the riverside biographical series number 7 ulysses s. grant by walter allen * * * * * the riverside biographical series andrew jackson, by w. g. brown james b. eads, by louis how benjamin franklin, by paul e. more peter cooper, by r. w. raymond thomas jefferson, by h. c. merwin william penn, by george hodges general grant, by walter allen. meriwether lewis and william clark, by william r. lighton. john marshall, by james b. thayer. each about 100 pages, 16mo, with photogravure portrait, 75 cents; _school edition_, 50 cents, _net_ houghton, mifflin & co. boston and new york * * * * * [illustration: u. s. grant] * * * * * ulysses s. grant by walter allen [illustration: publisher's logo] boston and new york houghton, mifflin and company the riverside press, cambridge 1901 * * * * * copyright, 1901, by walter allen all rights reserved * * * * * contents chap. page i. our national military hero 1 ii. his ancestry 5 iii. the period of youth 11 iv. his lifework appointed 18 v. love and war 26 vi. years of dormant power 34 vii. the summons of patriotism 42 viii. from springfield to fort donelson 46 ix. shiloh, corinth, iuka 57 x. vicksburg 65 xi. new responsibilities--chattanooga 77 xii. lieutenant-general, commander of all the armies 85 xiii. the wilderness and spottsylvania 95 xiv. from spottsylvania to richmond 104 xv. in washington among politicians 114 xvi. his first administration 123 xvii. his second administration 133 xviii. the tour of the world 144 xix. reverses of fortune--ill health--his last victory--the end 149 ulysses simpson grant chapter i our national military hero since the end of the civil war in the united states, whoever has occasion to name the three most distinguished representatives of our national greatness is apt to name washington, lincoln, and grant. general grant is now our national military hero. of washington it has often been said that he was "first in war, first in peace, and first in the hearts of his countrymen." when this eulogy was wholly just the nation had been engaged in no war on a grander scale than the war for independence. that war, in the numbers engaged, in the multitude and renown of its battles, in the territory over which its campaigns were extended, in its destruction of life and waste of property, in the magnitude of the interests at stake (but not in the vital importance of the issue), was far inferior to the civil war. it happens quite naturally, as in so many other affairs in this world, that the comparative physical magnitude of the conflicts has much influence in moulding the popular estimate of the rank of the victorious commanders. those who think that in our civil war there were other officers in both armies who were grant's superiors in some points of generalship will hardly dispute that, taking all in all, he was supreme among the generals on the side of the union. he whom sherman, sheridan, thomas, and meade saw promoted to be their commander, not only without envy, but with high gratification, under whom they all served with cordial confidence and enthusiasm, cannot have been esteemed by them unfit for the distinction. if these great soldiers then and always acclaimed him worthy to be their leader, it is unbecoming for others, and especially for men who are not soldiers, to contradict their judgment. whether he was a greater soldier than general robert e. lee, the commander-in-chief of the army of the confederate states, is a question on which there may always be two opinions. as time passes, and the passions of the war expire, it may be that wise students of military history, weighing the achievements of each under the conditions imposed, will decide that in some respects lee was grant's superior in mastery of the art of war. whether or not this comes about, lee can never supplant grant as our national military hero. he fought to destroy the union, not to save it, and in the end he was beaten by general grant. however much men may praise the personal virtues and the desperate achievements of the great warrior of the revolt against the union, they cannot conceal that he was the defeated leader of a lost cause, a cause which, in the chastened judgment of coming time, will appear to all men, as even now it does to most dispassionate patriots, well and fortunately lost. in the story of grant's life some things must be told that are not at all heroic. much as it might be wished that he had been what carlyle says a hero should be, a hero at all points, he was not a worshipful hero. like ourselves all, he was a combination of qualities good and not good. the lesson and encouragement of his life are that in spite of weaknesses which at one time seemed to have doomed him to failure and oblivion, he so mastered himself upon opportune occasion that he was able to prove his power to command great and intelligent armies fighting in a right cause, to obtain the confidence of lincoln and of his loyal countrymen, and to secure a fame as noble and enduring as any that has been won with the sword. chapter ii his ancestry this hero of ours was of an excellent ancestry. until lately, most americans have been careless of preserving their family records. that they were americans and of a respectable line, if not a distinguished one, for two or three generations back, was as much of family history as interested them, and all they really knew. this was especially true of families which had emigrated from place to place as pioneers in the settlement of the country. family records were left behind, and in the hard desperate work of life in a new country, where everything depended on individual qualities, and forefathers counted for little in the esteem of men as poor, as independent, and as aspiring as themselves, memories faded and traditions were forgotten. it was esteemed a condition of the equality which was the national boast that no one should take credit to himself on account of distant ancestry. not until abraham lincoln had honored his name by his own nobility did anybody think it worth while to inquire whether his blood was of the strain of the new england lincolns. all that was known of the grants in ohio was that jesse, the father of ulysses, came from pennsylvania. jesse himself knew that his father, who died when he was a boy, was noah grant, jr., who came into pennsylvania from connecticut, and he had made some further exploration of his genealogical line. but this was more than his neighbors knew or cared to know about the family, until a son demonstrated possession of extraordinary qualities, which set the believers in heredity upon making investigation. the grants are traced back through pennsylvania to connecticut, and from connecticut to the massachusetts bay colony, where matthew grant lived in 1630. he is believed to have come from scotland, where the grant clan has been distinguished for centuries on account of its sturdy indomitable traits and its prowess in war. the chiefs of the clan had armorial crests of which the conspicuous emblem was commonly a burning mountain, and the motto some expression of unyielding firmness. in one case it was, "stand fast, craig ellarchie!" in another, simply "stand fast;" in another, "stand sure." sometimes latin equivalents were used, as "stabit" and "immobile." it is said that, as late as the sepoy rebellion in india, there was a squadron of british troops, composed almost entirely of scotch grants, who carried a banner with the motto: "stand fast, craig ellarchie!" if it be true that our general grant came from such stock, his most notable characteristics are no mystery. it was in his blood to be what he was. ancestral traits reappeared in him with a vigor never excelled. but they had not been quite dormant during the intermediate period. his great-grandfather, captain noah grant, of windsor (now tolland), conn., commanded a company of colonial militia in the french and indian war, and was killed in the battle of white plains in 1776. his grandfather noah was a lieutenant in a company of the connecticut militia which marched to the succor of massachusetts in the beginning of the revolution. he served, off and on, through the war. regarding the circumstances of the removal to pennsylvania little is known. the home was in westmoreland county, where jesse r. grant was born. soon afterwards the family went to ohio. when jesse was sixteen he was sent to maysville, ky., and apprenticed to the tanner's trade, which he learned thoroughly, and made the chief occupation of his life. soon after he reached his majority he started in business for himself in ravenna, portage county, ohio. in a short time he removed to point pleasant, on the ohio side of the ohio river, about twenty miles above cincinnati. here he lived and prospered for many years, marrying, in 1821, hannah simpson, daughter of a farmer of the place in good circumstances. the simpsons were also of scotch ancestry, and of stout, self-reliant, industrious, respectable character, like the grants. thus in the parents of general grant were united strains of one of the strong races of the world,--sound in body, mind, and soul, and having in a remarkable degree vital energy, the spirit of independence, and the staying power which enables its possessors to work without tiring, to endure hardships with fortitude, and to accumulate a competence by patient thrift. this last ability general grant lacked. these parents, like those of the majority of americans of the old stock, thought it no dishonor to toil for livelihood, cultivating their souls' health by performance of daily duty in fidelity to god, their country, and their home. jesse r. grant had slight opportunities of schooling, but he had no contempt for knowledge. throughout his life he was a diligent reader of books and newspapers, and was rated a man of uncommon intelligence and of sound judgment in business. he was an entertaining talker, and a newspaper writer and public speaker of local celebrity. through his early manhood, while he lived in ohio, he was a farmer, a trader, a contractor for buildings and roads, as well as a tanner. when he reached the age of sixty, having secured a comfortable competence, he retired from active business. in his declining years he removed to covington, ky., near cincinnati. mrs. grant was a true helpmate, a woman of refinement of nature, of controlling religious faith, being from her youth an active member of the methodist church, of strong wifely and maternal instincts. her life was centred in her home and family. both these parents lived to rejoice in the high achievement and station of their son ulysses. chapter iii the period of youth of such ancestry general grant was born april 27, 1822, in point pleasant, ohio, and was named hiram ulysses grant. a picture of the house in which he was born shows it to have been a small frame dwelling of primitive character. its roof, sloping to the road in front, inclosed the two or three rooms that may have been above the ground floor. the principal door was in the middle of the front, and there was one small window on each side of it. apparently there was a low extension in the rear. this manner of house immediately succeeded the primal log cabins of the western states, and such houses have sufficed for the happy shelter of large families of strong boys and blooming girls, as sound in body and soul, if not so refined and variously accomplished, as are reared in mansions of more pretension. love, virtue, industry, and mutual helpfulness made true homes and bred useful citizens. in the next year his parents removed to the village of georgetown, ohio, in brown county, where the father continued his business of tanner. there young grant lived until he became a cadet in the military academy at west point. his life was that of other boys of like condition, with few uncommon incidents. being the eldest of an increasing family, it naturally happened that he was required to perform a share of work for its support, and to bear responsibilities. in his early youth his employment was in the farm work, and this he always preferred. he had a native liking for the open air, and enjoyed the smell of furrows and pastures and woods more than that of reeking hides in their vats. he was fond of all animals, and especially delighted in horses, early demonstrating a surprising power in managing them. he was locally noted for his success in breaking colts, and as a trainer of horses to be pacers, those having this gait being esteemed more desirable for riding, at a time when a large part of all traveling was done on horseback. as general grant became famous at a comparatively early age, a large crop of stories of his early feats in the subjection and use of horses was cultivated by persons who knew him as a boy. many of these, doubtless, are entirely credible; few of them are so extraordinary that they might not be true of any clever boy who loved horses and studied their disposition and powers. he was a lad of self-reliance, fertile in resources, and of good judgment within certain limitations. before he was fairly in his teens his father intrusted to him domestic and business affairs which required him to go to the city of cincinnati alone, a two-days' trip. his own account of this period of his life is: "when i was seven or eight years of age i began hauling [driving the team] all the wood used in the house and shops.... when about eleven years old, i was strong enough to hold a plow. from that age until seventeen, i did all the work done with horses.... while still young, i had visited cincinnati, forty-five miles away, several times alone; also maysville, ky., often, and once louisville.... i did not like to work; but i did as much of it while young as grown men can be hired to do in these days, and attended school at the same time.... the rod was freely used there, and i was not exempt from its influence." but his knowledge of horses, of timber, and of land was better than his knowledge of men. he had no precocious "smartness," as the yankees name the quality which enables one person to outwit another. his credulity was simple and unsuspecting, at least in some directions. this is illustrated by a story which he has told himself, one which he was never allowed to forget:-"there was a mr. ralston, who owned a colt which i very much wanted. my father had offered twenty dollars for it, but ralston wanted twenty-five. i was so anxious to have the colt that ... my father yielded, but said twenty dollars was all the horse was worth, and told me to offer that price. if it was not accepted, i was to offer twenty-two and a half, and if that would not get him, to give the twenty-five. i at once mounted a horse and went for the colt. when i got to mr. ralston's house, i said to him: 'papa says i may offer you twenty dollars for the colt, but, if you won't take that, i am to offer twenty-two and a half, and if you won't take that, to give you twenty-five.'" this naïve bargaining was done when he was eight years old. some persons have thought it betokens a defect in business acumen which was never fully cured. he learned his school tasks without great effort. his parents were alive to the advantages of education, and required him to attend all the subscription schools kept in the town. there were no free schools there during his youth. he was twice sent away from home to attend higher schools. it is not recorded that he especially liked study or disliked it. probably he took it as a part of life, something that had to be done, and did it. he was most apt in mathematics. when he arrived at west point he was able to pass the not very severe entrance examination without trouble. he seems to have had good native powers of perception, reasoning, and memory. what he learned he kept, but he was never an ardent scholar. he had no enthusiasm for knowledge, nor, indeed, so far as appears, for anything else except horses. he used to fish occasionally, but never hunted. the sportsman's tastes were not his, nor were his social tastes demonstrative. possibly they may have been restrained in some measure by his mother's strictness of religious principles. he was neither morose nor brooding,--not a dreamer of destiny. he yearned for no star. no instinct of his future achievements made him peculiar among his companions or caused him to hold himself aloof. he exhibited nothing of the young napoleon's distemper of gnawing pride. he was just an ordinary american boy, with rather less boyishness and rather more sobriety than most, disposed to listen to the talk of his elders instead of that of persons of his own age, and fond of visiting strange places and riding and driving about the country. his work had made him acquainted with the subjects in which grown men were interested. the family life was serious but not severe. obedience and other domestic virtues were inculcated with fidelity; but he said that he was never scolded or punished at home. chapter iv his lifework appointed when the boy was about seventeen years old he had made up his mind upon one matter,--he would not be a tanner for life. he told his father, possibly in response to some suggestion that it was time for him to quit his aimless occupations and begin his lifework, that he would work in the shop, if he must, until he was twenty-one, but not a day longer. his desire then was to be a farmer, or a trader, or to get an education; but he seems to have had no definite inclination except to escape from the disagreeable tannery. his father treated the matter judiciously, not being disposed to force the boy to learn a business that he would not follow. he was unable to set him up in farming. he had not much respect for the river traders, and may have had little confidence in the boy's ability to thrive in competitions of enterprise and greed. without consulting his son, he wrote to one of the united states senators from ohio, hon. thomas morris, telling him that there was a vacancy in the district's representation in west point, and asking that ulysses might be appointed. he would not write to the congressman from the district, because, although neighbors and old friends, they belonged to different parties and had had a falling out. but the senator turned the letter over to the congressman, who procured the appointment, thus healing a breach of which both were ashamed. general grant gives an account of what happened when this door to an education and a life service was opened before him. his father said to him one day: "'ulysses, i believe you are going to receive the appointment.' 'what appointment?' i inquired. 'to west point. i have applied for it.' 'but i won't go,' i said. he said he thought i would, _and i thought so too, if he did_." the italics are the general's. they make it plain that he did not think it prudent to make further objection when his father had reached a decision. little did congressman thomas l. hamer imagine that in doing this favor for his friend, jesse grant, he was doing the one thing that would secure remembrance of his name by coming generations. it did not contribute to his immediate popularity among his constituents, for the general opinion was that many brighter and more deserving boys lived in the district, and one of them should have been preferred. neighbors did not hesitate to shake their heads and express the opinion that the appointment was unwise. not one of them had discerned any particular promise in the boy. nor were they unreasonable. he was without other distinctions than of being a strong toiler, good-natured, and having a knack with horses. he had no aspiration for the career of a soldier, in fact never intended to stick to it. even after entering west point his hope, he has said, was to be able, by reason of his education, to get "a permanent position in some respectable college,"--to become professor grant, not general grant. in the course of making his appointment, his name by an accident was permanently changed. when congressman hamer was asked for the full name of his protégé to be inserted in the warrant, he knew that his name was ulysses, and was sure there was more of it. he knew that the maiden name of his friend's wife was simpson. at a venture, he gave the boy's name as ulysses simpson grant. grant found it so recorded when he reached the school, and as he had no special fondness for the name hiram, which was bestowed to gratify an aged relative, he thought it not worth while to go through a long red-tape process to correct the error. there was another cadet grant, and their comrades distinguished this one by sundry nicknames, of which "uncle sam" was one and "useless" another. when he arrived at west point, in july, 1839, he was not a prepossessing figure of a young gentleman. the rusticity of his previous occupation and breeding was upon him. seventeen years old, hardly more than five feet tall, but solid and muscular, with no particular charm of face or manner, no special dignity of carriage, he was only a common sort of pleb, modest, good-natured, respectful, companionable but sober-minded, observant but undemonstrative, willing but not ardent, trusty but without high ambitions,--the kind of boy who might achieve commendable success in the academy, or might prove unequal to its requirements, without giving cause of surprise to his associates. he had no difficulty in passing the examination at the end of his six months' probationary period, which enabled him to be enrolled in the army, and he was never really in danger of dismissal for deficient scholarship. he seems to have made no effort for superior excellence in scholarship, and in some studies his rank was low. mathematics gave him no trouble, and he says that he rarely read over any of his lessons more than once, which is evidence that he had unusual power of concentrating his attention, the secret of quick work in study. this power and a faithful memory will enable any one to achieve high distinction if he is willing to toil for it. grant was not willing to toil for it. he gave time to other things, not in the routine prescribed. he pursued a generous course of reading in modern english fiction, including all the works then published of scott, bulwer, marryat, lever, cooper, and washington irving, and much besides. the thing for which he was especially distinguished was, as may be surmised, horsemanship. he was esteemed one of the best horsemen of his time at the academy. but this, too, was easy for him. he appears to have been on good terms with his fellows and well liked, but he was not a leader among them. he has said that while at home he did not like to work. it must be judged that his mind was affected by a certain indolence, that he was capable enough when he addressed himself to any particular task, but not self-disposed to exertion. he felt no constant, pricking incitement to do his best; but was content to do fairly well, as well as was necessary for the immediate occasion. one of his comrades in the academy said in later years that he remembered him as "a very uncle-like sort of a youth.... he exhibited but little enthusiasm in anything." he was graduated in 1843, at the age of 21 years, ranking 21 in a class of 39, a little below the middle station. he had grown 6 inches taller while at the academy, standing 5 feet 7 inches, but weighed no more than when he entered, 117 pounds. his physical condition had been somewhat reduced at the end of his term by the wearing effect of a threatening cough. it cannot be said that any one then expected him to do great things. the characteristics of his early youth that have been set forth were persistent. he was older, wiser, more accomplished, better balanced, but in fundamental traits he was still the ulysses grant of the farm--hardly changed at all. no more at school than at home was his life vitiated by vices. he was neither profane nor filthy. his temperament was cool and wholesome. he tried to learn to smoke, but was then unable. it is remembered that during the vacation in the middle of his course, spent at home, he steadily declined all invitations to partake of intoxicants, the reason assigned being that he with others had pledged themselves not to drink at all, for the sake of example and help to one of their number whose good resolutions needed such propping. at his graduation he was a man and a soldier. life, with all its attractions and opportunities, was before. phlegmatic as he may have been, it cannot be supposed that the future was without beckoning voices and the rosy glamour of hope. chapter v love and war he had applied for an appointment in the dragoons, the designation of the one regiment of cavalry then a part of our army. his alternative selection was the fourth infantry. to this he was attached as a brevet second lieutenant, and after the expiration of the usual leave spent at home, he joined his regiment at jefferson barracks, st. louis. duties were not severe, and the officers entertained much company at the barracks and gave much time to society in the neighborhood. grant had his saddle-horse, a gift of his father, and took his full share in the social life. a few miles away was the home of his classmate and chum during his last year at the academy, f. t. dent. one of dent's sisters was a young lady of seventeen, educated at a st. louis boarding school. after she returned to her home in the late winter young grant found the dent homestead more attractive than ever. this was the time of the agitation regarding the annexation of texas, a policy to which young grant was strongly hostile. about may 1 of the next year, 1844, some of the troops at the barracks were ordered to new orleans. grant, thinking his own regiment might go soon, got a twenty-days leave to visit his home. he had hardly arrived when by a letter from a fellow officer he learned that the fourth had started to follow the third, and that his belongings had been forwarded. it was then that he became conscious of the real nature of his feeling for julia dent. his leave required him to report to jefferson barracks, and although he knew his regiment had gone, he construed the orders literally and returned there, staying only long enough to declare his love and learn that it was reciprocated. the secret was not made known to the parents of the young lady until the next year, when he returned on a furlough to see her. for three years longer they were separated, while he was winning honor and promotion. after peace was declared, and the regiment had returned to the states, they were married. she shared all his vicissitudes of fortune until his death. their life together was one in which wifely faith and duty failed not, nor did he fail to honor and esteem her above all women. whatever his weaknesses, infidelity in domestic affection was not one of them. in all relations of a personal character he reciprocated trust with the whole tenacity of his nature. in louisiana the regiment encamped on high ground near the sabine river, not far from the old town of natchitoches. the camp was named camp salubrity. in grant's case, certainly, the name was justified. there he got rid of the cough that had fastened upon him at west point and had caused fears that he would early fall a victim to consumption. in louisiana he was restored to perfect, lusty health, fit for any exertion or privation. he was regarded as a modest and amiable lieutenant of no great promise. the regiment was moved to corpus christi, a trading and smuggling port. there the army of occupation (of texas) was slowly collected, consisting of about three thousand men, commanded by general zachary taylor. mexico still claimed this part of texas, and it was expected that our forces would be attacked. but they were not, and, as the real purpose was to provoke attack, the army was moved to a point opposite matamoras on the rio grande, where a new camp was established and fortified. previous to leaving corpus christi, grant had been promoted, september 30, 1845, from brevet second lieutenant to full second lieutenant. the advance was made in march, 1846. on the 8th of may the battle of palo alto was fought, on the hither side of the rio grande, in which grant had an active part, acquitting himself with credit. on the next day was the battle of resaca de la palma, in which he was acting adjutant in place of the officer killed. one consequence of these victories was the evacuation of matamoras. war with mexico having been declared, general taylor's army became an army of invasion. volunteers for the war now began coming from the states. in august the movement on monterey began, and on the 19th of september, taylor's army was encamped before the city. the battle of monterey was begun on the 21st, and the desperately defended city was surrendered and evacuated on the 24th. grant, although then doing quartermaster's duty, having his station with the baggage train, went to the front on the first day, and was a participant in the assault, incurring all its perils, and volunteering for the extremely hazardous duty of a messenger between different parts of the force. when general scott arrived at the mouth of the rio grande, grant's regiment was detached from taylor's army and joined scott's. he was present and participated in the siege of vera cruz, the battle of cerro gordo, the assault on churubusco, the storming of chapultepec, for which he volunteered with a part of his company, and the battle of molino del rey. colonel garland, commander of the brigade, in his report of the storming of chapultepec, said: "lieutenant grant, 4th infantry, acquitted himself most nobly upon several occasions under my own observation." after the battle of molino del rey he was appointed on the field a first lieutenant for his gallantry. for his conduct at chapultepec he was later brevetted a captain, to date from that battle, september 13, 1847. he entered the city of mexico a first lieutenant, after having been, as he says, in all the engagements of the war possible for any one man, in a regiment that lost more officers during the war than it ever had present in a single engagement. perhaps his most notable exploit was during the assault on the gate of san cosme, under command of general worth. while reconnoitring for position, grant observed a church not far away, having a belfry. with another officer and a howitzer, and men to work it, he reached the church, and, by dismounting the gun, carried it to the belfry, where it was mounted again but a few hundred yards from san cosme, and did excellent service. general worth sent lieutenant pemberton (the same who in the civil war defended vicksburg) to bring grant to him. the general complimented lieutenant grant on the execution his gun was doing, and ordered a captain of voltigeurs to report to him with another gun. "i could not tell the general," says grant, "that there was not room enough in the steeple for another gun, because he probably would have looked upon such a statement as a contradiction from a second lieutenant. i took the captain with me, but did not use his gun." the american army entered the city of mexico, september 14, 1847, and this was his station until june, 1848, when the american army was withdrawn from mexico, peace being established. there was no more fighting. grant was occupied with his duties as quartermaster, and in making excursions about the country, in which and its people he conceived a warm interest that never changed. upon returning to his own country he left his regiment on a furlough of four months. his first business was to go to st. louis and execute his promise to marry miss dent. the remainder of this honeymoon vacation was spent with his family and friends in ohio. chapter vi years of dormant power although he had done excellent service, demonstrating his courage, his good judgment, his resourcefulness, his ability in command, and in the staff duties of quartermaster and commissary, his experience did not kindle in him any new love for his profession, nor any ardor of military glory. he had not revealed the possession of extraordinary talent, nor any spark of genius. he accounted the period of great value to him in his later life, but his heart was never enlisted in the cause for which the war was made. his letters home declared this. when he came to write his memoirs, speaking of the annexation of texas, he said: "for myself i was bitterly opposed to the measure, and to this day regard the war which resulted as one of the most unjust ever waged by a stronger against a weaker nation. it was an instance of a republic following the bad example of european monarchies in not considering justice in their desire to acquire additional territory.... the southern rebellion was largely the outgrowth of the mexican war.... we got our punishment in the most sanguinary and expensive war of modern times." but the mexican war changed grant's plan of life. while he was at jefferson barracks he had applied for a place as instructor of mathematics at west point, and had received such encouragement that he devoted much time to reviewing his studies and extending them, giving more attention to history than ever before. after the war the notion of becoming a college professor appears to have left him. he regarded himself as bound to the service for the rest of his days. it was not so much his choice as his lot, and he accepted it, not because he relished it, but because he discovered no way out of it. this illustrates a negative trait of his character remarked throughout his career. he was never a pushing man. he had no self-seeking energy. the work that was assigned to him he did as well as he could; but he had little art to recommend himself in immodest ways. he had not the vanity to presume that he would certainly succeed in strange enterprises. he shrank from the personal hostilities of ambition. then followed a long period of uneventful routine service in garrisons at detroit and at sackett's harbor, until in the summer of 1852 his regiment was sent to the pacific coast via the panama route. the crossing of the isthmus was a terrible experience, owing to the lack of proper provision for it and to an epidemic of cholera. the delay was of seven weeks' duration, and about one seventh of all who sailed on the steamer from new york died on the isthmus of disease or of hardships. lieutenant grant, however, had no illness, and exhibited a humane devotion to the necessities of the unfortunate, civilians as well as soldiers. his company was destined to fort vancouver, in oregon territory, where he remained nearly a year, until, in order, he received promotion to a captaincy in a company stationed at humboldt bay in california. here he remained until 1854, when he resigned from the army, because, as he says, he saw no prospect of being able to support his family on his pay, if he brought them--there were then two children--from st. louis, where mrs. grant had remained with her family since he left new york. his resignation took effect, following a leave of absence, july 31, 1854. there was another cause, as told in army circles, for his resignation. he had become so addicted to drink that his resignation was required by his commanders, who held it for a time to afford him an opportunity to retrieve his good fame if he would; but he was unable. through what temptation he fell into such disgrace is not clearly known. but garrison posts are given to indulgences which have proved too much for many an officer, no worse than his fellows, but constitutionally unable to keep pace with men of different temperament. it might be thought that grant was one unlikely to be easily affected; but the testimony of his associates is that he was always a poor drinker, a small quantity of liquor overcoming him. he was now thirty-two years old, a husband and father, discharged from the service for which he had been educated, and without means of livelihood. his wife fortunately owned a small farm near st. louis, but it was without a dwelling house. he had no means to stock it. he built a humble house there by his own hard labor. he cut wood and drew it to st. louis for a market. in this way he lived for four years, when he was incapacitated for such work by an attack of fever and ague lasting nearly a year. there is no doubt that the veteran and his family experienced the rigors of want in these years; no question that neither his necessities nor his duties saved him from being sometimes overcome by his baneful habit. in the fall of 1858 the farm was sold. grant embarked in the real estate agency business in st. louis, and made sundry unsuccessful efforts to get a salaried place under the city government. but his fortunes did not improve. finally in desperation he went in 1860 to his father for assistance. his father had established two younger sons in a hide and leather business in galena, ill. upon consultation they agreed to employ ulysses as a clerk and helper, with the understanding that he should not draw more than $800 a year. but he had debts in st. louis, and to cancel these almost as much more had to be supplied to him the first year. his father has told that the advance was repaid as soon as he began earning money in the civil war. in galena he was known to but few. ambition for acquaintance seemed to have died in him. he was the victim of a great humiliation and was silent. he avoided publicity. he was destitute of presumption. what brighter hopes he cherished were due to his father's purpose to make him a partner with his brothers. he heard lincoln and douglas when they canvassed the state, and approved of the argument of the former rather than of the other. he had voted for buchanan in 1856, his only vote for a president before the war. in 1860 he had not acquired a right to vote in illinois. these thirteen quiet years of grant's life are not of account in his public career, but they are a phase of experience that left its deep traces in the character of the man. he was changed, and ever afterwards there was a tinge of melancholy and a haunting shadow of dark days in his life that could not be escaped. nor in the pride and power of his after success did he completely conquer the besetting weakness of his flesh. the years from twenty-six to thirty-nine in the lives of most men who ever amount to anything are years of steady development and acquisition, of high endeavor, of zealous, well-ordered upward progress, of growth in self-mastery and outward influence, of firm consolidation of character. these conditions are not obvious in the case of general grant. had he died before the summer of 1861, being nearly forty years of age, he would have filled an obscure grave, and those to whom he was dearest could not have esteemed his life successful, even in its humble scope. he had not yet found his opportunity: he had not yet found himself. chapter vii the summons of patriotism the tide of patriotism that surged through the north after the fall of fort sumter in april, 1861, lifted many strong but discouraged men out of their plight of hard conditions and floated them on to better fortune. grant was one of these. at last he found reason to be glad that he had the education and experience of a soldier. on monday, april 15, 1861, galena learned that sumter had fallen. the next day there was a town meeting, where indignation and devotion found utterance. over that meeting captain grant was called to preside, although few knew him. elihu b. washburn, the representative of the district in congress, and john a. rawlins, a rude, self-educated lawyer, who had been a farmer and a charcoal burner, made passionate, fiery speeches on the duty of every man to stand by the flag. at the close of that meeting grant told his brothers that he felt that he must join the army, and he did no more work in the shop. how clearly he perceived the meaning of the conflict was shown in a letter to his father-in-law, wherein he wrote: "in all this i can see but the doom of slavery." he was offered the captaincy of the company formed in galena, and declined it, although he aided in organizing and drilling the men, and accompanied them to the state capital, springfield. as he was about starting for home, he was asked by governor richard yates to assist in the adjutant-general's office, and soon he was given charge of mustering in ten regiments that had been recruited in excess of the quota of the state, under the president's first call, in preparation for possible additional calls. his knowledge of army forms and methods was of great service to the inexperienced state officers. later, but without wholly severing his connection with the office, he returned home, and wrote a letter to the adjutant-general of the regular army, at washington, briefly setting forth his former service, and very respectfully tendering his service "until the close of the war in such capacity as may be offered," adding, that with his experience he felt that he was "competent to command a regiment, if the president should see fit to intrust one to him." the letter brought no reply. he went to cincinnati and tried, unsuccessfully, to see general mcclellan, whom he had known at west point and in mexico, hoping that he might be offered a place on his staff. while he was absent governor yates appointed him colonel of the twenty-first regiment of illinois infantry, then in camp near springfield, his commission dating from june 15. it was a thirty-day regiment, but almost every member reënlisted for three years, under the president's second call. thus, two months after the breaking out of the war, he was again a soldier with a much higher commission than he had ever held, higher than would have come to him in regular order had he remained in the army. at springfield he was in the centre of a great activity and a great enthusiasm. he met for the first time many leading men of the state, and became known to them. their personality did not overwhelm him, famous and influential as many of them were, nor did he solicit from them any favor for himself. his desire was to be restored to the regular army rather than to take command of volunteers. when the sought-for opportunity did not appear, he accepted the place that was offered, a place in which he was needed; for the first colonel, selected by the regiment itself, had already by his conduct lost their confidence. they exchanged him for grant with high satisfaction. chapter viii from springfield to fort donelson the regiment remained at the camp, near springfield, until the 3d of july, being then in a good state of discipline, and officers and men having become acquainted with company drill. it was then ordered to quincy, on the mississippi river, and colonel grant, for reasons of instruction, decided to march his regiment instead of going by the railroad. so began his advance, which ended less than four years later at appomattox, when he was the captain of all the victorious union armies,--holding a military rank none had held since washington,--and a sure fame with the great captains of the world's history. the details of this wonderful progress can only be sketched in this little volume. it was not without its periods of gloom, and doubt, and check; but, on the whole, it was steadily on and up. his orders were changed at different times, until finally he was directed to proceed with all dispatch to the relief of an illinois regiment, reported to be surrounded by rebels near palmyra, mo. before the place was reached, the imperiled regiment had delivered itself by retreating. he next expected to give battle at a place near the little town of florida, in missouri. as the regiment toiled over the hill beyond which the enemy was supposed to be waiting for him, he "would have given anything to be back in illinois." never having had the responsibility of command in a fight, he really distrusted his untried ability. when the top of the hill was reached, only a deserted camp appeared in front. "it occurred to me at once that harris had been as much afraid of me as i had been of him.... from that event to the close of the war," he says in his book, "i never experienced trepidation upon confronting an enemy, though i always felt more or less anxiety. i never forgot that he had as much reason to fear my forces as i had [to fear] his." on august 7 he was appointed by the president a brigadier-general of volunteers, upon the unanimous recommendation of the congressmen from illinois, most of whom were unknown to him. he had not won promotion by any fighting; but generals were at that time made with haste to meet exigent requirement, a proportional number being selected from each loyal state. among those whom general grant appointed on his staff was john a. rawlins, the galena lawyer, who was made adjutant-general, with the rank of captain, and who as long as he lived continued near grant in some capacity, dying while serving as secretary of war in the first term of grant's presidency. he was an officer of high ability and personal loyalty. he alone had the audacity to interpose a resolute no, when his chief was disposed to over-indulgence in liquor. he did not always prevent him, but it is doubtful whether grant would not have fallen by the way without the constant, imperative watchfulness of his faithful friend. there were times when both army and people were impatient with him, not wholly without reason. nothing saved him then but president lincoln's confidence and charity. the reply to all complaints was: "this man fights; he cannot be spared." in the last days of august, having been occupied, meantime, in reducing to order distracted and disaffected communities in missouri, he was assigned to command of a military district embracing all southwestern missouri and southern illinois. he established his headquarters at cairo, early in september, and from there he promptly led an expedition that forestalled the hostile intention of seizing paducah, a strategical point at the mouth of the tennessee river. this was his first important military movement, and it was begun upon his own initiative. his first battle was fought at belmont, mo., opposite columbus, ky., on the mississippi river, on november 7, 1861. grant, in command of a force of about 3000 men, was demonstrating against columbus, held by the enemy. learning that a force had been sent across the river to belmont, he disembarked his troops from their transports and attacked. the men were under fire for the first time, but they drove the enemy and captured the camp. they came near being cut off, however, through the inexperience and silly recklessness of subordinate officers. by dint of hard work and great personal risk on the part of their commander, they were got safely away. it was an all-day struggle, during which general grant had a horse shot under him, and made several narrow escapes, being the last man to reëmbark. the union losses were 485 killed, wounded, and missing. the loss of the enemy was officially reported as 632. this battle was criticised at the time as unnecessary; but general grant always asserted the contrary. the enemy was prevented from detaching troops from columbus, and the national forces acquired a confidence in themselves that was of great value ever afterwards. grant's governing maxim was, to strike the enemy whenever possible, and keep doing it. from the battle of belmont until february, 1862, there was no fighting by grant's army. troops were concentrated at cairo for future operations--not yet decided upon. major-general h. w. halleck superseded general fremont in command of the department of missouri. halleck was an able man, having a high reputation as theoretical master of the art of war, one of those who put a large part of all their energy into the business of preparing to do some great task, only to find frequently, when they are completely ready, that the occasion has gone by. when he was first approached with a proposition to capture forts henry and donelson, the first on the tennessee river, the other on the cumberland river, where the rivers are only a few miles apart near the southern border of kentucky, he thought that it would require an army of "not less than 60,000 effective men," which could not be collected at cairo "before the middle or last of february." early in january general grant went to st. louis to explain his ideas of a campaign against these forts to halleck, who told him his scheme was "preposterous." on the 28th he ventured again to suggest to halleck by telegraph that, if permitted, he could take and hold fort henry on the tennessee. his application was seconded by flag officer foote of the navy, who then had command of several gunboats at cairo. on february 1, he received instructions to go ahead, and the expedition, all preparations having been made beforehand, started the next day, the gunboats and about 9000 men on transports going up the ohio and the tennessee to a point a few miles below fort henry. after the troops were disembarked the transports went back to paducah for the remainder of the force of 17,000 constituting the expeditionary army. the attack was made on the 6th, but the garrison had evacuated, going toward fort donelson, to escape the fire of the gunboats. general tilghman, commanding the fort, his staff, and about 120 men were captured, with many guns and a large quantity of stores. the principal loss on the union side was the scalding of 29 men on the gunboat essex by the explosion of her boiler, pierced by a shell from the fort. grant had no instructions to attack fort donelson, but he had none forbidding him to do it. he straightway moved nearly his whole force over the eleven miles of dreadful roads, and on the 12th began investing the stronghold, an earthwork inclosing about 100 acres, with outworks on the land and water sides, and defended by more than 20,000 men commanded by general floyd, who had been president buchanan's secretary of war. the investing force had its right near the river above the fort. the weather was alternately wet and freezing cold. the troops had no shelter, and suffered greatly. on the 14th, without serious opposition, the investment was completed. at three o'clock in the afternoon of the 14th, flag officer foote began the attack, the fleet of gunboats steaming up the river and firing as rapidly as possible; but several were disabled by the enemy's fire, and all had to fall back before nightfall. the enemy telegraphed to richmond that a great victory had been achieved. on the next day, grant, riding several miles to the river, met foote on his gunboat, to which he was confined by a wound received the day before. returning, he found that a large force from the fort had made a sortie upon a part of his line, but had been driven back after a severe contest. it was found that the haversacks of the confederates left on the field contained three days' rations. instantly, grant reasoned that the intention was not so much to drive him away as to break through his line and escape. he ordered a division that had not been engaged to advance at once, and before night it had established a position within the outer lines of defense. surrender or capture the next day was the fate of the confederates. during the night general floyd and general pillow, next in command, and general forest made their escape with about 4000 men. before light the next morning, general grant received a note from general s. b. buckner, who was left in command of the fort, suggesting the appointment of commissioners to agree upon terms of capitulation, and meanwhile an armistice until noon. to this note general grant sent the curt reply: "no terms except an unconditional and immediate surrender can be accepted. i propose to move immediately upon your works." general buckner sent back word that he was compelled by circumstances "to accept the ungenerous and unchivalrous terms" which had been proposed. this victory electrified the whole north, then greatly in need of cheer. general grant became the hero of the hour. his name was honored and his exploit lauded from one end of the country to the other. it was not yet a year since he had been an obscure citizen of an obscure town. already many regarded him as the nation's hope. a phrase from his note to general buckner was fitted to his initials, and he was everywhere hailed as "unconditional surrender" grant. in this campaign he first revealed the peculiar traits of his military genius, clear discernment of possibilities, comprehension of the requirements of the situation, strategical instinct, accurate estimate of the enemy's motive and plan, sagacious promptness of action in exigencies, staunch resolution, inspiring energy, invincible poise. for his achievement he was promoted to be a major-general of volunteers. he had found himself now. chapter ix shiloh, corinth, iuka on the 4th of march, sixteen days after his victory, he was in disgrace. general halleck ordered him to turn over the command of the army to general c. f. smith and to remain himself at fort henry. this action of halleck was the consequence partly of accidents which had prevented communication between them and caused halleck to think him insubordinate, partly of false reports to halleck that grant was drinking to excess, partly of halleck's dislike of grant,--a temperamental incapacity of appreciation. after donelson he issued a general order of congratulation of grant and foote for the victory, but he sent no personal congratulations, and reported to washington that the victory was due to general smith, whose promotion, not grant's, he recommended. as to the reports of grant's drinking, they were decisively contradicted by rawlins, to whom the authorities in washington applied for information. he asserted that grant had drunk no liquor during the campaign except a little, by the surgeon's prescription, on one occasion when attacked by ague. the fault of failing to report his movements and to answer inquiries was later found to be due to a telegraph operator hostile to the union cause, who did not forward grant's reports to halleck nor halleck's orders to grant. grant's mortification was intense. since the fall of donelson he had been full of activities. the enemy had fallen back, his first line being broken, and grant was scheming to follow up his advantage by pushing on through tennessee, driving the discouraged confederate forces before him. he had visited nashville to confer with general buell, who had reached that city, and it was on his return that he received halleck's dispatch of removal. for several days he was in dreadful distress of mind, and contemplated resigning his commission. it seemed as if fate had cut off his career just as it had gloriously begun. but he made no public complaint. he obeyed orders and waited at fort henry. to some of his friends he said that he would never wear a sword again. but on the 13th he was restored to command. halleck became aware of the facts, and made a report vindicating grant's conduct, of which he sent him a copy. it was not until after the war that grant learned that halleck's previous reports had caused his degradation. his first battle after restoration to command was an unfortunate one in the beginning, but was turned into a victory. he was advancing on corinth, miss., a railroad centre of the southwest, where a large confederate army under general albert sidney johnston was collecting. all the available union forces in the west were gathering to meet it. grant had selected pittsburg landing on the tennessee river, twenty miles from corinth, as the place for landing his forces, and hamburg landing, four miles up the river, as the starting point for buell's army in marching on corinth. buell was hastening to the rendezvous, coming through tennessee with a large force. on the 4th of april grant's horse fell while he was reconnoitring at night, and the general's leg was badly bruised but not broken. expecting to make an offensive campaign and meet the enemy at corinth, he had not enjoined intrenchment of the temporary camp. so great was the confidence that johnston would await attack that the enemy's proximity in force was discovered too late. johnston led his whole army out of corinth, and early on the morning of the 6th of april surprised sherman's division encamped at shiloh, three miles from pittsburg landing, attacking with a largely superior force. the battle raged all day, with heavy losses on both sides, the union army being gradually forced back to pittsburg landing. five divisions were engaged, three of them composed of raw troops, and many regiments were in a demoralized condition at night. on the next day the union army, reinforced by buell's 20,000 men, advanced, attacking the enemy early in the morning, with furious determination. the confederate forces, although weakened, were determined not to lose the advantage gained, and fought with desperate stubbornness. but it was in vain. a necessity of vindicating their courage was felt by officers and men of the union army. they had fully recovered from the effects of the surprise, and pressed forward with zealous assurance. before the day was done grant had won the field and compelled a disorderly retreat. in this battle the commander of the confederate army, general albert sidney johnston, was killed in the first day's fighting, the command devolving on general g. t. beauregard. on the first day the union forces on the field numbered about 33,000 against the enemy's above 40,000. on the second day the union forces were superior. the union losses in the two days were 1754 killed, 8408 wounded, and 2885 missing; total 13,047. beauregard reported a total loss of 10,694, of whom 1723 were killed. general grant says that the union army buried more of the enemy's dead than is here reported in front of sherman's and mcclernand's divisions alone, and that the total number buried was estimated at 4000. the battles of shiloh and pittsburg landing together constitute one of the critical conflicts of the long war. had the confederate success of the first day been repeated and completed on the second day, it would have been difficult, if not impossible, to prevent the enemy from possessing tennessee and a large part of kentucky. after this battle general halleck came to pittsburg landing and took command of all the armies in that department. although general grant was second in command, he was not in general halleck's confidence, and was contemptuously disregarded in the direction of affairs. halleck proceeded to make a safe campaign against corinth by road-building and parallel intrenchments. he got there and captured it, indeed, having been a month on the way, but the rebel army, with all its equipments, guns, and stores, had escaped beforehand. grant's position was so embarrassing that during halleck's advance he made several earnest applications to be relieved. halleck would not let him go, apparently thinking that he needed to be instructed by an opportunity of observing how a great soldier made war. what grant really learned was how not to make war. after the fall of corinth he was permitted to make his headquarters at memphis, while halleck proceeded to construct defensive works on an immense scale. but in july halleck was appointed commander-in-chief of all the armies, with his headquarters in washington, and grant returned to corinth. he was the ranking officer in the department, but was not formally assigned to the command until october. the intermediate time was spent, for the most part, in defensive operations in the enemy's country, the great army that entered corinth having been scattered east, north, and west to various points. two important battles were fought, by one of which an attempt to retake corinth was defeated. the other was at iuka, in mississippi, where a considerable confederate force was defeated. in this period the energy and resourcefulness of general grant were conspicuous, although nothing that