knowing not where or when. xxxvii. tu ne quaesieris for all the lore of lodge and myers i cannot heal my torn desires, nor hope for all that man can speer to make the riddling earth grow clear. though it were sure and proven well that i shall prosper, as they tell, in fields beneath a different sun by shores where other oceans run, when this live body that was i lies hidden from the cheerful sky, yet what were endless lives to me if still my narrow self i be and hope and fail and struggle still, and break my will against god's will, to play for stakes of pleasure and pain and hope and fail and hope again, deluded, thwarted, striving elf that through the window of my self as through a dark glass scarce can see a warped and masked reality? but when this searching thought of mine is mingled in the large divine, and laughter that was in my mouth runs through the breezes of the south, when glory i have built in dreams along some fiery sunset gleams, and my dead sin and foolishness grow one with nature's whole distress, to perfect being i shall win, and where i end will life begin. xxxviii. lullaby lullaby! lullaby! there's a tower strong and high built of oak and brick and stone, stands before a wood alone. the doors are of the oak so brown as any ale in oxford town, the walls are builded warm and thick of the old red roman brick, the good grey stone is over all in arch and floor of the tower tall. and maidens three are living there all in the upper chamber fair, hung with silver, hung with pall, and stories painted on the wall. and softly goes the whirring loom in my ladies' upper room, for they shall spin both night and day until the stars do pass away. but every night at evening. the window open wide they fling, and one of them says a word they know and out as three white swans they go, and the murmuring of the woods is drowned in the soft wings' whirring sound, as they go flying round, around, singing in swans' voices high a lonely, lovely lullaby. xxxix. world's desire love, there is a castle built in a country desolate, on a rock above a forest where the trees are grim and great, blasted with the lightning sharp-giant boulders strewn between, and the mountains rise above, and the cold ravine echoes to the crushing roar and thunder of a mighty river raging down a cataract. very tower and forest quiver and the grey wolves are afraid and the call of birds is drowned, and the thought and speech of man in the boiling water's sound. but upon the further side of the barren, sharp ravine with the sunlight on its turrets is the castle seen, calm and very wonderful, white above the green of the wet and waving forest, slanted all away, because the driving northern wind will not rest by night or day. yet the towers are sure above, very mighty is the stead, the gates are made of ivory, the roofs of copper red. round and round the warders grave walk upon the walls for ever and the wakeful dragons couch in the ports of ivory, nothing is can trouble it, hate of the gods nor man's endeavour, and it shall be a resting-place, dear heart, for you and me. through the wet and waving forest with an age-old sorrow laden singing of the world's regret wanders wild the faerie maiden, through the thistle and the brier, through the tangles of the thorn, till her eyes be dim with weeping and her homeless feet are torn. often to the castle gate up she looks with vain endeavour, for her soulless loveliness to the castle winneth never. but within the sacred court, hidden high upon the mountain, wandering in the castle gardens lovely folk enough there be, breathing in another air, drinking of a purer fountain and among that folk, beloved, there's a place for you and me. xl. death in battle open the gates for me, open the gates of the peaceful castle, rosy in the west, in the sweet dim isle of apples over the wide sea's breast, open the gates for me! sorely pressed have i been and driven and hurt beyond bearing this summer day, but the heat and the pain together suddenly fall away, all's cool and green. but a moment agone, among men cursing in fight and toiling, blinded i fought, but the labour passed on a sudden even as a passing thought, and now-alone! ah, to be ever alone, in flowery valleys among the mountains and silent wastes untrod, in the dewy upland places, in the garden of god, this would atone! i shall not see the brutal, crowded faces around me, that in their toil have grown into the faces of devils-yea, even as my own- when i find thee, o country of dreams! beyond the tide of the ocean, hidden and sunk away, out of the sound of battles, near to the end of day, full of dim woods and streams. god the known and god the unknown by samuel butler prefatory note "god the known and god the unknown" first appeared in the form of a series of articles which were published in "the examiner" in may, june, and july, 1879. samuel butler subsequently revised the text of his work, presumably with the intention of republishing it, though he never carried the intention into effect. in the present edition i have followed his revised version almost without deviation. i have, however, retained a few passages which butler proposed to omit, partly because they appear to me to render the course of his argument clearer, and partly because they contain characteristic thoughts and expressions of which none of his admirers would wish to be deprived. in the list of butler's works "god the known and god the unknown" follows "life and habit," which appeared in 1877, and "evolution, old and new," which was published in may, 1879. it is scarcely necessary to point out that the three works are closely akin in subject and treatment, and that "god the known and god the unknown" will gain in interest by being considered in relation to its predecessors. r. a. streatfeild god the known and god the unknown chapter i. introduction mankind has ever been ready to discuss matters in the inverse ratio of their importance, so that the more closely a question is felt to touch the hearts of all of us, the more incumbent it is considered upon prudent people to profess that it does not exist, to frown it down, to tell it to hold its tongue, to maintain that it has long been finally settled, so that there is now no question concerning it. so far, indeed, has this been carried through all time past that the actions which are most important to us, such as our passage through the embryonic stages, the circulation of our blood, our respiration, etc. etc., have long been formulated beyond all power of reopening question concerning them--the mere fact or manner of their being done at all being ranked among the great discoveries of recent ages. yet the analogy of past settlements would lead us to suppose that so much unanimity was not arrived at all at once, but rather that it must have been preceded by much smouldering [sic] discontent, which again was followed by open warfare; and that even after a settlement had been ostensibly arrived at, there was still much secret want of conviction on the part of many for several generations. there are many who see nothing in this tendency of our nature but occasion for sarcasm; those, on the other hand, who hold that the world is by this time old enough to be the best judge concerning the management of its own affairs will scrutinise [sic] this management with some closeness before they venture to satirise [sic] it; nor will they do so for long without finding justification for its apparent recklessness; for we must all fear responsibility upon matters about which we feel we know but little; on the other hand we must all continually act, and for the most part promptly. we do so, therefore, with greater security when we can persuade both ourselves and others that a matter is already pigeon-holed than if we feel that we must use our own judgment for the collection, interpretation, and arrangement of the papers which deal with it. moreover, our action is thus made to appear as if it received collective sanction; and by so appearing it receives it. almost any settlement, again, is felt to be better than none, and the more nearly a matter comes home to everyone, the more important is it that it should be treated as a sleeping dog, and be let to lie, for if one person begins to open his mouth, fatal developments may arise in the babel that will follow. it is not difficult, indeed, to show that, instead of having reason to complain of the desire for the postponement of important questions, as though the world were composed mainly of knaves or fools, such fixity as animal and vegetable forms possess is due to this very instinct. for if there had been no reluctance, if there were no friction and vis inertae to be encountered even after a theoretical equilibrium had been upset, we should have had no fixed organs nor settled proclivities, but should have been daily and hourly undergoing protean transformations, and have still been throwing out pseudopodia like the amoeba. true, we might have come to like this fashion of living as well as our more steady-going system if we had taken to it many millions of ages ago when we were yet young; but we have contracted other habits which have become so confirmed that we cannot break with them. we therefore now hate that which we should perhaps have loved if we had practised [sic] it. this, however, does not affect the argument, for our concern is with our likes and dislikes, not with the manner in which those likes and dislikes have come about. the discovery that organism is capable of modification at all has occasioned so much astonishment that it has taken the most enlightened part of the world more than a hundred years to leave off expressing its contempt for such a crude, shallow, and preposterous conception. perhaps in another hundred years we shall learn to admire the good sense, endurance, and thorough englishness of organism in having been so averse to change, even more than its versatility in having been willing to change so much. nevertheless, however conservative we may be, and however much alive to the folly and wickedness of tampering with settled convictions-no matter what they are-without sufficient cause, there is yet such a constant though gradual change in our surroundings as necessitates corresponding modification in our ideas, desires, and actions. we may think that we should like to find ourselves always in the same surroundings as our ancestors, so that we might be guided at every touch and turn by the experience of our race, and be saved from all self-communing or interpretation of oracular responses uttered by the facts around us. yet the facts will change their utterances in spite of us; and we, too, change with age and ages in spite of ourselves, so as to see the facts around us as perhaps even more changed than they actually are. it has been said, "tempora mutantur nos et mutamur in illis." the passage would have been no less true if it had stood, "nos mutamur et tempora mutantur in nobis." whether the organism or the surroundings began changing first is a matter of such small moment that the two may be left to fight it out between themselves; but, whichever view is taken, the fact will remain that whenever the relations between the organism and its surroundings have been changed, the organism must either succeed in putting the surroundings into harmony with itself, or itself into harmony with the surroundings; or must be made so uncomfortable as to be unable to remember itself as subjected to any such difficulties, and therefore to die through inability to recognise [sic] its own identity further. under these circumstances, organism must act in one or other of these two ways: it must either change slowly and continuously with the surroundings, paying cash for everything, meeting the smallest change with a corresponding modification so far as is found convenient; or it must put off change as long as possible, and then make larger and more sweeping changes. both these courses are the same in principle, the difference being only one of scale, and the one being a miniature of the other, as a ripple is an atlantic wave in little; both have their advantages and disadvantages, so that most organisms will take the one course for one set of things and the other for another. they will deal promptly with things which they can get at easily, and which lie more upon the surface; those, however, which are more troublesome to reach, and lie deeper, will be handled upon more cataclysmic principles, being allowed longer periods of repose followed by short periods of greater activity. animals breathe and circulate their blood by a little action many times a minute; but they feed, some of them, only two or three times a day, and breed for the most part not more than once a year, their breeding season being much their busiest time. it is on the first principle that the modification of animal forms has proceeded mainly; but it may be questioned whether what is called a sport is not the organic expression of discontent which has been long felt, but which has not been attended to, nor been met step by step by as much small remedial modification as was found practicable: so that when a change does come it comes by way of revolution. or, again (only that it comes to much the same thing), a sport may be compared to one of those happy thoughts which sometimes come to us unbidden after we have been thinking for a long time what to do, or how to arrange our ideas, and have yet been unable to arrive at any conclusion. so with politics, the smaller the matter the prompter, as a general rule, the settlement; on the other hand, the more sweeping the change that is felt to be necessary, the longer it will be deferred. the advantages of dealing with the larger questions by more cataclysmic methods are obvious. for, in the first place, all composite things must have a system, or arrangement of parts, so that some parts shall depend upon and be grouped round others, as in the articulation of a skeleton and the arrangement of muscles, nerves, tendons, etc., which are attached to it. to meddle with the skeleton is like taking up the street, or the flooring of one's house; it so upsets our arrangements that we put it off till whatever else is found wanted, or whatever else seems likely to be wanted for a long time hence, can be done at the same time. another advantage is in the rest which is given to the attention during the long hollows, so to speak, of the waves between the periods of resettlement. passion and prejudice have time to calm down, and when attention is next directed to the same question, it is a refreshed and invigorated attention-an attention, moreover, which may be given with the help of new lights derived from other quarters that were not luminous when the question was last considered. thirdly, it is more easy and safer to make such alterations as experience has proved to be necessary than to forecast what is going to be wanted. reformers are like paymasters, of whom there are only two bad kinds, those who pay too soon, and those who do not pay at all. chapter ii. common ground i have now, perhaps, sufficiently proved my sympathy with the reluctance felt by many to tolerate discussion upon such a subject as the existence and nature of god. i trust that i may have made the reader feel that he need fear no sarcasm or levity in my treatment of the subject which i have chosen. i will, therefore, proceed to sketch out a plan of what i hope to establish, and this in no doubtful or unnatural sense, but by attaching the same meanings to words as those which we usually attach to them, and with the same certainty, precision, and clearness as anything else is established which is commonly called known. as to what god is, beyond the fact that he is the spirit and the life which creates, governs, and upholds all living things, i can say nothing. i cannot pretend that i can show more than others have done in what spirit and the life consists, which governs living things and animates them. i cannot show the connection between consciousness and the will, and the organ, much less can i tear away the veil from the face of god, so as to show wherein will and consciousness consist. no philosopher, whether christian or rationalist, has attempted this without discomfiture; but i can, i hope, do two things: firstly, i can demonstrate, perhaps more clearly than modern science is prepared to admit, that there does exist a single being or animator of all living things--a single spirit, whom we cannot think of under any meaner name than god; and, secondly, i can show something more of the persona or bodily expression, mask, and mouthpiece of this vast living spirit than i know of as having been familiarly expressed elsewhere, or as being accessible to myself or others, though doubtless many works exist in which what i am going to say has been already said. aware that much of this is widely accepted under the name of pantheism, i venture to think it differs from pantheism with all the difference that exists between a coherent, intelligible conception and an incoherent unintelligible one. i shall therefore proceed to examine the doctrine called pantheism, and to show how incomprehensible and valueless it is. i will then indicate the living and personal god about whose existence and about many of whose attributes there is no room for question; i will show that man has been so far made in the likeness of this person or god, that he possesses all its essential characteristics, and that it is this god who has called man and all other living forms, whether animals or plants, into existence, so that our bodies are the temples of his spirit; that it is this which sustains them in their life and growth, who is one with them, living, moving, and having his being in them; in whom, also, they live and move, they in him and he in them; he being not a trinity in unity only, but an infinity in unity, and a unity in an infinity; eternal in time past, for so much time at least that our minds can come no nearer to eternity than this; eternal for the future as long as the universe shall exist; ever changing, yet the same yesterday, and to-day, and for ever. and i will show this with so little ambiguity that it shall be perceived not as a phantom or hallucination following upon a painful straining of the mind and a vain endeavour [sic] to give coherency to incoherent and inconsistent ideas, but with the same ease, comfort, and palpable flesh-and-blood clearness with which we see those near to us; whom, though we see them at the best as through a glass darkly, we still see face to face, even as we are ourselves seen. i will also show in what way this being exercises a moral government over the world, and rewards and punishes us according to his own laws. having done this i shall proceed to compare this conception of god with those that are currently accepted, and will endeavour [sic] to show that the ideas now current are in truth efforts to grasp the one on which i shall here insist. finally, i shall persuade the reader that the differences between the so-called atheist and the so-called theist are differences rather about words than things, inasmuch as not even the most prosaic of modern scientists will be inclined to deny the existence of this god, while few theists will feel that this, the natural conception of god, is a less worthy one than that to which they have been accustomed. chapter iii. pantheism. the rev. j. h. blunt, in his "dictionary of sects, heresies, etc.," defines pantheists as "those who hold that god is everything, and everything is god." if it is granted that the value of words lies in the definiteness and coherency of the ideas that present themselves to us when the words are heard or spoken-then such a sentence as "god is everything and everything is god" is worthless. for we have so long associated the word "god" with the idea of a living person, who can see, hear, will, feel pleasure, displeasure, etc., that we cannot think of god, and also of something which we have not been accustomed to think of as a living person, at one and the same time, so as to connect the two ideas and fuse them into a coherent thought. while we are thinking of the one, our minds involuntarily exclude the other, and vice versa; so that it is as impossible for us to think of anything as god, or as forming part of god, which we cannot also think of as a person, or as a part of a person, as it is to produce a hybrid between two widely distinct animals. if i am not mistaken, the barrenness of inconsistent ideas, and the sterility of widely distant species or genera of plants and animals, are one in principle-sterility of hybrids being due to barrenness of ideas, and barrenness of ideas arising from inability to fuse unfamiliar thoughts into a coherent conception. i have insisted on this at some length in "life and habit," but can do so no further here. (note: butler returned to this subject in "luck, or cunning?" which was originally published in 1887.} in like manner we have so long associated the word "person" with the idea of a substantial visible body, limited in extent, and animated by an invisible something which we call spirit, that we can think of nothing as a person which does not also bring these ideas before us. any attempt to make us imagine god as a person who does not fulfil [sic] the conditions which our ideas attach to the word "person," is ipso facto atheistic, as rendering the word god without meaning, and therefore without reality, and therefore non-existent to us. our ideas are like our organism, they will stand a vast amount of modification if it is effected slowly and without shock, but the life departs out of them, leaving the form of an idea without the power thereof, if they are jarred too rudely. any being, then, whom we can imagine as god, must have all the qualities, capabilities, and also all the limitations which are implied when the word "person" is used. but, again, we cannot conceive of "everything" as a person. "everything" must comprehend all that is to be found on earth, or outside of it, and we know of no such persons as this. when we say "persons" we intend living people with flesh and blood; sometimes we extend our conceptions to animals and plants, but we have not hitherto done so as generally as i hope we shall some day come to do. below animals and plants we have never in any seriousness gone. all that we have been able to regard as personal has had what we can call a living body, even though that body is vegetable only; and this body has been tangible, and has been comprised within certain definite limits, or within limits which have at any rate struck the eye as definite. and every part within these limits has been animated by an unseen something which we call soul or spirit. a person must be a persona--that is to say, the living mask and mouthpiece of an energy saturating it, and speaking through it. it must be animate in all its parts. but "everything" is not animate. animals and plants alone produce in us those ideas which can make reasonable people call them "persons" with consistency of intention. we can conceive of each animal and of each plant as a person; we can conceive again of a compound person like the coral polypes [sic], or like a tree which is composed of a congeries of subordinate persons, inasmuch as each bud is a separate and individual plant. we can go farther than this, and, as i shall hope to show, we ought to do so; that is to say, we shall find it easier and more agreeable with our other ideas to go farther than not; for we should see all animal and vegetable life as united by a subtle and till lately invisible ramification, so that all living things are one tree-like growth, forming a single person. but we cannot conceive of oceans, continents, and air as forming parts of a person at all; much less can we think of them as forming one person with the living forms that inhabit them. to ask this of us is like asking us to see the bowl and the water in which three gold-fish are swimming as part of the gold-fish. we cannot do it any more than we can do something physically impossible. we can see the gold-fish as forming one family, and therefore as in a way united to the personality of the parents from which they sprang, and therefore as members one of another, and therefore as forming a single growth of gold-fish, as boughs and buds unite to form a tree; but we cannot by any effort of the imagination introduce the bowl and the water into the personality, for we have never been accustomed to think of such things as living and personal. those, therefore, who tell us that "god is everything, and everything is god," require us to see "everything" as a person, which we cannot; or god as not a person, which again we cannot. continuing the article of mr. blunt from which i have already quoted, i read:-"linus, in a passage which has been preserved by stobaeus, exactly expresses the notion afterwards adopted by spinoza: 'one sole energy governs all things; all things are unity, and each portion is all; for of one integer all things were born; in the end of time all things shall again become unity; the unity of multiplicity.' orpheus, his disciple, taught no other doctrine." according to pythagoras, "an adept in the orphic philosophy," "the soul of the world is the divine energy which interpenetrates every portion of the mass, and the soul of man is an efflux of that energy. the world, too, is an exact impress of the eternal idea, which is the mind of god." john scotus erigena taught that "all is god and god is all." william of champeaux, again, two hundred years later, maintained that "all individuality is one in substance, and varies only in its non-essential accidents and transient properties." amalric of bena and david of dinant followed the theory out "into a thoroughgoing pantheism." amalric held that "all is god and god is all. the creator and the creature are one being. ideas are at once creative and created, subjective and objective. god is the end of all, and all return to him. as every variety of humanity forms one manhood, so the world contains individual forms of one eternal essence." david of dinant only varied upon this by "imagining a corporeal unity. although body, soul, and eternal substance are three, these three are one and the same being." giordano bruno maintained the world of sense to be "a vast animal having the deity for its living soul." the inanimate part of the world is thus excluded from participation in the deity, and a conception that our minds can embrace is offered us instead of one which they cannot entertain, except as in a dream, incoherently. but without such a view of evolution as was prevalent at the beginning of this century, it was impossible to see "the world of sense" intelligently, as forming "a vast animal." unless, therefore, giordano bruno held the opinions of buffon, dr. erasmus darwin, and lamarck, with more definiteness than i am yet aware of his having done, his contention must be considered as a splendid prophecy, but as little more than a prophecy. he continues, "birth is expansion from the one centre of life; life is its continuance, and death is the necessary return of the ray to the centre of light." this begins finely, but ends mystically. i have not, however, compared the english translation with the original, and must reserve a fuller examination of giordano bruno's teaching for another opportunity. spinoza disbelieved in the world rather than in god. he was an acosmist, to use jacobi's expression, rather than an atheist. according to him, "the deity and the universe are but one substance, at the same time both spirit and matter, thought and extension, which are the only known attributes of the deity." my readers will, i think, agree with me that there is very little of the above which conveys ideas with the fluency and comfort which accompany good words. words are like servants: it is not enough that we should have them-we must have the most able and willing that we can find, and at the smallest wages that will content them. having got them we must make the best and not the worst of them. surely, in the greater part of what has been quoted above, the words are barren letters only: they do not quicken within us and enable us to conceive a thought, such as we can in our turn impress upon dead matter, and mould [sic] that matter into another shape than its own, through the thought which has become alive within us. no offspring of ideas has followed upon them, or, if any at all, yet in such unwonted shape, and with such want of alacrity, that we loathe them as malformations and miscarriages of our minds. granted that if we examine them closely we shall at length find them to embody a little germ of truth-that is to say, of coherency with our other ideas; but there is too little truth in proportion to the trouble necessary to get at it. we can get more truth, that is to say, more coherency-for truth and coherency are one-for less trouble in other ways. but it may be urged that the beginnings of all tasks are difficult and unremunerative, and that later developments of pantheism may be more intelligible than the earlier ones. unfortunately, this is not the case. on continuing mr. blunt's article, i find the later pantheists a hundredfold more perplexing than the earlier ones. with kant, schelling, fichte, and hegel, we feel that we are with men who have been decoyed into a hopeless quagmire; we understand nothing of their language-we doubt whether they understand themselves, and feel that we can do nothing with them but look at them and pass them by. in my next chapter i propose to show the end which the early pantheists were striving after, and the reason and naturalness of their error. chapter iv. pantheism. the earlier pantheists were misled by the endeavour [sic] to lay hold of two distinct ideas, the one of which was a reality that has since been grasped and is of inestimable value, the other a phantom which has misled all who have followed it. the reality is the unity of life, the oneness of the guiding and animating spirit which quickens animals and plants, so that they are all the outcome and expression of a common mind, and are in truth one animal; the phantom is the endeavour [sic] to find the origin of things, to reach the fountain-head of all energy, and thus to lay the foundations on which a philosophy may be constructed which none can accuse of being baseless, or of arguing in a circle. in following as through a thick wood after the phantom our forefathers from time to time caught glimpses of the reality, which seemed so wonderful as it eluded them, and flitted back again into the thickets, that they declared it must be the phantom they were in search of, which was thus evidenced as actually existing. whereon, instead of mastering such of the facts they met with as could be captured easily-which facts would have betrayed the hiding-places of others, and these again of others, and so ad infinitum-they overlooked what was within their reach, and followed hotly through brier and brake after an imaginary greater prize. great thoughts are not to be caught in this way. they must present themselves for capture of their own free will, or be taken after a little coyness only. they are like wealth and power, which, if a man is not born to them, are the more likely to take him, the more he has restrained himself from an attempt to snatch them. they hanker after those only who have tamed their nearer thoughts. nevertheless, it is impossible not to feel that the early pantheists were true prophets and seers, though the things were unknown to them without which a complete view was unattainable. what does linus mean, we ask ourselves, when he says:--"one sole energy governs all things"? how can one sole energy govern, we will say, the reader and the chair on which he sits? what is meant by an energy governing a chair? if by an effort we have made ourselves believe we understand something which can be better expressed by these words than by any others, no sooner do we turn our backs than the ideas so painfully collected fly apart again. no matter how often we go in search of them, and force them into juxtaposition, they prove to have none of that innate coherent power with which ideas combine that we can hold as true and profitable. yet if linus had confined his statement to living things, and had said that one sole energy governed all plants and animals, he would have come near both to being intelligible and true. for if, as we now believe, all animals and plants are descended from a single cell, they must be considered as cousins to one another, and as forming a single tree-like animal, every individual plant or animal of which is as truly one and the same person with the primordial cell as the oak a thousand years old is one and the same plant with the acorn out of which it has grown. this is easily understood, but will, i trust, be made to appear simpler presently. when linus says, "all things are unity, and each portion is all; for of one integer all things were born," it is impossible for plain people-who do not wish to use words unless they mean the same things by them as both they and others have been in the habit of meaning-to understand what is intended. how can each portion be all? how can one londoner be all london? i know that this, too, can in a way be shown, but the resulting idea is too far to fetch, and when fetched does not fit in well enough with our other ideas to give it practical and commercial value. how, again, can all things be said to be born of one integer, unless the statement is confined to living things, which can alone be born at all, and unless a theory of evolution is intended, such as linus would hardly have accepted? yet limit the "all things" to "all living things," grant the theory of evolution, and explain "each portion is all" to mean that all life is akin, and possesses the same essential fundamental characteristics, and it is surprising how nearly linus approaches both to truth and intelligibility. it may be said that the animate and the inanimate have the same fundamental substance, so that a chair might rot and be absorbed by grass, which grass might be eaten by a cow, which cow might be eaten by a man; and by similar processes the man might become a chair; but these facts are not presented to the mind by saying that "one energy governs all things"-a chair, we will say, and a man; we could only say that one energy governed a man and a chair, if the chair were a reasonable living person, who was actively and consciously engaged in helping the man to attain a certain end, unless, that is to say, we are to depart from all usual interpretation of words, in which case we invalidate the advantages of language and all the sanctions of morality. "all things shall again become unity" is intelligible as meaning that all things probably have come from a single elementary substance, say hydrogen or what not, and that they will return to it; but the explanation of unity as being the "unity of multiplicity" puzzles; if there is any meaning it is too recondite to be of service to us. what, again, is meant by saying that "the soul of the world is the divine energy which interpenetrates every portion of the mass"? the soul of the world is an expression which, to myself, and, i should imagine, to most people, is without propriety. we cannot think of the world except as earth, air, and water, in this or that state, on and in which there grow plants and animals. what is meant by saying that earth has a soul, and lives? does it move from place to place erratically? does it feed? does it reproduce itself? does it make such noises, or commit such vagaries as shall make us say that it feels? can it achieve its ends, and fail of achieving them through mistake? if it cannot, how has it a soul more than a dead man has a soul, out of whom we say that the soul has departed, and whose body we conceive of as returning to dead earth, inasmuch as it is now soulless? is there any unnatural violence which can be done to our thoughts by which we can bring the ideas of a soul and of water, or of a stone into combination, and keep them there for long together? the ancients, indeed, said they believed their rivers to be gods, and carved likenesses of them under the forms of men; but even supposing this to have been their real mind, can it by any conceivable means become our own? granted that a stone is kept from falling to dust by an energy which compels its particles to cohere, which energy can be taken out of it and converted into some other form of energy; granted (which may or may not be true) also, that the life of a living body is only the energy which keeps the particles which compose it in a certain disposition; and granted that the energy of the stone may be convertible into the energy of a living form, and that thus, after a long journey a tired idea may lag after the sound of such words as "the soul of the world." granted all the above, nevertheless to speak of the world as having a soul is not sufficiently in harmony with our common notions, nor does it go sufficiently with the grain of our thoughts to render the expression a meaning one, or one that can be now used with any propriety or fitness, except by those who do not know their own meaninglessness. vigorous minds will harbour [sic] vigorous thoughts only, or such as bid fair to become so; and vigorous thoughts are always simple, definite, and in harmony with everyday ideas. we can imagine a soul as living in the lowest slime that moves, feeds, reproduces itself, remembers, and dies. the amoeba wants things, knows it wants them, alters itself so as to try and alter them, thus preparing for an intended modification of outside matter by a preliminary modification of itself. it thrives if the modification from within is followed by the desired modification in the external object; it knows that it is well, and breeds more freely in consequence. if it cannot get hold of outside matter, or cannot proselytise [sic] that matter and persuade it to see things through its own (the amoeba's) spectacles-if it cannot convert that matter, if the matter persists in disagreeing with it-its spirits droop, its soul is disquieted within it, it becomes listless like a withering flower-it languishes and dies. we cannot imagine a thing to live at all and yet be soulless except in sleep for a short time, and even so not quite soulless. the idea of a soul, or of that unknown something for which the word "soul" is our hieroglyphic, and the idea of living organism, unite so spontaneously, and stick together so inseparably, that no matter how often we sunder them they will elude our vigilance and come together, like true lovers, in spite of us. let us not attempt to divorce ideas that have so long been wedded together. i submit, then, that pantheism, even as explained by those who had entered on the outskirts only of its great morass, nevertheless holds out so little hope of leading to any comfortable conclusion that it will be more reasonable to occupy our minds with other matter than to follow pantheism further. the pantheists speak of a person without meaning a person; they speak of a "him" and a "he" without having in their minds the idea of a living person with all its inevitable limitations. pantheism is, therefore, as is said by mr. blunt in another article, "practically nothing else than atheism; it has no belief in a personal deity overruling the affairs of the world, as divine providence, and is, therefore, atheistic," and again, "theism believes in a spirit superior to matter, and so does pantheism; but the spirit of theism is self-conscious, and therefore personal and of individual existence-a nature per se, and upholding all things by an active control; while pantheism believes in spirit that is of a higher nature than brute matter, but is a mere unconscious principle of life, impersonal, irrational as the brute matter that it quickens." if this verdict concerning pantheism is true--and from all i can gather it is as nearly true as anything can be said to be which is predicated of an incoherent idea--the pantheistic god is an attempt to lay hold of a truth which has nevertheless eluded its pursuers. in my next chapter i will consider the commonly received, orthodox conception of god, and compare it with the pantheistic. i will show that it, too, is atheistic, inasmuch as, in spite of its professing to give us a conception of god, it raises no ideas in our minds of a person or living being--and a god who is not this is non-existent. chapter v. orthodox theism we have seen that pantheism fails to satisfy, inasmuch as it requires us to mean something different by the word "god" from what we have been in the habit of meaning. i have already said-i fear, too often-that no conception of god can have any value or meaning for us which does not involve his existence as an independent living person of ineffable wisdom and power, vastness, and duration both in the past and for the future. if such a being as this can be found existing and made evident, directly or indirectly, to human senses, there is a god. if otherwise, there is no god, or none, at any rate, so far as we can know, none with whom we need concern ourselves. no conscious personality, no god. an impersonal god is as much a contradiction in terms as an impersonal person. unfortunately, when we question orthodox theology closely, we find that it supposes god to be a person who has no material body such as could come within the range of any human sense, and make an impression upon it. he is supposed to be of a spiritual nature only, except in so far as one part of his triune personality is, according to the athanasian creed, "perfect man, of a reasonable soul and human flesh subsisting." here, then, we find ourselves in a dilemma. on the one hand, we are involved in the same difficulty as in the case of pantheism, inasmuch as a person without flesh and blood, or something analogous, is not a person; we are required, therefore, to believe in a personal god, who has no true person; to believe, that is to say, in an impersonal person. this, as we have seen already, is atheism under another name, being, as it is, destructive of all idea of god whatever; for these words do not convey an idea of something which human intelligence can understand up to a certain point, and which it can watch going out of sight into regions beyond our view, but in the same direction-as we may infer other stars in space beyond the farthest that we know of; they convey utterly self-destructive ideas, which can have no real meaning, and can only be thought to have a meaning by ignorant and uncultivated people. otherwise such foundation as human reason rests upon-that is to say, the current opinion of those whom the world appraises as reasonable and agreeable, or capable of being agreed with for any time-is sapped; the whole thing tumbles down, and we may have square circles and round triangles, which may be declared to be no longer absurdities and contradictions in terms, but mysteries that go beyond our reason, without being contrary to it. few will maintain this, and those few may be neglected; an impersonal person must therefore be admitted to be nonsense, and an immaterial god to be atheism in another shape. on the other hand, if god is "of a reasonable soul and human flesh subsisting," and if he thus has the body without which he is-as far as we are concerned-non-existent, this body must yet be reasonably like other bodies, and must exist in some place and at some time. furthermore, it must do sufficiently nearly what all other "human flesh" belonging to "perfect man" must do, or cease to be human flesh. our ideas are like our organisms; they have some little elasticity and circumstance-suiting power, some little margin on which, as i have elsewhere said, side-notes may be written, and glosses on the original text; but this power is very limited. as offspring will only, as a general rule, vary very little from its immediate parents, and as it will fail either immediately or in the second generation if the parents differ too widely from one another, so we cannot get our idea of-we will say a horse-to conjure up to our minds the idea of any animal more unlike a horse than a pony is; nor can we get a well-defined idea of a combination between a horse and any animal more remote from it than an ass, zebra, or giraffe. we may, indeed, make a statue of a flying horse, but the idea is one which cannot be made plausible to any but ignorant people. so "human flesh" may vary a little from "human flesh" without undue violence being done to our reason and to the right use of language, but it cannot differ from it so much as not to eat, drink, nor waste and repair itself. "human flesh," which is without these necessary adjuncts, is human flesh only to those who can believe in flying horses with feathered wings and bills like birds-that is to say, to vulgar and superstitious persons. lastly, not only must the "perfect man," who is the second person of the godhead according to the orthodox faith, and who subsists of "human flesh" as well as of a "reasonable soul," not only must this person exist, but he must exist in some place either on this earth or outside it. if he exists on earth, he must be in europe, asia, africa, america, or on some island, and if he were met with he must be capable of being seen and handled in the same way as all other things that can be called perfect man are seen; otherwise he is a perfect man who is not only not a perfect man, but who does not in any considerable degree resemble one. it is not, however, pretended by anyone that god, the "perfect man," is to be looked for in any place upon the surface of the globe. if, on the other hand, the person of god exists in some sphere outside the earth, his human flesh again proves to be of an entirely different kind from all other human flesh, for we know that such flesh cannot exist except on earth; if in space unsupported, it must fall to the ground, or into some other planet, or into a sun, or go on revolving round the earth or some other heavenly body-or not be personal. none of those whose opinions will carry weight will assign a position either in some country on this earth, or yet again in space, to jesus christ, but this involves the rendering meaningless of all expressions which involve his personality. the christian conception, therefore, of the deity proves when examined with any desire to understand our own meaning (and what lawlessness so great as the attempt to impose words upon our understandings which have no lawful settlement within them?) to be no less a contradiction in terms than the pantheistic conception. it is atheistic, as offering us a god which is not a god, inasmuch as we can conceive of no such being, nor of anything in the least like it. it is, like pantheism, an illusion, which can be believed only by those who repeat a formula which they have learnt by heart in a foreign language of which they understand nothing, and yet aver that they believe it. there are doubtless many who will say that this is possible, but the majority of my readers will hold that no proposition can be believed or disbelieved until its nature is understood. it may perhaps be said that there is another conception of god possible, and that we may see him as personal, without at the same time believing that he has any actual tangible existence. thus we personify hope, truth, and justice, without intending to convey to anyone the impression that these qualities are women, with flesh and blood. again, we do not think of nature as an actual woman, though we call her one; why may we not conceive of god, then, as an expression whereby we personify, by a figure of speech only; the thing that is intended being no person, but our own highest ideal of power, wisdom, and duration. there would be no reason to complain of this if this manner of using the word "god" were well understood. many words have two meanings, or even three, without any mischievous confusion of thought following. there can not only be no objection to the use of the word god as a manner of expressing the highest ideal of which our minds can conceive, but on the contrary no better expression can be found, and it is a pity the word is not thus more generally used. few, however, would be content with any such limitation of god as that he should be an idea only, an expression for certain qualities of human thought and action. whence, it may be fairly asked, did our deeply rooted belief in god as a living person originate? the idea of him as of an inconceivably vast, ancient, powerful, loving, and yet formidable person is one which survives all changes of detail in men's opinion. i believe there are a few very savage tribes who are as absolutely without religious sense as the beasts of the field, but the vast majority for a long time past have been possessed with an idea that there is somewhere a living god who is the spirit and the life of all that is, and who is a true person with an individuality and self-consciousness of his own. it is only natural that we should be asked how such an idea has remained in the minds of so many--who differ upon almost every other part of their philosophy-for so long a time if it was without foundation, and a piece of dreamy mysticism only. true, it has generally been declared that this god is an infinite god, and an infinite god is a god without any bounds or limitations; and a god without bounds or limitations is an impersonal god; and an impersonal god is atheism. but may not this be the incoherency of prophecy which precedes the successful mastering of an idea? may we not think of this illusory expression as having arisen from inability to see the whereabouts of a certain vast but tangible person as to whose existence men were nevertheless clear? if they felt that it existed, and yet could not say where, nor wherein it was to be laid hands on, they would be very likely to get out of the difficulty by saying that it existed as an infinite spirit, partly from a desire to magnify what they felt must be so vast and powerful, and partly because they had as yet only a vague conception of what they were aiming at, and must, therefore, best express it vaguely. we must not be surprised that when an idea is still inchoate its expression should be inconsistent and imperfect-ideas will almost always during the earlier history of a thought be put together experimentally so as to see whether or no they will cohere. partly out of indolence, partly out of the desire of those who brought the ideas together to be declared right, and partly out of joy that the truth should be supposed found, incoherent ideas will be kept together longer than they should be; nevertheless they will in the end detach themselves and go, if others present themselves which fit into their place better. there is no consistency which has not once been inconsistent, nor coherency that has not been incoherent. the incoherency of our ideas concerning god is due to the fact that we have not yet truly found him, but it does not argue that he does not exist and cannot be found anywhere after more diligent search; on the contrary, the persistence of the main idea, in spite of the incoherency of its details, points strongly in the direction of believing that it rests upon a foundation in fact. but it must be remembered there can be no god who is not personal and material: and if personal, then, though inconceivably vast in comparison with man, still limited in space and time, and capable of making mistakes concerning his own interests, though as a general rule right in his estimates concerning them. where, then, is this being? he must be on earth, or what folly can be greater than speaking of him as a person? what are persons on any other earth to us, or we to them? he must have existed and be going to exist through all time, and he must have a tangible body. where, then, is the body of this god? and what is the mystery of his incarnation? it will be my business to show this in the following chapter. chapter vi. the tree of life atheism denies knowledge of a god of any kind. pantheism and theism alike profess to give us a god, but they alike fail to perform what they have promised. we can know nothing of the god they offer us, for not even do they themselves profess that any of our senses can be cognisant [sic] of him. they tell us that he is a personal god, but that he has no material person. this is disguised atheism. what we want is a personal god, the glory of whose presence can be made in part evident to our senses, though what we can realise [sic] is less than nothing in comparison with what we must leave for ever unimagined. and truly such a god is not far from every one of us; for if we survey the broader and deeper currents of men's thoughts during the last three thousand years, we may observe two great and steady sets as having carried away with them the more eligible races of mankind. the one is a tendency from polytheism to monotheism; the other from polytypism to monotypism of the earliest forms of life-all animal and vegetable forms having at length come to be regarded as differentiations of a single substance-to wit, protoplasm. no man does well so to kick against the pricks as to set himself against tendencies of such depth, strength, and permanence as this. if he is to be in harmony with the dominant opinion of his own and of many past ages, he will see a single god-impregnate substance as having been the parent from which all living forms have sprung. one spirit, and one form capable of such modification as its directing spirit shall think fit; one soul and one body, one god and one life. for the time has come when the two unities so painfully arrived at must be joined together as body and soul, and be seen not as two, but one. there is no living organism untenanted by the spirit of god, nor any spirit of god perceivable by man apart from organism embodying and expressing it. god and the life of the world are like a mountain, which will present different aspects as we look at it from different sides, but which, when we have gone all round it, proves to be one only. god is the animal and vegetable world, and the animal and vegetable world is god. i have repeatedly said that we ought to see all animal and vegetable life as uniting to form a single personality. i should perhaps explain this more fully, for the idea of a compound person is one which at first is not very easy to grasp, inasmuch as we are not conscious of any but our more superficial aspects, and have therefore until lately failed to understand that we are ourselves compound persons. i may perhaps be allowed to quote from an earlier work. "each cell in the human body is now admitted by physiologists to be a person with an intelligent soul, differing from our own more complex soul in degree and not in kind, and, like ourselves, being born, living, and dying. it would appear, then, as though 'we,' 'our souls,' or 'selves,' or 'personalities,' or by whatever name we may prefer to be called, are but the consensus and full-flowing stream of countless sensations and impulses on the part of our tributary souls or 'selves,' who probably no more know that we exist, and that they exist as a part of us, than a microscopic insect knows the results of spectrum analysis, or than an agricultural labourer [sic] knows the working of the british constitution; and of whom we know no more than we do of the habits and feelings of some class widely separated from our own."-("life and habit," p. 110.) after which it became natural to ask the following question:--"is it possible to avoid imagining that we may be ourselves atoms, undesignedly combining to form some vaster being, though we are utterly incapable of perceiving this being as a single individual, or of realising [sic] the scheme and scope of our own combination? and this, too, not a spiritual being, which, without matter or what we think matter of some sort, is as complete nonsense to us as though men bade us love and lean upon an intelligent vacuum, but a being with what is virtually flesh and blood and bones, with organs, senses, dimensions in some way analogous to our own, into some other part of which being at the time of our great change we must infallibly re-enter, starting clean anew, with bygones bygones, and no more ache for ever from age or antecedents. "'an organic being,' writes mr. darwin, 'is a microcosm, a little universe, formed of a host of self-propagating organisms inconceivably minute and numerous as the stars in heaven.' as these myriads of smaller organisms are parts and processes of us, so are we parts and processes of life at large." a tree is composed of a multitude of subordinate trees, each bud being a distinct individual. so coral polypes [sic] form a tree-like growth of animal life, with branches from which spring individual polypes [sic] that are connected by a common tissue and supported by a common skeleton. we have no difficulty in seeing a unity in multitude, and a multitude in unity here, because we can observe the wood and the gelatinous tissue connecting together all the individuals which compose either the tree or the mass of polypes [sic]. yet the skeleton, whether of tree or of polype [sic], is inanimate; and the tissue, whether of bark or gelatine [sic], is only the matted roots of the individual buds; so that the outward and striking connection between the individuals is more delusive than real. the true connection is one which cannot be seen, and consists in the animation of each bud by a like spirit-in the community of soul, in "the voice of the lord which maketh men to be of one mind in an house"-"to dwell together in unity"-to take what are practically identical views of things, and express themselves in concert under all circumstances. provided this-the true unifier of organism-can be shown to exist, the absence of gross outward and visible but inanimate common skeleton is no bar to oneness of personality. let us picture to our minds a tree of which all the woody fibre [sic] shall be invisible, the buds and leaves seeming to stand in mid-air unsupported and unconnected with one another, so that there is nothing but a certain tree-like collocation of foliage to suggest any common principle of growth uniting the leaves. three or four leaves of different ages stand living together at the place in the air where the end of each bough should be; of these the youngest are still tender and in the bud, while the older ones are turning yellow and on the point of falling. between these leaves a sort of twig-like growth can be detected if they are looked at in certain lights, but it is hard to see, except perhaps when a bud is on the point of coming out. then there does appear to be a connection which might be called branch-like. the separate tufts are very different from one another, so that oak leaves, ash leaves, horse-chestnut leaves, etc., are each represented, but there is one species only at the end of each bough. though the trunk and all the inner boughs and leaves have disappeared, yet there hang here and there fossil leaves, also in mid-air; they appear to have been petrified, without method or selection, by what we call the caprices of nature; they hang in the path which the boughs and twigs would have taken, and they seem to indicate that if the tree could have been seen a million years earlier, before it had grown near its present size, the leaves standing at the end of each bough would have been found very different from what they are now. let us suppose that all the leaves at the end of all the invisible boughs, no matter how different they now are from one another, were found in earliest budhood to be absolutely indistinguishable, and afterwards to develop towards each differentiation through stages which were indicated by the fossil leaves. lastly, let us suppose that though the boughs which seem wanted to connect all the living forms of leaves with the fossil leaves, and with countless forms of which all trace has disappeared, and also with a single root-have become invisible, yet that there is irrefragable evidence to show that they once actually existed, and indeed are existing at this moment, in a condition as real though as invisible to the eye as air or electricity. should we, i ask, under these circumstances hesitate to call our imaginary plant or tree by a single name, and to think of it as one person, merely upon the score that the woody fibre [sic] was invisible? should we not esteem the common soul, memories and principles of growth which are preserved between all the buds, no matter how widely they differ in detail, as a more living bond of union than a framework of wood would be, which, though it were visible to the eye, would still be inanimate? the mistletoe appears as closely connected with the tree on which it grows as any of the buds of the tree itself; it is fed upon the same sap as the other buds are, which sap-however much it may modify it at the last moment-it draws through the same fibres [sic] as do its foster-brothers-why then do we at once feel that the mistletoe is no part of the apple tree? not from any want of manifest continuity, but from the spiritual difference-from the profoundly different views of life and things which are taken by the parasite and the tree on which it grows-the two are now different because they think differently-as long as they thought alike they were alike-that is to say they were protoplasm-they and we and all that lives meeting in this common substance. we ought therefore to regard our supposed tufts of leaves as a tree, that is to say, as a compound existence, each one of whose component items is compounded of others which are also in their turn compounded. but the tree above described is no imaginary parallel to the condition of life upon the globe; it is perhaps as accurate a description of the tree of life as can be put into so small a compass. the most sure proof of a man's identity is the power to remember that such and such things happened, which none but he can know; the most sure proof of his remembering is the power to react his part in the original drama, whatever it may have been; if a man can repeat a performance with consummate truth, and can stand any amount of cross-questioning about it, he is the performer of the original performance, whatever it was. the memories which all living forms prove by their actions that they possess-the memories of their common identity with a single person in whom they meet-this is incontestable proof of their being animated by a common soul. it is certain, therefore, that all living forms, whether animal or vegetable, are in reality one animal; we and the mosses being part of the same vast person in no figurative sense, but with as much bona fide literal truth as when we say that a man's finger-nails and his eyes are parts of the same man. it is in this person that we may see the body of god-and in the evolution of this person, the mystery of his incarnation. [in "unconscious memory," chapter v, butler wrote: "in the articles above alluded to ("god the known and god the unknown") i separated the organic from the inorganic, but when i came to rewrite them i found that this could not be done, and that i must reconstruct what i had written." this reconstruction never having been effected, it may be well to quote further from "unconscious memory" (concluding chapter): "at parting, therefore, i would recommend the reader to see every atom in the universe as living and able to feel and remember, but in a humble way. he must have life eternal as well as matter eternal; and the life and the matter must be joined together inseparably as body and soul to one another. thus he will see god everywhere, not as those who repeat phrases conventionally, but as people who would have their words taken according to their most natural and legitimate meaning; and he will feel that the main difference between him and many of those who oppose him lies in the fact that whereas both he and they use the same language, his opponents only half mean what they say, while he means it entirely... we shall endeavour [sic] to see the so-called inorganic as living, in respect of the qualities it has in common with the organic, rather than the organic as non-living in respect of the qualities it has in common with the inorganic."] chapter vii. the likeness of god in my last chapter i endeavoured [sic] to show that each living being, whether animal or plant, throughout the world is a component item of a single personality, in the same way as each individual citizen of a community is a member of one state, or as each cell of our own bodies is a separate person, or each bud of a tree a separate plant. we must therefore see the whole varied congeries of living things as a single very ancient being, of inconceivable vastness, and animated by one spirit. we call the octogenarian one person with the embryo of a few days old from which he has developed. an oak or yew tree may be two thousand years old, but we call it one plant with the seed from which it has grown. millions of individual buds have come and gone, to the yearly wasting and repairing of its substance; but the tree still lives and thrives, and the dead leaves have life therein. so the tree of life still lives and thrives as a single person, no matter how many new features it has acquired during its development, nor, again, how many of its individual leaves fall yellow to the ground daily. the spirit or soul of this person is the spirit of god, and its body-for we know of no soul or spirit without a body, nor of any living body without a spirit or soul, and if there is a god at all there must be a body of god-is the many-membered outgrowth of protoplasm, the ensemble of animal and vegetable life. to repeat. the theologian of to-day tells us that there is a god, but is horrified at the idea of that god having a body. we say that we believe in god, but that our minds refuse to realise [sic] an intelligent being who has no bodily person. "where then," says the theologian, "is the body of your god?" we have answered, "in the living forms upon the earth, which, though they look many, are, when we regard them by the light of their history and of true analogies, one person only." the spiritual connection between them is a more real bond of union than the visible discontinuity of material parts is ground for separating them in our thoughts. let the reader look at a case of moths in the shop-window of a naturalist, and note the unspeakable delicacy, beauty, and yet serviceableness of their wings; or let him look at a case of humming-birds, and remember how infinitely small a part of nature is the whole group of the animals he may be considering, and how infinitely small a part of that group is the case that he is looking at. let him bear in mind that he is looking on the dead husks only of what was inconceivably more marvellous [sic] when the moths or humming-birds were alive. let him think of the vastness of the earth, and of the activity by day and night through countless ages of such countless forms of animal and vegetable life as that no human mind can form the faintest approach to anything that can be called a conception of their multitude, and let him remember that all these forms have touched and touched and touched other living beings till they meet back on a common substance in which they are rooted, and from which they all branch forth so as to be one animal. will he not in this real and tangible existence find a god who is as much more worthy of admiration than the god of the ordinary theologian-as he is also more easy of comprehension? for the theologian dreams of a god sitting above the clouds among the cherubim, who blow their loud uplifted angel trumpets before him, and humour [sic] him as though he were some despot in an oriental tale; but we enthrone him upon the wings of birds, on the petals of flowers, on the faces of our friends, and upon whatever we most delight in of all that lives upon the earth. we then can not only love him, but we can do that without which love has neither power nor sweetness, but is a phantom only, an impersonal person, a vain stretching forth of arms towards something that can never fill them-we can express our love and have it expressed to us in return. and this not in the uprearing of stone temples-for the lord dwelleth [sic] in temples made with other organs than hands-nor yet in the cleansing of our hearts, but in the caress bestowed upon horse and dog, and kisses upon the lips of those we love. wide, however, as is the difference between the orthodox theologian and ourselves, it is not more remarkable than the number of the points on which we can agree with him, and on which, moreover, we can make his meaning clearer to himself than it can have ever hitherto been. he, for example, says that man has been made in the image of god, but he cannot mean what he says, unless his god has a material body; we, on the other hand, do not indeed believe that the body of god-the incorporation of all life-is like the body of a man, more than we believe each one of our own cells or subordinate personalities to be like a man in miniature; but we nevertheless hold that each of our tributary selves is so far made after the likeness of the body corporate that it possesses all our main and essential characteristics-that is to say, that it can waste and repair itself; can feel, move, and remember. to this extent, also, we-who stand in mean proportional between our tributary personalities and god-are made in the likeness of god; for we, and god, and our subordinate cells alike possess the essential characteristics of life which have been above recited. it is more true, therefore, for us to say that we are made in the likeness of god than for the orthodox theologian to do so. nor, again, do we find difficulty in adopting such an expression as that "god has taken our nature upon him." we hold this as firmly, and much more so, than christians can do, but we say that this is no new thing for him to do, for that he has taken flesh and dwelt among us from the day that he first assumed our shape, some millions of years ago, until now. god cannot become man more especially than he can become other living forms, any more than we can be our eyes more especially than any other of our organs. we may develop larger eyes, so that our eyes may come to occupy a still more important place in our economy than they do at present; and in a similar way the human race may become a more predominant part of god than it now is-but we cannot admit that one living form is more like god than another; we must hold all equally like him, inasmuch as they "keep ever," as buffon says, "the same fundamental unity, in spite of differences of detail-nutrition, development, reproduction" (and, i would add, "memory") "being the common traits of all organic bodies." the utmost we can admit is, that some embodiments of the spirit of life may be more important than others to the welfare of life as a whole, in the same way as some of our organs are more important than others to ourselves. but the above resemblances between the language which we can adopt intelligently and that which theologians use vaguely, seem to reduce the differences of opinion between the two contending parties to disputes about detail. for even those who believe their ideas to be the most definite, and who picture to themselves a god as anthropomorphic as he was represented by raffaelle, are yet not prepared to stand by their ideas if they are hard pressed in the same way as we are by ours. those who say that god became man and took flesh upon him, and that he is now perfect god and perfect man of a reasonable soul and human flesh subsisting, will yet not mean that christ has a heart, blood, a stomach, etc., like man's, which, if he has not, it is idle to speak of him as "perfect man." i am persuaded that they do not mean this, nor wish to mean it; but that they have been led into saying it by a series of steps which it is very easy to understand and sympathise [sic] with, if they are considered with any diligence. for our forefathers, though they might and did feel the existence of a personal god in the world, yet could not demonstrate this existence, and made mistakes in their endeavour [sic] to persuade themselves that they understood thoroughly a truth which they had as yet perceived only from a long distance. hence all the dogmatism and theology of many centuries. it was impossible for them to form a clear or definite conception concerning god until they had studied his works more deeply, so as to grasp the idea of many animals of different kinds and with no apparent connection between them, being yet truly parts of one and the same animal which comprised them in the same way as a tree comprises all its buds. they might speak of this by a figure of speech, but they could not see it as a fact. before this could be intended literally, evolution must be grasped, and not evolution as taught in what is now commonly called darwinism, but the old teleological darwinism of eighty years ago. nor is this again sufficient, for it must be supplemented by a perception of the oneness of personality between parents and offspring, the persistence of memory through all generations, the latency of this memory until rekindled by the recurrence of the associated ideas, and the unconsciousness with which repeated acts come to be performed. these are modern ideas which might be caught sight of now and again by prophets in time past, but which are even now mastered and held firmly only by the few. when once, however, these ideas have been accepted, the chief difference between the orthodox god and the god who can be seen of all men is, that the first is supposed to have existed from all time, while the second has only lived for more millions of years than our minds can reckon intelligently; the first is omnipresent in all space, while the second is only present in the living forms upon this earth-that is to say, is only more widely present than our minds can intelligently embrace. the first is omnipotent and all-wise; the second is only quasi-omnipotent and quasi all-wise. it is true, then, that we deprive god of that infinity which orthodox theologians have ascribed to him, but the bounds we leave him are of such incalculable extent that nothing can be imagined more glorious or vaster; and in return for the limitations we have assigned to him, we render it possible for men to believe in him, and love him, not with their lips only, but with their hearts and lives. which, i may now venture to ask my readers, is the true god-the god of the theologian, or he whom we may see around us, and in whose presence we stand each hour and moment of our lives? chapter viii. the life everlasting let us now consider the life which we can look forward to with certainty after death, and the moral government of the world here on earth. if we could hear the leaves complaining to one another that they must die, and commiserating the hardness of their lot in having ever been induced to bud forth, we should, i imagine, despise them for their peevishness more than we should pity them. we should tell them that though we could not see reason for thinking that they would ever hang again upon the same-or any at all similar-bough as the same individual leaves, after they had once faded and fallen off, yet that as they had been changing personalities without feeling it during the whole of their leafhood, so they would on death continue to do this selfsame thing by entering into new phases of life. true, death will deprive them of conscious memory concerning their now current life; but, though they die as leaves, they live in the tree whom they have helped to vivify, and whose growth and continued well-being is due solely to this life and death of its component personalities. we consider the cells which are born and die within us yearly to have been sufficiently honoured [sic] in having contributed their quotum to our life; why should we have such difficulty in seeing that a healthy enjoyment and employment of our life will give us a sufficient reward in that growth of god wherein we may live more truly and effectually after death than we have lived when we were conscious of existence? is handel dead when he influences and sets in motion more human beings in three months now than during the whole, probably, of the years in which he thought that he was alive? what is being alive if the power to draw men for many miles in order that they may put themselves en rapport with him is not being so? true, handel no longer knows the power which he has over us, but this is a small matter; he no longer animates six feet of flesh and blood, but he lives in us as the dead leaf lives in the tree. he is with god, and god knows him though he knows himself no more. this should suffice, and i observe in practice does suffice, for all reasonable persons. it may be said that one day the tree itself must die, and the leaves no longer live therein; and so, also, that the very god or life of the world will one day perish, as all that is born must surely in the end die. but they who fret upon such grounds as this must be in so much want of a grievance that it were a cruelty to rob them of one: if a man who is fond of music tortures himself on the ground that one day all possible combinations and permutations of sounds will have been exhausted so that there can be no more new tunes, the only thing we can do with him is to pity him and leave him; nor is there any better course than this to take with those idle people who worry themselves and others on the score that they will one day be unable to remember the small balance of their lives that they have not already forgotten as unimportant to them-that they will one day die to the balance of what they have not already died to. i never knew a well-bred or amiable person who complained seriously of the fact that he would have to die. granted we must all sometimes find ourselves feeling sorry that we cannot remain for ever at our present age, and that we may die so much sooner than we like; but these regrets are passing with well-disposed people, and are a sine qua non for the existence of life at all. for if people could live for ever so as to suffer from no such regret, there would be no growth nor development in life; if, on the other hand, there were no unwillingness to die, people would commit suicide upon the smallest contradiction, and the race would end in a twelvemonth. we then offer immortality, but we do not offer resurrection from the dead; we say that those who die live in the lord whether they be just or unjust, and that the present growth of god is the outcome of all past lives; but we believe that as they live in god-in the effect they have produced upon the universal life-when once their individual life is ended, so it is god who knows of their life thenceforward and not themselves; and we urge that this immortality, this entrance into the joy of the lord, this being ever with god, is true, and can be apprehended by all men, and that the perception of it should and will tend to make them lead happier, healthier lives; whereas the commonly received opinion is true with a stage truth only, and has little permanent effect upon those who are best worth considering. nevertheless the expressions in common use among the orthodox fit in so perfectly with facts, which we must all acknowledge, that it is impossible not to regard the expressions as founded upon a prophetic perception of the facts. two things stand out with sufficient clearness. the first is the rarity of suicide even among those who rail at life most bitterly. the other is the little eagerness with which those who cry out most loudly for a resurrection desire to begin their new life. when comforting a husband upon the loss of his wife we do not tell him we hope he will soon join her; but we should certainly do this if we could even pretend we thought the husband would like it. i can never remember having felt or witnessed any pain, bodily or mental, which would have made me or anyone else receive a suggestion that we had better commit suicide without indignantly asking how our adviser would like to commit suicide himself. yet there are so many and such easy ways of dying that indignation at being advised to commit suicide arises more from enjoyment of life than from fear of the mere physical pain of dying. granted that there is much deplorable pain in the world from ill-health, loss of money, loss of reputation, misconduct of those nearest to us, or what not, and granted that in some cases these causes do drive men to actual self-destruction, yet suffering such as this happens to a comparatively small number, and occupies comparatively a small space in the lives of those to whom it does happen. what, however, have we to say to those cases in which suffering and injustice are inflicted upon defenceless [sic] people for years and years, so that the iron enters into their souls, and they have no avenger. can we give any comfort to such sufferers? and, if not, is our religion any better than a mockery-a filling the rich with good things and sending the hungry empty away? can we tell them, when they are oppressed with burdens, yet that their cry will come up to god and be heard? the question suggests its own answer, for assuredly our god knows our innermost secrets: there is not a word in our hearts but he knoweth it altogether; he knoweth our down-sitting and our uprising, he is about our path and about our bed, and spieth out all our ways; he has fashioned us behind and before, and "we cannot attain such knowledge," for, like all knowledge when it has become perfect, "it is too excellent for us." "whither then," says david, "shall i go from thy spirit, or whither shall i go, then, from thy presence? if i climb up into heaven thou art there; if i go down into hell thou art there also. if i take the wings of the morning and remain in the uttermost parts of the sea; even there also shall thy hand lead me, and thy right hand shall hold me. if i say peradventure the darkness shall cover me, then shall my night be turned into day: the darkness and light to thee are both alike. for my reins are thine; thou hast covered me in my mother's womb. my bones are not hid from thee: though i be made secretly and fashioned beneath in the earth, thine eyes did see my substance yet being unperfect; and in thy book were all my members written, which day by day were fashioned when as yet there was none of them. do i not hate them, o lord, that hate thee? and am i not grieved with them that rise up against thee? yea, i hate them right sore, as though they were mine enemies." (psalm cxxxix.) there is not a word of this which we cannot endorse with more significance, as well as with greater heartiness than those can who look upon god as he is commonly represented to them; whatever comfort, therefore, those in distress have been in the habit of receiving from these and kindred passages, we intensify rather than not. we cannot, alas! make pain cease to be pain, nor injustice easy to bear; but we can show that no pain is bootless, and that there is a tendency in all injustice to right itself; suffering is not inflicted wilfully, [sic] as it were by a magician who could have averted it; nor is it vain in its results, but unless we are cut off from god by having dwelt in some place where none of our kind can know of what has happened to us, it will move god's heart to redress our grievance, and will tend to the happiness of those who come after us, even if not to our own. the moral government of god over the world is exercised through us, who are his ministers and persons, and a government of this description is the only one which can be observed as practically influencing men's conduct. god helps those who help themselves, because in helping themselves they are helping him. again, vox populi vox dei. the current feeling of our peers is what we instinctively turn to when we would know whether such and such a course of conduct is right or wrong; and so paul clenches his list of things that the philippians were to hold fast with the words, "whatsoever things are of good fame"-that is to say, he falls back upon an appeal to the educated conscience of his age. certainly the wicked do sometimes appear to escape punishment, but it must be remembered there are punishments from within which do not meet the eye. if these fall on a man, he is sufficiently punished; if they do not fall on him, it is probable we have been over hasty in assuming that he is wicked. chapter ix. god the unknown the reader will already have felt that the panzoistic conception of god-the conception, that is to say, of god as comprising all living units in his own single person-does not help us to understand the origin of matter, nor yet that of the primordial cell which has grown and unfolded itself into the present life of the world. how was the world rendered fit for the habitation of the first germ of life? how came it to have air and water, without which nothing that we know of as living can exist? was the world fashioned and furnished with aqueous and atmospheric adjuncts with a view to the requirements of the infant monad, and to his due development? if so, we have evidence of design, and if so of a designer, and if so there must be some far vaster person who looms out behind our god, and who stands in the same relation to him as he to us. and behind this vaster and more unknown god there may be yet another, and another, and another. it is certain that life did not make the world with a view to its own future requirements. for the world was at one time red hot, and there can have been no living being upon it. nor is it conceivable that matter in which there was no life-inasmuch as it was infinitely hotter than the hottest infusion which any living germ can support-could gradually come to be alive without impregnation from a living parent. all living things that we know of have come from other living things with bodies and souls, whose existence can be satisfactorily established in spite of their being often too small for our detection. since, then, the world was once without life, and since no analogy points in the direction of thinking that life can spring up spontaneously, we are driven to suppose that it was introduced into this world from some other source extraneous to it altogether, and if so we find ourselves irresistibly drawn to the inquiry whether the source of the life that is in the world-the impregnator of this earth-may not also have prepared the earth for the reception of his offspring, as a hen makes an egg-shell or a peach a stone for the protection of the germ within it? not only are we drawn to the inquiry, but we are drawn also to the answer that the earth was so prepared designedly by a person with body and soul who knew beforehand the kind of thing he required, and who took the necessary steps to bring it about. if this is so we are members indeed of the god of this world, but we are not his children; we are children of the unknown and vaster god who called him into existence; and this in a far more literal sense than we have been in the habit of realising [sic] to ourselves. for it may be doubted whether the monads are not as truly seminal in character as the procreative matter from which all animals spring. it must be remembered that if there is any truth in the view put forward in "life and habit," and in "evolution old and new" (and i have met with no serious attempt to upset the line of argument taken in either of these books), then no complex animal or plant can reach its full development without having already gone through the stages of that development on an infinite number of past occasions. an egg makes itself into a hen because it knows the way to do so, having already made itself into a hen millions and millions of times over; the ease and unconsciousness with which it grows being in themselves sufficient demonstration of this fact. at each stage in its growth the chicken is reminded, by a return of the associated ideas, of the next step that it should take, and it accordingly takes it. but if this is so, and if also the congeries of all the living forms in the world must be regarded as a single person, throughout their long growth from the primordial cell onwards to the present day, then, by parity of reasoning, the person thus compounded-that is to say, life or god-should have already passed through a growth analogous to that which we find he has taken upon this earth on an infinite number of past occasions; and the development of each class of life, with its culmination in the vertebrate animals and in man, should be due to recollection by god of his having passed through the same stages, or nearly so, in worlds and universes, which we know of from personal recollection, as evidenced in the growth and structure of our bodies, but concerning which we have no other knowledge whatsoever. so small a space remains to me that i cannot pursue further the reflections which suggest themselves. a few concluding considerations are here alone possible. we know of three great concentric phases of life, and we are not without reason to suspect a fourth. if there are so many there are very likely more, but we do not know whether there are or not. the innermost sphere of life we know of is that of our own cells. these people live in a world of their own, knowing nothing of us, nor being known by ourselves until very recently. yet they can be seen under a microscope; they can be taken out of us, and may then be watched going here and there in perturbation of mind, endeavouring [sic] to find something in their new environment that will suit them, and then dying on finding how hopelessly different it is from any to which they have been accustomed. they live in us, and make us up into the single person which we conceive ourselves to form; we are to them a world comprising an organic and an inorganic kingdom, of which they consider themselves to be the organic, and whatever is not very like themselves to be the inorganic. whether they are composed of subordinate personalities or not we do not know, but we have no reason to think that they are, and if we touch ground, so to speak, with life in the units of which our own bodies are composed, it is likely that there is a limit also in an upward direction, though we have nothing whatever to guide us as to where it is, nor any certainty that there is a limit at all. we are ourselves the second concentric sphere of life, we being the constituent cells which unite to form the body of god. of the third sphere we know a single member only-the god of this world; but we see also the stars in heaven, and know their multitude. analogy points irresistibly in the direction of thinking that these other worlds are like our own, begodded and full of life; it also bids us believe that the god of their world is begotten of one more or less like himself, and that his growth has followed the same course as that of all other growths we know of. if so, he is one of the constituent units of an unknown and vaster personality who is composed of gods, as our god is composed of all the living forms on earth, and as all those living forms are composed of cells. this is the unknown god. beyond this second god we cannot at present go, nor should we wish to do so, if we are wise. it is no reproach to a system that it does not profess to give an account of the origin of things; the reproach rather should lie against a system which professed to explain it, for we may be well assured that such a profession would, for the present at any rate, be an empty boast. it is enough if a system is true as far as it goes; if it throws new light on old problems, and opens up vistas which reveal a hope of further addition to our knowledge, and this i believe may be fairly claimed for the theory of life put forward in "life and habit" and "evolution, old and new," and for the corollary insisted upon in these pages; a corollary which follows logically and irresistibly if the position i have taken in the above-named books is admitted. let us imagine that one of the cells of which we are composed could attain to a glimmering perception of the manner in which he unites with other cells, of whom he knows very little, so as to form a greater compound person of whom he has hitherto known nothing at all. would he not do well to content himself with the mastering of this conception, at any rate for a considerable time? would it be any just ground of complaint against him on the part of his brother cells, that he had failed to explain to them who made the man (or, as he would call it, the omnipotent deity) whose existence and relations to himself he had just caught sight of? but if he were to argue further on the same lines as those on which he had travelled hitherto, and were to arrive at the conclusion that there might be other men in the world. besides the one whom he had just learnt to apprehend, it would be still no refutation or just ground of complaint against him that he had failed to show the manner in which his supposed human race had come into existence. here our cell would probably stop. he could hardly be expected to arrive at the existence of animals and plants differing from the human race, and uniting with that race to form a single person or god, in the same way as he has himself united with other cells to form man. the existence, and much more the roundness of the earth itself, would be unknown to him, except by way of inference and deduction. the only universe which he could at all understand would be the body of the man of whom he was a component part. how would not such a cell be astounded if all that we know ourselves could be suddenly revealed to him, so that not only should the vastness of this earth burst upon his dazzled view, but that of the sun and of his planets also, and not only these, but the countless other suns which we may see by night around us. yet it is probable that an actual being is hidden from us, which no less transcends the wildest dream of our theologians than the existence of the heavenly bodies transcends the perception of our own constituent cells. the end the one great reality by louisa clayton author of "heart lessons", "loving messages", "winning and warning", "wilderness lessons", etc. "i am god, and there is none else"-isa. xiv. 22. this book is dedicated to all my friends in rusthall, in loving remembrance of our happy fellowship in the gospel during the past thirty years, with the earnest prayer that the messages may be stored up in their hearts and bring forth fruit in their lives when the voice which delivered them is still. 3, somerville gardens, tunbridge wells. foreword in response to the request of an old and esteemed friend i gladly add a foreword to the collection of addresses embodied in this volume. i do so in recognition of the supreme importance of the great topics that have been chosen, and also in appreciation of the clear and attractive way in which the truth is set forth. may the messages find attentive and receptive readers, and be followed by deep and abiding spiritual blessing. evan h. hopkins. woburn chase, addlestone, surrey. contents i god, the great reality ii god, our father iii the son of god iv the spirit of god v the voice of god vi the hands of god vii the word of god viii have faith in god ix the church of god x the kingdom of god index of contents address i god, the great reality personal knowledge of god, the secret of happiness--realising his presence in prayer--illustrations from the telephone and family life--god is our father, saviour, comforter--the living god-knowing all, and controlling everything--illustrations from current events. address ii god, our father a chinese convert--christ's confidence in the father--christ reveals the father--philip's prayer, "show us the father"--what god is to us as father--how the minister sang the doxology in an empty flour barrel--the glorious calling of the children of god. address iii the son of god christ is the son of god from eternity--he is sent to be the saviour of the world--three questions answered: where did he come from? when did he come? why did he come?--a working-man's experience--the story of the pearl necklace--christ's work of redemption--sir james simpson's dying testimony--hymn, "he came and took me by the hand." address iv the spirit of god god is a spirit--true spiritual worship--the spirit of god in creation and salvation--the new birth--the work of the holy spirit convincing of sin, and revealing christ--searchlights--the loveliness of christ--the holy ghost like a mother--the comforter. address v the voice of god jacob's ladder, a type of christ--jacob brought face to face with god--what it is to hear the voice of god--god's first call to man in the garden of eden--a perfect link of communication between god and man--the voice of god speaking in his word. address vi the hands of god why st. john wrote his gospel--the safety of the believer--god's hands in creation, providence and redemption--the "scarred hands"--the story of a brave shepherd lad--the hands of jesus wounded for our transgressions--the three crosses. address vii the word of god the glory of god seen in nature--the glory of god revealed in the bible--the dying woman and her rich inheritance--god's word brings wisdom, conversion, joy and light to the heart of man--spurgeon's text in the crystal palace--a chinese convert "behaving the bible"--the torch that will light you home--a neglected bible. address viii have faith in god abraham the friend of god--the greatness of his faith--faith the gate into life--faith the link between the sinner and the saviour--a missionary's faith rewarded--illustrations from the telegraph and electricity--the wonders wrought by the touch of faith--great faith brings heaven into our souls--the difference between believing and committing. address ix the church of god the church of god: past, present, future--its beginning and growth--the church the body of christ, a living union--the church the bride of christ, a loving relationship--the glory of this union--three great surprises--the old man's message; love, eternal love--the four precious words--"labelled and ready"--the glorious future of the church of god--the church will show forth god's grace and glory in the ages to come. address x the kingdom of god "bringing the king back"--one king, jesus, his entrance into jerusalem--the jews rejecting their king--his kingdom in our hearts--make jesus king--the cross the way to the throne--the dying thief received into the kingdom--the king's victory over the powers of darkness--the coming king--the glory of the lord revealed--christ's reign on earth--rutherford's testimony--miss havergal's prayer--the eternal kingdom. address i god, the great reality portion of scripture--hebrews xi. 1-6. god is the one great reality. will you close your eyes for a moment and say those words over again very slowly so as to let them burn into your inmost heart and soul. the word of god tells us that "the son of god is come and hath given us an understanding that we may know him that is true": this means that we may personally know him that is reality. in the wonder of that moment when we first know that god is real and that god is near, then we cry out, "my god, how wonderful thou art." to have personal knowledge of god is the secret of assurance and happiness, and to put real trust in him changes our whole life, for then we can say, "i have a wonderful god." to know god is eternal life; to know him fully, brings "life more abundantly"; to know him with no veil between, is glory--life. if you look again at the 6th verse of the 11th chapter of hebrews you will notice a very clear statement: it says, "he that cometh to god must believe that he is," or to put it in other words, "the man who draws near to god must believe that there is a god." do you believe in god? is he real to you? here is one test. when you pray do you realise his presence? is he so close to you that it is like speaking into his ear? it was this text, "he that cometh to god must believe that he is," which first awakened a worldly gentleman named brownlow north to think about his soul. god's spirit showed him that he had never really believed in god and that all his former religion was worthless, "for without faith it is impossible to please god." as soon as he had really learnt to know god, he devoted all his life to preaching the gospel. he told every one that the first thing we need is _to believe there is a god_. many of his friends who were rich and well educated were thus brought to a personal knowledge of god for the first time. he that cometh to god must believe that he is really there. have you ever been conscious of the presence of the living god? you must make sure that he is near before you can really pray. we have an illustration of this in the telephone. you first put the speaking tube to your mouth and then you say "are you there?" in any case you make sure that the person to whom you wish to speak, is listening at the other end. although you cannot see any one, you know he is holding the receiver so as to hear what you say. when you begin to pray always pause for a moment and remember that you are speaking to god. do not say a word until the holy spirit puts you into direct communication with god. the psalmist was quite sure that god was really listening to his prayer, for he says, "i love the lord because he hath heard my voice and my supplications. because he hath inclined his ear unto me therefore will i call upon him as long as i live." [footnote: ps. cxvi. 1, 2.] and again, "i cried unto god with my voice, even unto god with my voice, and he gave ear unto me." [footnote: ps. lxxvii. 1.] it is in this way we realise that there is a god, a personal living god. i asked a christian man one day if he had prayed about some work which was offered to him, and his reply was, "yes: i am on the telephone." can you say the same? as soon as you have spoken through the telephone you put the receiver to your ear to listen for the answer. many people pray without expecting to get an answer. they are like children who knock at a door and then run away before it is opened. the prophet micah says, "i will wait for god, my god will answer me." [footnote: mic. vii. 7.] yes, he expected to get an answer. the lord jesus says, "when thou prayest, enter into thy closet, and when thou hast shut the door, pray to thy father which is in secret." [footnote: st. matt. vi. 6.] when a child wants to tell his father something very private he whispers it in his ear. i daresay you have noticed that the telephone at the general post office is enclosed in a box, so that no one can overhear what is said. there are many things we say into god's ear which we could not tell to any one else. it makes him very real to us, if we can say in our inmost hearts, "o god, thou art my god, my very own father." when we speak through the telephone we never say useless words, and our lord tells us to avoid needless repetitions when we pray, and he adds, "for your father knows what things you need before ever you ask him." just as an earthly father delights to hear his children's, voices, so our heavenly father loves to hear us speaking to him, for he says, "put me in remembrance, let us plead together." [footnote: isa. xliii. 26.] a child's intercourse with his father is quite simple and natural, he talks freely about everything. when you speak to god, is it an effort, or do you look up into his face with confidence and tell him all? a child expects his father to supply all his wants and to be equal to every emergency, but we seem to have lost sight of the father in heaven who is pledged to "supply all our need according to his riches in glory by christ jesus." [footnote: phil. iv. 13.] we must not be disappointed if we do not get all we want, because god's promise is to supply what we _need_. we often wish for things which we do not really need. if ever you lose sight of _god_, think of the wonderful lesson which jesus teaches when he says, "if ye then being evil know how to give good gifts unto your children," and you, fathers, always get the best you can for them, "how much more" (wonderful words), "how much more shall your father which is in heaven give good things to them that ask him." [footnote: st. matt. vii. 11.] have you ever heard god's voice saying to you, i am your father; love me, look to me, trust me, worship me: "open thy mouth wide and i will fill it." [footnote: ps. lxxxi. 10.] a godly man who was a servant used to say, "there is not in the world a kind of life more sweet and delightful than that of a continual conversation with god." he felt that god was nearer and dearer to him than any one else. this is what makes god real to us when we feel that he is _near and dear_. "only to sit and think of god, oh! what a joy it is!" it is just the same with your children if you are a really good, loving father, they are quite happy if they can sit close to you. your very presence makes a great impression on them, even if you do not say a word. is god's presence so real to you that it makes you control your temper and keeps you from saying unkind things? a boy may be troublesome sometimes, but he never really doubts his father's love for him. do you ever doubt god's love? oh, yes: you say, i often murmur. then this shows that in a sense you have never really known god. people would not speak as they do about god, i mean even christians would not talk as they do if they really knew god. we often hear people say, "i hope god will be good to us," or, "i think it very hard god does not answer my prayer." this shows they have never personally known him. their thoughts about god are so contrary to what they sing. for example, how much do we really mean of that sweet hymn- "precious thought--my father knoweth, in his love i rest; for whate'er my father doeth. must be always best. well i know the heart that planneth nought but good for me; joy and sorrow interwoven, love in all i see." do you ever doubt his wisdom and think you might have been treated better? when we really know our father-god, then we see his wisdom even in the things that are against us. we know and we feel that they have all been working together for our good, "for he knows all." this book in my hand is the word of god. it is a revelation of god, and the glory of god himself shines in every page. the first word in it is, in the beginning _god_. perhaps you ask me, "who is god?" i will tell you. "he is my father." but you say, i am so sinful, i am not worthy to be called his son. that is just what i felt, so sinful, and then he revealed himself to me as my saviour. ah! you say, but i am so far off, how can i find my way to him? and that was just like me till the holy spirit led me to him. when god reveals himself to you as father, saviour, comforter, then you will know that _god_ himself is dwelling in your heart. perhaps you ask, will god really come and dwell in me for i am so unworthy? god himself answers that question; "thus saith the high and lofty one that inhabiteth eternity, whose name is holy; i dwell in the high and holy place, with him also that is of a contrite and humble spirit, to revive the spirit of the humble, and to revive the heart of the contrite ones." [footnote: isa. lvii. 15.] every one is standing now in view of god and eternity. a very long time ago the question was asked, "canst thou by searching find out god?" [footnote: job xi. 7.] the only way we can find him is by our spiritual necessities. if your soul needs life, you will find him. if your spirit needs reviving, you will find him. as this text says, i come "to revive the heart of the contrite ones." when your children talk about their father, he is a real person to them; that is what god wants to be to us, a real personal god. he says, "i will be to them a god." [footnote: heb. viii. 10.] i know a little boy who whispered to his aunt one night when she was giving him the goodnight kiss, "oh, auntie, i sometimes wonder whether there is a god. are you quite sure?" "yes," said the aunt very earnestly, "i am quite sure. you see, i have known him so long and he is so much to me, i am quite sure." the child was satisfied. if you will turn again to psalm cxvi. you will see a wonderful unfolding of the secret feelings of david's heart, and as we read it we cannot help saying to ourselves, the man who wrote this experience had very close dealings with some one about his soul. who is this some one? do you know? perhaps you think your religion is good enough to take you to heaven when you die, but alas! it begins and ends with the "unknown god." how different to david's experience when he says out of a full heart, "i love the lord," or as the word means, "i am full of love," and then he tells of his confidence in god; "i believed, therefore i have spoken," as if he had said, "god is so real to me now, i must tell others"; and he adds, "i will walk before the lord in the land of the living." we can walk with god in our daily life just as enoch did. a good man said a short time ago, if ever i pass any one in the street with a careworn, anxious face, i long to say to them, "there is _god_," "have faith in god." st. john said, "we have known and believed the love that god hath to us and in us--god is love." [footnote: 1 john iv. 16.] this is the central fact, the one great reality in life, and when once it is grasped there is nothing to compare with it. why is there so much unrest, so much ungodliness, and lawlessness in our midst? we are forgetting god. the only remedy is coming back to god. a poor woman who has been a christian for many years was telling me about her mother's sudden death the week before, and then she added, "i have never known god as i do now. the future used to look so dark, but now that i know him as the living god, i can only see _life_. i cannot tell you what he is to me." her face, which bore traces of her recent sorrow, shone with a new peace and a new joy, which made me rejoice. i was sure that god had revealed himself to her in her time of need. those precious words had come true in her case, "in that hour jesus rejoiced in spirit and said, i thank thee, o father, lord of heaven and earth, that thou hast hid these things from the wise and prudent and hast revealed them unto babes; even so, father, for so it seemed good in thy sight." [footnote: st. luke x. 21.] are you saying, "my soul thirsteth for god, for the living god"? then you will have a personal revelation of god himself, for that is the only way the life of god can enter into your soul and mine. are you longing to find god? it is not that we find him, but that he finds us, making himself to us the great reality. we may know wonderful things _about_ him, but that is not enough. we must really know him in our hearts! the very longing which you have for this personal revelation of god comes from the loving father himself, and he says, "i will give them a heart to know me": [footnote: jer. xxiv. 7.] so we need never think, ah! it is beyond me, for he promises to _give_ us the heart to know him. i had a striking instance of this some years ago. a working man who could not read or write told me that he had been converted at our meeting. he died in the union infirmary, and i heard afterwards that he had been a blessing to many in the ward. he said to me one day, "i want to tell you _what god is to me_." in very simple words he described how he could see it all plainly. how in the beginning, sin came into the garden of eden and then god revealed himself to the sinner so as to bring him back to himself. again and again his simple testimony was, i must tell every one _what god is to me_. this man had learnt to know god personally through his own need as a sinner, so it is not by earthly education that we find god, but through the holy spirit's teaching, and then in the word he reveals himself more fully. it is "through the knowledge of god and of jesus our lord that grace and peace are multiplied to us," [footnote: 2 pet. i. 2.] so if we have not more and more grace and peace coming into our souls it is because we do not really know god. it makes all the difference in our life when we can say, god is now my living father; for it means god in his infinite love has taken my life into his, and by this personal link of love i take his life into mine. when he assures us that he is the living god, it means that he lives and cares for us. all things, great and small, are under his control. we have an illustration of this in the present war. think of our navy, scattered over seven oceans, yet all under the control of the commander-in-chief, sir john jellicoe. not one vessel can move without his orders, no ship can be attacked without his knowledge; the wireless apparatus is at work night and day communicating every detail. it brings sir john word of any submarine sighted, or of any movement in all the seas round our country, and it carries his orders far and near. when god tells us that he is the living god, we know that he cares for us in the same way as a mother cares for her children. we had a touching illustration of this about a year ago. do you remember how we were thrilled with horror when the archduke francis ferdinand, heir to the throne of austria, was shot while driving through the city? he expired in a few minutes, leaving three children. in those few moments he turned to his wife who was seated by his side and said these pathetic words, "sophie, live for our children." he did not know that she too had been mortally wounded and would be powerless to care for their orphan children. it is because our father-god is the living god, that he can say to us to-day just as he said to the old testament saints, "i am living for you, caring for you, protecting you." "even to your old age i am he; and even to hoar hairs will i carry you: i have made and i will bear, even i will carry and will deliver you." [footnote: isa. xlvi. 4.] when he says to you, "i am god and there is none else," [footnote 2: isa. xlv. 22.] does your heart answer, yes: "even from everlasting to everlasting thou art god." [footnote 3: ps. xc. 2.] address ii god our father portion of scripture--matthew vii 24-34. in the chapter we have just read there is a great deal about our daily home life, and the word "father" is mentioned twelve times, so it shows that god knows all about the everyday work. it is a grand thing when we find this out. a poor woman in china was converted, and very soon the lady missionary who visited her noticed that now her house was very clean and tidy, and told her how glad she was to see it. the woman smiled, and said in her own simple way, "you see my father god and the lord jesus are constantly coming in and out, so i like to keep it nice." she realised the presence of god. "the eyes of the lord are in every place." [footnote: prov. xv. 3.] if we do not find god _everywhere_ we practically end by finding him _nowhere_. a busy christian mother told me that she begins each day and lives all the day long saying in her heart, "in thy presence and by thy power." we must not only _say_ it, but act upon it as a _reality_, and then it will be our daily experience to be in touch with god. there was one word which was very precious to christ and which was often on his lips, and that was "father." you remember how he stood one day at the grave of his friend lazarus. all the mourners were standing round him. lazarus had been dead four days. it seemed utterly impossible that he could be restored to life again. no one expected it. what did jesus do? "jesus lifted up his eyes and said '_father_.'" [footnote: st. john xi. 41.] those eyes were still wet with tears, for a few verses before we read "jesus wept." then he lifted up his eyes and said "_father_": that was enough. there is _everything_ in that word. it just meant, "i have told father all about it." he knows, he loves, he cares, and all things are possible with him. there is no limit to his power and his love. then the command was given to those standing near--"take ye away the stone." was christ going into the cave? no, the dead man was to _come out_. so we have first the wondrous name "father," and then the loud cry, "lazarus, come forth," and he that was dead came out of the cold grave', out of the region of death into the land of the living. all through his life on earth our lord always speaks to god as father. one verse especially brings out the perfect intimacy, the perfect confidence, the perfect love between the lord jesus and the father. jesus says, "all things are delivered unto me of my father, and no man knoweth the son but the father; neither knoweth any man the father save the son and he to whomsoever the son will reveal him." [footnote: st. matt. xi 27.] the last words of this verse are very precious, for they show that not only has the son perfect knowledge of the father, but he reveals or makes known the father so that you and i may know him as our father. you remember philip prayed, "lord, show us the father, that is what we want," [footnote: st. john xiv. 8.] and christ answered, "he who has seen me has seen the father." yes, "he is the image of the invisible god." god said to moses, "thou canst not see my face and live for there shall no man see me and live," [footnote: exod. xxxiii. 20.] and for hundreds of years no one saw god. then came the wondrous gift and the wondrous revelation. god gave his only begotten son, and _in him_ we see the father. praise the lord! the glorious light has come to us in our darkness. for "god, who commanded the light to shine out of darkness, hath shined in our hearts to give the light of the knowledge of the glory of god _in the face of jesus christ._" [footnote: cor. iv. 6.] the apostle john says, "we beheld his glory, the glory as of the only begotten of the father, full of grace and truth." "no man hath seen god at any time," [footnote: st. john i. 18.] and before christ came the verse stopped there; but after he came, then god was fully revealed; so the verse finishes with the words "the only begotten son which is in the bosom of the father, he hath declared him." will you look up now, and say, "lord, show _me_ the father," and he will reveal him to you, because this is what he promises to do. look at the last line of the 27th verse of matthew xi. where christ says, "he to whomsoever the son will reveal him," and without a pause he adds the wonderful invitation, "come unto me, all ye that labour and are heavy laden, and i will give you rest." it is to the weary and heavy laden that he reveals the father. he invites them to share the fellowship he has with the father, the peace and joy and rest of knowing the father. why does he invite the weary ones to come to him? because he felt in himself such joy in this close fellowship with god, he wanted every one to have it too. he felt that his experience of what the father was to him was so rich, he longed for them to come and share it, "i will give you rest." it is as if he said, "i will give you the same rest i have when i am tired and hungry and thirsty; the same comfort that i have when i am misunderstood and reviled; the rest, the comfort, the peace i have in my father." we have the same assurance when the holy ghost says in st. paul's letter to the corinthians, "grace be to you and peace from god our father and from the lord jesus christ. blessed be god, even the father of our lord jesus christ, the father of mercies and the god of all comfort." [footnote: 2 cor. i, 2, 3.] how can you and i know what the lord jesus found in his father's love? he has graciously made it known to us in the four gospels. there the veil is drawn aside and we see how all through his life he was in close fellowship with the father. we can hear the very words which the son spoke to his father in the hour of deep agony: "o my father, if it be possible let this cup pass from me; nevertheless not as i will, but as thou wilt." [footnote: st. matt. xxvi. 39.] the last words on his lips when he was dying on the cross were, "father, into thy hands i commend my spirit." [footnote: st. luke xxiii. 46.] he said to his disciples the last night, "you will leave me alone; and yet i am not alone, because the father is with me." all through his life he spoke of his oneness with the father and the joy of doing and finishing the work which he gave him to do. we too can have the sense of god's presence in our souls at all times. a christian woman who was suffering from neuralgia told me that one night when she could not sleep, a voice seemed to whisper softly to her, "like as a father pitieth his children, so the lord pitieth them that fear him, for he knoweth our frame, he knows all about our poor bodies, for he made them," [footnote: ps. ciii. 13, 14.] and with those words of comfort in her mind she fell into a refreshing sleep. if you will turn to the 6th chapter of st. matthew again you will see in the 8th verse that our heavenly father knows about something else. "he knows what things we have need of before we ask him." the secret of what it is to have god as our father, and the sweetness of it, comes out in these three homely questions, what shall we eat, what shall we drink, what shall we wear? and christ says, [footnote: st. matt, vi. 31, 32.] take no thought, that means, do not be anxious about these things, for your heavenly father knoweth that you have need of all these things. yes, if he knows, that is enough, and then we have only to trust him for all. do you find your faith failing sometimes? it is one thing to trust god when the wages are coming in regularly, and quite another thing to trust him when times are bad. it is just _then_ we learn to look less at our faith and more at god's faithfulness. a minister once gave a little bit of his experience about this. he said, "it is only as we really take god's promises and plant our feet upon them that we shall find faith abiding in times of testing. the last penny may be gone but god is there. i know this to be true. "i have often said when preaching, 'it takes real faith in god to be able to put your head into an empty flour barrel and sing the doxology.' my wife had heard me say this, and one morning she called me to come into the kitchen. i said, 'what do you want me for?' she replied, 'i want you to come out here and sing.' i thought this queer, so i went to see what it all meant. "in the middle of the kitchen was an empty flour barrel that she had just dusted out. 'now, my dear,' she said, 'i have often heard you say one could put his head into an empty flour barrel and sing, "praise god from whom all blessings flow," if he believed what god says. now here is your chance, practise what you preach.' "there was the empty flour barrel staring at me with open mouth, and my purse was empty too. i looked for my faith, but could not find it; i looked for a way of escape, but could not find one, for my wife blocked the doorway with the dust brush covered with flour. "i said, 'i will put my head in and sing on one condition.' "'what's that?' asked my wife. "'on condition that you will put your head in and sing too. you know you promised to share all my joys and sorrows.' "she consented, so we put our heads in and sang the doxology, and we told our heavenly father 'all about our need.' yes, we had a good time, and when we got our heads out we were a good bit powdered up, which we took as a token that there was more flour to follow! "sure enough, though no one knew of our need, the next day a barrel of flour was sent. where it came from or who sent it we never knew, but our heavenly father knew that we had 'need of these things.'" does not this simple testimony teach us all a lesson? i wonder how many of us can say from our hearts- those who trust do not worry; those who worry do not trust. which are you doing, dear friends? trusting or worrying? count on god. he never fails, and he knows just what to do. the moment a difficulty comes, look up and say "father," and at once the burden will roll off, he will undertake all for you. i had an illustration of this one day when i was going across the common. it was very windy, and two little girls lost their hats; they were quite at their wits' end, till they caught sight of their father in the distance, and at once they called to him, "father, father." that was enough, in a minute he ran to help them. i have often found great help in looking up again and again during the day and just saying "father." try it. you, fathers, often say to your children, "if you want me just call me." that is what our heavenly father tells us to do. to know god means not only to trust him, but also to _treat_ him as a father. if you will read the 6th chapter of st. matthew carefully when you are at home, you will see that it gives the experience of the child of god with the father for one whole day. it includes all that we need during the day:--food, clothing, forgiveness, victory over temptation, grace to do god's will, and grace in dealing with others. this experience is so deep, so real, so entirely something between father and child, that in this chapter we find the words "_in secret_" no less than six times. when the little child is looking up into a loving father's face and talking to him, it never thinks of those around. "in secret" means a sweet sense of his presence in the soul and of close communion with him. "i write unto you, little children, because you have known the father." [footnote: i st. john ii. 13.] god is our father, because he is the father of our lord jesus christ: this is one of the greatest treasures of redeeming grace. all the teaching about god as father comes from the lips of jesus, and it is in this way he reveals the father to us; so if we would know him, we must drink in his teaching and watch his life of communion with god. by his life he reveals to us the reality of the experience into which he calls us to enter. he also shows us the way. he not only says "come to me," but also come through me. "i am the way: no man cometh unto the father but by me." [footnote: st. john xiv. 6.] it was by dying for us he opened the way. "god sent forth his son to redeem them that were under the law, that we might receive the adoption of sons." "and because ye are sons, god hath sent forth the spirit of his son into your hearts crying, abba, father." [footnote: gal. iv. 6, 7] so we are not only received into god's family, but we have also all the privileges of sonship. we are made "heirs of god, joint heirs with christ." perhaps you are thinking of your unworthiness; like the prodigal son you are ready to say "father, i have sinned again and again, i am not worthy to be called thy son." god knows just what you are and what you have been, and he himself has asked the question, "how shall i put you among the children?" it is a question which none but the lord would ever have thought of, and it would never have been answered if he himself had not answered it. it is a wonderful answer: for he says, "thou shalt call me, my father." [footnote: jer. iii. 19.] god himself puts us sinners among his children, and no one else can do it, and he keeps us; for he says, "thou shalt not turn away from me." how does he do it? by creating a new life in us, we are "born again." the old nature is not improved, but a new heart is given. "a new heart also will i give you, and a new spirit will i put within you." [footnote: ezek. xxxvi. 26.] can you say, "god has sent forth the spirit of his son into my heart," and now i can call him my father? being made the children of god by adoption and grace, let us enjoy the privileges which are secured to us; let us act as loving children should do. does it all seem too good to be true? trust his word, "as many as received him, to them gave he power to become the sons of god, even to them that believe on his name." [footnote: st. john i. 12] some of you remember the joy which thrilled you when you first received him as your saviour, but perhaps it was not until afterwards that you realised the blessedness of your new position as sons of god. the holy spirit leads us on step by step. first, he assures us that "there is no condemnation," then he sets us free from the bondage of sin and death. [footnote: rom. viii. i, 2.] all is changed now, we feel the confidence of a child who has free access to his father at all times. there are three things which mark the children of god, the spiritual mind, the spiritual walk, and the spiritual talk. "the spirit itself beareth witness with our spirits that we are the children of god." [footnote: rom. viii. 16.] we then call out with the consciousness of sonship, "father, father." the witness of the spirit was given to me soon after my conversion and thrilled me with joyful assurance. it came to me when a christian doctor was telling his children about the way of salvation. he drew a line on the carpet with a stick and said, "on one side there is death, on the other, life," and i said to myself, "i know which side of the line i am on." so it was by means of this simple remark that i found out that i was really a child of god, and my heart began from that time to cling to god as my father. every day since then i have experienced the blessedness of trusting him and knowing him as my father. is this your happy portion? if not, why not? address iii the son of god portion of scripture--st. john i. 1-18, 29-34. "this is the son of god." these are the closing words of john the baptist's striking testimony, what a grand message! how it thrills us through and through! on and on the glorious words ring out, "_the son of god is come_." many years after, when the apostle john was a very old man, he wrote in one of his letters, "we know that the son of god is come." [footnote: i john v. 20.] now look back to the first words of our chapter. "in the beginning was the word." who is the word? it is "the son of god." when was the beginning? long, long ago in eternity that is past "the son of god was the brightness of his father's glory and the express image," [footnote: heb. i. 3.] or exact representation, "of his person." in his last prayer with his disciples our lord speaks of "the glory which he had with the father before the world was." [footnote: st. john xvii. 5.] the first verse of this gospel takes us back long before this world was created. then we come to the creation in verse 3: "all things were made by him." this is exactly what is said in the first verse of the bible of another beginning, "in the beginning god created the heavens and the earth." long before this world was created we read of god's dear son as "the image of the invisible god, the first-born of every creature." all things were created by him and for him, and he is before all things, the eternal son of god. [footnote: col. i. 15-17.] he says, "i was set up from everlasting from the beginning, before ever the earth was. when he appointed the foundations of the earth, then i was by him as one brought up with him; i was daily his delight, rejoicing always before him: rejoicing in the habitable parts of the earth, and my delights were with the sons of men." [footnote: gen. i. 26.] how wonderful it is to think that in the eternity that is past, and long before the world was made, god had two grand purposes. one was to create man to be the head of the whole human race. so, when the moment came that the earthly home was ready, then god said, "let us make man in our image, after our likeness." [footnote: prov. viii. 23, 29, 30, 31.] the other grand purpose in the eternal counsel between the father and his son was to redeem man after he had fallen through sin. the redeemer is the son of god himself, so he was foreordained to this work of redemption before the creation of the world--"the lamb slain from the foundation of the world." [footnote: rev. xiii. 8.] hundreds of years rolled on, and then the glorious message from heaven was sounded forth over the plains of bethlehem:--"behold, i bring you good tidings of great joy ... for unto you is born this day a saviour, which is christ the lord." [footnote: st. luke ii. 10, 11.] the son of god is come _where_ did he come from? _when_ did he come? _why_ did he come? these are some of the questions we must try to answer. first, where did he come from? he came forth from god. he was in the bosom of the father from all eternity. he said to the disciples, "i came forth from the father and am come into the world." [footnote: st. john xvi. 28.] we have read of two beginnings, now we will look at another beginning. in the first chapter of st. mark's gospel, and the first verse, we read, "the beginning of the gospel of jesus christ, the son of god." here we have the beginning of all that grand and glorious work of salvation which is still being carried on by our lord at the father's right hand in heaven. so we read of three beginnings, and these three are all of god. there is one more which is also of god. it is the beginning of the life of christ in the soul. when we read about "the beginning of the gospel of jesus christ," we know it means the beginning of his life on earth. have you ever asked whether there has been a beginning of his life _in your heart_? is it only what you read about, or is it a personal experience in your soul? alas! many join in singing the chorus, "what a wonderful saviour," who cannot say, "he is my own dear saviour." they have never been able to say "my spirit hath rejoiced in god my saviour." what is this personal experience of the life of christ in the soul? it is what the apostle paul describes when he says, "i have been crucified with christ, nevertheless i live, yet not i, but christ _liveth in me_." [footnote: gal. ii. 20.] "once far from god and dead in sin, no light my heart could see: but in god's word the light i found, now christ liveth in me." in writing to the galatians he says, "my little children, you for whom i am again undergoing, as it were, the pains of child-birth, until christ is fully formed within you" [footnote: gal. iv. 19.] (weymouth's translation). the son of god is come. secondly, when did he come? "it was when the fulness of the time was come," [footnote: gal. iv. 4.] that is when the time was ripe for it. god's clock is never too fast or too slow: so at the exact moment "when the fulness of time was come god sent forth _his son_." still and always his son, but now "made of a woman," "god, manifest in the flesh"--the god-man. the son of god is come. what is his name? god himself gave the name. "thou shalt call his name jesus." [footnote: st. matt. i. 21.] no other name was to be given: it is a command, "_thou shalt_ call his name jesus, for he shall save": that is why he is _come_. "he is come to seek and to save that which was lost." "thou shalt call his name jesus, for he himself shall save his people from their sins." he is presented to us as a living personal saviour. the promise is, "he, _himself_ shall save." it means that he will abide in each believing soul for ever. yes, moment by moment and for ever. he abides in us as the deliverer from all sin. what a glorious promise! are you living in the reality of it? "jesus! name of wondrous love, human name of god above." it is the god-given name. "the name which is above every name." is it precious to you? the son of god is come. thirdly, why did he come? the king sends ambassadors to represent him in foreign countries, but god sent "his own dearly loved son." "for god so loved the world that he gave his only begotten son." [footnote: st. john iii. 16.] the little word "_so_" means love in its unutterable fulness, and god is the source of it. have you ever thanked him for the unspeakable gift of his dear son? link the two words together, _god--the world_: it means god and you: god and me. then link together _loved_ and _gave_. it will take eternity to get to the bottom of those two words. now add that other precious text, "he loved me: he gave himself for me," [footnote: gal. ii. 20.] and you have "the grace of god bringing salvation." six times in the epistles we find the words "he gave himself," and in i peter ii. 24, it says, "who his own self bare our sins in his own body on the tree." this is why the son of god is come, and it is this which makes him so personally real to us when earthly things are fading away. i knew a working man who had a long, painful illness which lasted three years. i rejoice to say that soon after it began he was converted. he was so earnest that his one thought was to tell others what a dear saviour he had found, and many were led to christ through his example and testimony. his mother was converted through him and she is now carrying on the christian work which he began. what was it that changed this man? it was the holy spirit revealing christ to him as a living personal saviour. the day before he died he said to his sister, "i had such a lovely time with the master this morning in between the pain. oh! it was like healing balm to me and he gave me a little hymn- "'jesus loves me, he who died heaven's gate to open wide: he will wash away my sin, let his little child come in.'" how wonderful that a man nearly 40 years of age should find such comfort in a simple little hymn. but it is thus the lord reveals himself. do you feel that you are like a lost sheep? "the son of man is come to seek and to save that which was lost." [footnote: st. luke xix. 10.] the son of god is come! it is a fact, a certainty. a great reality. nothing can take it from us. it is a living experience in our inmost hearts. "and we know," says the apostle john, "that the son of god is come, and hath given us an understanding, that we may know him that is true; and we are in him that is true, even in his son, jesus christ. this is the true god, and eternal life." [footnote: i john v. 20.] the son of god is come and god presents him to us as his perfect son and our perfect saviour. twice during his earthly ministry there was a voice from heaven which said, "this is my beloved son in whom i am well pleased": "in whom i have perfect delight now and for ever." can you reply, "this is my beloved saviour and he is everything to me"? [footnote: st. matt. iii. 17 and xvii. 5.] he is either everything or nothing. are you like the merchant in the parable, "seeking goodly pearls, who when he had found one pearl of great price went and sold all that he had and bought it"? is your heart singing "i've found the pearl of greatest price, my heart doth sing for joy; and sing i must for christ is mine! christ shall my song employ!" a chinese convert told one of the missionaries that he happened to take up a testament which had been sold to the people of the house by a colporteur, but they could not see the meaning of it, so they laid it on one side. "but," he went on to say, "from the moment my eyes lighted upon it, i was greatly attracted by it. so i read and kept on reading till the meaning dawned upon me, and then," he added with a beaming face, "i found the pearl of great price." this reminds me of that strange story of a very valuable pearl necklace worth â£117,000 which was lost about a year ago. it was sent by post from paris to london when it suddenly disappeared and no one knew what had become of it. a very large reward was offered to any one who found it. but now comes the wonderful part of the story. one morning, a man of the name of horne was on his way to the factory where he was employed when he saw a large match-box lying in the gutter in st. paul's road, near london. he picked it up and put it in his pocket. presently he went into a public-house to have a glass of beer and there he met two of his mates. he took the match-box out of his pocket, pushed it open, and seeing it was filled with what he thought were white beads or marbles, he said to them, "what do you think of these, i've just picked them up?" "oh! they're no good," replied one of the men, "throw them away." however, horne decided to take them to the police station. the officers looked at them and said they were worth nothing, but gave him a receipt for them. on their way to the factory they turned into another public-house for a drink, and while there horne found one of the marbles loose in his coat pocket. "oh!" he said, "i've got one of them left." holding it up in his fingers, he looked round and asked, "will any one give me a penny for it?" but no one would have it. in another public-house where they stopped, he offered the pearl for a glass of beer, but no one accepted the offer. the pearl which was worth many hundreds of pounds was despised by one and all. then horne offered it for a packet of cigarettes, but again it was handed back with the remark, "that's no good to me." so one of his friends suggested that he should crush it under the heel of his boot as it was no good. later on when some one asked him what he had done with it he said he had thrown it away. it is a wonderful story and quite true. "oh!" you say, "what a thousand pities, if that man horne had only known its value, it would have made him a rich man in one day." are you not surprised that none of these men ever thought of finding out the real value of that pearl? but is it not stranger still that scarcely any one ever stops to inquire who jesus christ really is, and the meaning of his death on the cross? you listened just now with astonishment to the questions and answers about this valuable pearl, and yet the same questions are being asked every day about another pearl, god's pearl of great price, and people are treating it with the same indifference. how the angels must look on and wonder! there are two questions which you have to answer now. first, what think ye of christ, whose son is he? can you say, "he is the son of god"? think of the glory of his person: it is "the glory of the only begotten of the father." think of his divine mission: sent by god to be the saviour now and the judge by and by. think of him as god's great gift to a perishing world. have you received him? the other question which you have to answer is, "what shall i do with jesus?" remember god hath given to us eternal life and this life is in his son. "he who has the son has life, and he who has not the son of god has not life." [footnote: i john v. 12.] jesus is pleading with you, saying, "ye will not come," that means, you are unwilling to come to me "that you may have life." [footnote: st. john v. 40.] by and by you will have to face another question, "what will he do with me?" "the son of god is come." it is god himself who presents him to us: "behold the lamb of god who taketh away the sin of the world." [footnote: st. john i. 29.] he is the one whom god himself has provided and set apart: and "now he has appeared once for all to put away sin by the sacrifice of himself." [footnote: heb. ix. 26.] there on calvary's cross before the eyes of crowds of people "who came together to see that sight," he is set forth as the spotless son of god who was made an offering for sin. he it is "whom god now sets forth to us as a propitiation." [footnote: rom. iii. 25.] he it is, and no other, whom god sets forth as a mercy seat, the blood-sprinkled mercy seat. god's eye rests on christ and his finished work, and because it is a full, perfect and sufficient satisfaction for all our sins, "god sets him forth in order to demonstrate his righteousness that he may be shown to be righteous himself and the giver of righteousness to those who believe in jesus." oh, what a comfort it is to me to know that he is always there standing before god as the righteous one, and therefore when god looks at me in all my unworthiness he does not see me, he only sees his dear son. when that godly physician sir james simpson was dying, the minister who was by his bedside asked if he had any doubts. he looked up and said, "i have no doubts; when i stand before god i shall just _hold up christ to god."_ this is why jesus is come, and this is why jesus died, that the believing soul may hold him up to god as "the one who has been made unto us wisdom, righteousness, sanctification and redemption," [footnote: i cor. i. 30.] and it is all god's doing, from first to last. i love to say to myself,- "i'm a poor sinner and nothing at all, but jesus christ is my all in all." our salvation depends on believing god's word, that he has accepted our surety. when god raised him from the dead, it was a proof that all the claims of his holiness and justice had been fully met and satisfied. the debt is paid because jesus paid it all. he gave himself as a ransom--the redemption price for all. so now god sets him forth in all his untold preciousness and proclaims the glorious message, "_deliver him_, that poor helpless sinner, from going down into the pit. i have found a ransom." [footnote: job xxxiii. 24.] what was the price to be paid? "the son of man is come to give his life a ransom for many." "we are redeemed, not with silver and gold, but with the precious blood of christ." who can tell how precious? "more precious far than gold." think what it _cost_ the father: he gave his only son. "having yet one son, his well-beloved, he said, i will send him." think what it cost the son of god. think of his agony in the garden, and then the hiding of his father's face, and last of all the pouring out his soul unto death on the cross. our redemption is doubly precious, not only because of the price paid, but because of the divine and holy one who paid it, the lord of glory, even the son of god himself, "which things even the _angels_ desire to look into." [footnote: 1 pet. i. 12.] they long to see into the depths of this wondrous redeeming love. can you sing this chorus from your heart- "precious, precious, precious is my lord to me; precious, precious, everything in him i see." think of what we have been rescued from! christ has redeemed us from sin, and death and hell. think of the cost of this great salvation, and then ask yourself, how much is it worth to me? we shall only be able to answer that question when we are safe home in the glory. then we shall be looking back on death, looking back on the judgment of the great white throne, as never having come into it: looking back on the old world which has passed away. "when this passing world is done, when has sunk yon glorious sun, when i go to christ in glory, looking o'er life's finished story; then, lord, shall i fully know not till then--how much i owe." think of the last plague which god sent upon egypt. it was not till the midnight cry, that exceeding great and bitter cry had resounded through the land of egypt showing that the destroying angel had entered the houses of the egyptians, leaving death and desolation there; it was not till _the judgment had actually come_ that the israelites realised the delivering power of the blood which they had sprinkled on their doorposts. think of their wonder and of their thankfulness. they had believed and obeyed before, but _now_ their hearts are filled with gratitude and praise. if you have really cast yourself and all your sins on christ, then you too will join in the new song, saying, "thou art worthy, for thou wast slain and hast redeemed us to god by thy blood." [footnote: rev. v. 9.] to _receive_ christ now into our hearts by faith is to be born of god: [footnote: st. john. i. 12, 13.] spiritual life is imparted to the believer. to _feed_ upon christ day by day is to live by him: [footnote: st. john vi. 57.] this is the evidence of life in the believer. to see christ by and by and to be like him, is life perfected in glory. [footnote: 1 john iii. 2.] dear fellow sinners, let me entreat you most earnestly in the light of an eternity that is coming, and as you value your precious, never-dying souls, do not trifle with god's unspeakable gift. "how shall we escape if we neglect so great salvation?" [footnote: heb. ii. 3.] no one either in heaven or upon earth can answer that question. if the lost in hell could speak to us they would tell us that there is _no_ escape. the son of god is come, and oh! the wonder of it all, "he came to where i was." the words of this beautiful hymn describe it- "i looked and there was none to help, 'no man' could meet my case: a weary, world-worn heart was mine, without a resting place. then one drew near, the christ of god, with pitying eyes he scanned, jesus came to me where i was, and took me by the hand. "he led me first to calvary's mount, and, oh! what sight it gave! the agony, the life out-poured, it cost him there to save. my heart fell broken at his feet, who could such love withstand? the love that came to where i was, and took me by the hand. "he lifted me upon a rock, round me his light he shed; he poured his peace into my heart, he healed, he held, he fed. ah! then i knew that holy one, the whole could understand. the one who came to where i was, and took me by the hand. "and since that day, through all the days, his love my way has planned: he comes to bless me where i am, he takes me by the hand. this glorious one is all to me, he shall my life command, the christ who came to where i was, and took me by the hand." address iv the spirit of god portion of scripture--st. john iv. 1-26 god is a spirit. look at this poor woman standing at the well and let us try and realise what a wonderful revelation it was which christ made known to her soul about god. he told her that god is father, that god is saviour, and that god is spirit; three persons but one god. the lord opened her heart and she grasped this wondrous truth. christ said to her, "god the father is seeking you, he is longing for you to come to him." then he let her feel and see that he is the saviour. was it not wonderful that she was the first to tell the good news that he is "the saviour of the world"? [footnote: st. john iv. 42.] christ said to her, "god is a spirit," and she found that no one else but god could touch her heart. until the spirit of god comes into our hearts, we cannot really know god personally or have communion with him. "now we have received, not the spirit of the world, but the spirit which is of god; that we might know the things that are freely given to us of god." [footnote: 1 cor. ii. 12.] although our hearts are so sinful the holy spirit is longing to come in. he found an entrance into the heart of this poor woman whose life was a wreck with its four great failures. every life is a failure in god's sight, but we must never despair of any one, for "with god all things are possible," and as long as life lasts there is hope for the sinner. "the lord opened her heart," she heard and believed, and went home to tell others what a dear saviour she had found. it was the beginning of a revival at sychar, and every revival begins in the same way, god is revealed by his spirit and men realise the nearness of god. until a man really finds out what god is, there can be no true spiritual worship. this is the truth jesus came to make known to us when he says, "god is a spirit, and they that worship him must worship him in spirit and in truth," for the father seeketh such to worship him. yes, the father is seeking us, yearning for us to come close to him and to respond to his love for us. when our lord tells us that we must worship in spirit, he means that it is the spirit in man which responds to the spirit of god. do you offer him your heart's devotion and praise, or is it only lip-worship? true spiritual worship does not depend on forms or ceremonies or on any special place or time. i felt the point of this when a railwayman said to me, "we can be in touch with god all the day long." god is a spirit, just as "god is light." [footnote: 1 john i. 5.] and there are no limitations as to where he works or his ways and time of working. the holy spirit reveals to us far more about god than we ever imagined. the bible says, "eye hath not seen nor ear heard, neither have entered into the heart of man, the things which god hath prepared for them that love him. but god hath revealed them unto us by his spirit." [footnote: 1 cor. ii. 9, 10.] until the holy spirit opens our blind eyes to see spiritual things we cannot understand them. it is not the words of man's wisdom which can explain them, we need to use spiritual words for spiritual truths, so we can only speak as the holy spirit teaches us what to say. "the natural man receiveth not the things of the spirit of god, for they are foolishness unto him," [footnote: 1 cor. ii. 14.] he does not grasp the meaning of them. it is because god is a spirit that he meets our spiritual need when we feel altogether helpless and hopeless in ourselves, for he says, "i will put my spirit within you." [footnote: ezek. xxxvi. 27.] god begins in the very centre of our being, in our innermost hearts. god makes himself known to us as god, through our spiritual necessities. the presence of the holy spirit is a personal thing in each one who receives him. there is only one way by which we can receive the holy spirit, and that is by faith. the holy ghost has been given. will you ask yourself, have i received him? if not, why not? when god puts his spirit into our hearts he abides with us for ever. he never leaves us. even when we grieve him by our coldness of heart, he does not leave us. it is god who begins the work of grace in our hearts. the book which reveals to us what god is, opens with the words, "in the beginning, _god_." [footnote: gen. i. 1.] god is the beginner of all things, not only of the creation of the world, but of the new creation in our souls. this book unfolds to us how god begins and finishes the great work of redemption and salvation. we find another marvellous beginning which is also unfolded in this book. "the spirit of god moved upon the face of the waters." [footnote: 1 gen. i. 2.] it is a remarkable word; it means the spirit of god brooded on the face of the waters. in genesis we read, "the spirit of god was brooding," and in the gospels we find the spirit of god compared to a dove. the word "brooding" is a figure of the mother dove brooding over her nest and cherishing her young. the first time the holy spirit is mentioned in the old testament is in this verse, and the first emblem of the holy spirit in the new testament is in the 3rd chapter of st. matthew's gospel, where it says that, after our lord had been baptized, "the heavens were opened unto him, and he saw the spirit of god descending like a dove and lighting upon him." [footnote: st. matt. iii. 16.] first let us look at the background of the picture. we see darkness and desolation, death and ruin. then we see the spirit of god, the dove of peace, brooding over it all, and bringing light and life, love and peace out of the confusion. so the two thoughts which are here brought to our minds are motherhood and peace. if you look carefully into the word of god you will see how the thought of motherhood is brought before us in many ways in connection with the person and work of the holy spirit. when christ is speaking of the new birth, he says we are "born of the spirit." [footnote: st. john iii. 6.] again, when the cry of the new-born soul is spoken of, we are told how it comes; for paul says, "god hath sent forth the spirit of his son into your hearts, crying, abba, father." [footnote: gal. iv. 6] again there is the beautiful expression, "the spirit of adoption." "we have received the spirit of adoption whereby we cry abba, father." [footnote: rom. viii. 15.] "abba" means "dear father." when god would reveal his heart of love to us he says, "as one whom his mother comforteth, so will i comfort you." [footnote: isa. lxvi. 13.] think of a mother busy with her work, and her little one playing on the floor. presently there is a cry, it has fallen down, and in a moment the mother is by its side to soothe it. but there is something sweeter still. even if nothing befall the child the mother is near by to help it over every difficulty and to respond to every look and sign. even so our god who is to us our mother comforter, says, "before they call i will answer, and while they are yet speaking i will hear." [footnote: isa. lxv. 24] the little child always turns to its mother for comfort in every trouble. there is one thing which we notice in every home, that is, the mother's tender love and constant care for her little one. night and day her child is her one thought. so the lord says of his people, "i the lord do keep it, lest any hurt it, i will keep it night and day." [footnote: isa. xxvii. 3.] every child of god can say-"moment by moment i'm kept in his love." does the child need the mother's constant, watchful care? yes, because everything around is like a new world to the little one, it is all a new experience. the mother gives herself up so entirely to the child that it depends on her for everything. in the same way when the soul is born again it is brought into a new relation to god, it has entered into a new experience and the holy spirit becomes to it just what the mother is to the child and much more. just as the mother trains the little one to take the first steps in walking and holds it up, so it is the holy spirit who teaches us how to walk and to please god. the little hand is slipped into mother's hand to be led and held up. "as many as are led by the spirit of god they are the sons of god." [footnote: rom. viii. 14.] the mother keeps the child close to her, so the holy spirit is the comforter to us, by our side, for the word "comforter" means, the one whom we call to our side to help us. just as the mother tells her child what to say when it wants anything, so he helps us when we pray, "for we know not what we should pray for as we ought." [footnote: rom. viii. 26.] "the comforter is come." when did he come? on the day of pentecost, for it was _then_ that the holy spirit was poured out, and he has been with us ever since. let those words ring in your heart and in your life, "the comforter is come." [footnote: st. john xv. 26.] there is a beautiful hymn which illustrates the presence and work of the holy spirit in our hearts. it begins with the words- "spirit divine! attend our prayers, and make our hearts thy home." then four things are mentioned which show forth god's power in nature. light, fire, dew, wind. in the bible they are all used as symbols of the presence and power of the holy spirit working in the hearts of men. in nature we know that human power is small compared with the power of light, fire, wind, and water. have we learnt to depend only on the power of the holy ghost? god's voice is ever saying to us now, oh! that we may listen, "not by might, nor by power, but by my spirit, saith the lord." [footnote: zech. iv. 6.] just as all the marvels of the natural world are perfectly carried out by god's wisdom and power, so he has given the holy spirit to make him perfectly known as a living presence, a living power and reality in our hearts and lives. in the second verse of the hymn we find the words- "come as the light--to us reveal our emptiness and woe." we know what the light does when it shines into a room, it reveals or shows up any dust we had not noticed before. so when the light of god shines into our hearts it reveals what we never saw before. have you ever watched the battleships on a dark night, anchored a little way off from the coast? suddenly the bright dazzling searchlights are sent out from the ship. they seem to sweep over the ocean with their sparkling light and then to wrap you round, as you stand there on the shore. the sight fills you with wonder; you feel as if the eyes of all on board ship can see you. it is the same when the holy spirit shines into our hearts; it is almost overwhelming; we can only cry, "woe is me, for i am undone." [footnote: isa. vi. 5.] we stand condemned under the searching eye of god. all our self-righteous excuses are swept away. we can no longer take refuge in the fact that we are as good as others and a great deal better than some of our neighbours. the dazzling light of god's presence has searched us through and through and turned us inside out. is this searching necessary for every one? yes, for it is the only way we can learn to know the evil of our hearts. sometimes the light of the holy spirit comes to us in a quiet moment and shows us what we never saw before. sometimes it comes like a flash. it flashed out on the road when saul of tarsus was on his way to damascus. he described it when he was being tried before king agrippa, "at midday, o king, i saw in the way a light from heaven, above the brightness of the sun, shining round about me. and i fell to the ground and i heard a voice saying unto me, saul, saul, why persecutest thou me? and he tells us also that he could not see for the glory of that light." [footnote: acts xxvi. 13, xxii 17.] whenever the light comes it is a revelation, a moment never to be forgotten: darkness conceals, light reveals. the spirit of god brooded over the face of the waters, and god said, "let there be light and there was light." [footnote: gen. i. 3.] the holy spirit not only shows us what we are, but he shows christ to us; then we see the glory of god in the face of jesus christ. "for god, who commanded the light to shine out of darkness, hath shined in our hearts to give the light of the knowledge of the glory of god in the face of jesus christ." [footnote: 2 cor. iv. 6.] yes, god's glory is radiant on the face of christ and the holy spirit reveals it. he delights to show us his beauty and his loveliness and thus to glorify him. he makes him a reality in our souls--"a living bright reality." if you have not seen him as "altogether lovely" it is not because the holy spirit is not willing to show him to you, but because you turn away and will not look. how good it is of god to send the holy spirit into this world on purpose to reveal these things to us. we should never see them but for him. "the natural man receiveth not the things of the spirit of god, neither can he know them because they are spiritually discerned." [footnote: i cor. ii. 14.] what is the natural man? it is what we are by nature before the spirit of god gives us a new life. when it says "he receiveth not the things of the spirit of god," it means that he has no power to receive them. he is groping in the dark, loving the darkness rather than the light. a poor woman who had led a careless worldly life, sent me this message when she was dying, "tell her the little prayer she taught me has been answered. she will understand. tell her god has shown me myself and he has shown me himself, so i am going to be with him." the little prayer which she had learnt from my lips was this--"lord, show me myself; lord, show me thyself." how i thanked god that he used it for the saving of her soul. when the holy spirit convinces us of sin and of our need of a saviour, he does not leave us there. he draws aside the veil and reveals to us the secret love of god. when our eyes have been opened to know that god is _light_, then we find out that god is _love_. how did this love of god show itself? god sent his son, "in this was manifested the love of god towards us because that god sent his only begotten son into the world that we might live through him." [footnote: 1 john iv. 9.] it is not only the love of god made known and shining out in the gift of his son, but we are told that "god commendeth his love towards us." [footnote: rom. v. 8.] how does god commend his love? he sets together his love for his son and his love for the sinner, and his love for the sinner is so great that he gave his son to die for us. thus the words "god commendeth his love" make it quite clear that "god loves the sinner with a love which gives its best, gives everything, keeping nothing back, and gives to everybody." "oh, the love that gave jesus to die, the love that gave jesus to die, praise god it is mine this love so divine- the love that gave jesus to die." "god commendeth his love towards us in that, when we were yet sinners," it makes no difference _who_ we are or _what_ we have been, the holy spirit fixes our thoughts on that little word "yet." the text says, "when we were yet sinners, still far off, still lost and undone, christ died for us"; so the blood of jesus christ, god's son, "cleanseth us from all sin." [footnote: i john i. 7.] when we feel that sin is really a burden then the holy spirit points us to the little word "all." then he applies the precious blood to our guilty consciences, assuring us by the word that the blood of jesus christ does cleanse from all sin so that not a single stain is left. it is a perfect cleanser, there is nothing it cannot do. then the holy spirit shows us that god has provided a perfect covering for us in the robe of christ's righteousness. it is thus that the comforter, who is the spirit of truth, leading into all truth, shows us the meaning of christ's redeeming work and enables us to understand it and to appropriate it. when we do this it is indeed a blessed experience. a young man whom i know described it as follows: "i heard the voice of god saying to me, 'who told thee that thou wast naked?' [footnote: gen. iii. 11.] i am sure that it was the work of the holy spirit showing me my utter helplessness and leading me to seek the covering of christ's righteousness. i feel i am exactly suited to jesus as he is exactly suited to me, for i am just the one who needs his fulness, and he is the only one that can supply my emptiness." i praised god for this clear testimony, and i have seen again and again ever since i began to work for the lord many years ago, that the holy spirit delights to reveal the lord jesus christ as "a full saviour for empty sinners." the gospel of st. john tells us very plainly that the holy ghost was sent, not only to make us see the meaning of christ's finished work, but also to prepare our hearts to receive it in all its fulness. how does the holy spirit prepare our hearts? first, he opens our hearts, awakens in us a sense of our need and sinfulness, then, when he has opened our hearts, he breathes into them a new life; he creates a longing for god. we feel within us a burning desire to know god. we catch eagerly at everything we hear about god, this is quite a new experience; we used to go on year after year not troubling about it in the very least. what is this new experience, this seeking after god? it is what the bible calls "repentance." the word means "change of mind." again and again the apostle paul urged upon both jews and greeks the necessity of "repentance towards god and faith towards our lord jesus christ." [footnote: acts xx. 21.] a few days ago i received a touching letter from a young friend telling me how god's spirit had led her to repentance. she wrote, "when i was a little girl and began to seek the lord, i was very much troubled because i could not feel sorry enough for my sins. i wanted a real repentance to come to the lord with. i thought repentance meant crying over one's sins a great deal, and i could not feel sorry enough to cry as i wanted to. i used to keep praying, 'give me a real repentance.' many times i dreamed i had this deep repentance and could cry over my sins, and i have awakened with my face really bathed in tears, but oh, how disappointing it was to find it only a dream and i had not got what i wanted after all. i went on like this until i was twenty, when the lord spoke these words with great power to my soul, 'the goodness of god leadeth thee to repentance.' the voice seemed audible and i turned to see if anybody had spoken to me. i was able to weep enough then, but they were tears of joy and gratitude, and i well remember saying aloud, 'o lord, why me, why one so sinful as i am?' i now see that repentance means 'a change of mind' and not a flood of tears. had i known this when a child it would have saved me years of toiling and praying for repentance." dear friends, perhaps some of you are trying to get right with god. look at the text which gave such peace to this seeking one. it begins with this question, "despisest thou the riches of his goodness and forbearance and longsuffering, not knowing that the goodness of god leadeth thee to repentance?" [footnote: rom. ii. 4.] we little know that all the time we are working and toiling we are really despising, turning away from the riches of his goodness. the word "riches" shows how abundant his goodness is; therefore we are "without excuse." god's forbearance in delaying punishment, and his longsuffering in patiently waiting, show that his purpose in thus dealing with us is to lead us to repentance, which is not merely grief for sin, but a thorough inward change. so we now know what we did not know before, that it is "the goodness of god that leads us to repentance." yes, we find now that instead of working our way, back to god, he is there close to us, with open arms to receive us, stretching out his loving hand to save us. we find that instead of trying to gain god's favour by our prayers and good works, god's righteousness is there for us all ready and provided for us. we find that we are accepted in his dear son not for any good thing we have done, but simply by faith in jesus. all this is shown to us by the holy spirit, and without him we could not have seen it. we were speaking just now about repentance. have you ever noticed that when our lord began preaching the gospel, the first word he said was "repent." [footnote: st. matt. iv. 17.] why did he call to the crowds so earnestly to repent? again and again that word keeps ringing out. he wanted to make them see that he condemned the way they were living and their religious professions. it was a call to stop and think, as if he said to them, "you have lost your way, you are on the wrong road, stop and turn round." first he points to the right road. he proclaims that the kingdom of god is come. then he says to them, but before you can enter in you must repent. the people recognised the meaning of the call; they knew that if they obeyed the whole course of their lives would have to be changed, because having lost the true centre of life, they were simply _drifting_. the man who is living without god is like a ship drifting on the wide ocean without a pilot or chart or compass. for three years he pleaded with them tenderly and lovingly, and at last they gave their final answer to his message. they said, "we will not submit to the divine government, we will not have this man to reign over us," [footnote: st. luke xix. 14.] _and so they crucified him_. when we have been led by the holy spirit to repentance we see sin, and we see ourselves in a new light. as soon as we really know god we cannot help being sorry for our sin. we begin to long for a saviour, a mediator, and it is then that the holy spirit points us to jesus. repentance, or change of mind, is the first step, and then follows conversion--a change of heart and life. the word conversion means "turning round." jesus says, "except ye be converted and become as little children, ye shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven." [footnote: st. matt. xviii. 3.] think of god's two great gifts; first, the gift of his only begotten son, then the gift of the holy spirit. have you received them? perhaps you ask, "how can i know?" if you have received the holy spirit there will be joy and peace in your heart, and the fruits of the spirit will be seen in your daily life. "now the god of hope fill you with all joy and peace in believing, that ye may abound in hope through the power of the holy ghost." [footnote: rom. xv. 13.] "and the disciples were filled with joy and with the holy ghost." [footnote: acts xiii. 52.] they were filled again and again, more and more filled with joy and with the holy spirit. you, too, may have a spirit-filled life. god says to you now, and he is saying it every day and every hour, "_be filled with the spirit._" [footnote: eph. v. 18.] remember there are different degrees in the christian life. first, there is everlasting life for all who seek it. only ask me, jesus said to the woman of samaria, and i will give you _living_ water. then he leads her on a step further. "it shall be in you a well of water." it will be an abundant life, a joyous, satisfying life. afterwards he tells us that it will be a life "overflowing for others." [footnote: st. john vii. 38, 39.] this is to be the experience of all believers now through the holy spirit. lastly, the crowning of it all is still to come and we shall drink of "the pure river of the water of life." [footnote: rev. xxi. 1.] that will be the fulness of life through all eternity. address v the voice of god portion of scripture--genesis xxviii. 10-22. jacob is leaving home for the first time, to take a long journey of 450 miles. he is quite alone and he feels very lonely when he lies down the first night in a barren place, with a stone for his pillow. jacob was like some of us, he had heard about god ever since he was a child, but god was not real to him because he had never had any personal dealings with him. that night he had a wonderful dream, and it made a great difference to his whole life. the ladder which he saw in his dream was to show him that there was a gulf between him and god: and the gulf was caused by his sins. it also showed the necessity for some means of communication to be provided for him. right down to his deep need the ladder came, right up to god himself the ladder reached. it was set up on earth and it reached to heaven to make him understand that the gulf had been bridged over, so that now, constant, free communication was possible between his soul and god. the ladder which jacob saw in his dream is mentioned again in st. john's gospel. jesus said to nathaniel, "because i said unto thee i saw thee under the fig tree, believest thou? thou shalt see greater things than these. and he saith unto him, verily, verily, i say unto you, hereafter ye shall see heaven open and the angels of god ascending and descending upon the son of man." [footnote: st. john i. 50, 51.] the lord jesus had been revealing himself to nathaniel and this conversation took place near bethel, so that the reference to jacob's ladder was very forcible and the wonderful type was made clear. when jesus said that heaven would be opened, he meant not only opened just once, but _remaining open_; so that ever since christ ascended into heaven we have lived and are still living under an "open heaven," which means free intercourse between god and man, because christ himself is the ladder. it also means he is the one and only means of communication between the sinner and god. it is "through him we have access by one spirit unto the father." [footnote: eph. ii. 18.] all that we know of god comes to us through him, and all the grace we receive from god comes through him. so jacob's ladder is as real to us now as it was to him then, for it connects the seen with the unseen. it is possible for us now to have christ's presence with us always and everywhere, for he says lo, i am with you alway. [footnote: matt. xxviii. 20.] but there was something more wonderful for jacob to see even than the ladder. "the lord stood above the ladder." it was the first time in his life he had realised the presence of god. he had lived over forty years without realising that god was close to him. when he awoke from his dream he said, "surely the lord is in this place and i knew it not." he never forgot it, just as we never forget the time and place where we are converted. one hundred years after that night, when he was a very old man, he mentioned it to his son. he said to joseph, "god almighty appeared unto me at luz and blessed me." [footnote: gen. xlviii. 3.] but what impressed him deeply was that _there_ in that lonely place, many miles away from any human being, he heard the voice of god speaking to him. it was then that a new life began in his soul, for god told him that from that moment he would be with him _everywhere_, blessing him and protecting him from all danger, and it was then jacob began to trust god as his _god_. so we see how god's glory and god's grace were shining down from the top of the ladder into poor jacob's heart. jacob was face to face with god for the first time, and he began to tremble with fear. if only you could realise that god is now, at this very moment, straight in front of you, you would fall down on your face before him, and you would cry to him as job did, "i have heard of thee by the hearing of the ear, but now mine eye seeth thee; wherefore i abhor myself and repent in dust and ashes." [footnote: job xlii. 5, 6.] it is at this moment that we realise for the first time our need of a substitute, just as job did, for he said, "he is not a man as i am that i should answer him, neither is there any daysman betwixt us that can lay his hand upon us both." [footnote: job ix. 33.] how job would have rejoiced in the glorious revelation which christ has brought to us. "there is one god, and one mediator between god and men, the man christ jesus, who gave himself a ransom for all." [footnote: 1 tim. ii. 5, 6.] he is not only the mediator laying his hand upon us both, but he _gave himself_, that is, he gave his life as a _ransom_. the ransom price was his own precious blood, for the life is in the blood. it is the blood of god's own dear son which makes an atonement for the soul. the sentence passed on you and me and on every sinner is the sentence of death, for death is the penalty for sin. we are all under the sentence of death, but the glorious message is sent god has found a substitute. "he bore on the tree the sentence for me, and now both the surety and sinner are free." you and i now have what job longed for so earnestly. the daysman is the son of god himself, "whom god hath set forth to be a propitiation," that is an atoning sacrifice, "through faith in his blood." [footnote: rom. iii. 25.] at first jacob trembled with fear, but after he had heard the loving words which god spoke to him from the top of that wonderful ladder, then he began to realise that he was no longer alone in that lonely place. he said, "this is the house of god, this is the gate of heaven." earth had faded from his sight and he was surrounded by heavenly realities. and so it is now, the veil is very thin which separates earth from heaven, the temporal from the eternal. it was _god's voice_ which woke him up spiritually. god revealed himself as the personal god to jacob. we can recognise a friend by his voice even if we do not see him. so it is the voice more than anything else which makes the presence of any one real to us. we have an illustration of this in the pictures of the gramophone in which we see a dog listening for the master's voice. the sheep knows the shepherd's voice; the child is quick in recognizing its mother's voice; why do we turn a deaf ear to god's voice? how tenderly he pleads with us, saying, "but my people would not hearken to my voice." [footnote: ps. lxxxxi. 11.] god wants to be very real and very personal to each one of us, so he says, "unto you, o men, i call, and my voice is to the sons of man." [footnote: prov. viii. 4.] god has been calling us from the very beginning. far back in the 3rd chapter of genesis, when adam was hiding among the trees of the garden, it was god's voice which called him out with the searching question, where art thou? it was as if he said, "adam, i want you." he is the seeking god still. it was god's voice that reminded adam of the holy, happy friendship now broken by sin. before sin came into the world adam never listened to any other voice, and now when god is yearning to bring us to himself, he says, "listen." that word listen, or hearken, comes again and again in the bible. we find it very often in isaiah and jeremiah. when god is pleading with the sinner, that is the word he uses more than any other. in psalm lxxxi., where god tells us how grieved he is by our waywardness, he says, "oh that my people had listened or hearkened unto me." and in deuteronomy xxviii. 45, he tells them that their troubles have been sent because they would not hearken to the voice of the lord their god. i think god has chosen this special way of calling us by his voice, because it is what we can all understand--it is so simple and so homely. when a boy is disobedient the father calls him, then he talks to him and pleads with him. the father's voice touches the boy's heart. how wonderful it is that god's voice can reach us, however far off we may be. you have sometimes been to an open-air service, and you have heard the speaker's voice a good way off, but now it has been discovered that any one's voice can travel through the air and be heard above 300 miles away by means of a new apparatus called the wireless telephone. some time ago a gentleman living in england put a special receiver to his ear and he actually heard a man speaking in france, more than 300 miles away. a year or two ago when the _titanic_ went down among the icebergs, you remember how the wireless telegraph sent messages to other ships calling for help. this was done by special letters, flashed across the ocean, such as c.q.d. (come quick, danger) or when the ship was sinking s.o.s. (save our souls). but wonderful as this is, how much more wonderful it is to discover a way by which any one's voice can be heard miles and miles away. very likely as time goes on and the wireless telephone is more used, you will be able to speak to your father or son far away in australia or canada, so that they will not only hear your voice distinctly, but they will answer back, and you will hear their voices just as if you were sitting together again at home. what a wonderful thing it will be to have this close link with them! it is the same as the link which jacob felt when he heard god's voice speaking; it seemed to bring god quite close to him and to make god so real, that he started again on his journey cheered and encouraged; for we read in the first verse of the next chapter, "then jacob went on his journey," and in the margin it says he lifted up his feet, showing his heart was lightened of its burden: when the heart is heavy, our feet drag. but he made a fresh start: and if only god's voice reaches your heart now, you will go on your way rejoicing; it will be like making a fresh start. again and again we read of god talking to those who were willing to hear his voice. for example, "the lord talked with moses face to face as a man speaketh unto his friend," [footnote: exod. xxxiii. 9, 11.] and at mount sinai "moses spake and god answered him by a voice." not only is the link of communication perfect between god and man, but the way in which we can use it and be put in touch with god is so simple: it is by faith--that is all. we have another illustration of this when we think of the wireless messages. the world's greatest wireless station is in a little village called nassau, in germany. a short time ago a message was sent to a place far, far away over the ocean, 6,500 miles away. how was it started? only by touching a key in the machine. that touch releases the lightning which carries a message for thousands of miles over vast continents and across the boundless sea. only a touch--is it not like the touch of faith? but we must not forget that when the message has reached its destination, when these waves of sound talk across the world, the ear at the other end must be prepared to hear the call. there is the hearing of faith, as well as the touch of faith. the hearing means not only listening, but being willing to obey the voice. i have been told that when a message is to be sent by wireless telephone, the other waves of sound must be quite still before the person receiving the message can hear it. the speaker has to wait till the vibrations settle down, there must be perfect stillness, and then the voice is heard. how important it is to shut out all other sounds so that our hearts may be still enough to hear god speak. we must listen with an obedient heart. do you remember how one sunday was set apart not long ago to make collections for the blind. at midnight on saturday, a royal message was sent forth which encircled the whole world. it was king george's "god speed" to the appeal for the blind. it was flashed from the wireless station on a lonely cliff in cornwall to another station in america, and it went over the seven oceans of the world. it was received by forty-five ships in the atlantic. they were all warned it was coming and they were expecting it. the white star liner _baltic_, 810 miles away, heard it, and it travelled on to india, and it was caught up there 1,500 miles away. this reminds me of another royal message from the king of kings which is also encircling the world and telling the good news wherever man is willing to hear it. "he that hath an ear let him hear what the spirit saith unto the churches." [footnote: rev. ii. 7.] how the solemn call rings out, and rings on: to-day, to-day! how it sounds in our ears with startling urgency, and it is the holy ghost who says it, "to-day, if you will hear his voice, harden not your heart." [footnote: heb. iii. 7.] when we are careless and indifferent to what god's voice is saying to us then we are hardening our hearts. perhaps in days gone by you once listened to god's voice. why did you give up listening? "ah!" you reply, "other voices came and drowned that still small voice, and the voice of the evil one poisoned my mind." let me ask you one more question, has god's voice ever stopped calling? no, god is still calling. oh, that now at this very moment you may be able to say, "the voice of god has reached my heart." if any of you turn a deaf ear to god's voice, remember the time is coming when "all who are in the graves shall hear his voice and shall come forth"; [footnote: st. john. v. 25.] and to you it will be a coming forth to judgment and condemnation. how does god speak to us now? we can hear the voice of god speaking in his word. when any portion of scripture is specially impressed on our minds it shows that god is speaking to us. a young man who had been seeking god very earnestly said one day, "while reading the word, i felt certain that god had really spoken to my soul, that he had actually said to me, live!" yes, that young man was right, for that is just what god has said to us, but it makes all the difference whether we each one receive it as if god is really saying it to us personally. luther felt this, for he used to say, "when i open the bible it talks to me." why is the bible like no other book? because it is the revelation of god himself. the glory of god shines in its pages. in life and in death the only source of comfort is a personal god. our great need is to have god personally near, _near and dear_. never rest till you can look up into his face with confidence and say, "thou art near, o lord." [footnote: ps. cxix. 151.] he is saying to you now, "seek ye my face." [footnote: ps. xxvii. 8.] what answer will you give? will you say to god now, "thy face, lord, will i seek." when we seek his face, then we see "the glory of god in the face of jesus christ." [footnote: 2 cor. iv. 6.] how grand it all is, and yet how simple! let me say one word of loving appeal to any who have never really sought the lord. how is it that you say your prayers and yet you do not expect to get an answer direct from god? because, like jacob, you have never believed there is a god. you have not got hold of the first truth which the bible teaches us, _god is_; "he that cometh to god must believe that he is." [footnote: heb. xi. 6.] when you pray, he must be as real to you as if you saw him standing by hearing and answering you. until our eyes are opened to see that death and judgment, heaven and hell, are great realities we do not really cry to god, and when we do we find out that we have never realised there is a god. think of what god offers to you. forgiveness, life and glory. would you neglect getting these priceless gifts if you believed they were the real offers of a real person? "what meanest thou, o sleeper? arise, call upon thy god." [footnote: jonah i. 6.] address vi the hands of god portion of scripture--st. john xx. 19-31. why has this gospel been written? the last verse of this chapter tells us. "it has been written that we may believe that jesus is the christ, the son of god, and that believing we may have life through his name." in the old testament when "the name" is mentioned it meant the unveiling of the grace and glory and power of god. so we read men called upon "the name"--and in the new testament when the divine glory of christ is described we find the same expression, "his name." it means his nature and his character. in the verse which we have just read, the wonderful truth shines out that it is through his name, through all that he is, and all he has done, that we have _life_. so christ himself declares, "my sheep hear my voice and i know them and they follow me, and i give unto them eternal life, and they shall never perish, neither shall any man pluck them out of my hand. my father, which gave them me, is greater than all, and no man is able to pluck them out of my father's hand. i and my father are one." [footnote: st. john x. 27-30.] christ first speaks of his own hand and then of his father's hand, so there are two hands which hold us fast and keep us safe, now and for ever. let us look at what is said about the hands of god in the bible. think of god's hands in creation. the psalmist says, "of old hast thou laid the foundation of the earth: and the heavens are the work of thy hands." [footnote: psa. cii. 25.] "the sea is his and he made it: and his hands formed the dry land." [footnote: ps. xcv. 5.] think of his strong hands in providence, as moses said, "thy right hand, o lord, is become glorious in power." [footnote: exod. xv. 6.] nehemiah speaks again and again of "the good hand of my god upon me," [footnote: neh. ii. 8.] when he tells us of all god's loving help and guidance in the difficult work he had undertaken. think again of god's loving hands in grace, healing the broken in heart and binding up their wounds. how safe david felt when he said, "thy right hand upholdeth me." [footnote: ps. lxiii. 8.] he shows his confidence in god when he prays, "hold thou me up and i shall be safe." [footnote: ps. cxix. 117.] when your child wants you to hold him up he slips his little hand in yours, doesn't he? have you ever put your weak hand into god's strong loving hand so as to let him do the holding up? the saints in olden times felt god's hand in everything, over-ruling, planning, guiding, and jesus assures us of the perfect safety and everlasting security of the believer, for he says, "no one, either man or devil, can pluck them out of my hand, nor shall any man be able to pluck them out of my father's hand;" [footnote: st. john x. 28, 29.] so there are two divine hands holding us fast. think once more of the hands of god: not only strong hands to help and to heal, but _redeeming_ hands, mighty to save; hands that have been in the fire to pluck us out of the burning; hands that have laid hold of the enemy and have overcome him; hands that have unlocked the gates of a new life that we may enter in. not long ago a little girl was caressing her dear old nurse, and when she caught sight of the deep scars in her hands she asked, "how did you get these scars?" the nurse looked at her very tenderly and then she said, "when you were a baby, a fire broke out one night when you were asleep in your cot. i plunged my hands into the flames and lifted you out." the child's eyes were full of tears as she looked at the dear scarred hands, the hands that had been wounded to save her. those scarred hands remind me of another story. one day, about thirty years ago, some children were playing on a mountain in france, and their merry peals of laughter attracted the notice of a shepherd lad who was taking care of the sheep a little way off. suddenly a wolf foaming at the mouth came in sight. he saw it run madly down the mountain towards the children. without a moment's hesitation he rushed forward, seized the wolf, and grappled with it. after a fierce struggle he managed to bind a leather strap around its mouth, and then he killed it, but not before the wolf, which was raving mad, had bitten him severely in the hand. this occurred just at the time when pasteur, the famous paris doctor, had discovered a remedy for hydrophobia. without delay the shepherd lad who had saved the lives of the children at such a cost was taken to paris and was cured. hundreds of patients are sent to the pasteur institute at paris and when they ring the bell, the door is opened by an elderly man with a scar on his hand. he was once the shepherd lad who rescued the children from the raving wolf, and the deep scars are from its bite. inside the hall there is a statue representing him in the terrible struggle with the wolf. think of the wounded hands of the son of god. do you ask where? how? why? where were they wounded? on calvary's cross. how? "they pierced my hands and my feet." [footnote: ps. xxii. 16.] this is the wonder of it, "he was wounded for our transgressions." look at the 53rd chapter of isaiah, and there you will see jesus as the suffering substitute. seven times in that chapter it is distinctly mentioned that all his suffering was because he was bearing our sins. notice in verse 5 it says, "he was wounded for our transgressions, he was bruised for our iniquities." then in verse 6, "the lord hath laid on him the iniquity of us all." in verse 8, "for the transgression of my people was he stricken," or the stroke was upon him. he stood between the stroke of divine justice and the sinner and received the blow himself. in verse 10, "thou shalt make his soul an offering for sin;" verse 11, "he shall bear their iniquities;" verse 12, "he bare the sin of many." jesus was the suffering substitute because he was the sin-bearer. see how in his death he was identified with the sinner. for in verse 12 we read, "he was numbered with the transgressors." in the gospels we are told that there were two thieves crucified with him, on either side one and jesus in the midst. i once saw a coloured illustration of the three crosses on calvary. one cross was painted black, the other was white, and the middle one was red. now if we look at those three crosses on calvary from the divine standpoint, it seems as if one cross which was black at first is now white. it is the cross of the penitent thief; all his sins have been transferred to the sin-bearer, so now there is not one sin on him; he has been washed "whiter than snow." the cross of the impenitent thief is black, and remains black, for he dies with all his sins on him and goes into the blackness of darkness for ever. the middle cross is red: jesus the holy one has no sin in him, but the sin of the whole world is _on_ him, because he is the atoning sacrifice for sin. "o christ, what burdens bowed thy head, our load was laid on thee. thou stoodest in the sinner's stead, didst bear all ill for me. a victim led, thy blood was shed, now there's no load for me." in the writings of an american evangelist we meet with this quaint illustration, "god uses bright red to get pure white out of dead black." it is just the same truth as we have seen shining out from the three crosses. there we see jesus "in the midst," the god-appointed sacrifice for sin, and we see the penitent thief washed whiter than snow in the precious blood. we see jesus again "in the midst," three days after. it is in the upper room at jerusalem, on easter sunday. the disciples who were like scattered sheep have gathered together there once more, though still trembling with fear. "then came jesus and stood in the midst and said unto them, peace be unto you." [footnote: st. john xx. 19.] it was the first time he had spoken to them since the night when he was betrayed when they had forsaken him and had run away. he might have met them with a reproof, but he knows all about our poor hearts, so he meets them with a smile and the sweet greeting, "peace be unto you." and he says it to them _all_, even to peter who had denied his lord, and to the others who had forsaken him. yes, he has only one greeting for them one and all, and that is "peace." then a pause, and after the pause there came a revelation--"he showed them his hands and his side." why did he show them the nail prints in his hands and the deep wound in his side? it was to reveal to them the wondrous truth that he himself is our peace, and that the peace which he gives is the peace which he has himself made through the blood of his cross. [footnote: col. i. 20.] "through christ on the cross peace was made, my debt by his death was all paid; no otter foundation is laid, for peace the gift of god's love." he showed them his hands and his side, because he wants them to understand that these sacred scars tell us of his wondrous love and of the infinite cost of redemption. let us lift up our hearts and say- "oh, make me understand it, help me to take it in, "what it meant to thee the holy one to bear away my sin." we find from st. john's gospel that thomas, one of the twelve, was not among them when jesus came, so the rest of the disciples told him, "we have seen the lord." he replied, "unless i see in his hands the wound made by the nails, and put my finger into the wound, and put my hand into his side, i will never believe it." so when a week later jesus says to thomas, "reach hither thy finger and behold (or feel) my hands, and reach hither thy hand and thrust it into my side," [footnote: st. john xx. 27.] it shows how our lord made these scars the very test of his faith, and it is the same now. in st. luke's gospel we read that he said, "behold my hands and my feet." when he showed them the marks of his sufferings for them, it was as if he said, "here is the guarantee of your pardon and peace." we cannot have peace until we have pardon; many seek peace instead of taking pardon first. when he showed them his hands, and his feet, and his side, it was as if he said, "you need cleansing from all sin; here are the marks of the cleansing blood. you need the touch of healing power, and here is the hand that will give it to you. you want companionship in your daily life. here are the feet that will travel with you, you never walk alone." what wonderful tenderness and love! if ever you feel depressed or ready to doubt god's love, remember how "he showed them his hands and his side," that they might see those sacred scars. and we read in the next verse, "then were the disciples glad when they saw the lord." yes, "they were filled with joy at seeing the master." you will remember how troubled thomas had been before this, but now the sight of the wounded hands took away all his doubts and fears. it was then that his faith rose higher than that of any of the others, for he exclaimed with adoration and worship, "my lord, and my god!" if ever you wander away or your heart grows cold and careless, think of those words, "he showed them his hands and his side," and remember he is still the same in the glory. when the beloved apostle john looked through the open door into heaven, he saw him standing there in the midst of the throne with the nail prints in his hands and feet, "a lamb as it had been slain." [footnote: rev. v. 6.] what a sight! "dear dying lamb, thy precious blood shall never lose its power, till all the ransomed church of god be saved to sin no more." but _why_ did he show them the wounds in his hands and side? to make it plain that he bore all the penalty of sin. some speak about sin as if it were only a mistake, but god says sin is guilt, and that all are guilty, for all have sinned. we have offended against god's holy law, and if any one breaks the law he brings upon himself the penalty. god says, "the soul that sinneth, it shall die;" [footnote: ezek. xviii. 20.] so the penalty we deserve is death, everlasting punishment. the penalty must be paid by some one. god's justice demands it. god is not willing that any should perish; he loves the sinner, though he hates the sin. still the penalty must be paid, so he found out a way; his own dear son must take the sinner's place and suffer the full penalty instead, the death-penalty. perhaps you wonder, how can the death of one atone for the sin of the many? a lad once asked his father this question. the father made no reply but took him into the garden. then he dug up a spadeful of earth with a number of worms in it, and turning to the boy he asked him, "now which is of most value, your life or that of one worm, or even a thousand worms?" "mine," said the boy. "now" said the father, "you can see how the life and death of the divine saviour is _sufficient satisfaction to god_ for the sins of the whole world." oh! the wonder of it all. we see god, the holy god, the just god, the righteous god--we see man, guilty, condemned, sinful. then we see the son of god who knew no sin, _made_ sin for us, [footnote: 2 cor. v. 21.] so that all the requirements of god's holiness and justice are fully met. it was on the cross, in that hour of darkness and agony when he cried, "my god, my god, _why_ hast thou forsaken me," that he was _made_ sin for us. now we see the meaning of the wounded hands, the broken heart of god. "if i were god," the cynic said, "this sinning, suffering world would break my heart." but what if god's heart _was_ broken? do we not read in the 69th psalm, "reproach hath broken my heart? [footnote: ps. lxix. 20.]" the last night before he died he went to the garden of gethsemane. only three of his disciples followed him into the place where he knelt down to pray, and even these three fell asleep. he was left alone. he says, "i looked for some to take pity, but there was none, and for comforters, but i found none." it was then the agony began which ended on the cross in a broken heart. it was then he prayed saying, "father, if thou be willing, remove this cup from me, and there appeared an angel unto him from heaven, strengthening him." [footnote: st. luke xxii. 42, 43.] his prayer was heard and the victory was won over the adversary, for it must be on the cross and in no other way that the atonement could be made. "christ hath redeemed us from the curse of the law, being made a curse for us, for it is written, cursed is every one that hangeth on a tree." [footnote: gal. iii. 13.] "who his own self bare our sins in his own body on the tree." [footnote: i pet. ii. 24.] it was there on the cross that he said, "it is finished; and he bowed his head and died." we should not have known that he died of a broken heart if one little circumstance had not taken place. the holy spirit has shown us that this circumstance was foretold in the scriptures and was all part of god's purpose in our redemption. the soldiers had orders to break the legs of those who had been crucified, so as to hasten their death, and remove their bodies without delay; but when they came to jesus and saw that he was dead already, they brake not his legs; but one of the soldiers pierced his side, and forthwith came there out blood and water. "this was a proof that he had died of a broken heart." [footnote: john xix. 34.] "he died of a broken heart for you, he died of a broken heart, oh! wondrous love for you, for me, he died of a broken heart." when we remember that the pouring out of the blood followed on the breaking of the body, then we see the meaning of the precious words spoken by our lord during the last supper. we read that, "he took bread, and when he had given thanks, he brake it and said, 'take, eat; this is my body which is broken for you.' [footnote: i cor. xi. 24.] and he took the cup and said, 'this is my blood of the new testament which is shed for many.'" [footnote: st. mark xiv. 24.] why did he die? why was his blood poured out? the apostle paul answers that question when he says, "god was in christ reconciling the world unto himself." in that one sentence we have the message of the cross! we see god's purpose behind it all. two wonderful truths lie hidden in that glorious message. the first is, that "christ _died_ to put away sin," because sin is the thing and the only thing which comes between us and god. the good news which christ brings to us is that god himself has taken the first step in this work of reconciliation. oh! how wonderful it is that it is our sins which have brought out all the anguish and love of god's heart. yes, our sins grieved him so much he could not rest till he had devised a plan by which they could "all be blotted out," once for all. dear friends, whenever your sins are a burden, say these words over and over in your heart, "god was in christ reconciling me to himself." [footnote: 2 cor. v. 19.] this alone would have been wonderful, but there is something more in the good news, and that is "god is beseeching you to be reconciled to him." have you ever grasped that truth? i remember hearing of a great lawyer who was moved to shed tears, and when a fellow-lawyer asked him why he was in trouble he replied, "i see now what i never saw before. yes, i see that god is _beseeching_ me to be reconciled to him. i always thought it was for me to beseech god." many think as this lawyer did that the sinner must first come to god. no, it is god who comes to us entreating us to return to him. he is always sending us messages of love, and the moment we turn to him and trust him he gives us a full free pardon. dear fellow-sinners, "we pray you now in christ's stead," and because of his great love in dying for you, "be reconciled to god." god is now willing; are you willing? do say "yes." will you say it now very solemnly in your heart to god? address vii the word of god portion of scripture--psalm xix. this psalm is full of the glory of god. it tells us first of the glory of god shining in this beautiful world which he has made, and then it shows us the glory of god shining in the scriptures, in this book which lies open before us. the first verse bursts forth with the triumphant note, "the heavens declare the glory of god." everything in earth and sky shows forth his wisdom, his power and his love. then it gives us a wonderful picture of the sunrise and compares it to "a bridegroom coming out of his chamber." you have seen the first streaks of light in the early morning, and then you have watched the onward course of the sun till it is high up in the sky at mid-day, full of power, "rejoicing as a strong man to run a race." but nature, with all its secrets, nature with all its wonders and treasures, is only part of god's revelation of himself; the other part is to be found in his word. so the psalmist passes from the glorious sun in the heavens to the glory shining in the word of god. the glory we see in god's works is only an illustration of the glory shining in this book. after giving the wonderful description of the rising sun, he goes on to point out that there is not a single spot in the whole world where the sun does not shine, and that its light and heat can be felt by everything. then he shows us that it is just the same with the word of god. it is god's message to every one, but it is only when it finds an entrance into man's heart that it gives light. [footnote: ps. cxix. 130.] if you draw down the blind the sun cannot shine into your room; so the holy spirit must open our hearts for the light of his word to enter in, otherwise it will be to us the same as any other book. "is it dark without you, darker still within? clear the darkened windows, open wide the door; let the blessed sunshine in." how can we know that the bible is the word of god? a gentleman, who was an unbeliever, stopped one day to speak to molly, the old woman who kept a flower stall near the station. he noticed she was reading her bible, so he asked her why she read it. "because it is the word of god." "how do you know?" "because it cheers and warms my heart. i am just as sure it is god's own word as i am that it is the sun shining up there." this simple testimony was the means of convincing him and he thanked her for it. we have heard how the sun shines over the whole world, but is it not wonderful that every little drop of water can reflect the whole of its light? in every sunbeam there are seven colours, and when you look up at the rainbow you see all the seven in one drop of rain. this is only an illustration of the wonders of god's grace. if you are a child of god the whole of god's grace enters your heart, so you have grace to speak, grace to pray, grace to be loving and patient, grace for everything. the whole of god's life and light and love are for you as if there were no one else in the world. it is the same with all the precious truths of god's word: they are _all_ yours. a minister who wanted to know how many promises there are in the bible searched all through the book and he counted nearly five thousand. had you any idea that there are as many as five thousand precious promises for the believer in god's word? have you claimed them? a christian woman who was very ill asked her daughter to read the 8th chapter of the epistle to the romans. when she had finished the mother said, "that's mine, it's _all_ mine." how rich she was! only think of it and it is an _eternal_ inheritance, for the chapter begins with "no condemnation" and ends with "no separation." if you will look at verses 7 and 8 of our psalm, you will see four things which the word of god does. "it converts the soul, makes wise the simple, rejoices the heart, enlightens the eyes." let us think of these four things. first: "the law of the lord is perfect, converting the soul." the law here means the whole covenant of jehovah. you remember how, when god appeared to abraham, that abraham fell on his face, feeling his utter weakness and nothingness, and then god talked with him. when a man is laid low in the dust then god can talk to him. and god said to abraham, "i will make my covenant between me and thee." [footnote: gen. xvii. 2.] a covenant is a promise made under solemn conditions, and it is god's covenant of grace which converts the soul. such a promise as we have in ezekiel: "a new heart also will i give you, and a new spirit will i put within you, and i will take away the stony heart out of your flesh, and i will give you an heart of flesh: and i will put my spirit within you." [footnote: ezek. xxxvi. 26.] god says "i will" five times in those few lines, because he wants us to understand that in giving this promise he undertakes to do in us and for us what we can never do for ourselves. this reminds me of a young woman who was troubled because, although she was longing to be saved, yet she felt her heart was so hard. one sunday the minister took this verse as the text for his sermon. when he gave it out it seemed to her as if a voice was speaking these words close to her, right into her ear, "i will give you an heart of flesh." it came like a message direct from god. she was so deeply touched she could not listen to the sermon, and after it was over she went into the fields to find a quiet place that she might look at the words again in her bible. she is now a very bright earnest christian. it is through the word that god speaks to our hearts, and when the holy spirit makes it a living word and quickens us to receive it with faith, then we are converted. if you are not saved, take your bible and read it prayerfully, and you will find in it just what you want. remember the letter of scripture is of no use unless we experience its power and enjoy its sweetness. a young clergyman was converted through a very strange text. he was so much depressed he thought of committing suicide, and then his eye fell on that verse in ecclesiastes, "a living dog is better than a dead lion." [footnote: eccles. ix. 4.] the words brought fresh hope to him. he said to himself, one thing is certain and that is, i am still a _living_ man, and he was then led to seek christ as the way, the truth and the _life_. it is wonderful to think of the many different ways in which god sends his word home to our hearts. spurgeon gives an instance of this. he was asked to visit a dying man who told him about his conversion. he said, "some years ago i was at work in the crystal palace. god's spirit was striving with me and i felt the burden of sin. it seemed to follow me wherever i went. suddenly a voice said to me distinctly, 'behold he lamb of god which taketh away the sin of the world.' [footnote: st. john i. 29.] no one was near me, and i thought the message had come straight from god. i then saw clearly that christ had died to save me, and ever since i have had joy and peace in believing." spurgeon listened to the dying man's testimony with deep interest, and he remembered that on that very day he had gone to the crystal palace to test his voice in the transept before speaking at a people's service which was to be held there, and had used that very text, "behold the lamb of god which taketh away the sin of the world." let us thank god that his word is _perfect_ in converting he soul. "the testimony of the lord is _sure_, making wise the simple." it is well known that very often a man who is no scholar, but who is taught of god, is able to see deep truths which learned men fail to understand. every time you read your bible look up and say, "lord, open thou mine eyes that i may behold wondrous things out of thy law." [footnote: ps. cxix. 18.] do not feel discouraged because you do not understand t all. there are many things which earthly fathers tell their children which they do not understand till they are grown up, but still they love to get father's letters, and the bible is our heavenly father's letter to us. do you value it? in the 8th verse of the 19th psalm it says, "the statutes of the lord are right, rejoicing the heart." i have seen many careworn faces lit up with joy when reading the word. one man especially, who had a great deal of trouble and opposition in his home life, used to give his testimony at the meeting. opening his bible in the 5th chapter of the gospel of st. john he would read the 24th verse, "verily, verily, i say unto you, he that heareth my word and believeth on him that sent me hath everlasting life and shall not come into condemnation, but is passed from death unto life." then he would tell us with a beaming face that it was his song of assurance, for, as he said, there are three links, "he that _heareth_, _believeth_, _hath_--and 'hath' means 'got it,' and i've got everlasting life. jesus says it and i know it's true." he is now in the glory, and maybe he is telling the angels about it. if we had no bible we should have no certainty that our sins are forgiven. a little girl named molly said to her aunt who was teaching her about jesus, "how can i be sure that my sins are forgiven?" "because god says so," [footnote: i john i. 9.] was the reply, and then she repeated the text, "if we confess our sins, god is faithful and just to forgive us our sins and to cleanse us from all unrighteousness." many say, "i believe in the forgiveness of sins," and yet they still carry about the burden of their sins. they see clearly how god can forgive sin, but they cannot realise that it is their own sins which are forgiven. this was the case with luther. he tells us how, when he was distressed because of his sins, a friend pointed out to him that he would not have real peace unless he claimed god's forgiveness for his _own _sins. it was like a new light flashing into his soul; he saw his mistake and looking up with a beaming face, he said, "i see it now--it is not other people's sins, it is _my_ sins which are all forgiven!" we must not estimate sin and forgiveness by our own standard. when we have given way to sin again and again we feel ashamed to ask god's forgiveness so often but the wonder of it all is that god meets this very feeling of shame with the words, "my thoughts are not your thoughts"; and then he adds, "for i will abundantly pardon," [footnote: 2 isa. lv. 7, 8.] which means, i will repeatedly pardon. god's thoughts of sin and his thoughts about forgiveness are far higher than ours. sometimes i feel quite overwhelmed when i think of how great his forgiving love has been to me. look again at our psalm, verse 7, "the testimony of the lord is _sure_, making wise the simple." the word testimony means an assurance or a promise from god to the individual soul, and david had such confidence in god he is quite sure he will not disappoint him or fail to keep his word. so he says, "the testimony, or promise, of god is _sure_." it is this certainty which makes david so happy. he seems to be overflowing with joy, for he says, "thy testimonies also are my delight and my counsellors," [footnote: ps. cxix. 24.] and again, "i love thy testimonies." "thy testimonies are wonderful, therefore doth my soul keep them. thy testimonies that thou hast commanded are righteous and very faithful." [footnote: ps. cxix. 119, 129, 138.] the word "testimony" means also what god has commanded us to believe and also to practise. a native convert in china said the other day, "i began by reading the bible, but now i am _behaving_ it." this is what david means when he says, "my soul hath kept thy testimonies, and i love them exceedingly." [footnote: ps. cxix. 167.] the question was once asked at a meeting, "can you point to any text in the word of god which makes you sure you are saved and safe?" "i can," said one of the company, in a quiet firm voice. "it is john iii. 36, he that believeth on the son hath everlasting life." we have many bed-rock texts and that is one, as the beautiful old hymn says- "how firm a foundation, ye saints of the lord, is laid for your faith in his excellent word." i was summoned late one evening to see a dying man who had been brought to christ through my bible class. when i entered his room he looked up and said with a smile, "i sent for you because i want to tell you that i am quite safe, quite sure and quite satisfied. i am quite safe because jesus died for me. i am quite sure because i have his word for it. i am quite satisfied because i am going to be with him in the glory." the word of god was written that we _might_ believe; to believe is to know, and to be quite certain. the word "believe" comes from an old root meaning "to live by." "man shall not live by bread alone, but by every word that proceedeth out of the mouth of god." [footnote: st. matt. iv. 4.] put your finger down on one of the many precious assurances which god has given us in his word, of the certainty of complete forgiveness and acceptance, and then look up into his face with loving gratitude. god's pardon and acceptance are absolute and eternal; nothing can ever alter them. god wants us to know it and to live in the joy of it. trusting his word gives us safety, certainty and enjoyment. if any sin comes into your mind and troubles you, dear child of god, do not carry it about with you, tell father about it at once; confess it to him and remember that you are under the cleansing blood. "the blood of jesus christ, god's son, cleanseth us from all sin." [footnote: 1 john i. 7.] it has not only cleansed us once for all, but it is cleansing us now at the present moment. it is important to remember that the whole purpose of the bible is to give glory to god. it is the everlasting word of the everlasting god. "the word of our god shall stand for ever." [footnote: isa. xl. 8.] make the word of god _everything_. receive its statements by faith as revelations of simple certainties. find out how happy you are. "happy is that people that is in such a case, yea, happy is that people whose god is lord." [footnote: ps. cxliv. 15.] if we are walking with god in our daily life we need a light to show us the way. david knew well what it was to go along rough roads on dark nights, so he says, "thy word is a lamp unto my feet and a light unto my path." [footnote: ps. cxix. 105.] did you ever hear about moody's torch? one night moody had to return home through a dark wood after one of his meetings, and the path was winding and rough, so a friend offered him a torch. moody declined taking it, saying, "thank you, but it is too small." "it will light you home," said the man. "but the wind may blow it out." "it will light you home." "but if it should rain?" "it will light you home." at last moody started, taking the torch with him, and he said afterwards, "in spite of all my fears, it gave abundant light on my path all the way home." every promise in the word of god is like moody's torch, and if we will take it and use it, we shall find as he did, that it will light us all the way to our eternal home. the bible is the book of light placed by our master in the hand of faith that we may see clearly how to walk and to please god and how to deal wisely and kindly with those around us. it contains plain directions about everything in our daily life. the bible is a revelation of god himself. it is a direct communication from him to us. there are four things made known to us in the word which are of priceless value-1. it proclaims a full, free salvation through faith in christ. "to you is the message of this salvation sent." 2. it opens out to you the riches of grace and invites you to take them freely--freely--freely. 3. it opens "the door of faith" wide to the weakest sinner and even to you. 4. it gives a new life within, which transforms the soul and makes us new creatures in christ jesus. our lord says, "the words that i speak unto you, they are spirit and they are life." [footnote: st. john vi, 63.] can you say, "thy word hath quickened me"? [footnote: ps. cxix. 50.] do not be satisfied with reading a chapter here and there. read straight through. why? because the bible has a beginning and an ending like any other book. it begins with the story of a friendship between god and man: we see man very happy in this friendship. then something happens; you will find it in the third chapter of genesis. some one has come in between them and the friendship is broken. still god is looking for his friend and calling him, "where are you?" the answer comes from under the shadow of the trees. "i heard thy voice and i was afraid and hid myself." now we come to the last words at the end of the book, and we hear the same voice saying, "i am coming back again very soon." it is the voice of the same friend, no longer sad but glad. "the darkness has all passed away and the true light is shining," [footnote: i john ii. 8.] and will shine for ever: yes, it is sunshine all around, everlasting sunshine. where is the bible? do you keep your bible where you can take it up whenever you have a few spare moments? is it ready at hand so that you can read it before you go to bed at night? do the children speak of it as "mother's book"? do you turn to it for strength and comfort? is it a _living_ book to you? one of the most solemn things which god says to his rebellious people in olden times is that "they were casting his words behind their backs." we are doing the same thing if the bible is laid aside on the shelf, or put into the front room and allowed to remain unopened week after week. there can be no blessing in your home and in your life while you neglect the word of god. it is this very word of god which will judge you at the last day. listen to christ's solemn warning: "he that rejecteth me and receiveth not my words hath one that judgeth him," which means you will not be left without a judge. it is not a matter of small importance whether you read the bible or not: it is a matter of life or death. a neglected bible shows you are living without god; a neglected bible shows you are living for this world only; a neglected bible shows that your soul is dying of starvation; a neglected bible means that though you may _think_ you can get on very well without it, jesus _says_, "the word that i have spoken the same will judge him in the last day." [footnote: st. john xii. 48.] the bible is god's message to this present generation. sometimes people want to lay it on one side as an old book which is out of date. it is the most up-to-date book in the world. it not only tells us of what is going on at the present moment, but about what will happen in the future. we see pictures in the daily papers of what people were doing yesterday and what they looked like, but in the bible we have portraits true to life not only of what we are outwardly, but of the thoughts of our hearts. "the word of god is quick and powerful and sharper than any two-edged sword: it can discern the secret thoughts and purposes of the heart." [footnote: heb. iv. 12.] we hear a great deal about the x-rays which show what is going on inside the body, but this is nothing compared to the word of god which penetrates deep down into our inmost feelings and brings them to light. it is better to be searched and cleansed now, than to go on in the old way and then to stand before the great white throne by and by, condemned to everlasting punishment. let us pray with david, "search me, o god, and know my heart, try me and know my thoughts and see if there be any wicked way in me, and lead me in the way everlasting. amen." [footnote: ps. cxxxix, 23, 24.] address viii have faith in god portion of scripture--romans iv. there is one man set before us in this chapter as the man who had faith in god. the one thing which marks him more than any other is his faith. the man lived nearly 4,000 years ago, and yet he is still a vivid personality; he lives on in our thoughts and memories as the man who trusted god. his name is still reverenced all over the world, even among people of different religions, as "the friend of god." "the god of glory appeared to abraham," and from that moment abraham's faith fastens on what god is. the attractive power of jehovah drew him from his home, his relations and his country, and with every fresh revelation of god, abraham's faith grasped more of god and clung to him with a firmer hold. god's word was all he had to go by; whatever god said was enough for him; whatever god told him to do, he did it, because, to _trust god_ means to obey him. he had god with him at every step. if ever there was a clear-sighted man, that man was abraham, for trust in god enlightens our understanding. he was a man with a far sight. he saw what no other man then living saw. he saw that the day was coming when god would send his son to be the saviour of the world. how do we know this? because christ said, "abraham rejoiced to see my day, and he saw it and was glad." [footnote: st. john viii. 56.] he saw far on into the future, farther than any other man then living. he saw the golden city, the holy city, "whose builder and maker is god." [footnote: heb, xi. 10.] yes, the eye of faith not only sees god, it sees also what "god has prepared for those who love him." god was very real to that man. abraham trusted god because he knew him personally. faith is the act of the soul which looks wholly away from _self_, whether it be righteous self or sinful self, and looks to god only, in complete submission and confidence. it was because abraham trusted him that god stamped the man as his friend--abraham my friend. on and on through all these hundreds of years he has been called "the friend of god." in the book of chronicles, in isaiah and in the epistle of james it is mentioned again, "he was called the friend of god." what is friendship? it is two hearts trusting in each other. abraham trusted god, and god trusted abraham. god put such confidence in him that he let him know that he was going to destroy the cities of the plain. the lord said, "shall i hide from abraham that thing which i do?" [footnote: gen. xviii. 17.] mutual trust is at the root of all friendship. where there is a lack of mutual confidence in the home life or in commercial life it spells ruin. the great question for each one in life is, what is my relation to god? is it trusting god, or is it doubting god? "abraham believed god and it was counted unto him for righteousness." [footnote: rom. iv. 3.] what is righteousness? it means to be right with god, and the moment we trust god's word we are made righteous, and we become righteous. we read in acts that after their first missionary tour. paul and barnabas reported in detail all that god had done, and how he had opened the door of faith unto the gentiles. [footnote: acts xiv. 27.] so faith is the gate of life by which the gentiles were entering in. here was a new fact proving that faith was the gate of the lord into which the righteous should enter; [footnote: ps. cxviii. 20.] righteous _because_ believing. faith is the door by which god comes into our hearts. faith is only the door, nothing in itself, but it is called "precious faith" because of all the life and joy and riches of grace and glory which it lets in. abraham is not only presented to us in the word of god as the friend of god, but also as a pattern for all believers, and we are told to take him as our model, "to walk in his steps," to trust god and to find in god's wondrous friendship all that he found. god has been teaching us ever since, through the simplicity of the faith of this man. the most remarkable point in his faith is this, he grasped as no one else had done that god is god because he can quicken the dead. [footnote: rom. iv. 17.] he can give life to the dead because he himself is the source of life. he calls "those things which are not as though they were" because he is the creator of all things. this applies not only to the body but to the soul. your confidence in god began when your soul, which was "dead in sin," was quickened into a new life. when we ourselves have experienced this quickening it gives us such faith in praying for those we love, knowing that god alone can quicken dead souls. abraham was "strong in faith"; even when god promised him a son, although it seemed impossible, "he staggered not at the promise of god through unbelief," being "fully persuaded" that god was able to do it. to be "strong in faith" is to feel our utter helplessness and to rely on god's power only; to be "strong in faith" is to grasp god's promise and not to let anything make us doubt it. we have an illustration of this strong faith in the case of the first missionary who went out to china a hundred years ago. the captain of the ship in which he sailed was an atheist, and one day he said to him with a sneer, "you don't suppose, do you, that you are going to convert those chinese?" "no," said the missionary, "but i believe _god_ is going to do it." did god fail him? no. his faith was rewarded, and at the present time there are a quarter of a million chinese believers who meet in fellowship at the lord's table. what is faith? it is the link between me and god. the link between my emptiness and god's fulness. the link between me, the sinner and jesus, the saviour. is there this link between you and god? is the link on? faith is the spiritual link, the one and only means by which a man can have dealings with god, realise god and walk with god. it is a living link between god and the soul, a living union. the word "faith" comes from an old word which means to _bind_. when i say "i _believe_ god," it means that "i am his and he is mine for ever and for ever." it is trusting in his love, not a mere cold belief in his power. it is grasping his promises, because they are precious promises. it is the whole heart and mind going out and up to god. david says: "unto thee, o lord, do i lift up my soul; o my god, i trust in thee," [footnote: ps. xxv, 1, 2, 5] this brings perfect rest. "thou art the god of my salvation, on thee do i wait all the day." do we make it a habit to be constantly referring to god about everything? we learn first, that _god_ is, and then our faith feeds upon _what_ god is. his faithfulness and his lovingkindness are seen in all his dealings with us. faith has to do with unseen realities, for faith is the evidence, or proof of things not seen; [footnote: heb. xi. 1.] it makes them as real as if we could see them, and brings them near. so we may say faith is like the telegraph wire which connects two places however far apart they may be. we had an illustration of this not long ago. our queen mary was in her sitting-room in buckingham palace. a hospital was to be opened in canada 4,000 miles off, and she was asked to perform the ceremony. when the signal was given that all was ready, the queen pressed a little ivory button and in two seconds the door of the hospital, which was held by an electric wire, opened, and in fifteen seconds the signal was flashed back that the hospital was open. so in about half a minute the signal went there and back over a space of 8,000 miles. how wonderful! and yet greater spiritual wonders are happening every day and many times in the day, if only we have faith in god and let him work in us and through us. i will give you another illustration how the simple touch of faith links us with god's power. a few years ago some rocks blocked the entrance into the river st. lawrence, so that the ships could not go up the river to quebec. it was decided that the mass of solid rock must be removed. how was it done? in the presence of a large crowd a little child stepped forward and touched an electric button and the whole mass of rock was blown up by dynamite and the passage cleared. faith has done great wonders in times past, and it can still do wonders, if only we make use of god's almighty power. but the rule is, "according to your faith so be it unto you." i will give you an illustration. when i want light in my room i touch the electric button and the room is filled with light. the moment i press the button i expect the light will come, and i am surprised if it fails. why? touching the electric button is like the touch of faith; it brings us into contact with the source of light. faith brings me into contact with god himself, for he is the source of life and light. god has ordained that faith shall be a power as real and as uniform in its working as light or heat or electricity. everything about them is a mystery which we do not fully understand, but all the same they are real to us and we use them. although we do not understand them, yet we prove again and again that they supply us with new life and energy simply by a touch. even a child can touch. faith places all god's fulness at our disposal, but it is only according to our faith that we receive it. i know a poor woman who went through a time of great anxiety about her little girl who was ill. one day a christian friend called to see her and she told her all about her trouble. when she had finished the friend said to her very tenderly, "you have forgotten one little word of five letters." "what is it? do tell me," she exclaimed, looking puzzled. then the friend, pointing on her five fingers, said slowly, _f-a-i-t-h_. the dark cloud cleared away and she was able to look up into god's face again and to trust him. so when christ says, "have faith in god," it is a command to hold fast to god. it means trust god about everything, great and small; nothing is too small. trust him to save you, and to keep you. trust him in every difficulty and in every duty. "little faith will bring your souls to heaven, but great faith will bring heaven to your souls." when christ said to peter and the others, "have faith in god," he said it very earnestly and with a ring of deep conviction in his voice. he knew in himself what dependence on god means in the earthly life. day by day he showed what it is to have simple trust in god. when he said, "have faith in god," he said it very solemnly, because he was speaking on behalf of his father. he had come to reveal him, so he says, "i do nothing of myself, but as my father hath taught me i speak these things." he had already said, "he that believeth on me hath everlasting life," and now he adds, "have faith in god." yes, he claims our confidence, our full confidence, not a half-hearted trust. our lord saw men seeking other objects of trust, so he says, "take hold of god, hold fast to god, have faith in god and never let it go." the world's great need is faith in god. god's own character demands it. the scriptures make him known and reveal him as altogether trustworthy, such an one as invites our entire confidence. to have faith in god means leaning on him, letting him bear the whole weight. there is a great difference between believing and committing. many say they believe, but they are not willing to commit themselves to him. a few years ago there was a man named blondin who performed wonderful feats at the crystal palace. once he walked on a tight rope stretched across the centre of the palace at a height of 150 feet. another time a rope was stretched at a great height over a shipbuilder's yard, and he not only walked steadily across, but he carried a man on his back. a large crowd gazed at him in wonder and awe, and great was their relief when both blondin and his burden reached the ground in safety. among the eager upturned faces in the crowd there was a lad about eleven years of age. when blondin came down he went up to the lad and said to him, "you saw me carry that big man across, do you believe i could take you?" "of course you could," replied the boy; "why, he was a big man, and i am only a little chap." "well, then, jump up, my lad," said blondin, and he stooped down for the boy to climb up on his back. but although the boy said he believed blondin was able to carry him across, he was not willing to trust himself, and so, just saying, "no, thank you," he was off like a shot and ran as fast as he could till he was lost in the crowd. though he said he believed, when it came to the point he did not commit himself, and that is all the difference, between believing _in_ christ and believing _on_ him. faith in god means really committing ourselves into his hands and rolling our burdens on him. if we withhold our confidence it shows that we do not really believe that god is what the bible says he is. the reason there is so much unrest and ungodliness is because we have lost sight of god. it is not because the bible is out of date as some say, or that the gospel has lost its power; it is still as ever, "the power of god unto salvation," but we are limiting god. it is just the same now as in olden times when the children of israel limited the holy one of israel, and we read how this lack of confidence grieved god all through those forty years in the wilderness. yea, they spake against god, they said, "can god furnish a table in the wilderness; can god give bread also; can he provide flesh for his people?" [footnote: ps. lxxviii. 19, 20.] unbelief asks, "_can he?_" faith says, "_he can._" dear friends, let me ask you to stop and ask yourself, where do you put that little word "can"? are you constantly thinking to yourself, can god? or are you saying in your heart and meaning it too, "_god can_"! we limit god's power to save, by asking, _can_ god? the hindrance is the same as in olden times when jeremiah felt that because of the unbelief of the people "the lord was as a mighty man that cannot save." [footnote: jer. xiv; 9.] you have prayed many years perhaps for the conversion of some one near and dear to you, but are you limiting god because you doubt his power to do it? a poor man who gave way to drink said sadly, "i have broken the pledge again and again"; then pointing to his pledge card he said, "but now i have written a text on it, isaiah xli. 13: 'for i the lord thy god will hold thy right hand, saying unto thee, fear not, i will help thee.'" then looking up he said simply, "maybe, him and me will do it together." is it victory over temptation you long for? look up to him and say, "i can't, but god can." is it grace you need for some special trial? say, "god is able to make all grace abound towards me, for he tells us in his word that he is able to do 'exceeding abundantly above all we ask or think according to the power that is working in us.'" [footnote: eph. iii. 20.] the world's great sin is not trusting god. "thus said the lord, cursed be the man that trusteth in man, and maketh flesh his arm and whose heart departeth from the lord." [footnote: jer. xvii. 5.] yet in times of difficulty or danger how apt we are to lean on the arm of flesh. during the present european war i was much impressed by the words of one of our soldiers who writes from the front: "after all that is being done there still remains one supreme necessity without which neither arms or munitions can be decisive, namely, the spiritual outlook of the whole nation. when i returned home after ten months in flanders, i was amazed at the lack of spirituality of the people as a whole. the simple faith and dependence upon god which characterised our country in her past struggles seem lost to sight. 'they trusted in thee and thou didst deliver them' implied no disregard for military efficiency; it was the real and vital accompaniment to armed force. can it be that the hellishness of battle, the wearing down of the spirit induced by trench warfare, moments of utter loneliness which every soldier has to bear, strike right at the soul and enable him to realise the nearness of the spiritual world? 'prayer is the foundation of all grace' were the words of a dying soldier who had deliberately returned to the area of poisonous gas and had brought back the machine gun on his shoulders. some of us have realised what individual prayer at home has done for us, but we should all like to feel that the whole nation is also testing the value of spiritual power." we read in god's word that "the children of judah prevailed, because they relied upon the lord god"; [footnote: 2 chron. xiii. 18.] and when king asa was defeated the prophet said to him, "because thou hast relied on the king of syria, and not relied on the lord thy god, therefore is the host of the king of syria escaped out of thine hand." [footnote: 2 chron. xvi. 7.] to have faith in god we must put god first in everything. he must be first when we awake in the morning. how blessed it is to be able to feel, "when i awake i am still with thee." a working man said to me once, "i make myself happy in god the first thing in the morning." david says, "in the morning will i direct my prayer unto thee and will look up." [footnote: ps. v. 3.] "when i awake i am still with thee." [footnote: ps. cxxxix. 18.] "in my morning prayer," said a christian man, "instead of thinking of my own needs first, i like to think of the fulness there is in christ for me." let us resolve to put "god _first_," even if we have only time for one text of scripture. "god _first_," even if it is only a minute or two for prayer. a christian said once, "i must see the face of god before i see the face of man." the manna was gathered early every morning. another said, "unless i meet with god first, i cannot meet the difficulties of the day in a prepared spirit." if you put "god first," you will find this will make all the difference as to how you do your work and how you deal with others. "little is much if god is in it." to have faith in god is to trust him _only_. david says, "my soul, wait thou only upon god, for my expectation is from him." [footnote: ps. lxii. 5.] is it so with you? if so, what for, and for how much? first find out from his word that god is able and willing to do what you need; then trust him to do it. "trust in him at all times" it says again in that beautiful psalm. [footnote: ps. lxii. 8.] "i have been looking into my bible," said a working man, "and i find a great many men trusted god, and whatever they trusted god for, they always got it; he never failed them, and it is the same now." you have all heard of florence nightingale and her life of devotion in nursing the sick. she was asked to tell the secret of her earnest christian life, and after a pause she said, "i have kept nothing back from god." faith in god is unreserved confidence, telling him all and keeping nothing back. but before we can do this as a daily habit we must definitely commit ourselves and all we have into god's hands. it says in isaiah xliv. 5, "one shall say, i am the lord's." i have a mark in my bible which i made many years ago by the side of these words. i put the date and then i wrote these words: "he gave himself for me and i give myself to him. he takes me and i take him." ever since then it has been my delight to tell others how simple it all is. it is the sinner taking the saviour and the saviour taking the sinner. are you asking, what must i do? first believe what god says about you in his word. he says, that you are guilty, lost, ruined. then he presents christ to us as the saviour and calls on us to believe what he says about him. "he that believeth not god hath made him a liar because he hath not believed the record that god gave of his son. and this is the record that god hath given to us eternal life and this life is in his son." [footnote: i john v. 10, 11.] "have faith in god." faith cometh by hearing and hearing by the word of god, and "faith is the gift of god." and the wonder of it all is that god says to the weak ones like poor jacob, "i have chosen thee and not cast thee away," and he never will, for "_god keeps all his failures_," not like man who throws his failures on one side as worthless. oh! to trust him then more fully, just to simply trust. then instead of "limiting the holy one of israel" we shall be singing at the top of our voices, "the lord hath done great things for us whereof we are glad." [footnote: ps. cxxvi. 3.] so then let us "trust in the lord for ever, for in the lord jehovah is everlasting strength." [footnote: isa. xxvi. 4.] address ix the church of god portion of scripture--ephesians v. 22-33. "christ also loved the church and gave himself for it." [footnote: eph. v. 25.] two precious truths shine out in these words. he _loved_, he _gave_. he not only gave himself for the church when he died on the cross, but he is still sanctifying and cleansing it, and by and by when he comes again "he will present it unto himself a glorious church." [footnote: eph. v. 27.] so we have the history of the church in the past, in the present, and in the future. we look back to the past and we see christ giving himself, that is, laying down his life on the cross; but we must also look far, far back into the past eternity to find out another precious truth. (perhaps you have never thought about it.) it is, that the church was in god's thoughts from the very beginning! the son of god was in the bosom of the father "in the beginning"; and it was then--before the world was created, that god chose us in him and gave us to him. [footnote: eph. i. 4.] now we see why "christ loved the church and gave himself for it." what is the church? the word "church" means "called out," so the church embraces all who have been "called out" during the present age to form the "body of christ." in the old testament we find that the jews were god's chosen people, [footnote: exod. vi. 7.] so they had all the privileges, but in later times, the jews rejected the gospel of the grace of god, and then god graciously visited the gentiles to take out of them a people to be called by his name. [footnote: acts xv. 14.] when did this special "_calling out_" begin? nearly 1900 years ago on the day of pentecost, and it has been going on ever since, and when the number of "the called-out ones" has been completed, then "the lord himself shall descend from heaven with a shout, with the voice of the archangel, and with the trump of god: and the dead in christ shall rise first. then we which are alive and remain shall be caught up together with them in the clouds to meet the lord in the air." [footnote: i thess. iv. 16, 17.] each of those three words, "_chosen_," "_called out_," and "_caught up_," leads us on to something more. we were chosen in him to be holy; [footnote: eph. i. 4.] we are called out to be the body of christ now, and by and by we shall be caught up to meet the bridegroom and to be with him for ever. if you are a child of god, you can say with holy wonder, "god has done all this for me." the church was formed out of a little company of 120 men and women who were gathered together praying in the upper room at jerusalem. [footnote: acts i. 14, 15.] suddenly they heard a wonderful sound and saw a heavenly vision, and they were all filled with the holy ghost; and before the day was over that little company increased to the number of 3,000 souls. how many does it number now? no one knows, but it is a "multitude which no man can number." [footnote: rev. vii. 9.] some are already in glory, some are still on earth, but it matters not where they are, they belong to the "whole family" of god "in heaven and in earth." [footnote: eph. iii. 15.] on the day of pentecost, when the holy spirit was poured out, his special work was to create a new thing--it was then that the church of god was formed into one body by the holy spirit, "for, as the body is one and hath many members, and all the members of that one body, being many, are one body, so also is christ." [footnote: i cor. xii. 12, 27.] "now ye are the body of christ and members in particular," that is, individually, for every saved soul is a member. the church is a living body united to jesus christ, for he is the living head of the body. he needs his church just as much as his church needs him. it is the holy spirit who unites us to the risen and glorified christ who is the head, and then he unites us to one another in him. it is a _living_ union, because we pass through death into the resurrection life of christ, for by "one spirit we are all baptized into one body, and we have all been made to drink into that one spirit." [footnote: i cor. xii. 13.] the holy ghost sustains the life of the church. in him we live and move and have our being. as the bird lives in the air, as the flower lives in the sunshine, so we live in the spirit, and when we drink in his fulness there is growth and fruitfulness. have we ever felt this need of drinking into that one spirit? everything connected with the true church of christ must be spiritual, it is this which is being lost sight of in the present day, and it is the reason why there is so little power and so few conversions. have you ever tried to understand why the church is called "the body of christ"? think first about your own body. it is the only part of your real self that can be seen. i cannot see your heart or your thoughts, but i know what your thoughts are by your words, and what you feel by the look of joy or sorrow in your face, and by the way you go about. it is by your body that your real personality is made known to others; what you really are would never be seen unless your body made it known. in the same way the church is the body in order to make christ known in the world. he is hidden from our view, he is unseen, but he manifests himself and shines out through us, and he sends us to carry his messages and to do his will. this was the earnest desire of the apostle paul when he said that he was willing that the old self should be taken away so that "the _life_ also of jesus might be made manifest in our body." [footnote: 2 cor. iv. 10, 11.] this is what the church is here on earth for, to make the unseen christ known. just as every drop of water reflects the light, so every member of the church, however weak and small, can reflect his love. is his compassion for sinners beaming in your eye? is his purity seen in your daily life? do you judge things from his standpoint? i remember when some one was telling me why she loved a christian worker whom we both knew, she added, "i love her for what i see of christ in her." think of christ exalted in heaven far above all things, and remember he is there not for himself, but for _you_. "he is head over all things to his body, the church." [footnote: eph. i. 22, 23.] it is wonderful to think of this union with christ, that we are his body and he is the head; but there is another wonder quite as great, it is that he is the bridegroom and the church is the bride. when we speak of the church as the body of christ, it is a living union, _life_ is the one thought brought out; when we speak of christ as the bridegroom it is _love_ which is the chief point. it brings out the affection, tenderness and nearness of the bridegroom. "so ought men to love their wives as their own bodies, he that loveth his wife loveth himself." [footnote: eph. v. 28-30.] we have nothing so wonderful in the old testament. think of the depths out of which we have come, and the heights to which we are raised. "he raiseth up the poor out of the dust, and lifteth up the beggar from the dunghill to set them among princes and to make them inherit the throne of glory." [footnote: 1 sam. ii. 8.] think of the sinner lifted out of all his bondage and ruin to be the bride of the lamb! there is nothing higher that god can give than this. this will be our glorious position by and by when the bridegroom comes to take us to our heavenly home, for his parting words were, "i will come again and receive you unto myself." [footnote: st. john xiv. 3.] there will be three great surprises on the day that he comes again. these surprises have been kept secret, but on that day the glorious secrets will all be made known. the first surprise will be when we shall see all the saints who have died in christ called back from the unseen world and clothed with their new, glorified bodies. what a joyful meeting it will be. the next surprise will be that we who are still living on earth when christ comes will be changed, we shall not die, we shall escape from the hand of death. "it is appointed unto men once to die," but "christ was once offered to bear the sin of many," [footnote: heb. ix. 27, 28.] and when he comes the saints who are living will be changed "in a moment, in the twinkling of an eye." [footnote: 1 cor. xv. 52.] you know how long it takes for you to shut your eye and open it--it will not take longer than that for the change to be made. three great changes will take place--our _bodies_ will be changed, no more sin, or pain, or weariness; our _minds_ will be changed. "we shall _know_" then what we cannot know now, we shall see all as god sees it, we shall know the love of christ and we shall love him as he deserves to be loved, and best of all "we shall be like him for we shall see him as he is." the third surprise will be that our _circumstances_ will also be changed; we shall be no longer on the earth, for as soon as the great change takes place we shall be caught up to meet the lord in the air. he will then look into our life work, and he will say to his faithful ones who have been true-hearted and loyal: "well done, good and faithful servant." [footnote: st. matt. xxv. 21.] then the heavens will resound with the hallelujah chorus, "let us be glad and rejoice and give honour to him, for the marriage of the lamb is come and his wife hath made herself ready." [footnote: rev. xix. 7.] but the glory will be only then beginning, it will be "_glory upon glory_." remember there are two stages in christ's coming; he will come _for_ his saints, and then he will come down to earth _with_ his saints. as it is written: "behold, the lord cometh with ten thousands of his saints." [footnote: jude 14.] "when christ, who is our life, shall appear, then shall ye also appear with him in glory." [footnote: col. iii. 4.] we shall come _with_ him when he comes to reign on the earth. but there is something still grander than the glorious position of having a place with him on his throne. we look on and on into the eternity that is coming (and it is a wonderful outlook) and what do we find? it is that we are wanted for the ages to come to show forth, and to be living personal illustrations "of the riches of god's grace." it is not only that we shall be saved and glorified, but that god will use us personally to show forth all his love. the grace of god is the love which flowed down to us in our great need, when we were dead in sins, slaves to sin and satan and deserving nothing but god's wrath. it is we ourselves who are wanted for the ages to come for "the praise of his glory." the expression "_the riches_ of god's grace" [footnote: eph. i. 7.] meets our personal need, but there is something else that will shine forth, it is called "_the glory_ of god's grace." [footnote: eph. i. 6.] all that god prepares for us is worthy of his greatness and power. the inheritance which he has in store and the beautiful home above will be worthy of god himself, all that is in it and around it surpassing everything that we can imagine in its glory and beauty will be worthy of god himself. it is only as our eyes are spiritually enlightened that we can get a glimpse of "the riches of the glory of his inheritance in the saints." [footnote: eph. i. 18.] the words of this old hymn describe what it will be like- "i go on my way rejoicing, though weary the wilderness road- i go on my way rejoicing in hope of the glory of god. "then no more in the earthen vessel the treasure of god shall be, but in full and unclouded beauty, o lord, wilt thou shine through me. "all, all in thy new creation the glory of god shall see; and the lamp for that light eternal the bride of the lamb shall be. "a golden lamp in the heavens, that all may see and adore the lamb who was slain and who liveth, who liveth for evermore. "so i go on my way rejoicing that the heavens and earth shall see his grace, and his glory and beauty, in the depth of his love to me." our mission throughout eternity is to make known the love and wisdom of god that he may not only be all, but in all. he is in us now, but we want him to be in all, and it will be through us that god will let the whole universe be so filled with the glorious knowledge of his love and wisdom that these words will at last be fulfilled--"god ... all and in all." [footnote: i cor. xv. 28.] we are passing through wars and convulsions and revolutions hitherto unknown, but a glorious future is awaiting us, and one thing is certain, that nothing can "separate us from the love of god which is in christ jesus our lord." [footnote: rom. viii. 39.] that is our security. it is also certain that it is not in the power of the devil to destroy the church of god, for we are wanted in the ages to come. it is the church which is to be the glory of christ to all eternity. we are also wanted _now_ in a very special way. men's hearts are failing them for fear, they need strong, calm, prayerful helpers in this time of perplexity. who can speak a word of cheer and encouragement? who can point them to the rock of ages which cannot be moved? who can inspire them with faith and hope? only the one who has himself made god his refuge. it is in times of trouble that the worldly man turns for help and sympathy to the believer. it is through us that god would work out his purpose of grace and love to the world. a young man who had met with a bitter disappointment went to an aged christian and poured out his trouble. after hearing his sad story, his friend said in a calm, tender voice, "god knows all about it, there is no such thing as chance in the world." "what is there then?" asked the young man eagerly. "there is _love_, eternal _love_," was the answer. the reason why the believer is kept in perfect peace is because he looks beyond all the tumult of battle, the bitter strife and terrible bloodshed to the time when god will gather together all things in christ, for he is to be head over all. love, eternal love. never for a moment shall that love cease to bless us and shield us. whatever may happen to our bodies nothing can touch the eternal life within. do you feel anxious to know whether you will have a share in the glory? i will tell you how you may know. you remember christian had a roll given him by evangelist which he was to give in at the celestial gate. when you first come to jesus as a poor sinner the holy spirit gives you four precious words written as it were in a roll for you to hide in your heart until the moment when jesus comes and you are caught up to meet him in the air. take your bible and you will find there four precious words which god has written for you to rest upon, and which will never fail you. 1. redeemed. [footnote: pet. i. 18, 19] "bought with a price," and the price was the life-blood of god's dear son, so we belong to the church of christ which he has "purchased with his own blood." [footnote: acts xx. 28] 2. sealed. [footnote: eph. i. 13] the seal is god's mark upon us showing to men and angels and devils that we are his "purchased possession"; that we belong to him, spirit, soul and body absolutely, and for ever, for god's solid foundation stands unmoved, bearing this inscription, "the lord knoweth them that are his." [footnote: 2 tim. ii. 19] a christian doctor who had been in the crimean war and in china, was very particular when going on a journey to have all his luggage "_labelled and ready_." in his last illness he turned to a friend and said with a smile, "_i am labelled and ready_"! and then he gave this beautiful testimony: "there is only one thing that makes me quite ready and quite sure of heaven, it is that my sins are forgiven by trusting in the blood of jesus. nothing that we can do can save us, it is what he did. he alone can give us peace with god." 3. kept. [footnote: 1 pet. i. 5] a young christian told a friend that he was afraid as to whether he would be able to live the life. the friend looked at him, and said, with a ringing voice of assurance, "he is able to keep you from falling." [footnote: jude 24] he then saw that he was no longer in his own keeping, but in _god's_ keeping, and that the keeping would be up to the last moment, and be so complete that he would be handed over without the smallest defect to stand in "the presence of his glory with exceeding joy." 4. glorified. [footnote: rom. viii. 30] this is the last and grandest of the four precious words which god has given to strengthen our hearts, and it is the crown of all. what shall we say? no words can express what it will be, it will surpass our highest expectations. but we know that it will be fulness of life, fulness of joy, fulness of love, and all our deepest longings satisfied, all our highest hopes fulfilled, and it will be for ever and for ever! let us hold fast god's sure word of promise, "the lord will give grace and glory." [footnote: ps. lxxxiv. 11] let us lift up our hearts in praise and thanksgiving to him that is able to do exceeding abundantly above all that we ask or think, according to the power that worketh in us, unto him is the glory in the church, throughout all ages, to all eternity, world without end. amen. [footnote: eph. iii. 20, 21] address x the kingdom of god portion of scripture--st. matthew xxi. 1-17, and revelation xi. 15-18. now, therefore, why speak ye not a word of bringing the king back? [footnote: 2 sam. xix. 10] this question was asked a long time ago. you remember how david was driven from his throne. his son absalom rebelled against him and he had to leave the country; but absalom is now dead, the rebellion is at an end, and still david is an exile. at last some of the people talk it over together and inquire of one another, "why say ye not a word, or why are ye silent about bringing back the king?" so they sent word to the king and judah went to meet him. i was reminded of this old testament story when a correspondent wrote in the spring of this year as follows: "i have spent two days in what is left of belgium, and i find that the dream of the belgians is to see the king ride back into brussels. men and women, old and young, talk and plan and have visions of the time when the king comes home." it is touching to think how these people, in spite of all their misfortunes, still love their brave king and cling to the hope of having him once more among them in his rightful place on the throne and then their ruined towns and homes will be restored. it makes me think of another king, our lord jesus, who entered the city of jerusalem amidst the cheers and acclamations of a large crowd, and how the words came true: "tell ye the daughter of sion, behold thy king cometh unto thee." [footnote: st. matt. xxi. 5] and now they cry, "hosanna"--he is come, he is come! and the children's voices ring out with praise. but this proclaiming him as king aroused the enmity of some of the rulers and they stirred up the people against him. here was the opportunity, the golden opportunity, for accepting or rejecting the son of god. they had listened to his teaching, they brought their sick to him for healing, they appreciated the benefits of his ministry, but they refused to submit to his authority, so they were determined to silence his voice. sin shows itself in the rebellion of the _will_ against god, and so they lost the opportunity, and instead of accepting him, they crucified their king. the words are still true: "behold, thy king cometh," he comes to set up the kingdom of god in our hearts, so the opportunity is given to you now to accept him as your king. we listen to the good news about peace and forgiveness, but are we willing to make jesus king in our hearts? here is the great test, it is here that the opposition of man's _will_ begins to show itself, because if he is to be our lord and master he claims all we are and all we have. he must be lord of _all_ or he is not lord at all; nothing less will do. there is no real union with him by faith until we say in our hearts, "my lord, and my god." [footnote: st. john xx. 28.] it is impossible to accept christ as our saviour without also yielding to him as king, and proclaiming him as king. a young friend of mine has these three simple words, "make jesus king," in a frame hanging on the wall of her room. she told me they were the means of leading her to decide for christ. nothing but the power of the holy spirit can enable us to yield to him as our lord and master. "no man can say that jesus is the lord but by the holy ghost." [footnote: 1 cor. xii. 3.] this is the central fact--"jesus is lord." "for to this end christ both died, and rose, and revived, that he might be lord both of the dead and living." [footnote: rom. xiv. 9] it is the holy spirit who first reveals christ to your heart and enables you to say, "thou art my lord," [footnote: ps. xvi. 2] and then he gives you grace to love and obey him as your master. so, whether you look backward to the moment when your sins were all blotted out, "_he is lord_"; or whether you look at your present life with all its shortcomings, "_he is lord_"; or whether you look forward to the end, waiting for his coming, _he is lord_. "can you say truly- "he cleansed my heart from all its sin, what a wonderful saviour! and now he reigns and rules within, what a wonderful saviour!" we have seen our lord proclaimed king at jerusalem and accepting the title. although rejected and crucified, his every word and action was kingly up to the last moment of his earthly life. he spoke openly of his kingdom to pilate, for when pilate asked him, "art thou a king then?" [footnote: st. john xviii. 37] he answered, "i am." the purple robe, the crown of thorns, the sceptre, though offered in mockery, were all kingly, for the superscription over the cross, this is jesus, the king of the jews, [footnote: st. matt. xxvii. 37] was true. the cross was the way to the throne. "i beheld, and lo in the midst of the throne stood a lamb, as it had been slain." [footnote: rev. v. 6] in that dark, dark hour of christ's agony on the cross, there was only one man who recognised christ as king, and that was the dying thief. it was a very real cry that broke from his lips in his utter need--"lord, remember me when thou comest into thy kingdom." [footnote: st. luke xxiii. 42] it was wonderful faith. can you think of any other as wonderful? he recognised christ as king--not a dying king leaving his throne--but a victorious king about to enter his kingdom. the penitent thief saw even more than this, he saw that it was a kingdom of souls rescued from sin's bondage and slavery; not a kingdom of the great ones of earth, but for outcasts such as he was, so he cried, "take me as i am and give me a place in the kingdom." but the answer to the cry was as wonderful as the cry itself--"to-day shalt thou be with me in paradise." when the king said "with me," he meant, "i am passing from darkness into everlasting light. come with me. i have broken the chains of sin, i am setting the prisoners free. come with me." from that moment the penitent thief was identified with christ in his death and in his risen life. is this true of you? when earth rejected the king, not only was heaven opened to receive him, but a triumphant reception awaited him. heaven resounded with the joyful chorus of the angelic hosts--"lift up your heads, o ye gates, and be ye lift up, ye everlasting doors, and the king of glory shall come in"! [footnote: ps. xxiv. 7.] so for nineteen hundred years the heavens have received him, but once again the everlasting doors will open, and the son of man will come in "the clouds of heaven with power and great glory." [footnote: st. matt. xxiv. 30.] what has been going on during all these years? kingdoms and world powers have risen up one after another, but all have failed to give what the world really needs, "a king to reign in righteousness." [footnote: isa. xxxii. 1.] god is still saying, "why do the heathen rage and the people imagine a vain thing?" [footnote: ps. ii. 1.] but in spite of man's rebellion and forgetfulness of god, god's purpose will stand firm, "yet have i set my king upon my holy hill of zion." [footnote: ps. ii. 6.] god's purpose is to have all power placed in the hands of one man, and that is christ. what will be the final winding up of earth's suffering and struggles? the veil will be drawn aside and "the glory of the lord will be revealed." [footnote: isa. xl. 5.] it is the glory of the personal presence of the son of god. when? where? how? will the glory be seen. look back into the garden of eden. god gave man control over all, but he listened to another voice and then he lost control. the question was raised, "who was to rule, satan or god?" by and by another veil will be drawn aside and we shall see how the unseen powers of darkness have been at work behind all the wars and sin and rebellion of this poor world. "an enemy hath done this." [footnote: st. matt. xiii. 28.] it is the devil who blinds the eyes, hardens the hearts, and deadens the conscience of mankind. but we must not lose heart or think that satan is getting the upper hand. the word of god enables us not only to trace some of his plots and schemes, but it shows us _why_ god has been so long silent and _when_ god intends to break that silence. [footnote: see ps. 1] the victory is sure, but whose victory? the victory of the son of god. but first the jews must return to their own land, and then "the kings of the earth and of the whole world" will be gathered to the battle of the great day of god almighty. all these nations will fight against the jews at jerusalem in the place called armageddon. it is really a desperate attempt of the devil who is sending forth these nations to make war with the lamb. jerusalem will be taken, and when the enemy is rejoicing over the victory and the destruction of the jews seems certain, then suddenly they see the son of man coming in the clouds of heaven with power and great glory, [footnote: st. matt. xxiv. 30] "the armies" which are "in heaven" following him. [footnote: rev. xix. 14] then shall the lord go forth and fight against those nations, and his feet shall stand in that day upon the mount of olives, [footnote: zech. xiv. 3, 4] and "every eye shall see him." [footnote: rev. i. 7] the armies of the enemy will be destroyed and god's people will be delivered. in this marvellous way the lamb shall overcome, for "he is lord of lords and king of kings and they that are with him are called, and chosen, and faithful." [footnote: rev. xvii. 14] it will not only be the deliverance of the jews from their enemies, but the wonder of that great day will be that at last their eyes will be opened to see him as the messiah, so they will be converted and restored. the lord says, "i will pour upon them the spirit of grace and of supplication and they shall look upon me whom they have pierced." [footnote: zech. xii. 10.] what an overwhelming sight! the same jesus whom they despised and rejected is come down from heaven to deliver them, but they only think of him as the one whom they have pierced. the glory which meets their eye at that moment is the glory of the love and compassion of the crucified one. the result of looking is mourning. they get such a view of their sin against his love that they are filled with godly sorrow. when the eye of faith is turned to jesus then the tears flow. oh, how perfectly will all satan's evil influence in man's heart be destroyed in the presence of jesus. "in that day we have seen what has taken place at the beginning of that day, and now before it closes a fountain will be opened to the house of david and to the inhabitants of jerusalem for sin and for uncleanness." [footnote: zech. xiii. 1.] with the opening of that fountain there is grace given to _use_ it, for god says, "i will pour upon them the spirit of grace." many see the fountain now who never use it! precious fountain, of all things most precious to poor sinners such as you and me. no one but god's dear son, and nothing but his atoning death on calvary, could open that fountain. the fountain is still flowing--has it cleansed you? then the kingdom of god is set up on earth. who can tell the good news so well as these restored and converted ones? the question is sometimes asked, has the gospel lost its power? is christianity a failure? no. the gospel will yet be preached throughout the whole world. who will be the preachers? converted jews, [footnote: isa. lxi. 6] "a mighty angel, [footnote: rev. xiv. 6] and glorified saints, for they shall be priests of god." [footnote: rev. xx. 6] what will be the result of their preaching? there will be a world-wide revival. "the earth shall be filled with the knowledge of the lord as the waters cover the sea." [footnote: hab. ii. 14] when christ comes to us now, it is to rule in the hearts of his people, but _then_ he will reign over a believing world without opposition, for satan will be bound and christ will take the kingdom which is his by redemption, and his glory will be seen on mount zion. "out of zion, the perfection of beauty, god hath shined." [footnote: ps. 1. 2] and the seventh angel sounded and there were great voices in heaven saying: "the kingdoms of this world are become the kingdoms of our lord and of his christ and he shall reign for ever and ever." [footnote: rev. xi. 15] after reigning on earth for a thousand years there will be the judgment of "the great white throne," [footnote: rev. xx. 11-15] when all those who had no part in the first resurrection will be raised, and all whose names are not "written in the book of life" will be "cast into the lake of fire." "this is the second death." has your name been entered in the book of life? one more glorious vision of the kingdom is unfolded before us, and the glory grows brighter and brighter, for it is "the everlasting kingdom." "i saw a new heaven and a new earth: for the first heaven and the first earth were passed away and there was no more sea.... and he that sat upon the throne said, behold i make all things new...." [footnote: rev. xxi. 1, 5] "and there shall be no more curse: but the throne of god and of the lamb shall be in it; and his servants shall serve him; and they shall see his face and his name shall be in their foreheads. "and there shall be no night there: and they need no candle, neither light of the sun, for the lord god giveth them light: and they shall reign for ever and ever." [footnote: rev. xxii. 3-5] how wonderful that god should promise us an abundant entrance into his everlasting kingdom. [footnote: 2 pet. i. 11] what does an abundant entrance mean? it means that we shall not, as it were, just creep into heaven by a side door, but that we shall have a grand welcome from the glorified ones there and from the lord himself, all the doors, as it were, being thrown wide open to receive us. are we preparing for it? a mother who was dying called her little daughter who was ten years old to her bedside and said tenderly, "i want you to learn this little prayer, 'o god, prepare me for all thou art preparing for me.'" and the prayer was answered, for that little girl was frances ridley havergal, who lived a consecrated life, and passed away singing about the lord whom she loved. i must give you some words spoken by that holy man samuel rutherford who was persecuted and put into prison for christ's sake. "i wonder many times," he said, "that ever a child of god should have a sad heart considering what the lord is preparing for him. when we get home above and enter into possession of our brother's fair kingdom, it will be like one step from prison to glory." these words came true, for soon after this he received notice to appear before his judges in court, but before the day of the trial came he died. so it was literally one step for him from prison to glory. his own account of it is given in the following lines--- "they've summoned me before them, thither i may not come; my king says, come up hither, my lord says, welcome home." what will it all be like? no words of ours can describe it, but god himself tells us what he will be to us and what he will do for us in the eternal kingdom. "and i heard a great voice out of heaven saying, behold, the tabernacle of god is with men, and he will dwell with them, and they shall be his people, and god himself shall be with them, and be their god." [footnote: rev. xxi. 3-4] "and god shall wipe away all tears from their eyes; and there shall be no more death, neither sorrow, nor crying, neither shall there be any more pain, for the former things are passed away." the crown of it all is that "god himself shall be with them and be their god." [footnote: 1 cor. xv. 28] all creatures will say, "god is everything to me," for god will be "all in all."' we have traced out some of the wonderful truths which god has revealed to us about himself. "this is life eternal that they might know thee, the only true god and jesus christ, whom thou hast sent." [footnote: st. john xvii. 3] apart from god, all is death and ruin for ever; to _know_ god, to _trust_ god, to _love_ god is eternal life. the great question is, what is god to me? can you say--"o god, thou art my god"? transcribed by david price, email ccx074@coventry.ac.uk the existence of god introduction an ancestor of the french divine who under the name of fenelon has made for himself a household name in england as in france, was bertrand de salignac, marquis de la mothe fenelon, who in 1572, as ambassador for france, was charged to soften as much as he could the resentment of our queen elizabeth when news came of the massacre of st. bartholomew. our fenelon, claimed in brotherhood by christians of every denomination, was born nearly eighty years after that time, at the chateau of fenelon in perigord, on the 6th of august, 1651. to the world he is fenelon; he was francois de salignac de la mothe fenelon to the france of his own time. fenelon was taught at home until the age of twelve, then sent to the university of cahors, where he began studies that were continued at paris in the college du plessis. there he fastened upon theology, and there he preached, at the age of fifteen, his first sermon. he entered next into the seminary of saint sulpice, where he took holy orders in the year 1675, at the age of twenty-four. as a priest, while true to his own church, he fastened on faith, hope, and charity as the abiding forces of religion, and for him also the greatest of these was charity. during the next three years of his life fenelon was among the young priests who preached and catechised in the church of st. sulpice and laboured in the parish. he wrote for st. sulpice litanies of the infant jesus, and had thought of going out as missionary to the levant. the archbishop of paris, however, placed him at the head of a community of "new catholics," whose function was to confirm new converts in their faith, and help to bring into the fold those who appeared willing to enter. fenelon took part also in some of the conferences on scripture that were held at saint germain and versailles between 1672 and 1685. in 1681 an uncle, who was bishop of sarlat, resigned in fenelon's favour the deanery of carenas, which produced an annual income of three or four thousand livres. it was while he held this office that fenelon published a book on the "education of girls," at the request of the duchess of beauvilliers, who asked for guidance in the education of her children. fenelon sought the friendship of bossuet, who revised for him his next book, a "refutation of the system of malebranche concerning nature and grace." his next book, written just before the revocation of the edict of nantes in 1685, opposed the lawfulness of the ministrations of the protestant clergy; and after the edict, fenelon was, on the recommendation of bossuet, placed at the head of the catholic mission to poitou. he brought to his work of conversion or re-conversion charity, and a spirit of concession that brought on him the attacks of men unlike in temper. when louis xiv. placed his grandson, the young duke of burgundy, under the care of the duke of beauvilliers, the duke of beauvilliers chose fenelon for teacher of the pupil who was heir presumptive to the throne. fenelon's "fables" were written as part of his educational work. he wrote also for the young duke of burgundy his "telemaque"--used only in ms.--and his "dialogues of the dead." while thus living in high favour at court, fenelon sought nothing for himself or his friends, although at times he was even in want of money. in 1693--as preceptor of a royal prince rather than as author--fenelon was received into the french academy. in 1694 fenelon was made abbot of saint-valery, and at the end of that year he wrote an anonymous letter to louis xiv. upon wrongful wars and other faults committed in his reign. a copy of it has been found in fenelon's handwriting. the king may not have read it, or may not have identified the author, who was not stayed by it from promotion in february of the next year (1695) to the archbishopric of cambray. he objected that the holding of this office was inconsistent with his duties as preceptor of the king's grandchildren. louis replied that he could live at court only for three months in the year, and during the other nine direct the studies of his pupils from cambray. bossuet took part in the consecration of his friend fenelon as archbishop of cambray; but after a time division of opinion arose. jeanne marie bouvier de la mothe guyon became in 1676 a widow at the age of twenty-eight, with three children, for whose maintenance she gave up part of her fortune, and she then devoted herself to the practice and the preaching of a spiritual separation of the soul from earthly cares, and rest in god. she said with galahad, "if i lose myself, i save myself." her enthusiasm for a pure ideal, joined to her eloquence, affected many minds. it provoked opposition in the church and in the court, which was for the most part gross and self-seeking. madame guyon was attacked, even imprisoned. fenelon felt the charm of her spiritual aspiration, and, without accepting its form, was her defender. bossuet attacked her views. fenelon published "maxims of the saints on the interior life." bossuet wrote on "the states of prayer." these were the rival books in a controversy about what was called "quietism." bossuet afterwards wrote a "relation sur le quietisme," of which fenelon's copy, charged with his own marginal comments, is in the british museum. in march, 1699, the pope finally decided against fenelon, and condemned his "maxims of the saints." fenelon read from his pulpit the brief of condemnation, accepted the decision of the pope, and presented to his church a piece of gold plate, on which the angel of truth was represented trampling many errors under foot, and among them his own "maxims of the saints." at court, fenelon was out of favour. "telemaque," written for the young duke of burgundy, had not been published; but a copy having been obtained through a servant, it was printed, and its ideal of a true king and a true court was so unlike his majesty louis xiv. and the court of france, and the image of what ought not to be was so like what was, that it was resented as a libel. "telemaque" was publicly condemned; fenelon was banished from court, and restrained within the limits of his diocese. though separated from his pupil, the young duke of burgundy (who died in 1712), fenelon retained his pupil's warm affection. the last years of his own life fenelon gave to his work in cambray, until his death on the 7th of january, 1715. he wrote many works, of which this is one, and they have been collected into twenty volumes. the translation here given was anonymous, and was first published in the year 1713. h. m. the existence of god section i. metaphysical proofs of the existence of god are not within everybody's reach. i cannot open my eyes without admiring the art that shines throughout all nature; the least cast suffices to make me perceive the hand that makes everything. men accustomed to meditate upon metaphysical truths, and to trace up things to their first principles, may know the deity by its idea; and i own that is a sure way to arrive at the source of all truth. but the more direct and short that way is, the more difficult and unpassable it is for the generality of mankind who depend on their senses and imagination. an ideal demonstration is so simple, that through its very simplicity it escapes those minds that are incapable of operations purely intellectual. in short, the more perfect is the way to find the first being, the fewer men there are that are capable to follow it. sect. ii. moral proofs of the existence of god are fitted to every man's capacity. but there is a less perfect way, level to the meanest capacity. men the least exercised in reasoning, and the most tenacious of the prejudices of the senses, may yet with one look discover him who has drawn himself in all his works. the wisdom and power he has stamped upon everything he has made are seen, as it were, in a glass by those that cannot contemplate him in his own idea. this is a sensible and popular philosophy, of which any man free from passion and prejudice is capable. humana autem anima rationalis est, quae mortalibus peccati poena tenebatur, ad hoc diminutionis redacta ut per conjecturas rerum visibilium ad intelligenda invisibilia niteretur; that is, "the human soul is still rational, but in such a manner that, being by the punishment of sin detained in the bonds of death, it is so far reduced that it can only endeavour to arrive at the knowledge of things invisible through the visible." sect. iii. why so few persons are attentive to the proofs nature affords of the existence of god. if a great number of men of subtle and penetrating wit have not discovered god with one cast of the eye upon nature, it is not matter of wonder; for either the passions they have been tossed by have still rendered them incapable of any fixed reflection, or the false prejudices that result from passions have, like a thick cloud, interposed between their eyes and that noble spectacle. a man deeply concerned in an affair of great importance, that should take up all the attention of his mind, might pass several days in a room treating about his concerns without taking notice of the proportions of the chamber, the ornaments of the chimney, and the pictures about him, all which objects would continually be before his eyes, and yet none of them make any impression upon him. in this manner it is that men spend their lives; everything offers god to their sight, and yet they see it nowhere. "he was in the world, and the world was made by him, and nevertheless the world did not know him"--in mundo erat, et mundus per ipsum factus est, et mundus eum non cognovit. they pass away their lives without perceiving that sensible representation of the deity. such is the fascination of worldly trifles that obscures their eyes! fascinatio nugacitatis obscurat bona. nay, oftentimes they will not so much as open them, but rather affect to keep them shut, lest they should find him they do not look for. in short, what ought to help most to open their eyes serves only to close them faster; i mean the constant duration and regularity of the motions which the supreme wisdom has put in the universe. st. austin tells us those great wonders have been debased by being constantly renewed; and tully speaks exactly in the same manner. "by seeing every day the same things, the mind grows familiar with them as well as the eyes. it neither admires nor inquires into the causes of effects that are ever seen to happen in the same manner, as if it were the novelty, and not the importance of the thing itself, that should excite us to such an inquiry." sed assiduitate quotidiana et consuetudine oculorum assuescunt animi, neque admirantur neque requirunt rationes earum rerum, quas semper vident, perinde quasi novit as nos magis quam magnitudo rerum debeat ad exquirendas causas excitare. sect. iv. all nature shows the existence of its maker. but, after all, whole nature shows the infinite art of its maker. when i speak of an art, i mean a collection of proper means chosen on purpose to arrive at a certain end; or, if you please, it is an order, a method, an industry, or a set design. chance, on the contrary, is a blind and necessary cause, which neither sets in order nor chooses anything, and which has neither will nor understanding. now i maintain that the universe bears the character and stamp of a cause infinitely powerful and industrious; and, at the same time, that chance (that is, the blind and fortuitous concourse of causes necessary and void of reason) cannot have formed this universe. to this purpose it is not amiss to call to mind the celebrated comparisons of the ancients. sect. v. noble comparisons proving that nature shows the existence of its maker. first comparison, drawn from homer's "iliad." who will believe that so perfect a poem as homer's "iliad" was not the product of the genius of a great poet, and that the letters of the alphabet, being confusedly jumbled and mixed, were by chance, as it were by the cast of a pair of dice, brought together in such an order as is necessary to describe, in verses full of harmony and variety, so many great events; to place and connect them so well together; to paint every object with all its most graceful, most noble, and most affecting attendants; in short, to make every person speak according to his character in so natural and so forcible a manner? let people argue and subtilise upon the matter as much as they please, yet they never will persuade a man of sense that the "iliad" was the mere result of chance. cicero said the same in relation to ennius's "annals;" adding that chance could never make one single verse, much less a whole poem. how then can a man of sense be induced to believe, with respect to the universe, a work beyond contradiction more wonderful than the "iliad," what his reason will never suffer him to believe in relation to that poem? let us attend another comparison, which we owe to st. gregory nazianzenus. sect. vi. second comparison, drawn from the sound of instruments. if we heard in a room, from behind a curtain, a soft and harmonious instrument, should we believe that chance, without the help of any human hand, could have formed such an instrument? should we say that the strings of a violin, for instance, had of their own accord ranged and extended themselves on a wooden frame, whose several parts had glued themselves together to form a cavity with regular apertures? should we maintain that the bow formed without art should be pushed by the wind to touch every string so variously, and with such nice justness? what rational man could seriously entertain a doubt whether a human hand touched such an instrument with so much harmony? would he not cry out, "it is a masterly hand that plays upon it?" let us proceed to inculcate the same truth. sect. vii. third comparison, drawn from a statue. if a man should find in a desert island a fine statue of marble, he would undoubtedly immediately say, "sure, there have been men here formerly; i perceive the workmanship of a skilful statuary; i admire with what niceness he has proportioned all the limbs of this body, in order to give them so much beauty, gracefulness, majesty, life, tenderness, motion, and action!" what would such a man answer if anybody should tell him, "that's your mistake; a statuary never carved that figure. it is made, i confess, with an excellent gusto, and according to the rules of perfection; but yet it is chance alone made it. among so many pieces of marble there was one that formed itself of its own accord in this manner; the rains and winds have loosened it from the mountains; a violent storm has thrown it plumb upright on this pedestal, which had prepared itself to support it in this place. it is a perfect apollo, like that of belvedere; a venus that equals that of the medicis; an hercules, like that of farnese. you would think, it is true, that this figure walks, lives, thinks, and is just going to speak. but, however, it is not in the least beholden to art; and it is only a blind stroke of chance that has thus so well finished and placed it." sect. viii. fourth comparison, drawn from a picture. if a man had before his eyes a fine picture, representing, for example, the passage of the red sea, with moses, at whose voice the waters divide themselves, and rise like two walls to let the israelites pass dryfoot through the deep, he would see, on the one side, that innumerable multitude of people, full of confidence and joy, lifting up their hands to heaven; and perceive, on the other side, king pharaoh with the egyptians frighted and confounded at the sight of the waves that join again to swallow them up. now, in good earnest, who would be so bold as to affirm that a chambermaid, having by chance daubed that piece of cloth, the colours had of their own accord ranged themselves in order to produce that lively colouring, those various attitudes, those looks so well expressing different passions, that elegant disposition of so many figures without confusion, that decent plaiting of draperies, that management of lights, that degradation of colours, that exact perspective--in short, all that the noblest genius of a painter can invent? if there were no more in the case than a little foam at the mouth of a horse, i own, as the story goes, and which i readily allow without examining into it, that a stroke of a pencil thrown in a pet by a painter might once in many ages happen to express it well. but, at least, the painter must beforehand have, with design, chosen the most proper colours to represent that foam, in order to prepare them at the end of his pencil; and, therefore, it were only a little chance that had finished what art had begun. besides, this work of art and chance together being only a little foam, a confused object, and so most proper to credit a stroke of chance--an object without form, that requires only a little whitish colour dropped from a pencil, without any exact figure or correction of design. what comparison is there between that foam with a whole design of a large continued history, in which the most fertile fancy and the boldest genius, supported by the perfect knowledge of rules, are scarce sufficient to perform what makes an excellent picture? i cannot prevail with myself to leave these instances without desiring the reader to observe that the most rational men are naturally extreme loath to think that beasts have no manner of understanding, and are mere machines. now, whence proceeds such an invincible averseness to that opinion in so many men of sense? it is because they suppose, with reason, that motions so exact, and according to the rules of perfect mechanism, cannot be made without some industry; and that artless matter alone cannot perform what argues so much knowledge. hence it appears that sound reason naturally concludes that matter alone cannot, either by the simple laws of motion, or by the capricious strokes of chance, make even animals that are mere machines. those philosophers themselves, who will not allow beasts to have any reasoning faculty, cannot avoid acknowledging that what they suppose to be blind and artless in these machines is yet full of wisdom and art in the first mover, who made their springs and regulated their movements. thus the most opposite philosophers perfectly agree in acknowledging that matter and chance cannot, without the help of art, produce all we observe in animals. sect. ix. a particular examination of nature. after these comparisons, about which i only desire the reader to consult himself, without any argumentation, i think it is high time to enter into a detail of nature. i do not pretend to penetrate through the whole; who is able to do it? neither do i pretend to enter into any physical discussion. such way of reasoning requires a certain deep knowledge, which abundance of men of wit and sense never acquired; and, therefore, i will offer nothing to them but the simple prospect of the face of nature. i will entertain them with nothing but what everybody knows, and which requires only a little calm and serious attention. sect. x. of the general structure of the universe. let us, in the first place, stop at the great object that first strikes our sight, i mean the general structure of the universe. let us cast our eyes on this earth that bears us. let us look on that vast arch of the skies that covers us; those immense regions of air, and depths of water that surround us; and those bright stars that light us. a man who lives without reflecting thinks only on the parts of matter that are near him, or have any relation to his wants. he only looks upon the earth as on the floor of his chamber, and on the sun that lights him in the daytime as on the candle that lights him in the night. his thoughts are confined within the place he inhabits. on the contrary, a man who is used to contemplate and reflect carries his looks further, and curiously considers the almost infinite abysses that surround him on all sides. a large kingdom appears then to him but a little corner of the earth; the earth itself is no more to his eyes than a point in the mass of the universe; and he admires to see himself placed in it, without knowing which way he came there. sect. xi. of the earth. who is it that hung and poised this motionless globe of the earth? who laid its foundation? nothing seems more vile and contemptible; for the meanest wretches tread it under foot; but yet it is in order to possess it that we part with the greatest treasures. if it were harder than it is, man could not open its bosom to cultivate it; and if it were less hard it could not bear them, and they would sink everywhere as they do in sand, or in a bog. it is from the inexhaustible bosom of the earth we draw what is most precious. that shapeless, vile, and rude mass assumes the most various forms; and yields alone, by turns, all the goods we can desire. that dirty soil transforms itself into a thousand fine objects that charm the eye. in the compass of one year it turns into branches, twigs, buds, leaves, blossoms, fruits, and seeds, in order, by those various shapes, to multiply its liberalities to mankind. nothing exhausts the earth; the more we tear her bowels the more she is liberal. after so many ages, during which she has produced everything, she is not yet worn out. she feels no decay from old age, and her entrails still contain the same treasures. a thousand generations have passed away, and returned into her bosom. everything grows old, she alone excepted: for she grows young again every year in the spring. she is never wanting to men; but foolish men are wanting to themselves in neglecting to cultivate her. it is through their laziness and extravagance they suffer brambles and briars to grow instead of grapes and corn. they contend for a good they let perish. the conquerors leave uncultivated the ground for the possession of which they have sacrificed the lives of so many thousand men, and have spent their own in hurry and trouble. men have before them vast tracts of land uninhabited and uncultivated; and they turn mankind topsy-turvy for one nook of that neglected ground in dispute. the earth, if well cultivated, would feed a hundred times more men than now she does. even the unevenness of ground which at first seems to be a defect turns either into ornament or profit. the mountains arose and the valleys descended to the place the lord had appointed for them. those different grounds have their particular advantages, according to the divers aspects of the sun. in those deep valleys grow fresh and tender grass to feed cattle. next to them opens a vast champaign covered with a rich harvest. here, hills rise like an amphitheatre, and are crowned with vineyards and fruit trees. there high mountains carry aloft their frozen brows to the very clouds, and the torrents that run down from them become the springs of rivers. the rocks that show their craggy tops bear up the earth of mountains just as the bones bear up the flesh in human bodies. that variety yields at once a ravishing prospect to the eye, and, at the same time, supplies the divers wants of man. there is no ground so barren but has some profitable property. not only black and fertile soil but even clay and gravel recompense a man's toil. drained morasses become fruitful; sand for the most part only covers the surface of the earth; and when, the husbandman has the patience to dig deeper he finds a new ground that grows fertile as fast as it is turned and exposed to the rays of the sun. there is scarce any spot of ground absolutely barren if a man do not grow weary of digging, and turning it to the enlivening sun, and if he require no more from it than it is proper to bear, amidst stones and rocks there is sometimes excellent pasture; and their cavities have veins, which, being penetrated by the piercing rays of the sun, furnish plants with most savoury juices for the feeding of herds and flocks. even sea-coasts that seem to be the most sterile and wild yield sometimes either delicious fruits or most wholesome medicines that are wanting in the most fertile countries. besides, it is the effect of a wise over-ruling providence that no land yields all that is useful to human life. for want invites men to commerce, in order to supply one another's necessities. it is therefore that want that is the natural tie of society between nations: otherwise all the people of the earth would be reduced to one sort of food and clothing; and nothing would invite them to know and visit one another. sect. xii. of plants. all that the earth produces being corrupted, returns into her bosom, and becomes the source of a new production. thus she resumes all she has given in order to give it again. thus the corruption of plants, and the excrements of the animals she feeds, feed her, and improve her fertility. thus, the more she gives the more she resumes; and she is never exhausted, provided they who cultivate her restore to her what she has given. everything comes from her bosom, everything returns to it, and nothing is lost in it. nay, all seeds multiply there. if, for instance, you trust the earth with some grains of corn, as they corrupt they germinate and spring; and that teeming parent restores with usury more ears than she had received grains. dig into her entrails, you will find in them stone and marble for the most magnificent buildings. but who is it that has laid up so many treasures in her bosom, upon condition that they should continually produce themselves anew? behold how many precious and useful metals; how many minerals designed for the conveniency of man! admire the plants that spring from the earth: they yield food for the healthy, and remedies for the sick. their species and virtues are innumerable. they deck the earth, yield verdure, fragrant flowers, and delicious fruits. do you see those vast forests that seem as old as the world? those trees sink into the earth by their roots, as deep as their branches shoot up to the sky. their roots defend them against the winds, and fetch up, as it were by subterranean pipes, all the juices destined to feed the trunk. the trunk itself is covered with a tough bark that shelters the tender wood from the injuries of the air. the branches distribute by several pipes the sap which the roots had gathered up in the trunk. in summer the boughs protect us with their shadow against the scorching rays of the sun. in winter, they feed the fire that preserves in us natural heat. nor is burning the only use wood is fit for; it is a soft though solid and durable matter, to which the hand of man gives, with ease, all the forms he pleases for the greatest works of architecture and navigation. moreover, fruit trees by bending their boughs towards the earth seem to offer their crop to man. the trees and plants, by letting their fruit or seed drop down, provide for a numerous posterity about them. the tenderest plant, the least of herbs and pulse are, in little, in a small seed, all that is displayed in the highest plants and largest tree. earth that never changes produces all those alterations in her bosom. sect. xiii. of water. let us now behold what we call water. it is a liquid, clear, and transparent body. on the one hand it flows, slips, and runs away; and on the other it assumes all the forms of the bodies that surround it, having properly none of its own. if water were more rarefied, or thinner, it would be a kind of air; and so the whole surface of the earth would be dry and sterile. there would be none but volatiles; no living creature could swim; no fish could live; nor would there be any traffic by navigation. what industrious and sagacious hand has found means to thicken the water, by subtilising the air, and so well to distinguish those two sorts of fluid bodies? if water were somewhat more rarefied, it could no longer sustain those prodigious floating buildings, called ships. bodies that have the least ponderosity would presently sink under water. who is it that took care to frame so just a configuration of parts, and so exact a degree of motion, as to make water so fluid, so penetrating, so slippery, so incapable of any consistency: and yet so strong to bear, and so impetuous to carry off and waft away, the most unwieldy bodies? it is docile; man leads it about as a rider does a wellmanaged horse. he distributes it as he pleases; he raises it to the top of steep mountains, and makes use of its weight to let it fall, in order to rise again, as high as it was at first. but man who leads waters with such absolute command is in his turn led by them. water is one of the greatest moving powers that man can employ to supply his defects in the most necessary arts, either through the smallness or weakness of his body. but the waters which, notwithstanding their fluidity, are such ponderous bodies, do nevertheless rise above our heads, and remain a long while hanging there. do you see those clouds that fly, as it were, on the wings of the winds? if they should fall, on a sudden, in watery pillars, rapid like a torrent, they would drown and destroy everything where they should happen to fall, and the other grounds would remain dry. what hand keeps them in those pendulous reservatories, and permits them to fall only by drops as if they distilled through a gardener's watering-pot? whence comes it that in some hot countries, where scarce any rain ever falls, the nightly dews are so plentiful that they supply the want of rain; and that in other countries, such as the banks of the nile and ganges, the regular inundation of rivers, at certain seasons of the year, never fails to make up what the inhabitants are deficient in for the watering of the ground? can one imagine measures better concerted to render all countries fertile and fruitful? thus water quenches, not only the thirst of men, but likewise of arid lands: and he who gave us that fluid body has carefully distributed it throughout the earth, like pipes in a garden. the waters fall from the tops of mountains where their reservatories are placed. they gather into rivulets in the bottom of valleys. rivers run in winding streams through vast tracts of land, the better to water them; and, at last, they precipitate themselves into the sea, in order to make it the centre of commerce for all nations. that ocean, which seems to be placed in the midst of lands, to make an eternal separation between them, is, on the contrary, the common rendezvous of all the people of the earth, who could not go by land from one end of the world to the other without infinite fatigue, tedious journeys, and numberless dangers. it is by that trackless road, across the bottomless deep, that the whole world shakes hands with the new; and that the new supplies the old with so many conveniences and riches. the waters, distributed with so much art, circulate in the earth, just as the blood does in a man's body. but besides this perpetual circulation of the water, there is besides the flux and reflux of the sea. let us not inquire into the causes of so mysterious an effect. what is certain is that the tide carries, or brings us back to certain places, at precise hours. who is it that makes it withdraw, and then come back with so much regularity? a little more or less motion in that fluid mass would disorder all nature; for a little more motion in a tide or flood would drown whole kingdoms. who is it that knew how to take such exact measures in immense bodies? who is it that knew so well how to keep a just medium between too much and too little? what hand has set to the sea the unmovable boundary it must respect through the series of all ages by telling it: there, thy proud waves shall come and break? but these waters so fluid become, on a sudden, during the winter, as hard as rocks. the summits of high mountains have, even at all times, ice and snow, which are the springs of rivers, and soaking pasture-grounds render them more fertile. here waters are sweet to quench the thirst of man; there they are briny, and yield a salt that seasons our meat, and makes it incorruptible. in fine, if i lift up my eyes, i perceive in the clouds that fly above us a sort of hanging seas that serve to temper the air, break the fiery rays of the sun, and water the earth when it is too dry. what hand was able to hang over our heads those great reservatories of waters? what hand takes care never to let them fall but in moderate showers? sect. xiv. of the air. after having considered the waters, let us now contemplate another mass yet of far greater extent. do you see what is called air? it is a body so pure, so subtle, and so transparent, that the rays of the stars, seated at a distance almost infinite from us, pierce quite through it, without difficulty, and in an instant, to light our eyes. had this fluid body been a little less subtle, it would either have intercepted the day from us, or at most would have left us but a duskish and confused light, just as when the air is filled with thick fogs. we live plunged in abysses of air, as fishes do in abysses of water. as the water, if it were subtilised, would become a kind of air, which would occasion the death of fishes, so the air would deprive us of breath if it should become more humid and thicker. in such a case we should drown in the waves of that thickened air, just as a terrestrial animal drowns in the sea. who is it that has so nicely purified that air we breathe? if it were thicker it would stifle us; and if it were too subtle it would want that softness which continually feeds the vitals of man. we should be sensible everywhere of what we experience on the top of the highest mountains, where the air is so thin that it yields no sufficient moisture and nourishment for the lungs. but what invisible power raises and lays so suddenly the storms of that great fluid body, of which those of the sea are only consequences? from what treasury come forth the winds that purify the air, cool scorching heats, temper the sharpness of winter, and in an instant change the whole face of heaven? on the wings of those winds the clouds fly from one end of the horizon to the other. it is known that certain winds blow in certain seas, at some stated seasons. they continue a fixed time, and others succeed them, as it were on purpose, to render navigation both commodious and regular: so that if men are but as patient, and as punctual as the winds, they may, with ease, perform the longest voyages. sect. xv. of fire. do you see that fire that seems kindled in the stars, and spreads its light on all sides? do you see that flame which certain mountains vomit up, and which the earth feeds with sulphur within its entrails? that same fire peaceably lurks in the veins of flints, and expects to break out, till the collision of another body excites it to shock cities and mountains. man has found the way to kindle it, and apply it to all his uses, both to bend the hardest metals, and to feed with wood, even in the most frozen climes, a flame that serves him instead of the sun, when the sun removes from him. that subtle flame glides and penetrates into all seeds. it is, as it were, the soul of all living things; it consumes all that is impure, and renews what it has purified. fire lends its force and activity to weak men. it blows up, on a sudden, buildings and rocks. but have we a mind to confine it to a more moderate use? it warms man, and makes all sorts of food fit for his eating. the ancients, in admiration of fire, believed it to be a celestial gift, which man had stolen from the gods. sect. xvi. of heaven. it is time to lift up our eyes to heaven. what power has built over our heads so vast and so magnificent an arch? what a stupendous variety of admirable objects is here? it is, no doubt, to present us with a noble spectacle that an omnipotent hand has set before our eyes so great and so bright objects. it is in order to raise our admiration of heaven, says tully, that god made man unlike the rest of animals. he stands upright, and lifts up his head, that he may be employed about the things that were above him. sometimes we see a duskish azure sky, where the purest fires twinkle. sometimes we behold, in a temperate heaven, the softest colours mixed with such variety as it is not in the power of painting to imitate. sometimes we see clouds of all shapes and figures, and of all the brightest colours, which every moment shift that beautiful decoration by the finest accidents and various effects of light. what does the regular succession of day and night denote? for so many ages as are past the sun never failed serving men, who cannot live without it. many thousand years are elapsed, and the dawn never once missed proclaiming the approach of the day. it always begins precisely at a certain moment and place. the sun, says the holy writ, knows where it shall set every day. by that means it lights, by turns, the two hemispheres, or sides of the earth, and visits all those for whom its beams are designed. the day is the time for society and labour; the night, wrapping up the earth with its shadow, ends, in its turn, all manner of fatigue and alleviates the toil of the day. it suspends and quiets all; and spreads silence and sleep everywhere. by refreshing the bodies it renews the spirits. soon after day returns to summon again man to labour and revive all nature. sect. xvii. of the sun. but besides the constant course by which the sun forms days and nights it makes us sensible of another, by which for the space of six months it approaches one of the poles, and at the end of those six months goes back with equal speed to visit the other pole. this excellent order makes one sun sufficient for the whole earth. if it were of a larger size at the same distance, it would set the whole globe on fire and the earth would be burnt to ashes; and if, at the same distance, it were lesser, the earth would be all over frozen and uninhabitable. again, if in the same magnitude it were nearer us, it would set us in flames; and if more remote, we should not be able to live on the terrestrial globe for want of heat. what pair of compasses, whose circumference encircles both heaven and earth, has fixed such just dimensions? that star does no less befriend that part of the earth from which it removes, in order to temper it, than that it approaches to favour it with its beams. its kind, beneficent aspect fertilises all it shines upon. this change produces that of the seasons, whose variety is so agreeable. the spring silences bleak frosty winds, brings forth blossoms and flowers, and promises fruits. the summer yields rich harvests. the autumn bestows the fruits promised by the spring. the winter, which is a kind of night wherein man refreshes and rests himself, lays up all the treasures of the earth in its centre with no other design but that the next spring may display them with all the graces of novelty. thus nature, variously attired, yields so many fine prospects that she never gives man leisure to be disgusted with what he possesses. but how is it possible for the course of the sun to be so regular? it appears that star is only a globe of most subtle flame. now, what is it that keeps that flame, so restless and so impetuous, within the exact bounds of a perfect globe? what hand leads that flame in so strait a way and never suffers it to slip one side or other? that flame is held by nothing, and there is no body that can either guide it or keep it under; for it would soon consume whatever body it should be enclosed in. whither is it going? who has taught it incessantly and so regularly to turn in a space where it is free and unconstrained? does it not circulate about us on purpose to serve us? now if this flame does not turn, and if on the contrary it is our earth that turns, i would fain know how it comes to be so well placed in the centre of the universe, as it were the focus or the heart of all nature. i would fain know also how it comes to pass that a globe of so subtle matter never slips on any side in that immense space that surrounds it, and wherein it seems to stand with reason that all fluid bodies ought to yield to the impetuosity of that flame. in fine, i would fain know how it comes to pass that the globe of the earth, which is so very hard, turns so regularly about that planet in a space where no solid body keeps it fast to regulate its course. let men with the help of physics contrive the most ingenious reasons to explain this phenomenon; all their arguments, supposing them to be true, will become proofs of the deity. the more the great spring that directs the machine of the universe is exact, simple, constant, certain, and productive of abundance of useful effects, the more it is plain that a most potent and most artful hand knew how to pitch upon the spring which is the most perfect of all. sect. xviii. of the stars. but let us once more view that immense arched roof where the stars shine, and which covers our heads like a canopy. if it be a solid vault, what architect built it? who is it that has fixed so many great luminous bodies to certain places of that arch and at certain distances? who is it that makes that vault turn so regularly about us? if on the contrary the skies are only immense spaces full of fluid bodies, like the air that surrounds us, how comes it to pass that so many solid bodies float in them without ever sinking or ever coming nearer one another? for all astronomical observations that have been made in so many ages not the least disorder or irregular motion has yet been discovered in the heavens. will a fluid body range in such constant and regular order bodies that swim circularly within its sphere? but what does that almost innumerable multitude of stars mean? the profusion with which the hand of god has scattered them through his work shows nothing is difficult to his power. he has cast them about the skies as a magnificent prince either scatters money by handfuls or studs his clothes with precious stones. let who will say, if he pleases, that the stars are as many worlds like the earth we inhabit; i grant it for one moment; but then, how potent and wise must he be who makes worlds as numberless as the grains of sand that cover the sea-shore, and who, without any trouble, for so many ages governs all these wandering worlds as a shepherd does a flock of sheep? if on the contrary they are only, as it were, lighted torches to shine in our eyes in this small globe called earth, how great is that power which nothing can fatigue, nothing can exhaust? what a profuse liberality it is to give man in this little corner of the universe so marvellous a spectacle! but among those stars i perceive the moon, which seems to share with the sun the care and office of lighting us. she appears at set times with all the other stars, when the sun is obliged to go and carry back the day to the other hemisphere. thus night itself, notwithstanding its darkness, has a light, duskish indeed, but soft and useful. that light is borrowed from the sun, though absent: and thus everything is managed with such excellent art in the universe that a globe near the earth, and as dark as she of itself, serves, nevertheless, to send back to her, by reflection, the rays it receives from the sun; and that the sun lights by means of the moon the people that cannot see him while he must light others. it may be said that the motion of the stars is settled and regulated by unchangeable laws. i suppose it is; but this very supposition proves what i labour to evince. who is it that has given to all nature laws at once so constant and so wholesome, laws so very simple, that one is tempted to believe they establish themselves of their own accord, and so productive of beneficial and useful effects that one cannot avoid acknowledging a marvellous art in them? whence proceeds the government of that universal machine which incessantly works for us without so much as our thinking upon it? to whom shall we ascribe the choice and gathering of so many deep and so well conceited springs, and of so many bodies, great and small, visible and invisible, which equally concur to serve us? the least atom of this machine that should happen to be out of order would unhinge all nature. for the springs and movements of a watch are not put together with so much art and niceness as those of the universe. what then must be a design so extensive, so coherent, so excellent, so beneficial? the necessity of those laws, instead of deterring me from inquiring into their author, does but heighten my curiosity and admiration. certainly, it required a hand equally artful and powerful to put in his work an order equally simple and teeming, constant and useful. wherefore i will not scruple to say with the scripture, "let every star haste to go whither the lord sends it; and when he speaks let them answer with trembling, here we are," ecce adsumus. sect. xix. of animals, beasts, fowl, birds, fishes, reptiles, and insects. but let us turn our eyes towards animals, which still are more worthy of admiration than either the skies or stars. their species are numberless. some have but two feet, others four, others again a great many. some walk; others crawl, or creep; others fly; others swim; others fly, walk, or swim, by turns. the wings of birds, and the fins of fishes, are like oars, that cut the waves either of air or water, and steer the floating body either of the bird, or fish, whose structure is like that of a ship. but the pinions of birds have feathers with a down, that swells in the air, and which would grow unwieldy in the water. and, on the contrary, the fins of fishes have sharp and dry points, which cut the water, without imbibing it, and which do not grow heavier by being wet. a sort of fowl that swim, such as swans, keep their wings and most of their feathers above water, both lest they should wet them and that they may serve them, as it were, for sails. they have the art to turn those feathers against the wind, and, in a manner, to tack, as ships do when the wind does not serve. water-fowls, such as ducks, have at their feet large skins that stretch, somewhat like rackets, to keep them from sinking on the oozy and miry banks of rivers. amongst the animals, wild beasts, such as lions, have their biggest muscles about the shoulders, thighs, and legs; and therefore these animals are nimble, brisk, nervous, and ready to rush forward. their jaw-bones are prodigiously large, in proportion to the rest of their bodies. they have teeth and claws, which serve them, as terrible weapons, to tear in pieces and devour other animals. for the same reason, birds of prey, such as eagles, have a beak and pounces that pierce everything. the muscles of their pinions are extreme large and brawny, that their wings may have a stronger and more rapid motion: and so those creatures, though somewhat heavy, soar aloft and tower up easily to the very clouds, from whence they shoot, like a thunderbolt, on the quarry they have in view. other animals have horns. the greatest strength of some lies in their backs and necks; and others can only kick. every species, however, has both offensive and defensive arms. their hunting is a kind of war, which they wage one against another, for the necessities of life. they have also laws and a government among themselves. some, like tortoises, carry the house wherein they were born; others build theirs, as birds do, on the highest branches of trees, to preserve their young from the insult of unwinged creatures, and they even lay their nests in the thickest boughs to hide them from their enemies. another, such as the beaver, builds in the very bottom of a pond the sanctuary he prepares for himself, and knows how to cast up dikes around it, to preserve himself by the neighbouring inundation. another, like a mole, has so pointed and so sharp a snout, that in one moment he pierces through the hardest ground in order to provide for himself a subterranean retreat. the cunning fox digs a kennel with two holes to go out and come in at, that he may not be either surprised or trapped by the huntsmen. the reptiles are of another make. they curl, wind, shrink, and stretch by the springs of their muscles; they creep, twist about, squeeze, and hold fast the bodies they meet in their way; and easily slide everywhere. their organs are almost independent one on the other; so that they still live when they are cut into two. the long-legged birds, says cicero, are also long-necked in proportion, that they may bring down their bill to the ground, and take up their food. it is the same with the camel; but the elephant, whose neck through its bigness would be too heavy if it were as long as that of the camel, was furnished with a trunk, which is a contexture of nerves and muscles, which he stretches, shrinks, winds, and turns every way, to seize on bodies, lift them up, or throw them off: for which reason the latins called that trunk a hand. certain animals seem to be made on purpose for man. the dog is born to caress and fawn upon him; to obey and be under command; to give him an agreeable image of society, friendship, fidelity, and tenderness; to be true to his trust; eagerly to hunt down, course, and catch several other creatures, to leave them afterwards to man, without retaining any part of the quarry. the horse, and such other animals, are within the reach and power of man; to ease him of his labour, and to take upon them a thousand burdens. they are born to carry, to walk, to supply man's weakness, and to obey all his motions. oxen are endowed with strength and patience, in order to draw the plough and till the ground. cows yield streams of milk. sheep have in their fleeces a superfluity which is not for them, and which still grows and renews, as it were to invite men to shear them every year. even goats furnish man with a long hair, for which they have no use, and of which he makes stuffs to cover himself. the skins of some beasts supply men with the finest and best linings, in the countries that are most remote from the sun. thus the author of nature has clothed beasts according to their necessities; and their spoils serve afterwards to clothe men, and keep them warm in those frozen climes. the living creatures that have little or no hair have a very thick and very hard skin, like scales; others have even scales that cover one another, as tiles on the top of a house, and which either open or shut, as it best suits with the living creature, either to extend itself or shrink. these skins and scales serve the necessities of men: and thus in nature, not only plants but animals also are made for our use. wild beasts themselves either grow tame or, at least, are afraid of man. if all countries were peopled and governed as they ought to be, there would not be anywhere beasts should attack men. for no wild beasts would be found but in remote forests, and they would be preserved in order to exercise the courage, strength, and dexterity of mankind, by a sport that should represent war; so that there never would be any occasion for real wars among nations. but observe that living creatures that are noxious to man are the least teeming, and that the most useful multiply most. there are, beyond comparison, more oxen and sheep killed than bears or wolves; and nevertheless the number of bears and wolves is infinitely less than that of oxen and sheep still on earth. observe likewise, with cicero, that the females of every species have a number of teats proportioned to that of the young ones they generally bring forth. the more young they bear, with the more milk-springs has nature supplied them, to suckle them. while sheep let their wool grow for our use, silk-worms, in emulation with each other, spin rich stuffs and spend themselves to bestow them upon us. they make of their cod a kind of tomb, and shutting up themselves in their own work, they are new-born under another figure, in order to perpetuate themselves. on the other hand, the bees carefully suck and gather the juice of odorous and fragrant flowers, in order to make their honey; and range it in such an order as may serve for a pattern to men. several insects are transformed, sometimes into flies, sometimes into worms, or maggots. if one should think such insects useless, let him consider that what makes a part of the great spectacle of the universe, and contributes to its variety, is not altogether useless to sedate and contemplative men. what can be more noble, and more magnificent, than that great number of commonwealths of living creatures so well governed, and every species of which has a different frame from the other? everything shows how much the skill and workmanship of the artificer surpasses the vile matter he has worked upon. every living creature, nay even gnats, appear wonderful to me. if one finds them troublesome, he ought to consider that it is necessary that some anxiety and pain be mixed with man's conveniences: for if nothing should moderate his pleasures, and exercise his patience, he would either grow soft and effeminate, or forget himself. sect. xx. admirable order in which all the bodies that make up the universe are ranged. let us now consider the wonders that shine equally both in the largest and the smallest bodies. on the one side, i see the sun so many thousand times bigger than the earth; i see him circulating in a space, in comparison of which he is himself but a bright atom. i see other stars, perhaps still bigger than he, that roll in other regions, still farther distant from us. beyond those regions, which escape all measure, i still confusedly perceive other stars, which can neither be counted nor distinguished. the earth, on which i stand, is but one point, in proportion to the whole, in which no bound can ever be found. the whole is so well put together, that not one single atom can be put out of its place without unhinging this immense machine; and it moves in such excellent order that its very motion perpetuates its variety and perfection. sure it must be the hand of a being that does everything without any trouble that still keeps steady, and governs this great work for so many ages; and whose fingers play with the universe, to speak with the scripture. sect. xxi. wonders of the infinitely little. on the other hand the work is no less to be admired in little than in great: for i find as well in little as in great a kind of infinite that astonishes me. it surpasses my imagination to find in a hand-worm, as one does in an elephant or whale, limbs perfectly well organised; a head, a body, legs, and feet, as distinct and as well formed as those of the biggest animals. there are in every part of those living atoms, muscles, nerves, veins, arteries, blood; and in that blood ramous particles and humours; in these humours some drops that are themselves composed of several particles: nor can one ever stop in the discussion of this infinite composition of so infinite a whole. the microscope discovers to us in every object as it were a thousand other objects that had escaped our notice. but how many other objects are there in every object discovered by the microscope which the microscope itself cannot discover? what should not we see if we could still subtilise and improve more and more the instruments that help out weak and dull sight? let us supply by our imagination what our eyes are defective in; and let our fancy itself be a kind of microscope, and represent to us in every atom a thousand new and invisible worlds: but it will never be able incessantly to paint to us new discoveries in little bodies; it will be tired, and forced at last to stop, and sink, leaving in the smallest organ of a body a thousand wonders undiscovered. sect. xxii. of the structure or frame of the animal. let us confine ourselves within the animal's machine, which has three things that never can be too much admired: first, it has in it wherewithal to defend itself against those that attack it, in order to destroy it. secondly, it has a faculty of reviving itself by food. thirdly, it has wherewithal to perpetuate its species by generation. let us bestow some considerations on these three things. sect. xxiii. of the instinct of the animal. animals are endowed with what is called instinct, both to approach useful and beneficial objects, and to avoid such as may be noxious and destructive to them. let us not inquire wherein this instinct consists, but content ourselves with matter of fact, without reasoning upon it. the tender lamb smells his dam afar off, and runs to meet her. a sheep is seized with horror at the approach of a wolf, and flies away before he can discern him. the hound is almost infallible in finding out a stag, a buck, or a hare, only by the scent. there is in every animal an impetuous spring, which, on a sudden, gathers all the spirits; distends all the nerves; renders all the joints more supple and pliant; and increases in an incredible manner, upon sudden dangers, his strength, agility, speed, and cunning, in order to make him avoid the object that threatens his destruction. the question in this place is not to know whether beasts are endowed with reason or understanding; for i do not pretend to engage in any philosophical inquiry. the motions i speak of are entirely indeliberate, even in the machine of man. if, for instance, a man that dances on a rope should, at that time, reason on the laws and rules of equilibrium, his reasoning would make him lose that very equilibrium which he preserves admirably well without arguing upon the matter, and reason would then be of no other use to him but to throw him on the ground. the same happens with beasts; nor will it avail anything to object that they reason as well as men, for this objection does not in the least weaken my proof; and their reasoning can never serve to account for the motions we admire most in them. will any one affirm that they know the nicest rules of mechanics, which they observe with perfect exactness, whenever they are to run, leap, swim, hide themselves, double, use shifts to avoid pursuing hounds, or to make use of the strongest part of their bodies to defend themselves? will he say that they naturally understand the mathematics which men are ignorant of? will he dare to advance that they perform with deliberation and knowledge all those impetuous and yet so exact motions which even men perform without study or premeditation? will he allow them to make use of reason in those motions, wherein it is certain man does not? it is an instinct, will he say, that beasts are governed by. i grant it: for it is, indeed, an instinct. but this instinct is an admirable sagacity and dexterity, not in the beasts, who neither do, nor can then, have time to reason, but in the superior wisdom that governs them. that instinct, or wisdom, that thinks and watches for beasts, in indeliberate things, wherein they could neither watch nor think, even supposing them to be as reasonable as we, can be no other than the wisdom of the artificer that made these machines. let us therefore talk no more of instinct or nature, which are but fine empty names in the mouth of the generality that pronounce them. there is in what they call nature and instinct a superior art and contrivance, of which human invention is but a shadow. what is beyond all question is, that there are in beasts a prodigious number of motions entirely indeliberate, and which yet are performed according to the nicest rules of mechanics. it is the machine alone that follows those rules: which is a fact independent from all philosophy; and matter of fact is ever decisive. what would a man think of a watch that should fly or slip away, turn, again, or defend itself, for its own preservation, if he went about to break it? would he not admire the skill of the artificer? could he be induced to believe that the springs of that watch had formed, proportioned, ranged, and united themselves, by mere chance? could he imagine that he had clearly explained and accounted for such industrious and skilful operation by talking of the nature and instinct of a watch that should exactly show the hour to his master, and slip away from such as should go about to break its springs to pieces? sect. xxiv. of food. what is more noble than a machine which continually repairs and renews itself? the animal, stinted to his own strength, is soon tired and exhausted by labour; but the more he takes pains, the more he finds himself pressed to make himself amends for his labour, by more plentiful feeding. aliments daily restore the strength he had lost. he puts into his body another substance that becomes his own, by a kind of metamorphosis. at first it is pounded, and being changed into a liquor, it purifies, as if it were strained through a sieve, in order to separate anything that is gross from it; afterwards it arrives at the centre, or focus of the spirits, where it is subtilised, and becomes blood. and running at last, and penetrating through numberless vessels to moisten all the members, it filtrates in the flesh, and becomes itself flesh. so many aliments, and liquors of various colours, are then no more than one and the same flesh; and food which was but an inanimate body preserves the life of the animal, and becomes part of the animal himself; the other parts of which he was composed being exhaled by an insensible and continual transpiration. the matter which, for instance, was four years ago such a horse, is now but air, or dung. what was then either hay, or oats, is become that same horse, so fiery and vigorous--at least, he is accounted the same horse, notwithstanding this insensible change of his substance. sect. xxv. of sleep. the natural attendant of food is sleep; in which the animal forbears not only all his outward motions, but also all the principal inward operations which might too much stir and dissipate the spirits. he only retains respiration, and digestion; so that all motions that might wear out his strength are suspended, and all such as are proper to recruit and renew it go on freely of themselves. this repose, which is a kind of enchantment, returns every night, while darkness interrupts and hinders labour. now, who is it that contrived such a suspension? who is it that so well chose the operations that ought to continue; and, with so just discernment, excluded all such as ought to be interrupted? the next day all past fatigue is gone and vanished. the animal works on, as if he had never worked before; and this reviving gives him a vivacity and vigour that invites him to new labour. thus the nerves are still full of spirits, the flesh smooth, the skin whole, though one would think it should waste and tear; the living body of the animal soon wears out inanimate bodies, even the most solid that are about it; and yet does not wear out itself. the skin of a horse, for instance, wears out several saddles; and the flesh of a child, though very delicate and tender, wears out many clothes, whilst it daily grows stronger. if this renewing of spirits were perfect, it would be real immortality, and the gift of eternal youth. but the same being imperfect, the animal insensibly loses his strength, decays and grows old, because everything that is created ought to bear a mark of nothingness from which it was drawn; and have an end. sect. xxvi. of generation. what is more admirable than the multiplication of animals? look upon the individuals: no animal is immortal. everything grows old, everything passes away, everything disappears, everything, in short, is annihilated. look upon the species: everything subsists, everything is permanent and immutable, though in a constant vicissitude. ever since there have been on earth men that have taken care to preserve the memory of events, no lions, tigers, wild boars, or bears, were ever known to form themselves by chance in caves or forests. neither do we see any fortuitous productions of dogs or cats. bulls and sheep are never born of themselves, either in stables, folds, or on pasture grounds. every one of those animals owes his birth to a certain male and female of his species. all those different species are preserved much the same in all ages. we do not find that for three thousand years past any one has perished or ceased; neither do we find that any one multiplies to such an excess as to be a nuisance or inconveniency to the rest. if the species of lions, bears, and tigers multiplied to a certain excessive degree, they would not only destroy the species of stags, bucks, sheep, goats, and bulls, but even get the mastery over mankind, and unpeople the earth. now who maintains so just a measure as never either to extinguish those different species, or never to suffer them to multiply too fast? but this continual propagation of every species is a wonder with which we are grown too familiar. what would a man think of a watchmaker who should have the art to make watches, which, of themselves, should produce others ad infinitum in such a manner that two original watches should be sufficient to multiply and perpetuate their species over the whole earth? what would he say of an architect that should have the skill to build houses, which should build others, to renew the habitations of men, before the first should decay and be ready to fall to the ground? it is, however, what we daily see among animals. they are no more, if you please, than mere machines, as watches are. but, after all, the author of these machines has endowed them with a faculty to reproduce or perpetuate themselves ad infinitum by the conjunction of both sexes. affirm, if you please, that this generation of animals is performed either by moulds or by an express configuration of every individual; which of these two opinions you think fit to pitch upon, it comes all to one; nor is the skill of the artificer less conspicuous. if you suppose that at every generation the individual, without being cast into a mould, receives a configuration made on purpose, i ask, who it is that manages and directs the configuration of so compounded a machine, and which argues so much art and industry? if, on the contrary, to avoid acknowledging any art in the case you suppose that everything is determined by the moulds, i go back to the moulds themselves, and ask, who is it that prepared them? in my opinion they are still greater matter of wonder than the very machines which are pretended to come out of them. therefore let who will suppose that there were moulds in the animals that lived four thousand years ago, and affirm, if he pleases, that those moulds were so inclosed one within another ad infinitum, that there was a sufficient number for all the generations of those four thousand years; and that there is still a sufficient number ready prepared for the formation of all the animals that shall preserve their species in all succeeding ages. now, these moulds, which, as i have observed, must have all the configuration of the animal, are as difficult to be explained or accounted for as the animals themselves, and are besides attended with far more unexplicable wonders. it is certain that the configuration of every individual animal requires no more art and power than is necessary to frame all the springs that make up that machine; but when a man supposes moulds: first, he must affirm that every mould contains in little, with unconceivable niceness, all the springs of the machine itself. now, it is beyond dispute that there is more art in making so compound a work in little than in a larger bulk. secondly, he must suppose that every mould, which is an individual prepared for a first generation, contains distinctly within itself other moulds contained within one another ad infinitum, for all possible generations, in all succeeding ages. now what can be more artful and more wonderful in matter of mechanism than such a preparation of an infinite number of individuals, all formed beforehand in one from which they are to spring? therefore the moulds are of no use to explain the generations of animals without supposing any art or skill. for, on the contrary, moulds would argue a more artificial mechanism and more wonderful composition. what is manifest and indisputable, independently from all the systems of philosophers, is that the fortuitous concourse of atoms never produces, without generation, in any part of the earth, any lions, tigers, bears, elephants, stags, bulls, sheep, cats, dogs, or horses. these and the like are never produced but by the encounter of two of their kind of different sex. the two animals that produce a third are not the true authors of the art that shines in the composition of the animal engendered by them. they are so far from knowing how to perform that art, that they do not so much as know the composition or frame of the work that results from their generation. nay, they know not so much as any particular spring of it; having been no more than blind and unvoluntary instruments, made use of for the performance of a marvellous art, to which they are absolute strangers, and of which they are perfectly ignorant. now i would fain know whence comes that art, which is none of theirs? what power and wisdom knows how to employ, for the performance of works of so ingenious and intricate a design, instruments so uncapable to know what they are doing, or to have any notion of it? nor does it avail anything to suppose that beasts are endowed with reason. let a man suppose them to be as rational as he pleases in other things, yet he must own, that in generation they have no share in the art that is conspicuous in the composition of the animals they produce. let us carry the thing further, and take for granted the most wonderful instances that are given of the skill and forecast of animals. let us admire, as much as you please, the certainty with which a hound takes a spring into a third way, as soon as he finds by his nose that the game he pursues has left no scent in the other two. let us admire the hind, who, they say, throws a good way off her young fawn, into some hidden place, that the hounds may not find him out by the scent of his strain. let us even admire the spider who with her cobwebs lays subtle snares to trap flies, and fall unawares upon them before they can disentangle themselves. let us also admire the hern, who, they say, puts his head under his wing, in order to hide his bill under his feathers, thereby to stick the breast of the bird of prey that stoops at him. let us allow the truth of all these wonderful instances of rationality; for all nature is full of such prodigies. but what must we infer from them? in good earnest, if we carefully examine the matter, we shall find that they prove too much. shall we say that animals are more rational than we? their instinct has undoubtedly more certainty than our conjectures. they have learnt neither logic nor geometry, neither have they any course or method of improvement, or any science. whatever they do is done of a sudden without study, preparation, or deliberation. we commit blunders and mistakes every hour of the day after we have a long while argued and consulted together; whereas animals, without any reasoning or premeditation, perform every hour what seems to require most discernment, choice, and exactness. their instinct is in many things infallible; but that word instinct is but a fair name void of sense. for what can an instinct more just, exact, precise, and certain than reason itself mean but a more perfect reason? we must therefore suppose a wonderful reason and understanding either in the work or in the artificer; either in the machine or in him that made it. when, for instance, i find that a watch shows the hours with such exactness as surpasses my knowledge, i presently conclude that if the watch itself does not reason, it must have been made by an artificer who, in that particular, reasoned better and had more skill than myself. in like manner, when i see animals, who every moment perform actions that argue a more certain art and industry than i am master of, i immediately conclude that such marvellous art must necessarily be either in the machine or in the artificer that framed it. is it in the animal himself? but how is it possible he should be so wise and so infallible in some things? and if this art is not in him, it must of necessity be in the supreme artificer that made that piece of work, just as all the art of a watch is in the skill of the watchmaker. sect. xxvii. though beasts commit some mistakes, yet their instinct is, in many cases, infallible. do not object to me that the instinct of beasts is in some things defective, and liable to error. it is no wonder beasts are not infallible in everything, but it is rather a wonder they are so in many cases. if they were infallible in everything, they should be endowed with a reason infinitely perfect; in short, they should be deities. in the works of an infinite power there can be but a finite perfection, otherwise god should make creatures like or equal to himself, which is impossible. he therefore cannot place perfection, nor consequently reason, in his works, without some bounds and restrictions. but those bounds do not prove that the work is void of order or reason. because i mistake sometimes, it does not follow that i have no reason at all, and that i do everything by mere chance, but only that my reason is stinted and imperfect. in like manner, because a beast is not by his instinct infallible in everything, though he be so in many, it does not follow that there is no manner of reason in that machine, but only that such a machine has not a boundless reason. but, after all, it is a constant truth that in the operations of that machine there is a regular conduct, a marvellous art, and a skill which in many cases amounts to infallibility. now, to whom shall we ascribe this infallible skill? to the work, or its artificer? sect. xxviii. it is impossible beasts should have souls. if you affirm that beasts have souls different from their machines, i immediately ask you, "of what nature are those souls entirely different from and united to bodies? who is it that knew how to unite them to natures so vastly different? who is it that has such absolute command over so opposite natures, as to put and keep them in such a regular and constant a society, and wherein mutual agreement and correspondence are so necessary and so quick? if, on the contrary, you suppose that the same matter may sometimes think, and sometimes not think, according to the various wrangling and configurations it may receive, i will not tell you in this place that matter cannot think; and that one cannot conceive that the parts of a stone, without adding anything to it, may ever know themselves, whatever degree of motion, whatever figure, you may give them. i will only ask you now wherein that precise ranging and configuration of parts, which you speak of, consists? according to your opinion there must be a degree of motion wherein matter does not yet reason, and then another much like it wherein, on a sudden, it begins to reason and know itself. now, who is it that knew how to pitch upon that precise degree of motion? who is it that has discovered the line in which the parts ought to move? who is it that has measured the dimensions so nicely as to find out and state the bigness and figure every part must have to keep all manner of proportions between themselves in the whole? who is it that has regulated the outward form by which all those bodies are to be stinted? in a word, who is it that has found all the combinations wherein matter thinks, and without the least of which matter must immediately cease to think? if you say it is chance, i answer that you make chance rational to such a degree as to be the source of reason itself. strange prejudice and intoxication of some men, not to acknowledge a most intelligent cause, from which we derive all intelligence; and rather choose to affirm that the purest reason is but the effect of the blindest of all causes in such a subject as matter, which of itself is altogether incapable of knowledge! certainly there is nothing a man of sense would not admit rather than so extravagant and absurd an opinion. sect. xxix. sentiments of some of the ancients concerning the soul and knowledge of beasts. the philosophy of the ancients, though very lame and imperfect, had nevertheless a glimpse of this difficulty; and, therefore, in order to remove it, some of them pretended that the divine spirit interspersed and scattered throughout the universe is a superior wisdom that continually operates in all nature, especially in animals, just as souls act in bodies; and that this continual impression or impulse of the divine spirit, which the vulgar call instinct, without knowing the true signification of that word, was the life of all living creatures. they added, "that those sparks of the divine spirit were the principle of all generations; that animals received them in their conception and at their birth; and that the moment they died those divine particles disengaged themselves from all terrestrial matter in order to fly up to heaven, where they shone and rolled among the stars. it is this philosophy, at once so magnificent and so fabulous, which virgil so gracefully expresses in the following verses upon bees:-"esse apibus partem divinae mentis, et haustus aetherios dixere: deum namque ire per omnes terrasque, tractusque maris, caelumque profundum. hinc pecudes, armenta viros, genus omne ferarum, quemque sibi tenues nascentem arcessere vitas. scilicet huc reddi deinde, ac resoluta referri omnia, nec morti esse locum, sed viva volare sideris in numerum, atque alto succedere caelo." that is:-"induced by such examples, some have taught that bees have portions of ethereal thought, endued with particles of heavenly fires, for god the whole created mass inspires. through heaven, and earth, and ocean depth he throws his influence round, and kindles as he goes. hence flocks, and herds, and men, and beasts, and fowls, with breath are quickened, and attract their souls. hence take the forms his prescience did ordain, and into him, at length, resolve again. no room is left for death: they mount the sky, and to their own congenial planets fly." dryden's "virgil." that divine wisdom that moves all the known parts of the world had made so deep an impression upon the stoics, and on plato before them, that they believed the whole world to be an animal, but a rational and wise animal--in short, the supreme god. this philosophy reduced polytheism, or the multitude of gods, to deism, or one god, and that one god to nature, which according to them was eternal, infallible, intelligent, omnipotent, and divine. thus philosophers, by striving to keep from and rectify the notions of poets, dwindled again at last into poetical fancies, since they assigned, as the inventors of fables did, a life, an intelligence, an art, and a design to all the parts of the universe that appear most inanimate. undoubtedly they were sensible of the wonderful art that is conspicuous in nature, and their only mistake lay in ascribing to the work the skill of the artificer. sect. xxx. of man. let us not stop any longer with animals inferior to man. it is high time to consider and study the nature of man himself, in order to discover him whose image he is said to bear. i know but two sorts of beings in all nature: those that are endowed with knowledge or reason, and those that are not now man is a compound of these two modes of being. he has a body, as the most inanimate corporeal beings have; and he has a spirit, a mind, or a soul--that is, a thought whereby he knows himself, and perceives what is about him. if it be true that there is a first being who has drawn or created all the rest from nothing, man is truly his image; for he has, like him, in his nature all the real perfection that is to be found in those two various kinds or modes of being. but an image is but an image still, and can be but an adumbration or shadow of the true perfect being. let us begin to study man by the contemplation of his body. "i know not," said a mother to her children in the holy writ, "how you were formed in my womb." nor is it, indeed, the wisdom of the parents that forms so compounded and so regular a work. they have no share in that wonderful art; let us therefore leave them, and trace it up higher. sect. xxxi. of the structure of man's body. the body is made of clay; but let us admire the hand that framed and polished it. the artificer's seal is stamped upon his work. he seems to have delighted in making a masterpiece with so vile a matter. let us cast our eyes upon that body, in which the bones sustain the flesh that covers them. the nerves that are extended in it make up all its strength; and the muscles with which the sinews weave themselves, either by swelling or extending themselves, perform the most exact and regular motions. the bones are divided at certain distances, but they have joints, whereby they are set one within another, and are tied by nerves and tendons. cicero admires, with reason, the excellent art with which the bones are knit together. for what is more supple for all various motions? and, on the other hand, what is more firm and durable? even after a body is dead, and its parts are separated by corruption, we find that these joints and ligaments can hardly be destroyed. thus this human machine or frame is either straight or crooked, stiff or supple, as we please. from the brain, which is the source of all the nerves, spring the spirits, which are so subtle that they escape the sight; and nevertheless so real, and of so great activity and force, that they perform all the motions of the machine, and make up all in strength. these spirits are in an instant conveyed to the very extremities of the members. sometimes they flow gently and regularly, sometimes they move with impetuosity, as occasion requires; and they vary ad infinitum the postures, gestures, and other actions of the body. sect. xxxii. of the skin. let us consider the flesh. it is covered in certain places with a soft and tender skin, for the ornament of the body. if that skin, that renders the object so agreeable, and gives it so sweet a colour, were taken off, the same object would become ghastly, and create horror. in other places that same skin is harder and thicker, in order to resist the fatigue of those parts. as, for instance, how harder is the skin of the feet than that of the face? and that of the hinder part of the head than that of the forehead? that skin is all over full of holes like a sieve: but those holes, which are called pores, are imperceptible. although sweat and other transpirations exhale through those pores, the blood never runs out that way. that skin has all the tenderness necessary to make it transparent, and give the face a lively, sweet, and graceful colour. if the skin were less close, and less smooth, the face would look bloody, and excoriated. now, who is that knew how to temper and mix those colours with such nicety as to make a carnation which painters admire, but never can perfectly imitate? sect. xxxiii. of veins and arteries. there are in man's body numberless branches of blood-vessels. some of them carry the blood from the centre to the extreme parts, and are called arteries. through those various vessels runs the blood, a liquor soft and oily, and by this oiliness proper to retain the most subtle spirits, just as the most subtle and spirituous essences are preserved in gummy bodies. this blood moistens the flesh, as springs and rivers water the earth; and after it has filtrated in the flesh, it returns to its source, more slowly, and less full of spirits: but it renews, and is again subtilised in that source, in order to circulate without ceasing. sect. xxxiv. of the bones, and their jointing. do you consider that excellent order and proportion of the limbs? the legs and thighs are great bones jointed one with another, and knit together by tendons. they are two sorts of pillars, equal and regular, erected to support the whole fabric. but those pillars fold; and the rotula of the knee is a bone of a circular figure, which is placed on purpose on the joint, in order to fill it up, and preserve it, when the bones fold, for the bending of the knee. each column or pillar has its pedestal, which is composed of various inlaid parts, so well jointed together, that they can either bend, or keep stiff, as occasion requires. the pedestal, i mean the foot, turns, at a man's pleasure, under the pillar. in this foot we find nothing but nerves, tendons, and little bones closely knit, that this part may, at once, be either more supple or more firm, according to various occasions. even the toes, with their articles and nails, serve to feel the ground a man walks on, to lean and stand with more dexterity and nimbleness, the better to preserve the equilibrium of the body, to rise, or to stoop. the two feet stretch forward, to keep the body from falling that way, when it stoops or bends. the two pillars are jointed together at the top, to bear up the rest of the body, but are still divided there in such a manner, that that joint affords man the conveniency of resting himself, by sitting on the two biggest muscles of the body. the body of the structure is proportioned to the height of the pillars. it contains such parts as are necessary for life, and which consequently ought to be placed in the centre, and shut up in the securest place. therefore two rows of ribs pretty close to one another, that come out of the backbone, as the branches of a tree do from its trunk, form a kind of hoop, to hide and shelter those noble and tender parts. but because the ribs could not entirely shut up that centre of the human body, without hindering the dilatation of the stomach and of the entrails, they form that hoop but to a certain place, below which they leave an empty space, that the inside may freely distend and stretch, both for respiration and feeding. as for the backbone, all the works of man afford nothing so artfully and curiously wrought. it would be too stiff, and too frangible or brittle, if it were made of one single bone: and in such a case man could never bend or stoop. the author of this machine has prevented that inconveniency by forming vertebrae, which jointing one with another make up a whole, consisting of several pieces of bones, more strong than if it were of a single piece. this compound being sometimes supple and pliant, and sometimes stiff, stands either upright, or bends, in a moment, as a man pleases. all these vertebrae have in the middle a gutter or channel, that serves to convey a continuation of the substance of the brain to the extremities of the body, and with speed to send thither spirits through that pipe. but who can forbear admiring the nature of the bones? they are very hard; and we see that even the corruption of all the rest of the body, after death, does not affect them. nevertheless, they are full of numberless holes and cavities that make them lighter; and in the middle they are full of the marrow, or pith, that is to nourish them. they are bored exactly in those places through which the ligaments that knit them are to pass. moreover, their extremities are bigger than the middle, and form, as it were, two semicircular heads, to make one bone turn more easily with another, that so the whole may fold and bend without trouble. sect. xxxv. of the organs. within the enclosure of the ribs are placed in order all the great organs such as serve to make a man breathe; such as digest the aliments; and such as make new blood. respiration, or breathing, is necessary to temper inward heat, occasioned by the boiling of the blood, and by the impetuous course of the spirits. the air is a kind of food that nourishes the animal, and by means of which he renews himself every moment of his life. nor is digestion less necessary to prepare sensible aliments towards their being changed into blood, which is a liquor apt to penetrate everywhere, and to thicken into flesh in the extreme parts, in order to repair in all the members what they lose continually both by transpiration and the waste of spirits. the lungs are like great covers, which being spongy, easily dilate and contract themselves, and as they incessantly take in and blow out a great deal of air, they form a kind of bellows that are in perpetual motion. the stomach has a dissolvent that causes hunger, and puts man in mind of his want of food. that dissolvent, which stimulates and pricks the stomach, does, by that very uneasiness, prepare for it a very lively pleasure, when its craving is satisfied by the aliments. then man, with delight, fills his belly with strange matter, which would create horror in him if he could see it as soon as it has entered his stomach, and which even displeases him, when he sees it being already satisfied. the stomach is made in the figure of a bagpipe. there the aliments being dissolved by a quick coction, or digestion, are all confounded, and make up a soft liquor, which afterwards becomes a kind of milk, called chyle; and which being at last brought into the heart, receives there, through the plenty of spirits, the form, vivacity, and colour of blood. but while the purest juice of the aliments passes from the stomach into the pipes destined for the preparation of chyle and blood, the gross particles of the same aliments are separated, just as bran is from flour by a sieve; and they are dejected downwards to ease the body of them, through the most hidden passages, and the most remote from the organs of the senses, lest these be offended at them. thus the wonders of this machine are so great and numerous, that we find some unfathomable, even in the most abject and mortifying functions of the body, which modesty will not allow to be more particularly explained. sect. xxxvi. of the inward parts. i own that the inward parts are not so agreeable to the sight as the outward; but then be pleased to observe they are not made to be seen. nay, it was necessary according to art and design that they should not be discovered without horror, and that a man should not without violent reluctance go about to discover them by cutting open this machine in another man. it is this very horror that prepares compassion and humanity in the hearts of men when one sees another wounded or hurt. add to this, with st. austin, that there are in those inward parts a proportion, order, and mechanism which still please more an attentive, inquisitive mind than external beauty can please the eyes of the body. that inside of man--which is at once so ghastly and horrid and so wonderful and admirable--is exactly as it should be to denote dirt and clay wrought by a divine hand, for we find in it both the frailty of the creature and the art of the creator. sect. xxxvii. of the arms and their use. from the top of that precious fabric we have described hang the two arms, which are terminated by the hands, and which bear a perfect symmetry one with another. the arms are knit with the shoulders in such a manner that they have a free motion, in that joint. they are besides divided at the elbow and at the wrist that they may fold, bend, and turn with quickness. the arms are of a just length to reach all the parts of the body. they are nervous and full of muscles, that they may, as well as the back, be often in action and sustain the greatest fatigue of all the body. the hands are a contexture of nerves and little bones set one within another in such a manner that they have all the strength and suppleness necessary to feel the neighbouring bodies, to seize on them, hold them fast, throw them, draw them to one, push them off, disentangle them, and untie them one from another. the fingers, the ends of which are armed with nails, are by the delicacy and variety of their motions contrived to exercise the most curious and marvellous arts. the arms and hands serve also, according as they are either extended, folded, or turned, to poise the body in such a manner as that it may stoop without any danger of falling. the whole machine has, besides, independently from all after-thoughts, a kind of spring that poises it on a sudden and makes it find the equilibrium in all its different postures and positions. sect. xxxviii. of the neck and head. above the body rises the neck, which is either firm or flexible at pleasure. must a man bear a heavy burden on his head? this neck becomes as stiff as if it were made up of one single bone. has he a mind to bow or turn his head? the neck bends every way as if all its bones were disjointed. this neck, a little raised above the shoulders, bears up with ease the head, which over-rules and governs the whole body. if it were less big it would bear no proportion with the rest of the machine; and if it were bigger it would not only be disproportioned and deformed, but, besides, its weight would both crush the neck and put man in danger of falling on the side it should lean a little too much. this head, fortified on all sides by very thick and very hard bones in order the better to preserve the precious treasure it encloses, is jointed with the vertebrae of the neck, and has a very quick communication with all the other parts of the body. it contains the brain, whose moist, soft, and spongy substance is made up of tender filaments or threads woven together; this is the centre of all the wonders we shall speak of afterwards. the skull is regularly perforated, or bored, with exact proportion, and symmetry, for, the two eyes, the two ears, the mouth, and the nostrils. there are nerves destined for sensations, that exercise and play in most of those pipes. the nose, which has no nerves for its sensation, has a cribriform, or spongy bone, to let odours pass on to the brain. amongst the organs of these sensations the chief are double, to preserve to one side what the other might happen to be defective in by any accident. these two organs of the same sensation are symmetrically placed either on the forepart or on the sides, that man may use them with more ease to the right or to the left or right against him--that is to say, towards the places his joints direct his steps and all his actions. besides, the flexibility of the neck makes all those organs turn in an instant which way soever he pleases. all the hinder part of the head, which is the least able to defend itself, is therefore the thickest. it is adorned with hair which at the same time serves to fortify the head against the injuries of the air; and, on the other hand, the hair likewise adorns the fore part of the head and renders the face more graceful. the face is the fore part of the head, wherein the principal sensations meet and centre with an order and proportion that render it very beautiful unless some accident or other happen to alter and impair so regular a piece of work. the two eyes are equal, being placed about the middle, on the two sides of the head, that they may, without trouble, discover afar off both on the right and left all strange objects, and that they may commodiously watch for the safety of all the parts of the body. the exact symmetry with which they are placed is the ornament of the face; and he that made them has kindled in them i know not what celestial flame, the like of which all the rest of nature does not afford. these eyes are a sort of looking-glasses, wherein all the objects of the whole world are painted by turns and without confusion in the bottom of the retina that the thinking part of man may see them in those looking-glasses. but though we perceive all objects by a double organ, yet we never see the objects double, because the two nerves that are subservient to sight in our eyes are but two branches that unite in one pipe, as the two glasses of a pair of spectacles unite in the upper part that joins them together. the two eyes are adorned with two equal eyebrows, and, that they may open and close, they are wrapped up with lids edged with hair that defend so delicate a part. sect. xxxix. of the forehead and other parts of the face. the forehead gives majesty and gracefulness to all the face, and serves to heighten all its features. were it not for the nose, which is placed in the middle, the whole face would look flat and deformed, of which they are fully convinced who have happened to see men in whom that part of the face is mutilated. it is placed just above the mouth, that it may the more easily discern, by the odours, whatever is most proper to feed man. the two nostrils serve at once both for the respiration and smell. look upon the lips: their lively colour, freshness, figure, seat, and proportion, with the other features, render the face most beautiful. the mouth, by the correspondence of its motions with those of the eyes, animates, gladdens, suddens, softens, or troubles the face, and by sensible marks expresses every passion. the lips not only open to receive food, but by their suppleness and the variety of their motions serve likewise to vary the sounds that form speech. when they open they discover a double row of teeth with which the mouth is adorned. these teeth are little bones set in order in the two jaw-bones, which have a spring to open and another to shut in such a manner that the teeth grind, like a mill, the aliments in order to prepare their digestion. but these aliments thus ground go down into the stomach, through a pipe different from that through which we breathe, and these two pipes, though so neighbouring, have nothing common. sect. xl. of the tongue and teeth. the tongue is a contexture of small muscles and nerves so very supple, that it winds and turns like a serpent, with unconceivable mobility and pliantness. it performs in the mouth the same office which either the fingers or the bow of a master of music perform on a musical instrument: for sometimes it strikes the teeth, sometimes the roof of the mouth. there is a pipe that goes into the inside of the neck, called throat, from the roof of the mouth to the breast, which is made up of cartilaginous rings nicely set one within another, and lined within with a very smooth membrane, in order to render the air that is pushed from the lungs more sonorous. on the side of the roof of the mouth the end of that pipe is opened like a flute, by a slit, that either extends, or contracts itself as is necessary to render the voice either big or slender, hollow or clear. but lest the aliments, which have their separate pipe, should slide into the windpipe i have been describing, there is a kind of valve that lies on the orifice of the organ of the voice, and playing like a drawbridge, lets the aliments freely pass through their proper channel, but never suffers the least particle or drop to fall into the slit of the windpipe. this sort of valve has a very free motion, and easily turns any way, so that by shaking on that half-opened orifice, it performs the softest modulations of the voice. this instance is sufficient to show, by-the-by, and without entering long-winded details of anatomy, what a marvellous art there is in the frame of the inward parts. and indeed the organ i have described is the most perfect of all musical instruments, nor have these any perfection, but so far as they imitate that. sect. xli. of the smell, taste, and hearing. who were able to explain the niceness of the organs by which man discerns the numberless savours and odours of bodies? but how is it possible for so many different voices to strike at once my ear without confounding one another, and for those sounds to leave in me, after they have ceased to be, so lively and so distinct images of what they have been? how careful was the artificer who made our bodies to give our eyes a moist, smooth, and sliding cover to close them; and why did he leave our ears open? because, says cicero, the eyes must be shut against the light in order to sleep; and, in the meantime, the ears ought to remain open in order to give us warning, and wake us by the report of noise, when we are in danger of being surprised. who is it that, in an instant, imprints in my eye the heaven, the sea, and the earth, seated at almost an infinite distance? how can the faithful images of all the objects of the universe, from the sun to an atom, range themselves distinctly in so small an organ? is not the substance of the brain, which preserves, in order, such lively representations of all the objects that have made an impression upon us ever since we were in the world, a most wonderful prodigy? men admire with reason the invention of books, wherein the history of so many events, and the collection of so many thoughts, are preserved. but what comparison can be made between the best book and the brain of a learned man? there is no doubt but such a brain is a collection infinitely more precious, and of a far more excellent contrivance, than a book. it is in that small repository that a man never misses finding the images he has occasion for. he calls them, and they come; he dismisses them, and they sink i know not where, and disappear, to make room for others. a man shuts or opens his fancy at pleasure, like a book. he turns, as it were, its leaves; and, in an instant, goes from one end to the other. there is even in memory a sort of table, like the index of a book, which shows where certain remote images are to be found. we do not find that these innumerable characters, which the mind of man reads inwardly with so much rapidity, leave any distinct trace or print in the brain, when we open it. that admirable book is but a soft substance, or a sort of bottom made up of tender threads, woven one with another. now what skilful hand has laid up in that kind of dirt, which appears so shapeless, such precious images, ranged with such excellent and curious art? sect. xlii. of the proportion of man's body. such is the body of man in general: for i do not enter into an anatomical detail, my design being only to discover the art that is conspicuous in nature, by the simple cast of an eye, without any science. the body of man might undoubtedly be either much bigger and taller, or much lesser and smaller. but if, for instance, it were but one foot high, it would be insulted by most animals, that would tread and crush it under their feet. if it were as tall as a high steeple, a small number of men would in a few days consume all the aliments a whole country affords. they could find neither horses nor any other beasts of burden either to carry them on their backs or draw them in a machine with wheels; nor could they find sufficient quantity of materials to build houses proportioned to their bigness; and as there could be but a small number of men upon earth, so they should want most conveniences. now, who is it that has so well regulated the size of man to so just a standard? who is it that has fixed that of other animals and living creatures, with proportion to that of man? of all animals, man only stands upright on his feet, which gives him a nobleness and majesty that distinguishes him, even as to the outside, from all that lives upon earth. not only his figure is the noblest, but he is also the strongest and most dextrous of all animals, in proportion to his bigness. let one nicely examine the bulk and weight of the most terrible beasts, and he will find, that though they have more matter than the body of a man, yet a vigorous man has more strength of body than most wild beasts. nor are these dreadful to him, except in their teeth and claws. but man, who has not such natural arms in his limbs, has yet hands, whose dexterity to make artificial weapons surpasses all that nature has bestowed upon beasts. thus man either pierces with his darts or draws into his snares, masters, and leads in chains the strongest and fiercest animals. nay, he has the skill to tame them in their captivity, and to sport with them as he pleases. he teaches lions and tigers to caress him: and gets on the back of elephants. sect. xliii. of the soul, which alone, among all creatures, thinks and knows. but the body of man, which appears to be the masterpiece of nature, is not to be compared to his thought. it is certain that there are bodies that do not think: man, for instance, ascribes no knowledge to stone, wood, or metals, which undoubtedly are bodies. nay, it is so natural to believe that matter cannot think, that all unprejudiced men cannot forbear laughing when they hear any one assert that beasts are but mere machines; because they cannot conceive that mere machines can have such knowledge as they pretend to perceive in beasts. they think it to be like children's playing, and talking to their puppets, the ascribing any knowledge to mere machines. hence it is that the ancients themselves, who knew no real substance but the body, pretended, however, that the soul of a man was a fifth element, or a sort of quintessence without name, unknown here below, indivisible, immutable, and altogether celestial and divine, because they could not conceive that the terrestrial matter of the four elements could think, and know itself: aristoteles quintam quandam naturam censet esse, e qua sit mens. cogitare enim, et providere, et discere, et docere. . . . in horum quatuor generum nullo inesse putat; quintum genus adhibet vacans nomine. sect. xliv. matter cannot think. but let us suppose whatever you please, for i will not enter the lists with any sect of philosophers: here is an alternative which no philosopher can avoid. either matter can become a thinking substance, without adding anything to it, or matter cannot think at all, and so what thinks in us is a substance distinct from matter, and which is united to it. if matter can acquire the faculty of thinking without adding anything to it, it must, at least, be owned that all matter does not think, and that even some matter that now thinks did not think fifty years ago; as, for instance, the matter of which the body of a young man is made up did not think ten years before he was born. it must then be concluded that matter can acquire the faculty of thinking by a certain configuration, ranging, and motion of its parts. let us, for instance, suppose the matter of a stone, or of a heap of sand. it is agreed this part of matter has no manner of thought; and therefore to make it begin to think, all its parts must be configurated, ranged, and moved a certain way and to a certain degree. now, who is it that knew how to find, with so much niceness, that proportion, order, and motion that way, and to such a degree, above and below which matter would never think? who is it that has given all those just, exact, and precise modifications to a vile and shapeless matter, in order to form the body of a child, and to render it rational by degrees? if, on the contrary, it be affirmed that matter cannot become a thinking substance without adding something to it, and that another being must be united to it, i ask, what will that other thinking being be, whilst the matter, to which it is united, only moves? therefore, here are two natures or substances very unlike and distinct. we know one by figures and local motions only; as we do the other by perceptions and reasonings. the one does not imply, or create the idea of the other, for their respective ideas have nothing in common. sect. xlv. of the union of the soul and body, of which god alone can be the author. but now, how comes it to pass that beings so unlike are so intimately united together in man? whence comes it that certain motions of the body so suddenly and so infallibly raise certain thoughts in the soul? whence comes it that the thoughts of the soul, so suddenly and so infallibly, occasion certain motions in the body? whence proceeds so regular a society, for seventy or fourscore years, without any interruption? how comes it to pass that this union of two beings, and two operations, so very different, make up so exact a compound, that many are tempted to believe it to be a simple and indivisible whole? what hand had the skill to unite and tie together these two extremes and opposites? it is certain they did not unite themselves by mutual consent, for matter having of itself neither thought nor will, to make terms and conditions, it could not enter into an agreement with the mind. on the other hand, the mind does not remember that it ever made an agreement with matter; nor could it be subjected to such an agreement, if it had quite forgot it. if the mind had freely, and of its own accord, resolved to submit to the impressions of matter, it would not, however, subject itself to them but when it should remember such a resolution, which, besides, it might alter at pleasure. nevertheless, it is certain that in spite of itself it is dependent on the body, and that it cannot free itself from its dependence, unless it destroy the organs of the body by a violent death. besides, although the mind had voluntarily subjected itself to matter, it would not follow that matter were reciprocally subjected to the mind. the mind would indeed have certain thoughts when the body should have certain motions, but the body would not be determined to have, in its turn, certain motions, as soon as the mind should have certain thoughts. now it is most certain that this dependence is reciprocal. nothing is more absolute than the command of the mind over the body. the mind wills, and, instantly, all the members of the body are in motion, as if they were acted by the most powerful machines. on the other hand, nothing is more manifest than the power and influence of the body over the mind. the body is in motion, and, instantly the mind is forced to think either with pleasure or pain, upon certain objects. now, what hand equally powerful over these two divers and distinct natures has been able to bring them both under the same yoke, and hold them captive in so exact and inviolable a society? will any man say it was chance? if he does, will he be able either to understand what he means, or to make it understood by others? has chance, by a concourse of atoms, hooked together the parts of the body with the mind? if the mind can be hooked with some parts of the body, it must have parts itself, and consequently be a perfect body, in which case, we relapse into the first answer, which i have already confuted. if, on the contrary, the mind has no parts, nothing can hook it with those of the body, nor has chance wherewithal to tie them together. in short, my alternative ever returns, and is peremptory and decisive. if the mind and body are a whole made up of matter only, how comes it to pass that this matter, which yesterday did not, has this day begun to think? who is it that has bestowed upon it what it had not, and which is without comparison more noble than thoughtless matter? what bestows thought upon it, has it not itself, and how can it give what it has not? let us even suppose that thought should result from a certain configuration, ranging, and degree of motion a certain way, of all the parts of matter: what artificer has had the skill to find out all those just, nice, and exact combinations, in order to make a thinking machine? if, on the contrary, the mind and body are two distinct natures, what power superior to those two natures has been able to unite and tie together without the mind's assent, or so much as its knowing which way that union was made? who is it that with such absolute and supreme command over-rules both minds and bodies, and keeps them in society and correspondence, and under a sort of incomprehensible policy? sect. xlvi. the soul has an absolute command over the body. be pleased to observe that the command of my mind over my body is supreme and absolute in its bounded extent, since my single will, without any effort or preparation, causes all the members of my body to move on a sudden and immediately, according to the rules of mechanics. as the scripture gives us the character of god, who said after the creation of the universe, "let there be light, and there was light"--in like manner, the inward word of my soul alone, without any effort or preparation, makes what it says. i say, for instance, within myself, through that inward, simple, and momentaneous word, "let my body move, and it moves." at the command of that simple and intimate will, all the parts of my body are at work. immediately all nerves are distended, all the springs hasten to concur together, and the whole machine obeys, just as if every one of the most secret of those organs heard a supreme and omnipotent voice. this is certainly the most simple and most effectual power that can be conceived. all the other beings within our knowledge afford not the like instance of it, and this is precisely what men that are sensible and persuaded of a deity ascribe to it in all the universe. shall i ascribe it to my feeble mind, or rather to the power it has over my body, which is so vastly different from it? shall i believe that my will has that supreme command of its own nature, though in itself so weak and imperfect? but how comes it to pass that, among so many bodies, it has that power over no more than one? for no other body moves according to its desires. now, who is it that gave over one body the power it had over no other? will any man be again so bold as to ascribe this to chance? sect. xlvii. the power of the soul over the body is not only supreme or absolute, but blind at the same time. but that power, which is so supreme and absolute, is blind at the same time. the most simple and ignorant peasant knows how to move his body as well as a philosopher the most skilled in anatomy. the mind of a peasant commands his nerves, muscles, and tendons, which he knows not, and which he never heard of. he finds them without knowing how to distinguish them, or knowing where they lie; he calls precisely upon such as he has occasion for, nor does he mistake one for the other. if a rope-dancer, for instance, does but will, the spirits instantly run with impetuousness, sometimes to certain nerves, sometimes to others--all which distend or slacken in due time. ask him which of them he set a-going, and which way he begun to move them? he will not so much as understand what you mean. he is an absolute stranger to what he has done in all the inward springs of his machine. the lute-player, who is perfectly well acquainted with all the strings of his instrument, who sees them with his eyes, and touches them one after another with his fingers, yet mistakes them sometimes. but the soul that governs the machine of man's body moves all its springs in time, without seeing or discerning them, without being acquainted with their figure, situation, or strength, and yet it never mistakes. what prodigy is here! my mind commands what it knows not, and cannot see; what neither has, nor is capable of any knowledge. and yet it is infallibly obeyed. how much blindness and how much power at once is here! the blindness is man's; but the power, whose is it? to whom shall we ascribe it, unless it be to him who sees what man does not see, and performs in him what passes his understanding? it is to no purpose my mind is willing to move the bodies that surround it, and which it knows very distinctly; for none of them stirs, and it has not power to move the least atom by its will. there is but one single body, which some superior power must have made its property. with respect to this body, my mind is but willing, and all the springs of that machine, which are unknown to it, move in time and in concert to obey him. st. augustin, who made these reflections, has expressed them excellently well. "the inward parts of our bodies," says he, "cannot be living but by our souls; but our souls animate them far more easily than they can know them. . . . the soul knows not the body which is subject to it. . . . it does not know why it does not move the nerves but when it pleases; and why, on the contrary, the pulsation of veins goes on without interruption, whether the mind will or no. it knows not which is the first part of the body it moves immediately, in order thereby to move all the rest. . . . it does not know why it feels in spite of itself, and moves the members only when it pleases. it is the mind does these things in the body. but how comes it to pass it neither knows what she does, nor in what manner it performs it? those who learn, anatomy," continues that father, "are taught by others what passes within, and is performed by themselves. why," says he, "do i know, without being taught, that there is in the sky, at a prodigious distance from me, a sun and stars; and why have i occasion for a master to learn where motion begins? . . . when i move my finger, i know not how what i perform within myself is performed. we are too far above, and cannot comprehend ourselves." sect. xlviii. the sovereignty of the soul over the body principally appears in the images imprinted in the brain. it is certain we cannot sufficiently admire either the absolute power of the soul over corporeal organs which she knows not, or the continual use it makes of them without discerning them. that sovereignty principally appears with respect to the images imprinted in our brain. i know all the bodies of the universe that have made any impression on my senses for a great many years past. i have distinct images of them that represent them to me, insomuch that i believe i see them even when they exist no more. my brain is like a closet full of pictures, which should move and set themselves in order at the master's pleasure. painters, with all their art and skill, never attain but an imperfect likeness; whereas the pictures i have in my head are so faithful, that it is by consulting them i perceive all the defects of those made by painters, and correct them within myself. now, do these images, more like their original than the masterpieces of the art of painting, imprint themselves in my head without any art? is my brain a book, all the characters of which have ranged themselves of their own accord? if there be any art in the case, it does not proceed from me. for i find within me that collection of images without having ever so much as thought either to imprint them, or set them in order. moreover, all these images either appear or retire as i please, without any confusion. i call them back, and they return; i dismiss them, and they sink i know not where. they either assemble or separate, as i please. but i neither know where they lie, nor what they are. nevertheless i find them always ready. the agitation of so many images, old and new, that revive, join, or separate, never disturbs a certain order that is amongst them. if some of them do not appear at the first summons, at least i am certain they are not far off. they may lurk in some deep corner, but i am not totally ignorant of them as i am of things i never knew; for, on the contrary, i know confusedly what i look for. if any other image offers itself in the room of that i called for, i immediately dismiss it, telling it, "it is not you i have occasion for." but, then, where lie objects half-forgotten? they are present within me, since i look for them there, and find them at last. again, in what manner are they there, since i look for them a long while in vain? what becomes of them? "i am no more," says st. augustin, "what i was when i had the thoughts i cannot find again. i know not," continues that father, "either how it comes to pass that i am thus withdrawn from and deprived of myself, or how i am afterwards brought back and restored to myself. i am, as it were, another man, and carried to another place, when i look for, and do not find, what i had trusted to my memory. in such a case we cannot reach, and are, in a manner, strangers remote from ourselves. nor do we come at us but when we find what we are in quest of. but where is it we look for but within us? or what is it we look for but ourselves? . . . so unfathomable a difficulty astonishes us!" i distinctly remember i have known what i do not know at present. i remember my very oblivion. i call to mind the pictures or images of every person in every period of life wherein i have seen them formerly, so that the same person passes several times in my head. at first, i see one a child, then a young, and afterwards an old, man. i place wrinkles in the same face in which, on the other side, i see the tender graces of infancy. i join what subsists no more with what is still, without confounding these extremes. i preserve i know not what, which, by turns, is all that i have seen since i came into the world. out of this unknown store come all the perfumes, harmonies, tastes, degrees, and mixtures of colours; in short, all the figures that have passed through my senses, and which they have trusted to my brain. i revive when i please the joy i felt thirty years ago. it returns; but sometimes it is not the same it was formerly, and appears without rejoicing me. i remember i have been well pleased, and yet am not so while i have that remembrance. on the other hand, i renew past sorrows and troubles. they are present; for i distinctly perceive them such as they were formerly, and not the least part of their bitterness and lively sense escapes my memory. but yet they are no more the same; they are dulled, and neither trouble nor disquiet me. i perceive all their severity without feeling it; or, if i feel it, it is only by representation, which turns a former smart and racking pain into a kind of sport and diversion, for the image of past sorrows rejoices me. it is the same with pleasures: a virtuous mind is afflicted by the memory of its disorderly unlawful enjoyments. they are present, for they appear with all their softest and most flattering attendants; but they are no more themselves, and such joys return only to make us uneasy. sect. xlix. two wonders of the memory and brain. here, therefore, are two wonders equally incomprehensible. the first, that my brain is a kind of book, that contains a number almost infinite of images, and characters ranged in an order i did not contrive, and of which chance could not be the author. for i never had the least thought either of writing anything in my brain, or to place in any order the images and characters i imprinted in it. i had no other thought but only to see the objects that struck my senses. neither could chance make so marvellous a book: even all the art of man is too imperfect ever to reach so high a perfection, therefore what hand had the skill to compose it? the second wonder i find in my brain, is to see that my mind reads with so much ease, whatever it pleases, in that inward book; and read even characters it does not know. i never saw the traces or figures imprinted in my brain, and even the substance of my brain itself, which is like the paper of that book, is altogether unknown to me. all those numberless characters transpose themselves, and afterwards resume their rank and place to obey my command. i have, as it were, a divine power over a work i am unacquainted with, and which is incapable of knowledge. that which understands nothing, understands my thought and performs it instantly. the thought of man has no power over bodies: i am sensible of it by running over all nature. there is but one single body which my bare will moves, as if it were a deity; and even moves the most subtle and nicest springs of it, without knowing them. now, who is it that united my will to this body, and gave it so much power over it? sect. l. the mind of man is mixed with greatness and weakness. its greatness consists in two things. first, the mind has the idea of the infinite. let us conclude these observations by a short reflection on the essence of our mind; in which i find an incomprehensible mixture of greatness and weakness. its greatness is real: for it brings together the past and the present, without confusion; and by its reasoning penetrates into futurity. it has the idea both of bodies and spirits. nay, it has the idea of the infinite: for it supposes and affirms all that belongs to it, and rejects and denies all that is not proper to it. if you say that the infinite is triangular, the mind will answer without hesitation, that what has no bounds can have no figure. if you desire it to assign the first of the units that make up an infinite number, it will readily answer, that there can be no beginning, end, or number in the infinite; because if one could find either a first or last unit in it, one might add some other unit to that, and consequently increase the number. now a number cannot be infinite, when it is capable of some addition, and when a limit may be assigned to it, on the side where it may receive an increase. sect. li. the mind knows the finite only by the idea of the infinite. it is even in the infinite that my mind knows the finite. when we say a man is sick, we mean a man that has no health; and when we call a man weak, we mean one that has no strength. we know sickness, which is a privation of health, no other way but by representing to us health itself as a real good, of which such a man is deprived; and, in like manner, we only know weakness, by representing to us strength as a real advantage, which such a man is not master of. we know darkness, which is nothing real, only by denying, and consequently by conceiving daylight, which is most real, and most positive. in like manner we know the finite only by assigning it a bound, which is a mere negation of a greater extent; and consequently only the privation of the infinite. now a man could never represent to himself the privation of the infinite, unless he conceived the infinite itself: just as he could not have a notion of sickness, unless he had an idea of health, of which it is only a privation. now, whence comes that idea of the infinite in us? sect. lii. secondly, the ideas of the mind are universal, eternal, and immutable. oh! how great is the mind of man! he carries within him wherewithal to astonish, and infinitely to surpass himself: since his ideas are universal, eternal, and immutable. they are universal: for when i say it is impossible to be and not to be; the whole is bigger than a part of it; a line perfectly circular has no straight parts; between two points given the straight line is the shortest; the centre of a perfect circle is equally distant from all the points of the circumference; an equilateral triangle has no obtuse or right angle: all these truths admit of no exception. there never can be any being, line, circle, or triangle, but according to these rules. these axioms are of all times, or to speak more properly, they exist before all time, and will ever remain after any comprehensible duration. let the universe be turned topsy-turvy, destroyed, and annihilated; and even let there be no mind to reason about beings, lines, circles, and triangles: yet it will ever be equally true in itself, that the same thing cannot at once be and not be; that a perfect circle can have no part of a straight line; that the centre of a perfect circle cannot be nearer one side of the circumference than the other. men may, indeed, not think actually on these truths: and it might even happen that there should be neither universe nor any mind capable to reflect on these truths: but nevertheless they are still constant and certain in themselves although no mind should be acquainted with them; just as the rays of the sun would not cease being real, although all men should be blind, and no body have eyes to be sensible of their light. by affirming that two and two make four, says st. augustin, man is not only certain that he speaks truth, but he cannot doubt that such a proposition was ever equally true, and must be so eternally. these ideas we carry within ourselves have no bounds, and cannot admit of any. it cannot be said that what i have affirmed about the centre of perfect circles is true only in relation to a certain number of circles; for that proposition is true, through evident necessity, with respect to all circles ad infinitum. these unbounded ideas can never be changed, altered, impaired, or defaced in us; for they make up the very essence of our reason. whatever effort a man may make in his own mind, yet it is impossible for him ever to entertain a serious doubt about the truths which those ideas clearly represent to us. for instance, i never can seriously call in question, whether the whole is bigger than one of its parts; or whether the centre of a perfect circle is equally distant from all the points of the circumference. the idea of the infinite is in me like that of numbers, lines, circles, a whole, and a part. the changing our ideas would be, in effect, the annihilating reason itself. let us judge and make an estimate of our greatness by the immutable infinite stamp within us, and which can never be defaced from our minds. but lest such a real greatness should dazzle and betray us, by flattering our vanity, let us hasten to cast our eyes on our weakness. sect. liii. weakness of man's mind. that same mind that incessantly sees the infinite, and, through the rule of the infinite, all finite things, is likewise infinitely ignorant of all the objects that surround it. it is altogether ignorant of itself, and gropes about in an abyss of darkness. it neither knows what it is, nor how it is united with a body; nor which way it has so much command over all the springs of that body, which it knows not. it is ignorant of its own thoughts and wills. it knows not, with certainty, either what it believes or wills. it often fancies to believe and will, what it neither believes nor wills. it is liable to mistake, and its greatest excellence is to acknowledge it. to the error of its thoughts, it adds the disorder and irregularity of its will and desires; so that it is forced to groan in the consciousness and experience of its corruption. such is the mind of man, weak, uncertain, stinted, full of errors. now, who is it that put the idea of the infinite, that is to say of perfection, in a subject so stinted and so full of imperfection? did it give itself so sublime, and so pure an idea, which is itself a kind of infinite in imagery? what finite being distinct from it was able to give it what bears no proportion with what is limited within any bounds? let us suppose the mind of man to be like a looking-glass, wherein the images of all the neighbouring bodies imprint themselves. now what being was able to stamp within us the image of the infinite, if the infinite never existed? who can put in a looking-glass the image of a chimerical object which is not in being, and which was never placed against the glass? this image of the infinite is not a confused collection of finite objects, which the mind may mistake for a true infinite. it is the true infinite of which we have the thought and idea. we know it so well, that we exactly distinguish it from whatever it is not; and that no subtilty can palm upon us any other object in its room. we are so well acquainted with it, that we reject from it any propriety that denotes the least bound or limit. in short, we know it so well, that it is in it alone we know all the rest, just as we know the night by the day, sickness by health. now, once more, whence comes so great an image? does it proceed from nothing? can a stinted limited being imagine and invent the infinite, if there be no infinite at all? our weak and short-sighted mind cannot of itself form that image, which, at this rate, should have no author. none of the outward objects can give us that image: for they can only give us the image of what they are, and they are limited and imperfect. therefore, from whence shall we derive that distinct image which is unlike anything within us, and all we know here below, without us? whence does it proceed? where is that infinite we cannot comprehend, because it is really infinite: and which nevertheless we cannot mistake, because we distinguish it from anything that is inferior to it? sure it must be somewhere, otherwise how could it imprint itself in our minds? sect. liv. the ideas of man are the immutable rules of his judgment. but besides the idea of the infinite, i have yet universal and immutable notions, which are the rule and standard of all my judgments; insomuch that i cannot judge of anything but by consulting them; nor am i free to judge contrary to what they represent to me. my thoughts are so far from being able to correct or form that rule, that they are themselves corrected, in spite of myself, by that superior rule; and invincibly subjected to its decision. whatever effort my mind can make, i can never be brought, as i observed before, to entertain a doubt whether two and two make four; whether the whole is bigger than one of its parts; or whether the centre of a perfect circle be equally distant from all the points of the circumference. i am not free to deny those propositions; and if i happen to deny those truths, or others much like them, there is in me something above myself, which forces me to return to the rule. that fixed and immutable rule is so inward and intimate, that i am tempted to take it for myself. but it is above me, since it corrects and rectifies me; gives me a distrust of myself, and makes me sensible of my impotency. it is something that inspires me every moment, provided i hearken to it, and i never err or mistake except when i am not attentive to it. what inspires me would for ever preserve me from error, if i were docile, and acted without precipitation; for that inward inspiration would teach me to judge aright of things within my reach, and about which i have occasion to form a judgment. as for others, it would teach me not to judge of them at all, which second lesson is no less important than the first. that inward rule is what i call my reason; but i speak of my reason without penetrating into the extent of those words, as i speak of nature and instinct, without knowing what those expressions mean. sect. lv. what man's reason is. it is certain my reason is within me, for i must continually recollect myself to find it; but the superior reason that corrects me upon occasion, and which i consult, is none of mine, nor is it part of myself. that rule is perfect and immutable; whereas i am changeable and imperfect. when i err, it preserves its rectitude. when i am undeceived, it is not set right, for it never was otherwise; and still keeping to truth has the authority to call, and bring me back to it. it is an inward master that makes me either be silent or speak; believe, or doubt; acknowledge my errors, or confirm my judgment. i am instructed by hearkening to it; whereas i err and go astray when i hearken to myself. that master is everywhere, and his voice is heard, from one end of the universe to the other, by all men as well as me. whilst he corrects and rectifies me in france, he corrects and sets right other men in china, japan, mexico, and in peru, by the same principles. sect. lvi. reason is the same in all men, of all ages and countries. two men who never saw or heard of one another, and who never entertained any correspondence with any other man that could give them common notions, yet speak at two extremities of the earth, about a certain number of truths, as if they were in concert. it is infallibly known beforehand in one hemisphere, what will be answered in the other upon these truths. men of all countries and of all ages, whatever their education may have been, find themselves invincibly subjected and obliged to think and speak in the same manner. the master who incessantly teaches us makes all of us think the same way. whenever we hastily judge, without hearkening to his voice, in diffidence of ourselves, we think and utter dreams full of extravagance. thus what appears most to be part of ourselves, and our very essence, i mean our reason, is least our own, and what, on the contrary, ought to be accounted most borrowed. we continually receive a reason superior to us, as we incessantly breathe the air, which is a foreign body; or as we incessantly see all the objects near us by the light of the sun, whose rays are bodies foreign to our eyes. that superior reason over-rules and governs, to a certain degree, with an absolute power all men, even the least rational, and makes them all ever agree, in spite of themselves, upon those points. it is she that makes a savage in canada think about a great many things, just as the greek and roman philosophers did. it is she that made the chinese geometricians find out much of the same truths with the europeans, whilst those nations so very remote were unknown one to another. it is she that makes people in japan conclude, as in france, that two and two make four; nor is it apprehended that any nation shall ever change their opinion about it. it is she that makes men think nowadays about certain points, just as men thought about the same four thousand years ago. it is she that gives uniform thoughts to the most jealous and jarring men, and the most irreconcilable among themselves. it is by her that men of all ages and countries are, as it were, chained about an immovable centre, and held in the bonds of amity by certain invariable rules, called first principles, notwithstanding the infinite variations of opinions that arise in them from their passion, avocations, and caprices, which over-rule all their other less-clear judgments. it is through her that men, as depraved as they are, have not yet presumed openly to bestow on vice the name of virtue, and that they are reduced to dissemble being just, sincere, moderate, benevolent, in order to gain one another's esteem. the most wicked and abandoned of men cannot be brought to esteem what they wish they could esteem, or to despise what they wish they could despise. it is not possible to force the eternal barrier of truth and justice. the inward master, called reason, intimately checks the attempt with absolute power, and knows how to set bounds to the most impudent folly of men. though vice has for many ages reigned with unbridled licentiousness, virtue is still called virtue; and the most brutish and rash of her adversaries cannot yet deprive her of her name. hence it is that vice, though triumphant in the world, is still obliged to disguise itself under the mask of hypocrisy or sham honesty, to gain the esteem it has not the confidence to expect, if it should go bare-faced. thus, notwithstanding its impudence, it pays a forced homage to virtue, by endeavouring to adorn itself with her fairest outside in order to receive the honour and respect she commands from men. it is true virtuous men are exposed to censure; and they are, indeed, ever reprehensible in this life, through their natural imperfections; but yet the most vicious cannot totally efface in themselves the idea of true virtue. there never was yet any man upon earth that could prevail either with others, or himself, to allow, as a received maxim, that to be knavish, passionate, and mischievous, is more honourable than to be honest, moderate, good-natured, and benevolent. sect. lvii. reason in man is independent of and above him. i have already evinced that the inward and universal master, at all times, and in all places, speaks the same truths. we are not that master: though it is true we often speak without, and higher than him. but then we mistake, stutter, and do not so much as understand ourselves. we are even afraid of being made sensible of our mistakes, and we shut up our ears, lest we should be humbled by his corrections. certainly the man who is apprehensive of being corrected and reproved by that uncorruptible reason, and ever goes astray when he does not follow it, is not that perfect, universal, and immutable reason, that corrects him, in spite of himself. in all things we find, as it were, two principles within us. the one gives, the other receives; the one fails, or is defective; the other makes up; the one mistakes, the other rectifies; the one goes awry, through his inclination, the other sets him right. it was the mistaken and ill-understood experience of this that led the marcionites and manicheans into error. every man is conscious within himself of a limited and inferior reason, that goes astray and errs, as soon as it gets loose from an entire subordination, and which mends its error no other way, but by returning under the yoke of another superior, universal, and immutable reason. thus everything within us argues an inferior, limited, communicated, and borrowed reason, that wants every moment to be rectified by another. all men are rational by means of the same reason, that communicates itself to them, according to various degrees. there is a certain number of wise men; but the wisdom from which they draw theirs, as from an inexhaustible source, and which makes them what they are, is but one. sect. lviii. it is the primitive truth, that lights all minds, by communicating itself to them. where is that wisdom? where is that reason, at once both common and superior to all limited and imperfect reasons of mankind? where is that oracle, which is never silent, and against which all the vain prejudices of men cannot prevail? where is that reason which we have ever occasion to consult, and which prevents us to create in us the desire of hearing its voice? where is that lively light which lighteth every man that cometh into the world? where is that pure and soft light, which not only lights those eyes that are open, but which opens eyes that are shut; cures sore eyes; gives eyes to those that have none to see it; in short, which raises the desire of being lighted by it, and gains even their love, who were afraid to see it? every eye sees it; nor would it see anything, unless it saw it; since it is by that light and its pure rays that the eye sees everything. as the sensibler sun in the firmament lights all bodies, so the sun of intelligence lights all minds. the substance of a man's eye is not the light: on the contrary, the eye borrows, every moment, the light from the rays of the sun. just in the same manner, my mind is not the primitive reason, or universal and immutable truth; but only the organ through which that original light passes, and which is lighted by it. there is a sun of spirits that lights them far better than the visible sun lights bodies. this sun of spirits gives us, at once, both its light, and the love of it, in order to seek it. that sun of truth leaves no manner of darkness, and shines at the same time in the two hemispheres. it lights us as much by night as by day; nor does it spread its rays outwardly; but inhabits in every one of us. a man can never deprive another man of its beams. one sees it equally, in whatever corner of the universe he may lurk. a man never needs say to another, step aside, to let me see that sun; you rob me of its rays; you take away my share of it. that sun never sets: nor suffers any cloud, but such as are raised by our passions. it is a day without shadow. it lights the savages even in the deepest and darkest caves; none but sore eyes wink against its light; nor is there indeed any man so distempered and so blind, but who still walks by the glimpse of some duskish light he retains from that inward sun of consciences. that universal light discovers and represents all objects to our minds; nor can we judge of anything but by it; just as we cannot discern anybody but by the rays of the sun. sect. lix. it is by the light of primitive truth a man judges whether what one says to him be true or false. men may speak and discourse to us in order to instruct us: but we cannot believe them any farther, than we find a certain conformity or agreement between what they say, and what the inward master says. after they have exhausted all their arguments, we must still return, and hearken to him, for a final decision. if a man should tell us that a part equals the whole of which it is a part, we should not be able to forbear laughing, and instead of persuading us, he would make himself ridiculous to us. it is in the very bottom of ourselves, by consulting the inward master, that we must find the truths that are taught us, that is, which are outwardly proposed to us. thus, properly speaking, there is but one true master, who teaches all, and without whom one learns nothing. other masters always refer and bring us back to that inward school where he alone speaks. it is there we receive what we have not; it is there we learn what we were ignorant of; and find what we had lost by oblivion. it is in the intimate bottom of ourselves, he keeps in store for us certain truths, that lie, as it were, buried, but which revive upon occasion; and it is there, in short, that we reject the falsehood we had embraced. far from judging that master, it is by him alone we are judged peremptorily in all things. he is a judge disinterested, impartial, and superior to us. we may, indeed, refuse hearing him, and raise a din to stun our ears: but when we hear him it is not in our power to contradict him. nothing is more unlike man than that invisible master that instructs and judges him with so much severity, uprightness, and perfection. thus our limited, uncertain, defective, fallible reason, is but a feeble and momentaneous inspiration of a primitive, supreme, and immutable reason, which communicates itself with measure, to all intelligent beings. sect. lx. the superior reason that resides in man is god himself; and whatever has been above discovered to be in man, are evident footsteps of the deity. it cannot be said that man gives himself the thoughts he had not before; much less can it be said that he receives them from other men, since it is certain he neither does nor can admit anything from without, unless he finds it in his own bottom, by consulting within him the principles of reason, in order to examine whether what he is told is agreeable or repugnant to them. therefore there is an inward school wherein man receives what he neither can give himself, nor expect from other men who live upon trust as well as himself. here then, are two reasons i find within me; one of which, is myself, the other is above me. that which is myself is very imperfect, prejudiced, liable to error, changeable, headstrong, ignorant, and limited; in short it possesses nothing but what is borrowed. the other is common to all men, and superior to them. it is perfect, eternal, immutable, ever ready to communicate itself in all places, and to rectify all minds that err and mistake; in short, incapable of ever being either exhausted or divided, although it communicates itself to all who desire it. where is that perfect reason which is so near me, and yet so different from me? where is it? sure it must be something real; for nothing or nought cannot either be perfect or make perfect imperfect natures. where is that supreme reason? is it not the very god i look for? sect. lxi. new sensible notices of the deity in man, drawn from the knowledge he has of unity. i still find other traces or notices of the deity within me: here is a very sensible one. i am acquainted with prodigious numbers with the relations that are between them. now how come i by that knowledge? it is so very distinct that i cannot seriously doubt of it; and so, immediately, without the least hesitation, i rectify any man that does not follow it in computation. if a man says seventeen and three make twenty-two, i presently tell him seventeen and three make but twenty; and he is immediately convinced by his own light, and acquiesces in my correction. the same master who speaks within me to correct him speaks at the same time within him to bid him acquiesce. these are not two masters that have agreed to make us agree. it is something indivisible, eternal, immutable, that speaks at the same time with an invincible persuasion in us both. once more, how come i by so just a notion of numbers? all numbers are but repeated units. every number is but a compound, or a repetition of units. the number of two, for instance, is but two units; the number of four is reducible to one repeated four times. therefore we cannot conceive any number without conceiving unity, which is the essential foundation of any possible number; nor can we conceive any repetition of units without conceiving unity itself, which is its basis. but which way can i know any real unit? i never saw, nor so much as imagined any by the report of my senses. let me take, for instance, the most subtle atom; it must have a figure, length, breadth, and depth, a top and a bottom, a left and a right side; and again the top is not the bottom, nor one side the other. therefore this atom is not truly one, for it consists of parts. now a compound is a real number, and a multitude of beings. it is not a real unit, but a collection of beings, one of which is not the other. i therefore never learnt by my eyes, my ears, my hands, nor even by my imagination, that there is in nature any real unity; on the contrary, neither my senses nor my imagination ever presented to me anything but what is a compound, a real number or a multitude. all unity continually escapes me; it flies me as it were by a kind of enchantment. since i look for it in so many divisions of an atom, i certainly have a distinct idea of it; and it is only by its simple and clear idea that i arrive, by the repetition of it, at the knowledge of so many other numbers. but since it escapes me in all the divisions of the bodies of nature, it clearly follows that i never came by the knowledge of it, through the canal of my senses and imagination. here therefore is an idea which is in me independently from the senses, imagination, and impressions of bodies. moreover, although i would not frankly acknowledge that i have a clear idea of unity, which is the foundation of all numbers, because they are but repetitions or collections of units: i must at least be forced to own that i know a great many numbers with their proprieties and relations. i know, for instance, how much make 900,000,000 joined with 800,000,000 of another sum. i make no mistake in it; and i should, with certainty, immediately rectify any man that should. nevertheless, neither my senses nor my imagination were ever able to represent to me distinctly all those millions put together. nor would the image they should represent to me be more like seventeen hundred millions than a far inferior number. therefore, how came i by so distinct an idea of numbers, which i never could either feel or imagine? these ideas, independent upon bodies, can neither be corporeal nor admitted in a corporeal subject. they discover to me the nature of my soul, which admits what is incorporeal and receives it within itself in an incorporeal manner. now, how came i by so incorporeal an idea of bodies themselves? i cannot by my own nature carry it within me, since what in me knows bodies is incorporeal; and since it knows them, without receiving that knowledge through the canal of corporeal organs, such as the senses and imagination. what thinks in me must be, as it were, a nothing of corporeal nature. how was i able to know beings that have by nature no relation with my thinking being? certainly a being superior to those two natures, so very different, and which comprehends them both in its infinity, must have joined them in my soul, and given me an idea of a nature entirely different from that which thinks in me. sect. lxii. the idea of the unity proves that there are immaterial substances; and that there is a being perfectly one, who is god. as for units, some perhaps will say that i do not know them by the bodies, but only by the spirits; and, therefore, that my mind being one, and truly known to me, it is by it, and not by the bodies, i have the idea of unity. but to this i answer. it will, at least, follow from thence that i know substances that have no manner of extension or divisibility, and which are present. here are already beings purely incorporeal, in the number of which i ought to place my soul. now, who is it that has united it to my body? this soul of mine is not an infinite being; it has not been always, and it thinks within certain bounds. now, again, who makes it know bodies so different from it? who gives it so great a command over a certain body; and who gives reciprocally to that body so great a command over the soul? moreover, which way do i know whether this thinking soul is really one, or whether it has parts? i do not see this soul. now, will anybody say that it is in so invisible, and so impenetrable, a thing that i clearly see what unity is? i am so far from learning by my soul what the being one is, that, on the contrary, it is by the clear idea i have already of unity that i examine whether my soul be one or divisible. add to this, that i have within me a clear idea of a perfect unity, which is far above that i may find in my soul. the latter is often conscious that she is divided between two contrary opinions, inclinations, and habits. now, does not this division, which i find within myself, show and denote a kind of multiplicity and composition of parts? besides, the soul has, at least, a successive composition of thoughts, one of which is most different and distinct from another. i conceive an unity infinitely more one, if i may so speak. i conceive a being who never changes his thoughts, who always thinks all things at once, and in which no composition, even successive, can be found. undoubtedly it is the idea of the perfect and supreme unity that makes me so inquisitive after some unity in spirits, and even in bodies. this idea, ever present within me, is innate or inborn with me; it is the perfect model by which i seek everywhere some imperfect copy of the unity. this idea of what is one, simple, and indivisible by excellence can be no other than the idea of god. i, therefore, know god with such clearness and evidence, that it is by knowing him i seek in all creatures, and in myself, some image and likeness of his unity. the bodies have, as it were, some mark or print of that unity, which still flies away in the division of its parts; and the spirits have a greater likeness of it, although they have a successive composition of thoughts. sect. lxiii. dependence and independence of man. his dependence proves the existence of his creator. but here is another mystery which i carry within me, and which makes me incomprehensible to my self, viz.: that on the one hand i am free, and on the other dependent. let us examine these two things, and see whether it is possible to reconcile them. i am a dependent being. independency is the supreme perfection. to be by one's self is to carry within one's self the source or spring of one's own being; or, which is the same, it is to borrow nothing from any being different from one's self. suppose a being that has all the perfections you can imagine, but which has a borrowed and dependent being, and you will find him to be less perfect than another being in which you would suppose but bare independency. for there is no comparison to be made between a being that exists by himself and a being who has nothing of his own--nothing but what is precarious and borrowed--and is in himself, as it were, only upon trust. this consideration brings me to acknowledge the imperfection of what i call my soul. if she existed by herself, it would borrow nothing from another; she would not want either to be instructed in her ignorances, or to be rectified in her errors. nothing could reclaim her from her vices, or inspire her with virtue; for nothing would be able to render her will better than it should have been at first. this soul would ever possess whatever she should be capable to enjoy, nor could she ever receive any addition from without. on the other hand, it is no less certain that she could not lose anything, for what is or exists by itself is always necessarily whatever it is. therefore my soul could not fall into ignorance, error, or vice, or suffer any diminution of good-will; nor could she, on the other hand, instruct or correct herself, or become better than she is. now, i experience the contrary of all these; for i forget, mistake, err, go astray, lose the sight of truth and the love of virtue, i corrupt, i diminish. on the other hand, i improve and increase by acquiring wisdom and good-will, which i never had. this intimate experience convinces me that my soul is not a being existing by itself and independent; that is necessary, and immutable in all it possesses and enjoys. now, whence proceeds this augmentation and improvement of myself? who is it that can enlarge and perfect my being by making me better, and, consequently, greater than i was? sect. lxiv. good will cannot proceed but from a superior being. the will or faculty of willing is undoubtedly a degree of being, and of good, or perfection; but good-will, benevolence, or desire of good, is another degree of superior good. for one may misuse will in order to wish ill, cheat, hurt, or do injustice; whereas goodwill is the good or right use of will itself, which cannot but be good. good-will is therefore what is most precious in man. it is that which sets a value upon all the rest. it is, as it were, "the whole man:" hoc enim omnis homo. i have already shown that my will is not by itself, since it is liable to lose and receive degrees of good or perfection; and likewise that it is a good inferior to good-will, because it is better to will good than barely to have a will susceptible both of good and evil. how could i be brought to believe that i, a weak, imperfect, borrowed, precarious, and dependent being, bestow on myself the highest degree of perfection, while it is visible and evident that i derive the far inferior degree of perfection from a first being? can i imagine that god gives me the lesser good, and that i give myself the greater without him? how should i come by that high degree of perfection in order to give it myself! should i have it from nothing, which is all my own stock? shall i say that other spirits, much like or equal to mine, give it me? but since those limited and dependent beings like myself cannot give themselves anything no more than i can, much less can they bestow anything upon another. for as they do not exist by themselves, so they have not by themselves any true power, either over me, or over things that are imperfect in me, or over themselves. wherefore, without stopping with them, we must go up higher in order to find out a first, teeming, and most powerful cause, that is able to bestow on my soul the good will she has not. sect. lxv. as a superior being is the cause of all the modifications of creatures, so it is impossible for man's will to will good by itself or of its own accord. let us still add another reflection. that first being is the cause of all the modifications of his creatures. the operation follows the being, as the philosophers are used to speak. a being that is dependent in the essence of his being cannot but be dependent in all his operations, for the accessory follows the principal. therefore, the author of the essence of the being is also the author of all the modifications or modes of being of creatures. thus god is the real and immediate cause of all the configurations, combinations, and motions of all the bodies of the universe. it is by means or upon occasion of a body he has set in motion that he moves another. it is he who created everything and who does everything in his creatures or works. now, volition is the modification of the will or willing faculty of the soul, just as motion is the modification of bodies. shall we affirm that god is the real, immediate, and total cause of the motion of all bodies, and that he is not equally the real and immediate cause of the good-will of men's wills? will this modification, the most excellent of all, be the only one not made by god in his own work, and which the work bestows on itself independently? who can entertain such a thought? therefore my good-will which i had not yesterday and which i have to-day is not a thing i bestow upon myself, but must come from him who gave me both the will and the being. as to will is a greater perfection than barely to be, so to will good is more perfect than to will. the step from power to a virtuous act is the greatest perfection in man. power is only a balance or poise between virtue and vice, or a suspension between good and evil. the passage or step to the act is a decision or determination for the good, and consequent by the superior good. the power susceptible of good and evil comes from god, which we have fully evinced. now, shall we affirm that the decisive stroke that determines to the greater good either is not at all, or is less owing to him? all this evidently proves what the apostle says, viz., that god "works both to will and to do of his good pleasure." here is man's dependence; let us look for his liberty. sect. lxvi. of man's liberty. i am free, nor can i doubt of it. i am intimately and invincibly convinced that i can either will or not will, and that there is in me a choice not only between willing and not willing, but also between divers wills about the variety of objects that present themselves. i am sensible, as the scripture says, that i "am in the hands of my council," which alone suffices to show me that my soul is not corporeal. all that is body or corporeal does not in the least determine itself, and is, on the contrary, determined in all things by laws called physical, which are necessary, invincible, and contrary to what i call liberty. from thence i infer that my soul is of a nature entirely different from that of my body. now who is it that was able to join by a reciprocal union two such different natures, and hold them in so just a concert for all their respective operations? that tie, as we observed before, cannot be formed but by a superior being, who comprehends and unites those two sorts of perfections in his own infinite perfection. sect. lxvii. man's liberty consists in that his will by determining, modifies itself. it is not the same with the modification of my soul which is called will, and by some philosophers volition, as with the modifications of bodies. a body does not in the least modify itself, but is modified by the sole power of god. it does not move itself, it is moved; it does not act in anything, it is only acted and actuated. thus god is the only real and immediate cause of all the different modifications of bodies. as for spirits the case is different, for my will determines itself. now to determine one's self to a will is to modify one's self, and therefore my will modifies itself. god may prevent my soul, but he does not give it the will in the same manner as he gives motion to bodies. if it is god who modifies me, i modify myself with him, and am with him a real cause of my own will. my will is so much my own that i am only to blame if i do not will what i ought. when i will a thing it is in my power not to will it, and when i do not will it it is likewise in my power to will it. i neither am nor can be compelled in my will; for i cannot will what i actually will in spite of myself, since the will i mean evidently excludes all manner of constraint. besides the exemption from all compulsion, i am likewise free from necessity. i am conscious and sensible that i have, as it were, a two-edged will, which at its own choice may be either for the affirmative or the negative, the yes or the no, and turn itself either towards an object or towards another. i know no other reason or determination of my will but my will itself. i will a thing because i am free to will it; and nothing is so much in my power as either to will or not to will it. although my will should not be constrained, yet if it were necessitated it would be as strongly and invincibly determined to will as bodies are to move. an invincible necessity would have as much influence over the will with respect to spirits as it has over motion with respect to bodies; and, in such a case, the will would be no more accountable for willing than a body for moving. it is true the will would will what it would; but the motion by which a body is moved is the same as the volition by which the willing faculty wills. if therefore volition be necessitated as motion it deserves neither more nor less praise or blame. for though a necessitated will may seem to be a will unconstrained, yet it is such a will as one cannot forbear having, and for which he that has it is not accountable. nor does previous knowledge establish true liberty, for a will may be preceded by the knowledge of divers objects, and yet have no real election or choice. nor is deliberation or the being in suspense any more than a vain trifle, if i deliberate between two counsels when i am under an actual impotency to follow the one and under an actual necessity to pursue the other. in short, there is no serious and true choice between two objects, unless they be both actually ready within my reach so that i may either leave or take which of the two i please. sect. lxviii. will may resist grace, and its liberty is the foundation of merit and demerit. when therefore i say i am free, i mean that my will is fully in my power, and that even god himself leaves me at liberty to turn it which way i please, that i am not determined as other beings, and that i determine myself. i conceive that if that first being prevents me, to inspire me with a good-will, it is still in my power to reject his actual inspiration, how strong soever it may be, to frustrate its effect, and to refuse my assent to it. i conceive likewise that when i reject his inspiration for the good, i have the true and actual power not to reject it; just as i have the actual and immediate power to rise when i remain sitting, and to shut my eyes when i have them open. objects may indeed solicit me by all their allurements and agreeableness to will or desire them. the reasons for willing may present themselves to me with all their most lively and affecting attendants, and the supreme being may also attract me by his most persuasive inspirations. but yet for all this actual attraction of objects, cogency of reasons, and even inspiration of a superior being, i still remain master of my will, and am free either to will or not to will. it is this exemption not only from all manner of constraint or compulsion but also from all necessity and this command over my own actions that render me inexcusable when i will evil, and praiseworthy when i will good; in this lies merit and demerit, praise and blame; it is this that makes either punishment or reward just; it is upon this consideration that men exhort, rebuke, threaten, and promise. this is the foundation of all policy, instruction, and rules of morality. the upshot of the merit and demerit of human actions rests upon this basis, that nothing is so much in the power of our will as our will itself, and that we have this free-will--this, as it were, two-edged faculty--and this elative power between two counsels which are immediately, as it were, within our reach. it is what shepherds and husbandmen sing in the fields, what merchants and artificers suppose in their traffic, what actors represent in public shows, what magistrates believe in their councils, what doctors teach in their schools; it is that, in short, which no man of sense can seriously call in question. that truth imprinted in the bottom of our hearts, is supposed in the practice, even by those philosophers who would endeavour to shake it by their empty speculations. the intimate evidence of that truth is like that of the first principles, which want no proof, and which serve themselves as proofs to other truths that are not so clear and self-evident. but how could the first being make a creature who is himself the umpire of his own actions? sect. lxix. a character of the deity, both in the dependence and independence of man. let us now put together these two truths equally certain. i am dependent upon a first being even in my own will; and nevertheless i am free. what then is this dependent liberty? how is it possible for a man to conceive a free-will, that is given by a first being? i am free in my will, as god is in his. it is principally in this i am his image and likeness. what a greatness that borders upon infinite is here! this is a ray of the deity itself: it is a kind of divine power i have over my will; but i am but a bare image of that supreme being so absolutely free and powerful. the image of the divine independence is not the reality of what it represents; and, therefore, my liberty is but a shadow of that first being, by whom i exist and act. on the one hand, the power i have of willing evil is, indeed, rather a weakness and frailty of my will than a true power: for it is only a power to fall, to degrade myself, and to diminish my degree of perfection and being. on the other hand, the power i have to will good is not an absolute power, since i have it not of myself. now liberty being no more than that power, a precarious and borrowed power can constitute but a precarious, borrowed, and dependent liberty; and, therefore, so imperfect and so precarious a being cannot but be dependent. but how is he free? what profound mystery is here! his liberty, of which i cannot doubt, shows his perfection; and his dependence argues the nothingness from which he was drawn. sect. lxx. the seal and stamp of the deity in his works. we have seen the prints of the deity, or to speak more properly, the seal and stamp of god himself, in all that is called the works of nature. when a man will not enter into philosophical subtleties, he observes with the first cast of the eye a hand, that was the first mover, in all the parts of the universe, and set all the wheels of the great machine a-going. the heavens, the earth, the stars, plants, animals, our bodies, our minds: everything shows and proclaims an order, an exact measure, an art, a wisdom, a mind superior to us, which is, as it were, the soul of the whole world, and which leads and directs everything to his ends, with a gentle and insensible, though omnipotent, force. we have seen, as it were, the architecture and frame of the universe; the just proportion of all its parts; and the bare cast of the eye has sufficed us to find and discover even in an ant, more than in the sun, a wisdom and power that delights to exert itself in the polishing and adorning its vilest works. this is obvious, without any speculative discussion, to the most ignorant of men; but what a world of other wonders should we discover, should we penetrate into the secrets of physics, and dissect the inward parts of animals, which are framed according to the most perfect mechanics. sect. lxxi. objection of the epicureans, who ascribe everything to chance, considered. i hear certain philosophers who answer me that all this discourse on the art that shines in the universe is but a continued sophism. "all nature," will they say, "is for man's use, it is true; but you have no reason to infer from thence, that it was made with art, and on purpose for the use of man. a man must be ingenious in deceiving himself who looks for and thinks to find what never existed." "it is true," will they add, "that man's industry makes use of an infinite number of things that nature affords, and are convenient for him; but nature did not make those things on purpose for his conveniency. as, for instance, some country fellows climb up daily, by certain craggy and pointed rocks, to the top of a mountain; but yet it does not follow that those points of rocks were cut with art, like a staircase, for the conveniency of men. in like manner, when a man happens to be in the fields, during a stormy rain, and fortunately meets with a cave, he uses it, as he would do a house, for shelter; but, however, it cannot be affirmed that this cave was made on purpose to serve men for a house. it is the same with the whole world: it was formed by chance, and without design; but men finding it as it is, had the art to turn and improve it to their own uses. thus the art you admire both in the work and its artificer, is only in men, who know how to make use of everything that surrounds them." this is certainly the strongest objection those philosophers can raise; and i hope they will have no reason to complain that i have weakened it; but it will immediately appear how weak it is in itself when closely examined. the bare repetition of what i said before will be sufficient to demonstrate it. sect. lxxii. answer to the objection of the epicureans, who ascribe all to chance. what would one say of a man who should set up for a subtle philosopher, or, to use the modern expression, a free-thinker, and who entering a house should maintain it was made by chance, and that art had not in the least contributed to render it commodious to men, because there are caves somewhat like that house, which yet were never dug by the art of man? one should show to such a reasoner all the parts of the house, and tell him for instance:--do you see this great court-gate? it is larger than any door, that coaches may enter it. this court has sufficient space for coaches to turn in it. this staircase is made up of low steps, that one may ascend it with ease; and turns according to the apartments and stories it is to serve. the windows, opened at certain distances, light the whole building. they are glazed, lest the wind should enter with the light; but they may be opened at pleasure, in order to breathe a sweet air when the weather is fair. the roof is contrived to defend the whole house from the injuries of the air. the timber-work is laid slanting and pointed at the top, that the rain and snow may easily slide down on both sides. the tiles bear one upon another, that they may cover the timber-work. the divers floors serve to make different stories, in order to multiply lodgings within a small space. the chimneys are contrived to light fire in winter without setting the house on fire, and to let out the smoke, lest it should offend those that warm themselves. the apartments are distributed in such a manner that they be disengaged from one another; that a numerous family may lodge in the house, and the one not be obliged to pass through another's room; and that the master's apartment be the principal. there are kitchens, offices, stables, and coachhouses. the rooms are furnished with beds to lie in, chairs to sit on, and tables to write and eat on. sure, should one urge to that philosopher, this work must have been directed by some skilful architect; for everything in it is agreeable, pleasant, proportioned, and commodious; and besides, he must needs have had excellent artists under him. "not at all," would such a philosopher answer; "you are ingenious in deceiving yourself. it is true this house is pleasant, agreeable, proportioned, and commodious; but yet it made itself with all its proportions. chance put together all the stones in this excellent order; it raised the walls, jointed and laid the timber-work, cut open the casements, and placed the staircase: do not believe any human hand had anything to do with it. men only made the best of this piece of work when they found it ready made. they fancy it was made for them, because they observe things in it which they know how to improve to their own conveniency; but all they ascribe to the design and contrivance of an imaginary architect, is but the effect of their preposterous imaginations. this so regular, and so well-contrived house, was made in just the same manner as a cave, and men finding it ready made to their hands made use of it, as they would in a storm, of a cave they should find under a rock in a desert." what thoughts could a man entertain of such a fantastic philosopher, if he should persist seriously to assert that such a house displays no art? when we read the fabulous story of amphion, who by a miraculous effect of harmony caused the stones to rise, and placed themselves, with order and symmetry, one on the top of another, in order to form the walls of thebes, we laugh and sport with that poetical fiction: but yet this very fiction is not so incredible as that which the free-thinking philosopher we contend with would dare to maintain. we might, at least, imagine that harmony, which consists in a local motion of certain bodies, might (by some of those secret virtues, which we admire in nature, without being acquainted with them) shake and move the stones into a certain order and in a sort of cadence, which might occasion some regularity in the building. i own this explanation both shocks and clashes with reason; but yet it is less extravagant than what i have supposed a philosopher should say. what, indeed, can be more absurd, than to imagine stones that hew themselves, that go out of the quarry, that get one on the top of another, without leaving any empty space; that carry with them mortar to cement one another; that place themselves in different ranks for the contrivance of apartments; and who admit on the top of all the timber-roof, with the tiles, in order to cover the whole work? the very children, that cannot yet speak plain, would laugh, if they were seriously told such a ridiculous story. sect. lxxiii. comparison of the world with a regular house. a continuation of the answer to the objection of the epicureans. but why should it appear less ridiculous to hear one say that the world made itself, as well as that fabulous house? the question is not to compare the world with a cave without form, which is supposed to be made by chance: but to compare it with a house in which the most perfect architecture should be conspicuous. for the structure and frame of the least living creature is infinitely more artful and admirable than the finest house that ever was built. suppose a traveller entering saida, the country where the ancient thebes, with a hundred gates, stood formerly, and which is now a desert, should find there columns, pyramids, obelisks, and inscriptions in unknown characters. would he presently say: men never inhabited this place; no human hand had anything to do here; it is chance that formed these columns, that placed them on their pedestals, and crowned them with their capitals, with such just proportions; it is chance that so firmly jointed the pieces that make up these pyramids; it is chance that cut the obelisks in one single stone, and engraved in them these characters? would he not, on the contrary, say, with all the certainty the mind of man is capable of: these magnificent ruins are the remains of a noble and majestical architecture that flourished in ancient egypt? this is what plain reason suggests, at the first cast of the eye, or first sight, and without reasoning. it is the same with the bare prospect of the universe. a man may by vain, long-winded, preposterous reasonings confound his own reason and obscure the clearest notions: but the single cast of the eye is decisive. such a work as the world is never makes itself of its own accord. there is more art and proportion in the bones, tendons, veins, arteries, nerves, and muscles, that compose man's body, than in all the architecture of the ancient greeks and egyptians. the single eye of the least of living creatures surpasses the mechanics of all the most skilful artificers. if a man should find a watch in the sands of africa, he would never have the assurance seriously to affirm, that chance formed it in that wild place; and yet some men do not blush to say that the bodies of animals, to the artful framing of which no watch can ever be compared, are the effects of the caprices of chance. sect. lxxiv. another objection of the epicureans drawn from the eternal motion of atoms. i am not ignorant of a reasoning which the epicureans may frame into an objection. "the atoms will, they say, have an eternal motion; their fortuitous concourse must, in that eternity, have already produced infinite combinations. who says infinite, says what comprehends all without exception. amongst these infinite combinations of atoms which have already happened successively, all such as are possible must necessarily be found: for if there were but one possible combination, beyond those contained in that infinite, it would cease to be a true infinite, because something might be added to it; and whatever may be increased, being limited on the side it may receive an addition, is not truly infinite. hence it follows that the combination of atoms, which makes up the present system of the world, is one of the combinations which the atoms have had successively: which being laid as a principle, is it matter of wonder that the world is as it is now? it must have taken this exact form, somewhat sooner, or somewhat later, for in some one of these infinite changes it must, at last, have received that combination that makes it now appear so regular; since it must have had, by turns, all combinations that can be conceived. all systems are comprehended in the total of eternity. there is none but the concourse of atoms, forms, and embraces, sooner or later. in that infinite variety of new spectacles of nature, the present was formed in its turn. we find ourselves actually in this system. the concourse of atoms that made will, in process of time, unmake it, in order to make others, ad infinitum, of all possible sorts. this system could not fail having its place, since all others without exception are to have theirs, each in its turn. it is in vain one looks for a chimerical art in a work which chance must have made as it is. "an example will suffice to illustrate this. i suppose an infinite number of combinations of the letters of the alphabet, successively formed by chance. all possible combinations are, undoubtedly, comprehended in that total, which is truely infinite. now, it is certain that homer's iliad is but a combination of letters: therefore homer's iliad is comprehended in that infinite collection of combinations of the characters of the alphabet. this being laid down as a principle, a man who will assign art in the iliad, will argue wrong. he may extol the harmony of the verses, the justness and magnificence of the expressions, the simplicity and liveliness of images, the due proportion of the parts of the poem, its perfect unity, and inimitable conduct; he may object that chance can never make anything so perfect, and that the utmost effort of human wit is hardly capable to finish so excellent a piece of work: yet all in vain, for all this specious reasoning is visibly false. it is certain, on the contrary, that the fortuitous concourse of characters, putting them together by turns with an infinite variety, the precise combination that composes the iliad must have happened in its turn, somewhat sooner or somewhat later. it has happened at last; and thus the iliad is perfect, without the help of any human art." this is the objection fairly laid down in its full latitude; i desire the reader's serious and continued attention to the answers i am going to make to it. sect. lxxv. answers to the objection of the epicureans drawn from the eternal motion of atoms. nothing can be more absurd than to speak of successive combinations of atoms infinite in number; for the infinite can never be either successive or divisible. give me, for instance, any number you may pretend to be infinite, and it will still be in my power to do two things that shall demonstrate it not to be a true infinite. in the first place, i can take an unit from it; and in such a case it will become less than it was, and will certainly be finite; for whatever is less than the infinite has a boundary or limit on the side where one stops, and beyond which one might go. now the number which is finite as soon as one takes from it one single unit, could not be infinite before that diminution; for an unit is certainly finite, and a finite joined with another finite cannot make an infinite. if a single unit added to a finite number made an infinite, it would follow from thence that the finite would be almost equal to the infinite; than which nothing can be more absurd. in the second place, i may add an unit to that number given, and consequently increase it. now what may be increased is not infinite, for the infinite can have no bound; and what is capable of augmentation is bounded on the side a man stops, when he might go further and add some units to it. it is plain, therefore, that no divisible compound can be the true infinite. this foundation being laid, all the romance of the epicurean philosophy disappears and vanishes out of sight in an instant. there never can be any divisible body truly infinite in extent, nor any number or any succession that is a true infinite. from hence it follows that there never can be an infinite successive number of combinations of atoms. if this chimerical infinite were real, i own all possible and conceivable combinations of atoms would be found in it; and that consequently all combinations that seem to require the utmost industry would likewise be included in them. in such a case, one might ascribe to mere chance the most marvellous performances of art. if one should see palaces built according to the most perfect rules of architecture, curious furniture, watches, clocks, and all sort of machines the most compounded, in a desert island, he should not be free reasonably to conclude that there have been men in that island who made all those exquisite works. on the contrary, he ought to say, "perhaps one of the infinite combinations of atoms which chance has successively made, has formed all these compositions in this desert island without the help of any man's art;" for such an assertion is a natural consequence of the principles of the epicureans. but the very absurdity of the consequence serves to expose the extravagance of the principle they lay down. when men, by the natural rectitude of their common sense, conclude that such sort of works cannot result from chance, they visibly suppose, though in a confused manner, that atoms are not eternal, and that in their fortuitous concourse they had not an infinite succession of combinations. for if that principle were admitted, it would no longer be possible ever to distinguish the works of art from those that should result from those combinations as fortuitous as a throw at dice. sect. lxxvi. the epicureans confound the works of art with those of nature. all men who naturally suppose a sensible difference between the works of art and those of chance do consequently, though but implicitly, suppose that the combinations of atoms were not infinite--which supposition is very just. this infinite succession of combinations of atoms is, as i showed before, a more absurd chimera than all the absurdities some men would explain by that false principle. no number, either successive or continual, can be infinite; from whence it follows that the number of atoms cannot be infinite, that the succession of their various motions and combinations cannot be infinite, that the world cannot be eternal, and that we must find out a precise and fixed beginning of these successive combinations. we must recur to a first individual in the generations of every species. we must likewise find out the original and primitive form of every particle of matter that makes a part of the universe. and as the successive changes of that matter must be limited in number, we must not admit in those different combinations but such as chance commonly produces; unless we acknowledge a superior being, who with the perfection of art made the wonderful works which chance could never have made. sect. lxxvii. the epicureans take whatever they please for granted, without any proof. the epicurean philosophers are so weak in their system that it is not in their power to form it, or bring it to bear, unless one admits without proofs their most fabulous postulata and positions. in the first place they suppose eternal atoms, which is begging the question; for how can they make out that atoms have ever existed and exist by themselves? to exist by one's self is the supreme perfection. now, what authority have they to suppose, without proofs, that atoms have in themselves a perfect, eternal, and immutable being? do they find this perfection in the idea they have of every atom in particular? an atom not being the same with, and being absolutely distinguished from, another atom, each of them must have in itself eternity and independence with respect to any other being. once more, is it in the idea these philosophers have of each atom that they find this perfection? but let us grant them all they suppose in this question, and even what they ought to be ashamed to suppose--viz., that atoms are eternal, subsisting by themselves, independent from any other being, and consequently entirely perfect. sect. lxxviii. the suppositions of the epicureans are false and chimerical. must we suppose, besides, that atoms have motion of themselves? shall we suppose it out of gaiety to give an air of reality to a system more chimerical than the tales of the fairies? let us consult the idea we have of a body. we conceive it perfectly well without supposing it to be in motion, and represent it to us at rest; nor is its idea in this state less clear; nor does it lose its parts, figure, or dimensions. it is to no purpose to suppose that all bodies are perpetually in some motion, either sensible or insensible; and that though some parts of matter have a lesser motion than others, yet the universal mass of matter has ever the same motion in its totality. to speak at this rate is building castles in the air, and imposing vain imaginations on the belief of others; for who has told these philosophers that the mass of matter has ever the same motion in its totality? who has made the experiment of it? have they the assurance to bestow the name of philosophy upon a rash fiction which takes for granted what they never can make out? is there no more to do than to suppose whatever one pleases in order to elude the most simple and most constant truths? what authority have they to suppose that all bodies incessantly move, either sensibly or insensibly? when i see a stone that appears motionless, how will they prove to me that there is no atom in that stone but what is actually in motion? will they ever impose upon me bare suppositions, without any semblance of truth, for decisive proofs? sect. lxxix. it is falsely supposed that motion is essential to bodies. however, let us go a step further, and, out of excessive complaisance, suppose that all the bodies in nature are actually in motion. does it follow from thence that motion is essential to every particle of matter? besides, if all bodies have not an equal degree of motion; if some move sensibly, and more swiftly than others; if the same body may move sometimes quicker and sometimes slower; if a body that moves communicates its motion to the neighbouring body that was at rest, or in such inferior motion that it was insensible--it must be confessed that a mode or modification which sometimes increases, and at other times decreases, in bodies is not essential to them. what is essential to a being is ever the same in it. neither the motion that varies in bodies, and which, after having increased, slackens and decreases to such a degree as to appear absolutely extinct and annihilated; nor the motion that is lost, that is communicated, that passes from one body to another as a foreign thing--can belong to the essence of bodies. and, therefore, i may conclude that bodies are perfect in their essence without ascribing to them any motion. if they have no motion in their essence, they have it only by accident; and if they have it only by accident, we must trace up that accident to its true cause. bodies must either bestow motion on themselves, or receive it from some other being. it is evident they do not bestow it on themselves, for no being can give what it has not in itself. and we are sensible that a body at rest ever remains motionless, unless some neighbouring body happens to shake it. it is certain, therefore, that no body moves by itself, and is only moved by some other body that communicates its motion to it. but how comes it to pass that a body can move another? what is the reason that a ball which a man causes to roll on a smooth table (billiards, for the purpose) cannot touch another without moving it? why was it not possible that motion should not ever communicate itself from one body to another? in such a case a ball in motion would stop near another at their meeting, and yet never shake it. sect. lxxx. the rules of motion, which the epicureans suppose do not render it essential to bodies. i may be answered that, according to the rules of motion among bodies, one ought to shake or move another. but where are those laws of motion written and recorded? who both made them and rendered them so inviolable? they do not belong to the essence of bodies, for we can conceive bodies at rest; and we even conceive bodies that would not communicate their motion to others unless these rules, with whose original we are unacquainted, subjected them to it. whence comes this, as it were, arbitrary government of motion over all bodies? whence proceed laws so ingenious, so just, so well adapted one to the other, that the least alteration of or deviation from which would, on a sudden, overturn and destroy all the excellent order we admire in the universe? a body being entirely distinct from another, is in its nature absolutely independent from it in all respects. whence it follows that it should not receive anything from it, or be susceptible of any of its impressions. the modifications of a body imply no necessary reason to modify in the same manner another body, whose being is entirely independent from the being of the first. it is to no purpose to allege that the most solid and most heavy bodies carry or force away those that are less big and less solid; and that, according to this rule, a great leaden ball ought to move a great ball of ivory. we do not speak of the fact; we only inquire into the cause of it. the fact is certain, and therefore the cause ought likewise to be certain and precise. let us look for it without any manner of prepossession or prejudice. what is the reason that a great body carries off a little one? the thing might as naturally happen quite otherwise; for it might as well happen that the most solid body should never move any other body--that is to say, motion might be incommunicable. nothing but custom obliges us to suppose that nature ought to act as it does. sect. lxxxi. to give a satisfactory account of motion we must recur to the first mover. moreover, it has been proved that matter cannot be either infinite or eternal; and, therefore, there must be supposed both a first atom (by which motion must have begun at a precise moment), and a first concourse of atoms (that must have formed the first combination). now, i ask what mover gave motion to that first atom, and first set the great machine of the universe a-going? it is not possible to elude this home question by an endless circle, for this question, lying within a finite circumference, must have an end at last; and so we must find the first atom in motion, and the first moment of that first motion, together with the first mover, whose hand made that first impression. sect. lxxxii. no law of motion has its foundation in the essence of the body; and most of those laws are arbitrary. among the laws of motion we must look upon all those as arbitrary which we cannot account for by the very essence of bodies. we have already made out that no motion is essential to any body. wherefore all those laws which are supposed to be eternal and immutable are, on the contrary, arbitrary, accidental, and made without cogent necessity; for there is none of them that can be accounted for by the essence of bodies. if there were any law of motion essential to bodies, it would undoubtedly be that by which bodies of less bulk and less solid are moved by such as have more bulk and solidity. and yet we have seen that that very law is not to be accounted for by the essence of bodies. there is another which might also seem very natural--that, i mean, by which bodies ever move rather in a direct than a crooked line, unless their motion be otherwise determined by the meeting of other bodies. but even this rule has no foundation in the essence of matter. motion is so very accidental, and super-added to the nature of bodies, that we do not find in this nature of bodies any primitive or immutable law by which they ought to move at all, much less to move according to certain rules. in the same manner as bodies might have existed, and yet have never either been in motion or communicated motion one to another, so they might never have moved but in a circular line, and this motion might have been as natural to them as the motion in a direct line. now, who is it that pitched upon either of these two laws equally possible? what is not determined by the essence of bodies can have been determined by no other but him who gave bodies the motion they had not in their own essence. besides, this motion in a direct line might have been upwards or downwards, from right to left, or from left to right, or in a diagonal line. now, who is it that determined which way the straight line should go? sect. lxxxiii. the epicureans can draw no consequence from all their suppositions, although the same should be granted them. let us still attend the epicureans even in their most fabulous suppositions, and carry on the fiction to the last degree of complaisance. let us admit motion in the essence of bodies, and suppose, as they do, that motion in a direct line is also essential to all atoms. let us bestow upon atoms both a will and an understanding, as poets did on rocks and rivers. and let us allow them likewise to choose which way they will begin their straight line. now, what advantage will these philosophers draw from all i have granted them, contrary to all evidence? in the first place, all atoms must have been in motion from all eternity; secondly, they must all have had an equal motion; thirdly, they must all have moved in a direct line; fourthly, they must all have moved by an immutable and essential law. i am still willing to gratify our adversaries, so far as to suppose that those atoms are of different figures, for i will allow them to take for granted what they should be obliged to prove, and for which they have not so much as the shadow of a proof. one can never grant too much to men who never can draw any consequence from what is granted them; for the more absurdities are allowed them, the sooner they are caught by their own principles. sect. lxxxiv. atoms cannot make any compound by the motion the epicureans assign them. these atoms of so many odd figures--some round, some crooked, others triangular, &c.--are by their essence obliged always to move in a straight line, without ever deviating or bending to the right or to the left; wherefore they never can hook one another, or make together any compound. put, if you please, the sharpest hooks near other hooks of the like make; yet if every one of them never moves otherwise than in a line perfectly straight, they will eternally move one near another, in parallel lines, without being able to join and hook one another. the two straight lines which are supposed to be parallel, though immediate neighbours, will never cross one another, though carried on ad infinitum; wherefore in all eternity, no hooking, and consequently no compound, can result from that motion of atoms in a direct line. sect. lxxxv. the clinamen, declination, or sending of atoms is a chimerical notion that throws the epicureans into a gross contradiction. the epicureans, not being able to shut their eyes against this glaring difficulty, that strikes at the very foundation of their whole system, have, for a last shift, invented what lucretius calls clinamen--by which is meant a motion somewhat declining or bending from the straight line, and which gives atoms the occasion to meet and encounter. thus they turn and wind them at pleasure, according as they fancy best for their purpose. but upon what authority do they suppose this declination of atoms, which comes so pat to bear up their system? if motion in a straight line be essential to bodies, nothing can bend, nor consequently join them, in all eternity; the clinamen destroys the very essence of matter, and those philosophers contradict themselves without blushing. if, on the contrary, the motion in a direct line is not essential to all bodies, why do they so confidently suppose eternal, necessary, and immutable laws for the motion of atoms without recurring to a first mover? and why do they build a whole system of philosophy upon the precarious foundation of a ridiculous fiction? without the clinamen the straight line can never produce anything, and the epicurean system falls to the ground; with the clinamen, a fabulous poetical invention, the direct line is violated, and the system falls into derision and ridicule. both the straight line and the clinamen are airy suppositions and mere dreams; but these two dreams destroy each other, and this is the upshot of the uncurbed licentiousness some men allow themselves of supposing as eternal truths whatever their imagination suggests them to support a fable; while they refuse to acknowledge the artful and powerful hand that formed and placed all the parts of the universe. sect. lxxxvi. strange absurdity of the epicureans, who endeavour to account for the nature of the soul by the declination of atoms. to reach the highest degree of amazing extravagance, the epicureans have had the assurance to explain and account for what we call the soul of man and his free-will, by the clinamen, which is so unaccountable and inexplicable itself. thus they are reduced to affirm that it is in this motion, wherein atoms are in a kind of equilibrium between a straight line and a line somewhat circular, that human will consists. strange philosophy! if atoms move only in a straight line, they are inanimate, and incapable of any degree of knowledge, understanding, or will; but if the very same atoms somewhat deviate from the straight line, they become, on a sudden, animate, thinking, and rational. they are themselves intelligent souls, that know themselves, reflect, deliberate, and are free in their acts and determinations. was there ever a more absurd metamorphosis? what opinion would men have of religion if, in order to assert it, one should lay down principles and positions so trifling and ridiculous as theirs who dare to attack it in earnest? sect. lxxxvii. the epicureans cast a mist before their own eyes by endeavouring to explain the liberty of man by the declination of atoms. but let us consider to what degree those philosophers impose upon their own understandings. what can they find in the clinamen that, with any colour, can account for the liberty of man? this liberty is not imaginary; for it is not in our power to doubt of our freewill, any more than it is to doubt of what we are intimately conscious and certain. i am conscious i am free to continue sitting when i rise in order to walk. i am sensible of it with so entire certainty that it is not in my power ever to doubt of it in earnest; and i should be inconsistent with myself if i dared to say the contrary. can the proof of our religion be more evident and convincing? we cannot doubt of the existence of god unless we doubt of our own liberty; from whence i infer that no man can seriously doubt of the being of the deity, since no man can entertain a serious doubt about his own liberty. if, on the contrary, it be frankly acknowledged that men are really free, nothing is more easy than to demonstrate that the liberty of man's will cannot consist of any combination of atoms, if one supposes that there was no first mover, who gave matter arbitrary laws for its motion. motion must be essential to bodies, and all the laws of motion must also be as necessary as the essences of natures are. therefore, according to this system, all the motions of bodies must be performed by constant, necessary, and immutable laws; the motion in a straight line must be essential to all atoms, that are not made to deviate from it by the encounter of other atoms; the straight line must likewise be essential either upwards or downwards, either from right to left, or left to right, or some other diagonal way, fixed, precise, and immutable. besides, it is evident that no atom can make another atom deviate; for that other atom carries also in its essence the same invincible and eternal determination to follow the straight line the same way. from hence it follows that all the atoms placed at first on different lines must pursue ad infinitum those parallel lines without ever coming nearer one another; and that those who are in the same line must follow one another ad infinitum without ever coming up together, but keeping still the same distance from one another. the clinamen, as we have already shown, is manifestly impossible: but, contrary to evident truth, supposing it to be possible, in such a case it must be affirmed that the clinamen is no less necessary, immutable, and essential to atoms than the straight line. now, will anybody say that an essential and immutable law of the local motion of atoms explains and accounts for the true liberty of man? is it not manifest that the clinamen can no more account for it than the straight line itself? the clinamen, supposing it to be true, would be as necessary as the perpendicular line, by which a stone falls from the top of a tower into the street. is that stone free in its fall? however, the will of man, according to the principle of the clinamen, has no more freedom than that stone. is it possible for man to be so extravagant as to dare to contradict his own conscience about his free-will, lest he should be forced to acknowledge his god and maker? to affirm, on the one hand, that the liberty of man is imaginary, we must silence the voice and stifle the sense of all nature; give ourselves the lie in the grossest manner; deny what we are most intimately conscious and certain of; and, in short, be reduced to believe that we have no eligibility or choice of two courses, or things proposed, about which we fairly deliberate upon any occasion. nothing does religion more honour than to see men necessitated to fall into such gross and monstrous extravagance as soon as they call in question the truths she teaches. on the other hand, if we own that man is truly free, we acknowledge in him a principle that never can be seriously accounted for, either by the combinations of atoms or the laws of local motion, which must be supposed to be all equally necessary and essential to matter, if one denies a first mover. we must therefore go out of the whole compass of matter, and search far from combined atoms some incorporeal principle to account for free-will, if we admit it fairly. whatever is matter and an atom, moves only by necessary, immutable, and invincible laws: wherefore liberty cannot be found either in bodies, or in any local motion; and so we must look for it in some incorporeal being. now whose hand tied and subjected to the organs of this corporeal machine that incorporeal being which must necessarily be in me united to my body? where is the artificer that ties and unites natures so vastly different? can any but a power superior both to bodies and spirits keep them together in this union with so absolute a sway? two crooked atoms, says an epicurean, hook one another. now this is false, according to his very system; for i have demonstrated that those two crooked atoms never hook one another, because they never meet. but, however, after having supposed that two crooked atoms unite by hooking one another, the epicurean must be forced to own that the thinking being, which is free in his operations, and which consequently is not a collection of atoms, ever moved by necessary laws, is incorporeal, and could not by its figure be hooked with the body it animates. thus which way so ever the epicurean turns, he overthrows his system with his own hands. but let us not, by any means, endeavour to confound men that err and mistake, since we are men as well as they, and no less subject to error. let us only pity them, study to light and inform them with patience, edify them, pray for them, and conclude with asserting an evident truth. sect. lxxxviii. we must necessarily acknowledge the hand of a first cause in the universe without inquiring why that first cause has left defects in it. thus everything in the universe--the heavens, the earth, plants, animals, and, above all, men--bears the stamp of a deity. everything shows and proclaims a set design, and a series and concatenation of subordinate causes, over-ruled and directed with order by a superior cause. it is preposterous and foolish to criticise upon this great work. the defects that happen to be in it proceed either from the free and disorderly will of man, which produces them by its disorder, or from the ever holy and just will of god, who sometimes has a mind to punish impious men, and at other times by the wicked to exercise and improve the good. nay, it happens oftentimes that what appears a defect to our narrow judgment in a place separate from the work is an ornament with respect to the general design, which we are not able to consider with views sufficiently extended and simple to know the perfection of the whole. does not daily experience show that we rashly censure certain parts of men's works for want of being thoroughly acquainted with the whole extent of their designs and schemes? this happens, in particular, every day with respect to the works of painters and architects. if writing characters were of an immense bigness, each character at close view would take up a man's whole sight, so that it would not be possible for him to see above one at once; and, therefore, he would not be able to read--that is, put different letters together, and discover the sense of all those characters put together. it is the same with the great strokes of providence in the conduct of the whole world during a long succession of ages. there is nothing but the whole that is intelligible; and the whole is too vast and immense to be seen at close view. every event is like a particular character that is too large for our narrow organs, and which signifies nothing of itself and separate from the rest. when, at the consummation of ages, we shall see in god--that is, in the true point and centre of perspective--the total of human events, from the first to the last day of the universe, together with their proportions with regard to the designs of god, we shall cry out, "lord, thou alone art just and wise!" we cannot rightly judge of the works of men but by examining the whole. every part ought not to have every perfection, but only such as becomes it according to the order and proportion of the different parts that compose the whole. in a human body, for instance, all the members must not be eyes, for there must be hands, feet, &c. so in the universe, there must be a sun for the day, but there must be also a moon for the night. nec tibi occurrit perfecta universitas, nisi ubi majora sic praesto sunt, ut minora non desint. this is the judgment we ought to make of every part with respect to the whole. any other view is narrow and deceitful. but what are the weak and puny designs of men, if compared to that of the creation and government of the universe? "as much as the heavens are above the earth, as much," says god in the holy writ, "are my ways and my thoughts above yours." let, therefore, man admire what he understands, and be silent about what he does not comprehend. but, after all, even the real defects of this work are only imperfections which god was pleased to leave in it, to put us in mind that he drew and made it from nothing. there is not anything in the universe but what does and ought equally to bear these two opposite characters: on the one side, the seal or stamp of the artificer upon his work, and, on the other, the mark of its original nothing, into which it may relapse and dwindle every moment. it is an incomprehensible mixture of low and great; of frailty in the matter, and of art in the maker? the hand of god is conspicuous in everything, even in a worm that crawls on earth. nothingness, on the other hand, appears everywhere, even in the most vast and most sublime genius. whatever is not god, can have but a stinted perfection; and what has but a stinted perfection, always remains imperfect on the side where the boundary is sensible, and denotes that it might be improved. if the creature wanted nothing, it would be the creator himself; for it would have the fulness of perfection, which is the deity itself. since it cannot be infinite, it must be limited in perfection, that is, it must be imperfect on one side or other. it may have more or less imperfection, but still it must be imperfect. we must ever be able to point out the very place where it is defective, and to say, upon a critical examination, "this is what it might have had, what it has not." sect. lxxxix. the defects of the universe compared with those of a picture. do we conclude that a piece of painting is made by chance when we see in it either shades, or even some careless touches? the painter, we say, might have better finished those carnations, those draperies, those prospects. it is true, this picture is not perfect according to the nicest rules of art. but how extravagant would it be to say, "this picture is not absolutely perfect; therefore it is only a collection of colours formed by chance, nor did the hand of any painter meddle with it!" now, what a man would blush to say of an indifferent and almost artless picture he is not ashamed to affirm of the universe, in which a crowd of incomprehensible wonders, with excellent order and proportion, are conspicuous. let a man study the world as much as he pleases; let him descend into the minutest details; dissect the vilest of animals; narrowly consider the least grain of corn sown in the ground, and the manner in which it germinates and multiplies; attentively observe with what precautions a rose-bud blows and opens in the sun, and closes again at night; and he will find in all these more design, conduct, and industry than in all the works of art. nay, what is called the art of men is but a faint imitation of the great art called the laws of nature, and which the impious did not blush to call blind chance. is it therefore a wonder that poets animated the whole universe, bestowed wings upon the winds, and arrows on the sun, and described great rivers impetuously running to precipitate themselves into the sea, and trees shooting up to heaven to repel the rays of the sun by their thick shades? these images and figures have also been received in the language of the vulgar, so natural it is for men to be sensible of the wonderful art that fills all nature. poetry did only ascribe to inanimate creatures the art and design of the creator, who does everything in them. from the figurative language of the poets those notions passed into the theology of the heathens, whose divines were the poets. they supposed an art, a power, or a wisdom, which they called numen, in creatures the most destitute of understanding. with them great rivers were gods; and springs, naiads. woods and mountains had their particular deities; flowers had their flora; and fruits, pomona. after all, the more a man contemplates nature, the more he discovers in it an inexhaustible stock of wisdom, which is, as it were, the soul of the universe. sect. xc. we must necessarily conclude that there is a first being that created the universe. what must we infer from thence? the consequence flows of itself. "if so much wisdom and penetration," says minutius felix, "are required to observe the wonderful order and design of the structure of the world, how much more were necessary to form it!" if men so much admire philosophers, because they discover a small part of the wisdom that made all things, they must be stark blind not to admire that wisdom itself. sect. xci. reasons why men do not acknowledge god in the universe, wherein he shows himself to them, as in a faithful glass. this is the great object of the universe, wherein god, as it were in a glass, shows himself to mankind. but some (i mean, the philosophers) were bewildered in their own thoughts. everything with them turned into vanity. by their subtle reasonings some of them overshot and lost a truth which a man finds naturally and simply in himself without the help of philosophy. others, intoxicated by their passions, live in a perpetual avocation of thought. to perceive god in his works a man must, at least, consider them with attention. but passions cast such a mist before the eyes, not only of wild savages, but even of nations that seem to be most civilised and polite, that they do not so much as see the light that lights them. in this respect the egyptians, grecians, and romans were no less blind or less brutish than the rudest and most ignorant americans. like these, they lay, as it were, buried within sensible things without going up higher; and they cultivated their wit, only to tickle themselves with softer sensations, without observing from what spring they proceeded. in this manner the generality of men pass away their lives upon earth. say nothing to them, and they will think on nothing except what flatters either their brutish passions or vanity. their souls grow so heavy and unwieldy that they cannot raise their thoughts to any incorporeal object. whatever is not palpable and cannot be seen, tasted, heard, felt, or told, appears chimerical to them. this weakness of the soul, turning into unbelief, appears strength of mind to them; and their vanity glories in opposing what naturally strikes and affects the rest of mankind, just as if a monster prided in not being formed according to the common rules of nature, or as if one born blind boasted of his unbelief with respect to light and colours, which other men perceive and discern. sect. xcii. a prayer to god. o my god, if so many men do not discover thee in this great spectacle thou givest them of all nature, it is not because thou art far from any of us. every one of us feels thee, as it were, with his hand; but the senses, and the passions they raise, take up all the attention of our minds. thus, o lord, thy light shines in darkness; but darkness is so thick and gloomy that it does not admit the beams of thy light. thou appearest everywhere; and everywhere unattentive mortals neglect to perceive thee. all nature speaks of thee and resounds with thy holy name; but she speaks to deaf men, whose deafness proceeds from the noise and clutter they make to stun themselves. thou art near and within them; but they are fugitive, and wandering, as it were, out of themselves. they would find thee, o sweet light, o eternal beauty, ever old and ever young, o fountain of chaste delights, o pure and happy life of all who live truly, should they look for thee within themselves. but the impious lose thee only by losing themselves. alas! thy very gifts, which should show them the hand from whence they flow, amuse them to such a degree as to hinder them from perceiving it. they live by thee, and yet they live without thinking on thee; or, rather, they die by the fountain of life for want of quenching their drought in that vivifying stream; for what greater death can there be than not to know thee, o lord? they fall asleep in thy soft and paternal bosom, and, full of the deceitful dreams by which they are tossed in their sleep, they are insensible of the powerful hand that supports them. if thou wert a barren, impotent, and inanimate body, like a flower that fades away, a river that runs, a house that decays and falls to ruin, a picture that is but a collection of colours to strike the imagination, or a useless metal that glisters--they would perceive thee, and fondly ascribe to thee the power of giving them some pleasure, although in reality pleasure cannot proceed from inanimate beings, which are themselves void and incapable of it, but only from thee alone, the true spring of all joy. if therefore thou wert but a lumpish, frail, and inanimate being, a mass without any virtue or power, a shadow of a being, thy vain fantastic nature would busy their vanity, and be a proper object to entertain their mean and brutish thoughts. but because thou art too intimately within them, and they never at home, thou art to them an unknown god; for while they rove and wander abroad, the intimate part of themselves is most remote from their sight. the order and beauty thou scatterest over the face of thy creatures are like a glaring light that hides thee from and dazzles their sore eyes. thus the very light that should light them strikes them blind; and the rays of the sun themselves hinder them to see it. in fine, because thou art too elevated and too pure a truth to affect gross senses, men who are become like beasts cannot conceive thee, though man has daily convincing instances of wisdom and virtue without the testimony of any of his senses; for those virtues have neither sound, colour, odour, taste, figure, nor any sensible quality. why then, o my god, do men call thy existence, wisdom, and power more in question than they do those other things most real and manifest, the truth of which they suppose as certain, in all the serious affairs of life, and which nevertheless, as well as thou, escape our feeble senses? o misery! o dismal night that surrounds the children of adam! o monstrous stupidity! o confusion of the whole man! man has eyes only to see shadows, and truth appears a phantom to him. what is nothing, is all; and what is all, is nothing to him. what do i behold in all nature? god. god everywhere, and still god alone. when i think, o lord, that all being is in thee, thou exhaustest and swallowest up, o abyss of truth, all my thoughts. i know not what becomes of me. whatever is not thou, disappears; and scarce so much of myself remains wherewithal to find myself again. who sees thee not, never saw anything; and who is not sensible of thee, never was sensible of anything. he is as if he were not. his whole life is but a dream. arise, o lord, arise. let thy enemies melt like wax and vanish like smoke before thy face. how unhappy is the impious soul who, far from thee, is without god, without hope, without eternal comfort! how happy he who searches, sighs, and thirsts after thee! but fully happy he on whom are reflected the beams of thy countenance, whose tears thy hand has wiped off, and whose desires thy love has already completed. when will that time be, o lord? o fair day, without either cloud or end, of which thyself shalt be the sun, and wherein thou shalt run through my soul like a torrent of delight? upon this pleasing hope my bones shiver, and cry out:--"who is like thee, o lord? my heart melts and my flesh faints, o god of my soul, and my eternal wealth." the heavenly father. lectures on modern atheism. by ernest naville, corresponding member of the institute of france (academy of the moral and political sciences), late professor of philosophy in the university of geneva. translated from the french by henry downton, m.a., english chaplain at geneva. --"to this deplorable error i desire to oppose faith in god as it has been given to the world by the gospel--faith in the heavenly father." _author's letter to professor faraday_ (v. p. 193). boston: william v. spencer 1867. cambridge: press of john wilson and son. preface. these lectures, in their original form, were delivered at geneva, and afterwards at lausanne, before two auditories which together numbered about two thousand five hundred men. a swiss review published considerable portions of them, which had been taken down in short-hand, and on reading these portions, several persons, belonging to different countries, conceived the idea of translating the work when completed by the author, and corrected for publication. proof-sheets were accordingly sent to the translators as they came from the press: and thus this volume will appear pretty nearly at the same time in several of the languages of europe. the hearty kindness with which my fellow-countrymen received my words has been to me both a delight and an encouragement. the expressions of sympathy which have reached me from abroad allow me to hope that these pages, notwithstanding the deficiencies and imperfections of which i am keenly sensible, reflect some few of the rays of the truth which god has deposited on the earth, thereby to unite in the same faith and hope men of every tongue and every nation. ernest naville. geneva, _may, 1865_. note by the translator. the appearance of this translation so long after that of the original work is in contradiction to the foregoing statement of the author, that it would appear at nearly the same time with it. the delay has been due to causes beyond the translator's control--in part to the difficulty of revising the press at so great a distance from the place of publication, the translator being resident at geneva. this latter circumstance causes an exception in another particular as regards this translation, the proposal to translate the lectures having been made to the author, and kindly accepted by him, during the course of their delivery at geneva. the mere statement by the author of the numbers, large as they were, of those who formed the auditories, can give but a small idea of the enthusiasm with which they were received by the crowds which thronged to hear them, and which were composed of all classes of persons, from the most distinguished savant to the intelligent artisan. it is not to be expected that the lectures when read, even in the original, and still less in a translation, can produce the vivid impression which they made on those, who, with the translator, had the privilege of hearing them delivered,--the author having few rivals, on the continent or elsewhere, in the graces of polished eloquence; but the subjects treated are, it is to be feared, of increasing importance, not abroad only, but in england; and in fact one lecture, the fourth, is in a large measure occupied with forms of atheism which owe their chief support to english authors. in that lecture the author shows that the spiritual origin of man cannot "be put out of sight beneath details of physiology and researches of natural history," and that these not only "cannot settle," but "cannot so much as touch the question." the same lecture is occupied in part by a practical refutation of the prejudice against religion drawn from the irreligious character of many men of science. the author's subject has led him in the present work to confine his illustrations on this head to the question of natural religion: but the translator will avow that a main motive with him to undertake the labor of this translation has been the wish to prove, in the instance of the distinguished author himself, that men of incontestable eminence as metaphysical philosophers may hold and profess boldly their faith in doctrines, which many who affect to guide the religious opinions of our youth would teach them to despise as the heritage of narrow minds, and to cast away as incompatible with the highest intellectual cultivation. such doctrines are those of the fall and ruin of man by nature, the necessity for divine agency in his recovery, his need of propitiation by the sacrifice of the god-man--_l'homme-dieu_. these truths are explicitly stated by the author in his former course of lectures--_la vie eternelle_,[1] in which, while discoursing eloquently on that eternal life which is the portion of the righteous, he does not shrink from declaring his belief in its awful counterpart, the eternal condemnation of the wicked. "the offence of the cross" has not "ceased," and many finding that these are the opinions of this author, will perhaps lay down his book as unworthy of their attention: yet the editor, biographer, and expositor of the great french thinker, maine de biran, will not need introduction to the intellectual magnates of our own or of any country. the translator will be thankful, if some of those,--the youth more especially,--of his own country, who have been dazzled by the glare of false science, shall find in this work a help to the reassuring of their faith, while they learn in a fresh example that there are men quite competent to deal with the profoundest problems which can exercise our thoughts, who at the same time have come to a conviction,--compatible as they believe with principles of the clearest reason,--of the truth of those very doctrines which form the substance of evangelical christianity. in saying this, the translator is far from claiming the author as belonging to the same school of theology with himself: but differing with him on some important points, he has yet believed that this volume is calculated to be of much use in the present condition of religious thought in england, and in this hope and prayer he commends it to the blessing of him, whose being and attributes, as our god and father in jesus christ, are therein asserted and defended. geneva, _november, 1865_. footnote: [1] a translation of this work, by an english lady, has been published by mr. dalton, 28, cockspur street. contents. lecture i. page our idea of god 1 lecture ii. life without god 43 part i.--the individual 45 part ii.--society 72 lecture iii. the revival of atheism 117 lecture iv. nature 175 lecture v. humanity 245 lecture vi. the creator 297 lecture vii. the father 340 lecture i. _our idea of god._ (at geneva, 17th nov. 1863.--at lausanne, 11th jan. 1864.) gentlemen, some five-and-twenty or thirty years ago, a german writer published a piece of verse which began in this way: "our hearts are oppressed with the emotions of a pious sadness, at the thought of the ancient jehovah who is preparing to die." the verses were a dirge upon the death of the living god; and the author, like a well educated son of the nineteenth century, bestowed a few poetic tears upon the obsequies of the eternal. i was young when these strange words met my eyes, and they produced in me a kind of painful bewilderment, which has, i think, for ever engraven them in my memory. since then, i have had occasion to learn by many tokens that this fact was not at all an exceptional one, but that men of influence, famous schools, important tendencies of the modern mind, are agreed in proclaiming that the time of religion is over, of religion in all its forms, of religion in the largest sense of the word. beneath the social disturbances of the day, beneath the discussions of science, beneath the anxiety of some and the sadness of others, beneath the ironical and more or less insulting joy of a few, we read at the foundation of many intellectual manifestations of our time these gloomy words: "henceforth no more god for humanity!" what may well send a shudder of fright through society--more than threatening war, more than possible revolution, more than the plots which may be hatching in the dark against the security of persons or of property--is, the number, the importance, and the extent of the efforts which are making in our days to extinguish in men's souls their faith in the living god. this fear, gentlemen, i should wish to communicate to you, but i should wish also to confine it within its just limits. religion (i take this term in its most general acceptation) is not, as many say that it is, either dead or dying. i want no other proof of this than the pains which so many people are taking to kill it. it is often those who say that it is dead, or falling rapidly into dissolution, who apply themselves to this work. they are too generous, no doubt, to make a violent attack upon a corpse; and it is easy to understand, judging by the intensity of their exertions, that in their own opinion they have something else to do than to give a finishing stroke to the dying. present circumstances are serious, not for religion itself, which cannot be imperilled, but for minds which run the risk of losing their balance and their support. let it be observed, however, that when it is said that we are living in extraordinary times, that we are passing through an unequalled crisis, that the like of what we see was never seen before, and so on, we must always regard conclusions of this nature with distrust. our personal interest in the circumstances which immediately surround us produces on them for us the magnifying effect of a microscope: and our principal reason for thinking that our epoch is more extraordinary than others, is for the most part that we are living in our own epoch, and have not lived in others. a mind attentive to this fact, and so placed upon its guard against all tendency to exaggeration, will easily perceive that religious thought has in former times passed through shocks as profound and as dangerous as those of which we are witnesses. still the crisis is a real one. taking into account its extent in our days, we may say that it is new for the generation to which we belong; and it is worthy of close consideration. to-day, as an introduction to this grave subject, i should wish first to determine as precisely as possible what is our idea of god; to inquire next from what sources we derive it; and lastly to point out, as clearly as i may, the limits and the nature of the discussion to which i invite you. in asking what sense we must give to the word "god," i am not going to propose to you a metaphysical definition, or any system of my own: i am inquiring what is in fact the idea of god in the bosom of modern society, in the souls which live by this idea, in the hearts of which it constitutes the joy, in the consciences of which it is the support. when our thoughts rise above nature and humanity to that invisible being whom we speak of as god, what is it which passes in our souls? they fear, they hope, they pray, they offer thanksgiving. if a man finds himself in one of those desperate positions in which all human help fails, he turns towards heaven, and says, my god! if we are witnesses of one of those instances of revolting injustice which stir the conscience in its profoundest depths, and which could not on earth meet with adequate punishment, we think within ourselves,--there is a judge on high! if we are reproved by our own conscience, the voice of that conscience, which disturbs and sometimes torments us, reminds us that though we may be shut out from all human view, there is no less an eye which sees us, and a just award awaiting us. thus it is (i am seeking to establish facts) that the thought of god operates, so to speak, in the souls of those who believe in him. if you look for the meaning common to all these manifestations of man's heart, what do you find? fear, hope, thanksgiving, prayer. to whom is all this addressed? to a power intelligent and free, which knows us, and is able to act upon our destinies. this is the idea which is found at the basis of all religions; not only of the religion of the only god, but of the most degraded forms of idolatrous worship. all religion rests upon the sentiment of one or more invisible powers, superior to nature and to humanity. when philosophical curiosity is awakened, it disengages from the general sentiment of power the definite idea of the cause which becomes the explanation of the phenomena. the reason of man, by virtue of its very constitution, finds a need of conceiving of an absolute cause which escapes by its eternity the lapse of time, and by its infinite character the bounds of limited existences; a principle, the necessary being of which depends on no other; in a word a unique cause, establishing by its unity the universal harmony. so, when reason meets with the idea of the sole and almighty creator, it attaches itself to it as the only thought which accounts to it for the world and for itself. the creator is, first of all, he whose glory the heavens declare, while the earth makes known the work of his hands. he is the mighty one and the wise, whose will has given being to nature, and who directs at once the chorus of stars in the depths of the heavens, and the drop of vital moisture in the herb which we tread under foot. if, after having looked around, we turn our regard in upon ourselves, we then discover other heavens, spiritual heavens, in which shine, like stars of the first magnitude, those objects which cause the heart of man to beat, so long as he is not self-degraded: truth, goodness, beauty. now we feel that we are made for this higher world. material enjoyments may enchain our will; we may, in the indulgence of unworthy passions, pursue what in its essence is only evil, error, and deformity; but, if all the rays of our true nature are not extinguished, a voice issues from the depth of our souls and protests against our debasement. our aspirations toward these spiritual excellences are unlimited. our thought sets out on its course: have we solved one question? immediately new questions arise, which press, no less than the former, for an answer. our conscience speaks: have we come in a certain degree to realize what is right and good? immediately conscience demands of us still more. is our feeling for beauty awakened? well, sirs, when an artist is satisfied with the work of his hands, do you not know at once what to think of him? do you not know that that man will never do any thing great, who does not see shining in his horizon an ideal which stamps as imperfect all that he has been able to realize? the voice which urges us on through life from the cradle to the grave, and which, without allowing us a moment's pause, is ever crying--forward! forward! this voice is not more imperious than the noble instinct which, in the view of beauty, of truth, of good, is also saying to us--forward! forward! and, with the american poet, _excelsior!_ higher, ever higher! many of you know that instinct familiar to the _climbers of the alps_,[2] as they are called, who, arrived at one summit, have no rest so long as there remains a loftier height in view. such is our destiny; but the last peak is veiled in shining clouds which conceal it from our sight. perfection,--this is the point to which our nature aspires; but it is the ladder of jacob: we see the foot which rests upon the earth; the summit hides itself from our feeble view amidst the splendors of the infinite. these objects of our highest desires--beauty in its supreme manifestation, absolute holiness, infinite truth--are united in one and the same thought--god! the attributes of the spiritual are never in us but as borrowed attributes; they dwell naturally in him who is their source. god is the truth, not only because he knows all things, but because he is the very object of our thoughts; because, when we study the universe, we do but spell out some few of the laws which he has imposed on things; because, to know truth is never any thing else than to know the creation or the creator, the world or its eternal cause. god it is who must be himself the satisfaction of that craving of the conscience which urges us towards holiness. if we had arrived at the highest degree of virtue, what should we have done? we should have realized the plan which he has proposed to spiritual creatures in their freedom, at the same time that he is directing the stars in their courses by that other word which they accomplish without having heard it. god is the eternal source of beauty. he it is who has shed grace upon our valleys, and majesty upon our mountains; and he, again, it is (i quote st. augustine) who acts within the souls of artists, those great artists, who, urged unceasingly towards the regions of the ideal, feel themselves drawn onwards towards a divine world. god then above all is he who _is_,--the absolute, the infinite, the eternal,--in the ever mysterious depths of his own essence. in his relation to the world, he is the cause; in his relation to the lofty aspirations of the soul, he is the ideal. he is the ideal, because being the absolute cause, he is the unique source, at the same time that he is the object, of our aspirations: he is the absolute cause, because being he who _is_, in his supreme unity, nothing could have existence except by the act of his power. we are able already to recognize here, in passing, the source at which are fed the most serious aberrations of religious thought. are truth, holiness, beauty considered separately from the real and infinite spirit in which is found their reason for existing? we see thus appear philosophies noble in their commencement, but which soon descend a fatal slope. the divine, so-called, is spoken of still; but the divine is an abstraction, and apart from god has no real existence. if truth, beauty, holiness are not the attributes of an eternal mind, but the simple expression of the tendencies of our soul, man may render at first a sort of worship to these lofty manifestations of his own nature; but logic, inexorable logic, forces him soon to dismiss the divine to the region of chimeras. these rays are extinguished together with their luminous centre; the soul loses the secret of its destinies, and, in the measureless grief which possesses it, it proclaims at length that all is vanity. we shall have, in the sequel, to be witnesses together of this sorrowful spectacle. such is the basis of our idea of god: we must now discover its summit. before the thought of this sovereign being, by whose will are all things, and who is without cause and without beginning, our soul is overwhelmed. we are so feeble! the thought of absolute power crushes us. creatures of a day, how should we understand the eternal? frail as we are, and evil, we tremble at the idea of holiness. but milder accents, as you know, have been heard upon the earth: this sovereign god--he loves us. in proportion as this idea gains possession of our understanding, in the same proportion our soul has glimpses of the paths of peace. he loves us, and we take courage. he hears us, and prayer rises to him with the hope of being heard. he governs all, and we confide in his providence. when your gaze is directed towards the depths of the sky, does it never happen to you to remain in a manner terrified, as you contemplate those worlds which without end are added to other worlds? as you fix your thoughts upon the immeasurable abysses of the firmament,--as you say to yourselves that how far soever you put back the boundary of the skies, if the universe ended there, then the universe, with its suns and its groups of stars, would still be but a solitary lamp, shining as a point in the midst of the limitless darkness,--have you never experienced a sort of mysterious fright and giddiness? at such a time turn your eyes upon nearer objects. he who has made the heavens with their immensity, is he who makes the corn to spring forth for your sustenance, who clothes the fields with the flowers which rejoice your sight, who gives you the fresh breath of morning, and the calm of a lovely evening: it is he, without whose permission nothing occurs, who watches over you and over those you love. possess yourselves thoroughly with this thought of love, then lift once more your eyes to the sky, and from every star, and from the worlds which are lost in the furthest depths of space, shall fall upon your brow, no longer clouded, a ray of love and of peace. then with a feeling of sweet affiance you will adopt as your own those words of an ancient prophet: "whither shall i go from thy spirit, or whither shall i flee from thy presence? if i ascend up into heaven, thou art there: if i make my bed in hell, behold, thou art there. if i take the wings of the morning, and dwell in the uttermost parts of the sea; even there shall thy hand lead me, and thy right hand shall hold me:"[3] then you will understand those grand and sweet words of saint augustine, some of the most beautiful that ever fell from the lips of a man: "are you afraid of god? run to his arms!" thus our idea of god is completed,--the idea of him whom, in a feeling of filial confidence, we name the father, and whom we call the _heavenly_ father, while we adore that absolute holiness, of which the pure brightness of the firmament is for us the visible and magnificent symbol. goodness is the secret of the universe; goodness it is which has directed power, and placed wisdom at its service. my object is not to teach this idea, but to defend it: it is not, i say, to teach it, for we all possess it. there is no one here who has not received his portion of the sacred deposit. this sacred idea may be veiled by our sorrows, perverted by our errors, obscured by our faults; but, however thick be the layer of ashes heaped together in the depth of our souls--look closely: the sacred spark is not extinguished, and a favorable breath may still rekindle the flame. we have considered the essential elements of which our idea of god is composed. and whence comes this idea? what is its historical origin? i do not ask what is the historical origin of religion, for religion does not take its rise in history; it is met with everywhere and always in humanity. those who deny this are compelled to "search in the darkness for some obscure example known only to themselves, as if all natural inclinations were destroyed by the corruption of a people, and as if, as soon as there are any monsters, the species were no longer any thing."[4] the consciousness of a world superior to the domain of experience is one of the attributes characteristic of our nature. "if there had ever been, or if there still anywhere existed, a people entirely destitute of religion, it would be in consequence of an exceptional downfall which would be tantamount to a lapse into animality."[5] i am not therefore inquiring after the origin of the idea and sentiment of the deity, in a general sense, but after the origin of the idea of the only and almighty creator as we possess it. in fact, if religion is universal, distinct knowledge of the creator is not so. our own past strikes its roots into the historic soil which, in the matter of creeds, is known by the name of paganism or idolatry. at first sight what do we find in the opinions of that ancient world? no trace of the divine unity. adoration is dispersed over a thousand different beings. not only are the heavenly bodies adored and the powers of nature, but men, animals, and inanimate objects. the feeling of the holiness of god is not less wanting, it would seem, than the idea of his unity. religion serves as a pretext for the unchaining of human passions. this is the case unfortunately with religion in general, and the true religion is no exception to the rule: but what characterizes paganism is that in its case religion, by its own proper nature, favors the development of immorality. celebrated shrines become the dens of a prostitution which forms part of the homage rendered to the gods; the religious rites of ancient asia, and those of greece which fell under their influence, are notorious for their lewdness. the temples of false deities, too often defiled by debauchery, are too often also dishonored by frightful sacrifices. the ancient civilization of mexico was elegant and even refined in some respects; but the altars were stained, every year, with the blood of thousands of human beings; and the votaries of this sanguinary worship devoured, in solemn banquets, the quivering limbs of the victims. let us not look for examples too far removed from the civilization which has produced our own. in the greek and roman world, the stories of the gods were not very edifying, as every one knows: the worship of bacchus gave no encouragement to temperance, and the festivals of venus were not a school of chastity. it would be easy, by bringing together facts of this sort, to form a picture full of sombre coloring, and to conclude that our idea of god, the idea of the only and holy god, does not proceed from the impure sources of idolatry. the proceeding would be brief and convenient; but such an estimation of the facts, false because incomplete, would destroy the value of the conclusion. in pagan antiquity, in fact, the abominations of which i have just reminded you did not by themselves make up religious tradition. side by side with a current of darkness and impurity, we meet with a current of pure ideas and of strong gleams of the day. almost all the pagans seem to have had a glimpse of the divine unity over the multiplicity of their idols, and of the rays of the divine holiness across the saturnalia of their olympi. it was a greek who wrote these words: "nothing is accomplished on the earth without thee, o god, save the deeds which the wicked perpetrate in their folly."[6] it was in a theatre at athens that the chorus of a tragedy sang, more than two thousand years ago: "may destiny aid me to preserve unsullied the purity of my words and of all my actions, according to those sublime laws which, brought forth in the celestial heights, have heaven alone for their father, to which the race of mortal men did not give birth, and which oblivion shall never entomb. in them is a supreme god, and one who waxes not old."[7] it would be easy to multiply quotations of this order, and to show you in the documents of grecian and roman civilization numerous traces of the knowledge of the only and holy god. listen now to a voice which has come forth actually from the recesses of the sepulchre: it reaches us from ancient egypt. in egypt, as you know, the degradation of the religious idea was in popular practice complete. but, under the confused accents of superstition, the science of our age is succeeding in catching from afar the vibrations of a sublime utterance. in the coffins of a large number of mummies have been discovered rolls of papyrus containing a sacred text which is called the _book of the dead_. here is the translation of some fragments which appear to date from a very remote epoch. it is god who speaks: "i am the most holy, the creator of all that replenishes the earth, and of the earth itself, the habitation of mortals. i am the prince of the infinite ages. i am the great and mighty god, the most high, shining in the midst of the careering stars and of the armies which praise me above thy head.... it is i who chastise and who judge the evil-doers, and the persecutors of godly men. i discover and confound the liars.... i am the all-seeing judge and avenger ... the guardian of my laws in the land of righteousness."[8] these words are found mingled, in the text from which i extract them, with allusions to inferior deities; and it must be acknowledged that the translation of the ancient documents of egypt is still uncertain enough. still this uncertainty does not appear to extend to the general sense and bearing of the recent discoveries of our savants. myself a simple learner from the masters of the science, i can only point out to you the result of their studies. now, this is what the masters tell us as to the actual state of mythological studies. traces are found almost everywhere, in the midst of idolatrous superstitions, of a religion comparatively pure, and often stamped with a lofty morality. paganism is not a simple fact: it offers to view in the same bed two currents, the one pure and the other impure. what is the relation between these two currents? a passage in a writer of the latin church throws a vivid light upon their actual relation in practical life. it is thus that lactantius expresses himself: "when man (the pagan) finds himself in adversity, then it is that he has recourse to god (to the only god). if the horrors of war threaten him, if there appear a contagious disease, a drought, a tempest, then he has recourse to god.... if he is overtaken by a storm at sea, and is in danger of perishing, immediately he calls upon god; if he finds himself in any urgent peril, he has recourse to god.... thus men bethink themselves of god when they are in trouble; but as soon as the danger is past, and they are no longer in any fear, we see them return with joy to the temples of the false gods, make to them libations, and offer sacrifices to them."[9] this is a striking picture of the workings of man's heart in all ages; for, as our author observes, "god is never so much forgotten of men as when they are quietly enjoying the favors and blessings which he sends them."[10] as regards our special object, this page reveals in a very instructive manner the religious condition of heathen antiquity. the thought of the sovereign god was stifled without being extinguished; it awoke beneath the pressure of anguish; but ordinary life, the life of every day, belonged to the easy worship of idols. it may now be asked what is the historical relation between the two currents of paganism of which we have just established the actual relation in practical life. did humanity begin with a coarse fetichism, and thence rise by slow degrees to higher conceptions? do the traces of a comparatively pure monotheism first show themselves in the most recent periods of idolatry? contemporary science inclines more and more to answer in the negative. it is in the most ancient historical ground (allow me these geological terms) that the laborious investigators of the past meet with the most elevated ideas of religion. cut to the ground a young and vigorous beech-tree, and come back a few years afterwards: in place of the tree cut down you will find coppice-wood; the sap which nourished a single trunk has been divided amongst a multitude of shoots. this comparison expresses well enough the opinion which tends to prevail amongst our savants on the subject of the historical development of religions. the idea of the only god is at the root,--it is primitive; polytheism is derivative. a forgotten, and as it were slumbering, monotheism exists beneath the worship of idols; it is the concealed trunk which supports them, but the idols have absorbed all the sap. the ancient god (allow me once more a comparison) is like a sovereign confined in the interior of his palace: he is but seldom thought of, and only on great occasions; his ministers alone act, entertain requests, and receive the real homage. the proposition of the historical priority of monotheism is very important, and is not universally admitted. it will therefore be necessary to show you, by a few quotations at least, that i am not speaking rashly. one of the most accredited mythologists of our time, professor grimm, of berlin, writes as follows: "the monotheistic form appears to be the more ancient, and that out of which antiquity in its infancy formed polytheism.... all mythologies lead us to this conclusion."[11] among the french savants devoted to the study of ancient egypt, the vicomte de rongã© stands in the foremost rank. this is what he tells us: "in egypt the supreme god was called the one god, living indeed, he who made all that exists, who created other beings. he is the generator existing alone who made the heaven and created the earth." the writer informs us that these ideas are often found reproduced "in writings the date of which is anterior to moses, and many of which formed part of the most ancient sacred hymns;" then he comes to this conclusion: "egypt, in possession of an admirable fund of doctrines respecting the essence of god, and the immortality of the soul, did not for all that defile herself the less by the most degrading superstitions; we have in her, sufficiently summed up, the religious history of all antiquity."[12] as regards the civilization which flourished in india, m. adolphe pictet, in his learned researches on the subject of the primitive aryas, arrives, in what concerns the religious idea, at the following conclusion: "to sum up: primitive monotheism of a character more or less vague, passing gradually into a polytheism still simple, such appears to have been the religion of the ancient aryas."[13] one of our fellow-countrymen, who cultivates with equal modesty and perseverance the study of religious antiquities, has procured the greater part of the recent works published on these subjects in france, germany, and england. he has read them, pen in hand, and, at my urgent request, he has kindly allowed me to look over his notes which have been long accumulating. i find the following sentence in the manuscripts which he has shown me: "the general impression of all the most distinguished mythologists of the present day is, that monotheism is at the foundation of all pagan mythology." the savants, i repeat, do not unanimously accept these conclusions: savants, like other men, are rarely unanimous. it is enough for my purpose to have shown that it is not merely the grand tradition guaranteed by the christian faith, but also the most distinctly marked current of contemporary science, which tells us that god shone upon the cradle of our species. the august form was veiled, and idolatry with its train of shameful rites shows itself in history as the result of a fall which calls for a restoration, rather than as the point of departure of a continued progress. the august form was veiled. who has lifted the veil? not the priests of the idols. we meet in the history of paganism with movements of reformation, or, at the very least, of religious transformation: buddhism is a memorable example of this; but it is not a return towards the pure traditions of india or of egypt which has caused us to know the god whom we adore. has the veil been lifted by reflection, that is to say by the labors of philosophers? philosophy has rendered splendid services to the world. it has combated the abominations of idolatry; it has recognized in nature the proofs of an intelligent design; it has discerned in the reason the deeply felt need of unity; it has indicated in the conscience the sense of good, and shown its characteristics; it has contemplated the radiant image of the supreme beauty--still it is not philosophy which has restored for humanity the idea of god. its lights mingled with darkness remained widely scattered, and without any focus powerful enough to give them strength for enlightening the world. to seek god, and consequently to know him already in a certain measure; but to remain always before the altar of a god glimpsed only by an _ã©lite_ of sages, and continuing for the multitudes the unknown god: such was the wisdom of the ancients. it prepared the soil; but it did not deposit in it the germ from which the idea of the creator was to spring forth living and strong, to overshadow with its branches all the nations of the earth. and when this idea appeared in all its splendor, and began the conquest of the universe, the ancient philosophy, which had separated itself from heathen forms of worship, and had covered them with its contempt, contracted an alliance with its old adversaries. it accepted the wildest interpretations of the common superstitions, in order to be able to league itself with the crowd in one and the same conflict with the new power which had just appeared in the world. and this sums up in brief compass the whole history of philosophy in the first period of our era. the monotheism of the moderns does not proceed historically from paganism; it was prepared by the ancient philosophy, without being produced by it. whence comes it then? on this head there exists no serious difference of opinion. our knowledge of god is the result of a traditional idea, handed down from generation to generation in a well-defined current of history. much obscurity still rests upon man's earliest religious history, but the truth which i am pointing out to you is solidly and clearly established. pass, in thought, over the terrestrial globe. all the superstitions of which history preserves the remembrance are practised at this day, either in asia or in africa, or in the isles of the ocean. the most ridiculous and ferocious rites are practised still in the light of the same sun which gilds, as he sets, the spires and domes of our churches. at this very day, there are nations upon the earth which prostrate themselves before animals, or which adore sacred trees. at this very day, perhaps at this hour in which i am addressing you, human victims are bound by the priests of idols; before you have left this room, their blood will have defiled the altars of false deities. at this very day, numerous nations, which have neither wanted time for self-development, nor any of the resources of civilization, nor clever poets, nor profound philosophers, belong to the religion of the brahmins, or are instructed in the legends which serve as a mask to the pernicious doctrines of buddha. where do we meet with the clear idea of the creator? in a unique tradition which proceeds from the jews, which christians have diffused, and which mahomet corrupted. god is known, with that solid and general knowledge which founds a settled doctrine and a form of worship, under the influence of this tradition and nowhere else. we assert this as a simple fact of contemporary history; and there is scarcely any fact in history better established. the light comes to us from the gospel. this light did not appear as a sudden and absolutely new illumination. it had cast pale gleams on the soul of the heathen in their search after the unknown god; it had shone apart upon that strange and glorious people which bears the name of israel. israel had preserved the primitive light encompassed by temporary safe-guards. it was the flame of a lamp, too feeble to live in the open air, and which remained shut up in a vase, until the moment when it should have become strong enough to shine forth from its shattered envelope upon the world. the worship of jehovah is a local worship; but this worship, localized for a time, is addressed to the only and sovereign god. to every nation which says to israel as athaliah to joash: i have my god to serve--serve thou thine own,[14] israel replies with joash: nay, madam, but my god is god alone; him must thou fear: thy god is nought--a dream![15] israel does not affirm merely that the god of israel is the only true god, but affirms moreover that the time will come when all the earth will acknowledge him for the only and universal lord. a grand thought, a grand hope, is in the soul of this people, and assures it that all nations shall one day look to jerusalem. its prophets threaten, warn, denounce chastisements, predict terrible catastrophes; but in the midst of their severer utterances breaks forth ever and again the song of future triumph: uplift, jerusalem, thy queenly brow: light of the nations, and their glory, thou![16] thus is preserved in the ancient world the knowledge of god amongst an exceptional people, amidst the darkness of idolatry and the glimmerings of an imperfect wisdom. and not only is it preserved, but it shines with a brightness more and more vivid and pure. the conception of sovereignty which constitutes its foundation, is crowned as it advances by the conception of love. at length he appears by whom the universal father was to be known of all. have you not remarked the surprising simplicity with which jesus speaks of his work? he speaks of the universe and of the future as a lawful proprietor speaks of his property. the field in which the word shall be sown is the world. he introduces that worship in spirit and in truth before which all barriers shall fall. he knows that humanity belongs to him; and when he foretells his peaceful conquest, one knows not which predominates in his words, simplicity or grandeur. now this predicted work has been done, is being done, and will be done. no one entertains any serious doubt of this. the idea of god, as it exists amongst christian peoples, bears on its brow the certain sign of victory. in many respects, we are passing through the world in times which are not extraordinary, and among things little worthy of lasting record. still great events are being accomplished before our eyes. the ancient east is shaken to its foundations. the work of foreign missions is taken up again with fresh energy. ships, as they leave the shores of europe, carry with them,--together with those who travel for purposes of commerce, or from curiosity, or as soldiers,--those new crusaders who exclaim: god wills it! and are ready to march to their death in order to proclaim the god of life to nations plunged in darkness. the advances of industry, the developments of commerce, the calculations of ambition, all conspire to diffuse spiritual light over the globe. these are noble spectacles, revealing clearly the traces of a superior design, which the mighty of this world are accomplishing, even by the craft and violence of their policy: they are the manifest instruments of a will to which oftentimes they are insensible. the knowledge of god is extending; and while it is extending, it is enriching itself with its own conquests. just as it absorbed the living sap of the doctrines of the greeks, so it is strengthening itself with the doctrines of the ancient east and of old egypt, which an indefatigable science is bringing again to light. christian thought is growing, not by receiving any foreign impulse from without, but like a vigorous tree, whose roots traverse new layers of a fertile soil. all truth comes naturally to the centre of truth as to its rallying-point; and to the universal prayer must be gathered all the pure accents gone astray in the superstitious invocations which rise from the banks of the ganges or from the burning regions of africa. the day will come, when our planet, in its revolutions about the sun, shall receive on no point of its surface the rays of the orb of day, without sending back, over the ruins of idol-temples for ever overthrown, a song of thanksgiving to the god of abraham, isaac, and jacob, become through jesus christ the god of all mankind. we know now whence comes our idea of god: it is christian in its origin. it proceeds from this source, not only for those who call themselves christians, but for all those who, in the bosom of modern society, believe sincerely and seriously in god. but little study and reflection is required for the acknowledgment that the doctrines of our deists are the product of a reason which has been _evangelized_ without their own knowledge. they have not invented, but have received the thought, which constitutes the support of their life. a mind of ordinary cultivation is free henceforward from all danger of falling into the artless error of j.j. rousseau, when he pretended that even though he had been born in a desert island and had never known a human being, he would have been able to draw up the confession of faith of the _vicaire savoyard_. the habit of historical research has dispelled these illusions. a french writer, distinguished for solid erudition, wrote not long ago: "the civilized world has received from judea the foundations of its faith. it has learned of it these two things which pagan antiquity never knew--holiness and charity; for all holiness is derived from belief in a personal, spiritual god, creator of the universe; and all charity from the doctrine of human brotherhood!"[17] religion, in its most general sense, is found wherever there are men; but distinct knowledge of the heavenly father is the fruit of that word which comes to us from the borders of the jordan,--a word in which all the true elements of ancient wisdom are found to have mutually drawn together, and strengthened each other. in the very heart of our civilization, those men of mind who succeed in freeing themselves in good earnest from the influence of this word come, oftener than not, to throw off all belief in the real and true god, if they have strength of mind enough properly to understand themselves. how is it that the full idea of the creator,--an idea which true philosophers have sought after in all periods of history, and of which they have had, so to speak, glimpses and presentiments,--how is it that this idea is a living one only under the influence of the tradition which, proceeding originally from abraham and moses, has been continued by jesus christ? it is not impossible to point out the spiritual causes of this great historical phenomenon. faith in god, in order to maintain itself in presence of the difficulties which rise in our minds, and--to come at once to the core of the question--the idea of the love of god, in order to maintain itself in presence of evil and of the power of evil on the earth, has need of resources which the christian belief alone possesses. the knowledge of the heavenly father is essentially connected with the gospel: this is the historical fact. this fact is accounted for by the existence of an organic bond between all the great christian doctrines: this is my deliberate conviction. i frankly declare here my own opinions: to do so is for me a matter almost of honor and good faith; but i declare them, without desiring to lay any stress upon them in these lectures. my present object is to consider the idea of god by itself. i isolate it for my own purposes from christian truth taken as a whole, but without making the separation in my thoughts. the thesis which i propose to maintain is common to all christians, that is quite clear; but further; in a perfectly general sense, and in a merely abstract point of view, it is a proposition maintained equally by the disciples of mahomet; it is maintained by j.j. rousseau and the spiritualist philosophers who reproduce his thoughts. it is clear in fact that just as jesus christ is the corner-stone of all christian doctrine, so god is the foundation common to all religions. before concluding this lecture i desire to answer a question which may have suggested itself to some amongst you. what are we about when we take up a christian idea in order to defend it by reasoning? are we occupied about religion or philosophy? are we treading upon the ground of faith, or on the ground of reason? are we in the domain of tradition, or in that of free inquiry? i have no great love, gentlemen, for hedges and enclosures. i know very well, better, perhaps, than many amongst you, because i have longer reflected on the subject, what are the differences which separate studies specially religious, from philosophical inquiries. but when the question relates to god, to the universal cause, we find ourselves at the common root of religion and philosophy, and distinctions, which exist elsewhere, disappear. besides, these distinctions are never so absolute as they are thought to be. you will understand this if you pay attention to these two considerations: there is no such thing as pure thought disengaged from every traditional element: there is no such thing as tradition received in a manner purely passive, and disengaged from all exercise of the reflective faculties. you think you are employed about philosophy when you shut yourself up in your own individual thoughts. a mistake! the most powerful genius of modern times failed in this enterprise. descartes conceived the project of forgetting all that he had known, and of producing a system of doctrine which should come forth from his brain as minerva sprang all armed from the brain of jupiter. now-a-days a mere schoolboy, if he has been well taught, ought to be able to prove that descartes was mistaken, because the current of tradition entered his mind together with the words of the language. it is not so easy as we may suppose to break the ties by which god has bound us all together in mutual dependence. man speaks, he only thinks by means of speech, and speech is a river which takes its rise in the very beginnings of history, and brings down to the existing generation the tribute of all the waters of the past. no one can isolate himself from the current, and place himself outside the intellectual society of his fellows. we have more light than we had on this subject, and the attempt of descartes, which was of old the happy audacity of genius, could in our days be nothing but the foolish presumption of ignorance. as for the purely passive reception of tradition, this may be conceived when only unimportant legends are in question, or doctrines which occupy the mind only as matters of curiosity; but when life is at stake, and the interests of our whole existence, the mind labors upon the ideas which it receives. religion is only living in any soul when all the faculties have come into exercise; and faith, by its own proper nature, seeks to understand. the distinction between traditional data therefore and pure philosophy is far from being so real or so extensive as it is commonly thought to be. but for lack of time, i might undertake to prove to you more at length that the labor of individual thought upon the common tradition is the absolute and permanent law of development for the human mind. we have to steer between two extreme and contrary pretensions. what shall we say to those theologians who deny all power to man's reason, and consider the understanding as a receiver which does nothing but receive the liquid which is poured into it? to those theologians who, not content with despising aristotle and plato, think themselves obliged to vilify socrates and calumniate regulus? we will tell them that they depart from the grand christian tradition, of which they believe themselves _par excellence_ the representatives. we will add that they outrage their master by seeming to believe that in order to exalt him it is necessary to calumniate humanity. again, what shall we say to those philosophers, who do not wish for truth except when they have succeeded in educing it by themselves? to those philosophers who draw a little circle about their own personal thought, and say: if truth discovers itself outside this circle we have no wish to see it; and who boast that they only are free, because they have abandoned the common beliefs? we will tell them that they are deceiving themselves by taking for their own personal thought the _dã©bris_ of the tradition of the human race. we will add that their pretended independence is a veritable slavery. a strange sort of liberty that, which should forbid those who affect it to accept a faith which appeared to them to be true, because they were not the inventors of it. listen to this wise reflection of a contemporary writer: "philosophy allows us to range ourselves on the side of platonism: why should it not also allow us to range ourselves on the side of the christian faith, if there it is that we find wisdom and immutable truth? the choice ought to seem as free and as worthy of respect on the one side as on the other; and philosophy which claims liberty for itself, is least of all warranted in refusing it to others."[18] to be free, is to look for truth wherever it may be found, and it is to obey truth wherever we meet with it. when the question therefore relates to god, or to the soul and its eternal destinies,--to the man who asks me, are you occupied with religion or philosophy? i have only one answer to give: i am a man, and i am seeking truth. a final consideration will perhaps put these thoughts in a more striking light. if you think the most important of the discussions of our day to be that between natural and revealed religion, between deism and the gospel, you have not well discerned the signs of the times. the fundamental discussion is now between men who believe in god, in the soul, and in truth, and men, who, denying truth, deny at the same time the soul and god. when these high problems are in question, periodicals and other publications, which have the widest circulation, and which gain admission into every household, bring us too often the works of writers without convictions, eager to spread amongst others the doubt which has devoured their own beliefs. they have received entire, and without losing an obole of it, the heritage of the greek sophists. they involve in fact in the same proscription socrates and jesus christ, paul of tarsus and plato of athens: they have no more respect for the opinions of descartes and leibnitz than for those of pascal and bossuet. the great question of the day is to know whether our desire of truth is a chimã¦ra; whether our effort to reach the divine world is a spring into the empty void. when the question relates to god, inasmuch as he is the basis of reason no less than the object of faith, all the barriers which exist elsewhere disappear: to defend faith is to defend reason; to defend reason is to defend faith. the unbridled audacity of those who deny fundamental truths is bringing ancient adversaries, for a moment at least, to fight beneath the same flag. what they would rob us of, is not merely this or that article of a definite creed, but all faith whatever in divine providence, every hope which goes beyond the tomb, every look directed towards a world superior to our present destinies. but take courage. this flame lighted on the earth, and which is evermore directed towards heaven, has passed safely through rougher storms than those which now threaten it; it has shone brightly in thicker darkness than that in which men are laboring so hard to enshroud it. it is not going to be extinguished, be very sure, before the affected indifference of a few wits of our day, and the haughty disdain of a few contemporary journalists. in a word, gentlemen,--to take the idea of god as it has been handed down to us, and to study its relation to the reason, the heart, and the conscience of man,--this is my proposed method of proceeding. to show you that this idea is truth, because it satisfies the conscience, the heart, and the reason--this is the object i have in view. of this object i am sure you feel the importance: nevertheless, and that we may be more alive to it still, i propose to you to sound with me the abysses of sorrow and darkness which are involved in those terrible words--"without god in the world." footnotes: [2] aux _grimpeurs des alpes_. [3] psalm cxxxix. 7-10. [4] j.j. rousseau. [5] _les origines indo-europã©ennes_, by adolphe pictet, ii. 651. [6] cleanthes, _hymn to jupiter_. [7] sophocles, _oedipus r._ [8] _handbuch der gesammten ã¤gyptischen alterthumskunde_, von dr. max uhlemann. leipzig, 1857. [9] _institutions divines_, ii. 1. [10] id. [11] _deutsche mythol._ third edition, page lxiv. [12] _annales de philosophie chrã©tienne_, t. 59, p. 228._r_. [13] _les origines indo-europã©ennes_, ii. 720. [14] j'ai mon dieu que je sers, vous servirez le vã´tre. [15] il faut craindre le mien; lui seul est dieu, madame, et le vã´tre n'est rien. [16] lã¨ve, jã©rusalem, lã¨ve ta tãªte altiã¨re! les peuples ã  l'envi marchent ã  ta lumiã¨re. [17] _etudes orientales_, par adolphe franck, p. 427. [18] barthã©lemy st. hilaire, in the _sã©ances et travaux de l'acadã©mie des sciences morales et politiques_, lxx., p. 134. lecture ii. _life without god._ (at geneva, 20th nov. 1863.--at lausanne, 13th jan. 1864.) gentlemen, i propose to examine to-day what are the consequences for human life of the total suppression of the idea of god. this suppression is the result of atheism properly so called: it is also the result of scepticism raised into a system. the soul which doubts, but which seeks, regrets, hopes, is not wholly separated from god. it gives him a large share in its life, inasmuch as the desire which it feels to meet with him, and the sadness which it experiences at not contemplating him in a full light, become the principal facts of its existence. but doubt adopted as a doctrine realizes in its own way, equally with atheism properly so called, life without god, the mournful subject of our present study. having god, the spiritual life has a firm base and an invincible hope. the vapors of earth may indeed for a moment obscure the sky. one while fogs hang about the ground; another while clouds send forth the thunder-bolt; but, above the regions of darkness and of tempest, the eye of faith contemplates the eternal azure in its unchanging calm. life has its sorrows for all; but it is not only endurable, it is blessed, when in view of the instability of all things, in view of evil, of injustice, and of suffering, there can breathe from the depths of the soul to the eternal, the holy one, the comforter, those words of patience in life and of joy in death: _my god!