occurred added largely to his reputation. he was, however, gathering stores of useful experience while operating in the heart of the enemy's country, where every inhabitant, except the negroes, was hostile. both of the battles mentioned above were nearly lost by failure of his subordinates to render expected service according to orders; but he suffered no defeat. the service was wearing, but he was equal to all demands made upon him. chapter x vicksburg vicksburg had long been the hard military problem of the southwest. the city, which had been made a fortress, was at the summit of a range of high bluffs, two hundred and fifty feet above the east bank of the mississippi river, near the mouth of the yazoo. it was provided with batteries along the river front and on the bank of the yazoo to haines's bluff. a continuous line of fortifications surrounded the city on the crest of the hill. this hill, the slopes of which were cut by deep ravines, was difficult of ascent in any part in the face of hostile defenders. the back country was swampy bottom land, covered with a rank growth of timber, intersected with lagoons and almost impassable except by a few rude roads. the opposite side of the river was an extensive wooded morass. in may, 1862, flag officer farragut, coming up the mississippi from new orleans, had demanded the surrender of the city and been refused. in the latter part of june he returned with flag officer porter's mortar flotilla and bombarded the city for four weeks without gaining his end. in november, 1862, general grant started with an army from grand junction, intending to approach vicksburg by the way of the yazoo river and attack it in the rear. but general van dorn captured holly springs, his depot of supplies, and the project was abandoned. the narration, with any approach to completeness, of the story of the campaign against vicksburg would require a volume. it was a protracted, baffling, desperate undertaking to obtain possession of the fortifications that commanded the mississippi river at that point. grant was not unaware of the magnitude of the work, nor was he eager to attempt it under the conditions existing. he believed that, in order to their greatest efficiency, all the armies operating between the alleghanies and the mississippi should be subject to one commander, and he made this suggestion to the war department, at the same time testifying his disinterestedness by declining in advance to take the supreme command himself. his suggestion was not immediately adopted. on the 22d of december, 1862, general grant, whose headquarters were then at holly springs, reorganized his army into four corps, the 13th, 15th, 16th, and 17th, commanded respectively by major-generals john a. mcclernand, william t. sherman, s. a. hurlbut, and j. b. mcpherson. soon afterwards he established his headquarters at memphis, and in january began the move on vicksburg, which, after immense labors and various failures of plans, resulted in the surrender of that fortress on july 4, 1863. he first sent sherman, in whose enterprise and ability to take care of himself he had full confidence, giving him only general instructions. sherman landed his army on the east side of the river, above vicksburg, and made a direct assault, which proved unsuccessful, and he was compelled to reëmbark his defeated troops. the impracticability of successful assault on the north side was then accepted. general mcclernand's corps on the 11th of january, aided by the navy under admiral porter, captured arkansas post on the white river, taking 6000 prisoners, 17 guns, and a large amount of military stores. on the 17th, grant went to the front and had a conference with sherman, mcclernand, and porter, the upshot of which was a direction to rendezvous on the west bank in the vicinity of vicksburg. mcclernand was disaffected, having sought at washington the command of an expedition against vicksburg and been led to expect it. he wrote a letter to grant so insolent that the latter was advised to relieve him of all command and send him to the rear. instead of doing so, he gave him every possible favor and opportunity; but months afterwards, in front of vicksburg, mcclernand was guilty of a breach of discipline which could not be overlooked, and he was deprived of his command. throughout the war grant was notably considerate and charitable in respect of the mistakes and the temper of subordinates if he thought them to be patriotic and capable. his rapid rise excited the jealousy and personal hostility of many ambitious generals. of this he was conscious, but he did not suffer himself to be affected by it so long as there was no failure in duty. the reply he made to those who asked him to remove mcclernand revealed the principle of his action: "no. i cannot afford to quarrel with a man whom i have to command." the union army, having embarked at memphis, was landed on the west bank of the mississippi river, and the first work undertaken was the digging of a canal across a peninsula that would allow passage of the transports to the mississippi below vicksburg, where they could be used to ferry the army across the river, there being higher ground south of the city from which it could be approached more easily than from any other point. after weeks of labor, the scheme had to be abandoned as impracticable. then various devices for opening and connecting bayous were tried, none of them proving useful. the army not engaged in digging or in cutting through obstructing timbers was encamped along the narrow levee, the only dry land available in the season of flood. thus three months were seemingly wasted without result. the aspect of affairs was gloomy and desperate. the north became impatient and began grumbling against the general, doubting his ability, even clamoring for his removal. he made no reply, nor suffered his friends to defend him. he simply worked on in silence. stories of his incapacity on account of drinking were rife, and it may have been the case that under the dreary circumstances and intense strain he did sometimes yield to this temptation. but he never yielded his aim, never relaxed his grim purpose. vicksburg must fall. as soon as one plan failed of success another was put in operation. when every scheme of getting the vessels through the by-ways failed, one thing remained,--to send the gunboats and transports past vicksburg by the river, defying the frowning batteries and whatever impediments might be met. six gunboats and several steamers ran by the batteries on the night of april 16th, under a tremendous fire, the river being lighted up by burning houses on the shore. barges and flatboats followed on other nights. then grant's way to reach vicksburg was found; but it was not an easy one, nor unopposed. a place of landing on the east side was to be sought. the navy failed to silence the confederate batteries at grand gulf, twenty miles below vicksburg, so that a landing could be effected there, and the fleet ran past it, as it had run by vicksburg. ten miles farther down the river a landing place was found at bruinsburg. by daylight, on the 1st of may, mcclernand's corps and part of mcpherson's had been ferried across, leaving behind all impedimenta, even the officers' horses, and fighting had already begun in rear of port gibson, about eight miles from the landing. the enemy made a desperate stand, but was defeated with heavy loss. grand gulf was evacuated that night, and the place became thenceforth a base of operations. grant had defeated the enemy's calculation by the celerity with which he had transferred a large force. he slept on the ground with his soldiers, without a tent or even an overcoat for covering. general joseph e. johnston had superseded general beauregard in command of all the confederate forces of the southwest. his business was to succor general pemberton and drive grant back into the river. sherman with his corps joined grant on the 8th. jackson, the capital of mississippi, a confederate railroad centre and depot of supplies, was captured on the 14th, the defense being made by johnston himself. then pemberton's whole army from vicksburg, 25,000 men, was encountered, defeated, and forced to retire into the fortress, after losing nearly 5000 men and 18 guns. on the 18th of may grant's army reached vicksburg and the actual siege began. since may 1, grant had won five hard battles, killed and wounded 5200 of the enemy, captured 40 field guns, nearly 5000 prisoners, and a fortified city, compelled the abandonment of grand gulf and haines's bluff, with their 20 heavy guns, destroyed all the railroads and bridges available by the enemy, separated their armies, which altogether numbered 60,000 men, while his own numbered but 45,000, and had completely invested vicksburg. it was an astonishing exhibition of courage, energy, and military genius, calculated to confound his critics and reëstablish him in the confidence of the people. it has been said that there is nothing in history since hannibal invaded italy that is comparable with it. the incidents of the siege, abounding in difficult and heroic action, including an early unsuccessful assault, must be passed over. preparations had been made and directions given for a general assault on the works on the morning of july 5. but on the 3d general pemberton sent out a flag of truce asking, as buckner did at donelson, for the appointment of commissioners to arrange terms of capitulation. grant declined to appoint commissioners or to accept any terms but unconditional surrender, with humane treatment of all prisoners of war. he, however, offered to meet pemberton himself, who had been at west point and in mexico with him, and confer regarding details. this meeting was held, and on the 4th of july grant took possession of the city. the confederates surrendered about 30,000 men, 172 cannon, and 50,000 small arms, besides military stores; but there was little food left. grant's losses during the whole campaign were 1415 killed, 7395 wounded, 453 missing. when the paroled prisoners were ready to march out, grant ordered the union soldiers "to be orderly and quiet as these prisoners pass," and "to make no offensive remarks." this great victory was coincident with the repulse of lee at gettysburg, and the effect of the two events was a wonderfully inspiriting influence upon the country. president lincoln wrote to general grant a characteristic letter "as a grateful acknowledgment of the almost inestimable service you have done the country." in it he said: "i never had any faith, except a general hope that you knew better than i, that the yazoo pass expedition and the like could succeed. when you got below and took port gibson, grand gulf, and vicinity, i thought you should go down the river and join general banks [besieging port hudson]; and when you turned northward, east of the big black, i feared it was a mistake. i now wish to make a personal acknowledgment that you were right and i was wrong." port hudson surrendered to general banks, to whom grant sent reinforcements as soon as vicksburg fell, on the 8th of july, with 10,000 more prisoners and 50 guns. this put the union forces in possession of the mississippi river all the way to the gulf. grant now appeared to the nation as the foremost hero of the war. the disparagements and personal scandals so rife a few months before were silenced and forgotten. he was believed to be invincible. that he never boasted, never publicly resented criticism, never courted applause, never quarreled with his superiors, but endured, toiled, and fought in calm fidelity, consulting chiefly with himself, never wholly baffled, and always triumphant in the end, had shown the nation a man of a kind the people had longed for and in whom they proudly rejoiced. the hopes to which donelson had given birth were confirmed in the hero of vicksburg, who was straightway made a major-general in the regular army, from which, when a first lieutenant, he had resigned nine years before. chapter xi new responsibilities--chattanooga halleck, issuing orders from washington, proceeded to disperse grant's army hither and yon as he thought fractions of it to be needed. grant wanted to move on mobile from lake pontchartrain, but was not permitted to do it. having gone to new orleans in obedience to a necessity of conference with general banks, he suffered a severe injury by the fall of a fractious horse, as he was returning from a review of banks's army. for a long time he was unconscious. as soon as he could be moved he was taken on a bed to a steamer. for several days after reaching vicksburg he was unable to leave his bed. meantime he was repeatedly called upon to send reinforcements to rosecrans, in chattanooga, to which place the latter had retreated after the repulse of his army at chickamauga, september 19 and 20. on october 3, grant was directed to go to cairo and report by telegraph to the secretary of war as soon as he was able to take the field. he started on the same day, ill as he still was. on arriving in cairo he was ordered to proceed to louisville. he was met at indianapolis by secretary stanton, whom he had never before seen, and they proceeded together. on the train secretary stanton handed him two orders, telling him to take his choice of them. both created the military division of the mississippi, including all the territory between the alleghanies and the mississippi river, north of general banks's department, and assigning command of it to grant. one order left the commanders of the three departments, the ohio, the cumberland, and the tennessee, as they were, the other relieved general rosecrans, commanding the army of the cumberland, and assigned gen. george h. thomas to his place. general grant accepted the latter. this consolidation was a late compliance with his earnest, unselfish counsel given before the vicksburg campaign. its wisdom had become apparent. the centre of interest and anxiety now was chattanooga, in east tennessee, near the border of georgia. the confederates had been striving to retrieve the ground lost, since the fall of fort henry, by pushing northward in this direction. halleck's dispersion of forces had sent buell to this section, and buell had been superseded by rosecrans, a zealous and patriotic but unfortunate commander. the repulse at chickamauga might have proved disastrous to his army but for the splendid behavior of the division under general thomas, an officer not unlike grant in the mould of his military talent, who there earned the sobriquet, "the rock of chickamauga." the army of rosecrans had been gathered again at chattanooga, where it was confronted by bragg, whose force surrounded it in an irregular semicircle from the tennessee river to the river again, occupying missionary ridge on one flank and lookout mountain on the other, with its centre where these two ridges come nearly together. chattanooga was in the valley between, near the centre of which, behind the town, was an elevation, orchard knob, held by the enemy. bragg commanded the river and the railroads. the route for supplies was circuitous, inadequate, and insecure, over mountain roads that had become horrible. horses and mules had perished by thousands. the soldiers were on half rations. word came to grant in louisville, that rosecrans was contemplating a retreat. he at once issued an order assuming his new command, notified rosecrans that he was relieved, and instructed thomas to hold the place at all hazards until he reached the front. still so lame that he could not walk without crutches, and had to be carried in arms over places where it was not safe to go on horseback, he left louisville on the 21st of october, and reached chattanooga on the evening of the 23d. then began a work of masterly activity and preparation, in which his genius again asserted its supreme quality. sherman with his army was ordered to join grant. in five days the river road to bridgeport was opened, the enemy being driven from the banks, two bridges were built, and hooker's army added to his force. the enemy, having a much superior force, and assuming the surrender of the army of the cumberland to be only a question of time and famine, sent longstreet with 15,000 men to reinforce the army of johnston, holding burnside in knoxville, to the relief of whom the enemy supposed sherman to be marching. grant waited for sherman, who was coming on between longstreet and bragg. all general orders for the battle were prepared in advance, except their dates. sherman reached chattanooga on the evening of the 15th, and with grant inspected the field on the 16th. sherman's army, holding the left, was to cross to the south side of the river and assail missionary ridge. hooker, on the right, was to press through from lookout valley into chattanooga valley. thomas, in the centre, was to press forward through the valley and strike the enemy's centre while his wings were thus fully engaged, or as soon as hooker's support was available. the battle began on the afternoon of october 23. orchard knob, in the centre of the great amphitheatre, was attacked and captured, and became the union headquarters. on the 24th sherman crossed the river and established his army, on the north end of missionary ridge. on the morning of the same day hooker assailed lookout mountain, and after a long climbing fight, lasting far into the night, secured his position; and the enemy, who had occupied the mountain, retreated across the valley at its upper end to missionary ridge. grant's forces were now in touch from right to left. everything so far had gone well. early on the next morning sherman opened the attack. the ridge in his front was exceedingly favorable for defense, and during the whole night the enemy had been at work strengthening the position. sherman's first assault failed, but he continued pressing the enemy with resolution, although making little progress. from grant's place on orchard knob he watched the struggle. at three o'clock he saw sherman's right repulsed. then he gave to thomas, standing at his side, the order to advance. six guns were fired as a signal, and the army of the cumberland moved forward in splendid array to avenge chickamauga. the immediate purpose was to carry the rebel rifle pits at the foot of the ridge. this done, the soldiers were subjected to a galling fire from the line 800 feet above them. as by inspiration, they rushed on, climbing as they could, by aid of rocks and bushes, and using their guns as staves. they reached the crest and swept it in a mighty fury. it was the decisive action. all the columns now converged on the distracted foe who fled before them. grant galloped to the front with all speed, urging on the pursuit and exposing himself to every hazard of the fight. so chattanooga was added to grant's lengthening score of brilliant victories; and again, as at donelson and at vicksburg, he had been the instrument of relieving a tense oppression of anxiety that had settled upon the nation. sherman, with two corps, was at once sent to the relief of knoxville; but longstreet, having heard of bragg's defeat, made an unsuccessful assault and retreated into virginia. by the administration in washington, and by the people of the north, general grant's preëminence was conceded. his star shone brightest of all. congress voted a gold medal for him. chapter xii lieutenant-general, commander of all the armies during the winter, after the chattanooga victory, general grant made his headquarters at nashville, and devoted himself to acquiring an intimate knowledge of the condition of the large region now under his command, to the reorganization of his own lines of transportation, and the destruction of those of the enemy. he made a perilous journey to knoxville in the dead of winter, and a brief trip to st. louis, on account of the dangerous illness of his son there. on this trip he wore citizen's clothes, traveled as quietly as possible, declined all public honors, and made no delays. the whole route might have been a continuous enthusiastic ovation; but he would not have it so. his work was not done, and he sternly discountenanced all premature glorification. too many generals had fallen from a high estate in the popular judgment, for him to court a similar fate. the promotions that gave him greater opportunity of service he accepted; but he preferred to keep his capital of popularity, whatever it might be, on deposit and accumulating while he stuck to his unaccomplished task, instead of drawing upon it as he went along for purposes of vanity and display. of vulgar vanity he had as little as any soldier in the army. nashville was the base of supplies for all the operations in his military division. its lines of transportation had been worn out and broken down, largely through incompetent management. he put them in charge of new men, who reconstructed and equipped them. while engaged in this necessary work he dispatched sherman on an expedition through mississippi, which he hoped would reach mobile; but it terminated at meriden, through failure of a cavalry force to join it. but it did a work in destruction of railroads and railroad property, that inflicted immense damage on the confederacy. throughout the winter grant worked as if his reputation was yet to be made, and to be made in that military division. meanwhile congress and the country were pondering his deserts, and his ability for still greater responsibilities. the result of this deliberation was the passage of the act, approved march 1, 1864, reëstablishing the grade of lieutenant-general in the regular army. the next day president lincoln nominated general grant to the rank, and the nomination was promptly confirmed. he was ordered to washington to receive the supreme commission. it was his first visit to the national capital; his first personal introduction to the president, although he had heard him make a speech many years before; his first meeting with the leading men in civil official life, who were sustaining the armies and guiding the nation in its imperiled way. he came crowned with the glory of victories second in magnitude and significance to none, since wellington defeated napoleon at waterloo. everybody desired to see him, and to honor him. yet he journeyed to washington as simply and quietly as possible, avoiding demonstration. he arrived on the 8th of march, and going to a hotel waited, unrecognized, until the throng of travelers had registered, and then wrote, simply, "u. s. grant and son, galena." the next day, at 1 o'clock, he was received by president lincoln in the cabinet-room of the white house. there were present, by the president's invitation, the members of the cabinet, general halleck, and a few other distinguished men. after introductions the president addressed him as follows:-"general grant,--the expression of the nation's approbation of what you have already done, and its reliance on you for what remains to be done in the existing great struggle, are now presented with this commission, constituting you lieutenant-general in the army of the united states. with the high honor, devolves on you an additional responsibility. as the country herein trusts you, so, under god, it will sustain you. i scarcely need to add, that with what i here speak for the nation goes my own hearty personal concurrence." general grant made the following reply:-"mr. president,--i accept the commission with gratitude for the high honor conferred. with the aid of the noble armies that have fought on so many battlefields for our common country, it will be my earnest endeavor not to disappoint your expectations. i feel the full weight of the responsibilities now devolving upon me; and i know that if they are met, it will be due to those armies; and, above all, to the favor of that providence which leads both nations and men." the next day he was assigned to the command of all the armies, with headquarters in the field. he made a hurried trip to culpeper court house for a conference with general meade, commanding the army of the potomac; but would not linger in washington to be praised and fêted. he hastened back to nashville, where, on the 17th, he issued an order assuming command of the armies of the united states, announcing that until further notice, his headquarters would be with the army of the potomac. general halleck was relieved from duty as general-in-chief; but was assigned by grant to duty in washington, as chief-of-staff of the army. sherman was assigned to command the military division of the mississippi, which was enlarged, and mcpherson took sherman's place as commander of the army of the tennessee; thomas remaining in command of the army of the cumberland. on the 23d grant was again in washington, accompanied by his family and his personal staff. on the next day he took actual command, and immediately reorganized the army of the potomac in three corps,--the second, fifth, and sixth,--commanded by major-generals hancock, warren, and sedgwick; major-general meade retaining the supreme command. the cavalry was consolidated into a corps under sheridan. burnside commanded the ninth corps, which for a brief time acted independently. this crisis of grant's life should not be passed over without allusion to the remarkable letters that passed between grant and sherman before he left nashville to receive his new commission. grant wrote to sherman as follows:-"whilst i have been eminently successful in this war, in at least gaining the confidence of the public, no one feels more than i do how much of this success is due to the energy, skill, and the harmonious putting forth of that energy and skill, of those whom it has been my good fortune to have occupying subordinate positions under me. there are many officers to whom these remarks are applicable to a greater or less degree, proportionate to their ability as soldiers; but what i want is to express my thanks to you and mcpherson as the men to whom, above all others, i feel indebted for whatever i have had of success. how far your advice and assistance have been of help to me, you know; how far your execution of whatever has been given you to do entitles you to the reward i am receiving you cannot know as well as i. i feel all the gratitude this letter would express, giving it the most flattering construction." grant's modesty, generosity, and magnanimity shine in this acknowledgment. if there were no other record illustrating these qualities, this alone would be an irrefragable testimony to his possession of them. there can be no appeal from its transparent, cordial sincerity. sherman's reply is too long to be quoted fully, but the parts of it that reveal his estimate of grant's qualities and his confidence in him are important with reference to the purpose of this sketch:-"you do yourself injustice and us too much honor in assigning to us too large a share of the merits which have led to your high advancement.... you are now washington's legitimate successor, and occupy a position of almost dangerous elevation; but if you can continue, as heretofore, to be yourself, simple, honest, and unpretending, you will enjoy through life the respect and love of friends, and the homage of millions of human beings that will award you a large share in securing to them and their descendants a government of law and stability.... i believe you are as brave, patriotic, and just as the great prototype, washington, as unselfish, kind-hearted, and honest as a man should be; but the chief characteristic is the simple faith in success you have always manifested, which i can liken to nothing else than the faith the christian has in his saviour. this faith gave you victory at shiloh and vicksburg. also, when you have completed your preparations, you go into battle without hesitation, as at chattanooga,--no doubts, no answers,--and i tell you it was this that made us act with confidence. i knew, wherever i was, that you thought of me; and if i got in a tight place you would help me out if alive." he besought grant not to stay in washington, but to come back to the mississippi valley, "the seat of coming empire, and from the west where [when?] our task is done, we will make short work of charleston and richmond and the impoverished coast of the atlantic." but grant was wiser. he felt that the duty to which his new commission called him was to try conclusions with general lee, the most illustrious and successful of the confederate commanders, whom he had not yet encountered and vanquished. his new rank gave him an authority and prestige which would enable him, he trusted, to overcome the discouragements and discontents of the noble army of the potomac, and wield its unified force with victorious might. he knew, moreover, that the government and the people trusted him and would sustain him, as they trusted and would sustain no other, in a fresh and final attempt to destroy the army of northern virginia, upon which the hopes of the confederacy were staked. not so much ambition as duty determined him to make his headquarters with the army of the potomac. chapter xiii the wilderness and spottsylvania wherever grant had control in the west, and in all his counsels, his distinct purpose was to mass the union forces and not scatter them, and to get at the enemy. with what ideas and intention he began the new task he set forth definitely in his report made in july, 1865. "from an early period in the rebellion, i had been impressed with the idea that the active and continuous operations of all the troops that could be brought into the field, regardless of season and weather, were necessary to a speedy termination of the war.... i therefore determined, first, to use the greatest number of troops practicable against the armed force of the enemy, preventing him from using the same force at different seasons against first one and then another of our armies, and the possibility of repose for refitting and producing necessary supplies for carrying on resistance; second, to hammer continuously against the armed force of the enemy and his resources, until by mere attrition, if in no other way, there should be nothing left to him but an equal submission with the loyal sections of our common country to the constitution and laws of the land." grant instructed general butler, who had a large army at fortress monroe, to make richmond his objective point. he instructed general meade, commanding the army of the potomac, that lee's army "would be his objective point, and wherever lee went he would go also." he hoped to defeat and capture lee, or to drive him back on richmond, following close and establishing a connection with butler's army there, if butler had succeeded in advancing so far. sherman was to move against johnston's army, and sigel, with a strong force, was to protect west virginia and pennsylvania from incursions. this, with plans for keeping all the other armies of the confederacy so occupied that lee could not draw from them, constituted the grand strategy of the campaign. the theatre of operations of the army of the potomac was a region of country lying west of a nearly north-and-south line passing through richmond and washington. it was about 120 miles long, from the potomac on the north to the james on the south, and from 30 to 60 miles wide, intersected by several rivers flowing into chesapeake bay. the headquarters of the union army were at culpeper court house, about 70 miles southwest of washington, with which it was connected by railroad. this was the starting point. lee's army was about fifteen miles away, with the rapidan, a river difficult of passage, in front of it, the foothills of the blue ridge on its left, and on its right a densely wooded tract of scrub pines and various low growths, almost pathless, known as "the wilderness." two courses were open to grant,--to march by the right, cross the upper fords, and attack lee on his left flank, or march by the left, crossing the lower fords, and making into the wilderness. grant chose the latter way, as, on the whole, most favorable to keeping open communications. for general grant, as commander of all the armies, was bound to avoid being shut up or leaving washington imperiled. and it may properly be said here that his plan contemplated leaving general meade free in his tactics, giving him only general directions regarding what he desired to have accomplished, the actual fighting to be done under meade's orders. the official reports to the adjutant-general's office in washington show that on the 20th of april the army of the potomac numbered 81,864 men present and fit for duty. burnside's corps, which joined in the wilderness, added to this force 19,250 men, making a total of 101,114 men. after the wilderness, a division numbering 7000 or 8000 men under general tyler joined it. when the chickahominy was reached, a junction with butler's army, 25,000 strong, was made. lee had on the 20th of april present for duty, armed and equipped, 53,891. a few days later he was reinforced by longstreet's corps, which on the date given numbered 18,387, making a total of 72,278. grant's army outnumbered lee's, but he was to make an offensive campaign in the enemy's country, operating on exterior lines, and keeping long lines of communication open. defending richmond and petersburg there were other confederate forces, under beauregard, hill, and hoke, estimated to amount to nearly 30,000 men, and breckenridge commanded still another army in the shenandoah valley. in grant's command, but not of the army of the potomac, were the garrison of washington and the force in west virginia. on the 3d of may the order to move was given, and at midnight the start was made. the advance guard crossed the river before four in the morning of the 4th, and on the morning of the 5th grant's army, nearly a hundred thousand strong, was disposed in the wilderness. lee had discovered the movement promptly, and had moved his whole army to the right, determined to fall upon grant in that unfavorable place. as soon as the union army began a movement in the morning, it encountered the enemy, who attacked with tremendous and confident vigor. the fighting continued all day, with indecisive results. early the next morning the battle was renewed, and continued with varying fortunes, at one time one army, and at another time the opposing army, having the advantage. there was, in fact, a series of desperate battles between different portions of the two armies which did not end until the night was far advanced. the advantage, on the whole, was with the union army. it had not been forced back over the rapidan. it stood fast. but it had inflicted no such defeat on the enemy as grant had hoped to do in the first encounter. the losses of both sides had been very large, those of the union army being 3288 killed, 19,278 wounded, 6784 missing. the next morning it was discovered that the confederates had retired to their intrenchments, and were not seeking battle. then grant gave the order that was decisive, and revealed to the army of the potomac that it had a new spirit over it. the order was, "forward to spottsylvania!" no more turning back, no more resting on a doubtful result. "forward!" to the finish. but lee, controlling shorter lines, was at spottsylvania beforehand, and had seized the roads and fortified himself. here again was bloody fighting of a most determined character, lasting several days. here hancock, by a daring assault, captured an angle of the enemy's works, with a large number of guns and prisoners; and it was held, despite the repeated endeavors of the enemy to recapture it. here general sedgwick was killed. here upton made a famous assault on the enemy's line and broke through it, want of timely and vigorous support preventing this exploit from making an end of lee's army then and there. but the union losses at spottsylvania, while not so large as in the wilderness, were very heavy, and made a painful impression upon the people of the north. undoubtedly grant was disappointed by the failure to vanquish his opponent. undoubtedly lee was disappointed by his failure to repulse the union army in the wilderness and at spottsylvania as he had done formerly at chancellorsville and fredericksburg, when it had come into the same territory. each had underestimated the other's quality. from spottsylvania, on the 11th of may, after six days of continuous fighting, with an advance of scarcely a dozen miles, and an experience of checks and losses that would have disheartened any one but the hero of vicksburg, he sent this bulletin to the war department: "we have now ended the sixth day of very heavy fighting. the result to this time is much in our favor. but our losses have been heavy, as well as those of the enemy. we have lost to this time 11 general officers killed, wounded, and missing, and probably 20,000 men.... i am now sending back to belle plain all my wagons for a fresh supply of provisions and ammunition, and propose to fight it out on this line if it takes all summer." the indomitable spirit of the last sentence electrified the country. it did take all summer, and all winter, too,--eleven full months from the date of this dispatch, and more, before general lee, driven into richmond, forced to evacuate the doomed city, his escape into the south cut off, his soldiers exhausted, ragged, starving, reinforcements out of the question, surrendered at appomattox the army of northern virginia, the reliance of the confederacy, to the general whom he expected to defeat by his furious assault in the wilderness. chapter xiv from spottsylvania to richmond the story of this campaign is too long to be narrated in particular. on both sides it is a record of magnificent valor, endurance, and resolution, to which the world affords no parallel, when it is remembered that the armies were recruited from the free citizenship of the nation. as the weeks and months wore on, general's grant's visage, it is said, settled into an unrelaxing expression of grim resolve. he carried the nation on his shoulders in those days. if he had wearied or yielded, hope might have vanished. he did not yield nor faint. he planned and toiled and fought, keeping his own counsel, bearing patiently the disappointment, the misunderstanding, the doubt, the criticism, the woe of millions who had no other hope but in his success and were often on the verge of despair. he beheld his plans defeated by the incompetence or errors of subordinates whom he trusted, and let the blame be laid upon himself without protest or murmuring. he knew better than any one else the terrible cost of life which his unrelenting purpose demanded; but he knew also that the price of relenting, involving the discouragement of failure, the cost of another campaign after the enemy had got breath and new equipment, the possible refusal of the north to try again, was far greater and more humiliating. little wonder that he was oppressed and silent and moody. yet he ruled his own spirit in accordance with the habit of his life. no folly or disappointment provoked him to utter an oath. general horace porter, of his staff, a member of his intimate military family, says that the strongest expression of vexation that ever escaped his lips was: "confound it!" he alone had the genius to be master of the situation at all times, and the "simple faith in success" that would not let him be swerved from his aim. so he pressed on from the wilderness to spottsylvania, to north anna, to south anna, to the pamunky, to cold harbor, to the chickahominy, fighting and flanking all the way, until at the end of the month he had pressed lee back to the immediate vicinity of richmond. the bloodiest of all these battles was the ill-judged attack, for which grant has been much criticised, on the strongly intrenched rebel lines at cold harbor. if he could have dislodged lee here he could have compelled him to retreat into the immediate fortifications of richmond. but lee's position was impregnable: the assault failed. in less than an hour grant lost 13,000 men killed, wounded, and missing, and gained nothing substantial. general butler had signally failed to accomplish the work given him to do. instead of taking petersburg, destroying the railroads connecting richmond with the south, and laying siege to that city, he had, after some ineffectual manoeuvring, got his army hemmed in, "bottled up," grant called it, at bermuda hundred, where he was almost completely out of the offensive movement for months. sigel had been worsted in the north, and had been relieved by hunter, who had won measurable success in the shenandoah valley. grant, checked on the east and north of richmond, crossed the chickahominy and the james with his whole army by a series of masterly manoeuvres, regarding the meaning of which his opponent was brilliantly deceived. then followed the unsuccessful attempt to capture petersburg before it could be reinforced, unsuccessful by reason of the want of persistence on the part of the general intrusted with the duty. this failure involved a long siege of that place, which the confederates made impregnable to assault. a breach in the defences was made by the explosion of a mine constructed with vast labor, but there was failure to follow up the advantage with sufficient promptness. here the army of the potomac passed the winter, except the part of the army that was detached to protect washington from threatened attack, and with which sheridan made his great fame in the shenandoah valley. meanwhile sherman, in the west, had taken atlanta, and leaving hood's army to be taken care of by thomas, who defeated it at nashville, had marched across georgia, and was making his way through the carolinas northward toward richmond, an army under johnston disputing his way by annoyance, impediment, and occasional battle. another incident of the winter was the two attempts on fort fisher, near wilmington, north carolina,--the first, under general butler, a failure; the second, under general terry, a brilliant success. all these movements were in execution of plans and directions given by the lieutenant-general. it was the 29th of march when, all preparations having been made, grant began the final movement. he threw a large part of his army into the region west of petersburg and south of richmond, and at five forks, four days later, sheridan fought a brilliant and decisive battle, which compelled lee to abandon both petersburg and richmond, and to attempt to save his army by running away and joining johnston. all his movements were baffled by the eager union generals, flushed with the consciousness that the end was near. on the 7th of april grant wrote to lee: "i regard it as my duty to shift from myself responsibility for any further effusion of human blood by asking of you the surrender of that portion of the confederate states army, known as the army of northern virginia." lee replied at once, asking the terms that would be offered on condition of surrender. his letter reached grant on the 8th, who replied: "_peace_ being my great desire, there is but one condition i would insist upon, namely: that the men and officers surrendered shall be disqualified for taking up arms again against the government of the united states until properly exchanged." he offered to meet lee or any officers deputed by him for arranging definite terms. lee replied the same evening somewhat evasively, setting forth that he desired to treat for peace, and that the surrender of his army would be considered as a means to that end. to this grant responded on the 9th, having set his army in motion to appomattox court house, that he had no authority to treat for peace; but added some plain words to the effect that the shortest road to peace would be surrender. lee immediately asked for an interview. grant received this communication while on the road, and returned word that he would push on and meet him wherever he might designate. when grant arrived at the village of appomattox court house he was directed to a small house where lee awaited him. within a short time the conditions were drafted by grant and accepted by lee, who was grateful that the officers were permitted to keep their side-arms, and officers and men to retain the horses which they owned and their private baggage. the number of men surrendered at appomattox was 27,416. during the ten days' previous fighting 22,079 of lee's army had been captured, and about 12,000 killed and wounded. it is estimated that as many as 12,000 deserted on the road to appomattox. from may 1, 1864, to april 9, 1865, the armies of the potomac and the james took 66,512 prisoners and captured 245 flags, 251 guns, and 22,633 stands of small arms. their losses from the wilderness to appomattox were 12,561 killed, 64,452 wounded, and 26,988 missing, an aggregate of 104,001. it would be idle adulation to say that in all points during this long conflict with lee general grant always did the best thing, making no mistakes. the essential point is, and it suffices to establish, his military fame on secure foundations, that he made no fatal mistake, that progress toward the great result in view was constant, slower than he expected, slower than the country expected, but finally everywhere victorious, substantially on the lines contemplated in the beginning. after lee's experience in the wilderness and at spottsylvania he seldom assumed the offensive against grant. he became prudent, adopted a defensive policy, fought behind intrenchments or just in front of fortifications to which he could retire for safety, and waited to be attacked. watchful and alert as he was, he was deceived by grant oftener than he deceived him, and except that he managed to postpone the end by skillful tactics, he did not challenge the military superiority of his foe. he made grant's victory costly and difficult, but he did not prevent it. he retreated with desperate reluctance, but he was forced back. he could not protect his capital; he could not save his army. when lee measured powers with grant, his cause was lost. there are incidents of the campaign that mitigate its stern and in some sense savage features. when the imperturbable soldier learned of the death of his dear friend mcpherson, who fell in one of sherman's battles, he retired to his tent and wept bitterly. when lincoln, visiting grant at city point, before the general departed on what was expected to be the last stage of the campaign, said to him that he had expected he would order sherman's army to reinforce the army of the potomac for the final struggle, the reply was that the army of the potomac had fought the army of virginia through four long years, and it would not be just to require it to share the honors of victory with any other army. it was observed that when he bade good-by to his wife at this departure his adieus, always affectionate, were especially tender and lingering, as if presentiment of a crisis in his life oppressed him. lincoln accompanied him to the train. "the president," said grant, after they had parted, "is one of the few who have not attempted to extract from me a knowledge of my movements, although he is the only one who has a right to know them." long before, lincoln had written to him: "the particulars of your campaign i neither know nor seek to know. i wish not to intrude any restraints or constraints upon you." grant's reply to this confidence was: "should my success be less than i desire or expect, the least i can say is, the fault is not yours." these two understood each other by a magnanimous sympathy that had no need of particular confidences. that lincoln respected grant as one whom it was not becoming for him to presume to question is in itself impressive evidence of grant's greatness. chapter xv in washington among politicians within a few weeks after the surrender of lee, every army and fragment of an army opposed to the union was dissolved. but meantime lincoln had been assassinated, and the executive administration of the nation had devolved upon andrew johnson. this wrought an immense change in the aspect of national affairs. lincoln was a strong, wise, conservative, magnanimous soul. johnson was arrogant, vain, narrow, and contentious. grant soon established his headquarters at the war department, and devoted himself with characteristic energy to the work of discharging from the military service the great armies of volunteers no longer needed. their work as soldiers was gloriously complete. within a few months they were once more simple citizens of the republic, following the ways of industry and peace. the suddenness of the transformation by which at the outbreak of hostilities hundreds of thousands of citizens left their homes and their occupations of peace to become willing soldiers of the union and liberty, was paralleled by the alacrity of their return, the moment the danger was passed, to the stations and the manner of life they had abandoned. general grant was the central figure in the national rejoicing and pride. the desire to do him honor was universal. but he bore himself through all with dignity and modesty, avoiding as much as he could, without seeming inappreciation and disdain, the lavish popular applause that greeted him on every possible occasion. in july, 1866, congress created the grade of general, to which he was at once promoted, thus attaining a rank never before granted to a soldier of the united states. his great lieutenant, sherman, succeeded him in this office, which was then permitted to lapse, though it was revived later as a special honor for general sheridan. in further token of gratitude, some of the wealthier citizens purchased and presented to grant a house in washington. resolutions of gratitude, honorary degrees, presents of value and significance, came to him in abundance. through it all, he maintained his reputation as a man of few words, devoid of ostentation, and with no ambition to court public favor by any act of demagoguism. but a great and bitter trial confronted him. he had never been a politician. now he was caught in a maelstrom of ungenerous and malignant politics. all his influence and effort had been addressed to promote the calming of the passions of the war, and a reunion in fact as well as in form. the president, professing an intention of carrying out the policy of his predecessor, began a method of reconstructing civil governments in the states that had seceded which produced great dissatisfaction. upon his own initiative, without authority of congress, he proceeded to encourage and abet those who were lately in arms against the union to make new constitutions for their states, and institute civil governments therein, as if they alone were to be considered. the freedmen, who had been of so great service to our armies, whom by every requirement of honor and gratitude we were bound to protect, were left to the hardly restricted guardianship of their former masters, who, having no faith in their manhood or their development, devised for them a condition with few rights or hopes, and little removed from the slavery out of which they had been delivered. this policy found little favor with those in the north who had borne the heat and burden of the war. in the elections of 1866 the people repudiated president johnson's policy by emphatic majorities. when the hostile congress met, the governments johnson had instituted were declared to be provisional only, and it set about the work of reconstruction in its own way, imbedding the changed conditions, the fruits of the war, in proposed amendments of the constitution of the united states, which were ultimately ratified by a sufficient number of states to make them part of the organic frame of government of the republic. in these days of storm and stress, general grant took neither side as a partisan. he stuck to his professional work until he was forced to be a participator in a political war, strange to his knowledge and his habits. congress directed the southern states to be divided into five military districts, with a military commander of each, and all subordinate to the general of the army, who was charged with keeping the peace, until civil governments in the states should be established by the legislative department of national authority. congress, before adjourning in 1866, passed a tenure-of-office act,--overriding in this, as in other legislation, the president's veto. the motive was to prevent the president from using the patronage to strengthen his policy. this act required the president to make report to the senate of all removals during the recess, with his reasons therefor. all appointments to vacancies so created were to be _ad interim_ appointments. if the senate disapproved of the removals, the officer suspended at once became again the incumbent. severe penalties were provided for infraction of the law. during the recess the president removed stanton, and appointed general grant to be secretary of war. grant did not desire the office, but under advice accepted it, lest a worse thing for the country might happen. johnson hoped to win grant to his side, and in any event to use him in his strife with congress to defeat the purpose of the law. while the senate had stanton's case under consideration in january, 1867, grant was called into a cabinet meeting and questioned regarding what he would do. he said that he was not familiar with the law, but would examine it and notify the president. the next day he notified him that he would obey the law. therefore, when the senate disapproved of the reasons assigned for the removal of stanton, grant at once vacated the office, to the intense mortification and anger of the president, who made a public accusation that grant had promised to stay in office and oppose stanton's resumption of it. the charge made a great scandal, but it did not seriously impair grant's good repute. johnson was not believed, and the testimony of the members of his cabinet, regarding what happened, was so conflicting that it failed to convince anybody who did not seek to be convinced. there is reason to believe that johnson never contemplated retaining grant in the office, except to use his name and fame to break down the tenure-of-office act. general grant's plain common sense delivered him from the snare spread for him by wily and desperate politicians. on february 3, he closed an unsatisfactory correspondence with president johnson, with these severe words: "i can but regard this whole business, from the beginning to the end, as an attempt to involve me in the resistance of law, for which you hesitated to assume the responsibility in orders, and thus to destroy my character before the country. i am, in a measure, confirmed in this conclusion by your recent order, directing me to disobey orders from the secretary of war, my superior and your subordinate, without having countermanded his authority to issue the orders i am to disobey." when johnson was impeached by the house of representatives, general grant might, if he had chosen to do so, have contributed much to embarrass the president; but he held aloof, discharging his duties as general-in-chief with constant devotion. he was instrumental in instituting many economies and improvements of army management. he greatly advanced the work of reconstruction, and civil governments were firmly established on the congressional plan in a majority of the southern states before he became the chosen leader of the republican party. grant had not yet distinctly committed himself as between the democratic and the republican parties, although from the time of his break with johnson, he was more drawn to the republicans. so far as he had any politics he might have been classed as a war democrat. had he definitely proclaimed himself a democrat, no doubt he could have had that party's nomination for the presidency. he was the first citizen of the nation in popularity, of which he had marked tokens, and of which both parties were anxious to avail themselves. it is little wonder that he came to think that the presidency was an honor to which he might fitly aspire, and an office in which he could further serve his country, by promoting good feeling between the sections. in may, 1868, he was placed in nomination, first by a convention of union soldiers and sailors, and afterwards by the republican party, in both instances by acclamation. his democratic opponent was horatio seymour, of new york. in the election he had a popular majority of 305,456. he received 214 electoral votes, and seymour received 80. three of the southern states, not being fully restored to the union, had no voice in the election. chapter xvi his first administration immediately after general grant's inauguration as president, an incident occurred which revealed his inexperience in statesmanship. among the names sent to the senate as members of the cabinet was that of alexander t. stewart, of new york, the leading merchant of the country, for secretary of the treasury. grant was unaware of the existence of his disqualification by a statute passed in 1789, on account of being engaged in trade and commerce. his ignorance is hardly surprising in view of the fact that the senate confirmed the nomination without discovering its illegality. the point was soon made, however, and the reasonableness of the law was apparent to all except the president, who sent a message to the senate suggesting that mr. stewart be exempted from its application to him by a joint resolution of congress. this breaking down of a sound principle of government for the pleasure of the president was not favored, and george s. boutwell of massachusetts was substituted, mr. stewart having declined, in order to relieve the president of embarrassment. for the rest, the cabinet was a peculiar one. it appeared to be made up without consultation or political sagacity, in accordance with the personal reasons by which a general selects his staff. elihu b. washburn, of illinois, his firm congressional friend during the war, was secretary of state; general jacob d. cox, of ohio, secretary of the interior; adolph e. boise, of pennsylvania, secretary of the navy; general john m. schofield, of illinois, secretary of war; john a. j. cresswell, of maryland, postmaster-general; and e. rockwood hoar, of massachusetts, attorney-general. it did not long endure in this form. mr. washburn was soon appointed minister to france, and was succeeded by hamilton fish, of new york, in the state department. general schofield was succeeded in the war department by general john a. rawlins, who died in september, and was succeeded by general william w. belknap, of iowa. mr. boise gave way in june to george m. robeson, of new jersey. in july, 1870, mr. hoar was succeeded by a. t. akerman, of georgia, and he, in december, 1871, by george h. williams, of oregon. general cox resigned in november, 1870, and was succeeded by columbus delano. some of these changes, like that of washburn to fish, were good ones, and many of them were exceedingly bad ones,--men of high character and ability, like judge hoar and general cox, conscientious and faithful even to the point of remonstrance with their headstrong chief, being succeeded by compliant men of a distinctly lower strain. fish and boutwell achieved high reputation by their conduct of their offices. the death of rawlins deprived the president of a wise and staunch personal friend at a time when he was never more in need of his controlling influence. early in 1871 the work of reconstruction was completed, so far as the establishment of state governments and representation in congress was concerned. but later in the year, the outrages upon the colored population in certain states were so general and cruel that congress passed what became known as the "ku-klux act," which was followed by a presidential proclamation exhorting to obedience of the law. on october 17, the outrages continuing, suspension of the writ of habeas corpus was proclaimed in certain counties of south carolina, and many offenders were convicted in the united states courts. this severe proceeding had a deterring influence throughout the south, which understood quite well that general grant was not a person to be defied with impunity. in 1870 he sent to the senate a treaty that the administration had negotiated with president baez for the annexation of santo domingo as a territory of the united states, and also one for leasing to the united states the peninsula and bay of samana. these treaties, it was said, had already been ratified by a popular vote early in 1870. the scheme precipitated a conflict that divided the republican party into administration and anti-administration factions, the latter being led by charles sumner and carl schurz. sumner had long been chairman of the senate committee on foreign relations, but he was degraded through the influence of the president's friends in the senate. bitter personal animosities were aroused in this contest which never were healed. it was alleged that the sentiment of the people of santo domingo had not been fairly taken, and that they were in fact opposed to annexation. a commission composed of b. f. wade, of ohio, andrew d. white, of new york, and samuel g. howe, of massachusetts, was sent on a naval vessel to investigate the actual conditions. this committee reported in favor of annexation; but the hostile sentiment in congress and among the people was so strong that the treaties were never ratified. by many it was considered a wrong to the colored race to so extinguish the experiment of negro self-government. others were opposed to annexing such a population, thinking this country already had race troubles enough. others regarded the whole business as a speculation of jobbers, and the stain of jobbery then pervading government circles was so notorious that the presumption was not without warrant. the annexation scheme brought to a head and gave occasion for an outbreak of indignant hostile criticism of the president and the administration. in this term grant appointed the first board of civil service commissioners, with george william curtis at its head. the commissioners were to inquire into the condition of the civil service and devise a scheme to increase its efficiency. this they did; but later the president himself balked at the enforcement of their rules, and, in 1873, mr. curtis resigned. the most conspicuous achievement of general grant's first term was the settlement of the controversy with great britain growing out of the destruction of american commerce by confederate states cruisers during the war. a joint high commission of five british and five american members met in washington, february 17, 1871, and on may 8 a treaty was completed and signed, providing peaceable means for a settlement of the several questions arising out of the coast fisheries, the northwestern boundary line, and the "alabama claims." the last and most important subject was referred to an international court of arbitration, which met at geneva, switzerland, and on september 14, 1872, awarded to the united states a gross sum of $15,500,000, which was paid by great britain. this was the most important international issue that had ever been settled by voluntary submission to arbitration. it was long regarded as the harbinger of peace between nations. other important things done were the establishment of the first weather bureau; the honorable settlement of the outrage of spain in the case of the virginius, an alleged filibustering vessel which spain seized, executing a large part of its crew in cuba; and the settlement of the northwest boundary question. it should be said also that the president made a firm stand in behalf of national financial integrity. but during the four years there was a steady deterioration in the tone of official life, and a steady growth of corruption and abuses in the administration of government. the president exhibited a strange lack of moral perception and stamina in the sphere of politics. unprincipled flatterers, adventurers, and speculators gained a surprising influence with him. his native obstinacy showed itself especially in insistence upon his personal, ill-instructed will. he became intractable to counsels of wisdom, and seemed to be a radically different man from the sincere, modest soldier of the civil war. he affected the society of the rich, whom he never before had opportunity of knowing. he accepted with an indiscreet eagerness presents and particular favors from persons of whose motives he should have been suspicious. jay gould and james fisk used him in preparing the conditions for the corner of the gold market that culminated in "black friday." he provided fat offices for his relatives with a liberal hand, and prostituted the civil service to accomplish his aims and reward his supporters. in consequence of these things there was great disaffection in the republican party, which culminated in open revolt. yet he was supported by the majority. the democratic party, meantime, making a virtue of necessity, proclaimed a purpose to accept the results of the war, including the constitutional amendments, as accomplished facts not to be disturbed or further opposed. this made an opportunity for a union of all elements opposed to the reëlection of grant, leading democrats having given assurance of support to a candidate to be nominated by what had come to be called the "liberal reform" party. that party held its convention in cincinnati early in may, and named horace greeley as its candidate, a nomination which wrecked whatever chance the party had seemed to have. grant was renominated by acclamation in the republican convention. the democratic convention nominated greeley on the cincinnati convention platform, but without enthusiasm. general grant was elected by a popular majority of more than three quarters of a million, and a vote in the electoral college of 286 to 63 for all others, the opposing vote being scattered on account of the death of mr. greeley in november, soon after his mortifying defeat. chapter xvii his second administration the storm of criticism and calumny through which president grant passed during the election canvass of 1872 had no effect to change his general course or open his eyes to the true sentiment of the nation. instead of realizing that he was reëlected, not because his administration was approved, but because circumstances prevented an effective combination of the various elements of sincere opposition, he and his friends accepted the result as popular approbation of their past conduct and warrant for its continuance. things went from bad to worse with a pell-mell rapidity that made good men shudder. in the four years there were but two exhibitions of conspicuously courageous and honorable statesmanship. one was the passage of the resumption act of january 14, 1875, which promised the resumption of specie payments on january 1, 1879, and gave the secretary of the treasury adequate power to make the performance of the promise possible. this was one result of the collapse in 1873 of the enormous speculation promoted by a fluctuating currency and fictitious values. the demand for a currency of stable value enabled the conservative statesmen in congress to take this action. grant's approval of this act and his veto in the previous year of the "inflation bill" must always be regarded as highly commendable public services. the only immediate change in the cabinet was the appointment of william a. richardson to succeed george s. boutwell as secretary of the treasury. mr. richardson had some qualifications of experience for the place, but wanted the essential traits of firmness and high motive. in the next year after taking office he was forced to resign, on account of a report of the committee of ways and means condemning him for his part in making a contract, while acting secretary of the treasury, with one sanborn, for collecting for the treasury, on shares, taxes which it was the business of regular officers of the government to collect. immense power was given by the contract, and the resources of the treasury department were put at the service of a crew of irresponsible inquisitors before whom the business community trembled. they extorted immense sums in dishonorable ways which aroused popular resentment. the president saw no wrong, and accepted secretary richardson's resignation unwillingly, at once nominating him to be chief justice of the court of claims, a reward for malfeasance which amazed the country, although the administration supporters in the senate confirmed it. general benjamin h. bristow, of kentucky, became secretary of the treasury, a man of superior ability, aggressive honesty, and moral firmness. he quickly uncovered a mass of various wrongdoing,--the safe-burglary frauds of the corrupt ring governing washington, the seal-lock frauds, the subsidy frauds, and, most formidable of all, the frauds of the powerful whiskey ring having headquarters in st. louis. the administration of the treasury department, especially the internal revenue bureau, was permeated with corruption. the worst feature of it all was that officers who desired to be upright found themselves powerless against the intrigues and the potent political influence of the rascals at the headquarters of executive authority. when the evidence of wrongdoing accumulated by the new secretary of the treasury was laid before the president he was dumfounded by its wickedness and extent, but showed himself resolute and vigorous in supporting his able and resourceful secretary. the trap was sprung in may, 1875. indictments were found against 150 private citizens and 86 government officers, among the latter the chief clerk in the treasury department, and the president's private secretary, general o. e. babcock. all the principal defendants were convicted except babcock, and he was dismissed by the president. during all these proceedings, in spite of the president's professions, the treasury department was beset by subtle hostile influences and impediments. the politicians who had the president's ear made him believe that it was the ruin of himself and his household that the investigators sought. only the enthusiastic popular approval of secretary bristow's brave course prevented yielding to the political backers of the corruption. when in the spring of 1876 bristow initiated a similar campaign against the corruptions rife on the pacific coast, the secretary was overruled and the government prosecutors were recalled. whereupon the secretary resigned, and no less than seven high treasury officials, who had been active in the crusade of reform, left the department at the same time. mr. bristow was succeeded by an honorable man,--the president had to appoint a man known to be pure,--lot m. morrill, of maine; but he was infirm, and all aggressive reform work ceased. in the war department, secretary belknap, sustained by the president, stripped general sherman of the rights and duties properly pertaining to his rank, of which grant himself, in the same place during johnson's administration, had protested against being deprived. sherman was subjected to such humiliations by his old commander, turned politician, that he abandoned washington and retired to st. louis. congress was a subservient participator in this shame, repealing the law that required all orders to the army to go through its general. but in february, 1876, it was discovered that belknap had been enriching himself by corrupt partnership with contractors in his department, and he hurriedly resigned, the president strangely accepting the resignation before congress could act. he was impeached, notwithstanding. he set up the defense that being no longer an official, he could not be impeached, and this being overruled, he was tried, but was not convicted. of his guilt the country had no doubt. then alphonso taft, an ohio judge, was made secretary of war. he was soon transferred to the attorney-general's office, and was succeeded by don cameron, already his father's lieutenant in control of the republican party of pennsylvania. columbus delano, secretary of the interior, had so mismanaged affairs, especially in the indian bureau, which teemed with flagrant abuses, that public opinion turned against him with great force, and in 1875 he had to abandon the office, in which he was succeeded by zachariah chandler, against whom no scandalous charge was made, although he was a rank partisan of the president. marshall jewell, of connecticut, became postmaster-general in 1874. he was a successful business man, and on taking the office he declared his purpose to conduct it on business principles. he attacked effectively a system long in vogue known as "straw-bids" for mail-carrying contracts. he introduced the railway post-office system, that has been of so much use in facilitating promptness of transmitting correspondence. but he also insisted on conducting his office with respect of its personnel as a business man would, that is, by making appointments and promotions for merit rather than for political influence. this was intolerable to the spoilsmen in politics; and within two years he was summarily dismissed in a manner as graceless and cruel as any president, no matter how unfortunately bred, was ever guilty of. jewell was succeeded by james n. tyner, an entirely complaisant official. in 1875 congress neglected to make any appropriation for the civil service reform commission, and its work was suspended. during this time affairs in the southern states were, as a rule, growing worse and worse. the unreasonable arrogance and oppressive extravagance of the freedmen where they were in control, under the leadership of reckless carpet-baggers, and still more reckless and malicious white natives, had produced a revulsion in the minds of all at the north who regarded justice, honor, and honesty as essentials of good government. there were exceptions, like oases in the desert of ignorance and vice. the administration of governor chamberlain in south carolina was an instance of an earnest and partially successful endeavor to educe good government from desperate conditions. the colored race abused its privilege of the ballot with suicidal persistency. the experiment of maintaining bad state governments by the presence and activity of federal troops did not tend to social pacification. reconstruction in its earlier fruits was an obvious failure; and again, if the apparent paradox can be understood, lawless violence began asserting itself as the only hopeful means of preserving property, civil rights, and civilization itself. during the second term the report was persistently circulated that grant and those who followed his star were scheming for another term, in order to give him in civil office, as in military rank, a distinction higher than washington or any american had obtained. the proposal shocked the public sense of propriety; but its treatment by those who alone could repudiate it became ominous. the republican state convention of 1875 in pennsylvania boldly declared unalterable opposition to the third-term idea. grant then spoke. in a letter to the convention's chairman he said: "now, for the third term, i do not want it any more than i did the first." after calling attention to the fact that the constitution did not forbid a third term, and that an occasion might arise when a third term might be wisely given, he said that he was not a candidate for a third nomination, and "would not accept it, if tendered, unless under such circumstances as to make it an imperative duty--circumstances not likely to arise." this was justly regarded as a politician's letter, and increased alarm instead of allaying it. the national house of representatives (which the elections of 1874 had made a democratic body), by a vote of 234 to 18, passed the following resolution: "that in the opinion of this house the precedent, established by washington and other presidents of the united states after their second term, has become, by universal consent, a part of our republican system of government, and that any departure from this time-honored custom would be unwise, unpatriotic, and fraught with peril to our free institutions." as 70 republicans voted for this resolution, it was practically the voice of both parties, and it dispelled the spectre of "cæsarism," as the third-term idea was called. there is reason to believe that if it had caused less alarm it would have assumed a more substantial aspect. during the excited and perilous four months after the election of 1876, when civil war and anarchy were imminent on account of the disputed result of the people's suffrage, the conduct of the president was admirable. he let it be understood that violence would be suppressed, without hesitation, at any cost. he preserved the _status quo_, and compelled peaceful patience. the condition was one which summoned into action his genius of supreme command, and it shone with its former splendor of authority. on the 4th of march, 1877, he became a private citizen. chapter xviii the tour of the world upon leaving the presidency general grant retained the distinction of first citizen of the nation. there was no fame of living man that could vie with his. his old form of modesty and simplicity was resumed. as soon as he stepped down from the pedestal of power the criticism of duty and the criticism of malice both ceased. a generous people was glad to forget his errors and remember only his patriotism and his transcendent successes in arms. even those who had most deprecated his mistakes as a civil magistrate were hardly sorry that he had been repeatedly rewarded for his great services by the highest honor popular suffrage could bestow. they were ready to believe, as, indeed, was true, that in most of the things deserving reprobation he was the victim of his innocence of selfish politics and his unwary friendships, of which baser men had taken foul advantage. they were glad for his sake, as much as for their own, that he was no longer president grant, but again general grant, a title purely reminiscent and complimentary, for he was no longer an officer of the army. with all his honors about him, he stood on the common level of citizenship, as when he was a farmer in missouri or a tanner's clerk in galena. there came to him then the desire to see other lands and peoples and to meet the renowned commanders in other wars, the actors in other statesmanship. it was determined that he should have all the opportunities and advantages which the national prestige could command for its foremost unofficial representative. no other american had gone abroad whose achievements bespoke for him so respectful a welcome among the great. every aid was availed of to make it apparent that our nation expected him to be entertained as its beloved hero. he sailed from philadelphia on may 17, 1877, and, returning, he landed in san francisco september 20, 1879, having made the circuit of the globe. of such another progress there is no record. he visited nearly every country of europe, the holy land, egypt, syria, india, burmah, china, siam, and japan, being everywhere received as the guest of their rulers, and welcomed by the chief representatives of their statesmanship, their learning, and their social life. he was received with high courtesies by queen victoria of england, president mcmahon and president grévy of france, the emperors of germany, russia, and austria, the kings of belgium, italy, holland, sweden, and spain, pope leo xiii., the sultan of turkey, the khedive of egypt, the duke of wellington, prince bismarck, m. gambetta, lord lytton, viceroy of india, king thebau of burmah, prince kung of china, the emperor of siam, the mikado of japan, and many others only less famous. with few exceptions he met under the most favorable circumstances all persons of note in all the lands he visited. extraordinary pains were taken to promote the comfort of his party, and to enable its members to see whatever was most worth seeing. the recipient of all this flattering attention bore himself with a simple dignity that won the respect of the high and the low alike. he was neither awed nor abashed among the great, nor was he haughty or presuming among the common people. the nation at home followed his progress with pride and gratification. when he landed in san francisco, he was welcomed as a favorite who had achieved new distinction for himself and his land, and his leisurely way across the continent was marked by a series of ovations all the way to new york. to complete his itinerary, he soon made a tour of the west indies and of mexico, visiting the scenes where he had won his first laurels, as lieutenant grant, thirty years before. he was honored as the warrior whose victories, besides uniting and exalting his native land, had delivered mexico from the imposition of an alien imperialism. unfortunately, this revived popularity of general grant was taken advantage of by a faction of the republican party to urge again his reëlection to the presidency. new york, pennsylvania, and illinois were committed to his support by the influence of their powerful republican leaders; but not unanimously. the movement is supposed to have been undertaken without consultation with grant; but he did nothing to discourage it, and to this extent he consented to it. the attempt failed. prudent people had no mind to have their hero's good name again made opprobrious by fresh scandals, which they could not but dread. chapter xix reverses of fortune--ill health--his last victory--the end general grant now made his home in the city of new york. he was not wealthy, and he desired to be. the only persons he seemed to envy, and particularly to court, were those who had great possessions. he coveted a fortune that should place his family beyond any chance of poverty. this weakness was his undoing. he became the private partner of an unscrupulous schemer and robber, and intrusted to him all that he had, and more, to be adventured in speculation. his name was dishonored in wall street by association with a scoundrel whom prudent financiers distrusted and shunned. he was warned, but would not heed the warnings. the charitable view is that he was deceived by repayments which he was told were profits. on may 6, 1884, a crisis came and grant was ruined. he gave up everything he possessed in the struggle to redeem his honor, even the presents and trophies which had been lavishly bestowed upon him. this savior of his country and recipient of its grateful generosity, who was but lately the guest of the princes of the earth, became dependent upon pitying friends for shelter and bread, until enterprising editors of magazines began competing for contributions from his pen. and, as if his misfortunes were not yet sufficiently desperate, illness came. a malignant, incurable cancer appeared in his mouth. he stood face to face with the last enemy, the always victorious one, and realized that the rest of life was but a few months of increasing torture. then the magnificent courage of his soul asserted itself in fortitude unequaled at donelson, or vicksburg, or chattanooga, or the wilderness. no eye saw him quail; no ear heard him complain. it was suggested that if he would write a book, an autobiographical memoir, the profit of it, doubtless, would place his family above want. nothing can be imagined more unacceptable to general grant's native disposition than the narration for the public of his own life story. but in his circumstances, the question was not one of sentiment, but only of duty to those who were dependent upon him. the task was undertaken resolutely, and, in spite of physical weakness and suffering, was carried on with as high and faithful energy as he had shown in any campaign of the war. on march 3, 1885, he was restored to the army with the rank of general on the retired list with full pay. he was glad; but in his feebleness joy was as hard to bear as grief. he began failing more rapidly. in june he was taken to the sweet tonic air of a cottage on mount mcgregor, near saratoga. here, in pleasant weather, he could sit in the open air and enjoy the agreeable prospect. but whether indoors or out, he toiled at the book in every possible moment, writing with a pencil on tablets while he had strength, then dictating in almost inaudible whispers, little by little, to an amanuensis. so, toilsomely, through intense suffering, sustained by indomitable will, this legacy to his family and the world was completed to the end of the war. his last battle was won. four days after the victory, he died, july 23, 1885. the book had a success beyond all sanguine expectations, and accomplished the purpose of its author. to his countrymen it was a revelation of the heart of the man, ulysses grant, in its nobility, its simplicity, and its charity, that has endeared him beyond any knowledge afforded by the outward manifestations of his life. his conversations in his last days, as reported by visitors to mount mcgregor (among these was general buckner, who surrendered fort donelson), show a soul serene and cheerful, devoted to his country, to humanity, and to peace. no experiences of malevolence and injury had shaken his trust in the goodness of the great majority of mankind. when the great soldier died he owned no uniform in which he could be suitably attired for the grave, no sword to be laid on his coffin. his body lies in the magnificent tomb, erected by the voluntary contributions of admiring citizens, the commanding attraction of a beautiful park overlooking the broad hudson as it sweeps past the nation's chief city. already this resting place has become a veritable shrine of patriotism. military and naval pageants make it their proper goal, as when, after santiago, the returning battleships moved in stately procession up the hudson to the tomb of our national military hero, there to thunder forth the triumphant salute, like a summons to his spirit to bestow an approval. * * * * * the riverside press _electrotyped and printed by h. o. houghton & co. cambridge, mass., u. s. a._ * * * * * proofreading team note: older books often abbreviated words as contractions, and printed them as superscripts; for example, publi^ns for publications. this style is used in this text and the ^ symbol represents the beginning of the contraction and superscript. letters of ulysses s. grant to his father and his youngest sister, 1857-78 edited by his nephew jesse grant cramer with portraits 1912 preface there has of late years been a tendency, as a result of the teachings of certain historical authorities, to minimize the influence of the leadership of the so-called great men, and to question the importance of their work as a factor in shaping the history of the time. great events are referred to as brought about by such general influences as "the spirit of the time" (goethe's _zeitgeist_), the "movement of humanity," or "forces of society." if we accepted the theories of the writers of this school, we should be forced to the conclusion that generations of men move across the world's stage impelled by forces entirely outside of themselves; and that as far as the opportunity of individual action is concerned, that is for action initiated and completed under his own will-power, man might almost as well be a squirrel working in a revolving cage. the squirrel imagines that he moves the cylinder, but the outsider knows that the movement is predetermined, and that there is no change of position and no net result from the exertion. a large number of people hold, notwithstanding, to the old-time feeling expressed, and doubtless exaggerated and over-emphasized, in such books as carlyle's _hero worship_. they are unwilling, and in fact they find it practically impossible, to get away from the belief that the thought of the time is directed by the great thinkers, and that the action of the community is influenced and largely shaped by the power, whether this be utilized for good or for evil, of the great men of action. in any case, men will continue to be interested in the personalities of the leaders whose names are connected with the great events of history. the citizens of each nation look back with legitimate pride upon the patriotic work of those who have helped to found the state, or to maintain its existence. among the national leaders whose names will always hold an honorable place in american history is ulysses s. grant, the simple-hearted man and capable soldier, to whose patriotism, courage, persistence, and skill was so largely due the successful termination of the war between the states, the contest which assured the foundations of the republic. we are interested not only in learning what this man did, but in coming to know, as far as may be practicable, what manner of man he was. it is all-important in a study of development of character to have placed within reach the utterances of the man himself. there is no utterance that can give as faithful a picture of a man's method of thought and principle of action as the personal letter written, with no thought of later publication, to those who are near to him. the publishers deem themselves fortunate, therefore, in being able to place before the fellow-citizens of general grant who are appreciative of the great service rendered by him to the country, and who are interested also in the personality of the man, a series of letters written to members of his family or to near friends. these letters, dating back to the time of his youth, give a clear and trustworthy impression of the nature of the man and of the development of character and of force that made possible his all-valuable leadership. the plan for the publication of these letters had received the cordial approval of general grant's son, the late general frederick d. grant, and it is only because of his sudden death, which has brought sorrow upon a great circle of friends and upon the community at large, that the publishers are prevented from including with the volume a letter from the general as the head of the grant family, giving formal expression to his personal interest in the undertaking. this collection of letters will constitute a suitable companion volume to grant's _personal memoirs_ and to the accepted biographies of the great commander whose memory is honored by his fellow-citizens not only for the patience, persistence, and skill of the leader of armies, as evidenced in the brilliant campaigns that culminated with vicksburg, missionary ridge, and appomattox, but for the sturdy integrity of character, modest bearing, and sweetness of nature of the great citizen. geo. haven putnam. new york, april 25, 1912. illustrations ulysses simpson grant (frontispiece) from a photograph by w. kurtz, new york. jesse root grant, ætat. 69 father of ulysses simpson grant. from a photograph. mrs. hannah grant mother of ulysses simpson grant. from a photograph by landy, taken in cincinnati. facsimile of a letter written by ulysses simpson grant to his father facsimile of general grant's proclamation to the citizens of paducah general ulysses simpson grant from a photograph taken in 1865 by gutekunst, philadelphia. ulysses simpson grant from a photograph taken during his second term as president. letters of ulysses s. grant [in 1843, at the age of twenty-one, ulysses s. grant was graduated from west point with the rank of brevet second lieutenant. he was appointed to the 4th infantry, stationed at jefferson barracks near st. louis. in may, 1844, he was ordered to the frontier of louisiana with the army of observation, while the annexation of texas was pending. the bill for the annexation of texas was passed march 1, 1845; the war with mexico began in april, 1846. grant was promoted to a first-lieutenancy september, 1847. the mexican war closed in 1848. both this war and the civil war he characterizes in his _memoirs_ as "unholy." soon after his return from mexico he was married to julia dent. the next six years were spent in military duty in sacketts harbor, new york, detroit, michigan, and on the pacific coast. he was promoted to the captaincy of a company in 1853; but because of the inadequacy of a captain's pay, he resigned from the army, july, 1854, and rejoined his wife and children at st. louis. in speaking of this period grant says, "i was now to commence at the age of thirty-two a new struggle for our support." the first chapter in this new struggle was farming. the following letter was written to his youngest sister mary, then sixteen years old, afterward mrs. m.j. cramer. "jennie," afterward mrs. a.r. corbin, was the second sister, virginia.] st. louis, mo., august 22nd, 1857. dear sister: your letter was received on last tuesday, the only day in the week on which we get mail, and this is the earliest opportunity i have had of posting a letter. i am glad to hear that mother and jennie intend making us a visit. i would advise them to come by the river if they prefer it. write to me beforehand about the time you will start, and from louisville again, what boat you will be on, direct to st. louis,--not sappington, p.o.--and i will meet you at the river or planter's house, or wherever you direct. we are all very well. julia contemplates visiting st. charles next saturday to spend a few days. she has never been ten miles from home, except to come to the city, since her visit to covington. i have nothing in particular to write about. my hard work is now over for the season with a fair prospect of being remunerated in everything but the wheat. my wheat, which would have produced from four to five hundred bushels with a good winter, has yielded only seventy-five. my oats were good, and the corn, if not injured by frost this fall, will be the best i ever raised. my potato crop bids fair to yield fifteen hundred bushels or more. sweet potatoes, melons and cabbages are the only other articles i am raising for market. in fact, the oats and corn i shall not sell. i see i have written a part of this letter as if i intended to direct to one, and part as if to the other of you; but you will understand it, so it makes no difference. write to me soon and often. julia wears black. i had forgotten to answer that part of your letter. your affectionate brother, ulyss. p.s. tell father that i have this moment seen mr. ford, just from sacketts harbor, who informs me that while there he enquired of mr. bagley about my business with camp, and learns from him that the account should be acted upon immediately. camp is now at governor's island, n.y., and intends sailing soon for oregon. if he is stopped he may be induced to disgorge. tell father to forward the account immediately. u. [white haven was the name of the dent homestead near st. louis. grant has rented out his own farm, and taken that of his father-in-law. written to his sister mary.] white haven, march 21st, 1858. dear sister: your letter was received one week ago last tuesday, and i would have answered it by the next mail but it so happened that there was not a sheet of paper about the house, and as spring has now set in, i do not leave the farm except in cases of urgent necessity. father's letter, enclosing mr. bagley's relative to the camp business, was received one or two weeks earlier, and promptly answered. my reply was long, giving a detailed account of my whole transactions with camp, and a copy of which father can have to peruse when he comes along this way next. julia and her children are all well and talk of making you a visit next fall,--but i hardly think they will go. but if any of you, except father, should visit us this spring, or early summer, julia says that fred. may go home with you to spend a few months. she says she would be afraid to let him travel with father alone; she has an idea that he is so absent-minded that if he were to arrive in cincinnati at night he would be just as apt as not to walk out of the cars and be gone for an hour before he would recollect that he had a child with him. i have no such fears however. fred does not read yet, but he will, i think, in a few weeks. we have no school within a mile and a half, and that is too far to send him in the winter season. i shall commence sending him soon however. in the meantime i have no doubt but that he is learning faster at home. little ellen is growing very fast, and talks now quite plainly. jesse r. is growing very rapidly, is very healthy and, they say, is the best looking child among the four. i don't think however there is much difference between them in that respect. emma dent is talking of visiting her relatives in ohio and penn^a this summer, and if she does, she will stop a time with you. any talk of any of us visiting you, must not stop you from coming to see us. the whole family here are fond of planning visits, but poor in the execution of their plans. it may take two seasons yet before any of these visits are made; in the meantime, we are anxious to see all of you. for my part i do not know when i shall ever be able to leave home long enough for a visit. i may possibly be able to go on a flying visit next fall. i am anxious to make one more visit home before i get old. this spring has opened finely for farming and i hope to do well; but i shall wait until the crops are gathered before i make any predictions. i have now three negro men, two hired by the year and one of mr. dent's, which, with my own help, i think, will enable me to do my farming pretty well with assistance in harvest. i have however a large farm. i shall have about twenty acres of potatoes, twenty of corn, twenty-five of oats, fifty of wheat, twenty-five of meadow, some clover, hungarian grass and other smaller products, all of which require labor before they are got into market, and the money realized upon them. you are aware, i believe, that i have rented out my place and have taken mr. dent's. there are about two hundred acres of ploughed land on it and i shall have, in a few weeks, about two hundred and fifty acres of woods pasture fenced up besides. only one side of it and a part of another has to be fenced to take the whole of it in, and the rails are all ready. i must close with the wish that some of you would visit us as early as possible. in your letter you ask when my note in bank becomes due. the seventeenth of apl. is the last day of grace when it must be paid. give julia's, the children's, and my love to all at home and write soon. your brother ulysses. [when a boy grant suffered severely from fever and ague. this attack now lasted a year and was probably a factor in determining him to give up farming. to his sister mary.] st. louis, mo., sept. 7th, 1858. dear sister: your letter was received in due time and i should have answered it immediately, but that i had mailed a letter from julia to jennie the morning of the receipt of yours. i thought then to wait for two or three weeks; by that time there was so much sickness in my family, and freddy so dangerously ill, that i thought i would not write until his fate was decided. he was nearly taken from us by the bilious, then by the typhoid fever; but he is now convalescing. some seven of the negroes have been sick. mrs. sharp is here on a visit, and she and one of her children are sick; and julia and i are both sick with chills and fever. if i had written to you earlier it would have been whilst fred's case was a doubtful one, and i did not want to distress you when it could have done no good to anyone.--i have been thinking of paying you a visit this fall, but i now think it extremely doubtful whether i shall be able to. not being able to even attend to my hands, much less work myself, i am getting behindhand, so that i shall have to stay here and attend to my business. cannot some of you come and pay us a visit? jennie has not answered julia's letter yet. did she receive it? i was coming to the city the day it was written to hear a political speech, and it was too late to get it in the post office, so i gave it to a young man to put in the next morning. it is for this reason i asked the question. write to me soon. i hope you have had none of the sickness we have been troubled with. your brother, ulysses. to mary f. grant, covington, ky. [soon after the date of this letter grant sold at auction his stock, crops, and farming implements, and gave up farming. his father, jesse root grant, had founded a leather store in galena with the expectation of establishing his three sons in the business, and withdrawing from all connection with it himself. it is this business opportunity that is referred to here with characteristic independence, "i should prefer your offer to any one of mere salary that could be offered." but it was not until may, 1860, that he went to galena, nominally as a clerk, in reality as a future partner in the business.] st. louis, oct. 1st, 1858. dear father: i arrived at home on tuesday evening, and, it being my "chill" day, of course felt very badly. julia had been much worse during my absence, but had improved again so that i found her about as when i left home. fred, has improved steadily, and can now hear nearly as well as before his sickness. the rest of the family are tolerably well, with the exception of mr. dent whose health seems to be about as when i left. mr. dent and myself will make a sale this fall and get clear of all the stock on the place, and then rent out the cleared land and sell about four hundred acres of the north end of the place. as i explained to you, this will include my place. i shall plan to go to covington towards spring, and would prefer your offer to any one of mere salary that could be offered. i do not want any place for permanent stipulated pay, but want the prospect of one day doing business for myself. there is a pleasure in knowing that one's income depends somewhat upon his own exertions and business capacity, that cannot be felt when so much and no more is coming in, regardless of the success of the business engaged in or the manner in which it is done. mr. dent thinks i had better take the boy he has given julia along with me, and let him learn the farrier's business. he is a very smart, active boy, capable of making anything; but this matter i will leave entirely to you. i can leave him here and get about three dollars per month for him now, and more as he gets older. give my love to all at home. yours truly, ulysses. to j.r. grant, esq., covington, ky. [after giving up farming grant engaged in the real estate business in st. louis, with a mr. boggs as partner. the girls referred to are his three sisters. simpson is the brother next in age to himself.] st. louis, mo., march 12th, 1859. dear father: it has now been over a month, i believe, since i wrote to you last, although i expected to have written again the next week. i can hardly tell how the new business i am engaged in, is going to succeed, but i believe it will be something more than a support. if i find an opportunity next week i will send you some of our cards, which, if you will distribute among such persons as may have business to attend to in the city, such as buying or selling property, collecting either rents or other liabilities, it may prove the means of giving us additional commissions. mr. benton was here for some time and used to call in to see me frequently. whilst he was here i submitted to him some property for sale, belonging to a mr. tucker. since mr. benton's departure, mr. tucker has called several times and wants me to submit his propositions again, and say that if he is disposed to buy, and pay considerable cash, he will make his prices such as to secure to him a good investment. i enclose with this a list of the property, and prices, as first asked, one third cash, balance one and two years. please tell mr. benton if he feels like making any proposition for any part of this property to let me know, and i will submit it and give him an answer. we are living now in the lower part of the city full two miles from my office. the house is a comfortable little one, just suited to my means. we have one spare room, and also a spare bed in the children's room, so that we can accommodate any of our friends that are likely to come to see us. i want two of the girls, or all of them for that matter, to come and pay us a long visit soon. julia and the children are well. they will not make a visit to kentucky now. i was anxious to have them go before i rented, but with four children she could not go without a servant, and she was afraid that landing so often as she would have to do in free states, she might have some trouble. tell one of the girls to write soon. has simpson gone south? are you going to the city to live? yours truly, u.s. grant. to j.r. grant, esq., covington, ky. [orvil is the youngest brother. the appointment referred to was one for the position of county engineer. free-soilers: "the whig party had ceased to exist ... ; the know nothing party had taken its place but was on the wane; the republican party was in a chaotic state and had not yet received a name. it had no existence in the slave states except at points on the borders next to free states. in st. louis city and county what afterwards became the republican party was known as the free soil democracy."--_memoirs_. professorship of mathematics: when grant left the military academy he had no intention of remaining in the army. he then expected to teach mathematics, and had already applied for such a position at west point. at jefferson barracks his chief interest was the study of higher mathematics with the view of obtaining a professorship. the mexican war, however, soon drew him into active military life. the real estate venture was unsuccessful; it was a business even then much overcrowded. necessity, not instability, dictated the various experiments.] st. louis, aug. 20th, 1859. dear father: on last wednesday i received your letter, and on the monday before one from mr. burk, from both of which i much regretted to learn of simpson's continued ill health. i at once wrote to orvil, whose arrival at galena i learned from burk's letter, to urge simpson to come by steamer to st. louis and spend some time with me, and if it should prove necessary for anyone to accompany him, i would take him home. cannot jennie and orvil's wife come this way when they start for galena? we would like very much to see them. i am not over sanguine of getting the appointment mentioned in my last letter. the board of commissioners, who make the appointment, are divided,--three free soilers to two opposed,--and although friends who are recommending me are the very first citizens of this place, and members of all parties, i fear they will make strictly party nominations for all the offices under their control. as to the professorship you speak of, that was filled some time ago. and were it not, i would stand no earthly chance. the washington university, where the vacancy was to be filled, is one of the best endowed institutions in the united states, and all the professorships are sought after by persons whose early advantages were the same as mine, but who have been engaged in teaching all their mature years. quimby, who was the best mathematician in my class, and who was for several years an assistant at west point, and for nine years a professor in an institution in new york, was an unsuccessful applicant. the appointment was given to the most distinguished man in his department in the country, and an author. his name is shorano. since putting in my application for the appointment of county engineer, i have learned that the place is not likely to be filled before february next. what i shall do will depend entirely upon what i can get to do. our present business is entirely overdone in this city, at least a dozen new houses having started about the same time i commenced. i do not want to fly from one thing to another, nor would i, but i am compelled to make a living from the start for which i am willing to give all my time and all my energy. julia and the children are well and send love to you. on your way to galena can you not come by here? write to me soon. ulysses. [in regard to voting for buchanan for president, grant says in his _memoirs_ that he believed that the election of a republican president in 1856 would mean the secession of all the slave states and inevitable rebellion. accordingly, he preferred the success of a candidate whose election would prevent or postpone secession, to seeing the country plunged into a war the end of which no man could foretell. "with a democrat elected by the unanimous vote of the slave states, there would be no pretext for secession for four years. i very much hoped that the passions of the people would subside in that time, and the catastrophe be averted altogether; if it were not, i believed the country would be better prepared to receive the shock and to resist it. i therefore voted for james buchanan for president."] st. louis, sept. 23d, 1859. dear father: i have waited for some time to write you the result of the action of the county commissioners upon the appointment of a county engineer. the question has at length been settled, and i am sorry to say, adversely to me. the two democratic commissioners voted for me, and the free soilers against me. what i shall now go at i have not determined, but i hope something before a great while. next month i get possession of my own house, when my expenses will be reduced so much that a very moderate salary will support me. if i could get the $3000 note cashed, which i got as the difference in the exchange of property, i could put up with the proceeds two houses that would pay me, at least, $40 per month rent. the note has five years to run, with interest notes given separately and payable annually. we are looking for some of you here next week to go to the fair. i wrote to simpson to come down and see me but as i have had no answer from him nor from orvil to a letter written some time before, i do not know whether he will come or not. i should like very much to have some of you come and see us this fall. julia and the children are all very well. fred and buck go to school every day. they never think of asking to stay at home. you may judge from the result of the action of the county commissioners that i am strongly identified with the democratic party. such is not the case. i never voted an out and out democratic ticket in my life. i voted for buchanan for president to defeat fremont, but not because he was my first choice. in all other elections i have universally selected the candidates that, in my estimation, were the best fitted for the different offices, and it never happens that such men are all arrayed on one side. the strongest friend i had in the board of commissioners is a free soiler but opposition between parties is so strong that he would not vote for any one, no matter how friendly, unless at least one of his own party would go with him. the free soil party felt themselves bound to provide for one of their own party who was defeated for the office of county engineer; a german who came to the west as an assistant surveyor upon the public lands, and who has held an office ever since. there is, i believe, but one paying office in the county held by an american, unless you except the office of sheriff which is held by a frenchman who speaks broken english, but was born here. write to me soon. julia and the children join me in sending love to all of you. yours truly, ulysses. [to his brother simpson. this letter is a naive expression of a fundamental trait in grant's character, belief in the essential honesty of every man.] st. louis, oct. 24th, 1859. dear brother: i have been postponing writing to you hoping to make a return for your horse, but as yet i have received nothing for him. about two weeks ago a man spoke to me for him and said that he would try him the next day, and if he suited, give me $100 for him. i have not seen the man since; but one week ago last saturday he went to the stable and got the horse, saddle and bridle, since which i have seen neither man nor horse. from this i presume he must like him. the man, i understand, lives in florisant, about twelve miles from the city. my family are all well and living in our own house. it is much more pleasant than where we lived when you were here, and contains practically about as much room. i am still unemployed, but expect to have a place in the custom house from the first of next month. my name has been forwarded for the appointment of superintendent, which, if i do not get, will not probably be filled at all. in that case there is a vacant desk which i may get that pays $1200 per annum. the other will be worth from $1500 to $1800 and will occupy but little time. remember me to all at home. there is a gentleman here who has lands in san antonio de bexar county, texas, that would like to get you, should you go there this winter, to look after them. if you go, and will attend to his business, drop me a line and he will furnish me all the papers, and instructions, to forward to you. yours, u.s. grant. p.s. the man that has your horse is the owner of a row of six three story brick houses in this city, and the probabilities are that he intends to give me an order on his agent for the money on the first of the month when the rents are paid. at all events i imagine the horse is perfectly safe. u.s.g. [grant had given up the real estate business and had come to galena in may, 1860, as has been said, nominally as a clerk in his father's store, but really as a prospective partner in the business. in march, 1861, lincoln was inaugurated president. the confederates proclaimed themselves aliens; south carolina seceded; other southern states followed; fort sumter was fired upon, and president lincoln issued his first call for troops, 75,000 volunteers. the quota for illinois had been fixed at six regiments. galena immediately raised a company. grant declined the captaincy but promised his aid in every way possible.] galena, april 21st, 1861. dear father: we are now in the midst of trying times when every one must be for or against his country, and show his colors too, by his every act. having been educated for such an emergency, at the expense of the government, i feel that it has upon me superior claims, such claims as no ordinary motives of self-interest can surmount. i do not wish to act hastily or unadvisedly in the matter, and as there are more than enough to respond to the first call of the president, i have not yet offered myself. i have promised, and am giving all the assistance i can in organizing the company whose services have been accepted from this place. i have promised further to go with them to the state capital, and if i can be of service to the governor in organizing his state troops to do so. what i ask now is your approval of the course i am taking, or advice in the matter. a letter written this week will reach me in springfield. i have not time to write to you but a hasty line, for, though sunday as it is, we are all busy here. in a few minutes i shall be engaged in directing tailors in the style and trim of uniform for our men. whatever may have been my political opinions before, i have but one sentiment now. that is, we have a government, and laws and a flag, and they must all be sustained. there are but two parties now, traitors and patriots and i want hereafter to be ranked with the latter, and i trust, the stronger party. i do not know but you may be placed in an awkward position, and a dangerous one pecuniarily, but costs cannot now be counted. my advice would be to leave where you are if you are not safe with the views you entertain. i would never stultify my opinion for the sake of a little security. i will say nothing about our business. orvil and lank will keep you posted as to that. write soon and direct as above. yours truly, u.s. grant. [to his sister mary. grant organized and drilled the galena company, then went with it to springfield, the state capital, and mustered it into the state service. governor yates then requested him to remain and assist in the adjutant-general's office, because he realized the value of grant's former military experience. shortly after this the legislature authorized the state to accept the services of ten additional regiments. governor yates requested grant to muster these new troops into the service. the aunt rachel mentioned was a sister of jesse r. grant, who lived in virginia. she had a large plantation and owned many slaves, and was naturally an ardent secessionist. a heated partisan correspondence was carried on during this time between the aunt and the niece clara, grant's oldest sister. in the letter referred to, the aunt writes, "if you are with the accursed lincolnites, the ties of consanguinity shall be forever severed."] springfield, april 29th, 1861. dear sister: i came to this place several days ago, fully expecting to find a letter here for me from father. as yet i have received none. it was my intention to have returned to galena last evening, but the governor detained me, and i presume will want me to remain with him until all the troops are called into service, or those to be so called, are fully mustered in and completely organized. the enthusiasm throughout this state surpasses anything that could have been imagined three weeks ago. only six regiments are called for here, while at least thirty could be promptly raised. the governor, and all others in authority, are harassed from morning until night with patriotic men, and such political influence as they can bring, to obtain first promises of acceptance of their companies, if there should be another call for troops. the eagerness to enter companies that were accepted by the governor, was so great that it has been impossible for commanders of companies to keep their numbers within the limits of the law, consequently companies that have arrived here have all had from ten to sixty men more than can be accepted. the legislature on saturday last passed a bill providing for the maintenance and discipline of these surplus troops for one month, unless sooner mustered into service of the united states under a second call.