_ take god away, and life is decapitated. even this comparison is not sufficient; life, rather, becomes like to a man who should have lost at once both his head and his heart. the immense subject which opens before us falls into an easy and natural division: we will fix our attention successively upon the individual and upon society. part i. _the individual._ man thinks, he feels, and he wills: these are the three great functions of the spiritual life. let us inquire what, without god, would become, first, of thought, which is the instrument of all knowledge; next; of the conscience, which is the law of the will; then of the heart, which is the organ of the feelings. we will begin with thought. let us go back to the origin of modern philosophy. the labors of descartes will make us acquainted, under the form clearest for us, with a current of lofty thoughts which does honor to ancient civilization, and which has come down to us through the writings of plato and st. augustine. we have seen that descartes deceived himself, when he thought to separate himself altogether from tradition, and forgot the while how intimately men's minds are bound together in a common possession of truth. he was mistaken, because he confounded the idea, natural to the human mind, of an infinite reason, with the full idea of the creator; so attributing to the efforts of his own philosophy that gift of truth which he had received from the christian tradition. but, having so far recognized his error, listen now to this great man, and judge if he were again mistaken in those thoughts of his which i am about to reproduce to you. descartes strives hard to doubt of all things, persuaded that truth will resist his efforts, and come forth triumphant from the trial. he doubts of what he has heard in the schools: his masters may have led him into error. he doubts of the evidence of his senses: his senses deceive him in the visions of the night; what if he were always dreaming, and if his waking hours were but another sleep with other dreams! he will doubt even of the certainty of reason: what if the reason were a warped and broken instrument? reason is only worth what its cause may be worth. if man is the child of chance, his thoughts may be vain. if man is the creature of a wicked and cunning being, the light of reason may be only an _ignis fatuus_ kindled by a malicious and mocking spirit. here is a soul plunged in the lowest abysses of doubt; but it is a manly soul which seeks in doubt a trial for truth, and not a comfortable pillow on which slothfully to repose. how does descartes upraise himself? by a thought known to every one, and which was already found in st. augustine: "_cogito, ergo sum_. i think, therefore i am." deceive me who will; if i am deceived, i exist. here is a certainty protected from all assault: i am. but what a poor certainty is this! what does it avail me to have rescued my existence from the abysses of universal doubt, if above the deep waters which have swallowed up all belief floats only this naked and mortifying truth: i am; but i exist only perhaps to be the sport of errors without end. the first step therefore taken by the philosopher would be a fruitless one if it were not followed by a second. an eye is open, and says: i see; but it must have a warrant that the light by which it sees is not a fantastic brightness. no, replies descartes; reason sees a true light; and this is how he proves it: i am, i know myself; that is certain. i know myself as a limited and imperfect being; that again is certain. i conceive then infinity and perfection; that is not less certain; for i should not have the idea of a limit if i did not conceive of infinity, and the word _imperfect_ would have no meaning for me, if i could not imagine perfection, of which imperfection is but the negation. starting from this point, the philosopher proves by a series of reasonings that the conception of perfection by our minds demonstrates the real existence of that perfection: god is. he adds, that the existence of god is more certain than the most certain of all the theorems of geometry. you will observe, gentlemen, that the man who speaks in this way is one of the greatest geometricians that ever lived. he has found god, he has found the light. reason does not deceive, when it is faithful to its own laws: the senses do not deceive, when they are exercised according to the rules of the understanding. error is a malady; it is not the radical condition of our nature; it is not without limits and without remedy, for the final cause of our being is god, that is to say truth and goodness. from everlasting god was true, for ever good and just will be, says one of our old psalms. faith in the veracity of god--such is the ground of the assurance of believers; such is also the foundation on which has been raised the greatest of modern philosophies. without the knowledge of god and faith in his goodness, man remains plunged in irremediable doubt, possessing only this single, poor, and frightful certainty: i am; and i exist perhaps only to be eternally deceived. but, it has been said, and it needed no great cleverness to say it--what a strange way is this of reasoning! here is a man who first proves that god is, by means of his reason; and then proves that his reason is good because god is. his reason demonstrates god to him, and god demonstrates his reason to him: it is an argument of which any schoolboy can at once see the fallacy; it is manifestly a vicious circle. this has been said again and again by persons who have neglected a sufficiently simple consideration. the error is apparently a gross one; is it not likely that the argument has been misunderstood? ought we not to look very closely at it, before declaring that one of the most lucid minds that have ever appeared in the world left at the basis of his doctrine a fault of logic which any schoolboy can discover? self-sufficient levity of spirit is not the best means of penetrating the thought of leading minds; and it very often happens to us to fail of understanding because we have failed in respect. let us examine with serious attention, not the very words of descartes, as an historian might do, but the course of thought of which descartes is one of the most illustrious representatives. to recognize in the reason traces of god, and to show that in faith in god consists the only warrant of the reason, is not to argue in a vicious circle, because, in this way of proceeding, what we are employed in is not reasoning, but analysis; we are establishing a fact in order to ascertain what that fact implies and supposes. this fact is the natural faith which man has in his own reason, when his reason reveals to him the immediate light of evidence, or the mediate light of certainty. now, when man confides in his reason, it is not in his individual reason that he confides, for he has no doubt that what is evident for him is so also for others. if, tossed by a tempest, he were thrown upon an island of savages, he would not think that those savages, when they came to reflect, would be able to discover that the axioms of our geometry are false, or to make elements of logic which would contradict our own. we believe in a general reason, everywhere and always the same, and in which the reason of each individual participates. we believe therefore that there is a principle of truth which exists in itself, a reason which is eternal and everywhere present; in other words, we believe in god considered as the source of the universal intelligence. to believe in one's reason, is to believe in god, in this sense: the fact of the confidence which we place in our own faculty of thought, supposes a concealed faith in eternal truth. this is the analysis of which i was speaking. it is a circle if you please, but it is a circle of light, outside of which there is, as we shall see by and by, nothing but darkness and hard contradictions. you deny the existence of god. on what ground do you rest this denial? on the ground of your reason. you believe then that your reason is good, you believe it very good, since you do not hesitate to trust it, while you undertake to prove false the fundamental instincts of human nature. but you would not venture to say that this reason which you believe in with a faith so firm is your own separate reason merely, your personal and exclusive property. you believe in the universal reason; you believe in god, considered at least as the source of the understanding. the man therefore who denies god, affirms him in a certain sense at the same time that he denies him. he denies him in his words, in the external form of his thought; he affirms him in reality, as the supreme intelligence, by the very trust which he places in his own thought. our understanding is only the reflected ray of the divine verity. therefore it is that descartes, as soon as he has laid the first foundations of his system, interrupts the chain of his reasonings to trace these lines: "here i think it highly meet to pause for a while in contemplation of this all-perfect god, to ponder deliberately his marvellous attributes, to consider, admire, and adore the incomparable beauty of that immense light, at least so far as the strength of my mind, which remains in a manner dazzled by it, shall allow me to do so."[19] thus it is that while descending into the depths of the understanding, the philosopher who is supposed to be absorbed in pure abstractions, discovers all at once a sublime brightness, and exclaims with the ancient patriarch: "the lord is in this place, and i knew it not!"[20] god is everywhere; he is in the heights of heaven, he is in the depths of thought. remember those celebrated words of lord chancellor bacon: "a little knowledge inclineth the mind to atheism, but a further acquaintance therewith bringeth it back to religion." god is not demonstrated, in the ordinary sense which we attach to the word demonstrate;[21] he is pointed out[22] as the source of all light. the attempt to demonstrate god as anything else is demonstrated, by descending, that is, from higher principles until the object in view is arrived at--this attempt implies a contradiction. god is in fact the first principle, the foundation of all principles, the principle beyond which there is nothing. we may describe the process by which the human mind rises to this supreme idea; but to wish to demonstrate god by mounting higher than himself in order to look for a point of departure--this is literally to wish to light up the sun. if the sun of intelligences is extinguished, reason sets out on its way vaguely enlightened still with the remains of the light which it has reflected; but it is not long ere it is stumbling in darkness. then it is that--be not deceived about it!--the doubts which descartes called up by an act of his own will do in good earnest invade the soul. we possess a natural certainty, which does not suppose a clear view of god; we reason without thinking distinctly of the principles on which we reason, just as, when we are in a hurry, we take the shortest cut without thinking of the axiom of geometry which prescribes the straight line. but if we pass from the natural order of our thoughts into the domain of science, if we ask--what is it which guarantees to me the value of my reason? then the question is put, and many perish in the passage which separates natural faith from the domain of science,--that dangerous passage where doubt spreads out its perfidious fogs and its deceitful marshes. the moment the question is started of the worth of reason, and all the schools of scepticism do start it, our answer must be--_god_; and we must find light in this answer, or see thought invaded in its totality by an irremediable doubt. then men come to ask themselves if all be not a lie; and they speak of the universal vanity, without making the reserve of ecclesiastes.[23] there are more souls ill of this malady than are supposed to be so. many begin by setting up proudly against god what they call the rights of reason, and by and by we see this reason, which has revolted against its principle, vacillate, doubt of itself, and at last, losing itself in a bitter irony, wrap itself, with all beside, in the shroud of a universal scorn. without god reason is extinguished. what, in like case, will happen to the conscience? the conscience is a reality. i will say willingly in the style of the prophets: let my tongue cleave to the roof of my mouth, ere i deny conscience, and disparage the sacred name of duty! yes, conscience is a reality; but god is in it: he it is who gives to it its necessary basis and its indispensable support. the conscience is the august voice of the master of the universe. god has given us the light of the understanding that we may see and comprehend some portions of the works which he has created without us: a work there is for which he would have us to be fellow-workers with him. the heaven of stars is a spectacle for the eyes of the body, a grander spectacle still for the contemplation of the mind which has understood their wondrous mechanism. we admire them; but if the stars failed to attract our admiration, no one of them on that account would cease to trace its orbit. there is another heaven, a heaven of loving stars and free, the sight of which is one day to fill us with rapture, and the realization of which is to be the work of our love and of our will. before we contemplate it we must make it; this is our high and awful privilege. the plan of the spiritual heavens is deposited in the soul, and the utterances of the conscience reveal it to the will. it is a law of justice and of love. this law is evermore violated, because it is proposed to liberty, and liberty rebels: it subsists evermore, because it is the work of the almighty. humanity, in its strange destiny, has never ceased to outrage the rule which it acknowledges, and to pronounce upon its own acts a ceaseless condemnation. the laws which are investigated by the physical sciences are the plan of the creator realized in nature: the law proposed to liberty is the plan of the creator to be realized by the community of minds. such is the explanation of the conscience: god is its solid foundation. duty and god, morality and religion, are inseparable principles; all the efforts of a false philosophy have never succeeded, and never will succeed, in disjoining them. men will never be prevented from believing that god is holy, and that his will is binding upon them: they will never be prevented from believing that holiness is divine, and that the will of god reveals itself in the admonitions of the conscience. therefore the progress of religion and the progress of morality are closely united; the morality of a people depends above all on the idea which it forms to itself of god. the conscience, in fact, at the same time that it is real and permanent in its bases, is variable in the degrees of its light. it is enlightened or obscured, according as the man's religious conceptions are pure or corrupted; and, on the other hand, when the religious worship is degraded beyond a certain limit by error and the passions, the conscience protests, and by its protest purifies the religious conceptions. it has often been said, that in the onward march of humanity, morality is separated from faith, and comes at last to rest upon its own bases. it is a notion of the eighteenth century, which, although its root has been cut, is still throwing out shoots in our time. the attempt has been made to support this theory by the great name of socrates. it is affirmed that the sage of athens, breaking the bond which connects the earth with heaven, separated duty from its primitive source. listen: placed in the alternative of either renouncing his mission or dying, it is thus that socrates addresses his judges: "athenians, i honor you and i love you, but i will obey the deity rather than you. my whole occupation is to persuade you, young and old, that before the care of the body and of riches, before every other care, is that of the soul and of its improvement. know that this it is which the deity prescribes to me, and i am persuaded that there can be nothing more advantageous to the republic than my zeal to fulfil the behest of the deity."[24] does the man who speaks in this way appear to you to have wished to break the link which connects morality with religion? he separates himself from the established religion; he pursues with his biting raillery shameful objects of worship; his conscience protests. but, while it protests, it attaches itself immediately to a higher and holier idea of that god, of whose perfections the sage of athens had succeeded in obtaining a glimpse. god then is the explanation of the conscience: he is moreover its support. it has need in sooth to be supported,--that voice which speaks within us; because it is unceasingly contradicted and denied. the spectacle which the world presents is not an edifying one; the facts which are taking place on the earth are not all of a nature to maintain the steadfastness of the moral feeling. let us imagine an example, a striking example, such as it would be easy to find realized on a small scale in more commonplace events. a peaceable population, menaced in its most sacred rights, has taken up arms in the simplest and most legitimate self-defence. i do not allow my thoughts to rest upon the soldiers who are advancing to oppress it--mere instruments as they are in the hands of their leaders--but upon the leaders themselves. one of these, without the least necessity, with a calculating coolness, to which he sacrifices all the feelings of a man, or under the sway of one of those ferocious instincts which at times gain the mastery over the soul, gives up a town, a village, to all the horrors of slaughter, pillage, and fire. the blood of the victims will scarcely, perhaps, have grown cold, the last gleams of the fire will not yet be extinct, when this man shall be receiving the praises of his superiors. men will laud the bravery and daring of his exploit; his sovereign will place upon his breast a brilliant cross, the august sign of the world's redemption; he will return to his country amidst the acclamations of the multitude, and drink in with delight the shouts of triumph which greet him as he moves on his way. for such things as these, is there to be no penalty but troublesome recollections which may sometimes be banished, and a few timid protests soon hushed by the loud voice of success? verily there are perpetrated beneath the sun acts which cry aloud for vengeance. have you never felt it--that mighty cry--rising from your own bosom, at the sight of some odious crime, or on reading such and such a page of history? and it must be so; it must be that the cry for vengeance will rise, until the soul has learnt to transform imprecation into prayer, and the desire for justice into supplication for the guilty. but if, in the presence of crime, we were forced to believe that there will never be either vengeance or pardon, the mainspring of the moral life would be broken, and humanity would at length exclaim, like brutus in the plains of philippi:--"virtue! thou art but a name!" the conscience is a reality; but its voice is troublesome, and the captious arguments which go to deny its value find support in the evil tendencies of our nature. if it has no faith in eternal justice it runs the risk of being blunted by contact with the world. so doubt takes place, doubt still deeper and more agonizing than that which bears upon the processes of the understanding. the questions which arise are such as these:--"this voice of duty--whence comes it? and what would it have? may not conscience be a prejudice, the result of education and of habit? it has little power, it seems, for it is braved with impunity. many say that it is a factitious power from which one comes at last to deliver one's self by resisting it. am i not the dupe of an illusion? i am losing joys which others allow themselves. barriers encompass me on every hand, for there are for me prohibited actions, unwholesome beauties, culpable feelings. others are free, and make a larger use of life in all directions. what if i too made trial of liberty!" here lies the temptation. when the soul aspires to become larger than conscience and more tolerant than duty, it is not far from a fall. the honest woman will be tempted to repine at the liberty of the courtesan, and the man who is bound by his word will become capable of looking with envy on the liberty of the liar. then come terrible experiences which teach at length that the unbinding of the passions is the hardest of slaveries, and that, in the struggle between inclination and duty, it is liberty which oppresses and law which sets free. happy then is he who, feeling himself to be sinking in gloomy waters, cries to that god who is able to rescue him from the abyss, and strengthens his shaken conscience by replacing it on its solid foundation. "god speaks and reigns. all rebellion is transient in its nature; justice will at length be done. justice may be slow in the eyes of the creature of a day, seeing that he who shall dispense it has eternity at his disposal." but if god be not a refuge for us from men and from the world, if, when we see all that is passing around us, we cannot cast a look beyond and above the earth, men may lose their faith in duty. and this faith is lost in fact. if there are not dead consciences, there are consciences at any rate singularly sunk in sleep. there are men for whom goodness, truth, justice, honor, seem to be a coinage of which they make use because it is current, but without for themselves attaching to it any value. these pieces of money have no longer in their eyes any visible impression, because the conception of the almighty and just god is the impression which determines duty and guarantees its value. when the necessary alliance of moral order with religious thought is denied, the reality of conscience is opposed to what are called theological hypotheses always open to discussion. it is seen well enough that men may doubt of god, but it is supposed to be impossible to doubt of conscience. this is an illusion of generous minds. those who would keep this illusion must not open the pages of the history of philosophy where the negation of duty does not occupy less space than the negation of god; they must not cast their eyes too much about them; they must also take care not to open the most widely circulated books, and the most fashionable periodicals: otherwise, as we shall see, they would not be long in finding out that this morality which they would fain have superior to all attacks, is perhaps what of all things is most attacked now-a-days, and that that conscience which it is impossible to deny is in fact the object of denials the most audacious on the part of a few of the present favorites of fame. the voice of duty is heard no doubt even when god does not come distinctly into mind; but when the questions are clearly put, if god is denied, conscience grows dim, and comes at last to be extinguished. this obscuration does not take place all at once: the potter's wheel goes on turning for a while, says an old hindoo poem, after that the foot of the artisan is withdrawn from it. but the darkening takes place gradually with time: such at least is the general rule. there are exceptional men who seem to escape this law, and to bear in their bosom a god veiled from their own consciousness. such men may be found, and even in considerable numbers, in a time like ours, when doubt is, in many cases, a prejudice which current opinion deposits on the surface of minds without penetrating them deeply. there are men all whose convictions have fallen into ruins, while their conscience continues standing like an isolated column, sole remaining witness of a demolished building. the meeting with these heroes of virtue inspires a mingled feeling of astonishment and respect. they are verily miracles of that divine goodness of which they are unable to pronounce the name. if there is a man on earth who ought to fall on both knees and shed burning tears of gratitude, it is the man who believes himself an atheist, and who has received from providence so keen a taste for what is noble and pure, so strong an aversion for evil, that his sense of duty remains firm even when it has lost all its supports. but the exception does not make the rule; and that which is realized in the case of a few is not realized long, and for all. you know those crusts of snow which are formed over the _crevasses_ of our glaciers. these slight bridges are able to bear one person who remains suspended over the abyss, but let several attempt to pass together,--the frail support gives way, and the rash adventurers fall together into the gulf. such is the destiny of those schools of philosophy in which the notion of god disappears, and of those civilizations in which the sense of god is extinguished; they fall into dark regions where the light of goodness shines no longer. after the mind and conscience, it remains for us to speak of the heart. man, an intelligent and free being, has in his reason an instrument of knowledge, and in his conscience a rule for his will. but man is not sufficient for himself, and cannot live upon his own resources. if you inquire what the word heart expresses, in its most general acceptation, you will find that it always expresses a tendency of the soul to look, out of itself, in things or persons, for the support and nourishment of its individual life. does the question concern the relations of man with his fellows? the heart is the organ of communication of one soul with another, for receiving, or for giving, or for giving and receiving at the same time, in the enjoyment of the blessing of a mutual affection. the heart is in each of us what those marks are upon the scattered stones of a building in course of construction which indicate that they are to be united one to another. the philosopher suffices for himself, the stoics used to say; the heart is the negation of this haughty maxim. from the heart proceeds love, that son of abundance and of poverty, to speak with plato, that needy one ever on the search for his lost heritage. love has wings, said again the wisdom of the greeks, wings which essay to carry him ever higher. let us extricate the thought which is involved in these graceful figures: our desires have no limits, and indefinite desires can be satisfied only by meeting with an infinite being who can be an inexhaustible source of happiness, an eternal object of love. "our heart is made for love," said saint augustine, the great christian disciple of plato: "therefore it is unquiet till it finds repose in god." from this unrest proceed all our miseries. men do not always succeed in contenting themselves with a petty prosaic happiness, a dull and paltry well-being, and in stifling the while the grand instincts of our nature. if then the heart lives, and fails of its due object; if it does not meet with the supreme term of its repose, its indefinite aspirations attach themselves to objects which cannot satisfy them, and thence arise stupendous aberrations. with some, it is the pursuit of sensual gratifications; they rush with a kind of fury into the passions of their lower nature. with others it is the ardent pursuit of riches, power, fame,--feelings which are always crying more: more! and never: enough. and the after-taste from the fruitless search after happiness in the paths of ambition and vanity is not less bitter perhaps than the after-taste from sensual enjoyments. listen to the confession of a man whose works, full as they are of beauties, are disfigured by so many impure allusions, that the author appears to have indulged, more than most others, in the giddy follies and culpable pleasures of life: if, tired of mocking dreams, my restless heart returns to take its fill of waking joy, full soon i loathe the pleasures which impart no true delight, but kill me, while they cloy.[25] here are the accents of a true confession. these are moreover truths of daily experience. i have seen--and which of you could not render similar testimony?--i have seen the sick man, deprived of all the ordinary avocations and amusements of life, and with pain for his constant companion, i have seen him find joy in the thought of his god, and feeding, without satiety, on this bread of contentment. i have seen the face of the blind lighted up by a living faith, and radiant with a light of peace, for him sweeter and brighter than the rays of the sun. but where god is wanting, and all connection is broken with the source of joy, there you shall see the richest of the rich, the most prosperous among the ambitious, the man of fame whose renown is most widely extended,--you shall see these men carrying the heavy burden of discontent. their brow, unillumined by the celestial ray, is furrowed by the lines of sadness. if you meet them in a moment of candor, these rich, ambitious, and famous men will tell you with a sigh: "all this does not satisfy; we are but pursuing chimeras." still they continue to run after these chimeras. they cry vanity! vanity! and they do not cease to pursue vanity. they flee from themselves: if they retired within themselves, they would find there ennui, inexorable ennui, which is but the sense of that place which god should fill left void in the depth of the soul. for the deceived heart, life becomes a bitter comedy. those who do not succeed in blinding themselves by the dust of thoughtless folly, end oftentimes by wrapping themselves in disdain as with a cloak; they seek a sad and solitary satisfaction in the greatness of their contempt for life. but neither does this satisfy: disdain is not a beverage, and contempt is not food. such are the destinies of the heart, to which god is wanting. but i hope, gentlemen, that you have here some remonstrances to offer. i have just spoken of the pleasures of sense, of pride, of vanity, and i have made no allusion to those affections in which the heart manifests its highest qualities. shall we forget the joys of pure love? the domestic hearth? friendship? country? do not fear that, having given myself up to a fit of misanthropy, i am come hither to blaspheme the true happinesses of life. but do the affections of earth offer us sufficient guarantees? we have need of the infinite to answer to the immensity of our desires; in the presence of those we love, have we no need of the eternal that we may lean our hearts on him? will not all human love become a source of torment, if we have no faith in the love of him who will stamp holy affections with the seal of his own eternity? a single question will suffice to enlighten us on this head. do you know the feeling of anxiety? we all know it, though in different degrees. epidemical disease may appear. the cholera has started on its course; it has left the interior of asia, and is approaching. the report is current that neighboring cities have begun to feel its ravages. those we love--in a month, in a week, where will they be? war is declared. we hear of preparations for death; the sovereigns of europe apply themselves to calculations which seem to portend torrents of blood. if war breaks out, that brother, that son, who will have to take up arms, that daughter who will one day perhaps find herself at the mercy of an unbridled soldiery----. but let us not look for examples so far away. have you no dear one in a distant land of whom you are expecting tidings? and those who are near you! to-morrow, to-day, now perhaps, while you are listening to me, a fatal malady is discovering its first symptoms----. have you received the hard lessons of death? if you see children playing, full of ruddy and joyous health, does it happen to none of you to think of another child, once the joy of your fireside, now lying beneath the sod? does it never happen to you, by a sinister presentiment, to see features you love to gaze on convulsed with agony or pale in death? and yet you must either see the death of your beloved ones, or they must lay you in the earth; for every life ends with the tomb, and we do but walk over graves. when the soul has been thus wounded by anxiety, for this poisoned wound there is one remedy, but only one: "god reigns!" nothing happens without the permission of his goodness. and of all those who are dear to us, we can say: "father, to thy hands i commit them." if we are without this trust, we shall only escape torment by levity. without god our mind is sick; our conscience and our heart are sick also, and in a way more grievous still. footnotes: [19] _mã©ditation troisiã¨me_, at the end. [20] gen. xxviii. 16. [21] _dã©montrer_. [22] "_on le montre_." [23] "vanity of vanities; all is vanity.... let us hear the conclusion of the whole matter: fear god, and keep his commandments: for this is the whole duty of man." (eccles. i. and xii.) [24] apology. [25] si mon coeur, fatiguã© du rãªve qui l'obsã¨de, a la rã©alitã© revient pour s'assouvir, au fond des vains plaisirs que j'appelle ã  mon aide, je trouve un tel dã©goã»t que je me sens mourir. part ii. _society._ we have just studied what life without god would be for the individual. let us now direct our attention to those collections of human beings which form societies. we shall not speak here of the relations of civil with ecclesiastical authorities,--a complex question, the solution of which must vary with times, places, and circumstances. let us only remark that the distinction between the temporal and spiritual order of things is one of the foundations of modern civilization. this distinction is based upon those great words which, eighteen hundred years ago, separated the domain of god from the domain of cã¦sar. religion considered as a function of civil life; dogma supported by the word of a monarch or the vote of a body politic; the formula of that dogma imposed forcibly by a government on the lips of the governed--these are _dã©bris_ of paganism which have been struggling for centuries against the restraints of christian thought.[26] the religious convictions of individuals do not belong to the state; religious sentiments are not amenable to human tribunals; and it would be hard to say whether it is the spiritual or the temporal order of things which suffers most from the confusion of these distinct domains. religion should have its own proper life, and its special representatives; civil life ought to be set free from all tyranny exercised in the name of dogma; but religion is not the less on that account, by the influence which it exerts over the consciences of men, the necessary bond and strength of human society. "you would sooner build a city in the air," said plutarch, "than cause a state to subsist without religion." some have contested in modern times this opinion of ancient wisdom. the philosophy of the last century, as we have said already, wished to separate duty from the idea of god. it pretended to give as the only foundation for society a civil morality, the rules and sanction of which were to be found upon earth. the men of blood who for a short time governed france, gave once as the order of the day--_terror and all the virtues_: this was a terrible application of this theory. virtue rested on a decree of political power, and, for want of the judgment of god, the guillotine was the sanction of its precepts. healthier views begin now to prevail in the schools of philosophy. one of the members of the _institut de france_, m. franck, has lately published a volume on the history of ancient civilization,[27] with the express intention of showing that the conception which a people has of god is the true root of its social organization. according to the worth of the religious idea is that of the civil constitution. before m. franck, twenty years ago, a man of the very highest distinction as a public lecturer, indicated this movement of modern thought. m. edgard quinet, in his lyons course, taught that the religious idea is the very substance of civilization, and the generating principle of political constitutions. he announced "a history of civilization by the monuments of human thought," and added: "religion above all is the pillar of fire which goes before the nations in their march across the ages; it shall serve us as a guide."[28] benjamin constant exhibits in the variation of his opinions the transition from the stand-point of the last century to that of the present. he had at first conceived of his work upon religion as a monument raised to atheism, he ends by seeking in religious sentiments the condition necessary to the existence of civilized societies.[29] here is a real progress; and this progress brings us back to the thought above quoted from plutarch. in fact, take away the idea of god, and the first consequence will be that you will sacrifice all the conquests of modern civilization; the next, that you will soon have rendered impossible the existence of any society whatever. i am going to ask your close attention to these two points successively. history does not offer to our view an uninterrupted progress, as certain optimists suppose; still less does it present the spectacle of an ever-increasing deterioration, as misanthropes affirm; and lastly, it is not true, as we hear it said sometimes, that all epochs are alike, as good one as another. there are times better than those which follow them; and there are epochs less degraded than those which precede them. human societies fall and rise again; their march exhibits windings and retrograde steps, because that march is under the influence of created liberty; but when their destinies are regarded at one view, it is clearly seen that they are advancing to a determined end, because while man is in restless agitation, god is leading him on. the conquests of modern civilization are great and sacred realities. what are these conquests? let us not stay at the surface of things, but go to the foundation. societies fallen into a condition of barbarism have for their motto the famous saying of a gallic chief: woe to the vanquished! in institutions, as in manners, the triumph of force characterizes barbarous times. the right of the strongest is the twofold negation of justice and of love; and what characterizes civilization, issuing from the barbarous condition, the fragments of which it so long trails after it, is the establishment of that justice which founds states, and, upon the basis of justice, the development of the benevolence which renders communities happy. these are the two essential conditions of social progress. these conditions are necessary even to the progress of industry and of material welfare. modern civilization,--that, namely, which we so designate, while we relegate, so to speak, into the past the contemporaneous societies of the vast east,--modern civilization possesses a power unknown to antiquity. justice has a foundation in the conscience, benevolence has natural roots in the heart; but a moment has been when justice and love appeared in the world with new brightness, like rays disengaged from clouds. modern civilization was then deposited on the earth in a powerful germ, of which nothing was any more to arrest the growth. that moment was when the idea of god appeared in its fulness: modern civilization was born of the gospel. the knowledge of god strengthens justice, and the thought of the common father develops benevolence. these theses are well known; let us confine ourselves to a few rapid illustrations. there exists an institution in which has been embodied the negation of social justice--slavery. slavery is at length disappearing before our eyes from the bosom of christendom; and its final retreat is doing honor to russia, and bathing america in blood. this is perhaps the greatest of the events which the annals of history will inscribe on the page of the nineteenth century. now slavery was, in the past, an almost universal institution. the finest intellects of greece devoted a portion of their labors to its justification. rome, at the most brilliant period of its civilization, caused slaves to kill one another, in savage spectacles intended to delight the populace, or during sumptuous banquets for the amusement of wealthy debauchees![30] how has slavery disappeared little by little! how has man been rediscovered beneath that living _thing_ of which was made, one while an instrument of labor, and another while the sport of execrable passions? inquire into this history. you will find the reason and the heart making their protests heard in antiquity, but without becoming efficacious. one day all is changed, and the foundations of slavery begin to shake. at that memorable epoch you will meet with a written document, the first in which is shown in its germ the great social fact which was about to have birth. it is not an emperor's decree, it is not the vote of a body politic, it is a letter a few lines long written by a prisoner to one of his friends. the substance of this letter was: "i send thee back thy slave; but in the name of god i beg of thee to receive him as thy brother; think of the common master who is in heaven." this letter was addressed--"to philemon;" the name of the writer was paul. it is the first charter of slave emancipation. ponder this fact, gentlemen: contemplate the ancient institution of slavery shaken to its foundations, without being the object of any direct attack, by the breath of a new spirit. you will then understand how historians can tell us that the relations of states, belligerent rights, civil laws, political institutions, all these things of which the gospel has never spoken, have been, and are being still, every day transformed by the slow action of the gospel. god has appeared; justice is marching in his train. justice is the foundation of society; but without the spirit of love, justice remains crippled, and never reaches its perfection. justice maintains the rights of each; love seeks to realize the communication of advantages among all. justice overthrows the artificial barriers raised between men by force and guile; love softens natural inequalities and causes them to turn to the general good. need i tell you that the knowledge of god is a light of which the brightest ray is love to men? benevolence, that feeling natural to our hearts, is strengthened, extended, transfigured, by becoming charity;--charity, that union of the soul with the heavenly father, which descends again to earth in loving communion between all his children. the soul separated from god may be conscious of strong affections: but study well the character of a virtue which is nourished from purely human sources; you will see that it may for the most part be expressed in these terms--"to love one's friends heartily, and to hate one's enemies with a generous hatred; to esteem the honest and to despise the vicious." but that virtue which loves the vicious while it hates the vice, that virtue which will avenge itself only by overcoming evil with good, that virtue which, while it draws closer the bonds of private affections, makes a friend of every man, that virtue which we call divine, by a natural impulse of our heart--what is the source from which it flows? the following fact will sufficiently answer the question. on the faã§ade of one the hospitals of the christian world, are read these latin words, the brief energy of which our language cannot render: _deo in pauperibus_, "this edifice is consecrated to god in the person of the poor." here is the secret of charity: it discerns the divine image deposited in every human soul. but do not mistake here: we cannot love, with a love natural and direct, the rags of squalid poverty, the brands of vice, the languors and sores of sickness; but let god manifest himself, and our eyes are opened. the beauty of souls breaks forth to our view beneath the wasting of the haggard frame, and from under the filth of vice. we love those immortal creatures fallen and degraded; a sacred desire possesses us to restore them to their true destination. has an artist discovered in a mass of rubbish, under vulgar appearances, a product of the marvellous chisel of the greeks? he sets himself, with a zeal full of respect, to free the noble statue from the impurities which defile it. every soul of man is the work of art divine, and every charitable heart is an artist who desires to labor at its restoration. henceforward we can understand that love of suffering and of poverty, that passion for the galleys and the hospital, which have at times thrown christians into extravagances which our age has no reason to dread. god in the poor man, god in the sick man, god in the vicious man and the criminal; this, i repeat, is the grand secret of charity. charity passes from the heart of men and from individual practice into social customs and institutions. charity it is which, by degrees, takes from law its needless rigors, and from justice its useless tortures; which substitutes the prison in which it is sought to reform the guilty for the galley, which completes the corruption of the criminal; it is charity that opens public asylums for all forms of suffering; and that will realize, up to the limits of what is possible, all the hopes of philanthropy. if god ceases to be present to the mind and conscience of men, justice and love lose their power. without the powerful action of justice and of love, society would descend again, by the ways of corruption, towards the struggles of barbarism. observe, study well, all that is going on around us. does our civilization appear to you sufficiently solid to give you the idea that it can henceforth dispense with the foundations on which it has reposed hitherto? the sentiments of justice and of benevolence which form the double basis of the progress of society, suppose a more general sentiment which is their common support--the sentiment of humanity. the idea that man has a value in himself, that he is, in virtue of his quality as man, independently of the places which he inhabits and of the position which he occupies in the world, an object of justice and of love;--this idea includes in itself all the moral part of civilization. social progress is only the recognition, ever more and more explicit, of the value of one soul, of the rights of one conscience. now, the idea of humanity has the closest possible connection with the knowledge of god, considered as the father of the human race. ancient wisdom, superior to the worship of idols, had gained a glimpse of the fact that the philosopher is a citizen of the universe; and that famous line of terence: "i am a man, and i reckon nothing human foreign to me," excited, it is said, the applause of the roman spectators. but these were mere gleams, extinguished soon by the general current of thought. it was the pale dawn of the idea of humanity. whence came the day? i will limit the question by defining it. the idea of humanity is the idea of the worth and consequently of the rights of each individual man. it is the idea of liberty; not of liberty interpreted by passion and selfishness as the inauguration of the license which violates right, but of liberty interpreted by reason and conscience as the limit which the action of each man encounters in the right of his neighbor. we are not speaking here of the equality of political rights, which is not always a guarantee of veritable liberty. we are speaking of a social condition such that man, in the exercise of his faculties, in the manifestation of his thoughts, in his efforts for the causes which he loves, so long as he does not violate the rights of others, does not meet with an arbitrary power to arrest him. still farther to limit our subject, we shall speak of the most important manifestation of that liberty--liberty of conscience, of which religious liberty is the most ordinary and most complete manifestation. this is only one of the points of the subject, but it is a point which in reality supposes and includes all the rest. this liberty--whence does it come? it does not come from paganism. paganism, with its national religions, could only produce fanaticism or doubt. each people having its own particular religion, to exterminate the foreigner was to serve the cause of the gods of the country. a war-cry descended from the olympus of each several nation--that olympus which the gods quitted, in case of need, to take part in the quarrels of men. did reason perceive the nothingness of these national divinities? then scepticism appeared. the idea of the supreme god being unsettled with all, and wholly obscured for the crowd, when men ceased to believe in the gods of the nation, they lost all belief whatsoever. for this cause doubt prevailed so widely at the decline of the ancient world. those pantheons in which all religions were received, welcomed, protected, are the ever-memorable temples of scepticism. now you know what voice made itself heard, when the ancient civilization was enfeebled by the spirit of doubt: "henceforth there is neither greek nor barbarian, bond nor free. ye are all brethren, and for all there is one god, and one truth:" here behold the root of scepticism severed. and the same voice added: "this only god is the lawful owner of his creatures; and when you presume to do violence to the consciences which belong to him, you know not by what spirit you are animated:" here behold the fountain of fanaticism dried up. god is acknowledged; he is the master of souls: faith founds liberty. the witness to universal truth appears before rome as represented by a deputy of cã¦sar. he is a fanatic, says the roman; then he goes his way, and leaves him to be put to death. but ere long, a dull hoarse murmur of the nations, extending through all the length and breadth of the mighty empire, gives token that he who was dead is alive again, and is speaking to the general conscience. then rome starts from her sleep; rome; the politic tolerant rome, sheds rivers of blood. her tolerance allowed men to believe everything, but on condition that they believed seriously in nothing. rome was directed by the sure instinct of despotism. she did not fear the gods of the pantheon, because she could always place above them the statue of the emperor: whereas what was now in question was, while leaving to cã¦sar the things which were cã¦sar's, to place a sovereign above the emperor, and to raise a legislation above the legislation of the empire. therefore the roman city determined to give a death-blow to christianity,--to the idea of universal truth, because if that idea gained entrance into the understanding, the cause of the liberty of souls was gained. so it was that indifference became ferocious, and that doubt led back to fanaticism. i have told you whence liberty does not come; but whence comes it? whence comes liberty? ask any scholar of the lyceums of france; he will answer you, without hesitation: liberty comes from the french revolution!--no doubt, whispers an older comrade in his ear; but do not forget the philosophy of the eighteenth century which developed the principles which the revolution put in practice.--that is all very well, a protestant will say; but let us consider the grand fact of the reformation: it is from the sixteenth century that liberty has its date.--well and good, adds an historian; but do you not know that the germans were they who poured a generous and free blood into the impoverished blood of the men who had been fashioned by the slavery of the empire? i contest nothing, and i am not sufficiently well-informed to pronounce with confidence upon the action of all these historic causes. but this i venture to affirm,--that if any one thinks to fix definitely the hour when liberty was born in history, he is mistaken: for it has no other date than that of the human conscience, and i will say with m. lamartine: give me the freedom which that hour had birth, with the free soul, when first in conscious worth the just man braved the stronger![31] liberty had birth the first time that, urged by his fellow men to acts which wounded his conscience, a man, relying upon god, felt himself stronger than the world. that socrates had not studied, i fancy, in the school of the encyclopedists, and was no german either, that i know of, who said to the judges of athens, with death in prospect: "it is better to obey god than men." and when those words were repeated by the apostles of the universal truth, the death of socrates, that noble death which has justly gained for him the admiration of the universe, was reproduced in thousands and thousands of instances. children, women, young girls, old men, perished in tortures to attest the rights of conscience; and the blood of martyrs, that seed of christians, as a father of the church called it,[32] was not less a seed of liberty. liberty was not born in history; but if you wish to fix a date to its grandest outburst, you have it here; there is no other which can be compared with it. some of you are thinking perhaps, without saying so, that i am maintaining a hard paradox. to look for the source of liberty of conscience in religion, is not this to forget that the christian church has often marked its passage in history by a long track of blood rendered visible by the funereal light of the stake? i forget nothing, sirs, and i beg of you not to forget anything either. there are three remarks which i commend to your attention. it must not be forgotten that the gospel first obtained extensive success when roman society was in the lowest state of corruption, and that its representatives were but too much affected by the evils which it was their mission to combat. it must not be forgotten that there came afterwards hordes of barbarians who in a certain sense renovated the worn-out society, but who poured over the new leaven a coarse paste hard to penetrate. it must not be forgotten, lastly, that if a cause might legitimately be condemned for the faults of its defenders, there are none, no, not a single one, which could remain erect before the tribunal which so should give judgment. every cause in this world is more or less compromised by its representatives; but there are bad principles, which produce evil by their own development, and there are good principles which man abuses, but which by their very nature always end by raising a protest against the abuse. it is in the light of this indisputable truth that we are about to enter upon a discussion of which you will appreciate the full importance. sceptical writers affirm that toleration has its origin in the weakening of faith; and, drawing the consequence of their affirmation, they recommend the diffusion of the spirit of doubt as the best means of promoting liberty of conscience. we have here the old argument which would suppress the use to get rid of the abuse. persecutions are made in the name of religion; let us get rid of faith, and we shall have peace. prisons have been built and the stake has been set up in the name of god: let us get rid of god, and we shall have toleration. observe well the bearing of this mode of argument. let us get rid of fire, and we shall have no more conflagrations; let us get rid of water, and no more people will be drowned. no doubt,--but humanity will perish of drought and of cold. let us examine this subject seriously: it is well worth our while. if toleration proceeds from the enfeebling of religious belief, we ought among various nations to meet with toleration in an inverse proportion to the degree of their faith. this is a question then of history. let us study facts. recollecting first of all that ancient rome did not draw forth a germ of liberty from its scepticism, let us throw a glance over existing communities. sweden is far behind england in regard to liberty of conscience. is it that religious convictions are weaker in england than in sweden? has the religious liberty which great britain practises sprung from indifference? is it not rather that that land produces an energetic race, and that it has been so often drenched with the blood of the followers of different forms of worship, that that blood cried at length to heaven, and that the conscience of the people heard it? there is more religious liberty in france than in spain. is it the case that the true cause of the intolerance of the spanish people is a more lively and more general faith than that of the french? that is not so certain. switzerland is one of the countries in which is enjoyed the greatest liberty of opinion. is switzerland a land of indifference? was not the comparative firmness of its citizens' convictions remarked during the conflicts of the last century? do not the united states bear in large characters upon their banner this inscription: liberty of conscience? america is not distinguished as a country without religion; on the contrary, it is blamed for the excursiveness of its faith, for the multiplicity and sometimes for the extravagance of its sects. was it a sceptic that taught the inhabitants of the new world to respect religious convictions? assuredly not! william penn was shut up in the tower of london for the crime of free thought. set free from prison, he crossed the ocean. while intolerance was reigning still on both shores of the atlantic, he founded in pennsylvania a place of refuge for all proscribed opinions; and the germ has been fruitful. in vain i pass from old europe to young america; i look, i observe, and i do not see that liberty is developed in proportion to the scepticism and the incredulity of nations. i seem, on the contrary, to see that there is perhaps most liberty where there is most real faith. some may dispute the validity of these conclusions by remarking that the condition of communities is a complex phenomenon depending upon divers causes. let us simplify the question. is it not, it will be said, the literary representatives of the spirit of doubt who have demanded and founded toleration? is it not.... but it is not necessary for my supposed questioner to go on. if he is a frenchman, he will name voltaire. no doubt, freedom of opinion has been claimed by sceptics. they have served a good cause; let us know how to rejoice in the fact, and not to be unmindful of what there may have been in their work of noble impulses and generous inspirations. let us remark however that every proscribed opinion puts forth a natural claim to the liberty of which it is deprived. but it is one thing to claim for one's-self a liberty one would gladly make use of to oppress others, and it is another thing to demand liberty seriously and for all. there was, as i am glad to believe, a certain natural generosity in the motives which led voltaire to consecrate to noble causes a pen so often sold to evil. still it is impossible not to suspect that if that apostle of toleration had had a principality under his own sway, the fact of thinking differently from the master would very soon have figured among the number of delinquencies. the patriarch of ferney wrote in favor of toleration; some friends of religious indifference have pleaded the cause of liberty of conscience: the fact is certain. but other writers, animated by a living faith, have also demanded liberty for all: the fact is not less certain. some years ago, at nearly the same epoch, the pã¨re lacordaire and our own alexander vinet consecrated to this noble cause, the former the attractive brilliancy of his eloquence, the latter all the fineness of his delicate analyses. the friends of lacordaire are gathering up the vibrations of that striking utterance which proclaimed: "liberty slays not god."[33] let us gather up also the good words, which, uttered on the borders of our lake, have gained entrance far and near into many hearts. i should like to take such and such a parisian journalist, bring him into our midst, and get him to acquaint himself thoroughly with the results of our experience; i should like to conduct him to the cemetery of clarens, place him by the tomb of vinet, and tell him what that man was.--if, as he returned to his home, my journalist did not leave behind him at the french frontier, as contraband merchandise, all that he would have seen and learnt in our country, he would perhaps understand that the surest road by which to arrive at respect for the consciences of others is not indifference, but firmness of faith, in humility of heart, and largeness of thought. all the writers who have devoted their pen to the defence of the rights of the human soul have not therefore been sceptics. without continuing this discussion of proper names, let us settle what is here the true place of writers. before there are men who demand liberty and digest the theory of it, there must be other men who take it, and who suffer for having taken it. if liberty is consolidated with speech and pen, it is founded with tears and blood; and the sceptical apostles of toleration conveniently usurp the place of the martyrs of conviction. "what we want," rightly observes a revolutionary writer, "is free men, rather than liberators of humanity."[34] in fact, liberty comes to us above all from those who have suffered for it. its living springs are in the spirit of faith, and not, as they teach us, in the spirit of indifference. it is easy to understand, that where no one believes, the liberty to believe would not be claimed by any one. let us now endeavor to penetrate below facts, in order to bring back the discussion to sure principles. let us ask what, in regard to liberty of conscience, are the natural consequences of faith, and the natural consequences of scepticism. faith does appear, at first sight, a source of intolerance. the man who believes, reckons himself in possession of the right in regard to truth, and to god; he has nothing to respect in error. thus it is that belief naturally engenders persecution. this reasoning is specious, all the more as it is supported by numerous and terrible examples; but let us look at things more closely. place yourselves face to face with any one of your convictions, no matter which; i hope there is no one of you so unfortunate as not to have any. suppose that it were desired to impose upon you by force even the conviction which you have. suppose that an officer of police came to say to you, pronouncing at the same time the words which best expressed your own thoughts: "you are commanded so to believe." what would happen? if you had never had a doubt of your faith, you would be tempted to doubt it, the moment any human power presumed to impose it upon you. the feeling of oppression would produce in your conscience a strong inclination to revolt. let us analyze this feeling. you feel that it is words, not convictions, which are imposed by force; you feel that declarations extorted by fear from lying lips are an outrage to truth. you feel, in a word, that your belief is the right of god over you, and not the right of your neighbor. men respect god's right over the souls of their fellow-men, in proportion as they are intelligent in their own faith. the fanaticism which would impose words by force is not an ardent but a blind faith. in order to bring it back into the paths of liberty, it is enough to restore to it its sight. the establishment of the christian religion furnishes a great example in support of our thesis. the christians, when persecuted by the empire, had never allowed themselves to reply to the violence of power by the violence of rebellion. there came, however, and soon enough, a time when they were sufficiently numerous to defend themselves, and had withal the consciousness of their strength; but they had no will to conquer the world, except by the arms of martyrdom, and heroism, and obedience. this was not the case during a few years only, it is the history of three centuries, an ever-memorable page of human annals, in which all ages will be able to learn what are the true weapons of truth. christendom, too often forgetful of its origin, has in later times allowed the fury of persecution to cloak itself under a pretended regard for sacred interests; but the remedy has proceeded from the very evil. the christian conscience has protested, in the name of the gospel, against the crimes of which the gospel was the pretext, and the passions of men the cause. "we must bewail the misery and error of our time," already st. hilary was exclaiming, in the fourth century. "men are thinking that god has need of the protection of men.... the church is uttering threats of banishment and imprisonment, and desiring to compel belief by force,--the church, which itself acquired strength in exile and in prisons!" true faith, then, possesses a principle by which it protests against abuses which it is sought to cloak under its name, and this protest comes at last to make itself heard. faith suppressed, the passions will remain, for in order to be a saint, it is not enough to be a sceptic. the passions will look for other pretexts. will not the spirit of doubt offer them such pretexts? it seems at first sight that doubt must promote toleration, since it does not allow any importance to be attached to opinions. this is a specious conclusion, similar to that which placed in belief the source of intolerant passions. let us once more reflect a little. the first effect of doubt is certainly to dispose the mind to leave a free course to all opinions; but disdain is not the way to respect, and only respect can give solid bases to the spirit of liberty. believers are in the eyes of the sceptic weak-minded persons, whom he treats at first with a gentle and patronizing compassion. but these weak minds grow obstinate; the sceptic perceives that they do not bend before his superiority, and dare perhaps to consider themselves as his equals. then irritation arises, and, beneath the velvet paw, one feels the piercing of the claw. the sceptic has in fact a dogma; he has but one, but one he has after all--the negation of truth. the faith of others is a protest against that single dogma on which he has concentrated all the powers of his conviction. he is passionately in earnest for this negation; he feels himself the representative of an idea, of which he must secure the triumph. now come such surmisings as these: "here are men who think themselves the depositaries of truth! these pretended believers--may they not be hypocrites?" place men so disposed in positions of power; let them be the masters of society; what will follow? beliefs are a cause of disturbances: what seemed at first an innocent weakness, takes then the character of a dangerous madness. for the politician, the temptation to extirpate this madness is not far off. "what if we were to get rid of this troublesome source of agitation! if we declared that the conscience of individuals belongs to the sovereign, what repose we should have in the state! if we proclaimed the true modern dogma, namely, that there is no dogma; if silencing, in short, fanatics who are behind their age, we decreed that every belief is a crime and every manifestation of faith a revolt, what quiet in society!" the incline is slippery, and what shall hold back the sceptic who is descending it? faith carries with it the remedy for fanaticism, but where shall be found the remedy for the fanaticism of doubt? in the claims of god? god is but a word, or a worthless hypothesis. in respect for the convictions of others? all conviction is but weakness and folly. all this, be well assured, gives much matter for reflection. when i hear some men who call themselves liberal, tracing the ideal of the society which they desire, the bare imagination of their triumph frightens me, for i can understand that that society would enjoy the liberty of the roman empire, and the toleration of the cã¦sars. such are the consequences of scepticism for the leaders of a people. what will those consequences be for the people themselves? the spirit of indifference paralyzes the sources of generous sentiments, and ends in the same results as the spirit of cowardice. and do you not know the part which cowardice has played in history? if i may venture to call up here the most mournful recollections of modern times, do you not know that during the reign of terror, two or three hundred scoundrels instituted public massacres in the capital of france, in the midst of a population shuddering with fright, but who let things go? now the characteristic of indifference is the letting things go. if fanaticism has something to do with persecution, indifference has a great deal to do with it. the crimes which minds paralyzed by doubt allow to be perpetrated have besides a sadder character than those which are perpetrated by passions, which, wild and erring though they be, have a certain nobleness in their origin. if i must be bound to the stake, i had rather burn with the blind assent of a fanatical crowd, than in the presence of an indifferent populace who came to look on. for just as sceptics find all doctrines equally good, so they find all spectacles equally instructive and curious.[35] i have felt it necessary to insist on these considerations. direct attacks upon religious truth are perhaps less dangerous than the efforts by which modern infidelity endeavors to estrange us from god, by persuading us that doubt is the guarantee of liberty, and that belief rivets the chains of bondage. many consciences are disturbed by these affirmations. it concerns us therefore to know that god is the great liberator of souls, and that forgetfulness of god is the road to slavery. the faith which seeks to propagate itself by force inflicts upon itself the harshest of contradictions. the spirit of doubt, in order to become the spirit of violence, has only to transform itself according to the laws of its proper nature. and now to sum up. one of the noblest spectacles that earth can show, is that of a community animated with a true and profound faith, in which each man, using his best efforts to communicate his convictions to his brethren, respects the while that which belongs to god in the inviolable asylum of the conscience of others. but woe to the society formed by sophists, in which opinion, benumbed by doubt and indifference, arouses itself only to devote to hatred or to contempt every firm and noble conviction! to unsettle the idea of god, is to dry up its source the stream of the veritable progress of modern society; it is to attack the foundations of liberty, justice, and love. the material conquests of civilization would serve thenceforward only to hasten the decomposition of the social body. the pure idea of god is the true cause of the great progress of the modern era; religion, in its generality, is, as plutarch has told us, the necessary condition to the very existence of society. this is what remains for us to prove. "how sacred is the society of citizens," said cicero, "when the immortal gods are interposed between them as judges and as witnesses."[36] let us raise still higher this lofty thought, and say: "how sacred is human society, when, beneath the eye of the common father, the inequalities of life are accepted with patience and softened by love; when the poor and the rich, as they meet together, remember that the lord is the maker of them both; when a hope of immortality alleviates present evils, and when the consciousness of a common dignity reduces to their true value the passing differences of life!" take away from human society god as mediator, and the hopes founded in god as a source of consolation, and what would you have remaining? the struggle of the poor against the rich, the envy of the ignorant directed against the man who has knowledge, the dullard's low jealousy of superior intelligence, hatred of all superiority, and, by an almost inevitable reaction, the obstinate defence of all abuses,--in one word, war--war admitting neither of remedy nor truce. such is the most apparent danger which now threatens society. when i consider these facts with attention, i am astonished every day that society subsists at all, that the burning lava of unruly passions does not oftener make large fissures in the social soil, and overflow in devastating torrents, bearing away at once palace and cottage, field and workshop. this standing danger is drawing anxious attention, and we hear the old adage repeated: "there must be a religion for the people." there are men who wish to give the people a religion which they themselves do not possess, acting like a man who, at once poor and ostentatious, should give alms with counterfeit money. and what result do they attain? we must have a religion for the people, say the politicians, that they may secure the ends they have in view, and conduct at their own pleasure the herds at their disposal. we must have a religion for the people, say the rich, in order to keep peaceably their property and their incomes. we must have a religion for the people, say the _savants_, in order to remain quiet in their studies, or in their academic chairs. what are they doing--these men without god, who wish to preserve a faith for the use of the people? these _savants_,--they say, and print it, that religion is an error necessary for the multitudes who are incapable of rising to philosophy. where is it that they say it, and print it? is it in drawing-rooms with closed doors? is it within the walls of universities, or in scientific publications which are out of the reach of the masses? no. they say it in political journals, in reviews read by all the world; they print it at full in books which are sold by thousands of copies. their words are spreading like a deleterious miasma through all classes of society. thoughtless men! (i am unwilling to suppose a cool calculation on their part of money or of fame which should oblige me to say--heartless men), thoughtless men! they do not see the inevitable consequences of their own proceeding. the people hear and understand. the intellectual barriers between the different classes of society are gradually becoming lower: this is one of the clearest of the ways of providence in our time. do you believe that the people will long consent to hear it said that they only live on errors, but that those errors are necessary for them? do you not see that they are about to rise, and answer, in the sentiment of their own dignity, that they will no longer be deceived, and that they intend to deliver themselves also from superstition? then, all restraining barriers removed, passions will have free course; and believe me, the rising floods will not respect those quiet haunts of study in which they will have had one of their springs. the proof of this has been seen before. some men of the last century wished to destroy religion amongst decent folk, but not for the rabble: they are voltaire's words, who had too much good sense to be an atheist, but whose pale deism is sometimes scarcely distinguishable from the negation of god. "your majesty," thus he wrote to his friend the king of prussia, in january, 1757, "will render an eternal service to the human race, by destroying that infamous superstition, i do not say amongst the rabble, which is not worthy to be enlightened, and to which all yokes are suitable, but amongst honest people." a religion was necessary for the people; but voltaire and the king of prussia, the german barons, the french marquises, and the ladies who received their homage, could do without it. voltaire died before eating of the fruit of his works; and alfred de musset could only address to him his vengeful apostrophe at his tomb: sleep'st thou content, and does thy hideous smile still flit, voltaire, above thy fleshless bones?[37] voltaire was dead; but many of his friends and disciples were able to meditate, in the prisons of the terror and as they mounted the steps of the scaffold, on the nature of the terrible game which they had played--and lost. so it fares with men of letters who have no god, but who would have a religion for the people. other men there are who would have a religion for the people, being themselves the while without restraint, because they are without religious convictions. they abandon themselves to the ardent pursuit of riches, excitements, worldly pleasures. these are they who have made a fortune by disgraceful means, perhaps the public sale of their consciences, and who by their luxurious extravagance overwhelm the honest and economical working-man. these are the courtesans who parade in broad daylight the splendid rewards of their own infamy. let not such deceive themselves! the people see these things; they form their judgment of them, and if they give way to the bad instincts which are in us all, where god is not in the heart to restrain them, to their hatred is added contempt. if they are forcibly kept back from realizing their cherished hopes, they adjourn them, but without renouncing them. put away all belief in god, and you will see the action and reaction of human passions forming, as it were, a mass of opposite electricities, and preparing the thunder-peal and the furies of the tempest. then appear those disorganized societies which are terrified at their own dissolution, until a strong man comes, and, taking advantage of this very terror, takes and chastises these societies, as one chastises an unruly child. it is a story at once old and new, because, in proportion as god withdraws from human society, in that same proportion the power of the sword replaces the empire of the conscience. there must be a religion for the people! yes, sirs, but for that people, wide as humanity, which includes us all. if the existence of god is denied, man falls into despair, and society into dissolution. what then is my inference? that atheism is false. such a mode of arguing produces an outcry. "a matter of sentiment!" men exclaim. "you would build up a doctrine according to your own fancy! you do not discuss the question calmly, but appeal to interests and prejudices: you quit the domain of science, which takes cognizance only of facts and reasoning." such expressions are common enough to make it worth while to study their value. of course, science must not be an instrument of our caprice. we are bound to search for truth; and we are unfaithful to our obligations if we try to establish doctrines which serve our passions, or favor our interests, or flatter our tastes and our prejudices. but the conscience, the heart, the conditions of the existence of human society, are neither prejudices nor personal interests; they are eternal and living realities. we speak of the conscience, of the heart, of society, and they answer us: "we do not believe that there are true sciences in that domain; we only wish for facts." occasionally we hear naturalists speak in this way. we only wish for facts! then our thoughts, our feelings, our conscience are not facts! the man who will give the closest observation to the steps of a fly, or to a caterpillar's method of crawling, has not a moment's attention to give to the impulses of the heart, to the rules of duty, to the struggles of the will; and when addressed on the subject of these realities of the soul, the most certain of all realities, he will reply: "that is no business of mine, i want nothing but facts." let us pass from this aberration, and listen for a moment to other objectors. we do not deny, it is often said, the reality of our feelings. man desires happiness, and seeks it in religious belief; but this is an order of things which science cannot take account of. science has only truth for its object, and owes its own existence wholly to the reason. if it happens to science to give pain to the heart or to the conscience, no conclusion can thence be drawn against the certainty of its results. "there is no commoner, and at the same time faultier, way of reasoning, than that of objecting to a philosophical hypothesis the injury it may do to morals and to religion. when an opinion leads to absurdity, it is certainly false; but it is not certain that it is false because it entails dangerous consequences."[38] so wrote the patriarch of modern sceptics, the scotchman hume. the lesson has been well learnt; it is repeated to us, without end, in the columns of the leading journals of france, and in the pages of the _revue des deux mondes_. the adversaries of spiritual beliefs have changed their tactics. in the last century, they replied to minds alarmed for the consequences of their work: "truth can never do harm."--"truth can never do harm," retorted j.j. rousseau: "i believe it as you do, and this it is that proves to me that your doctrines are not truth." the argument is conclusive. so the adversary has taken up another position; and he says at this day:--"our doctrines do perhaps pain the heart, and wound the conscience, but this is no reason why they should be false: moral goodness, utility, happiness, are not signs by which we may know what is true." philosophy, gentlemen, has always assumed to be the universal explanation of things, and you will agree that it is on her part a humiliating avowal, that she is enclosed, namely, in a circle of pure reason, and leaves out of view, as being unable to give any account of them, the great realities which are called moral goodness and happiness. one might ask what are the bases of that science which disavows, without emotion, the most active powers of human nature. one might ask whether those who so speak, understand well the meaning of their own words; and inquire also what is the method which they employ, and the result at which they aim. one might ask whether these philosophers are not like astronomers who should say: "here are our calculations. it matters nothing to us whether the stars in their observed course do or do not agree with them. science is sovereign; it is amenable only to its own laws, and visible realities cannot be objections in the way of its calculations." let us leave these preliminary remarks, and let us come to the core of the controversy. they set the reason on one side, the conscience and heart upon the other, as an anatomist separates the organic portions of a corpse, and they say: truth belongs only to the reason; the conscience and the heart have no admission into science. listen to the following express declaration of the weightiest, perhaps, of french contemporary philosophers: "the god of the pure reason is the only true god; the god of the imagination, the god of the feelings, the god of the conscience, are only idols!"[39] it is impossible to accept this arbitrary division of the divine attributes. there is but one and the same god, the substance of truth, the inexhaustible source of beauty, the supreme law of the wills created to accomplish the designs of his mercy. the conscience, the heart, the reason rise equally towards him, following the triple ray which descends from his eternity upon our transitory existence. we cannot therefore seriously admit that god of the pure reason, separated from the god of the conscience and of the heart. still let us endeavor to make this concession, for argument's sake, to our philosopher. let us suppose that the reason has a god to itself, a god for the metaphysicians who is not the god of the vulgar. before we immolate upon his altar the conscience and the heart, it is worth our while to examine whether the statue of the god of the reason rests upon a solid pedestal. here are the theses which are proposed to us: "it is impossible for our feelings to supply any light for science. truth may be gloomy, and despair may gain its cause. virtue may be wrong, and immorality may be the true. reason alone judges of that which is." i answer: human nature has always eagerly followed after happiness. human nature has always acknowledged, even while violating it, a rule of duty. the heart is not an accident, the conscience is not a prejudice: they are, and by the same right as the reason, constituent elements of our spiritual existence. if there exist an irreconcilable antagonism between science and life; if the heart, in its fundamental and universal aspirations, is the victim of an illusion, if the conscience in its clearest admonitions is only a teacher of error, what is our position? in what i am now saying, gentlemen, i am not appealing to your feelings; the business is to follow, with calm attention, a piece of exact reasoning. if the heart deceives us, if the voice of duty leads us astray, the disorder is at the very core of our being; our nature is ill constructed. if our nature is ill constructed, what warrants to us our reason? nothing. what assures us that our axioms are good, and that our reasonings have any value? nothing. the life of the soul cannot be arbitrarily cloven in twain; it must be held for good in all its constituent elements, or enveloped wholly and entirely in the shades of doubt. if the heart and conscience deceive us, then reason may lead us astray, and the very idea of truth disappears. god is the light of the spiritual world. we prove his existence by showing that without him all returns to darkness. this demonstration is as good as another. footnotes: [26] christian states have given the force of law to institutions, such, for instance, as monogamy, which date their origin from the gospel records. here we have the normal development of civilization: religious faith enlightens the general conscience, and reveals to it the true conditions of social progress. in this order of things, it is not a question of _beliefs_, but of _acts_ imposed in the name of the interests of society. the state may take account of the religious beliefs of its subjects, and enter into such relations as may seem to it convenient with the ecclesiastical authorities: this is the basis of the system of concordats, a system which has nothing in it contrary to first principles, so long as liberty is maintained. but the establishment of _national_ religions, decreed by the temporal power and varying in different states, manifestly supposes a foundation of scepticism. for the idea of truth, one and universal in itself, is substituted the idea of decisions obligatory for those only who are under the jurisdiction of a definite political body. if the state, without pretending to decree dogma, receives it from the hands of the church, and imposes it upon its subjects, it seems at first that the temporal power has placed itself at the service of the church, but that the idea of truth is preserved. but when the question is studied more closely, it is seen that this is not the case, and that the state usurps in fact, in this combination, the attributes of the spiritual power. in fact, before protecting _the true religion_, it is necessary to ascertain which it is; and in order to ascertain the true religion, the political power must constitute itself judge of religious truth. so we come back, by a _dã©tour_, to the conception of national religions. the emperor of russia and the emperor of austria will inquire respectively which is the only true religion, to the exclusive maintenance of which they are to consecrate their temporal power. to the same question they will give two different replies; and each nation will have its own form of worship, just as each nation has its own ruler. [27] _etudes orientales_, 1861. [28] _unitã© morale des peuples modernes_,--a lecture delivered at lyons, 10 april, 1839. this lecture is inserted after the _gã©nie des religions_ in the complete works of the author. [29] franck, _philosophie du droit ecclã©siastique_, pages 117 and 118. [30] schmidt, _essai historique sur la sociã©tã© civile dans le monde romain_. bk. 1. ch. 3. [31] la libertã© que j'aime est nã©e avec notre ã¢me le jour oã¹ le plus juste a bravã© le plus fort. [32] tertullian. [33] _le pã¨re lacordaire_, by the comte de montalembert, p. 25. [34] _de l'autre rive_, by iscander (in russian). iscander is the pseudonyme of m. herzen. [35] "the man of thought knows that the world only belongs to him as a subject of study, and, even if he could reform it, perhaps he would find it so curious as it is that he would not have the courage to do so."--ernest renan, preface to _etudes d'histoire religieuse_, 1857. the author has manifested better sentiments in 1859, in the preface to his _essais de morale et de critique._ [36] _de legibus_, ii. 7. [37] dors-tu content, voltaire, et ton hideux sourire voltige-t-il encor sur tes os dã©charnã©s? [38] hume, essay viii. on liberty and necessity. [not having access to the original, i re-translate the french translation.--tr.] [39] vacherot, _la metaphysique et la science_. preface, p. xxix. lecture iii. _the revival of atheism._ (at geneva, 24th nov. 1863.--at lausanne, 18th jan. 1864.) gentlemen, the subject of the present lecture will be--the revival of atheism. and i do not employ the word 'atheism'--a term which has been so greatly abused--without mature reflection. when socrates opposed the idea of the holy god to the impure idols of paganism; when he dethroned jupiter and his train in order to celebrate "the supreme god, who made and who guides the world, who maintains the works of creation in the flower of youth, and in a vigor always new,"[40] they accused socrates of being an atheist. descartes, the great geometrician who proclaimed the existence of god more certain than any theorem of geometry, has been denounced as an atheist. when men began to forsake the temples of idols in order to worship the unknown god who had just manifested himself to the world, the christians were accused of atheism because they refused to bow down to wood and stone. such abuses might dispose one to renounce the use of the word. besides, when a word has been for a long time the signal of persecution and the forerunner of death, one hesitates to employ it. in an age when atheists were burned, generous minds would use their best efforts to prove that men suspected of atheism had not denied god, because they would not have been understood had they attempted to say--"they have denied god perhaps, but that is no reason for killing them." thence arose the sophistical apologies for certain doctrines, apologies made with a good intention, but which trouble the sincerity of history. these are the brands of servitude, which must disappear where liberty prevails. we are able now to call things by their proper names, for there exist no longer for atheism either stakes or prisons. in affirming that certain writers, some of whom are just now the favorites of fame, are shaking the foundations of all religion, one exposes no one to severities which have disappeared from our manners, one only exposes oneself to the being taxed with intolerance and fanaticism. but candor is here a duty. if this duty were not fulfilled, liberty of thought would no longer be anything else than liberty of negation; and, while truth was oppressed, error alone would be set free. let us settle clearly the terms of this discussion. it is often asserted that an atheist does not exist. does this mean that the lips which deny god, always in some way contradict themselves? does it mean that every soul bears witness to god, perhaps unconsciously to itself, either by a secret hope, or by a secret dread? this is true, as i think; but we are speaking here of doctrines and not of men. it is true again that the negation of the creator allows of the existence, in certain philosophies, of generous ideas and elevated conceptions. such men, while they put god out of existence, desire to keep the true, the beautiful, the good; they hope to preserve the rays, while they extinguish the luminous centre from which they proceed. such systems always tend to produce the deadly fruits pointed out in my last lecture; but men devoted to the severe labors of the intellect often escape, by a noble inconsistency, the natural results of their theories. therefore, in the inquiry on which we are about to enter, the term 'atheism' implies, with regard to persons, neither reproach nor contempt. it simply indicates a doctrine, the doctrine which denies god. this denial takes place in two ways: it is affirmed that nature, that is to say matter, force devoid of intelligence and of will, is the sole origin of things; or, the reality is acknowledged of those marks which raise mind above nature, but it is affirmed that humanity is the highest point of the universe, and that above it there is nothing. such are the two forms of atheism. perhaps you expect here the explanation of a doctrine which is often described as holding a sort of middle place between the negation and the affirmation of god, namely, pantheism. pantheism, in the true sense of that word, is a system according to which god is all, and the universe nothing. this extraordinary thesis is met with in india. a greek, parmenides, has vigorously sustained it. we have in it a kind of sublime infatuation. in presence of the one and eternal being thought collapses in bewilderment; and thenceforward it experiences for all that is manifold and transitory a disdain which passes into negation. in the domain of experience, all is limited, temporary, imperfect; and reason seeks the perfect, the eternal, the infinite. the doctrine of creation alone explains how the universe subsists in presence of its first cause. in ignorance of this doctrine, some bold thinkers have cut the knot which they could not untie. they have declared that reason alone is right, and that experience is wrong: the world does not exist, it is but an illusion of the mind. whence proceeds this illusion? if perfection alone exists, how comes that imperfect mind to exist which deceives itself in believing in the reality of the world? to this question the system has no answer. such is true pantheism; but it is not to dangers so noble that most minds run the risk of succumbing. what is commonly understood by pantheism is the deification of the universe. the idea of god is not directly denied, but it undergoes a transformation which destroys it. god is no longer the eternal and almighty spirit, the creator; but the unconscious principle, the substance of things, the whole. the universe alone exists; above it there is nothing; but the universe is infinite, eternal, divine. the higher wants of the reason, mingling with the data derived from experience, form an imposing and confused image, which, while it beguiles the imagination, perverts the understanding, deceives the heart, and places the conscience in peril. in a philosophical point of view, it is a contradiction of thought, which seeks the infinite being, and, being unable to discover him, gives the character of infinity to realities bounded by experience. in a religious point of view, it is an aberration of the heart, which preserves the sentiment of adoration, but perverts it by dispersing it over the universe. "pantheism," says m. jules simon, "is only the learned form of atheism; the universe deified is a universe without god."[41] from the moment that the reason endeavors to see distinctly, pantheism vanishes like a deceitful glare. atheism disengages itself from the cloak which was concealing its true nature, and the mind remains in presence of nature only, or of humanity only. we will proceed to take a rapid glance at some few of the countries of europe, in order to discover and point out in them the traces of this melancholy doctrine. let us begin with france. in the year 1844, just twenty years ago, some french writers, representing the philosophy, in some measure official, of the time, united to publish a _dictionnaire des sciences philosophiques_. m. franck, the director of this useful and laborious enterprise, said in the preface to the work: "atheism has well nigh completely disappeared from philosophy; the progress of a sound psychology will render its return for ever impossible." in speaking thus, he expressed the thoughts and hopes of the school of which he remains one of the most estimable representatives. a generous impulse was animating a group of intelligent and learned young men. their hope was to translate christianity into a purely rational doctrine, to purify religious notions without destroying them, and, while endowing humanity with a vigorous scientific culture, to leave to it its lofty hopes. the object in view was to establish a philosophy founded upon a serious faith in god; and to this philosophy was promised the progressive and pacific conquest of the human race.[42] twenty years have passed, and things bear quite another aspect. to language expressive of security have succeeded the accents of anxiety and words of alarm. the cause which was proclaimed victorious is defended at this day like a besieged city. you will remark however,--that i may not leave you beyond measure discouraged by the facts of which i have to tell you,--you will remark, i say, that it is the efforts attempted in the cause of good which have helped to set me on the track of evil; it has often been the defence which has fixed my attention upon the attack. the materialism of the last century seems to have maintained a strong hold upon one part of the paris school of medicine. we do find in france a good many physicians who, like boerhave, render homage to religion, and a good many physiologists who, like the great haller, are ready to defend beliefs of the spiritual order;[43] but, among men specially devoted to the study of matter, many succumb to the temptation of refusing to recognize anything as real which does not come under the experience of the senses. this however is not one of the points which offer themselves most strikingly for our examination. the atheistic manifestations of the socialist schools have more novelty, and perhaps more importance. man is naturally a social being. good and evil have their primitive seat in the heart of individuals, but good and evil are transferred into institutions of which the influence is morally beneficial or pernicious. if socialism consists in recognizing the importance of social institutions, in cherishing ideas of progress and hopes of reform, i trust that we are all socialists. do we desire progress by the ever wider diffusion of justice and love? from the moment that, across the conscience whereon divine rays are falling, we have descried the eternal centre of light, we understand that god is the most implacable enemy of abuses. how is it then that atheism sometimes manifests itself in attempts at social reform? we may explain it, without so much as pointing out the influence, but too real, of the faults committed by the representatives of religion. faith is a principle of action; it is, as history testifies, the grand source of the progress of human society; but faith is also a principle of patience. the brow of every believer is more or less illumined by the rays of his peace who is patient because he is eternal. eager to effect good to the utmost extent of his ability, he accomplishes his work with that calm activity to which are reserved durable victories. in the impossible (for if the word impossible is not french, it is human) the believer recognizes one of the manifestations of the supreme will, and immortal hope enables him to support the evils which he does not succeed in destroying. but this is not enough for impatient reformers. ignorant of the profound sources of evil, they think that institutions can do everything, and that a change of laws would suffice to reform men's hearts; they believe that the organization of society alone hinders the realization of good and of happiness. the resignation of believers appears to them a stupid lethargy, and in their patient expectation of a judgment to come they see only an obstacle to the immediate triumph of justice on the earth. what if the nations were persuaded that there is nothing to be looked for beyond the present life, so that all that is to be done is to make to ourselves a paradise as soon as may be here below! if they were persuaded that all appeal to the judge in heaven is a chimerical hope, with what ardor would they throw themselves into schemes of revolution! thus it is that certain political innovators are led to seek in the negation of god one of their means of action. two views, therefore, essentially diverse, govern the labors of the renovators of society. the one class desire to realize, in an ever larger measure, justice and love; religious convictions are the strongest support of their work. the other class would uproot from men's minds every principle of faith, in order the more readily to obtain the realization of their theories. these two classes of men seem at times to be fighting all together in the _mãªlã©e_ of opinions. they meet, as, in the doubtful glimmer of the dawn, might meet together laborious workmen who are anticipating the daylight, and evil-doers who are fleeing from the sun. in order to form a just estimate of the labors of the socialist schools, it would be necessary to make a bold and straightforward inquiry into the object of their studies, and to discern, in the midst of mad-brained and guilty dreams, whatever flashes of light might disclose some prophetic vision of the future. this is no task of ours. it is enough for us to remark that in france, as also in the other countries of europe, the negation of god discovers itself in this order of ideas. it discovers itself at one time by an idolatry of humanity, at another by a materialistic enthusiasm for corporeal indulgences. disregarding the sensual imaginations which disgrace the works of fourrier, let us turn our attention elsewhere. m. vacherot, a sober philosopher, of high intellectual power and elevated sentiment, has lately published, unhappily, twelve hundred pages destined to maintain the thesis that god does not exist.[44] man conceives the idea of perfection, and not finding that perfection realized either in the world or in himself, he rises to the conception of a real and perfect being: such is the usual process of metaphysical reasoning. for m. vacherot, reality and perfection mutually exclude one another; this is one of his fundamental theses. this thesis does but interpret the result of our experience, by refusing us the right to raise ourselves higher. the world with which we are acquainted is imperfect; therefore--say plato, saint augustine, and descartes--the perfection of which we have the idea is realized in a being superior to the world. the world with which we are acquainted is imperfect, therefore there is a contradiction between the ideal and the real, says m. vacherot, who makes thus of the general result of experience the absolute rule of truth. to say therefore of god that he is perfect, is to affirm that he does not exist, inasmuch as the ideal is never realized. thought thus finds itself placed in a situation at once odd and violent. if god is perfect, he does not exist. if god exists, he is not perfect. the respect which we owe to the being of beings forbids us to believe in him; to affirm his existence would be to do outrage to his perfection. the author of this theory renders a worship to that ideal which does not exist, and towards which he affirms nevertheless that the world is gravitating by the law of progress. this worship is of too abstract a nature to secure many adherents; it can only become popular by taking another shape, and it does so in this way: we conceive of that perfection which in itself does not exist; it exists therefore in our thought. since the world, by the law of progress, is tending towards perfection, the world has for its end and law a thought of the human mind. the human mind therefore is the summit of the universe, and it is it that we must adore. we are here out of the region of pure abstraction, and arrive at the doctrines of the positivist school. the positive philosophy, so called because it wishes to have done with chimeras, was founded in france, a few years ago, by auguste comte. m. littrã© is at present one of its principal representatives. this writer, says m. sainte-beuve, is one of those who are endeavoring "to set humanity free from illusions, from vague disputes, from vain solutions, from deceitful idols and powers."[45] let us say the same thing in simpler terms: m. littrã© professes the doctrines of a school which ignores the creator in nature, and providence in history. to ascertain phenomena, and acquaint ourselves with the law which governs them, such, say the positivists, is the limit of all our knowledge. as for the origin of things and their destination, that is an affair of individual fancy. "each one may be allowed to represent such matters to himself as he likes; there is nothing to hinder the man who finds a pleasure in doing so from dreaming upon that past and that future."[46] "in spite of some appearances to the contrary," says m. littrã©, "the positive philosophy does not accept atheism."[47] why? because atheism pretends to give an explanation of the universe, and that after a fashion is still theology. minds "veritably emancipated" profess to know nothing whatever on questions which go beyond actual experience. they do not deny god, they eliminate him from the thoughts. the attempt is a bold one, but it fails; men do not succeed in emancipating themselves from the laws of reason. the very writer whom i have just quoted is himself a proof of this, for he absolutely proscribes every statement of a metaphysical nature, and then, three pages farther on, in the very treatise in which he makes this proscription, he speaks of the "_eternal_ motive powers of a _boundless_ universe."[48] boundless! eternal! what thoughts are these? behold the instincts of the reason coming to light! behold all the divine attributes appearing! adoration is withdrawn from god, and it is given to the universe at large. what is it which, in the universe regarded as a whole, will become the direct object of worship? another positivist, m. de lombrail, will tell us, in a work reviewed by auguste comte: "man," he says, "has always adored humanity." here, we learn, is the true foundation of all religions, and the brief summary of their history. this humanity-god has been long adored under a veil which disguised it from the eyes of its worshippers; but the time is come when the sage ought to recognize the object of his worship and give it its true name.[49] the positivist school, then, professes a complete scepticism with regard to whatever is not included in the domain of experience. but its foot slips, and it falls into the negation of god, from which it rises again by means of a humanitarian atheism. all these marks are met with again in the works of the critical school. the critics group themselves about m. renan. the praises which they lavished a while ago on a bad book by that author seem at least to allow us to point him out as their chief. they derive their name from studies in history and archã¦ology, with which we here have nothing to do. they are regarded as forming a philosophical and religious school, and it is in that connection that they claim our attention. their influence is incontestable, and still, notwithstanding, their doctrinal value is nothing. they form merely a literary branch of the positivist school engrafted upon the eclecticism of m. cousin. we find in their writings the pretension to limit science to the experimental study of nature and to humanity. we afterwards find there the pretension to understand and to accept all doctrines alike. beyond this, nothing. the critics bestow particular attention on the phenomena of religion, of art, and of philosophy; but this interest is purely historical. nothing is more curious than the successive forms of human beliefs; but the period of beliefs is over. religious faith no longer subsists except in minds which are behind the age; and philosophy, upheld in a final swoon by hegel and hamilton, has just yielded its last breath in the arms of m. cousin: so m. renan informs us.[50] to choose a side between the defenders of the idea of god and its opponents; to choose between plato and epicurus, between origen and celsus, between descartes and hobbes, between leibnitz and spinoza, would be to make one's self the don quixote of thought. an honest man may find amusement in reading the amadis of gaul; the knight of _la manche_ went mad through putting faith in the adventures of that hero. a like fate befalls those minds which are simple enough to believe still, in the midst of the nineteenth century, in the brave chimeras of former days. let us study history, let us study nature; beyond that we do not know, and we never shall know, anything. our fashionable men of letters develop their thesis with so much assurance; they lavish upon believers so many expressions of amiable disdain; they appear so sure of being the interpreters of the mind of the age, that they seem ready to repeat to young people dazzled by their success, the lesson which gilbert had expressed in these terms: between ourselves--you own a god, i fear! beware lest in your verse the fact appear: dread the wits' laughter, friend, and know your betters: our grandsires might have worn those old-world fetters; but in our days! come, you must learn respect,- content _your age to follow_, not direct.[51] to believe in god would be vulgar; to deny the existence of god would be a want of taste; the divine world must remain as a subject for poetry. so our critics speak. their direct affirmation is scepticism. but they follow the destinies of the positivist school; they do not succeed in maintaining their balance between the affirmation and negation of god. alfred de musset has described this position of the soul, and its inevitable issue. must i hope in god? must i reject all faith and all hope? between these paths how difficult the choice! ah! might i find some smoother, easier way. "none such exists," whispers a secret voice, "god _is_, or _is not_--own, or slight, his sway." in sooth, i think so: troubled souls in turn by each extreme are tossed and harassed sore: they are but atheists, who feel no concern; if once they doubted they would sleep no more.[52] the indifference of the critical philosophers is in fact only a transparent veil to atheistical doctrines. faith in god the creator is in their eyes a superstition; this is their only settled dogma. in other respects they indulge in theses the most contradictory. most generally they deify man, declaring that there is no other god than the idea of humanity, no other infinite than the indefinite character of the aspirations of our own soul. at other times they proclaim an undisguised materialism, and look for the explanation of all things in atoms and in the law which governs them. they make to themselves a two-faced idol, one of these faces being called nature, and the other humanity. what strangely increases the confusion is that all the terms of language change meaning as employed by their pen. they speak of god, of duty, of religion, of immortality; their pages seem sometimes to be extracted from mystical writings; but these sacred words have for them a totally different meaning than for the ordinary run of their readers. their god is not a being, their religion is not a worship, their duty is not a law, their immortality is not the hope of a world to come. amidst these equivocations and contradictions thought is blunted, and the sinews of the intellect are unstrung. the public, bewitched by talent and captivated by success, is deluged with writings which have the same effect as the talk of a frivolous man, or the showy tattle of a woman of the world. they give an agreeable exercise to the mind, without ever allowing it to form either a precise idea or a settled judgment. many are the clouds then on the intellectual horizon of france. glance over the recent productions of french philosophy, and you will have no difficulty in recognizing the gravity of the situation. works are multiplying with the object of defending the existence of god, providence, the immortality of the soul: dams are being raised against the rising flood of atheism.[53] and here is a fact still more significant, namely, that the historians of ideas, whether they are recurring to the most remote antiquity, or are passing in review the worst errors of modern days, cannot meet with the negation of god, without having their eyes thus turned to paris, and their attention directed to contemporary productions.[54] i hence infer, that atheism is raising its head in france, and there presenting itself under two forms. materialism is appearing principally as an heritage from the last century. the new, or rather renewed, doctrine is the adoration of man by man. we are now going to cross the rhine. a powerful thinker, hegel, had supreme sway in the last movement of speculative thought in germany. hegel's system of doctrine is enveloped in clouds. it is so ambiguous in regard to the questions which most directly concern the conscience and human interests, that it has been pretended to deduce from it, on the one hand a christian theology, and on the other a sheer atheism. there is a story, whether a true one or not i cannot say, that this philosopher when near his end uttered the following words: "i have only had one disciple who has understood me--and he has misunderstood me." a man distinguished in metaphysical research by taste, genius, and science, and who has, in that respect, devoted particular attention to germany, m. charles secrã©tan, writes with reference to the fundamental principle of the entire hegelian system: "if you ask me how i understand the matter, i will give you no answer; i do not understand it at all, and i do not believe that any one has ever understood it."[55] you will excuse me, gentlemen, from here undertaking the scientific study of so difficult a system. it will be enough for us to render the darkness visible, that is to say, to understand well what it is which the doctrine of the berlin professor, in a certain sense, renders incomprehensible. the foundation of his theory is that the universe is explained by an eternal idea, an idea which exists by itself, without appertaining to any mind. the hegelians say that the existence of an infinite mind is an inadmissible conception. they reject this mystery, and prefer to it the palpable absurdity of an idea which exists in itself, without being the act of an intelligence. this idea-god we have already encountered in the writings of m. vacherot. we shall find it again more than once as we go on. in germany, as in france, the theory only becomes popular by undergoing a transformation. the eternal idea manifests itself in the mind of man, and exists nowhere else. above this idea there is nothing. man is therefore the summit of things; it is he who must be adored. and thus it is in fact that hegel has been understood. in the spring of 1850, henri heine wrote as follows in the _gazette d'augsbourg_: "i begin to feel that i am not precisely a biped deity, as professor hegel declared to me that i was twenty-five years ago." the deification of man: such is the popular translation of the philosophy of the idea. would you have a further proof of this? the following anecdote was current in my youth, when german idealism was at the height of its popularity. a student going to call on one of his fellow-students, found him stretched on his bed, or his sofa, and exhibiting all the signs of an ecstatic contemplation. "why, what are you doing there?" inquired the visitor. "i am adoring myself," replied the young adept in philosophy. i am not examining the doctrines of hegel with reference to the history of metaphysics, and within the precincts of the school in which it occupies a large place and demands the most serious attention; i am tracing the influence of those doctrines on the public mind at large. this influence is visible in the most disastrous consequences of atheism. "it certainly is not the hegelian school alone," says m. saint-rã©nã© taillandier, "which has produced all the moral miseries of the nineteenth century, all those unbridled desires, all those revolts of matter in a fury;[56] but it sums them all up in its formulã¦, it gives them, by its scientific way of representing them, a pernicious authority, it multiplies them by an execrable propaganda."[57] it was through feuerbach principally that the evolution was to be brought about which has led the hegelian system, severely idealistic in its commencement, to favor at length _the revolts of matter run mad_. and this evolution is only natural after all. if the universe is the development of an idea, and not the work of an intelligent will, all is necessary in the world, for the development of an idea is a matter of destiny. where all is necessary, all is legitimate: the desires of the flesh as well as the laws of thought and of conscience. but, from the moment that the flesh is emancipated, it aims at absolute empire, and ends by obtaining it: this is matter of fact. feuerbach has put atheism into a definite shape, and disengaged it from all obscurity. there exists no other infinite than the infinite in our thoughts; above us there exists nothing; no law which binds us, no power which governs us: the work of modern science is to set man free from god, for god is an idol. but man thus set free from all bonds and from all duty is not, for feuerbach, the individual, but humanity. the individual owes himself to his species; "the true sage will make no more silly and fantastic sacrifices, but he will never refuse sacrifices which are really serviceable to humanity."[58] here then is still a bond, a religion, and sacrifices; the emancipation is incomplete. what is this humanity to which man owes himself? an abstraction, an idol still, an idol to be overthrown if he would obtain perfect independence. listen to the german stirmer, deducing from the doctrine its extreme consequences: "perish the people," he exclaims, "perish germany, perish all the nations of europe; and let man, rid of all bonds, delivered from the last phantoms of religion, recover at length his full independence!"[59] all the mists of abstraction have now disappeared: here we are on ground which is hideously clear. humanity is no longer in question, but the worship of _self_; it is the complete enfranchisement of selfishness. while the proud idealism of the germans was thus, by its own weight, descending into the level flats of thought, a political movement was agitating germany. simple-minded poets were celebrating atheism with an enthusiasm which seemed sincere; and, at the same time, men who are not simple-minded, journalists and demagogues, were laying hold of the irreligion as a lever with which to make a breach in the social edifice. in the year 1845, the attention of the swiss authorities was drawn to certain secret societies, composed of germans, and having for their object a revolution in germany, but which had established their basis of operations on the swiss territory. the inquiries of the police issued in the discovery of twenty-seven clubs bound together by secret correspondence. working-men were induced on various pretexts to attend meetings, of which the real object was only gradually disclosed to them. if they were reckoned worthy, they were initiated into the plan of a social reform, the basis of which was atheism.[60] one of the principal agents in this work of proselytism, guillaume marr, exclaimed: "faith in a personal and living god is the origin and the fundamental cause of our miserable social condition." and he deduced as follows the practical consequence of his theory: "the idea of god is the key-stone of the arch of a tottering civilization; let us destroy it. the true road to liberty, to equality, and to happiness, is atheism. no safety on earth, so long as man holds on by a thread to heaven.--let nothing henceforward shackle the spontaneity of the human mind. let us teach man that there is no other god than himself, that he is the alpha and the omega of all things, the superior being, and the most real reality." we have still to explain the nature of this spontaneity, free from every shackle. one of the editors of the journal conducted by marr discloses it by quoting some verses in which henri heine expresses the wish to see _great vices, bloody and colossal crimes_, provided he may be delivered from a _worthy-citizen virtue_, and an _honest-merchant morality_![61] a little later, a journal of german switzerland asserted, that in order to set free man's natural instincts and propensities, it is indispensable to destroy the idea of god.[62] these, i am well aware, are the screams of a savage madness. but after all, and be this as it may, marr was publishing his journal at lausanne in 1845, and in 1848 he was named representative of the people, by a considerable majority, in one of the largest cities of germany. and this was by no means an isolated fact. atheism showed itself in the ephemeral parliament of frankfort as a sort of party, of which m. vogt, says the _revue des deux mondes_, was the great orator.[63] the german revolution was put down by the bayonet, but the doctrines of which it had revealed the existence, left vestiges for a long time in the country of the terror which they had inspired. alarm was felt for the various interests threatened, and noble souls were stirred with compassion by the conviction forced upon them of the spiritual miseries of their brethren. a powerful reaction took place, as well in the religious as the philosophical world. this reaction has produced salutary results; but the object is not fully attained. open the journals and the reviews, and you will learn that germany is, in these days, the principal centre of materialism. it is unhappily so rich in this respect, that it can afford to engage in exportation, and to furnish professors of the school to other countries of europe. doctor bã¼chner has published, under the title of _force and matter_, a small volume which has rapidly reached a seventh edition, and has lately been translated into french.[64] materialism is there set forth with perfect arrogance, or, to speak more moderately, with perfect audacity. the author pretends to confine himself strictly within the domain of experience, and it is wonderful with what haughtiness he proscribes the researches of philosophy. it would seem therefore that the question of the nature of things ought to remain outside the circle of his studies. nevertheless, he declares matter to be eternal and the universe infinite. i ask you how long it would be necessary to have lived in order to pronounce matter eternal in the name of experience; and what journeys it would have been necessary to make, before ascertaining by means of observation that the universe is infinite. we shall have occasion to recur to this subject. meanwhile we may be very sure that experience supplies no system of metaphysics, and that materialism is a metaphysical system as strongly marked as any. when its adepts cry out, away with philosophy! they mean by that simply: we will have no good philosophy, that we may be free to make bad philosophy of our own without rivalry. a proceeding which reminds one of certain demagogues who cry with all their might, down with tyrants! and who thus succeed in making out of the fear of the tyranny of others the solid foundation of their own despotism. we find then in germany, first of all the doctrine of the idea set forth with _ã©clat_ by hegel, then atheism mixed up with political notions and projects, and lastly materialism. the elements are the same as in france, but exhibit themselves in a different order. this diversity suggests some observations worth your attention. france, setting out with the materialism of the eighteenth century, rose to that adoration of man which characterizes at the present day the greater part of its atheistical manifestations. german atheism, having as its starting-point an abstract idealism of which the adoration of man was the result, has descended to the levels of materialism.[65] we may inquire into the theory of these facts, and say why materialism rises to the adoration of man by a natural movement; and why, also by a natural movement, the adoration of man descends again to materialism. materialism infers from its principles the denial of any future to man, and not only any future, but any true value, any real existence. we are nothing but an agglomeration of molecules, ready to separate without leaving any trace of ever having been together. is not this a thing to be said sadly, as the saddest thing in the world? why then are the apostles of matter nearly always assuming the loftiest tone, and uttering shouts of triumph? it is that they feel themselves free, emancipated from that terror which has made the gods, ... that brood of idle fear fine nothings worshipped,--_why_, doth not appear; the gods--whom man made, and who made not man.[66] emancipation! such is the watchword of materialism. listen, for example, to the conclusion of baron d'holbach's _system of nature_: "break the chains," says he, "which are binding men. send back those gods who are afflicting them to those imaginary regions from whence fear first drew them forth. inspire with courage the intelligent being; give him energy; let him dare at length to love himself, to esteem himself, to feel his own dignity; let him dare to emancipate himself, let him be happy and free." strange accents these, at the close of a large philosophical treatise intended to prove that there is nothing in the universe but matter. whence proceeds the dignity of that fragment of matter which calls itself man? understand well what passes in the mind of these philosophers. in proportion as man lowers his own origin, in the same proportion,--if he does not wish to make himself a brute, in order to live as do the animals,--he exalts himself in an inevitable sentiment of pride. in vain does he give out that the material frame is everything; he feels that thought is more than the material frame; and he accords to himself the first place in the universe. the materialist ignores the eternal mind in order to emancipate himself; and whatever he may say, his real deity is not the atom, but himself. the encyclopedists, sons of an age which yielded at once to noble influences and to guilty seductions, united the worship of progress to a degrading philosophy. consider with what a feeling of pride they lowered man, and you will understand why eternal nature gave place to sacred humanity. when france had fallen into the delirium of irreligion, it was not a little dust in an earthen vase which was offered for public adoration, but they led in procession through the streets of paris a woman who was called the goddess reason. so it was that materialism ended in the adoration of man. let us endeavor to understand how the adoration of man turns again to materialism. the mind endowed with intelligence and will is more elevated in the scale of being than inert bodies. this is for us an evident truth. could one demonstrate it by reasoning? i do not know; but in contesting it, we should contradict the plainest evidence. reason is superior to matter. if, with the school which extends from pythagoras to saint augustine, and from saint augustine to descartes, we connect reason with god as its principle, the grand science of metaphysics is founded. but if reason does not rise to god, what will happen? this reason, which proclaims itself superior to matter, is not, as we have said already, the individual thought of francis, peter, or john. if an individual presented himself as being reason itself, the absolute reason, and said, "i am the truth," it would be necessary to take one of three courses. if we thought that he spoke truly, and if we received his testimony, it would be necessary to worship him, for he would be god. if it were feared that he spoke truly, and those who so feared were unwilling to acknowledge his rule, it would be necessary for them to kill him in order to endeavor to kill the truth. if it were thought that he spoke falsely, it would be necessary to watch him, and the moment he committed an act dangerous for society, to shut him up, for he would be a madman. but the philosophers make no such pretension. the reason of which they speak is the reason common to all, a reason which is not that of an individual, but that of which all rational individuals partake. this common, universal, eternal reason,--where and how does it exist? reason manifests itself by ideas, and ideas are the acts of minds. to imagine an idea without a mind of which it is the act, is the same thing as to imagine a movement without a body of which it is also the act, in a different sense. take away bodies, and there is no more movement. take away intelligences, and there are no more ideas. the philosopher who speaks of an idea which is not the idea of an intelligence, utters words which have no meaning. the reason which is not that of any created individual remains therefore absolutely inconceivable without the eternal spirit, or god. idealism is based upon this impossible conception. thus it is that thought, trying in vain to maintain itself in this abstract domain, ends by holding as chimerical the world of ideas in which it has met with nothing to which to cling. it is seized with giddiness and falls. whither does it fall? to the ground. it is always thither one falls. wearied with its efforts to find footing on shifting clouds, the human mind comes back to the _positive_ by a violent reaction. here is the secret of that haughty and derisive materialism of certain modern germans, who jeer and scoff at the lofty pretensions of philosophy. so it was that hegel brought upon the scene doctor bã¼chner and his fellows. the great conflict of the spiritual world is not, as it is often said to be, the combat of idealism against materialism. idealism begins well, and we must not refuse to acknowledge the services which it has rendered to the cause of truth. but philosophy must follow the road traced out in an ancient adage: _ab exterioribus ad interiora, ab interioribus ad superiora_.[67] if the mind does not go to the end of this royal road; if idealism, having surmounted the fascinations of the senses, remains in ideas, without ascending to the supreme mind, the worship of matter and the worship of the idea call mutually one to another, and revolve in a fatal circle. the struggle between these two forms of atheism reminds one of those duels, in which, after having satisfied honor, the adversaries breakfast together, and gather strength to combat, in case of need, a common enemy. the great combat which forms the main subject of the history of ideas is the combat between belief in god and an atheistical philosophy. whether atheism admits for its first principle an atom without a creator, or a reason without an eternal mind, is a fact very important for the history of philosophy, but the importance of which is small enough in regard to the interests of humanity. we passed the rhine in order to penetrate into germany, let us now cross the british channel, and observe what is going on in england. england, at the close of the seventeenth and the beginning of the eighteenth century, was the principal centre of irreligion. france gave the patent of european circulation to ideas which proceeded in part from this foreign source. an active propaganda for the diffusion of impious and immoral writings had been established in great britain. a strong reaction set in, and, dating from the year 1698, we see formed various societies having for their object the diffusion of good books and respectable journals.[68] these efforts were crowned with success. england, by its zeal in the work of missions, by its sacrifices for the diffusion of the holy scriptures, and by its respect for the lord's-day,[69] assumed[70] the characteristic marks of a christian nation. grand measures adopted in the interests of liberty and humanity, placed it at the same time at the head of a seriously philanthropic civilization; but as pã¨re gratry has remarked, "more than in any other people, there are in the english people the old man and the new."[71] the strange contrasts which are presented by the political action of this double-people are found also in the productions of its thought, in which, while the spirit of piety is displayed full of life, the spirit of irreligion is also manifested with terrible energy. a book is instanced, of materialistic tendency,[72] published in 1828, of which a popular edition was printed with a view to extend the opinions which it advocated. there was sold of this edition, in a short time, more than eighty thousand copies. a thoughtful writer, mr. pearson, mentions a statistical statement, according to which english publications, openly atheistical, reached, in the year 1851, a total of six hundred and forty thousand copies.[73] if we pass from the current literature to scientific publications, we shall meet with facts of the same order. the hegelianism and the scepticism of the critical school are creeping into the works of some theologians. the theories of positivism, reduced to shape in france, have passed the channel, and have obtained in england more attention perhaps than in the country of their origin. they have been adopted by a distinguished author, mr. stuart mill; and a female writer, miss martineau, has set them forth, in her mother-tongue, for the use of her fellow-countrymen.[74] positivism is even in vogue, and has become "_fashionable_" amongst certain literary and intellectual circles in great britain.[75] in less elevated regions of the intellectual world of england, an organized sect commends itself to our attention. this sect has given to its system of doctrine the name of _secularism_. it has a social object--the destruction of the established church and the existing political order. it has a philosophy, the purport and bearing of which we will inquire of mr. holyoake. the following is the answer of the chief of the secularists:--"all that concerns the origin and end of things, god and the immortal soul, is absolutely impenetrable for the human mind. the existence of god, in particular, must be referred to the number of abstract questions, with the ticket _not determined_. it is probable, however, that the nature which we know, must be the god whom we inquire after. what is called atheism is found _in suspension_ in our theory."[76] the practical consequence of these views is, that all day-dreams relating to another world must be put aside, and we must manage so as to live to the best advantage possible in the present life.[77] hence the name of the system. _secularism_ teaches its disciples to have nothing to do with religion in any shape, that they may confine themselves strictly to the present life. it is an attempt of which the express object is to realize life without god. these doctrines formed the subject of public discussions, in london in 1853, and at glasgow in 1854. the meeting at glasgow numbered, it is said, more than three thousand persons.[78] the sect employs as its means of action open-air speeches, the publication of books and journals,[79] and assemblies for giving information and holding debates in lecture-rooms. there are five of these lecture-rooms in london. i have seen the programme, for 1864, of the meetings held at no. 12, cleveland street, under the direction of messrs. holyoake and j. clark. there are, every sunday,--a discourse at eleven o'clock, a discussion at three o'clock, a lecture at seven o'clock. the programme invites all free-thinkers to attend these meetings. some of the assemblies are public; for others a small entrance fee is demanded. london is the principal centre of the association; but it has branches all over the country, and it numbers in great britain twenty-one lecture-rooms, particularly at liverpool, manchester, birmingham, glasgow, and edinburgh.[80] secularism naturally seeks to magnify, as much as may be, its own importance; and it is not to the declarations of its apostles that we must refer in order to estimate the extent and influence of its action. at the same time the existence of a society, the avowed object of which is the diffusion of practical atheism, cannot be regarded with indifference. at the present moment the affairs of the sect would not appear to be flourishing. a year ago a secularist orator had delivered a vehement speech in favor of virtue. just as he had resumed his seat, a policeman entered the room and took him into custody. a few days afterwards the _times_ informed its readers that the orator of virtue had just been condemned for theft to twelve months' hard labor.[81] in the _secular world_ of the 1st january, 1864, mr. holyoake complains that a great many _mauvais sujets_ seem to seek in secularism a kind of cheap religion. he declares that he is going to use energetic efforts to purify the sect, and seems to intimate that he shall retire if his efforts fail. let us leave him to wrestle against the invasion of the orators of virtue, and let us pass from england into italy. while italy is seeking to deliver itself from the bayonets of austria, it is threatened with subjection to the influence of the most pernicious german doctrines. after having bent, like nearly all europe, in the eighteenth century, beneath the blast of sensualism, italy made a noble effort to renew more generous traditions. two eminent men, rosmini and gioberti, the second especially, succeeded in exciting in the youth of italy a passionate interest in doctrines in which liberty and vigor of thought were united with the confidence of faith. this intellectual movement preceded and prepared a national movement, the course of which has been precipitated by the intrigues of politics and the intervention of the arms of the foreigner. at the present time the influence of rosmini and of gioberti is on the decline. hegelianism is being installed with a certain _ã©clat_ in the university of naples. nothing warrants us in hoping that this system will not produce upon the shores of the mediterranean the same depravation of philosophic thought which it has produced in germany. in the ancient university of pisa, m. auguste conti, a brave defender of christian philosophy, steadfastly maintains the union of religion and of speculative inquiry,[82] and the centre of italy is less affected perhaps than the extremities of the peninsula by the spirit of infidelity. but as we go further north, we encounter in the writings of ferrari the utterance of a gloomy scepticism, and in those of ausonio franchi, formerly a journalist at turin, and now a professor at milan, the manifestations of an almost undisguised atheism. ausonio franchi, or rather the man who assumes that pseudonyme, is an ex-priest, who, "while maintaining severely the rule of good morals and the dignity of life,"[83] has turned with violent animosity against his former faith. he exerts some influence over the youth of italy, and has met with warm admirers in england and germany. franchi's profession of faith reduces itself to these very simple terms:--"the world is what it is, and it is _because it is_; any other reason whatever of its essence and of its existence can be nothing but a sophism or an illusion."[84] all inquiry into the origin of things is a pure chimera, and we must therefore limit ourselves to the experience of the present life, and look for nothing beyond it. the author treats with sufficient disdain arguments which satisfied descartes, newton, and leibnitz. it has seemed to me that his understanding, a little obscured by passion, misconceives the true purport of the reasonings which it rejects, and by thus impairing their force, assumes to itself the right to despise them. the religious negations of ausonio franchi do not stop at christian dogma. he denies all value to those higher aspirations of the human soul which constitute _reason_, in the philosophical meaning of the term. now, this radical negation of the reason is what those italians who do not scruple to practise it denominate _rationalism_. and this very unwarrantable use of a word is in fact only a particular case of a general phenomenon. to criticise, means to examine the thoughts which present themselves to the mind in order to distinguish error from truth. the frenchmen, who call themselves the _critics_, are men who require that the intellect shall make itself the impartial mirror of ideas, but shall renounce the while all discrimination between truth and error. the term scepticism, in its primary signification, contains the idea of inquiring, of examining; and they give the name of _sceptics_ to the philosophers who declare that there is nothing to discover, and consequently nothing to examine, or to search for! one is a _free-thinker_ only on the express condition of renouncing all such free exercise of thought as might lead to the acceptance of beliefs generally received. this is verily the carnival of language, and the _bal masquã©_ of words. these corruptions of the meaning of terms are highly instructive. doctrines contrary to the laws of human nature bear witness in this way to a secret shame in producing themselves under their true colors. just as hypocrisy is an homage which vice pays to virtue, so these barbarisms are an homage which error pays to truth. to return to italy: that beautiful and noble country has not escaped the revival of atheism. the intoxication of a new liberty, and the political struggles in which the papacy is at present engaged, will favor for a time, it may be feared, the development of evil doctrines.[85] but the lively genius of the italians will not be long in attaching itself again to the grand traditions of its past history; and the inhabitants of the land, whose soil was trodden by pythagoras and saint augustine, will not link themselves with doctrines which always run those who hold them aground sooner or later upon the sad and gloomy shores of a vulgar empiricism. we have not leisure, gentlemen, to extend our study to all parts of the globe, and besides, there are countries with regard to which information would fail me. therefore i say nothing of holland, where we should have, as i know, distressing facts to record. the silence imposed on spain upon the subjects which we are discussing would render the study of that country a difficult one. i am wanting in data regarding america. let us conclude our survey by a few words about russia. if we are warranted in making general assertions in speaking of that immense empire, we may say that the russian people, taken as a whole, is good and pious, badly instructed, and often the victim of ignorance or of superstition, but disposed to open its heart to elevated and pure influences. the clergy is ignorant, though with honorable and even brilliant exceptions. it is too much cut off from general society, and consigned to a sort of caste, of which it would be most desirable to break down the barriers, in order to allow the influence of the representatives of religion to extend itself more freely. the young nobles, and the university students in general, are, in too large a proportion, imbued with irreligious principles. various atheistical writings, those of feuerbach amongst others, have been translated into russian, printed abroad, and furtively introduced into the empire. m. herzen, a well-known writer, has published, under the pseudonyme of iscander, a work full of talent, but in which come plainly into view the worst tendencies of our time.[86] in his eyes, life is itself its own end and cause. faith in god is the portion of the ignorant crowd, and atheism, like all the high truths of science, like the differential calculus and the laws of physics, is the exclusive possession of the philosophical few. when robespierre declared atheism aristocratic, he was right in this sense, for atheism is above the reach of the vulgar; but when he concluded that atheism was false, he made a great mistake. this error, which led him to establish the worship of the supreme being, was one of the causes of his fall. when he began to follow in the wake of the _conservatives_, as a necessary consequence he would lose his power.[87] the writings of iscander have exerted a veritable influence in russia. m. herzen appears to have lost much of his repute, by the exaggerated and outrageous course he has taken in politics; but it is to be feared that the traces of his action are not altogether effaced. the russian empire has been for a long time, in the eyes of the west, only an immense garrison; but now for some years past it has been taking rank among the number of intellectual powers, and nowhere in europe is the ascending march of civilization displaying itself by signs so striking. the summons to liberty of so many millions of men, which has just been accomplished by the generous initiative of the ruling power, and with the consent of the nation, testifies that that vast social body is animated by the spirit of life and of progress. but in the solemn phase through which she is passing, russia is exposed to a great danger. she is running the risk of substituting for a national development, drawn from the grand springs of human nature, a factitious civilization, in which would figure together the fashions of paris, the morals of the _coulisses_ of the opera, and the most irreligious doctrines of the west. may god preserve her! we have passed in review some of the symptoms of the revival of atheism, and it is impossible not to acknowledge the gravity of the facts which we have established. what must especially awaken solicitude is, that the irreligious manifestations of thought have assumed such a character of generality, that the sorrowful astonishment which they ought to produce in us is blunted by habit. fashionable reviews, (i allude especially to the french-speaking public), widely-circulated journals which take good care not to violate propriety, and which could not with impunity offend the interests or prejudices of the social class from which their subscribers are recruited, are able to entertain without danger, and without exciting energetic protestations, the productions of an open, or scarcely disguised, atheism. here are ample reasons for thoughtfulness; but this thoughtfulness must not be mingled with fear. we have to do with a challenge the very audacity of which inspires me with confidence, rather than with dread. in fact all the productions of irreligious philosophy rest on one and the same thought, the common watchword, of the secularism of the english, of the rationalism of the italians, of the positivism of the french, and which may even be recognized, with a little attention, under the haughty formulas which bear the name of hegel. and the thought is this: the earth is enough for us, away with heaven; man suffices for himself, away with god; reality suffices for us, away with chimeras! wisdom consists in contenting ourselves with the world as it is. it is attempted ridiculously enough to place this wisdom under the patronage of the luminaries of our age. we are bidden, forsooth, to see in the negation of the real and living god, a conflict of progress with routine, of science with a blind tradition, of the modern mind with superannuated ideas.[88] we know of old this defiance hurled against the aspirations of the heart, the conscience, and the reason. we know the destined issue of this ancient revolt of the intellect against the laws of its own nature. there were atheists in palestine in the days when the psalmist exclaimed, "the fool hath said in his heart, there is no god."[89] there were atheists at rome when cicero wrote,[90] that the opinion which recognizes gods appeared to him to come nearest to the resemblance of truth. a poet of the thirteenth century has expressed in a latin verse the thoughts which are in vogue among a great many of our contemporaries: "he dares nothing great, who believes that there are gods."[91] there were atheists in the seventeenth century, when descartes exerted himself to confound them, and they reckoned themselves the fine spirits of their time.[92] and who, again, does not know that in the eighteenth century atheism marched with head aloft, and filled the world with its clamors. the attempt to do without god has nothing modern about it, it is met with at all epochs. the means employed now-a-days to attain this end have nothing new about them. atheism exhibits itself in history with the characters of a chronic malady, the outbreaks of which are transient crises. the moment the negation is blazoned openly, humanity protests. why? because man will never be persuaded to content himself with the earth, and with what the earth can give him: his nature absolutely forbids it. when we compare the reality with the desires of our souls, we can all say with the aged patriarch jacob: "few and evil have been the days of my pilgrimage;"[93] we can all say with lamartine: though all the good desired of man in one sole heart should overflow, death, bounding still his mortal span, would turn the cup of joy to woe.[94] and it is not the heart only which is concerned here; without god man remains inexplicable to his own reason. the spiritual creature of the almighty, free by the act of creation, and capable of falling into slavery by rebellion,--he understands his nature and his destiny; but it is in vain that the apostles of matter and the worshippers of humanity harangue him in turn to explain to him his own existence. man is too great to be the child of the dust; man is too miserable to be the divine summit of the universe. "if he exalts himself, i abase him; if he abases himself, i exalt him; and i contradict him continually, until he understands at last that he is an incomprehensible monster."[95] "the proper study of mankind is man;" and man remains an enigma for man, if he do not rise to god. so it is that our very nature is a living protest against atheism, and never allows its triumphs to be either general, or of long duration. a solid limit is thus set to our wanderings; and, to the errors of the understanding, as to the tides of the ocean, the master of things has said, "ye shall go no further." therefore atheists may become famous, but, destitute of the ray which renders truly illustrious, humanity refuses them the aureole with which it encircles the brows of its benefactors. this aureole it reserves for the sages which lead it to god, for the artists which reveal to it some of the rays of the immortal light, for all those who remind it of the titles of its dignity, the pledges of its future, the sacred laws of the realm of spirits. humanity desires to live; and to live it must believe; for it must believe in order to love and to act. atheism is a crisis in a disease, a passing swoon over which the vital forces of nature triumph. now the vital forces of humanity are neither extinct nor stupefied in our time. the world of literature is sick, and grievously sick in some of its departments; but even there again are manifesting themselves noble and powerful reactions. then look in other directions. contemplate the religious movement of society at large, the wide efforts making in the domain of active beneficence, the progressive conquests of civilization, the awakening of conscience on many subjects:--i could easily instance numerous facts in proof of what i advance, and say to you: know, by these speaking signs, a god to-day as yesterday the same--the same for aye: veiling, revealing, at his sovereign will, his glory,--and his people guarding still.[96] wrestle then against the invasion of deadly doctrines, wrestle and do not fear. if men rise against god in the name of the modern mind, of the science of the age, of the progress of civilization, do not suffer yourselves to be stunned by these clamors. let the past be to you the pledge of the future! to make of atheism a novelty, is an error. to make of it, in a general way, the characteristic of our epoch, is a calumny. footnotes: [40] xenophon, _memorab. of socrates_, bk. iv. 10. [41] _la religion naturelle_. preface. [42] emile saisset, in the _revue des deux mondes_, of march, 1845. [43] see the _lettres sur les vã©ritã©s, les plus importantes de la rã©vã©lation_, by albert de haller, translated into french by one of his grandsons. lausanne, bridel, 1846. [44] _la mã©taphysique et la science_, 2 tom. oct. 1858. [45] _notice sur m. littrã©_, page 57. [46] _paroles de philosophie positive_, page 33. [47] _idem_, page 30. [48] _paroles de philosophie positive_, page 34. [49] _aperã§us gã©nã©raux sur la doctrine positiviste_, par m. de lombrail, ancien ã©lã¨ve de l'ã©cole polytechnique. the author says in his preface: "auguste comte examined this work with the conscientious attention which he was accustomed to give to the simplest task. he desired by his useful counsels to render it worthy of publication." [50] _revue des deux mondes_, of 15th jan. 1860, page 367. [51] je soupã§onne entre nous que vous croyez en dieu. n'allez pas dans vos vers en consigner l'aveu; craignez le ridicule, et respectez vos maã®tres. croire en dieu fut un tort permis ã  nos ancãªtres. mais dans notre ã¢ge! allons, il faut vous corriger _et suivre votre siã¨cle_, au lieu de le juger. [52] entre ces deux chemins j'hã©site et je m'arrãªte. je voudrais ã  l'ã©cart suivre un plus doux sentier. il n'en existe pas, dit une voix secrã¨te: en prã©sence du ciel, il faut croire ou nier. je le pense, en effet: les ã¢mes tourmentã©es vers l'un et l'autre excã¨s se portent tour ã  tour; mais les indiffã©rents ne sont que des athã©es; ils ne dormiraient plus, s'ils doutaient un seul jour. [53] see, for example, _la religion naturelle_, by jules simon; _essai de philosophie religieuse_, by emile saisset; _de la connaissance de dieu_, by a. gratry; _la raison et la christianisme, douze lectures sur l'existence de dieu_, by charles secrã©tan; _essai sur la providence_, by ernest bersot; _de la providence_, by m. damiron; _l'idã©e de dieu_, by m. caro; _thã©odicã©e, etudes sur dieu, la crã©ation et la providence_, par amã©dã©e de magerie. [54] see, for example, the _etudes orientales_ of m. franck, the _bouddha_ of m. barthã©lemy saint-hilaire; _l'histoire de la philosophie au xviiie siã©cle_, of m. damiron. [55] _philosophie de la libertã©_, vol. i. p. 225. [56] _toutes ces rã©voltes de la matiã¨re en furie._ [57] _revue des deux mondes_, april, 1850. [58] _qu'est-ce la religion?_ page 586 of the translation of ewerbeck. [59] _revue des deux mondes_ of 15th april, 1850, p. 288. [60] general report addressed to the _conseil d'etat_ of neuchã¢tel on the secret german propaganda, and on the clubs of young germany in switzerland, by lardy, doctor of law. neuchã¢tel, 1845. [61] _pourvu qu'on le dã©livre d'une vertu bourgeoise et d'une morale d'honnãªtes nã©gociants_. blã¤tter der gegenwart fã¼r sociales leben. [62] see the _chroniqueur suisse_ of 19 jan. 1865. [63] april, 1850, p. 292. [64] _force et matiã¨re_, by louis bã¼chner, doctor in medicine: translated into french from the seventh edition of the german work, by gamper, leipzig, 1863. [65] my object is to point out the atheistical systems which are being produced in various parts of europe, and not to estimate, in a general way, the tendency of contemporary philosophies. the reader, who would understand the position occupied by materialism in relation to german thought in general, may consult with advantage, _le matã©rialisme contemporain_, by paul janet, paris, 1864; and the review of this work by m. reichlin-meldegg (_zeitschrift fã¼r philosophie_, sechsundvierzigster band). a swiss writer, m. bã¶hner, has lately published a learned work on the subject entitled: _le matã©rialisme au point de vue des sciences naturelles et des progrã¨s de l'esprit humain_, by nath. bã¶hner, member of the _sociã©tã© helvã©tique des sciences naturelles_, translated from the german, by o. bourrit, 1 vol. 8vo. (_genã¨ve, imprimerie fick_), 1861. [66] ... ces enfants de l'effroi, ces beaux riens qu'on adore, et sans savoir pourquoi, ces dieux que l'homme a faits et qui n'ont pas fait l'homme. cyrano de bergerac. [67] from outer to inner things, and from inner to higher. [68] see the report of mr. h. roberts, in the _comptes rendus du congrã¨s international de bienfaisance de londres_, vol. ii. page 95, and the 23rd _bulletin de la sociã©tã© genevoise d'utilitã© publique_, 1863. [69] par son respect pour le jour du dimanche. [70] revãªtit. [71] _la paix mã©ditations historiques et religieuses_, par a. gratry, prãªtre de l'oratoire.--septiã¨me mã©ditation: l'angleterre. [72] _the constitution of man_, by g. combe. the popular edition was printed at the expense of mr. henderson. [73] _infidelity: its aspects, causes, and agencies_, by thomas pearson. people's edition, 1854, page 263. [74] _auguste comte et la philosophie positive_, par e. littrã©, page 276. [75] "positivism, within the last quarter of a century, has become an active, and even fashionable mode of thought, and nowhere more so than amongst certain literary and intellectual circles in england." _the christ of the gospels and the christ of modern criticism, lectures on m. renan's 'vie de jã©sus,'_--by john tulloch, d.d., principal of the college of st. mary in the university of st. andrew. macmillan and co., 1864. [76] see pearson: _infidelity_, particularly page 316, and _christianity and secularism, the public discussion_--, particularly page 8. [77]--_dans le siã¨cle_. [78] vapereau's _dictionnaire des contemporains_--art. holyoake. [79] i have had in view here the first numbers of _the secular world_, and of _the national reformer, secular advocate_, for 1864. [80] _the national reformer_ of 2nd jan. 1864. [81] ms. information. [82] readers unacquainted with the italian language will find a compendious exposition of m. conti's philosophy, in a small volume published, in 1863, under the title of _le camposanto de pise ou le scepticisme_. (paris, librairies joã«l cherbuliez et auguste durand; i vol. in-18.) [83] such is the testimony rendered to him by m. aug. conti in his work, _la philosophie italienne_. (paris, joã«l cherbuliez et auguste durand; one small vol. 18mo.) [84] _le rationalisme_ (in french), published with an introduction, by m. d. bancel, brussels, 1858, page 27. [85] the learned author appears to intimate that the distractions of the papacy, consequent on its political struggles for temporal power, hinder the salutary influence which it might otherwise exercise in the suppression of evil doctrines. the translator feels it due to himself to state here, once for all, that he has no sympathy whatever with such a view of the influence of the papacy. on the contrary, he is disposed to attribute to the church of rome most of the evils which afflict, not italy only, but all the countries over which she has any power. perhaps, having "felt the weight of too much liberty" in his own church, the excellent author, fundamentally sound in his own views of christian doctrine, as is proved abundantly by his writings, has been led by a natural reaction to give too much weight to the opposite principle of authority. the concluding pages of his former work, _la vie eternelle_, indicate a mind too painfully and sensitively averse to all controversy with a corrupt church, in consideration of the acknowledged excellences of many of her individual members,--her pascals, fã©nã©lons, martin boos, girards, gratrys, and lacordaires.--_translator_. [86] _de l'autre rive_ (in russian). [87] _de l'autre rive_. v. consolatio.--this chapter is a dialogue between a lady and a doctor. i have considered the doctor as expressing the thoughts of the writer. the form of dialogue, however, always allows an author to express his thoughts, while declining, if need be, the responsibility of them. [88] _le rationalisme_, par ausonio franchi, page 19.--_force et matiã¨re_, par le docteur bã¼chner, page 262.--_paroles de philosophie positive_, par littrã©, page 36.--_la mã©taphysique et la science_, par vacherot, page xiv. (premiã¨re edition.) [89] ps. xiv. 1. [90] de natur㢠deorum. [91] nil audet magnum qui putat esse deos. [92] see bossuet: _sermon sur la dignitã© de la religion_. [93] gen. xlvii. 9. [94] quand tous les biens que l'homme envie dã©borderaient dans un seul coeur, la mort seule au bout de la vie fait un supplice du bonheur. [95] pascal. [96] reconnaissez, _messieurs_, ã  ces traits ã©clatants, un dieu tel aujourd'hui qu'il fut dans tous les temps. il sait, quand il lui plaã®t, faire ã©clater sa gloire, et son peuple est toujours prã©sent ã  sa mã©moire. lecture iv. _nature._ (at geneva, 27th nov. 1863.--at lausanne, 25th jan. 1864.) gentlemen, the thoughts of man are numberless; and still, in their indefinite variety, they never relate but to one or another of these three objects: nature, or the world of material substances, which are revealed to our senses; created spirits, similar or superior to that spirit which is ourselves; and finally god, the infinite being, the universal creator. therefore there are two sorts of atheism, and there are only two. the mind stops at nature, and endeavors to find in material substances the universal principle of existence; or, rising above nature, the mind stops at humanity, without ascending to the infinite mind, to the creator. we have seen how clearly these two doctrines appear in contemporary literature. we have now to enter upon the examination of them, and this will afford us matter for two lectures. the word nature has various meanings; we employ it here to designate matter, and the forces which set it in motion, those forces being conceived as blind and fatal, in opposition to the conscious and free force which constitutes mind. matter and the laws of motion are the object of mechanics, of chemistry, and of physics. do these sciences suffice for resolving the universal enigma? such is precisely the question which offers itself to our examination. let us first of all determine what, in presence of the spectacle of the universe, is the natural movement of human thought, when human thought possesses the idea of god. i open a book trivial enough in its form, but occasionally profound in its contents: the _journey round my room_, of xavier de maistre. the author is relating how he had undertaken to make an artificial dove which was to sustain itself in the air by means of an ingenious mechanism. i read: "i had wrought unceasingly at its construction for more than three months. the day was come for the trial. i placed it on the edge of a table, after having carefully closed the door, in order to keep the discovery secret, and to give my friends a pleasing surprise. a thread held the mechanism motionless. who can conceive the palpitations of my heart, and the agonies of my self-love, when i brought the scissors near to cut the fatal bond?--zest!--the spring of the dove starts, and begins to unroll itself with a noise. i lift my eyes to see the bird pass; but, after making a few turns over and over, it falls, and goes off to hide itself under the table. rosine (my dog), who was sleeping there, moves ruefully away. rosine, who never sees a chicken, or a pigeon, or the smallest bird, without attacking and pursuing it, did not deign even to look at my dove which was floundering on the floor. this gave the finishing stroke to my self-esteem. i went to take an airing on the ramparts. "i was walking up and down, sad and out of spirits as one always is after a great hope disappointed, when, raising my eyes, i perceived a flight of cranes passing over my head. i stopped to have a good look at them. they were advancing in triangular order, like the english column at the battle of fontenoy. i saw them traverse the sky from cloud to cloud.--ah! how well they fly, said i to myself. with what assurance they seem to glide along the viewless path which they follow.--shall i confess it? alas! may i be forgiven! the horrible feeling of envy for once, once only, entered my heart, and it was for the cranes. i pursued them, with jealous gaze, to the boundaries of the horizon. for a long while afterwards, motionless in the midst of the crowd which was moving about me, i kept observing the rapid movement of the swallows, and i was astonished to see them suspended in the air, just as if i had never before seen that phenomenon. a feeling of profound admiration, unknown to me till then, lighted up my soul. i seemed to myself to be looking upon nature for the first time. i heard with surprise the buzzing of the flies, the song of the birds, and that mysterious and confused noise of the living creation which involuntarily celebrates its author. ineffable concert, to which man alone has the sublime privilege of adding the accents of gratitude! who is the author of this brilliant mechanism? i exclaimed in the transport which animated me. who is he that, opening his creative hand, let fly the first swallow into the air? it is he who gave commandment to these trees to come forth from the ground, and to lift their branches toward the sky!" here is a charming page, and containing, though apparently trivial in style, a good and sound philosophy. let us translate this delightful description into the heavier language of science. the intellect is one of the things with which we are best acquainted; logic is the science of thought, and logic is perhaps, among all the sciences, the one best settled on its bases. the intellect discovers itself to us in the exercise of our activity. we pursue an object, we combine the means for attaining it, and it is the intellect which operates this combination. what happens if we compare the results of our activity with the results of the power manifested in the world? when we consider in their vast _ensemble_ the means of which nature disposes, when we remark the infinite number of the relations of things, the marvellous harmony of which universal life is the produce, we are dazzled by the splendor of a wisdom which surpasses our own as much as boundless space surpasses the imperceptible spot which we occupy upon the earth. think of this: the science of nature is so vast that the least of its departments suffices to absorb one human lifetime. all our sciences are only in their very beginning; they are spelling out the first lines of an immense book. the elements of the universe are numberless; and yet, notwithstanding, all hangs together; all things are linked one to another in the closest connection. the _savants_ therefore find themselves in a strange embarrassment. they are obliged to circumscribe more and more the field of their researches, on pain of losing themselves in an endless study; and, on the other hand, in proportion as science advances, the mutual relation of all its branches becomes so manifest that it is ever more and more clearly seen that, in order to know any one thing thoroughly, it would be necessary to know all. it needs not that we seek very high or very far away for occasions of astonishment: the least of the objects which nature presents to our view contains abysses of wisdom. the acquired results of science appear simple through the effect of habit. the sun rises every day; who is still surprised at its rising? the solar system has been known a long while; it is taught in the humblest schools, and no longer surprises any one. but those who found out, after long efforts, what we learn without trouble, the discoverers, reckoned their discoveries very surprising. kepler, one of the founders of modern astronomy, in the book to which he consigned his immortal discoveries, exclaims:[97] "the wisdom of the lord is infinite, as are also his glory and his power. ye heavens! sing his praises. sun, moon, and planets, glorify him in your ineffable language! praise him, celestial harmonies, and all ye who can comprehend them! and thou, my soul, praise thy creator! it is by him, and in him, that all exists. what we know not is contained in him as well as our vain science. to him be praise, honor, and glory for ever and ever!" these words, gentlemen, have not been copied from a book of the church; they are read in a work which, as all allow, is one of the foundations of modern science. i pass on to another example, and i continue to keep you in good and high company. newton set forth his discoveries in a large volume all bristling with figures and calculations.[98] the work of the mathematician ended, the author rises, by the consideration of the mutual interchange of the light of all the stars, to the idea of the unity of the creation; then he adds, and it is the conclusion of his entire work: "the master of the heavens governs all things, not as being the soul of the world, but as being the sovereign of the universe. it is on account of his sovereignty that we call him the sovereign god. he governs all things, those which are, and those which may be. he is the one god, and the same god, everywhere and always. we admire him because of his perfections, we reverence and adore him because of his sovereignty. a god without sovereignty, without providence, and without object in his works, would be only destiny or nature. now, from a blind metaphysical necessity, everywhere and always the same, could arise no variety; all that diversity of created things according to places and times (which constitutes the order and life of the universe) could only have been produced by the thought and will of a being who is _the being_, existing by himself, and necessarily." here, sirs, are noble thoughts, expressed in noble style. i recommend you to read throughout the pages from which i have quoted a few fragments. let us now analyze the ideas of this great astronomer as thus expounded. we may note these three affirmations: 1. the universe displays an admirable order which reveals the wisdom of the power which governs it. 2. the universe lives; it is not fixed, and its variations suppose an intelligent power which directs it. 3. the variable existence of the universe shows that it is not necessary; it must have its cause in a being who is _the_ being, necessarily, by his proper nature. such are the views of newton. examine this course of thought, and see if it is not natural. observation reveals to us facts. facts in themselves, isolated facts, are nothing for the mind; but in the facts of nature, human reason discovers an order, and in that order it recognizes its own proper laws. to keep within the domain of astronomy--there is harmony between our mind and the course of the stars. if you have any doubt about this, i appeal to the almanac. we there find it stated that in such a month, on such a day, at such an hour, there will be an eclipse of the sun or of the moon. how comes the editor of the almanac to know that? he has learnt it from the savants who have succeeded in explaining the phenomena of the skies. the savant therefore can in his study meet with the intelligence which directs the universe. if he makes no mistake in his calculations, the eclipse begins at the precise hour which he has indicated. if the eclipse did not take place at the instant foreseen, no one would suspect nature of not following the course prescribed by the directing intelligence; the inference would be that there had been a fault in observation, or an error of figures on the part of the astronomer. when science, then, does its part well, the mind of man encounters another mind which is governing the world and maintaining it in order. the special science of nature stops there, as we shall explain further on; but this is not all that man requires, when he makes use of all his faculties. all is passing and changing in the domain of experience; and reason seeks instinctively the cause of changeable facts in an unchangeable being, the cause of transient phenomena in an eternal being. nature, therefore, does not suffice to account to us for itself. it demands a power to direct it, an intelligence to regulate it; an absolute eternal being as its cause. this is what reason imperatively requires; and when we possess the idea of god, nature reveals to us his power and his wisdom. this is an old argument, and they call it commonplace. it is commonplace, in fact; it has appeared over and over again in the discourses of socrates, in the writings of galen, of kepler, of newton, of linnã¦us. yes, this argument has fallen so low as to be public property, if we can say that truth falls when it shines with a splendor vivid enough to enlighten the masses. if i desired to bring together here the testimony of all the savants who have seen god in nature, the song of all the poets who have celebrated the glory of the eternal as manifested by the creation, the enumeration would be long, and i should soon tire out your patience. you can understand therefore that if there are, as the misanthrope rousseau says there are, philosophers who hold in such contempt vulgar opinions that they prefer error of their own discovery to truth found out by other people, then the ancient argument, which infers the wisdom of the creator from the order of the creation, must be the object of but small esteem with them. still i for my part take this old argument for a good one, and i mean to defend it. nature is verily and indeed a marvel placed before the observation of our minds. the growth of a blade of grass, the habits of an ant, contain for an attentive observer prodigies of wisdom. a drop of dew reflecting the beams of morning, the play of light among the leaves of a tree, reveal to the poet and the artist treasures of poetry. but too often, blinded by habit, we are unable to see; and when our mind is asleep, it seems to us that the universe slumbers. a sudden flash of light can sometimes arouse us from this lethargy. if science all at once delivers up to us some one of those grand laws which reveal in thousands of phenomena the traces of one and the same mind, the astonishment of our intellect excites in our soul an emotion of adoration. when the first rays of morning light up with a pure brightness the lofty summits of our alps; when the sun at his setting stretches a path of fire along the waters of our lake, who does not feel impelled to render glory to the supreme artist? when dark cold fogs rest upon our valleys at the decline of autumn, it only needs sometimes to climb the mountain-side, in order to issue all at once from the gloomy region, and see the chain of high peaks, resplendent with light, mark themselves out upon a sky of incomparable blue. often have i given myself the delight of this grand spectacle, and always at such a time my heart has uttered spontaneously from its depths that hymn of adoration: tout l'univers est plein de sa magnificence. qu'on l'adore, ce dieu, qu'on l'invoque ã  jamais![99] such is, in the presence of nature, the spontaneous movement of the heart and of the reason. but a false wisdom obscures these clear verities by clouds of sophisms. when your heart feels impelled to render glory to god, there is danger lest importunate thoughts rise in your mind and counteract the impulse of your adoration. perhaps you have heard it said, perhaps you have read, that the accents of spiritual song, those echoes, growing ever weaker, of by-gone ages, are no longer heard by a mind enlightened by modern science. i should wish to deliver you from this painful doubt. i should wish to protect you from the fascinations of a false science. i should wish that in the view of nature, even those who have as yet no wish to adore, with st. paul, him whose invisible perfections are clearly seen when we contemplate his works, may at least feel themselves free to admire, with socrates, "the supreme god who maintains the works of creation in the flower of youth and in a vigor ever new." let us examine a few of the prejudices which it is sought to disseminate, in order to deprive of their force the reasonings of newton, and to turn us from the opinions of kepler. it is said that science leads away from god, and that faith continues to be the lot only of the ignorant. listen on this head first of all to the italian franchi. "the class of society in which infidels and sceptics especially abound is that of savants and men of letters,--men, in short, who have gone through studies, in the course of which they have certainly become acquainted with the famous demonstrations of the existence of god. but no sooner have they examined them with their own eyes, and submitted them to the criterion of their own judgment, than these demonstrations no longer demonstrate anything; these reasonings turn out to be only paralogisms."[100] here we have the thesis in its general form: to become an infidel or a sceptic, it is enough to be a well educated man. the german bã¼chner will now show us the application of this notion to the special study of nature. "at this day, our hardest laborers in the sciences, our most indefatigable students of nature, profess materialistic sentiments."[101] the same tendencies are often manifested among french writers. the author of a recent astronomical treatise, for example, draws a veil of deceitful words over the profound faith of kepler, and takes evident pleasure in throwing into relief the tokens of sympathy bestowed unfortunately by the learned laplace upon atheism.[102] here then we have open attempts to found a prejudice against religion on the authority of science; and these attempts disturb the minds of not a few. i ask two questions on this head. is it true, in fact, that modern naturalists are generally irreligious? is it possible that the science of nature, rightly considered, should lead to atheism?[103] let us begin with the question of fact; and first of all let us settle clearly the bearing and object of this discussion. i wish to destroy a prejudice, and not to create one. i am not proposing to you to take the votes of savants, in order to know whether god exists. no. though all the universities in europe should unite to vote it dark at mid-day, i should not cease on that account to believe in the sun, and that, gentlemen, in common with you all, and with the mass of my fellow-men. i have instituted a sort of inquiry in order to ascertain whether modern naturalists have in general been led to atheistical sentiments, as some would have us believe. in appealing to the recollections of my own earlier studies and subsequent reading, i have marked the names of the men best known in the various sciences, and i have inquired what religious opinions they may have publicly manifested. i will now give you briefly the result of my labor. i have left astronomy out of the question, considering that, notwithstanding the great notoriety of laplace, we have in kepler and newton a weight of authority sufficient to counterbalance that which it is desired to connect with his name. descending to the earth, we encounter first of all the general science of our globe, or geography. in this order of studies a german, ritter, enjoys an incontestable preeminence. he is called, even in france, the "creator of scientific geography." scientific geography rests for support on nearly all the sciences: it proceeds from the general results of chemistry, physics, and geology. had then the vast knowledge of ritter turned him away from god? i had read somewhere[104] that he was one of those savants who have best realized the union of science and faith. one of my friends who was personally acquainted with him has described him to me, not only as a man who adored the creator in the view of the creation, but as an amiable and zealous christian, who exerted himself to communicate to others his own convictions. from the general study of the globe, let us pass to that of the organized beings which people its surface. does botany teach the human mind to dispense with god? let us listen to linnã¦us. i open the _system of nature_,[105] and on the reverse of the title-page i read: "o lord, how manifold are thy works! in wisdom hast thou made them all: the earth is full of thy riches."[106] i turn over a few leaves, and i meet with a table which comprises, under the title, _empire of nature_, the general classification of beings. the commencement is as follows: "eternal god, all-wise and almighty! i have seen him as it were pass before me, and i remained confounded. i have discovered some traces of his footsteps in the works of the creation; and in those works, even in the least, even in those which seem most insignificant, what might! what wisdom! what inexplicable perfection!--if thou call him _destiny_, thou art not mistaken, it is he upon whom all depends. if thou call him _nature_, thou art not mistaken, it is he from whom all takes its origin. if thou call him _providence_, thou speakest truly; it is by his counsel that the universe subsists." another great naturalist, george cuvier, takes care to point out that "linnã¦us used to seize with marked pleasure the numerous occasions which natural history offered him of making known the wisdom of providence."[107] thus modern botany was founded in a spirit of piety. has it, at a later period, made any discoveries calculated to efface from the life of vegetables the marks of divine intelligence? allow me to introduce here a personal _souvenir_. i received lessons in my youth from an old man, who, having once been the teacher of de candolle, remained his friend.[108] by a rather strange academical arrangement, m. vaucher found himself set to teach us--not botany, for which he possessed both taste and genius,[109] but a science of which he knew but little, and which he liked still less. so it came to pass that a good part of the hour of lecture was often filled up with familiar conversations. these conversations took us far away from church history, which we were supposed to be learning. the misplaced botanist reverted, by a natural impulse, to his much-loved science; and i have seen him shed tears of tender emotion, in his professor's chair, as he spoke to us of the god who made the primrose of the spring, and concealed the violet under the hedge by the wayside. therefore is the recollection of that old man not only living in my memory, but also dear to my heart. still he was a savant, an enthusiastic naturalist; and, in the broad light of the nineteenth century, he felt and spoke like linnã¦us. let us pass to the study of animals. i had the wish, some years ago, to procure the best of modern treatises upon physiology. i was directed to the work of professor mã¼ller, of berlin. this book has not lost its value,--for, this very morning, a student of our faculty of sciences came to me to borrow it, by the advice of his masters. mã¼ller was a great physiologist, and he made an open profession of the christian religion. have we not the right to conclude that he believed in god? in france, i could cite more than one name in support of my thesis; i confine myself to a single fact. the attention of the scientific world has very recently been occupied with the discoveries of m. pasteur. m. pasteur has ascertained that the decomposition of organized bodies, after death, is effected by the action of small animals almost imperceptible, the germs of which the larger animals carry in themselves, as living preparatives for their interment. the design of providence reveals itself to his understanding, and he writes: "the immediate elements of living bodies would be in a manner indestructible, if from the beings which god has created were taken away the smallest, and, in appearance, the most useless. life would thus become impossible, because the return to the atmosphere and to the mineral kingdom of all that has ceased to live would be all at once suspended."[110] in other words: i have studied facts hitherto incompletely observed, and my study has revealed to me a new manifestation of that divine wisdom of which the universe bears the impression. england possesses a naturalist of the first order, whom his fellow-countrymen take a pleasure in comparing to george cuvier--professor owen. this savant lectured, a few months ago, before a numerous auditory, on the relations of religion and natural science.[111] he is fully possessed of all the information which the times afford,--is not ignorant of modern discoveries,--is, in fact, one of the princes of contemporary science. well, gentlemen, mr. owen repeats, with reference to animals, what newton was led to say by his contemplation of the heavens, and linnã¦us by his study of the plants. he is not afraid to admire with galen the marvellous wisdom which presided over the organization of living bodies. his discourse is entitled, _the power of god in his animal creation_. the more we understand, he says, the more we admire, the more we adore. he pauses in view of the marvellous productions of nature, beside which the most delicate works of human industry appear, beneath the microscope, but coarse, rough hewings; he compares our most highly finished machines to the living machines made by the hand of god, and infers that, not to discern intelligence in the relation of means to ends, necessarily implies in the mind a defect similar to that of eyes which are unable to distinguish colors. mr. owen declares that such a state of mind and feeling in a naturalist may provoke blame from some and pity from others, and remains for him, so far as he is concerned, absolutely incomprehensible. again, do the most learned chemists find in the study of the elements of matter a revelation of atheism? m. liebig, i have been told, is one of the first chemists of our epoch. he believed he had discovered an application of chemistry to agriculture, the effect of which would be to furnish a remedy to the exhaustion of the soil. his discovery turned out false, and a more attentive study of his subject led him to ascertain that the object which he was pursuing was actually realized by divine providence in a way of which he had had no suspicion. the following is his own account of this, published in 1862: "after having submitted all the facts to a new and very searching examination, i discovered the cause of my error. i had sinned against the wisdom of the creator, and i had received my just punishment. i was wishing to perfect his work, and, in my blindness, i thought that in the admirable chain of laws which preside over life at the surface of the earth, and maintain it ever in freshness, there was wanting a link which i, feeble and impotent worm, was to supply. provision had been made for this beforehand, but in a way so wonderful, that the possibility of such a law had not so much as dawned upon the human understanding."[112] here is a confession very noble in its humility; and to this chemist, who thus renders glory to god, no one of his colleagues could say: "if you had as much science as we, you would say no more about the wisdom of the creator." let us pass on to natural philosophers. i have taken a special interest in this part of my inquiry, because i had read in the productions of a literary man of paris, that modern physics have placed those at fault who defend the doctrine of the living and true god. i inquired accordingly of a man, very well able to give me the information, whether there exists in europe a natural philosopher holding a position of quite exceptional distinction. i received for reply: "you may say boldly that, by the unanimous consent of men of science, mr. faraday, in regard both to the greatness and range of his discoveries, is the first natural philosopher living." after having thus made myself sure, therefore, on this point, i took the liberty of writing to mr. faraday the following letter: "geneva, 30th october, 1863. "sir, "i have the intention of commencing shortly, at geneva, and for an auditory of men, a course of lectures designed to combat the manifestations of contemporary atheism. to this deplorable error i desire to oppose faith in god, as it has been given to the world by the gospel, faith in the heavenly father. "one of my lectures will be specially devoted to the removal of prejudices against religion which have their origin in natural science. it is said very often, and very boldly, that modern physics and modern chemistry demonstrate the unfounded character of religious beliefs. these theses are maintained at geneva as elsewhere. i should wish to reply that natural science does not of itself turn men from god, and that without being able to give faith, it confirms the faith of those who believe: this i should wish to establish by citing names invested, in science, with an incontestable and solid renown. will you, sir, authorize me to make use of your name?" mr. faraday, in reply, sent me the following letter, dated 6th nov. 1863. "sir, ...."you have a full right to make use of my name: for although i generally avoid mixing up things sacred and things profane, i have, on one occasion, written and published a passage which accords to you this right, and which i maintain. i send you a copy of it. i hope you will find nothing in any other part of my researches, to contradict or weaken in any way whatever the sense of this passage. "i beg you to transmit my best remembrances to my friend m. de la rive...." the passage thus indicated establishes a line of demarcation, very strongly (perhaps too strongly) drawn between researches of the reason and the domain of religious truth, and contains a profession of positive faith in revelation. the author affirms that he has never recognized any incompatibility between science and faith, and makes the following declaration: "even in earthly matters i reckon that 'the invisible things of god from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and godhead.'" a literary man of paris declares to us that natural science leads away from god: one of the first savants of our time informs us that the scientific contemplation of nature renders the wisdom of god manifest. the question is one of fact. to whom shall we give our confidence? for my part, since it is natural philosophy which is in question, i rank myself on the side of the natural philosopher. we will here terminate this review. it is time, however, which fails us, not subject-matter, for continuing it. you may have noticed that the name of no one of the savants of switzerland figures in this inquiry. nevertheless our country would have furnished a rich mine for my purpose. it contains (and it is one of its best privileges) a goodly number of savants, whom the observation of the facts of matter have not caused to forget the claims of mind, and who know how to raise their souls to the author of the marvels which they study. you will understand therefore that it has not been from anxiety for my cause, but from a motive of discretion, that i have forborne to bring into this discussion the names of men in whom we have a near interest, and many of whom perhaps are present in this assembly. i will take advantage of mr. faraday's letter to make a single exception, by naming m. de la rive. more than once, and in public, we have heard him distinctly point out the place occupied by the sciences of mind in relation to the natural sciences, and render glory to the creator. and i do not think that any one, in switzerland or elsewhere, can claim to speak with disdain, in the name of the physical sciences, of the religious convictions boldly professed by our learned fellow-countryman.[113] recollect, gentlemen, that i have not undertaken to prove the existence of god, by making appeal to the authority of men of science. all i have sought to do has been to destroy a prejudice. they tell us, and scream it at us, that the best naturalists become atheists. this is not true, as i think i have shown. there do exist atheists who cultivate the natural sciences,--no doubt of the fact. but even though half the whole number of naturalists were atheists, inasmuch as other naturalists, and those some of the greatest, find in their studies new motives to adoration, we are forced to the conclusion, that the true cause why these savants repudiate religion has nothing to do with their science. we shall come to be more strongly confirmed in this opinion, if we pass now from the question of fact to considerations of sound reason. the weakness of the human mind leads it to forget the facts with which it is not occupied. all special culture of the intellect risks consequently the paralyzing a part of our faculties. hegel, lost in abstractions, persuades himself that he will be able to construct by pure reasoning the history of nature and that of the human race. a geometrician, who no longer saw in the world anything but theorems and demonstrations, asked, after the representation of a dramatic masterpiece, "and what does that prove?" a physiologist absorbed in the study of sensible phenomena says: "where is that soul they talk of? i have never seen it." these are phenomena of the same order. this infirmity of the mind, which leads certain savants to think that the ordinary subject of their studies is everything, must not be imputed to science. a man accustomed to the exclusive observation of material phenomena, may become a materialist by the effect of his mental habits, and this really happens, in fact, in too many instances; but the study in itself is not responsible for this result. let us endeavor to prove this, by clearly defining the object of the natural sciences. when the matter of a phenomenon is given to us, the understanding proposes to itself three questions: 1. how does the fact manifest itself? what is the mode of its existence? the answer gives us the law of the phenomenon. bodies fall to the ground at a determined rate of speed: the determination of this rate is the law of their fall. 2. what is the real effective power which produces the phenomenon? this is the inquiry after the cause. 3. what is the intention which presided at the production of the phenomenon? this is the search after the object, which philosophers call the final cause. what we call understanding or explaining a fact, is answering these three questions; it is finding the law, the cause, the end. this analysis was made by aristotle, and seems to have been well made. the science of nature, as it is conceived by the moderns, does not undertake to satisfy entirely the desires of the human mind. it confines itself to the first question; it classes phenomena; it then seeks their law; arrived at this, it stops. the cause and design of things remain out of the sphere of its investigations; the question of god therefore continues foreign to it. a story is told that when buonaparte expressed his astonishment that the marquis de la place could have written a large book on the system of the universe, without making any mention of the creator, the learned astronomer replied to his sovereign: "sire, i had no need of that hypothesis." the answer is admissible if we regard only the science of nature. an astronomer has no need of god in order to follow out the series of his calculations, and compare their results with the course of the stars; a chemist has no need of god in order to ascertain the simple elements combined in composite bodies; a natural philosopher has no need of god in order to determine the laws of waves of sound or of electric currents. the science of nature does not demonstrate the existence of god; still less can it deny his existence. to deny god, it would be necessary for science to demonstrate that there is no order, and consequently no cause of the order to discover; for when we point out the harmony of the universe, we manifestly prepare a basis for the argument which, from the intelligence recognized in the phenomena, will infer the intelligence of the power which governs them. to prove that there is no order would be to prove that there is no science. for any one who well understands the value of terms, the words _atheistical science_ contain a contradiction; they signify science which proves that there is no science. such, gentlemen, is the real state of the question. our savants, when they remain faithful to their method, seek to determine the laws of phenomena, and do not occupy themselves either with the first cause of nature, or with its general object; they leave the question of god on one side. whence come then the negations of naturalists? they arise in this way: those savants who succeed in strictly confining themselves within the limits of their science are rare exceptions. almost always the _man_ introduces his thoughts into the work of the savant, and the results of his study appear to him religious or irreligious, according to his views of religion. newton ends his book with a hymn to the creator; but it is not the _mathematical principles_ of nature which have revealed to him the sovereign god. he perceives the rays of his glory because he believes in him. in the same way, the atheist thinks that his researches disprove the existence of god, because god is veiled from his soul. in both cases it is a doctrine foreign to pure natural science which gives a color to its results. self-deception is very common in this matter, and in both directions. the religious mind does not understand how it is possible to contemplate the universe, and not see inscribed upon it distinctly the name of its author; and the intrusion of atheism into the sciences of observation is veiled beneath confusions of ideas which it is of importance for us to dissipate. modern science, as we have said, stops at laws, without troubling itself with causes. the laws which determine the series of facts as they offer themselves to observation express the mode of the action of the causes. there are here two ideas absolutely distinct: the power which acts, and the manner in which it acts. if the naturalist thinks that his science is everything, he must conclude that we can know nothing beyond the laws, and that an insuperable ignorance hides from our view the power of which they express the action. but he rarely succeeds in keeping this position, and deceives his reason by confounding the laws which he discovers with the causes with which his mind is not able to dispense. he says first of all with franchi, "the universe is what it is"; this is the general formula of all the truths of experience; then he adds with the same author, "it is because it is." this _because_ means nothing, or means that laws are their own causes. if it is asked, what is the cause of the motion of the stars? they will give for answer the astronomical formul㦠which express this motion, and will think that they have explained the phenomena by stating in what way they present themselves to observation. this is a curious example of that confusion of ideas which opens the door to atheism. an english naturalist, mr. darwin, has shown that in the successive life of animal generations, the favorable variations which are produced in the organization of a being are transmitted to its descendants and insure the perpetuity of its race, while the unpropitious variations disappear because they entail the destruction of the races in which they are produced. he tells us: "this preservation of favorable variations and the rejection of injurious variations, i call natural selection."[114] what does the author understand by law? he answers: "the series of facts as it is known to us."[115] here we have the true definition of law: it is the simple expression of the series of the facts; the cause remains to be sought for. i open the book in another part. the author is speaking of the eye; and his doctrine is that the eye of the eagle was formed by the slow transformations of an extremely simple visual apparatus. there will have been then, in the development of animal existence, first of all a rudimentary eye, then an eye moderately well formed, and then the eye of the eagle, because the favorable modifications of the organ of sight will have been preserved and increased in the course of ages. such is the series of facts, such is the law; suppose we grant it. what is the cause? the optician makes our spectacles; who made the eye of the eagle, by directing the slow transformations which at length produced it? let us listen to the author: "there exists an intelligent power, and that intelligent power is natural selection, constantly on the watch for every alteration accidentally produced in the transparent layers, in order carefully to choose such of those alterations as may tend to produce a more distinct image.... natural selection will choose with infallible skill each new improvement effected."[116] natural selection is a law; a law is the series of facts; it seems that we must seek for the power which directs this series of facts; but, lo, the series of facts itself is transformed into a power--into an intelligent power--into a power which chooses with infallible skill! the confusion of ideas is complete. the mind is on a wrong scent; it concludes that the law explains everything, and has itself no need of explanation. the idea of the cause disappears, and, as auguste comte expresses it, "science conducts god with honor to its frontiers, thanking him for his provisional services."[117] this is not perhaps the idea of mr. darwin, but it is at any rate the idea of some of his disciples, as we shall see by-and-by. thus the idea of the cause is kept out of sight. let us now see the fate to which are consigned those other requirements of the reason--the eternal and the infinite. i take up dr. bã¼chner's book, and i read: "we are incapable of forming an idea, even approximately, of the _eternal_ and the _infinite_, because our mind, shut up within the limits of the senses, in what regards space and time, is quite unable to pass these bounds so as to rise to the height of these ideas." i follow the text, and thirteen lines further on, in the same page, i read, "therefore matter and space must be eternal."[118] observe well the use which this writer makes of the great ideas of the reason. is it desired to employ them to prove the existence of god? he will have nothing to do with them. is the object in question to deny god's existence? he makes use of them; and all in the same page. this is coarse work, no doubt, and dr. bã¼chner damages his cause; but, under forms, often more subtle and more intelligent, the same sophism turns up in all systems of materialism.[119] it is affirmed that we have no real idea of the infinite, and it is sought at the same time to beguile the need which reason feels of this idea by applying it to matter. pray do not suppose that i am here attacking the natural sciences, in the interest of metaphysics. i am not attacking but defending them. i am endeavoring, as far as in me lies, to avenge them from the outrages which are offered to them by materialism, while it seeks to cover with their noble mantle its own shameful nakedness. naturalists on the one hand, and theologians and philosophers on the other, are too often at war. they are men, and as nothing human is foreign to them, they are not unacquainted either with proud prepossessions, or with jealous rivalries, or with the miserable struggles of envy: with these things the passions are chargeable. but never render the sciences responsible for the errors of their representatives. take away human frailties, and you shall see harmony established; the study of matter will thus agree with the study of mind, and the idea of nature with the idea of god. you will see all the sciences rise together in a majestic harmony. i say rise, and i say it advisedly; for the sciences also form a part of that golden chain which should unite the earth to heaven. the assertion that the science of nature leads away from god, expresses nothing but a prejudice. it is not true in fact, and on principles of right reason it is impossible: the demonstration is complete. atheism is a philosophy for which the natural sciences are in no degree responsible. we shall not undertake here the general discussion of this philosophy. let us confine ourselves to the examination of the pretence which it puts forward to find a new support in the results of modern science. the nineteenth century bestows particular attention upon history, and it is not only to the annals of the human race that it directs its investigations. geology and palã¦ontology dive into the bowels of the earth in order to ask of the ground which carries us testimony as to what it carried of old. astronomy goes yet further. it endeavors to conjecture what was the condition of our planet before the appearance of the first living being. it remarks that the sun is not fixed in the heavens, and that our earth does not twice travel over the same line in its annual revolutions. it appears that stars are seen in course of formation; it is suspected that some have wholly disappeared. nature is not fixed, but is undergoing modifications--lives, in fact. the actual state of the universe is but a momentary phase in a development which supposes thousands of ages in the past, and seems to presage thousands more in the future. these conceptions are the result of solid and incontestable discoveries. they have disturbed men's minds, but what is their legitimate import? why, newton's argument receives new force from them. from a blind metaphysical necessity, everywhere and always the same, said this great man, no variation could spring. the more it is demonstrated that the universe is in course of development and modification, the more clearly comes into view the necessity of the supreme power which is the cause of its modifications, and of the infinite intelligence which is directing them to their end. this appears to be solid reasoning, and nevertheless atheism has endeavored to strike its roots in the ground of modern discoveries. it does this in the following way. if the universe as it is, with the infinite variety of beings which people it and the marvellous relations which connect these beings mutually together, could be shown to have sprung all at once from nothing, or to have emerged from chaos at a given instant, in its full harmony, the boldest mind would not venture to regard this miracle of intelligence as the product of chance. but modern science, it is said, no longer admits of this simple explanation of things: "god created the heavens and the earth." this phrase is henceforward admissible only in the catechism. we know that all has been produced by slow degrees, starting from weak and shapeless rudiments. this grand marvel of the universe was not made all of one piece. man is of recent date; quadrupeds at a certain epoch did not exist; animals had a beginning, and plants also. the earth was once bare. formerly, it was perhaps only a gaseous mass revolving in space. in course of time, matter was condensed; in time it was organized in living cellules; in time these cellules became shapeless animals; in time these animals were perfected. time appears therefore to be the "universal factor"; and for the ancient formula, "the universe is the creation of god," we are able to substitute this other formula, the result, most assuredly, of modern science, "the universe is the work of time." in all this, gentlemen, i have invented nothing. all i have done has been to put into form the theory, the elements of which i have met with in various contemporary productions.[120] they bewilder us by heaping ages upon ages, and in order to explain nature they substitute the idea of time for the ideas of power and intelligence. they seem to suppose that what is produced little by little is sufficiently explained by the slowness of its formation. these aberrations of thought have recently been manifested in a striking manner on the occasion of the publication of mr. darwin's book. this naturalist has given his attention to the transformation of organized types. he has discovered that types vary more than is generally supposed; and that we probably take simple varieties for distinct species. his discoveries will, i suppose, leave traces strongly marked enough in the history of science. but mr. darwin is not merely an observer; he is a theorist, dominated evidently by a disposition to systematize. now minds of this character, which render, no doubt, signal services to the sciences of observation, are all like pyrrhus, who, gazing on andromache as he walked by her side, still quaffed bewildering pleasure from the view.[121] their theory is their lady-love; they love it passionately, and passionate love always strongly excites the imagination. mr. darwin then has put forth the hypothesis, that not only all animals, but all vegetables too, might have come from one and the same primitive type, from one and the same living cellule. this supposes that there was at the beginning but one single species, an elementary and very slightly defined organization, from which all that lives descended in the way of regular generation. the oak and the wild boar which eats its acorn, the cat and the flea which lodges in its fur, have common ancestors. the family, originally one, has been divided under the influence of soil, climate, food, moisture, mode of life, and by virtue of the natural selection which has preserved and accumulated the favorable modifications which have occurred in the organism. mr. darwin, i repeat, appears to me a man strongly disposed to systematize, but i do not on this account conclude that he is mistaken. the question is, what opinion we must form of his doctrine on principles of experimental science? professor owen[122] does not appear to allow it any value; m. agassiz does not admit it at all;[123] and, without crossing the ocean, we might consult m. pictet,[124] who would reply, that judging by the experimental data which we have at present, this doctrine is an hypothesis not confirmed by the observation of facts. we will leave this controversy to naturalists. what will remain eventually in their science of the system under discussion? the answer belongs to the future enlightened by experience and by the employment of a sage induction. what is the relation existing between these systematic views and the question of the creator? this is the sole object of our study. the opinions of the english naturalist are very dubious as to the vital questions of religious philosophy. i have pointed out to you the confusion of his ideas in the use which he makes of natural selection. in the text of his book, he admits, in the special case of life, the intervention of the creator for the production of the first living being, and he does not speak of man, except in an incidental sentence, which only attentive readers will take any notice of. if we do not take the liberty to look a little below the surface, we must say that mr. darwin remains on the ground of natural history. therefore i spoke to you of the aberrations of philosophic thought which have been produced _on the occasion_ of his book. these aberrations are the following: first of all, natural selection has been taken for a cause, or rather as dispensing with the necessity for a cause, by means of a confusion of ideas for which the author is responsible. the system has therefore been understood as implying, that organized beings were formed without plan, without design, by the mere action of material causes, and as the result of modifications casual at first, and slowly accumulated. divine intelligence and creative power thus seemed to be disappearing from the organization of the universe, and to disappear especially before the lapse of time and the infinitely slow action of physical causes. but while the system was taking wing, and soaring aloft, lo! the creator at the commencement of things, and man conceived as a distinct being at the highest point of nature, have risen up as two idols and paralyzed its flight. to mr. darwin, however, have speedily succeeded disciples compromising their master's authority, and addressing him in some such language as this: "you, our master, do not fully follow out your own opinions; you strain off gnats,[125] and swallow camels. it is not more difficult to see in the living cellule a transformation of matter, and in man a transformation of the monkey, than to point out in a sponge the ancestor of the horse. cast down your idols, and confess that matter developed in course of time, under favorable circumstances, is the origin of all that is." matter, time, circumstances--these things have taken the place of god. this, gentlemen, is a philosophy, properly so called, which vainly pretends to find a support in the observation of facts. geoffroy saint-hilaire, the rival of cuvier, set forth views analogous to those which mr. darwin has lately reproduced. but in his replies to the attacks which were made upon his system, he affirmed that his theory offered "one of the most glorious manifestations of creative power, and an additional motive for admiration, gratitude, and love."[126] two different interpretations may therefore be given to the system. i wish to show you that these interpretations proceed in all cases from considerations external to the system. the system in itself, as a theory of natural history, could not in any way affect injuriously the great interests of spiritual truth. in order solidly to establish this assertion, i will suppose the hypotheses of the most advanced disciples of mr. darwin to have been verified by experimental science. i take for granted that it has been proved that all plants and all animals have descended, by way of regular generation, from living cellules originally similar; and that the material particles of the globe, at a given moment, drew together to form these cellules. and now where do we stand? will god henceforward be a superfluous hypothesis? do the atheistical consequences which it is desired to draw from this doctrine proceed logically from it? most certainly not! i observe first of all that there exists a great question relative to the beginning of things. matter is perfected and organized in process of time--but whence comes matter itself? is it also formed little by little in process of time? does non-existence become existence little by little? so it is said in the preface to the french translation of mr. darwin's book. but this appertains to high metaphysics; and i pass on. if time is the factor of all progress by a necessary law, this necessity must be everywhere the same. have the elements of matter all the same age? if so, why have some followed the law of progress, and others not? why has this mud and this coal remained mud and coal, age after age, while these other molecules have risen, in the hierarchy of the universe, to the dignity of life? why have these mollusks remained mollusks throughout the succession of their generations, while others, happily transformed, have gradually mounted the steps of the ladder up to man? whence comes this aristocracy of nature? are the beings which we call inferior only the cadets of the universe, and are they too in their turn to mount all the steps of the ladder? must we admit that there is going on the continual production, not only of living cellules which are beginning new series of generations, but also of new matter, which, setting out from the most rudimentary condition, is beginning the evolution which is to raise it into life? they do not venture to put forth theses of this nature, and, in order to account for the diversity of things, recourse is had to circumstances. the diversity of circumstances explains the diversity of developments. but whence can come the variety of circumstances in a world where all is produced in the way of fatal necessity, and without the intervention of a will and an intelligence? this is the remark of newton. study carefully the systems of materialism: their authors declare that to have recourse to god in order to account for the universe is a puerile conception unworthy of science, because all explanation must be referred to fixed and immutable laws; and then you will be for ever surprising them in the very act of the adoration of _circumstances_. convenient deities these, which they summon to their aid in cases which they find embarrassing. but we will not insist on these preliminary considerations. we have allowed, for argument's sake, that all organized beings have proceeded by means of generation from cellules presenting to sensible observation similar appearances. natural history cannot prove, nor even attempt to prove, more. let us transport ourselves, in thought, to the moment at which the highest points of the continents were for the first time emerging from the primitive ocean. we see, on the parts of the soil which are half-dried, and in certain conditions of heat and electricity, particles of matter draw together and form those rudiments of organism which are called living cellules. these cellules have the marvellous faculty of self-propagation, and the faculty, not less marvellous, of transmitting to their posterity the favorable modifications which they have undergone. generations succeed one another; gradually they form separate branches. new characteristics show themselves; the organisms become complicated, and becoming complicated they separate. the vegetable is distinguished from the animal; the plant which will become the palm-tree is distinguished from the oak which is in course of formation, and the ancestor of the future bird is already different from that of the fish. we follow up this great spectacle. the ages pass, they pass by thousands and by millions, they pass by tens of millions. we need not be stinting in our allowance of time; our imagination will be tired of conceiving of it sooner than thought of supplying it. and at what shall we have arrived at last? at the universe as it has been for some few thousands of years past; at the world with its vegetables of a thousand forms, grouped by classes and series, with the families of animals, with the relations of animals to plants, with the unnumbered harmonies of nature. let us choose out one particular, on which to fix our attention. shall it be a she-goat- upstretched on fragrant cytisus to browse? this will suit our purpose, although the cytisus, unless i am mistaken, has no perfume except in m. de lamartine's verses. let us fix our attention on a cytisus with its yellow clusters hanging down, and the goat bending its pliant branches as it browses on the foliage. here is a very small detail in the ample lap of nature. let us come closer, and to help our ignorance, let us provide ourselves with a naturalist who will answer for us the questions suggested by this simple spectacle. and what have we now before us? the various relations of the animal's organization to the vegetables on which it feeds. in the organization and functions of these two living beings, in the equilibrium and movements of their frames, in the circulation of sap and of blood, we have the application of the most secret laws of mechanism, of physics, and of chemistry. then again, in the relations which the animal and the plant sustain with the ground which bears them, with the air they breathe, with the sun which enlightens them, with heat and light, with the moisture of the air and its electricity--in all this we see the universal relations which connect all the various parts of the wide universe with each one of its minutest details. in this simple spectacle we have, in fact, reciprocal relations, the balance of things, the harmony which maintains the universal life--intelligence, in short, in the organization of beings, in the characteristics which divide them, in the classes which unite them, in the relations of these classes amongst themselves;--wonders of intelligent design, of which the sciences we are so proud of are spelling out, letter by letter, line after line, the inexhaustible abysses: this is what we find everywhere. let us now come back to our primitive cellules. all the living beings which people the surface of the globe are composed materially of some of the elements of the earth's substance. the birth therefore of the first living beings could only offer to the view the bringing together of some of the elements of the soil; this is not the matter in question. the primitive cellules were to all appearance alike. weighed in scales, opened by the scalpel, placed beneath the microscope, they would have offered no appreciable difference; i grant it: it is the supposition we have agreed to make. therefore they were identical, say you. i deny it, and here is my proof: if the cellules had been identical, they would not have given, in the successive development of their generations, the diverse beings which people the world, and the relations which unite them. alike to your eyes, the cellules differed therefore by a concealed property which their development brought to light. you have told me as a matter of history how the organization of the world was manifested by slow degrees; you have given me no account of the cause of that organization. it is said in reply: "we do know the origin of those developments which you refer to a supposed intelligence. the living beings are transformed by the action of food, climate, soil, mode of life. they experience slight variations in the first instance; but these variations are established, and increase; and where you see a plan, types, and species, there is really only the result of modifications slowly accumulated. nature disposes of periods which have no limit, and everything has come at its proper time, in the course of ages." they are always proposing to us to accept of time as the substitute for intelligence. i am tempted to say with alcestis: time in this matter, sirs, has nought to do.[127] you know what intelligence is; you know it by knowing yourself. is there, or is there not, intelligence in the universe? allow me to reproduce some old questions: if a machine implies intelligence, does the universe imply none? if a telescope implies intelligence in the optician, does the eye imply none in its author? the production of a variety of the camelia, or of a new breed of swine, demands of the gardener and the breeder the patient and prolonged employment of the understanding; and are our entire flora and fauna to be explained without any intervention of mind? and if there is intelligence in the universe, is this intelligence a chemical result of the combination of molecules? is it a physical result of caloric or of electricity? it is in vain that you give to material agents an unlimited time; what has time to do here? whether the world as it now exists arose out of nothing, or whether it was slowly formed during thousands of ages, the question remains the same. with matter and time, you will not succeed in creating intelligence; this were an operation of transcendent alchemy utterly beyond our power. in the theory of _slow causes_, the adjective ends by devouring the substantive; it seems that by dint of becoming slow the causes become superfluous. a breath of reason upsets, like a house of cards, the structures of this erring and misnamed science. time has a relative meaning and value. we reckon duration as long or short, by taking human life as our measure. but they tell of insects which are born in the morning, arrive at mature age at mid-day, and only reach the evening if they are patriarchs of their race. is it not easy to conceive of beings organized for an existence such that our centuries would be moments with them, and centuries heaped together one of our hours? suppose one of these beings to be contemplating our geological periods, and slow causes will to him appear rapid causes, and the question of intelligence will be the same for him as for us. it is manifest that the attempt is being made to restore the worship of the old _chronos_, to whom the ancients had erected temples. let us look the idol in the face. time appears at first to our imagination as the great destroyer. he is armed with a scythe, and passes gaunt and bald over the ruins of all that has lived. when he lifts up his great voice and cries- mighty nations famed in story into darkness i have hurled,- gone their myriads and their glory (lo! ye follow) from the world: my dark shade for ever covers stars i quenched as on they rolled:-the beautiful, and frightened girl in the song is not singular as she exclaims in her terror: ah! we're young, and we are lovers, spare us, reaper gaunt and old![128] such is the first impression which time makes upon us. but birth succeeds to death. from an inexhaustible spring, nature sends gushing forth new products and new developments. youth full of hope trips lightly over the ground, without a thought that the ground it treads on is the vast cemetery of all past generations. if we fix our thoughts on the permanence of life and the manifestations of progress, time appears to us as the great producer. destroyer of all that is, producer of all that is to be, time has thus a double form. it is a mysterious tide, ever rising and ever receding; it is the power of death, and it is the power of life. all this, gentlemen, is for the imagination. in the view of a calm reason, time is the simply negative condition of all development, as space is the negative condition of all motion. just as without bodies and forces infinite space could not produce any motion; so, without the action of causes, ages heaped on ages could neither produce nor destroy a single atom of matter, or a single element of intelligence. time is the scene of life and of death; it neither causes to be born, nor to die. the struggle which we are now maintaining against the philosophers of matter is as ancient as science, and was going on, nearly in the same terms, more than two thousand three hundred years ago. about five hundred years before the christian era was born at clazomenã¦, a city of ionia, the son of eubulus, who was to become famous by the name of anaxagoras. he fixed his abode at athens, and the athenian people gave him a glorious surname,--they called him _intelligence_. on what account? there were taught at that time doctrines which explained the world by the transformations of matter rising progressively to life and thought, without the intervention of a mind. the philosopher anaximander gave out that the first animals had their origin in the watery element, and became modified by living in drier regions, so that man was only a fish slowly transformed. "i am quite willing to grant it," replied anaxagoras; "but for your transformations there must be a transforming principle. matter is the material of the world, no doubt; but it could not produce universal order except as ruled by intelligence." the athenians admired this discovery. for us, gentlemen, the discovery has been made a long while. let us not then be talking in this discussion about modern science and the lights of the age. our natural history is much advanced as compared with that of the greeks; but the vital question has not varied. does nature manifest the intervention of a directing mind, or do we see in it only a fortuitous aggregation of atoms? intelligence radiates from the face of nature, and it is in vain that men endeavor to veil its splendor. nevertheless i consent to forget all that has just been said, in order to intrench myself in an argument, which of itself is sufficient for the object we have in view to-day. our object is to prove that material science does not contain the explanation of all the realities of the universe. even though they had succeeded in persuading us that there is no intelligence in nature, it would still be necessary to explain the origin of that intelligence which is in us, and the existence of which cannot be disputed. whence proceeds the mind which is in ourselves? let us first of all give our attention to a strange contradiction. those savants who make of the human soul a simple manifestation of matter, are the same who wish to explain nature without the intervention of the divine intelligence. in order to keep out of view the design which is displayed in the organization of the world, they take a pleasure in finding nature at fault, and in pointing out its imperfections. still, they do not pretend to be able to do better than nature; they would not undertake the responsibility of correcting the laws of life, and regulating the course of the seasons. they do not say, "we could make a better world," but "we can imagine a world more perfect than our own." now what is our answer? simply this: "you are right." nature is not the supreme perfection, and therefore we will not worship it. how admirable soever be the visible universe, we have the faculty of conceiving more and better. we understand that the atmosphere might be purified, so that the tempest should not engulf the ships, nor the thunderbolt produce the conflagration. we dream of mountain-heights more majestic than the loftiest summits of our alps, of waters more transparent than the pure crystal of our lakes, of valleys fresher and more peaceful than the loveliest which hide among our hills. the spectacle of nature awakens in us the powers of thought, and the sentiment of beauty draws us on to the pursuit of an ideal which surpasses all realities. nature is not perfect: let us be forward to acknowledge it, and let us draw from the fact its legitimate consequence. the stream cannot rise higher than its source. if man conceives an ideal superior to nature, he is not himself the mere product of nature. by what strange contradiction is it affirmed at once that our spirit overpasses the bounds of all the realities which encompass it, and that it has not a source more elevated than those realities? listen to a thought of that weighty writer montesquieu:[129] "those who have said that a blind fatality has produced all the effects which we see in the world, have said a great absurdity; for what greater absurdity than a blind fatality which should have produced intelligent beings?" without restricting ourselves to this simple and solid argument, let us see how they will explain man by nature. for this end, we must examine the theory of the perfected monkey, which, introduced to us by the lectures of professor vogt and the spirited rejoinders of m. de rougemont, made a great noise as it descended a short time ago from the mountains of neuchã¢tel.[130] a celebrated orator said one day to an assembly of frenchmen: "i am long, gentlemen; but it is your own fault: it is your glory that i am recounting." have not i the right to say to you: "i am long, gentlemen, but it is worth while to be so; it is our own dignity which is in question." man is a perfected monkey! i have three preliminary observations to make before i proceed to the direct examination of this theory. in the first place, this definition transgresses the first and most essential rules of logic. we must always define what is unknown by what is known. this is an elementary principle. what a man is, i know. to think, to will, to enjoy, to hope, to fear, are functions of the mental life. these words answer to clear ideas, because those ideas result directly from our personal consciousness. but what is the soul of a monkey? the nature of animals is a mystery, one which is perhaps incapable of solution, and which, in all cases is wrapped in profound darkness, because the animal appears to us an intermediate link between the mechanism of nature and the functions of the spiritual life, which are the only two conceptions we have that are really clear and distinct. in taking the monkey therefore as our point of departure for the definition of man, we are defining what is clear by what is obscure. my second remark is this: if it is affirmed that there is but one species, including all the animals and man, so that man is only a monkey modified, and the monkey, in its turn, an inferior animal modified; when once we have established the reality of man we arrive at this result: all animals whatsoever are only inferior developments of humanity, living foetuses which, without having come to their full term, have nevertheless the faculty of living and reproducing themselves. the animal then is an incomplete man; a theory which raises great difficulties, but which is more serious and more easy to understand than the doctrine which would have man to be a consummation of the monkey. in fact,--and this is my third observation,--when the theory which i am examining is adopted, it must be carried out to its consequences, and the bearing of it clearly seen. man, it is said, is the consummation of the monkey. the monkey is an improvement upon some quadruped or other, and this quadruped is an improvement upon another, and so on. we must descend, in an inevitable logical series, to the most elementary manifestations of life, and thence, finally, to matter. if it is not admitted that pure matter is a man in a state of torpor, it must be admitted that man is a _mã©lange_ of carbon, oxygen, hydrogen, azote, phosphorus--a _mã©lange_ which has been brought little by little to perfection. such is the final inference from the doctrine which we are examining; and there are theorists who deduce it clearly. now what is it that goes on in the minds of these savants? when the object is to banish god from nature, the creative intelligence is resolved into thousands of ages. when it is desired to get rid in man of the reality of mind, they seek to resolve the human intelligence into a long series of modifications which have caused life to spring from matter, superior animals from simpler organisms, and man from the animal. do not allow yourselves to be caught in this trap. maintain firmly, that, whatever the degree of intelligence, of will, of spiritual essence, which may exist in animals, if that element is really found in them, it demands a cause, and cannot, without an enormous confusion of ideas, be regarded as a mere perfecting of matter. in fact, a thing in perfecting itself, realizes continually more fully its own proper idea, and does not become another thing. a perfect monkey would be of all monkeys the one which is most a monkey, and would not be a man. but let us leave the animals in the darkness in which they abide for our minds, and let us speak of what for us is less obscure. our spiritual existence is a fact; it is of all facts the one which is best known to us; it is the fact without which no other fact would exist for us. and whence proceeds our spirit? to this question, natural history has no answer. it is easy to see this, though we grant once again to natural history, when made the most of by our adversaries, all that it can pretend to claim. suppose it proved, that in the historical development of nature, man has a monkey for his mother. i will grant it, and grant it quite seriously in order to ascertain what will be the influence of this hypothesis upon the problem on which we are engaged. if all monkeys were fossils, and if we had a natural history, also fossil, setting forth to us the customs and habits of these animals; if the savages that are said to be the nearest neighbors to monkeys were all fossils; we should find ourselves in presence of a progressive and continued development of beings, and, for an inattentive mind, all would be easily explained by the slow and continued action of time. but this is not the case. all the elements of nature are before our eyes, from inorganic matter up to man. we do not see that time suffices for savages to become civilized, and still less for monkeys to become men. i was, in the spring of this year, in the _jardin des plantes_ at paris, musing on the question which we are discussing, and i took a good look at the monkeys. come now, i said to myself, canst thou recognize them as thine ancestors? the question was badly put. the monkeys are not our ancestors, inasmuch as they are living at the same time with us; they can only be our cousins, and it would seem that they are the eldest branch, as they have best preserved the primitive type. but let us speak more seriously. the races of monkeys have lived as long or longer than we: it is neither time nor climate which has made men of them. recollect, i pray you, that the words 'time' and 'progress' explain nothing. there must have occurred favorable circumstances to transform the earth's substance into living cellules, and the living cellules into plants clearly marked, and into animals properly so called; and in the same way there must have been a propitious circumstance to transform the monkey into man. i think so, in fact; and this propitious circumstance well deserves to be studied with attention. man presents characteristics which distinguish him profoundly from the animal races: no one disputes it. he possesses speech; he is capable of religion; he exhibits the varied phenomena of civilization, while the animals succeed one another generations after generations in the unrecorded obscurity of a life for ever the same. suppose we admit that human phenomena presented themselves at first in a very elementary form; in rudiments of language and rudiments of religion,--although the historical sciences do not quite give this result:--still suppose the case that at a given moment a branch of the monkey species presented the germ, as little developed as you please, but real, of new phenomena. one variety of the monkey species has been endowed with speech, has become religious, capable of civilization, and the other varieties of the species have not offered the same characteristics, although they have had the same number of ages in which to develop themselves. observe well now my process of reasoning. remark attentively whether i oppose theories to facts, whether i substitute oratorical declamations for arguments. i grant the hypotheses best calculated, as commonly thought, to contradict my theses. i assume that natural history demonstrates by solid proofs that the first man was carried in the bosom of a monkey; and i ask: what is the circumstance which set apart in the animal species a branch which presented new phenomena? what is the cause? that monkey-author of our race which one day began to speak in the midst of his brother-monkeys, amongst whom thenceforward he had no fellow; that monkey, that stood erect in the sense of his dignity; that, looking up to heaven, said, my god! and that, retiring into himself, said: i!--that monkey which, while the female monkeys continued to give birth to their young, had sons by the partner of his life and pressed them to his heart; that monkey--what shall we say of it? what climate, what soil, what regimen, what food, what heat, what moisture, what drought, what light, what combination of phosphorus, what disengagement of electricity, separated from the animal races, not only man, but human society? humanity with its combats, its falls, its risings again, its sorrows and its joys, its tears and its smiles; humanity with its arts, its sciences, its religion, its history in short, its history and its hopes of immortality? that monkey, what shall we say of it? do you not see that the breath of the spirit passed over it, and that god said unto it: behold, thou art made in mine image: remember now thy father who is in heaven? do you not see that though we grant everything to the extreme pretensions of naturalists, the question comes up again whole and entire? when by dint of confusions and sophisms such theorists imagine that they have extinguished the intelligence which radiates from nature, that intelligence again confronts them in man, and there, as in an impregnable fortress, sets all attacks at defiance. mark then where lies the real problem. whether the eternal god formed the body of the first man directly from the dust of the earth; or whether, in the slow series of ages, he formed the body of the first man of the dust of the earth, by making it pass through the long series of animality--the question is a grave one, but it is of secondary importance. the first question is to know whether we are merely the ephemeral product of the encounter of atoms, or whether there is in us an essence, a nature, a soul, a reality in short, with which may connect itself another future than the dissolution of the sepulchre; whether there remains another hope than annihilation as the term of our latest sorrows, or, for the aspirants after fame, only that evanescent memory which time bears away with everything beside. this is the question. do not allow it to be put out of sight beneath details of physiology and researches of natural history, which can neither settle, nor so much as touch the problem. if therefore you fall in with any one of these philosophers of matter, bid him take this for all your answer: "there is one fact which stands out against your theory and suffices to overthrow it: that fact is--myself!" and since, to have the better of materialism, it is sufficient to understand well what is one thought of the mind, one throb of the spiritual heart, one utterance of the conscience,--add boldly with corneille's medea: i,--i say,--and it is enough. in fact, nature does not explain man, and to this conclusion has tended all that i have said to you to-day. footnotes: [97] _harmonices mundi, libri quinque._ [98] _philosophi㦠naturalis principia mathematica._ [99] the whole universe is full of his magnificence. may this god be adored and invoked for ever! [100] _le rationalisme_, page 19. [101] _force et matiã¨re_, page 262. [102] _les mondes causeries astronomiques_ by guillemin; see p. 122 (3rd edition), where kepler is described as an intelligence "penetrated by a profound faith in nature and exalted by a noble pride." see also pages 327 and 336. [103] the question discussed in these pages must not be confounded with that of the relations between the science of nature and the documents of revelation. whether nature can be explained without god is one question. whether geology is in accordance with the language of the book of genesis is another question, as regards both its nature and its importance. this latter subject does not come within the scope of these lectures. i will merely call attention to the fact, that if nature and the sacred text are fixed elements, this is not the case with the interpretations of theologians, and the results of geology. it is difficult to pronounce upon the exact relation of two quantities more or less indeterminate. [104] in the writings of m. de rougemont, if i am not mistaken. [105] _systema naturã¦._ [106] ps. civ. 24. [107] _biographie universelle._ [108] _a. p. de candolle_, by a. de la rive, pp. 12 and 13. [109] m. vaucher's principal title to scientific distinction is his _histoire des conferves d'eau douce_, genã¨ve, an xi (1803), 4â°. [110] _comptes rendus de l'acadã©mie des sciences_ of 20 april, 1863, page 738. [111] exeter hall lectures--_the power of god in his animal creation_, pamphlet in 12mo. this remarkable lecture contains a twofold protest--against the blindness of those savants who fail to recognize the presence of god in nature; and against the pretensions of those theologians who attack the certain results of the study of nature, relying upon texts more or less accurately interpreted. [112] _chemistry applied to agriculture and to physiology_ (in german). seventh edition. introd. page 69. [113] since these words were spoken, m. de la rive has been named an associated member of the institute of france (academy of sciences), and thus elevated to the first of scientific dignities. it might be shown, i believe, that the greater number of the eight associates of the academy of sciences to be found in the world, make profession of their faith in god the creator, the almighty and holy one. the silence which others may have preserved on the subject would, moreover, be no authority for concluding that they do not share in beliefs and sentiments which they have not had the occasion perhaps of publicly expressing. [114] _on the origin of species_, page 81. fifth edition. [115] _on the origin of species_. the text is--"the _necessary_ series of facts;" but it would be to do the writer wrong to impute to him the idea that observation reveals to us what is _necessary_, in the philosophical import of the word. [116] _on the origin of species._ [117] caro, _l'idã©e de dieu_, page 47. [118] _force et matiã¨re_, page 181. [119] the bã¼chner proceeding is found again pretty exactly in _les mondes_ of m. amã©dã©e guillemin. this writer affirms (page 60 of the third edition) that science does not approach metaphysical questions; and asserts in the same page, ten lines further on, that astronomical experience leads our reason to the idea of _the eternity of the universe_. after that, he may laugh, if he will, at _lovers of the absolute_. [120] see in particular the _revue des deux mondes_, passim. [121] s'enivrait en marchant du plaisir de la voir. [122] see the lecture above mentioned. [123] _lettres sur les etats-unis d'amã©rique_, by lieutenant-colonel ferri pisani, page 400.--letter of 25 sept. 1861. [124] on the origin of species, in the _archives des sciences de la bibliothã¨que universelle_, march, 1860. [125] vous coulez des moucherons. [126] in his _principes de philosophie zoologique_, a collection of answers made by geoffroy, in the discussions of the _acadã©mie des sciences_, in 1830. [127] voyons, messieurs, le temps ne fait rien ã  l'affaire. [128] sur cent premiers peuples cã©lã¨bres, j'ai plongã© cent peuples fameux, dans un abã®me de tã©nã¨bres oã¹ vous disparaã®trez comme eux. j'ai couvert d'une ombre ã©ternelle des astres ã©teints dans leur cours. --ah! par pitiã©, lui dit ma belle, vieillard, ã©pargnez nos amours! [129] _esprit des lois_, bk. i. chap. 1. [130] _leã§ons sur l'homme_, by carl vogt (lectures delivered during the winter of 1862-1863, at neuchã¢tel and at chaux-de-fonds), 1 vol. 8vo. paris, 1865.--_l'homme et le singe_, by frã©dã©ric de rougemont, pamphlet, 12mo. neuchã¢tel, 1863. lecture v. _humanity._ (at geneva, 1st. dec., 1863.) gentlemen, man has need of god. if he be not fallen into the most abject degradation, he does not succeed in extinguishing the instinct which leads him to inquire after his creator. a false wisdom labors to still the cravings which the truth alone can satisfy; but false wisdom remains powerless, and betrays itself continually by some outrageous contradiction. here is a curious example of this: in a book which was famous in the last century, and which was called the gospel of atheism,[131] the baron d'holbach explains as follows the existence of the universe: "the universe, that vast assemblage of all that exists, everywhere presents to our view only matter and motion.--nature is the grand whole which results from the assemblage of different material substances, from their different combinations, and from the different motions which we see in the universe."[132] here is a clear doctrine: all that exists, the soul included, is nothing but matter in motion. i pass from the beginning to the end of the work, and i arrive at this conclusion: "o nature! sovereign of all beings! and ye, her adorable daughters, virtue, reason, truth! be ye for ever our sole divinities; to you it is that the incense and the homage of the earth are due."[133] if we try to translate this sort of hymn in accordance with the express definitions of the author, we shall obtain the following result: "o matter in motion! sovereign of all material substances in motion! and ye, virtue, reason, truth, who are various names of matter which moves, be ye the only divinities of that moving matter which is ourselves." yet this author was no blockhead. what then passed in his mind? he laid down the thesis of materialism: bodies in motion are the only reality. but he is all the while a man. the need for adoration is not destroyed in his soul, and he deceives himself. he defines nature as consisting wholly of matter, and when he sets himself to worship it, he entirely forgets his definition. this is not on his part a piece of philosophical jugglery, but the manifestation of the real condition of our nature, which is always giving the lie, in one direction or another, to erroneous systems. the power of wholly maintaining himself in error has not been granted to man. he who denies god is always deifying something; and all worship which is not that of the eternal and infinite mind is stultified by glaring contradictions. here is a recent example of this: we were not a little surprised a short time since to see m. ernest renan deny clearly enough the immortality of our persons, and, in the opening of the very book in which this negation appears, to find him invoking the soul of his sister at rest with god.[134] elsewhere, the same writer says that the infinite being does not exist, that absolute reason and absolute justice exist only in humanity, and he concludes his exposition of these views by an invocation of the heavenly father.[135] the baron d'holbach had put eight hundred and thirty-nine pages between his materialistic definition of the universe and his invocation of nature. now-a-days everything goes faster; and m. renan places but a few pages of the _revue des deux mondes_ between his denial of god and his prayer to the heavenly father. with this difference, which is to the advantage of the writer of the eighteenth century, the process is absolutely the same. the philosopher declares god to be an imaginary being, and the future life an illusion; but the man protests, and, by a touching illusion of the heart, the man who in his system of doctrine has neither god nor hope, finds that he has a sister in the realms eternal, and a father in the heavens. it is impossible not to see, especially in literary works destined to a success of fashion, the seductive influence of art, the precautions of prudence, the concessions made to public opinion; but we cannot wholly explain the incredible contradictions of the holbachs and renans, without allowing full weight to that need for god which shows itself even in the farthest wanderings of human thought by sudden and abrupt returns. the illusion which deifies matter in motion is gross enough. it belongs only to minds which cicero called, in the aristocratic pride of a roman gentleman, the plebeians of philosophy.[136] it requires, in fact, no great reflection to understand that truth, beauty, and goodness are neither atoms nor a certain movement of atoms. the attempt, which is to form the subject of our study to-day, that of deifying man, is a far more subtle one. let us first of all inquire into the origin of the strange worship which humanity accords to itself. nature, considered separately from the beings which receive sensible impressions from it, has neither heat nor light. in a world peopled by the blind, light would have no name. if all men were entirely paralyzed as to their sensations, the idea of heat would not exist. light and heat, regarded as existing in matter itself, without reference to sensitive organizations, are, in the opinion of our natural philosophers, only determinate movements. in the same way, if nature were without any spectator whatever, beauty would not exist; if there were nowhere any intelligence, truth would no longer be. in the same way again, if there were no wills, goodness, which is nothing else than the law of the will, would be a word deprived of all meaning. beauty expresses the object of the perceptions of the soul. truth denotes the quality of the judgments of intelligences. goodness (i speak of moral goodness) expresses a certain direction of the free will. there exists no means of causing to proceed from nature, or from matter, the attributes of the spiritual being. this is only done by imaginary transformations, by a course of arrant juggling. the flame does not feel its own heat, light does not see itself, the planets know nothing of the laws of kepler. materialism is the result of a modesty wholly misplaced which leads man to forget himself, in order to attribute gratuitously to nature realities which exist only in spiritual beings connected with nature by a marvellous harmony. in order therefore to account for the universe, we must raise ourselves above the atom in motion, and penetrate into a higher world where truth, beauty, goodness become the objects of thought. truth, beauty, goodness conduct the mind to god, their eternal source. but there is a philosophy which endeavors to stop midway in the ascent of the divine ladder, and thinks to satisfy itself in the contemplation of the true, the beautiful, the good, without connecting them with their cause. this philosophy considers the true, the beautiful, the good, as ideas which exist by themselves, without a supreme spirit of which they are the manifestation. it has received, in consequence, the name of idealism. to conceive of ideas without a mind, ideas having an existence by themselves, is a thing impossible; such a conception is expressed by words which give back a hollow sound, because they contain nothing. we have already stated this thesis; let us now confirm it by an example. a literary frenchman, m. taine, would make us understand in what manner the universe may be explained without reference to god, and by means of a pure idea. listen well, not to understand, but to make sure that you do not understand: "the universe forms a unique being, indivisible, of which all the beings are members. at the supreme summit of things, at the highest point of the luminous and inaccessible ether, pronounces itself the eternal axiom; and the prolonged resounding of this creative formula composes, by its inexhaustible undulations, the immensity of the universe. every form, every change, every movement, every idea is one of its acts."[137] m. taine is a man of humor, and the burlesque has a place in his philosophical writings; but in the words which i have just read to you he seems to have intended seriously to expound the system which replaces god by an idea. try now to form a definite conception of this universe composed of the undulations of an axiom. do you understand how an axiom undulates, and how the heavens and the earth are only the undulations of an axiom? making all allowance for rhetoric and figures, do you understand what can be the acts of an axiom, and how an axiom _pronounces itself_ without being pronounced? you do not understand it, as neither do i. such doctrines, then, as we have said, can only be the portion of a small number of thinkers who have lost, by dint of abstraction, the sentiment of reality. the ideas--truth, beauty, good--will only exist for the common order of men, under such a system, in the human mind, where we have cognizance of them; and thenceforward, the ideal, or god, is nothing else than the image of humanity which contemplates itself in a sort of mirage. thus it is that the adoration of man by man is disengaged from the high theories of idealism. let us proceed to the examination of this worship, which is cried up now-a-days in divers parts of the intellectual globe. i open the _revue des deux mondes_, of the 15th february, 1861. as the author of the article i refer to[138] appears to admit "that one assertion is not more true than another opposed to it,"[139] we will not be so simple as to ask whether he adopts the opinions which he propounds. he presents to us, in a rapid sketch, the principal tendencies of the modern mind. the modern mind is here characterized by one of its declared partisans; you will not take therefore for a wicked caricature the picture which he puts before us. here then are the thoughts of the modern mind: "there is only one infinite, that of our desires and our aspirations, that of our needs and our efforts.[140] the true, the beautiful, the just are perpetually occurring; they are for ever in course of self-formation, because they are nothing else than the human mind, which, in unfolding itself, finds and knows itself again."[141] this is only the french translation of a saying celebrated in germany: "god is not: he becomes." what we call god is the human mind. what was there at the beginning of things? the human mind, which did not know itself. what will there be in the end? the human mind, which, in unfolding itself, will have come to know itself, and will adore itself as the supreme god. if this be indeed the final object of the universe, it appears that, in the opinion of these philosophers, the consummation of all things must be near. once that humanity, faithful to their doctrine, shall have pronounced the lofty utterance, "i am god, and there is none else," the world will no longer have any reason for existing. such is the system of which we have to follow out the consequences. let us take as our point of comparison the old ideas which we are urged to abandon. we usually explain human destinies by the concurrence of two causes, infinitely distinct, since the one is creative and the other created, but both of which we hold for real: man, and god. humanity has received from its author the free power which we call will, and the law of that will which we name conscience. the law proceeds from god, the liberty proceeds from god; but the acts of the created will, when it violates its law and revolts against its author, are the creation of the creature. god is the eternal source of good, and liberty is a good; but god is not the source of evil, which is distinctly a revolt against him, the abuse of the first of his gifts. together with will, man has received understanding, and gives himself to the search after truth. truth is the object of the understanding, its divine law. error is a deviation from the law of the understanding, as evil is a deviation from the law of the will. lastly, with will and understanding, man has received the faculty of feeling. this faculty applies itself to the world of bodies, from which we receive pain or pleasure. but our faculty of feeling does not stop there. above the animal life, the mind has enjoyments which are proper to it, and the object of which is beauty. beauty is not only in nature and in works of art, it is everywhere, in whatever attracts our love. the sciences are beautiful, and the harmony of the truths which are discovered in their order and mutual dependence causes us to experience a feeling similar to that produced by the most delightful music. virtue is beautiful; it shines in the view of the conscience with the purest brightness, and, as was said by one of the ancients, if it could reveal itself to our eyes in a sensible form, it would excite in our souls feelings of inexpressible love. vice is ugly when once stripped of the delusive fascination of the passions; the vicious excesses of the lower nature are ugly and repulsive as soon as the intoxication is over. error is ugly too; there are no beautiful errors but those which contain a larger portion of truth than the prosaic verities, which are nothing else than falsehoods put in a specious way. beauty therefore is the law of our feelings, as truth is the law of our thought, and good the law of our will. we will not inquire now what secret relations shall one day bring together in an indissoluble unity of light, the good, the true, and the beautiful, and in a unity of darkness, evil, deformity, and falsehood. let it suffice to have pointed out how a threefold aspiration leads man to god, under the guidance of the conscience, the understanding, and the feelings; and that a threefold rebellion estranges him from god, by sinking him into the dark regions of deformity, error, and evil. humanity has therefore a law; it has been endowed with liberty, but that a liberty of which the legitimate end is determined. it advances towards this end, or it swerves from it. there is a rule above its acts. the thing as it is may not be the thing as it ought to be; rebellion is not obedience, and good is not evil. all these consequences are included in the idea of creation. the struggle between two opposite principles, a struggle which sums up human destiny, is a fact of which each one of us can easily assure himself in his own person. what will happen when man, sensible of the law of his nature, and conscious of this struggle, proceeds to encounter humanity? each one of us carries humanity in his own bosom. but humanity, the character of man which is common to us, and which makes the spiritual unity of our species, is found to be altered by the influence of places, times, and circumstances. our reason is encumbered by prejudices of birth and education, and by such as we have ourselves created in our minds in the exercise of our will. our sense of beauty is vitiated and narrowed by local influences and habits. our conscience is likewise subjected to influences which impair its free manifestation. every one needs to enlarge his horizon. by seeking occasions of intercourse with our fellows, we shall learn to discriminate true and eternal beauty in the diversity of its manifestations; we shall distinguish the truth from the individual prepossessions of our own minds; good and evil, disengaged from the narrownesses of habit, will appear to us in their real and enduring nature. our taste will be formed, our conscience purified, our mind enlarged; we shall more and more become men, in the high and full acceptation of the term. in order that the meeting together of the individual and of humanity may produce such fruits, god must dwell continually in the sanctuary of the conscience. the inner light is kindled in the intercourse of the soul with its creator; it is afterwards brightened and nurtured by the soul's intercourse with the traces of god which humanity reveals. but this light makes manifest within us, and without us, great darkness. we have no right to abandon ourselves to every spectacle which strikes our view. if, in presence of what is passing in the world, we are tempted to regard the prosperity of the wicked with cowardly envy; if we would fill up, for the satisfaction of our evil desires, the abyss which separates the holy from the impure, the inner voice lifts itself up and cries to us: "woe! woe to them who call evil good, and good evil."[142] god is our master, even as he is our good and our hope. the fact of the revolts of humanity can have no effect against his sovereign will. soldiers in the service of the almighty, life is for us a conflict, and duty imposes on us a combat. such, sirs, is the explanation of our destinies, an old, and, if you like, a vulgar one. let us now give our attention to the doctrine which deifies humanity, and follow out its consequences. humanity carries within its bosom the idea of truth, the love of beauty, the sense of good. what does it need more? these noble aspirations mark for it the end of its efforts. what will be wanting to a life regulated by duty, enlightened by truth, ennobled by art? what will be wanting to such a life? nothing, or everything. nothing, if the search after good, truth, and beauty leads to god. everything, if it be sought to carry it on without any reference to god, because from the moment that man desires to be the source of light to himself, the light will be changed into darkness, as we said at the beginning of this lecture. put god out of view, and good, beauty, and truth will disappear; while you will see produced the decline of art, the dissolution of thought in scepticism, the absolute negation of morality. let us consider with the attention it deserves, and in contemporary examples, this sad and curious spectacle. i open a treatise by m. taine. the english historian macaulay speaks of literary men who "have taken pains to strip vice of its odiousness, to render virtue ridiculous, to rank adultery among the elegant fashions and obligatory achievements of a man of taste." the honest englishman takes the liberty to judge and to condemn men who have made so pernicious a use of their talents. this pretension to make the conscience speak is in the eyes of the french man of letters a gothic prejudice. listen how he expresses himself on the subject: "criticism in france has freer methods.--when we try to give an account of the life, or to describe the character, of a man, we are quite willing to consider him simply as an object of painting or of science.... we do not judge him, we only wish to represent him to the eyes and to set him intelligibly before the reason. we are curious inquirers and nothing more. that peter or paul was a knave matters little to us, that was the business of his contemporaries, who suffered from his vices--at this day we are out of his reach, and hatred has disappeared with the danger--i experience neither aversion nor disgust; i have left these feelings at the gate of history, and i taste the very deep and very pure pleasure of seeing a soul act according to a definite law--."[143] you understand, gentlemen: the distinction between good and evil, as that between error and truth; these are old sandals which must be put off before entering into the temple of history; and the man of the nineteenth century, if he has taste and information, is merely an historian, and nothing more. the sacred emotion which generous actions produce in us, the indignation stirred in us by baseness and cruelty, are childish emotions which are to disappear in order that we may be free to contemplate vice and virtue with a pleasure always equal, very deep, and very pure. we have not here the aberration of a young and ill-regulated mind, but the doctrine of a school. i open again the _revue des deux mondes_, and there i encounter the theory of which m. taine has made the application: "we no longer know anything of morals, but of manners; of principles, but of facts. we explain everything, and, as has been said, the mind ends _by approving of all that it explains_. modern virtue is summed up in toleration.[144]--immense novelty! that which is, has for us the right to be.[145]--in the eyes of the modern savant, all is true, all is right in its own place. the place of each thing constitutes its truth."[146] i cut short the enumeration of these enormities. all rule has disappeared, all morality is destroyed; there is no longer any difference between right and fact, between what is and what ought to be. and what is the real account to give of all this? it is as follows: humanity is the highest point of the universe; above it there is nothing; humanity is god, if we consent to take that sacred name in a new sense. how then is it to be judged? in the name of what rule? since there is no rule: in the name of what law? since there is no law. all judgment is a personal prejudice, the act of a narrow mind. we do not judge god, we simply recount his dealings; we accept all his acts, and record them with equal veneration. all science is only a history, and the first requisite in a historian is to reduce to silence his conscience and his reason, as sorry and deceitful exhibitions of his petty personality, in order to accept all the acts of the humanity-deity, and establish their mutual connection. the deification of the human mind is the justification of all its acts, and, by a direct consequence, the annihilation of all morality. let us look more in detail at the origin and development of these notions. the individual placing himself before humanity is to accept everything: this is the disposition recommended to us, in the name of the modern mind. good and evil are narrow measures which minds behind the age persist, ridiculously enough, in wishing to apply to things. "we no longer transform the world to our image by bringing it to our standard; _on the contrary, we allow ourselves to be modified and fashioned by it_."[147] the individual goes therefore to meet humanity without any inner rule: he gives himself up, he abandons himself to the spectacle of facts. but the world is large, and history is long. even those who spend their whole life in nothing else than in satisfying their curiosity, cannot see and know everything. to what then shall be directed that vague look, equally attracted to all points for want of any fixed rule? at what shall it stop? it will rest on that which shines most brilliantly, like a moth attracted by light. now, nothing shines more brightly than success; nothing more solicits the attention. the glorification of success is the first and most infallible consequence of moral indifference. in leaving ourselves to be fashioned by the world instead of bringing it to our standard, we shall begin by according our esteem to victory. this philosophy is come to us from germany. it was set forth on one occasion, in france, with great _ã©clat_, by the brilliant eloquence of a man who has rendered signal services to philosophy, and whose entire works must not be judged of by the single particular which i am about to mention. in the year 1829, m. cousin was developing at the sorbonne the meaning of these verses of la fontaine, which introduce the fable of the wolf and the lamb: la raison du plus fort est toujours la meilleure: je vais le montrer tout ã  l'heure. he had written as the programme of one of his lectures: _morality of victory_. now see how he justified this surprising title: "i have absolved victory as necessary and useful; i now undertake to absolve it as just in the strictest sense of the word. men do not usually see in success anything else than the triumph of strength, and an honorable sympathy draws us to the side of the vanquished; i hope i have shown that since there must always be a vanquished side, and since the vanquished side is always that which ought to be so, to accuse the conqueror is to take part against humanity, and to complain of the progress of civilization. we must go farther; we must prove that the vanquished deserved to be so, that the conqueror not only serves the interests of civilization, but that he is better, more moral than the vanquished, and that it is on that account he is the conqueror.... it is time that the philosophy of history should place at its feet the declamations of philanthropy."[148] these words are worth considering. when brennus the gaul was having the gold weighed which he exacted from the vanquished romans, he threw his heavy sword into the balance, exclaiming, _v㦠victis!_ woe to the conquered! he simply meant to say that he was the stronger, and did not foresee that a gaul of the nineteenth century, availing himself of the labors of learned germany, would demonstrate that being the stronger he was on that very account the more just. but we must not wander too far from our subject. when the spectacle of the world is freely indulged in without any application to it of the measure of the conscience, what first strikes the view is success. it is necessary therefore to begin with rendering glory to success by declaring victory good. now, mark well here the conflict of the old notions with the so-called modern mind. from the old point of view, victory in the issue belongs to good, because while man is tossed in strife and tumult, god is leading him on; but the success of good is realized by conflict, and the victory is often reached only after a long series of defeats. there are bad triumphs and impious successes. what is proposed to us is, to put aside the rule of our own judgments, and to declare that victory is good in itself. the old point of view, that of the conscience, does not surrender without an energetic resistance; and that resistance shows itself in the very words of m. cousin. his thesis is, that all victory is just. his intention is therefore to _approve_ victory. why does he say _absolve_? it is the term which he employs. since the matter in question is to absolve victory, it is placed on trial. it is accused of being, like fortune and fame, at one time on the side of good and justice, at another on the side of injustice and evil. which then is the party accused? victory. who is the advocate? an eloquent professor. who finally is the accuser? do you not see? it is the human conscience; the conscience which protests in the soul of the orator against the theory of which he is enamoured, and which forces him to say _absolve_ when he should say _glorify_. and in fact the choice must be made: either to glorify victory, by treading under foot that narrow conscience which sometimes ranks itself with cato on the side of the vanquished; or to glorify conscience by impeaching the victories which outrage it. it is not sufficient, however, to sacrifice the conscience in order to rescue from embarrassment the philosophy of success. it strikes on other rocks also. the same causes are by turns victorious and vanquished, and it is hard to make men understand that, in conflicts in which their dearest affections are engaged, they must beforehand, and in all cases, take part with the strongest. it will be in vain for the philosopher to say that the swiss of morgarten were right, for that they beat the austrians; but that the heroes of rotenthurm were greatly in the wrong, because, crushed without being vanquished, they were obliged to yield to numbers, and leave at last their country's soil to be trodden by the stranger;--the children of old switzerland will find it hard to admit this doctrine. even in france, in that nation so accustomed to encircle its soldiers' brows with laurel, this difficulty has risen up in the way of m. cousin. bã©ranger, when asked for a souvenir of waterloo, replied, with drooping eyelid, tear-bedewed: never that name shall sadden verse of mine.[149] but philosophy would be worth little if it had not at its disposal more extensive resources than those of a song-writer. m. cousin therefore looked the difficulty in the face. victory is always good. but how shall young frenchmen be made to hear this with regard to that signal defeat of the armies of france? listen: "it is not populations which appear on battle-fields, but ideas and causes. so at leipzig and at waterloo two causes came to the encounter, the cause of paternal monarchy and that of military democracy. which of them carried the day, gentlemen? neither the one nor the other. who was the conqueror and who the conquered at waterloo? gentlemen, there were none conquered. (_applause._) no, i protest that there were none: the only conquerors were european civilization and the map. (_unanimous and prolonged applause._)"[150] to make the youth of paris applaud at the remembrance of waterloo is perhaps one of the most brilliant triumphs of eloquence which the annals of history record. but this rhetorical success is not a triumph of truth. there were those who were conquered at waterloo; and, to judge by what has been going on for some time past in europe, it would seem that those who were conquered are bent on taking their revenge. we may infer from these facts that all triumphs are not good, since truth may be for a moment overcome by a false philosophy tricked out in the deceitful adornments of eloquence. but let us admit, whatever our opinion on the subject, that the waterloo rock has been passed successfully; we have not yet pointed out the main difficulty which rises up in the way of this system. if victory is good, it seems at first sight that defeat is bad. but defeat is the necessary condition of victory; and being the condition of good, it seems therefore that it also is good; and the mind comes logically to this conclusion: "victory is good;--defeat is good, since it is the condition of victory;--all is good." we set out with the glorification of victory, and, lo! we are arrived at the glorification of fact. all that is, has the right to be; in the eyes of the modern savant whatever is, is right. m. cousin laid down the principle; he laid it down in a general manner in his philosophical eclecticism, of which it was easy to make use, as has in fact been done, in a sense contrary to his real intentions. our young critics, wasting an inheritance of which they do not appear always to recognize the origin, are doing nothing else, very often, than catching as they die away the last vibrations of that surpassing eloquence. in the eyes of the modern savant, everything is right and good: such is the axiom for which the labors of more than one modern historian had prepared us. we are to seek for the relation of facts one to another, that is to explain; and all that we explain, we must approve. let us follow out this thought in a few examples. it was necessary that louis xvi should be beheaded and the guillotine permanently set up, in order to manifest the result of the disorders of louis xiv, of the shameful excesses of louis xv, and of the licentious immorality of french society. it was necessary for louis xiv to be an adulterer, louis xv a debauchee, the clergy corrupt, and the nobility depraved, to bring about the shocks of the revolution. the facts mutually correspond; i explain, and i approve. in the eyes of the modern savant everything is right. it was necessary that buonaparte should throw the _corps lã©gislatif_ out of the window, that he should let loose his armies upon europe, and leave thousands of dead bodies in the snows of russia, in order to end the revolution, and extinguish the restless ardor of the french. it needed the massacres of september, the gloomy days of the terror, the anarchy of the period of the directory, to throw dismayed france into the arms of the crowned soldier who was to carry to so high a pitch her glory and her influence. the facts correspond; i explain, and i approve. in the eyes of the modern savant, everything is right. i consider the character of nero. i take him at the commencement of his reign, when, being forced to sign the death-warrant of a criminal, he exclaimed--"would i were unable to write!" and then again i regard him after he has perpetrated acts such that to apply his name in future ages to the cruellest of tyrants shall appear to them a cruel injury. what has taken place in the interval? the development of his natural character, agrippina, narcissus ... i understand the play of all the springs which have made a monster. as i am out of his clutches, my detestation vanishes with the danger. "i taste the very deep and very pure pleasure of seeing a mind act according to a definite law." i understand, i explain, i approve. in the eyes of the modern savant, everything is right. it would be impossible, gentlemen, to pursue this reasoning to its extreme limits without offending against the commonest decency. we should have to descend into blood and mire, continuing to declare the while that everything is right. i pause therefore, and leave the rest to your imaginations. open the most dismal pages of history. choose out the acts which inspire the most vivid horror and disgust, the blackest examples of ingratitude, the meanest instances of cowardice, the cases of most refined cruelty, and the most hideous debaucheries: thence let your thoughts pass to facts which bedew the eyelid with the tear of tenderest emotion, to the cases of most heroic self-devotion, to sacrifices the most humble in their greatness; and then try to apply the rule of the modern savant, and to say that all this is equally right and good, and that whatever is has the right to be. open the book of your own heart. think of one of those base temptations which assault the best of us, one of those thoughts which raise a blush in solitude; then think of the best, the purest, the most disinterested of the feelings which have ever been given to your soul; and try again to apply the rule of the modern savant, and to affirm that all this is equally good, and that all that is has the right to be. i know very well that in general these doctrines are applied to things looked at in the mass, and to the far-off past of history; but this is a poor subterfuge for the defenders of these monstrous theses. things viewed in the mass are only the assemblage of things viewed in detail. if the distinction of good and evil do not exist for general facts, how should it exist for particular facts? and how can we apply to the past a rule which we refuse to apply to the present, seeing that the present is nothing else than the past of the future, and that the facts of our own time are matter for history to our posterity? these, i repeat, are but vain subterfuges. if humanity is always adorable, it is so in the faults of the meanest of men as in the splendid sins of the magnates of the earth; it is so to-day as it was thirty centuries ago; the god in growing old does not cease to be the same. when the mind is engaged in these pernicious ways, the spring of the moral life is broken, and the practical consequence is not long in appearing. the philosophers of success, having become the philosophers of the _fait accompli_, accept all and endure all; but in another sense than that in which charity accepts all, that it may transform all by the power of love. it is the morality of philinte: i take men quietly, and as they are: and what they do i train my soul to bear.[151] these instructions are not very necessary. there will always be people enough found ready to applaud victory, and to fall in with the _fait accompli_. but is it not sad to see men of mind, men of heart too, perhaps, making themselves the theorists of baseness, and the philosophers of cowardice? there is still more to be said. from the glorification of success the mind passes necessarily, as we have just seen, to the glorification alike of all that is. it would appear at first sight that the adept in the doctrine must find himself in a condition of indifference with regard to what prejudiced men continue to call good and evil. this indifference however is only apparent. when it is granted that nothing is evil, the part of good disappears in the end. there had been formed in ancient rome, under pretence of religion, a secret society, which had as its fundamental dogma the aphorism that _nothing is evil_.