--i am convinced that if the south knew the entire unanimity of the north for the union and maintenance of law, and how freely men and money are offered to the cause, they would lay down their arms at once in humble submission. there is no disposition to compromise now. nearly every one is anxious to see the government fully tested as to its strength, and see if it is not worth preserving. the conduct of eastern virginia has been so abominable through the whole contest that there would be a great deal of disappointment here if matters should be settled before she is thoroughly punished. this is my feeling, and i believe it universal. great allowance should be made for south carolinians, for the last generation have been educated, from their infancy, to look upon their government as oppressive and tyrannical and only to be endured till such time as they might have sufficient strength to strike it down. virginia, and other border states, have no such excuse and are therefore traitors at heart as well as in act. i should like very much to see the letter aunt rachel wrote clara! or a copy of it. can't you send it? when i left galena, julia and the children were very well. jesse had been very sick for a few days but was getting much better. i have been very anxious that you should spend the summer with us. you have never visited us and i don't see why you can't. two of you often travel together, and you might do so again, and come out with clara. i do not like to urge anything of the kind, lest you should think that i ignored entirely the question of economy, but i do not do so. the fact is i have had my doubts whether or not it would not be more prudent for all of you to lock up and leave, until the present excitement subsides. if father were younger and simpson strong and healthy, i would not advise such a course. on the contrary, i would like to see every union man in the border slave states remain firm at his post. every such man is equal to an armed volunteer at this time in defence of his country. there is very little that i can tell you that you do not get from the papers. remember me to all at home and write to me at once, to this place. brother ulysses. [grant is now assisting in the adjutant-general's office, as requested by governor yates. in connection with the call for troops and the enthusiastic response, he says elsewhere, "there was not a state in the north of a million inhabitants that would not have furnished the entire number faster than arms would have been supplied to them, if it had been necessary."] general head-quarters, state of illinois, adjutant-general's office springfield, may 2nd, 1861. dear father: your letter of the 24th inst was received the same evening one i had written to mary was mailed. i would have answered earlier but for the fact i had just written. i am not a volunteer, and indeed could not be, now that i did not go into the first company raised in galena. the call of the president was so promptly responded to that only those companies that organized at once, and telegraphed their application to come in, were received. all other applications were filed, and there are enough of them to furnish illinois quota if the army should be raised to 300,000 men. i am serving on the governor's staff at present at his request, but suppose i shall not be here long. i should have offered myself for the colonelcy of one of the regiments, but i find all those places are wanted by politicians who are up to log-rolling, and i do not care to be under such persons. the war feeling is not abating here much, although hostilities appear more remote than they did a few days ago. three of the six regiments mustered in from this state are now at cairo, and probably will be reinforced with two others within a few days. galena has several more companies organized but only one of them will be able to come in under a new call for ten regiments. chicago has raised companies enough nearly to fill all the first call. the northern feeling is so fully aroused that they will stop at no expense of money and men to insure the success of their cause. i presume the feeling is just as strong on the other side, but they are infinitely in the minority in resources. i have not heard from galena since coming down here, but presume all is moving along smoothly. my advice was not to urge collections from such men as we knew to be good, and to make no efforts to sell in the present distracted state of our currency. the money will not buy eastern exchange and is liable to become worse; i think that thirty days from this we shall have specie, and the bills of good foreign banks to do business on, and then will be the time to collect. if mary writes to me any time next week she may direct here to ulysses. [e.b. washburn was member of congress representing galena. pillow was a confederate general. he had served in the mexican war, where grant had learned to know him. grant expresses in this letter the opinion that the war will be of short duration. many believed with him that the war would be over in thirty days. he continued to think this until the battle of shiloh. he believed that there would have been no more battles in the west after the capture of fort donelson if all the troops in that region had been under a single commander who would have followed up that victory.] camp yates, near springfield, may 6th, 1861. dear father: your second letter, dated the first of may has just come to hand. i commenced writing you a letter three or four days ago but was interrupted so often that i did not finish it. i wrote one to mary which no doubt was duly received, but do not remember whether it answers your questions or not. at the time our first galena company was raised i did not feel at liberty to engage in hot haste, but took an active interest in drilling them, and imparting all the instruction i could, and at the request of the members of the company, and of mr. washburn, i came here for the purpose of assisting for a short time in camp, and of offering, if necessary, my services for the war. the next two days after my arrival it was rainy and muddy so that the troops could not drill and i concluded to go home. governor yates heard it and requested me to remain. since that i have been acting in that capacity, and for the last few days have been in command of this camp. the last of the six regiments called for from this state, will probably leave by to-morrow, or the day following, and then i shall be relieved from this command. the legislature of this state provided for the raising of eleven additional regiments and a battalion of artillery; a portion of these the governor will appoint me to muster into the service of the state, when i presume my services may end. i might have obtained the colonelcy of a regiment possibly, but i was perfectly sickened at the political wire-pulling for all these commissions, and would not engage in it. i shall be in no ways backward in offering my services when and where they are required, but i feel that i have done more now than i could do serving as a captain under a green colonel, and if this thing continues they will want more men at a later day. there have been fully 30,000 more volunteers who have offered their services, than can be accepted under the present call, without including the call made by the state; but i can go back to galena and drill the three or four companies there, and render them efficient for any future call. my own opinion is that this war will be but of short duration. the administration has acted most prudently and sagaciously so far in not bringing on a conflict before it had its forces fully marshalled. when they do strike, our thoroughly loyal states will be fully protected, and a few decisive victories in some of the southern ports will send the secession army howling, and the leaders in the rebellion will flee the country. all the states will then be loyal for a generation to come. negroes will depreciate so rapidly in value that nobody will want to own them, and their masters will be the loudest in their declamation against the institution from a political and economic point of view. the negro will never disturb this country again. the worst that is to be apprehended from him is now: he may revolt and cause more destruction than any northern man, except it be the ultra-abolitionist, wants to see. a northern army may be required in the next ninety days to go south to suppress a negro insurrection. as much as the south have vilified the north, that army would go on such a mission and with the purest motives. i have just received a letter from julia. all are well. julia takes a very sensible view of our present difficulties. she would be sorry to have me go, but thinks the circumstances may warrant it and will not throw a single obstacle in the way. there is no doubt but the _valiant_ pillow has been planning an attack on cairo; but as he will learn that that point is well garrisoned and that they have their ditch on the outside, filled with water, he will probably desist. as, however, he would find it necessary to receive a wound, on the first discharge of firearms, he would not be a formidable enemy. i do not say he would shoot himself, ah no! i am not so uncharitable as many who served under him in mexico. i think, however, he might report himself wounded on the receipt of a very slight scratch, received hastily in any way, and might irritate the sore until he convinced himself that he had been wounded by the enemy. tell simpson that i hope he will be able to visit us this summer. i should like very much to have him stay with us and i want him to make my house his home. remember me to all. ulysses. [grant has just finished mustering into state service the ten additional regiments authorized by the legislature. he then returned to galena whence he wrote to washington, may 24, 1861, to the adjutant-general, tendering "his services until the close of the war in such capacity as may be offered." he adds, "i would say in view of my present age and length of service, i feel myself competent to command a regiment, if the president in his judgment should see fit to intrust one to me." he never received an answer to this letter; long after, it was found not properly filed. grant's own comment is, that it was probably barely read by the adjutant-general and certainly could not have been submitted to higher authority. the day he wrote this letter he returned to springfield to find that governor yates had already appointed him colonel of one of the regiments that he himself had recently mustered into the state service, the 22d illinois infantry.] galena, may 30th, 1861. dear father: i have now been home nearly a week, but return to springfield to-day. i have tendered my services to the government and go to-day to make myself useful, if possible, from this until all our national difficulties are ended. during the six days i have been at home i have felt all the time as if a duty were being neglected that was paramount to any other duty i ever owed. i have every reason to be well satisfied with myself for the services already rendered, but to stop now would not do. all here are well. orvil or lank will write to you in a day or two and tell you how business matters stand. write to me at springfield. yours truly, u.s. grant. [after taking charge of his new regiment, grant was encamped a short time near springfield. a month was spent in drill and discipline; when the time came for the mustering into the national service of those who were willing to enter, the regiment went in as a body. july 3d he was ordered to quincy, mo. while here he was ordered to move against colonel tom harris, a confederate, who was encamped on a creek with high hills on both sides. grant approached the place with much uneasiness, expecting to find harris and his men drawn up ready to meet him. instead, they had fled. he realized then that harris had had quite as much fear of him as he had had of harris. this experience was a valuable lesson to him; remembering it, he never again felt trepidation before encountering an enemy.] east quincy, mo., july 13th, 1861. dear father: i have just received yours and mary's letters and really did not know that i had been so negligent as not to have written to you before. i did write from camp yates, but since receiving yours remember that i did not get to finish it at the time, and have neglected it since. the fact is that since i took command of this regiment i have had no spare time, and flatter myself, and believe i am sustained in my judgment by my officers and men, that i have done as much for the improvement and efficiency of this regiment as was ever done for a command in the same length of time.--you will see that i am in missouri. yesterday i went out as far as palmyra and stationed my regiment along the railroad for the protection of the bridges, trestle work, etc. the day before i sent a small command, all i could spare, to relieve colonel smith who was surrounded by secessionists. he effected his relief, however, before they got there. to-morrow i start for monroe, where i shall fall in with colonel palmer and one company of horse and two pieces of artillery. one regiment and a battalion of infantry will move on to mexico, north missouri road, and all of us together will try to nab the notorious tom harris with his 1200 secessionists. his men are mounted, and i have but little faith in getting many of them. the notorious jim green who was let off on his parole of honor but a few days ago, has gone towards them with a strong company well armed. if he is caught it will prove bad work for him. you no doubt saw from the papers that i started to march across the country for quincy. my men behaved admirably, and the lesson has been a good one for them. they can now go into camp after a day's march with as much promptness as veteran troops; they can strike their tents and be on the march with equal celerity. at the illinois river, i received a dispatch at eleven o'clock at night that a train of cars would arrive at half past eleven to move my regiment. all the men were of course asleep, but i had the drum beaten, and in forty minutes every tent and all the baggage was at the water's edge ready to put aboard the ferry to cross the river. i will try to keep you posted from time to time, by writing either to you or to mary, of my whereabouts and what i am doing. i hope you will have only a good account of me and the command under my charge. i assure you my heart is in the cause i have espoused, and however i may have disliked party republicanism there has never been a day that i would not have taken up arms for a constitutional administration. you ask if i should not like to go in the regular army. i should not. i want to bring my children up to useful employment, and in the army the chance is poor. there is at least the same objection that you find where slavery exists. fred. has been with me until yesterday; i sent him home on a boat. yours &c. u.s. grant. [shortly after the date of the last letter, grant was ordered to mexico, mo. general pope then commanded the district between the mississippi and missouri rivers with headquarters at mexico. grant was assigned to command a sub-district embracing the troops of the immediate neighborhood. in regard to the hospitality which grant mentions receiving in this secessionist district, we may note that the regiments before his accession to this command had visited houses without invitation and had helped themselves to food or had demanded it. grant at once published orders forbidding soldiers to go into private houses unless invited, or to appropriate private property.] mexico, mo., aug. 3d, 1861. dear father: i have written to you once from this place and received no answer, but as orvil writes to me that you express great anxiety to hear from me often, i will try to find time to drop you a line twice a month, and oftener when anything of special interest occurs. the papers keep you posted as to army movements, and as you are already in possession of my notions on secession nothing more is wanted on that point. i find here however a different state of feeling from what i expected existed in any part of the south. the majority in this part of the state are secessionists, as we would term them, but deplore the present state of affairs. they would make almost any sacrifice to have the union restored, but regard it as dissolved, and nothing is left for them but to choose between two evils. many, too, seem to be entirely ignorant of the object of present hostilities. you cannot convince them but that the ultimate object is to extinguish slavery by force. then, too, they feel that the southern confederacy will never consent to give up their state, and as they, the south, are the strong party, it is prudent to favor them from the start. there is never a movement of troops made, that the secession journals through the country do not give a startling account of their almost annihilation at the hands of the state troops, whilst the facts are, there are no engagements. my regiment has been reported cut to pieces once that i know of, and i don't know but oftener, whilst a gun has not been fired at us. these reports go uncontradicted here and give confirmation to the conviction already entertained that one southron is equal to five northerners. we believe they are deluded, and know that if they are not, we are. since i have been in command of this military district, (two weeks), i have received the greatest hospitality and attention from the citizens about here. i have had every opportunity of conversing with them freely and learning their sentiments, and although i have confined myself strictly to the truth as to what has been the result of the different engagements, the relative strength, the objects of the administration, and the north generally, yet i think they don't believe a word. i see from the papers that my name has been sent in for brigadier general. this is certainly very complimentary to me, particularly as i have never asked a friend to intercede in my behalf. my only acquaintance with men of influence in the state was whilst on duty at springfield, and i then saw so much pulling and hauling for favors that i determined never to ask for anything, and never have, not even a colonelcy. i wrote a letter to washington tendering my services, but then declined governor yates' and mr. trumbull's endorsement. my services with the regiment with which i now am have been highly satisfactory to me. i took it in a very disorganized, demoralized and insubordinate condition, and have worked it up to a reputation equal to the best, and, i believe, with the good will of all the officers and all the men. hearing that i was likely to be promoted, the officers, with great unanimity, have requested to be attached to my command. this i don't want you to read to others for i very much dislike speaking of myself. we are now breaking up camp here gradually. in a few days the last of us will be on our way for the missouri river, at what point cannot be definitely determined, wood and water being a consideration, as well as a healthy, fine site for a large encampment. a letter addressed to me at galena will probably find me there. if i get my promotion i shall expect to go there for a few days. remember me to all at home and write to me. yours truly, u.s. grant. [president lincoln asked the illinois delegation in congress to recommend some citizens of the state for the position of brigadier-general. they unanimously recommended grant first on a list of seven. since the date of the last letter he has been promoted to the rank of brigadier-general. he was then ordered to ironton, mo., seventy miles south of st. louis. to his sister mary.] ironton, mo., august 12th, 1861. dear sister: your letter directed to me at mexico, missouri came to hand yesterday at this place. a glance at the map will show you where i am. when i came here it was reported that this place was to be attacked by 8000 secessionists, under general hardee, within a day or two. now hardee's force seems to have reduced, and his distance from here to have increased. scouting parties however are constantly seen within a few miles of our pickets. i have here about 3000 volunteers nearly all infantry, but our position being strong, and our cause a good one, it would trouble a much larger force of the enemy to dislodge us. you ask my views about the continuance of the war, and so forth. well i have changed my mind so much that i don't know what to think. that the rebels will be so badly whipped by april next that they cannot make a stand anywhere, i don't doubt. but they are so dogged that there is no telling when they may be subdued. send union troops among them and respect all their rights, pay for everything you get, and they become desperate and reckless because their state sovereignty is invaded. troops of the opposite side march through and take everything they want, leaving no pay but scrip, and they become desperate secession partisans because they have nothing more to lose. every change makes them more desperate. i should like to be sent to western virginia, but my lot seems to be cast in this part of the world. i wanted to remain in st. louis a day or two to get some books to read that might help me in my profession, and have my uniform made. mine has been a busy life from the beginning, and my new-made friends in illinois seem to give me great credit. i hope to deserve it, and shall spare no pains on my part to do so. it is precious little time i shall have for writing letters, but i have subscribed for the _daily st. louis democrat_ to be sent to you, through which you may occasionally hear from me. write to me often even though your letters are not answered. as i told father in my last i will try to have you hear from me twice a month if i have to write you after midnight. i told julia she might go to covington and board whilst i am away but i don't know but that she had better stay where she is. the people of galena have always shown the greatest friendship for me and i would prefer keeping my home there. i would like very much though, if you would go and stay with julia. if i get a uniform and get where i can have my daguerreotype taken, your wish in that respect shall be gratified. your brother ulys. [from ironton, grant was next ordered to jefferson city, mo., to take command there. there were much confusion and lack of discipline here. "there was no system existing as to recruiting and the city was filled with fugitives. these, driven by guerilla bands to take refuge with the national troops, were in a deplorable condition." in a week or two order was restored. he was then recalled to st. louis, to receive important instructions.] jefferson city, mo., august 27th, 1861. dear father: your letter requesting me to appoint mr. foley on my staff was only received last friday night, of course too late to give mr. foley the appointment even if i could do so. i remember to have been introduced to mr. foley sr. several years ago, and if the son is anything like the impression i then formed of the father, the appointment would be one that i could well congratulate myself upon. i have filled all the places on my staff and, i flatter myself, with deserving men: mr. j.a. rawlins of galena is to be my adjutant general, mr. lagow of the regiment i was formerly colonel of, and mr. hillyer of st. louis, aides. they are all able men, from five to ten years younger than myself, without military experience but very capable of learning. i only have one of them with me yet, and having nothing but raw troops, and but little assistance, it keeps me busy from the time i get up in the morning until from 12 to 2 o'clock at night, or morning. i subscribed for the _daily democrat_, a staunch union paper, for you so that you might hear from me often. there is a good deal of alarm felt by the citizens of an early attack upon this place, and if anything of the kind should take place we are ill prepared. all the troops are very raw, and about one half of them missouri home guards without discipline. no artillery and but little cavalry here. i do not anticipate an attack here myself, certainly not until we have attacked the enemy first. a defeat might induce the rebels to follow up their success to this point, but that we expect to prevent. my means of information are certainly as good as those of any one else, and i cannot learn that there is an organized body of men north of the osage river, or any such body moving. there are numerous encampments throughout all the counties bordering on the missouri river, but the object seems to be to gather supplies, forces, transportation and so forth, for a fall and winter campaign. the country west of here will be left in a starving condition for next winter. families are being driven away in great numbers for their union sentiments, leaving behind farms, crops, stock and all. a sad state of affairs must exist under the most favorable circumstances that can take place. there will be no money in the country, and the entire crop will be carried off together with all stock of any value. i am interrupted so often while writing that my letters must necessarily be very meagre and disconnected. i hope you will let mary go to galena when mother returns home. she has never paid us a visit and i would like to have her make a long one. i think it doubtful whether i will go home at all. ulysses. [the special instructions which grant came from jefferson city to receive, assigned him to the command of southeastern missouri and southern illinois. he was to have temporary headquarters at cape girardeau during an expedition ordered for the capture of colonel jeff thompson, who was disputing with them the possession of southeastern missouri. this expedition was broken up on account of general prentiss leaving his command at jackson and returning to st. louis, offended at being placed under a brigadier-general whom he believed to be his junior. grant says prentiss' action was a great mistake. "he was a very brave and earnest soldier," he writes long after. "no man in the service was more sincere in his devotion to the cause for which we were battling, none more ready to make sacrifices or risk life in it."] cape girardeau, mo., august 31st, 1861. dear father: your letter of the 26th is just received. as to the relative rank of officers (brigadiers) you are right but in all the rest you are laboring under an erroneous impression. there has been no move made affecting me which has not been complimentary rather than otherwise, though calculated to keep me laboriously employed. i was sent to ironton when the place was weak and threatened with a superior force, and as soon as it was rendered secure i was ordered to jefferson city, another point threatened. i was left there but a week when orders were sent ordering me to this point, putting me in command of all the forces in s.e. missouri, south illinois and everything that can operate here. all i fear is that too much may be expected of me. my duties will absorb my entire attention, and i shall try not to disappoint the good people of illinois, who, i learn from every quarter, express an enthusiasm for me that was wholly unexpected.--general prentiss is not a particular favorite as you suspect, nor is there a prejudice against him. i think all the brigadiers are satisfied with the rank assigned them by the president. the brigadiers are not all up north as you suspect. i know of but one, hurlbut, who is there. general mcclernand is at cairo, prentiss at ironton, and i presume curtis will be with the command under me. general hunter is at chicago, but i look upon that as temporary. i have not heard of any command being assigned him as yet, and do not know that he has sufficiently recovered from wounds received in the late engagements in virginia to take the field. hunter will prove himself a fine officer. the letters spoken of by you have not all been received. one sent to galena i got and answered. my promise to write to you every two weeks has been complied with, and however busy i may be i shall continue to write if it is but a line. i am now probably done shifting commands so often, this being the fourth in as many weeks. your suspicions as to my being neglected are entirely unfounded, for i know it was the intention to give me a brigade if i had not been promoted. application would have been made to have me assigned arbitrarily as senior colonel from illinois for the purpose. i want to hear from you or mary often. i sent you the _daily democrat_, thinking that would keep you better posted in this section than i could, and it is a cheap correspondent. i wrote to you that i should like to have mary go out to galena and stay some time. i do not want julia to leave galena, being anxious to retain my residence after the many kindnesses received from the people there. i only arrived at this place last night and cannot tell you much about things here. the people however are generally reported to be secessionists. ulys. [september 4th, grant had removed headquarters from cape girardeau to cairo, ill. hearing that the confederates were about to seize paducah, ky., he went there immediately, arriving there a few hours before the enemy, who returned to columbus. before leaving grant addressed a short proclamation to the citizens promising them protection. troops were left to guard the city. to his sister mary.] cairo, september 11th, 1861. dear sister: your letter with a short one from father was received yesterday, and having a little time i answer it. the troops under me and the rebel forces are getting so close together however that i have to watch all points. since taking command i have taken possession of the kentucky bank opposite here, fortified it and placed four large pieces in position. have occupied norfolk, missouri, and taken possession of paducah. my troops are so close to the enemy as to occasionally exchange shots with the pickets. to day, or rather last night, sixty or seventy rebels came upon seventeen of our men and were repulsed with a loss of two men killed on their side, none hurt on ours. yesterday there was skirmishing all day. we had but two wounded however, whilst the loss must have been considerable on the other. what future operations will be, of course i don't know. i could not write about it in advance if i did. the rebel force numerically is much stronger than ours, but the difference is more than made up by having truth and justice on our side, whilst on the other they are cheered on by falsehood and deception. this war however is formidable and i regret to say cannot end so soon as i anticipated at first. father asks for a position for albert griffith. i have no place to give and at best could use only my influence. i receive letters from all over the country for such places, but do not answer them. i never asked for my present position, but now that i have it i intend to perform the duties as rigidly as i know how without looking out for places for others. i should be very glad if i had a position within my own gift for al. but i have not. my duties are very laborious and have been from the start. it is a rare thing that i get to bed before two or three o'clock in the morning and am usually wakened in the morning before getting awake in a natural way. now, however, my staff are getting a little in the way of this kind of business and can help me. i have been stopped so often already in writing this that i have forgotten what i was going to write about. are you talking of paying julia a visit? i wrote to you and father about it several times but have failed to elicit an answer on that point. i intended to have julia, miss and jess come down here to pay me a visit but i hardly think it would be prudent at this time. hearing artillery within a few miles it might embarrass my movements to have them about. i am afraid they would make poor soldiers. write to me again soon. good night. ulys. [simpson: the brother next in age to general grant. to his sister mary.] cairo, september 25th, 1861. dear sister: i have just received your last letter, also another written by you about one month ago, which has followed me around until at length it reached this place. i am very well, but have no news to communicate. i had extended my lines nearly half way to columbus and made reconnoissances frequently to within sight of the rebel camps, but my force has to be so reduced that it would be imprudent to make an attack now until i am reinforced. i hope some day, if i am allowed to retain this command, to give a good account of ourselves. simpson's death, though looked for for the last two years, causes me a great deal of sadness. the day i heard of it, i received a number of letters from galena. in two or three of them his arrival at st. paul was noted, and it was stated that he was no better. our family has been peculiarly blessed up to this time. but few families of the same number have gone so many years without the loss of a single member. i expect father here as soon as orvil returns to galena. brother ulys. [grant felt sure that columbus could easily have been taken soon after the occupation of paducah, and had asked more than once to be allowed to move against it. as time went on it was so strongly fortified that it would have required a large force and a long siege to capture it. general fremont was in charge of the department of missouri.] cairo, october 25th, 1861. dear sister: have gone longer this time without writing to you than i intended and have no good excuse for it. i have received two letters, at least, from you and father since my last, one of which wanted special answer. as i have not that letter before me i may fail to answer some points. as to my not taking columbus there are several reasons for it which i understand perfectly and could make plain to any one else, but do not feel disposed to commit the reasons to paper. as to the needlessness of the movements of troops i am a better judge than the newspaper reporters who write about it. my whole administration of affairs seems to have given entire satisfaction to those who have the right to judge, and who should have the ability to judge correctly. i find by a little absence for the few last days (under orders) that my whole course has received marked approbation from citizens and soldiers, so much so that many who are comparative strangers to me are already claiming for me promotion. this is highly gratifying but i do not think any promotions should be made for the present. let service tell who are the deserving ones and give them the promotion. father also wrote about a mr. reed. he is now here and will probably be able to secure a position. i do not want to be importuned for places. i have none to give and want to be placed under no obligation to any one. my influence no doubt would secure places with those under me, but i become directly responsible for the suitableness of the appointee, and then there is no telling what moment i may have to put my hand upon the very person who has conferred the favor, or the one recommended by me. i want always to be in a condition to do my duty without partiality, favor, or affection.--in the matter of making harness i know that a very large amount is wanted. maj. robert allen, chief quartermaster for the western department, stationed in st. louis, has the letting of a great deal. father remembers his father well. he is a son of old irish jimmy, as he used to be called about georgetown to distinguish him from the other two jimmy allens. he is a friend of mine also.--this letter has proven so far more one to father than to yourself, but i direct it to you that you may reply. i write in great haste having been engaged all the evening in writing orders, and still having more to do.--i send you with this the likeness of myself and staff. n^o 1 you will have no difficulty in recognizing. n^o 2 is capt. j.a. rawlins, a.a. gen. n^os 3 & 4 capts. lagow & hillyer, aides-de-camps, n^o 5 dr. simons medical director. a good looking set aren't they? i expect julia here the latter part of next week. i wish you could come at the same time and stay a week or two. i think it would pay you well. won't you try to come? if it were at all necessary i would pay the expense myself to have you come. give my love to all at home. i think i will send you several more of my photographs, one for uncle samuel, one for aunt margaret, one for aunt rachel and one for mrs. bailey. your brother, ulys. [the battle of belmont is the first event of importance after the occupation of paducah. this was the first time the men and officers were under fire; they behaved like veterans. here they gained a confidence in themselves that they did not lose throughout the war.] cairo, november 8th, 1861. dear father: it is late at night and i want to get a letter into the mail for you before it closes. as i have just finished a very hasty letter to julia that contains about what i would write, and having something else to do myself, i will have my clerk copy it. day before yesterday, i left here with about 3000 men in five steamers, convoyed by two gun boats, and proceeded down the river to within twelve miles of columbus. the next morning the boats were dropped down just out of range of the enemy's batteries and the troops debarked. during this operation our gun boats exercised the rebels by throwing shells into their camps and batteries. when all ready we proceeded about one mile towards belmont opposite columbus; then i formed the troops into line, and ordered two companies from each regiment to deploy as skirmishers, and push on through the woods and discover the position of the enemy. they had gone but a little way when they were fired upon, and the _ball_ may be said to have fairly opened. the whole command with the exception of a small reserve, was then deployed in like manner with the first, and ordered forward. the order was obeyed with great alacrity, the men all showing great courage. i can say with gratification that every colonel without a single exception, set an example to his command that inspired a confidence that will always insure victory when there is the slightest possibility of gaining one. i feel truly proud to command such men. from here we fought our way from tree to tree through the woods to belmont, about two and a half miles, the enemy contesting every foot of ground. here the enemy had strengthened their position by felling the trees for two or three hundred yards and sharpening the limbs, making a sort of abattis. our men charged through making the victory complete, giving us possession of their camp and garrison equipage, artillery and everything else. we got a great many prisoners. the majority however succeeded in getting aboard their steamer and pushing across the river. we burned everything possible and started back, having accomplished all that we went for and even more. belmont is entirely covered by the batteries from columbus and is worth nothing as a military position. it cannot be held without columbus. the object of the expedition was to prevent the enemy from sending a force into missouri to cut off troops i had sent there for a special purpose, and to prevent reinforcing price. besides being well fortified at columbus their numbers far exceed ours, and it would have been folly to have attacked them. we found the confederates well-armed and brave. on our return, stragglers that had been left in our rear, _now front_, fired into us, and more recrossed the river and gave us battle for fully a mile and afterwards at the boats when we were embarking. there was no hasty retreating or running away. taking into account the object of the expedition the victory was most complete. it has given me a confidence in the officers and men of this command, that will enable me to lead them in any future engagement without fear of the result. general mcclernand--(who by the way acted with great coolness throughout, and proved that he is a soldier as well as statesman)--and myself each had our horses shot under us. most of the field-officers met with the same loss, besides nearly one third of them being killed or wounded themselves. as nearly as i can ascertain our loss was about 250 killed, wounded, and missing. i write in great haste to get this in the office tonight. u.s. grant. [two days after the battle of belmont, november 9th, general halleck supersedes general fremont in command of the department of missouri. general grant's command is now changed from the district of southeastern missouri to the district of cairo and that of the mouths of the cumberland and the tennessee. this is the command he refers to here as the most important one in the department.] cairo, illinois, november 27th, 1861. dear father: your letter enclosed with a shawl to julia is just received. in regard to your stricture about my not writing i think that you have no cause of complaint. my time is all taken up with public duties. your statement of prices at which you proposed furnishing harness was forwarded to maj. allen as soon as received and i directed lagow, who received the letter enclosing it, to inform you of the fact. he did so at once. i cannot take an active part in securing contracts. if i were not in the army i should do so, but situated as i am it is necessary both to my efficiency for the public good and my own reputation that i should keep clear of government contracts. i do not write you about plans, or the necessity of what has been done or what is doing because i am opposed to publicity in these matters. then too you are very much disposed to criticise unfavorably from information received through the public press, a portion of which i am sorry to see can look at nothing favorably that does not look to a war upon slavery. my inclination is to whip the rebellion into submission, preserving all constitutional rights. if it cannot be whipped in any other way than through a war against slavery, let it come to that legitimately. if it is necessary that slavery should fall that the republic may continue its existence, let slavery go. but that portion of the press that advocates the beginning of such a war now, are as great enemies to their country as if they were open and avowed secessionists.[1] there is a desire upon the part of people who stay securely at home to read in the morning papers, at their breakfast, startling reports of battles fought. they cannot understand why troops are kept inactive for weeks or even months. they do not understand that men have to be disciplined, arms made, transportation and provisions provided. i am very tired of the course pursued by a portion of the union press. julia left last saturday for st. louis where she will probably spend a couple of weeks and return here should i still remain. it costs nothing for her to go there, and it may be the last opportunity she will have of visiting her father. from here she will go to covington, and spend a week or two before going back to galena. it was my bay horse (cost me $140) that was shot. i also lost the little pony, my fine saddle and bridle, and the common one. what i lost cost about $250. my saddle cloth which was about half the cost of the whole, i left at home. i try to write home about once in two weeks and think i keep it up pretty well. i wrote to you directly after the battle of belmont, and lagow and julia have each written since. give my love to all at home. i am very glad to get letters from home and will write as often as i can. i am somewhat troubled lest i lose my command here, though i believe my administration has given general satisfaction not only to those over me but to all concerned. this is the most important command within the department however, and will probably be given to the senior officer next to general halleck himself. there are not so many brigadier generals in the army as there are brigades, and as to divisions they are nearly all commanded by brigadiers. yours, ulysses. [footnote 1: grant's conviction that the essential purpose of the war was not the abolition of slavery as an end in itself, but the preservation of the union at all costs was identical with that of lincoln. this letter can properly be compared with the well-known letter written by lincoln to greeley on the third of august, 1862, in which lincoln says: "my paramount object in this struggle is to save the union, and it is not either to save or to destroy slavery." lincoln understood that the task accepted by him as president as the leader in the contest for national existence made the maintenance of the union his chief, if not for the time being his only responsibility. he had, however, placed himself on record in many utterances to the effect that if the republic were to be preserved, slavery must be, in the first place, restricted, and finally destroyed. it is probable that in this matter grant did not go so far as lincoln. in any case, in common with the president, he devoted himself simply to the duty immediately before him.] [the battlefield referred to is belmont. according to the _memoirs_, the loss of national troops, killed, wounded, and missing, was 485; that of the confederates, 642. number of union troops engaged was 2500 men; that of confederates, 7000.] cairo, illinois, november 28th, 1861. dear father: your letter asking if mr. leathers can be passed south, and also enclosing two extracts from papers is received. it is entirely out of the question to pass persons south. we have many union men sacrificing their lives now from exposure as well as battle, in a cause brought about by secession, and it is necessary for the security of the thousands still exposed that all communication should be cut off between the two sections. as to that article in the _hawk eye_ it gives me no uneasiness whatever. the iowa regiment did its duty fully, and my report gives it full credit. all who were on the battlefield know where general mcclernand and myself were, and there is no need of resort to the public press for our vindication. the other extract gives our loss in killed and wounded almost exactly correct. our missing however is only three or four over one hundred. recent information received through deserters shows that the rebel loss from killed, wounded, and missing reaches about 2500. one thing is certain,--after the battle about one third of columbus was used for hospitals and many were removed to houses in the country. there were also two steamboat loads sent to memphis and the largest hotel in the city taken as a hospital. the city was put in mourning and all business suspended for a day: and the citizens thrown into the greatest consternation lest they would be attacked. i wrote to you two days ago, therefore it is not necessary to write a long letter. i believe i told you that julia had gone to st. louis. she will pay you a short visit before returning to galena. ulysses. [general d.c. buell commanded the department of the ohio with headquarters at louisville. to his sister mary.] cairo, dec. 18th, 1861. dear sister: i have been wanting to write you for some time and am not so indifferent as you would make out. i wish you could be here for a day or two to see what i have to go through from breakfast until twelve at night, seven days in the week. i have now just got through with my mail for to-night, and as it is not yet twelve and the mail does not close until that time, i will devote the remainder of the time in penning you a few lines. i have no war news to communicate, however. julia and the children have returned from st. louis. they will not make you the promised visit whilst i remain here. captain foley arrived to-day and i showed him all the attention i could but i regret to say it was not much. he will excuse it however. i am sorry you did not come with him. i believe i should have allowed the children to go back with you. i have learned through private sources that an attack has been made upon fort jackson, louisiana, and that the place has been taken. that is to say such is the report in columbus, but i do not know whether to credit the report. something has taken place to call off many of their troops. they still have a much larger force than i have. whilst i am writing several galena gentlemen are in talking. they will remain until the office closes so you must excuse a disconnected letter. i do not now see that the probabilities are so strong that i will likely be removed. a full disposition seems to have been made of all my seniors. father seems to be very much inclined to criticise all our generals. it may have been a little inexcusable in general buell not to allow troops to stop for a few hours when near their homes. but he should recollect that general buell was not on the spot to see the circumstances fully, and he does not know what necessity may have existed to have got the troops through by a certain time. at your request i send a small batch from my cranium. i doubt whether it is big enough for the purpose you want it. if you will come out here you might spend a few weeks pleasantly and i hope you will not lose such an opportunity as has just occurred. i will close this. my love to all at home. ulys. [the great expedition into kentucky:--early in january, grant had been directed to make a reconnoissance in favor of brigadier-general buell who was confronting the confederate general buckner at bowling green. one force under general smith went up the west bank of the tennessee to threaten forts heiman and henry. mcclernand went into west kentucky, one column threatening columbus, and another the tennessee river. grant went with the latter. the object of the expedition was attained; troops were not sent to reinforce buckner. grant was now eager to move against the forts on the tennessee. this is his errand to st. louis, to ask permission of general halleck to move against them. he had long been convinced that the true line of operations was up the tennessee and cumberland rivers. once these rivers were held by the union troops, the confederates would be forced to evacuate kentucky altogether. but general halleck opposed the plan. to his sister mary.] cairo, jan. 23d, 1862. dear sister: you have seen through the papers notice of my return from the great expedition into kentucky. my orders were such and the force with me also so small that no attack was allowable. i made good use of the time however, making a splendid reconnoissance of the country over which an army may have to move. i have now a larger force than general scott ever commanded prior to our present difficulties. i do hope it will be my good fortune to retain so important a command for at least one battle. i believe there is no portion of our whole army better prepared to contest a battle than there is within my district, and i am very much mistaken if i have not got the confidence of officers and men. this is all important, especially so with new troops. i go tonight to st. louis to see general halleck; will be back on sunday morning. i expect but little quiet from this on and if you receive but short, unsatisfactory letters hereafter you need not be surprised. your letter asking me to intercede in behalf of lieut. jones was received. i have no one of equal rank now to offer in exchange, unless it should be some one of jeff thompson's command, but if it should fall in my power to effect lieutenant jones' release, i shall be most happy to do so. write to me giving the first name, where he now is, when taken and under what circumstances. i think you may look for julia and the children about the 1st of february. as i said before the three oldest will be left to go to school. jess is too small. you will like him the best of any of the children, although he is the worst. i expect he will whip his aunt mary the first day. buck, though never really sick, is very delicate. he is the best child i ever saw and is smart. give my love to all at home. i must close. brother ulys. [after repeated requests grant secured permission, february 1st, to undertake the campaign up the tennessee. fort henry was captured on the 6th; fort donelson, eleven miles away, fell on the 16th. fort donelson was on high ground, one hundred feet above the cumberland river. it was an important position for the enemy. generals floyd and pillow, first and second in command at port donelson, escaped during the night of the 15th. general buckner, who was forced to surrender the fort, said to grant that if he, buckner, had been in command grant would never have reached donelson as easily as he did. grant answered, "in that case i should not have tried in the way i did; i relied upon pillow to allow me to come up within gunshot of any entrenchments he was given to hold." pillow had been in the mexican war and he prided himself upon that service. grant speaks of his own service in the mexican war as being invaluable to him as he there came to know all the men who, later on, held conspicuous positions in both the northern and southern armies; he learned to know their strong points and their weaknesses, and to infer how they would act under given conditions. to his sister mary.] fort henry, tenn., feb. 9th, 1862. dear sister: i take my pen in hand "away down in dixie" to let you know that i am still alive and well. what the next few days may bring forth, however, i can't tell you. i intend to keep the ball moving as lively as possible, and have only been detained here from the fact that the tennessee is very high and has been rising ever since we have been here, overflowing the back land and making it necessary to bridge it before we could move.--before receiving this you will hear by telegraph of fort donelson being attacked.--yesterday i went up the tennessee river twenty odd miles, and to-day crossed over near the cumberland river at fort donelson.--our men had a little engagement with the enemy's pickets, killing five of them, wounding a number, and, expressively speaking, "gobbling up" some twenty-four more. if i had your last letter at hand i would answer it. but i have not and therefore write you a very hasty and random letter, simply to let you know that i believe you still remember me. whilst writing i am carrying on a conversation with my staff and others. julia will be with you in a few days and possibly i may accompany her. this is barely possible, depending upon having full possession of the line from fort henry to fort donelson, and upon being able to quit for a few days without retarding any contemplated movement. this would not leave me free more than one day however. you have no conception of the amount of labor i have to perform. an army of men all helpless, looking to the commanding officer for every supply. your plain brother, however, has as yet no reason to feel himself unequal to the task, and fully believes that he will carry on a successful campaign against our rebel enemy. i do not speak boastfully but utter a presentiment. the scare and fright of the rebels up here is beyond conception. twenty three miles above here some were drowned in their haste to retreat, thinking us such vandals that neither life nor property would be respected. g.j. pillow commands at fort donelson. i hope to give him a tug before you receive this. u.s.g. [after the fall of fort donelson grant was promoted to the grade of major-general. had this victory been immediately followed up, he believed that the entire southwest would have offered little resistance; and had there been one general who would have taken the responsibility and been in command of all the troops west of the alleghanies, the duration of the war would have been far briefer than it was. corinth was the junction of the two most important railroads in the mississippi valley. it was the great strategic position in the west between the tennessee and mississippi rivers, and between nashville and vicksburg. if the union troops obtained possession of corinth the confederates would have no railroad for transportation of armies or supplies until that running east from vicksburg was reached. the enemy was in force at corinth, march 17th. he attacked shiloh, april 6th, was defeated april 7th, and evacuated corinth may 30th. up to this time, grant had believed that the rebellion would suddenly collapse if a decisive victory could be gained. donelson and henry were such victories, but now that the confederates had collected new armies and assumed the offensive, he gave up all idea of saving the union except by complete conquest. hitherto, he had protected the property of both federal and confederate. now he began a new policy; he consumed everything that could be used to support armies, regarding supplies within reach of the confederates as contraband as arms or ordnance stores. this policy, he says, exercised a material influence in hastening the end. july 11th, halleck is appointed to the command of all the armies, with headquarters at washington. grant now has his headquarters at corinth in command of the district of west tennessee. he is practically a department commander.] corinth, mississippi, august 3d, 1862. dear father: your letter of the 25th of july is just received. i do not remember receiving the letters, however, of which you speak. one came from mary speaking of the secessionist holt who was said to be employed in the memphis post office. i at once wrote to general sherman who is in command there about it and he is no doubt turned out before this. you must not expect me to write in my own defence nor to permit it from any one about me. i know that the feeling of the troops under my command is favorable to me and so long as i continue to do my duty faithfully it will remain so. your uneasiness about the influences surrounding the children here is unnecessary. on the contrary it is good. they are not running around camp among all sorts of people, but we are keeping house, on the property of a truly loyal secessionist who has been furnished free lodging and board at alton, illinois; here the children see nothing but the greatest propriety. they will not, however, remain here long. julia will probably pay her father a short visit and then go to galena or covington in time to have the children commence school in september. i expect general hitchcock to command the department of the west. have no fears of general pope or any one junior to me being sent. i do not expect nor want the support of the cincinnati press on my side. their course has been so remarkable from the beginning that should i be endorsed by them i should fear that the public would mistrust my patriotism. i am sure that i have but one desire in this war, and that is to put down the rebellion. i have no hobby of my own with regard to the negro, either to effect his freedom or to continue his bondage. if congress pass any law and the president approves, i am willing to execute it. laws are certainly as binding on the minority as the majority. i do not believe even in the discussion of the propriety of laws and official orders by the army. one enemy at a time is enough and when he is subdued it will be time enough to settle personal differences. i do not want to command a department because i believe i can do better service in the field. i do not expect to be overslaughed by a junior and should feel exceedingly mortified should such a thing occur, but would keep quiet as i have ever done heretofore. i have just received a letter from captain foley about this same holt said to be in the memphis post office. you may say that i shall refer it to general sherman with the direction to expel him if it is not already done. julia and the children are well. i do not expect to remain here long but when i will go i can't say now. u.s. grant. [in referring to this period, grant says that it was the most anxious time of the war when the army of the tennessee was guarding the territory acquired by corinth and memphis, and before he was sufficiently reinforced to take the offensive. to his sister mary.] corinth, mississippi, august 19th, 1862. dear sister: julia and the children left here on saturday last for st. louis where they will remain on a visit until about the last of the month. at the end of that time they must be some place where the children can go to school.