[152] the members of the society did not practise good and evil, it appears, with equal indifference, for the magistrates of the republic took alarm, and smothered, by a free employment of death and imprisonment, a focus of murders, violations, false witness, and forged signatures. this fact reveals, with ominous clearness, a movement of thought on the nature of which it is easy to speculate. when man casts a vague glance over the world, extinguishing the while the inner light of conscience; when he resigns himself to the things he contemplates without applying to them any standard, what first strikes his attention, as we have said before, is success. and what next? scandal. nothing comes more into view than scandal. in a vast city, thousands of young men gain their livelihood laboriously, and devote themselves to the good of their families: no one speaks of them. a libertine loses other men's money at play, and blows out his brains: all the city knows it. honest women live in retirement; the king's mistresses form the subject of general conversation. crime and baseness hide themselves; but up to the limits of what the world calls infamy, evil delights in putting itself forward, because _ã©clat_ and noise supply the means of deadening the conscience; while, as regards the grand instincts of charity, it has been well said that--"the obscure acts of devotedness are the most magnificent." the poor and wretched shed tears in obscurity over benefits done secretly, while folly loves to display its glittering spangles, and shakes its bells in the public squares. there is in each one of us more evil than we think; but there is in the world more good than is commonly known. there are concealed virtues which only show themselves to the eye of the faith which looks for them, and of the attention which discovers them. bethink you, especially, how the laws of morality set at defiance appear again triumphant in the sorrows of repentance; those laws have their hour, and that hour is usually a silent one. let a poet of genius defile his works by the impure traces of a life spent in dissipation, and his brow shall shine in the sight of all with the twofold splendor of success and of scandal. but if, stretched on a bed of pain, he renders a tardy but sincere homage to the law which he has violated, to the truth which he has ignored, his voice will often be confined to the sick chamber; his companions in debauchery and infidelity will mount guard perhaps around his dwelling, in order to prevent the public from learning that their friend is a _defaulter_. the ball and the theatre make a noise and attract observation; but men turn their eyes from hospitals, those abodes in which, in the silence of sickness, or amidst the dull cries of pain, there germinate so many seeds of immortality. yes, sirs, evil is more apparent than good. the violations of the divine law have more _ã©clat_ than penitence. and what is the consequence? the man who abandons himself to the spectacle of the world, and who takes that spectacle for the rule of his thoughts, will see the world under a false aspect, and, in his estimation, evil will have more advantage over good than it has in reality. it will appear to him altogether dominant, and will thenceforward become his rule. from the glorification of success, we passed to the glorification of fact; from the glorification of fact, we arrive at last at the glorification of evil. we have seen how is illustrated the morality of victory. in the same current of ideas, a book famous now-a-days, and quite full of outrages to the conscience, supplies us with illustrations of the morality of falsehood. m. ernest renan, in his explanation of christianity, has applied, point after point, the theory which i have just set forth to you. in order to estimate the grand movements of the human mind, he frees himself from the vulgar prejudices which make up the ordinary morals, and abandons himself to the impression of the spectacle which he contemplates. jesus had a success without parallel. this success was based on charlatanism; and it is habitually so. to lead the nations by deceiving them is the lesson of history, and the good rule to follow. we find falsehood fortunate as matter of fact, we explain it, we approve it. whither then are we bound, under the guidance of modern science? an irresistible current is drawing us on, and causing us to leave the morals of philinthe in our rear. we are coming to those which racine has engraven in immortal traits in the person of mathan. when once conscience is put aside, all means are good in order to succeed; and the experience of the world teaches us that, to succeed, the worst means are often the best. it is not only at the theatre that such lessons are received; they come out but too commonly from the ordinary dealings of life. set a young man face to face with the world as it exhibits itself, and tell him to give himself up to what he sees, to let himself be fashioned by life. he will soon come to know that strict probity is a virtue of the olden times, chastity a fantastic excellence, and conscientious scruples an honorable simplicity. evil will become in his eyes the ordinary rule of life. when the socialist proudhon wrote that celebrated sentence, "property is robbery," there arose an immense outcry. ought there not to arise a louder outcry around a theory which arrives by a fatal necessity at this consequence: "evil is good"? but do these doctrines exercise any influence for the perversion of public morals? much; their influence is disastrous. and do the men who profess them believe them, taking the word 'believe' in its real and deep meaning? no; they often do mischief which they do not mean to do, and do not see that they do. they are intoxicated with a bad philosophy, and intoxication renders blind. it is easy to prove that these optimists, who in theory find that everything is right, are perpetually contradicting themselves in practice. address yourselves to one of them, and say to him: "your doctrine is big with immorality. you do not yourself believe it; and when you pretend to believe it, you lie." this man who tolerates everything will not tolerate your freedom of speech. he will get angry, and, according to the old doctrines, he will have the right to be so, for insult is an evil. then say to him: "here you are, it seems to me, in contradiction with your system. everything is right; the vivacity of my speech therefore is good. all that is has the right to be; my indignation is therefore a legitimate fact, and it appears to me that yours cannot be so unless you allow (an admission which would be contrary to your system) that mine is not so." if you have to do with a sensible man, he will begin to laugh. if you have met with a blockhead, he will be more angry than ever. this contradiction comes out in every page, and in a more serious manner, in the writings of our optimists. one cannot read them with attention, without meeting incessantly with the protest of their moral nature against the despotism of a false mode of reasoning. the man is at every moment making himself heard, the man who has a heart, a conscience, a reason, and who contradicts the philosopher without being aware of it. contradictions these, honorable to the writer, but dangerous for the reader, because they serve to invest with brilliant colors doctrines which in themselves are hideous. no, gentlemen, it is impossible to succeed in adoring humanity, preserving the while the least consistency of reasoning. in vain men wish to accept everything, to tolerate everything; in vain they wish to impose silence on the inner voice: that voice rebels against the outrage, and its revolt declares itself in the most manifest contradictions. the humanity-god is divided, and the affirmation-"everything is right"--will continue false as long as there shall be upon the earth a single conscience unsilenced, as long as there shall be in a single heart . . . . . that mighty hate which in pure souls vice ever must create;[153] that hatred which is nothing else than the indirect manifestation of the sacred love of goodness. the doctrine that all is equally good, equally divine, in the development of humanity, explains nothing, because humanity, torn by a profound struggle, condemns its own acts, and protests against its degradations. it cries aloud to itself that there are principles above facts, a moral law superior to the acts of the will; and all the petty clamors of a deceitful and deceived philosophy cannot stifle that clear voice. not only do these doctrines explain nothing, they do not even succeed in expressing themselves; language fails them. "everything is right and good." what will these words mean, from the time there is no longer any rule of right? how is it possible to approve, when we have no power to blame? the idea of good implies the idea of evil; the opposition of good and evil supposes a standard applied to things, a law superior to fact. he who approves of everything may just as well despise everything. but contempt itself has no longer any meaning, if esteem is a word void of signification. we must say simply that all is as it is, and abandon those terms of speech which conscience has stamped with its own superscription. we must purify the dictionary, and consign to the history of obsolete expressions such terms as good, evil, esteem, contempt, vice, virtue, honor, infamy, and the like. the doctrine which, to be consistent with itself, ought to reduce us to a kind of stupid indifference, does such violence to human nature that its advocates are incapable of enunciating it without contradicting themselves by the very words they make use of. all these extravagances are the inevitable consequence of the adoration of humanity. the humanity-god has no rule superior to itself. whatever it does must be put on record merely, and not judged: it is the immolation of the conscience. but on what altar shall we stretch this great victim? shall we sacrifice it to pure reason, to reason disengaged from all prejudice? allow me to claim your attention yet a few minutes longer. the humanity-god in all its acts escapes the judgment of the conscience. what measure shall we be able to apply to its thoughts? none. the god which cannot do evil, cannot be mistaken either. for the modern savant all is true, for exactly the same reason that all is right. the human mind unfolds itself in all directions; all these unfoldings are legitimate; all are to be accepted equally by a mind truly emancipated. furnished with this rule, i make progress in the history of philosophy. the greek democritus affirms that the universe is only an infinite number of atoms moving as chance directs in the immensity of space: i record with veneration this unfolding of the human mind. the greek plato affirms that truth, beauty, good, like three eternal rays, penetrate the universe and constitute the only veritable realities: i record with equal veneration this other unfolding of the human mind. i pass to modern times. descartes tells me that thought is the essence of man, and that reason alone is the organ of truth. helvetius tells me that man is a mass of organized matter which receives its ideas only from the senses. these two theses are equally legitimate, and i admit them both. i quit now philosophers by profession to address myself to those literary journalists who deal out philosophy in crumbs for the use of _feuilletons_ and reviews. there i find all possible notions in the most astounding of jumbles. "the villain has his apologist; the good man his calumniator.... marriage is honorable, so is adultery. order is preached up, so is riot, so is assassination, provided it be politic."[154] i contemplate with a calm satisfaction, with a very deep and very pure pleasure, these various unfoldings of the human mind; i place them all, with the same feelings of devotion, in the pantheon of the intelligence. i cannot do otherwise, inasmuch as there is no rule of truth superior to the thoughts of men, and because the human mind is the supreme, universal, and infallible intelligence. but will our mind be able to entertain together two directly opposite assertions? will contradiction no longer be the sign of error? we must come to this; we must acknowledge that the modern mind, breaking with superannuated traditions, has proclaimed the principle "that one assertion is not more true than an opposite assertion." we must proclaim that the thinker has not to disquiet himself "about the _real_ contradictions into which he may fall; and that a true philosopher has absolutely nothing to do with consistency."[155] the fear of self-contradiction may be excused in aristotle and plato, in st. anselm and st. thomas, in descartes and leibnitz. these writers were still wrapped in the swaddling clothes of old errors; the light of the nineteenth century had not shone upon their cradles; but the epoch of enfranchisement is come. these things, gentlemen, are printed now-a-days; they are printed at paris, one of the metropolises of thought! mark well whereabouts we are. we must admit--what? that all is true. but, if all is true, there is nothing true, just as if all is good, there is nothing good. there are thoughts in men's heads; to make history of them is an agreeable pastime; but there is no truth. we must not say that two contradictory propositions are equally true; that would be to make use of the old notion of truth; we must say that they are, and that is all about it. the night is approaching, the sun of intelligence is sinking towards the horizon, and thick vapors are obscuring its setting. but wait! if the humanity-god is always right, it must be that two contradictory propositions can be true at the same time, since contradictions abound in the history of human thoughts. if two contradictory propositions can be true, there is no more truth. what then is our reason, of which truth is the object? we are seized with giddiness. might not everything in the world be illusion? and myself--? listen to a voice which reaches us, across the ages, from the countries crowned by the himalayas. "nothing exists.... by the study of first principles, one acquires this knowledge, absolute, incontestable, comprehensible to the intelligence alone: i neither am, nor does anything which is mine, nor do i myself, exist."[156] what is there beneath these strange lines? the feeling of giddiness, which seeks to steady itself by language. here is now the modern echo of these ancient words. one of those writers who accept all, in the hope of understanding all, describes himself as having come at last to be aware that he is "only one of the most fugitive illusions in the bosom of the infinite illusion." one of his colleagues expresses himself on this subject as follows: "is this the last word of all?--and why not?--the illusion which knows itself--is it in fact an illusion? does it not in some sort triumph over itself? does it not attain to _the sovereign reality_, that of the thought which thinks itself, that of the dream which knows itself a dream, that _of nothingness which ceases to be so_, in order to recognize itself and to assert itself?"[157] we are gone back to ancient india. you will remark here three stages of thought. the fugitive illusion is man. the infinite illusion is the universe. the universal principle of the appearances which compose the universe is nothingness. here is the explanation of the universe! nothingness takes life; nothingness takes life only to know itself to be nothingness; and the nothingness which says to itself, "i am nothingness," is the reason of existence of all that is. i said just now that the sun was declining to the horizon. now the last glimmer of twilight has disappeared; night has closed in--a dark and starless night. yes, sirs, but there is never on the earth a night so dark as to warrant us in despairing of the return of the dawn. if the modern mind is such as it is described to us, it has lost all the rays of light; but the sun is not dead. the doctrine of non-existence and of illusion is entirely incomprehensible, in the sense in which to comprehend signifies to have a clear idea, and one capable of being directly apprehended. but, if one follows the chain of ideas as logically unrolled, in the way that a mathematician follows the transformations of an algebraical formula, without considering its real contents, it is easy to account for the origin of this theory. if the human mind has no rule superior to itself, if it is the absolute mind, god, all its thoughts are equally true, since we cannot point out error without having recourse to a rule of truth. if all doctrines are equally true, propositions directly and absolutely contradictory are equally true. if all is true, there is no truth; for truth is not conceived except in opposition to at least possible error. if there is no truth, the human reason, which seeks truth by a natural impulse belonging to its very essence, as the magnetized needle seeks the pole,--reason, i say, is a chimera. the truth which reason seeks is an exact relation of human thought to the reality of the world. if the search for this relation is chimerical, the two terms, mind, and the world, may be illusions. a fugitive illusion in presence of an infinite illusion: there is all. you see that these thoughts hang together with rigorous precision. the darkness is becoming visible to us, or, in other words, we are acquiring a perfect understanding of the origin and developments of the absurdity. put god aside, the law of our will, the warrant of our thought; deify human nature; and a fatal current will run you aground twice over--on the shores of moral absurdity, and on those of intellectual absurdity. these sad shipwrecks are set before our eyes in striking examples; it has been easy to indicate their cause. the consideration of the beautiful would give occasion to analogous observations. the human mind becoming the object of our adoration, we must give up judging it in every particular, and suppress the rules of the ideal in art, as those of morals in the conduct, and truth in the intellect. we must form a system of ã¦sthetics which accepts all, and finds equally legitimate whatever affords recreation to the humanity-god, in the great variety of its tastes. then high aspirations are extinguished, the beautiful gives place to the agreeable; and since the ugly and misshapen please a vicious taste, room must be made for the ugly in the pantheon of beauty. art despoiled of its crown becomes the sad, and often the ignoble slave of the tastes and caprices of the public. i do not insist further. the pretension of the worshippers of humanity is to make their conscience wide enough to accept all, and to have their intellect broad enough to understand all. they explain all, except these three small particulars--the conscience, the heart, and the reason. goodness and truth avenge themselves in the end for the long contempt cast upon them; and the first punishment those suffer who accept all, in the hope of understanding all, is no longer to understand what constitutes the life of humanity. let us not, sirs, be setting up altars to the human mind; for an adulterous incense stupefies it, and ends by destroying it. man is great, he is sublime, with immortal hope in his heart, and the divine aureole around his brow; but that he may preserve his greatness, let us leave him in his proper place. let us leave to him the struggles which make his glory, that condemnation of his own miseries which does him honor, the tears shed over his faults which are the most unexceptionable testimony to his dignity. let us leave him tears, repentance, conflict, and hope; but let us not deify him; for, no sooner shall he have said, "i am god," than, deprived that instant of all his blessings, he shall find himself naked and spoiled. before they deified man, the pagans at least transfigured him by placing him in olympus. at this day, it is humanity as it is upon earth that is proposed to our adoration, humanity with its profound miseries and its fearful defilements. they seek to throw a veil over the mad audacity of this attempt, by telling us of the progress which is to bring about, by little and little, the realization of our divinity. but, alas! our history is long already, and no reasonable induction justifies the vague hopes of heated imaginations. great progress is being effected, but none which gives any promise that the profound needs of our nature can ever be satisfied in this life. charity has appeared on the earth; but there are still poor amongst us, and it seems that there always will be. a breath of justice and humanity has penetrated social institutions; still politics have not become the domain of perfect truth and of absolute justice, and there seems small likelihood that they ever will. industry has given birth to marvels; we devour space in these days, but we shall never go so fast that suffering and death will not succeed in overtaking us. the great sources of grief are not dried up; the song of our poets causes still the chords of sorrow to vibrate as in the days of yore. progress is being accomplished, sure witness of a beneficent hand which is guiding humanity in its destinies; but everything tells us that the soil of our planet will be always steeped in tears, that the atmosphere which envelops us will always resound with the vibrations of sorrow. far as our view can stretch itself, we foresee a suffering humanity, which will not be able to find peace, joy, and hope, except in the expectation of new heavens and a new earth, wherein dwelleth righteousness. if there be no god above humanity, no eternity above time, no divine world higher than our present place of sojourn; if our profoundest desires are to be for ever deceived; if the cries we raise to heaven are never to be heard; if all our hope is a future in which we shall be no more; if humanity as we know it is the perfection of the universe; if all this is so, then indeed the answer to the universal enigma is illusion and falsehood. then, before the monster of destiny which brings us into being only to destroy us, which creates in our breast the desire of happiness only to deride our miseries; in view of that starry vault which speaks to us of the infinite, while yet there is no infinite; in presence of that lying nature which adorns itself with a thousand symbols of immortality, while yet there is no immortality; in presence of all these deceptions, man may be allowed to curse the day of his birth, or to abandon himself to the intoxication of thoughtless pleasure. but, a secret instinct tells us that wretchedness is a disorder, and thoughtless pleasure a degradation. let us have confidence in this deep utterance of our nature. good, truth, beauty descend as rays of streaming light into the shadows of our existence; let us follow them with the eye of faith to the divine focus from whence they proceed. all is fleeting, all is disappearing incessantly beneath our steps; but our soul is not staggered at this swift lapse of all things, only because she carries in herself the pledges of a changeless eternity. "the ephemeral spectator of an eternal spectacle, man raises for a moment his eyes to heaven, and closes them again for ever; but during the fleeting instant which is granted to him, from all points of the sky and from the bounds of the universe, sets forth from every world a consoling ray and strikes his upward gaze, announcing to him that between that measureless space and himself there exists a close relation, and that he is allied to eternity."[158] and are these sublime _pressentiments_ only dreams after all? dreams! know you not that our dreams create nothing, and that they are never anything else than confused reminiscences and fantastic combinations of the realities of our waking consciousness? what then is that mysterious waking during which we have seen the eternal, the infinite, the perfection of goodness, the fulness of joy, all those sublime images which come to haunt our spirit during the dream of life? recollections of our origin! foreshadowings of our destinies! while then all below is transitory, and is escaping from us in a ceaseless flight, let us abandon ourselves without fear to these instincts of the soul- as a bird, if it light on a sprig too slight the feathery freight to bear, yet, conscious of wings, tosses fearless, and sings, then drops--on the buoyant air.[159] footnotes: [131] _systã¨me de la nature_, published under the pseudonyme of mirabaud. [132] _systã¨me de la nature_, part i. chap. 1. [133] _ibid._ part ii. chap. 14. [134] _vie de jã©sus._ dedication. [135] _revue des deux mondes_ of 15 january, 1860. [136] plebeii philosophi qui a platone et socrate et ab e㢠famili㢠dissident. [137] _les philosophes franã§ais du xixe siã¨cle_, chap. xiv. [138] _hã©gel et l'hã©gã©lianisme_ par m. ed. schã©rer. [139] page 854. [140] page 852. [141] page 856. [142] isa. xx. 20. [143] _essais de critique et d'histoire_, pp. 8 and 9. [144] _revue des deux mondes_, 15 feb. 1861, page 855. [145] page 853. [146] page 854. [147] _revue des deux mondes_ of the 15th feb. 1861, page 854. [148] _introduction ã  l'histoire de la philosophie_. neuviã¨me leã§on. [149] il rã©pondit, baissant un oeil humide: jamais ce nom n'attristera mes vers. [150] _introduction ã  l'histoire de la philosophie._ treiziã¨me leã§on. [151] je prends tout doucement les hommes comme ils sont, j'accoutume mon ã¢me ã  souffrir ce qu'ils font. [152] _nihil nefas ducere, hanc summam inter eos religionem esse._ (tit. liv. lib. xxxix. c. 13.) [153] . . . . . . ces haines vigoureuses que doit donner le vice aux ã¢mes vertueuses. [154] _mã©langes de tã¶pffer._ de la mauvaise presse considerã©e comme excellente. [155] _revue des deux mondes_ of 15 feb. 1861, page 854.--_etudes critiques sur la littã©rature contemporaine_, par edmond scherer, page x. et xi. [156] sa'nkya--ka'rika', 61 and 64. the text 61 in which occur the words "nothing exists" is hard to understand, but there appears to be no doubt of the meaning of no. 64. _non sum, non est meum, nec sum ego._ [157] _etudes critiques sur la littã©rature contemporaine_, par edmond scherer.--m. sainte-beuve, p. 354. [158] xavier de maistre. [159] soyons comme l'oiseau posã© pour un instant sur des rameaux trop frãªles, qui sent ployer la branche et qui chante pourtant, sachant qu'il a des ailes.--victor hugo. lecture vi. _the creator._ (at geneva, 4th dec. 1863.--at lausanne, 27th jan. 1864.) gentlemen, man is not a simple product of nature; in vain does he labor to degrade himself by desiring to find the explanation of his spiritual being in matter brought gradually to perfection. man is not the summit and principle of the universe; in vain does he labor to deify himself. he is great only by reason of the divine rays which inform his heart, his conscience, and his reason. from the moment that he believes himself to be the source of light, he passes into night. when thought has risen from nature up to man, it must needs fall again, if its impetus be not strong enough to carry it on to god. these assertions do but translate the great facts of man's intellectual history. "there is no nation so barbarous," said cicero,[160] "there are no men so savage as not to have some tincture of religion. many there are who form false notions of the gods; ... but all admit the existence of a divine power and nature.... now, in any matter whatever, the consent of all nations is to be reckoned a law of nature." no discovery has diminished the value of these words of the roman orator. in the most degraded portions of human society, there remains always some vestige of the religious sentiment. the knowledge of the creator comes to us from the christian tradition; but the idea, more or less vague, of a divine world is found wherever there are men. cicero brings forward this universal consent as a very strong proof of the existence of the gods. the supporters of atheism dispute the value of this argument. they say: "general opinion proves nothing. how many fabulous legends have been set up by the common belief into historic verities! all mankind believed for a long time that the sun revolved about the earth. truth makes way in the world only by contradicting opinions generally received. the faith of the greater number is rather a mark of error than a sign of truth." this objection rests upon a confusion of ideas. humanity has no testimony to render upon scientific questions, the solution of which is reserved for patient study; but humanity bears witness to its own nature. the universality of religion proves that the search after the divine is, as said the roman orator, a law of nature. when therefore we rise from matter to man, and from man to god, we are not going in an arbitrary road, but are advancing according to the law of nature ascertained by the testimony of humanity. it needs a mind at once very daring and very frivolous not to feel the importance of this consideration. in our days atheism is being revived. in going over in your memory the symptoms of this revival, as we have pointed them out to you, you will perceive that the direct and primitive negation of god is comparatively rare; but that what is frequently attempted is, if i may venture so to speak, to effect the subtraction of god. any religious theory whatever is put aside as inadmissible, and with some such remarks as these: "how is it that real sciences are formed? by observation on the one hand, and by reasoning on the other. by observation, and reasoning applied to observation, we obtain the science of nature and the science of humanity. but do we wish to rise above nature and humanity? we fail of all basis of observation; and reason works in a vacuum. there is therefore no possible way of reaching to god. is god an object of experience? no. can god be demonstrated _ã  priori_ by syllogisms? no. the idea of god therefore cannot be established, as answering to a reality, either by the way of experience or by the way of reasoning; it is a mere hypothesis. we do not, however, it is added, in our view of the matter, pretend (heaven forbid!) to exclude the sentiment of the divine from the soul, nor the word _god_ from fine poetry. we accept religious thoughts as dreams full of charm. but is it a question of reality? then god is an hypothesis, and hypothesis has no admission into the science of realities." these ideas place those who accept them in a position which is not without its advantages. when a man of practical mind says with a smile, "do you happen to believe in god?" one may reply to him, smiling in turn, "have i said that god is a real being?" and if a religious man asks, "are you falling then into atheism?" one may assume an indignant tone, and say: "we have never denied god: whoever says we have is a slanderer!" so god remains, for the necessities of poetry and art. but as we cannot know either what he is, or whether he is, real life goes on in complete and entire independence of him. the taking up of this position with regard to religion may, in certain cases, be a literary artifice. in other cases it is seriously done. there are certain natures of extreme delicacy, which, touched by the breath of modern scepticism, have lost all positive faith; but their better aspirations, and an instinctive love of purity, guard and direct them, in the absence of all belief, and they do not deny that which they believe no longer. such a mind is in an exceptional position. is it yours? and would you preserve it? keep a solitary path, and do not seek to communicate your ideas to others. contact with the public, and such an unfolding even of your own thoughts as would be required in carrying on a work of proselytism, would place you under the empire of those laws which govern the human mind in these matters. now what are these laws? a poet has already answered for us this question: en prã©sence du ciel, il faut croire ou nier.[161] a famous writer expands the same thought as follows: "doubt about things which it highly concerns us to know," says jean-jacques rousseau, "is a condition which does too great violence to the human mind; nor does it long bear up against it, but in spite of itself comes to a decision one way or another, and likes better to be mistaken than to believe nothing."[162] such is the law. we have met with the pretension to maintain the mind independent of god, without either denying or asserting his existence, and we have seen how completely this pretension fails in the presence of facts. the sceptic makes vain efforts to continue in a state of doubt, but the ground fails him, and he slips into negation: he affirms that humanity has been mistaken, and that god is not. but neither does this negation succeed any the more in keeping its ground; it strikes too violently against all the instincts of our nature. the human mind is under an imperious necessity to worship something; if god fails it, it sets itself to adore nature or humanity; atheism is transformed into idolatry. recollect the destinies of the critical school and of the positive philosophy! let us now examine, with serious attention, that attempt to _eliminate_ god which is the starting-point in this course along which the mind is hurried so fatally. god is not, i grant, an object of experience. i grant it at least in this sense, that god is not an object of sensible experience. the experience of god (if i may be allowed the expression), the feeling of his action upon the soul, is not a phenomenon open to the observation of all, and apart from determined spiritual conditions. in order to be sensible of the action of god, we must draw near to him. in order to draw near to him, we must, if not believe with firm faith in his existence, at least not deny him. the captives of plato's cavern can have no experience of light, so long as they heap their raillery on those who speak to them of the sun. i grant again that god cannot possibly be the object of a demonstration such as the science of geometry requires; i grant it fully, i have already said so. every man who reasons, affirms god in one sense; and the foundation of all reasoning cannot be the conclusion of a demonstration. god therefore, in the view of science formed according to our ordinary methods, is, i grant, an hypothesis. and here, gentlemen, allow me a passing word of explanation. when i say that god is an hypothesis, i run the risk of exciting, in many of you, feelings of astonishment not unmixed with pain. but i must beg you to remember the nature of these lectures. we are here far from the calm retirement of the sanctuary, and from such words of solemn exhortation as flow from the lips of the religious teacher. i have introduced you to the ardent conflicts of contemporary thought, and into the midst of the clamors of the schools. the soul which is seeking to hold communion with god, and so from their fountain-head to be filled with strength and joy, has something better to do than to be listening to such discourses as these. solitude, prayer, a calm activity pursued under the guidance of the conscience,--these are the best paths for such a soul, and the discussions in which we are now engaged are not perhaps altogether free from danger for one who has remained hitherto undisturbed in the first simplicity of his faith. but we are not masters of our own ways, and the circumstances of the present times impose upon us special duties. the barriers which separate the school and the world are everywhere thrown down. everywhere shreds of philosophy, and very often of bad philosophy,--scattered fragments of theological science, and very often of a deplorable theological science,--are insinuating themselves into the current literature. there is not a literary review, there is scarcely a political journal, which does not speak on occasion, or without occasion, of the problems relating to our eternal interests. the most sacred beliefs are attacked every day in the organs of public opinion. at such a juncture, can men who preserve faith in their own soul remain like dumb dogs, or keep themselves shut up in the narrow limits of the schools? assuredly not. we must descend to the common ground, and fight with equal weapons the great battles of thought. for this purpose it is necessary to make use of terms which may alarm some consciences, and to state questions which run the risk of startling sincerely religious persons. but there is no help for it, if we are to combat the adversaries on their own ground; and because it is thus only that, while we startle a few, we can prove to all that the torrent of negations is but a passing rush of waters, which, fret as they may in their channel, shall be found to have left not so much as a trace of their passage upon the rock of ages. i now therefore resume my course of argument. god is neither an object of experience, nor yet of demonstration properly so called. in the view of science, as it is commonly understood, of science which follows out the chain of its deductions, without giving attention to the very foundations of all the work of the reason,--god, that chief of all realities for a believing heart, that experience of every hour, that evidence superior to all proof, god is an hypothesis. i grant it. hence it is inferred that god has no place in science, for that hypothesis has no place in a science worthy of the name. but this i deny; and in support of this denial i proceed to show that the hypothesis which it is pretended to get quit of, is the generating principle of all human knowledge. whence does science proceed? does it result from mere experience? no. what does experience teach us when quite alone? nothing. experience, separated from all element of reason, only reveals to us our own sensations. this, a scotch philosopher, hume, has proved to demonstration,--a demonstration which constitutes his glory. it is easy, without having even a smattering of philosophy, to understand quite well that science is formed by thought. now, if we did not possess the faculty of thinking, it would not be given to us by experience. thought does not enter by the eye or the ear. imagine a living body not possessed of reason: its eye will reflect objects like a mirror, its tympanum will vibrate to the undulations of the air; but it will have no thoughts, and will know nothing. is science formed by pure reason? no. no one can say what pure reason is, for the exercise of our thought is connected indissolubly with experience. but, without pausing at this consideration, let us ask what pure reason can do, if deprived of all objects of experience? one thing only, namely, take cognizance of itself. now the reason, in taking cognizance of itself, only creates logic, that is to say, the theory of the laws of knowledge. some philosophers, to be sure, have undertaken to prove that reason, by dint of self-contemplation, might arrive at the knowledge of all things. they have maintained that all the secrets of the universe are contained in our thought, and that by just reasoning one may form the science of astronomy without looking at the stars, and write the history of the human race without taking the trouble to search laboriously into the annals of the past. but these attempts to _construct_ facts, instead of observing them, have succeeded too ill to merit very serious attention. science does not proceed therefore either from pure experience or from pure reason; whence does it really come? from the encounter of experience and of reason. man observes, and he ascertains that facts are governed according to intelligent design. he creates mathematics, and discovers that the phenomena of the heavens and the earth are ruled according to the laws of the calculus. his thought meets in the facts with traces of a thought similar to his own. if any one of you doubts this, i once more appeal to the almanac. science, then, has birth only from a meeting of experience with reason; how is this meeting effected? the whole question of the origin of science is here. this encounter is not necessary; it does not result simply from perseverance in observation. the encounter of mind and of facts constitutes a discovery. the thought which has governed nature may remain long veiled from our mind. all at once perhaps the veil is lifted, and the thought of man meets and recognizes itself in the phenomena which it is contemplating. we encounter in this case the exercise of a special faculty, which is neither the faculty of observing nor the faculty of reasoning, but the faculty of discovering. when a man possesses it to a certain degree, we call him a man of genius. genius, or the faculty of discovering, is the generating principle of science. still, strange to say, this principle is scarcely pointed out by a great number of logicians. they develop at length the rules of observation and the rules of reasoning; and it seems that, in their idea, the conjunction of reason and experience is effected all alone and of necessity. i taught logic myself in this way for twenty years, until one day, thinking better upon the subject, i was obliged to say to myself (forgive me this rather trivial quotation): tu n'avais oubliã© qu'un point: c'ã©tait d'ã©clairer ta lanterne.[163] the meeting together of the understanding and of facts is a discovery; and discovery depends upon a faculty sung by poets, admired by mankind, and too little noticed by logicians--genius. genius has for its characteristic a sudden illumination of the mind, a gratuitous gift and one which cannot be purchased. but let us hasten to supply a necessary explanation. genius is a primitive fact, a gift; but the work of genius has conditions, or rather a condition--labor. labor does not replace genius, but genius does not dispense with labor; nature only delivers up her secrets to those who observe her with long patience. newton was asked one day how he had found out the system of the universe. he replied with a sublime _naã¯vetã©_: "by thinking continually about it." he so pointed out the condition of every great discovery; but he forgot the cause--the peculiar nature of his own intellect. it was necessary to be always pondering the motions of the stars; but it was necessary moreover to be isaac newton. so many had thought on the subject, as long perhaps as he, and had not made the discovery. labor, the condition of discoveries, should have as its effect to recognize the methods really appropriate to the nature of the inquiries, and to keep the mind well informed in existing science. in fact, every scientific discovery supposes a series of previous discoveries which have brought the mind to the point at which it is possible to see something new. for this reason it is that a discovery often presents itself to two or three minds at once, when there are found, at the same epoch, two or three minds endowed with the same power. they see all together because the onward progress of science has brought them to the same summit: this is the condition; and because they have the same power of vision: this is the cause. there is therefore a method for putting ourselves on the road to discovery, but no method for making the discovery itself. the man of genius sees where others do not see; and when he has seen, everybody sees after him. if, furnished with gyges' ring, you could gain access to the studies of savants at the moment when a great discovery has just been made, you would see more than one of them striking his forehead and exclaiming: "fool that i was! how could i help seeing it? it was so simple." truth appears simple when it has been discovered. discovery therefore, which has labor for its condition, is the principle of the progress of science. under what form does a discovery present itself to the mind of its author? as a supposition, or, which is the same thing, as an hypothesis. hypothesis is the sole process by which progress in science is effected. if we supposed nothing, we should know nothing. in vain should we look at the sky and the earth to all eternity, our eye would never read the laws of astronomy in the stars of heaven, nor the laws of life upon the bark of trees or in the entrails of animals. this is true even of mathematics. the contemplation, prolonged indefinitely, of the series of numbers, or of the forms of space, would produce neither arithmetic nor geometry, if the human mind did not suppose relations between the numbers and the lines, which it can only demonstrate after it has supposed them. the conditions are very clearly seen which have prepared and made possible a fruitful supposition, but the hypothesis does not itself follow of any necessity. it appears like a flash of light passing suddenly through the mind. the carpenter's saw opens a plank from end to end on the sole conditions of labor and time; but the discovery of truth preserves always a sudden and unforeseen character. archimedes leaps from a bath and rushes through the streets of syracuse, crying out, "i have found it!" why? the flash of genius has visited him unexpectedly. pythagoras discovers a geometrical theorem; and he offers, it is said, a sacrifice to the gods, in testimony of his gratitude. he thought therefore, according to the fine remark of malebranche, that labor and attention are a silent prayer which we address to the master of truth: the labor is a prayer, and the discovery is an answer granted to it. when this wholly spontaneous character of discovery is not recognized, and when it is thought that the observation of facts naturally produces their explanation, it must needs be granted that a discovery is confirmed by the very fact that it is made. but this is by no means the case. hypothesis does not carry on its brow, at the moment of its birth, the certain sign of its truth. a flash of light crosses the mind of the savant; but he must enter on a course, often a long course, of study, in order to know whether it is a true light, or a momentary glare. every supposition suggested by observation must be confirmed by its agreement with the data of experience. let us listen to a great discoverer-kepler. he is giving an account of the discovery of one of the laws which have immortalized his name. "after i had found the real dimensions of the orbits, thanks to the observations of brahe and the sustained effort of a long course of labor, i at length discovered the proportion of the periodic times to the extent of these orbits. and if you would like to know the precise date of the discovery,--it was on the eighth day of march in this year 1618 that,--first of all conceived in my mind, then awkwardly essayed by calculations, rejected in consequence as false, then reproduced on the fifteenth of may with fresh energy,--it rose at last above the darkness of my understanding, so fully confirmed by my labor of seventeen years upon brahe's observations, and by my own meditations perfectly agreeing with them, that i thought at first i was dreaming, and making some _petitio principii_; but there is no more doubt about it: it is a very certain and very exact proposition."[164] all the logic of discoveries is laid down in these lines; and these lines are a testimony rendered by one of the most competent of witnesses. you see in them the conditions of a good hypothesis: kepler has long studied the phenomena of which he wishes to find the law; he has studied them by himself, and by means of the discoveries of his predecessor brahe. the law has presented itself to his mind at a given moment, on the eighth of march, 1618. but he does not yet know whether it is a true light, or a deceptive gleam. he seeks the confirmation of his hypothesis; he does not find it, because he makes a mistake, and he rejects his idea as useless. the idea returns; a new course of labor confirms it; and so the hypothesis becomes a law, a certain proposition. such is the regular march of thought. an hypothesis has no right to be brought forward until it has passed into the condition of a law, by being duly confirmed. there are minds, however, endowed with a sort of divination, which feel as by instinct the truth of a discovery, even before it has been confirmed. it is told of copernicus, that having discovered, or re-discovered, the true system of planetary motion, he encountered an opponent who said to him: "if your system were true, venus would have phases like the moon; now she has none, and therefore your system is false. what have you to reply?"--"i have no reply to make," said copernicus, (the objection was a serious one in fact); "but god will grant that the answer shall be found."[165] galileo appeared, and by means of the telescope it was ascertained that venus has phases like the moon;--the confidence of copernicus was justified. the scientific career of m. ampã¨re, the illustrious natural philosopher, supplies an analogous fact. trusting, like copernicus, to a kind of intuition of truth, he read one day to the academy of sciences the complete description of an experiment which he had never made. he made it subsequently, and the result answered completely to his anticipations. genius is here raised to the second power, since it possesses at once the gift of discovery and the just presentiment of its confirmation; but these are exceptional cases, and in general we must say, with mithridates, that- .... to be approved as true such projects must be proved, and carried through.[166] we would encourage no one to attempt adventures so perilous, but would call to mind in a great example what is the regular march of science. newton, after he had discovered the law which regulates the motions of the heavens, sought the confirmation of it in an immense series of calculations. a true ascetic of science, he imposed on himself a regimen as severe as that of a trappist monk, in order that his life might be wholly concentrated upon the operations of the understanding; and it was not until after fifteen months of persistent labor that he exclaimed: "i have discovered it! my calculations have really encountered the march of the stars. glory to god! who has permitted us to catch a glimpse of the skirts of his ways!" and astronomy, placed upon a wider and firmer basis, went forward with new energy. it is thus that the human mind acquires knowledge. how then does hypothesis come to be made light of? how can it be seriously said that we have excluded hypothesis from the sphere of science, whereas the moment the faculty of supposing should cease to be in exercise, the march of science would be arrested; since, except a small number of principles the evidence of which is immediate, all the truths we possess are only suppositions confirmed by experiment? the reason is here: our mind forms a thousand different suppositions at its own will and fancy; and it shrinks from that studious toil which alone puts it in a position to make fruitful suppositions. we are for ever tempted to be guessing, instead of setting ourselves, by patient observations, on the road to real discoveries. it is therefore with good reason that theories hastily built up have been condemned, and lord chancellor bacon was right in thinking that the human mind requires lead to be attached to it, and not wings. hence the inference has been drawn that the simplest plan would be to cut the wings of thought, without reflecting that thenceforward it would continue motionless. because some had abused hypothesis, others must conclude that we could do without it altogether. trivial and premature suppositions have therefore discredited hypothesis, by encumbering science with a crowd of vain imaginations; but this encumbrance would have been of small importance but for the obstinacy with which false theories have too often been maintained against the evidence of facts. if ampã¨re had found his experiment fail, and had still continued to maintain his statements, he would not have given proof of a happy audacity, but of a ridiculous obstinacy. genius itself makes mistakes, and experience alone distinguishes real laws from mere freaks of our thought. we have maintained the rights of reason in the spontaneous exercise of the faculty of discovery; but let us beware how we ignore the rights of experience. it alone prepares discoveries; it alone can confirm them. a system, however well put together, is convicted of error by the least fact which really contradicts it. a greek philosopher was demonstrating by specious arguments that motion is impossible. diogenes was one of his auditory, and he got up and began to walk: the answer was conclusive. you remember, if you have read walter scott, the learned demonstration of the antiquary who is settling the date of a roman or celtic ruin, i forget which; and the intervention of the beggar, who has no archã¦ological system, but who has seen the edifice in question both built and fall to decay. reason as much as you like; if your reasonings do not accord with facts, you will have woven spider's webs, of admirable fineness perhaps, but wanting in solidity. it is time to sum up these lengthened considerations. science does not originate solely from experiment, nor does it proceed solely from reason; it results from the meeting together of experience and reason. experience prepares the discovery, genius makes it, experience confirms it. what distinguishes the sciences is not the process of invention, which is everywhere the same; but the process of control over supposed truths. a mathematical discovery is confirmed by pure reasoning. a physical discovery is confirmed by sensible observation joined with calculation. a discovery in the order of morals is confirmed by observation of the facts of consciousness. therefore it is that between the physical and moral sciences there exists a broad line of demarcation. moral facts have not less certainty than physical phenomena; but moral facts falling under the influence of liberty, all men cannot perceive them equally under all conditions. an optical experiment presents itself to the eyes, and all the spectators see it alike, if at least they have one and the same visual organization; but a case of moral experience has a personal character, and is only communicated to another person on condition that he puts faith in the testimony of his fellow. in this order of things a man can observe directly only what he concurs in producing. with this reservation, we may say that the control of moral truths is made by experience like that of physical truths. in all departments of knowledge, a thought may be held as true when it accounts for facts. and so, gentlemen, we conclude that every scientific truth is, in its origin, a supposition of the mind, the result of which is to produce the meeting together of experience and reason, and so to permit the rational reconstruction of the facts. every system is shown to be at fault by facts, if facts contradict it. when a system explains the facts, we hold it as proved just to the extent to which it explains them. this accordance of our thought with the nature of things is the mark of what we call truth. if you grant me these premises, my demonstration is completed, and it only remains for me to draw my conclusions. it is said that the idea of god can have no place in a serious science, because this idea comes neither from experience nor from reason; that it is only an hypothesis, and that hypothesis has no place in science. i reply, grounding my answer on the preceding reasonings: no science is formed otherwise than by means of hypothesis. for the solution of the universal problem there exists in the world an hypothesis, proposed to all by tradition, and which bears in particular the names of moses and of jesus christ. this hypothesis has the right to be examined. if it explains the facts, it must be held for true. the idea of god comes therefore within the regular compass of science; the attempt to exclude it is sophistical. let us separate the idea of god from the whole body of christian doctrine of which it forms part, in order that we may give it particular consideration. what is this hypothesis which bears the names of moses and jesus christ? it is that the principle of the universe is the eternal and infinite being. his power is the cause of all that exists; the consciousness of his infinite power constitutes his infinite intelligence. in himself, he is _he who is_; in his relation with the world, he is the absolute cause, the creator. this explanation of the universe is not the privilege of a few savants; it is taught and proposed to all; and this is no reason why we should despise it. if we further observe that this thought has renovated the world, that it upholds all our civilization, that thousands of our fellow-creatures raise their voice to tell us that it is only from this source they have drawn peace, light, and happiness, we shall understand perhaps that contempt would be foolish, and that everything on the contrary invites us to examine with the most serious attention an hypothesis which offers itself to us under conditions so exceptional. the hypothesis is stated. we must now submit it to the test of facts. where shall we find the elements of its confirmation? everywhere, since it is the first cause of all things which is in question: we shall find them in nature and in humanity; in the motions of the stars as they sweep through the depths of space, and in the rising of the sap which nourishes a blade of grass; in the revolutions of empires, and in the simplest elements of the life of one individual. there is no science of god; but every science, every study must terminate at that sacred name. i shall not undertake, therefore, to enumerate all the confirmations of the thought which makes of the creator the principle of the universe: to recount all the proofs of the infinite being would require an eternal discourse. we have stammered forth a few of the words of this endless discourse, by showing that, without god, the understanding, the conscience, and the heart lose their support and fall: this formed the subject of our second lecture. we saw further that reason makes fruitless attempts to find the universal principle in the objects of our experience--nature and humanity. let us follow up, although we shall not be able to complete it, the study of this inexhaustible subject, by showing that the idea of the creator alone answers to the demands of the philosophic reason. philosophy, in the highest acceptation of the term, is the search after a solution for the universal problem the terms of which may be stated as follows: experience reveals to us that the world is composed of manifold and diverse beings; and, to come at once to the great division, there are in the world bodies which we are forced to suppose inert, and minds which we feel to be intelligent and free. the universe is made up of manifold existences; this is quite evident, and a matter of experience. reason on the other hand forces us to seek for unity. to comprehend, is to reduce phenomena to their laws, to connect effects with their causes, consequences with their principles; it is to be always introducing unity into the diversity. all development of science would be at once arrested, if the mind could content itself with merely taking account of facts in the state of dispersion in which they are presented by experience. each particular science gathers up a multitude of facts into a small number of formulã¦; and, above and beyond particular sciences, reason searches for the connection of all things with one single cause. to determine the relation of all particular existences with one existence which is their common cause; such is the universal problem. this problem has been very well expressed by pythagoras in a celebrated formula, that of the _uni-multiple_. in order to understand the universe, we must rise to a unity which may account for the multiplicity of things and for their harmony, which is unity itself maintained in diversity. if you well understand this thought, you will easily comprehend the source of the great errors which flow from too strong a disposition to systematize. men of this mind attach themselves to inadequate conceptions, and look for unity where it does not exist. the barrier which we must oppose to this spirit of system is the careful enumeration of the facts which it forgets to notice. materialism looks for unity in inert and unintelligent bodies; it suffices to oppose to it one fact--the reality of mind. fatalism seeks unity in necessity. point out to it that its destiny-god does not account for the fact of repentance, for example, which implies liberty, and it is enough. the worship of humanity forces you to exclaim with pascal--a queer god, that! there is in the bitterness of this smile a sufficient condemnation of the doctrine. to seek for unity, is the foundation of all philosophy. to seek for unity too hastily and too low, is the source of the errors of absolute minds. absolute minds, however great they may be in other respects, are weak minds, in that they do not succeed in preserving a clear view of the diversity of the facts to be explained. take the problem of pythagoras; keep hold of the two extremities of the chain; never allow yourselves to deny the diversity of things, for that diversity is plainly evidenced by human experience; beware of denying their unity, because it is the foundation of reason; then search and look through the histories of philosophy: you will find one hypothesis, and one only, which answers the requirements of the problem. it goes back, as i believe, to the origin of the world; it was glimpsed by socrates, by aristotle, and plato; but, in its full light, it belongs only to men who have received the god of moses, and who have studied in the school of jesus christ. if this hypothesis explains the facts, it is sound, for the property of truth is to explain, as the property of light is to enlighten. the doctrine of the creator can alone account to us for the universe, by bringing us back to its first cause. the first cause of unity cannot be matter which could never produce mind; the first cause of unity cannot be the human mind, which, from the moment that it desires to take itself for the absolute being, is dissolved and annihilated. the unity which alone can have in itself the source of multiplicity, is neither matter nor idea, but power; power the essential characteristic of mind, and infinite, that is to say, creative power. the creator alone could produce divers beings, because he is almighty, and maintain harmony between those beings, because he is one. thus is manifested an essential agreement between the requirements of philosophy and the religious sentiment; for religion, as we said at the beginning of these lectures, rests upon the idea of divine power. reason and faith meet together upon the lofty heights of truth. but let us not enter too far into the difficulties of philosophy. let us confine ourselves to considerations of a less abstruse order. the creator is the god of nature. all the visible universe is but the work of his power, the manifestation of his wisdom. the poet of the hebrews invites to offer praise to the most high, not only men of every age and of all nations, but the beasts of the field, the birds of the air, and the cedars of the forest, the rain and the wind, the hail and the tempest.[167] in the language of a modern poet: thee, lord, the wide world glorifies; the bird upon its nest replies; and for one little drop of rain beings thine eye doth not disdain ten thousand more repeat the strain.[168] and such thoughts are not vain freaks of the imagination. man, the conscious representative of nature, the high-priest of the universe, feels himself urged by an impulse of his heart to translate the confused murmur of the creation into a hymn of praise to the infinite being, the absolute source of life,--to him who _is_, one, eternal,--the first and absolute cause of all existence. the creator is the god of spirits. he is not only the god of humankind; "the immense city of god contains, no doubt, nobler citizens than man, in reasoning power so weak, and in affections so poor."[169] but let us speak of what is known to us: he is the god of humankind. all nations shall one day render glory to him. mighty words have resounded through the world: "henceforth there is no longer either greek or barbarian or jew; but one and the same god for all." the idols have begun to fall; the gods of the nations have been hurled from their pedestals; they have fallen, they are falling, they will fall, until the knowledge of the only and sovereign creator shall cover the earth as the waters cover the sea. the creator shall one day be known of all his creatures; and in each of his creatures he will be the centre and the object of the whole soul; all the functions of the spiritual life lead on to him. what is truth, beauty, good? we have already replied to the question, but we will repeat our answer. to possess truth is to know god; it is to know him in the work of his hands, and it is to know him in his absolute power, as the eternal source of all that is, of all that can ever be, of all actual or possible truth in the mind of his creatures. truth binds us to him, "and all _science_ is a hymn to his glory."[170] he is the eternal source of beauty. he it is who gives to the bird its song, and to the brook its murmur. he it is who has established between nature and man those mysterious relations which give rise to noble joys. he it is who opens, above and beyond nature, the prolific sources of art; the ideal is a distant reflection of his splendor. and goodness, again, is none other than he; it is his plan; it is his will in regard of spirits; it is the word addressed to the free creature, which says to it: behold thy place in the universal harmony. thus a triple ray descends from the uncreated light, and before that insufferable brightness i am dazzled and bewildered. there is no longer any distinction for me between profane and sacred; i no longer understand the difference of these terms. wheresoever i meet with good, truth, beauty, be the man who brings them to me who he may, and come he whence he may, i feel that to despise in him that gleam, would be not only to be wanting to humanity, it would be to be wanting to my faith. if my prejudices or habits tend to shut up my heart or to narrow my mind, i hear a voice exclaiming to me: "enlarge thy tent; lengthen thy cords; enlarge thy tent without measure. be ye lift up, eternal gates, gates of the conscience and the heart! let in the king of glory!" all truth, all beauty, all good is he. where my god is, nothing is profane for me. to ignore any one of those rays would be to steal somewhat from his glory. oh! the happy liberty of the heart, when it rests on the author of all good and of all truth. but if the heart is at liberty, how well is it guarded too! what is the most beautiful jewel (if we may venture to use such language) in the immortal crown of this king of glory? powerful, he created power; free, he created liberty. and to the free creature, in the hour of its creation, he said: "behold! thou art made in mine own image! my will is written in thy conscience; become a worker together with me, and realize the plans of my love." and that voice--i hear it within myself. ah! i know that voice well, i know the secret attraction which, in spite of all my miseries, draws me towards that which is beautiful, pure, holy, and says to me: this is the will of thy father. but i know other voices also which speak within me only too loudly: the voice of rebellion and of cowardice, the voice of baseness and ignominy. there is war in my soul. enlightened by this inner spectacle, i cast my eyes once more over that world in which i have seen shining everywhere some divine rays; and i see that by a triple gate, lofty and wide, evil has entered thither, accompanied by error and deformity. then i understand that all may become profane; i understand that there is an erring science, a corrupting art, a moral system full of immorality. but these words take for me a new meaning. there is no sacred evil, there is no profane good; there are no sacred errors and profane truths. where god is, all is holy; where there is rebellion against god, all is evil. and so the god who is my light is my fortress also; my heart is strengthened while it is set at liberty, and i can join the ancient song of israel: jehovah is our strength and tower. yes, sirs, god is in all, because he is the universal principle of being; but he is not in all after the same manner. god is in the pure heart by the joy which he gives to it; he is in the frivolous heart by the void and the vexation which urge it to seek a better destiny; he is in the corrupt heart by that merciful remorse which does not permit it to wander, without warning, from the springs of life. god makes use of all for the good of his creatures. he is everywhere by the direct manifestation of his will, except in the acts of rebellious liberty, and in the shadow of pain which follows that evil light which leads astray from him. having said that the idea of god the creator alone satisfies the reason, and raises up, upon the basis of reason, man's conscience and heart, i should wish to show you, in conclusion, that this idea renders an account of the great systems of error which divide the human mind between them. truth bears this lofty mark, that it never overthrows a doctrine without causing any portion of truth which it may have contained to pass into its own bosom. what then,--apart from declared atheism, from the dualism which has almost disappeared, and from faith in god the creator,--are the great systems which share the human mind between them? there are two: deism and pantheism. what is deism? it is a doctrine which acknowledges that there is one god, the cause of the universe; but a god who is in a manner withdrawn from his own work, and who leaves it to go on alone. god has regulated things in the mass, but not in detail, or, to employ an expression of jean-jacques rousseau (who came at a later period to entertain better opinions), "god is like a king who governs his kingdom, but who does not trouble himself to ascertain whether all the taverns in it are good ones." the idea of a general government of god which does not descend to details--such is the essence of deism. what is pantheism, in the ordinary meaning of the word? we have already said: it is a doctrine which absorbs god in the universe, which confounds him with nature, and makes of him only the inert substance, the unconscious principle of the universe. these are the two great conceptions which wrestle, in the history of human thought, against the idea of the creator. these two systems triumph easily one over the other, because each of them contains a portion of truth which is wanting to its antagonist. they cannot support themselves because each of them has in it a portion of error. this is what we must well understand. deism contains a portion of truth; for it maintains a creator essentially distinct from the creation, or, according to an expression which i translate from an ancient indian poem: "one single act of his created the universe, and he remained himself whole and entire." this thought is true. what is the error of deism? it is that it makes a god like to a man who works upon matter existing previously to his action, and who puts in operation forces independent of himself, and which he does nothing but employ. in this way a watchmaker makes a watch which goes afterwards without him, because the watchmaker only sets to work forces which have an independent existence, and which continue to act when he has ceased his labor. we work upon matter foreign to us. the workman did not make matter, but only disposes of it, and he can never do more than modify the action of forces which do not proceed from his will, and have not been regulated by his understanding. but the being who is the cause of all cannot dispose of foreign forces which act afterwards by themselves, since there exists in his work no principle of action other than those which he has himself placed in it. deism results therefore from a confusion between the work of a creature placed in a preexisting world, and the work of the supreme will which is in itself the single and absolute cause of all. it contains an element of dualism: its god does not create; but organizes a world the being of which does not depend on him. take what is true in deism--the existence of the only god; remember that the creator is the absolute cause of the universe; and the distinction between _ensemble_ and detail will vanish, and you will understand that god is too great that there should be anything small in his eyes: god measures not our lot by line and square: the grass-suspended drop of morning dew reflects a firmament as vast and fair as ocean from his boundless field of blue.[171] in other words, take what is true in deism, and accept all the consequences of it, and you will arrive at the full doctrine of the creation. pantheism recognizes the omnipresence of god in the universe, or, if you like the terms of the school, the immanence of god; this is its portion of truth. when i open the hindoos' songs of adoration, and find therein the unlimited enumeration of the manifestations of god in nature, i find nothing to complain of. but when, in those same hymns, i see liberty denied, the origin of evil attributed to the holy one, and man cowering before destiny, instead of turning his eyes freely towards the heavenly father, then i stand only more erect and say: you forget that if your god is the cause of all, he is the cause of liberty. if liberty exists, evil, the revolt of liberty, is not the work of the creator. your system contradicts itself. you make of god the universal principle, and you are right; make of him then the author of free wills, so that he will be no longer the source of evil, and we shall be agreed. deism and pantheism therefore, pushed to their legitimate consequences, are transformed and united in the truth. and you see plainly that i am not making, for my part, an arbitrary selection in these systems. i am walking by one sole light, the light which has been given to us, and which serves me everywhere as a guiding clue:--the lord is god, and there is no other god but he. such, gentlemen, is the fundamental truth on which rests all religion, and all philosophy capable of accounting for facts. such is the grand cause which claims all the efforts which we are wasting too often in barren conflicts--the cause of god. but do i say the truth? is it the cause of god which is at stake? when a surgeon, by a successful operation, has restored sight to a blind man, we are not wont to say that he has rendered a service to the sun. this cause is our own; it is that of society at large, it is that of families, that of individuals; it is the cause which concerns our dignity, our happiness; it is the cause of all, even of those who attack it in words of which they do not calculate the import, and who, were they to succeed in banishing god from the public conscience, would, with us, recoil in terror at sight of the frightful abysses into which we all should fall together. it is time to sum up these considerations. inert and unintelligent matter is not the cause of life and intelligence. human consciences would be plunged in irremediable misery, if ever they could be persuaded that there is nothing superior to man. the universe is the work of wisdom and of power; it is the creation of the infinite mind. what can still be wanting to our hearts? the thought that god desires our good,--that he loves us. if it is so, we shall be able to understand that our cause is his, that he is not an impassible sun whose rays fall on us with indifference, but a father who is moved at our sorrows, and who would have us find joy and peace in him. this will be the subject of our next and concluding lecture. footnotes: [160] firmissimum hoc afferri videtur, cur deos esse credamus, quod nulla gens tam fera, nemo omnium tam sit immanis, cujus mentem non imbuerit deorum opinio. multi de diis prava sentiunt, id enim vitioso more effici solet; omnes tamen esse vim et naturam divinam arbitrantur.... omni autem in re consentio omnium gentium, lex natur㦠putanda est.--_tuscul._ i. 13. [161] _in presence of heaven, we must believe or deny._ see lecture iii. [162] _profession de foi du vicaire savoyard._ [163] thou hadst only forgotten one point, and that was, to light thy lantern. [164] _harmonices mundi libri quinque_. [165] the authenticity of this reply is disputed; m. arago gives it in different terms; but the question is of small consequence here as one of historical criticism, my object being not to establish a fact, but to put an idea in a strong light by means of an example. [166] .... pour ãªtre approuvã©s de semblables projets veulent ãªtre achevã©s. [167] ps. cxlviii. [168] le monde entier te glorifie, l'oiseau te chante sur son nid; et pour une goutte de pluie des milliers d'ãªtres t'ont beni. [169] albert de haller. _lettres sur les vã©ritã©s les plus importantes de la rã©vã©lation_. lettre 2. [170] et toute la _science_ est un hymne ã  sa gloire. [171] dieu ne mesure pas nos sorts ã  l'ã©tendue. la goutte de rosã©e ã  l'herbe suspendue y rã©flã©chit un ciel aussi vaste, aussi pur que l'immense ocã©an dans ses plaines d'azur. lamartine. lecture vii. _the father._ (at geneva, 8th dec. 1863.--at lausanne, 1st feb. 1864.) gentlemen, we have proposed for solution the problem which includes all others whatsoever--the problem of the universe. what are the laws which govern the universe? they are those which are the objects of science, taking that word in its largest and most general meaning. what is the cause of the universe? the eternal power of the infinite mind. these are the two answers which we have hitherto obtained, but, as we have explained, a study is not complete if it confine itself to these two answers. when we know the law and the cause of an object submitted to our study, we further look for the end designed. this is no freak of our fancy, but the direct result of the constitution of our understanding. the universe is the creation of god. what is the design of the creation? i answer: the design of the creation is the happiness of spirits. nature is made for the spiritual beings to which it offers the condition of their life and development; spiritual beings are made for felicity. the moving spring of infinite power is goodness: this is my thesis. if i succeed in establishing it, it will follow that we shall in imagination see issuing from the supreme unity of the infinite being three rays: the power which creates the being of things; the intelligence which orders them; and the love which conducts them to their destination. it will also follow that i shall have justified the title under which these lectures were announced: power and wisdom are attributes of the creator; the father reveals himself in goodness. what shall be our method? can we enter into the counsels of god? by what means? to place our understanding in the midst of the divine consciousness, there to behold the spring of the determinations of the infinite being, were an attempt so far exceeding our capacity, that it is impossible to point out any means whatever by which it could be made. this would be to conceive of god in his eternal essence, independently of his relation to the universe, to nature, and to our reason. i do not say merely that the attempt would be fruitless; i say that we have no means of attempting this metaphysical adventure. but might we not, in looking at the work of god, discern in it the evidence of its design? this is a process which we often follow in regard to our fellow-creatures. do we wish to know the object which a man has in view in his labor? he may himself disclose that object to us directly in words, or we may endeavor to discover it. we watch him at work, and by observing the way in which he proceeds we sometimes come to know what his thoughts are, because we find ourselves in presence of the work of a mind, and we ourselves are mind. can we in the same way, by looking at the universe, that grand work, succeed in discovering its end? the way on which we are entering raises two objections, which proceed from the difficulties felt by two classes of men of opposite views; and our first business will be to rid ourselves of these preliminary difficulties. you will never succeed, it has been said to me, in proving the goodness of god, because evil is in the world. i am not inventing, gentlemen. a letter containing this challenge has been addressed to me by one of you. it is manifest, since we propose to ourselves to recognize in the work the intention of the worker, and since our thesis is the goodness of the first cause of the universe, that evil, in all its forms, sin, pain, imperfection, is the main objection which can be addressed to us. evil is real; it is a sad and great reality; i am forward to acknowledge it. any system which would prove that evil does not exist, or, which comes to the same thing, that evil is necessary, that good and evil in short are of the same nature, is an impossible, i had almost said a culpable, system. the strongest minds have worn themselves out in such attempts with no result whatever. the great leibnitz attempted an enterprise of this nature. his system consisted in extenuating evil as far as possible, and in pronouncing that amount of evil, of which he could not dissemble the existence, to be necessary. he failed. the strong intellectual armor of one of the greatest geniuses the world has ever seen was completely transpierced by the sharp and brilliant shaft of voltaire. sad reckoners of the woes which men endure, sharpening the pangs ye make pretence to cure, poor comforters! in your attempts i see nought but the pride which feigns unreal glee! o mortals, of such bliss how weak the spell! ye cry in doleful accents--"all is well!"- and all things at the great deceit rebel. nay, if your minds to coin the flattery dare, your hearts as often lay the falsehood bare. the gloomy truth admits of no disguise- evil is on the earth![172] for once, gentlemen, we will not contradict our old neighbor of ferney. yes, evil is on the earth; and it constitutes, in the question which we are discussing, the greatest of problems, the most serious of difficulties. let us listen to a modern poet: why then so great, o sovereign lord, came evil from thy forming hand, that reason, yea, and virtue stand aghast before the sight abhorred? and how can deeds so hideous glare beneath the beams of holy light, that on the lips of hapless wight dies at their view the trembling prayer? why do the many parts agree so scantly in thy work sublime? and what is pestilence, or crime, or death, o righteous god, to thee?[173] we have only to put this poetry into common prose to obtain this argument, namely,--the presence of evil in the world is not compatible with the idea of the goodness of god. here is the objection in all its force. and what is the answer? simply this, that god did not create evil. it was not he who brought crime into the world. he created liberty, which is a good, and evil is the produce of created liberty in rebellion against the law of its being. i borrow from jean-jacques rousseau the development of this thought. "if man," says he, "is a free agent, then he acts of himself; whatever he does freely enters not into the ordained system of providence, and cannot be imputed to it. the creator does not will the evil which man does, in abusing the liberty which he gives him. he has made him free in order that he may do not evil but good by choice. to murmur because god does not hinder him from doing evil, is to murmur because he made him of an excellent nature, attached to his actions the moral character which ennobles them, and gave him a right to virtue. what! in order to prevent man from being wicked, must he needs be confined to instinct and made a mere brute? no; god of my soul, never will i reproach thee with having made it in thine image, in order that i might be free, good, and happy, like thyself. "it is the abuse of our faculties which renders us unhappy and wicked. our vexations and our cares come to us from ourselves." such is rousseau's answer to the objection drawn from the existence of evil. it is a good one. it is so good that it is impossible to find a better. if we are determined not to outrage the human conscience by denying the reality of evil; if god is the sovereign good, and if there is no other principle of things than he; evil cannot be accounted for otherwise than by the rebellion of the creature. but now, rousseau's answer, excellent in itself and in the abstract, becomes profoundly inadequate, as the citizen of geneva goes on to develop his theory. evil comes from the creature; but each individual is not the exclusive source of the evils which he does and suffers. to attribute to each individual, not only the responsibility of his acts, but the origin of the evil germs which exist in his soul, is the untenable proposition of a desperate individualism. there is evidently among men a common property in evil; rousseau sees it clearly enough, but he makes vain efforts to find in the organization of society and in the condition of civilization the causes of pain and of sin. when one has come to see clearly that the source of evil is in the creature, the close mutual connection of created wills and their relations with nature present a field for long and difficult study; and rousseau has no sooner discerned the road to truth than he wanders away into byroads in which the solution of the problem escapes him. this problem, gentlemen, i have the intention and desire of studying some day, if god permit, with those of you who may be willing to undertake it with me. we shall then have to deal with an objection, or rather with a difficulty. but this difficulty, which we cannot now dispose of, must not hinder us from stating our thesis. in every well-conducted study, the propositions to be maintained must be laid down and supported before dealing with objections. if it were maintained that evil is the principle of things, it would be necessary first of all to endeavor to establish the thesis, in which the existence of good would be brought forward, and would constitute the objection. the objection would have to be answered--why has good appeared in the world? and i would just say in passing, that our libraries are full of treatises upon the origin of evil, and i have never met with one upon the origin of good. it appears therefore that reason has always admitted, by a sort of instinct, the identity of good, and of the principle of being. our thesis is that the principle of the universe is good. we are going to try to demonstrate it. afterwards the difficulty, evil, will present itself, of which it will be necessary to seek the explanation. this will be the natural sequel, and the necessary complement of the course of lectures which we are concluding to-day. i pass to another difficulty, another challenge which also has been addressed to me. your object, christians have said to me, is to establish that the principle and ground of all things is goodness. this you will not be able to do without departing from your prescribed plan, and entering upon the domain of christian faith properly so called. in your examination of the universe will you leave out of view jesus christ and his work? do you not know that it is by means of this work that the idea of the love of god has been implanted in the world, and that it is thence you have taken it? do you think to climb to the loftiest heights of thought, and to make the ascent by some other road than over the mountain of nazareth and the hill of calvary? gentlemen, i declared my whole mind on this subject at first starting. the complete idea of god demands, for its maintenance, the grand doctrinal foundations of our faith. christian in its origin, firm faith in the love of god the creator requires for its defence the armor of the gospel. but before defending this belief, we must first establish it; we must show that it has natural roots in human nature. christianity purifies and strengthens it, but it does not in an absolute sense create it. the mark of truth is that it does not strike us as something absolutely new, but that it finds an echo in the depths of our soul. when we meet with it, we seem to re-enter into the possession of our patrimony. the cross of jesus christ is without all contradiction the most transcendent proof of the mercy of the creator; but the cross of jesus christ rather warrants the christian in believing in the divine love than gives him the idea of it. we must distinguish in the gospel between the universal religion which it has restored, and the act itself of that restoration, which constitutes the gospel in the special sense of the word. now what i am here maintaining is the fact of the existence in modern society of the elements of the universal religion. i am far from sharing in the illusions of my fellow-countryman rousseau, when he affirms that even if he had lived in a desert isle, and had never known a fellow-man, he would nevertheless have been able to write the _profession de foi du vicaire savoyard_. i know very well that if i were a brahmin, born at the foot of the himalayas, or a chinese mandarin, i should not be able to say all that i am saying respecting the goodness of god. the light which we have received--i know whence it radiates; but, by the help of that light, i seek its kindred rays everywhere, and everywhere i find them in humanity. let us endeavor, then, according to our plan, to recognize in the universe the marks of the divine goodness. let us first of all interrogate the human soul, which is certainly one of the essential elements of the world; and let us interrogate it with regard to the great fact of religion. the universal religion presents to observation two principal forms of mental experience: the sense of the necessity for appeasing the divine justice, and the sense of the necessity for obtaining the help of god. the sense of the necessity for appeasing justice reveals itself in sacrifices. there are sacrifices which are merely offerings of gratitude, and freewill gifts of love. but when you see the blood of animals flowing in the temples, and not seldom human blood gushing forth upon the altars, you will be unable to escape the conviction that man, in presenting himself before the deity, feels constrained to appease a justice which threatens him. the sense of the need of help shows itself in prayer; and this must be the especial object of our study, because it is in the fact of religious invocation that we shall encounter the idea, obscure perhaps, but real, of the goodness of the first cause of the universe. prayer is a fact of the universal religion. whence is it that we derive a large part of what knowledge we have of the ancient civilizations of india and egypt? from ruins: and the chief of these ruins are the ruins of temples, that is to say, of houses of prayer. would we go further back than these monuments of stone? i interrogate those pioneers of science who are searching for the traces of antiquity in old languages,--in the ruins of speech. i inquire, for example, of my learned fellow-countryman, m. adolphe pictet: "you who have studied, with patient care, the first origins of our race--what have you discovered in the way of religion?" he replies: "when i have gone as far back as historical speculations can carry us by the aid of language, it appears to me that i no longer see temples built by the hand of man, but, beneath the open vault of heaven, i see our earliest ancestors sending up together the chant of prayer and the flame of sacrifice."[174] and now, from this remote antiquity, i come down to the paganism, in which modern civilization had its beginning. tertullian teaches us that the pagans, seeming to forget their idols, and to offer a spontaneous testimony to the truth, were often wont to exclaim--great god! good god! what in their mind was the order of these two thoughts, the thought of greatness and that of goodness? the pediment of a temple at rome bore this famous inscription, _deo optimo maximo_; and cicero explains to us that the god of the capitol was by the roman people named "very good" on account of the benefits conferred by him, and "very great" on account of his power.[175] it is the idea of goodness which here appears to be first. but let us go more directly to the root of the question: what do we gather from the universality of prayer? what is it to pray? to pray is to ask. prayer may be mingled with thanksgivings, and with expressions of adoration, but in itself prayer is a petition. this petition rises to god: and when does it so rise? in distress, in anguish. it is misery, weakness, the heart cast down, the failing will, which unite to raise from earth to heaven that long cry which resounds across all the pages of history: help!--i analyze this fact, and inquire what it means. a request is made, and for what? for strength, for tranquillity, for peace; for happiness under all its forms. and of whom is happiness asked? of goodness. justice is appeased, power is dreaded, but it is goodness which is invoked. it is so in human relations. the man who supplicates the fiercest tyrant only does so because he supposes that a fibre of goodness may still vibrate in that savage heart. take from him that thought; persuade him that the last gleam of pity is extinct in the heart to which he appeals, and you will arrest the prayer on the lips of the suppliant. there will remain for him only the silence of despair, or the heroism of resignation. to sum up:--religion is a universal fact. "there is no religion without prayer," said voltaire, and he never said better. there is no prayer without a confused, perhaps, but real, conviction of the goodness of the first cause of the universe. if you could stifle in man's heart the feeling that the principle of things is good, you would silence over the whole globe that voice of prayer which is ever rising to god. thus humanity itself testifies to the truth for which i am contending. humanity prays; it believes therefore in the goodness of god. this fact is an argument. the heart of man is organized to believe that god is good: it is the mark set by the worker himself upon his work. let us study now another of the elements of the universe. we have heard the answer of man's heart; let us ask for the answer of reason. has reason nothing to tell us respecting the intentions of the creator? let us place it in presence of the idea of god--of the infinite being, and see what it will be able to teach us. to attain my object, i must explain more particularly than as yet i have done, a word rendered frivolous by the levity of our heart, a word defiled by the disorder of our passions, and too often by the unworthiness, and worse, of poets and novelists, but which still, in its virgin purity, is ever protesting against the outrages to which it has been subjected: that word is _love_. this word has two principal meanings. in the platonic sense of it, it is the search after what is beautiful, great, noble, pure,--after what, as being of the very real nature of the soul, attracts, fills, and delights it. but there is another sort of love, which does not pursue greatness and beauty, but which gives itself; a love which seeks the wretched to enrich him, the poor to make him happy, the fallen to raise him up. these two kinds of love seem to follow different and even contrary laws. here, for instance, is a description of what often occurs in a large city.[176] a man leaves his house in the evening in order to be present at performances in which i am willing to believe that everything bears the stamp of nobleness and grandeur, or at least of a pure and wholesome taste. he experiences keen enjoyment, and that of an elevated kind. the spectacle over, he returns to his dwelling, and at a still later hour he retires at length to his repose. he has not long extinguished his luxurious tapers, perhaps, when other men, who have slept while others were seeking amusement, rise before daylight, and, lighting their small lanterns, go forth to succor the unfortunate, without witnesses and without ostentation. i have taken this example from xavier de maistre. let me give you another from scenes more familiar to ourselves. you know those pure summer mornings, when one may truly say that the alp smiles and that the mountain invites. a young man quits his dwelling at the first dawning of the day, in his hand the tourist's staff, and his countenance beaming with joy. he starts on a mountain excursion. all day long he quaffs the pure air with delight, revels in the freedom of the pasture-grounds, in the view of the lofty summits and of the distant horizons. he reposes in the shade of the forest, drinks at the spring from the rock, and when he has gazed on the alpine chain resplendent in the radiance of the setting sun, he lingers still to see- twilight its farewell to the hills delaying.[177] noble enjoyments! this young man enjoys because he loves. the spectacle of the creation speaks to his heart and elevates his thoughts. he loves that enchanting nature, which blends in a marvellous union the impressions which in human relations are produced by the strong man's majesty and the maiden's sweetest smile. on this same summer-day, another man has also risen before the sun. he is devoted to the assuaging of human miseries, and he has had much to do. he has mounted gloomy staircases; he has entered dark chambers; he has spent time in hospitals, in the midst of the pains of sickness; he has come, in prisons, to the relief of pains which are sadder still. day, as it dawned, gilded the summits of the alps, but he saw not that pure light of the morning. day, as it advanced, penetrated into the valleys, but he did not notice its progress. the sun set in his glory, but he had no opportunity to admire either the bright reflection of the waters, or the rosy tint of the mountains. and yet he too is joyful because he loves. he loves the fulfilment of stern duty, he loves poverty solaced, and suffering alleviated. here are the two kinds of love. the disciple of plato rises, far from the vulgarities of life, into the lofty regions of the ideal, and feeds on beauty. vincent de paul takes the place of a convict at the galleys that he may restore a father to his children. these two kinds of love seem to us to be contrary one to the other: the one seeks itself, and the other gives itself. still they are both necessary to life, for in order to give we must receive. in the accomplishment of the works of goodness, the soul would be impoverished and would end by drying up in a purely mechanical exercise of beneficence, had it no spring from which to draw forth the living waters. man must himself find joy in order to diffuse it amongst his fellows. but mark the incomparable marvel of the spiritual order of things! the love which gives itself is able to find its worthiest object and its purest satisfaction in the very act of kindness. there is joy in self-devotion; there is happiness in self-sacrifice: the fountain furnishes its own supplies. thus are harmonized the two contrary tendencies of the heart of man. "it is more blessed to give than to receive;" words these, of jesus christ, which, forgotten by the evangelists, have been recorded by the apostle st. paul. and since the thought is a beautiful one, it has adorned the strains of the poets: says lamartine- dost thou happiness resign to another? it is thine- larger for the largess--still![178] and victor hugo, personifying charity, makes her speak as follows: dear to every man that lives, joy i bring to him who gives, joy i leave with him who takes.[179] and because this thought is profound as well as beautiful, it has been taken up by the philosophers. "to love," said leibnitz, "is to place one's happiness in the happiness of another." here is the connecting link between platonic love and the love which is charity. hear how a christian orator comments upon these words:--"this sublime definition has no need of explanations: it is either understood at once, or it is not understood. the man who has loved understands it; and he who has not loved will never understand it. he who has loved knows that a shadow in the heart of the beloved one would darken his own: he knows that he would reckon no means too costly--watchings, labors, privations--by which to create a smile on the lips of the sorrowful; he knows that he would die to redeem a forfeited life; he knows that he would be happy in another's welfare, happy in his graces, happy in his virtues, happy in his glory, happy in his happiness. the man who has loved knows all this; he who has not loved knows nothing of it:--i pity him!"[180] but the great mistake, which seems peculiar to our nature, is that we are ever connecting happiness with the idea of receiving, and are always thinking of giving as of a loss to ourselves. we do not understand that selfishly to keep is to be impoverished, while freely to relinquish is to be enriched. yet here is the grand discovery of the spiritual life; and once this discovery made, in order that the spiritual life may attain its object, it only remains to find the strength to put it into practice. selfishness is wrong, no doubt, but it is not only wrong, it is ignorant, for it looks for happiness where it is not; and it is unhappy, for it wanders from the paths of peace. let us now apply these considerations to the infinite being, and to the problem of the end of the creation. leaving ourselves to the guidance of the laws of our reason, let us ask what object we shall be able to attribute to the creator in his work? will creation be the effect of a necessity? no, sirs, for in that case everything in the world would be a matter of fate, and liberty would remain inexplicable. if a blind power were directing the almighty will, we should return to the worship of destiny. will creation, then, be the carrying out of a design of which the motive is interest? but what conceivable interest can influence him who is the plentitude of being? or will creation be a duty? but whence should come the obligation for the being who is in himself the absolute law? creation can only be conceived of as a work of love. but of what love? of that which is the manifestation of absolute disinterestedness, of supreme liberty. allow me to introduce into this discussion some eloquent words, uttered in the year 1848, in the midst of the revolutionary agitations of paris. the problem which we are debating was treated then, in the presence of an excited crowd, by pã¨re lacordaire.[181] he is entering upon this question: what can have been the motive of the creation? and he distinguishes between love in the platonic sense of it, for which he retains the name of love, and the love which gives itself, which he designates by the term--goodness. "was it then love," he asks, "which impelled the divine will, and said to it unceasingly: go and create? is it love which we must thus regard as our first father? but, alas! love itself has a cause in the beauty of its object; and what beauty could that dead and icy shade possess before god, which preceded the universe, and to which we cannot give a name without betraying the truth?... there remained something, sirs, be very sure, more generous than self-interest, more elevated than duty, more powerful than love. search your own hearts, and if you find it hard to understand me, if your own endowments are unknown to you, listen to bossuet speaking of you:--'when god,' says he, 'made the heart of man, the first thing he planted there was goodness:' goodness; that is to say, that virtue which does not consult self-interest, which does not wait for the commands of duty, which needs not to be solicited by the attraction of the beautiful, but which stoops towards its object all the more, as it is poorer, more miserable, more abandoned, more worthy of contempt! it is true, sirs, it is true: man possesses that adorable faculty. it is not genius, nor glory, nor love, which measures the elevation of his soul,--it is goodness. this it is which gives to the human countenance its principal and most powerful charm; this it is which draws us together; this it is which brings into communication the good and the evil, and which is everywhere, from heaven to earth, the great mediating principle. see, at the foot of the alps, yon miserable _crã©tin_, which, eyeless, smileless, tearless, is not even conscious of its own degradation, and which looks like an effort of nature to insult itself in the dishonor of the greatest of its own productions: but beware how you imagine that that wretched object has not found the road to any heart, or that his debasement has deprived him of the love of all the world. no: he is beloved; he has a mother, he has brothers and sisters; he has a place at the cottage-hearth; he has the best place and the most sacred of all, just because of all he may seem to have the least claim to any. the bosom which nursed him supports him still, and the superstition of love never speaks of him but as of a blessing sent of god. such is man! "but can i say, such is man, without saying also, such is god! from whom would man derive goodness, if god were not the primordial ocean of goodness, and if, when he formed our heart, he had not first of all poured into it a drop from his own? yes, god is good; yes, goodness is the attribute which includes in it all the rest; and it is not without reason that antiquity engraved on the pediment of its temples that famous inscription, in which goodness preceded greatness." now, to say nothing of the sparkling beauty of these words, let us pause at this definite idea: the eternal, the first universal cause of all things, independently of which nothing exists, could only create under the impelling motive of the goodness which gives, and not of the love which seeks requital. this proposition is as clear in the abstract as any theorem of geometry. but we have touched the threshold of the infinite; and we never touch the threshold of the infinite without falling into some degree of bewilderment. clear as this thought is in the abstract, if we wish to analyze it in its real substance, our view is confused. you understand well that goodness increases in the proportion in which its object is diminished. we are by so much more good as we stoop to that which is poorer and more miserable. what then shall be the infinite goodness? in order to find it, we must infinitely diminish its object: and here we encounter mystery. to diminish an object infinitely is an operation impossible to our thought. this mystery is encountered even in the mathematical sciences. we take a quantity, halve it, and again halve this half, and so on without end, but we shall never obtain the infinity of smallness; for the quantity indefinitely divided will always remain indefinitely divisible. at whatever degree of division we may have arrived, between what remains and nothingness there extends always the abyss of the infinite. so i seek for the object of infinite goodness: that object must be infinitely destitute. i diminish accordingly the existence of the universe: i extinguish all the rays of its beauty; i take from it order, life, measure, color, light; i reduce it until it is nothing but formless matter, a something--i know not what--which has no longer a name. vain attempt! this nameless something, so long as it is anything, will not be _nothing_. between it and nothing there will always be the infinite. if the goodness of god is applied to any object which was existing independently of him, however poor and abject that object be conceived to have been, then god is no longer the unique, the absolute creator. if imagination will cross the abyss, we shall come of necessity to say--what? that the object of infinite love must have been non-existence. this is what the orator already quoted has done:--"all perfection supposes an object to which to apply itself. the divine goodness therefore requires an object as vast and profound as itself. god discovered it. from the bosom of his own fulness he saw that being without beauty, without form, without life, without name, that being without being which we call non-existence: he heard the cry of worlds which were not, the cry of a measureless destitution calling to a measureless goodness. eternity was troubled, she said to time: begin!" this, gentlemen, is eloquence. the thought in itself does not bear a rigorous analysis; but do not think that the lustrous beauty of the language is only a brilliant veil to what in itself is absurd. we have arrived at darkness, but it is at darkness visible; the cloud is lighted up by the ray that issues from it. our goodness, finite creatures as we are, is so much the greater as the object on which it is bestowed is less. infinite goodness must create for itself an object. it does not love nothingness, but a creature which is nothing in itself, a creature simply possible, which, before owing to it the blessings of existence, shall owe to it that existence itself. the only being that we can represent to ourselves, by a sublime image, as stooping towards nothingness, is he whose look gives life. the creature is willed for itself, or,--to quote the words of professor secrã©tan, addressed to you last year,--the foundation of nature is grace.[182] we ask: what can have been the object of creation? our reason answers: the infinite being can only act from goodness, he can have no other object than the happiness of his creatures. and now i recapitulate. we ask what is the object of creation; and whereas we cannot transport ourselves into the inaccessible light of the divine consciousness, we question the work of god in order to discern the intentions of the creator. from the fact that humanity prays, we gather the reply that man has a spontaneous belief in the goodness of the first cause of the universe. we place reason in presence of the idea of the infinite being; reason declares to us that he who is the plenitude of being could not have created except from the motive of love. we understand that god has made all for his own glory, and that his glory consists in the manifestation of his goodness. these thoughts, in their full light, belong to the gospel revelation, but they appear, under a veil, in the conceptions which lie at the basis of pagan religions. without entering the temple of idols, we may bow the knee before the pediment of the ancient sanctuary, and, beneath the open vault of heaven, adore, with the roman people, that god whose goodness takes precedence of his greatness. the direct consequence of the principles which we have just laid down is that happiness is the object of our existence. created by goodness, we can have no other end than blessedness. but beware of supposing that we can take for our guide our desire of happiness, and ourselves calculate its conditions. happiness is our end; it is the will of our father; but we must let ourselves be conducted into it. if, shutting our ears to the voice which lays upon us commands and obligations, we would take our destinies into our own hands; if we made the search after happiness our rule, understanding happiness in our own way, we should be taking for light fantastic gleams which would lead us into abysses of ruin. the unruly propensities of our heart would lead us to make ourselves the centre of the world. to "live for self" is the motto of selfishness, and the watchword of unhappiness. to live for god is the way to happiness. to live to god, that is to say, over the ruins of our shattered selfishness, to enter into order, to take our place in the spiritual edifice of charity, and to share in the joy which god allots to all his children--this is the end of our creation. once lifted to the height of this thought, we are able to understand the great struggle which rent the conscience of the ancients, because in their times the light of truth illumined only at intervals the clouds of error which covered the world. there are in man two voices; the one leading him to happiness, the other calling him to holiness. the first impulse of his nature is to start in eager pursuit of mere enjoyment; but ere long the second voice is heard, the voice of conscience, striving to arrest him in his course. if man do not obey her call, conscience becomes his chastiser. hence arises a painful struggle of conflicting feelings, and the human mind is the subject of a strong temptation to pacify itself by silencing one of the two voices. it is the history of antiquity. socrates, the wise socrates, had indeed cried aloud: woe! woe to the man who separates the just from the useful; and had warned men that happiness may be found apart from what is right and good. cicero put into beautiful latin the lessons of the grecian sage; but the torn heart of man was not long in tearing the mantle of the philosopher. from the thought, full and complete as it is, of socrates issued two celebrated sects, one of which wished to establish man's life on the basis of duty without reference to happiness; and the other on the basis of happiness without reference to duty. the stoics attached themselves to duty; but the need of happiness asserted itself in spite of them, and sought satisfaction in the gloomy pleasure of isolation, and in the savage joy of pride. the sage of these philosophers sets himself free, not only from all the cares of earth, but from all the bonds of the heart, from all natural affection. finally, by a consequence, at once sad and odd, of the same doctrine, the highest point of self-possession is to prove that man is master of himself, by the emancipation of suicide and in the liberty of death. the stoic philosopher declares himself insensible to the ills of life; he denies that pain is an evil; and, on the other hand, he claims the right to kill himself in order to escape from the ills of existence! so ended this famous school. at the same period, the herd of epicurus' followers, giving themselves over to weak and shameful indulgences, were thus in fact laboring with all their might (this is montesquieu's opinion) to prepare that enormous corruption under which were to sink together the glory of rome and the civilization of the ancient world. this struggle which rent the ancient conscience, and which still rends the modern conscience wherever the goodness of god continues veiled--this great conflict is appeased when we have come to understand that goodness is the first principle of things, that happiness is our end, and that the stern voice of conscience is a friendly voice which warns us to shun those paths of error in which we should encounter wretchedness. the conscience is the voice of the master; and the same authority which, speaking in the name of duty, bids us--"be good," adds, in the gentle accents of hope--"and thou shalt be happy." happiness, duty,--these are the two aspects of the divine will. love is the solution of the universal enigma. therefore, surprising as the thought may be, it is our duty to be happy. our profession of faith, when we look above, must be: "i believe in goodness;" and when we enter again into ourselves, our profession of faith should be: "i believe in happiness." and we do not believe in it. not to believe in happiness is the root of our ills; it is the original misery which includes all our miseries. triflers that we are, we give ourselves up to pleasure because we do not believe in joy: frivolous, we run after giddy excitement because we do not believe in peace: with hearts corrupt, we abandon ourselves to the devouring flame of the passions, because we do not believe in the serene light of true felicity. but the more the thought of god's love enters our mind, the more will faith in happiness issue from our soul as a blessed flower. happiness is the end of our being; it is the will of the father. to each one of us are these words addressed: god loves thee; be happy! if therefore (and i address myself more particularly to the younger of my hearers), if in the depth of your soul you are conscious of a sudden aspiration after true felicity, ah! do not suffer the holy flame to be extinguished, do not talk of illusions; do not, i pray you, resign yourselves to the prose of life; to a dreary and gloomy contentedness with a destiny which has no ideal. your nature does not deceive you; it is you who deceive yourselves, if you seek your own welfare in the world of foolish or guilty chimeras. listen to all the voices which speak to you of comfort; be attentive to all the words of peace. seek, labor, pray, till you are able to utter, in quiet confidence, those words of the psalmist: in peace i lay me down to rest; no fears of evil haunt my breast: in peace i sleep till dawn of day, for god, my god, is near alway: on him in faith my cares i roll; he never sleeps who guards my soul.[183] god in the heart--this it is which adds zest to our enjoyments, sanctifies our affections, calms our griefs, and which, amidst the struggles, the sorrows, and the harrowing afflictions of life, suffers to rise from the heart to the countenance that sublime smile which can shine brightly even through tears. footnotes: [172] tristes calculateurs des misã¨res humaines, ne me consolez point, vous aigrissez mes peines; et je ne vois en vous que l'effort impuissant d'un fier infortunã© qui feint d'ãªtre content. quel bonheur, o mortels, et faible et misã©rable. vous criez: "tout est bien" d'une voix lamentable; l'univers vous dã©ment, et votre propre coeur cent fois de votre esprit a rã©futã© l'erreur. il le faut avouer, le mal est sur la terre. desastre de lisbonne. [173] pourquoi donc, o maã®tre suprãªme, as-tu crã©ã© le mal si grand que la raison, la vertu mãªme s'ã©pouvantent en le voyant? comment, sous la sainte lumiã¨re, voit-on des actes si hideux, qu'ils font expirer la priã¨re sur les lã¨vres du malheureux? pourquoi, dans ton oeuvre cã©leste, tant d'ã©lã©ments si peu d'accord? a quoi bon le crime et la peste, o dieu juste! pourquoi la mort? alfred de musset, _espoir en dieu_. [174] _les origines indo-europã©ennes, ou les aryas primitifs._--the above is a _rã©sumã©_, not a verbatim quotation. [175] quocirca te, capitoline, quem propter beneficia populus romanus optimum, propter vim maximum nominavit. (_pro domo sua_, lvii.) [176] see the _voyage autour de ma chambre_ of xavier de maistre. [177] _le crã©puscule aux monts prolonger ses adieux._ [178] tout le bonheur tu cã¨des accroã®t ta fã©licitã©. [179] chã¨re ã  tout homme quel qu'il soit, j'apporte la joie ã  qui donne et je la laisse ã  qui reã§oit. and shakspeare- ".... mercy ... is twice bless'd, it blesseth him that gives, and him that takes." _merchant of venice._--[tr.] [180] lacordaire. _confã©rences de 1848._ [181] _confã©rences de 1848_, p. 78. [182] _la raison et le christianisme_: twelve lectures on the existence of god, one vol. 12mo. in the _philosophie de la libertã©_ (2 vols. 8vo.) m. secrã©tan has set forth, in a severely scientific form, the arguments of which the reader has just seen the oratorical expression from the pen of pã¨re lacordaire. this agreement is worth notice, the dates showing that no communication was possible. [183] je me couche sans peur, je m'endors sans frayeur, sans crainte je m'ã©veille. dieu qui soutient ma foi est toujours prã¨s de moi, et jamais ne sommeille. the end. * * * * * cambridge: printed by john wilson and son. objection 1: it would seem that the human body was not produced by god immediately. for augustine says (de trin. iii, 4), that "corporeal things are disposed by god through the angels." but the human body was made of corporeal matter, as stated above (a. 1). therefore it was produced by the instrumentality of the angels, and not immediately by god. obj. 2: further, whatever can be made by a created power, is not necessarily produced immediately by god. but the human body can be produced by the created power of a heavenly body; for even certain animals are produced from putrefaction by the active power of a heavenly body; and albumazar says that man is not generated where heat and cold are extreme, but only in temperate regions. therefore the human body was not necessarily produced immediately by god. obj. 3: further, nothing is made of corporeal matter except by some material change. but all corporeal change is caused by a movement of a heavenly body, which is the first movement. therefore, since the human body was produced from corporeal matter, it seems that a heavenly body had part in its production. obj. 4: further, augustine says (gen. ad lit. vii, 24) that man's body was made during the work of the six days, according to the causal virtues which god inserted in corporeal creatures; and that afterwards it was actually produced. but what pre-exists in the corporeal creature by reason of causal virtues can be produced by some corporeal body. therefore the human body was produced by some created power, and not immediately by god. _on the contrary,_ it is written (ecclus. 17:1): "god created man out of the earth." _i answer that,_ the first formation of the human body could not be by the instrumentality of any created power, but was immediately from god. some, indeed, supposed that the forms which are in corporeal matter are derived from some immaterial forms; but the philosopher refutes this opinion (metaph. vii), for the reason that forms cannot be made in themselves, but only in the composite, as we have explained (q. 65, a. 4); and because the agent must be like its effect, it is not fitting that a pure form, not existing in matter, should produce a form which is in matter, and which form is only made by the fact that the composite is made. so a form which is in matter can only be the cause of another form that is in matter, according as composite is made by composite. now god, though he is absolutely immaterial, can alone by his own power produce matter by creation: wherefore he alone can produce a form in matter, without the aid of any preceding material form. for this reason the angels cannot transform a body except by making use of something in the nature of a seed, as augustine says (de trin. iii, 19). therefore as no pre-existing body has been formed whereby another body of the same species could be generated, the first human body was of necessity made immediately by god. reply obj. 1: although the angels are the ministers of god, as regards what he does in bodies, yet god does something in bodies beyond the angels' power, as, for instance, raising the dead, or giving sight to the blind: and by this power he formed the body of the first man from the slime of the earth. nevertheless the angels could act as ministers in the formation of the body of the first man, in the same way as they will do at the last resurrection by collecting the dust. reply obj. 2: perfect animals, produced from seed, cannot be made by the sole power of a heavenly body, as avicenna imagined; although the power of a heavenly body may assist by co-operation in the work of natural generation, as the philosopher says (phys. ii, 26), "man and the sun beget man from matter." for this reason, a place of moderate temperature is required for the production of man and other animals. but the power of heavenly bodies suffices for the production of some imperfect animals from properly disposed matter: for it is clear that more conditions are required to produce a perfect than an imperfect thing. reply obj. 3: the movement of the heavens causes natural changes; but not changes that surpass the order of nature, and are caused by the divine power alone, as for the dead to be raised to life, or the blind to see: like to which also is the making of man from the slime of the earth. reply obj. 4: an effect may be said to pre-exist in the causal virtues of creatures, in two ways. first, both in active and in passive potentiality, so that not only can it be produced out of pre-existing matter, but also that some pre-existing creature can produce it. secondly, in passive potentiality only; that is, that out of pre-existing matter it can be produced by god. in this sense, according to augustine, the human body pre-existed in the previous work in their causal virtues. _______________________ third article [i, q. 91, art. 3] whether the body of man was given an apt disposition? objection 1: it would seem that the body of man was not given an apt disposition. for since man is the noblest of animals, his body ought to be the best disposed in what is proper to an animal, that is, in sense and movement. but some animals have sharper senses and quicker movement than man; thus dogs have a keener smell, and birds a swifter flight. therefore man's body was not aptly disposed. obj. 2: further, perfect is what lacks nothing. but the human body lacks more than the body of other animals, for these are provided with covering and natural arms of defense, in which man is lacking. therefore the human body is very imperfectly disposed. obj. 3: further, man is more distant from plants than he is from the brutes. but plants are erect in stature, while brutes are prone in stature. therefore man should not be of erect stature. _on the contrary,_ it is written (eccles. 7:30): "god made man right." _i answer that,_ all natural things were produced by the divine art, and so may be called god's works of art. now every artist intends to give to his work the best disposition; not absolutely the best, but the best as regards the proposed end; and even if this entails some defect, the artist cares not: thus, for instance, when man makes himself a saw for the purpose of cutting, he makes it of iron, which is suitable for the object in view; and he does not prefer to make it of glass, though this be a more beautiful material, because this very beauty would be an obstacle to the end he has in view. therefore god gave to each natural being the best disposition; not absolutely so, but in the view of its proper end. this is what the philosopher says (phys. ii, 7): "and because it is better so, not absolutely, but for each one's substance." now the proximate end of the human body is the rational soul and its operations; since matter is for the sake of the form, and instruments are for the action of the agent. i say, therefore, that god fashioned the human body in that disposition which was best, as most suited to such a form and to such operations. if defect exists in the disposition of the human body, it is well to observe that such defect arises as a necessary result of the matter, from the conditions required in the body, in order to make it suitably proportioned to the soul and its operations. reply obj. 1: the sense of touch, which is the foundation of the other senses, is more perfect in man than in any other animal; and for this reason man must have the most equable temperament of all animals. moreover man excels all other animals in the interior sensitive powers, as is clear from what we have said above (q. 78, a. 4). but by a kind of necessity, man falls short of the other animals in some of the exterior senses; thus of all animals he has the least sense of smell. for man needs the largest brain as compared to the body; both for his greater freedom of action in the interior powers required for the intellectual operations, as we have seen above (q. 84, a. 7); and in order that the low temperature of the brain may modify the heat of the heart, which has to be considerable in man for him to be able to stand erect. so that size of the brain, by reason of its humidity, is an impediment to the smell, which requires dryness. in the same way, we may suggest a reason why some animals have a keener sight, and a more acute hearing than man; namely, on account of a hindrance to his senses arising necessarily from the perfect equability of his temperament. the same reason suffices to explain why some animals are more rapid in movement than man, since this excellence of speed is inconsistent with the equability of the human temperament. reply obj. 2: horns and claws, which are the weapons of some animals, and toughness of hide and quantity of hair or feathers, which are the clothing of animals, are signs of an abundance of the earthly element; which does not agree with the equability and softness of the human temperament. therefore such things do not suit the nature of man. instead of these, he has reason and hands whereby he can make himself arms and clothes, and other necessaries of life, of infinite variety. wherefore the hand is called by aristotle (de anima iii, 8), "the organ of organs." moreover this was more becoming to the rational nature, which is capable of conceiving an infinite number of things, so as to make for itself an infinite number of instruments. reply obj. 3: an upright stature was becoming to man for four reasons. first, because the senses are given to man, not only for the purpose of procuring the necessaries of life, which they are bestowed on other animals, but also for the purpose of knowledge. hence, whereas the other animals take delight in the objects of the senses only as ordered to food and sex, man alone takes pleasure in the beauty of sensible objects for its own sake. therefore, as the senses are situated chiefly in the face, other animals have the face turned to the ground, as it were for the purpose of seeking food and procuring a livelihood; whereas man has his face erect, in order that by the senses, and chiefly by sight, which is more subtle and penetrates further into the differences of things, he may freely survey the sensible objects around him, both heavenly and earthly, so as to gather intelligible truth from all things. secondly, for the greater freedom of the acts of the interior powers; the brain, wherein these actions are, in a way, performed, not being low down, but lifted up above other parts of the body. thirdly, because if man's stature were prone to the ground he would need to use his hands as fore-feet; and thus their utility for other purposes would cease. fourthly, because if man's stature were prone to the ground, and he used his hands as fore-feet, he would be obliged to take hold of his food with his mouth. thus he would have a protruding mouth, with thick and hard lips, and also a hard tongue, so as to keep it from being hurt by exterior things; as we see in other animals. moreover, such an attitude would quite hinder speech, which is reason's proper operation. nevertheless, though of erect stature, man is far above plants. for man's superior part, his head, is turned towards the superior part of the world, and his inferior part is turned towards the inferior world; and therefore he is perfectly disposed as to the general situation of his body. plants have the superior part turned towards the lower world, since their roots correspond to the mouth; and their inferior part towards the upper world. but brute animals have a middle disposition, for the superior part of the animal is that by which it takes food, and the inferior part that by which it rids itself of the surplus. _______________________ fourth article [i, q. 91, art. 4] whether the production of the human body is fittingly described in scripture? objection 1: it would seem that the production of the human body is not fittingly described in scripture. for, as the human body was made by god, so also were the other works of the six days. but in the other works it is written, "god said; let it be made, and it was made." therefore the same should have been said of man. obj. 2: further, the human body was made by god immediately, as explained above (a. 2). therefore it was not fittingly said, "let us make man." obj. 3: further, the form of the human body is the soul itself which is the breath of life. therefore, having said, "god made man of the slime of the earth," he should not have added: "and he breathed into him the breath of life." obj. 4: further, the soul, which is the breath of life, is in the whole body, and chiefly in the heart. therefore it was not fittingly said: "he breathed into his face the breath of life." obj. 5: further, the male and female sex belong to the body, while the image of god belongs to the soul. but the soul, according to augustine (gen. ad lit. vii, 24), was made before the body. therefore having said: "to his image he made them," he should not have added, "male and female he created them." _on the contrary,_ is the authority of scripture. reply obj. 1: as augustine observes (gen. ad lit. vi, 12), man surpasses other things, not in the fact that god himself made man, as though he did not make other things; since it is written (ps. 101:26), "the work of thy hands is the heaven," and elsewhere (ps. 94:5), "his hands laid down the dry land"; but in this, that man is made to god's image. yet in describing man's production, scripture uses a special way of speaking, to show that other things were made for man's sake. for we are accustomed to do with more deliberation and care what we have chiefly in mind. reply obj. 2: we must not imagine that when god said "let us make man," he spoke to the angels, as some were perverse enough to think. but by these words is signified the plurality of the divine person, whose image is more clearly expressed in man. reply obj. 3: some have thought that man's body was formed first in priority of time, and that afterwards the soul was infused into the formed body. but it is inconsistent with the perfection of the production of things, that god should have made either the body without the soul, or the soul without the body, since each is a part of human nature. this is especially unfitting as regards the body, for the body depends on the soul, and not the soul on the body. to remove the difficulty some have said that the words, "god made man," must be understood of the production of the body with the soul; and that the subsequent words, "and he breathed into his face the breath of life," should be understood of the holy ghost; as the lord breathed on his apostles, saying, "receive ye the holy ghost" (john 20:22). but this explanation, as augustine says (de civ. dei xiii, 24), is excluded by the very words of scripture. for we read farther on, "and man was made a living soul"; which words the apostle (1 cor. 15:45) refers not to spiritual life, but to animal life. therefore, by breath of life we must understand the soul, so that the words, "he breathed into his face the breath of life," are a sort of exposition of what goes before; for the soul is the form of the body. reply obj. 4: since vital operations are more clearly seen in man's face, on account of the senses which are there expressed; therefore scripture says that the breath of life was breathed into man's face. reply obj. 5: according to augustine (gen. ad lit. iv, 34), the works of the six days were done all at one time; wherefore according to him man's soul, which he holds to have been made with the angels, was not made before the sixth day; but on the sixth day both the soul of the first man was made actually, and his body in its causal elements. but other doctors hold that on the sixth day both body and soul of man were actually made. _______________________ question 92 the production of the woman (in four articles) we must next consider the production of the woman. under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) whether the woman should have been made in that first production of things? (2) whether the woman should have been made from man? (3) whether of man's rib? (4) whether the woman was made immediately by god? _______________________ first article [i, q. 92, art. 1] whether the woman should have been made in the first production of things? objection 1: it would seem that the woman should not have been made in the first production of things. for the philosopher says (de gener. ii, 3), that "the female is a misbegotten male." but nothing misbegotten or defective should have been in the first production of things. therefore woman should not have been made at that first production. obj. 2: further, subjection and limitation were a result of sin, for to the woman was it said after sin (gen. 3:16): "thou shalt be under the man's power"; and gregory says that, "where there is no sin, there is no inequality." but woman is naturally of less strength and dignity than man; "for the agent is always more honorable than the patient," as augustine says (gen. ad lit. xii, 16). therefore woman should not have been made in the first production of things before sin. obj. 3: further, occasions of sin should be cut off. but god foresaw that the woman would be an occasion of sin to man. therefore he should not have made woman. _on the contrary,_ it is written (gen. 2:18): "it is not good for man to be alone; let us make him a helper like to himself." _i answer that,_ it was necessary for woman to be made, as the scripture says, as a _helper_ to man; not, indeed, as a helpmate in other works, as some say, since man can be more efficiently helped by another man in other works; but as a helper in the work of generation. this can be made clear if we observe the mode of generation carried out in various living things. some living things do not possess in themselves the power of generation, but are generated by some other specific agent, such as some plants and animals by the influence of the heavenly bodies, from some fitting matter and not from seed: others possess the active and passive generative power together; as we see in plants which are generated from seed; for the noblest vital function in plants is generation. wherefore we observe that in these the active power of generation invariably accompanies the passive power. among perfect animals the active power of generation belongs to the male sex, and the passive power to the female. and as among animals there is a vital operation nobler than generation, to which their life is principally directed; therefore the male sex is not found in continual union with the female in perfect animals, but only at the time of coition; so that we may consider that by this means the male and female are one, as in plants they are always united; although in some cases one of them preponderates, and in some the other. but man is yet further ordered to a still nobler vital action, and that is intellectual operation. therefore there was greater reason for the distinction of these two forces in man; so that the female should be produced separately from the male; although they are carnally united for generation. therefore directly after the formation of woman, it was said: "and they shall be two in one flesh" (gen. 2:24). reply obj. 1: as regards the individual nature, woman is defective and misbegotten, for the active force in the male seed tends to the production of a perfect likeness in the masculine sex; while the production of woman comes from defect in the active force or from some material indisposition, or even from some external influence; such as that of a south wind, which is moist, as the philosopher observes (de gener. animal. iv, 2). on the other hand, as regards human nature in general, woman is not misbegotten, but is included in nature's intention as directed to the work of generation. now the general intention of nature depends on god, who is the universal author of nature. therefore, in producing nature, god formed not only the male but also the female. reply obj. 2: subjection is twofold. one is servile, by virtue of which a superior makes use of a subject for his own benefit; and this kind of subjection began after sin. there is another kind of subjection which is called economic or civil, whereby the superior makes use of his subjects for their own benefit and good; and this kind of subjection existed even before sin. for good order would have been wanting in the human family if some were not governed by others wiser than themselves. so by such a kind of subjection woman is naturally subject to man, because in man the discretion of reason predominates. nor is inequality among men excluded by the state of innocence, as we shall prove (q. 96, a. 3). reply obj. 3: if god had deprived the world of all those things which proved an occasion of sin, the universe would have been imperfect. nor was it fitting for the common good to be destroyed in order that individual evil might be avoided; especially as god is so powerful that he can direct any evil to a good end. _______________________ second article [i, q. 92, art. 2] whether woman should have been made from man? objection 1: it would seem that woman should not have been made from man. for sex belongs both to man and animals. but in the other animals the female was not made from the male. therefore neither should it have been so with man. obj. 2: further, things of the same species are of the same matter. but male and female are of the same species. therefore, as man was made of the slime of the earth, so woman should have been made of the same, and not from man. obj. 3: further, woman was made to be a helpmate to man in the work of generation. but close relationship makes a person unfit for that office; hence near relations are debarred from intermarriage, as is written (lev. 18:6). therefore woman should not have been made from man. _on the contrary,_ it is written (ecclus. 17:5): "he created of him," that is, out of man, "a helpmate like to himself," that is, woman. _i answer that,_ when all things were first formed, it was more suitable for the woman to be made from man than (for the female to be from the male) in other animals. first, in order thus to give the first man a certain dignity consisting in this, that as god is the principle of the whole universe, so the first man, in likeness to god, was the principle of the whole human race. wherefore paul says that "god made the whole human race from one" (acts 17:26). secondly, that man might love woman all the more, and cleave to her more closely, knowing her to be fashioned from himself. hence it is written (gen. 2:23, 24): "she was taken out of man, wherefore a man shall leave father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife." this was most necessary as regards the human race, in which the male and female live together for life; which is not the case with other animals. thirdly, because, as the philosopher says (ethic. viii, 12), the human male and female are united, not only for generation, as with other animals, but also for the purpose of domestic life, in which each has his or her particular duty, and in which the man is the head of the woman. wherefore it was suitable for the woman to be made out of man, as out of her principle. fourthly, there is a sacramental reason for this. for by this is signified that the church takes her origin from christ. wherefore the apostle says (eph. 5:32): "this is a great sacrament; but i speak in christ and in the church." reply obj. 1 is clear from the foregoing. reply obj. 2: matter is that from which something is made. now created nature has a determinate principle; and since it is determined to one thing, it has also a determinate mode of proceeding. wherefore from determinate matter it produces something in a determinate species. on the other hand, the divine power, being infinite, can produce things of the same species out of any matter, such as a man from the slime of the earth, and a woman from out of man. reply obj. 3: a certain affinity arises from natural generation, and this is an impediment to matrimony. woman, however, was not produced from man by natural generation, but by the divine power alone. wherefore eve is not called the daughter of adam; and so this argument does not prove. _______________________ third article [i, q. 92, art. 3] whether the woman was fittingly made from the rib of man? objection 1: it would seem that the woman should not have been formed from the rib of man. for the rib was much smaller than the woman's body. now from a smaller thing a larger thing can be made only--either by addition (and then the woman ought to have been described as made out of that which was added, rather than out of the rib itself)--or by rarefaction, because, as augustine says (gen. ad lit. x): "a body cannot increase in bulk except by rarefaction." but the woman's body is not more rarefied than man's--at least, not in the proportion of a rib to eve's body. therefore eve was not formed from a rib of adam. obj. 2: further, in those things which were first created there was nothing superfluous. therefore a rib of adam belonged to the integrity of his body. so, if a rib was removed, his body remained imperfect; which is unreasonable to suppose. obj. 3: further, a rib cannot be removed from man without pain. but there was no pain before sin. therefore it was not right for a rib to be taken from the man, that eve might be made from it. _on the contrary,_ it is written (gen. 2:22): "god built the rib, which he took from adam, into a woman." _i answer that,_ it was right for the woman to be made from a rib of man. first, to signify the social union of man and woman, for the woman should neither "use authority over man," and so she was not made from his head; nor was it right for her to be subject to man's contempt as his slave, and so she was not made from his feet. secondly, for the sacramental signification; for from the side of christ sleeping on the cross the sacraments flowed--namely, blood and water--on which the church was established. reply obj. 1: some say that the woman's body was formed by a material increase, without anything being added; in the same way as our lord multiplied the five loaves. but this is quite impossible. for such an increase of matter would either be by a change of the very substance of the matter itself, or by a change of its dimensions. not by change of the substance of the matter, both because matter, considered in itself, is quite unchangeable, since it has a potential existence, and has nothing but the nature of a subject, and because quantity and size are extraneous to the essence of matter itself. wherefore multiplication of matter is quite unintelligible, as long as the matter itself remains the same without anything added to it; unless it receives greater dimensions. this implies rarefaction, which is for the same matter to receive greater dimensions, as the philosopher says (phys. iv). to say, therefore, that the same matter is enlarged, without being rarefied, is to combine contradictories--viz. the definition with the absence of the thing defined. wherefore, as no rarefaction is apparent in such multiplication of matter, we must admit an addition of matter: either by creation, or which is more probable, by conversion. hence augustine says (tract. xxiv in joan.) that "christ filled five thousand men with five loaves, in the same way as from a few seeds he produces the harvest of corn"--that is, by transformation of the nourishment. nevertheless, we say that the crowds were fed with five loaves, or that woman was made from the rib, because an addition was made to the already existing matter of the loaves and of the rib. reply obj. 2: the rib belonged to the integral perfection of adam, not as an individual, but as the principle of the human race; just as the semen belongs to the perfection of the begetter, and is released by a natural and pleasurable operation. much more, therefore, was it possible that by the divine power the body of the woman should be produced from the man's rib. from this it is clear how to answer the third objection. _______________________ fourth article [i, q. 92, art. 4] whether the woman was formed immediately by god? objection 1: it would seem that the woman was not formed immediately by god. for no individual is produced immediately by god from another individual alike in species. but the woman was made from a man who is of the same species. therefore she was not made immediately by god. obj. 2: further, augustine (de trin. iii, 4) says that corporeal things are governed by god through the angels. but the woman's body was formed from corporeal matter. therefore it was made through the ministry of the angels, and not immediately by god. obj. 3: further, those things which pre-exist in creatures as to their causal virtues are produced by the power of some creature, and not immediately by god. but the woman's body was produced in its causal virtues among the first created works, as augustine says (gen. ad lit. ix, 15). therefore it was not produced immediately by god. _on the contrary,_ augustine says, in the same work: "god alone, to whom all nature owes its existence, could form or build up the woman from the man's rib." _i answer that,_ as was said above (a. 2, ad 2), the natural generation of every species is from some determinate matter. now the matter whence man is naturally begotten is the human semen of man or woman. wherefore from any other matter an individual of the human species cannot naturally be generated. now god alone, the author of nature, can produce an effect into existence outside the ordinary course of nature. therefore god alone could produce either a man from the slime of the earth, or a woman from the rib of man. reply obj. 1: this argument is verified when an individual is begotten, by natural generation, from that which is like it in the same species. reply obj. 2: as augustine says (gen. ad lit. ix, 15), we do not know whether the angels were employed by god in the formation of the woman; but it is certain that, as the body of man was not formed by the angels from the slime of the earth, so neither was the body of the woman formed by them from the man's rib. reply obj. 3: as augustine says (gen. ad lit. ix, 18): "the first creation of things did not demand that woman should be made thus; it made it possible for her to be thus made." therefore the body of the woman did indeed pre-exist in these causal virtues, in the things first created; not as regards active potentiality, but as regards a potentiality passive in relation to the active potentiality of the creator. _______________________ question 93 the end or term of the production of man (in nine articles) we now treat of the end or term of man's production, inasmuch as he is said to be made "to the image and likeness of god." there are under this head nine points of inquiry: (1) whether the image of god is in man? (2) whether the image of god is in irrational creatures? (3) whether the image of god is in the angels more than in man? (4) whether the image of god is in every man? (5) whether the image of god is in man by comparison with the essence, or with all the divine persons, or with one of them? (6) whether the image of god is in man, as to his mind only? (7) whether the image of god is in man's power or in his habits and acts? (8) whether the image of god is in man by comparison with every object? (9) of the difference between "image" and "likeness." _______________________ first article [i, q. 93, art. 1] whether the image of god is in man? objection 1: it would seem that the image of god is not in man. for it is written (isa. 40:18): "to whom have you likened god? or what image will you make for him?" obj. 2: further, to be the image of god is the property of the first-begotten, of whom the apostle says (col. 1:15): "who is the image of the invisible god, the first-born of every creature." therefore the image of god is not to be found in man. obj. 3: further, hilary says (de synod [*super i can]. synod. ancyr.) that "an image is of the same species as that which it represents"; and he also says that "an image is the undivided and united likeness of one thing adequately representing another." but there is no species common to both god and man; nor can there be a comparison of equality between god and man. therefore there can be no image of god in man. _on the contrary,_ it is written (gen. 1:26): "let us make man to our own image and likeness." _i answer that,_ as augustine says (qq. 83, qu. 74): "where an image exists, there forthwith is likeness; but where there is likeness, there is not necessarily an image." hence it is clear that likeness is essential to an image; and that an image adds something to likeness--namely, that it is copied from something else. for an "image" is so called because it is produced as an imitation of something else; wherefore, for instance, an egg, however much like and equal to another egg, is not called an image of the other egg, because it is not copied from it. but equality does not belong to the essence of an image; for as augustine says (qq. 83, qu. 74): "where there is an image there is not necessarily equality," as we see in a person's image reflected in a glass. yet this is of the essence of a perfect image; for in a perfect image nothing is wanting that is to be found in that of which it is a copy. now it is manifest that in man there is some likeness to god, copied from god as from an exemplar; yet this likeness is not one of equality, for such an exemplar infinitely excels its copy. therefore there is in man a likeness to god; not, indeed, a perfect likeness, but imperfect. and scripture implies the same when it says that man was made "to" god's likeness; for the preposition "to" signifies a certain approach, as of something at a distance. reply obj. 1: the prophet speaks of bodily images made by man. therefore he says pointedly: "what image will you make for him?" but god made a spiritual image to himself in man. reply obj. 2: the first-born of creatures is the perfect image of god, reflecting perfectly that of which he is the image, and so he is said to be the "image," and never "to the image." but man is said to be both "image" by reason of the likeness; and "to the image" by reason of the imperfect likeness. and since the perfect likeness to god cannot be except in an identical nature, the image of god exists in his first-born son; as the image of the king is in his son, who is of the same nature as himself: whereas it exists in man as in an alien nature, as the image of the king is in a silver coin, as augustine says explains in _de decem chordis_ (serm. ix, al, xcvi, de tempore). reply obj. 3: as unity means absence of division, a species is said to be the same as far as it is one. now a thing is said to be one not only numerically, specifically, or generically, but also according to a certain analogy or proportion. in this sense a creature is one with god, or like to him; but when hilary says "of a thing which adequately represents another," this is to be understood of a perfect image. _______________________ second article [i, q. 93, art. 2] whether the image of god is to be found in irrational creatures? objection 1: it would seem that the image of god is to be found in irrational creatures. for dionysius says (div. nom. ii): "effects are contingent images of their causes." but god is the cause not only of rational, but also of irrational creatures. therefore the image of god is to be found in irrational creatures. obj. 2: further, the more distinct a likeness is, the nearer it approaches to the nature of an image. but dionysius says (div. nom. iv) that "the solar ray has a very great similitude to the divine goodness." therefore it is made to the image of god. obj. 3: further, the more perfect anything is in goodness, the more it is like god. but the whole universe is more perfect in goodness than man; for though each individual thing is good, all things together are called "very good" (gen. 1:31). therefore the whole universe is to the image of god, and not only man. obj. 4: further, boethius (de consol. iii) says of god: "holding the world in his mind, and forming it into his image." therefore the whole world is to the image of god, and not only the rational creature. _on the contrary,_ augustine says (gen. ad lit. vi, 12): "man's excellence consists in the fact that god made him to his own image by giving him an intellectual soul, which raises him above the beasts of the field." therefore things without intellect are not made to god's image. _i answer that,_ not every likeness, not even what is copied from something else, is sufficient to make an image; for if the likeness be only generic, or existing by virtue of some common accident, this does not suffice for one thing to be the image of another. for instance, a worm, though from man it may originate, cannot be called man's image, merely because of the generic likeness. nor, if anything is made white like something else, can we say that it is the image of that thing; for whiteness is an accident belonging to many species. but the nature of an image requires likeness in species; thus the image of the king exists in his son: or, at least, in some specific accident, and chiefly in the shape; thus, we speak of a man's image in copper. whence hilary says pointedly that "an image is of the same species." now it is manifest that specific likeness follows the ultimate difference. but some things are like to god first and most commonly because they exist; secondly, because they live; and thirdly because they know or understand; and these last, as augustine says (qq. 83, qu. 51) "approach so near to god in likeness, that among all creatures nothing comes nearer to him." it is clear, therefore, that intellectual creatures alone, properly speaking, are made to god's image. reply obj. 1: everything imperfect is a participation of what is perfect. therefore even what falls short of the nature of an image, so far as it possesses any sort of likeness to god, participates in some degree the nature of an image. so dionysius says that effects are "contingent images of their causes"; that is, as much as they happen (_contingit_) to be so, but not absolutely. reply obj. 2: dionysius compares the solar ray to divine goodness, as regards its causality; not as regards its natural dignity which is involved in the idea of an image. reply obj. 3: the universe is more perfect in goodness than the intellectual creature as regards extension and diffusion; but intensively and collectively the likeness to the divine goodness is found rather in the intellectual creature, which has a capacity for the highest good. or else we may say that a part is not rightly divided against the whole, but only against another part. wherefore, when we say that the intellectual nature alone is to the image of god, we do not mean that the universe in any part is not to god's image, but that the other parts are excluded. reply obj. 4: boethius here uses the word "image" to express the likeness which the product of an art bears to the artistic species in the mind of the artist. thus every creature is an image of the exemplar type thereof in the divine mind. we are not, however, using the word "image" in this sense; but as it implies a likeness in nature, that is, inasmuch as all things, as being, are like to the first being; as living, like to the first life; and as intelligent, like to the supreme wisdom. _______________________ third article [i, q. 93, art. 3] whether the angels are more to the image of god than man is? objection 1: it would seem that the angels are not more to the image of god than man is. for augustine says in a sermon _de imagine_ xliii (de verbis apost. xxvii) that god granted to no other creature besides man to be to his image. therefore it is not true to say that the angels are more than man to the image of god. obj. 2: further, according to augustine (qq. 83, qu. 51), "man is so much to god's image that god did not make any creature to be between him and man: and therefore nothing is more akin to him." but a creature is called god's image so far as it is akin to god. therefore the angels are not more to the image of god than man. obj. 3: further, a creature is said to be to god's image so far as it is of an intellectual nature. but the intellectual nature does not admit of intensity or remissness; for it is not an accidental thing, since it is a substance. therefore the angels are not more to the image of god than man. _on the contrary,_ gregory says (hom. in evang. xxxiv): "the angel is called a "seal of resemblance" (ezech. 28:12) because in him the resemblance of the divine image is wrought with greater expression. _i answer that,_ we may speak of god's image in two ways. first, we may consider in it that in which the image chiefly consists, that is, the intellectual nature. thus the image of god is more perfect in the angels than in man, because their intellectual nature is more perfect, as is clear from what has been said (q. 58, a. 3; q. 79, a. 8). secondly, we may consider the image of god in man as regards its accidental qualities, so far as to observe in man a certain imitation of god, consisting in the fact that man proceeds from man, as god from god; and also in the fact that the whole human soul is in the whole body, and again, in every part, as god is in regard to the whole world. in these and the like things the image of god is more perfect in man than it is in the angels. but these do not of themselves belong to the nature of the divine image in man, unless we presuppose the first likeness, which is in the intellectual nature; otherwise even brute animals would be to god's image. therefore, as in their intellectual nature, the angels are more to the image of god than man is, we must grant that, absolutely speaking, the angels are more to the image of god than man is, but that in some respects man is more like to god. reply obj. 1: augustine excludes the inferior creatures bereft of reason from the image of god; but not the angels. reply obj. 2: as fire is said to be specifically the most subtle of bodies, while, nevertheless, one kind of fire is more subtle than another; so we say that nothing is more like to god than the human soul in its generic and intellectual nature, because as augustine had said previously, "things which have knowledge, are so near to him in likeness that of all creatures none are nearer." wherefore this does not mean that the angels are not more to god's image. reply obj. 3: when we say that substance does not admit of more or less, we do not mean that one species of substance is not more perfect than another; but that one and the same individual does not participate in its specific nature at one time more than at another; nor do we mean that a species of substance is shared among different individuals in a greater or lesser degree. _______________________ fourth article [i, q. 93, art. 4] whether the image of god is found in every man? objection 1: it would seem that the image of god is not found in every man. for the apostle says that "man is the image of god, but woman is the image [vulg. glory] of man" (1 cor. 11:7). therefore, as woman is an individual of the human species, it is clear that every individual is not an image of god. obj. 2: further, the apostle says (rom. 8:29): "whom god foreknew, he also predestined to be made conformable to the image of his son." but all men are not predestined. therefore all men have not the conformity of image. obj. 3: further, likeness belongs to the nature of the image, as above explained (a. 1). but by sin man becomes unlike god. therefore he loses the image of god. _on the contrary,_ it is written (ps. 38:7): "surely man passeth as an image." _i answer that,_ since man is said to be the image of god by reason of his intellectual nature, he is the most perfectly like god according to that in which he can best imitate god in his intellectual nature. now the intellectual nature imitates god chiefly in this, that god understands and loves himself. wherefore we see that the image of god is in man in three ways. first, inasmuch as man possesses a natural aptitude for understanding and loving god; and this aptitude consists in the very nature of the mind, which is common to all men. secondly, inasmuch as man actually and habitually knows and loves god, though imperfectly; and this image consists in the conformity of grace. thirdly, inasmuch as man knows and loves god perfectly; and this image consists in the likeness of glory. wherefore on the words, "the light of thy countenance, o lord, is signed upon us" (ps. 4:7), the gloss distinguishes a threefold image of "creation," of "re-creation," and of "likeness." the first is found in all men, the second only in the just, the third only in the blessed. reply obj. 1: the image of god, in its principal signification, namely the intellectual nature, is found both in man and in woman. hence after the words, "to the image of god he created him," it is added, "male and female he created them" (gen. 1:27). moreover it is said "them" in the plural, as augustine (gen. ad lit. iii, 22) remarks, lest it should be thought that both sexes were united in one individual. but in a secondary sense the image of god is found in man, and not in woman: for man is the beginning and end of woman; as god is the beginning and end of every creature. so when the apostle had said that "man is the image and glory of god, but woman is the glory of man," he adds his reason for saying this: "for man is not of woman, but woman of man; and man was not created for woman, but woman for man." reply obj. 2 and 3: these reasons refer to the image consisting in the conformity of grace and glory. _______________________ fifth article [i, q. 93, art. 5] whether the image of god is in man according to the trinity of persons? objection 1: it would seem that the image of god does not exist in man as to the trinity of persons. for augustine says (fulgentius de fide ad petrum i): "one in essence is the godhead of the holy trinity; and one is the image to which man was made." and hilary (de trin. v) says: "man is made to the image of that which is common in the trinity." therefore the image of god in man is of the divine essence, and not of the trinity of persons. obj. 2: further, it is said (de eccl. dogmat.) that the image of god in man is to be referred to eternity. damascene also says (de fide orth. ii, 12) that the image of god in man belongs to him as "an intelligent being endowed with free-will and self-movement." gregory of nyssa (de homin. opificio xvi) also asserts that, when scripture says that "man was made to the image of god, it means that human nature was made a participator of all good: for the godhead is the fulness of goodness." now all these things belong more to the unity of the essence than to the distinction of the persons. therefore the image of god in man regards, not the trinity of persons, but the unity of the essence. obj. 3: further, an image leads to the knowledge of that of which it is the image. therefore, if there is in man the image of god as to the trinity of persons; since man can know himself by his natural reason, it follows that by his natural knowledge man could know the trinity of the divine persons; which is untrue, as was shown above (q. 32, a. 1). obj. 4: further, the name of image is not applicable to any of the three persons, but only to the son; for augustine says (de trin. vi, 2) that "the son alone is the image of the father." therefore, if in man there were an image of god as regards the person, this would not be an image of the trinity, but only of the son. _on the contrary,_ hilary says (de trin. iv): "the plurality of the divine persons is proved from the fact that man is said to have been made to the image of god." _i answer that,_ as we have seen (q. 40, a. 2), the distinction of the divine persons is only according to origin, or, rather, relations of origin. now the mode of origin is not the same in all things, but in each thing is adapted to the nature thereof; animated things being produced in one way, and inanimate in another; animals in one way, and plants in another. wherefore it is manifest that the distinction of the divine persons is suitable to the divine nature; and therefore to be to the image of god by imitation of the divine nature does not exclude being to the same image by the representation of the divine persons: but rather one follows from the other. we must, therefore, say that in man there exists the image of god, both as regards the divine nature and as regards the trinity of persons; for also in god himself there is one nature in three persons. thus it is clear how to solve the first two objections. reply obj. 3: this argument would avail if the image of god in man represented god in a perfect manner. but, as augustine says (de trin. xv, 6), there is a great difference between the trinity within ourselves and the divine trinity. therefore, as he there says: "we see, rather than believe, the trinity which is in ourselves; whereas we believe rather than see that god is trinity." reply obj. 4: some have said that in man there is an image of the son only. augustine rejects this opinion (de trin. xii, 5,6). first, because as the son is like to the father by a likeness of essence, it would follow of necessity if man were made in likeness to the son, that he is made to the likeness of the father. secondly, because if man were made only to the image of the son, the father would not have said, "let us make man to our own image and likeness"; but "to thy image." when, therefore, it is written, "he made him to the image of god," the sense is not that the father made man to the image of the son only, who is god, as some explained it, but that the divine trinity made man to its image, that is, of the whole trinity. when it is said that god "made man to his image," this can be understood in two ways: first, so that this preposition "to" points to the term of the making, and then the sense is, "let us make man in such a way that our image may be in him." secondly, this preposition 'to' may point to the exemplar cause, as when we say, "this book is made (like) to that one." thus the image of god is the very essence of god, which is incorrectly called an image forasmuch as image is put for the exemplar. or, as some say, the divine essence is called an image because thereby one person imitates another. _______________________ sixth article [i, q. 93, art. 6] whether the image of god is in man as regards the mind only? objection 1: it would seem that the image of god is not only in man's mind. for the apostle says (1 cor. 11:7) that "the man is the image . . . of god." but man is not only mind. therefore the image of god is to be observed not only in his mind. obj. 2: further, it is written (gen. 1:27): "god created man to his own image; to the image of god he created him; male and female he created them." but the distinction of male and female is in the body. therefore the image of god is also in the body, and not only in the mind. obj. 3: further, an image seems to apply principally to the shape of a thing. but shape belongs to the body. therefore the image of god is to be seen in man's body also, and not in his mind. obj. 4: further, according to augustine (gen. ad lit. xii, 7,24) there is a threefold vision in us, "corporeal," "spiritual," or imaginary, and "intellectual." therefore, if in the intellectual vision that belongs to the mind there exists in us a trinity by reason of which we are made to the image of god, for the like reason there must be another trinity in the others. _on the contrary,_ the apostle says (eph. 4:23,24): "be renewed in the spirit of your mind, and put on the new man." whence we are given to understand that our renewal which consists in putting on the new man, belongs to the mind. now, he says (col. 3:10): "putting on the new" man; "him who is renewed unto knowledge" of god, "according to the image of him that created him," where the renewal which consists in putting on the new man is ascribed to the image of god. therefore to be to the image of god belongs to the mind only. _i answer that,_ while in all creatures there is some kind of likeness to god, in the rational creature alone we find a likeness of "image" as we have explained above (aa. 1,2); whereas in other creatures we find a likeness by way of a "trace." now the intellect or mind is that whereby the rational creature excels other creatures; wherefore this image of god is not found even in the rational creature except in the mind; while in the other parts, which the rational creature may happen to possess, we find the likeness of a "trace," as in other creatures to which, in reference to such parts, the rational creature can be likened. we may easily understand the reason of this if we consider the way in which a "trace," and the way in which an "image," represents anything. an "image" represents something by likeness in species, as we have said; while a "trace" represents something by way of an effect, which represents the cause in such a way as not to attain to the likeness of species. for imprints which are left by the movements of animals are called "traces": so also ashes are a trace of fire, and desolation of the land a trace of a hostile army. therefore we may observe this difference between rational creatures and others, both as to the representation of the likeness of the divine nature in creatures, and as to the representation in them of the uncreated trinity. for as to the likeness of the divine nature, rational creatures seem to attain, after a fashion, to the representation of the species, inasmuch as they imitate god, not only in being and life, but also in intelligence, as above explained (a. 2); whereas other creatures do not understand, although we observe in them a certain trace of the intellect that created them, if we consider their disposition. likewise as the uncreated trinity is distinguished by the procession of the word from the speaker, and of love from both of these, as we have seen (q. 28, a. 3); so we may say that in rational creatures wherein we find a procession of the word in the intellect, and a procession of the love in the will, there exists an image of the uncreated trinity, by a certain representation of the species. in other creatures, however, we do not find the principle of the word, and the word and love; but we do see in them a certain trace of the existence of these in the cause that produced them. for in the fact that a creature has a modified and finite nature, proves that it proceeds from a principle; while its species points to the (mental) word of the maker, just as the shape of a house points to the idea of the architect; and order points to the maker's love by reason of which he directs the effect to a good end; as also the use of the house points to the will of the architect. so we find in man a likeness to god by way of an "image" in his mind; but in the other parts of his being by way of a "trace." reply obj. 1: man is called to the image of god; not that he is essentially an image; but that the image of god is impressed on his mind; as a coin is an image of the king, as having the image of the king. wherefore there is no need to consider the image of god as existing in every part of man. reply obj. 2: as augustine says (de trin. xii, 5), some have thought that the image of god was not in man individually, but severally. they held that "the man represents the person of the father; those born of man denote the person of the son; and that the woman is a third person in likeness to the holy ghost, since she so proceeded from man as not to be his son or daughter." all of this is manifestly absurd; first, because it would follow that the holy ghost is the principle of the son, as the woman is the principle of the man's offspring; secondly, because one man would be only the image of one person; thirdly, because in that case scripture should not have mentioned the image of god in man until after the birth of the offspring. therefore we must understand that when scripture had said, "to the image of god he created him," it added, "male and female he created them," not to imply that the image of god came through the distinction of sex, but that the image of god belongs to both sexes, since it is in the mind, wherein there is no sexual distinction. wherefore the apostle (col. 3:10), after saying, "according to the image of him that created him," added, "where there is neither male nor female" [*these words are in reality from gal. 3:28] (vulg. "neither gentile nor jew"). reply obj. 3: although the image of god in man is not to be found in his bodily shape, yet because "the body of man alone among terrestrial animals is not inclined prone to the ground, but is adapted to look upward to heaven, for this reason we may rightly say that it is made to god's image and likeness, rather than the bodies of other animals," as augustine remarks (qq. 83, qu. 51). but this is not to be understood as though the image of god were in man's body; but in the sense that the very shape of the human body represents the image of god in the soul by way of a trace. reply obj. 4: both in the corporeal and in the imaginary vision we may find a trinity, as augustine says (de trin. xi, 2). for in corporeal vision there is first the species of the exterior body; secondly, the act of vision, which occurs by the impression on the sight of a certain likeness of the said species; thirdly, the intention of the will applying the sight to see, and to rest on what is seen. likewise, in the imaginary vision we find first the species kept in the memory; secondly, the vision itself, which is caused by the penetrative power of the soul, that is, the faculty of imagination, informed by the species; and thirdly, we find the intention of the will joining both together. but each of these trinities falls short of the divine image. for the species of the external body is extrinsic to the essence of the soul; while the species in the memory, though not extrinsic to the soul, is adventitious to it; and thus in both cases the species falls short of representing the connaturality and co-eternity of the divine persons. the corporeal vision, too, does not proceed only from the species of the external body, but from this, and at the same time from the sense of the seer; in like manner imaginary vision is not from the species only which is preserved in the memory, but also from the imagination. for these reasons the procession of the son from the father alone is not suitably represented. lastly the intention of the will joining the two together, does not proceed from them either in corporeal or spiritual vision. wherefore the procession of the holy ghost from the father and the son is not thus properly represented. _______________________ seventh article [i, q. 93, art. 7] whether the image of god is to be found in the acts of the soul? objection 1: it would seem that the image of god is not found in the acts of the soul. for augustine says (de civ. dei xi, 26), that "man was made to god's image, inasmuch as we exist and know that we exist, and love this existence and knowledge." but to exist does not signify an act. therefore the image of god is not to be found in the soul's acts. obj. 2: further, augustine (de trin. ix, 4) assigns god's image in the soul to these three things--mind, knowledge, and love. but mind does not signify an act, but rather the power or the essence of the intellectual soul. therefore the image of god does not extend to the acts of the soul. obj. 3: further, augustine (de trin. x, 11) assigns the image of the trinity in the soul to "memory, understanding, and will." but these three are "natural powers of the soul," as the master of the sentences says (1 sent. d iii). therefore the image of god is in the powers, and does not extend to the acts of the soul. obj. 4: further, the image of the trinity always remains in the soul. but an act does not always remain. therefore the image of god does not extend to the acts. _on the contrary,_ augustine (de trin. xi, 2 seqq.) assigns the trinity in the lower part of the soul, in relation to the actual vision, whether sensible or imaginative. therefore, also, the trinity in the mind, by reason of which man is like to god's image, must be referred to actual vision. _i answer that,_ as above explained (a. 2), a certain representation of the species belongs to the nature of an image. hence, if the image of the divine trinity is to be found in the soul, we must look for it where the soul approaches the nearest to a representation of the species of the divine persons. now the divine persons are distinct from each other by reason of the procession of the word from the speaker, and the procession of love connecting both. but in our soul word "cannot exist without actual thought," as augustine says (de trin. xiv, 7). therefore, first and chiefly, the image of the trinity is to be found in the acts of the soul, that is, inasmuch as from the knowledge which we possess, by actual thought we form an internal word; and thence break forth into love. but, since the principles of acts are the habits and powers, and everything exists virtually in its principle, therefore, secondarily and consequently, the image of the trinity may be considered as existing in the powers, and still more in the habits, forasmuch as the acts virtually exist therein. reply obj. 1: our being bears the image of god so far as it is proper to us, and excels that of the other animals, that is to say, in so far as we are endowed with a mind. therefore, this trinity is the same as that which augustine mentions (de trin. ix, 4), and which consists in mind, knowledge, and love. reply obj. 2: augustine observed this trinity, first, as existing in the mind. but because the mind, though it knows itself entirely in a certain degree, yet also in a way does not know itself--namely, as being distinct from others (and thus also it searches itself, as augustine subsequently proves--de trin. x, 3,4); therefore, as though knowledge were not in equal proportion to mind, he takes three things in the soul which are proper to the mind, namely, memory, understanding, and will; which everyone is conscious of possessing; and assigns the image of the trinity pre-eminently to these three, as though the first assignation were in part deficient. reply obj. 3: as augustine proves (de trin. xiv, 7), we may be said to understand, will, and to love certain things, both when we actually consider them, and when we do not think of them. when they are not under our actual consideration, they are objects of our memory only, which, in his opinion, is nothing else than habitual retention of knowledge and love [*cf. q. 79, a. 7, ad 1]. "but since," as he says, "a word cannot be there without actual thought (for we think everything that we say, even if we speak with that interior word belonging to no nation's tongue), this image chiefly consists in these three things, memory, understanding, and will. and by understanding i mean here that whereby we understand with actual thought; and by will, love, or dilection i mean that which unites this child with its parent." from which it is clear that he places the image of the divine trinity more in actual understanding and will, than in these as existing in the habitual retention of the memory; although even thus the image of the trinity exists in the soul in a certain degree, as he says in the same place. thus it is clear that memory, understanding, and will are not three powers as stated in the sentences. reply obj. 4: someone might answer by referring to augustine's statement (de trin. xiv, 6), that "the mind ever remembers itself, ever understands itself, ever loves itself"; which some take to mean that the soul ever actually understands, and loves itself. but he excludes this interpretation by adding that "it does not always think of itself as actually distinct from other things." thus it is clear that the soul always understands and loves itself, not actually but habitually; though we might say that by perceiving its own act, it understands itself whenever it understands anything. but since it is not always actually understanding, as in the case of sleep, we must say that these acts, although not always actually existing, yet ever exist in their principles, the habits and powers. wherefore, augustine says (de trin. xiv, 4): "if the rational soul is made to the image of god in the sense that it can make use of reason and intellect to understand and consider god, then the image of god was in the soul from the beginning of its existence." _______________________ eighth article [i, q. 93, art. 8] whether the image of the divine trinity is in the soul only by comparison with god as its object? objection 1: it would seem that the image of the divine trinity is in the soul not only by comparison with god as its object. for the image of the divine trinity is to be found in the soul, as shown above (a. 7), according as the word in us proceeds from the speaker; and love from both. but this is to be found in us as regards any object. therefore the image of the divine trinity is in our mind as regards any object. obj. 2: further, augustine says (de trin. xii, 4) that "when we seek trinity in the soul, we seek it in the whole of the soul, without separating the process of reasoning in temporal matters from the consideration of things eternal." therefore the image of the trinity is to be found in the soul, even as regards temporal objects. obj. 3: further, it is by grace that we can know and love god. if, therefore, the image of the trinity is found in the soul by reason of the memory, understanding, and will or love of god, this image is not in man by nature but by grace, and thus is not common to all. obj. 4: further, the saints in heaven are most perfectly conformed to the image of god by the beatific vision; wherefore it is written (2 cor. 3:18): "we . . . are transformed into the same image from glory to glory." but temporal things are known by the beatific vision. therefore the image of god exists in us even according to temporal things. _on the contrary,_ augustine says (de trin. xiv, 12): "the image of god exists in the mind, not because it has a remembrance of itself, loves itself, and understands itself; but because it can also remember, understand, and love god by whom it was made." much less, therefore, is the image of god in the soul, in respect of other objects. _i answer that,_ as above explained (aa. 2, 7), image means a likeness which in some degree, however small, attains to a representation of the species. wherefore we need to seek in the image of the divine trinity in the soul some kind of representation of species of the divine persons, so far as this is possible to a creature. now the divine persons, as above stated (aa. 6, 7), are distinguished from each other according to the procession of the word from the speaker, and the procession of love from both. moreover the word of god is born of god by the knowledge of himself; and love proceeds from god according as he loves himself. but it is clear that diversity of objects diversifies the species of word and love; for in the human mind the species of a stone is specifically different from that of a horse, which also the love regarding each of them is specifically different. hence we refer the divine image in man to the verbal concept born of the knowledge of god, and to the love derived therefrom. thus the image of god is found in the soul according as the soul turns to god, or possesses a nature that enables it to turn to god. now the mind may turn towards an object in two ways: directly and immediately, or indirectly and mediately; as, for instance, when anyone sees a man reflected in a looking-glass he may be said to be turned towards that man. so augustine says (de trin. xiv, 8), that "the mind remembers itself, understands itself, and loves itself. if we perceive this, we perceive a trinity, not, indeed, god, but, nevertheless, rightly called the image of god." but this is due to the fact, not that the mind reflects on itself absolutely, but that thereby it can furthermore turn to god, as appears from the authority quoted above (arg. on the contrary). reply obj. 1: for the notion of an image it is not enough that something proceed from another, but it is also necessary to observe what proceeds and whence it proceeds; namely, that what is word of god proceeds from knowledge of god. reply obj. 2: in all the soul we may see a kind of trinity, not, however, as though besides the action of temporal things and the contemplation of eternal things, "any third thing should be required to make up the trinity," as he adds in the same passage. but in that part of the reason which is concerned with temporal things, "although a trinity may be found; yet the image of god is not to be seen there," as he says farther on; forasmuch as this knowledge of temporal things is adventitious to the soul. moreover even the habits whereby temporal things are known are not always present; but sometimes they are actually present, and sometimes present only in memory even after they begin to exist in the soul. such is clearly the case with faith, which comes to us temporally for this present life; while in the future life faith will no longer exist, but only the remembrance of faith. reply obj. 3: the meritorious knowledge and love of god can be in us only by grace. yet there is a certain natural knowledge and love as seen above (q. 12, a. 12; q. 56, a. 3; q. 60, a. 5). this, too, is natural that the mind, in order to understand god, can make use of reason, in which sense we have already said that the image of god abides ever in the soul; "whether this image of god be so obsolete," as it were clouded, "as almost to amount to nothing," as in those who have not the use of reason; "or obscured and disfigured," as in sinners; or "clear and beautiful," as in the just; as augustine says (de trin. xiv, 6). reply obj. 4: by the vision of glory temporal things will be seen in god himself; and such a vision of things temporal will belong to the image of god. this is what augustine means (de trin. xiv, 6), when he says that "in that nature to which the mind will blissfully adhere, whatever it sees it will see as unchangeable"; for in the uncreated word are the types of all creatures. _______________________ ninth article [i, q. 93, art. 9] whether "likeness" is properly distinguished from "image"? objection 1: it would seem that "likeness" is not properly distinguished from "image." for genus is not properly distinguished from species. now, "likeness" is to "image" as genus to species: because, "where there is image, forthwith there is likeness, but not conversely" as augustine says (qq. 83, qu. 74). therefore "likeness" is not properly to be distinguished from "image." obj. 2: further, the nature of the image consists not only in the representation of the divine persons, but also in the representation of the divine essence, to which representation belong immortality and indivisibility. so it is not true to say that the "likeness is in the essence because it is immortal and indivisible; whereas the image is in other things" (sent. ii, d, xvi). obj. 3: further, the image of god in man is threefold--the image of nature, of grace, and of glory, as above explained (a. 4). but innocence and righteousness belong to grace. therefore it is incorrectly said (sent. ii, d, xvi) "that the image is taken from the memory, the understanding and the will, while the likeness is from innocence and righteousness." obj. 4: further, knowledge of truth belongs to the intellect, and love of virtue to the will; which two things are parts of the image. therefore it is incorrect to say (sent. ii, d, xvi) that "the image consists in the knowledge of truth, and the likeness in the love of virtue." _on the contrary,_ augustine says (qq. 83, qu. 51): "some consider that these two were mentioned not without reason, namely "image" and "likeness," since, if they meant the same, one would have sufficed." _i answer that,_ likeness is a kind of unity, for oneness in quality causes likeness, as the philosopher says (metaph. v, did. iv, 15). now, since "one" is a transcendental, it is both common to all, and adapted to each single thing, just as the good and the true. wherefore, as the good can be compared to each individual thing both as its preamble, and as subsequent to it, as signifying some perfection in it, so also in the same way there exists a kind of comparison between "likeness" and "image." for the good is a preamble to man, inasmuch as man is an individual good; and, again, the good is subsequent to man, inasmuch as we may say of a certain man that he is good, by reason of his perfect virtue. in like manner, likeness may be considered in the light of a preamble to image, inasmuch as it is something more general than image, as we have said above (a. 1): and, again, it may be considered as subsequent to image, inasmuch as it signifies a certain perfection of image. for we say that an image is like or unlike what it represents, according as the representation is perfect or imperfect. thus likeness may be distinguished from image in two ways: first as its preamble and existing in more things, and in this sense likeness regards things which are more common than the intellectual properties, wherein the image is properly to be seen. in this sense it is stated (qq. 83, qu. 51) that "the spirit" (namely, the mind) without doubt was made to the image of god. "but the other parts of man," belonging to the soul's inferior faculties, or even to the body, "are in the opinion of some made to god's likeness." in this sense he says (de quant. animae ii) that the likeness of god is found in the soul's incorruptibility; for corruptible and incorruptible are differences of universal beings. but likeness may be considered in another way, as signifying the expression and perfection of the image. in this sense damascene says (de fide orth. ii, 12) that the image implies "an intelligent being, endowed with free-will and self-movement, whereas likeness implies a likeness of power, as far as this may be possible in man." in the same sense "likeness" is said to belong to "the love of virtue": for there is no virtue without love of virtue. reply obj. 1: "likeness" is not distinct from "image" in the general notion of "likeness" (for thus it is included in "image"); but so far as any "likeness" falls short of "image," or again, as it perfects the idea of "image." reply obj. 2: the soul's essence belongs to the "image," as representing the divine essence in those things which belong to the intellectual nature; but not in those conditions subsequent to general notions of being, such as simplicity and indissolubility. reply obj. 3: even certain virtues are natural to the soul, at least, in their seeds, by reason of which we may say that a natural "likeness" exists in the soul. nor it is unfitting to us the term "image" from one point of view and from another the term "likeness." reply obj. 4: love of the word, which is knowledge loved, belongs to the nature of "image"; but love of virtue belongs to "likeness," as virtue itself belongs to likeness. _______________________ question 94 of the state and condition of the first man as regards his intellect (in four articles) we next consider the state or condition of the first man; first, as regards his soul; secondly, as regards his body. concerning the first there are two things to be considered: (1) the condition of man as to his intellect; (2) the condition of man as to his will. under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (1) whether the first man saw the essence of god? (2) whether he could see the separate substances, that is, the angels? (3) whether he possessed all knowledge? (4) whether he could err or be deceived? _______________________ first article [i, q. 94, art. 1] whether the first man saw god through his essence? objection 1: it would seem that the first man saw god through his essence. for man's happiness consists in the vision of the divine essence. but the first man, "while established in paradise, led a life of happiness in the enjoyment of all things," as damascene says (de fide orth. ii, 11). and augustine says (de civ. dei xiv, 10): "if man was gifted with the same tastes as now, how happy must he have been in paradise, that place of ineffable happiness!" therefore the first man in paradise saw god through his essence. obj. 2: further, augustine says (de civ. dei xiv, loc. cit.) that "the first man lacked nothing which his good-will might obtain." but our good-will can obtain nothing better than the vision of the divine essence. therefore man saw god through his essence. obj. 3: further, the vision of god in his essence is whereby god is seen without a medium or enigma. but man in the state of innocence "saw god immediately," as the master of the sentences asserts (sent. iv, d, i). he also saw without an enigma, for an enigma implies obscurity, as augustine says (de trin. xv, 9). now, obscurity resulted from sin. therefore man in the primitive state saw god through his essence. _on the contrary,_ the apostle says (1 cor. 15:46): "that was not first which is spiritual, but that which is natural." but to see god through his essence is most spiritual. therefore the first man in the primitive state of his natural life did not see god through his essence. _i answer that,_ the first man did not see god through his essence if we consider the ordinary state of that life; unless, perhaps, it be said that he saw god in a vision, when "god cast a deep sleep upon adam" (gen. 2:21). the reason is because, since in the divine essence is beatitude itself, the intellect of a man who sees the divine essence has the same relation to god as a man has to beatitude. now it is clear that man cannot willingly be turned away from beatitude, since naturally and necessarily he desires it, and shuns unhappiness. wherefore no one who sees the essence of god can willingly turn away from god, which means to sin. hence all who see god through his essence are so firmly established in the love of god, that for eternity they can never sin. therefore, as adam did sin, it is clear that he did not see god through his essence. nevertheless he knew god with a more perfect knowledge than we do now. thus in a sense his knowledge was midway between our knowledge in the present state, and the knowledge we shall have in heaven, when we see god through his essence. to make this clear, we must consider that the vision of god through his essence is contradistinguished from the vision of god through his creatures. now the higher the creature is, and the more like it is to god, the more clearly is god seen in it; for instance, a man is seen more clearly through a mirror in which his image is the more clearly expressed. thus god is seen in a much more perfect manner through his intelligible effects than through those which are only sensible or corporeal. but in his present state man is impeded as regards the full and clear consideration of intelligible creatures, because he is distracted by and occupied with sensible things. now, it is written (eccles. 7:30): "god made man right." and man was made right by god in this sense, that in him the lower powers were subjected to the higher, and the higher nature was made so as not to be impeded by the lower. wherefore the first man was not impeded by exterior things from a clear and steady contemplation of the intelligible effects which he perceived by the radiation of the first truth, whether by a natural or by a gratuitous knowledge. hence augustine says (gen. ad lit. xi, 33) that, "perhaps god used to speak to the first man as he speaks to the angels; by shedding on his mind a ray of the unchangeable truth, yet without bestowing on him the experience of which the angels are capable in the participation of the divine essence." therefore, through these intelligible effects of god, man knew god then more clearly than we know him now. reply obj. 1: man was happy in paradise, but not with that perfect happiness to which he was destined, which consists in the vision of the divine essence. he was, however, endowed with "a life of happiness in a certain measure," as augustine says (gen. ad lit. xi, 18), so far as he was gifted with natural integrity and perfection. reply obj. 2: a good will is a well-ordered will; but the will of the first man would have been ill-ordered had he wished to have, while in the state of merit, what had been promised to him as a reward. reply obj. 3: a medium (of knowledge) is twofold; one through which, and, at the same time, in which, something is seen, as, for example, a man is seen through a mirror, and is seen with the mirror: another kind of medium is that whereby we attain to the knowledge of something unknown; such as the medium in a demonstration. god was seen without this second kind of medium, but not without the first kind. for there was no need for the first man to attain to the knowledge of god by demonstration drawn from an effect, such as we need; since he knew god simultaneously in his effects, especially in the intelligible effects, according to his capacity. again, we must remark that the obscurity which is implied in the word enigma may be of two kinds: first, so far as every creature is something obscure when compared with the immensity of the divine light; and thus adam saw god in an enigma, because he saw him in a created effect: secondly, we may take obscurity as an effect of sin, so far as man is impeded in the consideration of intelligible things by being preoccupied with sensible things; in which sense adam did not see god in an enigma. _______________________ second article [i, q. 94, art. 2] whether adam in the state of innocence saw the angels through their essence? objection 1: it would seem that adam, in the state of innocence, saw the angels through their essence. for gregory says (dialog. iv, 1): "in paradise man was accustomed to enjoy the words of god; and by purity of heart and loftiness of vision to have the company of the good angels." obj. 2: further, the soul in the present state is impeded from the knowledge of separate substances by union with a corruptible body which "is a load upon the soul," as is written wis. 9:15. wherefore the separate soul can see separate substances, as above explained (q. 89, a. 2). but the body of the first man was not a load upon his soul; for the latter was not corruptible. therefore he was able to see separate substances. obj. 3: further, one separate substance knows another separate substance, by knowing itself (de causis xiii). but the soul of the first man knew itself. therefore it knew separate substances. _on the contrary,_ the soul of adam was of the same nature as ours. but our souls cannot now understand separate substances. therefore neither could adam's soul. _i answer that,_ the state of the human soul may be distinguished in two ways. first, from a diversity of mode in its natural existence; and in this point the state of the separate soul is distinguished from the state of the soul joined to the body. secondly, the state of the soul is distinguished in relation to integrity and corruption, the state of natural existence remaining the same: and thus the state of innocence is distinct from the state of man after sin. for man's soul, in the state of innocence, was adapted to perfect and govern the body; wherefore the first man is said to have been made into a "living soul"; that is, a soul giving life to the body--namely animal life. but he was endowed with integrity as to this life, in that the body was entirely subject to the soul, hindering it in no way, as we have said above (a. 1). now it is clear from what has been already said (q. 84, a. 7; q. 85, a. 1; q. 89, a. 1) that since the soul is adapted to perfect and govern the body, as regards animal life, it is fitting that it should have that mode of understanding which is by turning to phantasms. wherefore this mode of understanding was becoming to the soul of the first man also. now, in virtue of this mode of understanding, there are three degrees of movement in the soul, as dionysius says (div. nom. iv). the first is by the soul "passing from exterior things to concentrate its powers on itself"; the second is by the soul ascending "so as to be associated with the united superior powers," namely the angels; the third is when the soul is "led on" yet further "to the supreme good," that is, to god. in virtue of the first movement of the soul from exterior things to itself, the soul's knowledge is perfected. this is because the intellectual operation of the soul has a natural order to external things, as we have said above (q. 87, a. 3): and so by the knowledge thereof, our intellectual operation can be known perfectly, as an act through its object. and through the intellectual operation itself, the human intellect can be known perfectly, as a power through its proper act. but in the second movement we do not find perfect knowledge. because, since the angel does not understand by turning to phantasms, but by a far more excellent process, as we have said above (q. 55, a. 2); the above-mentioned mode of knowledge, by which the soul knows itself, is not sufficient to lead it to the knowledge of an angel. much less does the third movement lead to perfect knowledge: for even the angels themselves, by the fact that they know themselves, are not able to arrive at the knowledge of the divine substance, by reason of its surpassing excellence. therefore the soul of the first man could not see the angels in their essence. nevertheless he had a more excellent mode of knowledge regarding the angels than we possess, because his knowledge of intelligible things within him was more certain and fixed than our knowledge. and it was on account of this excellence of knowledge that gregory says that "he enjoyed the company of the angelic spirits." this makes clear the reply to the first objection. reply obj. 2: that the soul of the first man fell short of the knowledge regarding separate substances, was not owing to the fact that the body was a load upon it; but to the fact that its connatural object fell short of the excellence of separate substances. we, in our present state, fall short on account of both these reasons. reply obj. 3: the soul of the first man was not able to arrive at knowledge of separate substances by means of its self-knowledge, as we have shown above; for even each separate substance knows others in its own measure. _______________________ third article [i, q. 94, art. 3] whether the first man knew all things? objection 1: it would seem that the first man did not know all things. for if he had such knowledge it would be either by acquired species, or by connatural species, or by infused species. not, however, by acquired species; for this kind of knowledge is acquired by experience, as stated in _metaph._ i, 1; and the first man had not then gained experience of all things. nor through connatural species, because he was of the same nature as we are; and our soul, as aristotle says (de anima iii, 4), is "like a clean tablet on which nothing is written." and if his knowledge came by infused species, it would have been of a different kind from ours, which we acquire from things themselves. obj. 2: further, individuals of the same species have the same way of arriving at perfection. now other men have not, from the beginning, knowledge of all things, but they acquire it in the course of time according to their capacity. therefore neither did adam know all things when he was first created. obj. 3: further, the present state of life is given to man in order that his soul may advance in knowledge and merit; indeed, the soul seems to be united to the body for that purpose. now man would have advanced in merit in that state of life; therefore also in knowledge. therefore he was not endowed with knowledge of all things. _on the contrary,_ man named the animals (gen. 2:20). but names should be adapted to the nature of things. therefore adam knew the animals' natures; and in like manner he was possessed of the knowledge of all other things. _i answer that,_ in the natural order, perfection comes before imperfection, as act precedes potentiality; for whatever is in potentiality is made actual only by something actual. and since god created things not only for their own existence, but also that they might be the principles of other things; so creatures were produced in their perfect state to be the principles as regards others. now man can be the principle of another man, not only by generation of the body, but also by instruction and government. hence, as the first man was produced in his perfect state, as regards his body, for the work of generation, so also was his soul established in a perfect state to instruct and govern others. now no one can instruct others unless he has knowledge, and so the first man was established by god in such a manner as to have knowledge of all those things for which man has a natural aptitude. and such are whatever are virtually contained in the first self-evident principles, that is, whatever truths man is naturally able to know. moreover, in order to direct his own life and that of others, man needs to know not only those things which can be naturally known, but also things surpassing natural knowledge; because the life of man is directed to a supernatural end: just as it is necessary for us to know the truths of faith in order to direct our own lives. wherefore the first man was endowed with such a knowledge of these supernatural truths as was necessary for the direction of human life in that state. but those things which cannot be known by merely human effort, and which are not necessary for the direction of human life, were not known by the first man; such as the thoughts of men, future contingent events, and some individual facts, as for instance the number of pebbles in a stream; and the like. reply obj. 1: the first man had knowledge of all things by divinely infused species. yet his knowledge was not different from ours; as the eyes which christ gave to the man born blind were not different from those given by nature. reply obj. 2: to adam, as being the first man, was due a degree of perfection which was not due to other men, as is clear from what is above explained. reply obj. 3: adam would have advanced in natural knowledge, not in the number of things known, but in the manner of knowing; because what he knew speculatively he would subsequently have known by experience. but as regards supernatural knowledge, he would also have advanced as regards the number of things known, by further revelation; as the angels advance by further enlightenment. moreover there is no comparison between advance in knowledge and advance in merit; since one man cannot be a principle of merit to another, although he can be to another a principle of knowledge. _______________________ fourth article [i, q. 94, art. 4] whether man in his first state could be deceived? objection 1: it would seem that man in his primitive state could have been deceived. for the apostle says (1 tim. 2:14) that "the woman being seduced was in the transgression." obj. 2: further, the master says (sent. ii, d, xxi) that, "the woman was not frightened at the serpent speaking, because she thought that he had received the faculty of speech from god." but this was untrue. therefore before sin the woman was deceived. obj. 3: further, it is natural that the farther off anything is from us, the smaller it seems to be. now, the nature of the eyes is not changed by sin. therefore this would have been the case in the state of innocence. wherefore man would have been deceived in the size of what he saw, just as he is deceived now. obj. 4: further, augustine says (gen. ad lit. xii, 2) that, in sleep the soul adheres to the images of things as if they were the things themselves. but in the state of innocence man would have eaten and consequently have slept and dreamed. therefore he would have been deceived, adhering to images as to realities. obj. 5: further, the first man would have been ignorant of other men's thoughts, and of future contingent events, as stated above (a. 3). so if anyone had told him what was false about these things, he would have been deceived. _on the contrary,_ augustine says (de lib. arb. iii, 18): "to regard what is true as false, is not natural to man as created; but is a punishment of man condemned." _i answer that,_ in the opinion of some, deception may mean two things; namely, any slight surmise, in which one adheres to what is false, as though it were true, but without the assent of belief--or it may mean a firm belief. thus before sin adam could not be deceived in either of these ways as regards those things to which his knowledge extended; but as regards things to which his knowledge did not extend, he might have been deceived, if we take deception in the wide sense of the term for any surmise without assent of belief. this opinion was held with the idea that it is not derogatory to man to entertain a false opinion in such matters, and that provided he does not assent rashly, he is not to be blamed. such an opinion, however, is not fitting as regards the integrity of the primitive state of life; because, as augustine says (de civ. dei xiv, 10), in that state of life "sin was avoided without struggle, and while it remained so, no evil could exist." now it is clear that as truth is the good of the intellect, so falsehood is its evil, as the philosopher says (ethic. vi, 2). so that, as long as the state of innocence continued, it was impossible for the human intellect to assent to falsehood as if it were truth. for as some perfections, such as clarity, were lacking in the bodily members of the first man, though no evil could be therein; so there could be in his intellect the absence of some knowledge, but no false opinion. this is clear also from the very rectitude of the primitive state, by virtue of which, while the soul remained subject to god, the lower faculties in man were subject to the higher, and were no impediment to their action. and from what has preceded (q. 85, a. 6), it is clear that as regards its proper object the intellect is ever true; and hence it is never deceived of itself; but whatever deception occurs must be ascribed to some lower faculty, such as the imagination or the like. hence we see that when the natural power of judgment is free we are not deceived by such images, but only when it is not free, as is the case in sleep. therefore it is clear that the rectitude of the primitive state was incompatible with deception of the intellect. reply obj. 1: though the woman was deceived before she sinned in deed, still it was not till she had already sinned by interior pride. for augustine says (gen. ad lit. xi, 30) that "the woman could not have believed the words of the serpent, had she not already acquiesced in the love of her own power, and in a presumption of self-conceit." reply obj. 2: the woman thought that the serpent had received this faculty, not as acting in accordance with nature, but by virtue of some supernatural operation. we need not, however, follow the master of the sentences in this point. reply obj. 3: were anything presented to the imagination or sense of the first man, not in accordance with the nature of things, he would not have been deceived, for his reason would have enabled him to judge the truth. reply obj. 4: a man is not accountable for what occurs during sleep; as he has not then the use of his reason, wherein consists man's proper action. reply obj. 5: if anyone had said something untrue as regards future contingencies, or as regards secret thoughts, man in the primitive state would not have believed it was so: but he might have believed that such a thing was possible; which would not have been to entertain a false opinion. it might also be said that he would have been divinely guided from above, so as not to be deceived in a matter to which his knowledge did not extend. if any object, as some do, that he was not guided, when tempted, though he was then most in need of guidance, we reply that man had already sinned in his heart, and that he failed to have recourse to the divine aid. _______________________ question 95 of things pertaining to the first man's will--namely, grace and righteousness (in four articles) we next consider what belongs to the will of the first man; concerning which there are two points of treatment: (1) the grace and righteousness of the first man; (2) the use of righteousness as regards his dominion over other things. under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (1) whether the first man was created in grace? (2) whether in the state of innocence he had passions of the soul? (3) whether he had all virtues? (4) whether what he did would have been as meritorious as now? _______________________ first article [i, q. 95, art. 1] whether the first man was created in grace? objection 1: it would seem that the first man was not created in grace. for the apostle, distinguishing between adam and christ, says (1 cor. 15:45): "the first adam was made into a living soul; the last adam into a quickening spirit." but the spirit is quickened by grace. therefore christ alone was made in grace. obj. 2: further, augustine says (qq. vet. et nov. test., qu. 123) [*work of an anonymous author, among the supposititious works of st. augustine] that "adam did not possess the holy ghost." but whoever possesses grace has the holy ghost. therefore adam was not created in grace. obj. 3: further, augustine says (de correp. et grat. x) that "god so ordered the life of the angels and men, as to show first what they could do by free-will, then what they could do by his grace, and by the discernment of righteousness." god thus first created men and angels in the state of natural free-will only; and afterwards bestowed grace on them. obj. 4: further, the master says (sent. ii, d, xxiv): "when man was created he was given sufficient help to stand, but not sufficient to advance." but whoever has grace can advance by merit. therefore the first man was not created in grace. obj. 5: further, the reception of grace requires the consent of the recipient, since thereby a kind of spiritual marriage takes place between god and the soul. but consent presupposes existence. therefore man did not receive grace in the first moment of his creation. obj. 6: further, nature is more distant from grace than grace is from glory, which is but grace consummated. but in man grace precedes glory. therefore much more did nature precede grace. _on the contrary,_ man and angel are both ordained to grace. but the angels were created in grace, for augustine says (de civ. dei xii, 9): "god at the same time fashioned their nature and endowed them with grace." therefore man also was created in grace. _i answer that,_ some say that man was not created in grace; but that it was bestowed on him subsequently before sin: and many authorities of the saints declare that man possessed grace in the state of innocence. but the very rectitude of the primitive state, wherewith man was endowed by god, seems to require that, as others say, he was created in grace, according to eccles. 7:30, "god made man right." for this rectitude consisted in his reason being subject to god, the lower powers to reason, and the body to the soul: and the first subjection was the cause of both the second and the third; since while reason was subject to god, the lower powers remained subject to reason, as augustine says [*cf. de civ. dei xiii, 13; de pecc. merit. et remiss. i, 16]. now it is clear that such a subjection of the body to the soul and of the lower powers to reason, was not from nature; otherwise it would have remained after sin; since even in the demons the natural gifts remained after sin, as dionysius declared (div. nom. iv). hence it is clear that also the primitive subjection by virtue of which reason was subject to god, was not a merely natural gift, but a supernatural endowment of grace; for it is not possible that the effect should be of greater efficiency than the cause. hence augustine says (de civ. dei xiii, 13) that, "as soon as they disobeyed the divine command, and forfeited divine grace, they were ashamed of their nakedness, for they felt the impulse of disobedience in the flesh, as though it were a punishment corresponding to their own disobedience." hence if the loss of grace dissolved the obedience of the flesh to the soul, we may gather that the inferior powers were subjected to the soul through grace existing therein. reply obj. 1: the apostle in these words means to show that there is a spiritual body, if there is an animal body, inasmuch as the spiritual life of the body began in christ, who is "the firstborn of the dead," as the body's animal life began in adam. from the apostle's words, therefore, we cannot gather that adam had no spiritual life in his soul; but that he had not spiritual life as regards the body. reply obj. 2: as augustine says in the same passage, it is not disputed that adam, like other just souls, was in some degree gifted with the holy ghost; but "he did not possess the holy ghost, as the faithful possess him now," who are admitted to eternal happiness directly after death. reply obj. 3: this passage from augustine does not assert that angels or men were created with natural free-will before they possessed grace; but that god shows first what their free-will could do before being confirmed in grace, and what they acquired afterwards by being so confirmed. reply obj. 4: the master here speaks according to the opinion of those who held that man was not created in grace, but only in a state of nature. we may also say that, though man was created in grace, yet it was not by virtue of the nature wherein he was created that he could advance by merit, but by virtue of the grace which was added. reply obj. 5: as the motion of the will is not continuous there is nothing against the first man having consented to grace even in the first moment of his existence. reply obj. 6: we merit glory by an act of grace; but we do not merit grace by an act of nature; hence the comparison fails. _______________________ second article [i, q. 95, art. 2] whether passions existed in the soul of the first man? objection 1: it would seem that the first man's soul had no passions. for by the passions of the soul "the flesh lusteth against the spirit" (gal. 5:7). but this did not happen in the state of innocence. therefore in the state of innocence there were no passions of the soul. obj. 2: further, adam's soul was nobler than his body. but his body was impassible. therefore no passions were in his soul. obj. 3: further, the passions of the soul are restrained by the moral virtues. but in adam the moral virtues were perfect. therefore the passions were entirely excluded from him. _on the contrary,_ augustine says (de civ. dei xiv, 10) that "in our first parents there was undisturbed love of god," and other passions of the soul. _i answer that,_ the passions of the soul are in the sensual appetite, the object of which is good and evil. wherefore some passions of the soul are directed to what is good, as love and joy; others to what is evil, as fear and sorrow. and since in the primitive state, evil was neither present nor imminent, nor was any good wanting which a good-will could desire to have then, as augustine says (de civ. dei xiv, 10), therefore adam had no passion with evil as its object; such as fear, sorrow, and the like; neither had he passions in respect of good not possessed, but to be possessed then, as burning concupiscence. but those passions which regard present good, as joy and love; or which regard future good to be had at the proper time, as desire and hope that casteth not down, existed in the state of innocence; otherwise, however, than as they exist in ourselves. for our sensual appetite, wherein the passions reside, is not entirely subject to reason; hence at times our passions forestall and hinder reason's judgment; at other times they follow reason's judgment, accordingly as the sensual appetite obeys reason to some extent. but in the state of innocence the inferior appetite was wholly subject to reason: so that in that state the passions of the soul existed only as consequent upon the judgment of reason. reply obj. 1: the flesh lusts against the spirit by the rebellion of the passions against reason; which could not occur in the state of innocence. reply obj. 2: the human body was impassible in the state of innocence as regards the passions which alter the disposition of nature, as will be explained later on (q. 97, a. 2); likewise the soul was impassible as regards the passions which impede the free use of reason. reply obj. 3: perfection of moral virtue does not wholly take away the passions, but regulates them; for the temperate man desires as he ought to desire, and what he ought to desire, as stated in _ethic._ iii, 11. _______________________ third article [i, q. 95, art. 3] whether adam had all the virtues? objection 1: it would seem that adam had not all the virtues. for some virtues are directed to curb passions: thus immoderate concupiscence is restrained by temperance, and immoderate fear by fortitude. but in the state of innocence no immoderation existed in the passions. therefore neither did these virtues then exist. obj. 2: further, some virtues are concerned with the passions which have evil as their object; as meekness with anger; fortitude with fear. but these passions did not exist in the state of innocence, as stated above (a. 2). therefore neither did those virtues exist then. obj. 3: further, penance is a virtue that regards sin committed. mercy, too, is a virtue concerned with unhappiness. but in the state of innocence neither sin nor unhappiness existed. therefore neither did those virtues exist. obj. 4: further, perseverance is a virtue. but adam possessed it not; as proved by his subsequent sin. therefore he possessed not every virtue. obj. 5: further, faith is a virtue. but it did not exist in the state of innocence; for it implies an obscurity of knowledge which seems to be incompatible with the perfection of the primitive state. _on the contrary,_ augustine says, in a homily (serm. contra judaeos): "the prince of sin overcame adam who was made from the slime of the earth to the image of god, adorned with modesty, restrained by temperance, refulgent with brightness." _i answer that,_ in the state of innocence man in a certain sense possessed all the virtues; and this can be proved from what precedes. for it was shown above (a. 1) that such was the rectitude of the primitive state, that reason was subject to god, and the lower powers to reason. now the virtues are nothing but those perfections whereby reason is directed to god, and the inferior powers regulated according to the dictate of reason, as will be explained in the treatise on the virtues (i-ii, q. 63, a. 2). wherefore the rectitude of the primitive state required that man should in a sense possess every virtue. it must, however, be noted that some virtues of their very nature do not involve imperfection, such as charity and justice; and these virtues did exist in the primitive state absolutely, both in habit and in act. but other virtues are of such a nature as to imply imperfection either in their act, or on the part of the matter. if such imperfection be consistent with the perfection of the primitive state, such virtues necessarily existed in that state; as faith, which is of things not seen, and hope which is of things not yet possessed. for the perfection of that state did not extend to the vision of the divine essence, and the possession of god with the enjoyment of final beatitude. hence faith and hope could exist in the primitive state, both as to habit and as to act. but any virtue which implies imperfection incompatible with the perfection of the primitive state, could exist in that state as a habit, but not as to the act; for instance, penance, which is sorrow for sin committed; and mercy, which is sorrow for others' unhappiness; because sorrow, guilt, and unhappiness are incompatible with the perfection of the primitive state. wherefore such virtues existed as habits in the first man, but not as to their acts; for he was so disposed that he would repent, if there had been a sin to repent for; and had he seen unhappiness in his neighbor, he would have done his best to remedy it. this is in accordance with what the philosopher says, "shame, which regards what is ill done, may be found in a virtuous man, but only conditionally; as being so disposed that he would be ashamed if he did wrong" (ethic. iv, 9). reply obj. 1: it is accidental to temperance and fortitude to subdue superabundant passion, in so far as they are in a subject which happens to have superabundant passions, and yet those virtues are _per se_ competent to moderate the passions. reply obj. 2: passions which have evil for their object were incompatible with the perfection of the primitive state, if that evil be in the one affected by the passion; such as fear and sorrow. but passions which relate to evil in another are not incompatible with the perfection of the primitive state; for in that state man could hate the demons' malice, as he could love god's goodness. thus the virtues which relate to such passions could exist in the primitive state, in habit and in act. virtues, however, relating to passions which regard evil in the same subject, if relating to such passions only, could not exist in the primitive state in act, but only in habit, as we have said above of penance and of mercy. but other virtues there are which have relation not to such passions only, but to others; such as temperance, which relates not only to sorrow, but also to joy; and fortitude, which relates not only to fear, but also to daring and hope. thus the act of temperance could exist in the primitive state, so far as it moderates pleasure; and in like manner, fortitude, as moderating daring and hope, but not as moderating sorrow and fear. reply obj. 3: appears from what has been said above. reply obj. 4: perseverance may be taken in two ways: in one sense as a particular virtue, signifying a habit whereby a man makes a choice of persevering in good; in that sense adam possessed perseverance. in another sense it is taken as a circumstance of virtue; signifying a certain uninterrupted continuation of virtue; in which sense adam did not possess perseverance. reply obj. 5: appears from what has been said above. _______________________ fourth article [i, q. 95, art. 4] whether the actions of the first man were less meritorious than ours are? objection 1: it would seem that the actions of the first man were less meritorious than ours are. for grace is given to us through the mercy of god, who succors most those who are most in need. now we are more in need of grace than was man in the state of innocence. therefore grace is more copiously poured out upon us; and since grace is the source of merit, our actions are more meritorious. obj. 2: further, struggle and difficulty are required for merit; for it is written (2 tim. 2:5): "he . . . is not crowned except he strive lawfully" and the philosopher says (ethic. ii, 3): "the object of virtue is the difficult and the good." but there is more strife and difficulty now. therefore there is greater efficacy for merit. obj. 3: further, the master says (sent. ii., d, xxiv) that "man would not have merited in resisting temptation; whereas he does merit now, when he resists." therefore our actions are more meritorious than in the primitive state. _on the contrary,_ if such were the case, man would be better off after sinning. _i answer that,_ merit as regards degree may be gauged in two ways. first, in its root, which is grace and charity. merit thus measured corresponds in degree to the essential reward, which consists in the enjoyment of god; for the greater the charity whence our actions proceed, the more perfectly shall we enjoy god. secondly, the degree of merit is measured by the degree of the action itself. this degree is of two kinds, absolute and proportional. the widow who put two mites into the treasury performed a deed of absolutely less degree than the others who put great sums therein. but in proportionate degree the widow gave more, as our lord said; because she gave more in proportion to her means. in each of these cases the degree of merit corresponds to the accidental reward, which consists in rejoicing for created good. we conclude therefore that in the state of innocence man's works were more meritorious than after sin was committed, if we consider the degree of merit on the part of grace, which would have been more copious as meeting with no obstacle in human nature: and in like manner, if we consider the absolute degree of the work done; because, as man would have had greater virtue, he would have performed greater works. but if we consider the proportionate degree, a greater reason for merit exists after sin, on account of man's weakness; because a small deed is more beyond the capacity of one who works with difficulty than a great deed is beyond one who performs it easily. reply obj. 1: after sin man requires grace for more things than before sin; but he does not need grace more; forasmuch as man even before sin required grace to obtain eternal life, which is the chief reason for the need of grace. but after sin man required grace also for the remission of sin, and for the support of his weakness. reply obj. 2: difficulty and struggle belong to the degree of merit according to the proportionate degree of the work done, as above explained. it is also a sign of the will's promptitude striving after what is difficult to itself: and the promptitude of the will is caused by the intensity of charity. yet it may happen that a person performs an easy deed with as prompt a will as another performs an arduous deed; because he is ready to do even what may be difficult to him. but the actual difficulty, by its penal character, enables the deed to satisfy for sin. reply obj. 3: the first man would not have gained merit in resisting temptation, according to the opinion of those who say that he did not possess grace; even as now there is no merit to those who have not grace. but in this point there is a difference, inasmuch as in the primitive state there was no interior impulse to evil, as in our present state. hence man was more able then than now to resist temptation even without grace. _______________________ question 96 of the mastership belonging to man in the state of innocence (in four articles) we next consider the mastership which belonged to man in the state of innocence. under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) whether man in the state of innocence was master over the animals? (2) whether he was master over all creatures? (3) whether in the state of innocence all men were equal? (4) whether in that state man would have been master over men? _______________________ first article [i, q. 96, art. 1] whether adam in the state of innocence had mastership over the animals? objection 1: it would seem that in the state of innocence adam had no mastership over the animals. for augustine says (gen. ad lit. ix, 14), that the animals were brought to adam, under the direction of the angels, to receive their names from him. but the angels need not have intervened thus, if man himself were master over the animals. therefore in the state of innocence man had no mastership of the animals. obj. 2: further, it is unfitting that elements hostile to one another should be brought under the mastership of one. but many animals are hostile to one another, as the sheep and the wolf. therefore all animals were not brought under the mastership of man. obj. 3: further, jerome says [*the words quoted are not in st. jerome's works. st. thomas may have had in mind bede, hexaem., as quoted in the glossa ordinaria on gen. 1:26]: "god gave man mastership over the animals, although before sin he had no need of them: for god foresaw that after sin animals would become useful to man." therefore, at least before sin, it was unfitting for man to make use of his mastership. obj. 4: further, it is proper to a master to command. but a command is not given rightly save to a rational being. therefore man had no mastership over the irrational animals. _on the contrary,_ it is written (gen. 1:26): "let him have dominion over the fishes of the sea, and the birds of the air, and the beasts of the earth" [vulg."and the whole earth"]. _i answer that,_ as above stated (q. 95, a. 1) for his disobedience to god, man was punished by the disobedience of those creatures which should be subject to him. therefore in the state of innocence, before man had disobeyed, nothing disobeyed him that was naturally subject to him. now all animals are naturally subject to man. this can be proved in three ways. first, from the order observed by nature; for just as in the generation of things we perceive a certain order of procession of the perfect from the imperfect (thus matter is for the sake of form; and the imperfect form, for the sake of the perfect), so also is there order in the use of natural things; thus the imperfect are for the use of the perfect; as the plants make use of the earth for their nourishment, and animals make use of plants, and man makes use of both plants and animals. therefore it is in keeping with the order of nature, that man should be master over animals. hence the philosopher says (polit. i, 5) that the hunting of wild animals is just and natural, because man thereby exercises a natural right. secondly, this is proved by the order of divine providence which always governs inferior things by the superior. wherefore, as man, being made to the image of god, is above other animals, these are rightly subject to his government. thirdly, this is proved from a property of man and of other animals. for we see in the latter a certain participated prudence of natural instinct, in regard to certain particular acts; whereas man possesses a universal prudence as regards all practical matters. now whatever is participated is subject to what is essential and universal. therefore the subjection of other animals to man is proved to be natural. reply obj. 1: a higher power can do many things that an inferior power cannot do to those which are subject to them. now an angel is naturally higher than man. therefore certain things in regard to animals could be done by angels, which could not be done by man; for instance, the rapid gathering together of all the animals. reply obj. 2: in the opinion of some, those animals which now are fierce and kill others, would, in that state, have been tame, not only in regard to man, but also in regard to other animals. but this is quite unreasonable. for the nature of animals was not changed by man's sin, as if those whose nature now it is to devour the flesh of others, would then have lived on herbs, as the lion and falcon. nor does bede's gloss on gen. 1:30, say that trees and herbs were given as food to all animals and birds, but to some. thus there would have been a natural antipathy between some animals. they would not, however, on this account have been excepted from the mastership of man: as neither at present are they for that reason excepted from the mastership of god, whose providence has ordained all this. of this providence man would have been the executor, as appears even now in regard to domestic animals, since fowls are given by men as food to the trained falcon. reply obj. 3: in the state of innocence man would not have had any bodily need of animals--neither for clothing, since then they were naked and not ashamed, there being no inordinate motions of concupiscence--nor for food, since they fed on the trees of paradise--nor to carry him about, his body being strong enough for that purpose. but man needed animals in order to have experimental knowledge of their natures. this is signified by the fact that god led the animals to man, that he might give them names expressive of their respective natures. reply obj. 4: all animals by their natural instinct have a certain participation of prudence and reason: which accounts for the fact that cranes follow their leader, and bees obey their queen. so all animals would have obeyed man of their own accord, as in the present state some domestic animals obey him. _______________________ second article [i, q. 96, art. 2] whether man had mastership over all other creatures? objection 1: it would seem that in the state of innocence man would not have had mastership over all other creatures. for an angel naturally has a greater power than man. but, as augustine says (de trin. iii, 8), "corporeal matter would not have obeyed even the holy angels." much less therefore would it have obeyed man in the state of innocence. obj. 2: further, the only powers of the soul existing in plants are nutritive, augmentative, and generative. now these do not naturally obey reason; as we can see in the case of any one man. therefore, since it is by his reason that man is competent to have mastership, it seems that in the state of innocence man had no dominion over plants. obj. 3: further, whosoever is master of a thing, can change it. but man could not have changed the course of the heavenly bodies; for this belongs to god alone, as dionysius says (ep. ad polycarp. vii). therefore man had no dominion over them. _on the contrary,_ it is written (gen. 1:26): "that he may have dominion over . . . every creature." _i answer that,_ man in a certain sense contains all things; and so according as he is master of what is within himself, in the same way he can have mastership over other things. now we may consider four things in man: his _reason,_ which makes him like to the angels; his _sensitive powers,_ whereby he is like the animals; his _natural forces,_ which liken him to the plants; and _the body itself,_ wherein he is like to inanimate things. now in man reason has the position of a master and not of a subject. wherefore man had no mastership over the angels in the primitive state; so when we read "all creatures," we must understand the creatures which are not made to god's image. over the sensitive powers, as the irascible and concupiscible, which obey reason in some degree, the soul has mastership by commanding. so in the state of innocence man had mastership over the animals by commanding them. but of the natural powers and the body itself man is master not by commanding, but by using them. thus also in the state of innocence man's mastership over plants and inanimate things consisted not in commanding or in changing them, but in making use of them without hindrance. the answers to the objections appear from the above. _______________________ third article [i, q. 96, art. 3] whether men were equal in the state of innocence? objection 1: it would seem that in the state of innocence all would have been equal. for gregory says (moral. xxi): "where there is no sin, there is no inequality." but in the state of innocence there was no sin. therefore all were equal. obj. 2: further, likeness and equality are the basis of mutual love, according to ecclus. 13:19, "every beast loveth its like; so also every man him that is nearest to himself." now in that state there was among men an abundance of love, which is the bond of peace. therefore all were equal in the state of innocence. obj. 3: further, the cause ceasing, the effect also ceases. but the cause of present inequality among men seems to arise, on the part of god, from the fact that he rewards some and punishes others; and on the part of nature, from the fact that some, through a defect of nature, are born weak and deficient, others strong and perfect, which would not have been the case in the primitive state. therefore, etc. _on the contrary,_ it is written (rom. 13:1): "the things which are of god, are well ordered" [vulg."those that are, are ordained of god"]. but order chiefly consists in inequality; for augustine says (de civ. dei xix, 13): "order disposes things equal and unequal in their proper place." therefore in the primitive state, which was most proper and orderly, inequality would have existed. _i answer that,_ we must needs admit that in the primitive state there would have been some inequality, at least as regards sex, because generation depends upon diversity of sex: and likewise as regards age; for some would have been born of others; nor would sexual union have been sterile. moreover, as regards the soul, there would have been inequality as to righteousness and knowledge. for man worked not of necessity, but of his own free-will, by virtue of which man can apply himself, more or less, to action, desire, or knowledge; hence some would have made a greater advance in virtue and knowledge than others. there might also have been bodily disparity. for the human body was not entirely exempt from the laws of nature, so as not to receive from exterior sources more or less advantage and help: since indeed it was dependent on food wherewith to sustain life. so we may say that, according to the climate, or the movement of the stars, some would have been born more robust in body than others, and also greater, and more beautiful, and all ways better disposed; so that, however, in those who were thus surpassed, there would have been no defect or fault either in soul or body. reply obj. 1: by those words gregory means to exclude such inequality as exists between virtue and vice; the result of which is that some are placed in subjection to others as a penalty. reply obj. 2: equality is the cause of equality in mutual love. yet between those who are unequal there can be a greater love than between equals; although there be not an equal response: for a father naturally loves his son more than a brother loves his brother; although the son does not love his father as much as he is loved by him. reply obj. 3: the cause of inequality could be on the part of god; not indeed that he would punish some and reward others, but that he would exalt some above others; so that the beauty of order would the more shine forth among men. inequality might also arise on the part of nature as above described, without any defect of nature. _______________________ fourth article [i, q. 96, art. 4] whether in the state of innocence man would have been master over man? objection 1: it would seem that in the state of innocence man would not have been master over man. for augustine says (de civ. dei xix, 15): "god willed that man, who was endowed with reason and made to his image, should rule over none but irrational creatures; not over men, but over cattle." obj. 2: further, what came into the world as a penalty for sin would not have existed in the state of innocence. but man was made subject to man as a penalty; for after sin it was said to the woman (gen. 3:16): "thou shalt be under thy husband's power." therefore in the state of innocence man would not have been subject to man. obj. 3: further, subjection is opposed to liberty. but liberty is one of the chief blessings, and would not have been lacking in the state of innocence, "where nothing was wanting that man's good-will could desire," as augustine says (de civ. dei xiv, 10). therefore man would not have been master over man in the state of innocence. _on the contrary,_ the condition of man in the state of innocence was not more exalted than the condition of the angels. but among the angels some rule over others; and so one order is called that of "dominations." therefore it was not beneath the dignity of the state of innocence that one man should be subject to another. _i answer that,_ mastership has a twofold meaning. first, as opposed to slavery, in which sense a master means one to whom another is subject as a slave. in another sense mastership is referred in a general sense to any kind of subject; and in this sense even he who has the office of governing and directing free men, can be called a master. in the state of innocence man could have been a master of men, not in the former but in the latter sense. this distinction is founded on the reason that a slave differs from a free man in that the latter has the disposal of himself, as is stated in the beginning of the _metaphysics,_ whereas a slave is ordered to another. so that one man is master of another as his slave when he refers the one whose master he is, to his own--namely the master's use. and since every man's proper good is desirable to himself, and consequently it is a grievous matter to anyone to yield to another what ought to be one's own, therefore such dominion implies of necessity a pain inflicted on the subject; and consequently in the state of innocence such a mastership could not have existed between man and man. but a man is the master of a free subject, by directing him either towards his proper welfare, or to the common good. such a kind of mastership would have existed in the state of innocence between man and man, for two reasons. first, because man is naturally a social being, and so in the state of innocence he would have led a social life. now a social life cannot exist among a number of people unless under the presidency of one to look after the common good; for many, as such, seek many things, whereas one attends only to one. wherefore the philosopher says, in the beginning of the _politics,_ that wherever many things are directed to one, we shall always find one at the head directing them. secondly, if one man surpassed another in knowledge and virtue, this would not have been fitting unless these gifts conduced to the benefit of others, according to 1 pet. 4:10, "as every man hath received grace, ministering the same one to another." wherefore augustine says (de civ. dei xix, 14): "just men command not by the love of domineering, but by the service of counsel": and (de civ. dei xix, 15): "the natural order of things requires this; and thus did god make man." from this appear the replies to the objections which are founded on the first-mentioned mode of mastership. _______________________ question 97 of the preservation of the individual in the primitive state (in four articles) we next consider what belongs to the bodily state of the first man: first, as regards the preservation of the individual; secondly, as regards the preservation of the species. under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (1) whether man in the state of innocence was immortal? (2) whether he was impassible? (3) whether he stood in need of food? (4) whether he would have obtained immortality by the tree of life? _______________________ first article [i, q. 97, art. 1] whether in the state of innocence man would have been immortal? objection 1: it would seem that in the state of innocence man was not immortal. for the term "mortal" belongs to the definition of man. but if you take away the definition, you take away the thing defined. therefore as long as man was man he could not be immortal. obj. 2: further, corruptible and incorruptible are generically distinct, as the philosopher says (metaph. x, did. ix, 10). but there can be no passing from one genus to another. therefore if the first man was incorruptible, man could not be corruptible in the present state. obj. 3: further, if man were immortal in the state of innocence, this would have been due either to nature or to grace. not to nature, for since nature does not change within the same species, he would also have been immortal now. likewise neither would this be owing to grace; for the first man recovered grace by repentance, according to wis. 10:2: "he brought him out of his sins." hence he would have regained his immortality; which is clearly not the case. therefore man was not immortal in the state of innocence. obj. 4: further, immortality is promised to man as a reward, according to apoc. 21:4: "death shall be no more." but man was not created in the state of reward, but that he might deserve the reward. therefore man was not immortal in the state of innocence. _on the contrary,_ it is written (rom. 5:12): "by sin death came into the world." therefore man was immortal before sin. _i answer that,_ a thing may be incorruptible in three ways. first, on the part of matter--that is to say, either because it possesses no matter, like an angel; or because it possesses matter that is in potentiality to one form only, like the heavenly bodies. such things as these are incorruptible by their very nature. secondly, a thing is incorruptible in its form, inasmuch as being by nature corruptible, yet it has an inherent disposition which preserves it wholly from corruption; and this is called incorruptibility of glory; because as augustine says (ep. ad dioscor.): "god made man's soul of such a powerful nature, that from its fulness of beatitude, there redounds to the body a fulness of health, with the vigor of incorruption." thirdly, a thing may be incorruptible on the part of its efficient cause; in this sense man was incorruptible and immortal in the state of innocence. for, as augustine says (qq. vet. et nov. test. qu. 19 [*work of an anonymous author], among the supposititious works of st. augustine): "god made man immortal as long as he did not sin; so that he might achieve for himself life or death." for man's body was indissoluble not by reason of any intrinsic vigor of immortality, but by reason of a supernatural force given by god to the soul, whereby it was enabled to preserve the body from all corruption so long as it remained itself subject to god. this entirely agrees with reason; for since the rational soul surpasses the capacity of corporeal matter, as above explained (q. 76, a. 1), it was most properly endowed at the beginning with the power of preserving the body in a manner surpassing the capacity of corporeal matter. reply obj. 1 and 2: these objections are founded on natural incorruptibility and immortality. reply obj. 3: this power of preserving the body was not natural to the soul, but was the gift of grace. and though man recovered grace as regards remission of guilt and the merit of glory; yet he did not recover immortality, the loss of which was an effect of sin; for this was reserved for christ to accomplish, by whom the defect of nature was to be restored into something better, as we shall explain further on (iii, q. 14, a. 4, ad 1). reply obj. 4: the promised reward of the immortality of glory differs from the immortality which was bestowed on man in the state of innocence. _______________________ second article [i, q. 97, art. 2] whether in the state of innocence man would have been passible? objection 1: it would seem that in the state of innocence man was passible. for "sensation is a kind of passion." but in the state of innocence man would have been sensitive. therefore he would have been passible. obj. 2: further, sleep is a kind of passion. now, man slept in the state of innocence, according to gen. 2:21, "god cast a deep sleep upon adam." therefore he would have been passible. obj. 3: further, the same passage goes on to say that "he took a rib out of adam." therefore he was passible even to the degree of the cutting out of part of his body. obj. 4: further, man's body was soft. but a soft body is naturally passible as regards a hard body; therefore if a hard body had come in contact with the soft body of the first man, the latter would have suffered from the impact. therefore the first man was passible. _on the contrary,_ had man been passible, he would have been also corruptible, because, as the philosopher says (top. vi, 3): "excessive suffering wastes the very substance." _i answer that,_ "passion" may be taken in two senses. first, in its proper sense, and thus a thing is said to suffer when changed from its natural disposition. for passion is the effect of action; and in nature contraries are mutually active or passive, according as one thing changes another from its natural disposition. secondly, "passion" can be taken in a general sense for any kind of change, even if belonging to the perfecting process of nature. thus understanding and sensation are said to be passions. in this second sense, man was passible in the state of innocence, and was passive both in soul and body. in the first sense, man was impassible, both in soul and body, as he was likewise immortal; for he could curb his passion, as he could avoid death, so long as he refrained from sin. thus it is clear how to reply to the first two objections; since sensation and sleep do not remove from man his natural disposition, but are ordered to his natural welfare. reply obj. 3: as already explained (q. 92, a. 3, ad 2), the rib was in adam as the principle of the human race, as the semen in man, who is a principle through generation. hence as man does not suffer any natural deterioration by seminal issue; so neither did he through the separation of the rib. reply obj. 4: man's body in the state of innocence could be preserved from suffering injury from a hard body; partly by the use of his reason, whereby he could avoid what was harmful; and partly also by divine providence, so preserving him, that nothing of a harmful nature could come upon him unawares. _______________________ third article [i, q. 97, art. 3] whether in the state of innocence man had need of food? objection 1: it would seem that in the state of innocence man did not require food. for food is necessary for man to restore what he has lost. but adam's body suffered no loss, as being incorruptible. therefore he had no need of food. obj. 2: further, food is needed for nourishment. but nourishment involves passibility. since, then, man's body was impassible; it does not appear how food could be needful to him. obj. 3: further, we need food for the preservation of life. but adam could preserve his life otherwise; for had he not sinned, he would not have died. therefore he did not require food. obj. 4: further, the consumption of food involves voiding of the surplus, which seems unsuitable to the state of innocence. therefore it seems that man did not take food in the primitive state. _on the contrary,_ it is written (gen. 2:16): "of every tree in paradise ye shall [vulg. 'thou shalt'] eat." _i answer that,_ in the state of innocence man had an animal life requiring food; but after the resurrection he will have a spiritual life needing no food. in order to make this clear, we must observe that the rational soul is both soul and spirit. it is called a soul by reason of what it possesses in common with other souls--that is, as giving life to the body; whence it is written (gen. 2:7): "man was made into a living soul"; that is, a soul giving life to the body. but the soul is called a spirit according to what properly belongs to itself, and not to other souls, as possessing an intellectual immaterial power. thus in the primitive state, the rational soul communicated to the body what belonged to itself as a soul; and so the body was called "animal" [*from 'anima', a soul; cf. 1 cor. 15:44 seqq.], through having its life from the soul. now the first principle of life in these inferior creatures as the philosopher says (de anima ii, 4) is the vegetative soul: the operations of which are the use of food, generation, and growth. wherefore such operations befitted man in the state of innocence. but in the final state, after the resurrection, the soul will, to a certain extent, communicate to the body what properly belongs to itself as a spirit; immortality to everyone, impassibility, glory, and power to the good, whose bodies will be called "spiritual." so, after the resurrection, man will not require food; whereas he required it in the state of innocence. reply obj. 1: as augustine says (qq. vet. et nov. test. qu. 19 [*works of an anonymous author], among the supposititious works of st. augustine): "how could man have an immortal body, which was sustained by food? since an immortal being needs neither food nor drink." for we have explained (a. 1) that the immortality of the primitive state was based on a supernatural force in the soul, and not on any intrinsic disposition of the body: so that by the action of heat, the body might lose part of its humid qualities; and to prevent the entire consumption of the humor, man was obliged to take food. reply obj. 2: a certain passion and alteration attends nutriment, on the part of the food changed into the substance of the thing nourished. so we cannot thence conclude that man's body was passible, but that the food taken was passible; although this kind of passion conduced to the perfection of the nature. reply obj. 3: if man had not taken food he would have sinned; as he also sinned by taking the forbidden fruit. for he was told at the same time, to abstain from the tree of knowledge of good and evil, and to eat of every other tree of paradise. reply obj. 4: some say that in the state of innocence man would not have taken more than necessary food, so that there would have been nothing superfluous; which, however, is unreasonable to suppose, as implying that there would have been no faecal matter. wherefore there was need for voiding the surplus, yet so disposed by god as to be decorous and suitable to the state. _______________________ fourth article [i, q. 97, art. 4] whether in the state of innocence man would have acquired immortality by the tree of life? objection 1: it would seem that the tree of life could not be the cause of immortality. for nothing can act beyond its own species; as an effect does not exceed its cause. but the tree of life was corruptible, otherwise it could not be taken as food; since food is changed into the substance of the thing nourished. therefore the tree of life could not give incorruptibility or immortality. obj. 2: further, effects caused by the forces of plants and other natural agencies are natural. if therefore the tree of life caused immortality, this would have been natural immortality. obj. 3: further, this would seem to be reduced to the ancient fable, that the gods, by eating a certain food, became immortal; which the philosopher ridicules (metaph. iii, did. ii, 4). _on the contrary,_ it is written (gen. 3:22): "lest perhaps he put forth his hand, and take of the tree of life, and eat, and live for ever." further, augustine says (qq. vet. et nov. test. qu. 19 [*work of an anonymous author], among the supposititious works of st. augustine): "a taste of the tree of life warded off corruption of the body; and even after sin man would have remained immortal, had he been allowed to eat of the tree of life." _i answer that,_ the tree of life in a certain degree was the cause of immortality, but not absolutely. to understand this, we must observe that in the primitive state man possessed, for the preservation of life, two remedies, against two defects. one of these defects was the lost of humidity by the action of natural heat, which acts as the soul's instrument: as a remedy against such loss man was provided with food, taken from the other trees of paradise, as now we are provided with the food, which we take for the same purpose. the second defect, as the philosopher says (de gener. i, 5), arises from the fact that the humor which is caused from extraneous sources, being added to the humor already existing, lessens the specific active power: as water added to wine takes at first the taste of wine, then, as more water is added, the strength of the wine is diminished, till the wine becomes watery. in like manner, we may observe that at first the active force of the species is so strong that it is able to transform so much of the food as is required to replace the lost tissue, as well as what suffices for growth; later on, however, the assimilated food does not suffice for growth, but only replaces what is lost. last of all, in old age, it does not suffice even for this purpose; whereupon the body declines, and finally dies from natural causes. against this defect man was provided with a remedy in the tree of life; for its effect was to strengthen the force of the species against the weakness resulting from the admixture of extraneous nutriment. wherefore augustine says (de civ. dei xiv, 26): "man had food to appease his hunger, drink to slake his thirst; and the tree of life to banish the breaking up of old age"; and (qq. vet. et nov. test. qu. 19 [*work of an anonymous author], among the supposititious works of st. augustine) "the tree of life, like a drug, warded off all bodily corruption." yet it did not absolutely cause immortality; for neither was the soul's intrinsic power of preserving the body due to the tree of life, nor was it of such efficiency as to give the body a disposition to immortality, whereby it might become indissoluble; which is clear from the fact that every bodily power is finite; so the power of the tree of life could not go so far as to give the body the prerogative of living for an infinite time, but only for a definite time. for it is manifest that the greater a force is, the more durable is its effect; therefore, since the power of the tree of life was finite, man's life was to be preserved for a definite time by partaking of it once; and when that time had elapsed, man was to be either transferred to a spiritual life, or had need to eat once more of the tree of life. from this the replies to the objections clearly appear. for the first proves that the tree of life did not absolutely cause immortality; while the others show that it caused incorruption by warding off corruption, according to the explanation above given. _______________________ question 98 of the preservation of the species (in two articles) we next consider what belongs to the preservation of the species; and, first, of generation; secondly, of the state of the offspring. under the first head there are two points of inquiry: (1) whether in the state of innocence there would have been generation? (2) whether generation would have been through coition? _______________________ first article [q. 98, art. 1] whether in the state of innocence generation existed? objection 1: it would seem there would have been no generation in the state of innocence. for, as stated in _phys._ v, 5, "corruption is contrary to generation." but contraries affect the same subject: also there would have been no corruption in the state of innocence. therefore neither would there have been generation. obj. 2: further, the object of generation is the preservation in the species of that which is corruptible in the individual. wherefore there is no generation in those individual things which last for ever. but in the state of innocence man would have lived for ever. therefore in the state of innocence there would have been no generation. obj. 3: further, by generation man is multiplied. but the multiplication of masters requires the division of property, to avoid confusion of mastership. therefore, since man was made master of the animals, it would have been necessary to make a division of rights when the human race increased by generation. this is against the natural law, according to which all things are in common, as isidore says (etym. v, 4). therefore there would have been no generation in the state of innocence. _on the contrary,_ it is written (gen. 1:28): "increase and multiply, and fill the earth." but this increase could not come about save by generation, since the original number of mankind was two only. therefore there would have been generation in the state of innocence. _i answer that,_ in the state of innocence there would have been generation of offspring for the multiplication of the human race; otherwise man's sin would have been very necessary, for such a great blessing to be its result. we must, therefore, observe that man, by his nature, is established, as it were, midway between corruptible and incorruptible creatures, his soul being naturally incorruptible, while his body is naturally corruptible. we must also observe that nature's purpose appears to be different as regards corruptible and incorruptible things. for that seems to be the direct purpose of nature, which is invariable and perpetual; while what is only for a time is seemingly not the chief purpose of nature, but as it were, subordinate to something else; otherwise, when it ceased to exist, nature's purpose would become void. therefore, since in things corruptible none is everlasting and permanent except the species, it follows that the chief purpose of nature is the good of the species; for the preservation of which natural generation is ordained. on the other hand, incorruptible substances survive, not only in the species, but also in the individual; wherefore even the individuals are included in the chief purpose of nature. hence it belongs to man to beget offspring, on the part of the naturally corruptible body. but on the part of the soul, which is incorruptible, it is fitting that the multitude of individuals should be the direct purpose of nature, or rather of the author of nature, who alone is the creator of the human soul. wherefore, to provide for the multiplication of the human race, he established the begetting of offspring even in the state of innocence. reply obj. 1: in the state of innocence the human body was in itself corruptible, but it could be preserved from corruption by the soul. therefore, since generation belongs to things corruptible, man was not to be deprived thereof. reply obj. 2: although generation in the state of innocence might not have been required for the preservation of the species, yet it would have been required for the multiplication of the individual. reply obj. 3: in our present state a division of possessions is necessary on account of the multiplicity of masters, inasmuch as community of possession is a source of strife, as the philosopher says (politic. ii, 5). in the state of innocence, however, the will of men would have been so ordered that without any danger of strife they would have used in common, according to each one's need, those things of which they were masters--a state of things to be observed even now among many good men. _______________________ second article [i, q. 98, art. 2] whether in the state of innocence there would have been generation by coition? objection 1: it would seem that generation by coition would not have existed in the state of innocence. for, as damascene says (de fide orth. ii, 11; iv, 25), the first man in the terrestrial paradise was "like an angel." but in the future state of the resurrection, when men will be like the angels, "they shall neither marry nor be married," as is written matt. 22:30. therefore neither in paradise would there have been generation by coition. obj. 2: further, our first parents were created at the age of perfect development. therefore, if generation by coition had existed before sin, they would have had intercourse while still in paradise: which was not the case according to scripture (gen. 4:1). obj. 3: further, in carnal intercourse, more than at any other time, man becomes like the beasts, on account of the vehement delight which he takes therein; whence contingency is praiseworthy, whereby man refrains from such pleasures. but man is compared to beasts by reason of sin, according to ps. 48:13: "man, when he was in honor, did not understand; he is compared to senseless beasts, and is become like to them." therefore, before sin, there would have been no such intercourse of man and woman. obj. 4: further, in the state of innocence there would have been no corruption. but virginal integrity is corrupted by intercourse. therefore there would have been no such thing in the state of innocence. _on the contrary,_ god made man and woman before sin (gen. 1, 2). but nothing is void in god's works. therefore, even if man had not sinned, there would have been such intercourse, to which the distinction of sex is ordained. moreover, we are told that woman was made to be a help to man (gen. 2:18, 20). but she is not fitted to help man except in generation, because another man would have proved a more effective help in anything else. therefore there would have been such generation also in the state of innocence. _i answer that,_ some of the earlier doctors, considering the nature of concupiscence as regards generation in our present state, concluded that in the state of innocence generation would not have been effected in the same way. thus gregory of nyssa says (de hom. opif. xvii) that in paradise the human race would have been multiplied by some other means, as the angels were multiplied without coition by the operation of the divine power. he adds that god made man male and female before sin, because he foreknew the mode of generation which would take place after sin, which he foresaw. but this is unreasonable. for what is natural to man was neither acquired nor forfeited by sin. now it is clear that generation by coition is natural to man by reason of his animal life, which he possessed even before sin, as above explained (q. 97, a. 3), just as it is natural to other perfect animals, as the corporeal members make it clear. so we cannot allow that these members would not have had a natural use, as other members had, before sin. thus, as regards generation by coition, there are, in the present state of life, two things to be considered. one, which comes from nature, is the union of man and woman; for in every act of generation there is an active and a passive principle. wherefore, since wherever there is distinction of sex, the active principle is male and the passive is female; the order of nature demands that for the purpose of generation there should be concurrence of male and female. the second thing to be observed is a certain deformity of excessive concupiscence, which in the state of innocence would not have existed, when the lower powers were entirely subject to reason. wherefore augustine says (de civ. dei xiv, 26): "we must be far from supposing that offspring could not be begotten without concupiscence. all the bodily members would have been equally moved by the will, without ardent or wanton incentive, with calmness of soul and body." reply obj. 1: in paradise man would have been like an angel in his spirituality of mind, yet with an animal life in his body. after the resurrection man will be like an angel, spiritualized in soul and body. wherefore there is no parallel. reply obj. 2: as augustine says (gen. ad lit. ix, 4), our first parents did not come together in paradise, because on account of sin they were ejected from paradise shortly after the creation of the woman; or because, having received the general divine command relative to generation, they awaited the special command relative to time. reply obj. 3: beasts are without reason. in this way man becomes, as it were, like them in coition, because he cannot moderate concupiscence. in the state of innocence nothing of this kind would have happened that was not regulated by reason, not because delight of sense was less, as some say (rather indeed would sensible delight have been the greater in proportion to the greater purity of nature and the greater sensibility of the body), but because the force of concupiscence would not have so inordinately thrown itself into such pleasure, being curbed by reason, whose place it is not to lessen sensual pleasure, but to prevent the force of concupiscence from cleaving to it immoderately. by "immoderately" i mean going beyond the bounds of reason, as a sober person does not take less pleasure in food taken in moderation than the glutton, but his concupiscence lingers less in such pleasures. this is what augustine means by the words quoted, which do not exclude intensity of pleasure from the state of innocence, but ardor of desire and restlessness of the mind. therefore continence would not have been praiseworthy in the state of innocence, whereas it is praiseworthy in our present state, not because it removes fecundity, but because it excludes inordinate desire. in that state fecundity would have been without lust. reply obj. 4: as augustine says (de civ. dei xiv, 26): in that state "intercourse would have been without prejudice to virginal integrity; this would have remained intact, as it does in the menses. and just as in giving birth the mother was then relieved, not by groans of pain, but by the instigations of maturity; so in conceiving, the union was one, not of lustful desire, but of deliberate action." _______________________ question 99 of the condition of the offspring as to the body (in two articles) we must now consider the condition of the offspring--first, as regards the body; secondly, as regards virtue; thirdly, in knowledge. under the first head there are two points of inquiry: (1) whether in the state of innocence children would have had full powers of the body immediately after birth? (2) whether all infants would have been of the male sex? _______________________ first article [i, q. 99, art. 1] whether in the state of innocence children would have had perfect strength of body as to the use of its members immediately after birth? objection 1: it would seem that in the state of innocence children would have had perfect strength of the body, as to the use of its members, immediately after birth. for augustine says (de pecc. merit. et remiss. i, 38): "this weakness of the body befits their weakness of mind." but in the state of innocence there would have been no weakness of mind. therefore neither would there have been weakness of body in infants. obj. 2: further, some animals at birth have sufficient strength to use their members. but man is nobler than other animals. therefore much more is it natural to man to have strength to use his members at birth; and thus it appears to be a punishment of sin that he has not that strength. obj. 3: further, inability to secure a proffered pleasure causes affliction. but if children had not full strength in the use of their limbs, they would often have been unable to procure something pleasurable offered to them; and so they would have been afflicted, which was not possible before sin. therefore, in the state of innocence, children would not have been deprived of the use of their limbs. obj. 4: further, the weakness of old age seems to correspond to that of infancy. but in the state of innocence there would have been no weakness of old age. therefore neither would there have been such weakness in infancy. _on the contrary,_ everything generated is first imperfect. but in the state of innocence children would have been begotten by generation. therefore from the first they would have been imperfect in bodily size and power. _i answer that,_ by faith alone do we hold truths which are above nature, and what we believe rests on authority. wherefore, in making any assertion, we must be guided by the nature of things, except in those things which are above nature, and are made known to us by divine authority. now it is clear that it is as natural as it is befitting to the principles of human nature that children should not have sufficient strength for the use of their limbs immediately after birth. because in proportion to other animals man has naturally a larger brain. wherefore it is natural, on account of the considerable humidity of the brain in children, that the nerves which are instruments of movement, should not be apt for moving the limbs. on the other hand, no catholic doubts it possible for a child to have, by divine power, the use of its limbs immediately after birth. now we have it on the authority of scripture that "god made man right" (eccles. 