--mrs. hillyer has a nice house in the city and is all alone whilst her husband is on my staff, and it may be that she and julia will keep house together. if they do she would be very much pleased to have you make her a long visit. julia says that she is satisfied that the best place for the children is in covington. but there are so many of them that she sometimes feels as if they were not wanted. their visit down here in dixie was very pleasant and they were very loth to leave. things however began to look so threatening that i thought it was best for them to leave. i am now in a situation where it is impossible for me to do more than to protect my long lines of defence. i have the mississippi to memphis, the railroad from columbus to corinth, from jackson to bolivar, from corinth to decatur, and the tennessee and cumberland rivers to keep open. guerillas are hovering around in every direction, getting whipped every day some place by some of my command, but keeping us busy. the war is evidently growing oppressive to the southern people. their _institution_[2] are beginning to have ideas of their own; every time an expedition goes out many of them follow in the wake of the army and come into camp. i am using them as teamsters, hospital attendants, company cooks and so forth, thus saving soldiers to carry the musket. i don't know what is to become of these poor people in the end, but it weakens the enemy to take them from them. if the new levies are sent in soon the rebels will have a good time getting in their crops this fall. i have abandoned all hope of being able to make a visit home till the close of the war. a few weeks' recreation would be very grateful however. it is one constant strain now and has been for a year. if i do get through i think i will take a few months of pure and undefiled rest. i stand it well, however, having gained some fifteen pounds in weight since leaving cairo. give my love to all at home. ulys. [footnote 2: slaves.] [during the two months just past there has been much fighting between small bodies of the opposing armies.] corinth, mississippi, september 17th, 1862. dear father: a letter from you and one from mary were received some time ago, which i commenced to answer in a letter addressed to mary, but being frequently interrupted by matters of business it was laid aside for some days, and finally torn up. i now have all my time taxed. although occupying a position attracting but little attention at this time there is probably no garrison more threatened to-day than this. i expect to hold it and have never had any other feeling either here or elsewhere but that of success. i would write you many particulars but you are so imprudent that i dare not trust you with them; and while on this subject let me say a word. i have not an enemy in the world who has done me so much injury as you in your efforts in my defence. i require no defenders and for my sake let me alone. i have heard this from various sources and persons who have returned to this army and did not know that i had parents living near cincinnati have said that they found the best feeling existing towards me in every place except there. you are constantly denouncing other general officers and the inference with people naturally is that you get your impressions from me. do nothing to correct what you have already done but for the future keep quiet on this subject. mary wrote to me about an appointment for mr. nixon. i have nothing in the world to do with any appointments, no power to make and nothing to do with recommending except for my own staff. that is now already full. if i can do anything in the shape of lending any influence i may possess in mr. nixon's behalf i will be most happy to do so on the strength of what mary says in commendation, and should be most happy if it could so be that our lot would cast us near each other. i do not know what julia is going to do. i want her to go to detroit and board. she has many pleasant acquaintances there and she would find good schools for the children. i have no time for writing and scarcely any for looking over the telegraphic columns of the newspapers. my love to all at home. ulys. [in late september, grant went from corinth to jackson, tennessee, "to superintend the movements of the troops to whatever point a threatened attack upon bolivia might be made." bolivia was then their most advanced position on the mississippi central railroad. the troops from corinth were brought up in time to repel the threatened movement without a battle. iuka was a town twenty miles east of corinth. it was entered by general price of the confederate army on september 13th. on the 19th he was defeated by generals rosecrans and ord. the battle of corinth was won october 4th; van dorn was the leader of the confederate forces, while rosecrans commanded the union troops. grant was now assured as to the safety of the territory that he had won. to his sister mary.] jackson, tenn., october 16th, 1862. dear sister: i received your letter by due course of mail and expected before this to have answered one of your questions in the shape of an official report; that is the one where you ask me the part i played at the battle of iuka. when the reports of subalterns come in i will make my report which no doubt will be published and will be a full answer to your question. i had no more to do with troops under general ord than i had with those under rosecrans, but gave the orders to both. the plan was admirably laid for catching price and his whole army, but owing to the nature of the ground, direction of the wind, and general rosecrans having been so far behind where he was expected to be on the morning before the attack, it failed. in the late battles we have gained such a moral advantage over them however, with van dorn and lovell added, that i do not know but it may have all been for the best. i have written to julia to come down here to spend a short time. it will probably be but a short time that she can stay, but so long as i remain here this will be a pleasant place for her.--if the children have not already been sent to covington i told her to bring them with her. in the last letter i received she said she was about sending them to covington. i believe you have now got it all quiet on the ohio. i hope it will soon be so every place else. it does look to me that we now have such an advantage over the rebels that there should be but little more hard fighting. give my love to all at home. write often and without expecting either very prompt or very long replies. ulys. [october 25th, grant was placed in command of the department of the tennessee and headquarters were established at oxford, miss. reinforcements continued to come from the north, and by november 2d, he was prepared to take the initiative. this, he said, was a great relief after two and a half months of continued defence over a large district where every citizen was an enemy. on november 3d, grant left jackson for the campaign against vicksburg, which did not end until july 4, 1863. vicksburg was very important to the enemy on account of its position. it was the only link connecting the parts of the confederacy separated by the mississippi. while held by the enemy, free navigation of the river was impossible. during the winter of '62 to '63 there were exceptionally heavy rains and continuous high water on the mississippi. to his sister mary.] oxford, mississippi, dec. 15th, 1862. dear sister: yesterday i received a letter from you and the children and one from uncle samuel. to day i learned by telegraph that father is at holly springs, thirty miles north of here. julia is there and as i expect the railroad to be completed to this point by to-morrow i look for them down. i shall only remain here to-morrow, or next day at farthest; so that julia will go immediately back to holly springs. it is a pleasant place and she may as well stay there as elsewhere. we are now having wet weather. i have a big army in front of me as well as bad roads. i shall probably give a good account of myself however notwithstanding all obstacles. my plans are all complete for weeks to come and i hope to have them all work out just as planned. for a conscientious person, and i profess to be one, this is a most slavish life. i may be envied by ambitious persons, but i in turn envy the person who can transact his daily business and retire to a quiet home without a feeling of responsibility for the morrow. taking my whole department, there are an immense number of lives staked upon my judgment and acts. i am extended now like a peninsula into an enemy's country, with a large army depending for their daily bread upon keeping open a line of railroad running one hundred and ninety miles through an enemy's country, or, at least, through territory occupied by a people terribly embittered and hostile to us. with all this i suffer the mortification of seeing myself attacked right and left by people at home professing patriotism and love of country, who never heard the whistle of a hostile bullet. i pity them and a nation dependent upon such for its existence. i am thankful however that, although such people make a great noise, the masses are not like them. to all the other trials that i have to contend against, is added that of speculators whose patriotism is measured by dollars and cents. country has no value with them compared with money. to elucidate this would take quires of paper. so i will reserve this for an evening's conversation, if i should be so fortunate as to again get home where i can have a day to myself. tell the children to learn their lessons, mind their grandma and be good children. i should like very much to see them. to me they are all obedient and good. i may be partial but they seem to me to be children to be proud of. remember me to all at home, your brother ulys. [walnut hills is a little north of vicksburg. the position of vicksburg on high bluffs overlooking the river was inaccessible. after five months of exposure and labor grant at last attained his preliminary object, getting his troops to the rear of the city. during this time he would not communicate his plans to the public--this movement to a point below vicksburg from which to operate. the north was much discouraged over the situation; voluntary enlistment ceased. it was important to gain a decisive victory. in january, he assumed command himself of the expedition. the siege lasted from may 10th to july 4th. johnston was the commander-in-chief of the confederate forces and was east of the troops besieging vicksburg. pemberton was in command at vicksburg.] walnut hills, miss., june 15th, 1863. dear father: i have received several letters from mary and yourself, but as i have to deal with nineteen-twentieths of those received, have neglected to answer them. all i can say is that i am well. i have the enemy closely hemmed in all round. my position is naturally strong and fortified against an attack from outside. i have been so strongly reinforced that johnston will have to come with a mighty host to drive me away.--i do not look upon the fall of vicksburg as in the least doubtful. if, however, i could have carried the place on the 22nd of last month, i could by this time have made a campaign that would have made the state of mississippi almost safe for a solitary horseman to ride over. as it is, the enemy have a large army in it, and the season has so far advanced that water will be difficult to find for an army marching, besides the dust and heat that must be encountered. the fall of vicksburg now will only result in the opening of the mississippi river and demoralization of the enemy. i intended more from it. i did my best, however, and looking back can see no blunder committed. ulysses. [after vicksburg, grant began a tour of observation among the important parts of his military rule. in october, 1863, the "military division of the mississippi" was created and grant given the command. this was composed of the departments of the ohio, the cumberland, and the tennessee. headquarters were established at nashville, which was the most central point from which to communicate with his entire military division. the winter was quiet, preparing for the campaign against atlanta. he says in this letter, "i am not a candidate for any office." this refers, doubtless, to a proposal that he become a candidate for the presidency.] nashville, tenn., feby. 20th, 1864. dear father: i have received your letter and those accompanying, to wit, mr. newton's and i.n. morris'. i may write to mr. newton but it will be different from what he expects. i am not a candidate for any office. all i want is to be left alone to fight this war out; fight all rebel opposition and restore a happy union in the shortest possible time. you know, or ought to know, that the public prints are not the proper mediums through which to let a personal feeling pass. i know that i feel that nothing personal to myself could ever induce me to accept a political office. from your letter you seem to have taken an active feeling, to say the least, in this matter, that i would like to talk to you about. i could write, but do not want to do so. why not come down here and see me? i did tell julia to make a visit to cincinnati, batavia, bethel and georgetown. ulysses. [the rank of lieutenant-general had been conferred upon washington in 1798 when our relations with france appeared threatening. in 1852, it had been conferred upon general scott, by brevet, as a recognition of his great services in the mexican war. the full rank was revived february 26, 1864, for grant, who received his commission march 3d. after grant this rank was held by sherman and also sheridan, by promotion; since then the title has not been revived. by this rank grant was authorized to command all the armies of the united states. mr. washburne, who introduced the bill into congress for restoration of the grade of lieutenant-general, said that grant wrote to him that he did not ask or deserve anything more in the shape of honors or promotion; that he only desired to hold such an influence over those under his command as to use them to the best advantage to secure a decisive victory. grant's new policy was now to secure co-operative movements of all the armies east and west--these had heretofore worked independently--and to have a continuous and concentrated action against the chief armies of the enemy. his first work was to reorganize the army of the potomac, which in april began the campaign against lee and richmond. he accompanied the army in person, having movable headquarters in the field. from march to may his headquarters were at culpeper court-house, va. it was shortly after leaving these headquarters that he wrote from the field, may 11, 1864, "i propose to fight it out on this line if it takes all summer."] the editor desires to make correction of an error in the reference on page 102 to the rank of lieutenant-general. the statement should of course read that the rank of _general_ was conferred upon washington ... and had later been held by grant, sherman, and sheridan. the rank of lieutenant-general has been held not only by washington, grant, sherman, and sheridan, but also by schofield, miles, young, chaffee, bates, and macarthur. head-quarters armies of the united states culpeper c.h., va., apl. 16th, 1864. dear father: your letter enclosing one from young walker asking for duty on my staff during his suspension is received. it is the third letter from him on the same subject. of course i cannot gratify him. it would not be proper. it would be changing punishment into reward. julia will start west in a few days and will stop at covington on her way. she will remain at the house i purchased from judge dent until such time as she can join me more permanently. it is her particular desire to have jennie go to st. louis with her to spend the summer. i hope she can and will go. it has rained here almost every day since my arrival. it is still raining. of course i say nothing of when the army moves or how or where. i am in most excellent health and well pleased with appearances here. my love to all at home. ulysses. [city point was an important strategic point on the james where this river is joined by the appomattox. here general grant had headquarters until the end of the campaign against lee. the campaign against atlanta under general sherman lasted from may 6th to september 2d, 1864, when the city was evacuated by hood. the loss of atlanta was a severe blow to the south.] head-quarters armies of the united states city point, va., sept. 5th, 1864. dear father: your last letter is just received. before you receive this it is probable beverly simpson will be in service if he comes in at all. if he does enlist, however, after you receive this tell him to ask to be assigned to a regiment now with the army of the potomac. if he is already in service have him write to me and i will assign him to some duty either with me or where it will be equally pleasant for him. your theory about delays, either with sherman or myself, was not correct. our movements were co-operative but after starting each one has done all that he felt himself able to do. the country has been deceived about the size of our armies and also as to the number of the enemy. we have been contending against forces nearly equal to our own, moreover always on the defensive and strongly intrenched.--richmond will fall as atlanta has done and the rebellion will be suppressed in spite of rebel resistance and northern countenance and support. julia and children are in philadelphia. if i can get a house there, i will make that my home. julia is very desirous that jennie should make her home with us if she will, and if she will not do that, at least spend the fall and winter with us. ulysses. [clara was the oldest sister. the prophecy as to the end of the war proved true. petersburg and richmond were both captured april 3d. lee surrendered april 9th. by the end of may all the rebel armies had surrendered and the civil war was over.] head-quarters armies of the united states city point, va., march 19th, 1865. dear father: i received your two letters announcing the death of clara. although i had known for some time that she was in a decline, yet i was not expecting to bear of her death at this time.--i have had no heart to write earlier. your last letter made me feel very bad. i will not state the reason and hope i may be wrong in my judgment of its meaning. we are now having fine weather and i think will be able to wind up matters about richmond soon. i am anxious to have lee hold on where he is a short time longer so that i can get him in a position where he must lose a great portion of his army. the rebellion has lost its vitality and if i am not much mistaken there will be no rebel army of any great dimensions in a few weeks hence. any great catastrophe to any one of our armies would of course revive the enemy for a short time. but i expect no such thing to happen. i do not know what i can do either for will. griffith's son or for belville simpson. i sent orders last fall for john simpson to come to these head-quarters to run between here and washington as a mail messenger, but he has not come. i hope this service to end now soon. i am in excellent health but would enjoy a little respite from duty wonderfully. i hope it will come soon. my kindest regards to all at home. i shall expect to make you a visit the coming summer. yours truly, ulysses. [on the 7th of january, 1865, a number of the principal citizens of philadelphia presented general grant with a house.] head-quarters armies of the united states washington, d.c., may 6th, 1865. >dear father: i have ordered a sixty days' furlough for samuel a. he can be discharged at any time after his return home. it will take probably three weeks for my directions to reach him and for him to return. i have just returned from philadelphia leaving mr. cramer there. he can describe our new house to you when he returns. my health is good but i find so much to do that i can scarcely keep up with public business, let alone answering all the private letters i receive. my going to philadelphia and spending half my time there as i hope to do, will give me some leisure. i attend to public business there by telegraph and avoid numerous calls taking up much time, or hope to do so. my kind regards to all at home. i hope to hear of mother's entire recovery soon. ulysses. head-quarters army of the united states washington, d.c., feby. 10th, 1868. dear father: the memorandums you left with me relative to bounty due two needy persons in covington i attended to soon after you left here. the answer of the paymaster general was that under no circumstances could he take up claims for bounty out of turn; therefore, it was not satisfactory to you. i neglected to answer at the time and the matter escaped my memory until now. i spoke to secretary mcculloch about giving mrs. porter a clerkship in the treasury and he promised me he would do it, but has not yet. now, i fancy, i would not have much influence, and if i had, would be very careful about using it. the family are well and send much love to mother, jennie and yourself. yours truly, u.s. grant. [march 4, 1869, general grant was inaugurated president of the united states. written to his sister virginia, mrs. a.r. corbin.] long branch, n.j., aug. 21st, 1870. dear sister: by arrangement of a year's standing julia and i go to newport on tuesday morning next, to be gone there, and at west point, one week. but for that we would visit you and mother this week. i shall go next week however and if julia is not too much fatigued, or too lazy, with her travelling will take her along. you know i never give any one credit with being fatigued; i always attribute the feeling to another cause.--i hope you are all well. give my kindest regards to mother and mr. corbin. yours truly, u.s. grant. [written to his sister mary, mrs. m.j. cramer. dr. cramer was then united states minister to denmark.] washington, d.c., oct. 26th, 1871. dear sister: i have been intending to write you for some time; but the moment i get into my office in the morning it is overwhelmed with visitors, and continues so throughout the day. i now write of a rainy evening, after having read the new york papers.--jennie is with us, has been for some days. mr. corbin also has been with us for a few days but left to-day. jennie will remain until she becomes homesick which i hope will not be soon. i received your letter in which you gave me an extract from mr. wolff's. i had no recollection or knowledge of the matter whatever. the fact is i am followed wherever i go,--at long branch as well as here. i sometimes shake off callers, not knowing their business, whom i would be delighted to see. in the case of mr. wolff, however, i do not think that i ever knew that he had called. for the first time in my life i had arranged to go fishing at sea. to do so it was necessary to engage fishermen, with boat, beforehand. general porter did not know that i had made the arrangement, and probably was not at my house when i returned from riding the evening after mr. w. called. you will see the explanation. i will write it to mr. wolff. fred. after graduating at west point accepted a position as assistant civil engineer, and gave up a good portion of his furlough to go to work at his new profession. he has been in the rocky mountains since august surveying, in pursuit of his new profession, but with leave of absence as an army officer. but little or nothing can be done in the winter by him, and i have therefore got him a leave of absence from his engineer duties to accompany general sherman abroad, until the latter part of april. i expect him to sail about the middle of next month. general sherman goes on the flag-ship of the european squadron which will land at some of the atlantic ports, then proceed to the mediterranean touching at points during the early winter on both sides of the sea, and in the spring, probably in time to attend the carnival in rome, will leave the ship and work across the continent, in time to be home at the time i have indicated. i will instruct fred. to run up to copenhagen from a convenient point and spend a few days with you. you will find him a well-grown and much improved boy. he is about the height brother simpson was and well developed physically. you will be pleased with him i know. during the harvard vacation, next year, i intend that buck and jesse shall go to europe also. it may be that in the short time they will have to remain abroad they may not be able to get up to see you, but i know they will be pleased to do so, and may spare time for that purpose. i do not know but that i owe mr. cramer an apology for not answering his letters. all have been received and i have been gratified with them. but besides being a little negligent i am so constantly pressed that it is almost impossible for me to get any time to devote to private correspondence. all send our kindest regards to mr. cramer, and love to you and the children. yours affectionately, u.s. grant. p.s. i shall always be delighted to receive letters from you and mr. cramer whether i answer them or not. executive mansion washington, d.c., june 2nd, 1872. dear father: hearing from home frequently as i do through persons coming from there and through occasional letters, i scarcely ever think of writing. hereafter, however, i will try to write oftener or have jesse write. the children might all write to you for that matter. we hear occasionally from fred. directly and very often through the papers. he has enjoyed his european trip very much and i think will be much improved by it. nellie writes very often; she is a very much better writer than either of the boys. her composition is easy and fluent, and she writes very correctly. she seems to have made a very good impression where she has been.--buck sails for europe on the 6th of july. he will travel but little however. he expects to study his third year harvard course in some quiet german village, and return in june next in time for his examinations. in this way he expects to graduate at the same time he would if he did not go abroad. the object is to acquire a speaking knowledge of both the german and french languages, in both of which he is now quite a good scholar. i received a letter from mary a short time since. she said that she would leave for home about the first of june. you may expect her home by the twentieth no doubt. julia and jesse are well and send much love to you and mother. sincerely yours, u.s. grant. jesse r. grant, esq., covington, ky. [to mrs. a.r. corbin.] long branch, n.j., june 13th, 1872. dear sister: we got here tuesday evening and are now pretty well settled. can we not expect mr. corbin, you, mary and two children down to spend a few days with us as soon as the latter arrives? if mary does not come now, it is not probable that she will get east again this summer. you can see just as much of her here as you could at your own house; so i think the best arrangement will be for you to come immediately here and all spend the time together at the branch. i will go up to meet you in the harbor if informed in time. yours truly, u.s. grant. p.s. i learned from a letter from st. petersburg that fred. hurried off to copenhagen to meet mary before she left, which was to be the 1st day of june. i infer from this that she should be here in two or three days from now. [to his brother-in-law, mr. a.r. corbin. "nellie" is mrs. sartoris. mr. borie is secretary of the navy.] executive mansion washington, d.c., oct. 16th, 1872. my dear mr. corbin: your letter of the 14th is just received. mrs. grant and i go on to new york city on monday night to meet nellie and bring her home. it is not probable that the vessel in which she sailed will reach new york city before tuesday morning, so that we will be in the city from monday morning until tuesday night. if jennie were at home i do not know but we might go as far as elizabeth on saturday and remain over sunday.--i am much obliged to you for the offer of your kind offices. probably it will be pleasant for you to meet us on tuesday on the vessel that brings mr. borie and party home. what arrangement will be made i do not know; but in all probability a revenue cutter will be put at my service and i will be allowed to meet the vessel in the harbor below the city. in that case i would be glad of your company down the bay. my family are all very well. yours truly, u.s. grant. [to his sister, mrs. cramer. march 4, 1873, grant began his second term as president.] long branch, n.j., sept. 9th, 1873. dear sister: on monday next i start to take jesse to school, and then for pittsburgh to attend the meeting of the "society of the army of the cumberland." i will be back about the last of the week. i would like you to make your visit while i am at home, and want mother to come with you, as well as jennie and mr. corbin. if you have made no arrangements to start earlier suppose you come say on saturday week and bring the children with you. i am just in receipt of a letter from mr. corbin, and one from mr. clark, asking me to attend the fair next week. please say to mr. corbin, and mr. clark too if you see him, that i had an invitation from senator frelinghuysen to stay with him during the fair which i had to decline because i shall be absent during the week. the army of the cumberland was the one commanded by general thomas. they have their reunions annually, to all of which i have been invited, but it has so happened heretofore that i could not attend one of them. as i have attended one or other of the army society meetings almost every year, i feel it a duty to attend this one now and have informed them that i will be present. my kindest regards to all. yours truly, u.s. grant. mrs. mary g. cramer. [to his brother-in-law, mr. a.r. corbin, of elizabeth, n.j. mr. dent was mrs. grant's father.] executive mansion washington, d.c., dec. 16th, 1873. my dear mr. corbin: as i telegraphed you mr. dent breathed his last at 11.45 last night. there was nothing during the day or evening to indicate his near approach to death more than there has been almost every day for the last five months. indeed, and i believe for the first time since our return from long branch, he had himself partially dressed yesterday, ate a hearty breakfast, sitting up, and smoked his cigar with apparent relish. in the evening mrs. grant, fred. and i were out until after 11 p.m., perfectly unconscious that his end was near. on our return we found his attending physician with him, and he, mr. dent, apparently in a quiet slumber. not many minutes after he ceased to breathe and life was gone without a struggle or movement of a limb or muscle. it was a clear case of life worn out purely by time,--no disease, care or anxiety hastening dissolution. on thursday there will be funeral service at the house, by dr. tiffany, and at 11.30 his remains will leave the b. & p. depot for st. louis. the funeral there will be on saturday next; and mrs. dent's remains will be brought up from the farm at the same time, and the two interred in mr. dent's lot in bellefontaine. dr. sharp, mr. casey, gen. dent, fred. grant and myself, will accompany them. during all the time mr. dent has been confined to his room, and at all times before when he was in the least unwell since we have been in the white house--dr. bazil norris of the army has been most attentive. i feel disposed to recognize my appreciation of his attention in some way, and have thought if i could get about such a watch as was made for me at the establishment near jersey city i would get that. if it is not asking too much of you to enquire i would like you to do so. if it can be got before christmas you might order it at once, with the doctor's monogram--_from his friend u.s. grant_--. if it cannot be had by that time i would not order it until further directed. my children will all be at home by thursday, unless it may be bucky. the family are well, or as well as could be expected.--we would be very glad to see you here on thursday, as an old friend of mr. dent, but do not ask that you should undergo the fatigue of the trip unless you feel well enough to do so. very truly yours, u.s. grant. executive mansion washington, nov. 14th, '76. my dear mr. corbin: jennie's and your letter is just received. i shall not be in new york, nor away from washington, until after the meeting of congress. but i will gladly give you the hour or two you speak of if you come to washington. if you and jennie could come this week we could make a spare room without inconvenience. mrs. smith--of washington, pa., with her two children--are with us, but they can be put in the room with their mother. the alarm about the removal of holden as collector of internal revenue for the covington district is premature. there was a _raid_ made upon him by a person in whom i take no _stoc,_, and a statement made in regard to him which i said--if proved true--would mean that he must go out. but i think that rumor was entirely dispelled. my message is not "blocked out," nor scarcely thought of. so many other exciting matters preoccupy my time and thoughts that i do not bother myself about the other. i shall trust to the inspiration of the moment for what i shall say. will be brief, but to the point if i can. yours truly, u.s. grant. [grant's second term of office expired march, 1877.] executive mansion washington, dec. 13th, '76. my dear mr. corbin: i wish you and jennie would come down and make us a visit. we now have room, and will have until fred. returns with his family, which will probably be a few days before christmas.--sometime before my term of office expires i want mother to make me a visit. if she would like to come down during the holidays we could make room by sending one of the boys out o' nights. the children will all be at home during that week; possibly the last time we will have them all at home together. at all events it may be the last opportunity mother may have of seeing them together. i received your kind letter of the 11th this a.m. this year, owing to election excitement, department reports only came in a few days before the meeting of congress. when they did come the situation in south carolina was so critical that dispatches were coming to me, or to members of my cabinet, and brought from them to me in such rapid succession that i do not think i had one single half hour without interruption all the time i was preparing my message. i am sure i did not have four hours in its preparation all told, exclusive of the time consumed in reading the departmental reports. i left out necessarily topics i should liked to have talked about, but would not mention without being sure i was right. my love to all. yours truly, u.s. grant. [general and mrs. grant spent the next two years in a tour around the world.] chicago, ill., april 12th, 1877. dear mr. corbin: to-morrow evening mrs. grant and i start for washington, pa., where we will spend a few days, then go to harrisburgh, washington, d.c., and toward the last of the month get around to elizabeth to spend a few days with you before taking our departure for europe. we have not entirely decided whether to take the american line from philadelphia or the inman line from new york city. both have tendered pressing invitations, and both present good accommodations. if we take the former we will sail on the 9th or 16th of may, if the latter on the 19th. we had a very pleasant trip west but a little hurried. there is much complaint of dull times but really appearances do not justify it. kindest regards of mrs. grant and myself to mother and jennie. yours truly, u.s. grant. ragatz, switzerland, august 13th, '77. my dear mr. cramer: before leaving england i had accepted invitations to visit cities and country houses in scotland--and places in england not yet visited by me--to take up all the month of september and part of october. i thought there was time for me to visit this interesting country and to make a run through denmark, sweden and norway and get back to scotland in time to keep my engagements. but i have found so much of interest here, and the modes of conveyance so slow in reaching the points of greatest interest, that it is already too late to go even to denmark, leaving out norway and sweden. already we have spent eight actual days in carriages in getting from point to point, exclusive of other modes of travel. we have visited most of the lakes and crossed the principal passes in switzerland and northern italy. it has all been exceedingly interesting to me, the greatest regret being that i had not more time. i intend yet to visit denmark, and the countries north of it, but whether this fall or next season is not yet determined. probably about next june. i am sorry not to be able to see mary before she returns to america. i do not expect to return there before next july a year, and possibly not so early. all send love to mary and the children with kindest regards for yourself. yours truly, u.s. grant. dr. m.j. cramer, united states minister, copenhagen, denmark. bristol hotel, burlington gardens, london, w. aug. 26, '77. my dear mr. corbin: we arrived here from the continent yesterday, and found awaiting us your very acceptable letter. on wednesday we start again to visit scotland where i have had many invitations from both corporations and from private gentlemen. we will take about three weeks for this trip, after which we will visit some portions of england not yet visited, and nellie at her home, and get to paris the latter part of october. the papers no doubt will keep you advised of our movements in advance of anything i could write to go by mail. our visit has been most agreeable in every particular. people everywhere, both travellers and residents, did all they could to make everything pleasant for us. how long we will remain abroad is not yet determined, but i think for two years yet if the means to do so hold out. during my visit to the continent i saw but few american papers so that i am now somewhat behind in information as to what has been going on in the united states. all the foreign papers however have been full of the great strike which has taken place on our roads. it must have been serious but probably not so serious as it seemed at a distance. my judgment is that it should have been put down with a strong hand and so summarily as to prevent a like occurrence for a generation. we have made a short visit to nellie at her home. she lives in a delightful part of the country. all join me in love to mother and jennie as well as yourself. i will be glad to hear from you as often as you may feel like writing. yours truly, u.s. grant. we met mrs. clark and roberts in switzerland. it was like being back home to meet old acquaintances. except senator conkling and some of our government officials they are the only americans i have met that i felt i knew very well. please remember me to senator frelinghuysen and such other friends as you meet. a.r. corbin, esq., elizabeth, n.j. hotel bristol 5 place vendôme. paris, oct. 25th, '77. my dear mr. corbin: our trip has been a most agreeable one though the time seems long. i can scarcely realize that but little more than five months have passed since we sailed from philadelphia. but we have received nothing but kindness wherever we have been. in england, as you may have seen, our reception has been as enthusiastic as anything in the states directly after the war. we are now in paris for the first time. as yet i have seen but little of it, though enough to know that it is a most beautiful city. we shall probably remain here over a month, and then make a trip through spain and portugal, and up the mediterranean, in a naval vessel, stopping at all points of interest on both sides. mrs. grant finds she has brought too much baggage with her and proposes to send two or three trunks back, clothing brought from the states, and wants to send them either to jennie or mrs. sharp to keep until our return. if they are sent to you i will advise you when they are shipped. we were disappointed in not getting to copenhagen while mary was there. but switzerland was so agreeable, and there were so many points of interest to visit that i found it impossible to get there and return to scotland at the time i had promised. it is now very doubtful whether we will not have to abandon the idea of going there altogether. that will depend however upon whether we remain over another year. this winter we propose to go up the nile, and may keep on east and return by san francisco. but if we return we will stop in italy until the weather begins to get warm in the spring and then go north through austria, north germany, russia, sweden, norway and back by denmark and holland, spend the latter part of the summer again in switzerland, and go east the following winter. jesse will hardly go with us unless we go through this winter. he does not wish to leave another year before beginning the battle of life. give mrs. grant's, jesse's and my love to mother and jennie, and mary if she is with you. i keep very little track of political matters at home, knowing from experience the trouble a "new hand at the bellows" has. i hope all will be smooth and satisfactory before my return. i have not yet experienced any discomfort from lack of employment after sixteen years of continuous care and responsibilities. i may however feel it when i once settle down, though i think not. very truly yours, u.s. grant. p.s. direct letters to the care of drexel, harjes, & co., bankers, paris, france. paris france, nov. 27th, '77. my dear mr. cramer: i am just in receipt of your letter of the 21st inst. enclosing one from the portuguese minister to denmark recounting the cause of his brother-in-law's removal from the diplomatic service. i know baron de s----, and the baroness very well and esteem them very highly. there was never any difficulty with him and the state department, or with any official at washington that i have any recollection of. i am very sure that no cause of complaint could have existed on our part without my knowing it. it would afford me the greatest pleasure to meet the baron and his wife during my european tour, but i fear i shall not be able to do so. my trip through spain and portugal has been put off, or at least postponed, for this year. on saturday we leave here for the south of france, from there to take a naval vessel to visit all points of interest on the mediterranean. we shall probably go up the nile, and spend the winter in a warm climate, to be ready for our northern tour in the spring. it is barely possible that when we return from up the nile we may go on east, through china and japan to san francisco. but this is not probable for another year. this will probably be the last opportunity i shall ever have of visiting europe, and there is much to see that i have not seen, and cannot see this winter. i hear from home occasionally, but not as often, probably, as you do. all were well by the last advices received two days ago from orville. please assure your colleague that i have no recollection of other than the most pleasant relations between u.s. officials and the baron de s. with kind regards of mrs. grant, jesse and myself, i am, very truly, u.s. grant. cairo, egypt, jan'y 13th, '78. my dear mr. corbin: i am in receipt of your letter of december '77 at this remote, but historically interesting quarter of the globe. we have been in cairo since last tuesday. this is sunday. i have seen the city very thoroughly; visited the pyramids; the virgin mary's tree where she took shelter some twenty centuries ago; the spring which became sweet from being saline, on her quenching her thirst from it, and which remains sweet to this day,--while i was there water was being pumped from it, by ox power, with a revolving wheel, to irrigate the neighboring ground--; heliopolis, the great seat of learning in the days of moses, and where he was taught, and where the father-in-law of joseph was a teacher. the tree and the well are at heliopolis, about six miles from here. on tuesday we start up the nile on a special steamer provided by the khedive. we expect to go as far as to the first rapids stopping at all the points of interest on the way. this will probably take three weeks. on our return we expect to go to suez, thence by canal to port said, and then take our steamer again. from port said we will go to joppa and out to jerusalem. returning to joppa we will go to beirout, and out to damascus--possibly diverging to visit baalbec, thence to smyrna from which we will visit ephesus, thence to constantinople. returning we will stop a few days at athens, thence to old syracuse on the island of sicily, then to some convenient point on the italian coast from which to reach rome. we will remain in rome for several weeks. should you write me any time within six weeks from this directed to the care of our minister at rome, the letter will reach me. altogether we have had a most pleasant visit. our return to america during this year depends somewhat on circumstances, principally the means to stay away longer. it is likely this will be the last opportunity i shall ever have of travelling abroad and i am desirous of making the most of the pleasant opportunity.--give our love to mother, jennie and mary, and accept my thanks for your kind offers. very truly yours, u.s. grant. constantinople, march 5th, '78. my dear mr. cramer: on my arrival here i found your letter inquiring especially about the time i expect to be in copenhagen. my plan is to be in sweden by the middle of june, and after visiting that country and norway, to return by way of copenhagen. it is not likely that i shall be there before the fifth to the tenth of july, and it may be that i shall like the northern country so well that my visit to copenhagen will be postponed even a month longer. we have had a delightful winter. over a month was spent in egypt, visiting the old ruins of that country under the most favorable circumstances. leaving cairo we visited suez and passed through the suez canal to port said. from the latter place we went to joppa and out to jerusalem. since then we visited smyrna and ephesus and are now here. the russians are outside of the city but do not come in. a stranger would not detect from appearances that an enemy was so near. in fact i think the turks now regard the russians as about the only people in europe from whom they can expect anything. when you write home give my love to mother, mary and children, and jennie. i will inform you later, when i know definitely, about the time to expect me in copenhagen. very truly yours, u.s. grant. rome, italy, march 29th, '78. my dear mr. corbin: mr. young, of the new york _herald_, has been with us from the time we went on shipboard until we arrived here. his letters published in the papers are all good, and save me writing descriptive letters. presuming that you have read them i will say nothing further than that my winter travels, in the mediterranean, on the nile, and in the levant generally have been the pleasantest of my life. i should enjoy doing it over again next winter. we have been in rome eight days. it is a city of great interest. but one should visit it before making the nile trip. here you see modern and comparatively insignificant ruins, not dating back many centuries before the beginning of the christian era. on the nile one sees grand ruins, with the inscriptions as plain and distinct as when they were first made, that antedate moses by many centuries. it was our plan on leaving suez to go to florence, venice, vienna, berlin, dresden, st. petersburgh, through sweden, norway, back to denmark, through holland to paris, reaching the latter place about the middle of july, and to spend six or eight weeks there to see the exposition and the people that will fill the city. i think now i will change my plan and go from venice, by easy stages, to paris, reaching there early in may, and make my visit while the weather is pleasant. i will then go north in the summer, taking holland first, denmark next, and sweden and norway in august. i fear from present indications that mr. cramer and mary will not be there. it looks to me that unless the north rallies by 1880 the government will be in the hands of those who tried so hard fourteen--seventeen--years ago to destroy it. b---is evidently paving a way for re-organizing an army favorable to such a change. i think now we will not return to the states until about a year from may. i have no idea where we will live on our return, and if we should go back in the fall we would have to determine the question without delay. we can go back in may and occupy our long branch house and have all summer to prepare for the winter. i was getting some little mosaics--specialties of rome--to-day and i bought, among other things, what i think a very pretty pin and earrings for jennie. i have also got bracelets for clara cramer and jennie grant. if i see an opportunity of sending them home before going myself i will send them. i have written to buck to come over and spend his vacation with us. i can send them with him. give our love to mother, jennie, mary and the children. yours very truly, u.s. grant. p.s. it is very kind in mr. clark, and the gentlemen associated with him, to send the message you convey from them; but they must recollect that i had the harness on for sixteen years and feel no inclination to wear it again. i sincerely hope that the north will so thoroughly rally by next election as to bury the last remnant of secession proclivities, and put in the executive chair a firm and steady hand, free from utopian ideas purifying the party electing him out of existence. hotel liverpool, paris, may 25th, '78. my dear mr. cramer: i am now for the first time able to fix approximately the time of my visit to copenhagen. we shall leave here on saturday, three weeks from to-day, or on the following tuesday. we shall stop at the hague three or four days. jesse leaves for home so as to take the steamer of the fourth of june from liverpool. our party therefore will consist only of mrs. grant with her maid and myself. if your arrangements are made to be away from copenhagen at the time mentioned above, i beg that you will not change your plans. should you be there, we shall probably remain over about one week. should you be away, we shall stop only a couple of days. i have not heard directly from elizabeth for some time; it is probably my own fault, for mr. corbin is very prompt in answering every letter; but bucky writes regularly every week from new york, so i hear indirectly. when you write home give my love to all of them at elizabeth. very truly yours, u.s. grant. p.s. i go from copenhagen directly to stockholm. i am not personally acquainted with our present minister there, though i once appointed him to a south american mission. u.s.g. paris, france, june 3d, '78. my dear mr. cramer: your letter of the 31st of may is just received. i should have written to you within a day or two to inform you of a slight change of plan, which will bring me into copenhagen from ten days to two weeks later than i wrote you i should be there, even if i had not received your letter. to save retracing my steps, as i should be obliged to do by the routes laid out in my last letter, i now intend to go from the hague to berlin and visit a few of the german cities before going to denmark. from copenhagen i shall go by water to norway, thence to sweden, st. petersburg, moscow, and to vienna. i shall be very glad indeed to see mary and the children and hope they may be back by the time i reach copenhagen, about from the fifth to the tenth of july. jesse sails from liverpool to-morrow for home. he has been very homesick for some time. with best regards of mrs. grant and myself, i am, very truly, u.s. grant. hanover, germany, june 25th, '78. my dear mr. cramer: mrs. grant and i are now here on our way to the german capital. we shall probably remain in berlin until monday, the first of july. we shall stop over by the way from berlin to copenhagen, particularly at hamburg, so as to reach copenhagen about the fifth of july. if you will drop me a line to the kissenhof hotel, berlin, to let me know if mary will be home at the time designated i shall be obliged. if she is not to be at home i may change my plan and go direct to sweden, thence to norway, and return thence by denmark. mrs. grant and i are both well and send much love to mary and the children. very truly yours, u.s. grant. paris, france. dec. 10th, '78. my dear mr. cramer: since leaving copenhagen mrs. grant and i have visited every capital in europe not previously visited by us. i can say with great earnestness that no part of our journeyings gave us more pleasure than that through the scandinavian countries, and no public have impressed me more favorably. if i were going to remain over another year i should go back to norway at least and far enough north to see the midnight sun. but we expect to leave paris about the middle of january, to return to the states by the way of india, china, and japan. the secretary of the navy has been kind enough to invite us to go on a man-of-war which leaves the united states to-day for the chinese squadron, via the mediterranean and suez. i first declined but since cabled my acceptance. this will probably bring us around home about next october or november. i am sorry to say that i do not get favorable news from orvil. he does not seem to improve. julia joins me in love to mary and the children and in kindest regards to yourself. i hope you did not forward the stones presented by the consul.--julia says to tell mary that she got a very rich fur cloak in paris and hopes she got one also. is there anything we can do for you in paris? very truly yours, u.s. grant. rangoon, burma, march 20th, '79. my dear mr. cramer: we have now been very well through india and are this far on our way to the farther east. the weather has been pleasant until within the last few days. but now it is becoming very warm, and as we have yet to go through the straits of malacca near the equator before turning north, we must expect some discomfort. i have been very much pleased with english rule and english hospitality in india. with that rule two hundred and fifty millions of uncivilized people are living at peace with each other, and are not only drawing their subsistence from the soil but are exporting a large excess over imports from it. it would be a sad day for the people of india and for the commerce of the world if the english should withdraw. we hope to be in hong kong by the middle of april, and farther north in china as soon thereafter as possible. when a good climate is reached we shall regulate our further movements by the reports of weather on seas to be traversed, and climate of places to be visited. at present, however, we expect to reach san francisco about the first half of july. although homesick to be settled down i dread getting back. the clamor of the partisan and so-called independent press win be such as to make life there unpleasant for a time. mrs. grant joins me in love to you, mary, and the children. i have to-day written a letter to mr. corbin. very truly yours, u.s. grant. p.s. julia asks me to add, to tell mary that the english speak in the highest terms of the work being done all through this country by the missionaries, especially in an educational way. they say they are doing much good. [to his niece, clara cramer.] new york city, sept. 27th, 1883. my dear clara: on my return from the trip over the north pacific railroad to the pacific coast last friday, i found your excellent and welcome letter, with enclosures. your aunt was very much pleased with your letter and poetry as well as with your essay. they all do you great credit, and i think you can well sustain yourself as a writer with any young lady of your age in this or any other land. my trip over the northern route to the pacific about completes my personal observation of every part of our country. i was not prepared to see so rich a country or one so rapidly developing. across the continent where but a few years ago the indian held undisputed sway, there is now a continuous settlement, and every ten or fifteen miles a town or city, each with spires of the school house and the church. the soil for almost the entire distance is as fertile as that of illinois. i saw your aunt jennie yesterday. she is quite well. all my family are well and join in love to you. i think neither your aunt nor i will ever visit europe again. we may, however, change our minds. but we are getting a little too old to enjoy travelling, and then we have such pleasant homes for both summer and winter. love to your father and mother. yours truly, u.s. grant. 3 east 66th street, june 10th, '84. dear clara: your letter, with one from your aunt jennie, reached me a few days since. i regret that i have not more cheerful news to write you than i have. financially the grant family is ruined for the present, and by the most stupendous frauds ever perpetrated. but your aunt jennie must not fret over it. i still have a home and as long as i live she shall enjoy it as a matter of right; at least until she recovers what she has lost. fred is young, active, honest, and intelligent, and will work with a vim to recuperate his losses. of course his first effort will be to repay his aunts.