7:30), which rightness, as augustine says (de civ. dei xiv, 11), consists in the perfect subjection of the body to the soul. as, therefore, in the primitive state it was impossible to find in the human limbs anything repugnant to man's well-ordered will, so was it impossible for those limbs to fail in executing the will's commands. now the human will is well ordered when it tends to acts which are befitting to man. but the same acts are not befitting to man at every season of life. we must, therefore, conclude that children would not have had sufficient strength for the use of their limbs for the purpose of performing every kind of act; but only for the acts befitting the state of infancy, such as suckling, and the like. reply obj. 1: augustine is speaking of the weakness which we observe in children even as regards those acts which befit the state of infancy; as is clear from his preceding remark that "even when close to the breast, and longing for it, they are more apt to cry than to suckle." reply obj. 2: the fact that some animals have the use of their limbs immediately after birth, is due, not to their superiority, since more perfect animals are not so endowed; but to the dryness of the brain, and to the operations proper to such animals being imperfect, so that a small amount of strength suffices them. reply obj. 3 is clear from what we have said above. we may add that they would have desired nothing except with an ordinate will; and only what was befitting to their state of life. reply obj. 4: in the state of innocence man would have been born, yet not subject to corruption. therefore in that state there could have been certain infantile defects which result from birth; but not senile defects leading to corruption. _______________________ second article [i, q. 99, art. 2] whether, in the primitive state, women would have been born? objection 1: it would seem that in the primitive state woman would not have been born. for the philosopher says (de gener. animal. ii, 3) that woman is a "misbegotten male," as though she were a product outside the purpose of nature. but in that state nothing would have been unnatural in human generation. therefore in that state women would not have been born. obj. 2: further, every agent produces its like, unless prevented by insufficient power or ineptness of matter: thus a small fire cannot burn green wood. but in generation the active force is in the male. since, therefore, in the state of innocence man's active force was not subject to defect, nor was there inept matter on the part of the woman, it seems that males would always have been born. obj. 3: further, in the state of innocence generation is ordered to the multiplication of the human race. but the race would have been sufficiently multiplied by the first man and woman, from the fact that they would have lived for ever. therefore, in the state of innocence, there was no need for women to be born. _on the contrary,_ nature's process in generation would have been in harmony with the manner in which it was established by god. but god established male and female in human nature, as it is written (gen. 1, 2). therefore also in the state of innocence male and female would have been born. _i answer that,_ nothing belonging to the completeness of human nature would have been lacking in the state of innocence. and as different grades belong to the perfection of the universe, so also diversity of sex belongs to the perfection of human nature. therefore in the state of innocence, both sexes would have been begotten. reply obj. 1: woman is said to be a "misbegotten male," as being a product outside the purpose of nature considered in the individual case: but not against the purpose of universal nature, as above explained (q. 92, a. 1, ad 2). reply obj. 2: the generation of woman is not occasioned either by a defect of the active force or by inept matter, as the objection proposes; but sometimes by an extrinsic accidental cause; thus the philosopher says (de animal. histor. vi, 19): "the northern wind favors the generation of males, and the southern wind that of females": sometimes also by some impression in the soul (of the parents), which may easily have some effect on the body (of the child). especially was this the case in the state of innocence, when the body was more subject to the soul; so that by the mere will of the parent the sex of the offspring might be diversified. reply obj. 3: the offspring would have been begotten to an animal life, as to the use of food and generation. hence it was fitting that all should generate, and not only the first parents. from this it seems to follow that males and females would have been in equal number. _______________________ question 100 of the condition of the offspring as regards righteousness (in two articles) we now have to consider the condition of the offspring as to righteousness. under this head there are two points of inquiry: (1) whether men would have been born in a state of righteousness? (2) whether they would have been born confirmed in righteousness? _______________________ first article [i, q. 100, art. 1] whether men would have been born in a state of righteousness? objection 1: it would seem that in the state of innocence men would not have been born in a state of righteousness. for hugh of st. victor says (de sacram. i): "before sin the first man would have begotten children sinless; but not heirs to their father's righteousness." obj. 2: further, righteousness is effected by grace, as the apostle says (rom. 5:16, 21). now grace is not transfused from one to another, for thus it would be natural; but is infused by god alone. therefore children would not have been born righteous. obj. 3: further, righteousness is in the soul. but the soul is not transmitted from the parent. therefore neither would righteousness have been transmitted from parents, to the children. _on the contrary,_ anselm says (de concep. virg. x): "as long as man did not sin, he would have begotten children endowed with righteousness together with the rational soul." _i answer that,_ man naturally begets a specific likeness to himself. hence whatever accidental qualities result from the nature of the species, must be alike in parent and child, unless nature fails in its operation, which would not have occurred in the state of innocence. but individual accidents do not necessarily exist alike in parent and child. now original righteousness, in which the first man was created, was an accident pertaining to the nature of the species, not as caused by the principles of the species, but as a gift conferred by god on the entire human nature. this is clear from the fact that opposites are of the same genus; and original sin, which is opposed to original righteousness, is called the sin of nature, wherefore it is transmitted from the parent to the offspring; and for this reason also, the children would have been assimilated to their parents as regards original righteousness. reply obj. 1: these words of hugh are to be understood as referring, not to the habit of righteousness, but to the execution of the act thereof. reply obj. 2: some say that children would have been born, not with the righteousness of grace, which is the principle of merit, but with original righteousness. but since the root of original righteousness, which conferred righteousness on the first man when he was made, consists in the supernatural subjection of the reason to god, which subjection results from sanctifying grace, as above explained (q. 95, a. 1), we must conclude that if children were born in original righteousness, they would also have been born in grace; thus we have said above that the first man was created in grace (q. 95, a. 1). this grace, however, would not have been natural, for it would not have been transfused by virtue of the semen; but would have been conferred on man immediately on his receiving a rational soul. in the same way the rational soul, which is not transmitted by the parent, is infused by god as soon as the human body is apt to receive it. from this the reply to the third objection is clear. _______________________ second article [i, q. 100, art. 2] whether in the state of innocence children would have been born confirmed in righteousness? objection 1: it would seem that in the state of innocence children would have been born confirmed in righteousness. for gregory says (moral. iv) on the words of job 3:13: "for now i should have been asleep, etc.": "if no sinful corruption had infected our first parent, he would not have begotten 'children of hell'; no children would have been born of him but such as were destined to be saved by the redeemer." therefore all would have been born confirmed in righteousness. obj. 2: further, anselm says (cur deus homo i, 18): "if our first parents had lived so as not to yield to temptation, they would have been confirmed in grace, so that with their offspring they would have been unable to sin any more." therefore the children would have been born confirmed in righteousness. obj. 3: further, good is stronger than evil. but by the sin of the first man there resulted, in those born of him, the necessity of sin. therefore, if the first man had persevered in righteousness, his descendants would have derived from him the necessity of preserving righteousness. obj. 4: further, the angels who remained faithful to god, while the others sinned, were at once confirmed in grace, so as to be unable henceforth to sin. in like manner, therefore, man would have been confirmed in grace if he had persevered. but he would have begotten children like himself. therefore they also would have been born confirmed in righteousness. _on the contrary,_ augustine says (de civ. dei xiv, 10): "happy would have been the whole human race if neither they--that is our first parents--had committed any evil to be transmitted to their descendants, nor any of their race had committed any sin for which they would have been condemned." from which words we gather that even if our first parents had not sinned, any of their descendants might have done evil; and therefore they would not have been born confirmed in righteousness. _i answer that,_ it does not seem possible that in the state of innocence children would have been born confirmed in righteousness. for it is clear that at their birth they would not have had greater perfection than their parents at the time of begetting. now the parents, as long as they begot children, would not have been confirmed in righteousness. for the rational creature is confirmed in righteousness through the beatitude given by the clear vision of god; and when once it has seen god, it cannot but cleave to him who is the essence of goodness, wherefrom no one can turn away, since nothing is desired or loved but under the aspect of good. i say this according to the general law; for it may be otherwise in the case of special privilege, such as we believe was granted to the virgin mother of god. and as soon as adam had attained to that happy state of seeing god in his essence, he would have become spiritual in soul and body; and his animal life would have ceased, wherein alone there is generation. hence it is clear that children would not have been born confirmed in righteousness. reply obj. 1: if adam had not sinned, he would not have begotten "children of hell" in the sense that they would contract from him sin which is the cause of hell: yet by sinning of their own free-will they could have become "children of hell." if, however, they did not become "children of hell" by falling into sin, this would not have been owing to their being confirmed in righteousness, but to divine providence preserving them free from sin. reply obj. 2: anselm does not say this by way of assertion, but only as an opinion, which is clear from his mode of expression as follows: "it seems that if they had lived, etc." reply obj. 3: this argument is not conclusive, though anselm seems to have been influenced by it, as appears from his words above quoted. for the necessity of sin incurred by the descendants would not have been such that they could not return to righteousness, which is the case only with the damned. wherefore neither would the parents have transmitted to their descendants the necessity of not sinning, which is only in the blessed. reply obj. 4: there is no comparison between man and the angels; for man's free-will is changeable, both before and after choice; whereas the angel's is not changeable, as we have said above in treating of the angels (q. 64, a. 2). _______________________ question 101 of the condition of the offspring as regards knowledge (in two articles) we next consider the condition of the offspring as to knowledge. under this head there are two points of inquiry: (1) whether in the state of innocence children would have been born with perfect knowledge? (2) whether they would have had perfect use of reason at the moment of birth? _______________________ first article [i, q. 101, art. 1] whether in the state of innocence children would have been born with perfect knowledge? objection 1: it would seem that in the state of innocence children would have been born with perfect knowledge. for adam would have begotten children like himself. but adam was gifted with perfect knowledge (q. 94, a. 3). therefore children would have been born of him with perfect knowledge. obj. 2: further, ignorance is a result of sin, as bede says (cf. i-ii, q. 85, a. 3). but ignorance is privation of knowledge. therefore before sin children would have had perfect knowledge as soon as they were born. obj. 3: further, children would have been gifted with righteousness from birth. but knowledge is required for righteousness, since it directs our actions. therefore they would also have been gifted with knowledge. _on the contrary,_ the human soul is naturally "like a blank tablet on which nothing is written," as the philosopher says (de anima iii, 4). but the nature of the soul is the same now as it would have been in the state of innocence. therefore the souls of children would have been without knowledge at birth. _i answer that,_ as above stated (q. 99, a. 1), as regards belief in matters which are above nature, we rely on authority alone; and so, when authority is wanting, we must be guided by the ordinary course of nature. now it is natural for man to acquire knowledge through the senses, as above explained (q. 55, a. 2; q. 84, a. 6); and for this reason is the soul united to the body, that it needs it for its proper operation; and this would not be so if the soul were endowed at birth with knowledge not acquired through the sensitive powers. we must conclude then, that, in the state of innocence, children would not have been born with perfect knowledge; but in course of time they would have acquired knowledge without difficulty by discovery or learning. reply obj. 1: the perfection of knowledge was an individual accident of our first parent, so far as he was established as the father and instructor of the whole human race. therefore he begot children like himself, not in that respect, but only in those accidents which were natural or conferred gratuitously on the whole nature. reply obj. 2: ignorance is privation of knowledge due at some particular time; and this would not have been in children from their birth, for they would have possessed the knowledge due to them at that time. hence, no ignorance would have been in them, but only nescience in regard to certain matters. such nescience was even in the holy angels, according to dionysius (coel. hier. vii). reply obj. 3: children would have had sufficient knowledge to direct them to deeds of righteousness, in which men are guided by universal principles of right; and this knowledge of theirs would have been much more complete than what we have now by nature, as likewise their knowledge of other universal principles. _______________________ second article [i, q. 101, art. 2] whether children would have had perfect use of reason at birth? objection 1: it would seem that children would have had perfect use of reason at birth. for that children have not perfect use of reason in our present state, is due to the soul being weighed down by the body; which was not the case in paradise, because, as it is written, "the corruptible body is a load upon the soul" (wis. 9:15). therefore, before sin and the corruption which resulted therefrom, children would have had the perfect use of reason at birth. obj. 2: further, some animals at birth have the use of their natural powers, as the lamb at once flees from the wolf. much more, therefore, would men in the state of innocence have had perfect use of reason at birth. _on the contrary,_ in all things produced by generation nature proceeds from the imperfect to the perfect. therefore children would not have had the perfect use of reason from the very outset. _i answer that,_ as above stated (q. 84, a. 7), the use of reason depends in a certain manner on the use of the sensitive powers; wherefore, while the senses are tired and the interior sensitive powers hampered, man has not the perfect use of reason, as we see in those who are asleep or delirious. now the sensitive powers are situate in corporeal organs; and therefore, so long as the latter are hindered, the action of the former is of necessity hindered also; and likewise, consequently, the use of reason. now children are hindered in the use of these powers on account of the humidity of the brain; wherefore they have perfect use neither of these powers nor of reason. therefore, in the state of innocence, children would not have had the perfect use of reason, which they would have enjoyed later on in life. yet they would have had a more perfect use than they have now, as to matters regarding that particular state, as explained above regarding the use of their limbs (q. 99, a. 1). reply obj. 1: the corruptible body is a load upon the soul, because it hinders the use of reason even in those matters which belong to man at all ages. reply obj. 2: even other animals have not at birth such a perfect use of their natural powers as they have later on. this is clear from the fact that birds teach their young to fly; and the like may be observed in other animals. moreover a special impediment exists in man from the humidity of the brain, as we have said above (q. 99, a. 1). _______________________ question 102 of man's abode, which is paradise (in four articles) we next consider man's abode, which is paradise. under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) whether paradise is a corporeal place? (2) whether it is a place apt for human habitation? (3) for what purpose was man placed in paradise? (4) whether he should have been created in paradise? _______________________ first article [i, q. 102, art. 1] whether paradise is a corporeal place? objection 1: it would seem that paradise is not a corporeal place. for bede [*strabus, gloss on gen. 2:8] says that "paradise reaches to the lunar circle." but no earthly place answers that description, both because it is contrary to the nature of the earth to be raised up so high, and because beneath the moon is the region of fire, which would consume the earth. therefore paradise is not a corporeal place. obj. 2: further, scripture mentions four rivers as rising in paradise (gen. 2:10). but the rivers there mentioned have visible sources elsewhere, as is clear from the philosopher (meteor. i). therefore paradise is not a corporeal place. obj. 3: further, although men have explored the entire habitable world, yet none have made mention of the place of paradise. therefore apparently it is not a corporeal place. obj. 4: further, the tree of life is described as growing in paradise. but the tree of life is a spiritual thing, for it is written of wisdom that "she is a tree of life to them that lay hold on her" (prov. 3:18). therefore paradise also is not a corporeal, but a spiritual place. obj. 5: further, if paradise be a corporeal place, the trees also of paradise must be corporeal. but it seems they were not; for corporeal trees were produced on the third day, while the planting of the trees of paradise is recorded after the work of the six days. therefore paradise was not a corporeal place. _on the contrary,_ augustine says (gen. ad lit. viii, 1): "three general opinions prevail about paradise. some understand a place merely corporeal; others a place entirely spiritual; while others, whose opinion, i confess, pleases me, hold that paradise was both corporeal and spiritual." _i answer that,_ as augustine says (de civ. dei xiii, 21): "nothing prevents us from holding, within proper limits, a spiritual paradise; so long as we believe in the truth of the events narrated as having there occurred." for whatever scripture tells us about paradise is set down as matter of history; and wherever scripture makes use of this method, we must hold to the historical truth of the narrative as a foundation of whatever spiritual explanation we may offer. and so paradise, as isidore says (etym. xiv, 3), "is a place situated in the east, its name being the greek for garden." it was fitting that it should be in the east; for it is to be believed that it was situated in the most excellent part of the earth. now the east is the right hand on the heavens, as the philosopher explains (de coel. ii, 2); and the right hand is nobler than the left: hence it was fitting that god should place the earthly paradise in the east. reply obj. 1: bede's assertion is untrue, if taken in its obvious sense. it may, however, be explained to mean that paradise reaches to the moon, not literally, but figuratively; because, as isidore says (etym. xiv, 3), the atmosphere there is "a continually even temperature"; and in this respect it is like the heavenly bodies, which are devoid of opposing elements. mention, however, is made of the moon rather than of other bodies, because, of all the heavenly bodies, the moon is nearest to us, and is, moreover, the most akin to the earth; hence it is observed to be overshadowed by clouds so as to be almost obscured. others say that paradise reached to the moon--that is, to the middle space of the air, where rain, and wind, and the like arise; because the moon is said to have influence on such changes. but in this sense it would not be a fit place for human dwelling, through being uneven in temperature, and not attuned to the human temperament, as is the lower atmosphere in the neighborhood of the earth. reply obj. 2: augustine says (gen. ad lit. viii, 7): "it is probable that man has no idea where paradise was, and that the rivers, whose sources are said to be known, flowed for some distance underground, and then sprang up elsewhere. for who is not aware that such is the case with some other streams?" reply obj. 3: the situation of paradise is shut off from the habitable world by mountains, or seas, or some torrid region, which cannot be crossed; and so people who have written about topography make no mention of it. reply obj. 4: the tree of life is a material tree, and so called because its fruit was endowed with a life-preserving power as above stated (q. 97, a. 4). yet it had a spiritual signification; as the rock in the desert was of a material nature, and yet signified christ. in like manner the tree of the knowledge of good and evil was a material tree, so called in view of future events; because, after eating of it, man was to learn, by experience of the consequent punishment, the difference between the good of obedience and the evil of rebellion. it may also be said to signify spiritually the free-will as some say. reply obj. 5: according to augustine (gen. ad lit. v, 5, viii, 3), the plants were not actually produced on the third day, but in their seminal virtues; whereas, after the work of the six days, the plants, both of paradise and others, were actually produced. according to other holy writers, we ought to say that all the plants were actually produced on the third day, including the trees of paradise; and what is said of the trees of paradise being planted after the work of the six days is to be understood, they say, by way of recapitulation. whence our text reads: "the lord god had planted a paradise of pleasure from the beginning" (gen. 2:8). _______________________ second article [i, q. 102, art. 2] whether paradise was a place adapted to be the abode of man? objection 1: it would seem that paradise was not a place adapted to be the abode of man. for man and angels are similarly ordered to beatitude. but the angels from the very beginning of their existence were made to dwell in the abode of the blessed--that is, the empyrean heaven. therefore the place of man's habitation should have been there also. obj. 2: further, if some definite place were required for man's abode, this would be required on the part either of the soul or of the body. if on the part of the soul, the place would be in heaven, which is adapted to the nature of the soul; since the desire of heaven is implanted in all. on the part of the body, there was no need for any other place than the one provided for other animals. therefore paradise was not at all adapted to be the abode of man. obj. 3: further, a place which contains nothing is useless. but after sin, paradise was not occupied by man. therefore if it were adapted as a dwelling-place for man, it seems that god made paradise to no purpose. obj. 4: further, since man is of an even temperament, a fitting place for him should be of even temperature. but paradise was not of an even temperature; for it is said to have been on the equator--a situation of extreme heat, since twice in the year the sun passes vertically over the heads of its inhabitants. therefore paradise was not a fit dwelling-place for man. _on the contrary,_ damascene says (de fide orth. ii, 11): "paradise was a divinely ordered region, and worthy of him who was made to god's image." _i answer that,_ as above stated (q. 97, a. 1), man was incorruptible and immortal, not because his body had a disposition to incorruptibility, but because in his soul there was a power preserving the body from corruption. now the human body may be corrupted from within or from without. from within, the body is corrupted by the consumption of the humors, and by old age, as above explained (q. 97, a. 4), and man was able to ward off such corruption by food. among those things which corrupt the body from without, the chief seems to be an atmosphere of unequal temperature; and to such corruption a remedy is found in an atmosphere of equable nature. in paradise both conditions were found; because, as damascene says (de fide orth. ii, 11): "paradise was permeated with the all pervading brightness of a temperate, pure, and exquisite atmosphere, and decked with ever-flowering plants." whence it is clear that paradise was most fit to be a dwelling-place for man, and in keeping with his original state of immortality. reply obj. 1: the empyrean heaven is the highest of corporeal places, and is outside the region of change. by the first of these two conditions, it is a fitting abode for the angelic nature: for, as augustine says (de trin. ii), "god rules corporeal creatures through spiritual creatures." hence it is fitting that the spiritual nature should be established above the entire corporeal nature, as presiding over it. by the second condition, it is a fitting abode for the state of beatitude, which is endowed with the highest degree of stability. thus the abode of beatitude was suited to the very nature of the angel; therefore he was created there. but it is not suited to man's nature, since man is not set as a ruler over the entire corporeal creation: it is a fitting abode for man in regard only to his beatitude. wherefore he was not placed from the beginning in the empyrean heaven, but was destined to be transferred thither in the state of his final beatitude. reply obj. 2: it is ridiculous to assert that any particular place is natural to the soul or to any spiritual substances, though some particular place may have a certain fitness in regard to spiritual substances. for the earthly paradise was a place adapted to man, as regards both his body and his soul--that is, inasmuch as in his soul was the force which preserved the human body from corruption. this could not be said of the other animals. therefore, as damascene says (de fide orth. ii, 11): "no irrational animal inhabited paradise"; although, by a certain dispensation, the animals were brought thither by god to adam; and the serpent was able to trespass therein by the complicity of the devil. reply obj. 3: paradise did not become useless through being unoccupied by man after sin, just as immortality was not conferred on man in vain, though he was to lose it. for thereby we learn god's kindness to man, and what man lost by sin. moreover, some say that enoch and elias still dwell in that paradise. reply obj. 4: those who say that paradise was on the equinoctial line are of opinion that such a situation is most temperate, on account of the unvarying equality of day and night; that it is never too cold there, because the sun is never too far off; and never too hot, because, although the sun passes over the heads of the inhabitants, it does not remain long in that position. however, aristotle distinctly says (meteor. ii, 5) that such a region is uninhabitable on account of the heat. this seems to be more probable; because, even those regions where the sun does not pass vertically overhead, are extremely hot on account of the mere proximity of the sun. but whatever be the truth of the matter, we must hold that paradise was situated in a most temperate situation, whether on the equator or elsewhere. _______________________ third article [i, q. 102, art. 3] whether man was placed in paradise to dress it and keep it? objection 1: it would seem that man was not placed in paradise to dress and keep it. for what was brought on him as a punishment of sin would not have existed in paradise in the state of innocence. but the cultivation of the soil was a punishment of sin (gen. 3:17). therefore man was not placed in paradise to dress and keep it. obj. 2: further, there is no need of a keeper when there is no fear of trespass with violence. but in paradise there was no fear of trespass with violence. therefore there was no need for man to keep paradise. obj. 3: further, if man was placed in paradise to dress and keep it, man would apparently have been made for the sake of paradise, and not contrariwise; which seems to be false. therefore man was not place in paradise to dress and keep it. _on the contrary,_ it is written (gen. 2: 15): "the lord god took man and placed in the paradise of pleasure, to dress and keep it." _i answer that,_ as augustine says (gen. ad lit. viii, 10), these words in genesis may be understood in two ways. first, in the sense that god placed man in paradise that he might himself work in man and keep him, by sanctifying him (for if this work cease, man at once relapses into darkness, as the air grows dark when the light ceases to shine); and by keeping man from all corruption and evil. secondly, that man might dress and keep paradise, which dressing would not have involved labor, as it did after sin; but would have been pleasant on account of man's practical knowledge of the powers of nature. nor would man have kept paradise against a trespasser; but he would have striven to keep paradise for himself lest he should lose it by sin. all of which was for man's good; wherefore paradise was ordered to man's benefit, and not conversely. whence the replies to the objections are made clear. _______________________ fourth article [i, q. 102, art. 4] whether man was created in paradise? objection 1: it would seem that man was created in paradise. for the angel was created in his dwelling-place--namely, the empyrean heaven. but before sin paradise was a fitting abode for man. therefore it seems that man was created in paradise. obj. 2: further, other animals remain in the place where they are produced, as the fish in the water, and walking animals on the earth from which they were made. now man would have remained in paradise after he was created (q. 97, a. 4). therefore he was created in paradise. obj. 3: further, woman was made in paradise. but man is greater than woman. therefore much more should man have been made in paradise. _on the contrary,_ it is written (gen. 2:15): "god took man and placed him in paradise." _i answer that,_ paradise was a fitting abode for man as regards the incorruptibility of the primitive state. now this incorruptibility was man's, not by nature, but by a supernatural gift of god. therefore that this might be attributed to god, and not to human nature, god made man outside of paradise, and afterwards placed him there to live there during the whole of his animal life; and, having attained to the spiritual life, to be transferred thence to heaven. reply obj. 1: the empyrean heaven was a fitting abode for the angels as regards their nature, and therefore they were created there. in the same way i reply to the second objection, for those places befit those animals in their nature. reply obj. 3: woman was made in paradise, not by reason of her own dignity, but on account of the dignity of the principle from which her body was formed. for the same reason the children would have been born in paradise, where their parents were already. _______________________ treatise on the conservation and government of creatures (qq. 103-119) _______________________ question 103 of the government of things in general (in eight articles) having considered the creation of things and their distinction, we now consider in the third place the government thereof, and (1) the government of things in general; (2) in particular, the effects of this government. under the first head there are eight points of inquiry: (1) whether the world is governed by someone? (2) what is the end of this government? (3) whether the world is governed by one? (4) of the effects of this government? (5) whether all things are subject to divine government? (6) whether all things are immediately governed by god? (7) whether the divine government is frustrated in anything? (8) whether anything is contrary to the divine providence? _______________________ first article [i, q. 103, art. 1] whether the world is governed by anyone? objection 1: it would seem that the world is not governed by anyone. for it belongs to those things to be governed, which move or work for an end. but natural things which make up the greater part of the world do not move, or work for an end; for they have no knowledge of their end. therefore the world is not governed. obj. 2: further, those things are governed which are moved towards an object. but the world does not appear to be so directed, but has stability in itself. therefore it is not governed. obj. 3: further, what is necessarily determined by its own nature to one particular thing, does not require any external principle of government. but the principal parts of the world are by a certain necessity determined to something particular in their actions and movements. therefore the world does not require to be governed. _on the contrary,_ it is written (wis. 14:3): "but thou, o father, governest all things by thy providence." and boethius says (de consol. iii): "thou who governest this universe by mandate eternal." _i answer that,_ certain ancient philosophers denied the government of the world, saying that all things happened by chance. but such an opinion can be refuted as impossible in two ways. first, by observation of things themselves: for we observe that in nature things happen always or nearly always for the best; which would not be the case unless some sort of providence directed nature towards good as an end; which is to govern. wherefore the unfailing order we observe in things is a sign of their being governed; for instance, if we enter a well-ordered house we gather therefrom the intention of him that put it in order, as tullius says (de nat. deorum ii), quoting aristotle [*cleanthes]. secondly, this is clear from a consideration of divine goodness, which, as we have said above (q. 44, a. 4; q. 65, a. 2), was the cause of the production of things in existence. for as "it belongs to the best to produce the best," it is not fitting that the supreme goodness of god should produce things without giving them their perfection. now a thing's ultimate perfection consists in the attainment of its end. therefore it belongs to the divine goodness, as it brought things into existence, so to lead them to their end: and this is to govern. reply obj. 1: a thing moves or operates for an end in two ways. first, in moving itself to the end, as man and other rational creatures; and such things have knowledge of their end, and of the means to the end. secondly, a thing is said to move or operate for an end, as though moved or directed by another thereto, as an arrow directed to the target by the archer, who knows the end unknown to the arrow. wherefore, as the movement of the arrow towards a definite end shows clearly that it is directed by someone with knowledge, so the unvarying course of natural things which are without knowledge, shows clearly that the world is governed by some reason. reply obj. 2: in all created things there is a stable element, at least primary matter; and something belonging to movement, if under movement we include operation. and things need governing as to both: because even that which is stable, since it is created from nothing, would return to nothingness were it not sustained by a governing hand, as will be explained later (q. 104, a. 1). reply obj. 3: the natural necessity inherent in those beings which are determined to a particular thing, is a kind of impression from god, directing them to their end; as the necessity whereby an arrow is moved so as to fly towards a certain point is an impression from the archer, and not from the arrow. but there is a difference, inasmuch as that which creatures receive from god is their nature, while that which natural things receive from man in addition to their nature is somewhat violent. wherefore, as the violent necessity in the movement of the arrow shows the action of the archer, so the natural necessity of things shows the government of divine providence. _______________________ second article [i, q. 103, art. 2] whether the end of the government of the world is something outside the world? objection 1: it would seem that the end of the government of the world is not something existing outside the world. for the end of the government of a thing is that whereto the thing governed is brought. but that whereto a thing is brought is some good in the thing itself; thus a sick man is brought back to health, which is something good in him. therefore the end of government of things is some good not outside, but within the things themselves. obj. 2: further, the philosopher says (ethic. i, 1): "some ends are an operation; some are a work"--i.e. produced by an operation. but nothing can be produced by the whole universe outside itself; and operation exists in the agent. therefore nothing extrinsic can be the end of the government of things. obj. 3: further, the good of the multitude seems to consist in order, and peace which is the "tranquillity of order," as augustine says (de civ. dei xix, 13). but the world is composed of a multitude of things. therefore the end of the government of the world is the peaceful order in things themselves. therefore the end of the government of the world is not an extrinsic good. _on the contrary,_ it is written (prov. 16:4): "the lord hath made all things for himself." but god is outside the entire order of the universe. therefore the end of all things is something extrinsic to them. _i answer that,_ as the end of a thing corresponds to its beginning, it is not possible to be ignorant of the end of things if we know their beginning. therefore, since the beginning of all things is something outside the universe, namely, god, it is clear from what has been expounded above (q. 44, aa. 1, 2), that we must conclude that the end of all things is some extrinsic good. this can be proved by reason. for it is clear that good has the nature of an end; wherefore, a particular end of anything consists in some particular good; while the universal end of all things is the universal good; which is good of itself by virtue of its essence, which is the very essence of goodness; whereas a particular good is good by participation. now it is manifest that in the whole created universe there is not a good which is not such by participation. wherefore that good which is the end of the whole universe must be a good outside the universe. reply obj. 1: we may acquire some good in many ways: first, as a form existing in us, such as health or knowledge; secondly, as something done by us, as a builder attains his end by building a house; thirdly, as something good possessed or acquired by us, as the buyer of a field attains his end when he enters into possession. wherefore nothing prevents something outside the universe being the good to which it is directed. reply obj. 2: the philosopher is speaking of the ends of various arts; for the end of some arts consists in the operation itself, as the end of a harpist is to play the harp; whereas the end of other arts consists in something produced, as the end of a builder is not the act of building, but the house he builds. now it may happen that something extrinsic is the end not only as made, but also as possessed or acquired or even as represented, as if we were to say that hercules is the end of the statue made to represent him. therefore we may say that some good outside the whole universe is the end of the government of the universe, as something possessed and represented; for each thing tends to a participation thereof, and to an assimilation thereto, as far as is possible. reply obj. 3: a good existing in the universe, namely, the order of the universe, is an end thereof; this, however, is not its ultimate end, but is ordered to the extrinsic good as to the end: thus the order in an army is ordered to the general, as stated in _metaph._ xii, did. xi, 10. _______________________ third article [i, q. 103, art. 3] whether the world is governed by one? objection 1: it would seem that the world is not governed by one. for we judge the cause by the effect. now, we see in the government of the universe that things are not moved and do not operate uniformly, but some contingently and some of necessity in variously different ways. therefore the world is not governed by one. obj. 2: further, things which are governed by one do not act against each other, except by the incapacity or unskillfulness of the ruler; which cannot apply to god. but created things agree not together, and act against each other; as is evident in the case of contraries. therefore the world is not governed by one. obj. 3: further, in nature we always find what is the better. but it "is better that two should be together than one" (eccles. 4:9). therefore the world is not governed by one, but by many. _on the contrary,_ we confess our belief in one god and one lord, according to the words of the apostle (1 cor. 8:6): "to us there is but one god, the father . . . and one lord": and both of these pertain to government. for to the lord belongs dominion over subjects; and the name of god is taken from providence as stated above (q. 13, a. 8). therefore the world is governed by one. _i answer that,_ we must of necessity say that the world is governed by one. for since the end of the government of the world is that which is essentially good, which is the greatest good; the government of the world must be the best kind of government. now the best government is the government by one. the reason of this is that government is nothing but the directing of the things governed to the end; which consists in some good. but unity belongs to the idea of goodness, as boethius proves (de consol. iii, 11) from this, that, as all things desire good, so do they desire unity; without which they would cease to exist. for a thing so far exists as it is one. whence we observe that things resist division, as far as they can; and the dissolution of a thing arises from defect therein. therefore the intention of a ruler over a multitude is unity, or peace. now the proper cause of unity is one. for it is clear that several cannot be the cause of unity or concord, except so far as they are united. furthermore, what is one in itself is a more apt and a better cause of unity than several things united. therefore a multitude is better governed by one than by several. from this it follows that the government of the world, being the best form of government, must be by one. this is expressed by the philosopher (metaph. xii, did. xi, 10): "things refuse to be ill governed; and multiplicity of authorities is a bad thing, therefore there should be one ruler." reply obj. 1: movement is "the act of a thing moved, caused by the mover." wherefore dissimilarity of movements is caused by diversity of things moved, which diversity is essential to the perfection of the universe (q. 47, aa. 1,2; q. 48, a. 2), and not by a diversity of governors. reply obj. 2: although contraries do not agree with each other in their proximate ends, nevertheless they agree in the ultimate end, so far as they are included in the one order of the universe. reply obj. 3: if we consider individual goods, then two are better than one. but if we consider the essential good, then no addition is possible. _______________________ fourth article [i, q. 103, art. 4] whether the effect of government is one or many? objection 1: it would seem that there is but one effect of the government of the world and not many. for the effect of government is that which is caused in the things governed. this is one, namely, the good which consists in order; as may be seen in the example of an army. therefore the government of the world has but one effect. obj. 2: further, from one there naturally proceeds but one. but the world is governed by one as we have proved (a. 3). therefore also the effect of this government is but one. obj. 3: further, if the effect of government is not one by reason of the unity of the governor, it must be many by reason of the many things governed. but these are too numerous to be counted. therefore we cannot assign any definite number to the effects of government. _on the contrary,_ dionysius says (div. nom. xii): "god contains all and fills all by his providence and perfect goodness." but government belongs to providence. therefore there are certain definite effects of the divine government. _i answer that,_ the effect of any action may be judged from its end; because it is by action that the attainment of the end is effected. now the end of the government of the world is the essential good, to the participation and similarity of which all things tend. consequently the effect of the government of the world may be taken in three ways. first, on the part of the end itself; and in this way there is but one effect, that is, assimilation to the supreme good. secondly, the effect of the government of the world may be considered on the part of those things by means of which the creature is made like to god. thus there are, in general, two effects of the government. for the creature is assimilated to god in two things; first, with regard to this, that god is good; and so the creature becomes like him by being good; and secondly, with regard to this, that god is the cause of goodness in others; and so the creature becomes like god by moving others to be good. wherefore there are two effects of government, the preservation of things in their goodness, and the moving of things to good. thirdly, we may consider in the individual the effects of the government of the world; and in this way they are without number. reply obj. 1: the order of the universe includes both the preservation of things created by god and their movement. as regards these two things we find order among them, inasmuch as one is better than another; and one is moved by another. from what has been said above, we can gather the replies to the other two objections. _______________________ fifth article [i, q. 103, art. 5] whether all things are subject to the divine government? objection 1: it would seem that not all things are subject to the divine government. for it is written (eccles. 9:11): "i saw that under the sun the race is not to the swift, nor the battle to the strong, nor bread to the wise, nor riches to the learned, nor favor to the skillful, but time and chance in all." but things subject to the divine government are not ruled by chance. therefore those things which are under the sun are not subject to the divine government. obj. 2: further, the apostle says (1 cor. 9:9): "god hath no care for oxen." but he that governs has care for the things he governs. therefore all things are not subject to the divine government. obj. 3: further, what can govern itself needs not to be governed by another. but the rational creature can govern itself; since it is master of its own act, and acts of itself; and is not made to act by another, which seems proper to things which are governed. therefore all things are not subject to the divine government. _on the contrary,_ augustine says (de civ. dei v, 11): "not only heaven and earth, not only man and angel, even the bowels of the lowest animal, even the wing of the bird, the flower of the plant, the leaf of the tree, hath god endowed with every fitting detail of their nature." therefore all things are subject to his government. _i answer that,_ for the same reason is god the ruler of things as he is their cause, because the same gives existence as gives perfection; and this belongs to government. now god is the cause not indeed only of some particular kind of being, but of the whole universal being, as proved above (q. 44, aa. 1, 2). wherefore, as there can be nothing which is not created by god, so there can be nothing which is not subject to his government. this can also be proved from the nature of the end of government. for a man's government extends over all those things which come under the end of his government. now the end of the divine government is the divine goodness; as we have shown (a. 2). wherefore, as there can be nothing that is not ordered to the divine goodness as its end, as is clear from what we have said above (q. 44, a. 4; q. 65, a. 2), so it is impossible for anything to escape from the divine government. foolish therefore was the opinion of those who said that the corruptible lower world, or individual things, or that even human affairs, were not subject to the divine government. these are represented as saying, "god hath abandoned the earth" (ezech. 9:9). reply obj. 1: these things are said to be under the sun which are generated and corrupted according to the sun's movement. in all such things we find chance: not that everything is casual which occurs in such things; but that in each one there is an element of chance. and the very fact that an element of chance is found in those things proves that they are subject to government of some kind. for unless corruptible things were governed by a higher being, they would tend to nothing definite, especially those which possess no kind of knowledge. so nothing would happen unintentionally; which constitutes the nature of chance. wherefore to show how things happen by chance and yet according to the ordering of a higher cause, he does not say absolutely that he observes chance in all things, but "time and chance," that is to say, that defects may be found in these things according to some order of time. reply obj. 2: government implies a certain change effected by the governor in the things governed. now every movement is the act of a movable thing, caused by the moving principle, as is laid down _phys._ iii, 3. and every act is proportionate to that of which it is an act. consequently, various movable things must be moved variously, even as regards movement by one and the same mover. thus by the one art of the divine governor, various things are variously governed according to their variety. some, according to their nature, act of themselves, having dominion over their actions; and these are governed by god, not only in this, that they are moved by god himself, who works in them interiorly; but also in this, that they are induced by him to do good and to fly from evil, by precepts and prohibitions, rewards and punishments. but irrational creatures which do not act but are acted upon, are not thus governed by god. hence, when the apostle says that "god hath no care for oxen," he does not wholly withdraw them from the divine government, but only as regards the way in which rational creatures are governed. reply obj. 3: the rational creature governs itself by its intellect and will, both of which require to be governed and perfected by the divine intellect and will. therefore above the government whereby the rational creature governs itself as master of its own act, it requires to be governed by god. _______________________ sixth article [i, q. 103, art. 6] whether all things are immediately governed by god? objection 1: it would seem that all things are governed by god immediately. for gregory of nyssa (nemesius, de nat. hom.) reproves the opinion of plato who divides providence into three parts. the first he ascribes to the supreme god, who watches over heavenly things and all universals; the second providence he attributes to the secondary deities, who go the round of the heavens to watch over generation and corruption; while he ascribes a third providence to certain spirits who are guardians on earth of human actions. therefore it seems that all things are immediately governed by god. obj. 2: further, it is better that a thing be done by one, if possible, than by many, as the philosopher says (phys. viii, 6). but god can by himself govern all things without any intermediary cause. therefore it seems that he governs all things immediately. obj. 3: further, in god nothing is defective or imperfect. but it seems to be imperfect in a ruler to govern by means of others; thus an earthly king, by reason of his not being able to do everything himself, and because he cannot be everywhere at the same time, requires to govern by means of ministers. therefore god governs all things immediately. _on the contrary,_ augustine says (de trin. iii, 4): "as the lower and grosser bodies are ruled in a certain orderly way by bodies of greater subtlety and power; so all bodies are ruled by the rational spirit of life; and the sinful and unfaithful spirit is ruled by the good and just spirit of life; and this spirit by god himself." _i answer that,_ in government there are two things to be considered; the design of government, which is providence itself; and the execution of the design. as to the design of government, god governs all things immediately; whereas in its execution, he governs some things by means of others. the reason of this is that as god is the very essence of goodness, so everything must be attributed to god in its highest degree of goodness. now the highest degree of goodness in any practical order, design or knowledge (and such is the design of government) consists in knowing the individuals acted upon; as the best physician is not the one who can only give his attention to general principles, but who can consider the least details; and so on in other things. therefore we must say that god has the design of the government of all things, even of the very least. but since things which are governed should be brought to perfection by government, this government will be so much the better in the degree the things governed are brought to perfection. now it is a greater perfection for a thing to be good in itself and also the cause of goodness in others, than only to be good in itself. therefore god so governs things that he makes some of them to be causes of others in government; as a master, who not only imparts knowledge to his pupils, but gives also the faculty of teaching others. reply obj. 1: plato's opinion is to be rejected, because he held that god did not govern all things immediately, even in the design of government; this is clear from the fact that he divided providence, which is the design of government, into three parts. reply obj. 2: if god governed alone, things would be deprived of the perfection of causality. wherefore all that is effected by many would not be accomplished by one. reply obj. 3: that an earthly king should have ministers to execute his laws is a sign not only of his being imperfect, but also of his dignity; because by the ordering of ministers the kingly power is brought into greater evidence. _______________________ seventh article [i, q. 103, art. 7] whether anything can happen outside the order of the divine government? objection 1: it would seem possible that something may occur outside the order of the divine government. for boethius says (de consol. iii) that "god disposes all for good." therefore, if nothing happens outside the order of the divine government, it would follow that no evil exists. obj. 2: further, nothing that is in accordance with the pre-ordination of a ruler occurs by chance. therefore, if nothing occurs outside the order of the divine government, it follows that there is nothing fortuitous and casual. obj. 3: further, the order of divine providence is certain and unchangeable; because it is in accordance with the eternal design. therefore, if nothing happens outside the order of the divine government, it follows that all things happen by necessity, and nothing is contingent; which is false. therefore it is possible for something to occur outside the order of the divine government. _on the contrary,_ it is written (esther 13:9): "o lord, lord, almighty king, all things are in thy power, and there is none that can resist thy will." _i answer that,_ it is possible for an effect to result outside the order of some particular cause; but not outside the order of the universal cause. the reason of this is that no effect results outside the order of a particular cause, except through some other impeding cause; which other cause must itself be reduced to the first universal cause; as indigestion may occur outside the order of the nutritive power by some such impediment as the coarseness of the food, which again is to be ascribed to some other cause, and so on till we come to the first universal cause. therefore as god is the first universal cause, not of one genus only, but of all being in general, it is impossible for anything to occur outside the order of the divine government; but from the very fact that from one point of view something seems to evade the order of divine providence considered in regard to one particular cause, it must necessarily come back to that order as regards some other cause. reply obj. 1: there is nothing wholly evil in the world, for evil is ever founded on good, as shown above (q. 48, a. 3). therefore something is said to be evil through its escaping from the order of some particular good. if it wholly escaped from the order of the divine government, it would wholly cease to exist. reply obj. 2: things are said to be fortuitous as regards some particular cause from the order of which they escape. but as to the order of divine providence, "nothing in the world happens by chance," as augustine declares (qq. 83, qu. 24). reply obj. 3: certain effects are said to be contingent as compared to their proximate causes, which may fail in their effects; and not as though anything could happen entirely outside the order of divine government. the very fact that something occurs outside the order of some proximate cause, is owing to some other cause, itself subject to the divine government. _______________________ eighth article [i, q. 103, art. 8] whether anything can resist the order of the divine government? objection 1: it would seem possible that some resistance can be made to the order of the divine government. for it is written (isa. 3:8): "their tongue and their devices are against the lord." obj. 2: further, a king does not justly punish those who do not rebel against his commands. therefore if no one rebelled against god's commands, no one would be justly punished by god. obj. 3: further, everything is subject to the order of the divine government. but some things oppose others. therefore some things rebel against the order of the divine government. _on the contrary,_ boethius says (de consol. iii): "there is nothing that can desire or is able to resist this sovereign good. it is this sovereign good therefore that ruleth all mightily and ordereth all sweetly," as is said (wis. 8) of divine wisdom. _i answer that,_ we may consider the order of divine providence in two ways: in general, inasmuch as it proceeds from the governing cause of all; and in particular, inasmuch as it proceeds from some particular cause which executes the order of the divine government. considered in the first way, nothing can resist the order of the divine government. this can be proved in two ways: firstly from the fact that the order of the divine government is wholly directed to good, and everything by its own operation and effort tends to good only, "for no one acts intending evil," as dionysius says (div. nom. iv): secondly from the fact that, as we have said above (a. 1, ad 3; a. 5, ad 2), every inclination of anything, whether natural or voluntary, is nothing but a kind of impression from the first mover; as the inclination of the arrow towards a fixed point is nothing but an impulse received from the archer. wherefore every agent, whether natural or free, attains to its divinely appointed end, as though of its own accord. for this reason god is said "to order all things sweetly." reply obj. 1: some are said to think or speak, or act against god: not that they entirely resist the order of the divine government; for even the sinner intends the attainment of a certain good: but because they resist some particular good, which belongs to their nature or state. therefore they are justly punished by god. reply obj. 2 is clear from the above. reply obj. 3: from the fact that one thing opposes another, it follows that some one thing can resist the order of a particular cause; but not that order which depends on the universal cause of all things. _______________________ question 104 the special effects of the divine government (in four articles) we next consider the effects of the divine government in particular; concerning which four points of inquiry arise: (1) whether creatures need to be kept in existence by god? (2) whether they are immediately preserved by god? (3) whether god can reduce anything to nothingness? (4) whether anything is reduced to nothingness? _______________________ first article [i, q. 104, art. 1] whether creatures need to be kept in being by god? objection 1: it would seem that creatures do not need to be kept in being by god. for what cannot not-be, does not need to be kept in being; just as that which cannot depart, does not need to be kept from departing. but some creatures by their very nature cannot not-be. therefore not all creatures need to be kept in being by god. the middle proposition is proved thus. that which is included in the nature of a thing is necessarily in that thing, and its contrary cannot be in it; thus a multiple of two must necessarily be even, and cannot possibly be an odd number. now form brings being with itself, because everything is actually in being, so far as it has form. but some creatures are subsistent forms, as we have said of the angels (q. 50, aa. 2, 5): and thus to be is in them of themselves. the same reasoning applies to those creatures whose matter is in potentiality to one form only, as above explained of heavenly bodies (q. 66, a. 2). therefore such creatures as these have in their nature to be necessarily, and cannot not-be; for there can be no potentiality to not-being, either in the form which has being of itself, or in matter existing under a form which it cannot lose, since it is not in potentiality to any other form. obj. 2: further, god is more powerful than any created agent. but a created agent, even after ceasing to act, can cause its effect to be preserved in being; thus the house continues to stand after the builder has ceased to build; and water remains hot for some time after the fire has ceased to heat. much more, therefore, can god cause his creature to be kept in being, after he has ceased to create it. obj. 3: further, nothing violent can occur, except there be some active cause thereof. but tendency to not-being is unnatural and violent to any creature, since all creatures naturally desire to be. therefore no creature can tend to not-being, except through some active cause of corruption. now there are creatures of such a nature that nothing can cause them to corrupt; such are spiritual substances and heavenly bodies. therefore such creatures cannot tend to not-being, even if god were to withdraw his action. obj. 4: further, if god keeps creatures in being, this is done by some action. now every action of an agent, if that action be efficacious, produces something in the effect. therefore the preserving power of god must produce something in the creature. but this is not so; because this action does not give being to the creature, since being is not given to that which already is: nor does it add anything new to the creature; because either god would not keep the creature in being continually, or he would be continually adding something new to the creature; either of which is unreasonable. therefore creatures are not kept in being by god. _on the contrary,_ it is written (heb. 1:3): "upholding all things by the word of his power." _i answer that,_ both reason and faith bind us to say that creatures are kept in being by god. to make this clear, we must consider that a thing is preserved by another in two ways. first, indirectly, and accidentally; thus a person is said to preserve anything by removing the cause of its corruption, as a man may be said to preserve a child, whom he guards from falling into the fire. in this way god preserves some things, but not all, for there are some things of such a nature that nothing can corrupt them, so that it is not necessary to keep them from corruption. secondly, a thing is said to preserve another _per se_ and directly, namely, when what is preserved depends on the preserver in such a way that it cannot exist without it. in this manner all creatures need to be preserved by god. for the being of every creature depends on god, so that not for a moment could it subsist, but would fall into nothingness were it not kept in being by the operation of the divine power, as gregory says (moral. xvi). this is made clear as follows: every effect depends on its cause, so far as it is its cause. but we must observe that an agent may be the cause of the _becoming_ of its effect, but not directly of its _being._ this may be seen both in artificial and in natural beings: for the builder causes the house in its _becoming,_ but he is not the direct cause of its _being._ for it is clear that the _being_ of the house is a result of its form, which consists in the putting together and arrangement of the materials, and results from the natural qualities of certain things. thus a cook dresses the food by applying the natural activity of fire; thus a builder constructs a house, by making use of cement, stones, and wood which are able to be put together in a certain order and to preserve it. therefore the _being_ of a house depends on the nature of these materials, just as its _becoming_ depends on the action of the builder. the same principle applies to natural things. for if an agent is not the cause of a form as such, neither will it be directly the cause of _being_ which results from that form; but it will be the cause of the effect, in its _becoming_ only. now it is clear that of two things in the same species one cannot directly cause the other's form as such, since it would then be the cause of its own form, which is essentially the same as the form of the other; but it can be the cause of this form for as much as it is in matter--in other words, it may be the cause that "this matter" receives _this form._ and this is to be the cause of _becoming,_ as when man begets man, and fire causes fire. thus whenever a natural effect is such that it has an aptitude to receive from its active cause an impression specifically the same as in that active cause, then the _becoming_ of the effect, but not its _being,_ depends on the agent. sometimes, however, the effect has not this aptitude to receive the impression of its cause, in the same way as it exists in the agent: as may be seen clearly in all agents which do not produce an effect of the same species as themselves: thus the heavenly bodies cause the generation of inferior bodies which differ from them in species. such an agent can be the cause of a form as such, and not merely as existing in this matter, consequently it is not merely the cause of _becoming_ but also the cause of _being._ therefore as the becoming of a thing cannot continue when that action of the agent ceases which causes the _becoming_ of the effect: so neither can the _being_ of a thing continue after that action of the agent has ceased, which is the cause of the effect not only in _becoming_ but also in _being._ this is why hot water retains heat after the cessation of the fire's action; while, on the contrary, the air does not continue to be lit up, even for a moment, when the sun ceases to act upon it, because water is a matter susceptive of the fire's heat in the same way as it exists in the fire. wherefore if it were to be reduced to the perfect form of fire, it would retain that form always; whereas if it has the form of fire imperfectly and inchoately, the heat will remain for a time only, by reason of the imperfect participation of the principle of heat. on the other hand, air is not of such a nature as to receive light in the same way as it exists in the sun, which is the principle of light. therefore, since it has not root in the air, the light ceases with the action of the sun. now every creature may be compared to god, as the air is to the sun which enlightens it. for as the sun possesses light by its nature, and as the air is enlightened by sharing the sun's nature; so god alone is being in virtue of his own essence, since his essence is his existence; whereas every creature has being by participation, so that its essence is not its existence. therefore, as augustine says (gen. ad lit. iv, 12): "if the ruling power of god were withdrawn from his creatures, their nature would at once cease, and all nature would collapse." in the same work (gen. ad lit. viii, 12) he says: "as the air becomes light by the presence of the sun, so is man enlightened by the presence of god, and in his absence returns at once to darkness." reply obj. 1: _being_ naturally results from the form of a creature, given the influence of the divine action; just as light results from the diaphanous nature of the air, given the action of the sun. wherefore the potentiality to not-being in spiritual creatures and heavenly bodies is rather something in god, who can withdraw his influence, than in the form or matter of those creatures. reply obj. 2: god cannot grant to a creature to be preserved in being after the cessation of the divine influence: as neither can he make it not to have received its being from himself. for the creature needs to be preserved by god in so far as the being of an effect depends on the cause of its being. so that there is no comparison with an agent that is not the cause of _being_ but only of _becoming._ reply obj. 3: this argument holds in regard to that preservation which consists in the removal of corruption: but all creatures do not need to be preserved thus, as stated above. reply obj. 4: the preservation of things by god is a continuation of that action whereby he gives existence, which action is without either motion or time; so also the preservation of light in the air is by the continual influence of the sun. _______________________ second article [i, q. 104, art. 2] whether god preserves every creature immediately? objection 1: it would seem that god preserves every creature immediately. for god creates and preserves things by the same action, as above stated (a. 1, ad 4). but god created all things immediately. therefore he preserves all things immediately. obj. 2: further, a thing is nearer to itself than to another. but it cannot be given to a creature to preserve itself; much less therefore can it be given to a creature to preserve another. therefore god preserves all things without any intermediate cause preserving them. obj. 3: further, an effect is kept in being by the cause, not only of its _becoming,_ but also of its being. but all created causes do not seem to cause their effects except in their _becoming,_ for they cause only by moving, as above stated (q. 45, a. 3). therefore they do not cause so as to keep their effects in being. _on the contrary,_ a thing is kept in being by that which gives it being. but god gives being by means of certain intermediate causes. therefore he also keeps things in being by means of certain causes. _i answer that,_ as stated above (a. 1), a thing keeps another in being in two ways; first, indirectly and accidentally, by removing or hindering the action of a corrupting cause; secondly, directly and _per se,_ by the fact that that on it depends the other's being, as the being of the effect depends on the cause. and in both ways a created thing keeps another in being. for it is clear that even in corporeal things there are many causes which hinder the action of corrupting agents, and for that reason are called preservatives; just as salt preserves meat from putrefaction; and in like manner with many other things. it happens also that an effect depends on a creature as to its being. for when we have a series of causes depending on one another, it necessarily follows that, while the effect depends first and principally on the first cause, it also depends in a secondary way on all the middle causes. therefore the first cause is the principal cause of the preservation of the effect which is to be referred to the middle causes in a secondary way; and all the more so, as the middle cause is higher and nearer to the first cause. for this reason, even in things corporeal, the preservation and continuation of things is ascribed to the higher causes: thus the philosopher says (metaph. xii, did. xi, 6), that the first, namely the diurnal movement is the cause of the continuation of things generated; whereas the second movement, which is from the zodiac, is the cause of diversity owing to generation and corruption. in like manner astrologers ascribe to saturn, the highest of the planets, those things which are permanent and fixed. so we conclude that god keeps certain things in being, by means of certain causes. reply obj. 1: god created all things immediately, but in the creation itself he established an order among things, so that some depend on others, by which they are preserved in being, though he remains the principal cause of their preservation. reply obj. 2: since an effect is preserved by its proper cause on which it depends; just as no effect can be its own cause, but can only produce another effect, so no effect can be endowed with the power of self-preservation, but only with the power of preserving another. reply obj. 3: no created nature can be the cause of another, as regards the latter acquiring a new form, or disposition, except by virtue of some change; for the created nature acts always on something presupposed. but after causing the form or disposition in the effect, without any fresh change in the effect, the cause preserves that form or disposition; as in the air, when it is lit up anew, we must allow some change to have taken place, while the preservation of the light is without any further change in the air due to the presence of the source of light. _______________________ third article [i, q. 104, art. 3] whether god can annihilate anything? objection 1: it would seem that god cannot annihilate anything. for augustine says (qq. 83, qu. 21) that "god is not the cause of anything tending to non-existence." but he would be such a cause if he were to annihilate anything. therefore he cannot annihilate anything. obj. 2: further, by his goodness god is the cause why things exist, since, as augustine says (de doctr. christ. i, 32): "because god is good, we exist." but god cannot cease to be good. therefore he cannot cause things to cease to exist; which would be the case were he to annihilate anything. obj. 3: further, if god were to annihilate anything it would be by his action. but this cannot be; because the term of every action is existence. hence even the action of a corrupting cause has its term in something generated; for when one thing is generated another undergoes corruption. therefore god cannot annihilate anything. _on the contrary,_ it is written (jer. 10:24): "correct me, o lord, but yet with judgment; and not in thy fury, lest thou bring me to nothing." _i answer that,_ some have held that god, in giving existence to creatures, acted from natural necessity. were this true, god could not annihilate anything, since his nature cannot change. but, as we have said above (q. 19, a. 4), such an opinion is entirely false, and absolutely contrary to the catholic faith, which confesses that god created things of his own free-will, according to ps. 134:6: "whatsoever the lord pleased, he hath done." therefore that god gives existence to a creature depends on his will; nor does he preserve things in existence otherwise than by continually pouring out existence into them, as we have said. therefore, just as before things existed, god was free not to give them existence, and not to make them; so after they are made, he is free not to continue their existence; and thus they would cease to exist; and this would be to annihilate them. reply obj. 1: non-existence has no direct cause; for nothing is a cause except inasmuch as it has existence, and a being essentially as such is a cause of something existing. therefore god cannot cause a thing to tend to non-existence, whereas a creature has this tendency of itself, since it is produced from nothing. but indirectly god can be the cause of things being reduced to non-existence, by withdrawing his action therefrom. reply obj. 2: god's goodness is the cause of things, not as though by natural necessity, because the divine goodness does not depend on creatures; but by his free-will. wherefore, as without prejudice to his goodness, he might not have produced things into existence, so, without prejudice to his goodness, he might not preserve things in existence. reply obj. 3: if god were to annihilate anything, this would not imply an action on god's part; but a mere cessation of his action. _______________________ fourth article [i, q. 104, art. 4] whether anything is annihilated? objection 1: it would seem that something is annihilated. for the end corresponds to the beginning. but in the beginning there was nothing but god. therefore all things must tend to this end, that there shall be nothing but god. therefore creatures will be reduced to nothing. obj. 2: further, every creature has a finite power. but no finite power extends to the infinite. wherefore the philosopher proves (phys. viii, 10) that, "a finite power cannot move in infinite time." therefore a creature cannot last for an infinite duration; and so at some time it will be reduced to nothing. obj. 3: further, forms and accidents have no matter as part of themselves. but at some time they cease to exist. therefore they are reduced to nothing. _on the contrary,_ it is written (eccles. 3:14): "i have learned that all the works that god hath made continue for ever." _i answer that,_ some of those things which god does in creatures occur in accordance with the natural course of things; others happen miraculously, and not in accordance with the natural order, as will be explained (q. 105, a. 6). now whatever god wills to do according to the natural order of things may be observed from their nature; but those things which occur miraculously, are ordered for the manifestation of grace, according to the apostle, "to each one is given the manifestation of the spirit, unto profit" (1 cor. 12:7); and subsequently he mentions, among others, the working of miracles. now the nature of creatures shows that none of them is annihilated. for, either they are immaterial, and therefore have no potentiality to non-existence; or they are material, and then they continue to exist, at least in matter, which is incorruptible, since it is the subject of generation and corruption. moreover, the annihilation of things does not pertain to the manifestation of grace; since rather the power and goodness of god are manifested by the preservation of things in existence. wherefore we must conclude by denying absolutely that anything at all will be annihilated. reply obj. 1: that things are brought into existence from a state of non-existence, clearly shows the power of him who made them; but that they should be reduced to nothing would hinder that manifestation, since the power of god is conspicuously shown in his preserving all things in existence, according to the apostle: "upholding all things by the word of his power" (heb. 1:3). reply obj. 2: a creature's potentiality to existence is merely receptive; the active power belongs to god himself, from whom existence is derived. wherefore the infinite duration of things is a consequence of the infinity of the divine power. to some things, however, is given a determinate power of duration for a certain time, so far as they may be hindered by some contrary agent from receiving the influx of existence which comes from him whom finite power cannot resist, for an infinite, but only for a fixed time. so things which have no contrary, although they have a finite power, continue to exist for ever. reply obj. 3: forms and accidents are not complete beings, since they do not subsist: but each one of them is something "of a being"; for it is called a being, because something is by it. yet so far as their mode of existence is concerned, they are not entirely reduced to nothingness; not that any part of them survives, but that they remain in the potentiality of the matter, or of the subject. _______________________ question 105 of the change of creatures by god (in eight articles) we now consider the second effect of the divine government, i.e. the change of creatures; and first, the change of creatures by god; secondly, the change of one creature by another. under the first head there are eight points of inquiry: (1) whether god can move immediately the matter to the form? (2) whether he can immediately move a body? (3) whether he can move the intellect? (4) whether he can move the will? (5) whether god works in every worker? (6) whether he can do anything outside the order imposed on things? (7) whether all that god does is miraculous? (8) of the diversity of miracles. _______________________ first article [i, q. 105, art. 1] whether god can move the matter immediately to the form? objection 1: it would seem that god cannot move the matter immediately to receive the form. for as the philosopher proves (metaph. vii, did. vi, 8), nothing can bring a form into any particular matter, except that form which is in matter; because, like begets like. but god is not a form in matter. therefore he cannot cause a form in matter. obj. 2: further, any agent inclined to several effects will produce none of them, unless it is determined to a particular one by some other cause; for, as the philosopher says (de anima iii, 11), a general assertion does not move the mind, except by means of some particular apprehension. but the divine power is the universal cause of all things. therefore it cannot produce any particular form, except by means of a particular agent. obj. 3: as universal being depends on the first universal cause, so determinate being depends on determinate particular causes; as we have seen above (q. 104, a. 2). but the determinate being of a particular thing is from its own form. therefore the forms of things are produced by god, only by means of particular causes. _on the contrary,_ it is written (gen. 2:7): "god formed man of the slime of the earth." _i answer that,_ god can move matter immediately to form; because whatever is in passive potentiality can be reduced to act by the active power which extends over that potentiality. therefore, since the divine power extends over matter, as produced by god, it can be reduced to act by the divine power: and this is what is meant by matter being moved to a form; for a form is nothing else but the act of matter. reply obj. 1: an effect is assimilated to the active cause in two ways. first, according to the same species; as man is generated by man, and fire by fire. secondly, by being virtually contained in the cause; as the form of the effect is virtually contained in its cause: thus animals produced by putrefaction, and plants, and minerals are like the sun and stars, by whose power they are produced. in this way the effect is like its active cause as regards all that over which the power of that cause extends. now the power of god extends to both matter and form; as we have said above (q. 14, a. 2; q. 44, a. 2); wherefore if a composite thing be produced, it is likened to god by way of a virtual inclusion; or it is likened to the composite generator by a likeness of species. therefore just as the composite generator can move matter to a form by generating a composite thing like itself; so also can god. but no other form not existing in matter can do this; because the power of no other separate substance extends over matter. hence angels and demons operate on visible matter; not by imprinting forms in matter, but by making use of corporeal seeds. reply obj. 2: this argument would hold if god were to act of natural necessity. but since he acts by his will and intellect, which knows the particular and not only the universal natures of all forms, it follows that he can determinately imprint this or that form on matter. reply obj. 3: the fact that secondary causes are ordered to determinate effects is due to god; wherefore since god ordains other causes to certain effects he can also produce certain effects by himself without any other cause. _______________________ second article [i, q. 105, art. 2] whether god can move a body immediately? objection 1: it would seem that god cannot move a body immediately. for as the mover and the moved must exist simultaneously, as the philosopher says (phys. vii, 2), it follows that there must be some contact between the mover and moved. but there can be no contact between god and a body; for dionysius says (div. nom. 1): "there is no contact with god." therefore god cannot move a body immediately. obj. 2: further, god is the mover unmoved. but such also is the desirable object when apprehended. therefore god moves as the object of desire and apprehension. but he cannot be apprehended except by the intellect, which is neither a body nor a corporeal power. therefore god cannot move a body immediately. obj. 3: further, the philosopher proves (phys. viii, 10) that an infinite power moves instantaneously. but it is impossible for a body to be moved in one instant; for since every movement is between opposites, it follows that two opposites would exist at once in the same subject, which is impossible. therefore a body cannot be moved immediately by an infinite power. but god's power is infinite, as we have explained (q. 25, a. 2). therefore god cannot move a body immediately. _on the contrary,_ god produced the works of the six days immediately among which is included the movements of bodies, as is clear from gen. 1:9 "let the waters be gathered together into one place." therefore god alone can move a body immediately. _i answer that,_ it is erroneous to say that god cannot himself produce all the determinate effects which are produced by any created cause. wherefore, since bodies are moved immediately by created causes, we cannot possibly doubt that god can move immediately any bodies whatever. this indeed follows from what is above stated (a. 1). for every movement of any body whatever, either results from a form, as the movements of things heavy and light result from the form which they have from their generating cause, for which reason the generator is called the mover; or else tends to a form, as heating tends to the form of heat. now it belongs to the same cause, to imprint a form, to dispose to that form, and to give the movement which results from that form; for fire not only generates fire, but it also heats and moves things upwards. therefore, as god can imprint form immediately in matter, it follows that he can move any body whatever in respect of any movement whatever. reply obj. 1: there are two kinds of contact; corporeal contact, when two bodies touch each other; and virtual contact, as the cause of sadness is said to touch the one made sad. according to the first kind of contact, god, as being incorporeal, neither touches, nor is touched; but according to virtual contact he touches creatures by moving them; but he is not touched, because the natural power of no creature can reach up to him. thus did dionysius understand the words, "there is no contact with god"; that is, so that god himself be touched. reply obj. 2: god moves as the object of desire and apprehension; but it does not follow that he always moves as being desired and apprehended by that which is moved; but as being desired and known by himself; for he does all things for his own goodness. reply obj. 3: the philosopher (phys. viii, 10) intends to prove that the power of the first mover is not a power of the first mover _of bulk,_ by the following argument. the power of the first mover is infinite (which he proves from the fact that the first mover can move in infinite time). now an infinite power, if it were a power _of bulk,_ would move without time, which is impossible; therefore the infinite power of the first mover must be in something which is not measured by its bulk. whence it is clear that for a body to be moved without time can only be the result of an infinite power. the reason is that every power of bulk moves in its entirety; since it moves by the necessity of its nature. but an infinite power surpasses out of all proportion any finite power. now the greater the power of the mover, the greater is the velocity of the movement. therefore, since a finite power moves in a determinate time, it follows that an infinite power does not move in any time; for between one time and any other time there is some proportion. on the other hand, a power which is not in bulk is the power of an intelligent being, which operates in its effects according to what is fitting to them; and therefore, since it cannot be fitting for a body to be moved without time, it does not follow that it moves without time. _______________________ third article [i, q. 105, art. 3] whether god moves the created intellect immediately? objection 1: it would seem that god does not immediately move the created intellect. for the action of the intellect is governed by its own subject; since it does not pass into external matter; as stated in _metaph._ ix, did. viii, 8. but the action of what is moved by another does not proceed from that wherein it is; but from the mover. therefore the intellect is not moved by another; and so apparently god cannot move the created intellect. obj. 2: further, anything which in itself is a sufficient principle of movement, is not moved by another. but the movement of the intellect is its act of understanding; in the sense in which we say that to understand or to feel is a kind of movement, as the philosopher says (de anima iii, 7). but the intellectual light which is natural to the soul, is a sufficient principle of understanding. therefore it is not moved by another. obj. 3: further, as the senses are moved by the sensible, so the intellect is moved by the intelligible. but god is not intelligible to us, and exceeds the capacity of our intellect. therefore god cannot move our intellect. _on the contrary,_ the teacher moves the intellect of the one taught. but it is written (ps. 93:10) that god "teaches man knowledge." therefore god moves the human intellect. _i answer that,_ as in corporeal movement that is called the mover which gives the form that is the principle of movement, so that is said to move the intellect, which is the cause of the form that is the principle of the intellectual operation, called the movement of the intellect. now there is a twofold principle of intellectual operation in the intelligent being; one which is the intellectual power itself, which principle exists in the one who understands in potentiality; while the other is the principle of actual understanding, namely, the likeness of the thing understood in the one who understands. so a thing is said to move the intellect, whether it gives to him who understands the power of understanding; or impresses on him the likeness of the thing understood. now god moves the created intellect in both ways. for he is the first immaterial being; and as intellectuality is a result of immateriality, it follows that he is the first intelligent being. therefore since in each order the first is the cause of all that follows, we must conclude that from him proceeds all intellectual power. in like manner, since he is the first being, and all other beings pre-exist in him as in their first cause, it follows that they exist intelligibly in him, after the mode of his own nature. for as the intelligible types of everything exist first of all in god, and are derived from him by other intellects in order that these may actually understand; so also are they derived by creatures that they may subsist. therefore god so moves the created intellect, inasmuch as he gives it the intellectual power, whether natural, or superadded; and impresses on the created intellect the intelligible species, and maintains and preserves both power and species in existence. reply obj. 1: the intellectual operation is performed by the intellect in which it exists, as by a secondary cause; but it proceeds from god as from its first cause. for by him the power to understand is given to the one who understands. reply obj. 2: the intellectual light together with the likeness of the thing understood is a sufficient principle of understanding; but it is a secondary principle, and depends upon the first principle. reply obj. 3: the intelligible object moves our human intellect, so far as, in a way, it impresses on it its own likeness, by means of which the intellect is able to understand it. but the likenesses which god impresses on the created intellect are not sufficient to enable the created intellect to understand him through his essence, as we have seen above (q. 12, a. 2; q. 56, a. 3). hence he moves the created intellect, and yet he cannot be intelligible to it, as we have explained (q. 12, a. 4). _______________________ fourth article [i, q. 105, art. 4] whether god can move the created will? objection 1: it would seem that god cannot move the created will. for whatever is moved from without, is forced. but the will cannot be forced. therefore it is not moved from without; and therefore cannot be moved by god. obj. 2: further, god cannot make two contradictories to be true at the same time. but this would follow if he moved the will; for to be voluntarily moved means to be moved from within, and not by another. therefore god cannot move the will. obj. 3: further, movement is attributed to the mover rather than to the one moved; wherefore homicide is not ascribed to the stone, but to the thrower. therefore, if god moves the will, it follows that voluntary actions are not imputed to man for reward or blame. but this is false. therefore god does not move the will. _on the contrary,_ it is written (phil. 2:13): "it is god who worketh in us [vulgate--'you'] both to will and to accomplish." _i answer that,_ as the intellect is moved by the object and by the giver of the power of intelligence, as stated above (a. 3), so is the will moved by its object, which is good, and by him who creates the power of willing. now the will can be moved by good as its object, but by god alone sufficiently and efficaciously. for nothing can move a movable thing sufficiently unless the active power of the mover surpasses or at least equals the potentiality of the thing movable. now the potentiality of the will extends to the universal good; for its object is the universal good; just as the object of the intellect is the universal being. but every created good is some particular good; god alone is the universal good. whereas he alone fills the capacity of the will, and moves it sufficiently as its object. in like manner the power of willing is caused by god alone. for to will is nothing but to be inclined towards the object of the will, which is universal good. but to incline towards the universal good belongs to the first mover, to whom the ultimate end is proportionate; just as in human affairs to him that presides over the community belongs the directing of his subjects to the common weal. wherefore in both ways it belongs to god to move the will; but especially in the second way by an interior inclination of the will. reply obj. 1: a thing moved by another is forced if moved against its natural inclination; but if it is moved by another giving to it the proper natural inclination, it is not forced; as when a heavy body is made to move downwards by that which produced it, then it is not forced. in like manner god, while moving the will, does not force it, because he gives the will its own natural inclination. reply obj. 2: to be moved voluntarily, is to be moved from within, that is, by an interior principle: yet this interior principle may be caused by an exterior principle; and so to be moved from within is not repugnant to being moved by another. reply obj. 3: if the will were so moved by another as in no way to be moved from within itself, the act of the will would not be imputed for reward or blame. but since its being moved by another does not prevent its being moved from within itself, as we have stated (ad 2), it does not thereby forfeit the motive for merit or demerit. _______________________ fifth article [i, q. 105, art. 5] whether god works in every agent? objection 1: it would seem that god does not work in every agent. for we must not attribute any insufficiency to god. if therefore god works in every agent, he works sufficiently in each one. hence it would be superfluous for the created agent to work at all. obj. 2: further, the same work cannot proceed at the same time from two sources; as neither can one and the same movement belong to two movable things. therefore if the creature's operation is from god operating in the creature, it cannot at the same time proceed from the creature; and so no creature works at all. obj. 3: further, the maker is the cause of the operation of the thing made, as giving it the form whereby it operates. therefore, if god is the cause of the operation of things made by him, this would be inasmuch as he gives them the power of operating. but this is in the beginning, when he makes them. thus it seems that god does not operate any further in the operating creature. _on the contrary,_ it is written (isa. 26:12): "lord, thou hast wrought all our works in [vulg.: 'for'] us." _i answer that,_ some have understood god to work in every agent in such a way that no created power has any effect in things, but that god alone is the ultimate cause of everything wrought; for instance, that it is not fire that gives heat, but god in the fire, and so forth. but this is impossible. first, because the order of cause and effect would be taken away from created things: and this would imply lack of power in the creator: for it is due to the power of the cause, that it bestows active power on its effect. secondly, because the active powers which are seen to exist in things, would be bestowed on things to no purpose, if these wrought nothing through them. indeed, all things created would seem, in a way, to be purposeless, if they lacked an operation proper to them; since the purpose of everything is its operation. for the less perfect is always for the sake of the more perfect: and consequently as the matter is for the sake of the form, so the form which is the first act, is for the sake of its operation, which is the second act; and thus operation is the end of the creature. we must therefore understand that god works in things in such a manner that things have their proper operation. in order to make this clear, we must observe that as there are few kinds of causes; matter is not a principle of action, but is the subject that receives the effect of action. on the other hand, the end, the agent, and the form are principles of action, but in a certain order. for the first principle of action is the end which moves the agent; the second is the agent; the third is the form of that which the agent applies to action (although the agent also acts through its own form); as may be clearly seen in things made by art. for the craftsman is moved to action by the end, which is the thing wrought, for instance a chest or a bed; and applies to action the axe which cuts through its being sharp. thus then does god work in every worker, according to these three things. first as an end. for since every operation is for the sake of some good, real or apparent; and nothing is good either really or apparently, except in as far as it participates in a likeness to the supreme good, which is god; it follows that god himself is the cause of every operation as its end. again it is to be observed that where there are several agents in order, the second always acts in virtue of the first; for the first agent moves the second to act. and thus all agents act in virtue of god himself: and therefore he is the cause of action in every agent. thirdly, we must observe that god not only moves things to operate, as it were applying their forms and powers to operation, just as the workman applies the axe to cut, who nevertheless at times does not give the axe its form; but he also gives created agents their forms and preserves them in being. therefore he is the cause of action not only by giving the form which is the principle of action, as the generator is said to be the cause of movement in things heavy and light; but also as preserving the forms and powers of things; just as the sun is said to be the cause of the manifestation of colors, inasmuch as it gives and preserves the light by which colors are made manifest. and since the form of a thing is within the thing, and all the more, as it approaches nearer to the first and universal cause; and because in all things god himself is properly the cause of universal being which is innermost in all things; it follows that in all things god works intimately. for this reason in holy scripture the operations of nature are attributed to god as operating in nature, according to job 10:11: "thou hast clothed me with skin and flesh: thou hast put me together with bones and sinews." reply obj. 1: god works sufficiently in things as first agent, but it does not follow from this that the operation of secondary agents is superfluous. reply obj. 2: one action does not proceed from two agents of the same order. but nothing hinders the same action from proceeding from a primary and a secondary agent. reply obj. 3: god not only gives things their form, but he also preserves them in existence, and applies them to act, and is moreover the end of every action, as above explained. _______________________ sixth article [i, q. 105, art. 6] whether god can do anything outside the established order of nature? objection 1: it would seem that god cannot do anything outside the established order of nature. for augustine (contra faust. xxvi, 3) says: "god the maker and creator of each nature, does nothing against nature." but that which is outside the natural order seems to be against nature. therefore god can do nothing outside the natural order. obj. 2: further, as the order of justice is from god, so is the order of nature. but god cannot do anything outside the order of justice; for then he would do something unjust. therefore he cannot do anything outside the order of nature. obj. 3: further, god established the order of nature. therefore it god does anything outside the order of nature, it would seem that he is changeable; which cannot be said. _on the contrary,_ augustine says (contra faust. xxvi, 3): "god sometimes does things which are contrary to the ordinary course of nature." _i answer that,_ from each cause there results a certain order to its effects, since every cause is a principle; and so, according to the multiplicity of causes, there results a multiplicity of orders, subjected one to the other, as cause is subjected to cause. wherefore a higher cause is not subjected to a cause of a lower order; but conversely. an example of this may be seen in human affairs. on the father of a family depends the order of the household; which order is contained in the order of the city; which order again depends on the ruler of the city; while this last order depends on that of the king, by whom the whole kingdom is ordered. if therefore we consider the order of things depending on the first cause, god cannot do anything against this order; for, if he did so, he would act against his foreknowledge, or his will, or his goodness. but if we consider the order of things depending on any secondary cause, thus god can do something outside such order; for he is not subject to the order of secondary causes; but, on the contrary, this order is subject to him, as proceeding from him, not by a natural necessity, but by the choice of his own will; for he could have created another order of things. wherefore god can do something outside this order created by him, when he chooses, for instance by producing the effects of secondary causes without them, or by producing certain effects to which secondary causes do not extend. so augustine says (contra faust. xxvi, 3): "god acts against the wonted course of nature, but by no means does he act against the supreme law; because he does not act against himself." reply obj. 1: in natural things something may happen outside this natural order, in two ways. it may happen by the action of an agent which did not give them their natural inclination; as, for example, when a man moves a heavy body upwards, which does not owe to him its natural inclination to move downwards; and that would be against nature. it may also happen by the action of the agent on whom the natural inclination depends; and this is not against nature, as is clear in the ebb and flow of the tide, which is not against nature; although it is against the natural movement of water in a downward direction; for it is owing to the influence of a heavenly body, on which the natural inclination of lower bodies depends. therefore since the order of nature is given to things by god; if he does anything outside this order, it is not against nature. wherefore augustine says (contra faust. xxvi, 3): "that is natural to each thing which is caused by him from whom is all mode, number, and order in nature." reply obj. 2: the order of justice arises by relation to the first cause, who is the rule of all justice; and therefore god can do nothing against such order. reply obj. 3: god fixed a certain order in things in such a way that at the same time he reserved to himself whatever he intended to do otherwise than by a particular cause. so when he acts outside this order, he does not change. _______________________ seventh article [i, q. 105, art. 7] whether whatever god does outside the natural order is miraculous? objection 1: it would seem that not everything which god does outside the natural order of things, is miraculous. for the creation of the world, and of souls, and the justification of the unrighteous, are done by god outside the natural order; as not being accomplished by the action of any natural cause. yet these things are not called miracles. therefore not everything that god does outside the natural order is a miracle. obj. 2: further, a miracle is "something difficult, which seldom occurs, surpassing the faculty of nature, and going so far beyond our hopes as to compel our astonishment" [*st. augustine, de utilitate credendi xvi.]. but some things outside the order of nature are not arduous; for they occur in small things, such as the recovery and healing of the sick. nor are they of rare occurrence, since they happen frequently; as when the sick were placed in the streets, to be healed by the shadow of peter (acts 5:15). nor do they surpass the faculty of nature; as when people are cured of a fever. nor are they beyond our hopes, since we all hope for the resurrection of the dead, which nevertheless will be outside the course of nature. therefore not all things are outside the course of nature are miraculous. obj. 3: further, the word miracle is derived from admiration. now admiration concerns things manifest to the senses. but sometimes things happen outside the order of nature, which are not manifest to the senses; as when the apostles were endowed with knowledge without studying or being taught. therefore not everything that occurs outside the order of nature is miraculous. _on the contrary,_ augustine says (contra faust. xxvi, 3): "where god does anything against that order of nature which we know and are accustomed to observe, we call it a miracle." _i answer that,_ the word miracle is derived from admiration, which arises when an effect is manifest, whereas its cause is hidden; as when a man sees an eclipse without knowing its cause, as the philosopher says in the beginning of his _metaphysics._ now the cause of a manifest effect may be known to one, but unknown to others. wherefore a thing is wonderful to one man, and not at all to others: as an eclipse is to a rustic, but not to an astronomer. now a miracle is so called as being full of wonder; as having a cause absolutely hidden from all: and this cause is god. wherefore those things which god does outside those causes which we know, are called miracles. reply obj. 1: creation, and the justification of the unrighteous, though done by god alone, are not, properly speaking, miracles, because they are not of a nature to proceed from any other cause; so they do not occur outside the order of nature, since they do not belong to that order. reply obj. 2: an arduous thing is called a miracle, not on account of the excellence of the thing wherein it is done, but because it surpasses the faculty of nature: likewise a thing is called unusual, not because it does not often happen, but because it is outside the usual natural course of things. furthermore, a thing is said to be above the faculty of nature, not only by reason of the substance of the thing done, but also on account of the manner and order in which it is done. again, a miracle is said to go beyond the hope "of nature," not above the hope "of grace," which hope comes from faith, whereby we believe in the future resurrection. reply obj. 3: the knowledge of the apostles, although not manifest in itself, yet was made manifest in its effect, from which it was shown to be wonderful. _______________________ eighth article [i, q. 105, art. 8] whether one miracle is greater than another? objection 1: it would seem that one miracle is not greater than another. for augustine says (epist. ad volusian. cxxxvii): "in miraculous deeds, the whole measure of the deed is the power of the doer." but by the same power of god all miracles are done. therefore one miracle is not greater than another. obj. 2: further, the power of god is infinite. but the infinite exceeds the finite beyond all proportion; and therefore no more reason exists to wonder at one effect thereof than at another. therefore one miracle is not greater than another. _on the contrary,_ the lord says, speaking of miraculous works (john 14:12): "the works that i do, he also shall do, and greater than these shall he do." _i answer that,_ nothing is called a miracle by comparison with the divine power; because no action is of any account compared with the power of god, according to isa. 40:15: "behold the gentiles are as a drop from a bucket, and are counted as the smallest grain of a balance." but a thing is called a miracle by comparison with the power of nature which it surpasses. so the more the power of nature is surpassed, the greater the miracle. now the power of nature is surpassed in three ways: firstly, in the substance of the deed, for instance, if two bodies occupy the same place, or if the sun goes backwards; or if a human body is glorified: such things nature is absolutely unable to do; and these hold the highest rank among miracles. secondly, a thing surpasses the power of nature, not in the deed, but in that wherein it is done; as the raising of the dead, and giving sight to the blind, and the like; for nature can give life, but not to the dead; and such hold the second rank in miracles. thirdly, a thing surpasses nature's power in the measure and order in which it is done; as when a man is cured of a fever suddenly, without treatment or the usual process of nature; or as when the air is suddenly condensed into rain, by divine power without a natural cause, as occurred at the prayers of samuel and elias; and these hold the lowest place in miracles. moreover, each of these kinds has various degrees, according to the different ways in which the power of nature is surpassed. from this is clear how to reply to the objections, arguing as they do from the divine power. _______________________ question 106 how one creature moves another (in four articles) we next consider how one creature moves another. this consideration will be threefold: (1) how the angels move, who are purely spiritual creatures; (2) how bodies move; (3) how man moves, who is composed of a spiritual and a corporeal nature. concerning the first point, there are three things to be considered: (1) how an angel acts on an angel; (2) how an angel acts on a corporeal nature; (3) how an angel acts on man. the first of these raises the question of the enlightenment and speech of the angels; and of their mutual coordination, both of the good and of the bad angels. concerning their enlightenment there are four points of inquiry: (1) whether one angel moves the intellect of another by enlightenment? (2) whether one angel moves the will of another? (3) whether an inferior angel can enlighten a superior angel? (4) whether a superior angel enlightens an inferior angel in all that he knows himself? _______________________ first article [i, q. 106, art. 1] whether one angel enlightens another? objection 1: it would seem that one angel does not enlighten another. for the angels possess now the same beatitude which we hope to obtain. but one man will not then enlighten another, according to jer. 31:34: "they shall teach no more every man his neighbor, and every man his brother." therefore neither does an angel enlighten another now. obj. 2: further, light in the angels is threefold; of nature, of grace, and of glory. but an angel is enlightened in the light of nature by the creator; in the light of grace by the justifier; in the light of glory by the beatifier; all of which comes from god. therefore one angel does not enlighten another. obj. 3: further, light is a form in the mind. but the rational mind is "informed by god alone, without created intervention," as augustine says (qq. 83, qu. 51). therefore one angel does not enlighten the mind of another. _on the contrary,_ dionysius says (coel. hier. viii) that "the angels of the second hierarchy are cleansed, enlightened and perfected by the angels of the first hierarchy." _i answer that,_ one angel enlightens another. to make this clear, we must observe that intellectual light is nothing else than a manifestation of truth, according to eph. 5:13: "all that is made manifest is light." hence to enlighten means nothing else but to communicate to others the manifestation of the known truth; according to the apostle (eph. 3:8): "to me the least of all the saints is given this grace . . . to enlighten all men, that they may see what is the dispensation of the mystery which hath been hidden from eternity in god." therefore one angel is said to enlighten another by manifesting the truth which he knows himself. hence dionysius says (coel. hier. vii): "theologians plainly show that the orders of the heavenly beings are taught divine science by the higher minds." now since two things concur in the intellectual operation, as we have said (q. 105, a. 3), namely, the intellectual power, and the likeness of the thing understood; in both of these one angel can notify the known truth to another. first, by strengthening his intellectual power; for just as the power of an imperfect body is strengthened by the neighborhood of a more perfect body--for instance, the less hot is made hotter by the presence of what is hotter; so the intellectual power of an inferior angel is strengthened by the superior angel turning to him: since in spiritual things, for one thing to turn to another, corresponds to neighborhood in corporeal things. secondly, one angel manifests the truth to another as regards the likeness of the thing understood. for the superior angel receives the knowledge of truth by a kind of universal conception, to receive which the inferior angel's intellect is not sufficiently powerful, for it is natural to him to receive truth in a more particular manner. therefore the superior angel distinguishes, in a way, the truth which he conceives universally, so that it can be grasped by the inferior angel; and thus he proposes it to his knowledge. thus it is with us that the teacher, in order to adapt himself to others, divides into many points the knowledge which he possesses in the universal. this is thus expressed by dionysius (coel. hier. xv): "every intellectual substance with provident power divides and multiplies the uniform knowledge bestowed on it by one nearer to god, so as to lead its inferiors upwards by analogy." reply obj. 1: all the angels, both inferior and superior, see the essence of god immediately, and in this respect one does not teach another. it is of this truth that the prophet speaks; wherefore he adds: "they shall teach no more every man his brother, saying: 'know the lord': for all shall know me, from the least of them even to the greatest." but all the types of the divine works, which are known in god as in their cause, god knows in himself, because he comprehends himself; but of others who see god, each one knows the more types, the more perfectly he sees god. hence a superior angel knows more about the types of the divine works than an inferior angel, and concerning these the former enlightens the latter; and as to this dionysius says (div. nom. iv) that the angels "are enlightened by the types of existing things." reply obj. 2: an angel does not enlighten another by giving him the light of nature, grace, or glory; but by strengthening his natural light, and by manifesting to him the truth concerning the state of nature, of grace, and of glory, as explained above. reply obj. 3: the rational mind is formed immediately by god, either as the image from the exemplar, forasmuch as it is made to the image of god alone; or as the subject by the ultimate perfecting form: for the created mind is always considered to be unformed, except it adhere to the first truth; while the other kinds of enlightenment that proceed from man or angel, are, as it were, dispositions to this ultimate form. _______________________ second article [i, q. 106, art. 2] whether one angel moves another angel's will? objection 1: it would seem that one angel can move another angel's will. because, according to dionysius quoted above (a. 1), as one angel enlightens another, so does he cleanse and perfect another. but cleansing and perfecting seem to belong to the will: for the former seems to point to the stain of sin which appertains to will; while to be perfected is to obtain an end, which is the object of the will. therefore an angel can move another angel's will. obj. 2: further, as dionysius says (coel. hier. vii): "the names of the angels designate their properties." now the seraphim are so called because they "kindle" or "give heat": and this is by love which belongs to the will. therefore one angel moves another angel's will. obj. 3: further, the philosopher says (de anima iii, 11) that the higher appetite moves the lower. but as the intellect of the superior angel is higher, so also is his will. it seems, therefore, that the superior angel can change the will of another angel. _on the contrary,_ to him it belongs to change the will, to whom it belongs to bestow righteousness: for righteousness is the rightness of the will. but god alone bestows righteousness. therefore one angel cannot change another angel's will. _i answer that,_ as was said above (q. 105, a. 4), the will is changed in two ways; on the part of the object, and on the part of the power. on the part of the object, both the good itself which is the object of the will, moves the will, as the appetible moves the appetite; and he who points out the object, as, for instance, one who proves something to be good. but as we have said above (q. 105, a. 4), other goods in a measure incline the will, yet nothing sufficiently moves the will save the universal good, and that is god. and this good he alone shows, that it may be seen by the blessed, who, when moses asked: "show me thy glory," answered: "i will show thee all good" (ex. 33:18, 19). therefore an angel does not move the will sufficiently, either as the object or as showing the object. but he inclines the will as something lovable, and as manifesting some created good ordered to god's goodness. and thus he can incline the will to the love of the creature or of god, by way of persuasion. but on the part of the power the will cannot be moved at all save by god. for the operation of the will is a certain inclination of the willer to the thing willed. and he alone can change this inclination, who bestowed on the creature the power to will: just as that agent alone can change the natural inclination, which can give the power to which follows that natural inclination. now god alone gave to the creature the power to will, because he alone is the author of the intellectual nature. therefore an angel cannot move another angel's will. reply obj. 1: cleansing and perfecting are to be understood according to the mode of enlightenment. and since god enlightens by changing the intellect and will, he cleanses by removing defects of intellect and will, and perfects unto the end of the intellect and will. but the enlightenment caused by an angel concerns the intellect, as explained above (a. 1); therefore an angel is to be understood as cleansing from the defect of nescience in the intellect; and as perfecting unto the consummate end of the intellect, and this is the knowledge of truth. thus dionysius says (eccl. hier. vi): that "in the heavenly hierarchy the chastening of the inferior essence is an enlightening of things unknown, that leads them to more perfect knowledge." for instance, we might say that corporeal sight is cleansed by the removal of darkness; enlightened by the diffusion of light; and perfected by being brought to the perception of the colored object. reply obj. 2: one angel can induce another to love god by persuasion as explained above. reply obj. 3: the philosopher speaks of the lower sensitive appetite which can be moved by the superior intellectual appetite, because it belongs to the same nature of the soul, and because the inferior appetite is a power in a corporeal organ. but this does not apply to the angels. _______________________ third article [i, q. 106, art. 3] whether an inferior angel can enlighten a superior angel? objection 1: it would seem that an inferior angel can enlighten a superior angel. for the ecclesiastical hierarchy is derived from, and represents the heavenly hierarchy; and hence the heavenly jerusalem is called "our mother" (gal. 4:26). but in the church even superiors are enlightened and taught by their inferiors, as the apostle says (1 cor. 14:31): "you may all prophesy one by one, that all may learn and all may be exhorted." therefore, likewise in the heavenly hierarchy, the superiors can be enlightened by inferiors. obj. 2: further, as the order of corporeal substances depends on the will of god, so also does the order of spiritual substances. but, as was said above (q. 105, a. 6), god sometimes acts outside the order of corporeal substances. therefore he also sometimes acts outside the order of spiritual substances, by enlightening inferior otherwise than through their superiors. therefore in that way the inferiors enlightened by god can enlighten superiors. obj. 3: further, one angel enlightens the other to whom he turns, as was above explained (a. 1). but since this turning to another is voluntary, the highest angel can turn to the lowest passing over the others. therefore he can enlighten him immediately; and thus the latter can enlighten his superiors. _on the contrary,_ dionysius says that "this is the divine unalterable law, that inferior things are led to god by the superior" (coel. hier. iv; eccl. hier. v). _i answer that,_ the inferior angels never enlighten the superior, but are always enlightened by them. the reason is, because, as above explained (q. 105, a. 6), one order is under another, as cause is under cause; and hence as cause is ordered to cause, so is order to order. therefore there is no incongruity if sometimes anything is done outside the order of the inferior cause, to be ordered to the superior cause, as in human affairs the command of the president is passed over from obedience to the prince. so it happens that god works miraculously outside the order of corporeal nature, that men may be ordered to the knowledge of him. but the passing over of the order that belongs to spiritual substances in no way belongs to the ordering of men to god; since the angelic operations are not made known to us; as are the operations of sensible bodies. thus the order which belongs to spiritual substances is never passed over by god; so that the inferiors are always moved by the superior, and not conversely. reply obj. 1: the ecclesiastical hierarchy imitates the heavenly in some degree, but not by a perfect likeness. for in the heavenly hierarchy the perfection of the order is in proportion to its nearness to god; so that those who are the nearer to god are the more sublime in grade, and more clear in knowledge; and on that account the superiors are never enlightened by the inferiors, whereas in the ecclesiastical hierarchy, sometimes those who are the nearer to god in sanctity, are in the lowest grade, and are not conspicuous for science; and some also are eminent in one kind of science, and fail in another; and on that account superiors may be taught by inferiors. reply obj. 2: as above explained, there is no similarity between what god does outside the order of corporeal nature, and that of spiritual nature. hence the argument does not hold. reply obj. 3: an angel turns voluntarily to enlighten another angel, but the angel's will is ever regulated by the divine law which made the order in the angels. _______________________ fourth article [i, q. 106, art. 4] whether the superior angel enlightens the inferior as regards all he himself knows? objection 1: it would seem that the superior angel does not enlighten the inferior concerning all he himself knows. for dionysius says (coel. hier. xii) that the superior angels have a more universal knowledge; and the inferior a more particular and individual knowledge. but more is contained under a universal knowledge than under a particular knowledge. therefore not all that the superior angels know, is known by the inferior, through these being enlightened by the former. obj. 2: further, the master of the sentences (ii, d, 11) says that the superior angels had long known the mystery of the incarnation, whereas the inferior angels did not know it until it was accomplished. thus we find that on some of the angels inquiring, as it were, in ignorance: "who is this king of glory?" other angels, who knew, answered: "the lord of hosts, he is the king of glory," as dionysius expounds (coel. hier. vii). but this would not apply if the superior angels enlightened the inferior concerning all they know themselves. therefore they do not do so. obj. 3: further, if the superior angels enlighten the inferior about all they know, nothing that the superior angels know would be unknown to the inferior angels. therefore the superior angels could communicate nothing more to the inferior; which appears open to objection. therefore the superior angels enlighten the inferior in all things. _on the contrary,_ gregory [*peter lombard, sent. ii, d, ix; cf. gregory, hom. xxxiv, in ev.] says: "in that heavenly country, though there are some excellent gifts, yet nothing is held individually." and dionysius says: "each heavenly essence communicates to the inferior the gift derived from the superior" (coel. hier. xv), as quoted above (a. 1). _i answer that,_ every creature participates in the divine goodness, so as to diffuse the good it possesses to others; for it is of the nature of good to communicate itself to others. hence also corporeal agents give their likeness to others so far as they can. so the more an agent is established in the share of the divine goodness, so much the more does it strive to transmit its perfections to others as far as possible. hence the blessed peter admonishes those who by grace share in the divine goodness; saying: "as every man hath received grace, ministering the same one to another; as good stewards of the manifold grace of god" (1 pet. 4:10). much more therefore do the holy angels, who enjoy the plenitude of participation of the divine goodness, impart the same to those below them. nevertheless this gift is not received so excellently by the inferior as by the superior angels; and therefore the superior ever remain in a higher order, and have a more perfect knowledge; as the master understands the same thing better than the pupil who learns from him. reply obj. 1: the knowledge of the superior angels is said to be more universal as regards the more eminent mode of knowledge. reply obj. 2: the master's words are not to be understood as if the inferior angels were entirely ignorant of the mystery of the incarnation but that they did not know it as fully as the superior angels; and that they progressed in the knowledge of it afterwards when the mystery was accomplished. reply obj. 3: till the judgment day some new things are always being revealed by god to the highest angels, concerning the course of the world, and especially the salvation of the elect. hence there is always something for the superior angels to make known to the inferior. _______________________ question 107 the speech of the angels (in five articles) we next consider the speech of the angels. here there are five points of inquiry: (1) whether one angel speaks to another? (2) whether the inferior speaks to the superior? (3) whether an angel speaks to god? (4) whether the angelic speech is subject to local distance? (5) whether all the speech of one angel to another is known to all? _______________________ first article [i, q. 107, art. 1] whether one angel speaks to another? objection 1: it would seem that one angel does not speak to another. for gregory says (moral. xviii) that, in the state of the resurrection "each one's body will not hide his mind from his fellows." much less, therefore, is one angel's mind hidden from another. but speech manifests to another what lies hidden in the mind. therefore it is not necessary that one angel should speak to another. obj. 2: further, speech is twofold; interior, whereby one speaks to oneself; and exterior, whereby one speaks to another. but exterior speech takes place by some sensible sign, as by voice, or gesture, or some bodily member, as the tongue, or the fingers, and this cannot apply to the angels. therefore one angel does not speak to another. obj. 3: further, the speaker incites the hearer to listen to what he says. but it does not appear that one angel incites another to listen; for this happens among us by some sensible sign. therefore one angel does not speak to another. _on the contrary,_ the apostle says (1 cor. 13:1): "if i speak with the tongues of men and of angels." _i answer that,_ the angels speak in a certain way. but, as gregory says (moral. ii): "it is fitting that our mind, rising above the properties of bodily speech, should be lifted to the sublime and unknown methods of interior speech." to understand how one angel speaks to another, we must consider that, as we explained above (q. 82, a. 4), when treating of the actions and powers of the soul, the will moves the intellect to its operation. now an intelligible object is present to the intellect in three ways; first, habitually, or in the memory, as augustine says (de trin. xiv, 6, 7); secondly, as actually considered or conceived; thirdly, as related to something else. and it is clear that the intelligible object passes from the first to the second stage by the command of the will, and hence in the definition of habit these words occur, "which anyone uses when he wills." so likewise the intelligible object passes from the second to the third stage by the will; for by the will the concept of the mind is ordered to something else, as, for instance, either to the performing of an action, or to being made known to another. now when the mind turns itself to the actual consideration of any habitual knowledge, then a person speaks to himself; for the concept of the mind is called "the interior word." and by the fact that the concept of the angelic mind is ordered to be made known to another by the will of the angel himself, the concept of one angel is made known to another; and in this way one angel speaks to another; for to speak to another only means to make known the mental concept to another. reply obj. 1: our mental concept is hidden by a twofold obstacle. the first is in the will, which can retain the mental concept within, or can direct it externally. in this way god alone can see the mind of another, according to 1 cor. 2:11: "what man knoweth the things of a man, but the spirit of a man that is in him?" the other obstacle whereby the mental concept is excluded from another one's knowledge, comes from the body; and so it happens that even when the will directs the concept of the mind to make itself known, it is not at once make known to another; but some sensible sign must be used. gregory alludes to this fact when he says (moral. ii): "to other eyes we seem to stand aloof as it were behind the wall of the body; and when we wish to make ourselves known, we go out as it were by the door of the tongue to show what we really are." but an angel is under no such obstacle, and so he can make his concept known to another at once. reply obj. 2: external speech, made by the voice, is a necessity for us on account of the obstacle of the body. hence it does not befit an angel; but only interior speech belongs to him, and this includes not only the interior speech by mental concept, but also its being ordered to another's knowledge by the will. so the tongue of an angel is called metaphorically the angel's power, whereby he manifests his mental concept. reply obj. 3: there is no need to draw the attention of the good angels, inasmuch as they always see each other in the word; for as one ever sees the other, so he ever sees what is ordered to himself. but because by their very nature they can speak to each other, and even now the bad angels speak to each other, we must say that the intellect is moved by the intelligible object just as sense is affected by the sensible object. therefore, as sense is aroused by the sensible object, so the mind of an angel can be aroused to attention by some intelligible power. _______________________ second article [i, q. 107, art. 2] whether the inferior angel speaks to the superior? objection 1: it would seem that the inferior angel does not speak to the superior. for on the text (1 cor. 13:1), "if i speak with the tongues of men and of angels," a gloss remarks that the speech of the angels is an enlightenment whereby the superior enlightens the inferior. but the inferior never enlightens the superior, as was above explained (q. 106, a. 3). therefore neither do the inferior speak to the superior. obj. 2: further, as was said above (q. 106, a. 1), to enlighten means merely to acquaint one man of what is known to another; and this is to speak. therefore to speak and to enlighten are the same; so the same conclusion follows. obj. 3: further, gregory says (moral. ii): "god speaks to the angels by the very fact that he shows to their hearts his hidden and invisible things." but this is to enlighten them. therefore, whenever god speaks, he enlightens. in the same way every angelic speech is an enlightening. therefore an inferior angel can in no way speak to a superior angel. _on the contrary,_ according to the exposition of dionysius (coel. hier. vii), the inferior angels said to the superior: "who is this king of glory?" _i answer that,_ the inferior angels can speak to the superior. to make this clear, we must consider that every angelic enlightening is an angelic speech; but on the other hand, not every speech is an enlightening; because, as we have said (a. 1), for one angel to speak to another angel means nothing else, but that by his own will he directs his mental concept in such a way, that it becomes known to the other. now what the mind conceives may be reduced to a twofold principle; to god himself, who is the primal truth; and to the will of the one who understands, whereby we actually consider anything. but because truth is the light of the intellect, and god himself is the rule of all truth; the manifestation of what is conceived by the mind, as depending on the primary truth, is both speech and enlightenment; for example, when one man says to another: "heaven was created by god"; or, "man is an animal." the manifestation, however, of what depends on the will of the one who understands, cannot be called an enlightenment, but is only a speech; for instance, when one says to another: "i wish to learn this; i wish to do this or that." the reason is that the created will is not a light, nor a rule of truth; but participates of light. hence to communicate what comes from the created will is not, as such, an enlightening. for to know what you may will, or what you may understand does not belong to the perfection of my intellect; but only to know the truth in reality. now it is clear that the angels are called superior or inferior by comparison with this principle, god; and therefore enlightenment, which depends on the principle which is god, is conveyed only by the superior angels to the inferior. but as regards the will as the principle, he who wills is first and supreme; and therefore the manifestation of what belongs to the will, is conveyed to others by the one who wills. in that manner both the superior angels speak to the inferior, and the inferior speak to the superior. from this clearly appear the replies to the first and second objections. reply obj. 3: every speech of god to the angels is an enlightening; because since the will of god is the rule of truth, it belongs to the perfection and enlightenment of the created mind to know even what god wills. but the same does not apply to the will of the angels, as was explained above. _______________________ third article [i, q. 107, art. 3] whether an angel speaks to god? objection 1: it would seem that an angel does not speak to god. for speech makes known something to another. but an angel cannot make known anything to god, who knows all things. therefore an angel does not speak to god. obj. 2: further, to speak is to order the mental concept in reference to another, as was shown above (a. 1). but an angel ever orders his mental concept to god. so if an angel speaks to god, he ever speaks to god; which in some ways appears to be unreasonable, since an angel sometimes speaks to another angel. therefore it seems that an angel never speaks to god. _on the contrary,_ it is written (zech. 1:12): "the angel of the lord answered and said: o lord of hosts, how long wilt thou not have mercy on jerusalem." therefore an angel speaks to god. _i answer that,_ as was said above (aa. 1, 2), the angel speaks by ordering his mental concept to something else. now one thing is ordered to another in a twofold manner. in one way for the purpose of giving one thing to another, as in natural things the agent is ordered to the patient, and in human speech the teacher is ordered to the learner; and in this sense an angel in no way speaks to god either of what concerns the truth, or of whatever depends on the created will; because god is the principle and source of all truth and of all will. in another way one thing is ordered to another to receive something, as in natural things the passive is ordered to the agent, and in human speech the disciple to the master; and in this way an angel speaks to god, either by consulting the divine will of what ought to be done, or by admiring the divine excellence which he can never comprehend; thus gregory says (moral. ii) that "the angels speak to god, when by contemplating what is above themselves they rise to emotions of admiration." reply obj. 1: speech is not always for the purpose of making something known to another; but is sometimes finally ordered to the purpose of manifesting something to the speaker himself; as when the disciples ask instruction from the master. reply obj. 2: the angels are ever speaking to god in the sense of praising and admiring him and his works; but they speak to him by consulting him about what ought to be done whenever they have to perform any new work, concerning which they desire enlightenment. _______________________ fourth article [i, q. 107, art. 4] whether local distance influences the angelic speech? objection 1: it would seem that local distance affects the angelic speech. for as damascene says (de fide orth. i, 13): "an angel works where he is." but speech is an angelic operation. therefore, as an angel is in a determinate place, it seems that an angel's speech is limited by the bounds of that place. obj. 2: further, a speaker cries out on account of the distance of the hearer. but it is said of the seraphim that "they cried one to another" (isa. 6:3). therefore in the angelic speech local distance has some effect. _on the contrary,_ it is said that the rich man in hell spoke to abraham, notwithstanding the local distance (luke 16:24). much less therefore does local distance impede the speech of one angel to another. _i answer that,_ the angelic speech consists in an intellectual operation, as explained above (aa. 1, 2, 3). and the intellectual operation of an angel abstracts from the "here and now." for even our own intellectual operation takes place by abstraction from the "here and now," except accidentally on the part of the phantasms, which do not exist at all in an angel. but as regards whatever is abstracted from "here and now," neither difference of time nor local distance has any influence whatever. hence in the angelic speech local distance is no impediment. reply obj. 1: the angelic speech, as above explained (a. 1, ad 2), is interior; perceived, nevertheless, by another; and therefore it exists in the angel who speaks, and consequently where the angel is who speaks. but as local distance does not prevent one angel seeing another, so neither does it prevent an angel perceiving what is ordered to him on the part of another; and this is to perceive his speech. reply obj. 2: the cry mentioned is not a bodily voice raised by reason of the local distance; but is taken to signify the magnitude of what is said, or the intensity of the affection, according to what gregory says (moral. ii): "the less one desires, the less one cries out." _______________________ fifth article [i, q. 107, art. 5] whether all the angels know what one speaks to another? objection 1: it would seem that all the angels know what one speaks to another. for unequal local distance is the reason why all men do not know what one man says to another. but in the angelic speech local distance has no effect, as above explained (a. 4). therefore all the angels know what one speaks to another. obj. 2: further, all the angels have the intellectual power in common. so if the mental concept of one ordered to another is known by one, it is for the same reason known by all. obj. 3: further, enlightenment is a kind of speech. but the enlightenment of one angel by another extends to all the angels, because, as dionysius says (coel. hier. xv): "each one of the heavenly beings communicates what he learns to the others." therefore the speech of one angel to another extends to all. _on the contrary,_ one man can speak to another alone; much more can this be the case among the angels. _i answer that,_ as above explained (aa. 1, 2), the mental concept of one angel can be perceived by another when the angel who possesses the concept refers it by his will to another. now a thing can be ordered through some cause to one thing and not to another; consequently the concept of one (angel) may be known by one and not by another; and therefore an angel can perceive the speech of one angel to another; whereas others do not, not through the obstacle of local distance, but on account of the will so ordering, as explained above. from this appear the replies to the first and second objections. reply obj. 3: enlightenment is of those truths that emanate from the first rule of truth, which is the principle common to all the angels; and in that way all enlightenments are common to all. but speech may be of something ordered to the principle of the created will, which is proper to each angel; and in this way it is not necessary that these speeches should be common to all. _______________________ question 108 of the angelic degrees of hierarchies and orders (in eight articles) we next consider the degrees of the angels in their hierarchies and orders; for it was said above (q. 106, a. 3), that the superior angels enlighten the inferior angels; and not conversely. under this head there are eight points of inquiry: (1) whether all the angels belong to one hierarchy? (2) whether in one hierarchy there is only one order? (3) whether in one order there are many angels? (4) whether the distinction of hierarchies and orders is natural? (5) of the names and properties of each order. (6) of the comparison of the orders to one another. (7) whether the orders will outlast the day of judgment? (8) whether men are taken up into the angelic orders? _______________________ first article [i, q. 108, art. 1] whether all the angels are of one hierarchy? objection 1: it would seem that all the angels belong to one hierarchy. for since the angels are supreme among creatures, it is evident that they are ordered for the best. but the best ordering of a multitude is for it to be governed by one authority, as the philosopher shows (metaph. xii, did. xi, 10; polit. iii, 4). therefore as a hierarchy is nothing but a sacred principality, it seems that all the angels belong to one hierarchy. obj. 2: further, dionysius says (coel. hier. iii) that "hierarchy is order, knowledge, and action." but all the angels agree in one order towards god, whom they know, and by whom in their actions they are ruled. therefore all the angels belong to one hierarchy. obj. 3: further, the sacred principality called hierarchy is to be found among men and angels. but all men are of one hierarchy. therefore likewise all the angels are of one hierarchy. _on the contrary,_ dionysius (coel. hier. vi) distinguishes three hierarchies of angels. _i answer that,_ hierarchy means a "sacred" principality, as above explained. now principality includes two things: the prince himself and the multitude ordered under the prince. therefore because there is one god, the prince not only of all the angels but also of men and all creatures; so there is one hierarchy, not only of all the angels, but also of all rational creatures, who can be participators of sacred things; according to augustine (de civ. dei xii, 1): "there are two cities, that is, two societies, one of the good angels and men, the other of the wicked." but if we consider the principality on the part of the multitude ordered under the prince, then principality is said to be "one" accordingly as the multitude can be subject in _one_ way to the government of the prince. and those that cannot be governed in the same way by a prince belong to different principalities: thus, under one king there are different cities, which are governed by different laws and administrators. now it is evident that men do not receive the divine enlightenments in the same way as do the angels; for the angels receive them in their intelligible purity, whereas men receive them under sensible signs, as dionysius says (coel. hier. i). therefore there must needs be a distinction between the human and the angelic hierarchy. in the same manner we distinguish three angelic hierarchies. for it was shown above (q. 55, a. 3), in treating of the angelic knowledge, that the superior angels have a more universal knowledge of the truth than the inferior angels. this universal knowledge has three grades among the angels. for the types of things, concerning which the angels are enlightened, can be considered in a threefold manner. first as preceding from god as the first universal principle, which mode of knowledge belongs to the first hierarchy, connected immediately with god, and, "as it were, placed in the vestibule of god," as dionysius says (coel. hier. vii). secondly, forasmuch as these types depend on the universal created causes which in some way are already multiplied; which mode belongs to the second hierarchy. thirdly, forasmuch as these types are applied to particular things as depending on their causes; which mode belongs to the lowest hierarchy. all this will appear more clearly when we treat of each of the orders (a. 6). in this way are the hierarchies distinguished on the part of the multitude of subjects. hence it is clear that those err and speak against the opinion of dionysius who place a hierarchy in the divine persons, and call it the "supercelestial" hierarchy. for in the divine persons there exists, indeed, a natural order, but there is no hierarchical order, for as dionysius says (coel. hier. iii): "the hierarchical order is so directed that some be cleansed, enlightened, and perfected; and that others cleanse, enlighten, and perfect"; which far be it from us to apply to the divine persons. reply obj. 1: this objection considers principality on the part of the ruler, inasmuch as a multitude is best ruled by one ruler, as the philosopher asserts in those passages. reply obj. 2: as regards knowing god himself, whom all see in one way--that is, in his essence--there is no hierarchical distinction among the angels; but there is such a distinction as regards the types of created things, as above explained. reply obj. 3: all men are of one species, and have one connatural mode of understanding; which is not the case in the angels: and hence the same argument does not apply to both. _______________________ second article [i, q. 108, art. 2] whether there are several orders in one hierarchy? objection 1: it would seem that in the one hierarchy there are not several orders. for when a definition is multiplied, the thing defined is also multiplied. but hierarchy is order, as dionysius says (coel. hier. iii). therefore, if there are many orders, there is not one hierarchy only, but many. obj. 2: further, different orders are different grades, and grades among spirits are constituted by different spiritual gifts. but among the angels all the spiritual gifts are common to all, for "nothing is possessed individually" (sent. ii, d, ix). therefore there are not different orders of angels. obj. 3: further, in the ecclesiastical hierarchy the orders are distinguished according to the actions of "cleansing," "enlightening," and "perfecting." for the order of deacons is "cleansing," the order of priests, is "enlightening," and of bishops "perfecting," as dionysius says (eccl. hier. v). but each of the angels cleanses, enlightens, and perfects. therefore there is no distinction of orders among the angels. _on the contrary,_ the apostle says (eph. 1:20,21) that "god has set the man christ above all principality and power, and virtue, and dominion": which are the various orders of the angels, and some of them belong to one hierarchy, as will be explained (a. 6). _i answer that,_ as explained above, one hierarchy is one principality--that is, one multitude ordered in one way under the rule of a prince. now such a multitude would not be ordered, but confused, if there were not in it different orders. so the nature of a hierarchy requires diversity of orders. this diversity of order arises from the diversity of offices and actions, as appears in one city where there are different orders according to the different actions; for there is one order of those who judge, and another of those who fight, and another of those who labor in the fields, and so forth. but although one city thus comprises several orders, all may be reduced to three, when we consider that every multitude has a beginning, a middle, and an end. so in every city, a threefold order of men is to be seen, some of whom are supreme, as the nobles; others are the last, as the common people, while others hold a place between these, as the middle-class [populus honorabilis]. in the same way we find in each angelic hierarchy the orders distinguished according to their actions and offices, and all this diversity is reduced to three--namely, to the summit, the middle, and the base; and so in every hierarchy dionysius places three orders (coel. hier. vi). reply obj. 1: order is twofold. in one way it is taken as the order comprehending in itself different grades; and in that way a hierarchy is called an order. in another way one grade is called an order; and in that sense the several orders of one hierarchy are so called. reply obj. 2: all things are possessed in common by the angelic society, some things, however, being held more excellently by some than by others. each gift is more perfectly possessed by the one who can communicate it, than by the one who cannot communicate it; as the hot thing which can communicate heat is more perfect that what is unable to give heat. and the more perfectly anyone can communicate a gift, the higher grade he occupies, as he is in the more perfect grade of mastership who can teach a higher science. by this similitude we can reckon the diversity of grades or orders among the angels, according to their different offices and actions. reply obj. 3: the inferior angel is superior to the highest man of our hierarchy, according to the words, "he that is the lesser in the kingdom of heaven, is greater than he"--namely, john the baptist, than whom "there hath not risen a greater among them that are born of women" (matt. 11:11). hence the lesser angel of the heavenly hierarchy can not only cleanse, but also enlighten and perfect, and in a higher way than can the orders of our hierarchy. thus the heavenly orders are not distinguished by reason of these, but by reason of other different acts. _______________________ third article [i, q. 108, art. 3] whether there are many angels in one order? objection 1: it seems that there are not many angels in one order. for it was shown above (q. 50, a. 4), that all the angels are unequal. but equals belong to one order. therefore there are not many angels in one order. obj. 2: further, it is superfluous for a thing to be done by many, which can be done sufficiently by one. but that which belongs to one angelic office can be done sufficiently by one angel; so much more sufficiently than the one sun does what belongs to the office of the sun, as the angel is more perfect than a heavenly body. if, therefore, the orders are distinguished by their offices, as stated above (a. 2), several angels in one order would be superfluous. obj. 3: further, it was said above (obj. 1) that all the angels are unequal. therefore, if several angels (for instance, three or four), are of one order, the lowest one of the superior order will be more akin to the highest of the inferior order than with the highest of his own order; and thus he does not seem to be more of one order with the latter than with the former. therefore there are not many angels of one order. _on the contrary,_ it is written: "the seraphim cried to one another" (isa. 6:3). therefore there are many angels in the one order of the seraphim. _i answer that,_ whoever knows anything perfectly, is able to distinguish its acts, powers, and nature, down to the minutest details, whereas he who knows a thing in an imperfect manner can only distinguish it in a general way, and only as regards a few points. thus, one who knows natural things imperfectly, can distinguish their orders in a general way, placing the heavenly bodies in one order, inanimate inferior bodies in another, plants in another, and animals in another; whilst he who knows natural things perfectly, is able to distinguish different orders in the heavenly bodies themselves, and in each of the other orders. now our knowledge of the angels is imperfect, as dionysius says (coel. hier. vi). hence we can only distinguish the angelic offices and orders in a general way, so as to place many angels in one order. but if we knew the offices and distinctions of the angels perfectly, we should know perfectly that each angel has his own office and his own order among things, and much more so than any star, though this be hidden from us. reply obj. 1: all the angels of one order are in some way equal in a common similitude, whereby they are placed in that order; but absolutely speaking they are not equal. hence dionysius says (coel. hier. x) that in one and the same order of angels there are those who are first, middle, and last. reply obj. 2: that special distinction of orders and offices wherein each angel has his own office and order, is hidden from us. reply obj. 3: as in a surface which is partly white and partly black, the two parts on the borders of white and black are more akin as regards their position than any other two white parts, but are less akin in quality; so two angels who are on the boundary of two orders are more akin in propinquity of nature than one of them is akin to the others of its own order, but less akin in their fitness for similar offices, which fitness, indeed, extends to a definite limit. _______________________ fourth article [i, q. 108, art. 4] whether the distinction of hierarchies and orders comes from the angelic nature? objection 1: it would seem that the distinction of hierarchies and of orders is not from the nature of the angels. for hierarchy is "a sacred principality," and dionysius places in its definition that it "approaches a resemblance to god, as far as may be" (coel. hier. iii). but sanctity and resemblance to god is in the angels by grace, and not by nature. therefore the distinction of hierarchies and orders in the angels is by grace, and not by nature. obj. 2: further, the seraphim are called "burning" or "kindling," as dionysius says (coel. hier. vii). this belongs to charity which comes not from nature but from grace; for "it is poured forth in our hearts by the holy ghost who is given to us" (rom. 5:5): "which is said not only of holy men, but also of the holy angels," as augustine says (de civ. dei xii). therefore the angelic orders are not from nature, but from grace. obj. 3: further, the ecclesiastical hierarchy is copied from the heavenly. but the orders among men are not from nature, but by the gift of grace; for it is not a natural gift for one to be a bishop, and another a priest, and another a deacon. therefore neither in the angels are the orders from nature, but from grace only. _on the contrary,_ the master says (ii, d. 9) that "an angelic order is a multitude of heavenly spirits, who are likened to each other by some gift of grace, just as they agree also in the participation of natural gifts." therefore the distinction of orders among the angels is not only by gifts of grace, but also by gifts of nature. _i answer that,_ the order of government, which is the order of a multitude under authority, is derived from its end. now the end of the angels may be considered in two ways. first, according to the faculty of nature, so that they may know and love god by natural knowledge and love; and according to their relation to this end the orders of the angels are distinguished by natural gifts. secondly, the end of the angelic multitude can be taken from what is above their natural powers, which consists in the vision of the divine essence, and in the unchangeable fruition of his goodness; to which end they can reach only by grace; and hence as regards this end, the orders in the angels are adequately distinguished by the gifts of grace, but dispositively by natural gifts, forasmuch as to the angels are given gratuitous gifts according to the capacity of their natural gifts; which is not the case with men, as above explained (q. 62, a. 6). hence among men the orders are distinguished according to the gratuitous gifts only, and not according to natural gifts. from the above the replies to the objections are evident. _______________________ fifth article [i, q. 108, art. 5] whether the orders of the angels are properly named? objection 1: it would seem that the orders of the angels are not properly named. for all the heavenly spirits are called angels and heavenly virtues. but common names should not be appropriated to individuals. therefore the orders of the angels and virtues are ineptly named. obj. 2: further, it belongs to god alone to be lord, according to the words, "know ye that the lord he is god" (ps. 99:3). therefore one order of the heavenly spirits is not properly called "dominations." obj. 3: further, the name "domination" seems to imply government and likewise the names "principalities" and "powers." therefore these three names do not seem to be properly applied to three orders. obj. 4: further, archangels are as it were angel princes. therefore this name ought not to be given to any other order than to the "principalities." obj. 5: further, the name "seraphim" is derived from ardor, which pertains to charity; and the name "cherubim" from knowledge. but charity and knowledge are gifts common to all the angels. therefore they ought not to be names of any particular orders. obj. 6: further, thrones are seats. but from the fact that god knows and loves the rational creature he is said to sit within it. therefore there ought not to be any order of "thrones" besides the "cherubim" and "seraphim." therefore it appears that the orders of angels are not properly styled. on the contrary is the authority of holy scripture wherein they are so named. for the name "seraphim" is found in isa. 6:2; the name "cherubim" in ezech. 1 (cf. 10:15,20); "thrones" in col. 1:16; "dominations," "virtues," "powers," and "principalities" are mentioned in eph. 1:21; the name "archangels" in the canonical epistle of st. jude (9), and the name "angels" is found in many places of scripture. _i answer that,_ as dionysius says (coel. hier. vii), in the names of the angelic orders it is necessary to observe that the proper name of each order expresses its property. now to see what is the property of each order, we must consider that in coordinated things, something may be found in a threefold manner: by way of property, by way of excess, and by way of participation. a thing is said to be in another by way of property, if it is adequate and proportionate to its nature: by excess when an attribute is less than that to which it is attributed, but is possessed thereby in an eminent manner, as we have stated (q. 13, a. 2) concerning all the names which are attributed to god: by participation, when an attribute is possessed by something not fully but partially; thus holy men are called gods by participation. therefore, if anything is to be called by a name designating its property, it ought not to be named from what it participates imperfectly, nor from that which it possesses in excess, but from that which is adequate thereto; as, for instance, when we wish properly to name a man, we should call him a "rational substance," but not an "intellectual substance," which latter is the proper name of an angel; because simple intelligence belongs to an angel as a property, and to man by participation; nor do we call him a "sensible substance," which is the proper name of a brute; because sense is less than the property of a man, and belongs to man in a more excellent way than to other animals. so we must consider that in the angelic orders all spiritual perfections are common to all the angels, and that they are all more excellently in the superior than in the inferior angels. further, as in these perfections there are grades, the superior perfection belongs to the superior order as its property, whereas it belongs to the inferior by participation; and conversely the inferior perfection belongs to the inferior order as its property, and to the superior by way of excess; and thus the superior order is denominated from the superior perfection. so in this way dionysius (coel. hier. vii) explains the names of the orders accordingly as they befit the spiritual perfections they signify. gregory, on the other hand, in expounding these names (hom. xxxiv in evang.) seems to regard more the exterior ministrations; for he says that "angels are so called as announcing the least things; and the archangels in the greatest; by the virtues miracles are wrought; by the powers hostile powers are repulsed; and the principalities preside over the good spirits themselves." reply obj. 1: angel means "messenger." so all the heavenly spirits, so far as they make known divine things, are called "angels." but the superior angels enjoy a certain excellence, as regards this manifestation, from which the superior orders are denominated. the lowest order of angels possess no excellence above the common manifestation; and therefore it is denominated from manifestation only; and thus the common name remains as it were proper to the lowest order, as dionysius says (coel. hier. v). or we may say that the lowest order can be specially called the order of "angels," forasmuch as they announce things to us immediately. "virtue" can be taken in two ways. first, commonly, considered as the medium between the essence and the operation, and in that sense all the heavenly spirits are called heavenly virtues, as also "heavenly essences." secondly, as meaning a certain excellence of strength; and thus it is the proper name of an angelic order. hence dionysius says (coel. hier. viii) that the "name 'virtues' signifies a certain virile and immovable strength"; first, in regard of those divine operations which befit them; secondly, in regard to receiving divine gifts. thus it signifies that they undertake fearlessly the divine behests appointed to them; and this seems to imply strength of mind. reply obj. 2: as dionysius says (div. nom. xii): "dominion is attributed to god in a special manner, by way of excess: but the divine word gives the more illustrious heavenly princes the name of lord by participation, through whom the inferior angels receive the divine gifts." hence dionysius also states (coel. hier. viii) that the name "domination" means first "a certain liberty, free from servile condition and common subjection, such as that of plebeians, and from tyrannical oppression," endured sometimes even by the great. secondly, it signifies "a certain rigid and inflexible supremacy which does not bend to any servile act, or to the act of those who are subject to or oppressed by tyrants." thirdly, it signifies "the desire and participation of the true dominion which belongs to god." likewise the name of each order signifies the participation of what belongs to god; as the name "virtues" signifies the participation of the divine virtue; and the same principle applies to the rest. reply obj. 3: the names "domination," "power," and "principality" belong to government in different ways. the place of a lord is only to prescribe what is to be done. so gregory says (hom. xxiv in evang.), that "some companies of the angels, because others are subject to obedience to them, are called dominations." the name "power" points out a kind of order, according to what the apostle says, "he that resisteth the power, resisteth the ordination of god" (rom. 13:2). and so dionysius says (coel. hier. viii) that the name "power" signifies a kind of ordination both as regards the reception of divine things, and as regards the divine actions performed by superiors towards inferiors by leading them to things above. therefore, to the order of "powers" it belongs to regulate what is to be done by those who are subject to them. to preside [principari] as gregory says (hom. xxiv in ev.) is "to be first among others," as being first in carrying out what is ordered to be done. and so dionysius says (coel. hier. ix) that the name of "principalities" signifies "one who leads in a sacred order." for those who lead others, being first among them, are properly called "princes," according to the words, "princes went before joined with singers" (ps. 67:26). reply obj. 4: the "archangels," according to dionysius (coel. hier. ix), are between the "principalities" and the "angels." a medium compared to one extreme seems like the other, as participating in the nature of both extremes; thus tepid seems cold compared to hot, and hot compared to cold. so the "archangels" are called the "angel princes"; forasmuch as they are princes as regards the "angels," and angels as regards the principalities. but according to gregory (hom. xxiv in ev.) they are called "archangels," because they preside over the one order of the "angels"; as it were, announcing greater things: and the "principalities" are so called as presiding over all the heavenly "virtues" who fulfil the divine commands. reply obj. 5: the name "seraphim" does not come from charity only, but from the excess of charity, expressed by the word ardor or fire. hence dionysius (coel. hier. vii) expounds the name "seraphim" according to the properties of fire, containing an excess of heat. now in fire we may consider three things. first, the movement which is upwards and continuous. this signifies that they are borne inflexibly towards god. secondly, the active force which is "heat," which is not found in fire simply, but exists with a certain sharpness, as being of most penetrating action, and reaching even to the smallest things, and as it were, with superabundant fervor; whereby is signified the action of these angels, exercised powerfully upon those who are subject to them, rousing them to a like fervor, and cleansing them wholly by their heat. thirdly we consider in fire the quality of clarity, or brightness; which signifies that these angels have in themselves an inextinguishable light, and that they also perfectly enlighten others. in the same way the name "cherubim" comes from a certain excess of knowledge; hence it is interpreted "fulness of knowledge," which dionysius (coel. hier. vii) expounds in regard to four things: the perfect vision of god; the full reception of the divine light; their contemplation in god of the beauty of the divine order; and in regard to the fact that possessing this knowledge fully, they pour it forth copiously upon others. reply obj. 6: the order of the "thrones" excels the inferior orders as having an immediate knowledge of the types of the divine works; whereas the "cherubim" have the excellence of knowledge and the "seraphim" the excellence of ardor. and although these two excellent attributes include the third, yet the gift belonging to the "thrones" does not include the other two; and so the order of the "thrones" is distinguished from the orders of the "cherubim" and the "seraphim." for it is a common rule in all things that the excellence of the inferior is contained in the superior, but not conversely. but dionysius (coel. hier. vii) explains the name "thrones" by its relation to material seats, in which we may consider four things. first, the site; because seats are raised above the earth, and to the angels who are called "thrones" are raised up to the immediate knowledge of the types of things in god. secondly, because in material seats is displayed strength, forasmuch as a person sits firmly on them. but here the reverse is the case; for the angels themselves are made firm by god. thirdly, because the seat receives him who sits thereon, and he can be carried thereupon; and so the angels receive god in themselves, and in a certain way bear him to the inferior creatures. fourthly, because in its shape, a seat is open on one side to receive the sitter; and thus are the angels promptly open to receive god and to serve him. _______________________ sixth article [i, q. 108, art. 6] whether the grades of the orders are properly assigned? objection 1: it would seem that the grades of the orders are not properly assigned. for the order of prelates is the highest. but the names of "dominations," "principalities," and "powers" of themselves imply prelacy. therefore these orders ought not to be supreme. obj. 2: further, the nearer an order is to god, the higher it is. but the order of "thrones" is the nearest to god; for nothing is nearer to the sitter than the seat. therefore the order of the "thrones" is the highest. obj. 3: further, knowledge comes before love, and intellect is higher than will. therefore the order of "cherubim" seems to be higher than the "seraphim." obj. 4: further, gregory (hom. xxiv in evang.) places the "principalities" above the "powers." these therefore are not placed immediately above the archangels, as dionysius says (coel. hier. ix). _on the contrary,_ dionysius (coel. hier. vii), places in the highest hierarchy the "seraphim" as the first, the "cherubim" as the middle, the "thrones" as the last; in the middle hierarchy he places the "dominations," as the first, the "virtues" in the middle, the "powers" last; in the lowest hierarchy the "principalities" first, then the "archangels," and lastly the "angels." _i answer that,_ the grades of the angelic orders are assigned by gregory (hom. xxiv in ev.) and dionysius (coel. hier. vii), who agree as regards all except the "principalities" and "virtues." for dionysius places the "virtues" beneath the "dominations," and above the "powers"; the "principalities" beneath the "powers" and above the "archangels." gregory, however, places the "principalities" between the "dominations" and the "powers"; and the "virtues" between the "powers" and the "archangels." each of these placings may claim authority from the words of the apostle, who (eph. 1:20,21) enumerates the middle orders, beginning from the lowest saying that "god set him," i.e. christ, "on his right hand in the heavenly places above all principality and power, and virtue, and dominion." here he places "virtues" between "powers" and "dominations," according to the placing of dionysius. writing however to the colossians (1:16), numbering the same orders from the highest, he says: "whether thrones, or dominations, or principalities, or powers, all things were created by him and in him." here he places the "principalities" between "dominations" and "powers," as does also gregory. let us then first examine the reason for the ordering of dionysius, in which we see, that, as said above (a. 1), the highest hierarchy contemplates the ideas of things in god himself; the second in the universal causes; and third in their application to particular effects. and because god is the end not only of the angelic ministrations, but also of the whole creation, it belongs to the first hierarchy to consider the end; to the middle one belongs the universal disposition of what is to be done; and to the last belongs the application of this disposition to the effect, which is the carrying out of the work; for it is clear that these three things exist in every kind of operation. so dionysius, considering the properties of the orders as derived from their names, places in the first hierarchy those orders the names of which are taken from their relation to god, the "seraphim," "cherubim," and "thrones"; and he places in the middle hierarchy those orders whose names denote a certain kind of common government or disposition--the "dominations," "virtues," and "powers"; and he places in the third hierarchy the orders whose names denote the execution of the work, the "principalities," "angels," and "archangels." as regards the end, three things may be considered. for firstly we consider the end; then we acquire perfect knowledge of the end; thirdly, we fix our intention on the end; of which the second is an addition to the first, and the third an addition to both. and because god is the end of creatures, as the leader is the end of an army, as the philosopher says (metaph. xii, did. xi, 10); so a somewhat similar order may be seen in human affairs. for there are some who enjoy the dignity of being able with familiarity to approach the king or leader; others in addition are privileged to know his secrets; and others above these ever abide with him, in a close union. according to this similitude, we can understand the disposition in the orders of the first hierarchy; for the "thrones" are raised up so as to be the familiar recipients of god in themselves, in the sense of knowing immediately the types of things in himself; and this is proper to the whole of the first hierarchy. the "cherubim" know the divine secrets supereminently; and the "seraphim" excel in what is the supreme excellence of all, in being united to god himself; and all this in such a manner that the whole of this hierarchy can be called the "thrones"; as, from what is common to all the heavenly spirits together, they are all called "angels." as regards government, three things are comprised therein, the first of which is to appoint those things which are to be done, and this belongs to the "dominations"; the second is to give the power of carrying out what is to be done, which belongs to the "virtues"; the third is to order how what has been commanded or decided to be done can be carried out by others, which belongs to the "powers." the execution of the angelic ministrations consists in announcing divine things. now in the execution of any action there are beginners and leaders; as in singing, the precentors; and in war, generals and officers; this belongs to the "principalities." there are others who simply execute what is to be done; and these are the "angels." others hold a middle place; and these are the "archangels," as above explained. this explanation of the orders is quite a reasonable one. for the highest in an inferior order always has affinity to the lowest in the higher order; as the lowest animals are near to the plants. now the first order is that of the divine persons, which terminates in the holy ghost, who is love proceeding, with whom the highest order of the first hierarchy has affinity, denominated as it is from the fire of love. the lowest order of the first hierarchy is that of the "thrones," who in their own order are akin to the "dominations"; for the "thrones," according to gregory (hom. xxiv in ev.), are so called "because through them god accomplishes his judgments," since they are enlightened by him in a manner adapted to the immediate enlightening of the second hierarchy, to which belongs the disposition of the divine ministrations. the order of the "powers" is akin to the order of the "principalities"; for as it belongs to the "powers" to impose order on those subject to them, this ordering is plainly shown at once in the name of "principalities," who, as presiding over the government of peoples and kingdoms (which occupies the first and principal place in the divine ministrations), are the first in the execution thereof; "for the good of a nation is more divine than the good of one man" (ethic. i, 2); and hence it is written, "the prince of the kingdom of the persians resisted me" (dan. 10:13). the disposition of the orders which is mentioned by gregory is also reasonable. for since the "dominations" appoint and order what belongs to the divine ministrations, the orders subject to them are arranged according to the disposition of those things in which the divine ministrations are effected. still, as augustine says (de trin. iii), "bodies are ruled in a certain order; the inferior by the superior; and all of them by the spiritual creature, and the bad spirit by the good spirit." so the first order after the "dominations" is called that of "principalities," who rule even over good spirits; then the "powers," who coerce the evil spirits; even as evil-doers are coerced by earthly powers, as it is written (rom. 13:3,4). after these come the "virtues," which have power over corporeal nature in the working of miracles; after these are the "angels" and the "archangels," who announce to men either great things above reason, or small things within the purview of reason. reply obj. 1: the angels' subjection to god is greater than their presiding over inferior things; and the latter is derived from the former. thus the orders which derive their name from presiding are not the first and highest; but rather the orders deriving their name from their nearness and relation to god. reply obj. 2: the nearness to god designated by the name of the "thrones," belongs also to the "cherubim" and "seraphim," and in a more excellent way, as above explained. reply obj. 3: as above explained (q. 27, a. 3), knowledge takes place accordingly as the thing known is in the knower; but love as the lover is united to the object loved. now higher things are in a nobler way in themselves than in lower things; whereas lower things are in higher things in a nobler way than they are in themselves. therefore to know lower things is better than to love them; and to love the higher things, god above all, is better than to know them. reply obj. 4: a careful comparison will show that little or no difference exists in reality between the dispositions of the orders according to dionysius and gregory. for gregory expounds the name "principalities" from their "presiding over good spirits," which also agrees with the "virtues" accordingly as this name expressed a certain strength, giving efficacy to the inferior spirits in the execution of the divine ministrations. again, according to gregory, the "virtues" seem to be the same as "principalities" of dionysius. for to work miracles holds the first place in the divine ministrations; since thereby the way is prepared for the announcements of the "archangels" and the "angels." _______________________ seventh article [i, q. 108, art. 7] whether the orders will outlast the day of judgment? objection 1: it would seem that the orders of angels will not outlast the day of judgment. for the apostle says (1 cor. 15:24), that christ will "bring to naught all principality and power, when he shall have delivered up the kingdom to god and the father," and this will be in the final consummation. therefore for the same reason all others will be abolished in that state. obj. 2: further, to the office of the angelic orders it belongs to cleanse, enlighten, and perfect. but after the day of judgment one angel will not cleanse, enlighten, or perfect another, because they will not advance any more in knowledge. therefore the angelic orders would remain for no purpose. obj. 3: further, the apostle says of the angels (heb. 1:14), that "they are all ministering spirits, sent to minister to them who shall receive the inheritance of salvation"; whence it appears that the angelic offices are ordered for the purpose of leading men to salvation. but all the elect are in pursuit of salvation until the day of judgment. therefore the angelic offices and orders will not outlast the day of judgment. _on the contrary,_ it is written (judges 5:20): "stars remaining in their order and courses," which is applied to the angels. therefore the angels will ever remain in their orders. _i answer that,_ in the angelic orders we may consider two things; the distinction of grades, and the execution of their offices. the distinction of grades among the angels takes place according to the difference of grace and nature, as above explained (a. 4); and these differences will ever remain in the angels; for these differences of natures cannot be taken from them unless they themselves be corrupted. the difference of glory will also ever remain in them according to the difference of preceding merit. as to the execution of the angelic offices, it will to a certain degree remain after the day of judgment, and to a certain degree will cease. it will cease accordingly as their offices are directed towards leading others to their end; but it will remain, accordingly as it agrees with the attainment of the end. thus also the various ranks of soldiers have different duties to perform in battle and in triumph. reply obj. 1: the principalities and powers will come to an end in that final consummation as regards their office of leading others to their end; because when the end is attained, it is no longer necessary to tend towards the end. this is clear from the words of the apostle, "when he shall have delivered up the kingdom of god and the father," i.e. when he shall have led the faithful to the enjoyment of god himself. reply obj. 2: the actions of angels over the other angels are to be considered according to a likeness to our own intellectual actions. in ourselves we find many intellectual actions which are ordered according to the order of cause and effect; as when we gradually arrive at one conclusion by many middle terms. now it is manifest that the knowledge of a conclusion depends on all the preceding middle terms not only in the new acquisition of knowledge, but also as regards the keeping of the knowledge acquired. a proof of this is that when anyone forgets any of the preceding middle terms he can have opinion or belief about the conclusion, but not knowledge; as he is ignorant of the order of the causes. so, since the inferior angels know the types of the divine works by the light of the superior angels, their knowledge depends on the light of the superior angels not only as regards the acquisition of knowledge, but also as regards the preserving of the knowledge possessed. so, although after the judgment the inferior angels will not progress in the knowledge of some things, still this will not prevent their being enlightened by the superior angels. reply obj. 3: although after the day of judgment men will not be led any more to salvation by the ministry of the angels, still those who are already saved will be enlightened through the angelic ministry. _______________________ eighth article [i, q. 108, art. 8] whether men are taken up into the angelic orders? objection 1: it would seem that men are not taken up into the orders of the angels. for the human hierarchy is stationed beneath the lowest heavenly hierarchy, as the lowest under the middle hierarchy and the middle beneath the first. but the angels of the lowest hierarchy are never transferred into the middle, or the first. therefore neither are men transferred to the angelic orders. obj. 2: further, certain offices belong to the orders of the angels, as to guard, to work miracles, to coerce the demons, and the like; which do not appear to belong to the souls of the saints. therefore they are not transferred to the angelic orders. obj. 3: further, as the good angels lead on to good, so do the demons to what is evil. but it is erroneous to say that the souls of bad men are changed into demons; for chrysostom rejects this (hom. xxviii in matt.). therefore it does not seem that the souls of the saints will be transferred to the orders of angels. _on the contrary,_ the lord says of the saints that, "they will be as the angels of god" (matt. 22:30). _i answer that,_ as above explained (aa. 4,7), the orders of the angels are distinguished according to the conditions of nature and according to the gifts of grace. considered only as regards the grade of nature, men can in no way be assumed into the angelic orders; for the natural distinction will always remain. in view of this distinction, some asserted that men can in no way be transferred to an equality with the angels; but this is erroneous, contradicting as it does the promise of christ saying that the children of the resurrection will be equal to the angels in heaven (luke 20:36). for whatever belongs to nature is the material part of an order; whilst that which perfects is from grace which depends on the liberality of god, and not on the order of nature. therefore by the gift of grace men can merit glory in such a degree as to be equal to the angels, in each of the angelic grades; and this implies that men are taken up into the orders of the angels. some, however, say that not all who are saved are assumed into the angelic orders, but only virgins or the perfect; and that the other will constitute their own order, as it were, corresponding to the whole society of the angels. but this is against what augustine says (de civ. dei xii, 9), that "there will not be two societies of men and angels, but only one; because the beatitude of all is to cleave to god alone." reply obj. 1: grace is given to the angels in proportion to their natural gifts. this, however, does not apply to men, as above explained (a. 4; q. 62, a. 6). so, as the inferior angels cannot be transferred to the natural grade of the superior, neither can they be transferred to the superior grade of grace; whereas men can ascend to the grade of grace, but not of nature. reply obj. 2: the angels according to the order of nature are between us and god; and therefore according to the common law not only human affairs are administered by them, but also all corporeal matters. but holy men even after this life are of the same nature with ourselves; and hence according to the common law they do not administer human affairs, "nor do they interfere in the things of the living," as augustine says (de cura pro mortuis xiii, xvi). still, by a certain special dispensation it is sometimes granted to some of the saints to exercise these offices; by working miracles, by coercing the demons, or by doing something of that kind, as augustine says (de cura pro mortuis xvi). reply obj. 3: it is not erroneous to say that men are transferred to the penalty of demons; but some erroneously stated that the demons are nothing but souls of the dead; and it is this that chrysostom rejects. _______________________ question 109 the ordering of the bad angels (in four articles) we now consider the ordering of the bad angels; concerning which there are four points of inquiry: (1) whether there are orders among the demons? (2) whether among them there is precedence? (3) whether one enlightens another? (4) whether they are subject to the precedence of the good angels? _______________________ first article [i, q. 109, art. 1] whether there are orders among the demons? objection 1: it would seem that there are no orders among the demons. for order belongs to good, as also mode, and species, as augustine says (de nat. boni iii); and on the contrary, disorder belongs to evil. but there is nothing disorderly in the good angels. therefore in the bad angels there are no orders. obj. 2: further, the angelic orders are contained under a hierarchy. but the demons are not in a hierarchy, which is defined as a holy principality; for they are void of all holiness. therefore among the demons there are no orders. obj. 3: further, the demons fell from every one of the angelic orders; as is commonly supposed. therefore, if some demons are said to belong to an order, as falling from that order, it would seem necessary to give them the names of each of those orders. but we never find that they are called "seraphim," or "thrones," or "dominations." therefore on the same ground they are not to be placed in any other order. _on the contrary,_ the apostle says (eph. 6:12): "our wrestling . . . is against principalities and powers, against the rulers of the world of this darkness." _i answer that,_ as explained above (q. 108, aa. 4, 7, 8), order in the angels is considered both according to the grade of nature; and according to that of grace. now grace has a twofold state, the imperfect, which is that of merit; and the perfect, which is that of consummate glory. if therefore we consider the angelic orders in the light of the perfection of glory, then the demons are not in the angelic orders, and never were. but if we consider them in relation to imperfect grace, in that view the demons were at the time in the orders of angels, but fell away from them, according to what was said above (q. 62, a. 3), that all the angels were created in grace. but if we consider them in the light of nature, in that view they are still in those orders; because they have not lost their natural gifts; as dionysius says (div. nom. iv). reply obj. 1: good can exist without evil; whereas evil cannot exist without good (q. 49, a. 3); so there is order in the demons, as possessing a good nature. reply obj. 2: if we consider the ordering of the demons on the part of god who orders them, it is sacred; for he uses the demons for himself; but on the part of the demons' will it is not a sacred thing, because they abuse their nature for evil. reply obj. 3: the name "seraphim" is given from the ardor of charity; and the name "thrones" from the divine indwelling; and the name "dominations" imports a certain liberty; all of which are opposed to sin; and therefore these names are not given to the angels who sinned. _______________________ second article [i, q. 109, art. 2] whether among the demons there is precedence? objection 1: it would seem that there is no precedence among the demons. for every precedence is according to some order of justice. but the demons are wholly fallen from justice. therefore there is no precedence among them. obj. 2: further, there is no precedence where obedience and subjection do not exist. but these cannot be without concord; which is not to be found among the demons, according to the text, "among the proud there are always contentions" (prov. 13:10). therefore there is no precedence among the demons. obj. 3: if there be precedence among them it is either according to nature, or according to their sin or punishment. but it is not according to their nature, for subjection and service do not come from nature but from subsequent sin; neither is it according to sin or punishment, because in that case the superior demons who have sinned the most grievously, would be subject to the inferior. therefore there is no precedence among the demons. _on the contrary,_ on 1 cor. 15:24 the gloss says: "while the world lasts, angels will preside over angels, men over men, and demons over demons." _i answer that,_ since action follows the nature of a thing, where natures are subordinate, actions also must be subordinate to each other. thus it is in corporeal things, for as the inferior bodies by natural order are below the heavenly bodies, their actions and movements are subject to the actions and movements of the heavenly bodies. now it is plain from what we have said (a. 1), that the demons are by natural order subject to others; and hence their actions are subject to the action of those above them, and this is what we mean by precedence--that the action of the subject should be under the action of the prelate. so the very natural disposition of the demons requires that there should be authority among them. this agrees too with divine wisdom, which leaves nothing inordinate, which "reacheth from end to end mightily, and ordereth all things sweetly" (wis. 8:1). reply obj. 1: the authority of the demons is not founded on their justice, but on the justice of god ordering all things. reply obj. 2: the concord of the demons, whereby some obey others, does not arise from mutual friendships, but from their common wickedness whereby they hate men, and fight against god's justice. for it belongs to wicked men to be joined to and subject to those whom they see to be stronger, in order to carry out their own wickedness. reply obj. 3: the demons are not equal in nature; and so among them there exists a natural precedence; which is not the case with men, who are naturally equal. that the inferior are subject to the superior, is not for the benefit of the superior, but rather to their detriment; because since to do evil belongs in a pre-eminent degree to unhappiness, it follows that to preside in evil is to be more unhappy. _______________________ third article [i, q. 109, art. 3] whether there is enlightenment in the demons? objection 1: it would seem that enlightenment is in the demons. for enlightenment means the manifestation of the truth. but one demon can manifest truth to another, because the superior excel in natural knowledge. therefore the superior demons can enlighten the inferior. obj. 2: further, a body abounding in light can enlighten a body deficient in light, as the sun enlightens the moon. but the superior demons abound in the participation of natural light. therefore it seems that the superior demons can enlighten the inferior. _on the contrary,_ enlightenment is not without cleansing and perfecting, as stated above (q. 106, a. 1). but to cleanse does not befit the demons, according to the words: "what can be made clean by the unclean?" (ecclus. 34:4). therefore neither can they enlighten. _i answer that,_ there can be no enlightenment properly speaking among the demons. for, as above explained (q. 107, a. 2), enlightenment properly speaking is the manifestation of the truth in reference to god, who enlightens every intellect. another kind of manifestation of the truth is speech, as when one angel manifests his concept to another. now the demon's perversity does not lead one to order another to god, but rather to lead away from the divine order; and so one demon does not enlighten another; but one can make known his mental concept to another by way of speech. reply obj. 1: not every kind of manifestation of the truth is enlightenment, but only that which is above described. reply obj. 2: according to what belongs to natural knowledge, there is no necessary manifestation of the truth either in the angels, or in the demons, because, as above explained (q. 55, a. 2; q. 58, a. 2; q. 79, a. 2), they know from the first all that belongs to their natural knowledge. so the greater fulness of natural light in the superior demons does not prove that they can enlighten others. _______________________ fourth article [i, q. 109, art. 4] whether the good angels have precedence over the bad angels? objection 1: it would seem that the good angels have no precedence over the bad angels. for the angels' precedence is especially connected with enlightenment. but the bad angels, being darkness, are not enlightened by the good angels. therefore the good angels do not rule over the bad. obj. 2: further, superiors are responsible as regards negligence for the evil deeds of their subjects. but the demons do much evil. therefore if they are subject to the good angels, it seems that negligence is to be charged to the good angels; which cannot be admitted. obj. 3: further, the angels' precedence follows upon the order of nature, as above explained (a. 2). but if the demons fell from every order, as is commonly said, many of the demons are superior to many good angels in the natural order. therefore the good angels have no precedence over all the bad angels. _on the contrary,_ augustine says (de trin. iii), that "the treacherous and sinful spirit of life is ruled by the rational, pious, and just spirit of life"; and gregory says (hom. xxxiv) that "the powers are the angels to whose charge are subjected the hostile powers." _i answer that,_ the whole order of precedence is first and originally in god; and it is shared by creatures accordingly as they are the nearer to god. for those creatures, which are more perfect and nearer to god, have the power to act on others. now the greatest perfection and that which brings them nearest to god belongs to the creatures who enjoy god, as the holy angels; of which perfection the demons are deprived; and therefore the good angels have precedence over the bad, and these are ruled by them. reply obj. 1: many things concerning divine mysteries are made known by the holy angels to the bad angels, whenever the divine justice requires the demons to do anything for the punishment of the evil; or for the trial of the good; as in human affairs the judge's assessors make known his sentence to the executioners. this revelation, if compared to the angelic revealers, can be called an enlightenment, forasmuch as they direct it to god; but it is not an enlightenment on the part of the demons, for these do not direct it to god; but to the fulfilment of their own wickedness. reply obj. 2: the holy angels are the ministers of the divine wisdom. hence as the divine wisdom permits some evil to be done by bad angels or men, for the sake of the good that follows; so also the good angels do not entirely restrain the bad from inflicting harm. reply obj. 3: an angel who is inferior in the natural order presides over demons, although these may be naturally superior; because the power of divine justice to which the good angels cleave, is stronger than the natural power of the angels. hence likewise among men, "the spiritual man judgeth all things" (1 cor. 2:15), and the philosopher says (ethic. iii, 4; x, 5) that "the virtuous man is the rule and measure of all human acts." _______________________ question 110 how angels act on bodies (in four articles) we now consider how the angels preside over the corporeal creatures. under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) whether the corporeal creature is governed by the angels? (2) whether the corporeal creature obeys the mere will of the angels? (3) whether the angels by their own power can immediately move bodies locally? (4) whether the good or bad angels can work miracles? _______________________ first article [i, q. 110, art. 1] whether the corporeal creature is governed by the angels? objection 1: it would seem that the corporeal creature is not governed by angels. for whatever possesses a determinate mode of action, needs not to be governed by any superior power; for we require to be governed lest we do what we ought not. but corporeal things have their actions determined by the nature divinely bestowed upon them. therefore they do not need the government of angels. obj. 2: further, the lowest things are ruled by the superior. but some corporeal things are inferior, and others are superior. therefore they need not be governed by the angels. obj. 3: further, the different orders of the angels are distinguished by different offices. but if corporeal creatures were ruled by the angels, there would be as many angelic offices as there are species of things. so also there would be as many orders of angels as there are species of things; which is against what is laid down above (q. 108, a. 2). therefore the corporeal creature is not governed by angels. _on the contrary,_ augustine says (de trin. iii, 4) that "all bodies are ruled by the rational spirit of life"; and gregory says (dial. iv, 6), that "in this visible world nothing takes place without the agency of the invisible creature." _i answer that,_ it is generally found both in human affairs and in natural things that every particular power is governed and ruled by the universal power; as, for example, the bailiff's power is governed by the power of the king. among the angels also, as explained above (q. 55, a. 3; q. 108, a. 1), the superior angels who preside over the inferior possess a more universal knowledge. now it is manifest that the power of any individual body is more particular than the power of any spiritual substance; for every corporeal form is a form individualized by matter, and determined to the "here and now"; whereas immaterial forms are absolute and intelligible. therefore, as the inferior angels who have the less universal forms, are ruled by the superior; so are all corporeal things ruled by the angels. this is not only laid down by the holy doctors, but also by all philosophers who admit the existence of incorporeal substances. reply obj. 1: corporeal things have determinate actions; but they exercise such actions only according as they are moved; because it belongs to a body not to act unless moved. hence a corporeal creature must be moved by a spiritual creature. reply obj. 2: the reason alleged is according to the opinion of aristotle who laid down (metaph. xi, 8) that the heavenly bodies are moved by spiritual substances; the number of which he endeavored to assign according to the number of motions apparent in the heavenly bodies. but he did not say that there were any spiritual substances with immediate rule over the inferior bodies, except perhaps human souls; and this was because he did not consider that any operations were exercised in the inferior bodies except the natural ones for which the movement of the heavenly bodies sufficed. but because we assert that many things are done in the inferior bodies besides the natural corporeal actions, for which the movements of the heavenly bodies are not sufficient; therefore in our opinion we must assert that the angels possess an immediate presidency not only over the heavenly bodies, but also over the inferior bodies. reply obj. 3: philosophers have held different opinions about immaterial substances. for plato laid down that immaterial substances were types and species of sensible bodies; and that some were more universal than others; and so he held that immaterial substances preside immediately over all sensible bodies, and different ones over different bodies. but aristotle held that immaterial substances are not the species of sensible bodies, but something higher and more universal; and so he did not attribute to them any immediate presiding over single bodies, but only over the universal agents, the heavenly bodies. avicenna followed a middle course. for he agreed with plato in supposing some spiritual substance to preside immediately in the sphere of active and passive elements; because, as plato also said, he held that the forms of these sensible things are derived from immaterial substances. but he differed from plato because he supposed only one immaterial substance to preside over all inferior bodies, which he called the "active intelligence." the holy doctors held with the platonists that different spiritual substances were placed over corporeal things. for augustine says (qq. 83, qu. 79): "every visible thing in this world has an angelic power placed over it"; and damascene says (de fide orth. ii, 4): "the devil was one of the angelic powers who presided over the terrestrial order"; and origen says on the text, "when the ass saw the angel" (num. 22:23), that "the world has need of angels who preside over beasts, and over the birth of animals, and trees, and plants, and over the increase of all other things" (hom. xiv in num.). the reason of this, however, is not that an angel is more fitted by his nature to preside over animals than over plants; because each angel, even the least, has a higher and more universal power than any kind of corporeal things: the reason is to be sought in the order of divine wisdom, who places different rulers over different things. nor does it follow that there are more than nine orders of angels, because, as above expounded (q. 108, a. 2), the orders are distinguished by their general offices. hence as according to gregory all the angels whose proper office it is to preside over the demons are of the order of the "powers"; so to the order of the "virtues" do those angels seem to belong who preside over purely corporeal creatures; for by their ministration miracles are sometimes performed. _______________________ second article [i, q. 110, art. 2] whether corporeal matter obeys the mere will of an angel? objection 1: it would seem that corporeal matter obeys the mere will of an angel. for the power of an angel excels the power of the soul. but corporeal matter obeys a conception of the soul; for the body of man is changed by a conception of the soul as regards heat and cold, and sometimes even as regards health and sickness. therefore much more is corporeal matter changed by a conception of an angel. obj. 2: further, whatever can be done by an inferior power, can be done by a superior power. now the power of an angel is superior to corporeal power. but a body by its power is able to transform corporeal matter; as appears when fire begets fire. therefore much more efficaciously can an angel by his power transform corporeal matter. obj. 3: further, all corporeal nature is under angelic administration, as appears above (a. 1), and thus it appears that bodies are as instruments to the angels, for an instrument is essentially a mover moved. now in effects there is something that is due to the power of their principal agents, and which cannot be due to the power of the instrument; and this it is that takes the principal place in the effect. for example, digestion is due to the force of natural heat, which is the instrument of the nutritive soul: but that living flesh is thus generated is due to the power of the soul. again the cutting of the wood is from the saw; but that it assumes the length the form of a bed is from the design of the [joiner's] art. therefore the substantial form which takes the principal place in the corporeal effects, is due to the angelic power. therefore matter obeys the angels in receiving its form. _on the contrary,_ augustine says "it is not to be thought, that this visible matter obeys these rebel angels; for it obeys god alone." _i answer that,_ the platonists [*phaedo. xlix: tim. (did.) vol. ii, p. 218] asserted that the forms which are in matter are caused by immaterial forms, because they said that the material forms are participations of immaterial forms. avicenna followed them in this opinion to some extent, for he said that all forms which are in matter proceed from the concept of the _intellect;_ and that corporeal agents only dispose [matter] for the forms. they seem to have been deceived on this point, through supposing a form to be something made _per se,_ so that it would be the effect of a formal principle. but, as the philosopher proves (metaph. vii, did. vi, 8), what is made, properly speaking, is the _composite:_ for this properly speaking, is, as it were, what subsists. whereas the form is called a being, not as that which is, but as that by which something is; and consequently neither is a form, properly speaking, made; for that is made which is; since to be is nothing but the way to existence. now it is manifest that what is made is like to the maker, forasmuch as every agent makes its like. so whatever makes natural things, has a likeness to the composite; either because it is composite itself, as when fire begets fire, or because the whole "composite" as to both matter and form is within its power; and this belongs to god alone. therefore every informing of matter is either immediately from god, or form some corporeal agent; but not immediately from an angel. reply obj. 1: our soul is united to the body as the form; and so it is not surprising for the body to be formally changed by the soul's concept; especially as the movement of the sensitive appetite, which is accompanied with a certain bodily change, is subject to the command of reason. an angel, however, has not the same connection with natural bodies; and hence the argument does not hold. reply obj. 2: whatever an inferior power can do, that a superior power can do, not in the same way, but in a more excellent way; for example, the intellect knows sensible things in a more excellent way than sense knows them. so an angel can change corporeal matter in a more excellent way than can corporeal agents, that is by moving the corporeal agents themselves, as being the superior cause. reply obj. 3: there is nothing to prevent some natural effect taking place by angelic power, for which the power of corporeal agents would not suffice. this, however, is not to obey an angel's will (as neither does matter obey the mere will of a cook, when by regulating the fire according to the prescription of his art he produces a dish that the fire could not have produced by itself); since to reduce matter to the act of the substantial form does not exceed the power of a corporeal agent; for it is natural for like to make like. _______________________ third article [i, q. 110, art. 3] whether bodies obey the angels as regards local motion? objection 1: it would seem that bodies do not obey the angels in local motion. for the local motion of natural bodies follows on their forms. but the angels do not cause the forms of natural bodies, as stated above (a. 2). therefore neither can they cause in them local motion. obj. 2: further, the philosopher (phys. viii, 7) proves that local motion is the first of all movements. but the angels cannot cause other movements by a formal change of the matter. therefore neither can they cause local motion. obj. 3: further, the corporeal members obey the concept of the soul as regards local movement, as having in themselves some principle of life. in natural bodies, however, there is no vital principle. therefore they do not obey the angels in local motion. _on the contrary,_ augustine says (de trin. iii, 8,9) that the angels use corporeal seed to produce certain effects. but they cannot do this without causing local movement. therefore bodies obey them in local motion. _i answer that,_ as dionysius says (div. nom. vii): "divine wisdom has joined the ends of the first to the principles of the second." hence it is clear that the inferior nature at its highest point is in conjunction with superior nature. now corporeal nature is below the spiritual nature. but among all corporeal movements the most perfect is local motion, as the philosopher proves (phys. viii, 7). the reason of this is that what is moved locally is not as such in potentiality to anything intrinsic, but only to something extrinsic--that is, to place. therefore the corporeal nature has a natural aptitude to be moved immediately by the spiritual nature as regards place. hence also the philosophers asserted that the supreme bodies are moved locally by the spiritual substances; whence we see that the soul moves the body first and chiefly by a local motion. reply obj. 1: there are in bodies other local movements besides those which result from the forms; for instance, the ebb and flow of the sea does not follow from the substantial form of the water, but from the influence of the moon; and much more can local movements result from the power of spiritual substances. reply obj. 2: the angels, by causing local motion, as the first motion, can thereby cause other movements; that is, by employing corporeal agents to produce these effects, as a workman employs fire to soften iron. reply obj. 3: the power of an angel is not so limited as is the power of the soul. hence the motive power of the soul is limited to the body united to it, which is vivified by it, and by which it can move other things. but an angel's power is not limited to any body; hence it can move locally bodies not joined to it. _______________________ fourth article [i, q. 110, art. 4] whether angels can work miracles? objection 1: it would seem that the angels can work miracles. for gregory says (hom. xxxiv in evang.): "those spirits are called virtues by whom signs and miracles are usually done." obj. 2: further, augustine says (qq. 83, qu. 79) that "magicians work miracles by private contracts; good christians by public justice, bad christians by the signs of public justice." but magicians work miracles because they are "heard by the demons," as he says elsewhere in the same work [*cf. liber xxi, sentent., sent. 4: among the supposititious works of st. augustine]. therefore the demons can work miracles. therefore much more can the good angels. obj. 3: further, augustine says in the same work [*cf. liber xxi, sentent., sent. 4: among the supposititious works of st. augustine] that "it is not absurd to believe that all the things we see happen may be brought about by the lower powers that dwell in our atmosphere." but when an effect of natural causes is produced outside the order of the natural cause, we call it a miracle, as, for instance, when anyone is cured of a fever without the operation of nature. therefore the angels and demons can work miracles. obj. 4: further, superior power is not subject to the order of an inferior cause. but corporeal nature is inferior to an angel. therefore an angel can work outside the order of corporeal agents; which is to work miracles. _on the contrary,_ it is written of god (ps. 135:4): "who alone doth great wonders." _i answer that,_ a miracle properly so called is when something is done outside the order of nature. but it is not enough for a miracle if something is done outside the order of any particular nature; for otherwise anyone would perform a miracle by throwing a stone upwards, as such a thing is outside the order of the stone's nature. so for a miracle is required that it be against the order of the whole created nature. but god alone can do this, because, whatever an angel or any other creature does by its own power, is according to the order of created nature; and thus it is not a miracle. hence god alone can work miracles. reply obj. 1: some angels are said to work miracles; either because god works miracles at their request, in the same way as holy men are said to work miracles; or because they exercise a kind of ministry in the miracles which take place; as in collecting the dust in the general resurrection, or by doing something of that kind. reply obj. 2: properly speaking, as said above, miracles are those things which are done outside the order of the whole created nature. but as we do not know all the power of created nature, it follows that when anything is done outside the order of created nature by a power unknown to us, it is called a miracle as regards ourselves. so when the demons do anything of their own natural power, these things are called "miracles" not in an absolute sense, but in reference to ourselves. in this way the magicians work miracles through the demons; and these are said to be done by "private contracts," forasmuch as every power of the creature, in the universe, may be compared to the power of a private person in a city. hence when a magician does anything by compact with the devil, this is done as it were by private contract. on the other hand, the divine justice is in the whole universe as the public law is in the city. therefore good christians, so far as they work miracles by divine justice, are said to work miracles by "public justice": but bad christians by the "signs of public justice," as by invoking the name of christ, or by making use of other sacred signs. reply obj. 3: spiritual powers are able to effect whatever happens in this visible world, by employing corporeal seeds by local movement. reply obj. 4: although the angels can do something which is outside the order of corporeal nature, yet they cannot do anything outside the whole created order, which is essential to a miracle, as above explained. _______________________ question 111 the action of the angels on man (in four articles) we now consider the action of the angels on man, and inquire: (1) how far they can change them by their own natural power; (2) how they are sent by god to the ministry of men; (3) how they guard and protect men. under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (1) whether an angel can enlighten the human intellect? (2) whether he can change man's will? (3) whether he can change man's imagination? (4) whether he can change man's senses? _______________________ first article [i, q. 111, art. 1] whether an angel can enlighten man? objection 1: it would seem that an angel cannot enlighten man. for man is enlightened by faith; hence dionysius (eccl. hier. iii) attributes enlightenment to baptism, as "the sacrament of faith." but faith is immediately from god, according to eph. 2:8: "by grace you are saved through faith, and that not of yourselves, for it is the gift of god." therefore man is not enlightened by an angel; but immediately by god. obj. 2: further, on the words, "god hath manifested it to them" (rom. 1:19), the gloss observes that "not only natural reason availed for the manifestation of divine truths to men, but god also revealed them by his work," that is, by his creature. but both are immediately from god--that is, natural reason and the creature. therefore god enlightens man immediately. obj. 3: further, whoever is enlightened is conscious of being enlightened. but man is not conscious of being enlightened by angels. therefore he is not enlightened by them. _on the contrary,_ dionysius says (coel. hier. iv) that the revelation of divine things reaches men through the ministry of the angels. but such revelation is an enlightenment as we have stated (q. 106, a. 1; q. 107, a. 2). therefore men are enlightened by the angels. _i answer that,_ since the order of divine providence disposes that lower things be subject to the actions of higher, as explained above (q. 109, a. 2); as the inferior angels are enlightened by the superior, so men, who are inferior to the angels, are enlightened by them. the modes of each of these kinds of enlightenment are in one way alike and in another way unlike. for, as was shown above (q. 106, a. 1), the enlightenment which consists in making known divine truth has two functions; namely, according as the inferior intellect is strengthened by the action of the superior intellect, and according as the intelligible species which are in the superior intellect are proposed to the inferior so as to be grasped thereby. this takes place in the angels when the superior angel divides his universal concept of the truth according to the capacity of the inferior angel, as explained above (q. 106, a. 1). the human intellect, however, cannot grasp the universal truth itself unveiled; because its nature requires it to understand by turning to the phantasms, as above explained (q. 84, a. 7). so the angels propose the intelligible truth to men under the similitudes of sensible things, according to what dionysius says (coel. hier. i), that, "it is impossible for the divine ray to shine on us, otherwise than shrouded by the variety of the sacred veils." on the other hand, the human intellect as the inferior, is strengthened by the action of the angelic intellect. and in these two ways man is enlightened by an angel. reply obj. 1: two dispositions concur in the virtue of faith; first, the habit of the intellect whereby it is disposed to obey the will tending to divine truth. for the intellect assents to the truth of faith, not as convinced by the reason, but as commanded by the will; hence augustine says, "no one believes except willingly." in this respect faith comes from god alone. secondly, faith requires that what is to be believed be proposed to the believer; which is accomplished by man, according to rom. 10:17, "faith cometh by hearing"; principally, however, by the angels, by whom divine things are revealed to men. hence the angels have some part in the enlightenment of faith. moreover, men are enlightened by the angels not only concerning what is to be believed; but also as regards what is to be done. reply obj. 2: natural reason, which is immediately from god, can be strengthened by an angel, as we have said above. again, the more the human intellect is strengthened, so much higher an intelligible truth can be elicited from the species derived from creatures. thus man is assisted by an angel so that he may obtain from creatures a more perfect knowledge of god. reply obj. 3: intellectual operation and enlightenment can be understood in two ways. first, on the part of the object understood; thus whoever understands or is enlightened, knows that he understands or is enlightened, because he knows that the object is made known to him. secondly, on the part of the principle; and thus it does not follow that whoever understands a truth, knows what the intellect is, which is the principle of the intellectual operation. in like manner not everyone who is enlightened by an angel, knows that he is enlightened by him. _______________________ second article [i, q. 111, art. 3] whether the angels can change the will of man? objection 1: it would seem that the angels can change the will of man. for, upon the text, "who maketh his angels spirits and his ministers a flame of fire" (heb. 1:7), the gloss notes that "they are fire, as being spiritually fervent, and as burning away our vices." this could not be, however, unless they changed the will. therefore the angels can change the will. obj. 2: further, bede says (super matth. xv, 11), that, "the devil does not send wicked thoughts, but kindles them." damascene, however, says that he also sends them; for he remarks that "every malicious act and unclean passion is contrived by the demons and put into men" (de fide orth. ii, 4); in like manner also the good angels introduce and kindle good thoughts. but this could only be if they changed the will. therefore the will is changed by them. obj. 3: further, the angel, as above explained, enlightens the human intellect by means of the phantasms. but as the imagination which serves the intellect can be changed by an angel, so can the sensitive appetite which serves the will, because it also is a faculty using a corporeal organ. therefore as the angel enlightens the mind, so can he change the will. _on the contrary,_ to change the will belongs to god alone, according to prov. 21:1: "the heart of the king is in the hand of the lord, whithersoever he will he shall turn it." _i answer that,_ the will can be changed in two ways. first, from within; in which way, since the movement of the will is nothing but the inclination of the will to the thing willed, god alone can thus change the will, because he gives the power of such an inclination to the intellectual nature. for as the natural inclination is from god alone who gives the nature, so the inclination of the will is from god alone, who causes the will. secondly, the will is moved from without. as regards an angel, this can be only in one way--by the good apprehended by the intellect. hence in as far as anyone may be the cause why anything be apprehended as an appetible good, so far does he move the will. in this way also god alone can move the will efficaciously; but an angel and man move the will by way of persuasion, as above explained (q. 106, a. 2). in addition to this mode the human will can be moved from without in another way; namely, by the passion residing in the sensitive appetite: thus by concupiscence or anger the will is inclined to will something. in this manner the angels, as being able to rouse these passions, can move the will, not however by necessity, for the will ever remains free to consent to, or to resist, the passion. reply obj. 1: those who act as god's ministers, either men or angels, are said to burn away vices, and to incite to virtue by way of persuasion. reply obj. 2: the demon cannot put thoughts in our minds by causing them from within, since the act of the cogitative faculty is subject to the will; nevertheless the devil is called the kindler of thoughts, inasmuch as he incites to thought, by the desire of the things thought of, by way of persuasion, or by rousing the passions. damascene calls this kindling "a putting in" because such a work is accomplished within. but good thoughts are attributed to a higher principle, namely, god, though they may be procured by the ministry of the angels. reply obj. 3: the human intellect in its present state can understand only by turning to the phantasms; but the human will can will something following the judgment of reason rather than the passion of the sensitive appetite. hence the comparison does not hold. _______________________ third article [i, q. 111, art. 3] whether an angel can change man's imagination? objection 1: it would seem that an angel cannot change man's imagination. for the phantasy, as is said _de anima_ iii, is "a motion caused by the sense in act." but if this motion were caused by an angel, it would not be caused by the sense in act. therefore it is contrary to the nature of the phantasy, which is the act of the imaginative faculty, to be changed by an angel. obj. 2: further, since the forms in the imagination are spiritual, they are nobler than the forms existing in sensible matter. but an angel cannot impress forms upon sensible matter (q. 110, a. 2). therefore he cannot impress forms on the imagination, and so he cannot change it. obj. 3: further, augustine says (gen. ad lit. xii, 12): "one spirit by intermingling with another can communicate his knowledge to the other spirit by these images, so that the latter either understands it himself, or accepts it as understood by the other." but it does not seem that an angel can be mingled with the human imagination, nor that the imagination can receive the knowledge of an angel. therefore it seems that an angel cannot change the imagination. obj. 4: further, in the imaginative vision man cleaves to the similitudes of the things as to the things themselves. but in this there is deception. so as a good angel cannot be the cause of deception, it seems that he cannot cause the imaginative vision, by changing the imagination. _on the contrary,_ those things which are seen in dreams are seen by imaginative vision. but the angels reveal things in dreams, as appears from matt. 1:20; 2:13, 19 in regard to the angel who appeared to joseph in dreams. therefore an angel can move the imagination. _i answer that,_ both a good and a bad angel by their own natural power can move the human imagination. this may be explained as follows. for it was said above (q. 110, a. 3), that corporeal nature obeys the angel as regards local movement, so that whatever can be caused by the local movement of bodies is subject to the natural power of the angels. now it is manifest that imaginative apparitions are sometimes caused in us by the local movement of animal spirits and humors. hence aristotle says (de somn. et vigil.) [*de insomniis iii], when assigning the cause of visions in dreams, that "when an animal sleeps, the blood descends in abundance to the sensitive principle, and movements descend with it," that is, the impressions left from the movements are preserved in the animal spirits, "and move the sensitive principle"; so that a certain appearance ensues, as if the sensitive principle were being then changed by the external objects themselves. indeed, the commotion of the spirits and humors may be so great that such appearances may even occur to those who are awake, as is seen in mad people, and the like. so, as this happens by a natural disturbance of the humors, and sometimes also by the will of man who voluntarily imagines what he previously experienced, so also the same may be done by the power of a good or a bad angel, sometimes with alienation from the bodily senses, sometimes without such alienation. reply obj. 1: the first principle of the imagination is from the sense in act. for we cannot imagine what we have never perceived by the senses, either wholly or partly; as a man born blind cannot imagine color. sometimes, however, the imagination is informed in such a way that the act of the imaginative movement arises from the impressions preserved within. reply obj. 2: an angel changes the imagination, not indeed by the impression of an imaginative form in no way previously received from the senses (for he cannot make a man born blind imagine color), but by local movement of the spirits and humors, as above explained. reply obj. 3: the commingling of the angelic spirit with the human imagination is not a mingling of essences, but by reason of an effect which he produces in the imagination in the way above stated; so that he shows man what he [the angel] knows, but not in the way he knows. reply obj. 4: an angel causing an imaginative vision, sometimes enlightens the intellect at the same time, so that it knows what these images signify; and then there is no deception. but sometimes by the angelic operation the similitudes of things only appear in the imagination; but neither then is deception caused by the angel, but by the defect in the intellect to whom such things appear. thus neither was christ a cause of deception when he spoke many things to the people in parables, which he did not explain to them. _______________________ fourth article [i, q. 111, art. 4] whether an angel can change the human senses? objection 1: it seems that an angel cannot change the human senses. for the sensitive operation is a vital operation. but such an operation does not come from an extrinsic principle. therefore the sensitive operation cannot be caused by an angel. obj. 2: further, the sensitive operation is nobler than the nutritive. but the angel cannot change the nutritive power, nor other natural forms. therefore neither can he change the sensitive power. obj. 3: further, the senses are naturally moved by the sensible objects. but an angel cannot change the order of nature (q. 110, a. 4). therefore an angel cannot change the senses; but these are changed always by the sensible object. _on the contrary,_ the angels who overturned sodom, "struck the people of sodom with blindness or _aorasia_, so that they could not find the door" (gen. 19:11). [*it is worth noting that these are the only two passages in the greek version where the word _aorasia_ appears. it expresses, in fact, the effect produced on the people of sodom--namely, dazzling (french version, "eblouissement"), which the latin "caecitas" (blindness) does not necessarily imply.] the same is recorded of the syrians whom eliseus led into samaria (4 kings 6:18). _i answer that,_ the senses may be changed in a twofold manner; from without, as when affected by the sensible object: and from within, for we see that the senses are changed when the spirits and humors are disturbed; as for example, a sick man's tongue, charged with choleric humor, tastes everything as bitter, and the like with the other senses. now an angel, by his natural power, can work a change in the senses both ways. for an angel can offer the senses a sensible object from without, formed by nature or by the angel himself, as when he assumes a body, as we have said above (q. 51, a. 2). likewise he can move the spirits and humors from within, as above remarked, whereby the senses are changed in various ways. reply obj. 1: the principle of the sensitive operation cannot be without the interior principle which is the sensitive power; but this interior principle can be moved in many ways by the exterior principle, as above explained. reply obj. 2: by the interior movement of the spirits and humors an angel can do something towards changing the act of the nutritive power, and also of the appetitive and sensitive power, and of any other power using a corporeal organ. reply obj. 3: an angel can do nothing outside the entire order of creatures; but he can outside some particular order of nature, since he is not subject to that order; thus in some special way an angel can work a change in the senses outside the common mode of nature. _______________________ question 112 the mission of the angels (in four articles) we next consider the mission of the angels. under this head arise four points of inquiry: (1) whether any angels are sent on works of ministry? (2) whether all are sent? (3) whether those who are sent, assist? (4) from what orders they are sent. _______________________ first article [i, q. 112, art. 1] whether the angels are sent on works of ministry? objection 1: it would seem that the angels are not sent on works of ministry. for every mission is to some determinate place. but intellectual actions do not determine a place, for intellect abstracts from the "here" and "now." since therefore the angelic actions are intellectual, it appears that the angels are not sent to perform their own actions. obj. 2: further, the empyrean heaven is the place that beseems the angelic dignity. therefore if they are sent to us in ministry, it seems that something of their dignity would be lost; which is unseemly. obj. 3: further, external occupation hinders the contemplation of wisdom; hence it is said: "he that is less in action, shall receive wisdom" (ecclus. 38:25). so if some angels are sent on external ministrations, they would seemingly be hindered from contemplation. but the whole of their beatitude consists in the contemplation of god. so if they were sent, their beatitude would be lessened; which is unfitting. obj. 4: further, to minister is the part of an inferior; hence it is written (luke 22:27): "which is the greater, he that sitteth at table, or he that serveth? is not he that sitteth at table?" but the angels are naturally greater than we are. therefore they are not sent to administer to us. _on the contrary,_ it is written (ex. 23:20): "behold i will send my angels who shall go before thee." _i answer that,_ from what has been said above (q. 108, a. 6), it may be shown that some angels are sent in ministry by god. for, as we have already stated (q. 43, a. 1), in treating of the mission of the divine persons, he is said to be sent who in any way proceeds from another so as to begin to be where he was not, or to be in another way, where he already was. thus the son, or the holy ghost is said to be sent as proceeding from the father by origin; and begins to be in a new way, by grace or by the nature assumed, where he was before by the presence of his godhead; for it belongs to god to be present everywhere, because, since he is the universal agent, his power reaches to all being, and hence he exists in all things (q. 8, a. 1). an angel's power, however, as a particular agent, does not reach to the whole universe, but reaches to one thing in such a way as not to reach another; and so he is "here" in such a manner as not to be "there." but it is clear from what was above stated (q. 110, a. 1), that the corporeal creature is governed by the angels. hence, whenever an angel has to perform any work concerning a corporeal creature, the angel applies himself anew to that body by his power; and in that way begins to be there afresh. now all this takes place by divine command. hence it follows that an angel is sent by god. yet the action performed by the angel who is sent, proceeds from god as from its first principle, at whose nod and by whose authority the angels work; and is reduced to god as to its last end. now this is what is meant by a minister: for a minister is an intelligent instrument; while an instrument is moved by another, and its action is ordered to another. hence angels' actions are called "ministries"; and for this reason they are said to be sent in ministry. reply obj. 1: an operation can be intellectual in two ways. in one way, as dwelling in the intellect itself, as contemplation; such an operation does not demand to occupy a place; indeed, as augustine says (de trin. iv, 20): "even we ourselves as mentally tasting something eternal, are not in this world." in another sense an action is said to be intellectual because it is regulated and commanded by some intellect; in that sense the intellectual operations evidently have sometimes a determinate place. reply obj. 2: the empyrean heaven belongs to the angelic dignity by way of congruity; forasmuch as it is congruous that the higher body should be attributed to that nature which occupies a rank above bodies. yet an angel does not derive his dignity from the empyrean heaven; so when he is not actually in the empyrean heaven, nothing of his dignity is lost, as neither does a king lessen his dignity when not actually sitting on his regal throne, which suits his dignity. reply obj. 3: in ourselves the purity of contemplation is obscured by exterior occupation; because we give ourselves to action through the sensitive faculties, the action of which when intense impedes the action of the intellectual powers. an angel, on the contrary, regulates his exterior actions by intellectual operation alone. hence it follows that his external occupations in no respect impede his contemplation; because given two actions, one of which is the rule and the reason of the other, one does not hinder but helps the other. wherefore gregory says (moral. ii) that "the angels do not go abroad in such a manner as to lose the delights of inward contemplation." reply obj. 4: in their external actions the angels chiefly minister to god, and secondarily to us; not because we are superior to them, absolutely speaking, but because, since every man or angel by cleaving to god is made one spirit with god, he is thereby superior to every creature. hence the apostle says (phil. 2:3): "esteeming others better than themselves." _______________________ second article [i, q. 112, art. 2] whether all the angels are sent in ministry? objection 1: it would seem that all the angels are sent in ministry. for the apostle says (heb. 1:14): "all are ministering spirits, sent to minister" [vulg. 'are they not all . . . ?']. obj. 2: further, among the orders, the highest is that of the seraphim, as stated above (q. 108, a. 6). but a seraph was sent to purify the lips of the prophet (isa. 6:6, 7). therefore much more are the inferior orders sent. obj. 3: further, the divine persons infinitely excel all the angelic orders. but the divine persons are sent. therefore much more are even the highest angels sent. obj. 4: further, if the superior angels are not sent to the external ministries, this can only be because the superior angels execute the divine ministries by means of the inferior angels. but as all the angels are unequal, as stated above (q. 50, a. 4), each angel has an angel inferior to himself except the last one. therefore only the last angel would be sent in ministry; which contradicts the words, "thousands of thousands ministered to him" (dan. 7:10). _on the contrary,_ gregory says (hom. xxxiv in evang.), quoting the statement of dionysius (coel. hier. xiii), that "the higher ranks fulfil no exterior service." _i answer that,_ as appears from what has been said above (q. 106, a. 3; q. 110, a. 1), the order of divine providence has so disposed not only among the angels, but also in the whole universe, that inferior things are administered by the superior. but the divine dispensation, however, this order is sometimes departed from as regards corporeal things, for the sake of a higher order, that is, according as it is suitable for the manifestation of grace. that the man born blind was enlightened, that lazarus was raised from the dead, was accomplished immediately by god without the action of the heavenly bodies. moreover both good and bad angels can work some effect in these bodies independently of the heavenly bodies, by the condensation of the clouds to rain, and by producing some such effects. nor can anyone doubt that god can immediately reveal things to men without the help of the angels, and the superior angels without the inferior. from this standpoint some have said that according to the general law the superior angels are not sent, but only the inferior; yet that sometimes, by divine dispensation, the superior angels also are sent. it may also be said that the apostle wishes to prove that christ is greater than the angels who were chosen as the messengers of the law; in order that he might show the excellence of the new over the old law. hence there is no need to apply this to any other angels besides those who were sent to give the law. reply obj. 2: according to dionysius (coel. hier. xiii), the angel who was sent to purify the prophet's lips was one of the inferior order; but was called a "seraph," that is, "kindling " in an equivocal sense, because he came to "kindle" the lips of the prophet. it may also be said that the superior angels communicate their own proper gifts whereby they are denominated, through the ministry of the inferior angels. thus one of the seraphim is described as purifying by fire the prophet's lips, not as if he did so immediately, but because an inferior angel did so by his power; as the pope is said to absolve a man when he gives absolution by means of someone else. reply obj. 3: the divine persons are not sent in ministry, but are said to be sent in an equivocal sense, as appears from what has been said (q. 43, a. 1). reply obj. 4: a manifold grade exists in the divine ministries. hence there is nothing to prevent angels though unequal from being sent immediately in ministry, in such a manner however that the superior are sent to the higher ministries, and the lower to the inferior ministries. _______________________ third article [i, q. 112, art. 3] whether all the angels who are sent, assist? objection 1: it would seem that the angels who are sent also assist. for gregory says (hom. xxxiv in evang.): "so the angels are sent, and assist; for, though the angelic spirit is limited, yet the supreme spirit, god, is not limited." obj. 2: further, the angel was sent to administer to tobias. yet he said, "i am the angel raphael, one of the seven who stand before the lord" (tob. 12:15). therefore the angels who are sent, assist. obj. 3: further, every holy angel is nearer to god than satan is. yet satan assisted god, according to job 1:6: "when the sons of god came to stand before the lord, satan also was present among them." therefore much more do the angels, who are sent to minister, assist. obj. 4: further, if the inferior angels do not assist, the reason is because they receive the divine enlightenment, not immediately, but through the superior angels. but every angel receives the divine enlightenment from a superior, except the one who is highest of all. therefore only the highest angel would assist; which is contrary to the text of dan. 7:10: "ten thousand times a hundred thousand stood before him." therefore the angels who are sent also assist. _on the contrary,_ gregory says, on job 25:3: "is there any numbering of his soldiers?" (moral. xvii): "those powers assist, who do not go forth as messengers to men." therefore those who are sent in ministry do not assist. _i answer that,_ the angels are spoken of as "assisting" and "administering," after the likeness of those who attend upon a king; some of whom ever wait upon him, and hear his commands immediately; while others there are to whom the royal commands are conveyed by those who are in attendance--for instance, those who are placed at the head of the administration of various cities; these are said to administer, not to assist. we must therefore observe that all the angels gaze upon the divine essence immediately; in regard to which all, even those who minister, are said to assist. hence gregory says (moral. ii) that "those who are sent on the external ministry of our salvation can always assist and see the face of the father." yet not all the angels can perceive the secrets of the divine mysteries in the clearness itself of the divine essence; but only the superior angels who announce them to the inferior: and in that respect only the superior angels belonging to the highest hierarchy are said to assist, whose special prerogative it is to be enlightened immediately by god. from this may be deduced the reply to the first and second objections, which are based on the first mode of assisting. reply obj. 3: satan is not described as having assisted, but as present among the assistants; for, as gregory says (moral. ii), "though he has lost beatitude, still he has retained a nature like to the angels." reply obj. 4: all the assistants see some things immediately in the glory of the divine essence; and so it may be said that it is the prerogative of the whole of the highest hierarchy to be immediately enlightened by god; while the higher ones among them see more than is seen by the inferior; some of whom enlighten others: as also among those who assist the king, one knows more of the king's secrets than another. _______________________ fourth article [i, q. 112, art. 4] whether all the angels of the second hierarchy are sent? objection 1: it would seem that all the angels of the second hierarchy are sent. for all the angels either assist, or minister, according to dan. 7:10. but the angels of the second hierarchy do not assist; for they are enlightened by the angels of the first hierarchy, as dionysius says (coel. hier. viii). therefore all the angels of the second hierarchy are sent in ministry. obj. 2: further, gregory says (moral. xvii) that "there are more who minister than who assist." this would not be the case if the angels of the second hierarchy were not sent in ministry. therefore all the angels of the second hierarchy are sent to minister. _on the contrary,_ dionysius says (coel. hier. viii) that the "dominations are above all subjection." but to be sent implies subjection. therefore the dominations are not sent to minister. _i answer that,_ as above stated (a. 1), to be sent to external ministry properly belongs to an angel according as he acts by divine command in respect of any corporeal creature; which is part of the execution of the divine ministry. now the angelic properties are manifested by their names, as dionysius says (coel. hier. vii); and therefore the angels of those orders are sent to external ministry whose names signify some kind of administration. but the name "dominations" does not signify any such administration, but only disposition and command in administering. on the other hand, the names of the inferior orders imply administration, for the "angels" and "archangels" are so called from "announcing"; the "virtues" and "powers" are so called in respect of some act; and it is right that the "prince," according to what gregory says (hom. xxxiv in evang.), "be first among the workers." hence it belongs to these five orders to be sent to external ministry; not to the four superior orders. reply obj. 1: the dominations are reckoned among the ministering angels, not as exercising but as disposing and commanding what is to be done by others; thus an architect does not put his hands to the production of his art, but only disposes and orders what others are to do. reply obj. 2: a twofold reason may be given in assigning the number of the assisting and ministering angels. for gregory says that those who minister are more numerous than those who assist; because he takes the words (dan. 7:10) "thousands of thousands ministered to him," not in a multiple but in a partitive sense, to mean "thousands out of thousands"; thus the number of those who minister is indefinite, and signifies excess; while the number of assistants is finite as in the words added, "and ten thousand times a hundred thousand assisted him." this explanation rests on the opinion of the platonists, who said that the nearer things are to the one first principle, the smaller they are in number; as the nearer a number is to unity, the lesser it is than multitude. this opinion is verified as regards the number of orders, as six administer and three assist. dionysius, however, (coel. hier. xiv) declares that the multitude of angels surpasses all the multitude of material things; so that, as the superior bodies exceed the inferior in magnitude to an immeasurable degree, so the superior incorporeal natures surpass all corporeal natures in multitude; because whatever is better is more intended and more multiplied by god. hence, as the assistants are superior to the ministers there will be more assistants than ministers. in this way, the words "thousands of thousands" are taken by way of multiplication, to signify "a thousand times a thousand." and because ten times a hundred is a thousand, if it were said "ten times a hundred thousand" it would mean that there are as many assistants as ministers: but since it is written "ten thousand times a hundred thousand," we are given to understand that the assistants are much more numerous than the ministers. nor is this said to signify that this is the precise number of angels, but rather that it is much greater, in that it exceeds all material multitude. this is signified by the multiplication together of all the greatest numbers, namely ten, a hundred, and a thousand, as dionysius remarks in the same passage. _______________________ question 113 of the guardianship of the good angels (in eight articles) we next consider the guardianship exercised by the good angels; and their warfare against the bad angels. under the first head eight points of inquiry arise: (1) whether men are guarded by the angels? (2) whether to each man is assigned a single guardian angel? (3) whether the guardianship belongs only to the lowest order of angels? (4) whether it is fitting for each man to have an angel guardian? (5) when does an angel's guardianship of a man begin? (6) whether the angel guardians always watch over men? (7) whether the angel grieves over the loss of the one guarded? (8) whether rivalry exists among the angels as regards their guardianship? _______________________ first article [i, q. 113, art. 1] whether men are guarded by the angels? objection 1: it would seem that men are not guarded by the angels. for guardians are deputed to some because they either know not how, or are not able, to guard themselves, as children and the sick. but man is able to guard himself by his free-will; and knows how by his natural knowledge of natural law. therefore man is not guarded by an angel. obj. 2: further, a strong guard makes a weaker one superfluous. but men are guarded by god, according to ps. 120:4: "he shall neither slumber nor sleep, that keepeth israel." therefore man does not need to be guarded by an angel. obj. 3: further, the loss of the guarded redounds to the negligence of the guardian; hence it was said to a certain one: "keep this man; and if he shall slip away, thy life shall be for his life" (3 kings 20:39). now many perish daily through falling into sin; whom the angels could help by visible appearance, or by miracles, or in some such-like way. the angels would therefore be negligent if men are given to their guardianship. but that is clearly false. therefore the angels are not the guardians of men. _on the contrary,_ it is written (ps. 90:11): "he hath given his angels charge over thee, to keep thee in all thy ways." _i answer that,_ according to the plan of divine providence, we find that in all things the movable and variable are moved and regulated by the immovable and invariable; as all corporeal things by immovable spiritual substances, and the inferior bodies by the superior which are invariable in substance. we ourselves also are regulated as regards conclusions, about which we may have various opinions, by the principles which we hold in an invariable manner. it is moreover manifest that as regards things to be done human knowledge and affection can vary and fail from good in many ways; and so it was necessary that angels should be deputed for the guardianship of men, in order to regulate them and move them to good. reply obj. 1: by free-will man can avoid evil to a certain degree, but not in any sufficient degree; forasmuch as he is weak in affection towards good on account of the manifold passions of the soul. likewise universal natural knowledge of the law, which by nature belongs to man, to a certain degree directs man to good, but not in a sufficient degree; because in the application of the universal principles of law to particular actions man happens to be deficient in many ways. hence it is written (wis. 9:14): "the thoughts of mortal men are fearful, and our counsels uncertain." thus man needs to be guarded by the angels. reply obj. 2: two things are required for a good action; first, that the affection be inclined to good, which is effected in us by the habit of mortal virtue. secondly, that reason should discover the proper methods to make perfect the good of virtue; this the philosopher (ethic. vi) attributes to prudence. as regards the first, god guards man immediately by infusing into him grace and virtues; as regards the second, god guards man as his universal instructor, whose precepts reach man by the medium of the angels, as above stated (q. 111, a. 1). reply obj. 3: as men depart from the natural instinct of good by reason of a sinful passion, so also do they depart from the instigation of the good angels, which takes place invisibly when they enlighten man that he may do what is right. hence that men perish is not to be imputed to the negligence of the angels but to the malice of men. that they sometimes appear to men visibly outside the ordinary course of nature comes from a special grace of god, as likewise that miracles occur outside the order of nature. _______________________ second article [i, q. 113, art. 2] whether each man is guarded by an angel? objection 1: it would seem that each man is not guarded by an angel. for an angel is stronger than a man. but one man suffices to guard many men. therefore much more can one angel guard many men. obj. 2: further, the lower things are brought to god through the medium of the higher, as dionysius says (coel. hier. iv, xiii). but as all the angels are unequal (q. 50, a. 4), there is only one angel between whom and men there is no medium. therefore there is only one angel who immediately keeps men. obj. 3: further, the greater angels are deputed to the greater offices. but it is not a greater office to keep one man more than another; since all men are naturally equal. since therefore of all the angels one is greater than another, as dionysius says (coel. hier. x), it seems that different men are not guarded by different angels. _on the contrary,_ on the text, "their angels in heaven," etc. (matt. 8:10), jerome says: "great is the dignity of souls, for each one to have an angel deputed to guard it from its birth." _i answer that,_ each man has an angel guardian appointed to him. this rests upon the fact that the guardianship of angels belongs to the execution of divine providence concerning men. but god's providence acts differently as regards men and as regards other corruptible creatures, for they are related differently to incorruptibility. for men are not only incorruptible in the common species, but also in the proper forms of each individual, which are the rational souls, which cannot be said of other incorruptible things. now it is manifest that the providence of god is chiefly exercised towards what remains for ever; whereas as regards things which pass away, the providence of god acts so as to order their existence to the things which are perpetual. thus the providence of god is related to each man as it is to every genus or species of things corruptible. but, according to gregory (hom. xxxiv in evang.), the different orders are deputed to the different genera of things, for instance, the "powers" to coerce the demons, the "virtues" to work miracles in things corporeal; while it is probable that the different species are presided over by different angels of the same order. hence it is also reasonable to suppose that different angels are appointed to the guardianship of different men. reply obj. 1: a guardian may be assigned to a man for two reasons: first, inasmuch as a man is an individual, and thus to one man one guardian is due; and sometimes several are appointed to guard one. secondly, inasmuch as a man is part of a community, and thus one man is appointed as guardian of a whole community; to whom it belongs to provide what concerns one man in his relation to the whole community, such as external works, which are sources of strength or weakness to others. but angel guardians are given to men also as regards invisible and occult things, concerning the salvation of each one in his own regard. hence individual angels are appointed to guard individual men. reply obj. 2: as above stated (q. 112, a. 3, ad 4), all the angels of the first hierarchy are, as to some things, enlightened by god directly; but as to other things, only the superior are directly enlightened by god, and these reveal them to the inferior. and the same also applies to the inferior orders: for a lower angel is enlightened in some respects by one of the highest, and in other respects by the one immediately above him. thus it is possible that some one angel enlightens a man immediately, and yet has other angels beneath him whom he enlightens. reply obj. 3: although men are equal in nature, still inequality exists among them, according as divine providence orders some to the greater, and others to the lesser things, according to ecclus. 33:11, 12: "with much knowledge the lord hath divided them, and diversified their ways: some of them hath he blessed and exalted, and some of them hath he cursed and brought low." thus it is a greater office to guard one man than another. _______________________ third article [i, q. 113, art. 3] whether to guard men belongs only to the lowest order of angels? objection 1: it would seem that the guardianship of men does not belong only to the lowest order of the angels. for chrysostom says that the text (matt. 18:10), "their angels in heaven," etc. is to be understood not of any angels but of the highest. therefore the superior angels guard men. obj. 2: further, the apostle says that angels "are sent to minister for them who shall receive the inheritance of salvation" (heb. 1:14); and thus it seems that the mission of the angels is directed to the guardianship of men. but five orders are sent in external ministry (q. 112, a. 4). therefore all the angels of the five orders are deputed to the guardianship of men. obj. 3: further, for the guardianship of men it seems especially necessary to coerce the demons, which belongs most of all to the powers, according to gregory (hom. xxxiv in evang.); and to work miracles, which belongs to the virtues. therefore these orders are also deputed to the work of guardianship, and not only the lowest order. _on the contrary,_ in the psalm (90) the guardianship of men is attributed to the angels; who belong to the lowest order, according to dionysius (coel. hier. v, ix). _i answer that,_ as above stated (a. 2), man is guarded in two ways; in one way by particular guardianship, according as to each man an angel is appointed to guard him; and such guardianship belongs to the lowest order of the angels, whose place it is, according to gregory, to announce the "lesser things"; for it seems to be the least of the angelic offices to procure what concerns the salvation of only one man. the other kind of guardianship is universal, multiplied according to the different orders. for the more universal an agent is, the higher it is. thus the guardianship of the human race belongs to the order of "principalities," or perhaps to the "archangels," whom we call the angel princes. hence, michael, whom we call an archangel, is also styled "one of the princes" (dan. 10:13). moreover all corporeal creatures are guarded by the "virtues"; and likewise the demons by the "powers," and the good spirits by the "principalities," according to gregory's opinion (hom. xxxiv in ev.). reply obj. 1: chrysostom can be taken to mean the highest in the lowest order of angels; for, as dionysius says (coel. hier. x) in each order there are first, middle, and last. it is, however, probable that the greater angels are deputed to keep those chosen by god for the higher degree of glory. reply obj. 2: not all the angels who are sent have guardianship of individual men; but some orders have a universal guardianship, greater or less, as above explained. reply obj. 3: even inferior angels exercise the office of the superior, as they share in their gifts, and they are executors of the superiors' power; and in this way all the angels of the lowest order can coerce the demons, and work miracles. _______________________ fourth article [i, q. 113, art. 4] whether angels are appointed to the guardianship of all men? objection 1: it would seem that angels are not appointed to the guardianship of all men. for it is written of christ (phil. 2:7) that "he was made in the likeness of men, and in habit found as a man." if therefore angels are appointed to the guardianship of all men, christ also would have had an angel guardian. but this is unseemly, for christ is greater than all the angels. therefore angels are not appointed to the guardianship of all men. obj. 2: further, adam was the first of all men. but it was not fitting that he should have an angel guardian, at least in the state of innocence: for then he was not beset by any dangers. therefore angels are not appointed to the guardianship of all men. obj. 3: further, angels are appointed to the guardianship of men, that they may take them by the hand and guide them to eternal life, encourage them to good works, and protect them against the assaults of the demons. but men who are foreknown to damnation, never attain to eternal life. infidels, also, though at times they perform good works, do not perform them well, for they have not a right intention: for "faith directs the intention" as augustine says (enarr. ii in ps. 31). moreover, the coming of antichrist will be "according to the working of satan," as it is written (2 thess. 2:9). therefore angels are not deputed to the guardianship of all men. _on the contrary,_ is the authority of jerome quoted above (a. 2), for he says that "each soul has an angel appointed to guard it." _i answer that,_ man while in this state of life, is, as it were, on a road by which he should journey towards heaven. on this road man is threatened by many dangers both from within and from without, according to ps. 159:4: "in this way wherein i walked, they have hidden a snare for me." and therefore as guardians are appointed for men who have to pass by an unsafe road, so an angel guardian is assigned to each man as long as he is a wayfarer. when, however, he arrives at the end of life he no longer has a guardian angel; but in the kingdom he will have an angel to reign with him, in hell a demon to punish him. reply obj. 1: christ as man was guided immediately by the word of god: wherefore he needed not be guarded by an angel. again as regards his soul, he was a comprehensor, although in regard to his passible body, he was a wayfarer. in this latter respect it was right that he should have not a guardian angel as superior to him, but a ministering angel as inferior to him. whence it is written (matt. 4:11) that "angels came and ministered to him." reply obj. 2: in the state of innocence man was not threatened by any peril from within: because within him all was well ordered, as we have said above (q. 95, aa. 1, 3). but peril threatened from without on account of the snares of the demons; as was proved by the event. for this reason he needed a guardian angel. reply obj. 3: just as the foreknown, the infidels, and even antichrist, are not deprived of the interior help of natural reason; so neither are they deprived of that exterior help granted by god to the whole human race--namely the guardianship of the angels. and although the help which they receive therefrom does not result in their deserving eternal life by good works, it does nevertheless conduce to their being protected from certain evils which would hurt both themselves and others. for even the demons are held off by the good angels, lest they hurt as much as they would. in like manner antichrist will not do as much harm as he would wish. _______________________ fifth article [i, q. 113, art. 5] whether an angel is appointed to guard a man from his birth? objection 1: it would seem that an angel is not appointed to guard a man from his birth. for angels are "sent to minister for them who shall receive the inheritance of salvation," as the apostle says (heb. 1:14). but men begin to receive the inheritance of salvation, when they are baptized. therefore an angel is appointed to guard a man from the time of his baptism, not of his birth. obj. 2: further, men are guarded by angels in as far as angels enlighten and instruct them. but children are not capable of instruction as soon as they are born, for they have not the use of reason. therefore angels are not appointed to guard children as soon as they are born. obj. 3: further, a child has a rational soul for some time before birth, just as well as after. but it does not appear that an angel is appointed to guard a child before its birth, for they are not then admitted to the sacraments of the church. therefore angels are not appointed to guard men from the moment of their birth. _on the contrary,_ jerome says (_vide_ a. 4) that "each soul has an angel appointed to guard it from its birth." _i answer that,_ as origen observes (tract. v, super matt.) there are two opinions on this matter. for some have held that the angel guardian is appointed at the time of baptism, others, that he is appointed at the time of birth. the latter opinion jerome approves (loc. cit.), and with reason. for those benefits which are conferred by god on man as a christian, begin with his baptism; such as receiving the eucharist, and the like. but those which are conferred by god on man as a rational being, are bestowed on him at his birth, for then it is that he receives that nature. among the latter benefits we must count the guardianship of angels, as we have said above (aa. 1, 4). wherefore from the very moment of his birth man has an angel guardian appointed to him. reply obj. 1: angels are sent to minister, and that efficaciously indeed, for those who shall receive the inheritance of salvation, if we consider the ultimate effect of their guardianship, which is the realizing of that inheritance. but for all that, the angelic ministrations are not withdrawn for others although they are not so efficacious as to bring them to salvation: efficacious, nevertheless, they are, inasmuch as they ward off many evils. reply obj. 2: guardianship is ordained to enlightenment by instruction, as to its ultimate and principal effect. nevertheless it has many other effects consistent with childhood; for instance to ward off the demons, and to prevent both bodily and spiritual harm. reply obj. 3: as long as the child is in the mother's womb it is not entirely separate, but by reason of a certain intimate tie, is still part of her: just as the fruit while hanging on the tree is part of the tree. and therefore it can be said with some degree of probability, that the angel who guards the mother guards the child while in the womb. but at its birth, when it becomes separate from the mother, an angel guardian is appointed to it; as jerome, above quoted, says. _______________________ sixth article [i, q. 113, art. 6] whether the angel guardian ever forsakes a man? objection 1: it would seem that the angel guardian sometimes forsakes the man whom he is appointed to guard. for it is said (jer. 51:9) in the person of the angels: "we would have cured babylon, but she is not healed: let us forsake her." and (isa. 5:5) it is written: "i will take away the hedge"--that is, "the guardianship of the angels" [gloss]--"and it shall be wasted." obj. 2: further, god's guardianship excels that of the angels. but god forsakes man at times, according to ps. 21:2: "o god, my god, look upon me: why hast thou forsaken me?" much rather therefore does an angel guardian forsake man. obj. 3: further, according to damascene (de fide orth. ii, 3), "when the angels are here with us, they are not in heaven." but sometimes they are in heaven. therefore sometimes they forsake us. _on the contrary,_ the demons are ever assailing us, according to 1 pet. 5:8: "your adversary the devil, as a roaring lion, goeth about, seeking whom he may devour." much more therefore do the good angels ever guard us. _i answer that,_ as appears above (a. 2), the guardianship of the angels is an effect of divine providence in regard to man. now it is evident that neither man, nor anything at all, is entirely withdrawn from the providence of god: for in as far as a thing participates being, so far is it subject to the providence that extends over all being. god indeed is said to forsake man, according to the ordering of his providence, but only in so far as he allows man to suffer some defect of punishment or of fault. in like manner it must be said that the angel guardian never forsakes a man entirely, but sometimes he leaves him in some particular, for instance by not preventing him from being subject to some trouble, or even from falling into sin, according to the ordering of divine judgments. in this sense babylon and the house of israel are said to have been forsaken by the angels, because their angel guardians did not prevent them from being subject to tribulation. from this the answers are clear to the first and second objections. reply obj. 3: although an angel may forsake a man sometimes locally, he does not for that reason forsake him as to the effect of his guardianship: for even when he is in heaven he knows what is happening to man; nor does he need time for his local motion, for he can be with man in an instant. _______________________ seventh article [i, q. 113, art. 7] whether angels grieve for the ills of those whom they guard? objection 1: it would seem that angels grieve for the ills of those whom they guard. for it is written (isa. 33:7): "the angels of peace shall weep bitterly." but weeping is a sign of grief and sorrow. therefore angels grieve for the ills of those whom they guard. obj. 2: further, according to augustine (de civ. dei xiv, 15), "sorrow is for those things that happen against our will." but the loss of the man whom he has guarded is against the guardian angel's will. therefore angels grieve for the loss of men. obj. 3: further, as sorrow is contrary to joy, so penance is contrary to sin. but angels rejoice about one sinner doing penance, as we are told, luke 15:7. therefore they grieve for the just man who falls into sin. obj. 4: further, on numbers 18:12: "whatsoever first-fruits they offer," etc. the gloss of origen says: "the angels are brought to judgment as to whether men have fallen through their negligence or through their own fault." but it is reasonable for anyone to grieve for the ills which have brought him to judgment. therefore angels grieve for men's sins. _on the contrary,_ where there is grief and sorrow, there is not perfect happiness: wherefore it is written (apoc. 21:4): "death shall be no more, nor mourning, nor crying, nor sorrow." but the angels are perfectly happy. therefore they have no cause for grief. _i answer that,_ angels do not grieve, either for sins or for the pains inflicted on men. for grief and sorrow, according to augustine (de civ. dei xiv, 15) are for those things which occur against our will. but nothing happens in the world contrary to the will of the angels and the other blessed, because their will cleaves entirely to the ordering of divine justice; while nothing happens in the world save what is effected or permitted by divine justice. therefore simply speaking, nothing occurs in the world against the will of the blessed. for as the philosopher says (ethic. iii, 1) that is called simply voluntary, which a man wills in a particular case, and at a particular time, having considered all the circumstances; although universally speaking, such a thing would not be voluntary: thus the sailor does not will the casting of his cargo into the sea, considered universally and absolutely, but on account of the threatened danger of his life, he wills it. wherefore this is voluntary rather than involuntary, as stated in the same passage. therefore universally and absolutely speaking the angels do not will sin and the pains inflicted on its account: but they do will the fulfilment of the ordering of divine justice in this matter, in respect of which some are subjected to pains and are allowed to fall into sin. reply obj. 1: these words of isaias may be understood of the angels, i.e. the messengers, of ezechias, who wept on account of the words of rabsaces, as related isa. 37:2 seqq.: this would be the literal sense. according to the allegorical sense the "angels of peace" are the apostles and preachers who weep for men's sins. if according to the anagogical sense this passage be expounded of the blessed angels, then the expression is metaphorical, and signifies that universally speaking the angels will the salvation of mankind: for in this sense we attribute passions to god and the angels. the reply to the second objection appears from what has been said. reply obj. 3: both in man's repentance and in man's sin there is one reason for the angel's joy, namely the fulfilment of the ordering of the divine providence. reply obj. 4: the angels are brought into judgment for the sins of men, not as guilty, but as witnesses to convict man of weakness. _______________________ eighth article [i, q. 113, art. 8] whether there can be strife or discord among the angels? objection 1: it would seem that there can be [no] strife or discord among the angels. for it is written (job 25:2): "who maketh peace in his high places." but strife is opposed to peace. therefore among the high angels there is no strife. obj. 2: further, where there is perfect charity and just authority there can be no strife. but all this exists among the angels. therefore there is no strife among the angels. obj. 3: further, if we say that angels strive for those whom they guard, one angel must needs take one side, and another angel the opposite side. but if one side is in the right the other side is in the wrong. it will follow therefore, that a good angel is a compounder of wrong; which is unseemly. therefore there is no strife among good angels. _on the contrary,_ it is written (dan. 10:13): "the prince of the kingdom of the persians resisted me one and twenty days." but this prince of the persians was the angel deputed to the guardianship of the kingdom of the persians. therefore one good angel resists the others; and thus there is strife among them. _i answer that,_ the raising of this question is occasioned by this passage of daniel. jerome explains it by saying that the prince of the kingdom of the persians is the angel who opposed the setting free of the people of israel, for whom daniel was praying, his prayers being offered to god by gabriel. and this resistance of his may have been caused by some prince of the demons having led the jewish captives in persia into sin; which sin was an impediment to the efficacy of the prayer which daniel put up for that same people. but according to gregory (moral. xvii), the prince of the kingdom of persia was a good angel appointed to the guardianship of that kingdom. to see therefore how one angel can be said to resist another, we must note that the divine judgments in regard to various kingdoms and various men are executed by the angels. now in their actions, the angels are ruled by the divine decree. but it happens at times in various kingdoms or various men there are contrary merits or demerits, so that one of them is subject to or placed over another. as to what is the ordering of divine wisdom on such matters, the angels cannot know it unless god reveal it to them: and so they need to consult divine wisdom thereupon. wherefore forasmuch as they consult the divine will concerning various contrary and opposing merits, they are said to resist one another: not that their wills are in opposition, since they are all of one mind as to the fulfilment of the divine decree; but that the things about which they seek knowledge are in opposition. from this the answers to the objections are clear. _______________________ question 114 of the assaults of the demons (in five articles) we now consider the assaults of the demons. under this head there are five points of inquiry: (1) whether men are assailed by the demons? (2) whether to tempt is proper to the devil? (3) whether all the sins of men are to be set down to the assaults or temptations of the demons? (4) whether they can work real miracles for the purpose of leading men astray? (5) whether the demons who are overcome by men, are hindered from making further assaults? _______________________ first article [i, q. 114, art. 1] whether men are assailed by the demons? objection 1: it would seem that men are not assailed by the demons. for angels are sent by god to guard man. but demons are not sent by god: for the demons' intention is the loss of souls; whereas god's is the salvation of souls. therefore demons are not deputed to assail man. obj. 2: further, it is not a fair fight, for the weak to be set against the strong, and the ignorant against the astute. but men are weak and ignorant, whereas the demons are strong and astute. it is not therefore to be permitted by god, the author of all justice, that men should be assailed by demons. obj. 3: further, the assaults of the flesh and the world are enough for man's exercise. but god permits his elect to be assailed that they may be exercised. therefore there is no need for them to be assailed by the demons. _on the contrary,_ the apostle says (eph. 6:12): "our wrestling is not against flesh and blood; but against principalities and powers, against the rulers of the world of this darkness, against the spirits of wickedness in the high places." _i answer that,_ two things may be considered in the assault of the demons--the assault itself, and the ordering thereof. the assault itself is due to the malice of the demons, who through envy endeavor to hinder man's progress; and through pride usurp a semblance of divine power, by deputing certain ministers to assail man, as the angels of god in their various offices minister to man's salvation. but the ordering of the assault is from god, who knows how to make orderly use of evil by ordering it to good. on the other hand, in regard to the angels, both their guardianship and the ordering thereof are to be referred to god as their first author. reply obj. 1: the wicked angels assail men in two ways. firstly by instigating them to sin; and thus they are not sent by god to assail us, but are sometimes permitted to do so according to god's just judgments. but sometimes their assault is a punishment to man: and thus they are sent by god; as the lying spirit was sent to punish achab, king of israel, as is related in 3 kings 22:20. for punishment is referred to god as its first author. nevertheless the demons who are sent to punish, do so with an intention other than that for which they are sent; for they punish from hatred or envy; whereas they are sent by god on account of his justice. reply obj. 2: in order that the conditions of the fight be not unequal, there is as regards man the promised recompense, to be gained principally through the grace of god, secondarily through the guardianship of the angels. wherefore (4 kings 6:16), eliseus said to his servant: "fear not, for there are more with us than with them." reply obj. 3: the assault of the flesh and the world would suffice for the exercise of human weakness: but it does not suffice for the demon's malice, which makes use of both the above in assailing men. but by the divine ordinance this tends to the glory of the elect. _______________________ second article [i, q. 114, art. 2] whether to tempt is proper to the devil? objection 1: it would seem that to tempt is not proper to the devil. for god is said to tempt, according to gen. 22:1, "god tempted abraham." moreover man is tempted by the flesh and the world. again, man is said to tempt god, and to tempt man. therefore it is not proper to the devil to tempt. obj. 2: further, to tempt is a sign of ignorance. but the demons know what happens among men. therefore the demons do not tempt. obj. 3: further, temptation is the road to sin. now sin dwells in the will. since therefore the demons cannot change man's will, as appears from what has been said above (q. 111, a. 2), it seems that it is not in their province to tempt. _on the contrary,_ it is written (1 thess. 