--we go to long branch this week. we expected to live with fred this summer in morristown, n.j. but failing to rent our cottage we will occupy it and fred will live with us and rent his if he can. all send love to you, your father and mother and aunt jennie. yours affectionately, u.s. grant. [to mrs. cramer. general grant was then writing his _memoirs_. dr. cramer was united states minister to switzerland from 1881 to 1885. simpson is u.s. grant, son of orvil grant. reference is made to the customary resignation of diplomatic officials of the party opposed to the incoming political party. cleveland became president in 1885.] new york city, jan'y 13th, 1885. dear sister: i am just in receipt of jennie's letter of the 2nd of january. i am busy on my book which fred is copying for the press. i hope to have it ready for the press by may next. but i may fail in this on account of weakness. my mouth has been very sore, but not so bad i think as the papers have made out. but it has been bad enough. the rest of the family are all well. my advice is that mr. cramer does not resign until he is asked to. simpson i do not suppose will be disturbed in his position. he is very competent, and the soul of honor, both qualities wanted in the sub-treasury. all send love. yours affectionately, u.s. grant. proclamation to the citizens of paducah! i have come among you, not as an enemy, but as your friend and fellow-citizen, not to injure or annoy you, but to respect the rights, and to defend and enforce the rights of all loyal citizens. an enemy, in rebellion against our common government, has taken possession of, and planted its guns upon the soil of kentucky and fired upon our flag. hickman and columbus are in his hands. he is moving upon your city. i am here to defend you against this enemy and to assert and maintain the authority and sovereignty of your government and mine. i have nothing to do with opinions. i shall deal only with armed rebellion and its aiders and abettors. you can pursue your usual avocations without fear or hindrance. the strong arm of the government is here to protect its friends, and to punish only its enemies. whenever it is manifest that you are able to defend yourselves, to maintain the authority of your government, and protect the rights of all its loyal citizens, i shall withdraw the forces under my command from your city. u.s. grant, _brig-gen. u.s.a., commanding._ paducah, sept. 6th, 1861. [the following letter is from the secretary of general grant's aunt, the aunt rachel referred to on page twenty-seven. it is included in this volume as a historical curiosity.] chestnut hill, va., june 5th, 1861. miss grant: i have not often written to "incog." correspondents, nor should i have the presumption now to address you, unknown to me (unless by reputation), but that peculiar circumstances have so combined as to induce the experiment. your aunt, mrs. tompkins, has been prostrated by illness for many days, and, for a while, closely confined to her couch; thus rendering it at least inconvenient to respond to your elaborate epistle, and, having permitted me the pleasure (?) of its perusal, she requested me to act as her amanuensis. in compliance, then, with her desire i shall proceed "ex abrupto" to discuss the various points you have presented; hoping you will pardon whatever of presumption there attaches to me in taking up a gauntlet thrown _not directly_ at my own feet. first, then, you deplore the deep distress that pervades our land, in anticipation of a conflict such as the civilized world never witnessed, and even the annals of barbarous history scarce re^cd; together with the inevitable consequence, that, our once (though _many years ago_) happy union must be _for ever dissolved_. viewing it from our standpoint i unite my voice of lamentation with yours; for it seems truly a mournful sight to behold, spread out to the gaze of the world, the history of a nation's folly, written in letters of blood. but i look at the brighter side of this distorted photograph. with the eye of _faith_ at least i can discern the hand of _providence_ shifting the scenes. this may seem strange, that a partition wall should be erected in the temple of liberty, once an asylum for an oppressed world. that the "stars and stripes"--the (once) badge of freedom, gracing the bosom of every sea--should be riddled from its staff and another substituted in its stead. not less strange, however, did thousands of good englishmen deem it, to behold the proud "british lion" quail before his foe of "the wilderness," and the "magna charta" rent in twain. we must look upon it then as an exercise of god's retributive justice for our sins as a people, or, that he designs that he shall ultimately be the more glorified by the separation. in the former case of course i take it that the _north_ will receive the awful visitation, for although offences must needs come, yet, woe be unto him through whom they come! in the latter condition the south is destined to become what (& indeed far more than) the whole america _once_ was to the world. this government was far too large to prosper well for many years; or at least comp^d to england (prosper), france and spain, & russia itself; but especially should we be divided into 2 great gov's since we have _virtually been so_, as to our domestic institutions, and many of our social customs, for many, many years. it is true we did exist many years also in commercial and social prosperity, & might have continued to maintain such a happy condition had not the "green-eyed monster, jealousy, reared his horrid front." yes, it was in great part _jealousy_. you yourself have admitted (& rightly) that our great ancestors were wiser than we. well when they formed the _original confed^y_ they were the rep's[3] of _slave states_, with _one exception_. they did not deem it _wrong_ in itself, or they would have abolished it--at least would not have made the "fugitive s. law" _for its protection_. after a while, however, it _did not pay_ to keep slavery in northern climates, & it was abolished _instanter_. why then was it that it became such a monstrous crime in their eyes? wherein was the consistency? partisans became jealous of the wealth & power of southern planters & south^n politicians, elevated to their power _through their wealth_--a thing _unavoidable_ in a republican government. thus, through demagogues at the north an animosity was aroused. it slumbered long in the germ, but being assiduously cherished from year to year it at last budded and bloomed in a clime congenial to its nature, & is now bringing forth its venomous fruit, even to a "hundred fold." it was the consuming of this pernicious fruit that brought death upon our "body politic" and produced all our woe. would to god that woe should fall upon none but those who "planted & watered" it! i am perfectly conscious and cognizant of the manner in which this spirit of enmity has been fostered. i am a _northern_ by _birth_ and _education_, & can testify to that which i know. i have also been in the _south_ sufficiently long to _know_ the sentiments of the people here, and how they coincide (or rather disagree) with the _northern conceptions_ of them. i have spent almost 8 years here--certainly long enough to learn the _character_ of the "peculiar institution" as well as its _practical workings & effect_ on society. and as i came with somewhat of prejudice against it, you must be frank enough to acknowledge me a fair judge in the matter. among the first books put into my youthful library, was a work called _charles ball_, or _the trials of a run-away slave_. this was a horrid thing, and formed an impression on my young mind that has only with the utmost _difficulty_ been eradicated. i am conscious that its contents are false. about the same time, & repeatedly, i was taken to witness a panorama of _uncle tom's cabin_--another book whose leaves have furnished much fuel to infernal flames. at the same time, & ever since, i have had my ears grated with the harsh jargon of fanatical tirades against the institutions & people of the south. of course then my mind was _poisoned & prejudiced_. and this has not been _my_ political training alone but that of a majority of your youth at the north--_no further_ north too than _penna_. how then is it possible that the north can entertain amicable feelings toward the south? add to this, what you rightly remark, that the popular mind is continually influenced by the issues of the _press_--an instrument that has scattered the seeds of discord broadcast over the land. and here you either ignorantly or designedly intimate a slander against the south. you say "all papers have free issue at the _north & not_ so at the _south_." now do you not know enough of southern affairs to see that the south by their _very constitution_ cannot admit _incendiary_ documents to be cast into their midst--it were suicidal. if the south should publish papers uttering sentiments detrimental to northern manufactories (_in general_) & in favor of foreign manufac's, how long would the north permit such papers to pass into their territory? again, just as you say you "wish that north^n. papers could circulate south," so also _do i wish_ that i need not _bar my doors of nights_. and both our desires could be accomplished if _all men were honest_. but, first, as i can't expect robbers to pass by my unbarred treasury, so i can't expect to receive northern papers uncrammed with _incendiary items_. again, however, the south^n papers have _virtually_ no circulation at the north. i have heard men, reputable for their knowledge & conservatism even, denounce such publi^ns.[4] as "unworthy to be touched." in the reading room of princeton theo. seminary there were taken, last winter, 12 weekly papers, and about 8 periodicals from the south & scarcely 3 of these were touched by _any but southern students_ during the session, unless some exciting discussion were going on in their columns. thus much as to newspapers. i confess they have been the cause of many erroneous impressions on both sides, but the north is no purer from crimination on this score than the south;--one stubborn evidence of this is the numerical dif. in pop^ln.[5] you next remark that abolitionism does not predominate at the north. i admit that for many years it _did not_, but lately it has acquired an ascendency & is now wielding its baneful influence on the minds of the masses. it is true there are many good people there whose minds are too pure to be tainted by such an almost infidel spirit as pervades the breasts of abolitionists; yet the party in power has been elevated by such vast majorities of the people, _in that section_, that, to one investigating the matter, it seems the public sentiment at the north has greatly changed in the last few years. in such a country as ours--a democratic one--the masses are governed by a few great leaders; these leaders, whether in power or not, are still the almost despots who rule us. their actions give fruit and coloring to the character of the sections over which they sway their autocratic sceptres. who then can doubt the aboli^n propensities of the n. when such men as _beecher, greeley, webb, phillips, sumner_, & a host of kindred spirits, are the giant levers in the machinery of their society? it will not do to say that these are disregarded by sensible people there, for i know too well their power for evil. i know that _dr. hodge_--a man whom i love next to my father--stated, in his article on "the state of the country," that he did not know of 12 abolitionists "within the circle of his acquaintance." but the dr. was either woefully mistaken or he didn't consider his _pupils as belonging to that circle_; for to my certain knowledge there were twice that number within the walls of "princeton" at the time he made the assertion, and many of these avowedly such--men who, i was astonished to see, withheld their names when the same dr. h. came round with a petition to congress for "the restoration of the mis. comp." & the repeal of the "personal liberty bills." these young men were embryo ministers--men whose moral influence _must_ be _powerful_ for _good_ or for _evil_. how is it then you can assert that the north don't want the extinction of slavery when such men as i have mentioned exert every effort to prevent its extension & not that only, but the _operation_ of the _fugitive s. law?_ i am aware that you stated the _contrary_ in your letter--that the north are ever "rigorous" in its execution; nor am i so ungallant as to doubt your veracity; but i think you have not fully informed yourself on this point, else you would have learned that in scarcely an isolated case has the master ever recovered his property without being put to more expense & trouble than the negro was worth; although i am free to admit, that at the same time it cost the u.s. gov. an equal if not greater amount. of course i refer to those negroes who have _not merely_ crossed the _limits_ of a slave state, & thus been caught, but gone some distance north. now the obligation to restore a fugitive slave is a _constitu^l. & moral obligation;_ and those laws designed to prevent such restoration are unconst^l & criminal--and worthy of all condem^n.--and unbecoming the dignity of any sov^n. state. if people of any state can't conscientiously submit to the constitution there are only 2 courses: they should endeavor to have it peaceably altered, or should _move out of the country_. this is the opinion of the most learned and liberal men. _they have no right_ to live under the protec^n. of a const^n. & yet _refuse_ to submit to its _stipulations_. true enough, as you say, the north wish _not_ to have the negroes set free _in their midst_, to overrun and disturb them--this they declare by their actions, for they take no care for or interest in the poor free (almost) brutes in their midst;--yet how soon will they be ready to _resist_ you most violently should you attempt to take even one of them back, from his then wretched abode, to his former happier place in the service of a kind master? "oh! consistency, thou art a jewel!" this then has been _one_ of the _two great causes_ of the present troubles. the other--the denial of equal rights in the territories--is still a _greater_, because it involves a principle; the former was more a matter of personal interest. the territories being purchased in common, were the com. pos. of north and south. each had a const^l right to emigrate thither _with their property_ & demand for it the protection _afforded by_ the const^n. it became, in course of time, a matter of dispute whether the south could take their slaves there as _property_. (as a matter of course this arose from _jealousy_--the n. having no such prop, to take.) this great quest. was decided, however, by the _chief justice_ in the highest tribunal in the world, in favor of the south; viz. that _slaves were property_. i refer to the "dred scott" case. this should have been sufficient, as it came from the highest authority in the gov^t. but some parties and people are _never satisfied_. full in the face of this high official the repub^n party declare by their _platform orators, & press_, that slavery shall never enter another foot of territory. now if the south admit this principle they acknowledge their inferiority to the north--an act that, even in the eyes of the north, would not comport with their dignity & honor as an independent & free people. the south being thus _oppressed_ then i assert they have a right (not to secede, for no such right exists in my conception, as it would be an element _subversive_ of any, & especially of a repub^ln gov.,) _to revolt_--a right inherent in & beyond the control of all earthly govern^ts. yes i coincide with the great lord chatham when he says that "_rebellion_ against _oppression_ is _obedience_ to _god_." our ancestors rebelled against the tyranny of british usurpation, & the texans revolted against a like despotism exercised by a mexican autocrat. why then are the _sovereign_ states of _america_ not justifiable in throwing off the yoke or rather resisting _to have put upon them_, the yoke, of northern tyranny? to make the argument still clearer, however, as to the territories, let us illustrate it: suppose a repub^n. congress decides that slavery shan't be _protected_ in the _ter._ as _prop_. i take my slave thither. an indictment is brought against me. i am tried and condemned by the territorial court. i appeal from its decision to the sup. court of the u.s. what then? from _analogy_ i conclude that i shall be acquitted, i.e., recover my property. for one chief justice has already decided thus; and is not his decision final? here then is an end of the matter; since the sup. court is the sole arbiter in determining the _constitutionality_ of any of congress' acts. as to the north not making use of _slanderous epithets_ against the south, i know nothing about _your particular section_ of the north, but i do know that when i have been in penna. & n.j., i have heard all classes utter the vilest insinuations against the people of the south _indiscriminately_. yes, it often seemed as if they could find no language too harsh, no comparison too base, no denunciation too bitter to apply to those whom in their ignorance they deemed their inferiors in wisdom and sense. such have i heard from the lips of distinguished citizens in all departments & professions of life. even hoary-headed ministers have entered the sacred desk with their mss. reeking with filth from the cesspool of political slander. dr. brown, with whom you are doubtless acqu^td, is now in phila^d. at the gen. assem. of the pres. ch. he wrote home lately that he never saw a mob that made use of viler language than did the best of citizens there in their denouncings of the south. i confess, however, that this is not a _one-sided_ affair; for i have heard equally abusive language applied to the north by the people south. as before, then, let us "strike hands" on this point also, for both sections are equally culpable. as to the _strength_ of _individuals_ in the two sections, it must be tested on the battle-field, and there alone. our war of words can never decide anything on this point. i should be sorry to admit the men in the north could not fight, had they a real enemy to contend against--a war of "_justice, reason_, or _humanity_" to wage. but to arm themselves against their brethren, and in such an unholy cause as that in which they are engaged now, i must confess that their true metal can never be exhibited. _one_ man whose heart is in the war can always conquer _two_ who are fighting from some _impure motive_. and now let me candidly ask you to as candidly tell me whether or not you _think_ after _seeing_ the thing progress thus far, and having, as you say, been, & still continue to be, well-informed as to apper^ns on _both sides_, the north are engaged in the cause of "justice." admitting that some of them are actuated by pure and lofty motives, do you not acknowledge that the _vast majority_ are _blinded_ by _prejudice, led on_ by a desire for _military fame_, prompted by the _prospect_ of _plunder_, or actuated by the still more ----? but i refrain--my very pen shudders at the thought of expressing myself further. yes, i think you must confess that is the case. i refer, of course, to the armies of lincoln _thus far_ made up. are they not composed of a _mercenary horde_, made up generally of the lowest rabble of the country, & thousands of those thrown out of employment in the manufacturing cities--who have resorted to camp-life for self-sustenance--indeed _their only resource?_ whether you admit this or not, it is emphatically true to a great extent, for the northern papers themselves have made such statements as would lead me to believe so, & more, i have correspondents in the north, who confirm my suspicions on this score. my own father who does not justify the attack on sumter, yet denounces lin's army as a set of _murderers!_ he lives in penna. & this is the opinion of many good citizens there. and now can such men be justified in their present purposes and activities? if so, upon what principles? we have sh^n. that it is not in accordance with sound reason & the "inexorable logic" of the constitution, since that noble edifice was attacked in two points simultaneously by the repub^cn party: 1°. by abrogating the fugitive slave law; 2°. by depriving the south of eq^l rights in the territories. these are 2 points in which the north has transgressed the limits of immutable justice, and nothing which is unjust can be _reasonable_, for, they (just. & reas.) are twin sisters. moreover, the bible justifies no war but that of self-defence. then are the north invaded? no, nor never will be, by the south, for all they ask is peace within their borders. while they hold in one hand the sword of self-defence, they present the "olive branch" with the other; and so god grant it _may be ever_. you lament the inconceivable disasters "inaugurated by the attack on sumter." true enough they may have been _inaugurated_ by that _act_, but their unconcealed cause lies _far_ back of that, as we have shown. that was only a raising of the curtain, or rather a forcing of it to be raised by the abolitionists--a beginning of the bloody drama. who caused the attack? what meant those _human cargoes_ that approached so close to its walls the day before the battle? why did the worthy (?) lincoln so long deceive the south^rn commissioners by promise after promise not to make war, but to _evacuate_ the fort, & meet them, as a sensible pres. would have done, in friendly negotiation for peace? s.c. was right, and acted nobly in the affair, and was as justifiable therein, as was _anderson_ in occupying the fort _before_ he had a reason for doing so, declaring by his overt act that the u.s. forces under him were at _enmity_ with s.c. but then you say s.c. should have _first tried_ lincoln before determining to secede. i think she saw with prophetic vision the end from the beginning. she took lincoln at his word--that itself was oppression & tyranny sufficient to burst asunder the closest ties of union that could exist in any country. you say we sh^d. give everything a fair trial. i disagree. if i saw a _serpent_ in my path & it sh^d. attempt to make battle, or declare its hostility by displaying its horrid fangs, do you think i would coolly stand by & give it a fair trial, & test its friendship? i would be impelled, even had i never seen or heard of such a creature before, to crush it immediately, & so s.c. has sensibly said to the administration "_serpent, bite a file!_" as to your eulogium on lincoln i have not much to say. if he pleases you, well enough, you're easily satisfied. _i_ take it that he is a disgrace to the chair he occupies; and to judge from his conversations, he is devoid of all sense of refinement & etiquette; to look at his executive powers as displayed thus far, he had better be _a bey_ than helmsman of the "old ship"; and what of his _efforts_ at speeches? in the language of logan, "i appeal to any white man" to say if they would not be a disgrace to many a "country 'squire"! and yet such a man elevated to the highest position in the gift of the american people! there was a time when the soundest and most learned men of the land were made presidents, now a man's capacity for the office seems to depend on the meanness of his intellect & the _number of rails he can split in a day_. and so great were his "maul & wedge" propensities that he withheld not his hand from splitting the tree of liberty. but let us inquire upon which side "_humanity_" stands in this contest. you complain much of several (local) depredations com^td by south on private _boats_ &c. i ask, in candor, if it was not in retaliation for like outrages com^td by the north. i am certain as to its being so in several cases. the very 1st boat thus ill-treated was one belonging to the south on its way down the miss. & attacked at cairo. to retaliate they determined to attack _north^en boats coming up the river_. and what have your noble _ohioans_ done lately & repeatedly with our _ka._ boats at _gallipolis_? thrice have they overhauled the same boat and twice kept every pound of freight on her timbers. but this is not all; your _humane lincoln_ has closed the southern ports, & is daily _robbing vessels_ on their way in & out of the same. during the last week he stole $150,000 worth of southern tobacco, & thus the programme continues. _very humane indeed!_ again, he is _no invader!_ no indeed! by no means! yet hundreds of citizens are now fleeing from wheeling, & other towns invaded, for personal safety. scarce a day passes but some one stops here who has thus escaped. if they remain on their own soil and round their proper hearthstone the (very) humane doom of a murderer awaits them! the north don't intend to make invasion at all, yet _4000 f^l_ troops are now in _parkersburg_, breaking up printing presses, putting innocent people in jail, and doing other _humane_ acts, "too numerous to mention." according to my letter from father i understand they don't have the first principles of _civilized warfare_--they intend to _hang_ all their prisoners. oh! _humanity!_ humanity! and now that we have seen that neither reason, justice, nor humanity is on the side of the north, let us look at the subject in the light of _expediency_, admitting, for the sake of argument the while, that it _were_ right or just to wage the war. and viewing it from this standpoint, we ask, what does the north expect to _gain_ by it? does there live a man so lost to reason & common sense as to imagine that the union of the seceded states with the n.s. can ever be effected again? _and if it could be done by force_, how long could a repub^n gov. exist as a military despotism? and who would not prefer _banishment_ or _death_ to _such_ a _life?_ what satisfac^n could the north themselves have in such an event? they would live a life of misery; provoke the sneers of the civilized world; and draw down upon their heads the terrible wrath of an offended god. but this war will _not_ be permitted _thus to terminate_, the south can _never be conquered_. you yourself know their "_spirit_" too well to believe otherwise. rather than be _subjugated_ they will _die_ a _triple death_. like their mighty _henry_ they cry, "give us liberty or give us _death!_" and still more _i_ don't think they can be _exterminated. 8,000,000_ of people, armed in the holy cause of self-defence; struggling for their _liberties, honor, interests, & lives_, with a laudable ambition, & an _unyielding perseverance_, are _invincible_ by any force the north can raise to send against them. besides (to continue the sentiments of henry), the battle is not to the _strong_ alone, it is to the _vigilant, the active_, the _brave_. especially so when, as i said before, the forces of lincoln are not composed generally of men of the first rank of society (except a few officers desirous of fame), but the "offscouring" & rabble of the land--men who have nothing at stake, not even their own lives we might say, since they care so little for anything. so that notwithstanding the immense number (and here let me remind you of the _disparity_ of _forces_, of which you said so much, at _sumter_)--"stubborn facts"--of which you speak, the south has nothing to fear. and, moreover, as certainly as i believe there exists a god of justice & mercy, so certainly & conscientiously do i believe he will defend the south from the vandals of the north. yes, dark as they seem, the clouds of gloom do not shut out the star of hope, and they are beginning to be spanned by a radiant bow of promise; the fall of _ellsworth_ & the shattered walls of the _once presumed impreg^ble_ sumter, abundantly testify that _god_ is on their side, and "if the lord be _for_ them, _who can be against_ them?" so i heartily say "god speed" them--they shall have my prayers.--but let us take one more glance at the _expediency_ of this matter. are not the north fighting for a patroclus' grave in this struggle? what matters an _abstract banner?_ especially to the _"matter of fact" yankee?_ and then behold the inconsistency of the north in another point; they have through their representatives, for many years, cried "_no more slave_ territory"; and indeed many of them, such as seward &c., have declared that slavery _must be abolished_, as both can't exist under the _same gov.;_ yet, _now_ they are _fighting to the death_ to _keep_ or _get back slave territory!!!_ "oh! consistency!" and, _finally_, at this point, will it not cost _myriads_ of _lives & millions_ of _money_ to accomplish their infernal designs, even _could_ they do it? and can the north afford this? even now it is costing _lincoln's anarchy_ (for i can't call it _gov._) _$1,000,000_ per day--a _matter_ of _record!_ suppose then the war sh^d last a year, what then? union or dis-union? alas, _farther separation_. continue it then two years more. what then? _ditto & ditto_ it will _be_ should it last as long as the "_war of the roses_," for we have no houses of york & lancaster to _unite_, sign and settle the dispute by marriage--_one_ or _both_ annihilated!--and now i ask how, in the name of reason, justice, or humanity, can you lift up your voice in defence of the north when they are the cause of all this accumulating misery?--when they have deprived the south of her consti^tn rights, driven her to the necessity of a separation, and now raise their arm against her as an enemy, declaring either to subjugate her, to overrun her with their vandal hordes, or exterminate from her soil every living creature?--& when, "oh bloodiest picture in the book of time!" they are ready to repeat with a triple vengeance the untold horrors of the spanish inquisition? they are madly, blindly rushing, they know not where. the blame of dissolution rests upon her. and the still more awful responsibility of a civil war will hang as an everlasting incubus upon her shoulders. then let her beware ere she "_cross the rubicon_"--let her "pause long upon its brink." and shall we all perish by her fratricidal hand? shall the blood, shed by brother in deadly war with brother, flow ignominiously through our rivers to the ocean & be carried by its waves to stain the shores of nations that for long years have been centring their fond hopes on america as the _grand ideal_ of the gov. they too would some day enjoy? shall such hopes be blasted as soon as fondly cherished? and now that italy has trampled upon the tyrannical "mitre"--torn from her long subdued neck the yoke of papal bondage--passed from the darkness of superstitious bondage into the light of religious freedom, shall we sink back to what she was, by casting ourselves into the whirlpool of civil war? shall we not only put out, but shatter, the lamp of liberty, a lamp whose effulgence was beginning to scatter the shades of despotism from off the earth? shall we extinguish the brightest star in the constellation of human freedom? the united voices of humanity, justice, & reason answer, _no!_ the cries of myriad free men living, & of millions yet unborn, rend the air with a universal negative! and from the vaulted canopy of heaven there swells back the solemn echo, "_god forbid!_" as if augmented by the mournful strain of 10,000 angels hovering in amazement over the conflicting scene! _oh! then let the north beware!_ mrs. tompkins says that if _you_ can justify your bro. ulysses in drawing his sword against those connected by the ties of blood, and even boast of it, you are at liberty to do so, _but she can not_. and should one of those kindred be stricken down by his sword the awful judgment of god will be meted out to him, &, if not repented of, the hot thunderbolts of his wrath will blaze round his soul through eternity. on the contrary, if the _vice versa_ should occur, she thinks "those kin" would be justified, because in _self-defence_. as to mr. _john marshall's_ being _promoted_ in the army of lincoln, she thinks _that fact explains itself:_ he spent much of his time _previously_ seeking, or at least _expecting, promotion_, & failing in a _laudable way_,--in defence of his own kindred & the home of his bosom companion!--he resorted to _yankeedom_, and sold as it were his birthright for a mess of abolition pottage. this helps confirm my view, that many take positions in lincoln's army with the expectation of military promotion, & the hope of an easy conquest of the south. oh, how deluded! but as for many of them, "god forgive them, for they _know not what they do_." but i must bring these desultory remarks to a break-off. so, begging pardon once more for transgressing the limits of formality, and hoping you may live to see the verification of many of my remarks, i have the pleasure of signing myself the secretary of your aunt rachel p.s. if you sh^d write again, please use white paper; it almost gives me the "blues" to read your letter. [footnote 3: representatives.] [footnote 4: publications.] [footnote 5: population.] personal memoirs of u. s. grant, part 5. by u. s. grant chapter lii. battle of spottsylvania--hancock's position--assault of warren's and wright's corps--upton promoted on the field--good news from butler and sheridan. the mattapony river is formed by the junction of the mat, the ta, the po and the ny rivers, the last being the northernmost of the four. it takes its rise about a mile south and a little east of the wilderness tavern. the po rises south-west of the place, but farther away. spottsylvania is on the ridge dividing these two streams, and where they are but a few miles apart. the brock road reaches spottsylvania without crossing either of these streams. lee's army coming up by the catharpin road, had to cross the po at wooden bridge. warren and hancock came by the brock road. sedgwick crossed the ny at catharpin furnace. burnside coming by aldrich's to gates's house, had to cross the ny near the enemy. he found pickets at the bridge, but they were soon driven off by a brigade of willcox's division, and the stream was crossed. this brigade was furiously attacked; but the remainder of the division coming up, they were enabled to hold their position, and soon fortified it. about the time i received the news of this attack, word came from hancock that early had left his front. he had been forced over to the catharpin road, crossing the po at corbin's and again at wooden bridge. these are the bridges sheridan had given orders to his cavalry to occupy on the 8th, while one division should occupy spottsylvania. these movements of the enemy gave me the idea that lee was about to make the attempt to get to, or towards, fredericksburg to cut off my supplies. i made arrangements to attack his right and get between him and richmond if he should try to execute this design. if he had any such intention it was abandoned as soon as burnside was established south of the ny. the po and the ny are narrow little streams, but deep, with abrupt banks, and bordered by heavily wooded and marshy bottoms--at the time we were there--and difficult to cross except where bridged. the country about was generally heavily timbered, but with occasional clearings. it was a much better country to conduct a defensive campaign in than an offensive one. by noon of the 9th the position of the two armies was as follows: lee occupied a semicircle facing north, north-west and north-east, inclosing the town. anderson was on his left extending to the po, ewell came next, then early. warren occupied our right, covering the brock and other roads converging at spottsylvania; sedgwick was to his left and burnside on our extreme left. hancock was yet back at todd's tavern, but as soon as it was known that early had left hancock's front the latter was ordered up to warren's right. he formed a line with three divisions on the hill overlooking the po early in the afternoon, and was ordered to cross the po and get on the enemy's flank. the fourth division of hancock's corps, mott commanding, was left at todd's when the corps first came up; but in the afternoon it was brought up and placed to the left of sedgwick's--now wright's--6th corps. in the morning general sedgwick had been killed near the right of his intrenchments by rebel sharpshooters. his loss was a severe one to the army of the potomac and to the nation. general h. g. wright succeeded him in the command of his corps. hancock was now, nine p.m. of the 9th of may, across the left flank of lee's army, but separated from it, and also from the remainder of meade's army, by the po river. but for the lateness of the hour and the darkness of the night he would have attempted to cross the river again at wooden bridge, thus bringing himself on the same side with both friend and foe. the po at the points where hancock's corps crossed runs nearly due east. just below his lower crossing--the troops crossed at three points--it turns due south, and after passing under wooden bridge soon resumes a more easterly direction. during the night this corps built three bridges over the po; but these were in rear. the position assumed by hancock's corps forced lee to reinforce his left during the night. accordingly on the morning of the 10th, when hancock renewed his effort to get over the po to his front, he found himself confronted by some of early's command, which had been brought from the extreme right of the enemy during the night. he succeeded in effecting a crossing with one brigade, however, but finding the enemy intrenched in his front, no more were crossed. hancock reconnoitred his front on the morning of the 10th, with the view of forcing a crossing, if it was found that an advantage could be gained. the enemy was found strongly intrenched on the high ground overlooking the river, and commanding the wooden bridge with artillery. anderson's left rested on the po, where it turns south; therefore, for hancock to cross over--although it would bring him to the same side of the stream with the rest of the army--would still farther isolate him from it. the stream would have to be crossed twice in the face of the enemy to unite with the main body. the idea of crossing was therefore abandoned. lee had weakened the other parts of his line to meet this movement of hancock's, and i determined to take advantage of it. accordingly in the morning, orders were issued for an attack in the afternoon on the centre by warren's and wright's corps, hancock to command all the attacking force. two of his divisions were brought to the north side of the po. gibbon was placed to the right of warren, and birney in his rear as a reserve. barlow's division was left south of the stream, and mott of the same corps was still to the left of wright's corps. burnside was ordered to reconnoitre his front in force, and, if an opportunity presented, to attack with vigor. the enemy seeing barlow's division isolated from the rest of the army, came out and attacked with fury. barlow repulsed the assault with great slaughter, and with considerable loss to himself. but the enemy reorganized and renewed the assault. birney was now moved to the high ground overlooking the river crossings built by our troops, and covered the crossings. the second assault was repulsed, again with severe loss to the enemy, and barlow was withdrawn without further molestation. general t. g. stevenson was killed in this move. between the lines, where warren's assault was to take place, there was a ravine grown up with large trees and underbrush, making it almost impenetrable by man. the slopes on both sides were also covered with a heavy growth of timber. warren, before noon, reconnoitred his front twice, the first time with one and the second with two divisions. he was repulsed on both occasions, but gained such information of the ground as to induce him to report recommending the assault. wright also reconnoitred his front and gained a considerably advanced position from the one he started from. he then organized a storming party, consisting of twelve regiments, and assigned colonel emory upton, of the 121st new york volunteers, to the command of it. about four o'clock in the afternoon the assault was ordered, warren's and wright's corps, with mott's division of hancock's corps, to move simultaneously. the movement was prompt, and in a few minutes the fiercest of struggles began. the battle-field was so densely covered with forest that but little could be seen, by any one person, as to the progress made. meade and i occupied the best position we could get, in rear of warren. warren was repulsed with heavy loss, general j. c. rice being among the killed. he was not followed, however, by the enemy, and was thereby enabled to reorganize his command as soon as covered from the guns of the enemy. to the left our success was decided, but the advantage was lost by the feeble action of mott. upton with his assaulting party pushed forward and crossed the enemy's intrenchments. turning to the right and left he captured several guns and some hundreds of prisoners. mott was ordered to his assistance but failed utterly. so much time was lost in trying to get up the troops which were in the right position to reinforce, that i ordered upton to withdraw; but the officers and men of his command were so averse to giving up the advantage they had gained that i withdrew the order. to relieve them, i ordered a renewal of the assault. by this time hancock, who had gone with birney's division to relieve barlow, had returned, bringing the division with him. his corps was now joined with warren's and wright's in this last assault. it was gallantly made, many men getting up to, and over, the works of the enemy; but they were not able to hold them. at night they were withdrawn. upton brought his prisoners with him, but the guns he had captured he was obliged to abandon. upton had gained an important advantage, but a lack in others of the spirit and dash possessed by him lost it to us. before leaving washington i had been authorized to promote officers on the field for special acts of gallantry. by this authority i conferred the rank of brigadier-general upon upton on the spot, and this act was confirmed by the president. upton had been badly wounded in this fight. burnside on the left had got up to within a few hundred yards of spottsylvania court house, completely turning lee's right. he was not aware of the importance of the advantage he had gained, and i, being with the troops where the heavy fighting was, did not know of it at the time. he had gained his position with but little fighting, and almost without loss. burnside's position now separated him widely from wright's corps, the corps nearest to him. at night he was ordered to join on to this. this brought him back about a mile, and lost to us an important advantage. i attach no blame to burnside for this, but i do to myself for not having had a staff officer with him to report to me his position. the enemy had not dared to come out of his line at any point to follow up his advantage, except in the single instance of his attack on barlow. then he was twice repulsed with heavy loss, though he had an entire corps against two brigades. barlow took up his bridges in the presence of this force. on the 11th there was no battle and but little firing; none except by mott who made a reconnoissance to ascertain if there was a weak point in the enemy's line. i wrote the following letter to general halleck: near spottsylvania c. h., may 11, 1864--8.30 a.m. major-general halleck, chief of staff of the army, washington, d. c. we have now ended the 6th day of very hard fighting. the result up to this time is much in our favor. but our losses have been heavy as well as those of the enemy. we have lost to this time eleven general officers killed, wounded and missing, and probably twenty thousand men. i think the loss of the enemy must be greater--we having taken over four thousand prisoners in battle, whilst he has taken from us but few except a few stragglers. i am now sending back to belle plain all my wagons for a fresh supply of provisions and ammunition, and purpose to fight it out on this line if it takes all summer. the arrival of reinforcements here will be very encouraging to the men, and i hope they will be sent as fast as possible, and in as great numbers. my object in having them sent to belle plain was to use them as an escort to our supply trains. if it is more convenient to send them out by train to march from the railroad to belle plain or fredericksburg, send them so. i am satisfied the enemy are very shaky, and are only kept up to the mark by the greatest exertions on the part of their officers, and by keeping them intrenched in every position they take. up to this time there is no indication of any portion of lee's army being detached for the defence of richmond. u. s. grant, lieut.-general. and also, i received information, through the war department, from general butler that his cavalry under kautz had cut the railroad south of petersburg, separating beauregard from richmond, and had whipped hill, killing, wounding and capturing many. also that he was intrenched, and could maintain himself. on this same day came news from sheridan to the effect that he had destroyed ten miles of the railroad and telegraph between lee and richmond, one and a half million rations, and most of the medical stores for his army. on the 8th i had directed sheridan verbally to cut loose from the army of the potomac and pass around the left of lee's army and attack his cavalry and communications, which was successfully executed in the manner i have already described. chapter liii. hancock's assault-losses of the confederates--promotions recommended --discomfiture of the enemy--ewell's attack-reducing the artillery. in the reconnoissance made by mott on the 11th, a salient was discovered at the right centre. i determined that an assault should be made at that point. (*28) accordingly in the afternoon hancock was ordered to move his command by the rear of warren and wright, under cover of night, to wright's left, and there form it for an assault at four o'clock the next morning. the night was dark, it rained heavily, and the road was difficult, so that it was midnight when he reached the point where he was to halt. it took most of the night to get the men in position for their advance in the morning. the men got but little rest. burnside was ordered to attack (*29) on the left of the salient at the same hour. i sent two of my staff officers to impress upon him the importance of pushing forward vigorously. hancock was notified of this. warren and wright were ordered to hold themselves in readiness to join in the assault if circumstances made it advisable. i occupied a central position most convenient for receiving information from all points. hancock put barlow on his left, in double column, and birney to his right. mott followed birney, and gibbon was held in reserve. the morning of the 12th opened foggy, delaying the start more than half an hour. the ground over which hancock had to pass to reach the enemy, was ascending and heavily wooded to within two or three hundred yards of the enemy's intrenchments. in front of birney there was also a marsh to cross. but, notwithstanding all these difficulties, the troops pushed on in quick time without firing a gun, and when within four or five hundred yards of the enemy's line broke out in loud cheers, and with a rush went up to and over the breastworks. barlow and birney entered almost simultaneously. here a desperate hand-to-hand conflict took place. the men of the two sides were too close together to fire, but used their guns as clubs. the hand conflict was soon over. hancock's corps captured some four thousand prisoners among them a division and a brigade commander twenty or more guns with their horses, caissons, and ammunition, several thousand stand of arms, and many colors. hancock, as soon as the hand-to-hand conflict was over, turned the guns of the enemy against him and advanced inside the rebel lines. about six o'clock i ordered warren's corps to the support of hancock's. burnside, on the left, had advanced up east of the salient to the very parapet of the enemy. potter, commanding one of his divisions, got over but was not able to remain there. however, he inflicted a heavy loss upon the enemy; but not without loss in return. this victory was important, and one that lee could not afford to leave us in full possession of. he made the most strenuous efforts to regain the position he had lost. troops were brought up from his left and attacked hancock furiously. hancock was forced to fall back: but he did so slowly, with his face to the enemy, inflicting on him heavy loss, until behind the breastworks he had captured. these he turned, facing them the other way, and continued to hold. wright was ordered up to reinforce hancock, and arrived by six o'clock. he was wounded soon after coming up but did not relinquish the command of his corps, although the fighting lasted until one o'clock the next morning. at eight o'clock warren was ordered up again, but was so slow in making his dispositions that his orders were frequently repeated, and with emphasis. at eleven o'clock i gave meade written orders to relieve warren from his command if he failed to move promptly. hancock placed batteries on high ground in his rear, which he used against the enemy, firing over the heads of his own troops. burnside accomplished but little on our left of a positive nature, but negatively a great deal. he kept lee from reinforcing his centre from that quarter. if the 5th corps, or rather if warren, had been as prompt as wright was with the 6th corps, better results might have been obtained. lee massed heavily from his left flank on the broken point of his line. five times during the day he assaulted furiously, but without dislodging our troops from their new position. his losses must have been fearful. sometimes the belligerents would be separated by but a few feet. in one place a tree, eighteen inches in diameter, was cut entirely down by musket balls. all the trees between the lines were very much cut to pieces by artillery and musketry. it was three o'clock next morning before the fighting ceased. some of our troops had then been twenty hours under fire. in this engagement we did not lose a single organization, not even a company. the enemy lost one division with its commander, one brigade and one regiment, with heavy losses elsewhere.(*30) our losses were heavy, but, as stated, no whole company was captured. at night lee took a position in rear of his former one, and by the following morning he was strongly intrenched in it. warren's corps was now temporarily broken up, cutler's division sent to wright, and griffin's to hancock. meade ordered his chief of staff, general humphreys, to remain with warren and the remaining division, and authorized him to give it orders in his name. during the day i was passing along the line from wing to wing continuously. about the centre stood a house which proved to be occupied by an old lady and her daughter. she showed such unmistakable signs of being strongly union that i stopped. she said she had not seen a union flag for so long a time that it did her heart good to look upon it again. she said her husband and son, being, union men, had had to leave early in the war, and were now somewhere in the union army, if alive. she was without food or nearly so, so i ordered rations issued to her, and promised to find out if i could where the husband and son were. there was no fighting on the 13th, further than a little skirmishing between mott's division and the enemy. i was afraid that lee might be moving out, and i did not want him to go without my knowing it. the indications were that he was moving, but it was found that he was only taking his new position back from the salient that had been captured. our dead were buried this day. mott's division was reduced to a brigade, and assigned to birney's division. during this day i wrote to washington recommending sherman and meade (*31) for promotion to the grade of major-general in the regular army; hancock for brigadier-general; wright, gibbon and humphreys to be major-generals of volunteers; and upton and carroll to be brigadiers. upton had already been named as such, but the appointment had to be confirmed by the senate on the nomination of the president. the night of the 13th warren and wright were moved by the rear to the left of burnside. the night was very dark and it rained heavily, the roads were so bad that the troops had to cut trees and corduroy the road a part of the way, to get through. it was midnight before they got to the point where they were to halt, and daylight before the troops could be organized to advance to their position in line. they gained their position in line, however, without any fighting, except a little in wright's front. here upton had to contend for an elevation which we wanted and which the enemy was not disposed to yield. upton first drove the enemy, and was then repulsed in turn. ayres coming to his support with his brigade (of griffin's division, warren's corps), the position was secured and fortified. there was no more battle during the 14th. this brought our line east of the court house and running north and south and facing west. during the night of the 14th-15th lee moved to cover this new front. this left hancock without an enemy confronting him. he was brought to the rear of our new centre, ready to be moved in any direction he might be wanted. on the 15th news came from butler and averill. the former reported the capture of the outer works at drury's bluff, on the james river, and that his cavalry had cut the railroad and telegraph south of richmond on the danville road: and the latter, the destruction of a depot of supplies at dublin, west virginia, and the breaking of new river bridge on the virginia and tennessee railroad. the next day news came from sherman and sheridan. sherman had forced johnston out of dalton, georgia, and was following him south. the report from sheridan embraced his operations up to his passing the outer defences of richmond. the prospect must now have been dismal in richmond. the road and telegraph were cut between the capital and lee. the roads and wires were cut in every direction from the rebel capital. temporarily that city was cut off from all communication with the outside except by courier. this condition of affairs, however, was of but short duration. i wrote halleck: near spottsylvania c. h., may 16, 1864, 8 a.m. major-general halleck, washington, d. c.: we have had five days almost constant rain without any prospect yet of it clearing up. the roads have now become so impassable that ambulances with wounded men can no longer run between here and fredericksburg. all offensive operations necessarily cease until we can have twenty-four hours of dry weather. the army is in the best of spirits, and feel the greatest confidence of ultimate success. * * * * * * you can assure the president and secretary of war that the elements alone have suspended hostilities, and that it is in no manner due to weakness or exhaustion on our part. u. s. grant, lieut.-general. the condition of the roads was such that nothing was done on the 17th. but that night hancock and wright were to make a night march back to their old positions, and to make an assault at four o'clock in the morning. lee got troops back in time to protect his old line, so the assault was unsuccessful. on this day (18th) the news was almost as discouraging to us as it had been two days before in the rebel capital. as stated above, hancock's and wright's corps had made an unsuccessful assault. news came that sigel had been defeated at new market, badly, and was retreating down the valley. not two hours before, i had sent the inquiry to halleck whether sigel could not get to staunton to stop supplies coming from there to lee. i asked at once that sigel might be relieved, and some one else put in his place. hunter's name was suggested, and i heartily approved. further news from butler reported him driven from drury's bluff, but still in possession of the petersburg road. banks had been defeated in louisiana, relieved, and canby put in his place. this change of commander was not on my suggestion. all this news was very discouraging. all of it must have been known by the enemy before it was by me. in fact, the good news (for the enemy) must have been known to him at the moment i thought he was in despair, and his anguish had been already relieved when we were enjoying his supposed discomfiture, but this was no time for repining. i immediately gave orders for a movement by the left flank, on towards richmond, to commence on the night of the 19th. i also asked halleck to secure the cooperation of the navy in changing our base of supplies from fredericksburg to port royal, on the rappahannock. up to this time i had received no reinforcements, except six thousand raw troops under brigadier general robert o. tyler, just arrived. they had not yet joined their command, hancock's corps, but were on our right. this corps had been brought to the rear of the centre, ready to move in any direction. lee, probably suspecting some move on my part, and seeing our right entirely abandoned, moved ewell's corps about five o'clock in the afternoon, with early's as a reserve, to attack us in that quarter. tyler had come up from fredericksburg, and had been halted on the road to the right of our line, near kitching's brigade of warren's corps. tyler received the attack with his raw troops, and they maintained their position, until reinforced, in a manner worthy of veterans. hancock was in a position to reinforce speedily, and was the soldier to do it without waiting to make dispositions. birney was thrown to tyler's right and crawford to his left, with gibbon as a reserve; and ewell was whirled back speedily and with heavy loss. warren had been ordered to get on ewell's flank and in his rear, to cut him off from his intrenchments. but his efforts were so feeble that under the cover of night ewell got back with only the loss of a few hundred prisoners, besides his killed and wounded. the army being engaged until after dark, i rescinded the order for the march by our left flank that night. as soon as it was discovered that the enemy were coming out to attack, i naturally supposed they would detach a force to destroy our trains. the withdrawal of hancock from the right uncovered one road from spottsylvania to fredericksburg over which trains drew our supplies. this was guarded by a division of colored troops, commanded by general ferrero, belonging to burnside's corps. ferrero was therefore promptly notified, and ordered to throw his cavalry pickets out to the south and be prepared to meet the enemy if he should come; if he had to retreat to do so towards fredericksburg. the enemy did detach as expected, and captured twenty-five or thirty wagons which, however, were soon retaken. in consequence of the disasters that had befallen us in the past few days, lee could be reinforced largely, and i had no doubt he would be. beauregard had come up from the south with troops to guard the confederate capital when it was in danger. butler being driven back, most of the troops could be sent to lee. hoke was no longer needed in north carolina; and sigel's troops having gone back to cedar creek, whipped, many troops could be spared from the valley. the wilderness and spottsylvania battles convinced me that we had more artillery than could ever be brought into action at any one time. it occupied much of the road in marching, and taxed the trains in bringing up forage. artillery is very useful when it can be brought into action, but it is a very burdensome luxury where it cannot be used. before leaving spottsylvania, therefore, i sent back to the defences of washington over one hundred pieces of artillery, with the horses and caissons. this relieved the roads over which we were to march of more than two hundred six-horse teams, and still left us more artillery than could be advantageously used. in fact, before reaching the james river i again reduced the artillery with the army largely. i believed that, if one corps of the army was exposed on the road to richmond, and at a distance from the main army, lee would endeavor to attack the exposed corps before reinforcements could come up; in which case the main army could follow lee up and attack him before he had time to intrench. so i issued the following orders: near spottsylvania c. h., va., may 18, 1864. major-general meade, commanding army of the potomac. before daylight to-morrow morning i propose to draw hancock and burnside from the position they now hold, and put burnside to the left of wright. wright and burnside should then force their way up as close to the enemy as they can get without a general engagement, or with a general engagement if the enemy will come out of their works to fight, and intrench. hancock should march and take up a position as if in support of the two left corps. to-morrow night, at twelve or one o'clock, he will be moved south-east with all his force and as much cavalry as can be given to him, to get as far towards richmond on the line of the fredericksburg railroad as he can make, fighting the enemy in whatever force he can find him. if the enemy make a general move to meet this, they will be followed by the other three corps of the army, and attacked, if possible, before time is given to intrench. suitable directions will at once be given for all trains and surplus artillery to conform to this movement. u. s. grant. on the 20th, lee showing no signs of coming out of his lines, orders were renewed for a left-flank movement, to commence after night. chapter liv. movement by the left flank--battle of north anna--an incident of the march--moving on richmond--south of the pamunkey--position of the national army. we were now to operate in a different country from any we had before seen in virginia. the roads were wide and good, and the country well cultivated. no men were seen except those bearing arms, even the black man having been sent away. the country, however, was new to us, and we had neither guides nor maps to tell us where the roads were, or where they led to. engineer and staff officers were put to the dangerous duty of supplying the place of both maps and guides. by reconnoitring they were enabled to locate the roads in the vicinity of each army corps. our course was south, and we took all roads leading in that direction which would not separate the army too widely. hancock who had the lead had marched easterly to guiney's station, on the fredericksburg railroad, thence southerly to bowling green and milford. he was at milford by the night of the 21st. here he met a detachment of pickett's division coming from richmond to reinforce lee. they were speedily driven away, and several hundred captured. warren followed on the morning of the 21st, and reached guiney's station that night without molestation. burnside and wright were retained at spottsylvania to keep up the appearance of an intended assault, and to hold lee, if possible, while hancock and warren should get start enough to interpose between him and richmond. lee had now a superb opportunity to take the initiative either by attacking wright and burnside alone, or by following by the telegraph road and striking hancock's and warren's corps, or even hancock's alone, before reinforcements could come up. but he did not avail himself of either opportunity. he seemed really to be misled as to my designs; but moved by his interior line--the telegraph road--to make sure of keeping between his capital and the army of the potomac. he never again had such an opportunity of dealing a heavy blow. the evening of the 21st burnside, 9th corps, moved out followed by wright, 6th corps. burnside was to take the telegraph road; but finding stanard's ford, over the po, fortified and guarded, he turned east to the road taken by hancock and warren without an attempt to dislodge the enemy. the night of the 21st i had my headquarters near the 6th corps, at guiney's station, and the enemy's cavalry was between us and hancock. there was a slight attack on burnside's and wright's corps as they moved out of their lines; but it was easily repulsed. the object probably was only to make sure that we were not leaving a force to follow upon the rear of the confederates. by the morning of the 22d burnside and wright were at guiney's station. hancock's corps had now been marching and fighting continuously for several days, not having had rest even at night much of the time. they were, therefore, permitted to rest during the 22d. but warren was pushed to harris's store, directly west of milford, and connected with it by a good road, and burnside was sent to new bethel church. wright's corps was still back at guiney's station. i issued the following order for the movement of the troops the next day: new bethel, va., may 22, 1864 major-general meade, commanding army of the potomac. direct corps commanders to hold their troops in readiness to march at five a.m. to-morrow. at that hour each command will send out cavalry and infantry on all roads to their front leading south, and ascertain, if possible, where the enemy is. if beyond the south anna, the 5th and 6th corps will march to the forks of the road, where one branch leads to beaver dam station, the other to jericho bridge, then south by roads reaching the anna, as near to and east of hawkins creek as they can be found. the 2d corps will move to chesterfield ford. the 9th corps will be directed to move at the same time to jericho bridge. the map only shows two roads for the four corps to march upon, but, no doubt, by the use of plantation roads, and pressing in guides, others can be found, to give one for each corps. the troops will follow their respective reconnoitring parties. the trains will be moved at the same time to milford station. headquarters will follow the 9th corps. u. s. grant, lieut.-general. warren's corps was moved from harris's store to jericho ford, wright's following. warren arrived at the ford early in the afternoon, and by five o'clock effected a crossing under the protection of sharpshooters. the men had to wade in water up to their waists. as soon as enough troops were over to guard the ford, pontoons were laid and the artillery and the rest of the troops crossed. the line formed was almost perpendicular to the course of the river--crawford on the left, next to the river, griffin in the centre, and cutler on the right. lee was found intrenched along the front of their line. the whole of hill's corps was sent against warren's right before it had got in position. a brigade of cutler's division was driven back, the enemy following, but assistance coming up the enemy was in turn driven back into his trenches with heavy loss in killed and wounded, with about five hundred prisoners left in our hands. by night wright's corps was up ready to reinforce warren. on the 23d hancock's corps was moved to the wooden bridge which spans the north anna river just west of where the fredericksburg railroad crosses. it was near night when the troops arrived. they found the bridge guarded, with troops intrenched, on the north side. hancock sent two brigades, egan's and pierce's, to the right and left, and when properly disposed they charged simultaneously. the bridge was carried quickly, the enemy retreating over it so hastily that many were shoved into the river, and some of them were drowned. several hundred prisoners were captured. the hour was so late that hancock did not cross until next morning. burnside's corps was moved by a middle road running between those described above, and which strikes the north anna at ox ford, midway between telegraph road and jericho ford. the hour of its arrival was too late to cross that night. on the 24th hancock's corps crossed to the south side of the river without opposition, and formed line facing nearly west. the railroad in rear was taken possession of and destroyed as far as possible. wright's corps crossed at jericho early the same day, and took position to the right of warren's corps, extending south of the virginia central railroad. this road was torn up for a considerable distance to the rear (west), the ties burned, and the rails bent and twisted by heating them over the burning ties. it was found, however, that burnside's corps could not cross at ox ford. lee had taken a position with his centre on the river at this point, with the two wings thrown back, his line making an acute angle where it overlooked the river. before the exact position of the whole of lee's line was accurately known, i directed hancock and warren each to send a brigade to ox ford by the south side of the river. they found the enemy too strong to justify a serious attack. a third ford was found between ox ford and jericho. burnside was directed to cross a division over this ford, and to send one division to hancock. crittenden was crossed by this newly-discovered ford, and formed up the river to connect with crawford's left. potter joined hancock by way of the wooden bridge. crittenden had a severe engagement with some of hill's corps on his crossing the river, and lost heavily. when joined to warren's corps he was no further molested. burnside still guarded ox ford from the north side. lee now had his entire army south of the north anna. our lines covered his front, with the six miles separating the two wings guarded by but a single division. to get from one wing to the other the river would have to be crossed twice. lee could reinforce any part of his line from all points of it in a very short march; or could concentrate the whole of it wherever he might choose to assault. we were, for the time, practically two armies besieging. lee had been reinforced, and was being reinforced, largely. about this time the very troops whose coming i had predicted, had arrived or were coming in. pickett with a full division from richmond was up; hoke from north carolina had come with a brigade; and breckinridge was there: in all probably not less than fifteen thousand men. but he did not attempt to drive us from the field. on the 22d or 23d i received dispatches from washington saying that sherman had taken kingston, crossed the etowah river and was advancing into georgia. i was seated at the time on the porch of a fine plantation house waiting for burnside's corps to pass. meade and his staff, besides my own staff, were with me. the lady of the house, a mrs. tyler, and an elderly lady, were present. burnside seeing us, came up on the porch, his big spurs and saber rattling as he walked. he touched his hat politely to the ladies, and remarked that he supposed they had never seen so many "live yankees" before in their lives. the elderly lady spoke up promptly saying, "oh yes, i have; many more." "where?" said burnside. "in richmond." prisoners, of course, was understood. i read my dispatch aloud, when it was received. this threw the younger lady into tears. i found the information she had received (and i suppose it was the information generally in circulation through the south) was that lee was driving us from the state in the most demoralized condition and that in the south-west our troops were but little better than prisoners of war. seeing our troops moving south was ocular proof that a part of her information was incorrect, and she asked me if my news from sherman was true. i assured her that there was no doubt about it. i left a guard to protect the house from intrusion until the troops should have all passed, and assured her that if her husband was in hiding she could bring him in and he should be protected also. but i presume he was in the confederate army. on the 25th i gave orders, through halleck, to hunter, who had relieved sigel, to move up the valley of virginia, cross over the blue ridge to charlottesville and go as far as lynchburg if possible, living upon the country and cutting the railroads and canal as he went. after doing this he could find his way back to his base, or join me. on the same day news was received that lee was falling back on richmond. this proved not to be true. but we could do nothing where we were unless lee would assume the offensive. i determined, therefore, to draw out of our present position and make one more effort to get between him and richmond. i had no expectation now, however, of succeeding in this; but i did expect to hold him far enough west to enable me to reach the james river high up. sheridan was now again with the army of the potomac. on the 26th i informed the government at washington of the position of the two armies; of the reinforcements the enemy had received; of the move i proposed to make (*32); and directed that our base of supplies should be shifted to white house, on the pamunkey. the wagon train and guards moved directly from port royal to white house. supplies moved around by water, guarded by the navy. orders had previously been sent, through halleck, for butler to send smith's corps to white house. this order was repeated on the 25th, with directions that they should be landed on the north side of the pamunkey, and marched until they joined the army of the potomac. it was a delicate move to get the right wing of the army of the potomac from its position south of the north anna in the presence of the enemy. to accomplish it, i issued the following order: quarles' mills, va., may 25, 1864. major general meade, commanding a. p. direct generals warren and wright to withdraw all their teams and artillery, not in position, to the north side of the river to-morrow. send that belonging to general wright's corps as far on the road to hanover town as it can go, without attracting attention to the fact. send with it wright's best division or division under his ablest commander. have their places filled up in the line so if possible the enemy will not notice their withdrawal. send the cavalry to-morrow afternoon, or as much of it as you may deem necessary, to watch and seize, if they can, littlepage's bridge and taylor's ford, and to remain on one or other side of the river at these points until the infantry and artillery all pass. as soon as it is dark to-morrow night start the division which you withdraw first from wright's corps to make a forced march to hanover town, taking with them no teams to impede their march. at the same time this division starts commence withdrawing all of the 5th and 6th corps from the south side of the river, and march them for the same place. the two divisions of the 9th corps not now with hancock, may be moved down the north bank of the river where they will be handy to support hancock if necessary, or will be that much on their road to follow the 5th and 6th corps. hancock should hold his command in readiness to follow as soon as the way is clear for him. to-morrow it will leave nothing for him to do, but as soon as he can he should get all his teams and spare artillery on the road or roads which he will have to take. as soon as the troops reach hanover town they should get possession of all the crossings they can in that neighborhood. i think it would be well to make a heavy cavalry demonstration on the enemy's left, to-morrow afternoon, also. u. s. grant, lieut.-general. wilson's division of cavalry was brought up from the left and moved by our right south to little river. here he manoeuvred to give the impression that we were going to attack the left flank of lee's army. under cover of night our right wing was withdrawn to the north side of the river, lee being completely deceived by wilson's feint. on the afternoon of the 26th sheridan moved, sending gregg's and torbert's cavalry to taylor's and littlepage's fords towards hanover. as soon as it was dark both divisions moved quietly to hanover ferry, leaving small guards behind to keep up the impression that crossings were to be attempted in the morning. sheridan was followed by a division of infantry under general russell. on the morning of the 27th the crossing was effected with but little loss, the enemy losing thirty or forty, taken prisoners. thus a position was secured south of the pamunkey. russell stopped at the crossing while the cavalry pushed on to hanover town. here barringer's, formerly gordon's, brigade of rebel cavalry was encountered, but it was speedily driven away. warren's and wright's corps were moved by the rear of burnside's and hancock's corps. when out of the way these latter corps followed, leaving pickets confronting the enemy. wilson's cavalry followed last, watching all the fords until everything had recrossed; then taking up the pontoons and destroying other bridges, became the rear-guard. two roads were traversed by the troops in this move. the one nearest to and north of the north anna and pamunkey was taken by wright, followed by hancock. warren, followed by burnside, moved by a road farther north, and longer. the trains moved by a road still farther north, and had to travel a still greater distance. all the troops that had crossed the pamunkey on the morning of the 27th remained quiet during the rest of the day, while the troops north of that stream marched to reach the crossing that had been secured for them. lee had evidently been deceived by our movement from north anna; for on the morning of the 27th he telegraphed to richmond: "enemy crossed to north side, and cavalry and infantry crossed at hanover town." the troops that had then crossed left his front the night of the 25th. the country we were now in was a difficult one to move troops over. the streams were numerous, deep and sluggish, sometimes spreading out into swamps grown up with impenetrable growths of trees and underbrush. the banks were generally low and marshy, making the streams difficult to approach except where there were roads and bridges. hanover town is about twenty miles from richmond. there are two roads leading there; the most direct and shortest one crossing the chickahominy at meadow bridge, near the virginia central railroad, the second going by new and old cold harbor. a few miles out from hanover town there is a third road by way of mechanicsville to richmond. new cold harbor was important to us because while there we both covered the roads back to white house (where our supplies came from), and the roads south-east over which we would have to pass to get to the james river below the richmond defences. on the morning of the 28th the army made an early start, and by noon all had crossed except burnside's corps. this was left on the north side temporarily to guard the large wagon train. a line was at once formed extending south from the river, wright's corps on the right, hancock's in the centre, and warren's on the left, ready to meet the enemy if he should come. at the same time sheridan was directed to reconnoitre towards mechanicsville to find lee's position. at hawes' shop, just where the middle road leaves the direct road to richmond, he encountered the confederate cavalry dismounted and partially intrenched. gregg attacked with his division, but was unable to move the enemy. in the evening custer came up with a brigade. the attack was now renewed, the cavalry dismounting and charging as infantry. this time the assault was successful, both sides losing a considerable number of men. but our troops had to bury the dead, and found that more confederate than union soldiers had been killed. the position was easily held, because our infantry was near. on the 29th a reconnoissance was made in force, to find the position of lee. wright's corps pushed to hanover court house. hancock's corps pushed toward totopotomoy creek; warren's corps to the left on the shady grove church road, while burnside was held in reserve. our advance was pushed forward three miles on the left with but little fighting. there was now an appearance of a movement past our left flank, and sheridan was sent to meet it. on the 30th hancock moved to the totopotomoy, where he found the enemy strongly fortified. wright was moved to the right of hancock's corps, and burnside was brought forward and crossed, taking position to the left of hancock. warren moved up near huntley corners on the shady grove church road. there was some skirmishing along the centre, and in the evening early attacked warren with some vigor, driving him back at first, and threatening to turn our left flank. as the best means of reinforcing the left, hancock was ordered to attack in his front. he carried and held the rifle-pits. while this was going on warren got his men up, repulsed early, and drove him more than a mile. on this day i wrote to halleck ordering all the pontoons in washington to be sent to city point. in the evening news was received of the arrival of smith with his corps at white house. i notified meade, in writing, as follows: near hawes' shop, va., 6.40 p.m., may 30, 1864. major-general meade, commanding a. p. general smith will debark his force at the white house tonight and start up the south bank of the pamunkey at an early hour, probably at 3 a.m. in the morning. it is not improbable that the enemy, being aware of smith's movement, will be feeling to get on our left flank for the purpose of cutting him off, or by a dash to crush him and get back before we are aware of it. sheridan ought to be notified to watch the enemy's movements well out towards cold harbor, and also on the mechanicsville road. wright should be got well massed on hancock's right, so that, if it becomes necessary, he can take the place of the latter readily whilst troops are being thrown east of the totopotomoy if necessary. i want sheridan to send a cavalry force of at least half a brigade, if not a whole brigade, at 5 a.m. in the morning, to communicate with smith and to return with him. i will send orders for smith by the messenger you send to sheridan with his orders. u. s. grant. i also notified smith of his danger, and the precautions that would be taken to protect him. the night of the 30th lee's position was substantially from atlee's station on the virginia central railroad south and east to the vicinity of cold harbor. ours was: the left of warren's corps was on the shady grove road, extending to the mechanicsville road and about three miles south of the totopotomoy. burnside to his right, then hancock, and wright on the extreme right, extending towards hanover court house, six miles south-east of it. sheridan with two divisions of cavalry was watching our left front towards cold harbor. wilson with his division on our right was sent to get on the virginia central railroad and destroy it as far back as possible. he got possession of hanover court house the next day after a skirmish with young's cavalry brigade. the enemy attacked sheridan's pickets, but reinforcements were sent up and the attack was speedily repulsed and the enemy followed some distance towards cold harbor. chapter lv. advance on cold harbor--an anecdote of the war--battle of cold harbor --correspondence with lee--retrospective. on the 31st sheridan advanced to near old cold harbor. he found it intrenched and occupied by cavalry and infantry. a hard fight ensued but the place was carried. the enemy well knew the importance of cold harbor to us, and seemed determined that we should not hold it. he returned with such a large force that sheridan was about withdrawing without making any effort to hold it against such odds; but about the time he commenced the evacuation he received orders to hold the place at all hazards, until reinforcements could be sent to him. he speedily turned the rebel works to face against them and placed his men in position for defence. night came on before the enemy was ready for assault. wright's corps was ordered early in the evening to march directly to cold harbor passing by the rear of the army. it was expected to arrive by daylight or before; but the night was dark and the distance great, so that it was nine o'clock the 1st of june before it reached its destination. before the arrival of wright the enemy had made two assaults on sheridan, both of which were repulsed with heavy loss to the enemy. wright's corps coming up, there was no further assault on cold harbor. smith, who was coming up from white house, was also directed to march directly to cold harbor, and was expected early on the morning of the 1st of june; but by some blunder the order which reached smith directed him to newcastle instead of cold harbor. through this blunder smith did not reach his destination until three o'clock in the afternoon, and then with tired and worn-out men from their long and dusty march. he landed twelve thousand five hundred men from butler's command, but a division was left at white house temporarily and many men had fallen out of ranks in their long march. before the removal of wright's corps from our right, after dark on the 31st, the two lines, federal and confederate, were so close together at that point that either side could detect directly any movement made by the other. finding at daylight that wright had left his front, lee evidently divined that he had gone to our left. at all events, soon after light on the 1st of june anderson, who commanded the corps on lee's left, was seen moving along warren's front. warren was ordered to attack him vigorously in flank, while wright was directed to move out and get on his front. warren fired his artillery at the enemy; but lost so much time in making ready that the enemy got by, and at three o'clock he reported the enemy was strongly intrenched in his front, and besides his lines were so long that he had no mass of troops to move with. he seemed to have forgotten that lines in rear of an army hold themselves while their defenders are fighting in their front. wright reconnoitred some distance to his front: but the enemy finding old cold harbor already taken had halted and fortified some distance west. by six o'clock in the afternoon wright and smith were ready to make an assault. in front of both the ground was clear for several hundred yards and then became wooded. both charged across this open space and into the wood, capturing and holding the first line of rifle-pits of the enemy, and also capturing seven or eight hundred prisoners. while this was going on, the enemy charged warren three separate times with vigor, but were repulsed each time with loss. there was no officer more capable, nor one more prompt in acting, than warren when the enemy forced him to it. there was also an attack upon hancock's and burnside's corps at the same time; but it was feeble and probably only intended to relieve anderson who was being pressed by wright and smith. during the night the enemy made frequent attacks with the view of dispossessing us of the important position we had gained, but without effecting their object. hancock was moved from his place in line during the night and ordered to the left of wright. i expected to take the offensive on the morning of the 2d, but the night was so dark, the heat and dust so excessive and the roads so intricate and hard to keep, that the head of column only reached old cold harbor at six o'clock, but was in position at 7.30 a.m. preparations were made for an attack in the afternoon, but did not take place until the next morning. warren's corps was moved to the left to connect with smith: hancock's corps was got into position to the left of wright's, and burnside was moved to bethesda church in reserve. while warren and burnside were making these changes the enemy came out several times and attacked them, capturing several hundred prisoners. the attacks were repulsed, but not followed up as they should have been. i was so annoyed at this that i directed meade to instruct his corps commanders that they should seize all such opportunities when they occurred, and not wait for orders, all of our manoeuvres being made for the very purpose of getting the enemy out of his cover. on this day wilson returned from his raid upon the virginia central railroad, having damaged it considerably. but, like ourselves, the rebels had become experts in repairing such damage. sherman, in his memoirs, relates an anecdote of his campaign to atlanta that well illustrates this point. the rebel cavalry lurking in his rear to burn bridges and obstruct his communications had become so disgusted at hearing trains go whistling by within a few hours after a bridge had been burned, that they proposed to try blowing up some of the tunnels. one of them said, "no use, boys, old sherman carries duplicate tunnels with him, and will replace them as fast as you can blow them up; better save your powder." sheridan was engaged reconnoitring the banks of the chickahominy, to find crossings and the condition of the roads. he reported favorably. during the night lee moved his left up to make his line correspond to ours. his lines extended now from the totopotomoy to new cold harbor. mine from bethesda church by old cold harbor to the chickahominy, with a division of cavalry guarding our right. an assault was ordered for the 3d, to be made mainly by the corps of hancock, wright and smith; but warren and burnside were to support it by threatening lee's left, and to attack with great earnestness if he should either reinforce more threatened points by drawing from that quarter or if a favorable opportunity should present itself. the corps commanders were to select the points in their respective fronts where they would make their assaults. the move was to commence at half-past four in the morning. hancock sent barlow and gibbon forward at the appointed hour, with birney as a reserve. barlow pushed forward with great vigor, under a heavy fire of both artillery and musketry, through thickets and swamps. notwithstanding all the resistance of the enemy and the natural obstructions to overcome, he carried a position occupied by the enemy outside their main line where the road makes a deep cut through a bank affording as good a shelter for troops as if it had been made for that purpose. three pieces of artillery had been captured here, and several hundred prisoners. the guns were immediately turned against the men who had just been using them. no (*33) assistance coming to him, he (barlow) intrenched under fire and continued to hold his place. gibbon was not so fortunate in his front. he found the ground over which he had to pass cut up with deep ravines, and a morass difficult to cross. but his men struggled on until some of them got up to the very parapet covering the enemy. gibbon gained ground much nearer the enemy than that which he left, and here he intrenched and held fast. wright's corps moving in two lines captured the outer rifle-pits in their front, but accomplished nothing more. smith's corps also gained the outer rifle-pits in its front. the ground over which this corps (18th) had to move was the most exposed of any over which charges were made. an open plain intervened between the contending forces at this point, which was exposed both to a direct and a cross fire. smith, however, finding a ravine running towards his front, sufficiently deep to protect men in it from cross fire, and somewhat from a direct fire, put martindale's division in it, and with brooks supporting him on the left and devens on the right succeeded in gaining the outer--probably picket--rifle-pits. warren and burnside also advanced and gained ground--which brought the whole army on one line. this assault cost us heavily and probably without benefit to compensate: but the enemy was not cheered by the occurrence sufficiently to induce him to take the offensive. in fact, nowhere after the battle of the wilderness did lee show any disposition to leave his defences far behind him. fighting was substantially over by half-past seven in the morning. at eleven o'clock i started to visit all the corps commanders to see for myself the different positions gained and to get their opinion of the practicability of doing anything more in their respective fronts. hancock gave the opinion that in his front the enemy was too strong to make any further assault promise success. wright thought he could gain the lines of the enemy, but it would require the cooperation of hancock's and smith's corps. smith thought a lodgment possible, but was not sanguine: burnside thought something could be done in his front, but warren differed. i concluded, therefore to make no more assaults, and a little after twelve directed in the following letter that all offensive action should cease. cold harbor, june 3, 1864.-12.30 p.m. major-general meade, commanding a. p. the opinion of corps commanders not being sanguine of success in case an assault is ordered, you may direct a suspension of farther advance for the present. hold our most advanced positions and strengthen them. whilst on the defensive our line may be contracted from the right if practicable. reconnoissances should be made in front of every corps and advances made to advantageous positions by regular approaches. to aid the expedition under general hunter it is necessary that we should detain all the army now with lee until the former gets well on his way to lynchburg. to do this effectually it will be better to keep the enemy out of the intrenchments of richmond than to have them go back there. wright and hancock should be ready to assault in case the enemy should break through general smith's lines, and all should be ready to resist an assault. u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. the remainder of the day was spent in strengthening the line we now held. by night we were as strong against lee as he was against us. during the night the enemy quitted our right front, abandoning some of their wounded, and without burying their dead. these we were able to care for. but there were many dead and wounded men between the lines of the contending forces, which were now close together, who could not be cared for without a cessation of hostilities. so i wrote the following: cold harbor, va., june 5, 1864. general r. e. lee, commanding confederate army. it is reported to me that there are wounded men, probably of both armies, now lying exposed and suffering between the lines occupied respectively by the two armies. humanity would dictate that some provision should be made to provide against such hardships. i would propose, therefore, that hereafter, when no battle is raging, either party be authorized to send to any point between the pickets or skirmish lines, unarmed men bearing litters to pick up their dead or wounded, without being fired upon by the other party. any other method, equally fair to both parties, you may propose for meeting the end desired will be accepted by me. u. s. grant, lieut.-general. lee replied that he feared such an arrangement would lead to misunderstanding, and proposed that in future, when either party wished to remove their dead and wounded, a flag of truce be sent. i answered this immediately by saying: cold harbor, va., june 6, 1864. general r. e. lee, commanding army of n. va. your communication of yesterday's date is received. i will send immediately, as you propose, to collect the dead and wounded between the lines of the two armies, and will also instruct that you be allowed to do the same. i propose that the time for doing this be between the hours of 12 m. and 3 p.m. to-day. i will direct all parties going out to bear a white flag, and not to attempt to go beyond where we have dead or wounded, and not beyond or on ground occupied by your troops. u. s. grant, lieut.-general. lee's response was that he could not consent to the burial of the dead and removal of the wounded in the way i proposed, but when either party desired such permission it should be asked for by flag of truce and he had directed that any parties i may have sent out, as mentioned in my letter, to be turned back. i answered: cold harbor, va, june 6, 1864. general r. e. lee. commanding army, n. va. the knowledge that wounded men are now suffering from want of attention, between the two armies, compels me to ask a suspension of hostilities for sufficient time to collect them in, say two hours. permit me to say that the hours you may fix upon for this will be agreeable to me, and the same privilege will be extended to such parties as you may wish to send out on the same duty without further application. u. s. grant, lieut.-general. lee acceded to this; but delays in transmitting the correspondence brought it to the 7th of june--forty-eight hours after it commenced --before parties were got out to collect the men left upon the field. in the meantime all but two of the wounded had died. and i wrote to lee: cold harbor, va., june 7, 1864. 10.30 a.m. gen. r. e. lee, commanding army of n. va. i regret that your note of seven p.m. yesterday should have been received at the nearest corps headquarters, to where it was delivered, after the hour which had been given for the removal of the dead and wounded had expired; 10.45 p.m. was the hour at which it was received at corps headquarters, and between eleven and twelve it reached my headquarters. as a consequence, it was not understood by the troops of this army that there was a cessation of hostilities for the purpose of collecting the dead and wounded, and none were collected. two officers and six men of the 8th and 25th north carolina regts., who were out in search of the bodies of officers of their respective regiments, were captured and brought into our lines, owing to this want of understanding. i regret this, but will state that as soon as i learned the fact, i directed that they should not be held as prisoners, but must be returned to their commands. these officers and men having been carelessly brought through our lines to the rear have not determined whether they will be sent back the way they came, or whether they will be sent by some other route. regretting that all my efforts for alleviating the sufferings of wounded men left upon the battle-field have been rendered nugatory, i remain, &c., u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. i have always regretted that the last assault at cold harbor was ever made. i might say the same thing of the assault of the 22d of may, 1863, at vicksburg. at cold harbor no advantage whatever was gained to compensate for the heavy loss we sustained. indeed, the advantages other than those of relative losses, were on the confederate side. before that, the army of northern virginia seemed to have acquired a wholesome regard for the courage, endurance, and soldierly qualities generally of the army of the potomac. they no longer wanted to fight them "one confederate to five yanks." indeed, they seemed to have given up any idea of gaining any advantage of their antagonist in the open field. they had come to much prefer breastworks in their front to the army of the potomac. this charge seemed to revive their hopes temporarily; but it was of short duration. the effect upon the army of the potomac was the reverse. when we reached the james river, however, all effects of the battle of cold harbor seemed to have disappeared. there was more justification for the assault at vicksburg. we were in a southern climate, at the beginning of the hot season. the army of the tennessee had won five successive victories over the garrison of vicksburg in the three preceding weeks. they had driven a portion of that army from port gibson with considerable loss, after having flanked them out of their stronghold at grand gulf. they had attacked another portion of the same army at raymond, more than fifty miles farther in the interior of the state, and driven them back into jackson with great loss in killed, wounded, captured and missing, besides loss of large and small arms: they had captured the capital of the state of mississippi, with a large amount of materials of war and manufactures. only a few days before, they had beaten the enemy then penned up in the town first at champion's hill, next at big black river bridge, inflicting upon him a loss of fifteen thousand or more men (including those cut off from returning) besides large losses in arms and ammunition. the army of the tennessee had come to believe that they could beat their antagonist under any circumstances. there was no telling how long a regular siege might last. as i have stated, it was the beginning of the hot season in a southern climate. there was no telling what the casualties might be among northern troops working and living in trenches, drinking surface water filtered through rich vegetation, under a tropical sun. if vicksburg could have been carried in may, it would not only have saved the army the risk it ran of a greater danger than from the bullets of the enemy, but it would have given us a splendid army, well equipped and officered, to operate elsewhere with. these are reasons justifying the assault. the only benefit we gained--and it was a slight one for so great a sacrifice--was that the men worked cheerfully in the trenches after that, being satisfied with digging the enemy out. had the assault not been made, i have no doubt that the majority of those engaged in the siege of vicksburg would have believed that had we assaulted it would have proven successful, and would have saved life, health and comfort. chapter lvi. left flank movement across the chickahominy and james--general lee --visit to butler--the movement on petersburg--the investment of petersburg. lee's position was now so near richmond, and the intervening swamps of the chickahominy so great an obstacle to the movement of troops in the face of an enemy, that i determined to make my next left flank move carry the army of the potomac south of the james river. (*34) preparations for this were promptly commenced. the move was a hazardous one to make: the chickahominy river, with its marshy and heavily timbered approaches, had to be crossed; all the bridges over it east of lee were destroyed; the enemy had a shorter line and better roads to travel on to confront me in crossing; more than fifty miles intervened between me and butler, by the roads i should have to travel, with both the james and the chickahominy unbridged to cross; and last, the army of the potomac had to be got out of a position but a few hundred yards from the enemy at the widest place. lee, if he did not choose to follow me, might, with his shorter distance to travel and his bridges over the chickahominy and the james, move rapidly on butler and crush him before the army with me could come to his relief. then too he might spare troops enough to send against hunter who was approaching lynchburg, living upon the country he passed through, and without ammunition further than what he carried with him. but the move had to be made, and i relied upon lee's not seeing my danger as i saw it. besides we had armies on both sides of the james river and not far from the confederate capital. i knew that its safety would be a matter of the first consideration with the executive, legislative and judicial branches of the so-called confederate government, if it was not with the military commanders. but i took all the precaution i knew of to guard against all dangers. sheridan was sent with two divisions, to communicate with hunter and to break up the virginia central railroad and the james river canal, on the 7th of june, taking instructions to hunter to come back with him (*35). hunter was also informed by way of washington and the valley that sheridan was on the way to meet him. the canal and central road, and the regions penetrated by them, were of vast importance to the enemy, furnishing and carrying a large per cent. of all the supplies for the army of northern virginia and the people of richmond. before sheridan got off on the 7th news was received from hunter reporting his advance to staunton and successful engagement with the enemy near that place on the 5th, in which the confederate commander, w. s. jones, was killed. on the 4th of june the enemy having withdrawn his left corps, burnside on our right was moved up between warren and smith. on the 5th birney returned to hancock, which extended his left now to the chickahominy, and warren was withdrawn to cold harbor. wright was directed to send two divisions to the left to extend down the banks of that stream to bottom's bridge. the cavalry extended still farther east to jones's bridge. on the 7th abercrombie--who was in command at white house, and who had been in command at our base of supplies in all the changes made from the start--was ordered to take up the iron from the york river railroad and put it on boats, and to be in readiness to move by water to city point. on the 8th meade was directed to fortify a line down the bank overlooking the chickahominy, under cover of which the army could move. on the 9th abercrombie was directed to send all organized troops arriving at white house, without debarking from their transports, to report to butler. halleck was at this time instructed to send all reinforcements to city point. on the 11th i wrote: cold harbor, va., june 11, 1864. major-gen. b. f. butler, commanding department of va. and n. c. the movement to transfer this army to the south side of the james river will commence after dark to-morrow night. col. comstock, of my staff, was sent specially to ascertain what was necessary to make your position secure in the interval during which the enemy might use most of his force against you, and also, to ascertain what point on the river we should reach to effect a crossing if it should not be practicable to reach this side of the river at bermuda hundred. colonel comstock has not yet returned, so that i cannot make instructions as definite as i would wish, but the time between this and sunday night being so short in which to get word to you, i must do the best i can. colonel dent goes to the chickahominy to take to you the 18th corps. the corps will leave its position in the trenches as early in the evening, tomorrow, as possible, and make a forced march to cole's landing or ferry, where it should reach by ten a.m. the following morning. this corps numbers now 15,300 men. they take with them neither wagons nor artillery; these latter marching with the balance of the army to the james river. the remainder of the army will cross the chickahominy at long bridge and at jones's, and strike the river at the most practicable crossing below city point. i directed several days ago that all reinforcements for the army should be sent to you. i am not advised of the number that may have gone, but suppose you have received from six to ten thousand. general smith will also reach you as soon as the enemy could, going by the way of richmond. the balance of the force will not be more than one day behind, unless detained by the whole of lee's army, in which case you will be strong enough. i wish you would direct the proper staff officers, your chief-engineer and your chief-quartermaster, to commence at once the collection of all the means in their reach for crossing the army on its arrival. if there is a point below city point where a pontoon bridge can be thrown, have it laid. expecting the arrival of the 18th corps by monday night, if you deem it practicable from the force you have to seize and hold petersburg, you may prepare to start, on the arrival of troops to hold your present lines. i do not want petersburg visited, however, unless it is held, nor an attempt to take it, unless you feel a reasonable degree of confidence of success. if you should go there, i think troops should take nothing with them except what they can carry, depending upon supplies being sent after the place is secured. if colonel dent should not succeed in securing the requisite amount of transportation for the 18th corps before reaching you, please have the balance supplied. u. s. grant, lieut.-general. p. s.--on reflection i will send the 18th corps by way of white house. the distance which they will have to march will be enough shorter to enable them to reach you about the same time, and the uncertainty of navigation on the chickahominy will be avoided. u. s. grant. cold harbor, va., june 11,1864. major-general g. g. meade, commanding army of the potomac. colonel comstock, who visited the james river for the purpose of ascertaining the best point below bermuda hundred to which to march the army has not yet returned. it is now getting so late, however, that all preparations may be made for the move to-morrow night without waiting longer. the movement will be made as heretofore agreed upon, that is, the 18th corps make a rapid march with the infantry alone, their wagons and artillery accompanying the balance of the army to cole's landing or ferry, and there embark for city point, losing no time for rest until they reach the latter point. the 5th corps will seize long bridge and move out on the long bridge road to its junction with quaker road, or until stopped by the enemy. the other three corps will follow in such order as you may direct, one of them crossing at long bridge, and two at jones's bridge. after the crossing is effected, the most practicable roads will be taken to reach about fort powhattan. of course, this is supposing the enemy makes no opposition to our advance. the 5th corps, after securing the passage of the balance of the army, will join or follow in rear of the corps which crosses the same bridge with themselves. the wagon trains should be kept well east of the troops, and if a crossing can be found, or made lower down than jones's they should take it. u. s. grant, lieut.-general. p. s.--in view of the long march to reach cole's landing, and the uncertainty of being able to embark a large number of men there, the direction of the 18th corps may be changed to white house. they should be directed to load up transports, and start them as fast as loaded without waiting for the whole corps or even whole divisions to go together. u. s. grant. about this time word was received (through the richmond papers of the 11th) that crook and averell had united and were moving east. this, with the news of hunter's successful engagement near staunton, was no doubt known to lee before it was to me. then sheridan leaving with two divisions of cavalry, looked indeed threatening, both to lee's communications and supplies. much of his cavalry was sent after sheridan, and early with ewell's entire corps was sent to the valley. supplies were growing scarce in richmond, and the sources from which to draw them were in our hands. people from outside began to pour into richmond to help eat up the little on hand. consternation reigned there. on the 12th smith was ordered to move at night to white house, not to stop until he reached there, and to take boats at once for city point, leaving his trains and artillery to move by land. soon after dark some of the cavalry at long bridge effected a crossing by wading and floundering through the water and mud, leaving their horses behind, and drove away the cavalry pickets. a pontoon bridge was speedily thrown across, over which the remainder of the army soon passed and pushed out for a mile or two to watch and detain any advance that might be made from the other side. warren followed the cavalry, and by the morning of the 13th had his whole corps over. hancock followed warren. burnside took the road to jones's bridge, followed by wright. ferrero's division, with the wagon train, moved farther east, by window shades and cole's ferry, our rear being covered by cavalry. it was known that the enemy had some gunboats at richmond. these might run down at night and inflict great damage upon us before they could be sunk or captured by our navy. general butler had, in advance, loaded some vessels with stone ready to be sunk so as to obstruct the channel in an emergency. on the 13th i sent orders to have these sunk as high up the river as we could guard them, and prevent their removal by the enemy. as soon as warren's corps was over the chickahominy it marched out and joined the cavalry in holding the roads from richmond while the army passed. no attempt was made by the enemy to impede our march, however, but warren and wilson reported the enemy strongly fortified in their front. by the evening of the 13th hancock's corps was at charles city court house on the james river. burnside's and wright's corps were on the chickahominy, and crossed during the night, warren's corps and the cavalry still covering the army. the material for a pontoon bridge was already at hand and the work of laying it was commenced immediately, under the superintendence of brigadier-general benham, commanding the engineer brigade. on the evening of the 14th the crossing commenced, hancock in advance, using both the bridge and boats. when the wilderness campaign commenced the army of the potomac, including burnside's--which was a separate command until the 24th of may when it was incorporated with the main army--numbered about 116,000 men. during the progress of the campaign about 40,000 reinforcements were received. at the crossing of the james river june 14th-15th the army numbered about 115,000. besides the ordinary losses incident to a campaign of six weeks' nearly constant fighting or skirmishing, about one-half of the artillery was sent back to washington, and many men were discharged by reason of the expiration of their term of service.* in estimating our strength every enlisted man and every commissioned officer present is included, no matter how employed; in bands, sick in field hospitals, hospital attendants, company cooks and all. operating in an enemy's country, and being supplied always from a distant base, large detachments had at all times to be sent from the front, not only to guard the base of supplies and the roads to it, but all the roads leading to our flanks and rear. we were also operating in a country unknown to us, and without competent guides or maps showing the roads accurately. the manner of estimating numbers in the two armies differs materially. in the confederate army often only bayonets are taken into account, never, i believe, do they estimate more than are handling the guns of the artillery and armed with muskets (*36) or carbines. generally the latter are far enough away to be excluded from the count in any one field. officers and details of enlisted men are not included. in the northern armies the estimate is most liberal, taking in all connected with the army and drawing pay. estimated in the same manner as ours, lee had not less than 80,000 men at the start. his reinforcements were about equal to ours during the campaign, deducting the discharged men and those sent back. he was on the defensive, and in a country in which every stream, every road, every obstacle to the movement of troops and every natural defence was familiar to him and his army. the citizens were all friendly to him and his cause, and could and did furnish him with accurate reports of our every move. rear guards were not necessary for him, and having always a railroad at his back, large wagon trains were not required. all circumstances considered we did not have any advantage in numbers. general lee, who had led the army of northern virginia in all these contests, was a very highly estimated man in the confederate army and states, and filled also a very high place in the estimation of the people and press of the northern states. his praise was sounded throughout the entire north after every action he was engaged in: the number of his forces was always lowered and that of the national forces exaggerated. he was a large, austere man, and i judge difficult of approach to his subordinates. to be extolled by the entire press of the south after every engagement, and by a portion of the press north with equal vehemence, was calculated to give him the entire confidence of his troops and to make him feared by his antagonists. it was not an uncommon thing for my staff-officers to hear from eastern officers, "well, grant has never met bobby lee yet." there were good and true officers who believe now that the army of northern virginia was superior to the army of the potomac man to man. i do not believe so, except as the advantages spoken of above made them so. before the end i believe the difference was the other way. the army of northern virginia became despondent and saw the end. it did not please them. the national army saw the same thing, and were encouraged by it. the advance of the army of the potomac reached the james on the 14th of june. preparations were at once commenced for laying the pontoon bridges and crossing the river. as already stated, i had previously ordered general butler to have two vessels loaded with stone and carried up the river to a point above that occupied by our gunboats, where the channel was narrow, and sunk there so as to obstruct the passage and prevent confederate gunboats from coming down the river. butler had had these boats filled and put in position, but had not had them sunk before my arrival. i ordered this done, and also directed that he should turn over all material and boats not then in use in the river to be used in ferrying the troops across. i then, on the 14th, took a steamer and ran up to bermuda hundred to see general butler for the purpose of directing a movement against petersburg, while our troops of the army of the potomac were crossing. i had sent general w. f. smith back from cold harbor by the way of white house, thence on steamers to city point for the purpose of giving general butler more troops with which to accomplish this result. general butler was ordered to send smith with his troops reinforced, as far as that could be conveniently done, from other parts of the army of the james. he gave smith about six thousand reinforcements, including some twenty-five hundred cavalry under kautz, and about thirty-five hundred colored infantry under hinks. the distance which smith had to move to reach the enemy's lines was about six miles, and the confederate advance line of works was but two miles outside of petersburg. smith was to move under cover of night, up close to the enemy's works, and assault as soon as he could after daylight. i believed then, and still believe, that petersburg could have been easily captured at that time. it only had about 2,500 men in the defences besides some irregular troops, consisting of citizens and employees in the city who took up arms in case of emergency. smith started as proposed, but his advance encountered a rebel force intrenched between city point and their lines outside of petersburg. this position he carried, with some loss to the enemy; but there was so much delay that it was daylight before his troops really got off from there. while there i informed general butler that hancock's corps would cross the river and move to petersburg to support smith in case the latter was successful, and that i could reinforce there more rapidly than lee could reinforce from his position. i returned down the river to where the troops of the army of the potomac now were, communicated to general meade, in writing, the directions i had given to general butler and directed him (meade) to cross hancock's corps over under cover of night, and push them forward in the morning to petersburg; halting them, however, at a designated point until they could hear from smith. i also informed general meade that i had ordered rations from bermuda hundred for hancock's corps, and desired him to issue them speedily, and to lose no more time than was absolutely necessary. the rations did not reach him, however, and hancock, while he got all his corps over during the night, remained until half-past ten in the hope of receiving them. he then moved without them, and on the road received a note from general w. f. smith, asking him to come on. this seems to be the first information that general hancock had received of the fact that he was to go to petersburg, or that anything particular was expected of him. otherwise he would have been there by four o'clock in the afternoon. smith arrived in front of the enemy's lines early in the forenoon of the 15th, and spent the day until after seven o'clock in the evening in reconnoitering what appeared to be empty works. the enemy's line consisted of redans occupying commanding positions, with rifle-pits connecting them. to the east side of petersburg, from the appomattox back, there were thirteen of these redans extending a distance of several miles, probably three. if they had been properly manned they could have held out against any force that could have attacked them, at least until reinforcements could have got up from the north of richmond. smith assaulted with the colored troops, and with success. by nine o'clock at night he was in possession of five of these redans and, of course, of the connecting lines of rifle-pits. all of them contained artillery, which fell into our hands. hancock came up and proposed to take any part assigned to him; and smith asked him to relieve his men who were in the trenches. next morning, the 16th, hancock himself was in command, and captured another redan. meade came up in the afternoon and succeeded hancock, who had to be relieved, temporarily, from the command of his corps on account of the breaking out afresh of the wound he had received at gettysburg. during the day meade assaulted and carried one more redan to his right and two to his left. in all this we lost very heavily. the works were not strongly manned, but they all had guns in them which fell into our hands, together with the men who were handling them in the effort to repel these assaults. up to this time beauregard, who had commanded south of richmond, had received no reinforcements, except hoke's division from drury's bluff,(*37) which had arrived on the morning of the 16th; though he had urged the authorities very strongly to send them, believing, as he did, that petersburg would be a valuable prize which we might seek. during the 17th the fighting was very severe and the losses heavy; and at night our troops occupied about the same position they had occupied in the morning, except that they held a redan which had been captured by potter during the day. during the night, however, beauregard fell back to the line which had been already selected, and commenced fortifying it. our troops advanced on the 18th to the line which he had abandoned, and found that the confederate loss had been very severe, many of the enemy's dead still remaining in the ditches and in front of them. colonel j. l. chamberlain, of the 20th maine, was wounded on the 18th. he was gallantly leading his brigade at the time, as he had been in the habit of doing in all the engagements in which he had previously been engaged. he had several times been recommended for a brigadier-generalcy for gallant and meritorious conduct. on this occasion, however, i promoted him on the spot, and forwarded a copy of my order to the war department, asking that my act might be confirmed and chamberlain's name sent to the senate for confirmation without any delay. this was