3:5): "lest perhaps he that tempteth should have tempted you": to which the gloss adds, "that is, the devil, whose office it is to tempt." _i answer that,_ to tempt is, properly speaking, to make trial of something. now we make trial of something in order to know something about it: hence the immediate end of every tempter is knowledge. but sometimes another end, either good or bad, is sought to be acquired through that knowledge; a good end, when, for instance, one desires to know of someone, what sort of a man he is as to knowledge, or virtue, with a view to his promotion; a bad end, when that knowledge is sought with the purpose of deceiving or ruining him. from this we can gather how various beings are said to tempt in various ways. for man is said to tempt, sometimes indeed merely for the sake of knowing something; and for this reason it is a sin to tempt god; for man, being uncertain as it were, presumes to make an experiment of god's power. sometimes too he tempts in order to help, sometimes in order to hurt. the devil, however, always tempts in order to hurt by urging man into sin. in this sense it is said to be his proper office to tempt: for thought at times man tempts thus, he does this as minister of the devil. god is said to tempt that he may know, in the same sense as that is said to know which makes others to know. hence it is written (deut. 13:3): "the lord your god trieth you, that it may appear whether you love him." the flesh and the world are said to tempt as the instruments or matter of temptations; inasmuch as one can know what sort of man someone is, according as he follows or resists the desires of the flesh, and according as he despises worldly advantages and adversity: of which things the devil also makes use in tempting. thus the reply to the first objection is clear. reply obj. 2: the demons know what happens outwardly among men; but the inward disposition of man god alone knows, who is the "weigher of spirits" (prov. 16:2). it is this disposition that makes man more prone to one vice than to another: hence the devil tempts, in order to explore this inward disposition of man, so that he may tempt him to that vice to which he is most prone. reply obj. 3: although a demon cannot change the will, yet, as stated above (q. 111, a. 3), he can change the inferior powers of man, in a certain degree: by which powers, though the will cannot be forced, it can nevertheless be inclined. _______________________ third article [i, q. 114, art. 3] whether all sins are due to the temptation of the devil? objection 1: it would seem that all sins are due to the temptation of the devil. for dionysius says (div. nom. iv) that "the multitude of demons is the cause of all evils, both to themselves and to others." and damascene says (de fide orth. ii, 4) that "all malice and all uncleanness have been devised by the devil." obj. 2: further, of every sinner can be said what the lord said of the jews (john 8:44): "you are of your father the devil." but this was in as far as they sinned through the devil's instigation. therefore every sin is due to the devil's instigation. obj. 3: further, as angels are deputed to guard men, so demons are deputed to assail men. but every good thing we do is due to the suggestion of the good angels: because the divine gifts are borne to us by the angels. therefore all the evil we do, is due to the instigation of the devil. _on the contrary,_ it is written (de eccl. dogmat. xlix): "not all our evil thoughts are stirred up by the devil, but sometimes they arise from the movement of our free-will." _i answer that,_ one thing can be the cause of another in two ways; directly and indirectly. indirectly as when an agent is the cause of a disposition to a certain effect, it is said to be the occasional and indirect cause of that effect: for instance, we might say that he who dries the wood is the cause of the wood burning. in this way we must admit that the devil is the cause of all our sins; because he it was who instigated the first man to sin, from whose sin there resulted a proneness to sin in the whole human race: and in this sense we must take the words of damascene and dionysius. but a thing is said to be the direct cause of something, when its action tends directly thereunto. and in this way the devil is not the cause of every sin: for all sins are not committed at the devil's instigation, but some are due to the free-will and the corruption of the flesh. for, as origen says (peri archon iii), even if there were no devil, men would have the desire for food and love and such like pleasures; with regard to which many disorders may arise unless those desires are curbed by reason, especially if we presuppose the corruption of our natures. now it is in the power of the free-will to curb this appetite and keep it in order. consequently there is no need for all sins to be due to the instigation of the devil. but those sins which are due thereto man perpetrates "through being deceived by the same blandishments as were our first parents," as isidore says (de summo bono ii). thus the answer to the first objection is clear. reply obj. 2: when man commits sin without being thereto instigated by the devil, he nevertheless becomes a child of the devil thereby, in so far as he imitates him who was the first to sin. reply obj. 3: man can of his own accord fall into sin: but he cannot advance in merit without the divine assistance, which is borne to man by the ministry of the angels. for this reason the angels take part in all our good works: whereas all our sins are not due to the demons' instigation. nevertheless there is no kind of sin which is not sometimes due to the demons' suggestion. _______________________ fourth article [i, q. 114, art. 4] whether demons can lead men astray by means of real miracles? objection 1: it would seem that the demons cannot lead men astray by means of real miracles. for the activity of the demons will show itself especially in the works of antichrist. but as the apostle says (2 thess. 2:9), his "coming is according to the working of satan, in all power, and signs, and lying wonders." much more therefore at other times do the demons perform lying wonders. obj. 2: further, true miracles are wrought by some corporeal change. but demons are unable to change the nature of a body; for augustine says (de civ. dei xviii, 18): "i cannot believe that the human body can receive the limbs of a beast by means of a demon's art or power." therefore the demons cannot work real miracles. obj. 3: further, an argument is useless which may prove both ways. if therefore real miracles can be wrought by demons, to persuade one of what is false, they will be useless to confirm the teaching of the faith. this is unfitting; for it is written (mk. 16:20): "the lord working withal, and confirming the word with signs that followed." _on the contrary,_ augustine says (q. 83) [*lib. xxi, sent. sent 4, among the supposititious works of st. augustine]: "often by means of the magic art miracles are wrought like those which are wrought by the servants of god." _i answer that,_ as is clear from what has been said above (q. 110, a. 4), if we take a miracle in the strict sense, the demons cannot work miracles, nor can any creature, but god alone: since in the strict sense a miracle is something done outside the order of the entire created nature, under which order every power of a creature is contained. but sometimes miracle may be taken in a wide sense, for whatever exceeds the human power and experience. and thus demons can work miracles, that is, things which rouse man's astonishment, by reason of their being beyond his power and outside his sphere of knowledge. for even a man by doing what is beyond the power and knowledge of another, leads him to marvel at what he has done, so that in a way he seems to that man to have worked a miracle. it is to be noted, however, that although these works of demons which appear marvelous to us are not real miracles, they are sometimes nevertheless something real. thus the magicians of pharaoh by the demons' power produced real serpents and frogs. and "when fire came down from heaven and at one blow consumed job's servants and sheep; when the storm struck down his house and with it his children--these were the work of satan, not phantoms"; as augustine says (de civ. dei xx, 19). reply obj. 1: as augustine says in the same place, the works of antichrist may be called lying wonders, "either because he will deceive men's senses by means of phantoms, so that he will not really do what he will seem to do; or because, if he work real prodigies, they will lead those into falsehood who believe in him." reply obj. 2: as we have said above (q. 110, a. 2), corporeal matter does not obey either good or bad angels at their will, so that demons be able by their power to transmute matter from one form to another; but they can employ certain seeds that exist in the elements of the world, in order to produce these effects, as augustine says (de trin. iii, 8, 9). therefore it must be admitted that all the transformation of corporeal things which can be produced by certain natural powers, to which we must assign the seeds above mentioned, can alike be produced by the operation of the demons, by the employment of these seeds; such as the transformation of certain things into serpents or frogs, which can be produced by putrefaction. on the contrary, those transformations which cannot be produced by the power of nature, cannot in reality be effected by the operation of the demons; for instance, that the human body be changed into the body of a beast, or that the body of a dead man return to life. and if at times something of this sort seems to be effected by the operation of demons, it is not real but a mere semblance of reality. now this may happen in two ways. firstly, from within; in this way a demon can work on man's imagination and even on his corporeal senses, so that something seems otherwise that it is, as explained above (q. 111, aa. 3,4). it is said indeed that this can be done sometimes by the power of certain bodies. secondly, from without: for just as he can from the air form a body of any form and shape, and assume it so as to appear in it visibly: so, in the same way he can clothe any corporeal thing with any corporeal form, so as to appear therein. this is what augustine says (de civ. dei xviii, 18): "man's imagination, which whether thinking or dreaming, takes the forms of an innumerable number of things, appears to other men's senses, as it were embodied in the semblance of some animal." this not to be understood as though the imagination itself or the images formed therein were identified with that which appears embodied to the senses of another man: but that the demon, who forms an image in a man's imagination, can offer the same picture to another man's senses. reply obj. 3: as augustine says (qq. 83, qu. 79): "when magicians do what holy men do, they do it for a different end and by a different right. the former do it for their own glory; the latter, for the glory of god: the former, by certain private compacts; the latter by the evident assistance and command of god, to whom every creature is subject." _______________________ fifth article [i, q. 114, art. 5] whether a demon who is overcome by man, is for this reason hindered from making further assaults? objection 1: it would seem that a demon who is overcome by a man, is not for that reason hindered from any further assault. for christ overcame the tempter most effectively. yet afterwards the demon assailed him by instigating the jews to kill him. therefore it is not true that the devil when conquered ceases his assaults. obj. 2: further, to inflict punishment on one who has been worsted in a fight, is to incite him to a sharper attack. but this is not befitting god's mercy. therefore the conquered demons are not prevented from further assaults. _on the contrary,_ it is written (matt. 4:11): "then the devil left him," i.e. christ who overcame. _i answer that,_ some say that when once a demon has been overcome he can no more tempt any man at all, neither to the same nor to any other sin. and others say that he can tempt others, but not the same man. this seems more probable as long as we understand it to be so for a certain definite time: wherefore (luke 4:13) it is written: "all temptation being ended, the devil departed from him for a time." there are two reasons for this. one is on the part of god's clemency; for as chrysostom says (super matt. hom. v) [*in the opus imperfectum, among his supposititious works], "the devil does not tempt man for just as long as he likes, but for as long as god allows; for although he allows him to tempt for a short time, he orders him off on account of our weakness." the other reason is taken from the astuteness of the devil. as to this, ambrose says on luke 4:13: "the devil is afraid of persisting, because he shrinks from frequent defeat." that the devil does nevertheless sometimes return to the assault, is apparent from matt. 12:44: "i will return into my house from whence i came out." from what has been said, the objections can easily be solved. _______________________ question 115 of the action of the corporeal creature (in six articles) we have now to consider the action of the corporeal creature; and fate, which is ascribed to certain bodies. concerning corporeal actions there are six points of inquiry: (1) whether a body can be active? (2) whether there exist in bodies certain seminal virtues? (3) whether the heavenly bodies are the causes of what is done here by the inferior bodies? (4) whether they are the cause of human acts? (5) whether demons are subject to their influence? (6) whether the heavenly bodies impose necessity on those things which are subject to their influence? _______________________ first article [i, q. 115, art. 1] whether a body can be active? objection 1: it would seem that no bodies are active. for augustine says (de civ. dei v, 9): "there are things that are acted upon, but do not act; such are bodies: there is one who acts but is not acted upon; this is god: there are things that both act and are acted upon; these are the spiritual substances." obj. 2: further, every agent except the first agent requires in its work a subject susceptible of its action. but there is not substance below the corporeal substance which can be susceptible of the latter's action; since it belongs to the lowest degree of beings. therefore corporeal substance is not active. obj. 3: further, every corporeal substance is limited by quantity. but quantity hinders substance from movement and action, because it surrounds it and penetrates it: just as a cloud hinders the air from receiving light. a proof of this is that the more a body increases in quantity, the heavier it is and the more difficult to move. therefore no corporeal substance is active. obj. 4: further, the power of action in every agent is according to its propinquity to the first active cause. but bodies, being most composite, are most remote from the first active cause, which is most simple. therefore no bodies are active. obj. 5: further, if a body is an agent, the term of its action is either a substantial, or an accidental form. but it is not a substantial form; for it is not possible to find in a body any principle of action, save an active quality, which is an accident; and an accident cannot be the cause of a substantial form, since the cause is always more excellent than the effect. likewise, neither is it an accidental form, for "an accident does not extend beyond its subject," as augustine says (de trin. ix, 4). therefore no bodies are active. _on the contrary,_ dionysius says (coel. hier. xv) that among other qualities of corporeal fire, "it shows its greatness in its action and power on that of which it lays hold." _i answer that,_ it is apparent to the senses that some bodies are active. but concerning the action of bodies there have been three errors. for some denied all action to bodies. this is the opinion of avicebron in his book on _the fount of life,_ where, by the arguments mentioned above, he endeavors to prove that no bodies act, but that all the actions which seem to be the actions of bodies, are the actions of some spiritual power that penetrates all bodies: so that, according to him, it is not fire that heats, but a spiritual power which penetrates, by means of the fire. and this opinion seems to be derived from that of plato. for plato held that all forms existing in corporeal matter are participated thereby, and determined and limited thereto; and that separate forms are absolute and as it were universal; wherefore he said that these separate forms are the causes of forms that exist in matter. therefore inasmuch as the form which is in corporeal matter is determined to this matter individualized by quantity, avicebron held that the corporeal form is held back and imprisoned by quantity, as the principle of individuality, so as to be unable by action to extend to any other matter: and that the spiritual and immaterial form alone, which is not hedged in by quantity, can issue forth by acting on something else. but this does not prove that the corporeal form is not an agent, but that it is not a universal agent. for in proportion as a thing is participated, so, of necessity, must that be participated which is proper thereto; thus in proportion to the participation of light is the participation of visibility. but to act, which is nothing else than to make something to be in act, is essentially proper to an act as such; wherefore every agent produces its like. so therefore to the fact of its being a form not determined by matter subject to quantity, a thing owes its being an agent indeterminate and universal: but to the fact that it is determined to this matter, it owes its being an agent limited and particular. wherefore if the form of fire were separate, as the platonists supposed, it would be, in a fashion, the cause of every ignition. but this form of fire which is in this corporeal matter, is the cause of this ignition which passes from this body to that. hence such an action is effected by the contact of two bodies. but this opinion of avicebron goes further than that of plato. for plato held only substantial forms to be separate; while he referred accidents to the material principles which are "the great" and "the small," which he considered to be the first contraries, by others considered to the "the rare" and "the dense." consequently both plato and avicenna, who follows him to a certain extent, held that corporeal agents act through their accidental forms, by disposing matter for the substantial form; but that the ultimate perfection attained by the introduction of the substantial form is due to an immaterial principle. and this is the second opinion concerning the action of bodies; of which we have spoken above when treating of the creation (q. 45, a. 8). the third opinion is that of democritus, who held that action takes place through the issue of atoms from the corporeal agent, while passion consists in the reception of the atoms in the pores of the passive body. this opinion is disproved by aristotle (de gener. i, 8, 9). for it would follow that a body would not be passive as a whole, and the quantity of the active body would be diminished through its action; which things are manifestly untrue. we must therefore say that a body acts forasmuch as it is in act, on a body forasmuch as it is in potentiality. reply obj. 1: this passage of augustine is to be understood of the whole corporeal nature considered as a whole, which thus has no nature inferior to it, on which it can act; as the spiritual nature acts on the corporeal, and the uncreated nature on the created. nevertheless one body is inferior to another, forasmuch as it is in potentiality to that which the other has in act. from this follows the solution of the second objection. but it must be observed, when avicebron argues thus, "there is a mover who is not moved, to wit, the first maker of all; therefore, on the other hand, there exists something moved which is purely passive," that this is to be conceded. but this latter is primary matter, which is a pure potentiality, just as god is pure act. now a body is composed of potentiality and act; and therefore it is both active and passive. reply obj. 3: quantity does not entirely hinder the corporeal form from action, as stated above; but from being a universal agent, forasmuch as a form is individualized through being in matter subject to quantity. the proof taken from the weight of bodies is not to the purpose. first, because addition of quantity does not cause weight; as is proved (de coelo et mundo iv, 2). secondly, it is false that weight retards movement; on the contrary, the heavier a thing, the greater its movement, if we consider the movement proper thereto. thirdly, because action is not effected by local movement, as democritus held: but by something being reduced from potentiality to act. reply obj. 4: a body is not that which is most distant from god; for it participates something of a likeness to the divine being, forasmuch as it has a form. that which is most distant from god is primary matter; which is in no way active, since it is a pure potentiality. reply obj. 5: the term of a body's action is both an accidental form and a substantial form. for the active quality, such as heat, although itself an accident, acts nevertheless by virtue of the substantial form, as its instrument: wherefore its action can terminate in a substantial form; thus natural heat, as the instrument of the soul, has an action terminating in the generation of flesh. but by its own virtue it produces an accident. nor is it against the nature of an accident to surpass its subject in acting, but it is to surpass it in being; unless indeed one were to imagine that an accident transfers its identical self from the agent to the patient; thus democritus explained action by an issue of atoms. _______________________ second article [i, q. 115, art. 2] whether there are any seminal virtues in corporeal matter? objection 1: it would seem that there are no seminal virtues in corporeal matter. for virtue (_ratio_) implies something of a spiritual order. but in corporeal matter nothing exists spiritually, but only materially, that is, according to the mode of that in which it is. therefore there are no seminal virtues in corporeal matter. obj. 2: further, augustine (de trin. iii, 8, 9) says that demons produce certain results by employing with a hidden movement certain seeds, which they know to exist in matter. but bodies, not virtues, can be employed with local movement. therefore it is unreasonable to say that there are seminal virtues in corporeal matter. obj. 3: further, seeds are active principles. but there are no active principles in corporeal matter; since, as we have said above, matter is not competent to act (a. 1, ad 2, 4). therefore there are no seminal virtues in corporeal matter. obj. 4: further, there are said to be certain "causal virtues" (augustine, de gen. ad lit. v, 4) which seem to suffice for the production of things. but seminal virtues are not causal virtues: for miracles are outside the scope of seminal virtues, but not of causal virtues. therefore it is unreasonable to say that there are seminal virtues in corporeal matter. _on the contrary,_ augustine says (de trin. iii, 8): "of all the things which are generated in a corporeal and visible fashion, certain seeds lie hidden in the corporeal things of this world." _i answer that,_ it is customary to name things after what is more perfect, as the philosopher says (de anima ii, 4). now in the whole corporeal nature, living bodies are the most perfect: wherefore the word "nature" has been transferred from living things to all natural things. for the word itself, "nature," as the philosopher says (metaph. v, did. iv, 4), was first applied to signify the generation of living things, which is called "nativity": and because living things are generated from a principle united to them, as fruit from a tree, and the offspring from the mother, to whom it is united, consequently the word "nature" has been applied to every principle of movement existing in that which is moved. now it is manifest that the active and passive principles of the generation of living things are the seeds from which living things are generated. therefore augustine fittingly gave the name of "seminal virtues" [seminales rationes] to all those active and passive virtues which are the principles of natural generation and movement. these active and passive virtues may be considered in several orders. for in the first place, as augustine says (gen. ad lit. vi, 10), they are principally and originally in the word of god, as _typal ideas._ secondly, they are in the elements of the world, where they were produced altogether at the beginning, as in _universal causes._ thirdly, they are in those things which, in the succession of time, are produced by universal causes, for instance in this plant, and in that animal, as in _particular causes._ fourthly, they are in the _seeds_ produced from animals and plants. and these again are compared to further particular effects, as the primordial universal causes to the first effects produced. reply obj. 1: these active and passive virtues of natural things, though not called "virtues" (rationes) by reason of their being in corporeal matter, can nevertheless be so called in respect of their origin, forasmuch as they are the effect of the typal ideas [rationes ideales]. reply obj. 2: these active and passive virtues are in certain parts of corporeal things: and when they are employed with local movement for the production of certain results, we speak of the demons as employing seeds. reply obj. 3: the seed of the male is the active principle in the generation of an animal. but that can be called seed also which the female contributes as the passive principle. and thus the word "seed" covers both active and passive principles. reply obj. 4: from the words of augustine when speaking of these seminal virtues, it is easy to gather that they are also causal virtues, just as seed is a kind of cause: for he says (de trin. iii, 9) that, "as a mother is pregnant with the unborn offspring, so is the world itself pregnant with the causes of unborn things." nevertheless, the "typal ideas" can be called "causal virtues," but not, strictly speaking, "seminal virtues," because seed is not a separate principle; and because miracles are not wrought outside the scope of causal virtues. likewise neither are miracles wrought outside the scope of the passive virtues so implanted in the creature, that the latter can be used to any purpose that god commands. but miracles are said to be wrought outside the scope of the natural active virtues, and the passive potentialities which are ordered to such active virtues, and this is what is meant when we say that they are wrought outside the scope of seminal virtues. _______________________ third article [i, q. 115, art. 3] whether the heavenly bodies are the cause of what is produced in bodies here below? objection 1: it would seem that the heavenly bodies are not the cause of what is produced in bodies here below. for damascene says (de fide orth. ii, 7): "we say that they"--namely, the heavenly bodies--"are not the cause of generation or corruption: they are rather signs of storms and atmospheric changes." obj. 2: further, for the production of anything, an agent and matter suffice. but in things here below there is passive matter; and there are contrary agents--heat and cold, and the like. therefore for the production of things here below, there is no need to ascribe causality to the heavenly bodies. obj. 3: further, the agent produces its like. now it is to be observed that everything which is produced here below is produced through the action of heat and cold, moisture and dryness, and other such qualities, which do not exist in heavenly bodies. therefore the heavenly bodies are not the cause of what is produced here below. obj. 4: further, augustine says (de civ. dei v, 6): "nothing is more corporeal than sex." but sex is not caused by the heavenly bodies: a sign of this is that of twins born under the same constellation, one may be male, the other female. therefore the heavenly bodies are not the cause of things produced in bodies here below. _on the contrary,_ augustine says (de trin. iii, 4): "bodies of a grosser and inferior nature are ruled in a certain order by those of a more subtle and powerful nature." and dionysius (div. nom. iv) says that "the light of the sun conduces to the generation of sensible bodies, moves them to life, gives them nourishment, growth, and perfection." _i answer that,_ since every multitude proceeds from unity; and since what is immovable is always in the same way of being, whereas what is moved has many ways of being: it must be observed that throughout the whole of nature, all movement proceeds from the immovable. therefore the more immovable certain things are, the more are they the cause of those things which are most movable. now the heavenly bodies are of all bodies the most immovable, for they are not moved save locally. therefore the movements of bodies here below, which are various and multiform, must be referred to the movement of the heavenly bodies, as to their cause. reply obj. 1: these words of damascene are to be understood as denying that the heavenly bodies are the first cause of generation and corruption here below; for this was affirmed by those who held that the heavenly bodies are gods. reply obj. 2: the active principles of bodies here below are only the active qualities of the elements, such as hot and cold and the like. if therefore the substantial forms of inferior bodies were not diversified save according to accidents of that kind, the principles of which the early natural philosophers held to be the "rare" and the "dense"; there would be no need to suppose some principle above these inferior bodies, for they would be of themselves sufficient to act. but to anyone who considers the matter aright, it is clear that those accidents are merely material dispositions in regard to the substantial forms of natural bodies. now matter is not of itself sufficient to act. and therefore it is necessary to suppose some active principle above these material dispositions. this is why the platonists maintained the existence of separate species, by participation of which the inferior bodies receive their substantial forms. but this does not seem enough. for the separate species, since they are supposed to be immovable, would always have the same mode of being: and consequently there would be no variety in the generation and corruption of inferior bodies: which is clearly false. therefore it is necessary, as the philosopher says (de gener. ii, 10), to suppose a movable principle, which by reason of its presence or absence causes variety in the generation and corruption of inferior bodies. such are the heavenly bodies. consequently whatever generates here below, moves to the production of the species, as the instrument of a heavenly body: thus the philosopher says (phys. ii, 2) that "man and the sun generate man." reply obj. 3: the heavenly bodies have not a specific likeness to the bodies here below. their likeness consists in this, that by reason of their universal power, whatever is generated in inferior bodies, is contained in them. in this way also we say that all things are like god. reply obj. 4: the actions of heavenly bodies are variously received in inferior bodies, according to the various dispositions of matter. now it happens at times that the matter in the human conception is not wholly disposed to the male sex; wherefore it is formed sometimes into a male, sometimes into a female. augustine quotes this as an argument against divination by stars: because the effects of the stars are varied even in corporeal things, according to the various dispositions of matter. _______________________ fourth article [i, q. 115, art. 4] whether the heavenly bodies are the cause of human actions? objection 1: it would seem that the heavenly bodies are the cause of human actions. for since the heavenly bodies are moved by spiritual substances, as stated above (q. 110, a. 3), they act by virtue thereof as their instruments. but those spiritual substances are superior to our souls. therefore it seems that they can cause impressions on our souls, and thereby cause human actions. obj. 2: further, every multiform is reducible to a uniform principle. but human actions are various and multiform. therefore it seems that they are reducible to the uniform movements of heavenly bodies, as to their principles. obj. 3: further, astrologers often foretell the truth concerning the outcome of wars, and other human actions, of which the intellect and will are the principles. but they could not do this by means of the heavenly bodies, unless these were the cause of human actions. therefore the heavenly bodies are the cause of human actions. _on the contrary,_ damascene says (de fide orth. ii, 7) that "the heavenly bodies are by no means the cause of human actions." _i answer that,_ the heavenly bodies can directly and of themselves act on bodies, as stated above (a. 3). they can act directly indeed on those powers of the soul which are the acts of corporeal organs, but accidentally: because the acts of such powers must needs be hindered by obstacles in the organs; thus an eye when disturbed cannot see well. wherefore if the intellect and will were powers affixed to corporeal organs, as some maintained, holding that intellect does not differ from sense; it would follow of necessity that the heavenly bodies are the cause of human choice and action. it would also follow that man is led by natural instinct to his actions, just as other animals, in which there are powers other than those which are affixed to corporeal organs: for whatever is done here below in virtue of the action of heavenly bodies, is done naturally. it would therefore follow that man has no free-will, and that he would have determinate actions, like other natural things. all of which is manifestly false, and contrary to human habit. it must be observed, however, that indirectly and accidentally, the impressions of heavenly bodies can reach the intellect and will, forasmuch, namely, as both intellect and will receive something from the inferior powers which are affixed to corporeal organs. but in this the intellect and will are differently situated. for the intellect, of necessity, receives from the inferior apprehensive powers: wherefore if the imaginative, cogitative, or memorative powers be disturbed, the action of the intellect is, of necessity, disturbed also. the will, on the contrary, does not, of necessity, follow the inclination of the inferior appetite; for although the passions in the irascible and concupiscible have a certain force in inclining the will; nevertheless the will retains the power of following the passions or repressing them. therefore the impressions of the heavenly bodies, by virtue of which the inferior powers can be changed, has less influence on the will, which is the proximate cause of human actions, than on the intellect. to maintain therefore that heavenly bodies are the cause of human actions is proper to those who hold that intellect does not differ from sense. wherefore some of these said that "such is the will of men, as is the day which the father of men and of gods brings on" (odyssey xviii 135). since, therefore, it is manifest that intellect and will are not acts of corporeal organs, it is impossible that heavenly bodies be the cause of human actions. reply obj. 1: the spiritual substances, that move the heavenly bodies, do indeed act on corporeal things by means of the heavenly bodies; but they act immediately on the human intellect by enlightening it. on the other hand, they cannot compel the will, as stated above (q. 111, a. 2). reply obj. 2: just as the multiformity of corporeal movements is reducible to the uniformity of the heavenly movement as to its cause: so the multiformity of actions proceeding from the intellect and the will is reduced to a uniform principle which is the divine intellect and will. reply obj. 3: the majority of men follow their passions, which are movements of the sensitive appetite, in which movements of the heavenly bodies can cooperate: but few are wise enough to resist these passions. consequently astrologers are able to foretell the truth in the majority of cases, especially in a general way. but not in particular cases; for nothing prevents man resisting his passions by his free-will. wherefore the astrologers themselves are wont to say that "the wise man is stronger than the stars" [*ptolemy, centiloquium, prop. 5], forasmuch as, to wit, he conquers his passions. _______________________ fifth article [i, q. 115, art. 5] whether heavenly bodies can act on the demons? objection 1: it would seem that heavenly bodies can act on the demons. for the demons, according to certain phases of the moon, can harass men, who on that account are called lunatics, as appears from matt. 4:24 and 17:14. but this would not be if they were not subject to the heavenly bodies. therefore the demons are subject to them. obj. 2: further, necromancers observe certain constellations in order to invoke the demons. but these would not be invoked through the heavenly bodies unless they were subject to them. therefore they are subject to them. obj. 3: further, heavenly bodies are more powerful than inferior bodies. but the demons are confined to certain inferior bodies, namely, "herbs, stones, animals, and to certain sounds and words, forms and figures," as porphyry says, quoted by augustine (de civ. dei x, 11). much more therefore are the demons subject to the action of heavenly bodies. _on the contrary,_ the demons are superior in the order of nature, to the heavenly bodies. but the "agent is superior to the patient," as augustine says (gen. ad lit. xii, 16). therefore the demons are not subject to the action of heavenly bodies. _i answer that,_ there have been three opinions about the demons. in the first place the peripatetics denied the existence of demons; and held that what is ascribed to the demons, according to the necromantic art, is effected by the power of the heavenly bodies. this is what augustine (de civ. dei x, 11) relates as having been held by porphyry, namely, that "on earth men fabricate certain powers useful in producing certain effects of the stars." but this opinion is manifestly false. for we know by experience that many things are done by demons, for which the power of heavenly bodies would in no way suffice: for instance, that a man in a state of delirium should speak an unknown tongue, recite poetry and authors of whom he has no previous knowledge; that necromancers make statues to speak and move, and other like things. for this reason the platonists were led to hold that demons are "animals with an aerial body and a passive soul," as apuleius says, quoted by augustine (de civ. dei viii, 16). and this is the second of the opinions mentioned above: according to which it could be said that demons are subject to heavenly bodies in the same way as we have said man is subject thereto (a. 4). but this opinion is proved to be false from what we have said above (q. 51, a. 1): for we hold that demons are spiritual substances not united to bodies. hence it is clear that they are subject to the action of heavenly bodies neither essentially nor accidentally, neither directly nor indirectly. reply obj. 1: that demons harass men, according to certain phases of the moon, happens in two ways. firstly, they do so in order to "defame god's creature," namely, the moon; as jerome (in matt. iv, 24) and chrysostom (hom. lvii in matt.) say. secondly, because as they are unable to effect anything save by means of the natural forces, as stated above (q. 114, a. 4, ad 2) they take into account the aptitude of bodies for the intended result. now it is manifest that "the brain is the most moist of all the parts of the body," as aristotle says [*de part. animal. ii, 7: de sens. et sensato ii: de somn. et vigil. iii]: wherefore it is the most subject to the action of the moon, the property of which is to move what is moist. and it is precisely in the brain that animal forces culminate: wherefore the demons, according to certain phases of the moon, disturb man's imagination, when they observe that the brain is thereto disposed. reply obj. 2: demons when summoned through certain constellations, come for two reasons. firstly, in order to lead man into the error of believing that there is some divine power in the stars. secondly, because they consider that under certain constellations corporeal matter is better disposed for the result for which they are summoned. reply obj. 3: as augustine says (de civ. dei xxi, 6), the "demons are enticed through various kinds of stones, herbs, trees, animals, songs, rites, not as an animal is enticed by food, but as a spirit by signs"; that is to say, forasmuch as these things are offered to them in token of the honor due to god, of which they are covetous. _______________________ sixth article [i, q. 115, art. 6] whether heavenly bodies impose necessity on things subject to their action? objection 1: it would seem that heavenly bodies impose necessity on things subject to their action. for given a sufficient cause, the effect follows of necessity. but heavenly bodies are a sufficient cause of their effects. since, therefore, heavenly bodies, with their movements and dispositions, are necessary beings; it seems that their effects follow of necessity. obj. 2: further, an agent's effect results of necessity in matter, when the power of the agent is such that it can subject the matter to itself entirely. but the entire matter of inferior bodies is subject to the power of heavenly bodies, since this is a higher power than theirs. therefore the effect of the heavenly bodies is of necessity received in corporeal matter. obj. 3: further, if the effect of the heavenly body does not follow of necessity, this is due to some hindering cause. but any corporeal cause, that might possibly hinder the effect of a heavenly body, must of necessity be reducible to some heavenly principle: since the heavenly bodies are the causes of all that takes place here below. therefore, since also that heavenly principle is necessary, it follows that the effect of the heavenly body is necessarily hindered. consequently it would follow that all that takes place here below happens of necessity. _on the contrary,_ the philosopher says (de somn. et vigil. [*de divin. per somn. ii]): "it is not incongruous that many of the signs observed in bodies, of occurrences in the heavens, such as rain and wind, should not be fulfilled." therefore not all the effects of heavenly bodies take place of necessity. _i answer that,_ this question is partly solved by what was said above (a. 4); and in part presents some difficulty. for it was shown that although the action of heavenly bodies produces certain inclinations in corporeal nature, the will nevertheless does not of necessity follow these inclinations. therefore there is nothing to prevent the effect of heavenly bodies being hindered by the action of the will, not only in man himself, but also in other things to which human action extends. but in natural things there is no such principle, endowed with freedom to follow or not to follow the impressions produced by heavenly agents. wherefore it seems that in such things at least, everything happens of necessity; according to the reasoning of some of the ancients who supposing that everything that is, has a cause; and that, given the cause, the effect follows of necessity; concluded that all things happen of necessity. this opinion is refuted by aristotle (metaph. vi, did. v, 3) as to this double supposition. for in the first place it is not true that, given any cause whatever, the effect must follow of necessity. for some causes are so ordered to their effects, as to produce them, not of necessity, but in the majority of cases, and in the minority to fail in producing them. but that such causes do fail in the minority of cases is due to some hindering cause; consequently the above-mentioned difficulty seems not to be avoided, since the cause in question is hindered of necessity. therefore we must say, in the second place, that everything that is a being _per se,_ has a cause; but what is accidentally, has not a cause, because it is not truly a being, since it is not truly one. for (that a thing is) "white" has a cause, likewise (that a man is) "musical" has not a cause, but (that a being is) "white-musical" has not a cause, because it is not truly a being, nor truly one. now it is manifest that a cause which hinders the action of a cause so ordered to its effect as to produce it in the majority of cases, clashes sometimes with this cause by accident: and the clashing of these two causes, inasmuch as it is accidental, has no cause. consequently what results from this clashing of causes is not to be reduced to a further pre-existing cause, from which it follows of necessity. for instance, that some terrestrial body take fire in the higher regions of the air and fall to the earth, is caused by some heavenly power: again, that there be on the surface of the earth some combustible matter, is reducible to some heavenly principle. but that the burning body should alight on this matter and set fire to it, is not caused by a heavenly body, but is accidental. consequently not all the effects of heavenly bodies result of necessity. reply obj. 1: the heavenly bodies are causes of effects that take place here below, through the means of particular inferior causes, which can fail in their effects in the minority of cases. reply obj. 2: the power of a heavenly body is not infinite. wherefore it requires a determinate disposition in matter, both as to local distance and as to other conditions, in order to produce its effect. therefore as local distance hinders the effect of a heavenly body (for the sun has not the same effect in heat in dacia as in ethiopia); so the grossness of matter, its low or high temperature or other such disposition, can hinder the effect of a heavenly body. reply obj. 3: although the cause that hinders the effect of another cause can be reduced to a heavenly body as its cause; nevertheless the clashing of two causes, being accidental, is not reduced to the causality of a heavenly body, as stated above. _______________________ on fate (in four articles) we come now to the consideration of fate. under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) is there such a thing as fate? (2) where is it? (3) is it unchangeable? (4) are all things subject to fate? _______________________ first article [i, q. 116, art. 1] whether there be such a thing as fate? objection 1: it would seem that fate is nothing. for gregory says in a homily for the epiphany (hom. x in evang.): "far be it from the hearts of the faithful to think that fate is anything real." obj. 2: further, what happens by fate is not unforeseen, for as augustine says (de civ. dei v, 4), "fate is understood to be derived from the verb 'fari' which means to speak"; as though things were said to happen by fate, which are "fore-spoken" by one who decrees them to happen. now what is foreseen is neither lucky nor chance-like. if therefore things happen by fate, there will be neither luck nor chance in the world. _on the contrary,_ what does not exist cannot be defined. but boethius (de consol. iv) defines fate thus: "fate is a disposition inherent to changeable things, by which providence connects each one with its proper order." _i answer that,_ in this world some things seem to happen by luck or chance. now it happens sometimes that something is lucky or chance-like as compared to inferior causes, which, if compared to some higher cause, is directly intended. for instance, if two servants are sent by their master to the same place; the meeting of the two servants in regard to themselves is by chance; but as compared to the master, who had ordered it, it is directly intended. so there were some who refused to refer to a higher cause such events which by luck or chance take place here below. these denied the existence of fate and providence, as augustine relates of tully (de civ. dei v, 9). and this is contrary to what we have said above about providence (q. 22, a. 2). on the other hand, some have considered that everything that takes place here below by luck or by chance, whether in natural things or in human affairs, is to be reduced to a superior cause, namely, the heavenly bodies. according to these fate is nothing else than "a disposition of the stars under which each one is begotten or born" [*cf. st. augustine , loc. cit., v, 1, 8, 9]. but this will not hold. first, as to human affairs: because we have proved above (q. 115, a. 4) that human actions are not subject to the action of heavenly bodies, save accidentally and indirectly. now the cause of fate, since it has the ordering of things that happen by fate, must of necessity be directly and of itself the cause of what takes place. secondly, as to all things that happen accidentally: for it has been said (q. 115, a. 6) that what is accidental, is properly speaking neither a being, nor a unity. but every action of nature terminates in some one thing. wherefore it is impossible for that which is accidental to be the proper effect of an active natural principle. no natural cause can therefore have for its proper effect that a man intending to dig a grave finds a treasure. now it is manifest that a acts after the manner of a natural principle: wherefore its effects in this world are natural. it is therefore impossible that any active power of a heavenly body be the cause of what happens by accident here below, whether by luck or by chance. we must therefore say that what happens here by accident, both in natural things and in human affairs, is reduced to a preordaining cause, which is divine providence. for nothing hinders that which happens by accident being considered as one by an intellect: otherwise the intellect could not form this proposition: "the digger of a grave found a treasure." and just as an intellect can apprehend this so can it effect it; for instance, someone who knows a place where a treasure is hidden, might instigate a rustic, ignorant of this, to dig a grave there. consequently, nothing hinders what happens here by accident, by luck or by chance, being reduced to some ordering cause which acts by the intellect, especially the divine intellect. for god alone can change the will, as shown above (q. 105, a. 4). consequently the ordering of human actions, the principle of which is the will, must be ascribed to god alone. so therefore inasmuch as all that happens here below is subject to divine providence, as being pre-ordained, and as it were "fore-spoken," we can admit the existence of fate: although the holy doctors avoided the use of this word, on account of those who twisted its application to a certain force in the position of the stars. hence augustine says (de civ. dei v, 1): "if anyone ascribes human affairs to fate, meaning thereby the will or power of god, let him keep to his opinion, but hold his tongue." for this reason gregory denies the existence of fate: wherefore the first objection's solution is manifest. reply obj. 2: nothing hinders certain things happening by luck or by chance, if compared to their proximate causes: but not if compared to divine providence, whereby "nothing happens at random in the world," as augustine says (qq. 83, qu. 24). _______________________ second article [i, q. 116, art. 2] whether fate is in created things? objection 1: it would seem that fate is not in created things. for augustine says (de civ. dei v, 1) that the "divine will or power is called fate." but the divine will or power is not in creatures, but in god. therefore fate is not in creatures but in god. obj. 2: further, fate is compared to things that happen by fate, as their cause; as the very use of the word proves. but the universal cause that of itself effects what takes place by accident here below, is god alone, as stated above (a. 1). therefore fate is in god, and not in creatures. obj. 3: further, if fate is in creatures, it is either a substance or an accident: and whichever it is it must be multiplied according to the number of creatures. since, therefore, fate seems to be one thing only, it seems that fate is not in creatures, but in god. _on the contrary,_ boethius says (de consol. iv): "fate is a disposition inherent to changeable things." _i answer that,_ as is clear from what has been stated above (q. 22, a. 3; q. 103, a. 6), divine providence produces effects through mediate causes. we can therefore consider the ordering of the effects in two ways. firstly, as being in god himself: and thus the ordering of the effects is called providence. but if we consider this ordering as being in the mediate causes ordered by god to the production of certain effects, thus it has the nature of fate. this is what boethius says (de consol. iv): "fate is worked out when divine providence is served by certain spirits; whether by the soul, or by all nature itself which obeys him, whether by the heavenly movements of the stars, whether by the angelic power, or by the ingenuity of the demons, whether by some of these, or by all, the chain of fate is forged." of each of these things we have spoken above (a. 1; q. 104, a. 2; q. 110, a. 1; q. 113; q. 114). it is therefore manifest that fate is in the created causes themselves, as ordered by god to the production of their effects. reply obj. 1: the ordering itself of second causes, which augustine (de civ. dei v, 8) calls the "series of causes," has not the nature of fate, except as dependent on god. wherefore the divine power or will can be called fate, as being the cause of fate. but essentially fate is the very disposition or "series," i.e. order, of second causes. reply obj. 2: fate has the nature of a cause, just as much as the second causes themselves, the ordering of which is called fate. reply obj. 3: fate is called a disposition, not that disposition which is a species of quality, but in the sense in which it signifies order, which is not a substance, but a relation. and if this order be considered in relation to its principle, it is one; and thus fate is one. but if it be considered in relation to its effects, or to the mediate causes, this fate is multiple. in this sense the poet wrote: "thy fate draws thee." _______________________ third article [i, q. 116, art. 3] whether fate is unchangeable? objection 1: it seems that fate is not unchangeable. for boethius says (de consol. iv): "as reasoning is to the intellect, as the begotten is to that which is, as time to eternity, as the circle to its centre; so is the fickle chain of fate to the unwavering simplicity of providence." obj. 2: further, the philosopher says (topic. ii, 7): "if we be moved, what is in us is moved." but fate is a "disposition inherent to changeable things," as boethius says (de consol. iv). therefore fate is changeable. obj. 3: further, if fate is unchangeable, what is subject to fate happens unchangeably and of necessity. but things ascribed to fate seem principally to be contingencies. therefore there would be no contingencies in the world, but all things would happen of necessity. _on the contrary,_ boethius says (de consol. iv) that fate is an unchangeable disposition. _i answer that,_ the disposition of second causes which we call fate, can be considered in two ways: firstly, in regard to the second causes, which are thus disposed or ordered; secondly, in regard to the first principle, namely, god, by whom they are ordered. some, therefore, have held that the series itself o[f] dispositions of causes is in itself necessary, so that all things would happen of necessity; for this reason that each effect has a cause, and given a cause the effect must follow of necessity. but this is false, as proved above (q. 115, a. 6). others, on the other hand, held that fate is changeable, even as dependent on divine providence. wherefore the egyptians said that fate could be changed by certain sacrifices, as gregory of nyssa says (nemesius, de homine). this too has been disproved above for the reason that it is repugnant to divine providence. we must therefore say that fate, considered in regard to second causes, is changeable; but as subject to divine providence, it derives a certain unchangeableness, not of absolute but of conditional necessity. in this sense we say that this conditional is true and necessary: "if god foreknew that this would happen, it will happen." wherefore boethius, having said that the chain of fate is fickle, shortly afterwards adds--"which, since it is derived from an unchangeable providence must also itself be unchangeable." from this the answers to the objections are clear. _______________________ fourth article [i, q. 116, art. 4] whether all things are subject to fate? objection 1: it seems that all things are subject to fate. for boethius says (de consol. iv): "the chain of fate moves the heaven and the stars, tempers the elements to one another, and models them by a reciprocal transformation. by fate all things that are born into the world and perish are renewed in a uniform progression of offspring and seed." nothing therefore seems to be excluded from the domain of fate. obj. 2: further, augustine says (de civ. dei v, 1) that fate is something real, as referred to the divine will and power. but the divine will is cause of all things that happen, as augustine says (de trin. iii, 1 seqq.). therefore all things are subject to fate. obj. 3: further, boethius says (de consol. iv) that fate "is a disposition inherent to changeable things." but all creatures are changeable, and god alone is truly unchangeable, as stated above (q. 9, a. 2). therefore fate is in all things. _on the contrary,_ boethius says (de consol. iv) that "some things subject to providence are above the ordering of fate." _i answer that,_ as stated above (a. 2), fate is the ordering of second causes to effects foreseen by god. whatever, therefore, is subject to second causes, is subject also to fate. but whatever is done immediately by god, since it is not subject to second causes, neither is it subject to fate; such are creation, the glorification of spiritual substances, and the like. and this is what boethius says (de consol. iv): viz. that "those things which are nigh to god have a state of immobility, and exceed the changeable order of fate." hence it is clear that "the further a thing is from the first mind, the more it is involved in the chain of fate"; since so much the more it is bound up with second causes. reply obj. 1: all the things mentioned in this passage are done by god by means of second causes; for this reason they are contained in the order of fate. but it is not the same with everything else, as stated above. reply obj. 2: fate is to be referred to the divine will and power, as to its first principle. consequently it does not follow that whatever is subject to the divine will or power, is subject also to fate, as already stated. reply obj. 3: although all creatures are in some way changeable, yet some of them do not proceed from changeable created causes. and these, therefore, are not subject to fate, as stated above. _______________________ question 117 of things pertaining to the action of man (in four articles) we have next to consider those things which pertain to the action of man, who is composed of a created corporeal and spiritual nature. in the first place we shall consider that action (in general) and secondly in regard to the propagation of man from man. as to the first, there are four points of inquiry: (1) whether one man can teach another, as being the cause of his knowledge? (2) whether man can teach an angel? (3) whether by the power of his soul man can change corporeal matter? (4) whether the separate soul of man can move bodies by local movement? _______________________ first article [i, q. 117, art. 1] whether one man can teach another? objection 1: it would seem that one man cannot teach another. for the lord says (matt. 22:8): "be not you called rabbi": on which the gloss of jerome says, "lest you give to men the honor due to god." therefore to be a master is properly an honor due to god. but it belongs to a master to teach. therefore man cannot teach, and this is proper to god. obj. 2: further, if one man teaches another this is only inasmuch as he acts through his own knowledge, so as to cause knowledge in the other. but a quality through which anyone acts so as to produce his like, is an active quality. therefore it follows that knowledge is an active quality just as heat is. obj. 3: further, for knowledge we require intellectual light, and the species of the thing understood. but a man cannot cause either of these in another man. therefore a man cannot by teaching cause knowledge in another man. obj. 4: further, the teacher does nothing in regard to a disciple save to propose to him certain signs, so as to signify something by words or gestures. but it is not possible to teach anyone so as to cause knowledge in him, by putting signs before him. for these are signs either of things that he knows, or of things he does not know. if of things that he knows, he to whom these signs are proposed is already in the possession of knowledge, and does not acquire it from the master. if they are signs of things that he does not know, he can learn nothing therefrom: for instance, if one were to speak greek to a man who only knows latin, he would learn nothing thereby. therefore in no way can a man cause knowledge in another by teaching him. _on the contrary,_ the apostle says (1 tim. 2:7): "whereunto i am appointed a preacher and an apostle . . . a doctor of the gentiles in faith and truth." _i answer that,_ on this question there have been various opinions. for averroes, commenting on _de anima_ iii, maintains that all men have one passive intellect in common, as stated above (q. 76, a. 2). from this it follows that the same intelligible species belong to all men. consequently he held that one man does not cause another to have a knowledge distinct from that which he has himself; but that he communicates the identical knowledge which he has himself, by moving him to order rightly the phantasms in his soul, so that they be rightly disposed for intelligible apprehension. this opinion is true so far as knowledge is the same in disciple and master, if we consider the identity of the thing known: for the same objective truth is known by both of them. but so far as he maintains that all men have but one passive intellect, and the same intelligible species, differing only as to various phantasms, his opinion is false, as stated above (q. 76, a. 2). besides this, there is the opinion of the platonists, who held that our souls are possessed of knowledge from the very beginning, through the participation of separate forms, as stated above (q. 84, aa. 3, 4); but that the soul is hindered, through its union with the body, from the free consideration of those things which it knows. according to this, the disciple does not acquire fresh knowledge from his master, but is roused by him to consider what he knows; so that to learn would be nothing else than to remember. in the same way they held that natural agents only dispose (matter) to receive forms, which matter acquires by a participation of separate substances. but against this we have proved above (q. 79, a. 2; q. 84, a. 3) that the passive intellect of the human soul is in pure potentiality to intelligible (species), as aristotle says (de anima iii, 4). we must therefore decide the question differently, by saying that the teacher causes knowledge in the learner, by reducing him from potentiality to act, as the philosopher says (phys. viii, 4). in order to make this clear, we must observe that of effects proceeding from an exterior principle, some proceed from the exterior principle alone; as the form of a house is caused to be in matter by art alone: whereas other effects proceed sometimes from an exterior principle, sometimes from an interior principle: thus health is caused in a sick man, sometimes by an exterior principle, namely by the medical art, sometimes by an interior principle as when a man is healed by the force of nature. in these latter effects two things must be noticed. first, that art in its work imitates nature for just as nature heals a man by alteration, digestion, rejection of the matter that caused the sickness, so does art. secondly, we must remark that the exterior principle, art, acts, not as principal agent, but as helping the principal agent, but as helping the principal agent, which is the interior principle, by strengthening it, and by furnishing it with instruments and assistance, of which the interior principle makes use in producing the effect. thus the physician strengthens nature, and employs food and medicine, of which nature makes use for the intended end. now knowledge is acquired in man, both from an interior principle, as is clear in one who procures knowledge by his own research; and from an exterior principle, as is clear in one who learns (by instruction). for in every man there is a certain principle of knowledge, namely the light of the active intellect, through which certain universal principles of all the sciences are naturally understood as soon as proposed to the intellect. now when anyone applies these universal principles to certain particular things, the memory or experience of which he acquires through the senses; then by his own research advancing from the known to the unknown, he obtains knowledge of what he knew not before. wherefore anyone who teaches, leads the disciple from things known by the latter, to the knowledge of things previously unknown to him; according to what the philosopher says (poster. i, 1): "all teaching and all learning proceed from previous knowledge." now the master leads the disciple from things known to knowledge of the unknown, in a twofold manner. firstly, by proposing to him certain helps or means of instruction, which his intellect can use for the acquisition of science: for instance, he may put before him certain less universal propositions, of which nevertheless the disciple is able to judge from previous knowledge: or he may propose to him some sensible examples, either by way of likeness or of opposition, or something of the sort, from which the intellect of the learner is led to the knowledge of truth previously unknown. secondly, by strengthening the intellect of the learner; not, indeed, by some active power as of a higher nature, as explained above (q. 106, a. 1; q. 111, a. 1) of the angelic enlightenment, because all human intellects are of one grade in the natural order; but inasmuch as he proposes to the disciple the order of principles to conclusions, by reason of his not having sufficient collating power to be able to draw the conclusions from the principles. hence the philosopher says (poster. i, 2) that "a demonstration is a syllogism that causes knowledge." in this way a demonstrator causes his hearer to know. reply obj. 1: as stated above, the teacher only brings exterior help as the physician who heals: but just as the interior nature is the principal cause of the healing, so the interior light of the intellect is the principal cause of knowledge. but both of these are from god. therefore as of god is it written: "who healeth all thy diseases" (ps. 102:3); so of him is it written: "he that teacheth man knowledge" (ps. 93:10), inasmuch as "the light of his countenance is signed upon us" (ps. 4:7), through which light all things are shown to us. reply obj. 2: as averroes argues, the teacher does not cause knowledge in the disciple after the manner of a natural active cause. wherefore knowledge need not be an active quality: but is the principle by which one is directed in teaching, just as art is the principle by which one is directed in working. reply obj. 3: the master does not cause the intellectual light in the disciple, nor does he cause the intelligible species directly: but he moves the disciple by teaching, so that the latter, by the power of his intellect, forms intelligible concepts, the signs of which are proposed to him from without. reply obj. 4: the signs proposed by the master to the disciple are of things known in a general and confused manner; but not known in detail and distinctly. therefore when anyone acquires knowledge by himself, he cannot be called self-taught, or be said to have his own master because perfect knowledge did not precede in him, such as is required in a master. _______________________ second article [i, q. 117, art. 2] whether man can teach the angels? objection 1: it would seem that men teach angels. for the apostle says (eph. 3:10): "that the manifold wisdom of god may be made known to the principalities and powers in the heavenly places through the church." but the church is the union of all the faithful. therefore some things are made known to angels through men. obj. 2: further, the superior angels, who are enlightened immediately concerning divine things by god, can instruct the inferior angels, as stated above (q. 116, a. 1; q. 112, a. 3). but some men are instructed immediately concerning divine things by the word of god; as appears principally of the apostles from heb. 1:1, 2: "last of all, in these days (god) hath spoken to us by his son." therefore some men have been able to teach the angels. obj. 3: further, the inferior angels are instructed by the superior. but some men are higher than some angels; since some men are taken up to the highest angelic orders, as gregory says in a homily (hom. xxxiv in evang.). therefore some of the inferior angels can be instructed by men concerning divine things. _on the contrary,_ dionysius says (div. nom. iv) that every divine enlightenment is borne to men by the ministry of the angels. therefore angels are not instructed by men concerning divine things. _i answer that,_ as stated above (q. 107, a. 2), the inferior angels can indeed speak to the superior angels, by making their thoughts known to them; but concerning divine things superior angels are never enlightened by inferior angels. now it is manifest that in the same way as inferior angels are subject to the superior, the highest men are subject even to the lowest angels. this is clear from our lord's words (matt. 11:11): "there hath not risen among them that are born of woman a greater than john the baptist; yet he that is lesser in the kingdom of heaven is greater than he." therefore angels are never enlightened by men concerning divine things. but men can by means of speech make known to angels the thoughts of their hearts: because it belongs to god alone to know the heart's secrets. reply obj. 1: augustine (gen. ad lit. v, 19) thus explains this passage of the apostle, who in the preceding verses says: "to me, the least of all the saints, is given this grace . . . to enlighten all men, that they may see what is the dispensation of the mystery which hath been hidden from eternity in god. hidden, yet so that the multiform wisdom of god was made known to the principalities and powers in the heavenly places--that is, through the church." as though he were to say: this mystery was hidden from men, but not from the church in heaven, which is contained in the principalities and powers who knew it "from all ages, but not before all ages: because the church was at first there, where after the resurrection this church composed of men will be gathered together." it can also be explained otherwise that "what is hidden, is known by the angels, not only in god, but also here where when it takes place and is made public," as augustine says further on (gen. ad lit. v, 19). thus when the mysteries of christ and the church were fulfilled by the apostles, some things concerning these mysteries became apparent to the angels, which were hidden from them before. in this way we can understand what jerome says (comment. in ep. ad eph.)--that from the preaching of the apostles the angels learned certain mysteries; that is to say, through the preaching of the apostles, the mysteries were realized in the things themselves: thus by the preaching of paul the gentiles were converted, of which mystery the apostle is speaking in the passage quoted. reply obj. 2: the apostles were instructed immediately by the word of god, not according to his divinity, but according as he spoke in his human nature. hence the argument does not prove. reply obj. 3: certain men in this state of life are greater than certain angels, not actually, but virtually; forasmuch as they have such great charity that they can merit a higher degree of beatitude than that possessed by certain angels. in the same way we might say that the seed of a great tree is virtually greater than a small tree, though actually it is much smaller. _______________________ third article [i, q. 117, art. 3] whether man by the power of his soul can change corporeal matter? objection 1: it would seem that man by the power of his soul can change corporeal matter. for gregory says (dialog. ii, 30): "saints work miracles sometimes by prayer, sometimes by their power: thus peter, by prayer, raised the dead tabitha to life, and by his reproof delivered to death the lying ananias and saphira." but in the working of miracles a change is wrought in corporeal matter. therefore men, by the power of the soul, can change corporeal matter. obj. 2: further, on these words (gal. 3:1): "who hath bewitched you, that you should not obey the truth?" the gloss says that "some have blazing eyes, who by a single look bewitch others, especially children." but this would not be unless the power of the soul could change corporeal matter. therefore man can change corporeal matter by the power of his soul. obj. 3: further, the human body is nobler than other inferior bodies. but by the apprehension of the human soul the human body is changed to heat and cold, as appears when a man is angry or afraid: indeed this change sometimes goes so far as to bring on sickness and death. much more, then, can the human soul by its power change corporeal matter. _on the contrary,_ augustine says (de trin. iii, 8): "corporeal matter obeys god alone at will." _i answer that,_ as stated above (q. 110, a. 2), corporeal matter is not changed to (the reception of) a form save either by some agent composed of matter and form, or by god himself, in whom both matter and form pre-exist virtually, as in the primordial cause of both. wherefore of the angels also we have stated (q. 110, a. 2) that they cannot change corporeal matter by their natural power, except by employing corporeal agents for the production of certain effects. much less therefore can the soul, by its natural power, change corporeal matter, except by means of bodies. reply obj. 1: the saints are said to work miracles by the power of grace, not of nature. this is clear from what gregory says in the same place: "those who are sons of god, in power, as john says--what wonder is there that they should work miracles by that power?" reply obj. 2: avicenna assigns the cause of bewitchment to the fact that corporeal matter has a natural tendency to obey spiritual substance rather than natural contrary agents. therefore when the soul is of strong imagination, it can change corporeal matter. this he says is the cause of the "evil eye." but it has been shown above (q. 110, a. 2) that corporeal matter does not obey spiritual substances at will, but the creator alone. therefore it is better to say, that by a strong imagination the (corporeal) spirits of the body united to that soul are changed, which change in the spirits takes place especially in the eyes, to which the more subtle spirits can reach. and the eyes infect the air which is in contact with them to a certain distance: in the same way as a new and clear mirror contracts a tarnish from the look of a "menstruata," as aristotle says (de somn. et vigil.; [*de insomniis ii]). hence then when a soul is vehemently moved to wickedness, as occurs mostly in little old women, according to the above explanation, the countenance becomes venomous and hurtful, especially to children, who have a tender and most impressionable body. it is also possible that by god's permission, or from some hidden deed, the spiteful demons co-operate in this, as the witches may have some compact with them. reply obj. 3: the soul is united to the body as its form; and the sensitive appetite, which obeys the reason in a certain way, as stated above (q. 81, a. 3), it is the act of a corporeal organ. therefore at the apprehension of the human soul, the sensitive appetite must needs be moved with an accompanying corporeal operation. but the apprehension of the human soul does not suffice to work a change in exterior bodies, except by means of a change in the body united to it, as stated above (ad 2). _______________________ fourth article [i, q. 117, art. 4] whether the separate human soul can move bodies at least locally? objection 1: it seems that the separate human soul can move bodies at least locally. for a body naturally obeys a spiritual substance as to local motion, as stated above (q. 110, a. 5). but the separate soul is a spiritual substance. therefore it can move exterior bodies by its command. obj. 2: further, in the itinerary of clement it is said in the narrative of nicetas to peter, that simon magus, by sorcery retained power over the soul of a child that he had slain, and that through this soul he worked magical wonders. but this could not have been without some corporeal change at least as to place. therefore, the separate soul has the power to move bodies locally. _on the contrary,_ the philosopher says (de anima i, 3) that the soul cannot move any other body whatsoever but its own. _i answer that,_ the separate soul cannot by its natural power move a body. for it is manifest that, even while the soul is united to the body, it does not move the body except as endowed with life: so that if one of the members become lifeless, it does not obey the soul as to local motion. now it is also manifest that no body is quickened by the separate soul. therefore within the limits of its natural power the separate soul cannot command the obedience of a body; though, by the power of god, it can exceed those limits. reply obj. 1: there are certain spiritual substances whose powers are not determinate to certain bodies; such are the angels who are naturally unfettered by a body; consequently various bodies may obey them as to movement. but if the motive power of a separate substance is naturally determinate to move a certain body, that substance will not be able to move a body of higher degree, but only one of lower degree: thus according to philosophers the mover of the lower heaven cannot move the higher heaven. wherefore, since the soul is by its nature determinate to move the body of which it is the form, it cannot by its natural power move any other body. reply obj. 2: as augustine (de civ. dei x, 11) and chrysostom (hom. xxviii in matt.) say, the demons often pretend to be the souls of the dead, in order to confirm the error of heathen superstition. it is therefore credible that simon magus was deceived by some demon who pretended to be the soul of the child whom the magician had slain. _______________________ question 118 of the production of man from man as to the soul (in three articles) we next consider the production of man from man: first, as to the soul; secondly, as to the body. under the first head there are three points of inquiry: (1) whether the sensitive soul is transmitted with the semen? (2) whether the intellectual soul is thus transmitted? (3) whether all souls were created at the same time? _______________________ first article [i, q. 118, art. 1] whether the sensitive soul is transmitted with the semen? objection 1: it would seem that the sensitive soul is not transmitted with the semen, but created by god. for every perfect substance, not composed of matter and form, that begins to exist, acquires existence not by generation, but by creation: for nothing is generated save from matter. but the sensitive soul is a perfect substance, otherwise it could not move the body; and since it is the form of a body, it is not composed of matter and form. therefore it begins to exist not by generation but by creation. obj. 2: further, in living things the principle of generation is the generating power; which, since it is one of the powers of the vegetative soul, is of a lower order than the sensitive soul. now nothing acts beyond its species. therefore the sensitive soul cannot be caused by the animal's generating power. obj. 3: further, the generator begets its like: so that the form of the generator must be actually in the cause of generation. but neither the sensitive soul itself nor any part thereof is actually in the semen, for no part of the sensitive soul is elsewhere than in some part of the body; while in the semen there is not even a particle of the body, because there is not a particle of the body which is not made from the semen and by the power thereof. therefore the sensitive soul is not produced through the semen. obj. 4: further, if there be in the semen any principle productive of the sensitive soul, this principle either remains after the animal is begotten, or it does not remain. now it cannot remain. for either it would be identified with the sensitive soul of the begotten animal; which is impossible, for thus there would be identity between begetter and begotten, maker and made: or it would be distinct therefrom; and again this is impossible, for it has been proved above (q. 76, a. 4) that in one animal there is but one formal principle, which is the soul. if on the other hand the aforesaid principle does not remain, this again seems to be impossible: for thus an agent would act to its own destruction, which cannot be. therefore the sensitive soul cannot be generated from the semen. _on the contrary,_ the power in the semen is to the animal seminally generated, as the power in the elements of the world is to animals produced from these elements--for instance by putrefaction. but in the latter animals the soul is produced by the elemental power, according to gen. 1:20: "let the waters bring forth the creeping creatures having life." therefore also the souls of animals seminally generated are produced by the seminal power. _i answer that,_ some have held that the sensitive souls of animals are created by god (q. 65, a. 4). this opinion would hold if the sensitive soul were subsistent, having being and operation of itself. for thus, as having being and operation of itself, to be made would needs be proper to it. and since a simple and subsistent thing cannot be made except by creation, it would follow that the sensitive soul would arrive at existence by creation. but this principle is false--namely, that being and operation are proper to the sensitive soul, as has been made clear above (q. 75, a. 3): for it would not cease to exist when the body perishes. since, therefore, it is not a subsistent form, its relation to existence is that of the corporeal forms, to which existence does not belong as proper to them, but which are said to exist forasmuch as the subsistent composites exist through them. wherefore to be made is proper to composites. and since the generator is like the generated, it follows of necessity that both the sensitive soul, and all other like forms are naturally brought into existence by certain corporeal agents that reduce the matter from potentiality to act, through some corporeal power of which they are possessed. now the more powerful an agent, the greater scope its action has: for instance, the hotter a body, the greater the distance to which its heat carries. therefore bodies not endowed with life, which are the lowest in the order of nature, generate their like, not through some medium, but by themselves; thus fire by itself generates fire. but living bodies, as being more powerful, act so as to generate their like, both without and with a medium. without a medium--in the work of nutrition, in which flesh generates flesh: with a medium--in the act of generation, because the semen of the animal or plant derives a certain active force from the soul of the generator, just as the instrument derives a certain motive power from the principal agent. and as it matters not whether we say that something is moved by the instrument or by the principal agent, so neither does it matter whether we say that the soul of the generated is caused by the soul of the generator, or by some seminal power derived therefrom. reply obj. 1: the sensitive soul is not a perfect self-subsistent substance. we have said enough (q. 25, a. 3) on this point, nor need we repeat it here. reply obj. 2: the generating power begets not only by its own virtue but by that of the whole soul, of which it is a power. therefore the generating power of a plant generates a plant, and that of an animal begets an animal. for the more perfect the soul is, to so much a more perfect effect is its generating power ordained. reply obj. 3: this active force which is in the semen, and which is derived from the soul of the generator, is, as it were, a certain movement of this soul itself: nor is it the soul or a part of the soul, save virtually; thus the form of a bed is not in the saw or the axe, but a certain movement towards that form. consequently there is no need for this active force to have an actual organ; but it is based on the (vital) spirit in the semen which is frothy, as is attested by its whiteness. in which spirit, moreover, there is a certain heat derived from the power of the heavenly bodies, by virtue of which the inferior bodies also act towards the production of the species as stated above (q. 115, a. 3, ad 2). and since in this (vital) spirit the power of the soul is concurrent with the power of a heavenly body, it has been said that "man and the sun generate man." moreover, elemental heat is employed instrumentally by the soul's power, as also by the nutritive power, as stated (de anima ii, 4). reply obj. 4: in perfect animals, generated by coition, the active force is in the semen of the male, as the philosopher says (de gener. animal. ii, 3); but the foetal matter is provided by the female. in this matter, the vegetative soul exists from the very beginning, not as to the second act, but as to the first act, as the sensitive soul is in one who sleeps. but as soon as it begins to attract nourishment, then it already operates in act. this matter therefore is transmuted by the power which is in the semen of the male, until it is actually informed by the sensitive soul; not as though the force itself which was in the semen becomes the sensitive soul; for thus, indeed, the generator and generated would be identical; moreover, this would be more like nourishment and growth than generation, as the philosopher says. and after the sensitive soul, by the power of the active principle in the semen, has been produced in one of the principal parts of the thing generated, then it is that the sensitive soul of the offspring begins to work towards the perfection of its own body, by nourishment and growth. as to the active power which was in the semen, it ceases to exist, when the semen is dissolved and the (vital) spirit thereof vanishes. nor is there anything unreasonable in this, because this force is not the principal but the instrumental agent; and the movement of an instrument ceases when once the effect has been produced. _______________________ second article [i, q. 118, art. 2] whether the intellectual soul is produced from the semen? objection 1: it would seem that the intellectual soul is produced from the semen. for it is written (gen. 46:26): "all the souls that came out of [jacob's] thigh, sixty-six." but nothing is produced from the thigh of a man, except from the semen. therefore the intellectual soul is produced from the semen. obj. 2: further, as shown above (q. 76, a. 3), the intellectual, sensitive, and nutritive souls are, in substance, one soul in man. but the sensitive soul in man is generated from the semen, as in other animals; wherefore the philosopher says (de gener. animal. ii, 3) that the animal and the man are not made at the same time, but first of all the animal is made having a sensitive soul. therefore also the intellectual soul is produced from the semen. obj. 3: further, it is one and the same agent whose action is directed to the matter and to the form: else from the matter and the form there would not result something simply one. but the intellectual soul is the form of the human body, which is produced by the power of the semen. therefore the intellectual soul also is produced by the power of the semen. obj. 4: further, man begets his like in species. but the human species is constituted by the rational soul. therefore the rational soul is from the begetter. obj. 5: further, it cannot be said that god concurs in sin. but if the rational soul be created by god, sometimes god concurs in the sin of adultery, since sometimes offspring is begotten of illicit intercourse. therefore the rational soul is not created by god. _on the contrary,_ it is written in de eccl. dogmat. xiv that "the rational soul is not engendered by coition." _i answer that,_ it is impossible for an active power existing in matter to extend its action to the production of an immaterial effect. now it is manifest that the intellectual principle in man transcends matter; for it has an operation in which the body takes no part whatever. it is therefore impossible for the seminal power to produce the intellectual principle. again, the seminal power acts by virtue of the soul of the begetter according as the soul of the begetter is the act of the body, making use of the body in its operation. now the body has nothing whatever to do in the operation of the intellect. therefore the power of the intellectual principle, as intellectual, cannot reach the semen. hence the philosopher says (de gener. animal. ii, 3): "it follows that the intellect alone comes from without." again, since the intellectual soul has an operation independent of the body, it is subsistent, as proved above (q. 75, a. 2): therefore to be and to be made are proper to it. moreover, since it is an immaterial substance it cannot be caused through generation, but only through creation by god. therefore to hold that the intellectual soul is caused by the begetter, is nothing else than to hold the soul to be non-subsistent and consequently to perish with the body. it is therefore heretical to say that the intellectual soul is transmitted with the semen. reply obj. 1: in the passage quoted, the part is put instead of the whole, the soul for the whole man, by the figure of synecdoche. reply obj. 2: some say that the vital functions observed in the embryo are not from its soul, but from the soul of the mother; or from the formative power of the semen. both of these explanations are false; for vital functions such as feeling, nourishment, and growth cannot be from an extrinsic principle. consequently it must be said that the soul is in the embryo; the nutritive soul from the beginning, then the sensitive, lastly the intellectual soul. therefore some say that in addition to the vegetative soul which existed first, another, namely the sensitive, soul supervenes; and in addition to this, again another, namely the intellectual soul. thus there would be in man three souls of which one would be in potentiality to another. this has been disproved above (q. 76, a. 3). therefore others say that the same soul which was at first merely vegetative, afterwards through the action of the seminal power, becomes a sensitive soul; and finally this same soul becomes intellectual, not indeed through the active seminal power, but by the power of a higher agent, namely god enlightening (the soul) from without. for this reason the philosopher says that the intellect comes from without. but this will not hold. first, because no substantial form is susceptible of more or less; but addition of greater perfection constitutes another species, just as the addition of unity constitutes another species of number. now it is not possible for the same identical form to belong to different species. secondly, because it would follow that the generation of an animal would be a continuous movement, proceeding gradually from the imperfect to the perfect, as happens in alteration. thirdly, because it would follow that the generation of a man or an animal is not generation simply, because the subject thereof would be a being in act. for if the vegetative soul is from the beginning in the matter of offspring, and is subsequently gradually brought to perfection; this will imply addition of further perfection without corruption of the preceding perfection. and this is contrary to the nature of generation properly so called. fourthly, because either that which is caused by the action of god is something subsistent: and thus it must needs be essentially distinct from the pre-existing form, which was non-subsistent; and we shall then come back to the opinion of those who held the existence of several souls in the body--or else it is not subsistent, but a perfection of the pre-existing soul: and from this it follows of necessity that the intellectual soul perishes with the body, which cannot be admitted. there is again another explanation, according to those who held that all men have but one intellect in common: but this has been disproved above (q. 76, a. 2). we must therefore say that since the generation of one thing is the corruption of another, it follows of necessity that both in men and in other animals, when a more perfect form supervenes the previous form is corrupted: yet so that the supervening form contains the perfection of the previous form, and something in addition. it is in this way that through many generations and corruptions we arrive at the ultimate substantial form, both in man and other animals. this indeed is apparent to the senses in animals generated from putrefaction. we conclude therefore that the intellectual soul is created by god at the end of human generation, and this soul is at the same time sensitive and nutritive, the pre-existing forms being corrupted. reply obj. 3: this argument holds in the case of diverse agents not ordered to one another. but where there are many agents ordered to one another, nothing hinders the power of the higher agent from reaching to the ultimate form; while the powers of the inferior agents extend only to some disposition of matter: thus in the generation of an animal, the seminal power disposes the matter, but the power of the soul gives the form. now it is manifest from what has been said above (q. 105, a. 5; q. 110, a. 1) that the whole of corporeal nature acts as the instrument of a spiritual power, especially of god. therefore nothing hinders the formation of the body from being due to a corporeal power, while the intellectual soul is from god alone. reply obj. 4: man begets his like, forasmuch as by his seminal power the matter is disposed for the reception of a certain species of form. reply obj. 5: in the action of the adulterer, what is of nature is good; in this god concurs. but what there is of inordinate lust is evil; in this god does not concur. _______________________ third article [i, q. 118, art. 3] whether human souls were created together at the beginning of the world? objection 1: it would seem that human souls were created together at the beginning of the world. for it is written (gen. 2:2): "god rested him from all his work which he had done." this would not be true if he created new souls every day. therefore all souls were created at the same time. obj. 2: further, spiritual substances before all others belong to the perfection of the universe. if therefore souls were created with the bodies, every day innumerable spiritual substances would be added to the perfection of the universe: consequently at the beginning the universe would have been imperfect. this is contrary to gen. 2:2, where it is said that "god ended" all "his work." obj. 3: further, the end of a thing corresponds to its beginning. but the intellectual soul remains, when the body perishes. therefore it began to exist before the body. _on the contrary,_ it is said (de eccl. dogmat. xiv, xviii) that "the soul is created together with the body." _i answer that,_ some have maintained that it is accidental to the intellectual soul to be united to the body, asserting that the soul is of the same nature as those spiritual substances which are not united to a body. these, therefore, stated that the souls of men were created together with the angels at the beginning. but this statement is false. firstly, in the very principle on which it is based. for if it were accidental to the soul to be united to the body, it would follow that man who results from this union is a being by accident; or that the soul is a man, which is false, as proved above (q. 75, a. 4). moreover, that the human soul is not of the same nature as the angels, is proved from the different mode of understanding, as shown above (q. 55, a. 2; q. 85, a. 1): for man understands through receiving from the senses, and turning to phantasms, as stated above (q. 84, aa. 6, 7; q. 85, a. 1). for this reason the soul needs to be united to the body, which is necessary to it for the operation of the sensitive part: whereas this cannot be said of an angel. secondly, this statement can be proved to be false in itself. for if it is natural to the soul to be united to the body, it is unnatural to it to be without a body, and as long as it is without a body it is deprived of its natural perfection. now it was not fitting that god should begin his work with things imperfect and unnatural, for he did not make man without a hand or a foot, which are natural parts of a man. much less, therefore, did he make the soul without a body. but if someone say that it is not natural to the soul to be united to the body, he must give the reason why it is united to a body. and the reason must be either because the soul so willed, or for some other reason. if because the soul willed it--this seems incongruous. first, because it would be unreasonable of the soul to wish to be united to the body, if it did not need the body: for if it did need it, it would be natural for it to be united to it, since "nature does not fail in what is necessary." secondly, because there would be no reason why, having been created from the beginning of the world, the soul should, after such a long time, come to wish to be united to the body. for a spiritual substance is above time, and superior to the heavenly revolutions. thirdly, because it would seem that this body was united to this soul by chance: since for this union to take place two wills would have to concur--to wit, that of the incoming soul, and that of the begetter. if, however, this union be neither voluntary nor natural on the part of the soul, then it must be the result of some violent cause, and to the soul would have something of a penal and afflicting nature. this is in keeping with the opinion of origen, who held that souls were embodied in punishment of sin. since, therefore, all these opinions are unreasonable, we must simply confess that souls were not created before bodies, but are created at the same time as they are infused into them. reply obj. 1: god is said to have rested on the seventh day, not from all work, since we read (john 5:17): "my father worketh until now"; but from the creation of any new genera and species, which may not have already existed in the first works. for in this sense, the souls which are created now, existed already, as to the likeness of the species, in the first works, which included the creation of adam's soul. reply obj. 2: something can be added every day to the perfection of the universe, as to the number of individuals, but not as to the number of species. reply obj. 3: that the soul remains without the body is due to the corruption of the body, which was a result of sin. consequently it was not fitting that god should make the soul without the body from the beginning: for as it is written (wis. 1:13, 16): "god made not death . . . but the wicked with works and words have called it to them." _______________________ question 119 of the propagation of man as to the body (in two articles) we now consider the propagation of man, as to the body. concerning this there are two points of inquiry: (1) whether any part of the food is changed into true human nature? (2) whether the semen, which is the principle of human generation, is produced from the surplus food? _______________________ first article [i, q. 119, art. 1] whether some part of the food is changed into true human nature? objection 1: it would seem that none of the food is changed into true human nature. for it is written (matt. 15:17): "whatsoever entereth into the mouth, goeth into the belly, and is cast out into the privy." but what is cast out is not changed into the reality of human nature. therefore none of the food is changed into true human nature. obj. 2: further, the philosopher (de gener. i, 5) distinguishes flesh belonging to the species from flesh belonging to "matter"; and says that the latter "comes and goes." now what is formed from food comes and goes. therefore what is produced from food is flesh belonging to matter, not to the species. but what belongs to true human nature belongs to the species. therefore the food is not changed into true human nature. obj. 3: further, the "radical humor" seems to belong to the reality of human nature; and if it be lost, it cannot be recovered, according to physicians. but it could be recovered if the food were changed into the humor. therefore food is not changed into true human nature. obj. 4: further, if the food were changed into true human nature, whatever is lost in man could be restored. but man's death is due only to the loss of something. therefore man would be able by taking food to insure himself against death in perpetuity. obj. 5: further, if the food is changed into true human nature, there is nothing in man which may not recede or be repaired: for what is generated in a man from his food can both recede and be repaired. if therefore a man lived long enough, it would follow that in the end nothing would be left in him of what belonged to him at the beginning. consequently he would not be numerically the same man throughout his life; since for the thing to be numerically the same, identity of matter is necessary. but this is incongruous. therefore the food is not changed into true human nature. _on the contrary,_ augustine says (de vera relig. xi): "the bodily food when corrupted, that is, having lost its form, is changed into the texture of the members." but the texture of the members belongs to true human nature. therefore the food is changed into the reality of human nature. _i answer that,_ according to the philosopher (metaph. ii), "the relation of a thing to truth is the same as its relation to being." therefore that belongs to the true nature of any thing which enters into the constitution of that nature. but nature can be considered in two ways: firstly, in general according to the species; secondly, as in the individual. and whereas the form and the common matter belong to a thing's true nature considered in general; individual signate matter, and the form individualized by that matter belong to the true nature considered in this particular individual. thus a soul and body belong to the true human nature in general, but to the true human nature of peter and martin belong this soul and this body. now there are certain things whose form cannot exist but in one individual matter: thus the form of the sun cannot exist save in the matter in which it actually is. and in this sense some have said that the human form cannot exist but in a certain individual matter, which, they said, was given that form at the very beginning in the first man. so that whatever may have been added to that which was derived by posterity from the first parent, does not belong to the truth of human nature, as not receiving in truth the form of human nature. but, said they, that matter which, in the first man, was the subject of the human form, was multiplied in itself: and in this way the multitude of human bodies is derived from the body of the first man. according to these, the food is not changed into true human nature; we take food, they stated, in order to help nature to resist the action of natural heat, and prevent the consumption of the "radical humor"; just as lead or tin is mixed with silver to prevent its being consumed by fire. but this is unreasonable in many ways. firstly, because it comes to the same that a form can be produced in another matter, or that it can cease to be in its proper matter; wherefore all things that can be generated are corruptible, and conversely. now it is manifest that the human form can cease to exist in this (particular) matter which is its subject: else the human body would not be corruptible. consequently it can begin to exist in another matter, so that something else be changed into true human nature. secondly, because in all beings whose entire matter is contained in one individual there is only one individual in the species: as is clearly the case with the sun, moon and such like. thus there would only be one individual of the human species. thirdly, because multiplication of matter cannot be understood otherwise than either in respect of quantity only, as in things which are rarefied, so that their matter increases in dimensions; or in respect of the substance itself of the matter. but as long as the substance alone of matter remains, it cannot be said to be multiplied; for multitude cannot consist in the addition of a thing to itself, since of necessity it can only result from division. therefore some other substance must be added to matter, either by creation, or by something else being changed into it. consequently no matter can be multiplied save either by rarefaction as when air is made from water; or by the change of some other things, as fire is multiplied by the addition of wood; or lastly by creation. now it is manifest that the multiplication of matter in the human body does not occur by rarefaction: for thus the body of a man of perfect age would be more imperfect than the body of a child. nor does it occur by creation of fresh matter: for, according to gregory (moral. xxxii): "all things were created together as to the substance of matter, but not as to the specific form." consequently the multiplication of the human body can only be the result of the food being changed into the true human nature. fourthly, because, since man does not differ from animals and plants in regard to the vegetative soul, it would follow that the bodies of animals and plants do not increase through a change of nourishment into the body so nourished, but through some kind of multiplication. which multiplication cannot be natural: since the matter cannot naturally extend beyond a certain fixed quantity; nor again does anything increase naturally, save either by rarefaction or the change of something else into it. consequently the whole process of generation and nourishment, which are called "natural forces," would be miraculous. which is altogether inadmissible. wherefore others have said that the human form can indeed begin to exist in some other matter, if we consider the human nature in general: but not if we consider it as in this individual. for in the individual the form remains confined to a certain determinate matter, on which it is first imprinted at the generation of that individual, so that it never leaves that matter until the ultimate dissolution of the individual. and this matter, say they, principally belongs to the true human nature. but since this matter does not suffice for the requisite quantity, some other matter must be added, through the change of food into the substance of the individual partaking thereof, in such a quantity as suffices for the increase required. and this matter, they state, belongs secondarily to the true human nature: because it is not required for the primary existence of the individual, but for the quantity due to him. and if anything further is produced from the food, this does not belong to true human nature, properly speaking. however, this also is inadmissible. first, because this opinion judges of living bodies as of inanimate bodies; in which, although there be a power of generating their like in species, there is not the power of generating their like in the individual; which power in living bodies is the nutritive power. nothing, therefore, would be added to living bodies by their nutritive power, if their food were not changed into their true nature. secondly, because the active seminal power is a certain impression derived from the soul of the begetter, as stated above (q. 118, a. 1). hence it cannot have a greater power in acting, than the soul from which it is derived. if, therefore, by the seminal power a certain matter truly assumes the form of human nature, much more can the soul, by the nutritive power, imprint the true form of human nature on the food which is assimilated. thirdly, because food is needed not only for growth, else at the term of growth, food would be needful no longer; but also to renew that which is lost by the action of natural heat. but there would be no renewal, unless what is formed from the food, took the place of what is lost. wherefore just as that which was there previously belonged to true human nature, so also does that which is formed from the food. therefore, according to others, it must be said that the food is really changed into the true human nature by reason of its assuming the specific form of flesh, bones and such like parts. this is what the philosopher says (de anima ii, 4): "food nourishes inasmuch as it is potentially flesh." reply obj. 1: our lord does not say that the "whole" of what enters into the mouth, but "all"--because something from every kind of food is cast out into the privy. it may also be said that whatever is generated from food, can be dissolved by natural heat, and be cast aside through the pores, as jerome expounds the passage. reply obj. 2: by flesh belonging to the species, some have understood that which first receives the human species, which is derived from the begetter: this, they say, lasts as long as the individual does. by flesh belonging to the matter these understand what is generated from food: and this, they say, does not always remain, but as it comes so it goes. but this is contrary to the mind of aristotle. for he says there, that "just as in things which have their species in matter"--for instance, wood or stone--"so in flesh, there is something belonging to the species, and something belonging to matter." now it is clear that this distinction has no place in inanimate things, which are not generated seminally, or nourished. again, since what is generated from food is united to, by mixing with, the body so nourished, just as water is mixed with wine, as the philosopher says there by way of example: that which is added, and that to which it is added, cannot be different natures, since they are already made one by being mixed together. therefore there is no reason for saying that one is destroyed by natural heat, while the other remains. it must therefore be said that this distinction of the philosopher is not of different kinds of flesh, but of the same flesh considered from different points of view. for if we consider the flesh according to the species, that is, according to that which is formed therein, thus it remains always: because the nature of flesh always remains together with its natural disposition. but if we consider flesh according to matter, then it does not remain, but is gradually destroyed and renewed: thus in the fire of a furnace, the form of fire remains, but the matter is gradually consumed, and other matter is substituted in its place. reply obj. 3: the "radical humor" is said to comprise whatever the virtue of the species is founded on. if this be taken away it cannot be renewed; as when a man's hand or foot is amputated. but the "nutritive humor" is that which has not yet received perfectly the specific nature, but is on the way thereto; such is the blood, and the like. wherefore if such be taken away, the virtue of the species remains in its root, which is not destroyed. reply obj. 4: every virtue of a passible body is weakened by continuous action, because such agents are also patient. therefore the transforming virtue is strong at first so as to be able to transform not only enough for the renewal of what is lost, but also for growth. later on it can only transform enough for the renewal of what is lost, and then growth ceases. at last it cannot even do this; and then begins decline. in fine, when this virtue fails altogether, the animal dies. thus the virtue of wine that transforms the water added to it, is weakened by further additions of water, so as to become at length watery, as the philosopher says by way of example (de gener. i, 5). reply obj. 5: as the philosopher says (de gener. i, 5), when a certain matter is directly transformed into fire, then fire is said to be generated anew: but when matter is transformed into a fire already existing, then fire is said to be fed. wherefore if the entire matter together loses the form of fire, and another matter transformed into fire, there will be another distinct fire. but if, while one piece of wood is burning, other wood is laid on, and so on until the first piece is entirely consumed, the same identical fire will remain all the time: because that which is added passes into what pre-existed. it is the same with living bodies, in which by means of nourishment that is renewed which was consumed by natural heat. _______________________ second article [i, q. 119, art. 2] whether the semen is produced from surplus food? objection 1: it would seem that the semen is not produced from the surplus food, but from the substance of the begetter. for damascene says (de fide orth. i, 8) that "generation is a work of nature, producing, from the substance of the begetter, that which is begotten." but that which is generated is produced from the semen. therefore the semen is produced from the substance of the begetter. obj. 2: further, the son is like his father, in respect of that which he receives from him. but if the semen from which something is generated, is produced from the surplus food, a man would receive nothing from his grandfather and his ancestors in whom the food never existed. therefore a man would not be more like to his grandfather or ancestors, than to any other men. obj. 3: further, the food of the generator is sometimes the flesh of cows, pigs and suchlike. if therefore, the semen were produced from surplus food, the man begotten of such semen would be more akin to the cow and the pig, than to his father or other relations. obj. 4: further, augustine says (gen. ad lit. x, 20) that we were in adam "not only by seminal virtue, but also in the very substance of the body." but this would not be, if the semen were produced from surplus food. therefore the semen is not produced therefrom. _on the contrary,_ the philosopher proves in many ways (de gener. animal. i, 18) that "the semen is surplus food." _i answer that,_ this question depends in some way on what has been stated above (a. 1; q. 118, a. 1). for if human nature has a virtue for the communication of its form to alien matter not only in another, but also in its own subject; it is clear that the food which at first is dissimilar, becomes at length similar through the form communicated to it. now it belongs to the natural order that a thing should be reduced from potentiality to act gradually: hence in things generated we observe that at first each is imperfect and is afterwards perfected. but it is clear that the common is to the proper and determinate, as imperfect is to perfect: therefore we see that in the generation of an animal, the animal is generated first, then the man or the horse. so therefore food first of all receives a certain common virtue in regard to all the parts of the body, which virtue is subsequently determinate to this or that part. now it is not possible that the semen be a kind of solution from what is already transformed into the substance of the members. for this solution, if it does not retain the nature of the member it is taken from, it would no longer be of the nature of the begetter, and would be due to a process of corruption; and consequently it would not have the power of transforming something else into the likeness of that nature. but if it retained the nature of the member it is taken from, then, since it is limited to a certain part of the body, it would not have the power of moving towards (the production of) the whole nature, but only the nature of that part. unless one were to say that the solution is taken from all the parts of the body, and that it retains the nature of each part. thus the semen would be a small animal in act; and generation of animal from animal would be a mere division, as mud is generated from mud, and as animals which continue to live after being cut in two: which is inadmissible. it remains to be said, therefore, that the semen is not something separated from what was before the actual whole; rather is it the whole, though potentially, having the power, derived from the soul of the begetter, to produce the whole body, as stated above (a. 1; q. 108, a. 1). now that which is in potentiality to the whole, is that which is generated from the food, before it is transformed into the substance of the members. therefore the semen is taken from this. in this sense the nutritive power is said to serve the generative power: because what is transformed by the nutritive power is employed as semen by the generative power. a sign of this, according to the philosopher, is that animals of great size, which require much food, have little semen in proportion to the size of their bodies, and generate seldom; in like manner fat men, and for the same reason. reply obj. 1: generation is from the substance of the begetter in animals and plants, inasmuch as the semen owes its virtue to the form of the begetter, and inasmuch as it is in potentiality to the substance. reply obj. 2: the likeness of the begetter to the begotten is on account not of the matter, but of the form of the agent that generates its like. wherefore in order for a man to be like his grandfather, there is no need that the corporeal seminal matter should have been in the grandfather; but that there be in the semen a virtue derived from the soul of the grandfather through the father. in like manner the third objection is answered. for kinship is not in relation to matter, but rather to the derivation of the forms. reply obj. 4: these words of augustine are not to be understood as though the immediate seminal virtue, or the corporeal substance from which this individual was formed were actually in adam: but so that both were in adam as in principle. for even the corporeal matter, which is supplied by the mother, and which he calls the corporeal substance, is originally derived from adam: and likewise the active seminal power of the father, which is the immediate seminal virtue (in the production) of this man. but christ is said to have been in adam according to the "corporeal substance," not according to the seminal virtue. because the matter from which his body was formed, and which was supplied by the virgin mother, was derived from adam; whereas the active virtue was not derived from adam, because his body was not formed by the seminal virtue of a man, but by the operation of the holy ghost. for "such a birth was becoming to him," [*hymn for vespers at christmas; breviary, o. p.], who is above all god for ever blessed. amen. the creation of god. by dr. jacob hartmann, m.d. st. louis medical college; bachelor of medicine, toronto university; m.b. trinity college, ontario; member of the college of physicians and surgeons, ontario; licentiate of the royal college of physicians and surgeons, edinburgh, scotland; member of the county medical society of new york, etc., etc. new york: the truth seeker company, 28 lafayette place. contents. chapter i. the universal aspect, 9 ii. the earth, 21 iii. the chemical aspect, 39 iv. the sun, 51 v. genesis--the creation, 67 vi. genesis--the garden of eden, 80 vii. the deluge, 92 viii. the scriptural god--the creation, 101 ix. the creation of god--abraham, 112 x. moses--confirmation of the idea of god, 119 xi. samuel the kingmaker, 138 xii. god save the king, 147 xiii. jehova takes a rest, 170 xiv. the end of national life, 178 xv. the christian era, 200 xvi. organic life--vegetable, 212 xvii. organic life--animal, 221 the master tissues. the muscular tissues. the nervous tissues. xviii. food and food-substances, 242 xix. elimination of waste substances, 250 in general. by the lungs. by the skin. by the kidneys. xx. digestion, nutrition, 278 xxi. the elementary substances, 300 xxii. alcohol and its effects on the system, 310 xxiii. the soul--what is it? 321 the mind. xxiv. sin and salvation, 340 xxv. the ecclesiastical kindergarten, 353 xxvi. rational review, 372 xxvii. visions--bible dreams-revelations, 380 xxviii. the planetary gods, 392 xxix. every man his own god, 403 tables { gateways to knowledge. { morals: whence they spring. xxx. the non credo, 418 rules for human conduct. illustrations. map of the intellectual faculties--the mind, opp. title-page. map of theological retrogression, opp. p. 390 map of the deluge and garden of eden, opp. p. 432 preface. "si les nommes étaient capables de gouverner toute la conduite de leur vie par un dessein reglé, si la fortune leur était toujours favorable, leur âme serait libre de toute superstition." --spinoza, 1650. "il n'y a pas de moyen plus efficace que la superstition pour gouverner la multitude." --quinte curce. "but in the temple of their hireling hearts gold is a living god, and rules in scorn all earthly things but virtue." "falsehood demands but gold to pay the pangs of outraged conscience; for the slavish priest sets no great value on his hireling faith." "but human pride is skillful to invent most serious names to hide its ignorance." --shelley. at this time, in this age of agitation, unrest, dissatisfaction, and doubt among the masses, and all classes, in every civilized part of the globe, in all communities and human organizations, in church and out of church, ecclesiastical bodies of all shades; besides the vast number of theories and doctrines of a popular socialistic, anti-poverty, communistic order, etc., a prevailing skepticism has seized the minds of men, as to the truth, validity, and stability of the entire religious fabric. the unsettled condition of the minds of men, the disturbing elements of the laboring classes, the church quarrels, clerical litigations, disputes, wrangling, and mutual hate about scriptural authenticity, its truth and supernaturalism, the heresies and blasphemies, the unsatisfactory condition of the roman church, the constant and unremitting papal correspondence, the petty bickering, the selfish zeal, the greed for money, the anxiety to raise funds for all kinds of ecclesiastical establishments, naturally arouse suspicion whether the idea of a god is not going out of fashion, whether the clergy has not lost faith in the book, whether the jew, the jehovistic aristocrat, has not been the primary inventor of these supernatural wares, whether the christian theologians are not beginning to lose their sway and grip and their pretended supernatural authority over their ignorant devotees. we may ask frankly, honestly, truthfully, and in perfect good faith: has not the time arrived for a grand and human reformation? for new methods of teaching, for new and more accurate ideas, for a more precise knowledge of the natural, for instructions in absolute facts, for a more thorough understanding of natural laws, for a broader comprehension of man himself and his surroundings, for an abandonment of all the supernatural subterfuge, ignorance, and superstition, of religious fables, miracles, false theories, and misleading doctrines as to god, with their immense sacrifice of human life. within the limits of the church nothing is to be hoped for, nor can anything be expected, except the greedy grasping of the hard-earned money of the ignorant laboring classes, the fanatical devotees, to sustain and uphold a mercenary priesthood, a rotten supernatural system that has proved so pernicious to mankind. europe, at one time the rich pasture for the holy roman catholic apostolic church, no longer pours the milk and honey into the supreme pontiff's lap as of yore. in a letter dated "rome, feb. 3d," ledochowski writes of leo xiii.'s solicitude for the good of religion in these parts: "the supreme pontiff has many reasons of sadness on account of the distresses which the impudent endeavors of wicked men are trying to bring upon christianity, especially in europe. on the other hand, it is a great consolation to him to see the increase of catholicism, with god's aid, elsewhere in the world." of course ledochowski signifies the pope's great admiration for the wonderful resources--for this flourishing, prolific, and generous american milch-cow. the roman administration, with that marvelous business tact so characteristic of that church, turns its tender attention, with all its pontifical flummery and grotesque maneuvers, to insinuate its methods upon this republic, to overawe us with a blaze of stupefaction, profounder ignorance and superstition, by honoring america with a resident tax-collector, and to save gods, their divinities, with the christ, holy ghost, virgin immaculate, saints, angels, and all the other theological absurdities. is it not high time for man and woman to learn that their dependence on any supernatural aid is futile, their prayers and appeals to an imaginary god worse than useless, their cringing fear for the so-called sacred authority cowardly, their submission to priestly rule and authority slavish, and the inculcating of biblical church lore stupefying? is it not time for man and woman to comprehend themselves, their powers, the uses of their several organs, their functions, and the natural laws that govern them? that ideas, thought, consciousness, intellect, understanding, imagination, knowledge, etc., etc., are but the functions of nervous matter? that everything we know, have discovered, developed, or produced, is the natural product of nerve tissue. in reviewing the history of this theologico-ecclesiastical organization--this jehovistic christianized system, from the very beginning to the present time, we find that this many-shaded, ever-changeable, greedy, grasping creed has done during the four thousand years of its existence a vast amount of mischief and little or no good. it had to be civilized instead of civilizing. instead of elevating their followers, priests rather made every effort to keep them in subjection, steeped in ignorance and superstition. in presenting these pages to the public, it is for the purpose of exposing some simple intelligible facts, some wholesome truths, some few scientific revelations discovered by men of eminence, knowledge, and wisdom, regarding ourselves, this terrestrial globe, and the universe at large of which we are part. it is not possible in modern times to force men to believe, to accept the impossible. at this period of mental transition, the tendency is to think, to reason, to gain knowledge and truth, to be self-supporting, self-sustaining, independent, free, and untrammeled by barbaric delusion and terrorism. they no longer fear and cower before a shadow of some supernatural imaginary thing or being that has no existence and never had. man must learn to know that man is an evolution of nature's forces, a product of this terrestrial globe; that all the physical and physiological phenomena of his fine muscular and nervous system are the natural products and functions of his organization; that whether soul, spirit, god or jehovah, they were evolved in the brain of man; that man, as man, with all his endowments, faculties, and capabilities, is part and parcel of this earth, a natural result of natural causes, and the supernatural, the god or gods, is the natural product of man's working faculties. the scientific world has long since discarded every idea of anything supernatural, declared the impossibility, falsity, and absurdity of the scriptural fable, and that god, jehovah, with all the ingenious priestly inventions, has proved itself pernicious and oppressive to humanity and contrary to intelligence, reason, and common sense. man to know his rights must know himself, his nature and his natural surroundings, and if he knows himself, he will learn that god did not create man, but that man created god, and that every man is and must be his own god to be a true man. know the natural, never mind the supernatural. the creation of god. chapter i. universal aspect. the beginning of intellectual development consists of observant experience. by frequent and repeated observation man acquired a familiarity with the subjects of that process--a clearer and better understanding of them. thus, the chaldean shepherds, while minding their flocks of sheep and cattle, lazily and continuously watched the sky and starry hosts, and by degrees recognized, and acquired a knowledge of, many of the stars, laying the foundation for astronomy. authorities state that they composed seventy-two volumes on that science, these books dating as far back as 2,540 b.c., treating of the polar star, venus, mars, and so on. it is possible that many errors attended their observations; many mistakes may have entered their explanations. that was natural, considering the remoteness of the times and the lack of facilities. knowledge and truth never come easily. the former is very hard to acquire, the latter very difficult to discover. every truth, every new idea, has to battle against old established notions. if the new idea is persisted in, which is ordinarily the case, a struggle must ensue. the old idea resists, refuses to yield, no matter how false, ridiculous, or pernicious it may be. yield, however, it must, and does in the course of time. truth must win in the long run, though it has to fight its way through depths of ignorance, prejudice, and superstition, sustained by hate, bigotry, terrorism, and persecution. as century after century passed in the dark ages, apostles of science and truth appeared, here and there, now and then, calm, dignified, patient, persistent and persevering, untiring, self-denying, men of superior intellect, unswayed and undismayed by existing authorities. these men gave us, though not a complete, a very ample revelation of nature, unfolding its mysteries, explaining its phenomena, making known the truth as far as men had been able to discover up to their time. nature with its laws man had to observe carefully in order to learn to unravel its secrets, its workings, its forces. there is no way to reveal them except through the mind of man. there are no means of knowing or discovering the intricacies and subtleties of nature's hidden and inexhaustible resources but by careful thought, reason, constant study and application. not a single problem has ever been solved--in fact, one cannot be solved--except by acquired intellectual powers, developed by the refining process of education of the great nervous centers of man. many scholars have devoted and still devote their time, their energy, their life, in search of new facts, new truths, concerning the stars, planetary system, and this terrestrial globe we live on especially. centuries before christ's time, and after, men were engaged in developing the science of astronomy--anaximander, hipparchus, ptolemy, copernicus, galileo, newton, herschel, and many others. these men were the apostles of truth, the teachers of facts, and some of them were martyrs to science. the great civilizer, the press of modern times, was recently filled with accounts about the planet mars, comet, etc., giving all the detailed information obtainable. everyone who reads the newspapers learns something about mars, and ventures to give his opinion, whether it is like the earth--inhabited, has seas or atmosphere, etc. so that, whatever new facts are revealed, new truths announced, the minds of men are made so much richer. knowledge, the progress of science, the discoveries of important facts, the improvements of political, social, or civil laws, do not come to us spontaneously, nor do they come to us suddenly in overpowering quantities; it is a process of gradual acquirement, a slow accumulation, to which every generation contributes its quota of observation and experience that makes up the total wealth of aggregate thought, and is handed down from generation to generation, our common inheritance. this common inheritance is neither all true nor all good. a large proportion that has been handed down to us by the ancients is not true or good, though it is believed to be true and good. the revelations of absolute truths, of actual facts, are of more recent date--discoveries made within the last few centuries. the spurious, so-called revelations are the works of antiquity, which are not based on truth or fact or knowledge or experience. the mental faculties of pristine men were primitive, and their ideas were as primitive. they lived in an age of infancy; it was all surprise, wonder, astonishment, and miracle. when kepler discovered the law that "planets revolve in ellipses with the sun at one focus," he worked hard for many days, and after many trials succeeded. he also discovered a second law, which he defines, "a line connecting the center of the earth with the center of the sun passes over equal spaces in equal times;" and his third law, "the squares of the times of revolutions of the planets about the sun are proportioned to the center of their mean distance from the sun." no one ever claimed for kepler, nor has he laid claim himself, that he was inspired by god, or received the idea through any supernatural agency. the hostile and bitter opposition that galileo met on the part of the christian church is too well known; but the importance of his discoveries, and the truth, remains. all intelligent persons ought to understand newton's law of gravitation. if they understood the full import and significance of that law, they would never believe in the absurd miracles of moses, joshua, elijah, christ and company. the law: "every particle of matter in the universe attracts every other particle of matter with a force directly proportional to its quantity of matter, and decreasing as the square of the distance increases." it is most remarkable--that man discovering great truths, concerning which there has never been any dispute, or controversy, or fight; that stand, unaltered and unchanged, forever. such men have not been inspired by god, jehovah, christ, or the holy ghost, or anything supernatural. they have accomplished their works by their powers of observation, great mental efforts, skillful explanation and elucidation, accomplished by hard and untiring work. it is astonishing that, in the presence of so many revealed natural truths, so many ascertained scientific facts, and numerous discoveries in this century, which is claimed to be much advanced in civilization, intelligent persons--teachers, preachers, priests, and those laying claim to scholarship--still believe that the visionary figures, the product of distorted imagination or hallucination, of men like isaiah, ezekiel, etc., were of supernatural origin. the incredible stories found in the bible, the fabulous inventions concocted in the imagination of some person or persons away in chaldea many thousand years ago, are still taught to be true, and the children in the sunday-schools are instructed to believe these absurdities. the undue haste exhibited in the first chapter of genesis, in creating the earth, etc., is one of those wonderful puzzles to a child's mind. it is a something that is not easily explained at length to young people without awaking the suspicion of its impossibility, and requires considerable ingenuity to satisfy inquiring minds concerning it. the supernaturalists get over it by a final and complete answer, that admits of no argument--that "with god everything is possible." that being absolutely untrue, the answer explains nothing, but has a tendency to stupefy the child and hinder its educational advancement, for the reason that such an answer puts a stop to all farther inquiry. this really has been the effect of this pernicious teaching for many centuries. all the stories, fables, myths, handed down to us from antiquity may be classed in the same category. there are many of them--yes, a perfect wilderness. all are true in part, but false as a whole. upon close examination we find glimmerings of truth in all of them. the difference lies in the kind, not in the quality. in the biblical story of creation, the writers had evidently observed, and knew, there were an earth, water, stars, and something above the earth which they called heaven, the atmosphere. that was the limit of their knowledge. they knew they existed, and things and objects that surrounded them existed, and they made an attempt in their primitive method to account for the manner in which these things came into existence. they could know nothing about it, because the most important discoveries were made thousands of years later. hesiod, 900 b.c., in his "theogonia," invokes the muses who inhabit the heavenly mansions, and whose knowledge of generation and birth he had formerly sung: "tell, ye celestial powers, how first the gods and world were made; the rivers, and the boundless sea, with its strong surge. also, the bright, shining stars, and wide-stretched heaven above, and all the gods that sprang from them, givers of good things." the muses answer: "first of all existed chaos; next in order the broad-bosomed earth; then love appeared, the most beautiful of immortals. from chaos sprang erebus and dusky night, and from night and erebus came ether and smiling day." he gives a further description, which, like the foregoing, we know to be fiction, yet to contain elements of truth. we are not asked to believe all. he says: "look up, and view the immense expanse of heaven, the boundless ether in his genial arms clasping the earth. him callest thou god and jove." it is no easy matter for a man of ordinary education to form a notion of the mental crudeness of the lower type of the human race of our own times; it is far more difficult for him to divest his mind of all its acquisitions through study and observation, and reduce his ideas to the level of those progenitors of his race, the men of antiquity. when men had to struggle with savage beasts, it required superior intelligence to preserve themselves from destruction. that might have led to the worship of the strongest animals, such as the lion and the tiger. but no sooner did man learn the use of iron, which enabled him to kill these his gods, proving himself superior to the thing he worshiped, than these gods were thrown aside. so long as man was unable to explain the mysterious appearances of the sun, moon, and stars, he endowed them with his own intelligence. he worshiped what was to him incomprehensible, mighty, wonderful; made images representing their phenomena or forces for his adoration. in his mind he pictured the sun as a warrior clad in golden panoply, the pale moon he regarded as the queen, and the stars as an immense host of spirits and heroes. some interpreted the sun to be the child of darkness, the morning the bride of heaven, the clouds a fairy network, and the heat a friend of man; when the heat was very intense, then the sun was slaying his children. they would liken the dark clouds which rested on the earth to a terrible being whom they named the snake or dragon, that shut up the waters in his prisonhouse. when the thunder rolled they said that this hateful monster was uttering his hard riddles; and when, at last, the rain burst forth, they said that the bright sun had slain his enemy, and brought the stream of life for the thirsting earth. professor max müller says: "he begins to lift up his eyes; he stares at the tent of heaven, and asks, who supports it? he opens his ears to the winds, and asks them, whence and whither? he is awakened from darkness and slumber by the light of the sun, and him whom his eyes cannot behold, and who seems to grant him the daily pittance of his existence, he calls his life, his health, his brilliant lord and protector. he gives names to all the powers of nature." all sorts of names were invented to designate any particular force, phenomenon, or characteristic. in the vedas the sun has twenty different names, each one descriptive of the sun or its aspect. in persia the blazing sun was adored, and altars smoked perpetually of fire. in gaul and britain pillars were raised to the sun, altars to the moon, and fires were heaped under sacrificial caldrons to cardwen, the earth-goddess. man's ideas of course underwent modifications as civilization advanced. the religious idea had taken root and elaborated ramifications, and laws were evolved to govern them. the sun of prosperity shone; communities grew stronger and more numerous; from the worship of the physical laws of nature, the laws governing morality became involved. thus morals invaded nations, over which they enthroned their gods. every nation elaborated its own details, and slowly took its relative position. as these gods grew in importance men assumed the responsibility to guard them, and the function to attend them. thus a class called priests were chosen, elected, or self-appointed to minister to them. these functionaries at the same time assumed the moral and political guidance of nations or communities, and individuals. in this manner arose hundreds upon hundreds of gods: io, isis, jupiter, juno, etc., etc. the qualities of the gods, like the qualities of men, were good and bad. they were good and evil, light and dark, life and death, and were arranged to suit the time and occasion. when laws were established to govern society, obedience to these laws was declared to be right, disobedience wrong. men learned this; they became conscious of what was right and what was wrong. the ministration to these gods was acknowledged to be a righteous act. rules were established to prevent any violation or infringement of the duty due to these gods. a trespass in violation of anything considered sacred was regarded as an evil--a sin. slowly the consciousness of sin, of doing wrong, of violating the law, was recognized and established, and the attitude men assumed towards the gods, or their conduct towards them, was regarded as moral holiness, sanctity, or piety. the evolution of images, idols, gods and goddesses, was not the work of a day, but of very many centuries. the same may be said of sacrifices, worship, ceremonies, the laws concerning the same, holiness, sin, good and evil, sanctity, sacrilege, divinity, blasphemy, etc., etc. theologians, as well as theological philosophers and theorists, finding their pet notion of a god strangely interfered with and disturbed by the advancing progress in the knowledge of the natural sciences, bring to their aid additional proof to demonstrate the existence of a god, viz., that all races of men, wherever found, savage, barbarian, indian, african, etc., on the different parts of the earth's surface, believe in a something higher and greater or more powerful than themselves, a spirit, a soul, a supernatural being. unfortunately for their argument, this mental condition that is ascribed to the barbarians, etc., as being instinctive or innate--that is, this supernatural element--this having an idea of something they do not understand--proves the contrary, that there is no truth in their assumption. the very fact that they have gone through that process, or are going through it, shows it a kind of educational distemper of a lower order that all primitive races have to pass. as children who learn to read must first know their a b c, it is the road that leads to a higher grade of thought. they begin in surprise and wonder at the natural, concerning which they know nothing. they fear, they adore the forces they cannot overcome. they make images of them in their likeness and worship them. when, however, they have learned through experience to overpower them, they cease to respect them. new forms are adopted, modifications made, and lastly so changed that but a mere shadow of the original remains. all races began in a similar fashion, varying in form and method. the sun, clouds, atmosphere, seasons, oceans, thunder, and all other phenomena in nature--the inability to account for the existence of these led to worship, sacrifice, etc.; and images, idols, gods, originated; and in connection with them, stories, fables, myths, and fictions were supplied by the officiating priests or persons in attendance. the fanciful creations of the imagination hold good and will hold good so long as we do not know anything of the realities of life, of nature, of the actualities, of facts, of truth. but when the masses shall have learned more of nature, then the visionary, the imaginary god, the heirloom and heritage of our antiquated forefathers, will be thrown aside as the images were by abraham, the idols dismissed or discarded later. the relics, the remnants, of this barbarism still have a hold on the minds of men. our entire religious fabric rests upon the creation as related in the bible, handed down to us as the universally acknowledged text-book of all knowledge. the time was when it was dangerous to doubt, and imperiled one's safety or even life to openly state an opinion contrary to the supposed infallible assertions contained in the holy book. the man or men who originally wrote that part of genesis had not the remotest idea what he or they were talking about. he or they knew nothing of the subject-matter in consideration. the story told is like many other fables that had their origin in those early days of waking humanity. the great masses are not very much better off to-day as regards these notions. they still believe in the bible, and hang their hopes of salvation on its truth. the churches teach it, and it forms part and parcel of the church creed. it will therefore do no harm to present a few facts--that the holiest priest cannot contradict, that the most pious preacher must admit--that admit of no argument or controversy, because absolutely true. every intelligent person knows that we live on this earth; that this earth is also called the world, and that this world is a planet; that this planet belongs to a family of planets. this planet of ours, this earth, belongs to a system of planets known as the solar system. and the solar system is mainly comprised within the limits of the zodiacs. by the zodiacs is meant a belt of the celestial sphere. 8° on each side of the ecliptic is styled the zodiac. this division is of very high antiquity, having been in use among the hindoos and egyptians. the zodiac is divided into twelve equal parts, of 30° each, called signs, to each of which a fanciful name is given. the sun is the center. around him the planets revolve in ellipses. the sun itself has a diameter of 866,000 miles. the major planets revolving around the sun as far as known are as follows: name. distance from the sun. diameter. vulcan 13,000,000 miles. unknown. mercury 36,000,000 ,, 3,000 miles. venus 67,000,000 ,, 7,600 ,, earth 93,000,000 ,, 8,000 ,, mars 141,000,000 ,, 4,200 ,, jupiter 483,000,000 ,, 90,000 ,, saturn 886,000,000 ,, 73,000 ,, uranus 1,782,000,000 ,, 33,000 ,, neptune 2,790,000,000 ,, 37,000 ,, it is not an easy matter to imagine that we are suspended in space; being held up, not by any visible object, but in accordance with the laws of universal gravitation, whereby each planet attracts every other planet and is in turn attracted by all. there are a number of minor planets, satellites, a moon, and meteors or shooting-stars, and comets, etc., etc. the sun, the great central globe, is so vast as to overcome the attraction of all the planets, and compel them to circle around him; next we come to the planets, each turning on its axis while it flies around the sun in an elliptical orbit; then accompanying them are the satellites or moons, each revolving about its own planet, while all whirl in a dizzy waltz about the central orb; next the comets, rushing across the planetary orbits at irregular intervals of time and space; and finally shooting-stars or meteors, darting hither and thither, interweaving all in apparently inextricable confusion. to make the picture more wonderful still, every member is flying with an inconceivable velocity, and yet with such accuracy that the solar system is the most perfect timepiece known. the moon's distance from the earth is 239,000 miles; and it has a diameter of 2,160 miles. the above gives some idea of the immensity of the solar system. and it is but one of the myriads of systems, and our earth a speck amidst it. if on a clear night we cast our eyes upwards, we behold a belt of closely dotted stars extending across the sky--the milky way. this galaxy, a luminous, cloudlike band, stretches across the heavens in a great circle, and contains myriads of stars, densely crowded together. herschel remarks that 288,000 stars once passed across the field of his great reflector in forty-one minutes, and says: "thus we are to think of our own sun as a star of the second or third magnitude, and of our little solar system as plunged far into the midst of the vortex of worlds, a mere atom along that "'broad and ample road whose dust is gold and pavement stars.'" chapter ii. the earth. this earth we live on is a planet, and belongs to the solar system of planets. it shines brightly, and appears to other worlds as other planets do to us. it is nearly 25,000 miles in circumference, and has a diameter of a little over 8,000 miles. it is five and a half times denser than water, and weighs about 6,096,000,000,000,000,000,000 tons. the atmosphere that surrounds this earth is like a shell that is two hundred to three hundred or more miles in thickness. we live at the bottom of an immense ocean of gaseous matter, which envelops everything, and presses upon everything with a force which appears, at first, perfectly incredible, but whose actual amount admits of easy proof. gravity being, so far as is known, common to all matter, it is natural to expect that gases, being material substances, should be acted upon by the earth's attraction, as well as solids and liquids. this is really the case, and the result is the weight or pressure of the atmosphere, which is nothing more than the effect of the attraction of the earth on the particles of air. the amount of pressure exerted upon every square inch of the surface of the earth, and the objects thereon, is from fourteen to fifteen pounds. this enormous force is borne without inconvenience by the animal frames, by reason of its perfect uniformity in every direction; and it may be doubled, or even tripled, without inconvenience. an important law which connects the volume occupied by a gas with the pressure made upon it, is expressed by mariotte in the following manner. this law is usually called mariotte's law: "the volume of gas is inversely as the pressure; the density and elastic force are directly as the pressure, and indirectly as the volume." this law has been found to be true no matter how rarefied the air. the atmosphere, like everything else on earth or connected therewith, and like all other planets known, and the earth itself, is composed of elements, as we shall see presently. the atmospheric air is composed of gases, elementary substances, known by the names of nitrogen and oxygen, with variable proportions of carbonic acid and watery vapors, and usually a trace of ammonia. besides these, there may occasionally be other substances present, depending upon local causes, as the odoriferous principles of plants and the miasmata of marshes, etc., etc. nearly three-fourths of the atmosphere is composed of nitrogen, while about one-fourth or less is oxygen. the following is the relative proportion: by weight. by measure. nitrogen 76.9 79.3 oxygen 23.1 20.7 ---- ---- 100 100 its specific gravity is unity (1), being the standard with which the density of all gaseous substances is compared. it is 814 times lighter than water, and nearly 11,065 times lighter than mercury; 100 cubic inches weigh 31 grains. oxygen is necessary to combustion, to the respiration of animals, and to various other natural operations, by all of which that gas is withdrawn from the air. it is obvious that its quantity would gradually diminish, unless the tendency of these causes were counteracted by some compensating process. this, to some considerable extent, is accomplished by vegetation, as it is found that healthy plants, under the influence of the sun's light, constantly draw carbonic acid from the air, the carbon of which is retained, while the oxygen is returned. the atmosphere becomes less and less dense from the surface of the earth upwards. animals and vegetables exist in this atmosphere. they cannot exist in any other. all living things and beings live on this earth's crust. vegetables are fixed to the soil of this earth, while animals move freely upon it. the earth's crust.--sir charles lyell speaking of this earth's crust says: "by the 'earth's crust' is meant that small portion of the surface of our planet which is accessible to human observation, or on which we are enabled to reason by observations made at or near the surface. these reasonings may extend to a depth of several miles, perhaps ten miles; and even then it may be said that such a thickness is no more than 1/400 part of the distance from the surface to the center. the remark is just, but although the dimensions of such a crust are, in truth, insignificant when compared with the entire globe, yet they are vast and of magnificent extent in relation to man and to the other organic beings which people our globe. referring to this standard of magnitude, the geologist may admire the ample limits of his domain, and admit at the same time that not only the exterior of the planet, but the entire earth, is but an atom in the midst of the countless worlds surveyed by the astronomer. "the solid part of this earth consists of distinct substances, such as clay, chalk, sand, limestone, coal, slate, granite, and the like. it has been imagined that the various deposits on the earth's surface were created in their present form and in their present position. on the contrary, it has been shown that they have acquired their actual configuration and condition gradually, under a variety of circumstances, and at successive periods, during each of which distinct races of living beings have flourished on the land and in the waters, the remains of these creatures still lying buried in the crust of the earth. "the materials of this crust are not thrown together confusedly; but distinct mineral masses called rock are found to occupy definite spaces and to exhibit a certain order of arrangement. these rocks are divided into four great classes by reference to their different origin, or in other words by reference to the different circumstances and causes by which they have been produced. "the first two divisions, which will at once be understood as natural, are the aqueous and volcanic, or the products of water and those of igneous action at or near the surface.... the aqueous rocks, sometimes called sedimentary or fossiliferous, cover a larger part of the earth's surface than any other. these rocks are stratified, or divided into distinct layers or strata; these strata have been generally spread out by the action of water, like what we daily see taking place near the mouth of rivers or on the land during a temporary inundation. "the remains of animals, especially of aquatic species, are found almost everywhere, imbedded in stratified rocks; and sometimes, in the case of limestone, they are in such abundance as to constitute the entire mass of rock itself. shells and corals are the most frequent, and with them are often associated the bones and teeth of fishes, fragments of wood, impressions of leaves, and other organic substances. "when geology was first cultivated, it was a general belief that those marine shells and other fossils were the effects and proofs of the deluge of noah; but all those who have carefully investigated the phenomena have rejected this doctrine. a transient flood might be supposed to leave behind it, here and there upon the surface, scattered heaps of mud and sand and shingle, with shells confusedly intermixed; but the strata containing fossils are not superficial deposits, and do not simply cover the earth, but constitute the entire mass of mountains. ample proof of these reiterated revelations is given, and it will be seen that many distinct sets of sedimentary strata, each several hundreds or thousands of feet thick, are piled one upon the other in the earth's crust, each containing peculiar fossil animals and plants, which are distinguishable, with few exceptions, from species now living. the mass of some of these strata consists almost entirely of corals, others are made up of shells, others of plants turned into coal, while some are without fossil. "volcanic rocks are those which have been produced at or near the surface, whether in ancient or modern times, not by water, but by the action of fire or subterranean heat. these rocks are for the most part unstratified, and are devoid of fossils. "there are two other divisions of rock, called plutonic rocks, granite, etc., and metamorphic, or stratified crystalline rocks. the members of both these divisions of rocks agree in being highly crystalline and destitute of organic remains. "the composition of the aqueous rocks, mineral composition of strata: these may be said to belong principally to three divisions, as follows: "1. arenaceous or siliceous rocks. beds of loose sand frequently met with, of which the grains consist entirely of silex, which term comprehends all purely siliceous minerals, as quartz and common flint. quartz is silex in its purest form; flint usually contains some admixture of alumina and the oxide of iron. silica is the mineral used in the manufacture of glass, mixed with a little potassium oxide and lime, or lead, etc. "2. argillaceous rock. a mixture of silex or flint with a large proportion, usually about one-fourth, of alumina or argil; but in common language, any earth which possesses sufficient ductility, when kneaded up with water, to be fashioned like paste by the hand or by the potter's lathe, is called clay. such clays vary greatly in their composition. they are, in general, nothing more than mud derived from the decomposition or wearing down of various rocks. the purest clay in nature is porcelain clay or kaolin, which results from the decomposition of a rock composed of feldspar and quartz, and it is almost always mixed with quartz. (the kaolin of china consists of 71.15 parts of silex, 15.86 of alumina, 1.92 of lime, and 6.73 of water.)... one general character of all argillaceous rocks is to give out a peculiar, earthy odor when breathed upon, which is a test of the presence of alumina. "3. calcareous rocks. these consist mainly of chalk--lime and carbonic acid. shells and corals also are formed of the same elements, with the addition of animal matter. any limestone which is sufficiently hard to take a fine polish is called marble. many of these are fossiliferous; but statuary marble, which is also called saccharine limestone, as having a texture resembling that of loaf-sugar, is devoid of fossil. siliceous limestone is an intimate mixture of carbonate of lime and flint, and is harder in proportion as the flinty matter predominates. marl slate bears the same relation to marl which shale bears to clay, being calcareous shale. magnesian limestone is composed of carbonate of lime and carbonate of magnesia; the proportion of the latter amounting in some cases to nearly one-half. it effervesces much more slowly and feebly with acid than common limestone. gypsum is a rock composed of sulphuric acid, lime, and water. it is usually a soft whitish-yellow rock, with a texture resembling loaf-sugar, but sometimes it is entirely composed of lenticular crystals. alabaster is a granular and compact variety of gypsum found in masses large enough to be used in sculpture and architecture. it is sometimes a pure snow-white substance. it is a softer stone than marble and more easily wrought." when geologists examine the earth's crust, they usually commence with the surface on which we live, and search downwards as far as possible. lyell constructed a tabular view of the fossiliferous strata. it must be borne in mind that we have no other methods of ascertaining the truth than by close observation, making diligent search, in order to discover what this earth's crust is made of. we have no supernatural facilities to give us information, and we are very certain there never were any. what information we are reckoned to have, handed down by our antiquated barbarian forefathers, is of a different nature. it refers--briefly stated--to the conduct of man, the manner in which he shall act as an individual, or collectively as a community; including a great number of what are considered now theatrical or mountebank ceremonies, fancy customs, sacrifices, and a repetition of certain phrases, ordinarily called prayers, accompanied by illustrative images and pictures, and movements of body--fantastic symbols and devices created and prescribed by man. having no other means of ascertaining facts, man was naturally compelled to search for testimony in the earth's crust--to discover what it is composed of; the kind of material; how it was formed; the time it took to form; the period that elapsed between formations; how the layers or strata were superposed one upon another; what substances were found in them; where organic life was first found; what it consisted of; when man first appeared. by examining this table we get a glimpse of the true state of things. this shows the order of superposition, or chronological succession, of the principal european groups: i. post-tertiary. a. post-pliocene. periods and groups. 1. recent. peat mosses, shell marls, with bones of land animals, human remains and works of art. newer parts of modern deltas and coral reefs. 2. post-pliocene. clay, marl, volcanic trap. all the shell of living specimens. no human remains or works of art. bones of quadrupeds, partly of extinct species. ii. tertiary. b. pliocene. 3. newer pliocene. boulder formation. cavern formation, or pleistocene. three-fourths of fossil shells of extinct species. a majority of the mammals extinct; but the genera corresponding with those now surviving in the same great geographical and zoological provinces. icebergs frequent in the seas; glaciers on hills of moderate height. 4. older pliocene. a third or more of the species of mollusca extinct. nearly, if not all, the mammalia extinct. c. miocene. 5. miocene. about two-thirds of the species of shells extinct. all the mammalia extinct. d. eocene. } fossil shells of the eocene period, with very 6. upper eocene. } few exceptions, extinct. all the mammalia of } extinct species, and the greater part of them 7. middle eocene. } of extinct genera. plants of upper eocene } indicating a south european or mediterranean 8. lower eocene. } climate; those of lower eocene a tropical } climate. iii. secondary. e. cretaceous--upper. 9. maestricht beds. yellowish-white limestone. large marine saurians, etc. 10. upper white chalk. marine limestone composed in part of decomposed corals. 11. lower white chalk. 12. upper green sand. 13. gault. dark-blue marl at base of chalk escarpment. numerous extinct genera--conchiferous cephalopoda, etc. 14. lower green sand. species of shells, etc., nearly all distinct from those of upper cretaceous. f. wealden. 15. weald clay, of fresh-water origin. shells of pulmoniferous mollusca. 16. hastings sand. fresh water. reptiles of, etc. 17. purbeck beds. limestone, calcareous slate, etc. roots of trees; plants, etc. g. oölite. 18. upper oölite. portland building-stone, sand. 19. middle oölite. oxford clay, dark-blue clay. large saurians. 20. lower oölite. preponderance of ganoid fish. plants chiefly cycads, conifers, and ferns. h. lias. 21. argillaceous limestone, marl clay. mollusca, reptiles, and fish analogous to the oölitic. i. trias. 22. upper trias. red, gray, green, blue, and white marls, and sandstone, with gypsum. batrachian reptiles. 23. middle trias. compact grayish limestone, with beds of muschelkalk, of dolomite and gypsum. 24. lower trias. plants different for the most part. iv. primary. j. permian. 25. upper permian. yellow magnesian limestone. organic remains both animal and vegetable, more allied to primary than to secondary period. 26. lower permian. marl slate. thecodont saurians, heterocercal fish, etc. k. carboniferous. 27. coal measures. great thickness of strata of fluvio-marine origin, with beds of coal of vegetable origin, based on soils retaining roots of trees. oldest of known reptiles. sauroid fish. 28. mountain. carboniferous or mountain limestone. limestone with marine shells and corals, etc. l. devonian. 29. upper devonian. yellow sandstone, paving and roofing stone. tribe of fish with hard coverings. no reptiles yet known. 30. lower devonian. gray sandstone. m. silurian. 31. upper silurian. tilestone. oldest fossil fish yet discovered. trilobites, etc. 32. lower silurian. caradoc sandstone, etc. no land plants yet known. footprints of tortoise, etc. 33. upper and lower cambrian. synopsis. post-tertiary. } } pliocene. } tertiary or cainozoic. } miocene. } } eocene. } } mesozoic. } cretaceous. } } jurassic. } secondary or mesozoic. } triassic. } } permian. } } carboniferous. } } devonian. } primary or paleozoic. } paleozoic. silurian. } } cambrian. } } the precise chemical action upon the elements composing these various geological formations at different remote periods, is no doubt difficult to ascertain. that there always has been some chemical action going on, and that it is continually going on, is certain. how and to what extent we can judge only from the experience of actual observation in the laboratory. mr. crale remarks: "the whole surface of the land is exposed to chemical action of the air, and of the rainwater with its dissolved carbonic acid, and in colder countries the frost. the disintegrated matter is carried down the slopes during heavy rain; and, to a greater extent than might be supposed, especially in arid districts, by the wind; it is then transported by the streams and rivers, which when rapid deepen their channels and triturate the fragments." darwin says: "if the theory be true" (speaking of the time elapsed since the cambrian lowest formation) "it is indisputable that before the lowest cambrian stratum was deposited, long periods elapsed, as long as, or probably far longer than, the whole interval from the cambrian age to the present day; that during these vast periods, the world swarmed with living creatures. here we encounter a formidable objection; for it seems doubtful whether the earth, in a fit state for the habitation of living creatures, has lasted long enough. sir w. thompson concludes that the consolidation of the crust can hardly have occurred less than 20 or more than 400 million years ago, but probably not less than 98 or more than 200 millions of years. these very wide limits show how doubtful the data are; and other elements may have hereafter to be introduced into the problem. mr. crale estimates that about 60 million years have elapsed since the cambrian period, but this, judging from the small amount of organic change since the commencement of the glacial epoch, appears a very short time for the many and great mutations of life, which have certainly occurred since the cambrian formation; and the previous 140 millions of years can hardly be considered as sufficient for the development of the varied forms of life which already existed during the cambrian period." it seems almost impossible for an ordinary mind to grasp the magnitude of the figures, the span of life being so short. yet some idea may be formed when we compare the age of this earth's crust formation, the hundreds of thousands of years that passed in the evolution of man, and the brief space of time that has elapsed since he has become enabled to give an account of himself. as regards the thickness of the earth's crust, professor ramsey has given the maximum thickness, from actual measurement in most cases, of the successive formations in different parts of great britain; and this is the result: the paleozoic strata (not including igneous bed), 57,154 feet. secondary, 13,190 ,, tertiary, 2,240 ,, making altogether 72,584 feet; that is, very nearly thirteen and three-quarters british miles. büchner in his work on "force and matter" states: "the so-called coal formation alone required, according to bischoff, 1,000,177 years; according to chevandier's calculation, 672,788 years. the tertiary strata required for their development about 350,000 years; and before the originally incandescent earth could cool down from a temperature of 2,000 degrees to 200, there must, according to bischoff's calculation, have elapsed a period of 350,000,000 years. valger calculates that the time required for the deposit of the strata known to us must at least have amounted to 648,000,000 years. i quote these figures simply to show how difficult it is, and the labor required, to form even a proximate idea as to the period of time that must have elapsed for the formation of the various strata known. that all animals were not created at once is certain beyond all cavil and dispute. the development of the various forms of life was an exceeding slow process, and lasted very many thousand centuries. that the earth's crust was not at certain stages of formation in a fit condition either to receive or to maintain the higher types of animal life, is well known. and we know that man's remains are found only in the uppermost surface of the earth's crust. max müller says in his "testimony of the rocks": "it was not until the earlier ages of the oölite system had passed away, that the class of reptiles received its fullest development. and certainly very wonderful was the development which it did then receive. reptiles became everywhere the lords and masters of the lower world. when any class of air-breathing vertebrates is very largely developed, we find it taking possession of all three terrestrial elements--earth, air, and water. last of all, the true placental mammals appear, and thus, tried by the test of perfect reproduction, the great vertebral division receives its full development." agassiz's "principles of zoology" says: "we distinguish four ages of nature, comprehending the great geological divisions, namely: "1. the primary, or paleozoic age, comprising the lower silurian, the upper silurian, and the devonian. during this age there were no air-breathing animals. the fishes were masters of creation. we may therefore call it the reign of fishes. "2. the secondary age, comprising the carboniferous, the trias, the oölite, and the cretaceous formations. this is the epoch in which air-breathing animals first appear. the reptiles predominated over the other classes, and we may therefore call it the 'reign of reptiles.' "3. the tertiary age, comprising the tertiary formation. during this age terrestrial mammals of great size abound. this is the reign of mammals. "4. the modern age, characterized by the appearance of the most perfect of created beings." the majority of mankind trouble themselves but little whether progress is made in any one of the branches of science or not. man has no time to think seriously of anything except to provide food for his family. the priest does his thinking, and he is made to contribute part of his labor to support the holy man who does the thinking for him. all he knows is that his soul or his spirit, his hereafter, and his god are well cared for, and he pays for it. yet every man ought to understand that all his rights, civil and political--all the freedom he enjoys--he has to thank science for procuring and securing. "shall it be seriously objected to the application of the sciences to philosophical problems that its results are not agreeable? that the truth is not always agreeable, nor always consolatory, nor always religious, nor always acceptable, is as well known as the old experience of the almost total absence of reward, either external or internal, provided for its exemplars. what this or that man may understand by a governing reason, an absolute power, a universal soul, a personal god ... is his own affair. the theologians, with their articles of faith, must be left to themselves; so of the naturalists with their science; they both proceed by different routes.... the same bloody hatred with which science was once persecuted by religious fanaticism would revive now, and with it the inquisition and auto-da-fé, and all the horrors with which a refined zealotism has tortured humanity would be resorted to, to satisfy the wishes of the theological cutthroats. a man in advance of his age beholds the struggle of the contending parties from a high point of view, and sees in the eccentricities of this contest merely the natural and necessary expression of the opposing elements which agitate our time. no one can doubt that truth will finally emerge the victor. it certainly will not be long before the battle becomes general. is the victory doubtful? the struggle is unequal; the opponents cannot stand against the trenchant arm of physical and physiological materialism, which fights with facts, that everyone can comprehend, while the opponents fight with suppositions and presumptions" (büchner). "science and faith exclude each other" (virchow). fools still cling to faith; wise men find the truth in science. note.--baily's "history of astronomy," part i, page 31, § 124, and part ii, pp. 33, 39, maintains that india has existed as a nation, as the records show, 4,320,000 years. the indians divide this time into four principal periods: first period, that of innocence or simplicity, 1,728,000 years; second period, 276,000; the third period, 864,000; and the ages of misfortune about 422,000--cali-yon-gan period. similar statements are made by cicero ("de divinat," i, 19), concerning the chaldeans: "condemnemus, inquam, hos aut stultitiæ aut vanitatis aut imprudentiæ qui 470 millia annorum ut ipsi dicunt monumentis comprehensa continent." the atmosphere. the atmosphere is the gaseous envelope encircling the earth; and it constitutes the ocean of air at the bottom of which we live. we become aware of the existence of the air when we move rapidly and experience the resistance offered to the passage of our bodies, and also when the air is set in motion, giving rise to a wind. we notice the pressure of the atmosphere if we withdraw the air from beneath the hand by a powerful air-pump, for we then find that the hand is pressed down with a force equal to 1.033 kilos. on a square centimeter, or nearly 15 lbs. on every square inch. the total atmospheric pressure which the human body has to support hence amounts to several tons. but this pressure is not felt under ordinary circumstances, because the pressure exercised is exerted equally in every direction. the instrument used for measuring the pressure of the air is termed a barometer, and the average pressure at the sea level is equal to that exerted by a column of mercury 760 mm. high. the air being elastic and having weight, it is clear the lower layers of air must be more compressed than those above them, and hence the density of the air must vary at the different hights above the sea level. the density of the air being thus dependent on the pressure to which it is subjected, the higher strata of air become generally rarefied, and it is hence difficult to say whereabouts the air ceases, but it appears that the limit of the atmosphere is about 200 to 300 miles from the level of the sea. if the whole atmosphere were of the same density throughout as it is at the earth's surface, it would reach only to a height of a little more than five miles above the sea level. aqueous vapor is contained in the air in quantities varying in different localities and at different times, and depending mainly on the temperature of the air. air at a given temperature cannot contain more than a certain quantity of moisture in solution; and when it has taken up its maximum quantity, it is said to be saturated with aqueous moisture. the higher the temperature of the air the more water can it retain as vapor; and when air saturated with moisture is cooled, the water is deposited in liquid form in very small globules, forming a mist, fog, or cloud. this is the cause of the fall of rain, snow, and hail; when warm air heavily laden with moisture from the ocean passes into a higher and colder position, or meets with a stratum of air of lower temperature, it cannot any longer retain so much aqueous vapor, and a large quantity assumes a liquid form, falling as rain when the temperature is above the freezing-point, or crystallizing as snowflakes if the temperature is below that point. hail is caused by the congelation of raindrops in passing through a stratum of air below the freezing-point. the deposition of dew is caused by the rapid cooling of the earth's surface by radiation after sunset, and by the consequent cooling of the air near the ground below the temperature at which it begins to deposit moisture. in general the air contains from 50 to 70 per cent. of aqueous vapor of the quantities necessary to saturate it. if the quantity be not within these limits the air is either unpleasantly dry or unpleasantly moist. the air contains, besides the gases of oxygen and nitrogen, carbonic acid, ammonia, accidental impurities, and volatile organic matter, which latter is the most important, as it probably influences to a great extent the healthfulness of the special situation. we become aware of the existence of such organic putrescent substances when entering a crowded room from the fresh air; and it is probable that the well-known unhealthiness of marshy and other districts is owing to the presence of some organic impurities. we may have occasion to refer to this when speaking of the deluge, etc. chapter iii. the chemical aspect. by the word chemistry we understand the science which investigates the composition of all material substances, taking them apart or separating them, by a chemical process, and discovers the nature and properties of the minutest particle. these small particles have received the name, elements or elementary substances; that term is applied in chemistry to those forms of matter which have hitherto resisted all attempt to decompose them. "we know that we have earth, air, water, and we have seen in chapter ii that the earth's crust is made up of many substances, rocks, coral reefs, clay, marl, feldspar, quartz, limestone, granite, etc., etc. these substances are composed of small particles, or elements, and are called minerals or inorganic substances. there is another class of substances, called organic, that are derived from living things or beings. these are also taken apart or separated into their elementary substances. as plants or animals, all such elementary substances have received the name organic substances because plants and animals have organs of reproduction, hence the name. the taking apart of any substance into its constituent elements is called analysis by chemists. the same elements can also be put together to produce various substances; that is termed synthesis. chemists have adopted a name for each of the elements, and these names are represented by symbols, or letters. compound substances may contain two or more elements. when the composition of a substance is determined by splitting the compound into its elementary constituents a chemical analysis of that substance is said to have been made; and if the proportions by weight in which each of the constituents is present be determined, a quantitative analysis of the substance has been made, etc. by chemical action, we signify that which occurs when two or more substances so act upon one another as to produce a third substance differing altogether from the original ones in properties; or when a substance is brought under such conditions that it forms two or more bodies differing from the original one in properties. chemistry is called an experimental science. in investigating all the materials within his reach, whether solid, liquid, or gaseous, whether contained in the earth, sea, or air; whether belonging to the mineral, animal, or vegetable creation, the chemist finds himself obliged to divide substances into two classes: (1) compound substances--those which he is able to split up into two or more essentially different materials; (2) elements or simple substances--those which he is unable thus to split up, and out of which nothing essentially different from the original substances has been obtained. compound bodies are made up of two or more elementary substances chemically combined with each other; thus sulphur, copper, lead, are elementary bodies; out of each of these nothing different from sulphur, copper, lead, can be obtained; whereas when two of these bodies are heated together, a compound is formed from which both of the original elementary constituents can at any time be obtained. water is a compound body--it can be split up into two elementary gases, hydrogen and oxygen; common salt, again, is a compound of a gas (chlorine) with a metal (sodium); and limestone, clay, sugar, and wax may serve as examples of compound bodies; whilst phosphorus, charcoal, iron, mercury, and gold may be mentioned as belonging to the class of simple substances. as to physical properties of gases--they have weight, volume, diffusion, density, etc. theologians insist that there is a god, a god that was first introduced to us by a man with the name of abraham, advertised by moses, and has been palmed off upon the masses as a something exceedingly wonderful. a multitude of men who find it to their interest to advocate his pretended claims, are still doing their utmost to sustain their god. we are trying to discover where he is to be found, whether he is a local or a universal god, what he is composed of, whether he resides on earth permanently or transiently, whether he controls the entire solar system or more systems, whether he occasionally takes a trip to other planets; and if he has created everything we want to find out how he has created it. for that reason we have to search, taking a glimpse among the stars, in the earth, atmosphere, etc. since geology does not respond favorably, we are trying to discover what this earth is composed of. the elementary bodies at present recognized amount to sixty-four in number. of these about fifty belong to the class called metals. several of them are of recent discovery, and as yet very imperfectly known. the distinction between metals and certain non-metallic substances or metalloids, although very convenient for purposes of description, is entirely arbitrary, since the classes graduate into each other in the most indefinite manner. the following is a complete list of the elementary substances known, giving their names, symbols, and combining weight: symbols. metalloids. combining weight. elements of life: of primary importance. o oxygen [1] ii 16 h hydrogen i 1 n nitrogen v 14 c carbon iv 12 elements of secondary importance. cl chlorine i 35.5 br bromine i 80 i iodine i 127 f fluorine i 29 p phosphorus v 31 s sulphur vi 32 si silicon iv 28 b boron iii 11 se selenium vi 79.5 te tellurium vi 179 mechanics, arts, science, and medicine. al aluminium iv 27.4 ca calcium ii 40 (cuprum) cu copper ii 63.5 (ferrum) fe iron iv 56 (plumbum) pb lead iv 207 mn manganese iv 55 (hydrargyrum) hg mercury ii 200 (kalium) k potassium i 39.1 (argentum) ag silver i 108 (natrium) na sodium i 23 (stannum) sn tin iv 118 zn zinc ii 65.3 (stibium) sb antimony v 122 as arsenic v 75 ba barium ii 137 bi bismuth v 210 cr chromium vi 52.2 co cobalt iv 58.7 (aurum) au gold iii 197 in indium iv 74 mg magnesium ii 24 ni nickel iv 58.7 pd [2] palladium iv 106.6 pt platinum iv 197.5 sr strontium ii 87.5 ti titanium iv 50 w tungsten vi 184 u uranium iv 120 little known, rarely used. be beryllium ii 9.3 cd cadmium ii 112 cs cæsium i 133 cr cerium iv 92 d didymium ii 95 e erbium ii 112.6 ir iridium iv 198 la lanthanum ii 92 li [3] lithium i 7 mo molybdenum vi 96 nb niobium v 94 os osmium iv 199.2 rh rhodium iv 104.4 rb rubidium i 85.4 ru ruthenium iv 104.4 ta tantalum v 182 tb terbium tl thallium iii 204 th thorium ii 231.5 v vanadium v 51.3 y yttrium ii 61 zr zirconium iii 89.6 all matter is made up of very small particles which are chemically indivisible and which are termed atoms, and the atom of each elementary substance differs essentially from that of every other. all the atoms of each element are alike, and chemical compounds are formed by the combination of unlike atoms. hence the smallest particle of a compound consists of a group of atoms. this group, which can be divided by chemical but not by mechanical means, is termed a molecule. the smallest particle of an element in a free state is, however, not a single atom, but a group of atoms mechanically indivisible, or a molecule. this explains why elementary bodies act more energetically and enter more readily into combination at the moment of their liberation from a combination than when in the free state. when chemical changes occur, it is the molecules which react upon one another, and the change consists in the change of position of certain atoms contained in the groups. when an element is set free from a compound, the liberated join together to form molecules, unless some body is present with which the element can combine. by an atom we therefore understand the smallest portion of a chemical element which can enter into a chemical compound; by a molecule, the smallest portion of a simple compound body which can occur in the free state or which can take part in a chemical action. all the elements, with the single exception of fluorine, combine with oxygen to form oxides. in this act of combination, which is termed oxidation, heat is always, and light is frequently, given off. when bodies unite with oxygen, evolving light and heat, they are said to burn, or undergo combustion. all bodies which burn in the air burn with increased brilliancy in oxygen gas; and many substances, such as iron, which do not readily burn in the air, may be made to do so in oxygen. oxygen is a colorless invisible gas, possessing neither taste nor smell. hydrogen is a colorless invisible gas, possessing neither taste nor smell. it is the lightest gas known, being 14.47 times lighter than air. it combines with oxygen to form water. nitrogen is a colorless, tasteless, inodorous gas, slightly lighter than air. it does not combine readily with bodies, and it is a very inert substance, neither supporting combustion or animal life, nor burning itself. it has, however, no poisonous qualities, and animals plunged into a jar of this gas die simply of suffocation from want of oxygen. nitrogen exists in a free state in the air, of which it constitutes four-fifths by bulk. it occurs combined in the bodies of plants and animals, and in various chemical compounds, such as nitre, whence the gas derives its name. carbon is a solid element; it is not known in the free state, either as a liquid or as a gas. carbon is remarkable as existing in three distinct forms, which in outward appearance or physical properties have nothing in common, whilst their chemical relations are identical. these three allotropic forms of carbon are (1) diamond, (2) graphite or plumbago, (3) charcoal. these substances differ in hardness, color, specific gravity, etc., but they each yield on combustion in the air or oxygen the same weight of the same substance, carbonic acid or carbon dioxide. carbon is the element which is especially characteristic of animal and vegetable life, as every organized structure, from the simplest to the most complicated, contains carbon. if carbon were not present on the earth, no single vegetable or animal body such as we know could exist. in addition to the carbon which is found free in these three forms, and contained combined with hydrogen and oxygen in the bodies of plants and animals, it exists combined with oxygen as free carbon dioxide in the air, and with calcium and oxygen as calcium carbonate in limestone, chalk, marble, corals, shells, etc. plants are able when exposed to sunlight to decompose the carbon dioxide in the air, liberating the oxygen, and taking the carbon for the formation of their vegetable structure, whilst all animals, living directly or indirectly upon vegetables, absorb oxygen, and evolve carbon dioxide. thus the sun's rays, through the medium of plants, effect deoxidation, or reduction, whilst animals act as oxidizing agents with respect to carbon. oxygen, hydrogen, nitrogen, carbon--these are the life-giving elements. they are the life-producing and life-sustaining elements. neither animal nor vegetable life can exist without them. the entire activity of nature depends upon them. every organic substance contains them. no organic substance can exist without them. the principle of life is due to them. from a blade of grass to an insect, from an insect to an animal, including man, one cannot emerge into life without these elements. the birth, growth, and development of plant and animal depend upon them, the sustenance and nurture. all our food-substances are almost wholly made up of these elements. no force, power, or energy can be produced without their presence. our muscular strength, our nervous force, our very thoughts, our imagination, as well as digestion, respiration, circulation of the blood, depend on these elements. our sensations, our pleasures, our pains, depend upon them. all the excitement and depression in life are dependent on them. the beauties of vegetation, all the various shades and colors of flower and blossom, the tints and odors, are dependent on them. no phenomenon in nature, no matter how terrible, delightful, or enchanting, can be manifested without these elements. no earthquake, thunder, storm, lightning, wind, hail, rain, snow, or ice could exist without them. no light, heat, or motion--in fact, none of the physical forces, could be evolved without them. our atmosphere, ocean, seas, rivers, forests, are composed of them. no art, science, mechanics, architecture, nor indeed anything that we now enjoy, could exist without them. gunpowder, dynamite, electricity, and all else are dependent on these elements. why attempt to enumerate the extraordinary roles they play on earth and in the universe? every plant would wither, every life would perish, without oxygen; this element may be truly called the breath of life. the creation of god is dependent on these elements, because were it not for man god would never have been. the ark, made of wood, was composed of them. the figure of christ, and the virgin mary, as she is called, as well as all the saints, were and are composed of oxygen, carbon, nitrogen, hydrogen, etc. we know that these chemical elements enter into the composition of all things in nature--mineral, vegetable, animal. we also may be absolutely certain that no more elements exist now, at this present time, than existed ten, twenty, or one thousand million of years ago. chemical elementary substances have no greater relative weight towards one another, nor a greater volume, at this present time than they had at any time since the existence of this earth. the total weight of all elements that enter into the formation of this terrestrial globe has never varied, whether they were in solid, fluid, or gaseous state. the law of gravitation has always existed. elements that enter into the formation of organic beings, vegetable or animal, must in due time undergo decomposition and return to the same elements of which they were composed. the chemical action has always been the same. all substances are subject to chemical action when exposed to the primary elements, oxygen and hydrogen especially. an element can never be annihilated. it may not be out of place to mention some of the substances in daily use. for example, water is composed of oxygen and hydrogen. air is composed of oxygen and nitrogen. bread, of starch, sugars--oxygen, hydrogen and carbon. meats, of oxygen, hydrogen, carbon, and nitrogen, etc. salt, of sodium and chlorine. vegetables, fruits, etc., of oxygen, carbon, and hydrogen. fats, of oil. alcohols, of oxygen, carbon, and hydrogen. the tissues of the animal body are composed of oxygen, hydrogen, carbon, and nitrogen. the combination of five elements produces electricity, thus: zinc (zn) + copper (cu) + sulphuric acid, which consists of hydrogen (h2), sulphur (s), and oxygen (o4), = electricity. a few examples in the changes of the combination of oxygen and hydrogen are shown in water. under conditions of heat and cold it becomes ice, steam, dew, rain, hail, snow, clouds, etc., etc. these phenomena are known. we merely mention these facts to show how much has been discovered by human skill, but of how much more remains to be discovered we can not form the slightest notion. all that has been done in the field of science has been of actual benefit to humanity. for the discoveries are based on fact and truth. they are ushered into this world to alleviate and to lighten the struggle and the burden of men. they come without oppression, without crime, without bloodshed. they come as the great benefactors of mankind. men would be much better off to-day if they received for their sunday lessons instruction in the natural, instead of wasting their precious time in repeating the silly twaddle of supernatural extravagance, that tends to stupefy instead of clearing up the understanding. scientific research has advanced so far, that not only are we able to know, from the discoveries made, the elementary composition of this earth, and all that belongs thereto, but other far more difficult problems have been partially solved. that is, with the aid of newly discovered instruments, we can ascertain, to a considerable extent, the elementary composition of the sun, stars, and distant planets. in 1802 dr. wollaston, and later fraunhofer, discovered and perfected an instrument called the spectroscope. it consists of a prism, fixed upon an iron stand, and a tube carrying a slit. when light passes through a slit it impinges upon a flint glass prism, by which it is dispersed. the light of burning metals has been tested in that manner. thus when any light passes through the slit of a spectroscope, the substance giving the light may be determined, the elements burning ascertained. if the solar spectrum be examined--the light of the sun's rays--numerous dark lines parallel with the edge of the prism are observed, and reveal a number of colors giving the following: red, orange, yellow, green, blue, indigo, violet. these are intersected by fine black lines of different degrees of breadth and shade, which are always present, and always occupy the same relative position in the solar spectrum. these are called fraunhofer's lines. by the means of this instrument, the spectra of the sun, planets, and moon have been analyzed, and the color and position, the kind of metals these distant bodies are composed of. the sun's atmosphere, from experiments made, is known to contain metals, such as soda, iron, etc., in the condition of glowing gas, the white light proceeding from the solid or liquid strongly heated mass of the sun which lies in the interior. the metals hitherto detected in the sun's atmosphere are about fifteen or more--iron, sodium, strontium, cadmium, magnesium, calcium, chromium, nickel, barium, zinc, cobalt, manganese, aluminium, titanium, hydrogen, etc. so delicate is this instrument that 1/180000000 part of a grain of sodium can be detected, and a portion of lithium weighing 1/6000000 part of a grain has been detected; thus showing that there exists a very strong probability that the sun, planets, and moons are composed of similar, if not the same, elements that this earth is composed of. chapter iv. the sun. the colossus, or brazen statue of the sun, was placed across the mouth of the harbor of rhodes, its legs stretched to such a distance that a large ship under sail might easily pass between them. it was seventy cubits high, or a hundred english feet; its fingers were as long as ordinary statues, and few men with both arms could grasp one of its thumbs. scarcely sixty years had elapsed before this work of art was thrown down by an earthquake, which broke it off at the knees, in which position it remained till the conquest of rhodes by the saracens (a.d. 684), when it was beaten to pieces and sold to a jew merchant, who loaded nine hundred camels with its spoils. anaxagoras (500 b.c.) taught that there was but one god, and that the sun was only a fiery globe and should not be worshiped. he attempted to explain eclipses and other celestial phenomena by natural causes, saying that there is no such thing as chances, these being only names for unknown laws. for this audacity and impiety, as his countrymen considered it, he and his family were doomed to perpetual banishment. "man," said protagoras of abra (430 b.c.), "is the measure of all things.... of the gods i know nothing, neither whether they be nor whether they be not; for there is much that stands in the way of knowledge, as well the obscurity of the matter as the shortness of human life." st. john begins his writings: "in the beginning was the word, and the word was with god, and the word was god." but john, like many others of his time, knew nothing more than the use of words to make riddles, which he himself could not see through and no one else could understand. the man or men who first composed that part of scripture that informs us how the sun and earth were created, certainly knew nothing about it, because all that is at present known is of comparatively recent date. for many centuries, the established religion, the church, and the representatives of the theo-christian organization, did all in their power to prevent light from penetrating their hidden benighted doings. they looked upon themselves as being all in all, knowing all in all--as having had everything worth knowing revealed to them by an agency no one else had access to. the ideas of their mysterious doings, of their mysterious gods, are hidden from view in deep obscurity--like the temple of the egyptian isis, that bore the inscription: "i am all that is, that was, and that will be, and no mortal has lifted my veil." the ancient writers of the scripture were full of deep, mysterious ways, and their writings of hidden meanings. ordinary mortals were prohibited from making inquiry because the subject was considered too mysterious, and much too sacred. since then, many mysteries have been dissolved, or have been analyzed by the crucial test of science, and it has been discovered that there is nothing hidden except what our ignorance prevents us from knowing. we have lifted the sacred veil and looked into the temple of nature, as she is, and not as she appears. the more we search, the more we discover, the nearer we get to the truth. there is not the slightest reason why every man, woman, and child at proper age should not be instructed in matters wherein they are immediately interested, the knowledge whereof would undoubtedly be to their benefit. men have lived through centuries of fable, ages of fiction, long periods of myth. the christian god is as much of a myth as any myth that ever existed. humanity having passed through these various mental afflictions, gone through so many bloody surgical operations, we are, as it were, approaching a condition that will soon be declared as convalescent, and this most miserable of theological nurses may at not a very remote period be dismissed. we can say, without the slightest conscientious scruple, or fear of contradiction, with reason to sustain us and the light of science to prove the truth, that there is no god. there never was--except such a one as men have invented, held sacred, and worshiped. there is nothing sacred except what man makes sacred, nothing holy except what man makes holy, nothing divine except what man makes divine. he makes his own god, and he religiously, piously, devoutly prays to and worships it. the more regularly he does so, the more saintly he becomes, or esteems himself. for many thousand years the sun was worshiped, held sacred, sacrificed to, entempled, etc. as reason and understanding increased, they forsook him as a god, dismissed him as they had dismissed many gods before him. yet the sun was by far their greatest benefactor and best friend--more than they were aware of. the sun is 93,000,000 miles from the earth. supposing a railway could be built to the sun, an express train traveling day and night, at the rate of thirty miles an hour, would require 352 years to reach its destination. the light of the sun is equal to 5,563 wax candles held at a distance of one foot from the eye. the heat of the sun that we receive annually is sufficient to melt a layer of ice 180 feet thick, extending over the whole earth. yet the sunbeam is only 1/300000 part as intense as it is at the surface of the sun. moreover, the heat and light stream off into space equally in every direction. of this vast flood, but one twenty-three-hundred-millionth part reaches the earth. the diameter of the sun is about 860,000 miles. its volume is 1,300,000 times that of the earth, i.e., it would take 1,300,000 earths to make a globe the size of the sun. its mass is 750 times that of all the planets and moons in the solar system, and 300,000 times that of the earth. its weight may be expressed in tons thus: 1,910,278,070,000,000,000,000,000,000. the density of the sun is only about one-fourth that of the earth, or 1.41 that of water, so that the weight of a body transferred from the earth to the sun would not be increased in proportion to the comparative size of the sun. the sun rotates on his axis, like a wheel, once in about 25 days. our astronomers tell us that the solar heat is gradually diminishing. in time the sun will cease to shine, as the earth did long since. newcomb says that in 5,000,000 years, at the present rate, the sun will have shrunk to half its present size, and that it cannot sustain life on the earth more than 10,000,000 years longer. of this we may be assured, there is enough heat to support life on our globe for millions of years to come. the sun consists of a central orb, liquid or solid, of exceeding brightness, which of itself would give a continuous spectrum, or in other words which emits all kinds of light. the sunlight is decomposed by means of the spectroscope, already alluded to, in order to discover the kind of elements it is composed of. therefore tyndall says: "i think we now possess knowledge sufficient to raise us to the level of one of the most remarkable generalizations of our age. it has long been supposed that the sun and planets have had a common origin and that hence the same substances are more or less common to them all. can we detect the presence of any of our terrestrial substances in the sun?... i have said that the bright bands of a metal are characteristic of the metal; that we can without seeing the metal declare its name from the inspection of the bands. the bands are, so to speak, the voice of the metal declaring its presence. "professor kirchhoff finds iron, calcium, magnesium, sodium, chromium, etc., in the sunlight spectrum. we know also the total amount of solar heat received by the earth in a year, and we can calculate the entire quantity of heat emitted by the sun in a year. conceive a hollow sphere to surround the sun, its center the sun's center, and its surface at the distance of the earth from the sun. the section of the earth cut by this surface is to the whole area of the hollow sphere as 1 to 2,300,000,000; hence the quantity of solar heat intercepted by the earth is only 1/2300000000 of the total radiation. "the heat emitted by the sun, if used to melt a stratum of ice applied to the sun's surface would liquefy the ice at the rate of 2,400 feet an hour. it would boil per hour 700,000 millions of cubic miles of ice-cold water. expressed in another form, the heat given out by the sun per hour is equal to that which would be generated by the combustion of a layer of solid coal 10 feet thick entirely surrounding the sun; hence the heat emitted in a year is equal to that which would be produced by the combustion of a layer of coal 17 miles in thickness. these are the results of actual measurements; and should greater accuracy be conferred on them by future determinations, it will not deprive them of their astonishing character. and this expenditure has been going on for ages, without our being able, in historic times, to detect the loss. when the tolling of a bell is heard at a distance, the sound of each stroke soon sinks, the sonorous vibrations are quickly wasted, and renewed strokes are necessary to maintain the sound. like the bell, "die sonne tönt nach alter weise. "but how is its tone sustained? how is the perennial loss made good? we are apt to overlook the wonderful in the common. possibly to many of us--and to some of the most enlightened among us--the sun appears as a fire differing from our terrestrial fires only in the magnitude and the intensity of its combustion. but what is the burning matter which can thus maintain itself? all that we know of cosmical phenomena declares our brotherhood with the sun--affirms that the same constituents enter into the composition of his mass as those already known to chemistry. but no earthly substance with which we are acquainted--no substance which the fall of meteors has landed on the earth--would be at all competent to maintain the sun's combustion. the chemical energy of such substances would be too weak, and their dissipation would be too speedy. were the sun a solid block of coal, and were it allowed a sufficient supply of oxygen to enable it to burn at the rate necessary to produce the observed emissions, it would be utterly consumed in 5,000 years. on the other hand, to imagine it a body originally endowed with a store of heat--a hot globe now cooling--necessitates the ascription to it of qualities wholly different from those possessed by terrestrial matter. if we knew the specific heat of the sun, we could calculate its rate of cooling. assuming this to be the same as that of water--the terrestrial substance which possesses the highest specific heat--at its present rate of emission, the entire mass of the sun would cool down 15,000° faht. in 5,000 years. in short, if the sun be formed of matter like our own, some means must exist of restoring to him his wasted power. the facts are so extraordinary, that the soberest hypothesis regarding them must appear wild. the sun we know rotates upon his axis; he turns like a wheel once in 25 days: can it be the friction of the periphery of this wheel against something in surrounding space which produces the light and heat? such a notion has been entertained. but what forms the brake, and by what agency is it held, while it rubs against the sun? the action is inconceivable; but, granting the existence of the brake, we can calculate the total amount of heat which the sun could generate by such friction. we know his mass, we know his time of rotation; we know the mechanical equivalent of heat; and from these data we deduce, with certainty, that the entire force of rotation, if converted into heat, would cover more than one, but less than two, centuries of emission. there is no hypothesis involved in this calculation. "there is another theory, which, however bold it may at first sight appear, deserves our earnest attention. i have already referred to it as the meteoric theory of the sun's heat. solar space is peopled with ponderable objects. kepler's celebrated statement that 'there are more comets in the heavens than fish in the ocean' refers to the fact that a small portion only of the total number of comets belong to our system, and are seen from the earth. but besides comets, and planets, and moons, a numerous class of bodies belong to our system--asteroids, which from their smallness might be regarded as cosmical atoms. like the planets and the comets these smaller bodies obey the law of gravity, and revolve in elliptic orbits around the sun; and it is they, when they come within the earth's atmosphere, that, fired by friction, appear to us as meteors and falling stars. on a bright night twenty minutes rarely pass at any part of the earth's surface without the appearance of at least one meteor. at certain times (the 12th of august and the 14th of november), they appear in enormous numbers. during nine hours of observation in boston, when they were described as falling as thick as snowflakes, 240,000 meteors were calculated to have been observed. the number falling in a year might perhaps be estimated at hundreds or thousands of millions, and even these would constitute but a small portion of the total crowd of asteroids that circulate round the sun. from the phenomena of light and heat, and by the direct observation of encke, on his comet, we learn that the universe is filled with a resisting medium, through the friction of which all the masses of our system are drawn gradually toward the sun. and though the larger planets show, in historic times, no diminution of their periods of revolution, this may not hold good for the smaller bodies. in the time required for the mean distance of the earth from the sun to alter a single yard, a small asteroid may have approached thousands of miles nearer to our luminary. "following up these reflections we should infer that while this immeasurable stream of ponderable matter rolls unceasingly towards the sun, it must augment in density as it approaches the center of convergence. and here the conjecture naturally rises that that weak nebulous light, of vast dimensions, which embraces the sun--the zodiacal light--may owe its existence to these crowded meteors. however this may be, it is at least proved that the luminous phenomenon arises from matter which circulates in obedience to planetary laws; the entire mass constituting the zodiacal light must be constantly approaching, and incessantly raining its substance down upon, the sun. "we observe the fall of an apple and investigate the law which rules its motion. in the place of the earth we set the sun, and in place of the apple we set the earth, and thus possess ourselves of the key to the mechanics of the heavens. we now know the connection between hight of fall, velocity, and heat at the surface of the earth. in the place of the earth let us set the sun, with 300,000 times the earth's mass, and instead of a fall of a few feet, let us take cosmical elevations; we thus obtain a means of generating heat which transcends all terrestrial power. "it is easy to calculate both the maximum and the minimum velocity imparted by the sun's attraction to asteroids circulating round him; the maximum is generated when the body approaches the sun from an infinite distance as the entire pull of the sun being then expended upon it; the minimum is that velocity which would barely enable the body to revolve round the sun close to his surface. the final velocity of the former, just before striking the sun, would be 390 miles a second, that of the latter 276 miles a second. the asteroid on striking the sun with the former velocity, would develop more than 3,000 times the heat generated by the combustion of an equal asteroid of solid coal; while the shock, in the latter case, would generate heat equal to that of the combustion of upward of 4,000 such asteroids. it matters not whether the substances falling into the sun be combustible or not; their being combustible would not add sensibly to the tremendous heat produced by their mechanical collision. "here then we have an agency competent to restore his lost energy, and to maintain a temperature at his surface which transcends all terrestrial combustion. the very quality of the solar rays--their incomparable penetrating power--enables us to infer that the temperature of their origin must be enormous; but in the fall of asteroids we find the means of producing such a temperature. it may be contended that this showering down of matter must be accompanied by the growth of the sun in size; it is so; but the quantity necessary to produce the observed calorific emission, even if accumulated for 4,000 years, would defy the scrutiny of our best instruments. if the earth struck the sun it would utterly vanish from perception, but the heat developed by the shock would cover the expenditure of the sun for a century. "to the earth itself apply considerations similar to those which we have applied to the sun. newton's theory of gravitation, which enables us, from the present form of the earth, to deduce its original state of aggregation, reveals to us, at the same time, a source of heat powerful enough to bring about the fluid state--powerful enough to fuse even worlds. it teaches us to regard the molten condition of a planet as resulting from mechanical union of cosmical masses, and thus reduces to the same homogeneous process the heat stored up in the body of the earth, and the heat emitted by the sun. without doubt the whole surface of the sun displays an unbroken ocean of fiery fluid matter. on this ocean rests an atmosphere of flowing gas--a flame atmosphere, or photosphere. but gaseous substances, when compared with solid ones, emit, even when their temperature is very high, only a feeble and transparent light. hence it is probable that the dazzling white light of the sun comes through the atmosphere from the more solid portions of the surface.... in conclusion, thus writes professor thomson: 'the source of energy from which the solar heat is derived is undoubtedly meteoric.... the principal source--perhaps the sole appreciable efficient source--is in the bodies circulating round the sun at present inside the earth's orbit seen in the sunlight by us called "zodiacal light." the store of energy for future sunlight is at present partly dynamical--that of the motions of these bodies round the sun; and partly potential--that of their gravitation towards the sun. this latter is gradually being spent, half against the resisting medium, and half in causing a continuous increase of the former. each meteor thus goes on moving faster and faster, and getting nearer and nearer the center, until some time, very suddenly, it gets so much entangled in the solar atmosphere as to begin to lose its velocity. in a few seconds more it is at rest on the sun's surface, and the energy given up is vibrated across the district where it was gathered during so many ages, ultimately to penetrate as light the remotest regions of space.... "'the heat of rotation of the sun and planets, taken all together, would cover the solar emission for 134 years; while the heat of gravitation (that produced by falling into the sun) would cover the emission for 45,589 years. there is nothing hypothetical in these results; they follow directly and necessarily from the application of the mechanical equivalent of heat to cosmical masses.'... "but, continues helmholtz, though the store of our planetary system is so immense as not to be sensibly diminished by the incessant emission which has gone on during the period of man's history, and though the time which must elapse before a sensible change in the condition of our planetary system can occur is totally incapable of measurement, the inexorable laws of mechanics show that this store, which can only suffer loss, and not gain, must finally be exhausted. shall we terrify ourselves by this thought? men are in the habit of measuring the greatness of the universe, and the wisdom displayed in it, by the duration and the profit which it promises to their own race; but the past history of the earth shows the insignificance of the interval during which man has had his dwelling here. what the museums of europe show us of the remains of egypt and assyria we gaze upon in silent wonder, and despair of being able to carry back our thoughts to a period so remote. still, the human race must have existed and multiplied for ages before the pyramids could have been erected. we estimate the duration of human history at 6,000 years; but vast as this time may appear to us, what is it in comparison with the period during which the earth bore successive series of rank plants and mighty animals, but no man? periods during which, in our own neighborhood (koenigsberg) the amber tree bloomed and dropped its costly gum on the earth and in the sea; when in europe and north america groves of tropical palms flourished, in which gigantic lizards, and after them elephants, whose mighty remains are still buried in the earth, found a home. different geologists, proceeding from different premises, have sought to estimate the length of the above period, and they set it down from one to nine million of years. the time during which the earth has generated organic beings is again small, compared with the ages during which the world was a mass of molten rocks. the experiments of bischoff upon basalt show that for our globe to cool down from 2,000° to 200° centigrade would require 350 millions of years. and with regard to the period during which the first nebulous masses condensed, so as to form our planetary system, conjecture must entirely cease. the history of man, therefore, is but a minute ripple in the infinite ocean of time. for a much longer period than that during which he has already occupied the world, the existence of a state of inorganic nature, favorable to man's existence, seems to be secured; so that for ourselves, and for long generations after us, we have nothing to fear. but the same forces of air and water, and of the volcanic interior, which produced former geological revolutions, and buried one series of living forms after another, still act upon the earth's crust. they, rather than those distant cosmical changes of which we have spoken, will end the human race, and perhaps compel us to make way for new and more complete forms of life, as the lizard and the mammoth have given way to us and our contemporaries. "grand, however, and marvelous as are these questions regarding the physical constitution of the sun, they are but a portion of the wonders connected with our luminary. his relationship to life is yet to be referred to. the earth's atmosphere contains carbonic acid, and the earth's surface bears living plants; the former is the nutriment of the latter. the plant seizes the combined carbon and oxygen and tears them asunder, storing the carbon and letting the oxygen go free. by no special force, different in quality from other forces, do plants exercise this power--the real magician here is the sun. we have seen how heat is consumed in forcing asunder the atoms and molecules of solids and liquids, converting itself into potential energy, which reappears as heat when the attractions of the separated atoms are again allowed to come into play. precisely the same considerations which we then applied to heat we have now to apply to light; for it is at the expense of the solar light that the decomposition of the carbonic acid is effected. without the sun the reduction cannot take place, and an amount of sunlight is consumed exactly equivalent to the molecular work accomplished. thus trees are formed, thus meadows grow, thus the flowers bloom. let the rays fall upon the surface of sand, the sand is heated, and finally radiates away as much as it receives; let the same rays fall upon a forest, the quantity of heat given back is less than that received, for the energy of a portion of the sunbeams is invested in building up the trees. i have here a bundle of cotton which i ignite; it bursts into flame, and yields a definite amount of heat; precisely that amount of heat was abstracted from the sun in order to form that bit of cotton. this is a representative case--every tree, plant, and flower, grows and flourishes by the grace and bounty of the sun. "but we cannot stop at vegetable life; for this is the source, mediate or immediate, of all animal life. in the animal body vegetable substances are brought again into contact with their beloved oxygen, and they burn within as a fire burns in a grate. this is the source of all animal power; and the forces in play are the same, in kind, as those which operate in inorganic nature. in the plant the clock is wound up, in the animal it runs down. in the plant the atoms are separated, in the animal they recombine. and as surely as the force which moves a clock's hands is derived from the arm which winds the clock, so surely is all terrestrial power drawn from the sun. leaving out of account the eruption of volcanoes and the ebb and flow of the tides, every mechanical action on the earth's surface, every manifestation of power, organic and inorganic, vital or physical, is produced by the sun. his warmth keeps the sea liquid, and the atmosphere a gas, and all the storms which agitate both are blown by the mechanical force of the sun. he lifts the rivers and glaciers up the mountains; and thus the cataract and avalanche shoot with an energy derived immediately from him. thunder and lightning are also his transmuted strength. every fire that burns and every flame that glows dispenses light and heat which originally belonged to the sun. in these days, unhappily, the news of battle is familiar to us, but every shock, and every charge, is an application or misapplication of the mechanical force of the sun. he blows the trumpet, he urges the projectile, he bursts the bomb. and remember this is not poetry, but rigid mechanical truth. he rears, as i have said, the whole vegetable world, and through it the animal; the lilies of the field are his workmanship, the verdure of the meadows, and the cattle upon a thousand hills. he forms the muscle, he urges the blood, he builds the brain. his fleetness is in the lion's foot; he springs in the panther, he soars in the eagle, he slides in the snake. he builds the forest, and hews it down, the power which raised the tree and that which wields the axe being one and the same. the clover sprouts and blossoms, and the scythe of the mower swings, by the operation of the same force. the sun digs the ore from our mines, he rolls the iron, he rivets the plates, he boils the water, he draws the train. he not only grows the cotton, but he spins the fiber and weaves the web. there is not a hammer raised, a wheel turned, or a shuttle thrown, that is not raised, and turned, and thrown by the sun. his energy is poured freely into space, but our world is a halting-place where the energy is conditioned. here the proteus works his spells; the self-same essence takes a million of shapes and hues, and finally dissolves into its primitive and almost formless form. the sun comes to us as heat; he quits us as heat; and between his entrance and departure the multiform powers of our globe appear. they are all special forms of solar power--the molds into which his strength is temporarily poured, in passing from its source through infinitude. "presented rightly to the mind, the discoveries and generalizations of modern science constitute a poem more sublime than has yet been addressed to the intellect and imagination of man. the natural philosopher of to-day may dwell amid conceptions which beggar those of milton. so great and grand are they, that in the contemplation of them a certain force of character is requisite to preserve us from bewilderment. look at the integrated energies of the world--the stored power of our coal fields; our winds and rivers; our fleets, armies, and guns; what are they? they are all generated by a portion of the sun's energy, which does not amount to 1/2300000000th of the whole. this, in fact, is the entire fraction of the sun's force intercepted by the earth, and, in reality, we convert but a small fraction of that fraction into mechanical energy. multiplying all our powers by millions of millions, we do not reach the sun's expenditure. and still, notwithstanding this enormous drain, in the lapse of human history we are unable to detect a diminution of his store; measured by our largest terrestrial standards, such a reservoir of power is infinite; but it is our privilege to rise above these standards and to regard the sun himself as a speck in infinite extension--a mere drop in the universal sea. we analyze the space in which he is immersed, and which is the vehicle of his power. we pass to other systems and other suns, each pouring forth energy like our own, but still without infringement of the law, which reveals immutability in the midst of change, which recognizes incessant transference and conversion, but neither final gain nor loss. this law generalizes the aphorism of solomon that there is nothing new under the sun, by teaching us to detect everywhere, under its infinite variety of appearances, the same primeval force. to nature nothing can be added; from nature nothing can be taken away; the sum of her energies is constant, and the utmost that man can do in the pursuit of physical truth, or in the application of physical knowledge, is to shift the constituents of the never-varying total, and out of one of them to form another. the law of conservation rigidly excludes both creation and annihilation. waves may change into ripples, and ripples into waves--magnitude may be substituted for number, and number for magnitude--asteroids may aggregate to suns, and suns may resolve themselves into flora and fauna, and flora and fauna melt in air--the flux of power is eternally the same. it rolls in music through the ages, and all the terrestrial energy--the manifestations of life, as well as the display of phenomena, are but the modulations of the rhythm" (tyndall lecture xii). chapter v. genesis--the creation. man must pass through infancy and childhood before he reaches manhood and maturity. races and nations also had to pass the stages of infancy and childhood, with all their mistakes, fancy, and fable. in these stages any kind of information and interpretation is readily accepted, without inquiry and without investigation, for the reason that they are not capable of either. to inquire, is the awaking of knowledge; and to investigate, requires understanding. whatever knowledge has been acquired, that knowledge can be imparted, but no more. if it be true, it cannot be denied or contradicted; if that knowledge be not true, it will be subject to denial, controversy, and dispute, when experience has ripened the understanding. childhood will listen to anything without contradiction. it accepts the matter as told and believes it. as years pass on, the story that once seemed so impressive and pretty, that was listened to so eagerly, loses its charm, for lack of truth. fairy tales of past ages were abundant. every locality had them, and was by them adorned in mystery and wonder. they were ordinarily recited with startling impressiveness. with awe places were pointed out of perhaps some strange apparition, or prodigious occurrence. all of such accounts were either deliberate inventions, or concoctions of a prolific imagination. early writings abound in them. the improbability of a story grows stronger the farther you go back in the history of humanity. many of these stories were incorporated in poems, in heroic legends, in tales of the mysterious births of kings and queens, descendants of gods. and the vast majority of the writers of antiquity mix fiction and fact, the possible with the impossible. they treat on the conduct of men, their deeds and misdeeds, according to the extravagant customs of the time. the book called scripture writings is composed of three elements--fiction, exaggeration, and fact. the fiction consists of all that portion of the writings that relates to god and his miraculous works. the exaggeration consists of impossible doings of men, such as accounts of miracle-healers, resurrectionists, flights to heaven, etc. the facts appertain to the jewish race actually--that they did exist as a nation, and conducted their affairs in as barbarous a fashion as their neighbors. for nearly two thousand years christianity has done its utmost to sustain the fiction portion as being absolutely true, and still it teaches these absurdities to be true, and anyone doubting their accuracy is liable to persecution. for every doubter of the current belief, whether in ancient or modern times, is subject to discipline of the church to which he belongs. recently in our own city many have been subjected to a mild form of persecution for doubting. they were declared to be heretics, blasphemers, etc. i speak of such men as dr. newton, dr. briggs, and others. yet, we must concede that every organization has a right to judge as to the qualifications of any one of its members, especially if he is an office-holder. they may reject or accept any member. but since his membership depends on whether he believes in their mode of interpreting this fiction, he must say that he believes it, and proclaim to others that it is true, though he knows it is not. nothing on earth has given rise to so much dispute, angry quarrel, bitter hatred and abuse, as this fiction. it has been the cause of more villainy, brutality, massacres, and bloody wars than all matters that concern humanity put together. science universally agrees that the biblical story has not a particle of truth in it; and the older it gets the more it suffers, the weaker it gets, and it finally must undergo complete dissipation, in the presence of the strong light of natural truth. we have a great deal to be thankful for, to have and to enjoy the privilege, the freedom, of exercising and giving expression to opinions concerning matters that have been considered too sacred to be contradicted or criticised. the time has come, or is coming very fast, that we shall be able to dispense with god, christ, the holy ghost, and the bible as a sacred text-book, both the old and new testament. in order to do this we must examine some portion of its text. we should do this for educational purposes. every man and woman should acquire a proper amount of knowledge, to enable them to think for themselves. every person knows, or ought to know, that priest and preacher are especially educated to keep the masses as ignorant as they can possibly keep them. it is their trade. it is their bread and butter, like that of every other trade or profession--it is their business, their function, their profit, to sustain and uphold this tottering fabric, this hollow sham, this aerial nothing, with not a truth, not even a shadow of a truth, to support it. chapter i, verse 1, of genesis: "in the beginning god created heaven and earth." verse 2: "the earth was without form and void." (1) god could not have created the earth, as a planet distinct and separate by itself. this terrestrial globe belongs to a system of planets, and they are all not only dependent on one another, but all dependent on the sun for their existence. (2) how can god create a planet, this earth? where did he get his material from? and was it possible for god to overcome the laws of gravitation? (3) does it not seem strange that god, who seemed to have direct dealings with moses, did not give him more information about it? (4) theologians claim that god is the architect, the designer, the first cause, the creator. why did it take god to make this terrestrial globe six days? if he was able to make it in six days, he might as well have made it in one day, yes, one hour. if the word was god, and god was the word, then the word ought to have displayed this magical art; he might have simply said, go! the term designer, architect, creator, implies skill, human skill, a being that has brain. (5) as to heaven, that part that is scripturally indicated as heaven is the atmosphere. (6) we are nowhere told where god was when he was doing all this work. whether he was floating in space among the meteors and asteroids, or had his residence on mars or venus, we are not informed. (7) this earth always had a form. a globe that revolves round its own axis, once in twenty-four hours, and round the sun besides, cannot be without form. it must necessarily have a globular form; nor was it ever void. there is no such thing as a void in fact; it may appear so to one ignorant of natural phenomena. that was undoubtedly the case when that matter was written up. (8) it must also be remembered that every planet in the system of the sun receives a portion of his light. the contact of the sun's rays with the elements of this earth is fatal to any such nonsensical proposition as a void. (9) as to "the darkness on the face of the deep," that could exist only in isolated places, because of an intense fog or mist. the whole surface of the earth could not have a fog at one time. that is impossible. wherever the sun shines there is light. (10) "and the spirit of god moved on the face of the waters." what waters? where? we know that only one thing in this solar system can disperse a fog; that is the sun. verse 3: "and god said, let there be light, and there was light." this is worse than childish; it is stupid. (1) how could god have light when the sun was not made? (2) and if the sun existed, it was silly on his part to say it. verse 4: "and god saw the light that it was good, and god divided the light from the darkness." how is it possible for any sane person to believe such nonsense, when everybody with a grain of common sense knows that light and darkness depend on the sun, as day and night do? and this is said to have constituted the first day's work. if any man will read it carefully he will perceive that the composition is of a nature to entertain simple-minded people, children, who are unable to understand the ordinary phases of nature. the second day's work is very droll. verse 6: "and god said, let there be a firmament in the midst of the waters," etc. verse 7: "and god made the firmament," and divided the waters which were under the firmament and the waters which were above the firmament, and it was so. verse 8: "and called the firmament heaven." there is not a particle of sense in this. if the firmament is heaven, and heaven the atmosphere, we know that we cannot have any water above the firmament. we may have clouds, or a certain quantity of moisture, but no water. if the atmosphere is overloaded with moisture, that moisture is sure to return to the earth in the shape of rain or other form. this portion is important to pious persons, that they may know where their souls go when they go to "heaven"--to the atmosphere! theologians and religious writers contend that this earth was in a state of aqueous solution. that is all wrong. we have not oxygen and hydrogen enough to produce such a state with. besides, if it was in an aqueous solution what became of the sixty-two elementary substances that never enter into the composition of water? nor can the majority of the elements be held in suspension by water. the specific gravity of the different elements cannot be suspended to please anybody. elisha is supposed to have performed that miracle; he made an axe-head swim (2 kings vi, 6). this same man also beheld a chariot of fire and horses of fire with which elijah went to heaven. it seems surprising that men who claim to know something of science insist upon this miraculous supernatural work. they ought to know better. they ought to know that neither god nor man can stop the chemical action of the elements in the presence or absence of the sun's heat. they ought to know that no supernatural power can suspend nature's forces, or nature's laws. they ought to know that no spirit, whether belonging to god or not, can effect such an aqueous solution as these pious gentlemen would have us believe. the third day's work is remarkable. it embraces the 9th to the 13th verses inclusive. "and god said, let the waters under the heaven be gathered together unto one place and let dry land appear." was god ignorant of the existence of more oceans than one? of the numerous seas and lakes? or was this creation a local affair near the gulf of persia? there is a singular phraseology used: the first day's work is not qualified; the second day, "it was so;" on the third day, "it was so, it was good." thus, it seems, god did not discover the quality of his work until the third day, when he has it twice--"it was so," as if in surprise, and then that "it was good," as if he lacked self-reliance, or was uncertain how the work would turn out. verse 11: "and let the earth bring forth grass, the herb yielding seed, and the fruit tree yielding fruit after his kind," etc. it is a pertinent question, or questions: (1) on what part of the globe were these planted? (2) in what season of the year were they planted? (3) did these thrive and flourish in the absence of sunlight? and (4) in what kind of soil and in what locality? were these trees, grass, herbs, planted at the north pole, equator, in a subtropical or in a mild climate? was it winter, spring, summer, or autumn? was it sandy soil, as in the deserts of arabia, or hill, valley, or mountain? or was it really somewhere in chaldea where the story originated? remember, we have no sun yet. verse 13: "and the evening and the morning were the third day." god takes his rest during the night, like any other toiler on the surface of this terrestrial globe. he did not believe in working after proper hours. no doubt he started with sunrise and stopped at sunset, as shepherds and agriculturists usually do. and god simply suspended the natural operations and went to bed. i don't blame him. he was tired. then again, grass might and does grow in a season, but trees do not. it takes quite a number of seasons for trees to bear fruit. the elements that enter into their composition differ. some have more of one element, and grow on certain soil and flourish, while others do not. moreover, there are only certain localities on earth where the growth of any can be accomplished. the fourth day's work is something prodigious: verse 14: "and god said, let there be light in the firmament of the heaven" (in the eighth verse god calls the firmament heaven, but in the 14th calls it the firmament of the heaven) "to divide the day from the night; and let them be for signs and for seasons, and for days and years." verse 15: "and let them be for lights in the firmament of the heaven to give light upon earth: and it was so." verse 16: "and god made two great lights; the greater light to rule the day, and the lesser to rule the night: he made the stars also." the inventor or the writer of these passages had not the slightest conception of what he was talking about. he spoke and wrote of the mere appearance of what he beheld daily and nightly, the sun and the moon. they could not know, in those remote ages, the important role the sun plays in the solar system, because whatever is known thereon is of very recent date. talk of setting the sun in the firmament, 93,000,000 miles' distance from the earth, considering its bulk, weight, and condition, is an outrage on common sense. it is a monstrous piece of stupidity to make children believe it, and it is an infamous fraud for any priest or preacher to teach it. writers in order to explain away the above difficulty quote, for example: "maimonides (born 1131 a.d.) in his guide, rashi (1030) and aben ezra (1119) in their commentaries, hold that the light of the first day was that of the sun itself, which revolving in its sphere from west to east and from east to west made a day of twenty-four hours. the scripture's saying that it was created on the fourth day is incident to its thus demonstrating its effects upon plants, which appeared on the third day; rain, which proceeded from the exhalations and vapors raised from the earth by the action of the sun's heat thereon, being necessary to their vegetation. therefore, it is clear that there was no new creation on the fourth day; but the heat implies that on that day the sun developed the effects of his heat on plants." this is one of many explanations of philosophical commentators who have tried to explain away the difficulty of creation, owing to the many doubts that arose in the minds of learned men about the tenth and eleventh centuries a.d.; and especially the greek philosophers, aristotle [4] and others. volumes upon volumes have been written in order to explain away the difficulties theologians encounter. as science advances, explanations and reconciliations become more difficult. maimonides, in his pious enthusiasm, after having consulted aristotle and others, is not quite certain, but he claims (according to more, xi, 15): "i propose to show that the creation of the world, as our religion teaches, is not impossible, and all philosophical reasonings to the effect that it is not so, as i have said, they may overthrow, but cannot make any objection against us. as for me, i stand firm in my belief on the question, of whether the world had a beginning or not. i accept the solution of this problem from the prophets, as the prophets explain these things, which speculation cannot reach," etc. (kusari i, 65, 67). in other words, maimonides, the authors of the talmud, and all other writers, theological philosophers, hebrew and christian, prove the truth of the bible by the bible. one portion of scripture must prove another portion to be true. the jews use their own biblical authorities to demonstrate one another's statements. isaiah gives evidence for moses, and moses is made to testify for isaiah, and so the jewish philosophers whip the devil round the ring. the christians have a double hold. they have a new testament. they prove the statements made by persons figuring in the old testament by statements made in the new testament. that is, they make elijah, elisha, isaiah, ezekiel, moses, etc., give testimony for john, mark, matthew, and luke; and then make luke, matthew, mark, and john give evidence for moses, ezekiel, isaiah, elisha, elijah, etc. the majority of theological writings and commentaries, yes, all of them, were composed and written during the christian era, and nearly one-half of these after the twelfth century. all are employed with the same subject-matter. although they lay claim that the talmud and other works treat of mathematics, physics, medicine, etc., they knew little or nothing about these things, and the little they did know was mostly appropriated from the greek and other nations. it is not an unusual occurrence for modern thinkers to interpret the statements of ancient writers as they originally never intended. they spoke in enigmas, parables, simply philosophical phrases, without stating a single fact, implying nothing in particular and everything in general. "and he made the stars also." make the stars! we have shown in a previous chapter that this our solar system is but a speck among the starry host of the universe. from verse 20 to 23 inclusive, god created moving creatures in the water, and fowl that may fly above the earth. this general statement, like all other statements in the bible, is based on the principle that "with god everything is possible." unfortunately for god's adherents, that is absolutely not the case. the laws of nature are fixed, permanent. there is no exception in favor of any mortal and natural being, and certainly not for any supernatural and imaginary being. does it not seem strange that the only animal mentioned in the fifth and sixth days' performance is the whale? "great whales," it says. why great whales? they had heard something about the whale, he therefore received prominence, and was mentioned. they had no knowledge of other animals. or was this great whale purposely inserted to do that extraordinary service to jonah? and after all this work was done, god saw that it was good. evidently pleased with his handiwork. on the sixth day he finishes his work--he "brings forth living creatures." why living creatures? are not fish, fowl, and whales living creatures? next come cattle and creeping things. after he created the creeping things he made man. verse 27: "so god created man in his own image; in the image of god created he him, male and female created he them." if man was made in his own image, god's image, god must have the semblance of man, otherwise man would not be like him. if god has the semblance of man, and creates and desires, works and rests, like a man, he is a man, therefore cannot be supernatural--a god! verses 28, 29, 30: god places all that he has created at the service of man, giving him full control and dominion to make use of these benefits as he, man, thinks best. "and behold it was very good," and then god took a rest. the entire creation must have taken place in a mild or warm climate, in some isolated locality on the face of the globe. no mention is made of icebergs, snow or hail. there does not seem to have occurred the slightest impediment in any of the work done. no evolutionary period, except the night's rest god reserved for himself, in addition to the whole day sunday, or rather the seventh day. we are now prepared to make some very pertinent remarks and ask some very pertinent questions: (1) what period elapsed from the time man was created to the time man could use words or speech intelligently? (2) we may assume that no one was present at the time of creation, because man and woman were made the last thing on the sixth day. (3) who was the first man that received this information? after how many generations or centuries was this news published, and to whom? (4) we are not informed, even by the holy book, of the man's name who was the fortunate recipient of this valuable information. (5) is it not highly probable that the man who first told this story might also have invented it? we have no proof to the contrary, except the mere say-so of somebody. the statement, as written, is well enough as a fable; that's all. as to fact, there is not a particle of truth to sustain it. but if men are determined to believe it, and are not open to conviction, if they are willfully blind to the truth, they must remain the slaves to a powerful ecclesiastical organization. the 14th verse, however, betrays its origin. when the sun and moon were made for seasons, days, and years, as also for signs, that shows a high degree of civilization. these divisions did not take place before man was created? were really these divisions made before a living creature inhabited this earth? for whom? for whose use? writing had not been invented. athates, or hermes, the egyptian, is supposed to be the founder of hieroglyphics, 2,136 b.c. and we do not hear of writing until 1,494 b.c. it is claimed that writing was taught to the latins by europa, daughter of agenar, king of phoenicia. the doctrine of the solar system as it is now accepted was first taught by pythagoras of samos about 529 b.c. copernicus proved it in the sixteenth century, and newton demonstrated the truth fully in the year 1695. history claims for the egyptians that they were the first who fixed the length of the year. the chaldeans and persians had adopted the lunar year before abraham ever dreamed of being exiled by his countrymen, the chaldeans. can any man be so silly as to believe that an almanac was made before man was created? there is not an intelligent priest living who is ass big enough to believe any such nonsense. chapter vi. genesis--the garden of eden. the custom of six days' labor and one day's rest is a human invention, and is based on the principles of economy, power-saving, labor-saving, and had been a recognized institution long before the date of the supposed creation. for if the statement of baily be true (and we have no right to discredit it), human beings have existed, in one state or another, above 4,000,000 years. the record of the hebrew race is insignificant in comparison. the modern eight-hour movement is the outcome of the economic reforms of labor. had the composers of the scripture known something of it at that time god might have worked only eight hours instead of from sunrise to sunset. we cannot have the slightest doubt that the above first-given labor regulation existed long, long ago. the chaldeans had their mode of government, their laws, their social rules and regulations; other neighboring nations had theirs; it was therefore nothing new. this six days' labor clause was incorporated, but there was no need of a god to make it. verse 4: "and these are the generations of the heavens and of the earth, when they were created, in the day that the lord god made the earth and the heavens." what generations of heaven? verse 7: "and the lord god [in this chapter an extra title is assigned to god--it is the lord god! why?] formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life, and man became a living soul." this is a very grave error. man is not made of dust of the ground. there is comparatively very little dust in his composition. (1) man contains no more dust than any other animal; the proportion of inorganic constituents in him and other animals is about the same. (2) animals are constructed anatomically and physiologically the same. they have the same organs, the same number of muscles, and same number of bones, with some few exceptions. they are built on the same general principles as man; or rather, as man came later, we will say that man is constructed on the same general principles as the animals. (3) the same mechanism and functions are to be found in the one as in the other--respiration, circulation, digestion, etc. (4) the proportion of mineral matters contained in a man--or dust, as it is termed in scripture--is about 1/23 to 1/24 of the bodily weight. that is, a body weighing about 125 to 130 pounds would yield about 4 1/2 to 5 pounds of dust, or rather ashes, and the largest proportion of these ashes comes from the solid framework, the skeleton, the bones, composed of phosphates and carbonate of lime. (5) more than two-thirds of the body's weight is water--that is, hydrogen and oxygen. the principal elements found in the body are oxygen, hydrogen, nitrogen, carbon. there are traces of sulphur, etc., besides the mineral substances above alluded to. thus man is not made of dust, but of water, oxygen and hydrogen, nitrogen and carbon. if they had made god say that he made man out of water, he would have been much nearer the truth. solomon repeats the same in his eccles. iii, 20: "all go unto one place; all are of dust, and all turn to dust again." in the burial service the same absurdity is repeated. alter your service, your prayer--put water in place of dust. or better, give all the four elements a chance. do not teach children we are made out of dust. it is not true. teach the young what is true. what is the good of lying because some man said, god said so? the "breath of life." is it not time that men of intelligence, in this age of progress and civilization we boast so much of, cease to pretend to believe such nonsense? it is absurd to talk of its being "parables" and "figures of speech." either the text means what it says, or it means nothing. there has been an immense amount of controversy over two hebrew words, viz.: nephesh--breath, respiring, life, life strength, animal soul; ruach--anamos, breath, wind, psyche, soul, spirit, etc. they thought that the life is in the blood. lev. xvii, 11: "for the life of the flesh is in the blood." gen. ix, 4, 5: "but the flesh with the life thereof, which is the blood thereof," etc., etc. this controversy has given rise to no end of studies, as psychology--derived from the word psyche,--soul. the literature that has been expended on this subject, psyche, soul, cannot be easily estimated. the matter has been twisted into a science, discussed, argued, lectured on, etc. on the word theo, theon--deos--god, societies and sects, etc., have been formed, as the theosophists. what is the breath of life that caused so much controversy, in church and out of church? oxygen. deprive a man of oxygen and he dies. deprive a beast of oxygen and it dies. oxygen thus is essential to life. neither man nor beast, as we said, can live without it. the issues which this has given rise to are bewildering--theological, metaphysical, theosophical, philosophical, agnostic, gnostic, spiritual, etc., etc. oxygen, however, covers the ground. it represents all, so far as the life of a body is concerned. we now come to paradise, or the garden of eden. we will try to locate this garden of eden geographically, as nearly as possible correctly. verse 8: "and the lord god planted a garden eastward of eden; and there he put the man whom he had formed." that was very kind of god. verse 9: "god planted the tree of life also in the midst of the garden, and the tree of knowledge of good and evil." a wonderful tree surety. what is most to be regretted is that the species has become extinct. what a boon to humanity if but one tree were planted in every church. verse 10: "and a river went out of eden to water the garden; and from thence it parted, and became into four heads." verse 11: "the name of the first is pison; that is it which compasseth the whole land of havilah, where there is gold." verse 12: "and the gold of that land is good; there is bdellium and the onyx stone." verse 13: "and the name of the second river is gihon: the same is it that compasseth the whole land of ethiopia." verse 14: "and the name of the third river is hiddekel; that is it which goeth toward the east of assyria. and the fourth river is euphrates." assyria was founded about 2247 b.c. and is situated near the persian gulf; and seems to be wedged in between the persian empire on the east, arabia on the west, or badien el arab, and on the southern point the gulf of persia. ethiopia comprises nubia, sennaar, and northern abyssinia, and takes in a stretch of country on the west shore of the red sea. the two countries are separated by the red sea, and by arabia, which extends from the east shores of the red sea to the west shores of the gulf of persia, and assyria. some one made a big blunder, or johnston's atlas is wrong, or they--god--made a mistake in the name. there is considerable distance between the two countries. assyria lies in asia and ethiopia in africa. egypt lies farthest north of what is usually known as ethiopia. assyria is hemmed in, north by armenia, west by media and susiana, south and southeast by babylon and mesopotamia. the river tigris is the dividing line on the south and southeast. the parachoatras and zagrus mountains form the dividing line on the western border, and armenia is the boundary on the north. chaldea is, comparatively speaking, a small tract of land situated between the river euphrates and the arabian desert, or badien el arab, with babylon on its north and the gulf of persia on the southwestern point. the river euphrates takes its rise in the gulf of persia and runs westward, and divides into four branches. the first branch, the pasitigris, runs somewhat westward through susiana; the second, chaosper or kirkhah, runs northward through susiana; the third, the river tigris, runs north, northwest, separating babylon from susiana by assyria; the fourth, the river euphrates, the farthest south, runs westward, etc. this is the only river near the gulf of persia that divides into four branches, and these are the four rivers that are indicated where the garden of eden was planted. this is near enough geographically to locate this garden which the lord god planted. it will indeed afford great pleasure for pious people to know whereabouts they can find the garden of eden. in this rapid-transit age, they can get an excursion ticket and reach this paradise in a few weeks. this garden was planted in chaldea. we will now see what god did next. verse 15: "and the lord god took the man, and put him into the garden of eden to dress it and keep it." god gave the position of gardener to mr. adam. the only stipulation in the contract between the lord god and adam was (verses 16, 17), he could eat of every tree in the garden except the tree of knowledge. there is a god for you--wants to keep the man he made in his own image, a living soul, as ignorant and as stupid as possible; in addition tempting him to commit a wrong act. verse 18: "and the lord god said, it is not good that the man should be alone; i will make him a help meet for him." very considerate indeed on the part of god. verse 21: "and the lord god caused a deep sleep to fall upon adam, and he slept; and he took one of his ribs and closed up the flesh thereof." this is the cleverest kind of surgical operation that was ever performed, without loss of blood, use of antiseptics or anesthetics, without ligature, etc. and out of this rib he made a woman. why did god make a man of dust and the woman out of the man's rib? why did he breathe into the nostrils of the man and forget to do it to the woman? the only reasonable explanation that can be given is that, in those days, among the chaldeans, woman was considered an inferior creature, possessing no soul. she was the slave sometimes, but the servant always. she was the creature of man's lust, of his passion, and she was placed in the bible by the man that wrote it in just the position and condition she occupied at that period. this is a gross falsehood, it is debasing, it is an infamous libel on truth. does any woman believe that she is a bone of her husband's bone, and flesh of his flesh? verse 25: "and they were both naked, the man and his wife, and were not ashamed." what is there extraordinary about that? savage races up to this present time are found in many instances nude. cæsar describes the germans as bathing promiscuously in a nude state. columbus found our american indians nude. evidently a degree of civilization had already been attained when this story was evolved. the story had its origin in the romantic regions of chaldea, somewhere in the neighborhood of the persian gulf, near the river euphrates. the singer, the story-teller, or the traveling minstrel tramped from place to place, from one shepherd's tent to another, relating the story to his crude, barbarous countrymen, reciting the curious yet pretty fable of how man was made; the world made; the garden made; how gold, onyx, and bdellium were found, and where; lauding and glorifying their own country, and making out that they were the immediate descendants of the gods. every nation has its fairy tales, its fables, its myths, its songs, and its romances. whether they have their origin in egypt, or come down embellished from mount olympus, whether they are the fairy tales of the rhine, or those from the river euphrates in chaldea, they are only the products of imagination. "they spring from fountains and from sacred groves, and holy streams that flow into the sea" (od. x, 350). next we come to chapter iii--the childish account of the serpent, and the woman and the fruit she ate. the serpent is made to say, verse 5: "for god doth know that in the day ye eat thereof, then your eyes shall be opened, and ye shall be as gods, knowing good from evil." the first knowledge they acquired was, that they discovered they were without clothes. "and they sewed fig leaves together and made themselves aprons." why sewed? with what? aprons were a very late invention, and were never intended for any such purpose. and then, the conversation between the lord god and adam! god calls for adam while he is hiding. god inquires with a chinese simplicity, "where art thou?" this is the blandest kind of conversation that has ever taken place between mortal man and a god. adam tells him that he has eaten some fruit. like the boy who had stolen jam out of the jar, it seems adam could not lie. god grows petulant, angry, cross; scolds him, and immediately deprives him of his position and turns him out of the garden. god had two reasons for doing what he did. one reason was to punish adam for disobedience; the second, that god got afraid of adam. verse 22: "and the lord god said, behold the man is become as one of us" (were there more gods than one?), "to know good and evil; and now, lest he put forth his hand; and take also of the tree of life, and eat, and live forever"---was it the fear of competition--that men might interfere with god's occupation, infringe on his monopoly? it seems to have a priestly ring, this forbidding and preventing ordinary mortals to become intelligent. the story is so framed as to express the line of conduct of the higher towards the lower, of the slave towards his master, of the laborer towards his lord; and the 19th verse expresses the subjugation of the poor ignorant creature: "in the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread, till thou return unto the ground; for out of it wast thou taken; for dust thou art, and unto dust shalt thou return." it is the church and the priest that have taken care to keep the dust in the eyes of the masses. they are the cherubim with a flaming sword that keep the masses away from the tree of life. chapter iv relates to the crime of murder. god instigates the crime. abel kept sheep. cain tilled the ground. cain brought vegetables to god, and abel brought the firstlings of his flock and fat. god's taste ran in the meat line; he was somewhat of an epicurean. he respected abel and his offering, but did not respect cain's. then god asks cain why he is cross, and after cain kills his brother abel, he, god, says: where is thy brother abel? and god dispossesses cain and drives him east of eden to arabia. a very arbitrary landlord this god. chapter v: the fourth chapter winds up with enos the son of seth. verse 26: "then began men to call upon the name of the lord." now, adam lived 930 years, seth 912 years, and enos 905 years. god during this period was wholly occupied with these people. murder is the only incident of importance during the first thousand years. god takes a long rest for nearly 2,000 years before anything of importance occurs. this chapter treats of the genealogy, age, and death of the patriarchs from adam to noah. the records of creation are by no means harmonious. there are no less than one hundred and twenty opinions on the subject. the difference between the latest and remotest dates is no less than 3,268 years. here are some of the dates of the supposed creation of the world. they may be interesting to some, as showing the uncertainty and inaccuracy: hebrew, 4004 b.c. septuagint, 5873  ,,  talmudistic, 5344  ,,  scaliger, 3950  ,,  petovias, 3984  ,,  dr. hale, 5411  ,,  etc. here we give the genealogy of adam and his line: age. 930 adam, born 4004 b.c. died 3074 b.c. abel,  ,,  3875  ,,  912 seth,  ,,  3874  ,,  905 enos,  ,,  3769 [5] ,,  910 cainon,  ,,  3679  ,,  895 mahaloled,  ,,  3609  ,,  962 jared,  ,,  3544  ,,  815 enos,  ,,  3282  ,,  969 methuselah,  ,,  3317  ,,  777 lamech,  ,,  3130  ,,  365 enoch,  ,,  3017  ,,  (translated?) 815 noah,  ,,  2948  ,,  500 bef. flood. } 315 aft.   ,,   } we may venture to make a very strong interrogation mark after these years. they are, however, in harmony with the rest of the story. noah closes the fabulous period. we hear no more of god's doings until we come to abraham, 1921 b.c. and abraham reached the age of 175 years only. chapter vi, on the sons of god, etc., is next. i beg to remind the reader we are still in chaldea, near the gulf of persia; near the river euphrates; near the garden of eden, where god created man; where we found gold and precious stones; the place where murder was committed; near arabia, etc. the geographical location is important, and let the reader also remember that the whole tract of land where all these transactions are supposed to have taken place is not so large as any moderate-sized state in our union. if you will examine a map of this particular region, it will help to bring the truth to your mind, and add considerably to your understanding. it is also well to bear in mind that in this small territory the art of agriculture was pursued, as well as fruit-growing, sewing was invented and aprons were made, and eve had an apron before she had a dress, and this high state of civilization existed as soon as man and woman appeared on earth! what a contrast with other barbaric, savage, and uncivilized tribes! eve had a decided advantage over the young female that was captured when columbus landed december 12th. she was perfectly naked; so says history. verse 2: "the sons of god saw the daughters of men, that they were fair; and they took them wives all which they chose." sons of god! was god married? if so, to whom? how many wives had he? how many sons and daughters? where was god's residence, if he had any? were his domestic relations pleasant or not? was his family large or small? pray give us some information. our theologians will tell us, "ah, that has a spiritual meaning." verse 3: "and the lord [not god] said: my spirit shall not always strive with man, for that he also is flesh." who?--god? "yet his days shall be a hundred and twenty." this is a crafty statement, because it shows that the average length of life was the same as it is now, with some few exceptions, and as the fabulous age was past, the only way to get out of the difficulty was to give timely notice that extraordinary ages should not occur again. verse 4: "there were giants in the earth in those days; and also after that, when the sons of god came in unto the daughters of men, and they bore children to them, the same became mighty men which were of old, men of renown." who were these descendants of god that became mighty and men of renown? after god's sons intermarry with the daughters of men, the affairs of man grow worse, instead of better. and god grows despondent: verse 5: "and god saw that the wickedness of man was great in the earth, and that every imagination of the thoughts of his heart was only evil continually." think of god's sons causing all this wickedness on earth. he ought to have brought them up better. what can we expect of a god that cannot raise his own children properly? "every imagination of the thoughts of his heart." this exhibits the profound ignorance of god. though he made man, he did not know what the various organs in the body were for. he ought to have known that the heart does not think. its function is to circulate the blood--a truth which was not discovered until 1618 by harvey, of england. verse 6: "and it repented the lord that he had made man on earth, and it grieved him at his heart." ha! god has a heart, and he has flesh, and he has sons; he knows what is good, evil, wickedness; repents and grieves; and has domestic relations with--evidently ladies, by whom he has children. we will not mind the preparations of the ark, or the shipbuilding instructions given by god. a god that knew something of mechanics, shipbuilding, dimensions, measurement, etc.--no wonder theologians call god a designer, an architect. he showed some skill in the construction of this boat. as soon as noah had everything prepared, had loaded his cattle, etc., food and provender, god was ready to destroy his own sons and their relations by drowning them. chapter vii. the deluge. as to the region where the deluge occurred--on the northern edge ascend the persian mountains; on the east the steep and lofty parallel chains of the indo-persian boundary mountains, and on the south the plateau for a thousand miles along the persian gulf and arabian sea is bounded by the wild terraced regions of beloochistan and faristan. the second division includes the mountainous regions of armenia, koordistan, and azerbijan. here the table-land is compressed about half its general width. from this plateau, of which a part is mentioned in scripture as the "mountains of ararat," rises the volcanic cone commonly styled mount ararat, to the hight of 17,212 feet above the sea level. the highlands of syria rise gradually from the neighboring desert to the hight of 10,000 feet in libanus and antilibanus, and slope steeply in terraces down to the narrow coastlands of phoenicia and palestine. of the syrian and arabian lowlands, the south is hot and arid, with almost no oasis; but the north is watered by the tigris and euphrates. near this isolated corner of asia, in the neighborhood of the persian gulf and the rivers euphrates and tigris, where the deluge is supposed to have occurred, in the lowlands of that region, chaldea, immense chains of mountains run in several directions, with highlands 10,000 feet above the level of the sea. verse 4: "for yet seven days, and i will cause it to rain upon the earth forty days and forty nights; and every living substance that i have made will i destroy from off the face of the earth." this deluge is supposed to have taken place about 2348 b.c. hale puts it at 3154 b.c. the sons of god came upon earth and married the daughters of men about 2948 b.c.; about this date ought to be nearer the flood. noah was 600 years old when he floated in his ark. we will consider, first, a general deluge. a deluge over the whole earth is an impossibility. 1. we have to take in consideration the inequality of the earth's surface--lowlands, highlands, hills and mountains, plateaus, etc. as to mountains: asia possesses no less than sixty or seventy mountains, the highest being some 29,000 feet above the sea's level--the himalaya, everest. africa boasts of some thirty or forty mountains, the kenia and killamandja being 20,000 feet above the level of the sea, the other mountains grading downward in hight. europe is adorned with some seventy or eighty mountains, mount blanc being the highest, others ranging downwards. south america boasts of some forty or more mountains, the tupengater being the highest, 22,450 feet above the level of the sea. north america counts some seventy or more mountains, mt. elias being 17,900 above the level of the sea. we have plateaus and table-lands ranging from 10,000 feet above the level of the sea downward to near the sea's level. the great basins between the highest points of the earth's surface are filled with water. these immense expanses form oceans, seas, lakes, rivers. the ocean bed is just as uneven as the dry portion of the earth's surface. the numerous islands are the mountains of the ocean bed, some of greater, others of lesser extent. 2. the fluid part of the terrestrial globe fills the hollow places of the solid portion of the earth's crust. these are the great and small depressions, or greater and smaller basins. 3. the earth's weight has always been the same, neither increased nor diminished. this includes both the solid and liquid part of this terrestrial globe. 4. the fluid portion of this terrestrial globe has neither increased nor diminished. it cannot, because the quantity of oxygen and hydrogen is limited to this earth. none can get away, and none can come to it. 5. water may change its position, or state--split up into elements; make clouds, mist, hail, snow, or rain, or dew--but it ultimately returns to the great basin of water where it came from. 6. if water rises in any one locality beyond the ordinary sea level, water has diminished in some other locality. the quantity of water on the earth's surface has not increased, except in one locality. 7. rain cannot fall over the whole surface of this earth at one time. 8. there is always daylight and sunshine, night and darkness, on this earth. 9. heat and cold vary in the different parts of this earth. the atmosphere is different in the various parts of the earth's surface. there is a perpetual winter, summer, spring, or autumn in various parts on this globe. 10. the rays of the sun strike the various portions of the earth at different times. this variation in the direction of the sun's rays produces a corresponding variation in the intensity of the sun's heat and light at different places, and accounts for the difference between the torrid and the frigid regions, etc. 11. the atmosphere does not, and cannot, carry beyond a certain percentage of aqueous vapor. when it becomes overcharged the moisture must fall, in raindrops when the temperature is warm enough. 12. the sun's heat regulates the amount of aqueous vapor the atmosphere can carry in the form of clouds. when the atmosphere is fully saturated, rain must fall. 13. when the atmosphere is cool or cold, the raindrops congeal, and we have snow or hail. 14. there are regions on the earth where it never rains, probably never rained. the rainless region of asia is of vast extent. it includes part of tibet, the great desert of gobi, and part of mongolia--a space estimated to comprise about 2,000,000 square miles. there are other rainless regions on the face of the earth's surface. there is a great diversity in the yearly amount of rainfall; the highest is about 60 inches, the lowest 21 and less. 15. there is no great difference between the polar and equatorial diameter of the earth, the average number of miles being about 8,000. taking the above facts in consideration--the conformation of the earth's surface, the elevation above the sea level, table-lands or plateaus, and mountains, the fixed quantity of water upon the surface of the earth, the influence of heat and cold, the condition of the atmosphere, etc., a general deluge must be rigidly excluded. supposing it rained forty days and forty nights, how many inches of rainfall could we possibly get? we can know to an inch the quantity of rain that would fall. the water would certainly roll down the hills and mountains, fill up the lakes and rivers, overflow the banks, and rise in the lowlands to a certain hight. the deluge, noah's deluge, was a local affair, if it ever occurred. granting such a flood did take place, it never extended beyond that portion of asia, chaldea. supposing that the rivers tigris and euphrates may have overflowed and caused a flood say of fifty feet rise above the level of the sea (which is impossible, because the surplus waters would flow into the seas and oceans), how insignificant is the rise of fifty feet even in comparison with table-lands 10,000 feet above the sea-level, and mountains 20 to 30,000 feet above the sea-level. as to the extent of the rainstorm that caused this deluge, i do not suppose that the clouds held in the atmosphere extended over 500, or say 1,000, square miles over the region where the rain fell. as to collecting the animals for the ark from all over the globe, that is just as ridiculous as the deluge itself. it is to be presumed that the person or persons who wrote the first seven chapters of the bible had not the slightest idea of the geographical condition of the earth's surface. it was not known. they thought that their locality embraced the whole earth. even in columbus's time they had no idea of the extent of this earth. the seas that they probably had some knowledge of may have been the gulf of persia, the red sea, the mediterranean or arabian sea, probably the caspian. that was about the extent. they had means neither of land travel nor of navigation. verse 20: "fifteen cubits upward did the water prevail, and the mountains were covered." a cubit, standard, contains 21 inches. fifteen multiplied by 21 gives 315 inches, or 26 feet 3 inches. how can 26 feet 3 inches of water cover plateaus 10,000 feet high and mountains like the ida, 4,000 feet, and the himalayas 29,000 feet in height? mount ararat in asia minor is 17,112 feet high. these are figures. they do not lie. we have here positive proof. i defy contradiction. every man and woman with a little sense can prove it. and any priest or clergyman that will maintain the truth of a general deluge after reading this statement, is either a fool, or a fraud and an infamous liar. in fact, the entire rainfall during the forty days and nights would have had as much effect on this globe as a pint of water would have to drown an elephant. verse 21: "and all flesh died that moved upon the earth, both of fowl, and of cattle, and of beast, and of every creeping thing that creepeth upon the earth, and every man." verse 22: "all in whose nostrils was the breath of life, all that was on dry land, died." verse 23: "and every living substance was destroyed, which was upon the face of the ground, both man and cattle and the creeping things, and the fowl of the heaven; and they were destroyed from the earth; and noah only remained alive, and they that were with him in the ark." verse 24: "and the waters prevailed upon the earth a hundred and fifty days." mount ararat is situated in persia about 150 to 200 miles south of the black sea, and about 300 miles west of the caspian sea, about 500 miles east of aleppo and the mediterranean sea, and about 700 miles north of the gulf of persia, from mount sinai about 1,000 or more miles northeast, and a similar distance from the red sea. arabia is about 700 miles across between the persian gulf and the red sea. the distance between the shores of the persian gulf and the caspian sea is about five hundred miles. the caspian chain of mountains are situated about two hundred miles north of mount ararat, and they extend from the sea of azof north, running southwest to the caspian sea. the entire tract of territory where this deluge is said to have occurred does not embrace one thousand miles in any given direction, and takes in but two countries--turkey and persia--and only a portion of either. it does not extend farther north than the caspian mountains and the black sea, east than the mediterranean sea, west than the caspian sea, and south than the persian gulf and arabia. turkistan, afghanistan, and beloochistan form the eastern boundary of persia. the twenty-six feet three inches of the rise of water in consequence of the rain could not have extended beyond the limits indicated above. at the period of the deluge there were immense countries east of turkistan, afghanistan, and beloochistan--russia north, the chinese empire and hindostan farthest south. europe and africa could not be reached. so that all living substance was not destroyed and could not be destroyed. nor was all living substance destroyed in the country where the flood occurred, because those living on high table-lands were out of reach of the flood. we must necessarily draw our own conclusions as to the truth or falsity of the statements contained in verses 21, 22, 23. some destruction of life may have taken place, limited to the locality. there are other evidences that go to show the incorrectness of the scripture. the hindoo era, or the era of the caleyung, dates 3001 b.c., seven hundred and fifty-six years before the deluge. this country was flourishing at the time of the flood. moreover, the hindoos counted their months by the progress of the sun through the zodiacs. keep the figures of the deluge in mind, 2348 b.c. china, north of hindostan and east of the deluged territory, was flourishing 2700 b.c. it was not touched by the flood. it had its own floods, separate and distinct from noah's. in 2347 b.c., one year after the flood, noah made wine from grapes. babylon was founded by belus 2245 b.c. astronomical observations were made 2234 b.c. bricks were made 2247 b.c. babylon was built 2247 b.c. all this region was in a state of civilization one hundred years later, when all men had been destroyed, and the region had been under water twenty-six feet three inches for one hundred and fifty days. one hundred years seems a long time, and a great deal can be done, that's true. in those days civilization was exceedingly slow. people did not progress so rapidly as we do in this new world. there are regions where hardly any progress has been made. they are at a standstill, as it is termed. the people live, feed, and die. the inconsistency, the untruth, of the story of the deluge will be palpable to everyone, if he or she will take the trouble to examine the geographical, physical, and historical facts. i especially call the attention of hysterical, fanatical theologians, supernaturalists, and the whole priestly class, to the declaration that god had nothing to do with this deluge; that the god in whom they believe must be an ass to think that he can drown out the whole terrestrial globe with forty days and nights' rain, with a rise of water of twenty-six feet three inches. it is impossible to enter into every detail in this brief statement. there is, however, ample proof that a general deluge never occurred, and that all animals, whether men or beasts, were never destroyed. how much honor it would reflect for a convention of clergymen, or a gathering of archbishops in saintly conclave assembled, to solemnly declare the whole beginning of genesis a fabrication, a fiction, a fable--that god had nothing to do with any such performance; that god could not do anything so foolish; that god never did anything contrary to the laws of nature; that neither god nor man could, if they wished, do anything contrary to the laws of nature. and that "we, the archbishops, bishops, and clergy in general, further declare and aver, that we, the sacred representatives of the ignorant masses, no longer believe that god, the so-called father almighty, created either heaven or earth, or beast or man, or anything; that we repudiate, deny, and reject all of the statements made in the book called the bible; that we do not believe in any supernatural interference; that we have erred and have misinstructed and misguided the masses; that the whole story is false, frivolous, and incredible; that neither the creation, as recited, nor the deluge, or any part thereof, as described, is true." chapter viii. the scriptural god--the creation. the chaldeans were undoubtedly great admirers of nature at the time we first hear the name of abraham mentioned in connection with the bible, about the year 1921 b.c. the people had already arrived at a high degree of civilization. the country belonged to the assyrian empire under ninus the jupiter, 2069 b.c. how long this section of country had been populated, and its inhabitants under a proper form of government, we have no record--in all probability, for many centuries. the chaldeans had already invented a judicial astrology, which was transmitted to the egyptians, greeks, and romans. the science of astronomy was known to them, and of it there are records as early as 2234 b.c. the science of arithmetic was used by them--in all probability invented by them; concerning it we have nothing recorded. the kingdom of babylon existed 2245 b.c. an art of architecture of some kind was already in use among its people, as we see from the fact that they had built important structures. we have no records as to the proficiency they had arrived at in any other branch of science or art. that the art of writing was known to them is probable, otherwise they could not have recorded certain facts about astronomy. the credit of first using hieroglyphics, 2212 b.c., is given to athates, or hermes, the egyptian. the correct division of the days of the week, the months, and the seasons may probably have been known to them, though the jews take the credit. that these chaldeans were great observers will not be disputed--otherwise they could not have discovered the fixed stars, planetary system, etc. that they must have had considerable intellectual qualities--perceptive powers and skill in reasoning--developed will be admitted, inasmuch as they were the inventors of astrology, and of what more we have no knowledge. they were great admirers of nature. we may infer that from the fact that they were students of astronomy, acute and close observers of nature. what myths or fables they had, we have at the present time no idea. we have no historical knowledge of these people. we know very little of their manners, culture, science, arts, degree of civilization. other events occurred about that period. a phoenician colony under partholani landed in ireland 2048 b.c. in 2207 b.c. the government of china was established--it had an imperial dynasty. fohi was the chinese monarch. in 2089 b.c. sicyon was king of greece. in 2188 b.c. egypt was established. in 2085 b.c. egypt was conquered by the shepherd kings of phoenicia. in 1998 b.c. ching hong teaches the chinese the art of husbandry, and the method of making bread from wheat and wine from rice. in 2095 b.c. pyramids and canals in egypt. the science of geometry begins to be cultivated. in 2100 b.c. sculpture and painting are employed to commemorate the exploits of asymandyas. we have no difficulty in arriving at a conclusion that considerable progress had been made in the art of government, in the political and social world, in the arts and sciences, and also in the moral and religious departments of life. as to whatever myths and fables they had, of their origin we know very little, or i may say nothing. the story of the creation and the deluge is in all probability native to the soil. the deluge was in all likelihood a local affair--an overflow of the river euphrates or the gulf of persia. whether it rained forty days and nights or more, water enough could not fall to the ground to do any serious damage, beyond the locality where it occurred. it would be not amiss even for the most pious, god-fearing man to understand that the rainwater that falls to the surface of the earth was originally taken from the waters that are found on the surface of the earth. the actual quantity of water on the earth was no more after the flood, or after any flood, than before. the water changes position from one locality to another; it does not increase or diminish in quantity, whether it consolidates, evaporates, or liquefies. whatever elementary form it may assume, the law of gravitation holds its elements down to mother earth. the idea entertained by many theologians, that the whole earth was covered with water, is absurd. we have not water enough on the surface of this earth to serve any such purpose. this problem is just as feasible as trying to drown a man in two inches of water--attempting to cover the entire earth with the water that is upon it. from historical evidence we gather that the people that inhabited this region occupied their time chiefly with raising cattle, and were prone both to the observation of nature and to superstition. the nervous system had at this time undergone considerable training and culture. their faculties were already developed. they discussed and reasoned about current subjects, especially about those subjects which were nearest and dearest to them--religion and politics. and we are still discussing the same subjects with as much eagerness, acrimony, and hate as these chaldean shepherds did. they were adorers of nature, which was perfectly in harmony with their occupation. the beauties, the phases, the phenomena of nature, these they could not explain. ignorant of their character and composition, not understanding the natural, they reasoned themselves into conclusions that there must be a power beyond that sets all these things in motion. they knew nothing of god. in all probability they created nothing new, but may have modified whatever was handed down to them by their fore-fathers--notions, customs, well-outlined rules of conduct, observances, policy, government, etc. the wiser and best-instructed portion of the community selected those things that to them were most beneficial, and for which they thought they ought to be grateful--in their wonderment and admiration they made selection of that which was to them most striking--and this gradually led to a systematization of certain qualities, certain excellences. all things in nature are object-teachers. when we have seen a thing several times, we know it--learn its qualities, etc. so the forefathers of the chaldeans, admiring nature, came to recognizing what was best, either in themselves or round about them. in order to present these ideas, powers, and excellences in the most striking manner to the senses, symbolic representations, or typical forms, were made, about in the same or similar manner as playthings are made to instruct and amuse children. all the idols and mythological gods are drawn from nature, associated and endowed with such qualities as the human beings had from time to time attained. the motives that suggested these were just as pure as any motives are now. we have symbols and idols among us at this day, four thousand years later. it makes no difference whether it is christ on a stick, the virgin mary on a canvas, or the sacred heart of a saint, it amounts to precisely the same thing; it is object-teaching--an object-lesson. these chaldeans had any number of symbols and idols, and men were assigned to watch and guard them. they had their ceremonies, their gowns or priestly garbs; they had their places for worship, out of doors or indoors--everything that gave beauty, dignity, and sanctity to their performances. in short, we may conclude that they had what may be called an established religion, with ceremonies, sacrifices, idols, as well as social, moral, and political rules to govern them. there was dissension in those days as there is now. men differed, argued, discussed; and differences arose. new ideas were intolerated then, as they are now. the old would not yield to the new. wrangling, anger, passion, jealousy, led to new formations, antagonistic to the old. the old systems had in all probability grown corrupt, domineering, cruel, selfish, and rapacious. a reformation of some kind was in order. men of ability and sagacity began to grow skeptical as regards the quality and ability of these numerous idols. something similar is agitating the world to-day. doubtless it is always to be found. abraham was an agitator, a reformer, if you will. josephus thus speaks of him (chap. vii): "he was a person of great sagacity, both for understanding all things and persuading his hearers, and not mistaken in his opinions; for which reason he began to have higher notions of virtue than others had, and he determined to renew and to change the opinions all men happened then to have concerning god; for he was the first that ventured to publish this notion: that there was but one god, the creator of the universe; and that as to other (gods) if they contributed anything to the happiness of men, each of them afforded it only according to his appointment, and not of their own power. his opinion was derived from the irregular phenomena that were visible both at land and sea, as well as those that happened to the sun and moon and all the heavenly bodies. 'if,' said he, 'these bodies had power of their own, they would certainly take care of their own regular motions; but since they do not preserve such regularity, they make it plain, that so far as they coöperate to our advantage, they do it not of their own abilities; but as they are subservient to him that commands them, to whom alone we ought justly to offer our honor and thanksgiving.' for which doctrines when the chaldeans, and the people of mesopotamia, raised a tumult against him, he thought fit to leave that country." in other words, he was driven from his country for sedition and heresy, when he was seventy-five years old. he settled down in a land called canaan, where he built an altar, and performed a sacrifice to god. in this manner abraham began to cultivate a reformation and religion among his own people, who were quite numerous. the egyptians at this period were in a flourishing condition. canaan was invaded by famine. so abraham went down to egypt, "both to partake of the plenty they enjoyed, and to become an auditor for their priests, and to know what they said concerning the gods; designing either to follow them, if they had better notions than he, or convert them to a better way, if his own notions proved the truer." at this time, too, much dissension, quarrel, and antagonism existed between the religious orders, and abraham was not going to lose such an excellent opportunity. josephus describes the condition of affairs as follows: "for whereas the egyptians were formerly addicted to different customs, and despised one another's sacred and accustomed rites, and were very angry one with another on that account, abraham conferred with each of them, and confuting the reasoning they made use of, every one for their own practices, he demonstrated that such reasoning was vain and void of truth; whereupon he was admired by them in those conferences, as a very wise man and of great sagacity when he discoursed on any subject he undertook; and this not only in understanding it, but in persuading other men also to assent to him. he communicated to them arithmetic, and delivered to them the science of astronomy," etc. finding perhaps that he could not make proselytes he returned to canaan. he there divided the tract of land between himself and lot, each one pursuing his own particular course, abraham with his notions and lot with his, unable to agree. an incident worthy of notice occurred. the assyrians made war on a number of kings, the sodomites and lot among them. the assyrians conquered, and lot, among the rest, was made captive. abraham, with three hundred and eighteen men, pursued the assyrians, slew them, captured all they had, and gained a signal victory--thus showing that abraham was a power. lot's affairs with his daughters we pass over, since they have no special interest for us. abraham had several wives or women, by whom he had a number of children. he had six sons by katurah, ishmael by hagar, isaac by sarah, etc. none of the sons adopted his method of thinking except isaac, who at the age of twenty-five was to have been sacrificed to god. isaac, being a mild-mannered young man, generous, and obedient to his father's will, readily consented. upon that, abraham changed his mind. isaac then became the heir both of his property and of his ideas concerning god. abraham had two brothers, nahor and haron. haron left a son, lot, and two daughters, sarai and milcha. nahor married milcha and abraham married sarai. in this manner the family concentration began. and when isaac was forty it was decided that he should marry the granddaughter of his brother nahor, rebeka, the sister of laban. isaac in turn made choice of jacob as heir to his ideas and property--who took flight on account of esau, and landed safely at his uncle laban's house in mesopotamia. jacob married laban's daughters, leah and rachel, as well as their handmaids, zilpha and bilhah. now, laban and his family were idolators. so were esau and his family. rachel took along with her the images of the gods which, according to their laws, they used to worship in their own country, etc. jacob raised his children strict to the rules laid down by his grandfather and father; and the views as regards the rites of worship and circumcision, as well as god in the abstract with all the carnal passions and emotions of man that formerly were the attributes of the idols, as also the sacrifices. the story of joseph is too well known to be repeated. it is quite enough for our purpose that a famine drove this jacob's family, as it did abraham, to egypt, where they increased and multiplied during a period of nearly four hundred years; that joseph was famous in the land, and the king gave jacob and his children leave to live in heliopolis--for in that city the king's shepherds had their pasturage. this in brief is the story, stripped of the peculiar phraseology, which no doubt was in those days customary. the trouble had begun with terah, abraham's father, who hated the chaldeans; and the chaldeans returned the same with interest, i suppose. so they moved to haran in canaan and settled down on a tract of land, by the right of squatter sovereignty, as it would be called in our times. terah, the first squatter, turned this land over as a heritage to his son, abraham; abraham to isaac, and isaac to jacob. in this manner it became the promised land, the heritage of their fathers. it is no easy matter to suppress and eradicate a practice, a habit, a custom, once firmly ingrafted in a community. prohibit it as much as you will, it will be done secretly. so after circumcising the hamerites and shechemites, the sons of jacob slaughtered them, on account of the seduction of dinah, jacob's daughter. he and his family had to leave for fear of their neighbors, so jacob told his household to put away the strange gods that were among them, and "be clean and change your garments," he said (gen. xxxv, 2). this abstract idea of god that abraham called into life was not so firmly rooted as might have been expected. the taint of the ancient gods more or less remained among them and occasionally cropped up here and there in a most prominent manner. for four hundred years we hear nothing of god or his workings--whether the jews flourished or were oppressed--nor have the other descendants ever made mention. abraham, isaac, and jacob call on this imaginary god when in an emergency, when some task has to be accomplished, some journey has to be undertaken, or a battle has to be fought. during the whole of the period they were in egypt, notwithstanding they were sorely oppressed, this god paid no attention to them, until a man arose that produced a great crisis in the affairs of this people, in the destiny of this family which had grown into a nation. this was really the first reformation--that is, modification--of the existing religious practices--their numerous gods, perhaps their rites, etc. the sacrifices the jews retained, with most of the usages and priestly rituals. how many reformations or modifications had taken place before abraham the reformer, we do not know; and how long these gods (they were very numerous) were in existence we know still less. the evolution of these idols, the existing gods, did not take place all of a sudden. it may have taken thousands of years for anything we know. it required considerable mental training to produce them. intelligence had assumed some importance, because the people had become proficient in argument, skillful in reasoning, and observers of nature. the ordinary barbarian possesses no such capabilities. his brain is not sufficiently cultured. so long as his wants are amply supplied, there is no necessity to exert himself, the nervous system lies inactive, and this inactivity involves the perpetuation of ignorance. we may reasonably presume that these chaldeans, these shepherds, had through many centuries of slow culture acquired the knowledge they possessed, the customs and habits they practiced, the laws they promulgated, and the rules of conduct enacted both for social and political purposes. and any innovation on the established laws was resisted and punished, pretty much as it is to-day. so when abraham, or terah his father before him, started the reformation, it caused a good deal of commotion and alarm. the upholders of the settled state of affairs were shocked. anger, passion, partisanship, ran their course then, as they do now. these idolators were just as intolerant then as christians are to-day. it was either submit or leave. thus abraham's and terah's leaving the land of their fathers and settling on a tract of land where they could cultivate their new idea, their new god, was without any special act, without miracle, without supernaturalism, without mystery, perfectly human, perfectly natural. chapter ix. the creation of god--abraham. god, such god as we know of now, like all other things and beings on this terrestrial globe was evolved very, very slowly in the minds of man--crude, ill-shapen, ill-fashioned, grotesque, barbarous, savage, semi-civilized: harmonizing with his existing mental condition and all his surroundings; a product of man's rudeness, of his uncultured nature, his inexperienced special senses, with his nervous system just emerging from an instinctive animal life to a grade or two above its former intelligence--the first step towards real humanity. god was not always presented to humanity in his present guise. oh, no; everyone with a moderate degree of intelligence who chooses to examine the records will find that god has undergone vast and important changes--changes in tendencies and character, conforming with the progressive or retrogressive forms of political and social life of the various communities, corresponding with the periods of the time in which they lived. the idea, in its primary conception, was slowly evolved, without special meaning or signification, dark, mysterious, incomprehensible. we may say, however, that this idea of god was endowed with characteristics best known to men, but of a higher quality than ordinarily then existing; largely reflecting their makers, an embodiment of their own powers and capabilities. there was a time, no matter how remote, when there were creatures resembling the present form of man but of inferior nervous development, that had no knowledge of either god or religion. nor had man in those ages any more intelligence than he had acquired by experience, or was necessary for his immediate use. it improved as the exigencies of his wants arose, fresh experience leading to new observations, slowly adding to the already accumulated stock. the intelligence of to-day would have been useless a hundred years ago, to the same race even, and of less use still two hundred years ago, and so on. it is very doubtful whether man at first was even conscious of his own existence, any more than the higher type of brute life. this consciousness slowly dawned upon him as his intelligence increased. a child is not conscious of its own existence. it exists so long as the necessary material is contributed towards its existence, or until it has grown strong enough to contribute towards its own. it may after a while acquire intelligence sufficient to become conscious of its own existence or not. the same rule holds good among the types of man such as we find on earth at the present time. during the early stages of man's existence, the muscular powers were exercised most, we may say almost exclusively, the special senses serving in their function as a guide for those powers, with the degree of intelligence obtained from the number of impressions received. these senses had acquired their several experiences from the necessities that from time to time were made manifest. there are writers who make use of extraordinary expressions in regard to nature, as for example, that nature is mighty, beautiful, wise, etc. nature is mighty only under certain conditions. peculiar combinations of elements are essential. the presence or absence of the sun's heat plays always an important part. nature's being beautiful depends largely upon the education of the senses, the capability of discerning symmetry, harmony, color, etc., and this is acquired by comparison, taste, and habit. what strikes one eye as beautiful, may have just a contrary effect on another, or be passed with perfect indifference by a third. as to wisdom, nature can be wise only through a cultured, well-educated, evenly balanced mind. the expression is applicable only to man. wisdom is a particular quality eminently and evidently the product of a highly trained nervous system. it is not an easy task at the present time to unravel the mental process of the earliest races of man that first led to the formation and the adoption of the idea that something existed more potent and more powerful than themselves. yet if we carefully examine the mental condition of some of the wild, barbarous nations existing at the present time, we may infer, with a reasonable degree of accuracy, the mental process the earliest races of man were capable of. races or tribes, no matter how low in the scale of civilization, that were perfectly secure in their possessions, amply provided by nature against the encroachments of other races, man or animals, existed right along perfectly content, exerting themselves just enough to gather in those substances which they found contributive to the sustenance of their lives. the surplus time was spent in gamboling, frisking, playing, amusing themselves in their primitive condition like children of nature as they were. progress they made none. there was no occasion for it. their senses were exercised to the extent of their immediate wants and no more. the natural head of the family or tribe was the oldest, the father. he controlled or governed his descendants. so long as the father was able to exercise his supreme power he was the recognized head, adviser, leader, etc. while in this condition, the primitive customs, habits, or usages practiced in their natural mode of living began, and continued with very few changes for ages. their language was as simple and crude as their mode of life, just sufficient for their wants. this mode of communication originated mainly from the necessities of life, as hunger, danger, pleasure, protection, surprise, fear, etc. for all these they found expressions, sounds that conveyed the notions to one another, quite intelligible among themselves. they adopted names for things and beings with which they came in contact in their daily lives, and for such instruments, utensils, and clothing as they from time to time invented or discovered by accident. the sounds that expressed their immediate necessity of communicating with one another, their wants--the cries of call, pain, etc.--had no form in particular, no grammatical construction, no rules. their emotions and passions were limited, because they knew no wants, no conflicts, other than those that arise from feelings inspired by their five senses. and they really had language enough for all purposes--suitable and ample for their condition in life. arts and sciences they had none. their simple domestic arrangements were as primitive as they were. their furniture consisted of little or nothing. cooking utensils they needed none. there was no occasion to cook; nature's food was ample. this they collected, selected, and fed upon. clothing they had no use for, in the warm climate they lived in. they were clad in nature's garb, male and female alike. innocence and virtue was well understood among them. they were moral in their way, committed no wrong--there was no occasion for it. there was plenty for everyone. the larders of nature were free, open, and plentiful. therefore all were satisfied and happy. wealth or property they had. all they surveyed was theirs. what belonged to one belonged to the other. mine and thine was unknown. the more civilized qualifications of property right developed many centuries later. commerce they knew nothing of. there was no need for that, since furniture, utensils, implements of agriculture, weapons, clothing of any kind, they had no use for. they had no laws--nor law-makers, nor justices, nor judges, nor any officials known in later times. and what is more, they had no god, or idol, or myth, or symbol, or worship, or prayer or religion, or soul, or spirit. nor did they know anything about what we indicate by the epithets physical or metaphysical, neither theological nor psychological, neither gnostic nor agnostic. they did not know of any of those things. these were evolved and invented later, as the necessities and exigencies arose, as their wants increased, and circumstances changed from internal to external conditions. consequently, their language was limited. they made use of a limited number of words, or produced articulate sound enough to express just what they wanted, and no more. they may have had two or three hundred different words or sounds in use. we have men to-day among us that have not many more words at command, and their ideas generally correspond in number and quality to their stock of words. the stock of words and the stock of ideas always depend upon the amount of experience and the amount of exercise the five senses have had; together with the urgencies and difficulties they have had to contend with. the power of observation is developed in accordance as the opportunities arise. each particular special sense develops its own faculties, from the practice, use, and experience of that sense, the role it is called upon to play as necessities arise. and as each object is perceived or observed by the special sense, it is recorded, a picture of the same is retained in the great nervous storehouse for future reference. the retention and recognition of the same goes to the formation of memory. as the stock of objects increases, words or sounds designating the same also increase in number, and the material for the formation of ideas is also largely increased. ideas can be formed only about such things as we know, or rather such things as any one special sense has been impressed with, has perceived and recognized. those things or beings by which any one sense has not been impressed, the mind neither has perceived nor is able to recognize. everyone, whether barbarian or civilized, is perfectly familiar with those things or beings that immediately surround him--that is, all those things and beings which the senses have already been impressed with, perceived and recognized. sounds, or words, have been invented to designate all such; and these are known; the picture representing any one object is retained, stored away in the great nervous storehouse, the brain--are remembered. the oftener a thing is perceived, the more familiar it becomes and the more easily recognized, the firmer it becomes fixed and the more easily it is recollected. thus primitive man, with his few wants, and these wants amply supplied by nature, had or invented names for all of them. these formed the earliest collection of names of objects--their appearance, their actions, their habits, etc. all these qualities were associated, identified, and presented by words, in due time, without the presence of the objects. that is to say, the simplest ideas were in this manner formed, and the ideas so formed corresponded with the number of words, and the number of words corresponded with the number of impressions received by the senses. each sense presents its share--one sense more, another less. a person may have received a large number of impressions on the organ of vision--a painter, for instance--and may have stored away a wealth of artistic knowledge, yet the sense of hearing may be exceedingly poor in the number of impressions received. such an individual would be rich in artistic ideas but comparatively poor in musical ideas. so it is with all the special senses. each sense receives impressions on its own account. it has its own special nervous center, and these special centers again are closely connected with the great mass of brain matter. collectively they have for their function, to receive impressions, retain them, store them away, recollect them, and reproduce them by articulate sound, or to recognize them. in this process then we have the formation of idea, memory, thought; recollection is the endeavor to call back, or form a figure of, an object once already perceived--felt by the senses. chapter x. moses.--the confirmation of the idea of god. we will here sketch the military career of moses. we omit the early incidents of the life of moses--his childhood, his growth, his education--and begin with his active life. "and the occasion he laid hold of was this: the ethiopians, who are next neighbors to the egyptians, made an inroad into their country, which they seized upon, and carried off the effects of the egyptians, who in their rage, fought against them, and revenged the affronts they had received from them; but being overcome in battle some of them were slain, and the rest ran away in a shameful manner, and by that means saved themselves, whereupon the ethiopians followed after them in the pursuit, and thinking that it would be an act of cowardice if they did not subdue all egypt, they went on to subdue the rest with greater vehemence; and when they had tasted the sweets of the country, they never left off the prosecution of the war; and as the nearest parts had not courage enough at first to fight with them, they proceeded as far as memphis, and the sea itself, while not one of the cities was able to oppose them. the egyptians, under this sad oppression, betook themselves to their oracles and prophecies" (josephus, ch. x). moses thereupon was appointed general of the egyptian army against the ethiopians, and conquered them in the following manner: "but moses prevented the enemies, and took and led his army, before those enemies were apprised of his attacking them; for he did not march by the river, but by land, where he gave a wonderful demonstration of his sagacity; for when the ground was difficult to be passed over, because of the multitude of serpents, which it produces in vast numbers, and indeed is singular in some of these productions, which other countries do not breed, ... when he had therefore proceeded thus on his journey he came upon the ethiopians before they expected him; and joining battle with them, he beat them, and deprived them of the hopes they had of success against the egyptians, and went on in overturning their cities, and indeed made great slaughter of these ethiopians. now when the egyptian army had once tasted of this prosperous success by the means of moses, they did not slacken their diligence, insomuch that the ethiopians were in danger of being reduced to slavery, and all sorts of destruction. and at length they retired to saba, which was the royal city of ethiopia, which cambyses afterwards named meroe, after the name of his own sister. this place was to be besieged with very great difficulty, since it was both compassed by the nile quite round, and the other rivers astapus and astaboms made it a very difficult thing for such as attempted to pass over them; for the city was situate in a retired place, and was inhabited after the manner of an island, being encompassed by a strong wall, and having the rivers to guard them from their enemies, and having great ramparts between the wall and the rivers, insomuch, that when the waters come with the greatest violence, it can never be drowned; which ramparts make it next to impossible for even such as are gotten over the rivers to take the city. however, while moses was uneasy at the army's lying idle (for the enemies durst not come to battle), an accident happened: tharbis was the daughter of the king of the ethiopians; she happened to see moses as he led his army near the walls, and fought with good courage, and admiring the subtlety of his undertakings, she believed him to be the author of the egyptians' success, when they had before despaired of recovering their liberty, and to be the occasion of the great danger the ethiopians were in, when they had before boasted of their great achievements, she fell deeply in love with him; and upon the prevalency of that passion, sent to him the most faithful of all her servants to discourse with him upon their marriage. he thereupon accepted the offer on condition she would procure the delivering up of the city; and gave her the assurance of an oath to take her to be his wife, and that when he had once taken possession of the city, he would not break his oath to her. no sooner was the agreement made, but it took effect immediately; and when moses had cut off the ethiopians, he gave thanks to god, and consummated his marriage, and led the egyptians back to their own land" (josephus, chap. v.) these are simple facts, wherein god plays no part. it is a human transaction, a conflict of forces; the strongest and most skillful wins. and when the last place of refuge, the fortress, is besieged, and the ethiopians are thoroughly beaten, the place seeming impregnable, the army discouraged, a woman, the king's daughter, betrays it, and moses is victorious. thermutis, his mother by adoption, raised him and educated him after the manner of princes. he was a great favorite. her influence gave him not only her protection, advice, and information, but other great advantages such as no other being could obtain, she being constantly at court and a sister to the king. it was no small glory, as well as experience, he reaped. that conquest made him the first man in the land. that jealousies, antagonism and hatred were engendered against him by his rivals, that conspiracies were formed, may readily be imagined, and that finally his life was threatened. finding it rather dangerous to remain in the country, since he was being closely watched, and all the roads were guarded, and being no doubt fully informed of the plot, moses fled. "he took flight through the deserts, where his enemies could not suspect he would travel; though he was destitute of food, he went on, and despised that difficulty courageously" (jos.). moses was born in 1571 b.c., and was made general of the egyptian army when he was about thirty-five or thirty-seven years of age. in 1531 b.c. he fled from egypt and arrived at midian. he made the acquaintance of a priest named raguel or jethro--his future father-in-law, for he married zipporah, jethro's daughter. aaron, his brother, three years older, being born 1574 b.c., must have been a man of considerable influence. he remained during moses's absence in egypt. the exodus of the israelites from egypt took place in 1491. daring his forty years' stay with jethro he minded his cattle near mount sinai, where many supposed wonders are related to have occurred. that moses was not idle is self-evident. a man of that particular type could not remain inactive. what took place between him and aaron or between him and thermutis his stepmother is not recorded in history. that some systematic organization did take place is very probable. that all followed in the ordinary course of human events, is to be presumed. and that the plans were laid and matured, how these people were to be molded into a nation, and in what manner they were to leave egypt, we cannot have a reasonable doubt. it is more than likely that after the successful conquest, he was fired with the ambition to become a ruler himself. envy and jealousy prevented his ever assuming the crown of egypt, but what was to hinder him becoming the head and leader of his own people? in his solitary wanderings about mount sinai, he was inspired with the thought of delivering his own people, especially as the pharaoh, his former protector, was dead. having all the necessary material at hand in court and out of court, he proceeded to carry out his plans. moses was the man who created jehova. ex. vi, 3: "and i appeared unto abraham and isaac, and unto jacob by the name of god almighty; but by my name jehova was i not known to them." not likely! abraham, isaac, and jacob were of little or no culture. they were herdsmen who simply differed from their neighbors by substituting an imaginary god for the numerous images and idols that were then in fashion. they had not the remotest idea of the meaning of the god they worshiped, such as moses now put into the word god. it was no longer a mere abstract copy with him--a thing to dispute, to reason, to argue about. to moses it became a stern reality. the brain, the nervous system, the senses, the faculties, had undergone a revolution during the four hundred years. moses, with all the scholastic advantages, raised and educated to rule and govern man and nations, ambitious for power, a great general, a man of determination and force, a man that was capable of plotting against plotters, conspiring against conspirators, who deliberately and shrewdly went to work to organize his people--he conceived then the idea that the simple old-fashioned adonay--lord--had lost its importance, being a common-place, every-day god among the hebrews. he invented the unpronounceable jehova. it makes little difference whence it is derived, whether from io, jovis, jupiter, etc. jehova and mount sinai are inseparable. moses knew every stone and crag about that mountain. a man does not live near a mountain, especially a man of great vigor, action, and intellect, but that he observes every nook, every spot, every footpath, and every turn. the conception of jehova originated at mount sinai; and later the power, the establishing and the realization, of his ambition, of his jehova, took place. the miraculous pretensions and the wonderful workings that appear in the scriptural phraseology were no doubt necessary for the purpose of carrying out the scheme moses had concocted. in modern times we can regard it only as a very peculiar method of writing up a history. moses had his emissaries and leaders among his people. when they were told about the wonderful occurrences about mount sinai, and what the great jehova said to moses, the story was rehearsed and repeated--about the promised land, their preservation, their liberty. of course, what could they do otherwise than yield? their hopes were elated, and they were really interested, and believed that the god of their forefathers had sent moses as their deliverer. moses had already their confidence by his past history. the hero, the great conqueror of the ethiopians, the savior of egypt--that alone was an immense prestige. but when it was announced that the jehova, the lord god, etc., had said this and that to him, that he commanded him to do this and that, where is the miracle, where is the wonder, that they obeyed? when moses found that the hebrews would be obedient to whatsoever he should direct, as they promised to be, and were in love with liberty, he began his negotiations with the king of egypt, who had but lately received the government. as to his contest with the egyptian priests in performing their respective tricks, called miracles, what wonder that these ignorant creatures believed, when we find stupid people enough of all nations that believe in the miraculous cures of an old rag, purporting to have belonged to christ or some one else? whatever was done, and how it was done, we shall never know. that there was nothing supernatural about the transaction is absolutely certain. the people may have believed it to be supernatural, as many millions believe to this day. you may believe a circle to be square, but that does not make it so. the untutored brain is surprised at a trifle, astonished at what it does not understand, and regards every new trick as a miracle. neither abraham, isaac, nor jacob could perform miracles. they had no use for them, knew nothing of them, and really had not the talent to produce them. miracles had not been invented, or become the fashion. moses was undoubtedly a proficient master of the magic arts, and accomplished his purpose thereby. after all, those performances were simply a side-show. he knew the strength of his people. a general of his capacity does not undertake a task of that magnitude without calculating the convincing force to back his demands. six hundred thousand men on foot--besides children and women--organized under leaders, and no doubt equipped and ready for any emergency--an army of that size means a revolution of no small importance to a state. to avert greater danger, egypt let them go. henceforth moses is the imperial master of the situation, the dictator, the ruler, the lawgiver, as determined as he is imperious--"i am the lord thy god." and the man moses knew what he was talking about, and the class of people he was talking to. he was the organizer of the nation, the creator of jehova, the intimate of god. no other man throughout the bible before or after moses pretended to talk with god face to face except moses. and moses alone shall come near the lord (ex. xxiv, 2). and he took every care that no other man should discover his secret workings. "i am that i am;" that is moses. "thus shalt thou say unto the children of israel, i am hath sent me unto you" (ex. iii, 14). who but a man accustomed to command and be obeyed would dare use such language? moses was fully familiar with the locality; and mount sinai, where he developed his scheme, he would permit no one to approach. "take heed to yourself that ye go not up into the mount, or touch the border of it; whosoever toucheth the mount shall be surely put to death" (ex. xix, 12). he would brook no nonsense. he kept these poor ignoramuses in constant terror, in constant dread, of his jehova. these precautions were used, and terrible things threatened, so that no one should intrude upon his privacy on the mountain, and no doubt were necessary in order to secure his success. we have no clear account of the manner in which these people left egypt. the population must have numbered close upon three millions. this is entirely omitted. what god said to moses, and moses said to god, is continually repeated, but historical facts are wanting. we learn one important fact, however--they did not leave poor. when they departed from egypt this multitude had to be kept busy, otherwise they would lose confidence in jehova and in moses, and relapse into making images. what kind of a god was this jehova? in ex. xxxi we find him giving directions about working in brass, silver, gold, furniture, designating who should work at it; but god himself turns stone-mason--in verse 18 we find two tables of testimony, tables of stone, written by the finger of god. if god had a finger, he had a whole hand. if he had one hand he may have had two. to write needs practice, sight, brain, and all other parts belonging to a man. no doubt, when the tables, etc., were written, it was done by a man. as to the ten commandments, they were not new with moses. they were a codification of chaldean and egyptian laws. the day of rest was recognized long ago in those slave-making days. it was a principle of economy, power-saving. six of the commandments are natural laws and are instinctively obeyed even among lower animals. all other laws were adopted from recognized customs and usages of the people, mostly taken from the egyptians, with some few alterations, perhaps, suitable to the existing emergency. when this republic was founded, there were actually no new laws made, but old laws modified to suit our case; thus the constitution was framed. moses did precisely the same thing. the laws were the recognized habits, practices, customs, laws, usages, long established among the nations in that region. and god, or jehova, had as much to do with the framing of them as he had with the constitution of this nation. leviticus may be truly called the cookery-book of jehova. just think of it, that god himself told them what to select and how to cook it. they were instructed to forsake the idols or the images of god, but retained the grosser barbaric practices of sacrificing. the detailed account given of the bill of fare is interesting. for a full description we beg to refer the reader to leviticus. human nature was strong in moses. he did what any man high in the affairs of a state would do. he installed his own relations into office--first his own tribe, the levites. these were immediately installed as a permanent bureaucracy, as well as aristocracy. they were the rulers, lawmakers, preachers, doctors, etc. (num. i, 47, et seq.). his brother aaron and his sons were at once installed in the permanent offices. a hereditary aristocracy was established and consecrated as priests of the nation (lev. viii). and the tribe of levi were also selected to minister unto the priests, aaron and sons. the actions of this supposed god are very curious, and even amusing. he assumes so many shades of color, character, and passion, just as a man would under various degrees of excitement, disappointment, and discontent. "whenever moses found it necessary to act with promptness and resolution he found it convenient to use his lord god, jehova, and usually with excellent effect. but when korah, dathan, and abiram rebel moses gives god advice (num. xvi, 15). "and moses was very wroth, and said unto the lord: respect not thou their offering." he at once suppresses the rebellion with a strong hand and puts an end to it. wipe out of the biblical story the dust and cob-webs of superstition and ignorance, cleanse it of the mire and dirt of barbarism, and you find in moses a man of action, sagacity, and determination; skillful in the arts of war; a man of great will power, energy, and pluck, breaking down all barriers, overcoming all obstacles, conquering all difficulties, in order to secure the final success of his immense undertaking; the creator of jehova, the great i am, the maker of god, the leader of a great army, the organizer of a nation, the lawmaker, the lawgiver, the molder and master mind of this great work. his stratagem to preserve the egyptian army from serpents by filling baskets with ibises, who devour and destroy serpents, is an instance of his foresight, leading his army safely through the swamps without damage, during the war with the ethiopians. the great feature of moses's mount sinai expedition, and his absence for forty days, and the production of the ten commandments, keeps the theological world in a constant stew of wonder and admiration. from the point of reason, common sense, and the light we have now, there is nothing remarkable or wonderful about the forty days' absence or the ten commandments. moses was provided with all the food he needed, and all the assistance he needed, during his stay in the mountain. his own family, as well as his wife's relatives, knew all about the mountain, while the masses were kept at a respectful distance, on penalty of death. what are these ten commandments? 1. one god (the concentrated essence of the } chaldean gods), worship him only. } natural laws of 2. have no other god, image, etc. } self-preservation 3. don't swear by god. } and 4. rest on the seventh day (economy of } self-protection. muscular forces). } 5. honor thy parents. } 6. do not commit murder. 7. do not commit adultery. 8. do not steal. 9. do not bear false witness. 10. do not desire another man's property. all these laws had been in existence centuries before the coming of moses. nations had already adopted them, as a matter of necessity. crimes of murder and robbery, etc., were familiar among the chaldeans and other nations. when isaac sent messengers to nahor in order to secure rebeka for his wife, they had to pass through mesopotamia, "in which it was tedious traveling, both in winter, for a depth of clay, and in summer for a want of water; and besides this, for the robberies there committed" (jos.). it must be remembered that society had reached a degree of organization and civilization; that these fundamental principles, these natural laws, are observed to a considerable extent even among the lower animals, and that they were strictly enforced in every barbarian as well as more civilized community. in the codification of these laws by moses there is nothing wonderful, nothing miraculous, supernatural. the whole matter consisted in the adoption of these fundamental principles, these common-law usages, and the proclaiming of them as the laws to govern this newly organized nation, as all other nations had done centuries before them. the laws incorporated in the book of leviticus, etc., consisting in the regulation or government of the nation, appointing communities or families, dealing with food, dress, sacrifice, crime and its punishment, trade, commerce, domestic affairs, marriage, and above all church affairs, were mostly adoptions from other nations with certain modifications, written up in the manner we find them. the supernatural phenomena recited in the bible in the books of moses--what descended from heaven, clouds, pillars, earthquakes, thunder, lightning, rain, deluge, fire, etc., on and about mount sinai--and that god performed these wonders to oblige moses, because he exercised his influence in prayer upon jehova--form the greatest piece of nonsense that ever was written. clouds belong to the earth, are composed of earthly elements, are taken from the surface of the earth by a natural process and return to the earth by a natural process. neither god nor man can influence them. the same may be said of all other phenomena. water cannot be composed from any other elements than oxygen and hydrogen, and the silly theological twaddle cannot change it. what we ought to know is, at least something of the natural. the more we know of the natural the less we believe of the supernatural--in fact, the latter has largely disappeared. in time, let us hope, these childish delusions will be regarded as some of the remnants of the past and infantile ages of humanity. in all ages and at all times, men of great merit have been admired and honored by mankind. but the mythology and theology that enshrouds ancient heroes, the deification, the supernaturalism, the sanctity, the holiness, and the delusions that accompany and surround their actions, are entirely superfluous. we have outgrown these fables. and truly, these imaginary attributions, these visionary productions, have outlived their usefulness. whether it be moses, david, alexander, hannibal, cæsar, charlemagne, cromwell, frederick the great, napoleon, or washington, they were men, nothing but men, and their actions, as also the great good resulting from their actions, that benefited humanity, were natural, not influenced in any way or shape by the smallest particle of supernaturalism. josephus speaking of moses says: "he was one that exceeded all men that ever were in understanding, and made the best use of what understanding suggested to him. he had a very grateful way of speaking and addressing himself to the multitude. as to his other qualifications, he had such a full command of his passions, as if he hardly had any such in his soul, and only knew them by their names, as rather perceiving them in other men than himself. he was also such a general of an army as was seldom seen, as well as such a prophet as was never known, and this to such a degree that whatsoever he pronounced, you would think you heard the voice of god himself" (b. iv, ch. viii, 49). the following verse in the bible is undoubtedly true: "and there was not a prophet since in israel like unto moses, whom the lord knew face to face." moses deserves all the credit for molding the chaldean god into shape, for creating jehova, and for inventing prophets and the jewish oracles. these oracles, or pretended consultations or inquiries of god, whether heathen or hebrew, were all of a similar nature and character. whenever the question asked was concerning the success or non-success of a battle, whether they should fight or not, the answer depended on the circumstances and the condition of affairs. if the army was well disciplined, had a good leader, a good general, better than the enemy, they were going to fight. if not so well organized, weaker numerically, or with an indifferent general, they would let fighting alone. the priests if well informed would give either a positive or a negative answer, but if they knew nothing about either party, they would deliver the answer of the oracle in such dubious expressions or terms, that let what would happen to the inquirer, the answer might be accommodated or explained to mean the event that came to pass. the expressions of the bible during and after the time of moses are of oracular form, and for that reason of a dubious nature, of marvelous elasticity, accommodating any and every opinion or inquiry, susceptible of a vast variety of interpretations. many portions may be made to mean anything or everything. there being nothing positive about these biblical expressions, followers of these doctrines have been explaining and explaining. and as new views or opinions are set afloat, clever talkers explain and explain, and grow enthusiastic in explaining. and as fashions change, the explanations change. for centuries these explanations and interpretations have been going on--over what? among the jews there were several sorts of oracles: as, first, those that were delivered viva voce, as when god spoke to moses; secondly, prophetic dreams, as those of joseph and others; thirdly, visions, as when a prophet in an ecstasy, a nervous, excitable condition, being properly neither asleep nor awake, had what they called supernatural revelations; fourthly, when they were accompanied with the wearing of an ephod, or the pectoral worn by the high priest, who was endowed with the gift of foretelling future things upon extraordinary occasions; and fifthly, by consulting the prophets or messengers sent by god. moses was the first great prophet, the first great general, the first great lawgiver, the first and only organizer, and with his death god, jehova, ceases to be active. everything appears wonderful or miraculous if we do not understand it, or are ignorant and credulous. thus it was with the manna, that usually falls in certain seasons of the year in that region. even moses himself did not know what it was, until it had stuck to his hands and he had tasted it. it was no special favor to the jews. it falls for all creatures alike, but is not used until it is discovered that it has reached the season when it is good to eat. nevertheless, it is in our bible accounted a miracle. no man has ever performed a miracle except to deceive or delude another, who is ignorant of what he is performing, or how it is performed. miracles are natural events occurring to those that are ignorant, or of little understanding; or they are intentionally performed with the intent to deceive, delude, or defraud. god himself, all believers should know, cannot perform a miracle, contrary to the laws of nature--whether it be the laws governing planets or the laws that govern the various phenomena that appear from time to time on earth. all are simply the result of some natural process. what shrewdness moses used, whatever cunning, whatever diplomacy, whatever wisdom or courage, was the production of his own will power, the evolution of his own brain, acquired by education and training. he utilized these powers to gain his ends, to the best advantage and welfare of the people he was trying to organize. he may have fully believed in the oracles he invoked, the conception of his own powerful imagination. he may have inspired himself by a concentration of nervous force, stimulated by the immense responsibility that rested upon him. the solitude he enjoyed in the mountain was of great service to his reflecting mind. it gave him an opportunity to analyze every detail, think over every circumstance, form his ideas and his plans. that it was to him a sanctuary, a holy retreat, we can easily imagine, as every place that becomes a retreat for great thinkers is a sanctum to them, and where, when they are deliberating, communing with themselves, it is no place for strangers to intrude. we must, however, not lose sight of an important fact--that whatever may be the products of the brain, of the nervous system, however stimulated or inspired the workings of the imagination and the production of ideas, evolving powerful thoughts, and however sublime and beautiful they may be, they are the effect of the educated faculties; the result of the combined forces of the great nervous centers. notwithstanding the sagacity and cleverness of moses, the barbarism and brutality of the age in which he lived was predominant in all his actions towards his enemies. neither god nor jehova had any mitigating sentiment, neither pity nor mercy. the ark was a superstitious symbol, and the priest the ready tool to carry out any system to deceive and delude the masses. the ark, the creation of moses, aaron, jethro & co., was nothing more than an idol of another form. whether the idol is in the image of somebody or a four-cornered box wherein lies the difference? for several centuries this wooden box plays an important role among these half-civilized barbarians. they were no better than their neighbors, and were not any farther advanced in civilization than the neighboring nations were--indeed, not so much. how christianity can hold that book, the bible, as sacred, as a guide for the present civilized age, is indeed a greater wonder and a far more complicated miracle than ever was performed in the bible. the superstitious, cowardly army of joshua refused to cross the river jordan, but the miracle was performed when the priest carried the ark across the river--which was fordable, because they could see the sand at the bottom, and the stream was neither strong nor swift. so the army forded the stream, following the wooden box. the same box was used before the walls of jericho. the falling of the walls is related in a mysterious fashion, but the slaughter of men, women, and children is made quite plain. the only thing saved was that prostitute rahab who betrayed the city--and that was all the doings of god and the box. joshua sends to ai three thousand men, and the israelites get beaten. then after some hocus-pocus joshua goes to ai with thirty thousand and he beats them, "and all the men and women that were killed at ai were twelve thousand" (josh, viii, 25). and then he hanged the king of ai (verse 29). and this was a miraculous victory. every natural phenomenon was interpreted as a miracle. a hailstorm, an aerial phosphorescence imitating sun and moon, the clouds, thunder, etc.--are all miracles, if they help to beat the enemy. and after the slaying was done the kings were hanged (x, 26). altogether, joshua conquered thirty-one kings and took possession of their territories. these kingdoms could not have been very large affairs, since the whole land is not very large. the presumption is that superior numbers and better leadership in reality won the day. when the strong hand of moses and joshua has disappeared (jehova is no longer the stronghold) quarrels, outrages, and discontent arise. eleven tribes retire from the field of action. judah, the warrior tribe, does the fighting. the levites, this aristocratic tribe, watch and guide the nation, dwelling in the forty cities assigned to them. i mention these two tribes especially on account of the important role they play hereafter. a few statements of the mere facts will suffice. joshua dies in 1443 b.c. othniel succeeds. judah's military force fights and beats the canaanites. discord and fighting continue, until eglon the king of moab enslaves them, 1343 b.c. when eglon is killed they are freed for a short period, when jabin the canaanite subdues them. they are again freed and again enslaved, and so on. meantime they have their heroes, as shamgar, who kills six hundred philistines with an ox-goad, and samson, who kills one thousand philistines with a jawbone of an ass, etc. i will append to this chapter a description of some events of moses's career from tacitus, chapter iii: "many authors agree, that when once an infectious distemper was arisen in egypt and made men's bodies impure, bocchorius, their king, went to the oracle of (jupiter) hammon and begged he would grant him some relief against this evil, and he was enjoined to purge his nation of them, and to banish this kind of men into other countries, as hateful to the gods. that when he had sought for, and gotten them all together, they were left in a vast desert; that hereupon the rest devoted themselves to weeping and inactivity; but one of those exiles, moses by name, advised them to look for no assistance from any of the gods or from any of mankind, since they had been abandoned by both, but bade them believe in him, as in a celestial leader, by whose help they had already gotten clear of their present miseries. they agreed to it; and though they were unacquainted with every thing, they began their journey at random: but nothing tried them so much as want of water; and now they laid themselves down on the ground to a great extent, as just ready to perish, when a herd of wild asses came from feeding, and went to a rock overshadowed by a grove of trees. moses followed them, as conjecturing that there was (thereabouts) some grassy soil, and so opened large sources of water for them." chapter iv: "as for moses, in order to secure the nation firmly to himself, he ordained new rites, and such as were contrary to other men. all things are with them profane which with us are sacred; and again, those practices are allowed among them which are by us esteemed most abominable. they sacrifice rams by way of reproach to (jupiter) hammon. an ox is also sacrificed, which the egyptians worship under the name of apis," etc. chapter xi. samuel the kingmaker--the warwick of antiquity. our forefathers of antiquity, no matter to what nation they belonged, dressed every important event with a halo of mystery--fable, myth, and miracle. they knew no better. the mind, the brain, the senses, had reached a stage of development that might well be called childish, with sensuality and selfishness predominating. fighting, cruelty, and lust were the leading actions prompted. and as in the case of children, ghosts and hobgoblins scared them, shadows and darkness frightened them, unusual sights and noises surprised and alarmed them. and in their calmer moments they wondered. and any natural phenomenon was interpreted as miraculous if it aided any undertaking, and resulted favorably to them. wealth and women were considered the capital prizes in those days. (that was three thousand years ago; how is it with us?) they were men in physique, but children in the development of their mental faculties. it was then as it is now--every man talks about that which is uppermost in his mind; he makes his comparisons with those things he is most familiar with; his illustrations are drawn from those objects he sees most frequently; his language never extends beyond the number of words at his command; his memory is only equal to the number of things he has stored away; his mind is made up or composed of those ideas that he has gathered from the experience of his senses; his ideas from the number of objects he has come in contact with; his knowledge consists of that which he has learned; his thoughts and reflections extend to that which he knows and never beyond; his understanding depends on all these; and comparatively speaking, few men are in advance of the age in which they live. ideas, like other things terrestrial, have their birth, growth, development, maturity, and decline, and finally they partially or wholly disappear. the birth of the idea of god, without the various objective representations, had its origin in the mind of man; abraham being the first, or supposed to be the first, man who conceived the notion that these images, idols, were not the proper thing. he doubted the quality of the gods, and the principal objection to these idols was that they had ears that did not hear, eyes that could not see, etc., etc., but the new god, the later jehova, could. the strangest of all inconsistencies lies in the fact that while they endowed him with the human faculties, passions, emotions, desires, and feelings, there is nothing tangible about his body. nothing was accomplished with this god during several centuries in egypt. moses brought his jehova out--as a stern reality. he skillfully manipulated the idea. his own intellect and experience, his force and character, were concentrated in this jehova. his masterly organization, his discipline, his impressive sternness, imperative and imperial, his stupendous will power, left a lasting impress upon this people during the four centuries. this idea was nursed, nourished, and sustained by the levites, and when they found their influence was waning they established a concentrated form of government by selecting a sanhedrin or council of seventy and electing the most eligible person they could find on the recommendation of samuel as their king. this king was saul, whose reign, fortunately or unfortunately, did not last very long. competition and struggle with other nations had, if anything, an educational tendency. as they grew numerically stronger, jealousies arose. ambitious men were grasping for power, and contending faction naturally was the result. the story about the lost asses is like that about another ass we have heard of, that saw the angel and talked--we have many such, even at the present day. these stories are excellent fabrications to entertain juveniles with. and people must be precious asses to believe this nonsense, that god would be such an ass as to interfere with these asses. but something occurred which was perfectly human, and shows the character of the man. it happened to be one of those critical moments in a nation's existence. nahash the ammonite had made war against israel, and encamped against jabest-gilead. saul hearing of it, he did as follows (1 sam. xi, 7): "and he took a yoke of oxen, and hewed them in pieces, and sent them throughout all the coast of israel by the hands of messengers, saying, whosoever cometh not forth after saul and after samuel, so shall it be done unto his oxen. and the fear of the lord fell upon the people, and they came out with one consent." thus saul collected an army of three hundred thousand men. that is what may be termed practical politics. he was victorious over the ammonites. as to the prisoners of war, whether captured or having given themselves up, he caused their right eyes to be put out. he plucked their right eyes out, making them useless for war in the future. when he went to war against the philistines, his army observed how numerous the enemy were. god's army was scared and hid in caves. so he sent to samuel to consult the oracle, like any other respectable heathen. he also made a conquest of the amalekites, whom he utterly destroyed. the hebrews and these people had a grudge of several centuries' standing, because when the jews went out of egypt they requested permission to pass through the amalekites' country, which was refused them (ex. xvii, et seq.). but saul offended god by saving agag, the king of the amalekites, so said samuel (1 sam. xv, 32, 33). "then samuel said, bring ye hither to me agag, the king of the amalekites. and agag came to him delicately. and agag said, surely the bitterness of death is passed. and samuel hewed agag in pieces before the lord in gilgal." saul's tenderness and mercy towards agag displeased the stern, cruel priest and soldier. his, agag's, life had to pay the penalty of death, by the hand of the priest himself, for an offense his forefathers were presumed to have been guilty of, several centuries before. all barbarities, cruelties, and slaughter were done in jehovah's, god's, the lord's, name. the same pious crimes were repeated centuries later, under the pretext of doing some imaginary brutal god a great favor. for this transgression saul is rejected by this priestly warwick. for this human action this wily priest denounces him, and saul's act of kindness is interpreted by this domineering priest as a crime against his god. to carry out his political scheme, samuel went to beth-lehem. "and the elders of the town trembled at his coming" (1 sam. xvi, 4). the revengeful priest, with a nerve of iron and a will of steel, was not going to stand any nonsense. saul had not obeyed him to the letter--it is, off with your head! samuel with all the church palaver, priest discipline, and pious hypocrisy, selects a successor, without compunction, without ceremony, and david is anointed to reign instead of saul. from this time forth to the end of his life saul is constantly in hot water. he slinks to his home at gibeah (1 sam. xv, 34) like a whipped cur, rejected and excommunicated by the priest. full of apprehension and fear, he blunders at every step he takes. the priestly influence is gone, and god has departed from him and is now with david. the crafty samuel uses the expression, when others question the propriety of his action: "men do not see as god seeth." no! men must have no will except the priest's will. harassed and maddened by priestly cunning, jealous and angered at david's success in acts of heroism, saul loses courage, as well as prestige with the people, to such an extent that david finds it not a difficult task to organize a small army of his own, carrying on a sort of desultory war on his own account. samuel dies, having governed his people twelve years himself, and jointly with saul eighteen years. he was the greatest man, priest, and general since the times of moses, a man of singular sagacity and courage, no doubt right royal and honest in his intentions and to his nation. samuel did more to solidify the nation, and terrify neighboring nations, to infuse courage in his people and inspire them to acts of heroism, than any other of the judges, or any other man, during this period. a curious incident is related of the manner in which samuel came into the world. it is the first one of its kind in the bible. hannah, the wife of elkanah, had no children, or as the bible phrase has it, "the lord had shut up her womb" (1 sam. i, 5, 6). so she continued praying before the lord, and eli the priest marked her mouth (verse 12). she conceived and bore a son, and she named him samuel. and eli the priest adopted samuel. "and the child did minister unto the lord before eli the priest" (ii, 12). what the relations were between hannah and eli is not known, but that his own sons were not very righteous is testified to by the following passage (1 sam. ii, 20): "now eli was very old, and heard all that his sons did unto all israel; and how they lay with the women that assembled at the door of the tabernacle of the congregation." it was not an unusual thing, in the temples of the heathens, for women to accommodate the gods whenever they felt piously inclined; and also the priests lost no opportunity to gratify their saintly passions, or permit others to gratify theirs so long as it was to benefit the church. samuel's father, or rather reputed father, did not belong to the priestly tribe. he was an ephrathite. eli his adopted father belonged to the priestly caste. i simply cite this story to show how completely human these holy jehovaists were. many crimes and disreputable acts were committed under the very shadow of the lord. yet jehova was pleased with anything these priests delighted in. eli was a heavy man (iv, 18). fat, which i suppose they meant, shows he was a good liver. he broke his neck by falling off his seat on hearing the ark was taken by the philistines and israel beaten. when samuel took the reins of government he was still young. he subdued the philistines, regained the ark, and reorganized and consolidated the nation. he made saul king and general, and a stream of prosperity followed; the choice was a good one, and saul served his nation well so long as he was obedient to samuel's commands. saul's humanity got the better of him, he offended this stern, dictatorial priest, and lost his favor. david, his rival, was already chosen and in the field, on whom all samuel's influence and priestly glory was shed. now god deserted saul and his cause. henceforth the lord was with david. samuel was the first and only kingmaker; saul and david were his handiwork. he was a priest, a soldier and a statesman of more than ordinary capacity and qualities, far superior to any of the judges that governed israel during the last four centuries. he was stern and severe, but without blemish otherwise. he was, as far as we can learn from history, a relentless and cruel man towards his enemies. he was of immense will-power, resolute and energetic. he was honored to an extraordinary degree by the people for whom he accomplished so much. he left the nation at his death more firmly united than it had ever been--with an organized army, a stable government, and a well-filled treasury. it was samuel that really raised the nation to the utmost hight that it ever attained, for he laid the foundation for solomon's glory, the zenith of hebrew nationality. it is he that closes the second period of national life, the people having attained under him its maximum standing as a nation, and the greatness which culminated in solomon, and the only political unity as a nation that the hebrews ever had. a parallel may be drawn between the two periods. the egyptian period: four centuries or so pass without anything being done, until a man rises possessing the necessary qualifications to mold these people into a nation. the second period consists of a struggle with other nations, almost continuously, to exist. necessities arise; men present themselves who seize the opportunity to fill up the want for the time being, until the coming of samuel, the right man, at the right time, for the right place. he closes the second act of the hebrews' struggle for nationality by giving them a centralized form of government, and placing a king at their head to rule them. all the transactions of his life were human, natural. his conduct was perfectly in harmony with the age he lived in. the nation as a whole had become a little more civilized, and had reached as high a point of intelligence as it ever attained--that is, as a nation. thus far we have not seen anything in their history that other nations had not to contend with. to attribute their acts, individually or as a nation, to any supernatural power, to god, jehova, or the lord, is preposterous. in their dealings, their fightings, their cruelty, their brutality, their superstition, and their ignorance, they were in no sense superior to any of the contemporaneous nations. they were no better in their conduct than their neighbors. the strongest had always the best of it; the conquered had to submit to slavery or be killed, women are captured and used, and the plunder is divided. notwithstanding the priestly rule of the levites, the hebrews are constantly relapsing into idolatry, brought back to the fold, and relapsing again. the church was at this time used for all sorts of corrupt purposes. the jehova that had been brought into the theological world with such an immense boom by moses had expended a good deal of its original force. the remembrance of that stupendous crisis of the hebrew national existence was kept alive and the flames were fanned by priestly interest. the god after moses, the jehova, had shrunk into the lord, and the ark was the representative of god. "the ark of god was taken," ... "when she heard tidings of the ark of god" (1 sam. iv, etc.). and the success or failure of the hebrews depended on the man who led them. with a weak man as general or leader they were beaten, with a strong man they won. other nations meanwhile had sprung into life, and become powerful, without jehova--without the god of the hebrews. they had, however, idols and images, which seemed to behave with far greater propriety than the god of israel. so well did these mythological deities manage their affairs, that they almost swallowed up the whole hebrew race. samuel, having established a kingdom, and crowned two kings, saul and david, dies, leaving these two competitors in the field. chapter xii. god save the king! that was the shout, with the commencement of the new era, when the tallest man in the nation appeared in the midst of the people that had assembled at the call of samuel (1 sam. x, 24). i will give a short chronology of this united kingdom under three kings--saul, david, and solomon: saul is made king 1095 dies 1055 rules over israel about 40 years david born 1085 kills goliath 1062 reigns in hebron 1055 king over israel 1048 dies 1016 rules over israel about 40 years solomon is born 1036 is crowned king 1015 lays foundation of temple 1012 dedicates the temple 1004 worships idols 985 dies 975 rules over israel about 40 years these figures may not be accurate. they are as near as the dates can be had. josephus gives the dates as follows: saul reigned with samuel 18 years after the death of samuel 22  ,,   david lived 70  ,,   reigned in hebron 7 yrs 6m   ,,    ,, jerusalem 33 years solomon lived 94  ,,   having reigned 80  ,,   there is a discrepancy somewhere. something is wrong in dates, like most other facts in the bible. david was twenty-three years old when he killed goliath. solomon was twenty-one years old when he was crowned king; according to josephus, fourteen years of age. we have no further interest in the dates of those men, but more in their acts and character. being the rulers of god's own chosen people--with jehova for a pilot, protector, and guide--with the wooden box, the ark, with all its mysterious secrets and its holy enchantments; priests, prophets, and sacrifices, with all their secret necromantic performances, these three men, with all their godly professions, were no better than they should have been, even for the age in which they lived. they were brutal, gross, and licentious. barbarous crimes were committed by them, with the sanction of their preposterous imaginary god--who is lauded at this present day to the very echo, but the most stupendous piece of folly that ever was palmed off on civilized humanity. saul, the first king, in exercising his terrible cruelty towards his enemies perhaps only followed the practices and customs of other nations. why this bloodthirsty man caused 385 persons to be murdered; why he slaughtered all the inhabitants of nob, men, women, and children, because abimelech the priest supplied david with food, are some of those things that pulpit orators can best explain. the life of the priest was not sufficient to expiate the offense he had committed, but saul had his whole family exterminated. the ark was no longer available. jehova had taken the juvenile david in hand. the priestly oracle refused to be consulted. he, saul, had recourse to a fortune-telling woman of endor, who was employed to call up the spirit of samuel. saul's jealousies, his quarrels with david, and all his misdeeds, as well as bravery, may be read by those that feel an interest in the matter. he finally committed suicide by falling on his own sword, and the next day the philistines cut his and his sons' heads off, and deposited them before their idols, dagon, etc. where was god? can it be possible that our christian neighbors believe that the life and conduct of saul was directed by any supreme power? that god directed saul to do so many foolish, barbarous, and murderous acts? we shall probably be more interested in david, the man after god's own heart. david, like saul, was judiciously selected by samuel. david's acts and david's conduct were no different from the acts and conduct of any other man in his position and possessing his characteristics. he combined a good deal of philosophy with his bravery; if the psalms were written by him we have before us a higher type of brain culture, a mind that has undergone some training, is capable of analyzing its own feelings and giving expression to them. his comparisons never extend beyond that--beyond what he knows. he appeals to the higher qualities of men--their good acts, their virtues, their just conduct, their self-restraint, their passions, emotions, faults, and weaknesses. he recognizes them in others, and sees them reflected clearly in himself. his distress and his fears, his gladness and his joys, his trust in an unseen power, are all poetic, some sweet and sentimental. he speaks of his lord, of his god, as of the pleasant recollections of a dream. jehova had long since lost the stern reality of moses, and had changed with the changes the nation had undergone. the formalities had been kept up, the priestly luxuries had increased, the ceremonies were more formal and business-like, but the central power, the centralized government of the people, the mantle of authority, had been shifted from high priest to king. the god, jehova, was no longer the guide, the power it had been. for twenty-two years after the death of samuel, saul had conducted his government and fought his battles without god, ark, or priest, and sought advice and counsel from other and human sources. skeptics even at this early period began to doubt the existence of a god, "the fool saith in his heart, there is no god" (ps. xiv, 1). the theocratic period of 395 years from exodus to saul had already developed corruption in the church and licentiousness in the temple. the priestly power received a terrible blow at the hands of saul when he slaughtered the priest, abimelech, and his family, thus showing that the representative of god no longer inspired terror; that the priest was nothing more than any other man; that neither god, jehova, ark, nor any other sanctified paraphernalia could protect him, nor miracle interfere for his preservation. opinions were freely expressed, discussion arose, and arguments were not wanting to sustain the doubts that had arisen as to the genuineness, the truth, of the god they had adopted. neighboring nations had their gods. how was it, if their gods were not more potent, that they should win so many battles, and enslave the nation of the true god? the same or similar arguments that abraham brought to bear on the chaldean gods were now beginning to be used against jehova. david, besides being an excellent soldier, a brave general, was a dreamer, a man of imagination. god was to him a sublime vision, a reflected glory of the past. to him, an intense admirer of the beautiful, trees, hills, and valleys, and the phenomena of nature in general, were the wonders of his imaginary god. he was a musician, a poet, a dreamer, in his moments of leisure. everything he beheld courted, kindled his admiration, awoke new feeling in his sensitive nature, from a pretty flower to a beautiful woman. the conversations which he holds with his visionary god are the simplest and most confidential. he pours out his grievances and his delight to him. "thou hast put gladness in my heart.... i will both lay me down in peace and sleep" (ps. iv, 8, 9). that christian translators of the bible presume to interpret certain passages and words to mean, to foretell, things or events that occurred one thousand years later, is an assumption, and warrantable neither by the text nor by the actions of the persons writing them. david is supposed to have written the psalms. when he speaks he refers mainly to himself, addresses himself personally to his lord. he, david, is himself interested. then again he speaks of man and things in general, without ever alluding to any one thing or body in the coming future. david's psalm ii is headed "the kingdom of christ." the writer had no more idea of christ than he had of peter the great at the time that that psalm was written. david wrote one hundred and fifty psalms as printed in the bible. in the headings, the superscriptions, the solicitude of christian believers, trying to torture meanings and significations out of sentences or expressions, led them to commit gross errors, as false as they are ridiculous. judge for yourself: psalm ii, 1--the kingdom of christ. "why do the heathen rage, and the people imagine vain things?" verse 10: "be wise, now therefore, o ye kings; be instructed ye judges of the earth." psalm xlv, 1--the majesty and grace of christ's kingdom. "my heart is inditing a good matter; i speak of the things which i have made touching the king; my tongue is the pen of a ready writer." verse 10--the duty of the church, etc. "hearken, o daughter, and consider, and incline thine ear; forget also thine own people, and thy father's house." psalm xlvi, 1--confidence which the church, etc. "god is our refuge and strength, a very present help in trouble." psalm xlvii--the nations are exhorted cheerfully to entertain the kingdom of christ. psalm xlviii--the ornaments and privileges of the church. in not one of these psalms is there the slightest allusion to a church. it is the extravagant language of an exuberant mind, the outcome of an overwrought imagination upon the subject he was thinking about. psalm l, 1--the majesty of god in the church. psalm li, 18--he prayeth for the church. psalm lxviii, 7--for his care of the church. psalm lxxii, 1--david praying for solomon, etc.; and the truth of christ's kingdom. psalm xciii--the majesty and power of christ's kingdom. psalm cxviii, 19--coming of christ's kingdom, etc. the passage referred to, viz., verse 19, is: "open to me the gates of righteousness; i will go into them, and i will praise the lord." the absurdity of the interpretation is evident from the fact that out of one hundred and fifty psalms the christian bible-makers were able to find only five that could be twisted to make allusion to christ--the ii, xlv, lxxii, xcviii, and cxviii, and from these certain sentences were selected, and these verses have as much connection with christ or his kingdom as they have with the man in the moon. six of all the chapters are supposed to allude to the church; those are above cited. david had not the remotest notion what would or could happen at any time during his life, or at any time after his death. he was a child of circumstances like saul, and like many other men after and before them. the same may be said of moses and abraham. opportunity makes the man, if the man is fitting, able, to seize the opportunity when it occurs. no supernatural power had anything to do with any one of these men, or any man that figured in the bible, any more than god had to do with men that played prominent parts as leaders, rulers, kings, or governors of other nations. whatever power, skill, intellect, or imagination was developed, it was the proper sum-total of the experience, observation, and instruction of the world's progress. the hebrews perhaps had special advantages in some respects over other nations, through their migratory instinct or inclination. the contact with so many other nations gave them the advantage of a broader experience and a greater variety of culture. david had enjoyed special advantages. after his first heroic action, he became the leader of a band of desperadoes. and saul himself unwittingly helped him, by making the bargain with david that if he, david, brought him one hundred foreskins of the philistines, saul would give him his daughter michal for wife. david with his band of chosen men brought him two hundred, and thus obtained his wife michal. henceforth david leads a kind of bandit's life, with his six hundred brave followers, evading saul, who is in hot pursuit of him, and meantime fighting other nations, philistines, amalekites, etc.; levying contributions, making conquests, whenever and wherever there was a chance; falling in love easily and gracefully as the most expert leader of a gallant band. the pretty, attractive face of abigail, the wife of nabal, was an irresistible temptation. nabal died from fright, it is said. later in life when he happened to cast his eyes upon the beautiful nude figure of bathsheba, he immediately fell in love. since he was a man of action he satisfied his passion almost immediately, and poor uriah, a captain of his, was sent to the war to be killed. he was a shrewd and bold warrior, a great lover of woman, a philosopher and a poet. his psalms bear witness of his acts, deeds, and thoughts. in consequence of his overindulgence with women he contracted a disease, a disease of which he complains most bitterly. psalm iv: his bones are vexed, he is weary with groaning--"all night make i my bed to swim; i water my couch with my tears" (verse 6). psalm xxxviii: he is in a sad plight: verse 3: "there is no soundness in my flesh;" verse 5: "my wounds stink and are corrupt because of my foolishness;" verse 7: "for my loins are filled with a loathsome disease; and there is no soundness in my flesh," etc. the gentleman in all probability was afflicted with a disease known as syphilis in its tertiary stage. there is more of it. a sober reading of these psalms will find them full of indications of human nature with its frailties, weaknesses, impulses, mixed with superstitious fear, a vivid imagination, and an excitable temperament. when his greatness had been established, many conquests made, great wealth accumulated, numerous victories gained, festivities were inaugurated. in order to honor god and the ark, david danced and jumped in complete undress before the box, in a true half-civilized fashion. we must not consider all these acts as faults. he simply followed the customs of the age. he was the highest representative type of the then struggling civilization. samuel began, saul developed, and david consummated a new era of this part of the world of human history--while other sections of the globe were keeping abreast in organizing and drilling the human race to a higher sort of culture, forming nations, establishing kingdoms, producing heroes, evolving lawgivers and poets, and advancing in the arts and war, etc. david died seventy years of age, leaving a large and numerous family. of his score of sons, there is none worth talking about, except solomon, his successor. the immense wealth he amassed laid the foundation for the glory of solomon, who spent it lavishly, luxuriously, freely. all in all david was an excellent character. he preserved the twelve tribes, exalting the nation, consolidating the government, making it respected and feared without, and giving them by his valor peace and security and prosperity for the next ruler and for the nation. this young gentleman, solomon, however, had been fed with a golden spoon. his senses and his passions were prematurely ripe. he did not have to search for opportunity; his desires were easily accommodated and satisfied. his indulgences were many and frequent, and his authority and arbitrariness were soon made manifest. he was surrounded with the best scholars of the day, and whatever facilities were then to be had were got, either in philosophical works or in other books. the higher studies consisted in close observance of moral conduct, and contemplation of the outer world without knowing anything more than the outward appearances. science, art, and mechanics were little known. the school of poesy had begun. theological disputes were in fashion, and thus theological doubt furnished ample food for conjecture, hypothesis, and imagination. men had already entered the field of controversy as to the falsity or the truth of the prevailing opinions. king solomon in all his glory was the greatest showman upon earth at the time he was living. let it be understood that it is not our purpose to write history. that has long since been exhausted; nothing new can be discovered. it may, however, be profitable to call attention to the fact that all these men that figure in the scripture were human, perfectly human. that they acted and spoke in accordance with the prevailing degree of intelligence and customs of nations. that in all their dealings and doings there is not one scintilla of evidence that they were anything else than perfectly natural. that they were struggling as a nation for a position among the family of nations. that their methods of warfare were no better than those of their neighbors. by good generalship, brave conduct, and hard fighting they gained influence, affluence, and prestige. by their conquests and victories they got into possession of a fair tract of land. by robbery and plunder they amassed an immense amount of wealth. by their continual successes under david's brave leadership they secured peace from their enemies, their surrounding neighbors; while those nations were subdued and weakened, the israelites became powerful and strong. a well-disciplined army, a strong and united nation, was the inheritance solomon received. he was the prince-royal--his father a clever king, and his mother the captain's wife, mrs. bathsheba, later queen-wife of david. he was the first real prince that had ever ruled israel--and also the one that caused their ruin, as a nation, by his extravagant and lascivious conduct. the scriptural story begins in kings, with the death of david. solomon, the prince of the blood, was now king in his stead. he ascended the throne when he was twenty-one years of age, having received every educational advantage of a prince. he, after moses, is the second ruler of israel that had been instructed and prepared for the high position he was about to occupy. that is the only comparison that can be made between him and moses. the latter was a giant of intellect, action, and determination, while the former was a luxurious debauchee and squanderer of his father's patrimony. why there should be so much adoration and adulation poured out on this man, i fail to see. because he built the temple and made profuse exhibition of his gold and silver? he could not have built it if his father had not plundered other nations, and given him, solomon, the money to build with. because he had an immense number of chariots and soldiers, decked with costly trappings? the money was there to provide these with, and later the people were pretty heavily taxed for his extravagance. the only real point of glory may perhaps lie in the fact that he had one thousand women to play with. we all know that he beats the record on that particular branch of human enterprise. there was truly none like him before or since. and lastly, we have his purported writings, consisting of the proverbs, ecclesiastes, and the songs of solomon. no sooner was he seated on his throne than he began to remove all objectionable persons, those that were likely to be troublesome or dangerous. his elder brother, adonijah, whose aspiration led him to great things, was dispatched by benaiah, solomon's future general. abiathar, the priest, he removed where he could do least damage. joab, david's general, who sought the altar of the temple for protection, solomon ordered benaiah to behead. zadock he made high priest in place of abiathar. shimei was the next man on the list for death, and benaiah received order to kill him. having removed all dangerous or antagonistic men, solomon settled himself firmly in his kingdom. those that are curious may read all about the temple, his house, the wall, cherubim, vessels and the like of gold, the royal palace, splendors, etc., etc. he became what is termed a glorious king, but luxury and women soon had their effect upon his judgment. he had reached the zenith of israel's greatness. he had touched the highest point of its eminence. it was the golden age of the hebrews--the age of pomp, pride, braggadocio, and exhilaration. jerusalem became the great center of attraction. everything obtainable was collected within its walls. no expense was spared. indeed, the city became the center of luxury, extravagance, and licentiousness. and solomon was surely, though slowly, paving the way for the destruction of the nation. the older he grew the worse he got. his reason gradually deserted him; he wasted his energy and his strength on his women, so that when he died he was despised, if not hated, by his people. and he left such a rotten condition of affairs that it tumbled to pieces almost before he was dead. in the course of human events, certain results follow a given line of conduct in the affairs of man. the current of events depends upon our actions, whether good or bad, better or worse. drain or waste of force and energy, of an individual or of a collective body as a community, state, or nation, slowly but surely weakens, undermining the natural healthy condition, and ultimately leads to a breaking down, and may bring about a final disintegration. solomon began his reign with an abundance. he had a plenty both of means and health; a most extraordinary opportunity, with an ample training and education; an immense, well-organized army; a stable, firm government, with a full quota of understanding or wisdom. as a rule men get wiser as they grow older. they acquire greater deliberation, sounder judgment, better understanding, more skill in the management of affairs, of man and of state. they are generally more conservative in their actions, more cautious in their dealings, more abstemious in their desires. their pleasures are restricted, their passions subdued, their wants few, and their pursuits in life so evenly regulated, their conduct so accurately adjusted, that a justice and a wisdom seem to guard every thought and every reflection. solomon's course was like that of a balloon. he started chockfull of wisdom. he was a marvel, and made a prodigious show. he was a startling phenomenon, the wonder of the age. (you know he asked god for wisdom and god gave it to him; why did not god keep him wise?) in old age he lacked wisdom. he had almost grown into a senseless imbecile. he was a squanderer of energy, a roué, a debauchee, a frivolous and licentious old man who frittered away his time and his brains on his women and their playthings. when the pomp, pride, vanity, show, and bluster of his youth and manhood were exhausted, all there was left was the remnants of a glaring painted show. he had, as it were, danced and skipped and capered, sung and spoken his lines, in a blaze of glory and extravaganza on the stage of human affairs; the curtain drops, and alas, you behold, when the paint and gorgeous dress are removed, a simpering, brainless old image-worshiper. but what a colossal church figure this man makes! what a miraculous personality he is made to be! what a wonderful creation of the christians' god! a pity some pope has not canonized him and manufactured him into a saint. as to his writings--if he really wrote them, and they were not compiled or written for him--it is to be regretted that his conduct was not regulated by them. a most astonishing perversion of truth is the attribution to the eight chapters of the song of solomon of the subject of the church's love unto christ. the following are the chief interpretations: chapter i, verse 1: "the song of songs, which is solomon's." meaning--the church's love unto christ. verse 5: "i am black, but comely, o ye daughters of jerusalem, as the tents of kedar, as the curtains of solomon." meaning--she confesseth her deformity. verse 7: "tell me, o thou whom my soul loveth, where thou feedest, where thou makest thy flock to rest at noon," etc. meaning--and prayeth to be directed to his flock. verse 8: "if thou know not, o thou fairest among women, go thy way forth," etc. meaning--christ directeth her to the shepherd's tent. verse 9: "i have compared thee, o my love, to a company of horses in pharaoh's chariots." meaning--and showing his love to her. verse 11: "we will make thee borders of gold and studs of silver." meaning--giveth her gracious promise. verse 12: "while the king sitteth at his table, my spikenard sendeth forth the smell thereof." meaning--the church and christ congratulate each other. chapter ii, verse 1: "i am the rose of sharon and lily of the valley." meaning--the mutual love of christ and his church. verse 8: "the voice of my beloved! behold, he cometh leaping upon the mountains, skipping upon the hills." meaning--the hope. verse 10: "my beloved spake and said unto me, rise up, my love, my fair one, and come away." meaning--the calling of the church. verse 14: "o my dove, that art in the clefts of the rocks, in the secret places of the stairs, let me see thy countenance, let me hear thy voice; for sweet is thy voice, and thy countenance is comely." meaning--christ's care of the church. verse 16: "my beloved is mine and i am his: he feedeth among the lilies." meaning--the profession of the church, her faith and hope. chapter iii, verse 1: "by night on my bed i sought him whom my soul loveth: i sought him, but i found him not." meaning--the church's fight and victory in temptation. verse 6: "who is this that cometh out of the wilderness like pillars of smoke, perfumed with myrrh, and frankincense, with all the powders of the merchant?" meaning--the church glorieth in christ. chapter iv, verse 1: "behold thou art fair, my love, behold thou art fair; thou hast doves' eyes within thy locks: thy hair is like a flock of goats that appear from mount gilead." meaning--christ setteth forth the graces of the church. verse 8: "come with me from lebanon, my spouse," etc. meaning--he showeth his love to her. verse 16: "awake o north wind; and come thou south; blow upon my garden, that the spices thereof may flow out. let my beloved come into his garden and eat his pleasant fruits." meaning--the church prayeth to be made fit for his presence. chapter v, verse 1: "i am come into my garden, my sister, my spouse. i have gathered my myrrh with my spice; i have eaten my honeycomb with my honey; i have drunk my wine with my milk; eat o friends; drink ye, drink abundantly, o beloved." meaning--christ awaketh his church with his calling. verse 2: "i sleep, but my heart waketh, it is the voice of my beloved that knocketh, saying, open to me, my sister, my love, my dove, my undented; for my head is filled with dew, and my locks with the drops of the night." meaning--the church having a taste of christ's love, is sick of love. verse 9: "what is my beloved more than another beloved, o thou fairest among women? what is thy beloved more than another beloved, that thou dost so charge us?" meaning--a description of christ and his graces. chapter vi, verse 1: "whither is my beloved gone, o thou fairest among women? whither is my beloved turned aside? that we may seek him with them." meaning--the church professeth her faith in christ. verse 4: "thou art beautiful, o my love, as tirzah, comely as jerusalem, terrible as an army with banners." meaning--christ showeth the grace of the church. verse 10: "who is she that looketh forth as the morning, fair as the moon, clear as the sun, and terrible as an army with banners?" meaning--and his love towards her. chapter vii, verse 1: "how beautiful are thy feet with shoes, o prince's daughter! the joints of thy thighs are like jewels, the work of the hands of a cunning workman." meaning--a further description of the church's graces. verse 10: "i am my beloved's, and his desire is towards me." meaning--"the church professeth her faith and desire." chapter viii, verse 1: "o that thou wert as my brother, that sucked the breasts of my mother! when i should find thee without, i would kiss thee; yea, i should not be despised." meaning--the love of the church to christ. verse 6: "set me as a seal upon thine heart, as a seal upon thine arm, for love is as strong as death; jealousy as cruel as the grave; the coals thereof are coals of fire, which hath a most vehement flame." meaning--the vehemency of love. verse 8: "we have a little sister; and she hath no breasts; what shall we do for our sister in the day when she shall be spoken for?" meaning--the calling of the gentiles. verse 14: "make haste, my beloved, and be thou like to a roe or to a young hart upon the mountain of spices." meaning--the church prayeth for christ's coming. these are the verses specifically interpreted and marked for christian worshipers. it must be remembered that the most decent were selected. to say the interpretations are absurd, is putting it very mildly. solomon had no more idea of christ than he had of the laws of gravitation. he was describing and writing about that which was constantly occupying his mind and his time. he portrays a love-sick swain, with all the details that are pleasing both to his eye and to his fancy. he gloats and feeds upon his passions, thus: "his left hand should be under my head, and his right hand should embrace me" (viii, 4). "how fair and how pleasant art thou, o love, for delights" (vii, 6). "there are threescore queens and fourscore concubines, and virgins without number" (vi, 8). "his mouth is most sweet; yea, he is altogether lovely. this is my beloved," etc. (v, 16). "thy lips, o my spouse, drop as the honeycomb; honey and milk are under thy tongue" (iv, 11). "behold his bed, which is solomon's; threescore valiant men are about it," etc. (iii, 7). "his left hand is under my head, and his right hand doth embrace me" (ii, 6). "behold thou art fair, my love, behold thou art fair; thou hast doves' eyes" (i, 15). it is an outrage on decency even to attempt to construe the intent of these songs. the man sang about his woman, like any other swain who delights in his love. solomon enjoyed nude beauties, as many men do in our day, and he represented the various parts of the female anatomy most accurately. he reveled in the luxurious contemplation of them. pull down the curtain of hypocrisy and falsehood and let's have the truth--as it was, as it is. solomon died at a pretty fair old age, having lived ninety-four years. the country had been harassed by robbers, the factions began to be restless, conspiracies were forming, and the people were nervously yet patiently waiting for a chance to revolt. no sooner was he dead than the nation split into two kingdoms. henceforth this people as a nation is doomed. it soon disappears from the family of nations. but--where is jehova all this while? note.--"solomon's wickedness became intolerable, fully confirming my former observations, that his wickedness began early and continued very long" (josephus, bk. viii, chapter vii). the two kingdoms--judah, israel. david was dead; joab the great general had been decapitated by solomon; and what samuel, saul, and david had built up, solomon had been very successful in pulling down. ten tribes revolted immediately and formed the kingdom of israel, selecting jeroboam as their king, 975 b.c. in order to establish a church, a temple, of his own, and his own gods, jeroboam made two golden heifers and built two little temples for them, claiming that men had built the temple at jerusalem as men had built the temples here, and so there was no difference between them. besides, they would save the journey to jerusalem. this change was immediately put into effect. one class or tribe was dissatisfied. those were the levites, and they emigrated to judea. this new kingdom of israel was not over-tranquil. prophets, and stump orators, agitators, naturally arose. dissension, bickering, and quarrels appeared. the outlook for the kingdom was not of the brightest. meantime jeroboam was in clover. rehoboam, the son of solomon, was made king of the two tribes, judah the fighting tribe and benjamin the king-giving tribe. besides these two tribes, we must not forget the levites, for because of them his kingdom was augmented. the priests of all israel were levites, and there were quite a multitude of them. rehoboam was a solomon on a very small scale. he had only eighteen wives and thirty concubines, and twenty-eight sons and threescore daughters. he followed in his father's footsteps and led a jolly life, as we should call it in our present age. in 971, four years after he ascended the throne, shishka, king of egypt, knowing of all the gold and silver solomon had stuck into the temple, invaded judea with some four hundred thousand men, etc., without opposition, cleared the temple of all the gold and everything of value, and returned home without striking a blow. rehoboam was a coward, he was afraid. as soon as judea was clear of shishka's army, rehoboam had these gold ornaments that had formerly decorated the temple, which had been carried away by shishka, replaced by brass trimmings of the same make and style, and delivered them to the keeper of the king's palace. these people were too like their brethren in israel, for "they built them high places, and images, and groves on every hill, and under every green tree" (1 kings xiv, 23). "and there was war between rehoboam and jeroboam all the days of his life" (1 kings xv, 6). these two nations therefore have been launched at a pretty fair pace on the downhill grade. judah, however, had the best of it. for the kingdom of israel lasted only two hundred and fifty-four years. shalmanezer, king of nineveh, takes samaria and carries the ten tribes into captivity. these are what are usually known as the lost tribes. lost nonsenses!--they had forsaken their former method of worship and adopted another. the kingdom of judah lasted to the time the temple was burnt, 588 b.c., having lasted three hundred and eighty-seven years--one hundred and thirty-three years longer than the kingdom of israel. and what is more, these are the very jews that are scattered all over the world. these latter are the representatives of these three tribes, levi, benjamin, and judah. and if any person is curious enough to inquire of any jew to what tribe he belongs, he will receive the answer that he belongs to one of the three above mentioned, that originally formed the kingdom of judah. why they were preserved is nothing miraculous. it has nothing to do with god or jehova, or the ark, or any special grace, as people generally believe. the reason is plain and perfectly natural. the levites preserved them, the levites sustained them, the levites were the brainy race. the levites, the priestly tribe who were appointed by moses, himself one of that tribe, to be the rulers, governors, lawgivers, fosterers, priests and preachers, were the brain of the whole nation. they clung to the idea of nationhood with all their priestly might, craft, and ingenuity, and are still clinging to it, with all their might and main. judah and benjamin survived only because of the levites. the miracle-mongers. at 958 b.c. abijah is king over judah. he reigns only three years. king asa follows, 955. nadab follows jeroboam, king of israel; dies; and baasha reigns in 954. "and there was war between asa, and baasha king of israel, all their days" (1 kings xv, 16). these facts go to show that fighting continued between israel and judah. foreign powers are now invited to help, and the struggle continues. in 918 ahab is king of israel. it is during his reign that a new class of men rise, agitators, talkers, prophets, and small miracle-makers. elijah makes his appearance. jehu had already prophesied against baasha; he was a minor star in the field of prophecy. elijah the tishbite, who was of the inhabitants of gilead, "said unto ahab," etc., says 1 kings xvii, 1. ahab was king of israel 918. no miracles are reported to have occurred after moses. joshua did not perform any, except that incident about the sun. during all these centuries from 1443, the date of joshua's death, up to the reign of ahab, not a miracle-maker appears. there are strong men, bad men, fighting men, priests, brave generals, very wicked men, etc., but none performs a miracle. another class of men are soon to appear. they, however, do not make their appearance until a century later, or so. i mean the nervous men, the visionary dreamers and prophets of the type of isaiah. in addition, any number of soothsayers, necromancers, fortune-tellers, and quacks had entered into the business of miracle-making on a small scale. and a new school of skeptics and philosophic speculators slowly developed. civilization had not advanced much, but it nevertheless was progressing. the minds of men had undergone an evolution. the jehova of moses, or the simple abstract form of the chaldean idol of abraham, had lost its force, prestige, and importance. the ark, that sacred box, is completely lost sight of in these stirring times of revolution, rebellion, dissension, and fighting. the high priest since the time of saul had to take a subordinate position. he was the minor oracle, the fault-finder, sometimes the counselor, but never the leader. there was also great competition among the prophets. the trade had grown profitable, consequently false prophets, as they were termed, were trying to gain royal favor. the ideas about god and jehova had increased and multiplied. disputes and confusion swayed the people. idolatry flourished, and the gods of abraham and moses were to some extent still sustained by the relatives of the man who created jehova, moses. man's progress in thought, the evolution of the human brain, is slow and uncertain, especially when the line of advance is of a speculative and problematic character. it is not like a scientific question, that can be demonstrated; accompanied by actual proof and absolute certainty; with no discussion or equivocation, no denial or speculation; which once established remains forever the same. euclid's geometry has never been disputed. hippocrates in medicine--whatever he said that was known and true, remains unchanged. everything that is based upon facts lasts forever. chapter xiii. jehova takes a rest. god rests and lets the hebrews take care of themselves for a period of four hundred and seventy-six years. during these several centuries we hear nothing of miracle or of prophecy, of any importance. in fact, we have passed the only time god or jehova made himself at all conspicuous. he never appeared again so prominently. he made his exit with moses. when we hear of jehova it is but the mere echo of his former self. it is not our purpose to examine or criticise the balance of the old testament, but for the sake of showing how human and natural is all the course of these people struggling and making an attempt to exist as a nation, it will be well to consider the actual state of affairs of god's people, after they had become a nation. joshua, the disciple of moses, the general and leader after him, subdued and conquered the territory moses had indicated, and divided the land among eleven tribes. he followed the example of his master. he was a man of resolution and energy, and at this time he had a well-disciplined army. he was quick and active in his movements, with the prestige of moses to back him. he made war on neighboring nations, slaughtered, hanged, and conquered, sparing nothing. he was shrewd and strategic. he consolidated the nation. he was wise, eloquent, and persuasive. this closes the existence of the republican or theocratic form of government, not a very glorious career of the hebrews as a nation. nothing very remarkable occurs during these four centuries, but we have a variety of incidents, all interwoven with superstitious notions of a barbaric, miraculous nature. besides the introduction of the box, called the ark, female agitators and heroines are introduced. debora and barak deliver the people from sisera, by means of mrs. jael heber, who drives a tent-nail through his temple while he is asleep. then there is great rejoicing and another miracle is performed. meantime they were in slavery under the assyrians for eighty years--freed by othniel; under the moabites eighteen years--freed by one ehud. under the canaanites they were in slavery twenty years, and were delivered by barak and debora. the midianites afflicted the country for seven years, and gideon delivered them. and this period called the era of the judges winds up with the benjamites abusing the wife of a levite, from the effects of which she dies. thereupon the husband cuts the body up in twelve pieces and sends one to each of the twelve tribes--of course through his brother levites. war is made upon the benjamites whereby they are nearly exterminated. lust, robbery, plunder, slaughter, superstition, and barbarism marked these few centuries with little intermission. the levites had utilized the time in establishing the church and their priestly order, and that was actually the governing power during the four hundred and seventy-six years, but always under the name of the god of moses, and was therefore designated the theocratic form of government. i ask now in all seriousness, can anyone possessing a reasonable amount of understanding really believe that a god, such as jews and christians would make us believe that jehova is, could behave in the manner recited in the history of the judges? it is a poor god that cannot restrain his people from committing crimes and depredations, restraining their brutal instincts and passions, keeping them in order, at peace among themselves and with others. these intestine quarrels began in moses's time, at the formation and organization of the jews as a nation, and ceased only with their destruction. the church which was called into life by moses was firmly established during this period with all the priestly paraphernalia of an egyptian temple. aaron may rightly be considered as the first pope of the church, and the levites the priestly tribe. "and these are the garments which they shall make; a breastplate, and an ephod, and a robe, and a broidered coat, a miter, and a girdle, and they shall make holy garments for aaron thy brother, and his sons, that he may minister unto me in the priest's office. and they shall take gold, and blue, and purple, and scarlet and fine linen" (ex. xxviii, 4, 5). these theatrical garments we have to this day in the christian churches. some additions have been made, corresponding and harmonizing with the events that have occurred since. we must not for one moment suppose that the hebrews were the only people that were active and struggled for existence--which existence in their case this jehova christendom still looks upon as most miraculous. as a nation the jews never invented anything. jehova is the only thing humanity at large has inherited, and he has been a cause of quarrel and discord ever since. joshua dies 1443 and saul is made king 1095. other nations during this period advance more rapidly in civilization without god, without jehova, than the hebrews do with his assistance. dardanus, king of troy, is busy building cities 1480 b.c. danmoni invades ireland 1463 b.c. perseus establishes the kingdom of mycene 1457 b.c. crockery is made by the greeks 1490 b.c. all kinds of tools and weapons are being made. at 1453 olympic games are celebrated in greece. hercules makes his appearance and arrives in phrygia 1225 b.c. the trojan war begins 1194 and helen elopes with paris 1204 b.c. latinus in 1239 reigns in italy. in 1141 the temple of ephesus is burnt by the amazons. many nations may be cited using dancing music. singing had already developed. i cite these few items to show that the world was doing bravely without jehova or god. in 1115 the chinese not only knew of the mariner's compass, but were compiling a standard dictionary containing forty thousand characters--which is said to have been completed by pa-aut-she 1100 b.c. these brief statements, these few historical facts--and there are any number of them--i recite for the purpose of showing that other nations developed, other kingdoms existed, other peoples had already made considerable advances in art, science, lawmaking, government, priestcraft, without god, without jehova, without the ark. these other nations had their oracles, their ceremonies, their customs. and what is more, they still exist as nations. they no doubt had their wonders, their miracles, their spirits, their souls, their ghosts, their holy of holies, their sanctums, their angels, and their divinities, and whatever else has from time to time been invented to control and deceive the masses and to satisfy the priests. what everybody should understand is that these hebrews during the theocratic form of government were no better than, and in fact not so good as, other nations, or any of their neighbors. the stage of civilization has never yet advanced beyond the natural capacity and capability of the people at any time. whatever stage has been reached in the world's progress in the past, it was in harmony and corresponded with the degree of nervous culture that had been attained. and just in proportion as the senses were developed, intelligence and understanding advanced. the senses are the sole originators of ideas. the collective experience and training of these senses becomes the standard by which we may judge the height of knowledge any class of people may have reached. nations kept pace with one another, copying from one another, imitating or modifying or improving those things and conditions with which they were brought in contact, whether by travel, commercial intercourse, or war. all these means of communication served as a means of exchanging ideas, of adopting, rejecting, or improving whatever degree of civilization had been attained. at no time has any individual, community, or nation been especially favored by any supernatural endowment, influence, or miraculous contribution towards their advancement. but each has always been improved by the force, energy, power, of some individual or individuals whose training and education has been such as to fit him or them to concentrate and carry out the ideas that have perhaps been floating for a greater or lesser time in the intellectual atmosphere. when civilization has outgrown the swaddlings of the times, something must yield. a change is sure to be effected. although it may not take place without a struggle, or at once, ultimately it will and must attain the necessary accommodation. change or revolution has never yet taken place without some new ideas having been evolved. doubts have arisen, and processes of reasoning have been set in motion, plans made, in order to upset the old ideas, to replace them by the new. new ideas and improvements ripen slowly. the minds of men are not ready to receive and adopt them. skepticism as to the existing state of things makes way for the newer and advanced condition of affairs. our understanding and reasoning faculties are limited to the state of progress and the steps that have been made in the advancement of civilization. we may be a little before our time, but never very much. we could never have had an electric light if volta had not discovered the battery. nor would steam power be so generally used if the marquis of worcester had not had the idea suggested to him a.d. 1663 of a way to drive up water by fire, etc. men must learn to know and understand that all knowledge, whether belonging to mythology, idolatry, fable, romance, theology, philosophy, or science--all rules adopted for our mode of conduct, either as individuals, communities, or governments--are the products of the brain, evolved by degrees by a perfectly natural process. and just as we advance from infancy to childhood, from childhood to youth, from youth to puberty, from puberty to manhood, from manhood to maturity, from maturity to reasoning, from reasoning to judgment, from judgment to wisdom, so humanity has gone step by step, through many thousands of centuries perhaps, slowly improving in intelligence, accumulating experience. observing so many phenomena in nature they did not understand, it was all surprise and wonder. and not being able to account for them, in consequence of the infantile development of their nerve centers, admiration of their beauty and usefulness led to gratitude and worship. and they at length made themselves images representing these extraordinary phases. thus idols in all probability originated. like children with dolls, they dressed them, painted them, played with them, imitated living beings in their form and shape, endowing them with some of the best human qualities or virtues known to them. the collection of these representations, especially the most prominent ones, formed in due time the center or focus round which fables and myths gathered. the older they grew, the more they were honored, till at length they became established institutions. the history of the human race begins with fables, myths, childish stories, and with idols. these prevail until some one arises and either disputes their authenticity or proves them unreasonable. this tends to produce new ideas, disputes, conflicts, angry passions, and separation. differences of opinion concerning old ideas and methods lead to the formation of new ones, especially when the old ones cease to interest and become impracticable or burdensome. new ideas in time take the place of the old ones, improved, modified, and adapted to the existing circumstances and conditions. the levites had for several centuries attempted to govern the hebrews by means of ecclesiastical discipline, laws, and leadership, but finally discovered that it was anything but a success. every form had been tried. they were threatened with destruction, in spite of their jehova and the wooden box, the ark. some new stimulant had to be tried to bring about a more healthy condition of affairs. to consolidate the nation if possible, to infuse a new spirit, and divert ideas from discontent, turmoil, and dissension, a king was suggested. samuel finding a very tall man who bore an excellent reputation for courage and wise conduct, one of the tribe of benjamin, he selected him as a proper person to become king of the jews. this man's name was saul. samuel himself not only was a clever priest and prophet, but also possessed the necessary qualities to make a good general. it was he who defeated the philistines after they had gained one victory over the israelites and captured their ark. during this period of their existence as a republic, an ecclesiastical republic--the theocracy, as it is called--they had to contend and struggle, and undergo many vicissitudes. it was barbarian fighting against barbarian. regardless of their having on the one side jehova and the ark, and on the other side dagon & co., the victory always remained with the best-disciplined or more numerous army, which also possessed good generalship. chapter xiv. the end of national life. the hebrew monarchy established under saul 1095 b.c., continued and cemented under david, and weakened and ruined under solomon, terminated in the year 975 b.c., lasting altogether one hundred and twenty years. this marks the culmination of national greatness and glory--and the rapid decline and disintegration. we now come upon the rise of a new class of men, prophets of a new school--visionary men, dreamers and agitators, reformers--besides miracle-mongers and fault-finders. discontent reigned. men began to sing the glories of their past greatness, the wonders of jehova, the miracles of moses, and the promises that the lord had made to their forefathers, abraham, isaac, and jacob, of the land that flowed with milk and honey. it seems almost unaccountable, even from a theological, christian standpoint, that god, jehova, the lord almighty, should not be able to exhibit his wonderful powers regularly, systematically, instead of by fits and starts, on special occasions, after intervening centuries. why should a god come and go by leaps and jumps, appearing and disappearing at distant ages, now helping and then punishing? why lead and mislead? why permit people to be so foolish and senseless as to create rival gods? why should he be jealous of a wooden god, or of any other kind of an idol? why should it be necessary to whip people into understanding god, knowing him? why were there so many thousand people slaughtered to force conviction of his marvelous powers? is it not an outrage on common sense for a god to stoop to mountebank tricks, subterfuge, and delusion, so-called miracles, in order to establish his existence, or his presence? if god made man, why did he not make him properly to begin with, so as to suit himself at least? why did he not make him so as to know the father right from the start? why should this almighty god, this jehova, keep his chosen people continually on the rack of transgression, crime, and folly? why did he create them so that they should so easily forget him, and devote their reverence, their veneration, their sacrifices, and their prayers to some brass or wooden image? the excuse so frequently made throughout the bible, as a reason for losing battles or being made captives, that the jews forsook their jehova, their god, is no extenuating circumstance. how comes it that the nations with the heathen gods were victorious and finally conquered the hebrew nation and led them forth as captives? the heathen gods must have been equal, indeed frequently superior, to the hebrew god, because they, the heathen gods, were so very often victorious, and finally subdued the hebrews. the two nations judah and israel fell into idolatry almost immediately. solomon even preferred ashtoreth, the goddess of the zidonians; and after milcom, the abomination of the ammonites (1 kings xi, 5), and how many other strange gods we have no record. israel began as a kingdom 975 b.c.; jeroboam, a servant of solomon, was the first king and hoshea the last; shalmanezer, king of assyria, took samaria by force, and drove the ten tribes into media captives, in the year 721 b.c.; this kingdom having lasted two hundred and fifty-four years, and having had during that time nineteen kings. the kingdom of judah lasted longer, beginning at the same time, 975 b.c. rehoboam, the son of king solomon, was the first king. the captivity of judah and the destruction of jerusalem was completed 588 b.c. judah had existed as a nation about three hundred and eighty-seven years. jehoiachin and zedekiah were the last kings. during this period they had about twenty-one kings. nebuchadnezzar, king of babylon, made a conquest of egypt, besieged jerusalem, pillaged and burnt the temple, and carried everything away that he could lay his hands on. with few exceptions, a worse, a more brutal set of men than these rulers never governed any nation. during their successive reigns, we find an unbroken succession of the barbarities which were at that time the generally recognized method of warfare, accompanied by licentiousness, and all the other savageries of these semi-civilized people. prophet traffic flourished in those days. there were as many kinds of prophets as there were gods, with a complement of priests to correspond. religious hate and intolerance was manifest on every occasion towards one another. to gain power and control the affairs of state was the chief aim and object. they would curse and destroy one another whenever a favorable opportunity occurred. two religious fanatics became especially conspicuous about 918 b.c., elijah and later elisha. the antagonism and hostility between the leaders of factions was now very intense. jezebel slaughtered the prophets of her opponents, and elijah, who was the leader of the jehova faction, cursed and raved, and many hundred prophets of baal were slaughtered (1 kings xviii, 19, 40). it was brutality against brutality, crime against crime, savagedom against savagedom. the bloody struggle continued right along, the slaying being employed on any and every occasion. thus he caused the killing of the several fifties, as related in 2 kings i. elijah was a zealot; harsh, bitter, and merciless to the opponents of his faith. as to the miracles, they answered the purpose well enough for a lot of ignorant, half-civilized country people. we have had similar tricks repeated by priests all along, deluding, cheating, and defrauding the poor simple-minded, ignorant classes. "and it came to pass as they still went on and talked, that behold, there appeared a chariot of fire, and horses of fire, and parted them both asunder; and elijah went up by a whirlwind into heaven" (2 kings ii, 11). how could a man go up to heaven? the atmosphere around this terrestrial globe is about two to three hundred miles in hight. the law of gravitation prevents the smallest particle from leaving the earth's surface, much more a body of the weight of a man. the whirlwind belongs to the earth, and never reaches beyond a certain hight. besides, everything taken up by a whirlwind or cloud in due time returns to mother earth. as for the horses and chariot of fire, in later days pious persons pretend to have seen similar appearances. a man sitting before a fire fancies he sees all kinds of pictures and faces; they are the reflections of his mind. so when one fancies representations of figures and objects in the clouds, or in the moon, they are either delusions of vision, or the fancied picture of the imagination. there are delusions of hearing. an unsound condition of the nervous system may produce hallucinations of such a nature; a disease or a mental derangement may occasion this sort of nervous disturbances. a new feature was introduced by these men--the healing art, resuscitating the supposed dead, casting out evil spirits, laying on hands, etc. a sillier piece of charlatanism was never put in print than elisha's miraculous resuscitating trick on a child in a cataleptic fit (2 kings iv, 34, etc.). a craftier or more cunning piece of business was exciting jehu, king ahab's general, to rebel, and to slaughter the whole of the king's family. elisha sends a young prophet to jehu to pour oil on his head and anoint him king, on his promise to exterminate the king's family (2 kings ix): "for the whole house of ahab shall perish; and i will cut off from ahab him that pisseth against the wall and him that is shut up and left in israel" (2 kings ix, 8). ahab, jezebel, and ahab's seventy sons were all slaughtered. all the great man's priests, and his kinsfolk, were slain. and elisha called together all the prophets of ahab's faction, all those that worshiped baal, and killed them all off. general jehu was made king as a recompense for the services he had rendered to the elisha faction. that was about 884 b.c. usurpation, conspiracy, and bloody crimes mark this period. intrigue, robbery, spoilings, lust, and degradation seem epidemic in these nations. when they were not fighting each other, they were warring with these barbarities. elijah had undoubtedly a powerful party at his command when he prompted jehu to revolt and assume the reins of government. he had everything pretty well organized when elijah said, "and it shall come to pass, that him that escapeth hazael shall jehu slay; and him that escapeth from the sword of jehu shall elisha slay." "yet i have left seven thousand in israel, all the knees which have not bowed unto baal" (1 kings xix, 17, 18). these seven thousand were no doubt his immediate disciples, not the commoner herd of people. he selected a man to succeed him, whom he no doubt knew well--a farmer, for elisha was plowing when he was chosen as chief agitator, arch-conspirator, and inheritor of all the rights and privileges of a revolutionary leader (1 kings xix, 20, etc.). this plowman, prophet, and conspirator combines in himself also the healer, preacher, and leader, etc. he cures naaman's leprosy, causes iron to swim, brings blessings to some and curses to others. these knavish tricks succeeded with the ignorance and superstition of the day. the people could be swayed in any direction by a clever, determined, bold talker, consequently were easily excited into the committal of any acts, no matter how revolting or brutal. these political factions led by prophets and priests were not so gentle and polite towards one another as they are at the present day. the church ruled. gods of either side alternately were in power. those in power killed off those who were out of power. whether it is elijah or elisha, leaders of the jehova party, or queen jezebel, leader of the baal prophets of the other party, the result always depends upon numbers and clever leadership. ferocious brutality never ceases but for a short while. there is not a spark of humanity, no mercy, not an act of kindness or consideration. menahem was king of israel 772 b.c. he smote tipsha and all that were therein. "and all the women therein that were with child he ripped up" (2 kings xv, 16). thus we have page after page marked with bloody crime in the book called sacred history, scripture, and what not. and alas! this is god's work, god's own book, god's own people. much has been said about the inaccuracies in the bible--the contradictions, the errors that are found. we are not concerned in any of them. we are interested in directing the attention of the reader to the book called holy scripture, a book believed to have been written by supernatural inspiration, relating to certain acts done by god; and these acts, accompanied by wonders, were performed for a people especially selected by him, that were under his protection, guidance, direct supervision; and their leaders, lawgivers, kings, priests, prophets, and teachers were by reason of their holiness in communication with this god, either directly or indirectly, and thereby were endowed with powers that rendered them capable of doing things contrary to the fixed laws of nature. we have endeavored to point to a few of the acts of the greatest and best men figuring in that book called scripture. these men were not divine nor were their acts divine. their acts were not humane, nor anything approaching what is understood to be humane at the present age. on the contrary, their acts were barbarous, savage, brutal, cruel, and in many instances outrageous. they, the hebrews, were no better than their neighbors the heathens, whatever their name or nationality might be. the heathen with their idols were just as good in war, in battle, as, if not better than, the jews were with their god, their jehova, and the ark, and finally succeeded in subduing the jews, burning their temple with god's ark, vessels, etc., taking them captives, and destroying them as a nation. it is evident from history that the principal men of the nation were corrupt; that both the kingdom of israel and that of judah were rotten to the core. they were continually warring with each other, as with other nations. their abuses gave rise to public agitators, who always found supporters. men of the elijah and elisha stamp never lose an opportunity, and they made the most of all of it while they lived. they introduced a school of thought and action that laid the foundation for new sects that culminated in the remote future. the belief in medical miracles was more firmly fastened upon the minds of their followers by the prophets, fortune-tellers, and healers, than by any class previous. other nations meantime were progressing in civilization--literature, the art of warfare, etc. greece was gaining laurels. homer appeared. hesiod wrote about 900 b.c. tyrtæus's elegies, archilochus's satires, etc., about 700 b.c. the persians and romans were rising and making rapid progress and conquest, soon to sweep smaller peoples and nations aside. these heathen made conquests, gained victories, transplanted the captives, and were altogether far more prosperous and successful with their idols than the hebrews were with their god. nothing else better proves that the struggles for supremacy among the human families were perfectly natural, each side depending always on their leaders, their skill in fighting, their bravery, and their organization; that their gods, their idols, their oracles, and their priests played but a small part in the transactions of life; and that all the gods, whether idols, or mythological, or jehovistic, and no matter of what nationality, had all about the same material value, power, and importance. from our modern standpoint all the gods may be classed in one category. we may safely pronounce them to be creatures of imagination, sprung into existence through ignorance, fears, and superstition. they are all alike false, frivolous, and foolish. they have not a particle of truth in them. and the gods that are now held in such high esteem by many people, are no better than the chaldean idols. judah is still struggling to retain her grip on her national life. every effort prolongs the agony. hezekiah is king 717 b.c. isaiah is the prophet. romantic dreamer, songster, critic, and man of visions, he sees distress, ruin, and misery before him; recalls the glories of the past, but sees none of the faults; sees the greatness of the nation of solomon, david, and saul, and now beholds the national degradation. he laments this dreadful condition with a bitterness of feeling. then he hopes against hope that something will happen in the future that will bring about a happy state of his nation and reproduce the golden prosperity of those glittering ages that are gone. this man is a close observer, a visionary man, and a critic. he writes and sings of his own people, of his own country. in the introduction which he gives himself in isaiah i and ii, he presents his vision concerning judah and jerusalem, etc. he reproaches them for their sin, iniquity, corruption, etc.: "your country is desolate, your cities are burned with fire; your land, strangers devour it in your presence, and it is desolate, as overthrown by strangers" (i, 7). his dream and hope of the future: "and he shall judge among the nations, and shall rebuke many people; and they shall beat their swords into plow-shares, and their spears into pruning-hooks: nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more" (ii, 4). this entire chapter, like most of the chapters of isaiah, is a work of the imagination. it is the fancy of a dreamer who mentally sees the thing he longs for. in his nervous exaltation, visions appear, incoherent, meaningless, except to himself. he brings different parts of different objects together, representing things and scenes he is familiar with, in the form of pictures, natural in parts but unnatural and impossible as a whole. "as for my people, children are their oppressors and women rule over them" (iii, 12). he describes the "tinkling ornaments" about their feet, and their cauls and their round tires like the moon, their chains and bracelets and mufflers, the bonnets, and the ornaments of the legs, and the headbands and the tablets and the earrings, and the rings and nose-jewels, the changeable suits of apparel, and the mantles, and the wimples, and the crisping-pins, and the glasses, and the fine linen, and the hoods, and the vails, etc. this portion is no doubt realistic. it shows his mental condition and the mood he was in. his humor changes: "now i will sing to my well-beloved a song of my beloved touching his vineyard" (v, 1). in this chapter he touches upon everything that strikes his fancy. hell, wind, land, instruments, lions, etc., etc., are all introduced. he rambles all over nature. imaginary ideas are mixed with realities indiscriminately, for illustration, comparison, lamentation, or complaining. high in the temple he sees the lord sit; sees the seraphim with six wings, etc. (vii). and in chapter viii he has a "great roll and writes in it with a man's pen concerning maher-shalal-hash-baz." verse 1: "and i went to the prophetess; and she conceived, and had a son. then said the lord to me, call his name maher-shalal-hash-baz" (3). isaiah lived after the captivity of the ten tribes. he also knows of the constant fighting between the ten tribes and the two, israel and judah. israel has been carried away captive to other lands and its country has been given to a people called cutheans, or samaritans. these cultivated and adopted in some measure the jewish religion. in moments of despondency he refers to them as he refers to moab and other nations elsewhere. the whole christian faith seems to be based on the prophecy of the ninth chapter of isaiah, 6th and 7th verses. isaiah starts out in this chapter speaking of the time when god first lightly afflicted the land of zebulon and the land of naphtali, etc. in the 6th verse he says, "for unto us a child is born, unto us a son is given," etc. that man has no reference to christ as maher-shalal-hash-baz. chapter viii, verse 8: "and he shall pass through judah; he shall overflow and go over, he shall reach even to the neck, and the stretching out of his wings shall fill the breadth of the land, o immanuel." this really means the son which the prophetess conceived, and called maher-shalal-hash-baz. chapter ix, verse 21: "manasseh and ephraim, and ephraim and manasseh; and they together shall be against judah," etc. he talks in a confused, mystified fashion, alluding now to this people, now to that; at one time to the tribes and at another to the moabites, assyrians, then to egypt or zion; dreams of tyrants, hypocrites, and his hopes revived about the remnants of israel. when he speaks of the child he has not the remotest dream of christ. he has no foreknowledge, except what his judgment suggests. he feels annoyed and irritated, then his hope and aspiration soothe and comfort him, and in chapter xi he describes a most happy state of affairs: "the wolf also shall dwell with the lamb, and the leopard shall lie down with the kid, and the calf and the young lion and the fatling together, and a little child shall lead them" (verse 6). "and the cow and the bear shall feed; their young ones shall lie down together, and the lion shall eat straw like an ox" (xi, 7), etc. the wildest and most extravagant kinds of interpretation are given to various passages in isaiah. into them the theologians force a meaning: chapter xxxv, 1: "the wilderness and the solitary place shall be glad for them and the desert shall rejoice, and blossom as the rose." christians say it means the joyful flourishing of christ's kingdom. in chapter xliii, verse 2, jehova declares: "i, even i, am the lord; and beside me there is no savior." he repeats it in chapter xliv, verse 6: "i am the first, and i am the last, and beside me there is no god." verse 8: "is there a god beside me? yea, there is no god; i know not any." chapter xlix: "listen, o isles, unto me; and hearken ye people from afar; the lord hath called me from the womb; from the bowels of my mother hath he made mention of my name." this is supposed to mean, christ being sent to the jews complaineth of them. chapter lv: "thus saith the lord, where is the bill of your mother's divorcement, whom i have put away? or which creditors is it to whom i have sold you? behold! for your iniquities you have sold yourselves, and for your transgression is your mother put away." it is said that this means, christ sheweth that the dereliction of the jews is not to be imputed to him, by his ability to save. this is the christian interpretation of the above passage. it is a misrepresentation of facts as well as meaning. why twist, torture, and falsify it? isaiah lived in stirring times. after the captivity of the ten tribes, the government and the people were corrupt. an invasion was at hand. sennacherib invades judea 712-711 b.c. the medes and assyrians were also fighting for supremacy. being an educated man, he knew the history of his nation--their trials, the triumph and the glory they had enjoyed, and the decline of this people with its pride and pomp to a passing away. he had ample material to supply his imagination; he therefore dreamed, sang praises, saw visions, hoping for something to turn up, miraculous or otherwise, to save the remnant of his nation. he cannot be compared to the two strong, rough miracle-mongers of israel, elijah and elisha, that had lived over a century before him. this idealistic dreamer had not the slightest knowledge of coming events, of what was to happen seven hundred years later. the minds of men had slowly undergone changes. the rigidity of the mosaic laws had undergone some modification, and some change in interpretation as to the meaning of the many commands and usages. with every battle and with every invasion new notions, new customs, were introduced. the transition was surely laying the foundation for various schools, which was inevitable as the intelligence and education progressed. after isaiah jeremiah comes, as a natural result of the age. manasseh, king of judah, had been carried captive to babylon, and restored to power 677 b.c. ammon and josiah follow. the latter is killed, and his successor, jehoahaz king of judah, is deposed and carried to egypt 609. three years later nebuchadnezzar conquers jerusalem. jehoiachin reigns three months, and he is carried off captive to babylon, besides three thousand of the principal persons of dignity, and among these was ezekiel (598 b.c.). zedekiah was appointed king. he was the uncle of jehoiachin, twenty-one years of age when he began his reign; a bad one it was, and he suffered for it. and he was the last of the kings of judah. in 588 b.c. jerusalem was captured and destroyed, the temple burnt; the sons and friends of zedekiah were slain; zedekiah's eyes were put out, and he was bound and taken to babylon. jeremiah had spoken a good many truths, and given them ample warnings what would happen. he met with a great deal of opposition--was thrown into prison and made to suffer for his boldness. his exhortations and his appeals availed nothing. the heads of the high priests and those of the rulers were cut off. the destruction was complete. jeremiah wrote fifty-two chapters, and christian interpreters managed to find two places in this entire writing that indicated christ's kingdom: chapter xxiii, verse 5; "behold the days come, saith the lord, that i will raise unto david a righteous branch, and a king shall reign and prosper and shall execute justice and judgment in the earth"--meaning, christ shall rule and save them. chapter xxxi, verse 22: "how long wilt thou go about, o thou backsliding daughter? for the lord hath created a new thing in the earth. a woman shall compass a man"--meaning, christ is promised. these are the only two spots whence any possible allusion can be drawn. this man is unlike the visionary, romantic dreamer isaiah, whose imagination and nervous exaltation kept him more or less in a state of excitability and carried him into regions of dreamland where his hopes and wishes were planted. jeremiah writes up the historical occurrences; passes judgment on his own people and on the nations his people had to struggle with, bewailing their corruption, wickedness, wretchedness, misery. he never dreams of christ or christianity, nor does he in any part allude to christ. he also, like isaiah, wrote and acted in accordance with the times he lived in. he was a steadfast friend to his disciple baruch. his lamentations describing the miserable state of jerusalem, bewailing its calamities, are perfectly human, and perfectly natural for a patriot and a poet of his time. ezekiel was in chaldea among the captives about 590 b.c. this man is also largely endowed with a prolific imagination; he is a visionary man. he adopts a new method of talking; when the word of the lord comes to him, "son of man" is the manner in which he is addressed. jeremiah uses the expression, "sayeth the lord," or "the word to jeremiah from the lord saying"----isaiah uses, "thus saith the lord." ezekiel wrote forty-eight chapters. the following are interpreted to mean christ: chapter xxxiv, verse 20: "therefore thus saith the lord god unto them: behold i, even i, will judge between the fat cattle and between the lean cattle"--meaning, the kingdom of christ. chapter xxxvi, verse 25: "then will i sprinkle clean water upon you; and ye shall be clean; from all your filthiness, and from all your idols, will i cleanse you"--meaning, the blessings of christ's kingdom. chapter xxxvii, verse 20: "and the sticks whereon thou writest shall be in thine hand before their eyes"--meaning, the promises of christ's kingdom. the political methods of governing nations which had their origin in the ages of barbarism, ignorance, and brutality, left the rotten remnants to construct upon them a system of rules for the guidance of the masses, to control, subjugate, and restrain their mental faculties, the development and advancement of their understanding, and to perpetuate the suppression of their higher intellectual powers. the beliefs in a god with the inferior natural human functions were handed down to us through many centuries, undergoing transitions and changes to suit the occasions, circumstances, and times. the toning down of the hebrew god is in the first instance mainly due to the beneficent influences of the heathen, as they were then called. the educational facilities the jews enjoyed during their captivity were of a better and higher order, and how much of the entire book called scripture is due to these opportunities afforded them we shall never know. history teaches us, however, that ezra, when cyrus was king of persia, 457 b.c., was permitted to go to jerusalem to collect what manuscripts and data he could find, and he is credited to have written the chronicles 453 b.c. how many more books or parts were written and compiled by ezra and his companions will remain a mystery. the work of resuscitating the nation--to recover its former importance, to reëstablish some of its former glory--was attempted seventy years later, under cyrus, who granted the jews the privilege to return and rebuild the temple. they were prompted to do this out of pure motives of patriotism, and it can be regarded only as a struggle to continue to exist as a portion of a historic people. the levites were instrumental in bringing about their return. the tribes were those belonging to the kingdom of judah. at this time an opposition temple and an opposition religion was established by the people of samaria, a mixture of cutheans and israelites. the rivalry and hatred towards each other was as intense as the hatred and bitter factional fight had been between the ten tribes and the two tribes israel and judah. affairs did not succeed well. there were quarrels, wrangles, application to higher authorities to arbitrate and decide their differences and disputes. new kings, new powers, came for conquest and plunder. new leaders, new governors, deceit, treachery, rebellion, assassination, mark these centuries under assyrians, persians, greeks, and romans, until 63 b.c., when judea was made a roman province. meantime new sects had organized under different names, each one giving its interpretation as to the signification of the laws contained in the books that were handed down to them. from the multiplicity of opinions, sects, factions, and fanaticisms, the already modified ideas were about to undergo a farther transition, that helped to inaugurate what might well be termed a reformation. while this nation was crumbling to pieces other nations had advanced in civilization, in art, science, and literature, that never claimed to have done anything under the influence of a jehova, or any symbol representing him. these nations--greeks, romans, persians--seemed to have succeeded better with mythological gods than the jews with theirs. they had laws to govern them, which required neither smoke nor thunder to make them. man, plain man, made them. some were surrounded with mysterious ceremonies, symbols; others were not. lycurgus reforms the constitution of sparta 884 b.c. carpets are made for tents about this time. the art of sculpture rises in egypt. buddha's religion is introduced into india, and an attempt is made to discover the primitive language of mankind by psameticus; and, what is of considerable importance, children are being educated in the grecian language and manners 660 b.c. these facts are mentioned to show that nations that were not hampered with the jehovistic religion, that had no miracles, wonders, or arks, were more advanced in the national sciences, had made farther progress in the general civilization of mankind, than the hebrews. the electricity of amber was discovered by thales, and he also taught the spherical form of the earth as the true cause of lunar eclipses, 640 b.c. schools of learning flourished in many places. authors appeared whose writings are classic to this day--sappho, alcæus, æsop, pittachus. solon's legislation in athens superseded the laws of draco. it was not the mosaic god that made these people intelligent, gave them their understanding. their enlightenment was due simply to the natural processes of the great nervous centers, independent of all supernatural interference. the school of statuary was opened at athens by depoenus and scyllis. comedies were enacted on a cart by susarian and dolon. dials were invented by anaximander, etc. learning is encouraged at athens, and a public library is founded. all this and much more occurs about 540 b.c. persia, too, is rapidly spreading its empire; growing powerful; progressing in wealth, commerce, and learning. zoroaster founds his philosophy, without bloodshed, rapine, or murder. rome is in a nourishing condition; takes its first census 565 b.c.--811,700 citizens--spreading its empire. we must ever bear in mind that all these nations were called heathen, and their methods of belief are looked upon by christian teachers as much inferior to their own. confucius, the chinese philosopher, is not inferior in his morality to any of the moralists of the age in which he lived, 522 b.c. and we may safely say he is equal even to the morals of to-day. manners, methods, and fashions change, but certain principles remain. we can examine the pages of the history of other human races and compare them with the jews, god's own chosen race, his own people, and the heathen takes the prize in every branch of science, art, and the progress of civilization. the hebrews for many, many centuries, with their blind infatuation with the supernatural, their constant superstitious practices of their ceremonial, their senseless devotion to an imaginary piece of extravagance, were so steeped in stupidity and ignorance that they had neither time nor inclination to observe and examine nature and its workings, so remained slaves to their preposterous practices. republics become fashionable. corinth starts with her republican form of government 582 b.c., and rome follows in abolishing a regal government and establishing a republic 509 b.c. the carthaginians make a voyage to great britain for tin, etc. sophocles, plato, socrates, aristophanes, and a host of renowned men rise to teach the world how to think, how to speak. philosophy, medicine, morality, poetry, history, comedy, tragedy, arts, and science had a firm hold on the public mind. a degree of refinement both in manner and in conduct prevailed among all classes. it was about this time that ezra and his companions were compiling--rather collecting--fragments for composing the book of chronicles. other books may have been compiled or written. nehemiah followed ezra. he rebuilt and repeopled jerusalem. for all that, nothing good of a permanent character was accomplished. time goes on, centuries accumulate; intelligence, experience, and a higher grade of civilization appear. nations grow more powerful. the struggle for supremacy continues, and judah, like a shuttlecock, is thrown about from nation to nation, now under one dominion and now under another. religious opinions, however, are forming. they are hostile, bitter, inimical towards one another; accompanied with all the hatred, jealousy, spite, that religious differences usually engender. they are all anxious to hold office, priestly or otherwise, consequently bribery, lying, and misrepresentation are the means used to gain the influence of those in power. the rivalry between the sects makes matters no better. the samaritan sect were already in existence when ezra returned to jerusalem. hostilities led to conflicts, and there was little peace between them. in judea there were several sects, holding various opinions. like so many political factions, each sought control, and tried to uphold its peculiar views and interpretations. the sadducees sprang into life about 244 b.c. this sect believed that the soul dies with the body; "nor do they regard the observance of anything besides that the law enjoins them; for they think it an instance of virtue to dispute with those teachers of philosophy whom they frequent; but this doctrine is received but by few, yet by those still of greatest dignity. but they are able to do almost anything of themselves; for when they become magistrates, as they are unwillingly and by force sometimes obliged to be, they addict themselves to the notions of the pharisees, because the multitude would not otherwise hear them" (josephus). this sect, one would judge, consisted of the wealthy and more enlightened class. "the pharisees live meanly, despise delicacies in diet, and they follow the contract of reason; and what that prescribes for them, as good for them, they do; and they think they ought earnestly to strive to observe reason's dictates for practice. they also pay respect to such as are in years; nor are they so bold as to contradict them in anything which they have introduced; and, when they determine that all things are done by fate, they do not take away the freedom from men of acting as they think fit; since their notion is, that it hath pleased god to make a temperament, whereby what he wills is done, but so that the will of man can act virtuously or viciously. they also believe that souls have an immortal vigour in them, and that under the earth there will be rewards or punishments according as they have lived virtuously or viciously in this life; and the latter are to be detained in an everlasting prison, but that the former shall have power to revive and live again; on account of which doctrines they are able greatly to persuade the body of the people; and whatsoever they do about divine worship, prayers and sacrifices, they perform them according to their directions; insomuch that the cities gave great attestation to them, on account of their entire virtuous conduct, both in the actions of their lives, and of their discourse also" (josephus). "the doctrine of the essenes is this, that all things are best ascribed to god. they teach the immortality of souls and esteem that rewards of righteousness are to be earnestly striven for, and when they send what they have dedicated to god unto the temple, they do not offer sacrifices, because they have more pure lustrations of their own; on which account they are excluded from the common court of the temple, but offer their sacrifices themselves; yet is their course of life better than other men; and they entirely addict themselves to husbandry. it also deserves our admiration, how much they exceed all other men that addict themselves to virtue, and this in righteousness; and indeed to such a degree that as it hath never appeared among any other men, neither greeks nor barbarians, no, not for a little time, so hath it endured a long while among them. this is demonstrated by that institution of theirs, which will not suffer anything to hinder them from having all things in common; so that a rich man enjoys no more of his own wealth than he that hath nothing at all. there are about four thousand men that live in this way; and neither have many wives, nor are desirous to keep servants; as thinking the latter tempts men to be unjust; but as they live by themselves, they minister one to another. they also appoint certain stewards to receive the income of their revenues, and of the fruits of the ground; such as are good men, and priests, who are to get their coin and their food ready for them. of a fourth sect of jewish philosophers, judas the galilean was the author. these men agree in all other things with pharisaic notions; but they have an inviolable attachment to liberty, and say that god is to be their only ruler and lord. they also do not value dying any kind of death, nor indeed do they heed the deaths of their relations and friends, nor can any such fear make them call any man lord" (josephus). these matters are quoted to show the changes and modifications religious opinions were undergoing, and must have undergone for many centuries previously, until they reached the present stage. the arguments, discussions, and reasons given, as well as the beliefs adopted, differ only in degree and kind from those when abraham and his father dissented from the mode of worship then extant in chaldea, some one thousand nine hundred years previous, and from the modifications introduced by moses, the greater part of which were adopted from the egyptians--whence the jews really got the first taste of civilization. these religious notions of the jews are the opinions, simply the opinions, of a small branch of the human family. there are a great many others. during all these centuries little or nothing was known of the natural, of the more intimate relations of nature and nature's forces. and of all nations the jewish race knew the least. they were too much occupied with the supernatural to ever learn anything of the natural. the supernatural idea sprang from the mire of ignorance and barbarism and savagery. crime and outrage mark the centuries as it rolled along in the tide of human events, halting only when forced, and renewing its current when there was nothing to bar its way--struggling madly, conquering, fighting, subduing. life was of no value, and everything was brutally crushed under this monstrous supernatural idea, until at length it was brought to halt by superior natural forces that in time crushed and subdued it. after one thousand four hundred years of jehovaism, of various shades and hues, this religion emerges from the past ages to the coming centuries in a new garb, slightly improved, somewhat milder in temper, and wearing altogether a new mask, so that neither father abraham nor general moses would recognize his offspring. chapter xv. the christian era. we come to the beginning of the second two thousand years of modified jehovaism, called the christian era. the christian era, like the chaldean-abrahamic era, and like the mosaic-jehovistic era, was introduced in a mysterious manner. both the mosaic and the christian were accompanied with miracles, differing in degree and intensity, as also corresponding with the changes and transitions of the times, the progress of intelligence, and the development of brain power. if moses had made the attempt to perform his miracles in christ's time, he would have been hooted. he could not have deceived these masses with his tricks as he did the ignorant horde he led out of egypt. these people had no opinion, no idea, no intelligence. they were the obedient tools and slaves of anyone who exhibited superior skill to control them and keep them in subjection, as the catholic and greek church make the ignorant masses subservient to their will at this day. the small end of the wedge of science had begun to make its way into the dense solid mass of ignorance and superstition, through the thick coating of jehovistic supernaturalism. this thin end, however, opened a chink big enough to give us the first glimpse of the natural. men began to think, reason, calculate. their past experience made them think and compare the various conditions of man and things in nature. philosophy, arts, science, had taken root, in opposition to and in spite of any supernatural theory or any jehovistic influence. the natural is the proper antidote for this supernatural poison. greece was one of the first nations that helped to lift the heavy fog that obscured man's intellectual vision: b.c. aristæus writes a treatise on conic sections, 380 dionysius invents catapultæ, 399 aristotle, the founder of the peripatetics, logician and philosopher, plato, diogenes, demosthenes (philippics), etc., 368 gausias of sycion invents caustic painting, the art of burning colors into wood and ivory, 335 lysistratus invents molds from which to cast wax figures, 328 the gnomon is invented or constructed to measure altitudes, euclid of alexandria writes his celebrated mathematics, that has never been contradicted or modified, and is used at the present day, 300 dionysius the astronomer at alexandria finds the solar year to consist of 365 days 5 hours and 49 minutes, archimedes the mathematician demonstrates the property of a lever and other mechanical powers, also the art of measuring solids and surfaces and conic sections, and constructs a planetarium, the art of making paper and printing invented by the chinese, 200 attalus, king of pergamos, introduces a book with leaves of vellum, instead of rolls, pasidonius calculates the hight of the atmosphere to be 800 stadia, scipio nascia invents a water clock, hipparchus lays the foundation of trigonometry, fixes the first degree of longitude, the meridian, these few citations i hope will be convincing proof of the progress made, thus showing that men were observing, reasoning, calculating, governed by demonstration and proof. it would have been impossible for moses, or any other man, to perform miracles of the nature theologians believe, at the time of christ. two conditions are always necessary for every miracle--profound ignorance on the one hand, and a clever fraud on the other. there are, however, another class of miracles, that are at all times in order; that are played and plied on human failing and human weakness, always coupled with ignorance on the one side, and dishonest scoundrelism, a fraud by a priest or church mountebank, on the other. in disturbances of nature, no one believes unless he has ocular proof and demonstration, knowing that these things are subject to natural laws and no one man could produce an earthquake or a thunderstorm. no man could stop the current of the mississippi river either by praying or by throwing a stick over it. what we can do, that has the appearance of a miracle, is to play upon the susceptibilities, failings, weaknesses, and imaginations of ignorant human nature. these cure-alls, these medical wonder-workers, these spiritual charlatans, these theological miracle-mongers, these fanatical frauds, were introduced more prominently in the bible story by the celebrated political agitators elijah and elisha. the christian form of religion is a modification of the hebrew, mixed with either greek or some other of the numerous doctrines existing at that period. the hero of this reformation is brought to our notice in what is scripturally called a miraculous manner. matthew introduces the subject by saying (i, 18): "now the birth of jesus christ was in this wise: when as his mother mary was espoused to joseph, before they came together, she was found with child of the holy ghost." we have noticed how (gen. vi, 2) the sons of god married the daughters of men--who the lady was, the mother of these sons, we do not know, or by what process they were brought into this world. there are instances in the bible when prayer had the effect of producing that interesting condition on woman. we have also the example of eli, that fat, lascivious priest (whose sons entertained themselves behind the altar with the ladies) who assisted hannah when the lord closed her womb. the temple has served many outrageous purposes, and many amusing as well as instructive lessons might be gathered. fortunately the jewish temple is no exception. the heathen temples were equally guilty. during the reign of tiberius, the romans had a temple of isis, and they had a god called anubis. a man with the name of mundus fell in love with a married lady called paulina, who bribed the priests to permit him to appear to paulina in the temple as the god anubis. the priest representing the god anubis invited paulina to the temple in order to be entertained by that god. her husband, pleased with the favor, consented. paulina was entertained all night at the temple by what she supposed to be the god anubis, mundus representing him. paulina was delighted, her husband also, but mundus could not hold his tongue. tiberius heard of it; he caused the temple, priests, and all to be burnt, and mundus was exiled for three months. the priests were crucified. anyone curious to know particulars about this matter may consult history. in modern times, living as we do in an age of reason, fact, and science, we do not take the same view of these particular occurrences such as the bible speaks of as our forefathers, the ancients who lived in an age of fancy and imagination. the holy ghost, unless he is in the substantial form of a man, can accomplish nothing, and either mrs. mary joseph had committed an act of indiscretion before marriage, or joseph himself was the father. it would be far more decent for all parties concerned to legitimatize the child. the effect or result would be just the same, since the young gentleman is to be the great reformer of that age, clever, meek, mild, amiable as he is represented to be in the new testament. mark begins his gospel: "the beginning of the gospel of jesus christ, the son of god." luke begins historically and then tells his virgin story (i, 27). john philosophizes, and tells us that (verse 18) "no man hath seen god; the only begotten son which is in the bosom of the father, he hath declared him." in verse 45 he is called the son of joseph. the entrance of christ into this world is the most stupid and ridiculous piece of nonsense that was ever written. if christ is the son of god he can be no relation of david, and joseph can certainly not be his father. or if the holy ghost was the cause of mary's condition before marriage, joseph condoned the offense by living with her, and is the father by adoption and not by nature; and can by no means be a relation or descendant of david. then again, if joseph is the father, jesus is not the son of god. in that case, he might be a relation of david, but no relation to god. men of ordinary education no longer believe either in the holy ghost, the manner of christ's coming, nor in his divinity. it is an absurd fabrication, an impossibility and contrary to nature. i repeat once more, that neither god, his spirit, nor his holy ghost, can perform anything that is in direct opposition to the laws of nature. the miracles that are attributed to jesus christ by matthew, mark, luke, and john are invariably of a medical nature; embracing all kinds--lepers, palsy, fevers, dropsy, the blind, the dumb, the lame--hemorrhages of women, casting out devils, curing lunatics, healing every disease. the manner of curing is very peculiar--by touch, by rebuke, by word, by spit and touch. a sample or two will suffice: mark vii, 32: "and they bring unto him one that was deaf, and had an impediment in his speech; and they beseech him to put his hand on him." 33: "and he took him aside from the multitude, and put his fingers into his ears, and he spit, and touched his tongue." 34: "and looking up to heaven, he sighed, and said unto him, ephphatha, that is, be opened." 35: "and straightway his ears were opened, and the strings of his tongue were loosed, and he spake plain." matt. xvii, 15, etc.: christ rebukes the devil out of a lunatic. chapter xx, 34: he touches the eyes of two blind men and they see. luke viii, 43: "and a woman having an issue of blood twelve years, which had spent all her living upon physicians, neither could be healed by any." 44: "came behind him, and touched the borders of his garment; and immediately, her issue of blood stanched." chapter viii, 54 (woman dead): "and put them all out, and took her by the hand, and called saying, maid, arise." 55: "and her spirit came again, and she arose straightway," etc. john ix, 1: "and as jesus passed by, he saw a man, which was blind from his birth." verse 6: "when he had thus spoken, he spat on the ground, and made clay of the spittle, and he anointed the eyes of the blind man with the clay." luke xiv, 2: he cures a man of dropsy, etc. that these cures were actually performed is not very probable, for the simple fact that the art of medicine was little known, and least known among the jews. that these four witnesses really were present at the time these operations were performed, we have no proof. luke says christ cures blindness by touch; john makes him use spit and clay. we are not told that he was trying experiments. anyway, every operation was successful. raising people from the dead was equally successful. why should we wonder that such miracles could be performed among the lower classes, rude, uneducated, and poor? they were ready to believe any kind of plausible deception; and it was among this class that he found his adherents. these performances called miracles are supposed to have happened nearly two thousand years ago. at that time the masses were not to be compared to the masses of to-day in education, understanding, or in the progress made in every branch of art, science, literature, mechanics, etc. the church christianity has also progressed somewhat, and there can be no possible excuse for the priests of to-day affirming these pretended cures of christ. they ought to know that the notions of these things are due to feebleness of intellect in the uncultured brain, to the lack of understanding and the gullibility of the masses. christ and his disciples were as ignorant as the masses concerning medicine or the healing art. they knew absolutely nothing about it. at 325 a.d., later 318, fathers of the then existing christian organizations approved of the entire contents. nay, a large part of it may have been manufactured by them. at this day there is no reason that men should not know better. every man, whether priest or layman, ought to understand that so-called miraculous cures can be performed only by men, priests or others, that premeditatedly, with intent, cheat, swindle, and defraud some portion of the public, in consequence of the ignorance of the one, and the superior knowledge, shrewdness, and cunning of the other. it is a flagrant abuse of authority, a miserable condition of our laws, a stupendous piece of bigotry, an outrage, that a man can be punished for speaking the truth, and it is an actual miracle that people are still so wonderfully stupid as to believe in the scandalous deception of the healing qualities of an old rag, a coat, pretended to have belonged to christ or some one else. recently we read in the daily paper, the sun: "berlin, sept. 26.--in treves, herr reichar has been sentenced to six weeks' imprisonment for ridiculing the holy coat and for attacking the roman catholic prelates because they encouraged the people to believe that it had healing qualities. his publisher, herr sonnenburg, was sentenced to three weeks' imprisonment. the chief charge against them was blasphemy." even in this city, some miserable cheat or cheats attempted to perpetrate the same sort of scoundrelism in one of the catholic churches. during the recent cholera desolation in hamburg, we read: "in all the churches services of prayer for the abatement of the plague have been held. they have been attended by crowds which have filled the buildings" (sun). in ancient times plagues were regarded as visitations from god; to-day we know that they are the products of filth and starvation. sanitary measures and food for the starving are needed, instead of prayer. the churches would answer a far better purpose converted into soup-kitchens and healthy lodging-houses for the poor and homeless. in russia the condition is still worse. the degradation of the masses is extreme. of the dreadful doings there we hear but the slightest echo. the russian priest is an ignorant, intolerant, selfish, tyrannical brute. in time of cholera the clergy walk in procession through the streets in church garb, with banners, crosses, candles, chanting and praying, while the dirt, filth, and cholera poison lie all around them. the pilgrimages to lourdes are another ecclesiastical swindle. the poor, miserable dupes are enticed in order to be plundered. from the tribune, "zola at lourdes," we quote: "nothing could be more truly sensational than the annual pilgrimage thither, the flocking to that shrine of tens of thousands of devotees, dozens of special trains running to it daily; the daily processions, with thousands of priests and tens of thousands of the laity; the fervent prayers of the supplicants, and the wild exaltation of those that are miraculously healed--or who believe themselves to be healed.... so m. zola, accompanied by mme. zola, were at lourdes, and following the crowd, proceeded at once to the holy grotto. he found it surrounded by more than twenty thousand people, of both sexes and of all ages and conditions. indeed in none of his novels is a more striking scene portrayed than that. in the afternoon the daily procession occurred. at its head marched no less than two thousand priests, monks, and nuns. then came the holy sacrament, borne beneath a silken canopy. after it came the sick and the suffering who had come thither to be cured. these were cripples on crutches or leaning on the arms of friends; the blind, led by their friends or fellow-pilgrims; sick and deformed infants in their mothers' arms; here and there a cripple and a blind man arm in arm, relying upon each other, the one for support, the other for guidance. behind these thousands came other thousands of suppliants, sightseers, perhaps some scoffers, while yet other thousands stood by and gazed upon the scene." it is indeed a miracle that we have so many such persons at this stage of progressive civilization. but the church and its priests have exerted every influence to prevent its advance. fortunately the world at large has outgrown this childish nonsense to some extent. the development of our civil laws, with a greater knowledge of the natural laws, keep the church and priestly fanatics in subjection. as to the resurrection of christ's body, or anyone else's body, we may put it down as fabulous and untrue. dead bodies do not rise--cannot rise. from the moment a body is dead the process of decomposition begins, and resuscitation is an impossibility. no one believes it, and the priest of this century even doubts it, though the manner of christ's birth and death forms the creed of christian believers, and reads as follows: "i believe in god, the father almighty, maker of heaven and earth, and in jesus christ his only son our lord, who was conceived by the holy spirit, born of the virgin mary, suffered under pontius pilate, was crucified, dead and buried. he descended into hell; the third day he rose again from the dead; he ascended into heaven, and sitteth at the right hand of the father, whence he shall come to judge the quick and the dead. i believe in the holy ghost, the holy catholic church, the communion of saints, the remission of sins, the resurrection of the body, and life everlasting." does anyone, except the most ignorant, believe any of the items contained in the above creed? the men that composed the old, and later the new testament, may have been sincere in their belief, may have acted from pure motives, and i give them credit that their endeavors were honest, that they knew no better. they could not know the truth, have knowledge of the natural. its forces, its capabilities, its phenomena--these were unknown to them. they erred, were mistaken in what they observed; that of itself is ample excuse for their opinions. no such excuse exists at this present time, and no men or set of men, however organized, priestly or otherwise, should be permitted to delude and stupefy the more ignorant portion of a community. the judge on the bench ought to know better than punish a man because he ridicules the efficacy of an old coat to cure miraculously. it is a disgrace to our civilization, and should not be tolerated. we have a right to criticise any idea, opinion, set of opinions, or ceremonies, no matter how ancient, how originated or by whom entertained or put into practice. we have as much right to protest against the truth or falsity of their statements, as any of our forefathers had in remote ages. any individual that permits his prejudices to get the better of his judgment, because he belongs to this or that church, is unfit to serve in a public capacity. the judge or magistrate that sentenced reichar and sonnenberg at treves deserves to be branded as the greatest jackass that ever decorated a bench. ridicule is the only weapon that wipes out these shameful practices, that helps to enlighten the masses, that elevates their thoughts and makes their understanding. it is disgraceful enough for the ancients to have crucified christ for his opinions, beheaded paul for his preaching, and crucified st. peter for his energy. abraham had a right to have his opinions. he differed with the chaldeans about their gods, ridiculed them, despised them, argued, reasoned, as best he knew how. he had to leave the land of his birth for his opinions. moses had a right to set up his jehova, organize a nation, and fight under his banner. he forced a success with superior numbers and superior skill. coming to christ, paul and peter had a right to their opinions. they suffered for their opinions, yet their opinions held. we of to-day have a right to deny the truth of their opinion. we have a right to deny any part or the whole of their doctrine, their pretensions, their errors; we have a perfect right to decline to accept their say-so for proof of anyone's having done certain things by supernatural aid. and neither church nor priest can force people to believe in their absurdities, when our reason, understanding, and common sense tell us that it is neither true nor possible. few men are so dull that they do not recognize the fact that it is unpleasant, as well as unprofitable, for an organized body of men, whether church or other organization, who have prospered, gained influence, control and authority over men, territory or wealth, by means of certain ideas or opinions, to be interfered with or encroached upon by a new and opposing organized body, with new ideas or opinions, lest the former might lose some of their influence, control, or authority over men, territory, or wealth. selfishness and self-preservation lie at the root of this, and every aggressive movement will be hindered, checked, or prevented if possible. chapter xvi. organic life--vegetable. the constituent elements that enter into vegetable life consist in the main of three elementary substances. these essential elements consist of oxygen, hydrogen, and carbon. the secondary elementary bodies consist of nitrogen and earthy elements, sulphur and phosphorus. there are also found other elementary substances in lesser quantities in vegetable structures, as potassium, sodium, calcium, magnesium, silicon, aluminium, iron, manganese, chlorine, bromine, and iodine. these are the materials of which vegetables are made. vegetables derive all the materials of their fabric from the earth and the air. plants can possess no simple elements which these do not supply. they may take in, to some extent, almost every element which is thus supplied. the elements above mentioned are not of universal occurrence, nor are they all components of any one vegetable tissue. although plants and animals have no peculiar elements; though the materials from which their bodies spring, and to which they return, are common earth, water, and air, yet in them these elements are wrought into something widely different from any form of lifeless mineral matters, under the influence of what is usually termed the principle of life. this may be said to consist of a favorable condition brought about by the union of certain elements, under a moist atmosphere and a high temperature, combined with other powerful forces in nature. "when this terrestrial globe began to cool the matter predominating in the atmosphere was water or its elements oxygen and hydrogen, carbonic acid and nitrogen; under the influence of a high temperature, and powerful sources of electricity, numerous combinations were produced between the elements; first carburetted hydrogen, then a nitrogenous combination, more or less analogous to the albuminous matter which we know" (huxley). among the innumerable combinations nature produced, during a series of infinite ages, slowly undergoing transformation, the mixture of these substances, acting chemically upon one another, generating and regenerating at the expense of their surroundings, composed the first living being. this being was of excessive simplicity, comparable to the organisms which we call monera. the sun's heat acting upon these elements, and the elements acting upon one another, produced motion. heat is motion, expansion, restrained and acting in its strife upon the smallest particles of bodies. the principles of life were first produced by the action of the sun's heat upon these vitalizing elements, setting them in motion, generating the required force. the surrounding condition being favorable, the simplest form of physiological life was produced. once under the influence of what may now be termed the principle of life, in connection with which alone such phenomena are manifested, the three or four simple constituents effected peculiar combinations, giving rise to a few organizable elements--as they are termed, because of them the organized fabric of the vegetable or animal kingdom is built up. this fabric is in a good degree similar in all living bodies; the solid parts, or tissues, in all assuming the form of membranes, arranged so as to surround cavities, or form the walls of tubes, in which fluids are contained. such a structure is called organized structure, and the bodies so composed are called organized bodies, because such fabrics consist of parts coöperating with one another as instruments or organs adapted to certain ends, and through which alone the living principle, under whose influence the structure itself was built up, is manifested in the operations which the animal or plant carries on. there is in every organic fabric, a necessary connection between its conformation and the action it is destined to perform. this is equally true of the minute structure, or tissue, as revealed by the microscope, and of the larger organs which the tissues form in all plants and animals of the higher grades, such as a leaf, a petal, or a tendril, a hand, an eye, or a muscle. the term organization formerly referred to the possession of organs in this larger sense, that is, of conspicuous parts or membranes. it is now applied as well to the intimate structure of these parts, themselves made up of smaller organs through which the vital forces directly act. protoplasm, called by huxley the basis of physical life, is nothing more than a homogeneous albuminous matter. an isolated albuminoid is not living any more than an acid or a base equally isolated is a chemically active body. but a mixture of two or several albuminous substances (a protoplasm contains at least two) might be living, similarly as a mixture of an acid and a base demonstrates the chemical activity of the two bodies. but, whereas in the combination of an acid and a base, the formation of a new body puts an end to the dynamic manifestations of the mixture; the albuminous matter which by its union gives birth to a protoplasm, that is to say, to living matter, is capable of generating itself at the expense of the medium in which it is placed, and in proportion to the dynamic manifestations which it produces, gives birth to some rejected excreta in its midst. living matter may be roughly compared to an electric pile, the elements of which are capable of regenerating indefinitely. this continual exchange of the elements of living bodies and the medium in which they are placed, is one of the conditions of life. life is the continued organization, while the molecules constituting the organized body (organism) are in a state of mobile equilibrium, or a continual renovation. a grain of vegetation, or an animal (rotifera) slowly dried, might not manifest any vital property for a long time. far from constituting an example opposed to our definition, it on the contrary goes to corroborate it. whilst the chemical elements which compose it could not act one upon the other, it was necessary that they should be dissolved: corpora non agunt nisi sulta. one might compare these organisms to a pile where nothing except the fluid is wanting. the eggs of certain animals (birds, etc.), that require a certain heat in order to develop completely, furnish us a case analogous to those chemical actions which could not be accomplished in a perfect manner except by a sufficient elevation of temperature. the long discussions that have taken place in the last few years on this question, the attempted efforts to demonstrate or refute the heterogenic doctrine, have but indifferently served the purposes of science. they have made us at least to see more clearly the impotence of chemistry and physiology alone to solve the biological problem. it is impossible for anyone to study with care the organization of the infusoria, and even the protista, and believe that beings so complex are formed by spontaneous generation. the size of an animal or a vegetable signifies nothing in this question. the imperfections of the micrographic investigation have alone permitted the notion of the creation of beings such as the paramecia, the mucidina, etc. even in the more inferior protista, the bacteria, and other schizomycites, the hypothesis of heterogeny is reversed by the simple observation that these beings present a very complicated metamorphosis. an evolution, that is to say a series of supposed forcible metamorphoses, a special condition of the germ, resulting from heredity, consequently proves a generation dependent on other than anterior organisms. this reasoning, however, demonstrates in an unobjectionable manner that the first living beings were formed independent of all preëxisting organization, and that these beings were as little organized as possible. the latest progress in chemistry and in biology permits us to raise the veil partly in recovering the obscure origin of living matter. animal-vegetables, protista. when we behold the plants and animals that ordinarily surround us, the distinction between the animal and vegetable kingdom is somehow intuitive. and it seems a loss of time and trouble to indicate the character which separates these two from each other. it is not the same when we descend the scale of organisms. then we arrive at an inferior region where the distinction disappears gradually, and we soon conceive the existence of a frontier zone between the animal and vegetable, a neutral territory which has been designated the kingdom of protista. they reproach naturalists for admitting the kingdom of protista, accusing them of doubling the difficulty, instead of abolishing it; since it is necessary to establish a distinction between protista, on the one part animal, on the other vegetable. that objection could be made every time they established a new division in the organic kingdom. it does not signify anything for those who know that all divisions that trench on biology are purely subjective and that nature does not bend to our strict system of classification. natura non facit saltus. all living bodies can be decomposed into visible elements under the microscope, and these have been named plastides or cells. that word is employed in a more general sense. the most simple plastide is the cytode, a simple mass of protoplasm without a nucleus or membranous envelope. a cell in a restricted meaning of the word is a cytode presenting a nucleus, that is to say, a mass of protoplasm in the midst of which is a distinct part of the substance ambient differentiated by its aspect and its property. 1. plants and animals are always produced under the influence of a living body similar to themselves. 2. they develop from a germ or rudiment, and run through a course of changes, to a state of maturity. 3. plants increase by a process through which foreign materials are taken, made to permeate their interior, and deposited interstitially among the particles of the previously existing substance; that is, they are nourished by food. 4. plants and animals alone possess the power of assimilation, or the faculty of converting the proper foreign materials they receive into their own peculiar substance. 5. connected with assimilation, as a part of the functions of nutrition, is a state of internal activity and unceasing change in living bodies; these constantly undergoing decomposition and recomposition, particles which have served their turn being continually thrown out of the system as new ones are brought in. this is true of both plants and animals, but more fully of the latter. 6. the duration of living beings is limited. they are developed, they reach maturity, they support themselves for a time, then perish by death sooner or later. mineral bodies have no life to lose, and contain no internal principle of destruction. once formed, they exist until destroyed by some external power. they lie passive under control of physical forces. life. the great characteristic of plants and animals is life, which these beings enjoy, but minerals do not. we may safely infer that life is not a product, or result, of the organization; but is a force manifested in matter, which it controls and shapes into peculiar forms--into an apparatus, in which means are manifestly adapted to ends, by which results are reached that are in no other way attainable. as we rise in the scale of organized structure from plants through the various grades of the animal organization, the superadded vital manifestations become more and more striking and peculiar. but the fundamental characteristics of living beings--those which all enjoy in common, and which necessarily give rise to all the peculiarities above enumerated--are reducible to two, viz.: 1. the power of self-support, that of nourishing themselves by taking in surrounding mineral matter and converting it into their own proper substance; by which individuals increase in bulk or grow, and maintain their life; 2. the power of self-division or reproduction, by which they increase in number and perpetuate the species. a striking illustration may set both points in a strong light. the larva of the flesh-fly possesses such power of assimilation that it will increase its own weight two hundred times in twenty-four hours, and such consequent power of reproduction that linnæus did not exaggerate when he affirmed that "three flesh-flies would devour the carcass of a horse as quickly as a lion." the distinction between vegetable and mineral is therefore well defined. but the line of demarcation between plants and animals is by no means so readily drawn. ordinarily, there can be no difficulty in distinguishing a vegetable from an animal. all the questionable cases occur on the lower confines of the kingdom, which exhibit forms of the greatest simplicity of structure, and of a minuteness of size that baffles observation. even here the uncertainty may be attributed rather to the imperfection of our knowledge, than to any confusion of the essential characteristics of the two kinds of beings (the kingdom of protista above alluded to). the essential characteristics of vegetables doubtless depend upon the position which the vegetable kingdom occupies between the mineral and the animal, and upon the general office it fulfills. plants are those organized beings that live directly upon the mineral kingdom, upon the surrounding earth, air, water. they alone convert inorganic, or mineral, into organic matter; whilst animals originate none, but draw their whole sustenance from the organized matter which plants have thus elaborated. plants, having thus the most intimate relations with the mineral world, are generally fixed to the earth, or other substance upon which they grow, and the mineral matter upon which they feed is taken directly into their system by absorption from without, and is assimilated under the influence of light in organs exposed to the air, while animals, endowed with volition and capable of responding promptly to external impressions, have the power of selecting the food ready prepared for their nourishment, which is received into an internal reservoir or stomach. the permanent fabric of plants is composed of only carbon, hydrogen, and oxygen. the tissue of animals contains an additional element, viz., nitrogen. plants, as a necessary result of assimilating their inorganic food, decompose carbonic acid and restore its oxygen to the atmosphere. animals in respiration continually recompose carbonic acid, at the expense of the oxygen of the atmosphere and the carbon of plants. chapter xvii. organic life--animal. we have seen that the principal elements, the most active, that enter into the composition of plant life, that form the food substance for the support and nourishment of animals, are mainly composed of three elements, oxygen, hydrogen, and carbon; that during evolution, growth, and development certain elements are absorbed and assimilated, while others, the gases, are exchanged. plants yield up oxygen and take in carbonic acid from the atmosphere, which they store up and elaborate. we have also seen that all the elements that enter into the composition of the various sorts of vegetation, are, chemically considered, seventeen in number. animal life. the animal, like the vegetable, is also composed of chemical elements, and by chemical analysis has been found to contain eighteen, as follows: 1. of primary or vital importance: oxygen, hydrogen, carbon, nitrogen. 2. of secondary importance, entering into the more solid structures: sulphur, phosphorus, calcium, sodium, chlorine, silicon, potassium, fluorine, magnesia, iron. 3. accidental constituents: magnesium, alumina, copper, and lead. the compounds found in the body are recognized as being derived from organic and inorganic substances. organic substances are obtained: 1. from plants and vegetables, and are termed carbohydrates or non-nitrogenous substances, being composed of oxygen, carbon, and hydrogen--as starch, sugar, etc. 2. from animals: nitrogenous substances; these compounds contain oxygen, hydrogen, carbon, and nitrogen--as meat, white of eggs; these are also termed albuminous. 3. mineral, elements of inorganic origin, as soda, potassium, phosphorus, etc. the more highly organized tissues found in the animal are composed of five elements, as muscle, brain, blood; these are oxygen, carbon, hydrogen, nitrogen, and sulphur. albumen, for example, exists in most of the tissues of the body, but especially in the nervous tissue, lymph, chyle, blood, etc. fibrine is found most abundantly in the blood and the more perfect portions of the lymph and chyle. gelatinous substances are contained in the cellular or fibro-cellular tissues in all parts of the body, as tendons, ligaments, cartilages, bone, skin, mucous membranes, etc. chondrine is obtained from cartilages, etc. the general chemical composition of these substances is as follows: albumen. fibrine. gelatine. chondrine. carbon 52.5 52.7 50.40 49.97 hydrogen 7.0 6.9 6.64 6.63 nitrogen 15.5 15.4 18.34 14.44 oxygen 22.0 23.5 28.58 sulphur 1.6 1.2 24.36 } 0.38 (inorganic } elements.) } phosphorus 0.4 0.3 ----- ----- ----- ----- 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 it will be observed that in the composition of these tissues, more than half of their constituent elements is carbon. there is but a very small quantity of hydrogen. the most abundant inorganic substance in the body is water, which is composed of oxygen one and hydrogen two (oh2). more than two-thirds of the body is made up of water. the body is composed of various structures. of the chief tissues of the human body, the weight is as follows: the skeleton 15.9 per cent. the muscles 41.8  ,,   thoracic viscera (lungs, heart, etc.) 1.7  ,,   abdominal viscera (liver, etc.) 7.2  ,,   fat 18.2  ,,   skin 6.9  ,,   brain 1.9  ,,   let us examine, briefly, each of these. the skeleton.--the skeleton, or solid framework of the body, is mainly formed of bones, but is completed in some parts by the addition of cartilages. the bones are bound together by means of ligaments, and are so disposed as to support the softer parts, protect delicate organs, and give attachment to the muscles by which the different movements are executed. there are two hundred and four bones in the body: the vertebral column contains 26 the skull--cranium and face 22 the hyoid bone--bone of the tongue 1 ribs and sternum, forming the thorax 25 the upper limbs--arms and shoulders 64 the lower limbs 62 small bones, including the patella or kneecap, to the number of 16 the organic constituents form about 33.3 per cent of the composition of bone, while the remainder, 66.7 per cent, is inorganic matter; as follows: organic matter (gelatine and blood-vessels) 33.30 { phosphate of lime 51.04 { carbonate of lime 11.30 inorganic substances { fluoride of calcium 2.00 { phosphate of magnesia 1.16 { soda and chloride of sodium 1.20 the mineral or earthy matter enters very largely into the composition of bone. a fibrous membrane covers bone externally, and is called periosteum. the hollow bones contain marrow, composed of fat, 96 parts; water, 3; connecting tissue, 1. bones are supplied with blood-vessels, which carry the nutritious fluid to them. 1. the master tissues. primarily, it is the tissue, and not the blood, that gets loaded with carbonic acid, the latter simply receiving the gas from the former by diffusion, and the oxygen which passes from the blood into the tissues being at once taken up in some combination. 2. nearly one-half of the weight of the body consists of the skeletal muscles, and about one-quarter of the total blood in the body is contained in them. 3. the muscles are always producing carbonic acid (co2), and when they contract there is a sudden and extensive increase of the normal production. 4. oxygen is necessary for the life of the muscle; it is for the nervous tissue, but for muscular tissue especially. 5. when venous blood, instead of arterial, is sent through the blood-vessel of a muscle, the irritability speedily disappears, and unless fresh oxygen is administered the muscle soon ceases to act and dies. 6. the oxidation power is determined by the tissue and by the tissue only. 7. all the available evidence goes to show that oxidation takes place in all the tissues and not in the adjoining blood. the master tissues of the body are the muscular and nervous tissues. all other tissues may be regarded as the servants to these. these tissues are the all-important tissues in the body. the muscular tissues constitute and carry out the power, force, or energy of the body. they set the body in motion. they do the work. they regulate the delicate movements of the organs of special sense or function, as the eye, the ear, the tongue, the nose, larynx, thorax, abdomen; and fighting, defending, building, destroying, labor and mechanical skill of whatever nature, depend on them. of exercise, sport, pain and pleasure, sensation, emotion, expression of the face, in fact all in all in every act of life, the muscles, the voluntary muscles, must perform the work. they are called the muscles of animal life. they are voluntary; they may be set in action at will. for guidance, control, coördination, sensation, and motion, the muscular tissues are dependent on the nervous tissues. it is not difficult to understand, i think, as will be explained later on, that all muscular movements are perfectly natural, purely physical and mechanical. the nervous tissue will be a little more difficult to comprehend, for causes that are reasonable and plain. all animals are provided with two distinct sets of organs: 1. the master tissues, the nervous and muscular tissues, the voluntary muscular tissues, which are the organs of animal life, the voluntary, the active organs that do the work, consume the food, and throw off the waste material; and 2. the servants to these, the involuntary tissues, the organs of organic life that prepare the food, carry it to the master tissues, and bring away the waste material. the inherent qualities of both these sets of organs are instinctive, with this difference--the former, the voluntary, the controlling and working master tissues, are capable of development, progressively, acquiring intelligence, maturing into educatedness, etc. the latter, the involuntary, are simply servants to these, and they perform their functions in the same manner instinctively all through life. the muscular and nervous tissues are the educable tissue. by repetition, practice, and exercise they improve and at length exhibit certain degrees of skill in the performance of their work. on the other hand, the organs of mastication, deglutition, digestion, absorption, excretion, circulation, and respiration simply perform their functions instinctively, without possessing the capacity of improvement, and without regard to volition. these act involuntarily throughout life, as preparers and carriers of nourishment to the master tissues, and removers of waste material. the work of the muscular tissues is comparatively easy to understand. we can see the work done, can account for it, can demonstrate it. the performances are capable of absolute proof, and controversy therefore is out of question. the nervous tissues present quite another state of things. the great mass of cerebral matter, with all its complicated organs and their appendages, are hid within the cranium of the skull. we have no ocular proof of anything that is done by that structure, or of the manner in which the tissue acts. that we can see, hear, taste, and smell we know. we recognize the organs that perform these functions. sensation, feeling, memory, thinking, cannot so easily be accounted for. among the masses it is a mystery to-day. the doctrine of a dual existence in man is old, still it is held on to with remarkable tenacity. the church still teaches and preaches that soul or spirit is a part of some great personality or individuality not at all connected with nature--supernatural, divine, godly. this supernatural part, it is said, is placed in man some time during the process of birth. this subject will be more fully discussed farther on, in order to show what queer views theologians formerly held on some scientific subjects. i beg to quote from a talmudistic scholar and philosopher some thousand years ago: philosophico-anatomical views of a celebrated hebrew author, after talmudistic interpretation. jehuda ha-levi ben samuel, whose arabic name was abulhassan, considered an authority and philosopher of repute, was born in castile 1085 a.d. he adopted medicine for his profession, but was also a traveler, philosopher, and student, and a talmudistic scholar and writer. he wrote a book called "sepher hakusir: book kusari." it is a philosophico-theologico-scientific treatise, conducted in dialogue between himself and the king of kusar, who became convinced of the truth of his argument and was converted to the hebrew faith. in the fourth part, section 25, page 246, jehuda ha-levi is explaining the harmonious working of the whole universe, and in evidence thereof he cites the world, soul, and year, very learnedly setting forth the mysterious working of creation, the supernatural origin and significance of the hebrew letters, the secret and hidden meaning of their number, etc. this is based upon the principle that one rests on three, three on seven, and seven on twelve, as follows: letters: three mothers, a. m. sh. alof, mem, shin. world, air, water, fire. man, chest, abdomen, head. year, dampness, cold, heat. letters: seven double one. b. g. d. k. ph. r. t. bet, gimmel, dalet, kof, fe, rosh, tave. world: saturn, jupiter, mars, sun, venus, mercury, moon. man: wisdom, riches, dominion, life, kindness, posterity, peace. year: the seven days in the week. the twelve single one letters not mentioned--man: organs of hearing, seeing, smelling, speaking, tasting, begetting, dealing, walking, thinking, anger, laughing, sleeping. world: the twelve zodiacs. "one on three and three on seven and seven on twelve. and these numbers have their functions in common one with another. for example, 'the kidneys counsel,' 'the spleen laughs,' 'the stomach sleeps,' 'the liver gets angry.' it is not to be wondered at that the kidneys have power to give counsel; we observe something similar when the testicles have been removed; one that has been castrated is weaker than a woman; the beard does not grow, and, what is more significant, the person can no longer give advice, counsel. the spleen laughs because of her natural functions, by reason of the blood being protected against the black gall and thickening and turbidity, and from this clearness, purity, nothing but brightness and joy comes. the liver is angry because of the bitterness she forms. the stomach sleeps by reason that it stands in relation with the organs of nourishment. the heart is not thought of, because it is the king. no more do they take in consideration the lungs and diaphragm, because they are necessarily so constituted to be of service to the heart; accidentally only do they serve the rest of the body, and are originally not designed to serve. the brain is under the senses, which emanate from that organ, and are thence distributed. moreover, as to the organs that are situated below the diaphragm, therein lies a deep meaning. these are the primary vegetations, the primary generatives. the diaphragm separates the vegetative from the animal life, as the throat separates the animal from the rational (plato in his timæus explains). out of the primary generatives, out of the world vegetative, there where the root of being exists, the seed comes, and there the embryo is fashioned out of four elements. god has selected certain parts for his sacrifices--fat, blood, the peritoneum on the liver, the kidneys. on the contrary, he did not select the heart, or the brain, or the lungs, or the diaphragm. this is a deep mystery; the explanation is forbidden. therefore the prescript, that the jezisa is permitted to be studied only after undergoing some preparation, by few persons, and only under certain formalities," etc. maimonides, or moses ben maimon (rambam), 1131-1205 a.d., wrote god hazaker, the strong hand, a very celebrated commentary on the talmud. he held similar views, and is also considered a very learned authority. the muscular tissues. the voluntary muscles are for the most part placed in close relation with the skeleton, being attached to the hard parts, and moving these in different directions by their contraction. the muscles are all symmetrical, and with the exception of the sphincters and one or two others are in pairs. each muscle constitutes a separate organ, composed chiefly of contractile fibrous tissue, which is called muscular, and of other tissues and parts which may be regarded as accessory. thus muscular fibers are connected together in bundles or fasciculi, and these fasciculi are again embedded in and united together by a quantity of connective tissue, forming the perimysium; and the whole is usually inclosed in an external sheath of the same material. many of the muscles are connected at their more or less tapering extremities with tendons by which they are attached to the bones or hard parts; and the tendinous bands frequently run to a considerable length either on the surface of the muscle or between its fibers. there are two chief kinds of muscular tissue, the striped, and the plain or unstriped, and they are distinguished by structural peculiarities and mode of action. the striped form of muscular fibers is sometimes called voluntary muscle, because all muscles under the control of the will are constructed of it. the plain or unstriped variety is often termed involuntary, because it alone is found in the greater number of muscles over which the will has no power. the involuntary or unstriped muscles are made up of elongated, spindle-shaped fiber cells, which in their most perfect form are flat, from about 1/4500 to 1/3500 of an inch broad, and about 1/600 to 1/300 of an inch in length; very clear, and granular and brittle so that when they break they often have abruptly rounded or square extremities. the fibers of involuntary muscles form the proper muscular coats of the digestive canal, æsophagus, urinary bladder, trachea, bronchi, gall-bladder, blood-vessels, lymphatics, etc. to this kind of fiber, muscular fiber, the term organic is often applied. the sympathetic or ganglionic portion of the nervous system, which consists of a chain of ganglia connected by nervous cords, extends from the cranium to the pelvis, along each side of the vertebral column, and from which nerves with ganglia proceed to the viscera in the thoracic, abdominal, and pelvic cavities. by its distribution, as well as by its peculiar mode of action, this system is less immediately connected with the mind, as conducting either sensation or the impulses of the will; it is more closely connected than the cerebro-spinal system is with the processes of organic life. the muscles of animal life, or striped muscles, include the whole class of voluntary muscles, the heart, and those muscles neither completely voluntary nor completely involuntary, etc. all these muscles are composed of fleshy bundles called fasciculi, inclosed in coverings of fibro-cellular tissue, by which each is at once connected with, and isolated from, those adjacent to it. each bundle is again divided into smaller ones similarly ensheathed and similarly divisible; and so on, through an uncertain number of gradations, till we arrive at the primitive fasciculi or the muscular fibers peculiarly so called. muscular fibers consist each of a tube or sheath of delicate structureless membrane, inclosing a number of filaments or fibrils. they are of cylindrical form, or of prismatic with one or more sides, according to the manner in which they are compressed by adjacent tissues. their average diameter is about 1/500 of an inch, and their length never exceeds an inch and a half. the arrangement of the elementary substances in a muscular fiber (the sarcos element or protoplasm inclosed in the sarcolemna, the sheath) composing a muscular fiber may be compared to volta's pile or an electric battery. in fact, both muscle and nerve are made up of electrical molecules, each of the two ends of which is negative--though the development of the electrical current is at present very imperfectly known. besides, there is every reason to believe that the ground substance is similar in nature to ordinary protoplasm, but without the granular character commonly but not always exhibited. blood-vessels are largely distributed in the substance of a muscle, carrying the materials necessary for its nourishment and chemico-vital changes, and there are also lymphatic vessels as in other vascular parts of the body. nerves run through every muscle, by which the muscular contractions are called forth, and a low degree of muscular sensibility is conferred upon the muscular substance. the blood-vessels of the muscular tissues are extremely abundant, so that when they are successfully filled with a colored injection the fleshy parts of the muscle contrast strongly with its tendons. the arteries, accompanied by their veins, enter the muscle at various points and divide into branches, etc. the nerves of a voluntary muscle are of considerable size. their branches pass between the fasciculi and repeatedly unite with each other in form of a plexus, which is for the most part confined to a small part of the length of the muscle, or muscular division, in which it lies. the voluntary muscles to which distinct names have been given in the system amount to about 240, and they naturally fall under the following four great divisions (the muscles are symmetrical and with few exceptions are in pairs): a. in the axial part of the body: 1. muscles of the head and neck, 75 2. muscles of the vertebral column and trunk, 51 b. in the limbs: 3. muscles of the upper extremities, 58 4. muscles of the lower extremities, 59 flesh and blood have nearly the same ultimate composition. on evaporating 1000 parts of blood it yields 790 parts of water and 210 parts solid residue. the elements that enter into the composition of the solid matter are as follows: flesh. blood. carbon, 51.86 51.96 hydrogen, 7.58 7.25 nitrogen, 15.03 15.07 oxygen, 21.30 21.30 ashes, 4.23 4.43 the general composition of a human muscle is shown by the following table: water, 744.5 { myosin and other matters, { elastic elements, etc. 155.4 solids. { soluble elements, 19.3 { gelatine, 20.7 { extractives, 37.1 { fats, 23.02 55.5 the muscles of the flesh form a large proportion of the weight of the whole body. calculated for a man of 150 pounds' weight: the skeleton, bone, 27 lbs. the muscles, 63  ,,  the viscera, with skin, fat, blood, etc., 60  ,,  the property of muscular tissue by which its peculiar functions are exercised, is its contractility--contraction or shortening. this is excited by all kinds of stimuli, applied either directly to the muscles, or indirectly to them through the medium of their nerves. the muscular tissues perform all the physical work--as locomotion, every kind of action and exertion--of the body. the quantity of blood circulated through the body is estimated to be from about 1/10 to about 1/13 part of the body's weight, and about 1/4 of that is distributed in the muscles. as regards the action of the muscles the following general principles ought to be kept in view: 1. that the force exerted by any muscle during its contraction is in proportion to the number of muscular elements or fibers composing the muscle. 2. that the extent of motion, in so far as it merely depends on the shortening of the fibers of the muscle, is in proportion to the length of the fibers. 3. that the direction of the force produced by a contracting muscle is in the line of the axis of the whole muscle if it runs straight between its opposite points of attachment, but in the line of the portion attached to the moving part of the muscle, or its tendon, if it be bent in its course, etc. the cerebro-spinal system. the nervous tissue. the nervous system consists of the cerebrum, pons varolii, cerebellum, medulla oblongata, the spinal cord with its nerves and the sympathetic ganglia, etc. the cerebrum or brain proper constitutes the highest and much the largest portion of the encephalon. the cerebrum consists of two halves, that are connected with each other by the corpus callosum, and with the peduncular masses of the cruri cerebri, the processus a cerebello ad cerebrum; the series of eminences, or cerebral centers or ganglia, concealed from view, named corpora quadrigemina, optic thalamus and corpora striata, etc. the cerebral hemispheres are by far the most bulky part of the cerebrum. various commissural structures unite the two hemispheres, including the corpus callosum and fornix; and some smaller structures, viz., the pineal gland, the petuitary bodies, and the olfactory bulb. the cerebral hemispheres together form an ovoid mass, in contact with the vault of the cranium, and with its smaller end forward, its greatest width being opposite to the parietal eminences. they are separated in the greater part of their extent by the great longitudinal fissure. the surface of the hemisphere is composed of gray matter, and is molded into numerous smooth tortuous eminences, named convolutions, or gyri, which are marked off from one another by deep furrows, called sulci. the cerebrum is divided into lobes for convenience of study, five in number, called frontal, parietal, occipital, temporal, sphenoidal, and central. the internal structure of the cerebrum is composed of white matter. it consists of tubular fibers varying in size in various parts, but in general still smaller than those in the cord, their average diameter being 1/10000 of an inch. the fibers of white substance present no division. they are arranged in bundles, separated by a network of delicate connective tissue, consisting of cells, etc. the cells are of various forms and sizes--spheroidal, angular, fusiform, etc. the fibers radiate from the white center of each convolution in all directions into the gray cortex, having a course for the most part perpendicular to the free surface. in passing through the gray substance they are arranged in bundles about 1/1500 of an inch in diameter, thus separating some of the nerve cells, etc. the olfactory tract and bulb, the corpora quadrigemina, corpora genicolate, optic thalamus, corpora striata, are all more or less mixed. they possess gray matter. the nerves immediately connected with the brain are of several kinds. and there are twelve pairs of them. they are called cerebral nerves. there are four kinds. 1. nerves of special sense. 2. nerves of common sensation. 3. nerves of motion. 4. mixed nerves of sensation and motion. the nerves of special sense may with great propriety be termed the nerves of observation, perception--the gateways of intelligence and education. i.--nerves of special sense: 1. the olfactory supplies the nose, special sense of smell. 2. the optic supplies the eye, special sense of sight. 3. the auditory supplies the ear, special sense of hearing. 4. part of the glosso-pharyngeal supplies the tongue and pharynx. 5. the gustatory, lingual branch of the fifth, supplies the tongue, sense of taste. ii.--nerves of common sensation: 1. the ophthalmic supplies the eye. 2. the superior maxillary supplies the upper jaw and teeth. 3. the inferior maxillary supplies the lower jaw and teeth. iii.--nerves of motion: 1. the third nerve, motor acuti. } } 2. the fourth nerve, trochlear or } supply the muscles pathetic. } of the eye. } 3. the fifth, branch of fifth. } } 4. the sixth, abducers. } 5. the facial nerve supplies the muscles of the face. 6. the hyperglossal supplies the muscles of the tongue. iv.--mixed nerves: 1. the pneumogastric supplies lungs, heart, stomach, larynx, etc. 2. the spinal accessory supplies some muscles of the back. the average weight of the brain in the adult male is about 49 1/2 ounces, a little more than three pounds avoirdupois; in the female 44 ounces; the average difference between the two being from 5 to 6 ounces. the spinal cord has a length of about 16 to 17 inches, and weighs about 1 1/2 ounces. the spinal cord is a continuation of the medulla oblongata, is lodged in the spinal canal, and gives off 31 pairs of nerves, that supply all the muscles of the body with sensitive and motor nerves. the medulla oblongata is pyramidal in form, having its broad extremity upwards. it is expanded laterally at its upper part. its length from the pons varolii to the lower extremity of the pyramid is about an inch and a quarter; its greatest breadth is nearly an inch; and its thickness from before backwards is about three-quarters of an inch. the medulla is the link between the brain and the spinal cord. the majority of centers for various organic functions are situated in it; as follows: 1. the respiratory center, with its neighboring convulsive center (venous blood excites convulsive centers, etc.). 2. the vaso-motor center. 3. the cardiac-inhibitory center. 4. the diabetic center, or center for producing artificial diabetes. 5. the center for deglutition. 6. the center for the movements of the æsophagus, with its vomiting center. 7. the center for reflex excitation of the secretion of saliva, with which may be associated the center through which the væjus (pneumogastric) influences the secretions of pancreatic juice, and possibly of the other digestive juices. 8. the center for the dilation of the pupil by means of the cervical sympathetic. from the surface of the medulla certain of the cranial nerves arise, namely the sixth (abducens), glosso-pharyngeal, pneumogastric, spinal accessory, etc. the fibers from the spinal cord pass upwards through the medulla oblongata and various other structures and finally reach the cerebrum. the cerebellum, or hinder brain, consists of a body, and of three pairs of crura or peduncles, by which it is connected with the rest of the cerebro-spinal axis. the cerebellum is covered with a gray cortical substance, rather darker than that of the cerebrum. its greatest diameter is transverse, and extends to about three and a half or four inches; its width from before backwards is about two or two and a half inches; and its greatest depth is about two inches, but it is much thinner round its outer border. it consists of two lateral hemispheres joined by a median portion called the vermiform process, and other structures therewith connected, etc. minute structure: the cortical gray substance is composed of an external clear gray layer, an inner grayish-red "granule" layer, and between the two a single layer of large cells with long processes, termed the corpuscles of porkinge (after the man who first described them). outside all is the layer of fibers and vessels of the pia mater. the external layer consists of a delicate matrix, probably of the nature of connective tissue, consisting of cells and fibers, etc. the cerebellum is probably concerned in the coördination of movements. its functions seem especially connected with afferent impulses proceeding from the semicircular coats. the spinal cord is a cylindriform column of nerve substance connected above with the brain, through the medium of the medulla oblongata, terminating below, about the lower border of the first lumbar vertebra, in a slender filament of gray or vesicular substance, the filum terminale, which lies in the midst of knots of many nerves forming the codæ equina. through the center of the cord, running in a longitudinal direction, is a minute canal, which is continuous through the whole length of the cord, and opens above into the space at the back of the medulla oblongata and pons varolii, called the fourth ventricle; the aqueduct of silvius connects it with the third ventricle, lateral and fifth ventricles, near the base of the brain. the cerebro-spinal fluid circulates in the interior of these ventricles and spinal cord. what precise mechanical function it subserves is only surmised, not known. the cerebro-spinal axis is protected by three membranes, named also meninges. they are: 1. an external fibrous membrane, named dura mater, which closely lines the interior of the skull, and forms a loose sheath in the spinal canal; 2. an internal areolo-vascular tunic, the pia mater, which accurately covers the brain and spinal cord; and, 3. an intermediate membrane, the arachnoid, which lies over the pia mater, the two being in some places in close connection, and in others separated by a considerable space. the sympathetic nerves are distributed in general to all the internal viscera, and to the coats of the blood-vessels. some organs, however, receive their nerves also from the cerebro-spinal system, as the lungs, the heart, and the upper and lower parts of the alimentary canal. the great gangliated cords consist of two series, in each of which the ganglia are connected by intervening cords. these cords are placed symmetrically in front of the vertebral column and extend from the base of the skull to the coccyx. with respect to the functions of the sympathetic nervous system, it may be stated generally that the sympathetic nerve fibers are simple conductors of impressions as those of the cerebro-spinal system are, and that the ganglionic centers have (each in its appropriate sphere) the like powers of conducting and of communicating impressions. the general processes which the sympathetic appears to influence, are those of involuntary motion, secretion, and nutrition. nerve centers. this term is applied to all those parts of the nervous system which contain ganglion corpuscles, or vesicular nerve-substance--i.e., the brain, spinal cord, and the several ganglia which belong to the cerebro-spinal and the sympathetic system. each of these nervous centers has a proper range of functions, the extent of which bears a direct proportion to the number of nerve fibers that connect it with the various organs of the body, and with other nervous centers; but they all have certain general properties and modes of action common to them as nervous centers. the brain does not issue any force, except when itself impressed by some force from within, or stimulated by an impression from without; neither do the other nerve centers without such previous impressions produce or issue motor impulses. the more certain and general office of all the nervous centers is that of variously disposing and transferring the impressions that reach them through the several centripetal fibers. in nerve fibers impressions are conducted only in the simple isolated course of the fiber; in all the nervous centers an impression may not only be conducted, but also communicated; in the brain alone it may be perceived. in all cases in which the mind either has cognizance of, or exercises influence on, the process carried on in any part supplied with the sympathetic nerve, there must be conduction of impressions through all the nervous centers between the brain and the part. but instead of, or as well as, being conducted, impressions made on nervous centers may be communicated from the fibers that brought them to others, and in this communication may be either transferred, diffused, or reflected. along nerve fibers impressions or conditions of excitement are simply conducted; in nerve centers they may be made to deviate from their course, and may be variously diffused, reflected, or otherwise disposed of. function of nerves. the office of nerves as simple conveyors or conductors of nervous impressions is of a twofold kind: 1. they serve to convey to the nervous centers the impressions made upon the peripheral extremities or parts of their course; 2. they serve to transmit impressions from the brain and other nervous centers to the parts to which they are distributed. for this twofold office of the nerves two distinct sets of nerve fibers are provided, in both the cerebro-spinal and sympathetic systems. those which convey impressions from the periphery to the center are classed together as centripetal or afferent nerves, or nerves of sensation--sensitive nerves. those, on the other hand, which are employed to transmit central impulses to the periphery are classed as centrifugal or afferent nerves or motor nerves, conveying impulses to the voluntary and involuntary muscles, etc. nerves are constructed of minute fibers or tubules full of nervous matter, arranged in parallel or interlacing bundles, which bundles are connected by intervening connective tissue in which their principal blood-vessels ramify. the size of nerve fibers varies, and the same fibers do not preserve the same diameter through their whole length, being largest in their course within their trunk and branches of nerves, in which the majority measure from 1/2000 to 1/3000 of an inch in diameter. as they approach the brain or spinal cord, and generally also in the tissue in which they are distributed, they gradually become smaller. in the gray or vesicular substance of the brain or spinal cord they generally do not measure more than from 1/10000 to 1/14000 of an inch. the chemical composition of nervous matter. like most of the other tissues of the body, the nervous substance contains a large proportion of water (from three-fourths to four-fifths of its weight). of the residue which remains after the removal of this by evaporation or other means, the larger part consists of a phosphuretted fat, which may be obtained crystallized, and in this condition was termed protagon. the crystalline substance, however, is in reality a mixture of two other substances, lecithin and neurin. cerebrin is also described as being frequently met with in conjunction with lecithin. lecithin. neurin. cerebrin. cholestrin. carbon, 44 5 17 26 hydrogen, 90 15 33 44 nitrogen, 1 1 1 phosphorus, 1 oxygen, 9 2 3 1 chapter xviii. food and food-substances. there are two kinds of food: 1. those food substances that are derived from the animal kingdom; and, 2. food substances that are derived from the vegetable kingdom. food is taken into the system to replace the material expended by the human body, or the waste products which are thrown off from the master tissues. definition: food may be defined to be any natural substance, vegetable or animal, recognized as such, that has undergone neither the process of fermentation nor that of putrefaction. food may be considered in its relation to two purposes--the nutrition of the tissues, and the production of heat. under the first of these heads will be included many other allied functions, as for example, secretion and generation; and under the second, not the production of heat only as such, but of all other forces correlated with it, which are manifested by the living body. foods derived from the animal kingdom are called nitrogenous substances, or azotized. they are also known by the name of proteids. these are mainly derived from meat, milk, eggs, etc. of several we will examine the chemical composition. it will be well to state in general terms that all food substances contain in their composition from two-thirds to three-fourths, or even more, of water--some more, some less. proteids. albumen. caseine. syntonin. gluten. gelatine. carbon, 72 hydrogen, 112 oxygen, 23 nitrogen, 18 sulphur, 1 phosphorus, r. 2 non-nitrogenous substances. carbon. hydrogen. oxygen. 1. starch (amyloids), 18 30 15 sugar cane, 12 22 11 2. oils and fats composed of stearic acid 18 36 2 of mutton or beef, 3. mineral--saline matters, as chloride of sodium, phosphate of lime. animals cannot subsist on any but organic substances, and these must contain the elements which are naturally combined with them--in other words, not even organic compounds are nutritive unless they are supplied in their natural state. pure fibrine, pure gelatine, and other principles purified from the substances naturally mingled with them, are incapable of supporting life for more than a brief time. moreover, health cannot be maintained by any number of substances derived exclusively from one only of the two chief groups of elementary principles mentioned above. a mixture of nitrogenous and non-nitrogenous organic substances, together with the inorganic principles which are severally contained in them, is essential to the well-being, and generally even to the existence, of an animal. the truth of this is demonstrated by experiments performed for the purpose; and is also well illustrated by the composition of the food prepared by nature as the exclusive source of nourishment to the young mammals, namely milk. the composition of milk is: human. cow's. water, 890 858 solids, 110 142 --- --- 1000 1000 caseine, 35 68 butter, 25 38 sugar (with extracts), 48 30 salts, 2 6 -- -- 110 142 carb. hyd. nit. oxy. sulph. r (unknown). caseine, 72 112 18 23 1 2 in milk, it will be seen from the preceding table, the albuminous group of aliments is represented by the caseine, the oleaginous by the butter, the aqueous by the water, the saccharine by the sugar of milk. let us compare the composition of these four organic substances and water: oxy. hyd. carb. nitr. sulph. r (unknown element). water, 1 2 sugar, oh2+ 11 22 12 caseine, 23 112 72 18 1 2 olein, 6 38 21 among the salts of milk are phosphate of lime, alkaline and other salts, and a trace of iron; so that it may be briefly said to include all the substances which the tissues of a growing animal need for their nutrition and which are required for the production of animal heat. the yolk and albumen of eggs stand in the same relation as food for the embryos of oviparous animals, that milk does to the young mammalia; and affords another example of mixed food being provided as the most perfect nutrition. the composition of fowl's egg is: white. yolk. water, 80.0 53.73 albumen, 15.5 17.47 mucus, 4.5 yellow oil 28.75 salts, 4.0 6.0 the food substances. 1. amyloids, starch and sugars. starch is derived from grain and vegetables, as wheat, barley, rye, oats, corn, rice, sago, tapioca, beans, peas, etc. the vegetables contain from 75 to 90 per cent of water. starch and sugars are derived from such as potatoes, turnips, carrots, beets, etc., etc. the fruits are largely composed of water, sugars, and acids. all these classes of food contain only three elements.--starch: carbon. hydrogen. oxygen. 18 30 15 in their composition we have fifteen molecules of water presented carrying eighteen atoms of carbon. sugar: carbon. hydrogen. oxygen. 12 22 11 in this case again we have eleven molecules of water carrying twelve atoms of carbon. this is the chemical composition of starch and sugar food. 2. fats are also composed of three elements only--carbon, hydrogen, and oxygen. take the fat of mutton or pork: carbon. hydrogen. oxygen. 21 40 1 all other animal oils and fats are composed of these three elements only. 3. albuminous substances--meats, beef, mutton, veal, pork, birds, and fish, of all descriptions. 4. besides these, mineral salts, already mentioned. 5. and lastly, water--of which by far the greatest quantity is consumed. the quantity of food ought to be in amount sufficient to replace the waste products of the body. an amount should be taken into the system equal in kind and quantity to the material expended. since we know the amount of carbon, hydrogen, nitrogen, oxygen, and the salts that are excreted by the kidneys, skin, and lungs, we may easily calculate the amount of various kinds of food needed to replace them. the outcome being known, the income can be regulated accordingly. the expenditure or waste, we have seen, in daily loss amounts in carbon to about 4,500 grains, and in nitrogen to 300 grains; besides a certain quantity of water, etc. we therefore require starchy substances, meat and fat, water, etc., to replace the quantity lost. bread, for example, contains 30 per cent of carbon and 1 per cent of nitrogen. if bread alone, therefore, were taken as food, a man would require in order to obtain the requisite nitrogen 30,000 grains, containing of carbon, 9,000 grains; of nitrogen, 300 grains--an excess of carbon above the amount required of 4,500 grains. but a combination of bread and meat would supply much more economically what was necessary: carbon. nitrogen. 15,000 grains of bread (rather more than 2 pounds) contains 4,500 grs. 150 grs. 5,000 grains of meat (about 3/4 pounds) contains 500 150 ---- -- 5,000 300 so that 3/4 pounds meat and 2 pounds of bread, or its equivalent, would supply the needful carbon and nitrogen with but little waste. from all these facts it will be plain that a mixed diet is the best and most economical for man; and the result of experience entirely coincides with what might have been anticipated on theoretical grounds only. the quality and quantity of foods to be taken depends largely upon their digestibility. the quantity of food necessary for a healthy man taking free exercise in the open air is as follows: meat 16 ounces or 1 pound avoir. bread and all other 19   ,,   ,, 1.19  ,,     ,,   carbohydrates, fat, butter, 3 1/2   ,,   ,, 0.22  ,,     ,,   water 52   ,,   ,, 3.38  ,,     ,,   the quantity and quality of food taken into the system every twenty-four hours, should depend upon the amount and kind of labor done, whether muscular or nervous, whether sitting or not, inactive or active, whether indoors or out of doors; upon the kind of atmosphere we breathe; upon season and climate, etc.; also upon the opportunities we have of throwing off the surplus carbon and nitrogen that the system has been overcrowded with. these conditions determine the proper variations of the income, since that has to be regulated and corrected by the outcome, and amounts after all to just so much carbon, hydrogen, oxygen, nitrogen, sulphur, phosphorus, saline matter, and water as are contained in the proteids, fats, carbohydrates, salts, and water. it matters little how food is prepared. the main feature is that the supply is equal to the loss, of good and wholesome quality. whether the food is manipulated by an artistic $10,000 cook or by a plain, clean housewife, the result is the same. whether the special sense of taste, the gustatory nerve, has or has not undergone a high course of training and education, the fact remains that all that can be supplied is the necessary material that has been expended by the work and labor done by the muscular and nervous tissues. the subjoined results, selected from boussingault, exhibit in a tabular form the relative quantity of organic and inorganic constituents in several kinds of herbage compared in several cases with the root or grain. the water was previously driven off by thorough drying: ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- leaves of root of mangel mangel potato pea clover wheat wurzel. wurzel. tops. potatoes. straw. peas. hay. straw. wheat. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------carbon 38.10 42.75 44.80 43.72 45.80 46.06 47.53 48.48 46.10 hydrogen 5.10 5.77 5.10 6.00 5.00 6.09 4.69 5.41 5.80 oxygen 30.80 43.58 30.50 44.88 35.57 40.53 37.96 38.79 43.40 nitrogen 4.50 1.66 2.30 1.50 2.31 4.18 2.06 0.35 2.27 ashes 21.50 6.24 3.90 3.90 11.32 3.14 7.76 6.97 2.43 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------subjoined is a table from the same work of the percentage of mineral substances taken up from the soil by various plants: ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------substances acids oxide of which ------------------------------- iron, charcoal, yield ammonia moisture, ashes. carbonic. sulphuric. phosphoric. chlorine. lime. magnesia. potash. soda. silica. etc. and loss. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------potatoes 13.4 7.1 11.3 2.7 1.8 5.4 51.5 traces 5.6 0.5 0.7 mangel wurzel 16.1 1.6 6.1 5.2 7.0 4.4 39.0 6.0 8.0 2.5 4.2 turnips 14.0 10.9 6.0 2.9 10.9 4.3 39.7 4.1 6.4 1.2 5.5 potato tops 11.0 2.2 10.8 1.6 2.3 1.8 44.5 traces 13.0 5.2 7.6 wheat 0.0 1.0 47.0 traces 2.9 15.9 29.5 traces 1.3 0.0 2.4 wheat straw 0.0 1.0 3.1 0.5 8.5 5.0 9.2 0.3 67.6 1.0 3.7 oats 1.7 1.0 14.9 0.5 3.7 7.7 12.9 0.0 53.3 1.3 3.0 oat straw 3.2 4.1 3.0 4.7 8.3 2.8 24.5 4.4 40.0 2.1 2.9 clover 25.0 2.5 6.3 2.6 24.6 6.3 26.6 0.5 5.3 0.3 0.0 pease 0.5 6.7 30.1 1.1 10.1 11.9 35.3 2.5 1.5 traces 2.3 french beans 3.3 1.3 26.8 0.1 5.8 11.5 49.1 0.0 1.0 traces 1.1 horse beans 1.0 1.6 34.2 0.7 5.1 8.6 45.2 0.0 0.5 traces 3.1 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------chapter xix. the elimination of waste substances. the expenditures of the human body, or the waste products which arise from the activity of the master tissues, are thrown off by the excretory tissues, as the lungs, the skin, the kidneys, and the terminal part of the intestines. the lungs are hollow organs, and we may consider them as really two bags containing air, each of which communicates by a separate orifice with a common air tube, through the upper part of which, the larynx, they freely communicate with the external atmosphere. the orifice of the larynx is guarded by muscles, and can be opened or closed at will. each lung is partially subdivided into separate portions called lobes. the right lung has three lobes, and the left lung has two. each of these lobes, again, is composed of a large number of minute parts, called lobules. each pulmonary lobule may be considered a lung in miniature, consisting as it does of a branch of a bronchial tube, air-cells, blood-vessels, nerves, and lymphatics, with a sparing amount of areolar tissue. the terminal portion of each lobule is composed of a group of pouches or air-cells, which communicate with the intercellular air passages. these cells are of various forms, according to the mutual pressure to which they are subject. their cell walls are nearly in contact, and they vary from 1/50 to 1/90 of an inch in diameter. outside the cells a network of pulmonary capillaries is spread out so densely that the interspaces or meshes are even narrower than the vessels, which are on an average 1/3000 of an inch in diameter. between the atmospheric air in the cells and the blood in the vessels nothing intervenes but the thin membrane of the cells and the capillaries, and the delicate epithelium lining the former. and the exposure of the blood to the air is the more complete because the folds of membrane between contiguous cells, and often the spaces between the walls of the same, contain only a single layer of capillaries, both sides of which are thus at once exposed to the air. the enlargement of the capacity of the chest in inspiration is a muscular act; the muscles concerned in producing the effect being chiefly the diaphragm, the external intercostal muscles, etc. from the enlargement produced in inspiration, the chest and lungs return in ordinary tranquil expiration by their elasticity; the force employed by the inspiratory muscles in distending the chest and overcoming the elastic resistance of the lungs and chest wall being returned as an expiratory effort when the muscles are relaxed. the acts of expansion and of contraction of the chest take up, under ordinary circumstances, a nearly equal time, and can scarcely be said to be separated from each other by an intervening pause. the quantity of air that is changed in the lungs in each act of ordinary tranquil breathing is variable, but probably 30 to 35 cubic inches are a fair average in the case of healthy young and middle-aged men. the total quantity of air which passes into and out of the lungs of an adult, at rest, in 24 hours, has been estimated to be about 686,000 cubic inches. this quantity is largely increased by exertion; and it has been computed that the average amount for a hard-working laborer in the same time is 1,568,390. breathing air is the quantity of air which is habitually and almost uniformly changed in each act of breathing. complemental air is the quantity of air over and above this which a man can draw into the lungs in the deepest inspiration. after ordinary expiration, such as that which expels the breathing air, a certain quantity of air remains in the lungs which may be expelled by a forcible and deeper expiration; this is termed reserve air. but even after the most violent expiratory effort, the lungs are not completely emptied; a certain quantity of air remains in them, over which there is no voluntary control, which may be called residual air. its amount depends, in great measure, on the absolute size of the chest, and has been variously estimated at from 40 to 200 cubic inches. power of inspiratory power of expiratory muscles. muscles. 1.5 inches. weak 2.0 inches. 2.0   ,,    ordinary 2.5   ,,    2.5   ,,    strong 3.5   ,,    3.5   ,,    very strong 4.5   ,,    4.5   ,,    remarkable 5.8   ,,    5.5   ,,    very remarkable 7.0   ,,    6.0   ,,    extraordinary 8.5   ,,    7.0   ,,    very extraordinary 10.0   ,,    the blood as it moves through the respiratory organs is exposed to the air that alternately moves into and out of the air-cells and minute bronchial tubes. the blood is propelled from the right ventricle through the pulmonary capillaries in steady streams, and slowly enough to permit every minute portion of it to be for a few seconds exposed to the air, with only the thin walls of the capillary vessels and air-cells intervening. the atmosphere we breathe has in every situation in which it has been examined in its natural state a nearly uniform composition. it is a mixture of oxygen and nitrogen, carbonic acid, and watery vapor, with traces of other gases, as ammonia, sulphuretta, hydrogen, etc. of every 100 volumes of pure atmospheric air, 79 volumes consist of nitrogen and 21 of oxygen, about. the proportion of carbonic acid is extremely small: 10,000 volumes of atmospheric air contains only about 4 or 5 of carbonic acid. the average quantity of watery vapor in the atmosphere in this country is about 1.40 per cent. the changes produced by respiration on the atmosphere are that: 1. it is warmed; 2. its carbonic acid is increased; 3. its oxygen is diminished; 4. its watery vapor is increased; 5. a minute amount of organic matter and of free ammonia is added to it. 1. the expired air is hotter than the inspired air. the temperature varies from 97° to 99 1/2°. 2. carbonic acid in respired air is always increased; but the quantity exhaled in a given time is subject to change from various circumstances. from every volume of air inspired about 4 1/2 per cent of oxygen is abstracted; while rather a smaller quantity of carbonic acid is added in its place. under ordinary circumstances, the quantity of carbonic acid exhaled into the air breathed by a healthy adult man amounts to 1,346 inches, or about 636 grains, per hour. it is estimated that the weight of carbon excreted from the lungs is about 173 grains per hour, or rather more than 8 ounces in 24 hours. of course the influence of age, sex, respiratory movements, external temperature, season of the year, purity of the respired air, hygrometric state of the atmosphere, period of day, food and drink, exercise and sleep, have to be taken in consideration. the oxygen of respired air is always less than in the same air before respiration, and its diminution is generally proportionate to the increase of the carbonic acid. it has been shown that for every volume of carbonic acid exhaled into the air 1.17421 volumes of oxygen are absorbed from it; and that when the average quantity of carbonic acid, i.e., 1,346 cubic inches, or 636 grains, is exhaled in the hour, the quantity of oxygen absorbed in the same time is 1,584 cubic inches, or 542 grains. the nitrogen in the atmosphere, in relation to the respiratory process is supposed to serve only mechanically, by diluting the oxygen, and moderating the action upon the system. the most obvious change which the blood undergoes in its passage through the lungs is that of color, the dark venous blood being exchanged for the bright scarlet arterial blood. it gains oxygen, loses carbonic acid, becomes 1° to 2° f. warmer; it coagulates sooner and more firmly, and contains more fibrine. the venous blood as it issues from the right ventricle is loaded with carbonic acid. the oxygen present is insufficient to the whole of the hæmoglobin of the red corpuscles; much reduced hæmoglobin is present, hence the purple color of venous blood. as the blood-vessels pass through the capillaries of the lungs, this reduced hæmoglobin takes from the pulmonary air its complement of oxygen, all or nearly all the hæmoglobin of the red corpuscles becomes oxy-hæmoglobin, and the purple color forthwith shifts into scarlet. the hæmoglobin of arterial blood is saturated or nearly saturated with oxygen. passing from the left ventricle to the capillaries, some of the oxy-hæmoglobin gives up its oxygen to the tissues, becomes reduced hæmoglobin, and the blood in consequence becomes once more venous, with a purple hue. thus the red corpuscles by virtue of their hæmoglobin are emphatically oxygen-carriers. undergoing no intrinsic change in itself, the hæmoglobin combines in the lungs with oxygen, which it carries to the tissues; these, more greedy of the oxygen than itself, rob it of its charge, and the reduced hæmoglobin hurries back to the lung in venous blood for another portion. hæmoglobin combines loosely with carbonic oxide just as it does with oxygen, but the affinity with the former is greater than with the latter. while carbonic oxide readily turns out oxygen, oxygen cannot so readily turn out carbonic acid. this property of carbonic oxide explains its poisonous nature. respiratory changes in the tissues. arterial blood passing through the several tissues, becomes once more venous. a considerable quantity of the oxy-hæmoglobin becomes reduced, and a quantity of carbonic acid passes from the tissue into the blood. the blood which comes from a contracting muscle, is not only richer in carbonic acid, but also, though not to a corresponding amount, poorer in oxygen, than the blood which flows from a muscle at rest. a muscle is always producing carbonic acid, and when it contracts there is a sudden and extensive increase of the normal production. oxygen is necessary for the life of the muscle. when venous blood instead of arterial blood is sent through the blood-vessel of a muscle, the irritability speedily disappears, and unless fresh oxygen be administered the muscle soon dies. our knowledge of the respiratory changes in muscle is more complete than in the case of any other tissue; but we have no reason to suppose the phenomena of muscle are exceptional. on the contrary, all the available evidence goes to show that in all the tissues the oxidation takes place in the tissues and not in the adjoining blood. it is a remarkable fact, that lymph, serous fluid, bile, urine, and the other secretions contain no free or loosely combined oxygen, while the tension of carbonic acid in peritoneal fluid is as high as six per cent, and in bile and urine is still higher, etc. all these facts point to the conclusion, that it is the tissues, and not the blood, which become primarily loaded with carbonic acid, the latter simply receiving the gas from the former by diffusion; and that the oxygen which passes from the blood into the tissues is at once taken up in the same combinations, so that it is no longer removable by diminished tension. the production of carbonic acid in the muscle is not directly dependent on the consumption of oxygen. the muscles produce carbonic acid in an atmosphere of hydrogen. what is true of muscle is true also of other tissues and of the body at large. oxygen helps to wind up the vital clock; but once wound up, the clock will go on for a period without further winding (pflüger). to sum up, then, the result of respiration in its chemical aspect. as the blood passes through the lungs, the low oxygen tension of the venous blood permits the entrance of oxygen from the air of the pulmonary alveolus, through the thin alveolar wall, through the thin capillary sheath, through the thin layer of blood plasma, to the red corpuscles, and the reduced hæmoglobin of the venous blood becomes wholly, or all but wholly, oxy-hæmoglobin. hurried to the tissues, the oxygen, at a comparatively high tension in the arterial blood, passes largely into the tissues, in which the oxygen tension is always kept at an exceedingly low pitch, by the fact that the tissues, in some way at present unknown to us, pack away, at every moment, into some stable combination each molecule of oxygen which they receive from the blood. with much, but not all, of its oxy-hæmoglobin reduced, the blood passes on as venous blood. how much hæmoglobin is reduced will depend on the activity of the tissue itself. the quantity of hæmoglobin in the blood is the measure of limit of the oxidizing power of the body at large; but within that limit the amount of oxidation is determined by the tissue, and by the tissue alone. the skin is an excretory tissue, and consists principally of two layers, an external covering of epithelium, termed the cuticle or epidermis, and a layer of vascular tissue, named the corium derma or cutis vera. the integument serves (1) for the protection of deeper tissues, (2) as a sensitive organ in the exercise of touch, (3) as an excretory organ, (4) as an absorbing organ, (5) for regulating the temperature of the body. within and beneath the corium are imbedded several organs with special functions, namely, sudoriferous or sweat glands, sebaceous or fat glands, and hair follicles; and on its surface are sensitive papillæ. the so-called appendages of the skin, the hair and nails, are modifications of the epidermis. sudoriferous glands: in the middle of each of the transverse furrows between the papillæ, and irregularly scattered between the bases of the papillæ in those parts of the surface of the body in which there are no furrows between them, are the orifices or ducts of the sudoriferous, or sweat glands, by which it is probable that a large portion of the aqueous and gaseous materials excreted by the skin are separated. each of these glands consists of a small lobular mass, which appears formed of a coil of tubular gland-duct surrounded by blood-vessels and imbedded in the subcutaneous adipose tissue. from this mass the duct ascends, for a short distance, in a spiral manner through the deeper parts of the cutis, then passing straight, and then sometimes again becoming spiral, it runs through the cuticle and opens by an oblique, valve-like apparatus. the sudoriferous glands are abundantly distributed over the whole surface of the body; but are especially numerous, as well as very large, in the skin of the palm of the hand. they are estimated from 2,738 to 3,528 in each superficial square inch. they are almost equally abundant and large in the skin of the sole. the glands by which the peculiar odorous matter of the axilla is secreted form a nearly complete layer under the cutis, and are like the ordinary sudoriferous glands, except in being larger and having very short ducts. in the neck and back, where they are least numerous, the glands amount to 417 on the square inch. the total number is estimated, at 2,381,248; and supposing the orifice of each gland to present a surface of 1/54 of a line in diameter (and regarding a line as equal to 1/10 of an inch) the whole of the glands would present an evaporating surface of about eight square inches. sebaceous glands secrete a peculiar fatty matter. like the sudoriferous glands, they are abundantly distributed over most parts of the body. the quantity of matter which leaves the human body by way of the skin is very considerable. it is estimated that while 7 grains pass through the lungs per minute, as much as 11 escape through the skin. the amount varies extremely. it is calculated that the total amount of perspiration excreted from the whole body in 24 hours might range from 2 to 20 kilos. the total amount of perspiration is affected not only by the condition of the atmosphere, but also by the nature and quantity of food taken, the amount of fluid drunk, and the amount of exercise taken. it is also influenced by the mental condition, by medicines and poisons, by disease, and by the relative activity of the other excreting organs, more particularly the kidneys. the fluid perspiration or sweat, when collected, is found to be a clear colorless fluid, with a strong and distinctive odor varying according to the part of the body from which it is taken. besides accidental epidermic scales, it contains no structural elements. its reaction is generally acid, but in cases of excessive secretion may become alkaline. the average amount of solids is about 1.81 per cent, of which about two-thirds consists of organic substances. the chief normal constituents are (1) sodium chloride (common salt), with small quantities of other inorganic salts; (2) various acids of the fatty series, such as fermic, acetic, butyric acid, with probably other acids--ch2o2-c2h4o2--c4h8o2; (3) neutral fats and cholestrine; (4) ammonia (nh3) (urea), and possibly other nitrogenous substances. the average loss by cutaneous and pulmonary exhalation in a minute is from 17 to 18 grains; the minimum, 11 grains; the maximum, 32 grains; of the average 18 grains 11 pass by the skin and 7 by the lungs. the maximum loss by exhalation, cutaneous and pulmonary, in twenty-four hours is about 3 3/4 pounds; the minimum, about 1 1/2 pounds. valentine found the whole quantity lost by exhalation from the respiratory and cutaneous surfaces of a healthy man who consumed daily 40,000 grains of food and drink to be 19,000 grains, or 2 1/2 pounds. subtracting from this, for the pulmonary exhalation, 5,000 grains, and for the excess of the weight of the exhaled carbonic acid over that of the equal volume of the inspired oxygen, 2,256 grains, the remainder, 11,744 grains, or nearly 1 5/7 pounds, may represent an average amount of cutaneous exhalation in a day. the kidneys, two in number, are excretory organs. they are deeply seated in the lumbar region, one on each side of the vertebral column, at the back of the abdominal cavity, and behind the peritoneum. the kidneys measure about 4 inches in length, 2 1/2 inches in breadth, and 1 1/2 inches in thickness. the left is usually longer and narrower than the right one. the weight of the kidney is usually stated to be about 4 1/2 ounces in the male and somewhat less in the female. the excretory apparatus consists of fine tubules (the tubuli urineferi), malpighian bodies, blood-vessels, nerves, and lymphatics, etc. the kidneys are highly vascular, and receive their blood from the renal arteries, which are very large in proportion to the organ they supply. each artery breaks up into four or five branches, these again subdivide and break up into capillaries in the substance of the kidney. the veins arise by numerous venous radicals from the capillary network of the kidney, as seen near the surface of the gland, and collect the blood from the capillary plexus around the convoluted tubules which mainly compose this part, the smaller veins joining together and ultimately forming a single vein and ending in the inferior vena cava. the kidneys are so arranged by their anatomical structure--that of the cortical and medullary substance, the tubuli urineferi, pyramids, malpighian bodies, etc.--that they separate from the blood the solids in a state of solution. the secretion takes place by the agency of the gland cells, and equally in all the parts of the urine tubes. the protoplasmic cells which line at least a large portion of the tubuli urineferi elaborate from the blood certain substances, and discharge them into the channels of the tubules. all parts of the tubular system of the kidney take part in the secretion of urine as a whole, but there is another provision of vessels for a more simple draining off of the water from the blood when required. the large size of the renal arteries and veins permits so rapid a transit of the blood through the kidneys that the whole of the blood is purified by them. the secretion of urine is rapid in comparison with other secretions, and as each portion is secreted, it propels that which is already in the tubes onwards into the pelvis of the kidney. thence, through the ureter, the urine passes into the bladder, into which its rate and mode of entrance has been watched. the urine does not enter the bladder at any regular rate, nor is there a synchronism in its movement through the two ureters. in a recumbent posture the urine collects for a little time in the ureters, then flows gently, and if the body is raised, runs from them in a stream till they are empty. its flow is increased in deep inspiration, or straining, and in active exercise, and in fifteen or twenty minutes after meals. substances taken into the stomach pass very rapidly through the circulation. it does not take longer than one minute for ferrocyanide of potassium to pass through. vegetable substances pass in from sixteen to thirty-five. neutral alkaline salts with vegetable acids, which were generally decomposed in transitu, made the urine alkaline in twenty-eight to forty-seven minutes. but the time of passage varied much; and the transit was always slow when the substances were taken during digestion. there are really two distinct parts in the kidney--the actively secreting part, the epithelium of the secreting tubules; and what maybe called a filtering part, the malpighian bodies. the specific gravity of urine is 1020--that is, the average human urine. urine varies--in the morning before breakfast it is darker, urina sanguinis; urine secreted shortly after the introduction of any considerable quantity of fluid into the body, urina potus; and the urine evacuated immediately succeeding a solid meal of food, urina cibi. the last kind contains a larger quantity of solid matter than either of the others, the first and second being largely diluted with water. specific gravity: the morning urine is best calculated for analysis. the average healthy range may be stated at 1015 in the winter to 1025 in the summer, and variations of diet and exercise may make a great difference. in disease, the variations may be greater; sometimes descending in albuminaria to 1004, and frequently ascending in diabetes, when the urine is loaded with sugar, to 1050, or even to 1060. the whole quantity of urine secreted in twenty-four hours is subject to variations according to the amount of fluid drunk, and the proportion of the latter passing off from skin, lungs, and alimentary canal. the average quantity voided in twenty-four hours by healthy male adults from twenty to forty years of age amounts to 52 1/2 fluid ounces. the chemical composition of urine. the average quantity of each constituent of the urine in 1,000 parts is: water (o h2), 967 urea (c o n2 h4), 14.239 uric acid (c5 n4 h4 o3), .468 coloring matter, mucus, and animal extractive matter, 10.107 { sulphates (soda, potash), } 8.185 salts. { bisulphates (lime, soda, } { magnesia, ammonia), } { chlorides (sodium, potassium), } silica, etc., traces. -------- 1,000.000 urea is the principal solid constituent of the urine, forming nearly one-half of the whole quantity of solid matter. it is also the most important ingredient, since it is the chief substance by which the nitrogen of decomposed tissue and superfluous food is excreted from the body. the salts excreted by the kidneys in 24 hours are: urea (c n2 h4 o), 512 grains. chloride of sodium (na cl), 177   ,,    phosphoric acid (h3 p o4), 48   ,,    sulphuric acid (h2 s o4), 31.11   ,,    uric acid (c5 n4 h4 o3), 8.53   ,,    the substances excreted consist mainly of carbonic acid gas (c o2), which is expired by the lungs, and urea (c n2 h4 o), which is expelled by the urine. these excretions, or expenditures, or waste products of the human body, present the carbohydrates--starch, sugars, and fats--and the proteids--meats and albumen--taken into the system as food. the daily average loss by the expenditure or waste products of the body is estimated to be about: carbon, 4,500 grains. nitrogen, 3 to 500 grains. besides salts and water. of all the elements of the income and outcome, the nitrogen, the carbon, and the free oxygen of respiration, are by far the most important. since water is of use to the body for merely mechanical purposes, and not as food in the strict sense of the word, the hydrogen element becomes a dubious one; the sulphur of the proteids, and phosphorus of the fats, are insignificant in amount; while the saline matters stand on a wholly different footing from the other parts of the food, inasmuch as they are not sources of energy, and pass through the body with comparatively little change. the correct income will consist of so much nitrogen, carbon, hydrogen, oxygen, sulphur, phosphorus, saline matters, and water, contained in the proteids, fats, carbohydrates, salts, and water of the food, together with the oxygen absorbed by the lungs, skin, and alimentary canal. the outcome will consist of: 1. the respiratory products of the lungs, skin, and alimentary canal, consisting chiefly of carbonic acid and water, with small quantities of hydrogen and carburetted hydrogen, these two latter coming exclusively from the alimentary canal; 2. perspiration, consisting chiefly of water and salts, with urea by the skin, and other organic constituents of sweat amounting to very little; 3. the urine, which contains practically all the nitrogen really excreted by the body, as well as a large quantity of saline matter and water. heat and temperature. the average temperature of the human body in those internal parts which are more accessible, as the mouth and rectum, is from 98.5° to 99.5° f. the chief circumstances by which the temperature of the healthy body is influenced are the following: age. the average temperature of the new-born babe is only about 1° f. above that proper to the adult. in old age the temperature rises again, and approaches that of infancy. sex. in the female slightly higher than in the male. exercise. active exercise raises the temperature of the body, through muscular contraction, etc. climate and season. in passing from a temperate to a hot climate, the temperature of the human body rises slightly, rarely more than 2° to 3° f. in summer the temperature of the body is a little higher than in winter, 1/5° to 1/3° f. cold alcoholic drinks depress the temperature 1/2° to 1°f. warm alcoholic drinks, as well as warm tea and coffee, raise the temperature about 1/2° f. in disease, as in pneumonia and typhus, it occasionally rises as high as 106° or 107° f. in asiatic cholera a thermometer placed in the mouth sometimes rises only to 77° or 79° f. the temperature maintained by mammalia of an active state of life averages 101° f. in birds, the average is as high as 107° f., the highest temperature, 111.25°, being in the species of the linnets, etc. the sources and distribution of heat. wherever metabolism of protoplasm is going on, heat is being generated. all over the body heat is being set free; more abundantly in the more active tissues, and most of all in those tissues the metabolism of which leads to little or no external work. the metabolism of the tissues (including the blood) and of the food within the alimentary canal is the source of the heat of the body. but heat, being continually produced, is as continually being lost, as we have seen, by the skin, urine, and feces. the blood passing from one part of the body to another, and carrying warmth from the tissues where heat is being actively generated, to the tissues or organs where heat is being lost by conduction or evaporation, tends to equalize the temperature of the various parts and thus maintain a constant bodily temperature. taking the body as a whole, under normal conditions, the chief sources of the production of heat are the muscles, and the abdominal viscera, more especially the liver; and of these the liver deserves attention, inasmuch as it is always at work, whereas the heat produced by the muscles is at least largely dependent on their contracting, and they may remain at rest for a considerable period. the brain, too, may be regarded as a source of heat, since its temperature is higher than that of the arterial blood with which it is supplied. heat is lost by the skin, respiration, feces, etc. the great regulator, however, is undoubtedly the skin. the more blood passes through the skin the greater will be the loss of heat by conduction, radiation, and evaporation. the working of this heat-regulating mechanism is well seen in the case of exercise. since every muscular contraction gives rise to heat, exercise must increase for the time being the production of heat; yet the bodily temperature rarely rises as much as a degree c., if at all. by exercise the respiration is quickened and the loss of heat by the lungs increased. the circulation of blood is also quickened, and the cutaneous vascular areas becoming dilated, a large amount of blood passes through the skin. the expenditure of heat may be tabulated thus: by the skin, in conducting, radiating, and evaporating, 77.5 per cent. warming expired air, 5.2  ,,   evaporating the water of respiration, 14.5  ,,   in warming urine, etc., 2.6   ,,   the circulation. the heart is a hollow muscular organ divided by a longitudinal septum into a right and a left half, each of which is again subdivided by a transverse constriction into two compartments communicating with each other, and named auricle and ventricle. the heart is inclosed in the pericardium and placed behind the sternum and costal cartilages on the border end or base, by which it is attached, being directed upwards, backwards, and to the right, and extending from the level of the fourth to that of the eighth dorsal vertebra, the apex downwards, forwards, and to the left. in size, it is about five inches long, three and a half in its greatest width, and two in its extreme thickness from the anterior to the posterior surface. the weight is from nine to ten ounces. the circulation of the blood.-the body is divided into two chief cavities, the chest or thorax, and abdomen, by a curved muscular partition called the diaphragm or midriff. the chest is almost entirely filled with lungs and heart, the latter being fitted in, so to speak, between the two lungs, nearer to the front than the back of the chest, and partly overlapped by them. in the living body the heart and lungs are in constant rhythmic movement, the result of which is an unceasing stream of air through the trachea alternately into and out of the lungs, and an unceasing stream of blood into and out of the heart. the blood is conveyed away from the heart by the arteries and returned to it by the veins; the arteries and veins being continuous with each other, at one end by means of the heart, and at the other by a fine network of vessels called capillaries. the blood, therefore, in its passage from the heart passes first into the arteries, then into the capillaries, and lastly into the veins, by which it is conveyed back again to the heart--thus completing a revolution, or circulation. there are two circulations by which all the blood must pass--the one a shorter circuit from the heart to the lungs and back again, which is called the pulmonic; the other the larger circuit, from the heart to all parts of the body and back again, which is called the systemic; and a subordinate stream of blood, that has been collected by the blood-vessels of the intestines, passes by means of the portal vein through the liver, and is called the portal circulation. the principal force provided for constantly moving the blood on this course, is that of the muscular substance of the heart; other assistant forces are (2) those of the elastic walls of the arteries, (3) the pressure of the muscles among which some of the veins run, (4) the movements of the walls of the chest in respiration, and (5) probably to some extent the interchange of relations between the blood and the tissues which ensues in the capillary system during the nutritive processes. the right direction of the blood's course is determined and maintained by the valves of the heart. the heart is divided into two chief chambers or cavities--right and left. each of these chambers is again divided into an upper and lower portion called respectively auricle and ventricle, which freely communicate with each other. the right auricle communicates on the one hand with the veins of the general system and on the other with the right ventricle. the valvular curtain between the right auricle and the right ventricle is named the tricuspid; by it the auricle is guarded from the ventricle. the ventricle leads directly into the pulmonary artery and this in turn into the lungs. the pulmonary artery is guarded by three semilunar valves. the left auricle again communicates on the one hand with the pulmonary vein and on the other with the left ventricle, which is guarded by the mitral or bicuspid valve. the left ventricle leads directly into the aorta, which is also guarded by three semilunar valves. the aorta is a large artery which conveys the blood to the general system. the arrangement of the heart's valves is such that the blood can pass only in one definite direction, and this is--from the right auricle the blood passes into the right ventricle, and thence into the pulmonary artery, by which it is conveyed to the capillaries of the lungs. from the lungs, the blood, which is now purified and altered in color, is gathered by the pulmonary veins and taken to the left auricle. from the left auricle it passes into the left ventricle, and thence into the aorta, by which it is distributed to the capillaries in every portion of the body. the heart's action. the heart's action in propelling the blood consists in the successive alternate contractions and dilatations of the muscular walls of the two auricles and ventricles. the auricles contract simultaneously; so do the ventricles; their dilatations also are severally simultaneous; and the contractions of the one pair of cavities are synchronous with the dilatations of the other. valves--bi and tricuspid. during auricular contraction the force of the blood propelled into the ventricle is transmitted in all directions, but being insufficient to raise the semilunar valves, it is expended in distending the ventricle and in raising and gradually closing the auriculo-ventricular valves (tricuspid and bicuspid valves). these when the ventricle is full form a complete septum (partition) between it and the auricle. the arterial or semilunar valves are brought into action by the pressure of the arterial blood forced back towards the ventricles, when the elastic walls of the arteries recoil after being dilated by the blood propelled into them in the previous contraction of the ventricle. the sounds. when the ear is placed over the region of the heart two sounds may be heard at every beat of the heart, which follow in quick succession, and are succeeded by a pause or a period of silence. the first sound is dull and prolonged; its commencement coincides with the impulse of the heart and just precedes the pulse at the wrist. the second is a shorter and sharper sound, with a somewhat flapping character, and follows close after the arterial pulse. first sound. the chief cause of the first sound of the heart appears to be the vibration of the auriculo-ventricular valve, and also, but to a less extent, of the ventricular walls, and the coats of the aorta and pulmonary artery, all of which parts are suddenly put into a state of tension at the moment of ventricular contraction. the second sound is more complete than that of the first. it is probably due entirely to the sudden closure and consequent vibration of the semilunar valves when they are pressed down across the orifice of the aorta and pulmonary artery. pulse. the heart of a healthy adult man in the middle period of life acts from seventy to seventy-five times per minute. the frequency of the heart's action gradually diminishes from the commencement to near the end of life. in persons of sanguine temperament, the heart acts somewhat more frequently than in those of the phlegmatic; and in the female sex more frequently than in the male; in children, more frequently still. capacity. the capacity of the two ventricles is probably exactly the same. from the mean of various estimates taken, it may be inferred that each ventricle is able to contain on an average about three ounces of blood, the whole of which is impelled into the respective arteries at each contraction. every time the ventricles contract three ounces of blood are pumped out of the heart into the lungs and heart respectively. calculating seventy pulses per minute, the quantity of blood passing through the heart would be about 211 ounces, or 14 1/4 pints per minute; or 895 pints per hour, or 21,480 pints in 24 hours. velocity. the velocity of the stream of blood is greater in the arteries than in any other part of the circulatory system, and in them it is greatest in the neighborhood of the heart and during the ventricular systole; the rate of movement diminishes during the diastole of the ventricles, and in the parts of the arterial system most distant from the heart. the rate is calculated to be about from 10 to 12 inches per second in the large arteries near the heart. the blood. blood is a tissue of which the red corpuscles are the essential and active elements, while the plasma is the liquid matrix. there are two kinds of corpuscles, the white and the red. the protoplasm of the white corpuscles is native indifferentiated protoplasm, in no respect fitted for any special duty, as far as we know at present. the white corpuscles are in reality embryonic structures, concerned chiefly in the production of other forms, such as red corpuscles, and it may be under certain conditions various elements of the other tissues. the red corpuscles have a definite respiratory function. but these form a part only of the blood. the largest portion of the blood, the whole mass of the plasma, is an unorganized fluid with no proper physiological (vital) properties of its own. its function is to serve as the great medium of exchange between all the tissues of the body. just as the whole organism lives on the things around it, its air and its food, so the several tissues live on the complex fluid by which they are all bathed and which is to them their immediate air and food. blood within the living vessel is a fluid; but when shed, or after the death of the vessels, becomes solid by the process known as coagulation. the average specific gravity of human blood is 1056, varying from 1045 to 1075 within the limits of health. it has an alkaline reaction, which in shed blood rapidly diminishes up to the onset of coagulation. blood may, in general terms, be considered as consisting by weight of more than one-third and less than one-half of corpuscles, the rest being plasma, the corpuscles being supposed to retain the amount of water proper to them. human blood: corpuscles 513, plasma 487. the average quantity of fibrine in the human blood is said to be two per cent. composition of serum: in 100 parts there are in round numbers: water, 90 parts. proteid substance, 8 to 9   ,,   fat extractives and saline matter, 2 to 1   ,,   of the proteid substances the great mass consists of the so-called serum-albumen. composition of red corpuscles: the red corpuscles contain less water than the serum. in 100 parts of red corpuscle there are: water, 56.5 solid, 43.5 the solids are almost entirely organic matter, the inorganic salts in the corpuscles amounting to less than 4 per cent. in 100 parts of dried organic matter of the corpuscles of human blood there are: hæmoglobin, 90.54 proteid substance, 8.67 lecithin, .54 cholestrin, .25 the blood is distributed as follows in round numbers: in the heart, lungs, large arteries and veins, about one-fourth. in the liver,  ,,      ,,      in the skeletal muscles,  ,,      ,,      in the other organs,  ,,      ,,      the average proportion of the principal constituents of the blood in 1,000 parts is: water, 784 red corpuscles (solid residue), 130 albumen serum, 70 saline matter, 6.03 extractive fatty matter, 7.77 fibrine, 2.20 the chemical composition of hæmoglobin is: carb. hyd. iron. nit. oxy. sulph. 54.2 7.2 0.42 16.0 21.5 6.7 mucine, 52.2 7.0 12.6 28.2 proteids, 51.5 6.9 15.2 20.9 0. to 54.5 to 7.3 to 17.0 to 23.5 to 2.0 the organs of respiration. the principal organs of respiration consist of larynx, trachea, bronchi, lungs. the larynx is affixed to the upper end of the windpipe, and is not only the entrance for air into the respiratory organs from the pharynx, but also the organ of voice. the trachea measures from four inches to four inches and a half in length, and from three-quarters of an inch to one inch in width; but its length and width are liable to continual variations, according to the position of the larynx and the direction of the neck. the trachea divides into two branches, called bronchi, right and left. the right bronchus, wider and shorter than the left, measuring about an inch in length, passes outwards almost horizontally into the root of the right lung on a level with the fourth dorsal vertebra. the left bronchus, smaller in diameter but longer than the right, being nearly two inches in length, inclines downwards and outwards to reach the root of the right lung, which it enters on a level with the fifth dorsal vertebra--that is, about an inch lower than the right bronchus. the lungs, placed one on the right and the other on the left of the heart and large vessels, occupy by far the larger part of the cavity of the chest, and during life are always in accurate contact with the internal surface of its walls. each lung is attached at a comparatively small part of its flattened inner or median surface by a part named the root and by a thin membranous fold, which is continued downwards from it. the pleuræ are serous membranes forming two shut sacs, quite distinct from each other, which line the right and left side of the thorax, forming by their approximation in the middle line the mediastinal partition, and are reflected each upon the root and over the entire free surface of the corresponding lung. the lungs. each lung is irregularly pyramidal or conical, with its base downwards, and one side (the inner) much flattened. the broad concave base is of a semi-lunar form, and rests upon the arch of the diaphragm. the apex is blunt, and reaches into the root of the neck, above the first rib, where it is separated from the first portion of the subclavian artery by the pleural membrane. the lungs vary much in size and weight, according to the quantity of blood and mucous or serous fluid they may happen to contain, which is greatly influenced by the circumstances immediately preceding death, as well as other causes. the weight of both lungs together, as generally stated, ranges from 30 to 48 ounces, the more prevalent weights being found between 36 and 42 ounces. the proportion borne by the right lung to the left is nearly 22 ounces to 20, taking the combined weight of the two at 42 ounces. the lungs are not only absolutely heavier in the male than in the female, but appear to be heavier in proportion to the weight of the body. the general ratio between the weight of the lungs and body in the adult fluctuates between one to thirty-five and one to fifty. the average weight in twenty-nine cases, male and female: male. female. right lung, 24 ounces. 17 ounces. left lung, 21   ,,    15   ,,    -------- -------- 45 ounces. 32 ounces. the proportionate weight of the lungs to the body is: male. female. 1 to 37 1 to 34 the substance of the lungs is of a light porous spongy texture, and when healthy is buoyant in water. specific gravity, 0.126; deprived of air, 1.056. when pressed between the fingers, the lungs impart a crepitant sensation, which is accompanied by a peculiar noise, both effects being caused by the air contained in the tissue. on cutting the lung the same crepitation is heard. the pulmonary tissues are endowed with great elasticity, in consequence of which the lungs collapse to about one-third of their bulk when the thorax is opened. the root of each lung consists of bronchi, arteries, and veins, together with the nerves, lymphatic vessels, and glands, connected by areolar tissue, and inclosed in a sheath of the pleura. respiration consists of an expiration and an inspiration. the air passes in through the nose or mouth, through the larynx, trachea, bronchi, into the lungs. inspiration: by the contraction of certain muscles, the cavity of the thorax is enlarged; in consequence the pressure of the air within the lungs becomes less than that of the air outside the body, and this difference of pressure causes a rush of air through the trachea into the lungs until an equilibrium of pressure is established between the air inside and that outside the lungs. this constitutes inspiration. expiration: upon the relaxation of the inspiratory muscles (the muscles whose contraction has brought about the thoracic expansion), the elasticity of the chest walls and lungs, aided by the contraction of certain muscles and other circumstances, causes the chest to return to its original size, or even become smaller. in consequence of this the pressure within the lungs now becomes greater than that outside, and thus air rushes out of the trachea, until equilibrium is once more established. this constitutes expiration. the inspiratory and expiratory act together form a respiration. the fresh air introduced into the upper part of the pulmonary passages by the inspiratory movement contains more oxygen and less carbonic acid than the old air previously present in the lungs. by diffusion the new or tidal air, as it is frequently called, gives up the oxygen to, and takes carbonic acid from, the old or stationary air, and thus when it leaves the chest in expiration has been the means both of introducing oxygen into and of removing carbonic acid from it. by this ebb and flow of the tidal air and the diffusion between it and the stationary air, the air in the lungs is being continually renewed, through the alternate expansion and contraction of the chest. in what may be considered normal breathing, the respiratory act is repeated about seventeen times a minute; and the duration of the inspiration as compared with that of the expiration and such pause as exists, is about as ten to twelve. when the ordinary respiratory movements prove insufficient to effect the necessary changes in the blood, their rhythm and character become changed. normal respiration gives place to labored respiration, and this in turn to dyspnoea, which unless some restorative event occurs terminates in asphyxia. changes of the air in respiration: 1. the temperature of the expired air is variable, but under ordinary circumstances is higher than that of the inspired air. 2. the expired air is loaded with aqueous vapor. 3. the expired air contains about 4 to 6 per cent less oxygen and about 4 per cent more carbonic acid than the inspired air, the quantity of nitrogen suffering but little change. thus: oxygen. nitrogen. carbon. inspired air contains 20.81 79.15 .04 expired ,,     ,,    16.033 79.557 4.380 while the air in passing in and out of the lungs is thus robbed of a portion of its oxygen, and loaded with a certain quantity of carbonic acid, the blood as it streams along the pulmonary capillaries undergoes important correlative changes. as it leaves the right ventricle it is venous blood of a dark purple or maroon color; when the blood has passed through the lungs and falls into the left auricle, it is arterial blood of a bright scarlet hue. in passing through the capillaries of the body from the left to the right side of the heart, it is again changed from the arterial to the venous condition. the average composition of this gas in the two kinds of blood is as follows. from 100 volumes may be obtained: oxygen. carbonic acid. nitrogen. of arterial blood, 20 (16) vol. 39 (30) vol. 1 to 2 vol. of venous blood, 8-12 (6 to 10) 46 (35) vol. 1 to 2 vol. oxygen plays a most important role on this terrestrial globe. life, health, and food depend on it. this element penetrates, pervades, everything and everywhere, unites and disunites with all other elements, preserves and destroys. while its absence from a living being, whether plant or animal, is death. when a liquid such as water is exposed to an atmosphere containing a gas such as oxygen, some of the oxygen will be dissolved in the water, that is to say will be absorbed from the atmosphere. the quantity which is so absorbed will depend on the quantity of oxygen which is in the atmosphere above; that is to say, on the pressure of the oxygen; the greater the pressure of the oxygen, the larger the amount which will be absorbed. if, on the other hand, water containing a good deal of oxygen dissolved in it be exposed to an atmosphere containing little or no oxygen, the oxygen will escape from the water into the atmosphere. chapter xx. digestion, nutrition. in plant life the permanent fabric consists of only three elements--carbon, hydrogen, oxygen. we know that plants alone convert inorganic or mineral substances into organic matter, and that plants as a necessary result assimilate their inorganic food, decompose carbonic acid, and restore its oxygen to the atmosphere. vegetation is constructed of cells or vesicles, and has a cellular tissue. a cell is a living organism. it is that which makes up the tissue of plants. for the whole life of the plant is that of the cells which compose it; in them and by them its products are elaborated, and all its vital processes are carried on. cell multiplication by division, cell growth, cell modification, exist in plants. fluids are transferred from cell to cell by a process called endosmose. absorption takes place by the roots, and the substance absorbed is carried up into the leaves, even to the topmost bough of a tree, passing in its course many millions of apparently water-tight partitions. plants exchange gases, taking in carbonic acid and giving off oxygen. they evolve heat, have organs of reproduction, and elaborate the material for the final evolution of the seed. this seed, whether of grain, of vegetables, or of fruits, is composed of carbon, hydrogen, and oxygen. and these constitute the starches and sugars which we find have been evolved by the vegetable or plant, and which form the food for animals. plants, then, convert the elementary substances, the crude material, into food. in doing so, they pass through the processes known as the essentials of life; these are, birth, growth, development, decline, and death. all organic compounds are transitory. they are constantly appearing and disappearing, composing and decomposing, organizing and disorganizing; and they are always dependent upon a certain degree of heat and moisture for their existence or non-existence. the universal constituents of plant life; of organic existence, which are indispensable to vegetation, are carbon, hydrogen, oxygen, and nitrogen. every vegetable substance is made up of at least eighty-eight to ninety-nine per cent of these elements. the proper vegetable structure, that is, the tissue itself, consists only of three of these elements, carbon, hydrogen, oxygen; while the fourth, nitrogen, is an essential constituent of the protoplasm, which plays so important a part in the formation of the cell, etc. plants prepare or elaborate out of these chemical elements food-substances composed of those elements--starches and sugars--upon which animals subsist. animals feeding upon these vegetable substances assimilate, elaborate, them into meat substances, flesh, or proteids. these again are composed of carbon, hydrogen, nitrogen, and oxygen. nitrogen plays the important role in proteids, being the distinguishing feature, as contrasted with substances of vegetable origin, the carbohydrates. thus man is provided with two kinds of food: derived from plants, carbohydrates; derived from animals, proteids, or albumens, besides water and mineral salts. these foods undergo certain preparations previous to being introduced into the system. in the system the food undergoes farther elaboration, to make it fit to enter into the circulation of the blood, in order to supply suitable material for the master tissues. we will now examine briefly the organs and their secretions that convert food-substances into blood, and, by the blood, into tissue. the solvents and diluents of food in the human animal economy are the saliva of the mouth, the gastric juice of the stomach, the pancreative juice of the pancreas, the bile of the liver, and the juices of the intestines--the succus entericus. the digestive apparatus consists mainly of the alimentary canal together with various glands of which it receives the secretions. the alimentary canal commences at the mouth and terminates at the anus. the average length is about thirty feet, about five or six times the length of the body. the part situated in the head and thorax consists of the organs of mastication, insalivation, and deglutition, and comprises the mouth with the teeth, the salivary glands, and the æsophagus or gullet. the parts contained in the abdomen and pelvis consist of the stomach and the small and large intestines. the glands which are most immediately connected with digestion are very numerous small organs, situated in the mucous membrane of the alimentary canal, and the larger glands, such as the salivary glands, pancreas, and liver, whose ducts open on its inner surface. the mouth is included between the lips and the throat, bounded by the lips, cheeks, tongue, and hard and soft palate. it communicates behind with the pharynx, and through the pharynx with the æsophagus. it is lined throughout with mucous membrane. the mouth contains 32 teeth, 16 in the upper jaw and 16 in the lower jaw. the inferior maxillary bone, or lower jaw, is the only movable bone about the head. the teeth have for their functions biting, grinding, chewing, or triturating any hard food substance that may be introduced into the mouth. the tongue is a muscular organ covered with mucous membrane. by its muscular structure it takes part in the process of mastication and deglutition, and in the articulation of speech, while its mucous membrane, with common and tactile sensibility, is the seat of the sense of taste. the tonsils are two prominent bodies which occupy the recesses formed, one on each side of the fauces, between the anterior and posterior palatine arches and the pillars of the fauces. the saliva, which is poured into the mouth and there mixed with the food during mastication, is secreted by three pairs of glands named from their respective situation parotid, submaxillary, and sublingual. the parotid is the largest of three salivary glands. it lies on the side of the face, in front of the ear, and extends deeply into the space behind the ramus of the lower jaw. its weight varies from 5 to 8 drachms. it has a duct called the parotid or stenson's duct. it is about 2 1/2 inches long, and about a line and a half in thickness. its orifice is opposite the crown of the second molar tooth of the upper jaw. the submaxillary gland weighs about 2 to 2 1/2 drachms, and is situated on the inner surface of the inferior maxillary. the duct is named wharton's, and is about 2 inches in length. its orifice is found under the tongue. the sublingual gland weighs about a drachm. it is situated on the floor of the mouth. the ducts are called the ducti rivintiani. they are from 8 to 20 in number. they may be seen when the tip of the tongue is lifted up. saliva. mixed saliva, as it appears in the mouth, is a thick, glairy, generally frothy, turbid fluid. the quantity of saliva secreted in 24 hours varies. the average amount is probably from two to three pints in 24 hours. the composition of saliva is: water, 994.10 solids, 5.90 the solids are: pyaline, 1.41 fat, 0.07 epithelium and mucus, 2.13 { sulphocyanide of potassium, } { phosphate of soda, } salts, {    ,,     ,, lime, } 2.29 {    ,,     ,, magnesia, } { chloride of sodium, } {    ,,    ,, potassium, } --- 5.90 the specific gravity varies from 1.004 to 1.008. the rate at which saliva is secreted is subject to considerable variation. when the tongue and muscles concerned in mastication are at rest, and the nerves of the mouth are subject to no unusual stimulus, the quantity secreted is not more than sufficient, with the mucus, to keep the mouth moist. the purposes served by saliva are of several kinds: 1. acting mechanically in conjunction with mucus, it keeps the mouth in a due condition of moisture, and facilitates the movements of the tongue in speaking, and the mastication of the food. 2. it serves also in dissolving sapid substances and rendering them capable of exciting the nerves of taste. 3. by mixing with the food during mastication, it makes it a soft pulpy mass, such as may easily be swallowed. 4. saliva performs a chemical part in the digestion of food. it transforms starchy substances into dextrine and grape sugar. starch is a carbohydrate--carbon 18, hydrogen 30, oxygen 15. c18h30o15 + 3h2o = c6h12o6 + 2(c6h10o5) + 2h2o (grape sugar.) (dextrine.) ptyaline is the salient feature of saliva. it is known as a ferment--acting upon starch and converting it into dextrine and grape sugar. the action of saliva varies in intensity in different animals. the food after having been acted upon and prepared is propelled, by the act of deglutition, through the æsophagus into the stomach, by way of the pharynx. the pharynx is that part of the alimentary canal which unites the cavities of the mouth and nose to the æsophagus. it extends from the base of the skull to the lower border of the cricoid cartilage, and forms a sac open at the lower end, and imperfect in front, where it presents apertures leading into the nose, mouth, and larynx. the pharynx is about four and a half inches in length, and is considerably wider across than it is deep from before backwards. the æsophagus or gullet, the passage leading from the pharynx into the stomach, commences at the cricoid cartilage opposite the lower border of the fifth cervical vertebra, descends in front of the spine, passes through the diaphragm opposite the ninth dorsal vertebra, and ends by an opening at the cardiac orifice of the stomach. it is from nine to ten inches in length. the stomach is situated in the abdominal cavity. it lies in part against the anterior wall of the abdomen, and in part beneath the liver and diaphragm, and above the transverse colon. it is somewhat conical or pyriform in shape. the left part is the larger, and is named the cardiac, or splenic, the right is named the pyloric, extremity. the upper border is about three or four inches in length, is concave, and is named the lesser curvature, while the lower border is much longer, is convex, and forms the greater curvature. the dimensions vary greatly in different subjects, and also according to the state of distension of the organ. when moderately filled, its length is about ten to twelve inches, and its diameter at its widest part from four to five inches. it weighs when freed from other parts about four and a half ounces in the male and somewhat less in the female. the structure of the stomach consists of four coats--a serous, a muscular, an areolar, and a mucous coat. the external or serous coat is derived from the peritoneum. there are three kinds of muscular fibers--longitudinal, circular, and oblique, and the internal mucous lining is a rather thicker, soft, smooth, pulpy membrane, lying in ridges or rugæ, and containing a large number of glands--tubular or gastric glands, and another variety of gland called peptic, besides others. while the stomach contains no food, and is inactive, no gastric fluid is secreted; and mucus, which is either neutral or slightly alkaline, covers its surface. but immediately on the introduction of food into the stomach, the mucous membrane, previously quite pale, becomes slightly turgid and reddened with the influx of a large quantity of blood; the gastric glands commence secreting actively, and an acid fluid is poured out in minute drops, which gradually run together and flow down the walls of the stomach, or soak into the substance introduced. the quantity of this fluid secreted daily has been variously estimated; but the average for a healthy adult has been assumed to range from ten to twenty pints in twenty-four hours. the specific gravity of gastric juice has been found to differ little from that of water, varying from 1.001 to 1.010, and the amounts of solid present to be very small, viz., about 56 per cent. the chemical composition of gastric juice is: water, 994.40 solids, 5.59 { ferment, pepsin, and a trace of ammonia, 3.19 { hydrochloric acid, 0.20 solids, { chloride of calcium, 0.06 {    ,,    ,, sodium 1.46 {    ,,    ,, potassium, 0.55 { phosphate of lime, magnesia, and iron, 0.12 on starch gastric juice per se has no effect whatever, nor has healthy gastric juice any effect on grape sugar or cane sugar. on fats gastric juice is powerless. the essential property of gastric juice is the power of dissolving proteid matters (meats, albumens, nitrogenous substances), and converting them into a substance called peptones. gastric juice thus readily dissolves coagulated proteids which otherwise are insoluble, or soluble only with difficulty in very strong acids. certain conditions are required for the perfection of the process, which are all found in the stomach. the first is a temperature of 100° f. second, minute division and constant movement favor digestion. third, the greater the surface presented to the action of the juice, the more rapid the solution. neutralization of the juice wholly arrests digestion. the digestive action of gastric juice on proteids, like that of saliva on starch, is a ferment action; in other words, the solvent action of gastric juice is essentially due to the presence in it of a ferment body called pepsin. the general effect of digestion of the stomach is the conversion of food into chyme, a substance of various compositions according to the nature of the food, yet always presenting a characteristic thick pultaceous grumous consistence. the small intestines commence at the pylorus and after many convolutions terminate in the large intestines. they measure on an average about twenty feet in length in the adult. for convenience they have been divided into three parts--the duodenum, which extends from eight to ten inches beyond the pylorus; the jejunum, which occupies two-fifths, and the ilium, which occupies three-fifths, of the rest of the canal. the mucous membrane, the interior coat, is the most important to the function of digestion. there are permanent folds, shelf-like processes, of the mucous membrane, called valvular conniventes. there are also villi and glands, as the glands of lieberkühn, of peyer, and of bruner. the glands of lieberkühn are thickly distributed over the whole surface of the large and small intestines. the glands of peyer are exclusively in the small intestine. they are found in greatest abundance in the lower part of the ileum near to the ileo-cæcal valve. they are met with in two conditions, viz., either scattered singly, in which case they are termed glandulæ solitairæ, or aggregated in groups varying from one to three inches in length and about half an inch in width, chiefly of an oval form, their long axes parallel with that of the intestines. in this state they are named glandulæ agminatæ. the latter are almost always placed opposite the attachment of the mesentery. in structure they are analogous to lymphatics or absorbent glands, and their office is to take up certain materials from the chyle, elaborate them, and subsequently discharge them into the lacteals, with which vessels they appear to be closely connected. bruner's glands are confined to the duodenum; they are most abundant and thickly set at the commencement of this portion of the intestines, and are provided with permanent gland ducts. the villi are confined exclusively to the mucous membrane of the small intestines. they are minute vascular processes, from a quarter of a line to a line and two-thirds in length. there are about fifty to ninety in number to a square line. each villus consists of a small projection of mucous membrane, and its interior is supported throughout by fine retiform or adenoid tissue. two or more arteries are distributed to each villus, and from their capillaries, which form a dense network, proceed one or two small veins, which pass out at the base of the villus. the lacteal vessels enter the base of each villus, and passing up in the middle extend nearly to the top, where it ends commonly by a closed and somewhat dilated extremity. the office of the villi is the absorption of chyle from the completely digested food of the intestines. the large intestine extends from the termination of the ileum to the anus. it is usually about five to six feet in length, being about one-fifth of the whole length of the intestinal canal. the large intestine is constructed of four coats like those of the stomach and small intestines, namely, the serous, the muscular, the areolar or submucous, and the mucous. it is divided into the ascending colon, transverse and descending colon, and rectum and anus. the cæcum is a short wide pouch, communicating with the lower end of the small intestines through an opening guarded by the ileo-cæcal valve. the appendix vermiformis is attached to the cæcum. the colon commences at the right groin, ascends to the liver, forms the hepatic flexure, then crosses transversely from right to left to the spleen, forms the splenic flexure, descends to the left groin, forms the sigmoid flexure, passes through the pelvis as the rectum, and terminates at the anus. the mucous membrane of the large intestines, like that of the small intestines, is lined throughout by columnar epithelium, but unlike it, is quite destitute of villi and is not projected in the form of valvular conniventes. the peritoneum, or serous membrane of the abdominal cavity, is by far the most extensive and complicated of serous membranes. like the others, it may be considered to form a shut sac, on the outside of which are placed the viscera, which it covers. the peritoneum forms the mesenteries and omenta for the stomach, small and large intestines, and ligaments for the liver, spleen, uterus, and bladder. the liver is a very important glandular organ, very constant in the animal series, being found in all the vertebrates, and, in a more or less developed condition, in most invertebrate tribes. it secretes bile, and appears to act upon the blood which is transmitted through it. the liver is the largest gland in the body, and by far the most bulky of the abdominal viscera. it measures from ten to twelve inches transversely from right to left, between six and seven inches from its posterior to its anterior border, and about three and a half inches from above downwards where thickest, which is towards the right and posterior part. the average bulk is about eighty-eight cubic inches. the ordinary weight in the adult is between 50 to 60 ounces, about one-thirtieth of the weight of the whole body. the liver is solid to the feel, and of a dull reddish-brown color, with frequently a dark-purplish tinge along the margin. it has an upper surface smooth and convex, and an under surface which is uneven and concave. the liver is divided into two unequal lobes, a right and a left, and on the under surface of the right lobe are three secondary lobes or lobules, named the lobe of spigolius, the caudate or tailed lobe, and the square lobe. it has five fissures or fossæ, described as the transverse or portal; the umbilical fissure and the fissure of the ductus venosus, together forming the longitudinal fissure; the fossa of the vena cava, and the fossa of the gall bladder. it is held in position by five ligaments formed by layers of peritoneum. the liver is situated on the right side of the body under the diaphragm. the convex surface is protected, on the right by the six or seven lower ribs, and in front by the cartilages of the same, and by the ensiform cartilage, the diaphragm of course being interposed. to the left of the longitudinal fissure the liver is in contact with the pyloric extremity and anterior surface of the stomach, on which it moves freely. when the stomach is quite empty, the left part of this surface of the liver may overlap the cardiac end of that organ. to the right of the longitudinal fissure the liver rests upon the first part of the duodenum and the hepatic flexure of the colon. farther back it is in contact with the upper part of the right kidney and suprarenal capsule. the two blood-vessels which supply the liver are the hepatic artery and the vena porta. the hepatic vein conveys the blood away from the liver. the lymphatics of the liver are large and numerous, forming a deep and a superficial set. the nerves are derived partly from the coeliac plexus and partly from the pneumogastric nerve, especially from the left pneumogastric. the excretory apparatus of the liver consists of the hepatic duct, the cystic duct, gall bladder, and common bile duct. the hepatic duct is formed by the union of a right and left branch, which issue from the bottom of the transverse fissure and unite at a very obtuse angle; it descends to the right, within the gastro-hepatic omentum. its diameter is nearly two lines, and its length nearly two inches. at its lower end it meets the cystic descending from the gall bladder, and the ducts uniting together at an angle form the common bile duct. the cystic duct is about one and a half inches in length. the gall bladder is a pear-shaped membranous sac, three or four inches long, about an inch and a half across its widest part, and capable of containing from 8 to 12 fluid drachms. the gall bladder is attached to the liver. the neck, gradually narrowing, becoming constricted, bends downward, and terminates in the cystic duct. the common bile duct (ductus communis choledicus), the largest of the ducts, being from two to three lines in width, and nearly three inches long, conveys the bile from the liver and the gall bladder into the duodenum by a common orifice, with the pancreatic duct on its inner surface, about three to four inches below the pylorus. the liver is an extremely vascular organ, and receives its blood supply from two distinct vessels, the portal vein and the hepatic artery, while the blood is returned from it into the inferior vena cava by the hepatic vein. its secretion, the bile, is conveyed from it by the hepatic duct, either directly into the intestines, or, when digestion is not going on, into the cystic duct, and thence into the gall bladder, where it accumulates until required. the portal vein, hepatic artery, and hepatic duct branch together throughout the liver, while the hepatic vein and its tributaries run by themselves. at the transverse fissure it is merged into the areolar investment called glisson's capsule, which surrounds the portal vein, hepatic artery, and hepatic duct, as they enter at this part, and accompanies them in their branches through the substance of the liver. the liver is made up of small roundish or oval portions called lobules, each of which is about 1/20 of an inch in diameter, and composed of minute branches of the portal vein, hepatic artery, hepatic duct, and hepatic vein; while the interstices of these vessels are filled by liver cells. these cells, which make up a great portion of the substance of the organ, are of rounded or polygonal form; about 1/800 to 1/1000 of an inch in diameter. the function of the liver is the secretion of bile. the bile is a somewhat viscid fluid of a yellow, or greenish-yellow, color, a strongly bitter taste, and when fresh a scarcely perceptible odor. it has a neutral or slightly alkaline reaction, and its specific gravity is 1.020. the composition of human bile is: water, 859.2 solids, 140.8 ------ 1,000 the solids are: biliary acids combined with alkalies (bilin), 91.5 fat, 9.2 cholestrin, 2.6 mucus and coloring matter, 29.8 salts, 7.7 ---- 140.8 bile is distinguished from the other alimentary secretions by the entire absence of proteids. the chemical composition of bilin, as compared with the organic parts of blood, is: carb. hyd. nitr. oxy. sul. bilin atoms, 76 66 2 22 blood, 48 36 6 14 { biliverdin, 16 20 2 5 coloring matter, { glycocholic acid, 26 43 1 6 { taurocholic acid, 26 45 1 7 1 there seems to be some relationship between the coloring matters of the blood and bile; and it may be added, between these and that of the urine also; so that it is possible they may be, all of them, varieties of the same pigment, or derived from the same source. the quantity of bile discharged into the intestines is estimated to be about thirty to forty ounces secreted by an adult man in twenty-four hours. the purposes served by the secretion of bile may be considered to be of two principal kinds, viz., excrementitious and digestive. as an excrementitious substance, the bile serves especially as a medium for the separation of excess of carbon and hydrogen from the blood. though one of the chief purposes of the secretion of bile may appear to be the purification of the blood by ultimate excretion, yet there are many reasons for believing that while it is in the intestines it performs an important part in the process of digestion. bile has a slight solvent action on fats, and only a slight emulsifying power. its functions generally may be considered thus: 1. it assists in emulsifying fatty portions of food, thus rendering them capable of being absorbed by the lacteals. 2. bile facilitates the absorption of fatty matter. 3. bile, like the gastric fluid, has a strongly antiseptic power, and may serve to prevent the decomposition of food during the time of its sojourn in the intestines. 4. bile has been considered to act as a natural purgative, by prompting an increased secretion of the intestinal glands. 5. another very important function appears to be that of so acting upon certain constituents of the blood passing through it, as to render some of them capable of assimilation with blood generally, and to prepare others for being duly eliminated in the process of respiration. 6. an important influence seems also to be exerted by the liver upon the saccharine matters derived from the alimentary canal. the chief purpose of the saccharine and amylaceous principles of food is, in relation to respiration and the production of animal heat. the pancreas is a long, narrow, flattened gland of a reddish-cream color, larger at one end than at the other, and lying behind the stomach opposite the first lumbar vertebra. it is usually from 6 to 8 inches long, about 1 1/2 inch in average width, and 1/2 to 1 inch in thickness. it weighs about 2 1/4 to 3 1/2 ounces. its principal excretory duct is called the pancreatic duct, and runs through the entire length of the gland from left to right. the duct opens in a common orifice with the ductus communis choledicus on the inner surface of the duodenum about 4 inches below the pylorus. healthy pancreatic juice is a clear, viscid fluid, frothing when shaken. it has a very decided alkaline reaction. the pancreas in its minute anatomy closely resembles the salivary glands; and the fluid elaborated by it appears almost identical with saliva. the composition of pancreatic juice is: water, 980.45 solids, 19.55 the solids are: pancreatic, 12.71 inorganic bases and salts, 6.84 ---- 19.55 action of pancreatic juice. (1) it acts on starch raw and boiled with great energy, rapidly converting it into grape sugar. (2) on proteids (meats) it also exercises a solvent action, so far similar to that of gastric juice that by it the proteids are converted into peptones. (3) on fats pancreatic juice has a twofold action: it emulsifies them, and it splits up neutral fats into their respective acids and glycerine. thus pancreatic juice is remarkable for the power it possesses of acting on all food-stuffs--on starch, fats, and proteids. succus entericus (intestinal juice). the precise action of this is not known. it has been said to act upon starch, to convert proteids into peptones, and to emulsify fats. on the other hand, each of these actions has been denied. the portal system of veins. the portal vein, or vena porta, collects the blood from the stomach, intestines, pancreas, and spleen; and carries it to the liver, from which the bile is secreted; ramifying after the manner of an artery in the substance of the liver and conveying to the capillaries of that organ the blood collected in the main trunk. this blood, together with that of the hepatic artery, after having served for the secretion of the bile and the nourishment of the liver, is withdrawn from that organ by the hepatic veins, and carried by them into the vena cava inferior. digestion begins at the mouth. food is masticated by the movement of the lower jaw, broken into small pieces, moistened by the saliva, and starchy substances are converted into sugar. no change takes place during the rapid transit through the æsophagus. in the stomach the proteids are acted upon by the gastric juice and converted into peptones. fats remain unchanged, and sugars are not acted upon. while these changes are proceeding, the thick grayish liquid, or chyme, formed by the imperfectly dissolved food, is from time to time ejected through the pylorus, accompanied even by large morsels of solid less digested matter. this may occur within a few minutes of food having been token, but the larger escape from the stomach probably does not begin till from one to two and lasts from four to five hours after the meal, becoming more rapid towards the end, such pieces as most resist the gastric juice being the last to leave the stomach. substances can be absorbed from the cavity of the stomach into the circulation. the presumption is, that the diffusible sugars and peptones pass by osmosis direct into the capillaries, and so into the gastric veins. in the small intestines the semi-digested food, or chyme, as it passes the biliary orifice causes a gush of bile, and at the same time the pancreatic juice which flows freely into the intestine at the taking of the meal, is secreted again with renewed vigor, when the gastric digestion is completed. the conversion of starch into sugar, which may have languished in the stomach, is resumed with great activity by the pancreatic juice. the pancreatic juice emulsifies fats, and also splits them into their respective fatty acids and glycerine, and the bile is able to a certain extent to saponify the free fatty acids. it also appears that the slight emulsifying power of the bile is much increased by the presence of soap; and as a matter of fact, the bile and pancreatic juice do largely emulsify the contents of the small intestines, so that the grayish turbid chyme is changed into a creamy-looking fluid, which has been called chyle. these products as they are formed pass into the lacteals or the portal blood-vessels. through the large intestine pass off indigestible or undigested constituents of the meal, and the gases generated. absorption takes place from the stomach, and occurs along the course of the small and large intestines, especially of water. the largest and most important part of the digested material passes away from the canal during the transit of food along the small intestines, partly into the lacteals, partly into the portal vein. digestion being, broadly speaking, the conversion of non-diffusible proteids and starch into highly diffusible peptones and sugar, and the emulsifying, or division into minute particles, of various fats, it is natural to suppose that the diffusible peptones and sugars pass by osmosis into the blood-vessels, and that the emulsified fats pass into the lacteals. that the great mass of the fat which enters the body from the intestines passes through the lacteals, there can be no doubt; and there is but little doubt that a considerable quantity of peptone and sugar does pass into the portal blood. chyle is a white milky-looking fluid, which after its escape coagulates, forming a not very firm clot. the nature of the coagulation seems to be exactly the same as that of blood. lymph seems to be blood minus red corpuscles, and chyle is lymph plus a very large quantity of minutely divided fats. it has been calculated that a quantity equal to that of the whole blood may pass through the thoracic duct in twenty-four hours, and of this it is supposed that about half comes from food through the lacteals, the remainder from the body at large; but these calculations are based on uncertain data. entrance of chyle into the lacteals. the lacteals begin at a club-shaped lymphatic space lying in the center of the villus, and connected with the smaller lymphatic spaces of the adenoid tissue around it; it opens below into the submucous lymphatic plexus from which the lacteals spring. the thoracic duct is the common trunk which receives the absorbents from both the lower limbs, from the abdominal viscera, from the walls of the abdomen, from the left side of the thorax, left lung, left side of the heart, and left upper limbs, and from the left side of the head and neck. it is from fifteen to eighteen inches long in the adult, and extends from the second lumbar vertebra to the root of the neck. at the last dorsal vertebra there is usually a dilation of the duct, of variable size, which is called the receptaculum chyli, and is the common place of junction of the lymphatics of the lower limbs and the trunks of the lacteal vessels. there are two sets of absorbent vessels--the lacteals, which convey the chyle from the alimentary canal to the thoracic duct; and the lymphatics, which take up the lymph from all the other parts of the body and return it into the venous system. there is a right lymphatic duct, about a quarter to a half inch in length, which receives the lymph from the absorbents of the right upper limb, the right side of the head and neck, the right side of the chest, the right lung and the right half of the heart, and the upper surface of the liver. the thoracic duct terminates on the outer side of the internal jugular vein, in the angle formed by the union of that vein with the subclavian, and the subclavian empties itself in the superior vena cava. lymphatics and lacteals are furnished with valves serving the same office as those of the veins, and for the most part constructed after the same fashion. lymph and chyle, unlike the blood, pass only in one direction, namely, from the fine branches to the trunk and so to the large veins, on entering which they are mingled with the stream of blood and form part of its constituents. in some part of their course all lymphatic vessels pass through certain bodies called lymphatic glands. analysis of lymph and chyle: lymph. lymph from chyle from thoracic duct. the lacteals. water, 937.32 939.70 902.37 fibrine, 0.595 10.60 3.70 albumen, 42.775 38.83 35.16 fat, 6.51 a little 36.01 extractive matter, 5.05 salts, 7.75 10.87 22.76 ----- ------ ------ 1000. 1000. 1000. chyle having reached the lymphatic channels, its onward progress is determined by a variety of circumstances. putting aside the pumping action of the villi, the same events which cause the movement of the lymph generally, also further the flow of the chyle, and these are briefly as follows: 1. the wide-spread presence of valves in the lymphatic vessels causes every pressure exercised on the tissues in which they lie, to assist in the propulsion forward of the lymph. 2. considering the whole lymphatic system as a set of branching tubes passing from the extravascular regions just outside the small arteries and veins and capillaries, to the large venous trunks, it is obvious that the mean pressure of the blood in the subclavian at the junction with the jugular is the cause of the movement, etc., assisted perhaps by the respiratory movements, and other causes, as osmosis, etc. the average quantity of solid fecal matter evacuated by the human adult in twenty-four hours is about five ounces; an uncertain proportion of which consists simply of the undigested or chemically modified residue of the food, and the remainder of certain matters which are excreted in the intestinal canal. gases contained in the stomach and intestines. the sources of the gases contained in the stomach and bowels may be enumerated: 1. air introduced in the act of swallowing either food or saliva. 2. gas developed by the decomposition of alimentary matter, or of the secretions and excretions mingled with it in the stomach and intestines. 3. it is probable that a certain mutual interchange occurs between the gases contained in the alimentary canal, and those present in the blood of the gastric and intestinal blood-vessels. the movement of the intestines is peristaltic or vermicular, and is effected by the alternate contractions and dilatations of successive portions of the intestinal coats. the contractions, which may commence at any point of the intestine, extend in a wavelike manner along the tube. this is due to the involuntary longitudinal and circular muscular fibers contracting successively from above downwards and from behind forwards, etc. the movements take place slowly, and in health are commonly unperceived by the mind, but they are perceptible when they are accelerated under the influence of any irritation. chapter xxi. the elementary substances. we have thus far discovered that this terrestrial globe is composed of sixty-four elementary substances; that fifty belong to a class called metals, and the remaining fourteen are non-metallic and are called metalloids. we know with absolute certainty the elementary chemical composition of all the substances known to man; everything within the reach of man has been analyzed, whether of inorganic or of organic origin. we also know the principal elements that enter into the composition of organic substances, animal or vegetable. but a thing that is not generally known is the wonderful role certain elements play in nature, especially in the life of plants and animals. if we examine the extraordinary display of combination or composition of some of the elements--especially those that enter into the composition of organic substances--we shall find how few of these elements are essential for the production of life, and its maintenance; and we shall be surprised to find what force or power, and phenomena, they are capable of producing. we shall be surprised to see how nicely and delicately these elementary compositions are adjusted--with what precision the elements enter into combination with each other--and with what astonishing result. the union of the elements that enter into the composition of living matter, must always be very accurately balanced, to insure a healthy or normal condition of either plant or animal. a very slight deviation or change may prove either injurious or destructive to the living organism. in order to obviate writing the names of the elements, we propose to use symbols. the elementary substances that enter into the composition of living matter being few, it will not be difficult to recognize the meaning of the symbols. the four vital elements mentioned in a previous chapter are carbon. hydrogen. nitrogen. oxygen. symbols: c h n o the atmosphere we breathe, for example, is what is called a chemical mixture, and is composed of o22n77, with traces of ammonia, etc. the water we drink is a chemical composition, and is constituted by o h2. the number placed against each element indicates the quantity of each one requisite, or found, in the composition, or chemical combination, of the substance indicated. take water for example. o1 (one) and h2 (two), that represents a chemical compound. it is most abundant, and is by far the most essential, in the formation of organic life. air, water, fire, are represented by the four elements c h n o. every power, every force known to man is dependent upon these. every kind of life is made up of these. of every phenomenon manifested by nature, whatever the display may be or where it may occur, these elements are the fundamental basis. protoplasm, which is acknowledged to be the base of physical life, is nothing more than a homogeneous mass of albuminous matter which is composed of c h n o--with a greater or less quantity of each of these elements. these elements enter into the formation of all gases, fluids, and solids. they are invisible at one time and visible at another. without taste or color or odor in a free state, or even in combination, they assume taste, color, and odor when the elements combine in certain proportions. they become either harmless or poisonous; create, maintain, or destroy life. oxygen is a tasteless, colorless, and inodorous gas. hydrogen is a colorless, tasteless, and inodorous gas. nitrogen is destitute of color, taste, or odor. carbon is a solid but becomes gaseous in combination with either oxygen or hydrogen. the diamond is one of the most remarkable substances known. it is always distinctly crystallized, often quite transparent and colorless, now and then having a shade of yellow, pink, or blue. carbon is also found as graphite or plumbago. it constitutes a large proportion of all organic structures, animal and vegetable. pure carbon, diamond, is the hardest substance known. in combination with oxygen and hydrogen it forms the softest of living matter, protoplasm. in combination with oxygen it is poisonous to all animal life, and beneficial to vegetable life. combined with hydrogen, it forms the gas we burn, and is destructive to animal life. it is the food-maker in the plant, and it is the food-provider for the animal. it is the combustive agent in nature, in vegetables and in animals. from a thunderstorm to a flickering flame of a candle, carbon displays its power. from the smallest and lowliest aquatic vegetable cell to the highest animal cell tissue, it is the important solidifying, heat-giving element. these elements when free have neither color, odor, nor taste. combined, however, they acquire odor, taste, and color. o and n, the atmosphere, has no color, taste, or odor. o and h, water, has no color, taste, or odor. n and h, ammonia, has color, taste, and odor. o and c is given off by animals, taken in by vegetables--carbonic acid. c and h, the gas, has taste, odor, and color. n and o produce a gas--laughing gas. any two of these elements may combine in the form of a gas, a liquid, or a solid. and any one may combine with any other element known and form a substance, a molecule. o combines with all the elements known. h    ,,     ,,  many. n    ,,     ,,  some. c    ,,     ,,  many. two elements form a substance. three elements form vegetable life. four elements form animal life. common salt is used daily with our food; is harmless and useful; it is known as the chloride of sodium. by analysis this compound is separated, analyzed, into chlorine and sodium. na stands for sodium, and cl for chlorine. combine cl with h. that forms hydrochloric acid, a strong poison, strong enough to dissolve marble. cl has little attraction for o. its chemical energies are principally exerted toward hydrogen and the metals. cl is one of the best disinfectants, and makes excellent bleaching material. na (sodium) combines with o, and h, and c. these are some of the combinations: na cl = common salt. cl h = hydrochloric acid, a poison. o na h = caustic soda. na2 n o3 = chili saltpetre. na2 c o3 = sodium, carbonate, etc. phosphorus and sulphur and other elements enter into combination with oxygen and hydrogen. both phosphorus (p) and sulphur (s) enter into organic life, but play a subordinate role. the vegetable cell contains liquid, solid, and air. the growing, vitally active cells are filled with liquid, namely o and h, charged with more or less nutritive assimilated matters, c, etc. sap--the liquid which is imbibed by the roots and carried upwards by the stem--this is the water impregnated with certain gaseous matter derived from the air, and minute portions of earthy matter dissolved from the soil under the influence of light. sap elaborated--from this we obtain the ternary substances composed of three elements, o c h; also substances composed of four elements, o c h n. the latter represents protoplasm or protein. vegetable chemical compounds, organic substances, can be produced only under certain vitalizing conditions and influences. wherever upon the surface of this earth, the sun's rays produce a certain degree of heat, temperature, c h o may combine and evolve vegetable life. in tropical climates, for example, notwithstanding the sun's heat, no vegetation grows on high mountain peaks that are covered with snow and ice year in and year out; nor will vegetation grow in the cold climate of the north. c h and o will produce vegetable life only in the presence of heat. heat is essential. and there is one source only whence it can be obtained, that is the sun. the climate, as the temperature, etc.; the quantity of elements, and the quality of soil, vary the products of vegetation. that accounts for the immense variety, the differences existing. the organic chemical combinations in vegetable life are infinite. and all these varieties depend on the numerical quantities of each of the elements c h o that enter any composition. the products of vegetation. c h o n starch food substances, 18 13 15 sugar, grape, 6 12 6   ,,   cane, h2o + 12 22 11 oils, aniseed, etc., 10 12 1 acids, tartaric, 4 6 6  ,,  , citric, etc., 6 8 7 hydrocyanic, or prussic, acid, one of the strongest poisons, 1 1 1 tannin or tannic acid, 27 22 17 turpentine oil (composed of carbon and hydrogen only) 10 16 we have other vegetable products called alkaloids, that are principally found in the bark and the leaves. a few examples will suffice: c h n o morphia, 17 19 1 3 strychnine, 21 22 2 2 quinine (sulphate h2so4), 20 24 2 2 the essence of coffee and tea, caffein or thein, 8 10 4 2 the alcohols, acids, ethers, and so on, are all composed of these elements: c h o alcohol, 2 6 1 acetic acid, 2 4 2 the combinations are infinite. volumes are filled with organic chemistry. mere mention only can be made, to show the wonderful power these elements display when variously combined. the products of destructive distillation of coal yield a remarkable series of combinations: carb. hyd. light carburetted hydrogen, marsh gas, or fire-damp, is composed of 1 4 (c1h4) aceteline, another product, 2 2 (c2h2) heavy carburetted hydrogen, olefiant gas, the gas we burn, ethelene, 2 4 (c2h4) these may undergo a vast variety of changes and combinations. chloroform, alcohol, ethers, acids, oils and fats, resins, balsams, etc., etc., all have these elements in combination. does it not seem strange that the different numerical combinations of the same elements should have such different effects upon the animal system? why should starch and sugar compounds be good for the sustenance of animal life while other compounds of the same elements prove destructive to life? or, why should morphia have such a peculiar effect upon the animal tissues--especially the nervous? and why should alcohol have such a peculiar effect upon the master tissues of the body? the difference in the chemical composition of quinine and strychnine is not so very great, yet the action upon the system is by no means the same. the effect upon the tissues is not the same. those who believe in a god easily dispose of these questions by simply exclaiming, they are the wonderful works of god! that one drop of hydrocyanic acid upon the tongue of an animal should kill is very astonishing; that acid being composed only of one of carbon, one of hydrogen, and one of nitrogen (c n h). why should it paralyze the brain first, before it affects the heart, since it has to be carried by the blood through the circulation to the brain? the derangement of the functions of that center causes death. the revelations of these important combinations and actions man had to make for himself. they were not brought down to us on tablets of stone by some supernatural agent, nor did spirits or angels communicate the mysteries and the powers of these elements. it is owing to the development of man's intellectual faculties, that the combinations of these elements has been made possible. it was quite a discovery when it was found that nitre, sulphur, and charcoal made gunpowder. there are only five elements in that compound, viz., nitrogen, potassium, oxygen, carbon, and sulphur. chili saltpeter is used for domestic purposes. harmless to animal life, so is each one of these elements when they enter into combinations that are not destructive to life. the forces and powers exercised by any compound depend on the number and kind of elements that enter into the composition. and the influence that bears directly upon their mutual activity again depends, when in a state of nature, upon the presence of heat. when a seed, as of wheat or of any starchy vegetable, is thrown into the ground, it will not germinate except in the presence of a certain amount of moisture, and heat, the heat varying from 50° to 80° fahrenheit, in addition to free communication with the air. temperature, moisture, air, electricity, kind and quantity of the various elements in the soil present, cause the immense variations in plant life and plant compositions. yet the same elementary compositions will be found in the same species, and the same conditions generally will be required to reproduce them. each group of elements that enters into the composition of any substance, carries with it qualities and capabilities peculiar to itself, throughout the vegetable kingdom. its influence upon the animal economy will depend on the various atomic elements, and the quantities of each, that enter its combinations. for example, the atmosphere, the balance of power between o and n, is essential to both plant and animal. so with water, o h2. and so with those foods, starch and sugars, c18h30o15 or c6 h12o6; in each of these substances carbon has its complement of hydrogen and oxygen. that is, the carbon is, as it were, diluted in a sufficient quantity of water to make it suitable for food. rob it of its oxygen and it becomes a poison, an active poison. the less the quantity of oxygen in any substance of organic origin the more unfit it becomes as a food. and it becomes poisonous to the animal system in proportion as the oxygen is absent or removed from the composition. we have representatives of poisonous substances in alcohol, c2h6o, a mild poison; and in hydrocyanic acid, c n h, the strongest poison known. moreover, we see already peculiar manifestations in vegetable life, humble in character, low in degree. plants not only rest from activity, but have their sleep and exhibit sensible movement from irritation. the foliage of the locust, and of most leguminous plants, and that of oxalis and wood-sorrel, seem to have their sleep, as seen by the position of their leaves and blossoms. irritate the mimosa plant, as by roughly touching it, and the leaflets will suddenly change position. in the dionæa muscipula, or venus's flytrap, the touch of an insect, alighting upon the upper surface of the outspread laminæ, causes its sides to close suddenly, the strong bristles of the marginal fringe crossing each other like the teeth of a steel trap, and the two surfaces pressing together with considerable force, so as to retain, if not destroy, the intruder, whose struggles only increase the pressure which this animated trap exerts. it is evident that the elementary combinations under certain conditions and the influence of heat, will exhibit vital action, in an organic form--manifest phenomena of life, that are only in degree, and not in kind, inferior to the lowest plant life. the process is the same. the mode of living differs in degree, though the results are different. the combination and exchange of elements takes place in the simple plant life as in the higher animal life. the watery portion of plant life is composed of o and h2, the same as water in a free state or water in animal life, and the combination of oxygen and hydrogen with carbon. the food substances are found in the vital machinery of vegetation. the characteristics of life exhibited in the lower grade of vegetation, are seen in a more perfect degree in animal life--respiration, exchange of gases, imbibition, absorption, assimilation, evolution of heat and motion, the power of incorporating material in its own substance, endosmosis, subjectibility to irritation, exhaustion, spontaneous movement, rest and sleep, capability of being influenced by various stimuli, etc., etc. the combination of o, c, and h, organized and vitalized, in conjunction with a few other less important elements, manifests in conformity with the laws of nature all functions and activities that plant lie is capable of realizing. it would neither be extravagant, nor an exaggeration, considering the important role these elements play in vegetation, if they were rightfully termed the soul-life of plants. chapter xxii. alcohol and its effects on the system. all substances taken into the stomach as food are of three kinds, carbohydrates, proteids, and fats. this means, starch, sugars, meats, and fats, besides water and some salts. food substances carry their own complement of water, serve nutritive purposes when taken into the system, and are easily dissolved by the various fluids in the body. food may be taken into the system for three purposes: 1. simply for the maintenance of health; 2. for fattening purposes; 3. for the sake of muscular energy. the body, the human body, consists, speaking in general terms, of carbohydrates, fats, and proteids, and water and saline matters. we have seen that the work done by the master tissues causes a loss, or produces a certain amount of waste material, consisting of carbon, hydrogen, oxygen, and nitrogen, and some mineral matter--salts. this loss or waste has to be replaced in quantity and quality sufficient in order to maintain a healthy condition of the body. and, since we know the precise, or almost the precise, quantity of material excreted, which consists of carbon, nitrogen, oxygen, and hydrogen, etc., we can also estimate, with considerable precision, the quantity needed to replace it. more than 41 per cent of the entire weight of the body is made up of muscular tissue. the nervous tissue constitutes not quite two per cent. the chemical composition of muscular and nervous tissue--of the solid part only--is carbon. hydrogen. nitrogen. oxygen. sul. 51.5 6.9 15.2 20.9 0.3 to to to to to 54.5 7.3 17.0 23.5 2.0 the watery portion of the muscle is not mentioned. please notice the large quantity of carbon and the small quantity of hydrogen in the composition of the solid part of the muscle. we are aware that the muscles are always producing carbonic acid--that is, c and o2--and when a muscle contracts, there is a sudden and extensive increase of the normal production. the blood that comes from a contracting muscle is richer in carbonic acid--that is, it contains one atom more of carbon and two atoms of oxygen more. the blood that has passed through the lungs changes from venous to arterial blood. the venous discharges about 5 vols. of carbonic acid (c o2); the arterial carries away about 5 vols. of oxygen (o) to the tissues. the carbohydrates taken into the system: oz. starch and sugars, about 20 meats, proteids,  ,,   15 fats,  ,,   3 1/2 water,  ,,   52 about 32 ounces of saliva converts the starch into sugar. that is, the saliva changes starch (c18 h30 o15) into sugar (c6 h11 o5). meats are acted upon by the gastric juice, it requiring about ten to twenty pints to dissolve three-quarters to one pound of meat-stuff; and the substances in the stomach are changed into chyme. the fats are emulsified by the gall from the liver--about 30 to 40 ounces for 3 to 4 ounces of fat. and the pancreatic juice completes the work and still farther dissolves all three kinds of substances, so that, with the aid of the succus entericus, the whole mass is changed into a substance called chyle. all the carbohydrates and proteids in solution, together with the fluids taken into the system, are taken up by the veins of the abdominal organs and conveyed by the portal vein to the liver. passing through the liver, the blood is collected by the hepatic vein and emptied into the inferior vena cava. the fatty substances are taken up by the lacteals to the receptaculum chyli, passed up the thoracic duct, and poured into the left subclavian vein, which empties its contents into the superior vena cava. both streams of blood--venous blood--from the superior and inferior vena cava, pass into the right auricle, thence to the right ventricle, through the pulmonary artery into the lungs, there exchange the carbonic acid for oxygen, and return by means of the pulmonary veins into the left auricle, thence to the left ventricle, through the aorta into the general system--and to the master tissues. in the tissues the oxygen is taken up. that is, the oxygen passes from the blood to the tissues and the tissues throw off the carbonic acid, which the veins again carry to the right side of the heart. alcohol is composed of carbon two (2), hydrogen six (6), and oxygen one (1) (c2 h6 o1). alcohol, like all poisonous substances, carries a small amount of oxygen. in composition it resembles very much, and probably is, a union of c2 h4 + h2 o, c2 h4 = ethane, olefiant gas, or heavy carburetted hydrogen. it is, in fact, a constituent of the gas we burn, procured from the destructive distillation of coal--in other words, coal gas. to make it plainer, ethane contains two of carbon, four of hydrogen + one molecule of water. when alcohol is taken into the system, it is almost immediately absorbed by the veins of the stomach, is carried at once by the portal vein to the liver, and returns from the liver by way of the hepatic vein to the inferior vena cava, to the right auricle, and to the lungs through the right ventricle. but the lungs cannot supply oxygen enough to satisfy the carbon of the alcohol. there is only one atom of oxygen in the composition of alcohol, and three more atoms of oxygen are needed to form carbonic acid (c o2). under ordinary, normal conditions, oxygen enough is inspired to satisfy the wants of the tissues for combustion purposes, but in the case of alcohol an extra demand for oxygen is made, and the lungs are not prepared to supply the demand. since oxidation takes place in the tissues and not in the blood, the blood, being overcharged with heavy carburetted hydrogen (c2 h4), unloads it into the tissue. the extra amount of carbon arriving at the tissue, robs it of its oxygen. the oxygen arriving from the lungs being insufficient, the tissue loses oxygen. the presence of oxygen is necessary for the maintenance of irritability. from the fact that no free oxygen is present in the muscular tissue the tension is nil or even less than nothing. when the carbon of the alcohol robs the tissues of its oxygen, the hydrogen is set free. what becomes of it? the muscular and nervous tissues contain from 51 to 54 per cent of carbon in their composition, and 6 to 7 per cent of hydrogen. the free hydrogen combines with the carbon of the tissues and forms carburetted hydrogen, with which the blood gets overloaded, and carries it to the other tissues. the nervous system, the brain, not receiving the oxygen necessary, in consequence of the blood being overcharged with both carbonic acid and carburetted hydrogen, the nervous substance is first impaired, next exhausted, and lastly its normal activity extinguished. the muscles meantime through having been robbed of both oxygen and carbon--receiving no free oxygen or very little--and through the presence in the circulating fluid of carbonic acid and carburetted hydrogen, lose the power to act. the cerebrum, cerebellum, medulla oblongata, with all the other subordinate nervous centers, being impaired by the poison and the absence of oxygen, the nerves of volition lose control, the cerebrum has its will power impaired or entirely subdued, and the cerebellum loses the power of muscular coördination. thus, then, the master tissues become crippled. at first alcohol may have a stimulating effect on the nervous system; next, if the indulgence be continued, the nervous forces become exalted; finally, however, depression sets in, and proves at last a complete extinguisher of the intellectual faculties. the muscles first lose the power of coördination, the irritability and tension gradually cease, at length they refuse to act. the brain and muscles being helpless, the body lies in a state of stupor, motionless. the individual is temporarily deprived of his mental faculties, incapacitated, and completely oblivious to all his surroundings. the involuntary organs, however, may act. the stomach may eject its contents, having lost consciousness and will power. the urine and feces may pass off involuntarily. all organs have to suffer, but two more than all the rest--the liver and kidneys. the function of the liver, as we have already seen, is the secretion of the bile. that organ has still another important duty to perform, and that is in converting the starchy substances, or its already converted sugars, in to glycogen = c6 h10 o5. the metabolic activity of the hepatic cells lies in the formation of glycogene. glycogene is a source of heat in the body. it is constantly present in the muscle, as a functional material no doubt. the chief purposes this substance serves are probably for respiration and production of animal heat. we must bear in mind that fats are composed of c, h, and o, and that both fats and carbohydrates serve nutritive purposes. whether any difference exists between the two we do not know at present, beyond the fact that in the final combination of the two, while carbohydrates require sufficient oxygen only to combine with their carbon, there being already sufficient oxygen in the carbohydrate itself to form water with the hydrogen, fats require in addition oxygen to burn off some of their hydrogen. alcohol is not convertible into glycogene. the six atoms of carbon are complemented by five molecules of water: c6 + 5 o h2 = c6 h{10} o5. as already stated, alcohol (c6 h2 o) contains only one molecule of water (h2 o + c2 h4 ethane). to convert the four of hydrogen into water, two of oxygen are needed--and to form carbonic acid three of oxygen are wanting. in this connection we may ask, is alcohol a food? no! alcohol is in no sense a food! as a stimulant it is very useful, in a certain class of exhausting diseases, but taken in large quantities alcohol acts as a slow poison. the action of the alcohol, which must pass through the liver, is certainly not beneficial. on the contrary, the function of the organ is interfered with and the tissues of which the liver is composed slowly but surely undergo a degenerative process. the alcoholic beverages differ. as for example, whisky, wine, and beer--of the three beer is probably the least injurious. by reason of the hops it contains it helps to allay nervous irritability. when taken continuously in large quantities, it leads to congestion of the liver and the accumulation of fat. beer contains only four to five per cent of alcohol, or thereabout. the effect of beer on some individuals is somewhat similar, in the increase of size, to the remarkable growth of some aquatic plants, as the gourd, in which the vegetable tissue cells are very large and increase very rapidly. the use of the stronger spirits leads to a degeneration of another kind--contraction of the liver, cirrhosis. the kidneys are the next to suffer severely by the alcoholic fluids. the whole blood is purified by the kidneys. the transit is very rapid; the elimination of impurities must necessarily be rapid. the body under the normal condition eliminates nitrogen chiefly; this is the urea and uric acid found in the diurnal excretion of urine of fifty-two ounces in the twenty-four hours. but if instead of a man drinking the ordinary allowance of fifty-two ounces of water, a man takes in several hundred ounces, as in the case of some beer-drinkers, it is evident that the kidneys have a great deal more work to perform than usual, in addition to the constant irritability the kidneys, like the liver and other organs, are subject to. the sobering up of a man after a drunk, consists in receiving oxygen sufficient in quantity into the tissues, to supply the amount he has lost. it takes several hours before sufficient oxygen has been introduced into the tissues to establish the normal equilibrium. the theories on alcohol are various. i quote some of the more important ones, briefly stated: liebig thought that alcohol disappeared by complete and rapid combustion. lallemand and perrin entertained the theory that alcohol was eliminated by the excretory organs. (that means, perhaps, that alcohol simply promenaded through the system.) parks was of opinion that alcohol is directly absorbed by the blood-vessels without undergoing any change or decomposition. another theory was that alcohol is converted into acetic acid (c2 h{4} o2); and that acetic acid is split up into carbonic acid (c o2) and water--which is impossible, as there is not oxygen enough for both c o2 and h2 o. it appears, then, that alcohol does not disappear by rapid combustion, except when taken in very small quantities and during a state of exhaustion, and then not by combustion. that alcohol is excreted there is no doubt, but when taken in large quantities it is not excreted without leaving its permanent mark behind it. nor is it absorbed by the blood-vessels without undergoing any change or decomposition, otherwise it would be excreted by the kidneys and skin. that the function of the brain is entirely suspended, for a time at least, needs no argument, because all will power is arrested, the nerves of special sense cease to act, all nerve-centers suspend operation, and the nerve-fibers no longer act as conductors of either motion or sensation. and the muscular tissues are no longer capable of irritation, stimulation, or coördination; contraction, flexion, and extension have been temporarily annihilated; the force, the power, and the action have succumbed to the harmful influence of alcohol. and the cause of it all is--too much carburetted hydrogen and the absence of oxygen. this has unbalanced the elements that normally enter into the composition of the tissue both of muscle and nerve. the master tissues, the nervous and muscular, that get drunk, they are the first to feel the stimulation, become excited, depressed, and exhausted. and finally let us sum up some of the effects of alcohol on the system: 1. it is a source neither of heat nor of energy, nor can it be stored up for future use, nor can it be assimilated in the tissues. 2. alcohol retards the motion of the blood. 3. it induces specific action after the manner of cumulative poisons. 4. by the veins and absorbents alcohol mixes with the blood, and immediately acts as a stimulant on all the tissues with which it is brought in contact. 5. it causes the retention of substances which ought to be eliminated. 6. it is shown by abundant testimony that the blood becomes surcharged with unchanged and unused material, and contains more carbon than normally, at times as much as 20 to 30 per cent. 7. alcoholic blood coagulates slowly and extravasates easily. 8. the susceptibility to disease is greater, the resisting force is diminished, and the healing process seriously interfered with. 9. oxygen is diverted from its proper functions, the exhalation of carbonic acid at the lungs is diminished, both absolutely and relatively, but the pulmonary aqueous vapor is not lessened. 10. the functions of the brain are at once stimulated, and all other organs are excited, and a train of phenomena is induced partly of a chemical nature and partly of a physical or vital. 11. alcohol produces a temporary increase of the heart's action, and a congestion of the whole of the pulmonary capillaries. 12. it irritates the parts, stimulating the glandular secretions, leads to congestion of the blood-vessels, in time forms spurious melanotic deposits and a gradual thickening of the gastric substance. 13. fat gradually is increased in the blood, and a milky character is imparted to the serum of the blood, and the red corpuscles in time assume a wrinkled and contracted appearance. 14. the water of the urine is diminished; the chlorides are greatly lessened, as well as the acids and bases. most people are concerned about themselves only to the extent of securing the immediate satisfaction of their senses. the superficial surroundings they utilize to cater to the enjoyment of such indulgences of acquired taste, habit, passion, feelings or emotions, as prove most gratifying to them, never thinking that their constitution is nothing more than a vitalized chemical machine, temporarily passing through its terrestrial cycle of physiological activity, beginning as a mass of protoplasm, and terminating, when it has gone through all the phases of animal existence, in the distribution of its chemical elements. the deranging effect of alcohol on the nervous and muscular tissues may be compared to the working of an ordinary battery. we know that the action and the force depend on the elements that enter into the composition of the battery, fluids and solids, zinc and copper, and sulphuric acid--representing zinc, copper, sulphur, oxygen, and hydrogen. the action of the zinc and copper depends upon the fluids. other fluids, though composed of three elements, would produce either not the same effect, or no effect at all. it stands to reason that, since we know the kind of fluid that will set the elements in action, we certainly should be very unwise to use another fluid that will either derange or destroy the battery's working capacity. the forces or force are in this instance produced by the combination of certain elements, and in order to continue the activity or action of these elements one upon the other, a constant supply must be kept up. the mechanism of muscular action, or nervous action, depends upon the supply of certain elements; they are continually replacing elements that are used up in the work they have to perform--that is, the function of brain or muscle. the moment elements are introduced that do not or cannot make up the loss of the working expenditure, that tend rather to disorganize or decompose the tissues, the functions and the natural forces are interfered with, weakened, or may be brought to a standstill. the effect of alcohol is much the same on all animals. i mean, that the master tissues of the lower animals will succumb to the influence of alcohol as readily as those of a human being. we know with certainty what gets drunk--where is the spiritual part of man? where is the soul? when the brain is intoxicated, its functions are more or less suspended, its controlling or governing action is lost over the muscular tissue, in addition to the muscles themselves being disabled. both tissues, having been robbed of their elementary equilibrium, consequently cease working. the moment the equilibrium is reëstablished, the tissues assume their functions the same as before. if a given number of specific parts enter into the construction of any mechanism in order to produce a certain amount of force and effect, the number of specific parts must always be present if the same force and effect is to be realized. brain and muscle are made up of a specific number of elements; these must be always present if we would have them produce the normal force and effect. when too much carbon and hydrogen and too little oxygen are introduced into the system, as in the case of alcohol, the derangement of these elements is felt in the poisonous effect, because enough oxygen cannot be supplied to keep up with the demand. chapter xxiii. the soul--what is it? dry truth, real knowledge, hard facts, are less interesting, less entertaining, than a plausible fable or a fanciful story. while the latter is listened to, with eagerness and pleasure, the former barely receives ordinary civility and attention. the effort requisite to understand and to think, requires resolution, determination, and fixed attention. the senses are not stimulated, the emotions and feelings not aroused, by mathematical problems or astronomical calculations. the muscular tissues are much more easily trained, disciplined, and educated than the nervous tissues. in the former we see immediate results. there is a pleasure in the pursuit, a palpable satisfaction in watching the muscular action and physical development. the most agreeable part about that kind of exercise, training--or education if you choose--is that it is easily acquired and soon put in practice, and much admired. it has other advantages in addition. the fatigue and exhaustion in consequence of muscular exercise, add no small amount of enjoyment to that already experienced, by having to replenish the spent energies, to fill the demand for new material called for. the gustatory and olfactory nerves are stimulated by odor of the viands provided, and what is still more important, the glandular activity that is set in motion produces an amount of exhilaration, so satisfactory that it is recognized as one of the principal features for every and on all occasions. "a feast is made for laughter and wine maketh merry" (eccles. x, 19). muscular action, however, cannot take place without nervous action. these two tissues are dependent one on the other. yet the muscular tissue may be considered as subordinate to the nervous tissue. while the muscular tissue may become totally inactive or incapacitated, or even removed, the brain tissue may retain its activity and continue to perform its functions. the very reverse takes place when the brain is either injured or removed. we know by experience, experiments, that injuries or other pathological changes will cause impairment to muscular tissue. it is hard to conceive, and harder still to understand, that an animal--man included--is nothing more than a vitalized machine, composed in the first place of two distinct working parts--muscular and nervous--while all the other portions have to perform duty in order to sustain them. the word function is a term applied to all tissues in general, as kidneys, liver, stomach, etc.; each has its function. so have muscles and nerves. the former has for its function contraction, while the latter has for its function to control and regulate that contraction. the first part of the machinery is governed and checked by the domination of the other. that dominion, that control, is termed volition, in other words, will power! 1. will power! what is it? it is a power which every animal possesses, and every animal exercises, in accordance with its particular organization and degree of organic development. 2. every animal has the power, with the aid of its senses--five senses of sight, hearing, smelling, tasting, feeling--to select substances from the vegetable and mineral kingdom, for its immediate want, for the sustenance of life. 3. it has the power of locomotion to go in search for those substances, and to carry them to a place of safety, for present or future use. it has the power to select the kind of food, to choose that which is beneficial and reject that which is injurious. the five senses direct in that selection. 4. the animal has will power to protect and defend his possessions--through his senses the brain directs and the muscles act. 5. the animal has will power, when the organs of procreation are developed, to choose a partner for the production of young. the senses serve in making the selection, as regards beauty, form, size, etc. 6. it has the will power to nourish and protect its young or to destroy it. 7. animals have the will power to build their habitation, their home, and furnish it in a manner best suited for their comfort. 8. animals have the power to articulate sound, and have the will to communicate with each other if they so desire, to antagonize or to quarrel. 9. they have the will power to select from the surrounding elements. they choose water, air, sunshine, high or low altitudes; they migrate from warm to cold, and from cold to warm, climates. 10. they have social intercourse among themselves; have a will power to organize as a band or body to protect themselves against the attacks of other organized bodies, to fight and to battle. 11. animals instruct their young--guide them and protect them, as well as feed them. they have their code of morals. they have all such functions as serenading, love-making, music, jealousy, pleasure, and anger. animals have judgment; they can compare and reflect on cold and heat, danger and tranquillity, comfort and discomfort. they can reject or accept. 12. they have memory, perception, and understanding. domestic and wild animals exhibit these peculiarities. they will manifest their likes and dislikes, hate and love, courage and cowardice. the will power depends on the nervous system--the cerebral hemispheres, the cerebrum or small brain, the thalamus opticus, corpus striata, corpora quadrigemina, the peduncles, medulla oblongata, spinal cord, etc. that is, all the organs that constitute the nervous machinery, that control the muscular tissues in all their acts, and keep a watchful outlook over all other organs of the body. the will power, then, is the power to act in accordance and in harmony with the things recognized, or the selection made by any of the five senses, discriminating between that which is good for them and that which is injurious, or good and evil. animals in selecting grass for food will avoid that which is injurious to them. the olfactory and gustatory nerves guide them. they will seek shelter, and evidently know what to do when a thunderstorm approaches, etc., etc. will power is a property, quality, or function belonging to all living creatures in common. the degree of will power depends upon the quality, quantity, and perfection of the nervous organization. man has will power in a measure greater as the nervous system is developed, educated, and perfected. morality--a quality that does not exclusively belong to man. what is morality? it is nothing more than a restraint, or check, on our actions and our feelings. it is the regulating of the actions of life towards ourselves and towards others. it is the obedience to recognized and established laws in a community, socially and politically. it means not to trespass against the laws of nature, against ourselves, or against our neighbors. animals restrain themselves and obey. morality differs according to the social customs and practices, and the civil laws regulating the same, which were made and adopted for mutual benefit and protection. these are either crude or refined, depending on the condition of society. to a limited degree animals have morality. man has it in a higher and more refined degree, according to the progress and culture attained. intelligence--animals possess intelligence, if the meaning of it is, to recognize sounds and figures, be obedient to the voice, understand what is said, perform certain acts, execute the will of a master, know the difference between right and wrong, express gratitude, exercise watchfulness, protect life and property, remember places and objects in general, be capable of some degree of improvement, susceptible of training and modification of conduct, etc., within the limits of the nervous power the animal has. what is the soul? is the soul something quite independent of matter? is it a something entire and complete in itself? a perfect part of a perfect whole? does the soul possess all the excellences and qualities theologians claim for it? whence does it come? what does it consist of? has it an existence separate and apart from the body? if so, where? in what state does it exist previous to entering the body? does every human being receive a like quality and quantity? has it consistency? density? elasticity? is there any connection between the soul principle and matter? spirit and soul, are they one and the same thing, or do they differ? if so, in what? what is substance soul and substance spirit? is it self-acting and self-existing? is the soul susceptible to training and education, and the reception of knowledge? or is the soul already trained, educated, and possessed of all the knowledge that is now known or likely to be known? does the will power reside in the soul? and is the nervous system subservient to the soul? is the soul endowed with passions and emotions? can the soul deteriorate, be injured or be afflicted? in what degree does the soul differ in the civilized and in uncivilized man? the theological soul has its origin in the bible, no doubt (from the word nephesh, breathing; the greek psyche: latin animas, chayu, breath of life). this word gave the impulse to a vast amount of thought and reflection, both theological and psychological. discussion and literature followed as extensive as there has ever been on any metaphysical topic. it may be interesting to learn some of the attributes of the soul. here is a partial list: "will, passion, love, joy, grief, anger, mirth, sorrow, revenge, contempt, hatred, honor, pride, humility, jealousy, despair, pity, compassion, love of fame, of music, of the marvelous, of notoriety, avarice, guilt, curiosity, astonishment, respect, desire, cheerfulness, melancholy, sense of beauty, sense of the sublime, sense of friendship, feeling of delight, selfishness, generosity, etc." the author of this concoction had not a very clear notion of what he was writing about, otherwise he would have known that animals have in common with man most of the emotions above recited. the soul is a display of nervous phenomena, exhibited under certain circumstances, differing only in intensity of expression, depending upon the kind and character of animal and man. it is one of the common tricks of trade--when theologians argue upon the immortality of the soul, they bring and ring in any amount of biblical evidence to sustain them. they prove nothing. they cannot prove anything. it is the standing puzzle. they try to unravel a mysterious something that is not mysterious. nor is there any need of mystery. what is essential for us to know is the truth, plain natural facts. there is nothing that we need be either ashamed or afraid of. if we have been deluded by errors made several thousand years ago, regarding the dual composition of man, or have been imposed upon and intentionally retarded in the onward progress, it is time to correct the error and remove the imposition. let us have a clear, intelligent view of things and look at them as they are. this mystery, like other mysteries, can be cleared up by the light of science and modern investigation. what is the difference between man and animal? articulate speech and the susceptibility of the brain matter to a high degree of culture. mind is a term employed to designate the collective acquirements of a man's brain. in proportion as the acquirements are greater or less, the mind is greater or smaller. these acquirements may be simple, complex, or profound. they may be biased, general, or scientific; they may be deep, learned, or superficial. they may be only a slight advance above the general animal instinct; or may have assumed a superior intelligence and may have arisen to a higher plane of intellectual qualities. the acquirement or evolution of mental power and intellectual capacity depends: 1. on the constitutionally inherited capacity and capability. 2. on the size and general conformation of the brain. 3. on the perfect condition of the organs of special sense. 4. on the quality of the nervous structure. 5. on the general physical constitution of the body. 6. on the evenly balanced equilibrium between the vital organs. 7. on the chemical elementary constituents that enter into the composition of the various tissues, especially the nervous tissue. 8. and lastly on the education, training, or culture. 9. i may add, suggestively, on the relative quantity and quality of the gray and white substance of the brain, etc., and perhaps on the depth of the sulci and the size of the convolutions and the general symmetry of the different lobes of the cerebrum, etc. the brain of an idiot is not susceptible to culture or education. he has all the senses, but of an inferior and imperfect order; a brain insufficient in quantity and quality to be capable of acquiring anything. no mind can be formed. the idiot has not any intellect. has he a soul? or supposing any portion of the brain is diseased and any one of the special senses ceases to act, as sight, hearing, or any part of the muscular tissue, and the intellect is impaired, either partially or wholly incapacitated, then has the soul suffered any damage, or does the soul remain intact? or supposing that a child is born blind, or that some one of the nerve centers controlling certain faculties of the brain is absent, and the education is necessarily limited to the remaining nerve centers, is the soul still complete and perfect? or in case of change of structure of the brain substance, as in softening of the brain; or in case of tumors, blood clots (thrombosis), or syphilitic disease, and paralysis either local or general resulting--depending on the seat of the disease--what has the soul to do with it? or in disease of the meninges (coverings); or in case of insanity, whatever morbid cause might have produced that condition, where is the soul? or when, in consequence of morbid changes, the mental and physical expressions, the actions, change, often extravagantly, is the soul affected thereby? when the body is afflicted with disease, does the soul suffer? at what period of fetal development is it that the soul enters the body? or does it enter at birth? the breath of life is oxygen. without that element one could not live. without it the newly born babe is more helpless than a lower animal. not a single special sense is fully developed. the brain substance is not fully developed. the babe has no power to will anything. it has no volition--except the act of nursing, and that is not a voluntary act. the organs over which will has no control are the first to act--an infant soils its linen involuntarily. it imbibes nourishment, as a mass of protoplasm imbibes moisture. it has neither will power nor desire. it cannot select. it has neither knowledge nor conscience. since none of the special senses is able to act, it has no perception of any kind whatsoever. it experiences only two sensations, pain and hunger. young birds and other young animals do the same. is there anything in this newly born babe of a supernatural character, such as a soul, spirit; the knowledge of god, or of good and evil? does there exist in this mass of organized protoplasm anything that may be called divine? is there aught innate? no! certainly not! there are what may be termed latent powers--not unlike latent heat--capable of being evolved. you may fashion anything out of it--in the religious line, brutal or uncivilized, etc. it will acquire any kind of speech, from the howling of a dog to the most refined language. it will contract any habit, from that of the lowest animal type to that of the most refined lady or gentleman. you may make either a cannibal out of it or the most fantastic gustatorian. it will either crawl, climb, or walk. it will live anywhere and anyhow. it will either parade nude, be painted, or wear a breechcloth, or wear a swell dress coat, or, if it be a female, a long trailing skirt with all sorts of gewgaws. in religion you may make anything out of this babe. you may make it believe the greatest nonsense. it will believe three gods in one or twenty-five gods in one. it will be a jew, a christian, a mohammedan, or the lowest brute on the face of the earth. this mass of vitalized matter is susceptible to training. the physical part, the muscular part, always develops and is readily trained. in a primitive state it requires but little discipline to acquire muscular strength. the muscular powers are the first to assert themselves. this master tissue, whenever and wherever it excels, receives honor and homage, and prevails among its companions. in barbaric ages this was the controlling force, the ruling spirit, the governing power. the nervous tissues require teaching. the senses must be trained, educated, cultured, refined. the impressions received through the nerve-centers by the senses are stored up in the cerebrum. though they are at first simple, crude, and incomprehensible, habit, use, or repetition enables them to familiarize us with the surrounding objects. if the brain is fully formed, the infantile education begins. by constant repetition of the same acts, the sense of satisfaction from feeding, and the sense of comfort from cleanliness, are slowly established in the experience of the child. hunger, cold, heat, and moisture will cause it to manifest its dissatisfaction by crying. it sleeps twenty out of the twenty-four hours, and wakes only to indicate its wants of either hunger or discomfort. the more regularly it is fed, and the more cleanly it is kept, the more peacefully will it rest and the more soundly will it sleep. when, however, an infant is born, though physically fully developed, with face fully formed, but acephalous, without brain--that is, when an arrest of development has taken place--the babe cannot live, it cannot breathe, because the principal part of the nervous system is wanting--the medulla oblongata, cerebrum and cerebellum, etc.--though the lungs, heart, and all other organs are perfectly developed. this arrest of development may take place at any time. it is thus that congenital malformations are produced. idiots are thus formed, or any other inferior formation of brain may take place. in proportion as the parts are present or wanting--the brain, or rather the nervous system--latent (better, inherent) qualities for future capabilities exist or do not exist. supposing the optic nerve is arrested in its development, or any organ with which it is immediately connected, the special sense of sight is wanting. though the eye itself, the organ of sight, may be perfect, all the training and education will never give it capability or skill in arts and sciences. this can never be acquired by that organ. you cannot educate that organ which you have not. whatever perfect brain formation exists may be trained, fashioned, educated, in any one of the thousands of directions one pleases. it may be given any bent or bias, good, bad, or indifferent--depending upon the influences that are brought to bear on the young brain while it is in the process of developing. an infant has no mind, intellect, thought, idea, memory, or any other nerve quality that nerve structure is capable of developing. talk of soul or spirit is absurd. it does not exist either in infant or in man any more than it exists in a plant or an animal--unless the term is applied to the collective functions of the great central organs, and in that case it would certainly not be supernatural. at the time when the books of moses were written--we need not even go so far back as when the fable of creation was first related--they knew nothing of circulation or of respiration, or of the nervous system. it was not even thought of. i believe you may search the bible from end to beginning and from beginning to end without finding such a thing. no such word as brain is mentioned. what is known of the nervous system is, comparatively speaking, of recent date. "what seems most marvelous is, that we, in the nineteenth century, boasting of a high grade of civilization, and, i may say, with all the modern improvements, should accept and still hold fast to an idea that originated in the brain of some barbarian four thousand or more years ago, away down in mesopotamia (now turkey) where they are still considered uncivilized. this is certainly very strange. but ah! that priestcraft! the mind. all the organs in the body are capable of performing their functions the moment the child is born. most organs have performed their functions prior to the child's birth. circulation, respiration, digestion, secretion, and excretion--these functions are performed at once. these are involuntary, and require no educational training. they are performed while the organism is otherwise entirely helpless. 1. the first few weeks.- the nervous system is not developed. the special senses are not responsive--neither sight, hearing, taste, nor smell. there are no voluntary muscular movements, no coördinations of muscles. nervous and muscular tissues undeveloped. special senses undeveloped, no recognition. it has no mind--no faculties, morality, intellect, memory, reason, judgment. in short, it has nothing innate--no principle of either god, soul, or religion. no will power. the muscular and nervous tissues are not yet able to perform their functions, except such as are reflex and of an involuntary character. no expression. 2. a few weeks after birth.- impressions of light perceptible. sensations slightly improved. expression still blank. no volition. no recognition. cry the only sound. 3. three months.- special senses improved. the eye steadier. the child begins to recognize its mother, etc. utters sounds of satisfaction. perceives sounds indistinctly. no coördinate movement. upper extremities more active. expression of face improved--smiles. 4. six months.- muscular tissues more developed--crawls. no coördination of muscular action. sight improved--recognizes mother, father, etc. excretions involuntary. expressions of pain and satisfaction more palpable. hearing improved--listens to sounds. playfulness. makes sounds of satisfaction and dissatisfaction more distinctly. no articulation. 5. one year.- special senses more developed. coördination still imperfect. excretion involuntary. upper extremities more active. fear manifested. the dawn of want. recognizes a few objects. pleasure expressed as well as anger. likes and dislikes exhibited in some degree. beginning of articulation. sounds more distinctly recognized. sight more perfect. taste slightly developed. smell--no discrimination. a child one year old--(a) recognizes its parents imperfectly. has slight coördinate movement of the upper extremities, and beginning of coördination of the lower extremities. manifests its wants by making noises, but has no articulation. sensations of pleasure, pain, and anger are more plainly expressed. playfulness is greater. fear is exhibited. (b) it has no mind, no intellect, no will power. no god, no religion, no soul. no thought, no idea, no conscience. no faculties, no memory, no judgment. no knowledge of objects, or numbers. it knows nothing of comparison, relation, liberty, morality, love, hate, shame, joy, sorrow, despair, envy, ambition, pride, etc., etc. 6. second year.- the master tissues begin to perform their functions--the muscular and nervous tissues. digestive apparatus more completely developed by the appearance of teeth. all the special senses more susceptible. voluntary muscles begin to act, though imperfectly. coördination still uncertain. muscles of articulation attempt to produce articulate sound--beginning to imitate. recognizes some objects; cannot discriminate. the sense of taste shows signs of development. the sense of smell--no discrimination. the sense of hearing recognizes simple sounds--voice. the sense of sight more distinct. the sense of feeling slightly improved. attracted by bright-colored objects. selfishness exhibited--seizes objects indiscriminately. shows fear; knows nothing of danger. manifestation of affection toward those who care and provide for its comfort. excretions still pass involuntarily. responds feebly to calls. playful. cognizant of light and darkness, indoors and out of doors. shows signs of preference. training begins; involuntary acts checked to a slight extent only. at the end of the second year the child (a) recognizes its parents and others about it. has coördinate movements comparatively correct of both lower and upper extremities. may manifest its wants by imperfect articulation. the sensations of pleasure, pain, and anger are more emphatic. (b) the will power is slight. the memory is very feeble. discrimination begins in simple matters. 7. third year.- training progresses. coördination complete. nerve centers formed. will power attempted. it depends at this age upon the surroundings--the guidance, attention, direction given to the child. it is more susceptible to impression. memory improving. perception manifested, but little discrimination. articulates more perfectly. imitates to some extent. excretion controlled. playful, active. all the senses work. more subject to discipline--obeys more readily. teachable in right and wrong of a simple character. likes and dislikes more prominent. recognizes objects. begins to pronounce. at the end of this period there is no manifestation of anything innate. the child knows nothing. only the muscular tissues are more active, and the nervous tissues more susceptible to teaching. it has no faculty of any kind. the functions of the brain are more distinctly manifest through the organs of special sense. the child will become just what you make it; though the latent inherited qualities will give impulse to some directions more than others. thus inclinations and susceptibilities are awakened that may lead to greater or less distinction. all that the child thus far has developed is instinctive, checked and modified by those in whose care it is. the animal nature predominates, and the child at this stage will become a brute if left to itself. if the proper training, teaching, discipline, or education is from this time forth properly applied and the latent power judiciously brought out, mind and intellectual qualities may be developed--differing in degree and intensity--by the bias or bent given to the functions of the great nervous center. on the culture of this organ depends the kind of creature we may have when full grown in the shape of either man or woman. any kind of sentiment, belief, or superstition, prejudice, hate, brutality, humanity or inhumanity, good or bad habits, vicious or benign--with no end to the variety, such as we witness among ourselves and among the various nations upon earth--may be inculcated. it is brain function, brain culture, brain education, that produces greater or lesser minds, that evolves from mere intelligence the highest intellectual powers, that marks the difference between man and man from the meanest savage to the greatest philosopher and scientist. brain may exercise will power without training, culture, or education. the muscles may exercise strength without training, culture, or education. it is the systematic attention of the one as of the other, the frequent repetition, steady practice, that produces skill in the one, as in the other; it is the patient application and perseverance in the one as in the other, sustained by constitutional endurance, that makes the expert in the one as well as in the other. it is the united forces of the master tissues that have produced all that is and was, and will continue to produce all that ever will be. soul is the product of the imagination. it has no immortality, because it has no existence. there are a class of men that are interested in sustaining the delusion; these are the priesthood. what we want is not the salvation of souls, but the salvation of man. if soul is the collective name of brain product, or combined result of brain function and education, we need not disagree about the word. but if it is insisted upon that the word soul means something distinct and apart from the animal body, a supernatural manifestation, a supernatural gift or endowment, given to man at birth and to man only, and that this piece of supposed god enters the body at some period during birth and quits the body at death, it is not true! on the contrary, it is false. man has no soul, nor has any other animal, except that power that is produced by the nervous material. the brain has a function to perform, like every other tissue in the body. the muscular tissue, the liver tissue, etc., each perform their function. the great nervous centers and the special senses, being intimately connected, carry all impressions direct to the brain; the retention of impressions, the memorizing, the recollection, the formation of ideas, of thought, imagination, are the immediate functions of the nervous substance. these are secreted in a similar manner as the pancreas secretes pancreatin; with this distinction, that pancreatin is a fluid, while the quality of nerve function is a force, a power, a manifestation, or phenomenon if you choose. electricity is a product of a similar nature. there are other forces of a nature similar in character, the result of chemical combinations. let the blood be overcharged with carbonic acid and circulate in the brain, the nerve tissue will at first act irregularly, next very erratically, and finally stop its function altogether. the function of the brain is partially suspended in certain diseases, as in hysteria, epilepsy, and chorea or convulsions. and where there is no brain, or little brain, there is no function or very little function. the variety of brain, with its inequality of size, quantity, quality, the hereditary failings, opportunity, training, education, all, and much more, make up the sum total of mind. as you educate the brain, so the mind will be. it will exhibit energy and endurance, and perform its functions, in proportion as the nervous structure is healthy, the chemical constituents evenly balanced, and the equilibrium of all the organs and tissues of the body evenly and smoothly maintained, so that the molecular and chemical or vital and nervous elements of the brain perform each and every one its proper office. there is no immortality of the soul, nor is there such a thing as death of instinct. there is nothing immortal except the elementary substances, proper; they cannot be destroyed. all live bodies function, no matter how small or how simple; complex bodies also function, and each and every organ that enters into the composition performs its function. every phase, every phenomenon, is a manifestation of matter. thunderstorm, lightning, electricity, or thought--whatsoever it may be, call it by any other name, designate it or describe it how you will, we cannot separate any object from this terrestrial globe of matter. the elements composing this world gave birth to life, life manifests its energies in many forms, then returns again to the great ocean of elements whence it came. no soul you will ever find, trust not in its life or death; education makes the mind; oxygen is the life's breath. chapter xxiv. sin and salvation. what is sin? if we are able to ascertain what sin is, we shall probably understand why salvation should be extended to the one that sins, or to a community of sinners. everything has a beginning. we draw our deductions by comparison. men judge in part by their own experience, and in part by the experience of others. we see what is going on in our daily active life, how every work or enterprise, society or society reform, is started and set in active operation. every beginning is crude and awkward. rules adopted to govern a family circle, jar and chafe when introduced to govern larger bodies of individuals. what may seem good for a household government would hardly be suitable for a community, and the rules regulating the general community would hardly be available for a people or a nation. modifications in the rule of conduct are inevitable as families or communities increase numerically. they may be slow, imperceptible, and cause little disturbance. but sudden and radical changes produce quite another effect. they may cause simple irritation or friction among the elements composing the family or community, may cause temporary embarrassment, or may cause an eruption with considerable commotion, and accompanied with more or less serious effects. change in the methods of conducting and regulating the affairs of mankind, individually or collectively, in small family groups or in large communities, has ever been a matter, not only of great interest and deep concern to mankind, but also of bitter dispute, conflict, and hostility. it has ever been thus, from the time intelligence superseded instinct, with attempts to introduce innovations, new or improved methods regulating the conduct of either individuals or communities, or the general affairs of man. individual must yield to family, family to community, community to people, and people to nation. rules once established, no matter how rude, vulgar, or barbarous, or how enlightened and beneficial, were adopted to secure a general uniformity of conduct or line of action for each individual or family belonging to the community or people, for what was considered the best interest of the whole, and their mutual benefit and safety. the most primitive rules were instinctively adopted in the lower order of animal life, the laws of self-preservation and mutual protection. the individual conduct, in either family or community life, is governed accordingly. that is very evident, and requires but little observation to find the secret spring that explains the necessity for its existence. if a community, whether animals or men, are favorably located, have ample provision and comfort, they will live in peace and contentment, thrive, develop, without friction or trouble. let a lack of food arise, or let the numbers increase and produce a scarcity, strife is inevitable. new, other than peaceful, methods are adopted. either they quarrel and battle among themselves, or they go in search of food elsewhere--emigrate, in part or as a whole. if they meet with opposition, they will fight--the strongest takes possession, might asserts its right, and the conquerer becomes the ruling power. in the early stages of human civilization, thousands of years ago, the simplest primitive rules were established for the conduct and guidance of the individual living in the community--for, of course, mutual protection and self-preservation. humanity in a barbarous state adopted these rules, and handed them down from generation to generation until at length they were codified into laws. what are they? honor thy parents. do not commit murder. do not take another man's wife. do not bear false witness. do not take anything belonging to another. these are laws for self-preservation and mutual protection! if such simple rules were not recognized and established, neither life nor property would be safe. destruction of life and forcible possession of property would naturally lead to extermination. the family union is instinctive. the father, like the leader of a flock, is in authority. he is feared, therefore honored. a community soon learns from experience that "in union is strength." herds of cattle seem to know this, and are ever ready to protect and defend themselves collectively. the lowest savages, barbarians, observe among themselves the first, yes, primitive rules to govern them in community, in family. these rules arose from necessity. it was for each individual's interest, for family interest, and for the interest of the community at large, to adopt these rules, obey them and have them obeyed. these rules were for individual welfare, and for the common welfare of the community at large, the preservation of their lives and the protection of their life and property. so long as any community of human beings, whatever be their condition, have ample provision to satisfy their wants, and are secure from depredations from without, there will be no trouble. happiness and contentment, as well as peace and prosperity, will characterize their state. as to the relation between males and females, that regulates itself. all communities, barbarians and savages, have always some general recognized rule to guide them. female chastity is secure among all nations, high and low, civilized and uncivilized, whether they are decorated in a complete suit of nudity, a gauze covering, or a ball-room dress. there is no necessity of going back four or five thousand years. cæsar relates (lib. vi, 21) that the germans were in complete undress costume when bathing promiscuously; yet they had their customs of marriage and marriage ceremonies. in this country we have had the same customs and may have again. when columbus arrived at one of the islands of the caribs, 1494, a cacique and his family paid him a visit. this family consisted of two daughters, five sons, and five brothers. "one of the daughters was eighteen years of age, beautiful in form and countenance; her sister somewhat younger; both were naked, according to the custom of these islands, but were of modest demeanor" (irving). as a further illustration i quote from irving's description of the people that peter martyr met with. he relates: "it is certain that the land among the people is as common as the sun and water; and that 'mine and thine,' the seed of all mischief, have no place with them. they are content with so little, that in so large a country they have rather superfluity than scarceness; so they seem to live in the golden world, without toil, living in open gardens; not intrenched with dykes, divided with hedges, or defended with walls. they deal truly one with another, without laws, without books, without judges. they take him for an evil and mischievous man who taketh pleasure in doing hurt to another; and albeit they delight not in superfluities, yet they make provision for the increase of such roots whereof they make their bread, content with such simple diet, whereby health is preserved and disease avoided." possibly somewhere on the african continent there may still exist a people that live a life as simple and as happy as those in the time of columbus. but everything must yield before northern energy and christian greed; besides, the new-comers need the land for their surplus population. may we not ask, is not our present high state of civilization the natural outcome of our necessities in the struggle to exist? is not our high state of nervous development largely due to that struggle? indolence and inactivity produce nothing. activity and diligence produce and invent all things. all wrongful acts committed are either injuries done to ourselves, or injuries inflicted upon others. injuries done to ourselves are not necessarily sins. onanism, for example, is unquestionably injurious, yet is not recognized as a sin. it leads to the insane asylum, and in many instances underlies religious insanity. there are other disgusting practices that are neither injurious nor recognized as sins. the stomach commits no sin, but leads nevertheless to many wrongs, to one's self. all crimes are sins, but all sins are not crimes. and all injuries done to others are accounted both sins and crimes. what seems very strange yet is wonderfully true is that all sins and crimes against others find their origin in the indulgence of either stomach or sexual organs. starvation may lead to crime. hunger often drives to theft. extravagance, lust, and luxury lead to any variety of crime, from forgery to appropriating another man's wife. in the gratification of those two organs, passions, we find the cradle of all crime. and what we call morality means the proper regulation of these passions, of these organs. the church occasionally takes cognizance of sins, when discovered, that do not come within the category of crime, as was seen recently in the case of a major theobald who seduced his niece while nursing his invalid wife; he was suspended for one year, but saved his soul! all our civil justices in the city of new york are kept busy to regulate and to punish overindulgences of the stomach and some other petty wrongs. our criminal courts are kept busy in punishing those who have wrongfully appropriated other people's property, or injured or killed another. the superior civil courts attend to the disputes about property. why do those who adopt for their mode of livelihood the profession of theology want to exercise salvation? what have they to save? let us examine for what sins the deluge was brought, sodom and gomorrah were destroyed, and christ was crucified. the principal scriptural sins: cain commits murder, from jealousy, because god preferred meat to vegetables (gen. iv, 8). gen. vi, 5: "and god saw that the wickedness of man was great in the earth, and that every imagination of the thoughts of his heart was only evil continually." the contents of this sentence is absurd. the heart cannot imagine, or think. the function of the heart is the circulation of the blood. what this wickedness consisted of, we do not know. history has no record exactly where this flood or deluge took place. that it was localized is certain. it was in all probability nothing more than an overflow of the river euphrates--that is joined by the river tigris, and terminates in the gulf of persia--in consequence of a series of consecutive rainstorms, etc., and god had as much to do with this supposed deluge as he has to do with any deluge in the mississippi valley when that river overflows. gen. vi, 6: "and it repented the lord that he had made man on the earth and it grieved him at his heart." now we are getting at god's anatomy! man may labor under delusions--hear voices, etc. all those extravagant statements are perfectly excusable from our modern standpoint. all this wickedness is supposed to have taken place 2348 before the christian era, and we have still the same sort of wickedness on earth as there was then. barbarians inhabited that region--rude, crude, half-civilized herdsmen, not much superior to our indians. minding their flocks and increasing their families was their main occupation. abraham made no scruples in cohabiting with miss hagar, sarah's maid; nor had jacob any objections to miss bilhah, rachel's maid, nor did he scruple to accommodate miss zilpha, leah's maid, and later we read how reuben lay with bilhah, jacob's mistress. shechem seduced dina, jacob's daughter. her brothers simon and levi killed all the males, etc. at this time, we learn, harlots were in fashion. we have it recited, crime after crime--according to our modern notions--yet these barbarians were god's own people! after killing shechem, and hamor his father, and all the rest of the males, they took possession of their property. lot and his daughters is another instance of biblical ethics. this barbarian family, these shepherds, had their first experience in civilization when they reached egypt, and whatever they practiced later was adopted from that nation. they had received some training under egyptian rule for nearly four hundred and thirty years. during this period we hear nothing of sin or transgression. no sooner were they organized as a community than the sins, transgressions, and wickedness broke out anew, and continued right along in a greater or lesser degree through the patriarchal period, theocratic period, and monarchial period. during the entire national existence of nearly one thousand years to their captivity, we have recited sins, transgressions, and crime, crime, transgressions, and sin; and all are perfectly human, perfectly natural among barbarians, savages, half-civilized, and even civilized people. whether david lusts after a nude woman, or amnon forces his own sister, it reveals the weakness of animal human nature, and is a breach of the recognized laws, and a lack of discipline. all through the old testament the same story is repeated--sensuality, cruelty, and crime; and rebellion against the established laws. it is the burden of song and of prophecy--greed and scramble for power, the cause of continual dissension. the only time the jews were reasonably quiet was when they were exterminating other nations, plundering and taking forcible possession of their women and female children as well as their property. the great burden of sin throughout the old testament consists in the infringement of the law established by moses, to worship no other god except the one he manufactured--that is, a god endowed with all brutality and sensuality, without a representative form, a god that had all the senses and could utilize them. the wooden idol had these organs but could not use them, while the mosaic god had them not but could exercise all the functions of animal life. in the light of history, all ages display the same process in the human mind--the same passions and the same tendencies, held more or less under restraint, according to the laws, customs, and habits of the people. the jews during their whole career were more or less idolators, and were continually relapsing into the idolatry, of some one kind or another, of dead men, which was practiced under different celestial or animal emblems in the neighboring countries. and it was not ended until after the babylonish captivity, 588 b.c., and when ezra returned to jerusalem, 557 b.c., who collected the various manuscripts and put them into some sort of shape and started to rebuild the temple. this event took place during the reign of xerxes son of darius. ezra and his companions had been educated meanwhile. they had enjoyed the privilege of a babylonian education. they had the advantage of their learning, their philosophy. now they returned better equipped mentally than ever they were before their captivity. and for the first time they began to call themselves "holy seed" (chapter ix). they had intermarried with the canaanites, hittites, perizzites, jebusites, ammonites, moabites, egyptians, amorites, etc., (verse 2) "so that the holy seed have mingled themselves with the people of those lands." verse 6, this priest goes into hysterics: "o my god, i am ashamed and blush to lift up my face to thee," etc. chapter x: he prays, confesses, and weeps and casts himself down before the house of god, etc. verse 11: "and separate yourself from the people of the land, and from the strange wives." of course their wives were sent adrift. that was the first time in their history that marriages were restricted to their own nation. this also is the first wholesale divorce on record. intermarriages they had been guilty of for many centuries, and they were never accounted a sin until the time of ezra. after this reformation the same sins continue, intermarriages perhaps excepted. the animal predominated, as it naturally would. selfishness was more prominent than ever. they knew the value of gold, and onyx stone, and bdellium. god had told them all about it in gen. ii, 11, 12. the commercial enterprise started with creation, and has continued. jehova had not half the romance and the poesy of zeus or jupiter. the latter had all the grecian refinement, while the former had all the barbarity of chaldea. thus, the identical sins continued through the remaining centuries until christ made his entry on this world's stage. he came opportunely. it was at a time of great agitation. judea was a roman province. pontius pilate was governor. corruption, fraud, and crimes of all descriptions were practiced and flourished. the temple served as a place for barter and business. sedition, parricide, greed, and seduction were the ruling crimes and passions. fanatics, heretics, and blasphemers were abundant. there were any number of religious factions, quarreling and fighting among themselves, hating one another heartily, and doing one another as much mischief as in their power lay. the frequent contact with foreign invading nations brought new notions, new customs and usages. new ideas consequently developed--sins and salvation of souls. and humility and meekness were put forth against arrogance of wealth, domineering, and priestly oppression. communistic and socialistic ideas are always a prolific field for the hungry, poor, and starving. "give us this day our daily bread, and forgive us our debts," etc. (matt. vi, 11, 12). christ's camel and needle story confirms it. the result was he had a following, preached reformation, and accusation and persecution put an end to his life. it had taken root, and a new sect was formed. was his life sacrificed for the sins of humanity? nonsense! this young man's death has not relieved any one, much more all future generations, of their sins. what? sacrifice a man to god in place of sheep and cattle? so long as men have senses and passions, so long as we have extremes of poverty and wealth, sin remains. the prevention of sin has never been the function of the church. the trespasses of the natural laws were not properly understood, and the masses are not educated up to that standard even now. each man and woman pays the penalty if he or she trespass against her or himself; and if they trespass or sin against another, our civil laws take care of that part. has humanity improved since the coming of christ? where do you find it? in the history of the catholic church? they have two kinds of sin, mortal and venial sin. mortal sin entails spiritual death. venial sin does not. mountains of literature have been written upon that one subject. hundreds of thousands of men have assumed the task of salvation for nearly two thousand years. what have they accomplished? what have the popes, bishops, and priests done? and what are they doing now? of what use are they? they have been more of a curse to the world than a benefit. we are too busy to look back at popish history, the power, the ignorance, the superstition, the darkness, and the persecution that overshadowed the world during the popes' tyrannical and bloodthirsty rule. greed, the chief characteristic of the churchmen, readily finds means to raise money for their use and benefit. in 1517 they sold indulgences for past and future sins. every crime was pardoned. luther and reformation came. did this change or eradicate the evil? no! god, christ, holy ghost, virgin mary, etc., assumed only a milder role, only a slight transformation. the catholic church has been the greatest curse of any church that ever existed. they started their anathemas (curses) at nice 325 a.d., and have continued cursing, through the twentieth council at trent, 1546 a.d., and still continue. their power has to some extent been modified, but the spirit of intolerance only slumbers. they readily accommodate themselves to circumstances. if they cannot rule the nation, they will seize the schools and train the young, inculcating obedience to the church--that the youth shall be subservient to the priest and yield up their earnings to the pope's treasure. these are supported by the masses, assisted by the state, to teach stuff like the following sample: the litany of the blessed virgin. we fly to thy patronage, o holy mother of god! despise not our petitions, but deliver us from all dangers, o ever glorious and blessed virgin! lord have mercy on us. christ have mercy on us. lord have mercy on us. christ hear us. christ graciously hear us. god the father of heaven have mercy on us. god the son, redeemer of the world, have mercy on us. holy trinity, one god, have mercy on us. holy mary, } holy mother of god, } holy virgin of virgins, } mother of christ, } mother of divine grace, } mother most pure, } mother most chaste, } mother undefiled, } mother unviolated, } mother most amiable, } mirror of justice, } seat of wisdom, } cause of our joy, } spiritual vessel, } pray for us. mother most adorable, } mother of our creator, } mother of our redeemer, } virgin most prudent, } virgin most venerable, } virgin most renowned, } virgin most powerful, } virgin most merciful, } virgin most faithful, } vessel of power, } vessel of singular devotion, } mystical rose, } tower of david, } tower of ivory, } house of gold, } ark of the covenant, } gate of heaven, } morning star, } health of the weak, } refuge of sinners, } comforter of the afflicted, } queen of angels, } let us pray. queen of patriarchs, } queen of prophets, } queen of apostles, } queen of martyrs, } queen of confessors, } queen of virgins, } queen of all saints, } etc., etc., etc. from the time of luther up to the present, god, christ, holy ghost, virgin, etc., have been toned down considerably, until there is indeed very little left except a shade of god. our creeds now that have dismissed christ, holy ghost, and virgin, yet retain a hazy something which they still call god. the most erratic of these denominations yell themselves hoarse with shouting sin and salvation! the modern kindergarten of protestant fashionable church organizations, the society churches, the scholarly preachers, entertain their congregations with a novel sort of oratory and classic music. these represent a god at ease, a gentlemanly and mild sort of a god, with a constant aristocratic smile round his lips, as irresistibly attractive as money can make him. strong drastic terms, as purgatory, hell, and brimstone, are seldom heard. that sort of doctrine is usually reserved and dished up in furnace-like fashion to the poor, half-starved, ignorant sinners. chapter xxv. the ecclesiastical kindergarten. what shall we do to be saved? is a question asked by every religious fanatic. saved from what? ignorance? superstition? bigotry? or stupidity? from idiocy or imbecility? or, are we to be saved from poverty, hunger, starvation, misery and wretchedness, distress and degradation? barbarism, savagery, or uncivilization does not enter into consideration of these unfortunate conditions. they exist right in the midst of us, in the highest centers of human civilization. of what good is the talking of spiritual welfare, salvation, and heaven to a hungry stomach? of what good is it to grow eloquent over celestial conditions when the poor wretch has sunk into the mire of sloth and apathy, when darkness, misery, and disappointment hang over him like a pall at a funeral? is this the man that is sinning--when tempted to steal some trifle to satisfy hunger? self-preservation is the first law throughout organic nature. this poverty-stricken individual occupies the lowest strata of civilized life. he must be civilized--for the law makes him so. the starving must not eat, unless charity extends a helping hand. in the state of want and helplessness, all the inherent failings loom up into prominence, and aid to weaken the little resisting force remaining to withstand the temptation of wrongfully supplying his wants. the higher indulgences, either gustatory or sexual, are not within reach of the hungry and depressed; and salvation contemplated in the pleasures derived from overindulgence or excesses certainly does not apply to them. the class of persons in a position to satisfy both digestive and sexual pleasures we find in quite another catalogue of sinners. for some of these there is no salvation, for others there is what may be termed a reparatory saving power, viz., confession and atonement, for which the spiritual part of the body is not held responsible, but only the flesh. it is precisely the men who practice these flesh-begotten sins which the church from the time of st. paul to the present period has been trying to save, with little or no success. st. paul is the man who contributed more towards laying the foundation for the entire christian system than any other man in the bible. of course he claims to be an israelite of the seed of abraham and of the tribe of benjamin. jesus was of the same tribe--and probably the other apostles that figure in the new testament belonged to the same tribe. that tribe is of mixed blood on the mother side. whosoever desires to be fully informed upon that subject, let him read judges, xix, xx, and xxi chapters--a story of licentiousness, barbarism, and butchery the like of which cannot be found in any history. a levite with his concubine or wife came to gibeah to lodge overnight. some benjamites used and abused the woman till she died. the levite cut the woman up into twelve parts and sent one part to each tribe. israel came together in battle with the benjamites and slaughtered man, woman, and child. six hundred men escaped to the wilderness, unto the rock of rimmon. israel had sworn not to give them their daughters to wife, so they helped them to get wives elsewhere, by means that are very interesting, very savage, and very godly. i simply mention this incident to show that the tribe of benjamin was of mixed blood. it was not what would be called a natural divine selection, but a forced. paul with his half-grecian ideas, whose mind was permeated with grecian philosophy, used it largely in his argumentations, theologico-philosophic, and in his epistolary correspondence to enlighten and instruct his disciples. the israelites or jews up to the time of christ were not by any means a spiritual nation. they had a god of the flesh; a sort of cannibal god; a politico-religious god, in whose name every kind of horror and brutality was committed. this was not paul's god. the garb of socratic and platonic philosophy adorns the spiritual phase of paul's idea. the dual existence is distinctly set forth (cor. xv, 44): "there is a natural body and there is a spiritual body." "for the spirit itself beareth witness with our spirit, that we are the children of god" (rom. viii, 16). "likewise the spirit helpeth our infirmities" (26). "for if ye live after the flesh ye shall die" (13). "for as many as are led by the spirit of god, they are the sons of god" (14). the notion of paul throughout his epistles of what he terms flesh and spirit, separating them as two distinct parts of the body, and as having a dual existence, on one side the spiritual, the godly, on the other the fleshy, the sinful, the earthly--is due to the educational doctrines that then were in vogue. the anatomical knowledge was limited, and the physiological workings of the nervous system, the functions of the brain, were entirely unknown. the flesh and spirit were the representatives of the muscular and nervous tissue, flesh of the muscular, spirit of the nervous. one of the most mysterious or hidden secrets was this function of the brain. the absence of any positive knowledge of the nervous system until recent times, caused many errors to creep in, and many false impressions were received by mistake; and these blunders through ignorance have remained to a very considerable extent fixed and unaltered. grecian philosophers who were attempting to give a reason, or account, for the various mental phenomena, came to conclusions which are to-day seen to be contrary to scientific truth. he, paul, embodied in his writings all the speculative philosophy known at his time. this dual existence had been taught among the greeks for several centuries. when paul wrote to the romans he was in corinth, and when he wrote to the corinthians he was at philippi, macedonia. the rest of his epistles were written partly from greece, but mostly from rome or italy. nowhere in the old testament is mention made of spirit and flesh after the manner of paul. they had no knowledge of grecian philosophy. of course the mental condition had undergone some changes from the time of ezra to christ. numerous sects had paved the way, and the ideas of various nations had been exchanged. a wonderful metamorphosis had taken place in the god during the one thousand five hundred years that passed between moses and paul. the ideal of moses was a barbarous, cruel god--a determined, imperative, imperious god, that had a purpose in view, a nation to form, a country to conquer. the prince of egypt, the successful general of a victorious army, talks; every word is a peremptory command. the strong, powerful will of an energetic man stands behind jehova. there is no philosophy, but all action. no ideality, but muscular force. no humbleness, meekness, or mildness, but the stern exercise of a power that never flinches in any undertaking; regardless of consequences; pitiless in battle; fearless in the struggle, once determined must reach success. there is no display of imagination, no spiritual reflection, no refinement, but there is only the coarse, vulgar, savage god of chaldean-egyptian modification. the god had undergone changes in the mental agitation of the times, and paul had accepted the god as he conceived him, through teachings then prevalent. an orator for a reformation, the cause of christ he had embraced, coupled with the learning of the grecian literature, his imagination led him to portray his god in the abstract--a refined ethereal being--in truth, a gentleman of a god. paul was the real founder of the past and modern church system, the giver of ideas, the furnisher of numerous themes that gave impulse to any number of shades of the various sects now in existence, the promulgator of modification, the pleader of a cause, the moralizer, the humble adviser and counselor of the lowly, ignorant, and poor. he was very earnest and sincere in the cause he had espoused, and, if anything, proud of it--"for i am not ashamed of the gospel of christ: for it is the power of god unto salvation to every one that believeth; to the jew first, and also to the greek" (rom. i, 16). next to jew he was greek. no wonder that his mind was tainted with grecianism. his god was an alloy of greek and jew gods. the greek philosophy helped to refine and eliminate the barbarism and brutality out of the mosaic god. our modern mountebank preachers have nothing new to agitate and talk about in their fashionable decorated kindergartens of christianity. they are ever spinning round the same circle. they are sensational, mouthing and gesticulating before a crowd they wish to entertain, and for this they are very handsomely housed, fed, and otherwise recompensed. they are the greedy theological leeches of humanity. they suck the blood, but give nothing in return. have they advanced the cause of humanity? is humanity any wiser to-day than these poor ignorant creatures were at the time paul was trying to get a new idea into their untutored brain? here is a partial list of paul's complaints (rom. i, 29, 30, 31): being filled with all unrighteousness, fornication, wickedness, covetousness, maliciousness; full of envy, murder, debate, deceit, malignity, whisperers, backbiters, haters of god, despiteful, proud, boasters, inventors of evil things, disobedient to parents, without understanding, covenant-breakers, without natural affection, implacable, unmerciful. for nineteen hundred years these christian saints have been trying to convert the world--jews included, for indeed they needed it--and what has been accomplished? does your kindergarten church teach aught that corrects the above evils? have you made them all into saints? paul's argument about circumcision is very ingenious. he proposes an inward circumcision for the outward--heart and spirit (rom. ii, 29), circumcision through faith. his doctrine, the wages of sin is death but the gift of god is eternal life (rom. vi, 23), is very mischievous. it leads men to give their flesh a full swing and leads them to a satiety of pleasure and satisfaction of earthly bliss--lust or licentiousness, and they let the godly or spiritual part take care of itself. this is not education, but stupefaction. yet our civilized spiritual purveyors of the soul are still chewing the same theological cud of nineteen hundred years ago. every transgression against ourselves, against our own body, is a transgression against the law of nature, and the body must pay the penalty. paul (rom. xiii, 13) says, "let us walk honestly, as in the day; not in rioting and drunkenness, not in chambering and wantonness, not in strife and annoying." paul was a great believer in spiritual gifts. cor. xii--this chapter has given rise to more crazes, frauds, and cheats than paul ever dreamed of. verse 4: "now these are diversities of gifts, but the same spirit." verse 7: "but the manifestation of spirit is given to every man," etc. then he enumerates the gifts--faith-healing, miracles, prophecy, discerning spirits, speaking divers kinds of tongues, interpretation of tongues, etc. (cor. xii, 9, 10). this of course opens a wide field for imposition and charlatanism. paul being an authority, cranks and "fakes" are not slow in taking advantage of it. a very large percentage of the masses are ignorant, easily made superstitious and bigoted. any nonsensical idea is swiftly impressed. they are satisfied with anything they are told--content with a filled stomach and salvation hereafter. this heavenly promise is an immense thing, an ecclesiastical bonanza. for thousands of years, it has been an extraordinary source of income. hundreds of thousands have lived in ease and luxury, have enjoyed heaven on earth, and let their poor ignorant dupes enjoy the hereafter. paul also gives the catholic church a right to use the anathema. cor. xvi, 22: "if any man love not the lord jesus christ, let him be anathema, maranatha"--"let him be accursed." the roman catholic church has made good use of it. from the time the nicean council was held every one of their canons--as their rules are termed--is accompanied by an anathema for every man that does not think, say, or believe as the church or its priests dictate. the church institution is so well organized and the system so well regulated, that they possess the means of squeezing the last cent out of poor ignorant parishioners. they have so many trapdoors to catch the weary simpleton, that if the money does not come through mass, it will come through indulgence, or unction, or sacrament, or anything and everything. they dispose of their spiritual wares at all prices--anywhere, everywhere, and at all times. here is an instructive example of teaching: "what is the blessed eucharist? ans. the body and blood, soul and divinity of jesus christ, under the appearance of bread and wine," etc. the immense amount of evil done by this church is something enormous to contemplate. if a papal medal in honor of the massacre of st. bartholomew's could be found and put up at auction, it would fetch a small fortune. literature was almost completely suppressed by this church, by laws published under the seal of the supreme pontiff. how few at the present day know anything of the history of the catholic church. their past, their terrible black past, with their god, their jesus christ, their holy ghost, their holy virgin, and their saints--what arrogance, ambition, pride, selfishness, greed, tyranny, licentiousness, terror and torture of the inquisition, bloody crimes and massacres, they were guilty of! reflection on these many diabolical outrages makes one's flesh creep, and one wonders why such an institution has not been swept from the face of the earth centuries ago. have they done any good upon earth? from the time of moses until after the time of luther, yes, up to the present time even, they have been continuously thrusting their idea of god into the minds of man with the sword, through blood and slaughter, with what result? has humanity improved? paul has much to say about the frailties of human nature (2 tim. iv, 2, 3, 4): "for men shall be lovers of their own self, covetous, boasters, proud, blasphemers, disobedient to parents, unthankful, unholy, without natural affection, truce-breakers, false accusers, incontinent, fierce, despisers, traitors, heady, high-minded, lovers of pleasure," etc. the quarrels, dissensions, and protestations of the present day among the teachers and preachers of christianity are a topic of entertainment in our daily press. heresy, blasphemy, money disputes, briggs, smith, corrigan, wigger, etc.--what is it all about that will benefit humanity? priest and preacher, the modern teachers of the theological kindergarten, have not advanced any in their methods. the civil law holds them in check and keeps them within the bounds of their vocation. women, the decorations and attractions, the most numerous supporters of all church enterprises, are not held in very high estimation by paul. 1 tim. ii, 9: "in like manner also, that women adorn themselves in modest apparel, with shame-facedness and sobriety; not with braided hair, or gold, or pearls, or costly array." verse 11: "let the woman learn in silence with all subjection." verse 12: "but i suffer not a woman to teach nor to usurp authority over the man, but to be in silence." the church kindergarten instructions are based upon the writings and teachings of both the old and the new testament. who wrote them, or who compiled them, matters little. they are the accepted doctrines of the church or churches. whether orthodoxy or heterodoxy, whether monotheism or polytheism, whether the idolatry of calf or idolatry of the figure of jesus or the virgin, it amounts to one and the same thing. it is of no serious consequence whether paul actually wrote the epistles or some one wrote them in his name several hundred years later; or whether john wrote his revelations; or moses the pentateuch; or whether the whole bible was compiled a thousand years after moses. the whole fabric is based upon error, partly due to the times when it was written, partly due to the state of civilization, to the educational status, to the ignorance and superstition of the times, the limited knowledge of nature, and the undeveloped mental faculties, the misinterpretation and misconstruction of every phase and phenomenon their perceptive faculties were unable to explain, the impressions received from the outward world or the feelings and emotions that agitated them within. it is no easy task to overcome the prejudices of the times in which we live. we are instinctively opposed to any innovation, whether the new ideas are an improvement on the old or not. for many generations, and for centuries, the various church organizations have been teaching the old, antiquated idea that the bible was a supernatural production, that either god had written it or had inspired man to do the work. what does it signify who wrote æsop's fables, homer's iliad, the five books of moses, isaiah, or the new testament, or even shakespeare? they are written. the question really is, whether the contents are true, are fabulous or historically correct. for many years it has been a recognized fact that the bible is a composition of fable, fiction, facts, misunderstanding, and misstatement. we only need glance at the absurd trials that are now going on at this present time. these gentlemen, briggs and smith, are not the first to doubt the truth of the book. hundreds have doubted before them. it is skepticism that produces evolution and revolution in the accepted form of worship and faith and belief. abraham, socrates, christ, luther, and hundreds have doubted. they were skeptics in consequence of a superior insight into the propaganda of certain accepted beliefs. every speculative theory has been doubted. great sciences are never doubted. theology, the offspring of idolatry and mythology, is a purely speculative science--if indeed it can be classed as a science. therefore, it has always been laboring under a cloud of doubt. what wonder, then, that modern scholars, even clergymen, of superior ability, become skeptics when they compare modern science, modern truth, with ancient fable and falsehood? the debates on progressive sanctification, a middle state, whether sanctification is complete or incomplete at death--where is the heresy? where is the blasphemy? what are these overgrown, lopsided educated men thinking about--these self-constituted righteous bigots, what are they squabbling about? was not abraham a heretic and a blasphemer to the chaldeans, jesus christ a heretic and a blasphemer to the jews, socrates a heretic and a blasphemer to the greeks, luther a heretic and a blasphemer to the most holy apostolic roman catholic church? why, the entire theological doctrine, the whole spiritual code of morals, all the articles of faith and creeds and canons of the church, all the figures and carvings of christ, all the paintings, all the steeples, all the belfries on this earth's surface--what are they for? what are all the mountebank church costumes for? what is the use for a man to disguise himself in a stage costume of the egyptian period, to scare a lot of ignorant boobies? of what use are your incense, your prayer, and your blessing, your self-conceited holiness, your pretended sanctity, and your priestly hypocrisy? what is it all for? to save sinners? what shall we do to be saved? all this ecclesiastical humbug, preaching and pulpit noise and theological humbug, is about crushing out sin, saving the sinner, and all the supernatural thunder is brought to bear upon the great sinning organs--to wit, the stomach and the sexual organs, to regulate these. god and gods, angels, prophets, and spirits labored--and what is more monstrous and more extravagantly ridiculous, the young man jesus christ had to be sacrificed--to save you from overloading your stomach--or rather abusing your stomach--and from overindulging in sexual exercises. remember, every crime, known or unknown, recognized or not recognized, every evil and every wickedness, every abomination or pollution or defilement, springs from these two sources. i am not taking diseases into consideration, such as david describes in psalm xxxviii, for example. to satisfy the wants of these organs, leads to greed, selfishness, fraud, forgery, deception, falsehood, corruption, etc. the pleasures resulting therefrom are accompanied by vanity, pride, pamperedness, envy, jealousy, hate, discontent, etc. the indulgences are known as drunkenness, lust, lasciviousness, fornication, adultery, obscenity, debauchery, whoredom, luxury, revelry, and by many other terms. these form the theme of the prophets and the burden of the apostles. these are the sins, the vices, they have been trying to crush and wipe out with their theological absurdities for several thousand years. they have created all sorts of bugaboos to frighten fools, idiots, and stupid ignoramuses into discipline. they have created hell, purgatory, dark and deep pits, brimstone and fire. the gentleman devil, or mr. satan, presides over the lower regions, conducts their affairs, only to accommodate the spiritual fraternity, from the pope to the rev. sam patch. but in order to be saved, to go to heaven--an imaginary abode in the atmosphere, a sort of ethereal paradise in the upper strata of the air that surrounds this globe, either with or without sunlight--in order to get one up there some clown of a priest will mumble off masses, a sort of ribald fustian composition that will raise your spirit or your soul right up into the pure upper strata of this terrestrial atmospheric crust. of course if there are seven heavens you must pay accordingly. in case, however, you miss the aerial place, the heaven, and accidentally become one of the devil's subjects, it stands to reason that satan requires an extra fee to release you from eternal punishment--which the good, pious priest puts into his pocket. it is a pertinent question to ask our spiritual advisers, whether or not the christian kindergarten makes a specialty of guarding and regulating, by the celestial medium of the son of god, the holy ghost, the digestive apparatus and the organs of procreation. because all the sins and vices originate with these. the devil, or satan, holds his jubilee in the pleasures and extravagant indulgences of man and woman. the church has long since been deprived of its political power and importance. the civil law regulates minor and major crimes, and provides punishment therefor. the only function left for the christian church, the ecclesiastical kindergarten, is advisory, admonitory, accompanied with frivolous promises--be good, you well-dressed ladies and gentlemen; pray to our shadows, kneel before yon figure on the cross, sprinkle yourselves with holy water, and contribute liberally toward our support and sustain our kindergarten, then we bless you and give you a pass to the heavenly regions. basta! only believe, have faith, never mind about understanding, common sense, and reason, then you surely will be saved, and have a white and clean gown fresh from the laundry, a pair of wings, a golden crown, and you can have your choice of either a trumpet or a harp, which you may either blow or touch, and may sit at the feet of an old man with a long white beard, on a golden chair, his feet resting on the clouds, surrounded by an innumerable host of angels and cherubim that will make music everlasting, where spiritual fountains will keep you cool, oh, and a vast deal more which can not be here recited. anyone who desires a full and complete description of this celestial paradise, this heaven, including abraham's bosom, the right hand of jesus, his beloved father, and the holy ghost in the bargain, may obtain it by making proper application. ah! what a blessing it would be for the whole human family if the churches were utilized for educational purposes wherein truths, scientific truths, could be taught; where young people could meet to amuse themselves, or be instructed in something useful; where young men and women could entertain themselves by feeding off the tree of knowledge, instead of loafing round saloons, round the street corners, gambling-houses, dives or pool rooms. young and old must have a pastime, and a place to pass this time; if the state or community does not provide such places in densely populated districts, where are these poor, ignorant creatures to go to? talk about charity! a large bulk of our charities are advertising schemes. i do not call what i here advocate a charity, but a right. if we want to improve the public morals, if we desire to educate the young men and women, provide district temples for amusement and instruction, open from 10 a.m. to 10 p.m., where they may assemble after working hours, sit, talk, read, or play--may educate the brain, the nervous and muscular tissues, so that both these master tissues may perform their functions skillfully, naturally, and judiciously. our scientific scholars throughout the world have long since dispensed with the supernatural. know the natural, is the modern shibboleth. if you want to take care of the machine, understand the machinery, and if you want the coming generation to understand something about it, it is certain that the saloon is not the proper place for it. we ought to guard our public institutions with jealous care. our public non-sectarian schools are the places for our children. the public schools ought to be numerous enough to accommodate every citizen's children in the land. i think it bad grace for any foreigner to come here to give us advice upon that subject. archbishop satolli, papal ablegate, said at the recent meeting of the american archbishops in new york, on "the settling of the school question and the giving of religious education:" "to the catholic church belong the duty and divine right of teaching all nations to believe the truth of the gospel, and to observe whatsoever christ commanded. "for the rest the provisions of the council of baltimore are yet in force, and in a general way will remain so, to wit: not only out of our paternal love do we exhort catholic parents, but we command them, by all the authority we possess, to procure a truly christian and catholic education for the beloved offspring given them of god, born again in baptism unto christ, and destined for heaven, to shield and secure them throughout childhood and youth from the dangers of a mere worldly education, and therefore to send them to parochial or other truly catholic schools." the beloved offspring given them of god? nonsense! about as much born of god as a calf, or a flower. offspring are the natural result of a natural cause. "born again in baptism unto christ, and destined for heaven"--would it not be well to ascertain what the catholic church has ever done to elevate and educate the masses? does not the educational system of peter dens, satolli, and co. consist merely of: 1. to hear mass on sundays and all holy days of obligation; 2. to fast and abstain on the days commanded; 3. to receive worthily the blessed eucharist at easter, or within the time appointed; 4. to confess our sins at least once a year; 5. to contribute to the support of our pastor; 6. not to solemnize marriage at the forbidden times, nor to marry persons within the forbidden degrees of kindom or otherwise prohibited by the church nor clandestinely? the dirt and filth, the nauseating nastiness, of the cesspool of the "moral theology" of peter dens cannot be printed in the english language. or perhaps mr. satolli will educate the children to mumble over and over the litany of the blessed virgin, quoted in another chapter, and all the rest of the instructions in mortal sin, venial sin, precepts of the church, infidels and heretics, decalogue, grace, justification, merit, virtue of faith, articles of faith, apostolic creed, church visibility, marks, holiness, authority, infallibility, concerning ecclesiastical councils, supreme pontiff, signs of the cross, magic, miracles, sacrament, worship of relics, worship of images, resurrection, heaven, hell, perdition, purgatory, etc., etc. satolli and his confréres would rather have parish schools, to educate the young in their ecclesiastical stupidities, and draw the funds from the state treasury in order to sustain them. the roman catholic church, in its career as an educational medium, has not contributed one iota towards the progress and advancement of civilization. the opposition of its clergy has always been the severest and most bloody. humanity "owes them no thanks for the culture and privileges it now enjoys. the church interferes and checks every step forward. the clergy are determined to keep the masses ignorant as long as it is possible. greed, selfishness, rapacity, dominion, self-righteousness, and self-sanctification have ever been their chief characteristics. every act and every transaction is justifiable so long as their ends and objects are gained. satolli represents the pope's big toe, that is ready to be firmly planted on the neck of our public school system, whenever the power of state or nation is secured. the wily priests with their jesuitic craftiness never lose an opportunity. in a republic they are republicans, in a monarchy they are monarchists. they are anything and everything--but the church with all its abominations first. all else must be subservient to their will, to their power, to their use. they are intolerant, bigoted, and tyrannical all the time. whether it be to prevent the methodists from establishing a church in austria, or to intrude their priestly interference in the public school methods in waterford, saratoga, it is the same impudent aggression that has characterized them for ages. they are bound to keep the people ignorant, superstitious, and slaves to their system, in spite of all the existing civilizing influences. what we want, and what we must have, is a public school system of education free from all sectarian bias, with neither catechism nor bible-reading, neither prayers nor psalm-singing, but a thorough instruction in all matters of a nature directly beneficial in the conduct of this life. the state of transition is rapidly forcing itself upon the minds of men. they can no longer be held in submission. they believe no more in the antiquated notions of four thousand years ago--though modified and decorated to suit modern times. notwithstanding the ecclesiastical hedges, fences, walls, and draw-bridges that have been erected by priests' sagacity and cunning in order to prevent encroachments on their theological fortifications, it is plain that there is a natural wearing and tearing of effete notions of the past. that the structure, erected on a false and fictitious foundation, has already given way, protestants can testify. and as the protestants have yielded to dissenters, etc., so must they all gradually crumble--before the battering-ram of scientific truth first, next before the advancing intelligence of the masses, and lastly before the press, which indiscriminately lays bare before the public every wrangle, every squabble, and every dissension occurring among the followers of christ. neither faith, grace, nor brotherly love, the holy kiss of paul included, prevents these saintly gentlemen from exercising their greed, selfishness, and covetousness, as well as throwing dirt at one another. father corrigan vs. cahenslyism and wigger--they keep the pecuniary pot boiling. there is neither malice nor jealousy, but all is for the love of christ. dollars and cents? these pious brethren would scorn the idea. at professor smith's trial for heresy the ladies of mount auburn church presented the heretic with a basket of flowers. when in old times we find heretics tried by the roman catholic church, are heretics rightly punished with death? asks the priest. st. thomas answers in the affirmative. latimer and ridley were treated to an excellent bonfire at oxford, 1555, for being heretics. nor did cranmer receive white and pink roses in a bed of fern leaves and smilax. what a change! professors smith and briggs are proud to be heretics. they are praised and complimented for being heretics, and no doubt will be well taken care of when these frivolous proceedings have terminated. guilty or not guilty, they have gained notoriety enough to place them in an excellent position for the rest of their lives. i call that a high, very sensible, and very respectable sort of martyrdom. both these gentlemen ought to be very grateful to science for having brought about such a change, that gives them the privilege of differing from their spiritual brethren and becoming respectable heretics with baskets of roses. o civilization, how much have we to thank you for all this! it is so lovely to be a heretic, a blasphemer, and a martyr in this present generation! what a pity that daniel's mene, mene, tekel upharsin is not quite applicable to the present condition of christianity. the great ecclesiastical bugbear of christianity, backed by their god, their son, holy ghost, virgin mary, saints, popes, heaven and hell, and their infinite methods of salvation, is nothing near so terrible as he used to be. that bugbear has been tamed, and is, comparatively speaking, gentle. his appetites and his passions have been subdued. indeed paul deserves no small credit for polishing the mosaic god. it is only occasionally that paul mentions his god's wrath or severity, and very mildly too. paul's god comes near being esthetic. the mosaic god is muscular and energetic. paul's god is mild and persuasive. the mosaic god was a fighting god, conquering territory and molding a political nation. paul's god has quite another line of business, sin-forgiving and soul-saving. the mosaic god was all alone engaged in business. paul's god is a firm--father, son, and holy ghost. the occupation of sin-forgiving and soul-saving is carried on with great ceremonials in our christian kindergartens, accompanied with music, prayer, and psalm-singing. the sins are derived, directly or indirectly, from two organs in the main--to wit, digestive and sexual. any man or woman that cannot perceive the truth of the above must be exceedingly obtuse. does anyone believe that the teachings and preachings, with all the complementary paraphernalia and other numerous accessories, are necessary to save us or guard us against transgressions or sin? supposing all the churches and buildings assigned to the worship of god or gods, and all the priests and preachers, disappeared from the surface of this terrestrial globe, would this planet come to a standstill, or the sun cease to shine? would the elements entering into the composition of the numerous substances found on or within this earth change their relative proportion, construction, or chemical relation? we need not have the slightest apprehension. new systems of ideas have always displaced and replaced the old systems. as we advance from cycle to cycle, this is continuously taking place. the hand gave way to the stick, the stick to the spade, the spade to the hand-plow, the hand-plow to oxen, oxen to horses, horses to steam, etc. it is the natural progress from one step to another, in every branch of thought, learning, and industry. it is a higher education and a better comprehension of the human machinery, a knowledge of the proper functions of the nervous and muscular tissues, a keener insight into the necessities of life, a regulation and control of the organs of organic life, a riper judgment, and a more evenly balanced brain power. the churches with their ethics and refined methods of the present day, with their eloquent admonitions constantly repeated, cannot be regarded in any other light than as a theological kindergarten for a fashionable musical sunday entertainment. chapter xxvi. rational review. reason and reflection. if any person with a, reasonable amount of intelligence will seriously reflect, he may gain sufficient information to satisfy himself as regards the true nature of the conditions that surround him. first try to the best of your ability to present in your mind the outlines of this terrestrial globe, this planet on which we live, with its mountains and its valleys; oceans, seas, and rivers; the two extreme poles, north and south; the center of the earth's surface and the equator, etc. next try to satisfy your mind that this planet has no immediate connection with any other planet--that it belongs to a system of planets that revolve round the sun, with a space or distance between them of many millions of miles. and that this planet is entire and complete in itself. whatever substances are about, upon, or within the earth, belong to this planet and no other. that not a particle of any substance can leave this earth, whether visible or invisible. that all formations, no matter of what character or nature, are made from substances belonging to this earth. that the size and weight of this globe has never changed. it is the same now as it was millions of years ago, or will be at any time in the future. that the quantity of water upon the surface of this earth, whether ocean, sea, lake, or river, has neither increased nor diminished. that the solid mineral portion of the earth has neither increased nor diminished either in size or weight. that the fluid, the watery portion, is susceptible to change of position and conditions on the surface of this earth, whether above the earth's surface or upon it. that all clouds, rain, vapor, mist, moisture, dew, snow, hail, must be and is taken from the waters on the surface of the earth, and when clouds, that have been taken from the waters of the earth, fall to the surface of the earth in the form of rain, vapor, mist, moisture, dew, snow, or hail, they simply return what has been temporarily taken or loaned from the waters of the earth. that in the case of all deluges, freshets, overflows, that have ever taken place, the waters that enter into their formation have been taken from the waters of the earth. the waters have simply changed position from one locality to another. that all ice formations are nothing more than solidified water. water crystallizes by the absence of sunlight, and melts in the presence of the sun's heat. that snow is nothing more than congealed water, and returns to water when heated. that the quantity of water remains the same. whether it rains forty days and nights, or a whole year, it is neither increased nor diminished. that the deepest portion of the earth's surface is filled with water. being fluid, it naturally fills up the hollows until it has found its level. if there is more water than it can hold, it will find its way into the next hollow. and the higher portions of the earth's surface will not and cannot be covered by water. such is the condition of the earth's surface that the deepest places on this terrestrial globe are filled with water; thus oceans, lakes, pools, and rivers are formed. that all living substances, whether vegetable or animal, are composed more than two-thirds of water. that more than two-thirds of the entire quantity of food taken daily into the animal economy consists of water. that is to say, we feed on more than two-thirds of water. nothing living can maintain its existence without two-thirds of water. second. all the material taken from the earth's surface, or from the interior of the earth's crust, for any purpose whatsoever, no matter how great the weight or volume may be, does not increase the weight of this earth, or diminish it. the material has simply been moved from one place and deposited in another. the building of one city, or ten thousand cities or more, would not add one pound more or less to the entire weight of this earth. all the stone, coal, iron, copper, silver, gold, lead, and all other mineral substances, used either in building, machinery, or anything human ingenuity can make or invent--all belong to this earth. no matter how great the bulk or quantity, it does not influence this earth one particle. moreover, this earth would not be in the slightest inconvenienced in its motion or evolution whether there were sixteen billion of persons on its surface, or ten million times as many. nor would it make the slightest difference to this terrestrial globe whether the entire animal creation was destroyed, or increased indefinitely. it would neither slacken its pace, increase its weight, diminish its size, change its poles, alter its seasons, nor in any other way be affected. the fluids, the solids, and the gases would relatively remain the same. let it be distinctly understood, that whatever change may take place in some remote future, say one billion million of years, more or less, this earth as a whole will be but little affected. vegetable and animal life may disappear, but the component parts of the earth cannot be destroyed or changed. furthermore, whatever is produced upon this earth by the inventive power of man's faculties, in the arts and sciences mechanical, the natural, and what is thought to be supernatural, whatsoever shape or character it may take, whether phase or phenomenon, an idea, thought, or imagination--in fact, every thing, every essence, from an angel to the devil, from a saint to a sinner, from a brass button to a god or gods, holy ghosts or divinities, all, all, are part and parcel of this earth. all there are recorded in any book, called sacred or profane, inspired or uninspired, visionary or materialistic, are the creations of the brain of man, inventions of the brain of man, concoctions and fabrications of the brain of man. whether devil, saint, angel, or god, they are of earth, earthly, chained to this terrestrial globe so long as there is a brain in human form that can exercise its faculties. third. no things can leave this earth, whether they are things visible, or things that are not visible. nothing can come to us from any distant planet, whether it is visible or not visible. all things or beings, whether visible or not visible, tangible or not tangible, perceptible or imperceptible, belong to this earth, are the products of the earth. all things, beings, forms, or shapes, whatever be their nature or consistence, however they have appeared or been produced, on any portion of the surface of this globe, are the products of this earth. all things, beings, forms, shapes, material, or what appears to be material, are produced upon the surface of this earth. all things, beings, forms, shapes, phases, or phenomena, and all manifestations, whether spiritual or supernatural, are the products of this earth, produced through the material composing the nervous matter, by the ordinary physiological mechanism of the animal economy. no psychological condition, as it is termed, can be produced without nervous matter. it is a function of nerve or brain material. it has no existence of itself. it is not a product foreign to matter. the soul is a term employed to represent in the abstract an intellectual product of, or the result of functional activity of, brain substance. where there is no brain there can be no soul. and souls differ in proportion to size, quality, quantity, educational or brutal development. the mind is the collective term for the entire product of nervous activity, from non-intellectual to intellectual activity. thus we have all kinds of minds--vulgar, brutal, licentious, pious, enlightened, educated, intellectual, refined, ideal, imaginary, etc., etc. a mind may be simple, mixed, complex, complicated, perverted, disordered, rational or irrational, etc., etc. the mind is of ages--infantile, childish, youthful, young, mature, deliberate, strong, weak, and senile, feminine or masculine, etc., etc. nervous effects not understood are interpreted to be supernatural, not the product of the matter composing brain; this is false. the so-called spiritual manifestations are, in plain terms, delusions for susceptible nervous conditions, and generally largely adulterated with fraud. nervous conditions bordering on hallucinations may easily be influenced by a strong nervous force and utilized for swindling purposes. there is as little truth in spirit manifestations as there was in the casting out of evil spirits or devils, as related in the bible. fourth. material prosperity consists in the accumulation of wealth, gained either by industry or inheritance. wealth is used: 1. to supply food sufficient in quantity to sustain bodily health. 2. to obtain clothing to protect the body from extreme heat, and also for decorative purposes. 3. to furnish domicile or housing to shelter the body against the inclemency of the weather, in luxury as our acquired taste may desire. 4. to give us the opportunities of an education and training that we could not otherwise obtain. 5. to provide for those that are dependent upon us for support, as children and old persons. 6. to exercise charitable acts, in aiding all those that are either disabled or unable to procure the necessities of life--clothing and shelter. remember that god has not created anything--either plant, animal, or man. while we resemble each other, we are not precisely constructed all alike. dogs are dogs, for example, yet a skye terrier is not so big as a newfoundland dog, nor is either fashioned the same as a bulldog. the same may be said of plants and trees. the structural tissue of all trees is wood, yet are the trees not all alike. nor can the wood tissue of the various trees be used for the same purpose. each one is useful in its own particular line or sphere. the same may be said of minerals as to their appearance, qualities, uses, etc., etc. each individual is simply the offspring of his parents. god has had nothing whatever to do in shaping or fashioning him. he has not endowed him with anything. he has given him neither a soul nor a body. he is a creature that has been placed upon this earth by his parents, with all the qualities, form, general construction, composition, and constitution of his parents. this hardly requires an explanation. every farmer and cattle-breeder understands it. we have every day illustrations with our race-horses, cattle, etc. two black persons cannot breed white children. they can mix them, yes. god had nothing at all to do with the selection of either the black man or white woman, or the white man or black woman. whatever seed is planted, that will grow, and no other. cabbage seed will yield cabbages, and nothing else. that law holds good in nature--like will produce like; subject, however, to modification of soil, temperature, moisture, of the immediate surroundings. but it will not change the cabbage. it may be finer, of improved quality, larger--that's all. the prevailing notion that we are all created free and equal, is nonsense. 1. we are not created. we are simply the offspring of our parents and inherit all the characteristics and qualities of our parents, which are subject to betterment, improvement, and a higher degree of culture, or deterioration, depending on circumstances and surroundings. 2. we are not born equal by any means, either in muscular strength, brain power, size, constitution, or wealth. therein lies the difference in the condition and surroundings of man, while we are spending this short-lived existence on this earth. 3. whether we are born free, depends upon what form of government we live under. we are free to comply with the laws of the government under which we are born, comply with the recognized moral and social laws in the midst of which our parents reside, where we first saw daylight. dismiss the silly notion from your mind that anything can help you, either priest or any supernatural agency. the priest may help as one man may help another. prayers can avail you nothing, nor blessings. every man, to be a man, must act the man! training, education, culture, makes him one. free yourself from priestly influence and church dominion, if you would be free. think and reason. throw off the shackles of ecclesiastical slavery. let your own brain work out your own salvation. never mind the jehova, the god of barbarism, the christ of delusion, or the holy ghost of the imagination. shake off the dust of superstition and ignorance if you would be free. it is the noblest work of man to make himself free--to make himself equal, not muscular--free from prejudice, free from superstitions, free from bigotry, free from ignorance, free from vice, free from passions, free from wrong-doing either to yourself or to your fellow-man. equal you can be in brain power, brain culture, in brain force, by brain culture, education, in the improvement and perfection of the intellectual faculties, so that we may exercise our understanding and judgment, free and untrammeled, to the benefit of ourselves and to the benefit of our neighbors. the perfection you imagine your god ought to be, exalt yourself to that perfection, and be an intelligent free man. chapter xxvii. visions--bible dreams--revelations. these are the fireworks of the imagination. isaiah's vision, chapter vi, 1, 2: "i saw the lord sitting upon a throne, high and lifted up, and his train filled the temple. "around it stood the seraphim; each one had six wings; with twain he covered his face, and with twain he covered his feet, and with twain he did fly," etc. ezekiel, chapter iii: son of man eats the roll. vision of chapter viii: "a fire below the loins, and the appearance of brightness, as the color of amber upwards," etc. chapter ix: "six men with slaughter weapons, clothed in white linen with a writer's inkhorn by the side." chapter x: "above the head of the cherubim there appeared over them as it were a sapphire-stone, as the appearance of the likeness of a throne." verse 2: "go in between the wheels even under the cherub, and fill thine hands with coals of fire," etc. verse 4: "and the house was filled with a cloud," etc. verse 8: "and there appeared in the cherubim the form of a man's hand under their wings." verse 9: "four wheels," etc. verse 12: "and their whole body, and their backs, and their hands, and their wings, and their wheels were full of eyes round about, even the wheels that they four had." verse 14: and every one had four faces, the first face was the face of a cherub, the second the face of a man, the third that of a lion, the fourth the face of an eagle, etc. chapter xxii: sin. chapter xxiii: whoredoms. chapter xxxviii: boneyard. chapter xlvii: visions of holy waters. daniel's visions, dreams: verse 3: four great beasts came up from the sea. the first was a lion and had eagle's wings. the second was like a bear, it had three ribs in the mouth between the teeth, etc. the third was like a leopard, and had four wings of a fowl, and had four heads. the fourth a beast dreadful and terrible, strong exceedingly--had great iron teeth--and it had ten horns. a little horn came up; in this horn were eyes like the eyes of a man, a mouth speaking great things. throne whereon an ancient sat, the hair of his head like pure wool, garments snow-white, etc.; throne of fiery flame, wheels as burning fire. verse 19: "then i would know the truth of the fourth beast," etc. his teeth were iron, nails of brass, etc., etc. chapter viii: a ram had two horns; one was higher than the other. he saw the ram pushing westward, northward, southward, etc. verse 5: a he-goat with a horn between the eyes; the goat smote the ram, broke the two horns, etc. zechariah iv: a candlestick all of gold, a hood upon the top of it. seven lamps thereon, seven pipes to the seven lamps; two olive trees. chapter v: flying roll twenty cubits long, ten cubits broad. verse 9: two women, and the wind was in their wings; they had wings like a stork. chapter vi: four chariots between two mountains of brass. the first chariot had red horses, the second chariot had black horses, the third chariot had white horses, the fourth chariot had grizzled bay horses, etc. the most prominent men in the old testament that were endowed with high imaginative powers, were not many. the most noted among them were isaiah, 681 b.c.; ezekiel, 591 b.c.; daniel, 559 b.c.; zechariah, 535 b.c. these four visionary gentlemen lived during a very exciting, troublesome period. it was the ending of national life. there were continuous wars, constant changes, invasions, robberies, plunder, and all other barbaric crimes that ordinarily accompany these revolutionary events. israel was made captive 721 b.c.--the lost ten tribes, as they are called. the conquest of jerusalem was 606 b.c.; the captivity of judah and destruction of jerusalem, 588 b.c. it must be remembered that all the prophets, so termed, lived during a time of approaching national dissolution, and date from the death of jonah, 761 b.c., to the death of nehemiah, 430. these political preachers, agitators, and fault-finders were altogether some twenty in number. and when national life ceased, these prophets ceased. men of this particular type and character were no longer needed. they had outlived their usefulness. their national greatness was rapidly disintegrating--short-lived it was. luxury, licentiousness, and crime; rapacity, internal disorder, factional strife, lack of order and discipline, made them the prey of neighboring nations, that finally proved their destruction. it was not a question of god or jehovah or idols; it was a question of organization, discipline, and a higher civilization, that wiped the jews out as a nation. they struggled as long as they could maintain their existence as a nation. they were overpowered and subdued. it is not, therefore, surprising that these men appealed to their patriotism--their moral sense, of which they had but little--and made every endeavor to reform them. the national pride, love of country and patriotism, fired their imagination. they talked, wrote, and scolded in the name of the visionary god in fashion among them, employing the phraseology then in use, giving vent to their feelings, their passions, their lamentations, their dreams, their visions, the product of an over-excited nervous system, mixing poesy, philosophy, and facts indiscriminately; producing a heterogeneous, fantastic creation of the brain, part true, but false as a whole, dovetailed together as the fancy of the moment suggested. these rambling fireworks of the imagination have little meaning and less sense, except that they portray their feelings, emotions, and practical impressions for the time being. eliminate the facts out of their writings, and you obtain a residue of wild, incoherent ravings of an over-excited, over-heated brain. we hear nothing of any great mental disturbance or loss of equilibrium, until we reach a new crisis. for nearly four hundred years not a vision, not an angel, not a prophet, is heard of. the religious disputes, the ecclesiastical quarrels, the heated discussions, the hatred, hostility, and opposition that the differences of opinion engendered, caused considerable nervous irritation, mental excitement, and a display of the imagination. this new religion, this reformation, this new organization, produced no small amount of fermentation. it was all nervous, stimulated to a degree of exaltation, rising in intensity to enthusiasm and religious ecstacy, wherein many varieties of nervous phases were exhibited. st. john was on the isle of patmos when he wrote his revelations. he could not have chosen a more suitable spot for his visionary work. an isolated little island situated in the archipelago near asia minor, it is one of the smallest islands in that region. it could certainly not contain many inhabitants. it is surrounded by sea and exceedingly lonely. a man with a highly nervous temperament could almost see anything in that dreamland of melancholy and seclusion. john's visions resembled those of his predecessors several hundred years previous. but john came four hundred years later, and had the advantage of more culture. ideas had multiplied, experience had increased, the imagination was amplified. education had advanced, and the mental faculties were better developed. he had therefore the brain, the opportunity, and a very favorable locality, to dream, to have visions, and to imagine to his heart's content. he had the material, the impressions, and the state of mind to aid him. of course we take it for granted that john wrote these revelations--or some one imagined these things for him. john wrote to the seven churches, ephesus, smyrna, pergamos, thyatera, sardis, philadelphia, and laodicea. none of these places was any considerable distance from patmos. what he sees: chapter i: seven candlesticks. one was like (verse 13) the son of man, clothed in garments down to the feet, girt about the paps with a golden girdle. verse 14: "his head and his hair were white like wool, as white as snow." verse 15: his feet like unto fine brass, as if they burned in a furnace; and his voice as the sound of many waters. verse 16: he had in his right hand seven stars, and out of his mouth a sharp two-edged sword: and his countenance was as the sun shineth in his strength. the second and third chapters are advisory to the seven churches. in the fourth his imagination takes a great flight. a more romantic spot to have visions could not be found--about 38° north of the equator, a beautiful sky, mild climate, calm waters, and a solemnity of surroundings that would impress a less imaginative mind. it would have a marvelous effect on an excitable fanatic zealot, brimful with fantastic religious notions. no wonder he beheld the doors of heaven open, and heard a sound of a trumpet--and he was immediately in the spirit; that is, he was either dreaming or in an ecstatic state, and could see all the things he did see with his eyes either closed or open. he saw a throne. one sat in it. it looked like jasper and sardonyx. and he saw a rainbow like emerald. round about there were twenty-four seats, wherein twenty-four elders were sitting clad in white raiment, with crowns of gold on their heads. thunder and lightning came out of the throne. there were seven lamps before the throne, and seven spirits of god, and before the throne there was a sea of glass like unto crystal; and in the midst of the throne and round about were four beasts, full of eyes before and behind. the first beast was like a lion, the second beast was like a calf, the third beast had the face of a man, the fourth beast was a flying eagle. and the four beasts had each six wings about him, and they were full of eyes within. chapter v, 6: there stood a lamb with seven horns, seven eyes, seven spirits, etc. chapter vi: he saw a white horse, a red horse, a black horse, and a pale horse. the first had a crown, the second a sword, the third a pair of balances, on the fourth sat death and hell. there were seals opened, etc., etc. the fifth seal was the souls slain by the sword of god. the sixth seal, earthquake, the sun became black and the moon red, and the heavens departed as a scroll, etc. chapter vii: he sees four angels standing on the four corners of the earth, holding the four winds of the earth, that the wind should not blow, etc. he saw another angel with a seal--for various tribes, etc.--very fanciful, very fantastic, very imaginative. chapter viii: the seventh seal opened. seven angels with seven trumpets standing before god. one angel stood with a golden censer. five filled the censer with fire. voices. thunderings, lightnings, and an earthquake. verse 7: the first angel sounded. there followed hail and fire, mingled with blood; trees and green grass were burnt up. verse 8: the second angel sounded. a mountain of burning fire was cast into the sea, and the third part of the sea became blood. verse 9: a third part of the creatures and a third part of the ships were destroyed. verse 10: the third angel sounded. a great star fell from heaven, burning. verse 11: the fourth angel sounded. a third part of the sun and moon were smitten, a third part of the stars, etc. chapter ix: the fifth angel sounded. a star falls into the bottomless pit. he mixes smoke, locusts, scorpions, torments, horns, battles, crowns of gold. verse 7: faces of men with hair of women and teeth of lions. he sees breastplates of iron. there is sound in the wings, sound in the chariots running to battle, etc., etc. verse 17: he sees the horses in the vision, and them that sat on them having breastplates of fire, and of jacinth and brimstone; and the heads of the horses were the heads of lions; and out of their mouths issued fire, and smoke, and brimstone. verse 19: for their power is in their mouths and their tails; and their tails were like unto serpents, etc. chapter x, 4: seven thunders utter voices. john takes the little book out of the angel's hands, eats it up, and it is as sweet as honey but bitter in his belly. we pass on through the extravagances of the succeeding chapter to xvi. seven angels and seven plagues and seven vials of wrath. the first vial of wrath was poured upon earth; the second vial of wrath was poured upon the sea; the third vial of wrath was poured upon rivers and fountains of water; the fourth angel poured his vial upon the sun; the fifth angel poured his vial upon the seat of heat; the sixth angel poured his vial into the river euphrates, and the waters were dried up, unclean spirits like frogs came out of the mouth of the dragon, etc. the seventh angel poured his vial into air--voices--thunder--lightning. a more jumbled mass of hysterical nonsense was never concocted by the brain of man. with this silly twaddle of an over-excited nervous system, he continues to give vent to absurd impulses and perverted impressions of a theoleptic nature. in chapter xx he sees an angel from heaven having the keys of the bottomless pit and a great chain in his hand. and he laid hold of the dragon, that old serpent, which is the devil, and satan, and bound him a thousand years. verse 3: "and cast him into the bottomless pit, and shut him up," etc., etc. verse 9: "and they went up on the breadth of the earth, and compassed the camp of the saints about, and the beloved city: and fire came down from god out of heaven and devoured them." verse 10: "and the devil that deceived them was cast into the lake of fire and brimstone, where the beasts and the false prophets are, and shall be tormented day and night forever and ever," etc. that this so-called revelation is not the product of a healthy brain is self-evident. that john was reveling in the realms of fantasie, while he was laboring under a theological nightmare, is so palpable, that he might almost be accused of being a monomaniac. and that this abominable concoction of absurdities should form the basis of a system of moral education, and be tolerated as a supernatural production, is an outrage on common sense. the whole construction is the fabric of a man bordering on a state of hallucination, where fancy, fact, and fiction are indiscriminately mixed and compounded with the theoleptical effervescence of an almost demented enthusiast. there is not a particle of sense in the entire twenty-two chapters, except such as refer to earthly particulars. the combination is false in conception, and pernicious in its tendencies. he sees and hears things so glaringly ridiculous that it is really surprising that any sensible preacher can regard the writings in the light of seriousness. it is perhaps as unique an erratic compilation of material substances as was ever produced, based on ignorance, superstition, and a diseased mind. that man, st. john the divine, had no more conception of the size of this earth or its configuration than he had of electricity, or a steam-engine. of course i understand that theologians do not--or pretend not to--look upon the statements literally. they may interpret the contents of revelation from a spiritual point of view, nothing will or can relieve it of its defects. whatever he meant by his ravings, in those days, they do not contain a particle of practical sense. when he beheld the doors of heaven open and heard a sound of a trumpet, he was immediately in the spirit. then his mind spliced together thrones of jasper, emerald, seats, elders, white raiment, crowns of gold, seven lamps, seven spirits, a sea of glass, and four beasts full of eyes, a lion, calf, man, eagle, six wings, four horses, death and hell, seven angels, seven vials of wrath, hail, fire, blood, thunder, lightning, brimstone, a bottomless pit, etc., etc. thoughts were flying through his brain that embraced pretty much all he knew, that he had either heard, read about, or had had some personal experience of, bringing all the things, objects, substances, and phenomena to bear upon his imagination, forming ideas to illustrate his heaven or hell, his saints and sinners, his salvation and his perdition. the mind was in a state of delirious confusion. john's mind had had a larger experience, his imagination was more amplified and expanded, than the mind and imagination of his predecessors isaiah, ezekiel, daniel, and zechariah. the time and locality were not the same. the burden of john's thoughts was of a quite different nature. the nervous phenomena of theological excitement and irritation was purely visionary, while those of the old testament were largely tainted with the politics of their time. the former writers were loaded down with the expected ruin of their nationality; were filled with patriotism; were hoping and wishing for some one to come and help them out of their dire distress. their ideas and thoughts led them to flights of imagination within the limits of their knowledge. john was fully charged with the philosophy and teachings of his times, and he mustered all his knowledge to open the gulf between the two extremes of bliss and punishment, the saved and lost. thus he invented the appearance of heaven, with all the material substances, to exhibit its fearful glory, and showed the interior of his bottomless pit with its darkness, fire and brimstone. all these things might have appeared very terrible to the ignorant fishermen he had to deal with. it may still leave a strongly unpleasant impression on a great many of our ignorant population. very few sensible people take any stock in john's incoherent, erratic flight of imagination. it may be regarded as a very curious composition of antiquity--senseless, useless, meaningless; admirable in its way, but nothing more than a production of an overwrought, unbalanced, over-stimulated, and over-exalted imagination. we may distinctly perceive the progress that had been made in the evolution of the imagination, in the multiplication of ideas, in the amplification of thought, from abraham to moses, from moses to david, from david to isaiah, from isaiah to john. the nervous system, the brain, had undergone some modifications among these people, but not of a nature that was likely to be a lasting benefit to humanity. on the contrary, these speculative ideas caused a great deal of friction of thought, bitter quarrels, hatred, crime, and bloodshed. neighboring nations, who had neither jehova nor christ, revealed to us the light of science that never produced a friction nor a quarrel--being based on eternal truth. from the very beginning of their conception to the present day this remains unchanged, unaltered and untouched, a monument of truths, an inheritance for all future generations. the god-christ-holy-ghost idea has ever been a source of greed, selfishness, intolerance, bigotry, quarrel, hatred, licentiousness, cruelty, and crime. bickering and quarreling are still going on. and the grasping hand of greed holds the ignorant bigot by the throat to squeeze the last cent out of him, to enrich and aggrandize the most pernicious organization humanity was ever plagued with. heresy, blasphemy, is as fashionable to-day as it was in the rankest days of popery. fortunately the civil law reigns supreme, otherwise these ecclesiastical monomaniacs would be at each other's throats. at this stage of scientific civilization, we can afford to look on at the theological quarrels and antics as a result of a nervous craze that is perfectly harmless. after all it is but the physiological effect of an educational training, the development of the faculties and the evolution of the imagination; the brain functions in proportion to the progress made in the culture in general, harmonizing with the times, circumstances, and conditions of the period in which we live. every age has its turn in the evolution of the mental faculties, and it must go through its stage. the visionary period, the result of a theological hallucination of an over-exalted imagination, can occur only under certain favorable conditions, viz., on the one hand a highly susceptible nervous temperament, a strongly biased educational training, and an enthusiastic excitability, and on the other, an ignorant, bigoted, poor, and helpless population. shades of intellectual development. from barbarism to civilization, multiplicity of gods to nature, darkness to light. barbarism, savagery, ignorance, chaldaism. women barbarians. 200 b.c. idolatry. astronomy. degraded a.d. 1893. many gods. (paganism 766,312,000 slaves. physical god. remaining). 1921-450 b.c. very little light. hebrewism, 6,000,000. physiology, science, mathematics, mythology, women honored science breaking. 1921-500-0 b.c. greece a nation. ignorance, superstition. buddhism, 320,000,000. 1100 b.c. uncivilization (to our notion). confucianism. caste rule. brahmanism, 120,000,000. philosophy, 320,000,000 gods. one god. mohammedanism, 166,000,000. tyrants. a.d. 600. polygamy. five gods. roman catholic still a.d. 325. father, son, and ghost, virgin, christianity, 200,000,000. degraded. a.d. 800. saints, relics, etc. idolatry, greek christianity, figure-painting, ignorance, 80,000,000. intolerance, non-progression, superstition, bigotry. dark ages. a.d. 325 to 1517. three gods. protestantism--luther, women 200 to a.d. 1517. class rule. calvin--100,000,000. sub 300 a.d. 1693. progression, toleration, episcopalianism. ordinate. sects. a.d. 1572. superstition, bigotry, presbyterianism. a.d. 1730. civilization, selfishness, baptists. greed. methodism. wesley. one god. universalism. a.d. 1691. enlightened, advancing. unitarianism. ethical culture. doubtful god. a.d. 1550. latest theological a.d. 1870. metamorphosis. no god. science, nature, fact, truth. manhood, womanhood. intellectual development. in modern times, if a man should attempt to rave after the style of john, he would certainly be declared a fit candidate for an insane asylum. what was possible on the isle of patmos by john would be an utter impossibility to-day. it is not because we have not religious fanatics enough, but education, reason, and science have advanced, so that such extravagant fire-works of the imagination would be declared evidence of an insane condition of the mind. on the following page a diagram of various shading shows the growth of intelligence and enlightenment of the various religious denominations, indicating the beginning of actual progress with the reformation, and how little there is left of the entire religious fabric that has been handed down these many centuries. the darkness of ignorance is still hiding the truth. the church is doing its utmost to train the young in the pernicious doctrine of superstition and falsehood of antiquity. the clergy would stop our public school system, if they could drag humanity back into the mire of brutality. the sooner the bible, with its god, jehova, jesus christ, the holy ghost, the prophets and the apostles, with all the angels, heaven, and hell, are placed under a glass case to be viewed and admired as a matter of antique curiosity the better. chapter xxviii. the planetary gods. the terrestrial god. why man should claim that the terrestrial god, the god that was created on this earth, extends his sway beyond the limits of this globe, is not easily accounted for. it is an assumption that is not at all warranted. we know that the composition of the planets that belong to the family of the solar system are the same as that of our own, this earth. all those worlds seem to be constructed of the same chemical elementary substances as this globe of ours, and working on the same general universal plan. that all the planets of the solar system, and the sun itself, possess the same common characteristics as this earth, is evident. the planets all move in the same direction round the sun. they all revolve upon their own axes, and round the sun. they have day and night, seasons and periods of revolution. they have their atmospheres, snows, rings, and all the necessary equipments of a planet proper. they seem to have seas, mountains, valleys, poles, equators, etc. some of the planets seem to be in a much higher state of organization than our own. take saturn, for example, with its series of rings and satellites, its immense distance from the sun, 886,000,000 miles, moving at the rate of 22,000 miles per hour, and having a year equal to about 30 years of our globe. he flourishes at a distance from us of about 300,000,000 miles. he has a diameter of 73,000 miles. his volume is 700 times that of the earth, and he receives his light from the sun, just the same as we do. it is admitted by astronomers that the saturnal scenery is most magnificent, and surpasses anything we are familiar with. the rings form immense arches, which span the sky and shed a soft radiance around; while in the strange beauty of the night eight moons in all their different phases, full, new crescent, or gibbous, light up the starry vault. we know that the planets are composed of the same elementary substances as this world whereon we live, that they are also surrounded with an atmosphere, have water upon them, receive the sun's heat, exhibit all the peculiar characteristics of this globe of ours, and all the planets seem to be obeying the same general universal laws. can anyone give us a plausible reason why there is no organized vital matter on our neighboring planets--plants, living creatures, similar to those found on this terrestrial globe? if the elementary substances are the same as those that are found on this earth, and they have a similar sunshine, heat, moisture, and temperature, all the forces may be presumed to be the same or similar. there is no reason that the elements should not enter into organic life of a similar, perhaps either inferior or superior, organization to that existing on this world? what is to hinder them? it is certainly possible, therefore probable. may we not assume that it is both possible and probable? those on earth who believe that this globe of ours was especially fitted up for us, made for man only, are very presumptuous. there was no special forethought for the adaptation or convenience of creatures like ourselves. as to the forethought, adaptation, or convenience, the hog, the elephant, the ass, and the fly enjoy their life just as much as men do. it is very convenient for them. but not more so than it is for man, and it is no more convenient for man than it is for the animals. we are certainly nearer the truth to say that the other planets are inhabited by beings, races, that may exhibit as much intelligence as, if not more than, we do on this globe. the conditions of light and heat may not be the same. the other planets may vary in form and structure, and have shapes not at all familiar to us. that, however, does not in any way interfere with the reasonable probability, nay, certainty, that they are inhabited. whether they are inhabited or not, matters little. yet we may safely make the inference that these planets are not simply placed in space for our convenience. may not the inhabitants of venus, mercury, mars, flora, mnemosene, jupiter, saturn, uranus, neptune, etc., think that this earth has been created by their respective gods for their convenience? have they not as much right to have each of them a god as this earth is supposed to have? has not the god of jupiter as much right to be proclaimed by a portion of its inhabitants to be the creator of all the planets, sun, moon, and stars, as this sectarian, terrestrial god has? the right to this power, to this prerogative, is as much vested in the god of neptune or saturn, as in this earthly god. imagine the god of saturn complacently smiling at the arrogance of this pigmy of a terrestrial god. may not the god of venus have a preëmptory claim to the godship of this planetary system? or the god of uranus, or of any other of the planets? or possibly every planet has its god that acts as superintendent over his own territory, the laws of gravitation preventing his divinity from leaving his place of abode. or, perhaps there are no planetary gods--every solar system may have, perhaps, only one god, residing on the great sun himself, communicating directly with all his subject planets by the rays he sends forth. it is not at all unlikely that perhaps every solar system has its god. and over these many solar system gods, somewhere in the immensity of space, a god of immense magnitude may preside. so you may go on multiplying gods, sub-gods and superior gods, without end. where do we find that a man, or a set of men, have a right to arrogate to themselves the power or privilege to assume that this terrestrial god has anything at all to say or to dictate on any other planet? this earthly god has no more right to interfere with the business of mars or mercury than the god of saturn has a right to interfere with our earthly affairs. should it, however, transpire that any planetary god, whether he comes from uranus, or neptune, or any other planet, should interfere, we who were made in his image will assemble in the houses we have built for his sake, for the terrestrial god's sake, and pass resolutions advising our terrestrial god to say to the other planetary gods: "hands off, ye gods, if you please! for the sake of peace and harmony among the gods of this planetary system, we, representing this terrestrial god by proxy--since it really makes no great difference in the end of the great gathering-in of the elementary substances all organic beings are composed of--we, the organized elements of this earth, men, animals, plants, etc., more especially the highest organized beings, men, having a more perfected nervous system, being the elect of all terrestrial productions, claim the right to speak for our god, and proclaim to all planetary gods, potentates, majesties, holies of holies, or their representatives, that they have no right whatsoever to interfere with our terrestrial management. we can have our little local pet god or gods if we desire, so long as our methods do not in any way inconvenience them." let it be taken for granted that the same, elementary substances are found (of which we have evidence) in the sun and all the planets, and probably in the stars we see; that their gaseous fluids and solid substances are of similar nature to the elements known to us; and that they also receive the same sun's heat (or the distant stars may receive light and heat from some other suns), is it not more than likely that the conditions produced by the contact of these elements with the sun's heat, may resemble those we are familiar with? if there is heat there must be motion, there must be friction, there must be consumption and expenditure of heat, also expansion and contraction. if these forces exist, other forces necessarily must also exist, as cold from absence of heat, dynamic force, electric and magnetic forces. we may readily suppose that there are currents of air. water may be agitated by the wind. if atmospheres surround these planets there is only one source of heat that can keep them in a gaseous state, and that is the sun. heat from the same source keeps the oxygen and the hydrogen fluid. if evaporation and consolidation exist why should there not be aqueous vapor, rain, etc.? we must concede that the elements known as oxygen, hydrogen, nitrogen, and carbon are found in these distant planets. we cannot be far wrong in supposing that there are carbonic acid, ammonia, and maybe other combinations. atoms certainly must exist, and molecules (a drop of water is a molecule). there may also be conductions of heat, of molecular motion. what then is to hinder the evolution of phenomena on these distant planets being regulated by laws very similar to the laws of this earth--radiation and absorption of heat, combustion and explosion, tension and velocity of the various elements, under peculiar circumstances favoring all these conditions? that elements wherever found possess the same physical properties when brought under the same influence of heat and moisture, there can be no doubt, whether they are farther removed, or nearer to the contact of the sun's rays. it is a fact, a well-established fact, that different substances require varying degrees of temperature to reduce them to a liquid, gaseous, or solid condition, and no matter where the temperature is produced the result will be the same. if, for example, a temperature can be procured on the surface of uranus, or saturn, sufficient to melt iron, lead, or silver, these metallic substances will melt at uranus or saturn as quickly as on the earth's surface. the laws regulating radiation, absorption, dispersion, or contraction, or any other phase the elementary substances may assume, under heat or pressure, etc.--these laws will hold good on any of the planets just as well as on this terrestrial planet. it is therefore far from unreasonable to presume that the organizable elements may have assumed a vitality on the distant planets, evolved and developed creatures in accordance with known laws, or laws that are still unknown to us. because it is perfectly natural for these substances to organize themselves into life, under a certain degree of temperature, moisture, and electricity, when these necessary elements are present--as natural as that oxygen and hydrogen make water, or that the sun's heat sets all the elementary substances into a state of activity. we have no reason to doubt that these planets, or even the sun, have not their own vital products just as well as this earth. these vital products may be of low grade, or of a very highly organized nature. we may assume, without fear of any great error, that wherever there are air and water there is life. because if there is heat it is a sun's heat, otherwise there could not be air and water. if there is a sun's heat, atmosphere, and water, there is certainly life, lowly or highly developed. the degree of organic development depends on the age of the planet--whether it has been in existence a few millions of years more or a few millions of years loss. these organic forms may have advanced to any degree of perfection and possess qualities like or unlike our own, or they may still exist in a very primitive state of evolution. let it be distinctly understood that on the degree of organic development depends whether they have reached our height of perfection of nervous development, or the development of a substance capable of performing functions similar to the brain substance animals are endowed with on this earth, with physiological action the same or similar--whether undergoing gradual changes, and accumulating experience, they may have arrived at that degree of perfection to be capable of thinking and reflecting, may have acquired understanding of a nature possessing all the fear, wonder, and ignorance of certain states of nervous development, where the ideas are just forming and imagination barely assuming form. they may, i say, have begun evolving their gods, or images representing the same, or may have reached that state of perfection that every creature is endowed with such powers, understanding, and reasoning, acquired by millions of years of training and education, that they constitute gods in themselves. or the creatures inhabiting these planets may be in a condition like that of creatures many, many ages past upon earth--may have no knowledge of gods or god, but are undergoing the necessary evolutionary changes that will ultimately bring them to that happy elysium, when they will be capable to produce their god or gods, as we have done on this earth. why is it not possible that a higher order of beings inhabiting saturn are at this moment employing instruments in order to ascertain the constitution and condition of this terrestrial globe, speculating on the probability whether this earth is inhabited or not? they may have positive knowledge that this planet has an atmosphere several hundred miles in depth. they may know its size, diameter, its distance from the sun, and that this planet revolves in an ellipse as the planet saturn does. they may also know that the elements are of the same nature; and that there are mountains, seas, an equator, a north and a south pole, but only one moon. looking at this planet as a star of this solar system, of perhaps the third or the fourth magnitude, nothing compared with their own, either in size, moons, belts, or other important features, these higher organized beings on saturn may be able to behold worlds beyond themselves far more vast than their own, and regard this planet, venus, mercury, etc., as very insignificant affairs. why may they not have appliances, modes of travel or communication, as far removed in intelligence from our highest order of beings, as the difference between a frog and the pope? we have no reason to exclude any supposition, however wild and extravagant, as to the conditions of other planets. it is not entirely imaginary. inferences may be drawn from what we know, and deductions made from our practical experience. this problem is safer to speculate on, having a solid basis to start with. those who believe in the actuality of an existing god have not a thing to base his existence on, except the natural functions of the brain. but if we concede that this earth has a god, what right have we to assume that each other planet has not a god of its own? we have no evidence to the contrary. who dares to state positively that they have not a god? why should this insignificant terrestrial planet god presume, or persons for him, that he controls and governs planetary bodies hundreds of times larger, and perhaps far more important, than this small solar system? how do we know that the inhabitants of other planets have not had angels, saints, and saviors? how do we know that they have not had beings who pretended to know all about their god, and were as brutal, as savage, and as demented as some of the persons figuring in scripture, or the tyrannical, bloody papists of the dark ages? the imagination of man supplied us with gods or a god on earth; the imagination is justified in supplying other planets with a god or gods. the god of jupiter, mars, or saturn, etc., may with as much force and propriety say, "i am that i am; i am the great i am, the creator of all things. you, planet earth, may be a little older, riper, more solidified, have a solid crust, yet remember our god is just as good as yours, and better. you have only one moon--a fossil world, a mere cinder. and, moreover, our god is fourteen hundred times larger than yours, because our globe is that much larger. our globe has a diameter of ninety thousand miles. and we have four satellites, or moons. our largest is as big as your whole earth. therefore, it is ridiculous for you to claim superiority. as to my neighbor saturn, with his eight moons and belts, his god smiles at your presumption. i, the god of jupiter, agree with the great god of saturn and others, that your terrestrial affected greatness is too ridiculous to be worthy of our serious consideration. in fact, it is absurd for your earthly godship to claim to have made the sun that great luminary that gives us all heat, light, and life." let us go but one step farther into space to show the fallacy of the assumption that this terrestrial god created all planets, stars, etc. at the present time it is considered that the star alpha (a) centauri in the southern hemisphere is the nearest to the earth. its distance is more than 200,000 times that of the earth from the sun, or twenty trillions of miles. light would require about four and a half years to travel this enormous distance. the stars which we see at such immense distances are suns. the vast distance at which the stars are known to be, precludes the thought of their shining, like the planets or the moon, by reflecting back the light of our sun. they must be self-luminous, and are doubtless each a center of a system of planets and satellites. our sun is but a star. as we see only the suns of these distant systems, so their inhabitants see only the sun of our system, and that as a small star. arrogant, conceited humanity, with an unbounded assurance and self-confidence, mixed with profound ignorance, have the impudence to claim that their terrestrial god created all the stars, suns, and planetary systems that are so far away in space that the eye of man cannot behold them--no, not even with the strongest instrument yet made. we may be compared to maggots on a big cheese, crawling over its surface; they may with equal propriety claim that their cheese is the only cheese ever created, and that it was made for their own special use, and that all other cheeses were made only for their benefit. some of the maggots might equally claim that there was only one god--the man who made the cheese. that is, that man, the maggot's god, made the cow that gave the milk that produced the cheese whereon the maggot dwelt. let every planet have its god, and every god its planet. much mystery lies in the word, you simply have to scan it. let every man his own god make, god in man, pure and elect, let common sense and reason wake! knowledge, truth, makes man perfect. go search your god through depths of space on suns and stars infinite. the mind expands to every place. to distance without limit. if you don't find the god you seek search within yourselves. perchance, you'll find your god, quite good and meek, but not in your ignorance. chapter xxix. every man his own god. writers and thinkers with a strong theological bias, seem to fear that the world would go to pieces if the scriptural god or gods were deposed. they seem to apprehend that the moral and political economy would seriously suffer, and the moral idea especially be destroyed. when these gentlemen find it impossible to reconcile the difficulties that overshadow the personal and triple-headed deities--that somehow they cannot make them harmonize with the recent discoveries and the development in natural sciences--they attempt to mold them so as to fit the requirements of the occasion. thus, it was discovered that the prime essence of the world is god, or something that pervades all nature; that he is the first great cause, and that this implies some huge mountain of will power, and an immense ocean of intelligence; that he is the creator of all things--that out of him this world emerged and out of the world all the various activities and objects were developed by the life inherent in the substances, etc. then again they represent him as a great designer--declare that god designed all things and beings, and put everything in shipshape order; and after the design was finished he set the machinery in motion. these, and interminable similar pet theories and excuses, are made for god to retain a foothold in the mind of man. clever brains and prolific imaginations have succeeded in clothing god, or gods, with all the attributes thus far discovered either in man, beast, planet, or space--extension, contraction, elasticity, etc.--modes, limitation, finite, infinite, absolute--everything, in fact, that has ever been printed in the largest encyclopedia known. these gentlemen should have had memories that the original doubts in abraham's mind were the result of common sense and reason; that he still retained the sensual qualities of the chaldean gods. the modifications and transitions of that first idea are very marked, as well as very numerous. by the time we reach christ, he is not the same. it is to be regretted that we have no compliments to waste on this god--alias jehova--because a more bloody, selfish, monstrous idea cannot be well portrayed, if the story in the bible be true. and certainly he, and his triple alliance, does not exhibit one redeeming quality during the centuries of christianity, because a more hideous, outrageous, criminal monster cannot be constructed, except by human ingenuity and by human devices. in another chapter we call the attention of the reader to some of the most barbarous abominations of the roman catholic church, and such a polluted set of butchering popes as words fail to give any adequate idea of. all this goes to show that this imaginary idea of god may be made to fit any person or any purpose. it is but reasonable to inquire, does god create the brain, or does the brain create god? that is really the entire question in a nutshell. we know, with absolute certainty, that god does not make brain, otherwise we should have it perhaps a little more uniform, and of a better quality. besides, all other animals possessing brain would, of course, be entitled to the knowledge of this god in proportion to the size, quantity, and quality of the brain. this, then, being impossible, we have no other means of arriving at the truth than by concluding that brain created god. every brain cannot create god; the great nervous centers may be insufficient, either in quantity or quality, to enable the brain to acquire qualifications that will give expression to more than the instinctive number of sensations and emotions. creatures generally are limited to the instinctive number of sensations and emotions; and act, move, and have their being in harmony with these. animals of all classes belong to this category, and not infrequently man, too. by that is meant, man in an uncultured state, and even among them the degree of experience and the power of observation make the difference between one set of savages and another. intelligence, understanding, and reasoning power depend on some kind of experience. the repetition of experience constitutes, in some measure, the training of the senses, and through the senses and the cerebral hemispheres the intellect is thus formed and mind developed. the intellectual acquirements may be limited by the ascendency of some predominating ideas or opinions that check progress. as for example, the absence of schools in communities, the forcible prevention of education, the prohibition of education by priestly authority of the church, and the suppression by ecclesiastics of all ideas except their own. this we may term limitation of brain culture by undue interference of the ascendent idea or ideas that limits the range of intelligence and subjects the will power to the control and direction of what the people presumed to be a greater right than their own. prescribed limits of education check or stunt the natural progress, and if any progress is made, the people must break through the prescribed limits, as was the case with luther, spinoza, voltaire, renan, etc. the ascendency of man over animals checks their further progress in the way of intelligence. the superior hostile intelligence holds possession and will not permit further development. as regards animals, we have taken possession of the earth, and have put a stop to all further advancement. supposing a man develops an idea, it is not an easy matter to persuade his next-door neighbor, who is his equal perhaps in intelligence; but, it is not difficult to inculcate his pet idea into his child. it is, as it were, virgin ground, and he plows it to his liking. he has complete control. he is master. he directs it as he wishes, and prevents others from planting strange ideas or ideas hostile or antagonistic to his own. in this manner we commence breeding ideas, and we continue breeding the same ideas, on the same principle as breeding pigeons or chickens; they are all of the same kind, if you don't cross them; and the more eggs you lay the more chickens you get, and if they multiply rapidly, especially if you have many hens to one rooster (as the jews had), what a multitude to spoil a garden-patch! that is precisely what happens, and that is what actually took place with abraham. we have also a natural limitation to brain culture. we may instance the orang-outang, the bushman, the negro, the idiot, etc.--brains that are not susceptible to much culture or education. the understanding, the development of the intellectual faculties, is limited of necessity. there is no possibility of going beyond their capacity; it will hold a given measure and no more. even among these, the range of intelligence may vary some degrees. impairment, effectiveness, or entire absence of any one of the senses, limits intellectual acquirements. the uniform activity of all the senses is thereby hindered. we have in addition innumerable varieties of brain in size, quality, quantity, form; as also inherited failings or diseased conditions. the qualities of god depend upon the qualities of the man. there has not yet been a god conceived by the human mind but greediness was the chief element. men made gods for others, whose inferior intellect was easily swayed to believe in great benefits they were to expect, but never got, yet were continually paying for. every man or woman is responsible for his or her acts, and no god--supposing there to be any--can save him or her. there can be no intercession between man, and nature or nature's laws. every living being is held to strict accountability to the prevailing forces and the controlling elements that compose it. it is always a question of unchangeable equilibrium between the elements and the surrounding medium, as to the kind of a god we may acquire. a man can see no farther than his sight will permit him. the organ of sight, the eye, may be so constituted that we can barely recognize the nearest object, or we may without difficulty distinguish the smallest object at a great distance. this condition, of seeing objects near, at a moderate distance, or far off, or not seeing at all, depends on the natural construction of the organ itself. the difference between the various qualities of sight is due to the proper qualities and shape of the various structures that enter into the composition of the organ of vision. every part must be perfect--the lens, the iris, the cornea, the vitreous humor, etc. not only must the parts be perfect, but they must also be in a healthy condition, to produce accurate vision. all this answers well for ordinary purposes in life, taking in such impressions as the apparatus of vision may from time to time receive. these are retained, stored up; thus memory of objects, the impressions of which have been recorded, may be recalled to mind either in actuality or in imagination. the education of that organ consists in the number, variety, and kind of impressions received. this constitutes the degree of educational experience, being regulated by the amount of knowledge of the greater or lesser number of objects that have been recorded through the retina on the great central nervous system. experience, long practice, matures and perfects the knowledge of all things that meet the eye; understanding becomes more thorough, intellect clearer, and judgment more accurate, enabling us by that means to recognize the smallest imperfection, the slightest deviation, and the most delicate shade of harmony, in color and form. we all know how hard it is for a child to recognize shapes, objects, colors, etc. we know its long and tedious repetitions of looking at one and the same thing an infinite number of times before it will recognize it. we know that a child will repeat things, or the names of things, without knowing anything about them; or, it may know the names of things yet not recognize the things when presented to its sight. the decision or judgment whether the thing is right and proper, is left to the person who has already had experience and acquired knowledge and understanding concerning these matters. thus the child may be directed rightly or wrongly, and its education must depend on the accuracy of the instruction received. however, the impressions received in the early part of life remain firm, and are not easily removed or eradicated, no matter how faulty, wrong, how perverse and false, they may be. the stronger and deeper the impressions and the longer they have become habituated to them, the harder it is to correct them, the more difficult to explain the errors. it is in such cases almost impossible to convince, and a tedious task to eradicate. by these early educational processes durable habits are acquired, that become persistent and remain during life; especially when no contrary influences have been brought to bear upon them to modify or correct them. it is almost an impossibility to train or educate the organ, whether sense of sight or ear, or the organ of voice, after a certain ago has been reached. an artist must start young in his artistic education if he has any desire to excel in that art--that is, if the organs of sight and touch are to be evenly balanced. so that whenever any person inherits the necessary qualities of sight and touch, and these become educated, i mean accurately trained, skill must result in excellence, and from that reach to a degree of perfection. the high art of painting becomes this man's ideal, and this ideal his god, if the education of the other senses has not materially interfered in shading his ideal, or the moral and social qualities, giving his productions a tone or tint that may cloud or brighten his efforts, not forgetting the inherent or acquired bias of other surroundings that may influence his mind. in the culture of music or of the ear, there is a wonderful difference in the kind of sounds a person has received as his earliest impressions, the number of sounds his scale of the notes consists of. what we term the monotonous sounds of chinese music delight the chinaman's ear, and he cannot conceive how it is possible for europeans to tolerate the immense amount of confusion that is usually displayed in an orchestra. yet the european is delighted with our music and finds the chinese music very dull. the same difference, but not to that degree, exists among the various european nationalities. sprightly france thinks british music very dull, etc. painting is an art, but everybody cannot paint, though everybody has sight and touch. that art requires a great deal of training. the vast majority of mankind are not able even to draw an accurate outline of any object. sight, the organ of vision, is a difficult organ to educate. the same difficulties confront us with other organs. a degree of perfection is requisite in the construction of the organ in order to confer the necessary qualification for a higher training. and here too the education consists of receiving impressions through the organ of hearing to the brain, and these, like the impressions of sight, are recorded, that is to say, they are retained, in memory, so that we may recall them, or recognize them, when familiar sounds strike the ear. any kind of simple sound is easily retained. a child will much more easily recognize the voice of a cat or a dog than a painting or a picture, and will remember the one but not recognize the other. there is certainly a difference in the educational capabilities of these organs. simple sounds are easily retained and easily reproduced. a simple combination of sounds are also retained without difficulty. thus it comes that we are all more or less imitators of sounds or simple melodies. these seem to contribute to our amusement more readily, either for our own satisfaction, or for the satisfaction of others, or both. these reproductions of sounds or melodies do not require any mental effort or physical effort. the organ of voice may be used--that is, we attempt to sing. we may hum, or we can pucker our lips together and whistle. each individual whistles in his own peculiar fashion, seldom two alike. they may be similar, but never alike. the fault may lie in the lips, the tongue, in the form of the opening made, the manner of blowing through the opening formed by the lips, the duration and strength of the expiration, dryness or moisture of the mouth, the thickness or flabbiness of cheeks, etc., etc. hence it comes that every man has his whistle. you may take a class and train them to whistle a melody, say "yankee doodle." each one will produce similar successive sounds or notes, so that that particular melody is recognized, but each one will have his own "yankee doodle," with peculiarities, characteristics peculiarly his own. if, for example, he is musically inclined, or has had any training in music, he or she may put a quaver or two in, as a variation, more or less. yet each one will still own his own whistle and pipe his own "yankee doodle." that is just what happens with god. we have no god, we never had one, but we have been educated up to one. in childhood we already hear the first indistinct sound, and we don't know whether it is the bark of a dog or the mew of a cat. by and by, as we grow older and are ready to attend sunday-school, or some other institution where these instructions are imparted, you learn the melody of "yankee doodle"--rather puzzling at first, but it comes. variations are put in to suit special cases and special occasions, and each individual member of any one class whistles his "yankee doodle" to the best of his ability--entirely his own; he is perfectly happy with it; it does not in any way interfere in the ordinary pursuits in life, his pleasures, his stomach, his diversion nor his business; and really it makes no difference where he is, in the street, in the factory, in the store, on the exchange, in the hovel or in the palace, he carries his "yankee doodle" with him. whistle it over a birth, over a wedding, or over a funeral, whistle it wherever you will, it is the same "yankee doodle." it is used on all occasions--in wars on the battlefield, or at peace on parade, etc. thus it happens that everyone, male or female, has his or her own peculiar "doodle." if the man or woman or child had never heard this melody they would certainly not have known anything about it, and therefore could not have enjoyed that particular melody. he or she might have heard another melody just as simple, perhaps just as stupid, but differently constructed. the culture of these theological ideas forms the fundamental groundwork of our educational church system, and each sect has its own method of planting its seed according to its peculiar notions. we must always bear in mind that before nerve tissue was developed, nerve force or thought could not exist; that the phenomena of imagination, or the product of a combination of ideas, the result of the impressions received by the senses, retained, and passing, connectedly or disconnectedly, through the brain, could not be effected except by experience and training. the idea of a god or gods impressed early in life, while the brain is being developed--the brain tissue of course--remains firmly rooted, and is very difficult to change or eradicate later in life. in case a change is ever produced, it takes place by a process of reasoning, when understanding has been acquired. the acceptance of an idea or an opinion requires little sense and no reasoning, and, indeed, no education. children believe anything they are told, until they grow older and learn to know better. men and women believe because they don't know better. accidentally they were placed in a particular groove of thinking, wherein they can glide forward, backward, round in a circle, perpetually, with ease and without interruption, without effort and without understanding. this perpetual gliding motion, within circumscribed limits, is over the same god, holy ghost, christ, sin and salvation, or the reverse; no advancement or progress. whatever has been accomplished in the affairs of men, has been done without the prescribed limits, and to that we owe our present civilization and material prosperity. whoever the first individual was that proposed worship, no matter how it originated, or what it was, or how crude, the thought was the product of some man's brain. whether he ever stood face to face with his own idea like moses, or mohammed, or anyone else, makes not the slightest difference. it was a man's individual notion, prompted by fear, ignorance, or astonishment. it is the work of the brain just the same. it was their idols, images, god, gods, and men that were endowed with divinity, were held sacred, worshiped, and honored. these human inventions were supplemented by other human inventions, rites and rituals, up to this present time. we discard ideas that have been tried and found wanting for modified or new ones--as abraham, moses, christ, mohammed, luther, wesley, etc. the notions of these men in turn have undergone the civilizing filtering process, until there is little left but the mere sound. the unitarians, for example, have stripped the christian trinity down to a skeleton. they seem to say: this was once the great bugaboo: you need not be scared, it's perfectly harmless. it has been civilized, you know. science did it. hell is out of fashion. heaven we have on earth, if we have the means to do it with. we can be angels if we wish to, saints if necessary, and holy if desirable. every man makes his own heaven, his own hell, his own angels, his own bliss, and his own god. yes, he has his own saints and his own divinities. a woman does precisely the same thing. the imagination supplies all the necessary material for their production, selected from natural objects and put together in a manner most pleasing, acceptable, and satisfactory to each one. we make them as good as we know how, as pretty and as delightful as our taste and fancy can create them. yet the kind of whimsical representations of the mind depends largely upon the condition of the nervous system, time of life, and our daily occupation. a young girl at puberty, whose mind is entering into that beautiful paradise of dreamland, blooming with buds of hopes and rosy wishes, experiences the delights of new sensations, creates her god, her jesus, or her holy ghost, to fill the nooks of her aspirations, with all the abounding exaltation and luxuries of her creative power. every cloud has wings, every star bright eyes that wink and beckon her to future bliss, to desires unknown yet longed for. she listens with eager ears for every sound. the zephyrs of the spring of life are wafting music to her ear. as she gazes with gushing eyes into ethereal space, she is searching the heavens for coming enchantment. her doll, the god or the plaything of childhood, has lost its interest, and all the pretty things that formerly were so pleasing have lost their charm, as the bell and smaller infantile toy had lost theirs before the doll had nestled into her affections. now a more realistic feeling permeates her senses, and beauties of a new and more attractive form occupy her agitated heart and brain. what is the awakening of these new emotions, the unfolding of these new sentiments, that seem to linger on the borderland of restrained passion? is it not the dawn of love, the transitory period, that bridge of nervous exaltation that leads from puberty to maternity? she has her own god, a figure to her notion as pure, refined, and beautiful as she can picture in the visions of her waking or sleeping dreamland mind. her sighs, her prayers, her devotions, are directed to him. this is her coming messiah, her angel, her everything, that is to realize all her hopes and expectations. it is her god. can a jockey or a prizefighter have feelings like these? the former has a horsey god, the latter a muscular. the fisherman, the sailor, the soldier, each in his sphere has his or her god. underlying all the busy activities of daily life, whatever feelings of care or pleasure each may experience, it is but upon rare occasions he puckers his lips to give vent to his devotional feelings and whistles his yankee doodle--his god! our gods are as we make them. if we are good our god is good, if we are pure our god is pure, and if our senses are subordinate to our reason and understanding our god will be one of reason and understanding, but if we are impure, bad, and evil-minded, our senses and passions ruling supreme, reason and understanding are subordinate in our god, and the evils of animal sense predominate. every man is his own god. as he is, so is his god. as he makes himself, so will his god be. as he protects himself, so god will protect him. as he guides himself, so will god guide him. whatsoever a man accomplishes for himself, that will god accomplish for him. whatsoever a man does for himself, that god will do for him. if a man supports himself, god will support him. if he neglects himself, god will neglect him. the more he depends on himself, the surer is his dependence on god. as he saves himself, so god will surely save him. as he injures himself, so will he be injured by god. as a man punishes himself, so will he be punished by god. god will help him who can help himself. if a man is true to himself, god will be true to him. by industry, economy, and sobriety you will confer blessings on yourself; you have no need of god to bless you. make yourself a good man or woman, and you will surely have a good god. a brutal man never has a meek god, a stingy man a generous god, nor a vicious man a merciful god. every man brings himself to the level of a brute or lower, or to the highest type of nobility of man. god never made man, but every man makes his god. the gateways through which knowledge enters the senses. the functions of the brain. perception--receiving impressions--retaining impressions--reproducing impressions--knowing--forming simple ideas--compound ideas--complex ideas--mixed ideas and complicated ideas--conducting, transferring, and reflexation- coördination. sight. hearing. touch-feeling. smell. taste. recognition } comparing } discernment } attention } in retention } common. succession } identity } diversity } continuity contemplation distance distance distance color solidity solidity solidity figure figure shape shape shape { long size { thick size { thin dimensions dimensions softness softness softness hardness hardness hardness rough roughness roughness roughness smooth smoothness smoothness smoothness motion motion motion motion action action action action dryness dryness dry dryness moisture moisture moist moisture fluidity fluid fluidity fluidity vibration vibration vibration vibration heat heat heat heat cold cold cold cold pain pleasure odor odor expansion expansion expansion expansion contraction contraction contraction contraction resistance resistance relation relation relation rest rest rest unrest unrest sound appearance proportion proportion proportion proportion \----------------------------------v----------------------------------/ | produce sensations emotions--feelings- ideation--thought--understanding- reflection--recollection--deliberation--induction- memory--imagination--judgment--intellect--will power--mind: the normal products of a healthy nervous system. (the abnormal result from a deranged condition of the cerebro-spinal system.) morals: whence they spring. to be moral means that the organs be properly and legitimately used, in accordance with the law of nature: stomach. sexual organs. for nutrition of the body. for the propagation of the species. wants normally supplied. satisfaction } { satisfaction contentment } lead to health and happiness, { contentment comfort } purity, chastity, love, { comfort pleasure } affection, joy. { pleasure peace } { peace abnormal use of the organs. starvation } { passion hunger } lead to vanity, negligence, indolence, { lust poverty } deception, discontent, selfishness, { overindulgence luxury } disease. { lasciviousness extravagance } { vice drunkenness } { whoredoms crime. sin. ------- will power intellectually used. industry, integrity, activity, honor, courage, goodness, charity, benevolence, sympathy, pity, humanity. ------- be wise, let the gods and church alone; they're false, contrary to nature's plan. trespass not, there's nothing to atone. be human, an upright man. all their rites and creeds are full of flaws. as nature's products, we thrive and grow. but we must be ruled by nature's laws if we'd happy be--ourselves must know. morals! are the laws we must obey. infringe them not, prayers cannot save. though blessed, we the penalty must pay. not to god, or church, or priest be slave! chapter xxx. the non credo. religion, supernaturalism, ecclesiastical control of human affairs, have done more harm than the good they have ever effected. for several thousand years they have been doing the worst of mischief--in spite of their conceited belief to the contrary--to actual enlightenment, to the advancement and prosperity of the masses, to the progress of nations generally. they have been a persistent barrier to every step forward, and have persecuted every idea that threatened in any way to interfere with their organized system. the sacred or hebraic nationality, steeped in barbarism, washed in cruelty, and bathed in the blood of humanity, was succeeded by another organized system, the roman catholic church, which was by no means an improvement upon the bible methods. they added savagery and cruelty of a more refined character. they associated with it a tyranny and a persecution that fairly blackens the pages of history. all was done, however, for the sacred cause, with the cant, sanctimoniousness, greed, and selfishness that only the church and its saintly priests could be capable of. these self-styled divine organizations ever have been, and are even now, inimical to the best social interests of humanity. their own aggrandizement was of greater importance to them than the welfare of the oppressed. they are the real promoters of class distinction. they are the promulgators of sectarian hate. they lessen the dignity of woman. they are the fomentors of prejudice and superstition. they are the supporters and sustainers of the opulent, the powerful, the wealthy and influential, to the detriment and debasement of the poor and more unfortunate classes. they are the actual enemies of virtue and simplicity of life--by their expensive church trappings, their gorgeous adornments, their costly decorations, their glaring exhibition, their glittering finery, their pompous display of church dress, their gilded magnificence, their showy grandeur, their ostentation and boastful ceremonies, overawing the senses, and subduing the humble, the ignorant, making them mentally more stupid, the slaves to a pernicious system of doctrine. in ancient times, in the days of antiquity, the males were the chief worshipers. they were the privileged portion of the community, who assumed the duties to come in direct contact with all that was considered sacred, holy, or divine. woman was considered as a defiled or polluted creature, unworthy or unfit to come within the sacred precincts of their temples or participate in any church affairs, or to minister in any of their ecclesiastical rites or ceremonies. women had nothing to say. they have nothing to say to this day, in the roman catholic church especially, and in the orthodox protestant denominations very little, because paul lays down the law in cor. xiv, 34: "let your women keep silence in your churches: for it is not permitted unto them to speak; but they are commanded to be under obedience as also saith the law." the sacred christian view of woman is that she is an inferior creature. she is the slave, the plaything, the toy of pleasurable gratification. god himself so ordained it, when he created adam out of the dust and eve out of one of adam's ribs. that was the chaldean mode of explaining her inferiority and of subjecting woman to man. these barbarians, first the hebrews, and christians later, did not think fit to place woman on a level with man. therefore they placed her in the lower scale of creation as a servant and handmaid to man. the heathens, the greeks especially, were more considerate, politer, and more refined towards women. women were honored by them, which is evident from the composition of the council of jupiter, the supreme divinity. this was composed of six gods, namely, jupiter, neptune, mercury, apollo, mars, and vulcan; and six goddesses, namely, juno, ceres, vesta, minerva, diana, and venus. to this assembly no other deities were admitted. there is some sense, reason, and humanity in this arrangement. it is very unlike the great masculine bully of a god, what christians call sacred and scriptural jehova, an intermeddling, sensual, beef-eating affair, who has sons and never tells any one where they came from, who the mother was (gen. vi, 2): "and the sons of god," etc. vestal virgins were admitted by the romans to their temples, thus showing that woman was honored. she was equally privileged with man to minister to the sacred offices of the gods. civilization has advanced, progress has been made in the arts and sciences, the intellectual faculties are more developed, and to woman has been conceded her proper place among the learned and the more liberal portion of humanity. intellectually no line of demarcation is drawn. cultured brain is cultured brain, whether found in man or in woman. both sexes stand on the same platform, on an equal footing, and they receive equal honor and recognition if the mental capacity is equal. what is the relation of woman to-day to the respective churches to which she may belong? has the roman catholic church receded one step from her antiquated ecclesiastical position? or have the orthodox protestants? not one step! woman still holds the same degraded position in the christian church as she did a thousand years ago. circumstances have somewhat ameliorated the relative position of church and worshipers. formerly the males were the principal church attenders and worshipers. in modern times it is the women who make the congregations. the male, if he attends, does so to please the female more than himself. besides, the sexual attractions contribute very largely towards these sunday entertainments. "women" (says maudsley, in his "pathology of mind," ch. iv, page 143) "are naturally more prone to religious worship than man, and more apt to fall into a morbidly subjective habit, first, because of the preponderance of the affective life in them, and secondly, because they have not the distracting and correcting and intellectually hardening influences of outside interests and pursuits which men have. if unmarried women chance to come, as by reason of those conditions they are apt to do, under the ignorant and misapplied zeal of unwise priests who mistake for deep religious feeling what is really morbid self-feeling springing at bottom from unsatisfied instinct or other uterine action upon the mind, the mischief is greatly aggravated. it were well if those who make it their business to guide the consciousness of mankind through the manifold changes and chances of life were to be at the pains to inquire how much supposed religious feeling may be due to physiological causes, before they sanction or enjoin a repeated introspection of the feelings. he whose every organ is in perfect health knows not he has a body, and only becomes conscious that he has organs when something wrong is going on; in like manner a healthy mind in the sound exercise of the functions is little conscious that he has feeling, and only gets very self-conscious when there is something morbid in the processes of its activity. the ecstatic trances of such saintly women as catherine de sienne and st. theresa, in which they believed themselves to be visited by their savior and to be received as veritable spouses into his bosom, were, though they knew it not, little else than vicarious sexual orgasm; a condition of things which the intense contemplation of the naked male figure, carved or sculptured in all its proportions on the cross, is more fitted to produce in women of susceptible nervous temperament than people are apt to consider. every experienced physician must have met with instances of single and childless women who have devoted themselves with extraordinary zeal to habitual religious exercises, and who having gone insane as a culmination of their emotional fervor, have straightway exhibited the saddest mixture of religious and erotic symptoms--a boiling over with lust, in voice, face, gesture, under the pitiful degradation of disease. on such persons the confessional has had sometimes the most injurious effect, more especially in those churches which spring romanism in their ritual, have not placed confession under the stringent regulations and safeguards with which the roman catholic church surrounds it. the fanatical religious sects, such as the shakers and the like, which spring up from time to time in communities and disgust them by the offensive way in which they mingle love and religion, are inspired in great measure by sexual feelings. on the one hand, there is probably the cunning of a hypocritical knave or the self-deceiving duplicity of a half-insane one, using the weaknesses of weak woman to minister to his vanity or to his lust, under a religious guise; on the other hand, there is an exaggerated self-feeling, rooted often in sexual passions, which is unwittingly fostered under the cloak of religious emotion, and which is apt to conduct to madness or to sin. in such case the holy kiss of love owes its warmth to the sexual impulse which inspires it, consciously or unconsciously, and the mystical religious union of the sexes is fitted to issue in a less spiritual union. without doubt, an excessive development of the emotional life in any other direction would be equally pernicious. all that the unwise religious teacher can be blamed for is his disposition to foster the egotistic development of emotion, without considering its real origin, by the overwhelming importance which he teaches the individual to attach to himself and his destiny. instead of urging him to lessen the gap between himself and nature until he loses self in a sympathetic oneness with nature, he stimulates him to widen it more and more until he rises to the insane conceit of himself as something entirely distinct from nature--an unrelated, spiritual essence, for whose benefit the universe and all that there is has been specially created. assuredly were not man now, as he always has been, instinctively wiser than his creeds, were he not moved by a deeper impulse than consciousness can give account of, he would make no progress in civilization." the church has lost its grip on the male portion of society. they have considerably outgrown the ecclesiastical swaddling of scriptural doctrine of the ancient and modern theology. the woman is the stronghold as worshiper, and sustainer of the sacred masculine prerogative whom they can easily influence. by reason, as the holy book claims, of their intellectual feebleness, women are the submissive tools of cunning priests, sentimental and emotional appeals, and yield readily to their extravagant dictum. the priests exhort them, with their conventional religious phraseology, to be partakers of some mysterious glory to be found somewhere in infinite space. keeping ever in sight the same stupefying refrain of the orthodox prayer and blessing: "blessed and glorious trinity, trinity in unity, three--one, three persons in one god, tri-personal, triune, coeternal, coequal, god-man, o lord god! who art one god, one lord! not one only person, but three persons in one substance! o lord god! lamb of god! son of the father! o god the son, redeemer of the world! o god the holy ghost, proceeding from the father and the son! the blessing of god almighty, the father, son, and holy ghost, be among you. god the father, god the son, god the holy ghost, bless, preserve, and keep you. glory be to the father, and to the son, and to the holy ghost. now to god the father, god the son, and god the holy ghost, be all honor and glory. jesus christ, who with thee and the holy ghost, liveth and reigneth ever, one god, world without end," etc. these are the terms and doxologies, forms of prayer and blessings. can anyone conceive a more meaningless set of phrases? these are automatically repeated year in and year out, with the same intonation, gesture, whirling and buzzing in a circle. do not the brains become blunted, the senses dulled? or is it a mere mechanical effort, accompanied by an extraordinary amount of insincerity and actual duplicity of character? the conceit of these theological gentlemen, claiming divine superiority, is in consequence of the frequent repetition of the above vapid nonsense, that they are the truly chosen and elect, separate and apart from other people. though they accept and place trust in the above creed, god, son, and holy ghost, and delude themselves with prayers, blessings, psalm-singing, and the rest of supernatural subterfuge, do they believe that it will save them--save their bodies from dissolution, when the vital organs have ceased to perform their functions? these fixed delusions are not wholesome. encouraging them is misleading and deceiving those who are ignorant of the actual state of nature. it is playing upon the weak and simple-minded. it means corrupting their morals and their understanding. it is paralyzing to every human effort. it is degrading manhood and womanhood. analyze the meaning of the belief, the language employed, the associations of ideas, and seriously consider the amount of sense you can discover. does not this rigid system of changeless belief prevent intellectual development? does it not bar proper inquiry into the phenomena of nature? does it not encourage a cowardly dependence on priestcraft and hypocritical cunning? does it not extinguish every impulse towards the evolution of thought? does it not stamp out the energies and aspirations of man and woman? is not the kneeling and praying before some daub of a picture or the figure of some supposed god or saint debasing and degrading to the individual? is not the act of prayer a humiliating acknowledgement either of an enfeebled mind or of a contemptible slave? is not the will power subdued and deteriorated and the natural energy destroyed? are not the functions of the brain seriously interfered with, the mental faculties checked in the normal process of development, and the powers of reason stifled by the asphyxiating influences of prayer? does it not blunt the sense of responsibility, breed insincerity, foster falsehood, promote lying, and offer a premium for wrong-doing and a shelter for crime? imagine the stupefying effect of counting beads. the "rosary" is a series of prayers, and consists of fifteen decades. each decade contains ten ave marias, marked by small beads, preceded by a pater noster, marked by a larger bead, and concluded by a gloria patri. five decades make a chaplet, which is a third of a rosary. what a sluggardizing effect on the intellect, what a suppression of intelligence, and how near it brings them to the borderland of monomaniacs, by the constant mumbling of those insipid compositions. the sooner we get rid of the belief in this supernatural intervention in human affairs the better for our physical, moral, and mental welfare. every time the priest induces his pupil to repeat a prayer, he stupefies and degrades his pupil. he knocks the pins of self-restraint and self-reliance right from under him. the blessing the pupil receives, and the forgiveness at the confessional, shift the responsibility for his acts off his shoulders, thus leading him to believe himself irresponsible for any wrong he may commit. the absurd doctrine inculcated, that god made him necessarily makes him irresponsible. if god was a fool big enough to make him bad, or silly, why should he be responsible? the priest who helps to maintain and sustain this belief, helps to weaken the pupil's mind and rather gives him license to indulge than restrains him. you are taught to deceive yourselves and deceive others by prayer, but you cannot bribe nature; you cannot deceive nature. the penalty must be paid for every transgression. and prayers are absolutely useless, nay, every prayer is an admission of an act of cowardice, just as every blessing pronounced is a humiliation to those receiving it. what necessity is there for a man who is supposed to teach morality to be dressed like a clown in scarlet, purple, or other-colored coat and decorated with an antiquated headgear like a mountebank going through a series of peculiar gesticulations and ceremonials of buffoonery, in order to sustain this ecclesiastical humbug? would it not be better to train the intellect by teaching the young how to observe accurately, to reason soundly from facts, to think honestly and act sincerely, have the truth revealed and nature and nature's laws soundly and practically interpreted? an insight into the secret workings of nature would lead to a more precise adjustment on the part of man to his complex surroundings, guard cautiously against the infringement of nature's laws, and correspondingly produce gain in intellectual power. how can a man be otherwise than reckless, or willfully disobedient, to laws he is entirely ignorant of, though he brings certain punishment upon himself? can there be any better discipline than to learn the cause and know the root of all evils, in order to avoid them, thus improving the morals and inducing one to take earnest pains to do well in the future? there is more satisfaction in doing right than many may think, if people were instructed how. unfortunately, the ecclesiastical mills of forgiveness are too busy teaching supernatural follies, which actually mislead the ignorant and the foolish. as a foolish woman spoils her own child by her own silly conduct, so the supernatural creeds have spoilt humanity by perverting the moral responsibility in teaching their pernicious beliefs. wonder why the world has not become better? teach men the moral and physical laws of nature, by lessons of experience, that may guide them in their conduct through life. teach them to learn prudence, and observe them faithfully and sincerely. good, natural, healthy thoughts produce good actions; by their frequent repetition, generate good habits of doing well, of doing right. the nervous structures that are brought into play, the mental activities, function these excellences, developing these faculties, generating higher moral feelings. we finally come to regard as doing wrong acting contrary to our acquired habit. good impulses to act right and do well come out of good feelings. to act otherwise becomes repugnant to our acquired habits, our second nature, and is judged unwise by our reason and understanding. let nature teach you to be wise, and when you understand the natural you will cease to believe in aught supernatural. do not believe in a god--there is no such thing. do not believe in the divinity of any man, whether he be called moses, jesus christ, or martin luther. do not believe that the book called the bible, sacred scripture, and testaments, new or old, is sacred, holy, or inspired by any supernatural being. do not believe the story of the creation as recited in the five books of moses--they are not true. it is a fiction, a sort of fairy tale. it is the work of the imagination of man. do not believe in any miracle. no man can perform a miracle, except to the ignorant and stupid. no man in the bible ever performed a miracle. those said to have been performed were deceptions, tricks, and delusions. do not believe in the holy ghost. there are no ghosts, either holy or unholy. and above all, do not give credence to that very silly piece of nonsense, that the holy ghost committed adultery with mrs. mary joseph, the reputed mother of jesus christ. nor believe that the young man jesus was the son of god, nor that he came upon earth to save the world from sinning. do not believe that there are three gods in one, father, son, and holy ghost; nor god the father, god the son, or god the holy ghost. this fallacy, compounded of hebraic theology and grecian mythology, is an absurd fabrication--this trinity in unity, and unity in trinity. do not believe in a heaven, nor in a hell. you make your own heaven, and your own hell. nor place any reliance on future rewards, or future punishments. your good conduct will bring your rewards and your bad conduct your punishments. do not believe in angels, spirits, or any supernatural existences. have no faith in anything you do not understand. place no reliance on divine interference. do not follow blindly any ecclesiastical teachings. rely upon yourself. let reason and common sense be your guide. do not pray--praying makes a coward of you. nor place confidence in the blessing of any man, be he the pope or some fanatical preacher. never kneel before any image, whether it be the nude figure of christ, or a daub painting of the virgin mary. do not be the dupe of priestly cunning. do not be afraid of anything except your own bad deeds, your vicious habits, and your own transgressions. some rules and duties in life. health is essential for physical and mental labor. the maintenance of health consists in having proper food, proper clothing, and proper shelter. work is a duty, nature demands it. exercise that duty. earn so much as will provide the necessary comforts in life. indolence is a vice, and laziness a crime. they are of no good to their practicers, and a curse to others. economy is a law of nature. save your surplus produce of industry. it comes useful in time of need. avoid excesses of all kinds. do not overtax or over-stimulate the organs of the body. luxuries are injurious to health. remember the stomach is only a receptacle for food and not a cesspool for all kinds of refuse. cleanliness of stomach and body is necessary for the healthy action both of mind and body. a rigid adherence to the natural rules is the surest safeguard against disease. make judicious use of everything. abuse neither yourself nor others. each individual is his own guardian over his own acts. he himself is responsible for his own misdeeds, whether through ignorance, want of proper education or understanding, or weakness. our guide through life should be: speak the truth always. let yes and no be the form of speech. every promise fulfill. never deceive yourself, or deceive others. promise nothing you cannot perform. honesty is ennobling, dishonesty debasing. let every word and act be strictly reliable, never waver or fail in your integrity. be punctilious in your duties towards others. do not cheat yourself or your neighbors. misrepresentation is wrong. have confidence in yourself, others will have confidence in you. do not slander others, lest you do an injury, doing evil without benefit to yourself. a slanderer is despised. let your motives be pure, your purpose upright. be mild in speech, even in temper. kind words are inexpensive. anger and passion are brutal qualities, be human. do not get excited over trifles, it does not prolong life. if your habits are bad, mend them. good impulses come from good feelings, as bad impulses from bad feelings. our character is molded by our habits, as our habits are by our instruction. by your conduct gain the esteem of your fellow-men. it is better to be loved than hated. injure no one. despise no one. be neither prejudiced nor bigoted. gain the respect of every man, and respect those that deserve to be respected. obey the existing laws. learn to depend on yourself. trust in your own judgment, none will be so true to you as yourself. hope is delusive, action is certain. reveal not your own thoughts to others lest they betray you. confidence, self-possession, and presence of mind guard against surprises. do not mind other people's business, you may not find time to mind your own. negligence is a fault, diligence is a virtue. frivolity is the froth of life. it has neither strength nor substance. there is more satisfaction in an ounce of peace than in a ton of wrangling. control your appetites, subdue your passions, if you would be human. remember there is no heaven beyond this life, therefore make your home and your life as beautiful as you can. few wants well supplied, is better than many wants unsatisfied. desire nothing you cannot obtain, it will save you annoyance. do not assume to be what you are not. nature has marked you. do not be tempted by trifles, life is too short and time too precious. pleasures are enjoyable where the senses are not overstrained. be not too proud, nor too vain, no matter how great you are; man, like the animal, is composed only of eighteen elements. ambition is laudable, when others are not made to suffer. do not try to be greater than you are; a gill will never fill a pint. gain understanding, and let reason and common sense guide you in all your acts. look out. save your honor, your integrity, and your character. our duty on earth is to be good, to do right, and contribute to the betterment of our fellow-men. the higher we rise in intelligence, the farther we are removed from the brute. free yourself from all supernatural notions, all antiquated beliefs, and all superstitions. the humanization of mankind marks the progress of civilization. the excitement of pleasure is not lasting; exhaustion stops all enjoyment; too much sunshine is fatiguing; too much laughter is trying. empty stomachs make a bad audience, hunger breeds discontent. poverty is degrading; it ruins health, breeds disease, and lowers the morals. neglect yourself and everybody will neglect you. lost opportunities are seldom recovered. the higher you climb the farther you are removed from the lower levels. one wrong act loses the balance of integrity, our esteem suffers. one grain of intelligence is worth a pound of brute force. be prudent, discreet, and deliberate in all transactions in life, but quick in decision. distrust persuasive, bland, smooth, suave talkers. a pious hypocrite is the worst of frauds. your own faults are the greatest misfortune. a brave man is never discouraged, and simpletons are the prey for sharpers. don't be a coward in danger, or pray when disaster overtakes you. self-abuse is the worst abuse. your expenditure should never exceed your income. aspire to be better, not worse. you cannot get wealthy on nothing. millionaire and beggar belong to this earth, whether living or dead. our success in life depends on the quality of brain. polished steel is of greater value than common iron ore, so are intellectual faculties of greater worth than uncultured brains. the weaker must yield to the stronger. the friction of life is great; the less the resisting force, the sooner it yields. in the struggle the strongest survive. tenacity to life and tenacity to our possessions lead to success. let those who accumulate great wealth unjustly, yield it readily to those who are most in need. a man can accumulate vast riches only by the industry of many, never by his own. remember dead men enjoy nothing, therefore be wise, be reasonable, make your heaven on earth, your paradise of your home. be your own god, your own savior, your own priest. notes [1] explanation.--the roman numerals placed opposite the above list of elementary substances present the difference or equivalent or saturating power of each element. hydrogen, for example, is a monad, a simple particle, or atom, or unit. oxygen is a dyad, represented by ii, two. it requires two atoms of hydrogen to saturate one of oxygen, or its equivalent, to form water. a triad, iii, requires three monads; a tetrad, iv, four; a pentad, v, five; a sexad, vi, six units or monads, their respective equivalents or saturating power. a monad or monogenic element replaces another one by one. an atom of a polygenic element, that is, a dyad, etc., on the other hand, always takes the place of, or is equivalent to, two or more atoms of a monogenic element. [2] important. [3] exception. [4] aristotle, 343 b.c., logician and philosopher, founder of the peripatetics. [5] weights and measures were invented about this period.