done, and at last a gallant and meritorious officer received partial justice at the hands of his government, which he had served so faithfully and so well. if general hancock's orders of the 15th had been communicated to him, that officer, with his usual promptness, would undoubtedly have been upon the ground around petersburg as early as four o'clock in the afternoon of the 15th. the days were long and it would have given him considerable time before night. i do not think there is any doubt that petersburg itself could have been carried without much loss; or, at least, if protected by inner detached works, that a line could have been established very much in rear of the one then occupied by the enemy. this would have given us control of both the weldon and south side railroads. this would also have saved an immense amount of hard fighting which had to be done from the 15th to the 18th, and would have given us greatly the advantage in the long siege which ensued. i now ordered the troops to be put under cover and allowed some of the rest which they had so long needed. they remained quiet, except that there was more or less firing every day, until the 22d, when general meade ordered an advance towards the weldon railroad. we were very anxious to get to that road, and even round to the south side railroad if possible. meade moved hancock's corps, now commanded by birney, to the left, with a view to at least force the enemy to stay within the limits of his own line. general wright, with the 6th corps, was ordered by a road farther south, to march directly for the weldon road. the enemy passed in between these two corps and attacked vigorously, and with very serious results to the national troops, who were then withdrawn from their advanced position. the army of the potomac was given the investment of petersburg, while the army of the james held bermuda hundred and all the ground we possessed north of the james river. the 9th corps, burnside's, was placed upon the right at petersburg; the 5th, warren's, next; the 2d, birney's, next; then the 6th, wright's, broken off to the left and south. thus began the siege of petersburg. chapter lvii. raid on the virginia central railroad--raid on the weldon railroad --early 's movement upon washington--mining the works before petersburg --explosion of the mine before petersburg--campaign in the shenandoah valley--capture of the weldon railroad. on the 7th of june, while at cold harbor, i had as already indicated sent sheridan with two divisions of cavalry to destroy as much as he could of the virginia central railroad. general hunter had been operating up the shenandoah valley with some success, having fought a battle near staunton where he captured a great many prisoners, besides killing and wounding a good many men. after the battle he formed a junction at staunton with averell and crook, who had come up from the kanawha, or gauley river. it was supposed, therefore, that general hunter would be about charlottesville, virginia, by the time sheridan could get there, doing on the way the damage that he was sent to do. i gave sheridan instructions to have hunter, in case he should meet him about charlottesville, join and return with him to the army of the potomac. lee, hearing of hunter's success in the valley, started breckinridge out for its defence at once. learning later of sheridan's going with two divisions, he also sent hampton with two divisions of cavalry, his own and fitz-hugh lee's. sheridan moved to the north side of the north anna to get out west, and learned of the movement of these troops to the south side of the same stream almost as soon as they had started. he pushed on to get to trevilian station to commence his destruction at that point. on the night of the 10th he bivouacked some six or seven miles east of trevilian, while fitz-hugh lee was the same night at trevilian station and hampton but a few miles away. during the night hampton ordered an advance on sheridan, hoping, no doubt, to surprise and very badly cripple him. sheridan, however, by a counter move sent custer on a rapid march to get between the two divisions of the enemy and into their rear. this he did successfully, so that at daylight, when the assault was made, the enemy found himself at the same time resisted in front and attacked in rear, and broke in some confusion. the losses were probably very light on both sides in killed and wounded, but sheridan got away with some five hundred prisoners and sent them to city point. during that day, the 11th, sheridan moved into trevilian station, and the following day proceeded to tear up the road east and west. there was considerable fighting during the whole of the day, but the work of destruction went on. in the meantime, at night, the enemy had taken possession of the crossing which sheridan had proposed to take to go north when he left trevilian. sheridan learned, however, from some of the prisoners he had captured here, that general hunter was about lynchburg, and therefore that there was no use of his going on to charlottesville with a view to meet him. sheridan started back during the night of the 12th, and made his way north and farther east, coming around by the north side of white house, and arriving there on the 21st. here he found an abundance of forage for his animals, food for his men, and security while resting. he had been obliged to leave about ninety of his own men in the field-hospital which he had established near trevilian, and these necessarily fell into the hands of the enemy. white house up to this time had been a depot; but now that our troops were all on the james river, it was no longer wanted as a store of supplies. sheridan was, therefore, directed to break it up; which he did on the 22d of june, bringing the garrison and an immense wagon train with him. all these were over the james river by the 26th of the month, and sheridan ready to follow. in the meantime meade had sent wilson's division on a raid to destroy the weldon and south side roads. now that sheridan was safe and hampton free to return to richmond with his cavalry, wilson's position became precarious. meade therefore, on the 27th, ordered sheridan over the river to make a demonstration in favor of wilson. wilson got back, though not without severe loss, having struck both roads, but the damage done was soon repaired. after these events comparative quiet reigned about petersburg until late in july. the time, however, was spent in strengthening the intrenchments and making our position generally more secure against a sudden attack. in the meantime i had to look after other portions of my command, where things had not been going on so favorably, always, as i could have wished. general hunter who had been appointed to succeed sigel in the shenandoah valley immediately took up the offensive. he met the enemy on the 5th of june at piedmont, and defeated him. on the 8th he formed a junction with crook and averell at staunton, from which place he moved direct on lynchburg, via lexington, which he reached and invested on the 16th. up to this time he was very successful; and but for the difficulty of taking with him sufficient ordnance stores over so long a march, through a hostile country, he would, no doubt, have captured lynchburg. the destruction of the enemy's supplies and manufactories had been very great. to meet this movement under general hunter, general lee sent early with his corps, a part of which reached lynchburg before hunter. after some skirmishing on the 17th and 18th, general hunter, owing to a want of ammunition to give battle, retired from before the place. unfortunately, this want of ammunition left him no choice of route for his return but by the way of the gauley and kanawha rivers, thence up the ohio river, returning to harper's ferry by way of the baltimore and ohio railroad. a long time was consumed in making this movement. meantime the valley was left open to early's troops, and others in that quarter; and washington also was uncovered. early took advantage of this condition of affairs and moved on washington. in the absence of hunter, general lew wallace, with headquarters at baltimore, commanded the department in which the shenandoah lay. his surplus of troops with which to move against the enemy was small in number. most of these were raw and, consequently, very much inferior to our veterans and to the veterans which early had with him; but the situation of washington was precarious, and wallace moved with commendable promptitude to meet the enemy at the monocacy. he could hardly have expected to defeat him badly, but he hoped to cripple and delay him until washington could be put into a state of preparation for his reception. i had previously ordered general meade to send a division to baltimore for the purpose of adding to the defences of washington, and he had sent ricketts's division of the 6th corps (wright's), which arrived in baltimore on the 8th of july. finding that wallace had gone to the front with his command, ricketts immediately took the cars and followed him to the monocacy with his entire division. they met the enemy and, as might have been expected, were defeated; but they succeeded in stopping him for the day on which the battle took place. the next morning early started on his march to the capital of the nation, arriving before it on the 11th. learning of the gravity of the situation i had directed general meade to also order wright with the rest of his corps directly to washington for the relief of that place, and the latter reached there the very day that early arrived before it. the 19th corps, which had been stationed in louisiana, having been ordered up to reinforce the armies about richmond, had about this time arrived at fortress monroe, on their way to join us. i diverted them from that point to washington, which place they reached, almost simultaneously with wright, on the 11th. the 19th corps was commanded by major-general emory. early made his reconnoissance with a view of attacking on the following morning, the 12th; but the next morning he found our intrenchments, which were very strong, fully manned. he at once commenced to retreat, wright following. there is no telling how much this result was contributed to by general lew wallace's leading what might well be considered almost a forlorn hope. if early had been but one day earlier he might have entered the capital before the arrival of the reinforcements i had sent. whether the delay caused by the battle amounted to a day or not, general wallace contributed on this occasion, by the defeat of the troops under him a greater benefit to the cause than often falls to the lot of a commander of an equal force to render by means of a victory. farther west also the troubles were threatening. some time before, forrest had met sturgis in command of some of our cavalry in mississippi and handled him very roughly, gaining a very great victory over him. this left forrest free to go almost where he pleased, and to cut the roads in rear of sherman who was then advancing. sherman was abundantly able to look after the army that he was immediately with, and all of his military division so long as he could communicate with it; but it was my place to see that he had the means with which to hold his rear. two divisions under a. j. smith had been sent to banks in louisiana some months before. sherman ordered these back, with directions to attack forrest. smith met and defeated him very badly. i then directed that smith should hang to forrest and not let him go; and to prevent by all means his getting upon the memphis and nashville railroad. sherman had anticipated me in this matter, and given the same orders in substance; but receiving my directions for this order to smith, he repeated it. on the 25th of june general burnside had commenced running a mine from about the centre of his front under the confederate works confronting him. he was induced to do this by colonel pleasants, of the pennsylvania volunteers, whose regiment was mostly composed of miners, and who was himself a practical miner. burnside had submitted the scheme to meade and myself, and we both approved of it, as a means of keeping the men occupied. his position was very favorable for carrying on this work, but not so favorable for the operations to follow its completion. the position of the two lines at that point were only about a hundred yards apart with a comparatively deep ravine intervening. in the bottom of this ravine the work commenced. the position was unfavorable in this particular: that the enemy's line at that point was re-entering, so that its front was commanded by their own lines both to the right and left. then, too, the ground was sloping upward back of the confederate line for a considerable distance, and it was presumable that the enemy had, at least, a detached work on this highest point. the work progressed, and on the 23d of july the mine was finished ready for charging; but i had this work of charging deferred until we were ready for it. on the 17th of july several deserters came in and said that there was great consternation in richmond, and that lee was coming out to make an attack upon us the object being to put us on the defensive so that he might detach troops to go to georgia where the army sherman was operating against was said to be in great trouble. i put the army commanders, meade and butler, on the lookout, but the attack was not made. i concluded, then, a few days later, to do something in the way of offensive movement myself, having in view something of the same object that lee had had. wright's and emory's corps were in washington, and with this reduction of my force lee might very readily have spared some troops from the defences to send west. i had other objects in view, however, besides keeping lee where he was. the mine was constructed and ready to be exploded, and i wanted to take that occasion to carry petersburg if i could. it was the object, therefore, to get as many of lee's troops away from the south side of the james river as possible. accordingly, on the 26th, we commenced a movement with hancock's corps and sheridan's cavalry to the north side by the way of deep bottom, where butler had a pontoon bridge laid. the plan, in the main, was to let the cavalry cut loose and, joining with kautz's cavalry of the army of the james, get by lee's lines and destroy as much as they could of the virginia central railroad, while, in the mean time, the infantry was to move out so as to protect their rear and cover their retreat back when they should have got through with their work. we were successful in drawing the enemy's troops to the north side of the james as i expected. the mine was ordered to be charged, and the morning of the 30th of july was the time fixed for its explosion. i gave meade minute orders (*38) on the 24th directing how i wanted the assault conducted, which orders he amplified into general instructions for the guidance of the troops that were to be engaged. meade's instructions, which i, of course, approved most heartily, were all that i can see now was necessary. the only further precaution which he could have taken, and which he could not foresee, would have been to have different men to execute them. the gallery to the mine was over five hundred feet long from where it entered the ground to the point where it was under the enemy's works, and with a cross gallery of something over eighty feet running under their lines. eight chambers had been left, requiring a ton of powder each to charge them. all was ready by the time i had prescribed; and on the 29th hancock and sheridan were brought back near the james river with their troops. under cover of night they started to recross the bridge at deep bottom, and to march directly for that part of our lines in front of the mine. warren was to hold his line of intrenchments with a sufficient number of men and concentrate the balance on the right next to burnside's corps, while ord, now commanding the 18th corps, temporarily under meade, was to form in the rear of burnside to support him when he went in. all were to clear off the parapets and the _abatis_ in their front so as to leave the space as open as possible, and be able to charge the moment the mine had been sprung and burnside had taken possession. burnside's corps was not to stop in the crater at all but push on to the top of the hill, supported on the right and left by ord's and warren's corps. warren and ord fulfilled their instructions perfectly so far as making ready was concerned. burnside seemed to have paid no attention whatever to the instructions, and left all the obstruction in his own front for his troops to get over in the best way they could. the four divisions of his corps were commanded by generals potter, willcox, ledlie and ferrero. the last was a colored division; and burnside selected it to make the assault. meade interfered with this. burnside then took ledlie's division--a worse selection than the first could have been. in fact, potter and willcox were the only division commanders burnside had who were equal to the occasion. ledlie besides being otherwise inefficient, proved also to possess disqualification less common among soldiers. there was some delay about the explosion of the mine so that it did not go off until about five o'clock in the morning. when it did explode it was very successful, making a crater twenty feet deep and something like a hundred feet in length. instantly one hundred and ten cannon and fifty mortars, which had been placed in the most commanding positions covering the ground to the right and left of where the troops were to enter the enemy's lines, commenced playing. ledlie's division marched into the crater immediately on the explosion, but most of the men stopped there in the absence of any one to give directions; their commander having found some safe retreat to get into before they started. there was some delay on the left and right in advancing, but some of the troops did get in and turn to the right and left, carrying the rifle-pits as i expected they would do. there had been great consternation in petersburg, as we were well aware, about a rumored mine that we were going to explode. they knew we were mining, and they had failed to cut our mine off by countermining, though beauregard had taken the precaution to run up a line of intrenchments to the rear of that part of their line fronting where they could see that our men were at work. we had learned through deserters who had come in that the people had very wild rumors about what was going on on our side. they said that we had undermined the whole of petersburg; that they were resting upon a slumbering volcano and did not know at what moment they might expect an eruption. i somewhat based my calculations upon this state of feeling, and expected that when the mine was exploded the troops to the right and left would flee in all directions, and that our troops, if they moved promptly, could get in and strengthen themselves before the enemy had come to a realization of the true situation. it was just as i expected it would be. we could see the men running without any apparent object except to get away. it was half an hour before musketry firing, to amount to anything, was opened upon our men in the crater. it was an hour before the enemy got artillery up to play upon them; and it was nine o'clock before lee got up reinforcements from his right to join in expelling our troops. the effort was a stupendous failure. it cost us about four thousand men, mostly, however, captured; and all due to inefficiency on the part of the corps commander and the incompetency of the division commander who was sent to lead the assault. after being fully assured of the failure of the mine, and finding that most of that part of lee's army which had been drawn north of the james river were still there, i gave meade directions to send a corps of infantry and the cavalry next morning, before lee could get his forces back, to destroy fifteen or twenty miles of the weldon railroad. but misfortunes never come singly. i learned during that same afternoon that wright's pursuit of early was feeble because of the constant and contrary orders he had been receiving from washington, while i was cut off from immediate communication by reason of our cable across chesapeake bay being broken. early, however, was not aware of the fact that wright was not pursuing until he had reached strasburg. finding that he was not pursued he turned back to winchester, where crook was stationed with a small force, and drove him out. he then pushed north until he had reached the potomac, then he sent mccausland across to chambersburg, pa., to destroy that town. chambersburg was a purely defenceless town with no garrison whatever, and no fortifications; yet mccausland, under early's orders, burned the place and left about three hundred families houseless. this occurred on the 30th of july. i rescinded my orders for the troops to go out to destroy the weldon railroad, and directed them to embark for washington city. after burning chambersburg mccausland retreated, pursued by our cavalry, towards cumberland. they were met and defeated by general kelley and driven into virginia. the shenandoah valley was very important to the confederates, because it was the principal storehouse they now had for feeding their armies about richmond. it was well known that they would make a desperate struggle to maintain it. it had been the source of a great deal of trouble to us heretofore to guard that outlet to the north, partly because of the incompetency of some of the commanders, but chiefly because of interference from washington. it seemed to be the policy of general halleck and secretary stanton to keep any force sent there, in pursuit of the invading army, moving right and left so as to keep between the enemy and our capital; and, generally speaking, they pursued this policy until all knowledge of the whereabouts of the enemy was lost. they were left, therefore, free to supply themselves with horses, beef cattle, and such provisions as they could carry away from western maryland and pennsylvania. i determined to put a stop to this. i started sheridan at once for that field of operation, and on the following day sent another division of his cavalry. i had previously asked to have sheridan assigned to that command, but mr. stanton objected, on the ground that he was too young for so important a command. on the 1st of august when i sent reinforcements for the protection of washington, i sent the following orders: city point, va., august 1, 1864, 11.30 a.m. major-general halleck, washington d. c. i am sending general sheridan for temporary duty whilst the enemy is being expelled from the border. unless general hunter is in the field in person, i want sheridan put in command of all the troops in the field, with instructions to put himself south of the enemy and follow him to the death. wherever the enemy goes let our troops go also. once started up the valley they ought to be followed until we get possession of the virginia central railroad. if general hunter is in the field, give sheridan direct command of the 6th corps and cavalry division. all the cavalry, i presume, will reach washington in the course of to-morrow. u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. the president in some way or other got to see this dispatch of mine directing certain instructions to be given to the commanders in the field, operating against early, and sent me the following very characteristic dispatch: office u. s. military telegraph, war department, washington, d. c., august 3, 1864. cypher. 6 p.m., lt. general grant, city point, va. i have seen your despatch in which you say, "i want sheridan put in command of all the troops in the field, with instructions to put himself south of the enemy, and follow him to the death. wherever the enemy goes, let our troops go also." this, i think, is exactly right, as to how our forces should move. but please look over the despatches you may have received from here, even since you made that order, and discover, if you can, that there is any idea in the head of any one here, of "putting our army south of the enemy," or of "following him to the death" in any direction. i repeat to you it will neither be done nor attempted unless you watch it every day, and hour, and force it. a. lincoln. i replied to this that "i would start in two hours for washington," and soon got off, going directly to the monocacy without stopping at washington on my way. i found general hunter's army encamped there, scattered over the fields along the banks of the monocacy, with many hundreds of cars and locomotives, belonging to the baltimore and ohio railroad, which he had taken the precaution to bring back and collect at that point. i asked the general where the enemy was. he replied that he did not know. he said the fact was, that he was so embarrassed with orders from washington moving him first to the right and then to the left that he had lost all trace of the enemy. i then told the general that i would find out where the enemy was, and at once ordered steam got up and trains made up, giving directions to push for halltown, some four miles above harper's ferry, in the shenandoah valley. the cavalry and the wagon trains were to march, but all the troops that could be transported by the cars were to go in that way. i knew that the valley was of such importance to the enemy that, no matter how much he was scattered at that time, he would in a very short time be found in front of our troops moving south. i then wrote out general hunter's instructions. (*39) i told him that sheridan was in washington, and still another division was on its way; and suggested that he establish the headquarters of the department at any point that would suit him best, cumberland, baltimore, or elsewhere, and give sheridan command of the troops in the field. the general replied to this, that he thought he had better be relieved entirely. he said that general halleck seemed so much to distrust his fitness for the position he was in that he thought somebody else ought to be there. he did not want, in any way, to embarrass the cause; thus showing a patriotism that was none too common in the army. there were not many major-generals who would voluntarily have asked to have the command of a department taken from them on the supposition that for some particular reason, or for any reason, the service would be better performed. i told him, "very well then," and telegraphed at once for sheridan to come to the monocacy, and suggested that i would wait and meet him there. sheridan came at once by special train, but reached there after the troops were all off. i went to the station and remained there until he arrived. myself and one or two of my staff were about all the union people, except general hunter and his staff, who were left at the monocacy when sheridan arrived. i hastily told sheridan what had been done and what i wanted him to do, giving him, at the same time, the written instructions which had been prepared for general hunter and directed to that officer. sheridan now had about 30,000 men to move with, 8,000 of them being cavalry. early had about the same number, but the superior ability of the national commander over the confederate commander was so great that all the latter's advantage of being on the defensive was more than counterbalanced by this circumstance. as i had predicted, early was soon found in front of sheridan in the valley, and pennsylvania and maryland were speedily freed from the invaders. the importance of the valley was so great to the confederates that lee reinforced early, but not to the extent that we thought and feared he would. to prevent as much as possible these reinforcements from being sent out from richmond, i had to do something to compel lee to retain his forces about his capital. i therefore gave orders for another move to the north side of the james river, to threaten richmond. hancock's corps, part of the 10th corps under birney, and gregg's division of cavalry were crossed to the north side of the james during the night of the 13th-14th of august. a threatening position was maintained for a number of days, with more or less skirmishing, and some tolerably hard fighting; although it was my object and my instructions that anything like a battle should be avoided, unless opportunities should present themselves which would insure great success. general meade was left in command of the few troops around petersburg, strongly intrenched; and was instructed to keep a close watch upon the enemy in that quarter, and himself to take advantage of any weakening that might occur through an effort on the part of the enemy to reinforce the north side. there was no particular victory gained on either side; but during that time no more reinforcements were sent to the valley. i informed sheridan of what had been done to prevent reinforcements being sent from richmond against him, and also that the efforts we had made had proven that one of the divisions which we supposed had gone to the valley was still at richmond, because we had captured six or seven hundred prisoners from that division, each of its four brigades having contributed to our list of captures. i also informed him that but one division had gone, and it was possible that i should be able to prevent the going of any more. to add to my embarrassment at this time sherman, who was now near atlanta, wanted reinforcements. he was perfectly willing to take the raw troops then being raised in the north-west, saying that he could teach them more soldiering in one day among his troops than they would learn in a week in a camp of instruction. i therefore asked that all troops in camps of instruction in the north-west be sent to him. sherman also wanted to be assured that no eastern troops were moving out against him. i informed him of what i had done and assured him that i would hold all the troops there that it was possible for me to hold, and that up to that time none had gone. i also informed him that his real danger was from kirby smith, who commanded the trans-mississippi department. if smith should escape steele, and get across the mississippi river, he might move against him. i had, therefore, asked to have an expedition ready to move from new orleans against mobile in case kirby smith should get across. this would have a tendency to draw him to the defence of that place, instead of going against sherman. right in the midst of all these embarrassments halleck informed me that there was an organized scheme on foot in the north to resist the draft, and suggested that it might become necessary to draw troops from the field to put it down. he also advised taking in sail, and not going too fast. the troops were withdrawn from the north side of the james river on the night of the 20th. before they were withdrawn, however, and while most of lee's force was on that side of the river, warren had been sent with most of the 5th corps to capture the weldon railroad. he took up his line of march well back to the rear, south of the enemy, while the troops remaining in the trenches extended so as to cover that part of the line which he had vacated by moving out. from our left, near the old line, it was about three miles to the weldon railroad. a division was ordered from the right of the petersburg line to reinforce warren, while a division was brought back from the north side of the james river to take its place. this road was very important to the enemy. the limits from which his supplies had been drawn were already very much contracted, and i knew that he must fight desperately to protect it. warren carried the road, though with heavy loss on both sides. he fortified his new position, and our trenches were then extended from the left of our main line to connect with his new one. lee made repeated attempts to dislodge warren's corps, but without success, and with heavy loss. as soon as warren was fortified and reinforcements reached him, troops were sent south to destroy the bridges on the weldon railroad; and with such success that the enemy had to draw in wagons, for a distance of about thirty miles, all the supplies they got thereafter from that source. it was on the 21st that lee seemed to have given up the weldon railroad as having been lost to him; but along about the 24th or 25th he made renewed attempts to recapture it; again he failed and with very heavy losses to him as compared with ours. on the night of the 20th our troops on the north side of the james were withdrawn, and hancock and gregg were sent south to destroy the weldon railroad. they were attacked on the 25th at reams's station, and after desperate fighting a part of our line gave way, losing five pieces of artillery. but the weldon railroad never went out of our possession from the 18th of august to the close of the war. chapter lviii. sheridan's advance--visit to sheridan--sheridan's victory in the shenandoah--sheridan's ride to winchester--close of the campaign for the winter. we had our troops on the weldon railroad contending against a large force that regarded this road of so much importance that they could afford to expend many lives in retaking it; sherman just getting through to atlanta with great losses of men from casualties, discharges and detachments left along as guards to occupy and hold the road in rear of him; washington threatened but a short time before, and now early being strengthened in the valley so as, probably, to renew that attempt. it kept me pretty active in looking after all these points. on the 10th of august sheridan had advanced on early up the shenandoah valley, early falling back to strasburg. on the 12th i learned that lee had sent twenty pieces of artillery, two divisions of infantry and a considerable cavalry force to strengthen early. it was important that sheridan should be informed of this, so i sent the information to washington by telegraph, and directed a courier to be sent from there to get the message to sheridan at all hazards, giving him the information. the messenger, an officer of the army, pushed through with great energy and reached sheridan just in time. the officer went through by way of snicker's gap, escorted by some cavalry. he found sheridan just making his preparations to attack early in his chosen position. now, however, he was thrown back on the defensive. on the 15th of september i started to visit general sheridan in the shenandoah valley. my purpose was to have him attack early, or drive him out of the valley and destroy that source of supplies for lee's army. i knew it was impossible for me to get orders through washington to sheridan to make a move, because they would be stopped there and such orders as halleck's caution (and that of the secretary of war) would suggest would be given instead, and would, no doubt, be contradictory to mine. i therefore, without stopping at washington, went directly through to charlestown, some ten miles above harper's ferry, and waited there to see general sheridan, having sent a courier in advance to inform him where to meet me. when sheridan arrived i asked him if he had a map showing the positions of his army and that of the enemy. he at once drew one out of his side pocket, showing all roads and streams, and the camps of the two armies. he said that if he had permission he would move so and so (pointing out how) against the confederates, and that he could "whip them." before starting i had drawn up a plan of campaign for sheridan, which i had brought with me; but, seeing that he was so clear and so positive in his views and so confident of success, i said nothing about this and did not take it out of my pocket. sheridan's wagon trains were kept at harper's ferry, where all of his stores were. by keeping the teams at that place, their forage did not have to be hauled to them. as supplies of ammunition, provisions and rations for the men were wanted, trains would be made up to deliver the stores to the commissaries and quartermasters encamped at winchester. knowing that he, in making preparations to move at a given day, would have to bring up wagons trains from harper's ferry, i asked him if he could be ready to get off by the following tuesday. this was on friday. "o yes," he said, he "could be off before daylight on monday." i told him then to make the attack at that time and according to his own plan; and i immediately started to return to the army about richmond. after visiting baltimore and burlington, new jersey, i arrived at city point on the 19th. on the way out to harper's ferry i had met mr. robert garrett, president of the baltimore and ohio railroad. he seemed very anxious to know when workmen might be put upon the road again so as to make repairs and put it in shape for running. it was a large piece of property to have standing idle. i told him i could not answer then positively but would try and inform him before a great while. on my return mr. garrett met me again with the same and i told him i thought that by the wednesday he might send his workmen out on his road. i gave him no further information however, and he had no suspicion of how i expected to have the road cleared for his workmen. sheridan moved at the time he had fixed upon. he met early at the crossing of opequon creek, a most decisive victory--one which the country. early had invited this attack himself by his bad generalship and made the victory easy. he had sent g. t. anderson's division east of the blue ridge before i went to harper's ferry; and about the time i arrived there he started other divisions (leaving but two in their camps) to march to martinsburg for the purpose destroying the baltimore and ohio railroad at that point. early here learned that i had been with sheridan and, supposing there was some movement on foot, started back as soon as he got the information. but his forces were separated and, as i have said, he was very badly defeated. he fell back to fisher's hill, sheridan following. the valley is narrow at that point, and early made another stand there, behind works which extended across. but sheridan turned both his flanks and again sent him speeding up the valley, following in hot pursuit. the pursuit was continued up the valley to mount jackson and new market. sheridan captured about eleven hundred prisoners and sixteen guns. the houses which he passed all along the route were found to be filled with early's wounded, and the country swarmed with his deserters. finally, on the 25th, early turned from the valley eastward, leaving sheridan at harrisonburg in undisputed possession. now one of the main objects of the expedition began to be accomplished. sheridan went to work with his command, gathering in the crops, cattle, and everything in the upper part of the valley required by our troops; and especially taking what might be of use to the enemy. what he could not take away he destroyed, so that the enemy would not be invited to come back there. i congratulated sheridan upon his recent great victory and had a salute of a hundred guns fired in honor of it, the guns being aimed at the enemy around petersburg. i also notified the other commanders throughout the country, who also fired salutes in honor of his victory. i had reason to believe that the administration was a little afraid to have a decisive battle at that time, for fear it might go against us and have a bad effect on the november elections. the convention which had met and made its nomination of the democratic candidate for the presidency had declared the war a failure. treason was talked as boldly in chicago at that convention as ever been in charleston. it was a question whether the government would then have had the power to make arrests and punish those who talked treason. but this decisive victory was the most effective campaign argument made in the canvass. sheridan, in his pursuit, got beyond where they could hear from him in washington, and the president became very much frightened about him. he was afraid that the hot pursuit had been a little like that of general cass was said to have been, in one of our indian wars, when he was an officer of army. cass was pursuing the indians so closely that the first thing he knew he found himself in front, and the indians pursuing him. the president was afraid that sheridan had got on the other side of early and that early was in behind him. he was afraid that sheridan was getting so far away that reinforcements would be sent out from richmond to enable early to beat him. i replied to the president that i had taken steps to prevent lee from sending reinforcements to early, by attacking the former where he was. on the 28th of september, to retain lee in his position, i sent ord with the 18th corps and birney with the 10th corps to make an advance on richmond, to threaten it. ord moved with the left wing up to chaffin's bluff; birney with the 10th corps took a road farther north; while kautz with the cavalry took the darby road, still farther to the north. they got across the river by the next morning, and made an effort to surprise the enemy. in that, however, they were unsuccessful. the enemy's lines were very strong and very intricate. stannard's division of the 18th corps with general burnham's brigade leading, tried an assault against fort harrison and captured it with sixteen guns and a good many prisoners. burnham was killed in the assault. colonel stevens who succeeded him was badly wounded; and his successor also fell in the same way. some works to the right and left were also carried with the guns in them--six in number--and a few more prisoners. birney's troops to the right captured the enemy's intrenched picket-lines, but were unsuccessful in their efforts upon the main line. our troops fortified their new position, bringing fort harrison into the new line and extending it to the river. this brought us pretty close to the enemy on the north side of the james, and the two opposing lines maintained their relative positions to the close of the siege. in the afternoon a further attempt was made to advance, but it failed. ord fell badly wounded, and had to be relieved; the command devolved upon general heckman, and later general weitzel was assigned to the command of the 18th corps. during the night lee reinforced his troops about fort gilmer, which was at the right of fort harrison, by eight additional brigades from petersburg, and attempted to retake the works which we had captured by concentrating ten brigades against them. all their efforts failed, their attacks being all repulsed with very heavy loss. in one of these assaults upon us general stannard, a gallant officer who was defending fort harrison, lost an arm. our casualties during these operations amounted to 394 killed, i,554 wounded and 324 missing. whilst this was going on general meade was instructed to keep up an appearance of moving troops to our extreme left. parke and warren were kept with two divisions, each under arms, ready to move leaving their enclosed batteries manned, with a scattering line on the other intrenchments. the object of this was to prevent reinforcements from going to the north side of the river. meade was instructed to watch the enemy closely and, if lee weakened his lines, to make an attack. on the 30th these troops moved out, under warren, and captured an advanced intrenched camp at peeble's farm, driving the enemy back to the main line. our troops followed and made an attack in the hope of carrying the enemy's main line; but in this they were unsuccessful and lost a large number of men, mostly captured. the number of killed and wounded was not large. the next day our troops advanced again and established themselves, intrenching a new line about a mile in front of the enemy. this advanced warren's position on the weldon railroad very considerably. sheridan having driven the enemy out of the valley, and taken the productions of the valley so that instead of going there for supplies the enemy would have to bring his provisions with him if he again entered it, recommended a reduction of his own force, the surplus to be sent where it could be of more use. i approved of his suggestion, and ordered him to send wright's corps back to the james river. i further directed him to repair the railroad up the shenandoah valley towards the advanced position which we would hold with a small force. the troops were to be sent to washington by the way of culpeper, in order to watch the east side of the blue ridge, and prevent the enemy from getting into the rear of sheridan while he was still doing his work of destruction. the valley was so very important, however, to the confederate army that, contrary to our expectations, they determined to make one more strike, and save it if possible before the supplies should be all destroyed. reinforcements were sent therefore to early, and this before any of our troops had been withdrawn. early prepared to strike sheridan at harrisonburg; but the latter had not remained there. on the 6th of october sheridan commenced retiring down the valley, taking or destroying all the food and forage and driving the cattle before him, early following. at fisher's hill sheridan turned his cavalry back on that of early, which, under the lead of rosser, was pursuing closely, and routed it most completely, capturing eleven guns and a large number of prisoners. sheridan lost only about sixty men. his cavalry pursued the enemy back some twenty-five miles. on the 10th of october the march down the valley was again resumed, early again following. i now ordered sheridan to halt, and to improve the opportunity if afforded by the enemy's having been sufficiently weakened, to move back again and cut the james river canal and virginia central railroad. but this order had to go through washington where it was intercepted; and when sheridan received what purported to be a statement of what i wanted him to do it was something entirely different. halleck informed sheridan that it was my wish for him to hold a forward position as a base from which to act against charlottesville and gordonsville; that he should fortify this position and provision it. sheridan objected to this most decidedly; and i was impelled to telegraph him, on the 14th, as follows: city point, va., october 14, 1864.--12.30 p.m. major-general sheridan, cedar creek, va. what i want is for you to threaten the virginia central railroad and canal in the manner your judgment tells you is best, holding yourself ready to advance, if the enemy draw off their forces. if you make the enemy hold a force equal to your own for the protection of those thoroughfares, it will accomplish nearly as much as their destruction. if you cannot do this, then the next best thing to do is to send here all the force you can. i deem a good cavalry force necessary for your offensive, as well as defensive operations. you need not therefore send here more than one division of cavalry. u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. sheridan having been summoned to washington city, started on the 15th leaving wright in command. his army was then at cedar creek, some twenty miles south of winchester. the next morning while at front royal, sheridan received a dispatch from wright, saying that a dispatch from longstreet to early had been intercepted. it directed the latter to be ready to move and to crush sheridan as soon as he, longstreet, arrived. on the receipt of this news sheridan ordered the cavalry up the valley to join wright. on the 18th of october early was ready to move, and during the night succeeded in getting his troops in the rear of our left flank, which fled precipitately and in great confusion down the valley, losing eighteen pieces of artillery and a thousand or more prisoners. the right under general getty maintained a firm and steady front, falling back to middletown where it took a position and made a stand. the cavalry went to the rear, seized the roads leading to winchester and held them for the use of our troops in falling back, general wright having ordered a retreat back to that place. sheridan having left washington on the 18th, reached winchester that night. the following morning he started to join his command. he had scarcely got out of town, when he met his men returning in panic from the front and also heard heavy firing to the south. he immediately ordered the cavalry at winchester to be deployed across the valley to stop the stragglers. leaving members of his staff to take care of winchester and the public property there, he set out with a small escort directly for the scene of battle. as he met the fugitives he ordered them to turn back, reminding them that they were going the wrong way. his presence soon restored confidence. finding themselves worse frightened than hurt the men did halt and turn back. many of those who had run ten miles got back in time to redeem their reputation as gallant soldiers before night. when sheridan got to the front he found getty and custer still holding their ground firmly between the confederates and our retreating troops. everything in the rear was now ordered up. sheridan at once proceeded to intrench his position; and he awaited an assault from the enemy. this was made with vigor, and was directed principally against emory's corps, which had sustained the principal loss in the first attack. by one o'clock the attack was repulsed. early was so badly damaged that he seemed disinclined to make another attack, but went to work to intrench himself with a view to holding the position he had already gained. he thought, no doubt, that sheridan would be glad enough to leave him unmolested; but in this he was mistaken. about the middle of the afternoon sheridan advanced. he sent his cavalry by both flanks, and they penetrated to the enemy's rear. the contest was close for a time, but at length the left of the enemy broke, and disintegration along the whole line soon followed. early tried to rally his men, but they were followed so closely that they had to give way very quickly every time they attempted to make a stand. our cavalry, having pushed on and got in the rear of the confederates, captured twenty-four pieces of artillery, besides retaking what had been lost in the morning. this victory pretty much closed the campaigning in the valley of virginia. all the confederate troops were sent back to richmond with the exception of one division of infantry and a little cavalry. wright's corps was ordered back to the army of the potomac, and two other divisions were withdrawn from the valley. early had lost more men in killed, wounded and captured in the valley than sheridan had commanded from first to last. on more than one occasion in these engagements general r. b. hayes, who succeeded me as president of the united states, bore a very honorable part. his conduct on the field was marked by conspicuous gallantry as well as the display of qualities of a higher order than that of mere personal daring. this might well have been expected of one who could write at the time he is said to have done so: "any officer fit for duty who at this crisis would abandon his post to electioneer for a seat in congress, ought to be scalped." having entered the army as a major of volunteers at the beginning of the war, general hayes attained by meritorious service the rank of brevet major-general before its close. on the north side of the james river the enemy attacked kautz's cavalry on the 7th of october, and drove it back with heavy loss in killed, wounded and prisoners, and the loss of all the artillery. this was followed up by an attack on our intrenched infantry line, but was repulsed with severe slaughter. on the 13th a reconnoissance was sent out by general butler, with a view to drive the enemy from some new works he was constructing, which resulted in heavy loss to us. on the 24th i ordered general meade to attempt to get possession of the south side railroad, and for that purpose to advance on the 27th. the attempt proved a failure, however, the most advanced of our troops not getting nearer than within six miles of the point aimed for. seeing the impossibility of its accomplishment i ordered the troops to withdraw, and they were all back in their former positions the next day. butler, by my directions, also made a demonstration on the north side of the james river in order to support this move, by detaining there the confederate troops who were on that side. he succeeded in this, but failed of further results by not marching past the enemy's left before turning in on the darby road and by reason of simply coming up against their lines in place. this closed active operations around richmond for the winter. of course there was frequent skirmishing between pickets, but no serious battle was fought near either petersburg or richmond. it would prolong this work to give a detailed account of all that took place from day to day around petersburg and at other parts of my command, and it would not interest the general reader if given. all these details can be found by the military student in a series of books published by the scribners, badeau's history of my campaigns, and also in the publications of the war department, including both the national and confederate reports. in the latter part of november general hancock was relieved from the command of the 2d corps by the secretary of war and ordered to washington, to organize and command a corps of veteran troops to be designated the 1st corps. it was expected that this would give him a large command to co-operate with in the spring. it was my expectation, at the time, that in the final operations hancock should move either up the valley, or else east of the blue ridge to lynchburg; the idea being to make the spring campaign the close of the war. i expected, with sherman coming up from the south, meade south of petersburg and around richmond, and thomas's command in tennessee with depots of supplies established in the eastern part of that state, to move from the direction of washington or the valley towards lynchburg. we would then have lee so surrounded that his supplies would be cut off entirely, making it impossible for him to support his army. general humphreys, chief-of-staff of the army of the potomac, was assigned to the command of the 2d corps, to succeed hancock. chapter lix. the campaign in georgia--sherman's march to the sea--war anecdotes--the march on savannah--investment of savannah--capture of savannah. let us now return to the operations in the military division of the mississippi, and accompany sherman in his march to the sea. the possession of atlanta by us narrowed the territory of the enemy very materially and cut off one of his two remaining lines of roads from east to west. a short time after the fall of atlanta mr. davis visited palmetto and macon and made speeches at each place. he spoke at palmetto on the 20th of september, and at macon on the 22d. inasmuch as he had relieved johnston and appointed hood, and hood had immediately taken the initiative, it is natural to suppose that mr. davis was disappointed with general johnston's policy. my own judgment is that johnston acted very wisely: he husbanded his men and saved as much of his territory as he could, without fighting decisive battles in which all might be lost. as sherman advanced, as i have show, his army became spread out, until, if this had been continued, it would have been easy to destroy it in detail. i know that both sherman and i were rejoiced when we heard of the change. hood was unquestionably a brave, gallant soldier and not destitute of ability; but unfortunately his policy was to fight the enemy wherever he saw him, without thinking much of the consequences of defeat. in his speeches mr. davis denounced governor brown, of georgia, and general johnston in unmeasured terms, even insinuating that their loyalty to the southern cause was doubtful. so far as general johnston is concerned, i think davis did him a great injustice in this particular. i had know the general before the war and strongly believed it would be impossible for him to accept a high commission for the purpose of betraying the cause he had espoused. there, as i have said, i think that his policy was the best one that could have been pursued by the whole south--protract the war, which was all that was necessary to enable them to gain recognition in the end. the north was already growing weary, as the south evidently was also, but with this difference. in the north the people governed, and could stop hostilities whenever they chose to stop supplies. the south was a military camp, controlled absolutely by the government with soldiers to back it, and the war could have been protracted, no matter to what extent the discontent reached, up to the point of open mutiny of the soldiers themselves. mr. davis's speeches were frank appeals to the people of georgia and that portion of the south to come to their relief. he tried to assure his frightened hearers that the yankees were rapidly digging their own graves; that measures were already being taken to cut them off from supplies from the north; and that with a force in front, and cut off from the rear, they must soon starve in the midst of a hostile people. papers containing reports of these speeches immediately reached the northern states, and they were republished. of course, that caused no alarm so long as telegraphic communication was kept up with sherman. when hood was forced to retreat from atlanta he moved to the south-west and was followed by a portion of sherman's army. he soon appeared upon the railroad in sherman's rear, and with his whole army began destroying the road. at the same time also the work was begun in tennessee and kentucky which mr. davis had assured his hearers at palmetto and macon would take place. he ordered forrest (about the ablest cavalry general in the south) north for this purpose; and forrest and wheeler carried out their orders with more or less destruction, occasionally picking up a garrison. forrest indeed performed the very remarkable feat of capturing, with cavalry, two gunboats and a number of transports, something the accomplishment of which is very hard to account for. hood's army had been weakened by governor brown's withdrawing the georgia state troops for the purpose of gathering in the season's crops for the use of the people and for the use of the army. this not only depleted hood's forces but it served a most excellent purpose in gathering in supplies of food and forage for the use of our army in its subsequent march. sherman was obliged to push on with his force and go himself with portions of it hither and thither, until it was clearly demonstrated to him that with the army he then had it would be impossible to hold the line from atlanta back and leave him any force whatever with which to take the offensive. had that plan been adhered to, very large reinforcements would have been necessary; and mr. davis's prediction of the destruction of the army would have been realized, or else sherman would have been obliged to make a successful retreat, which mr. davis said in his speeches would prove more disastrous than napoleon's retreat from moscow. these speeches of mr. davis were not long in reaching sherman. he took advantage of the information they gave, and made all the preparation possible for him to make to meet what now became expected, attempts to break his communications. something else had to be done: and to sherman's sensible and soldierly mind the idea was not long in dawning upon him, not only that something else had to be done, but what that something else should be. on september 10th i telegraphed sherman as follows: city point, va., sept. 10, 1864. major-general sherman, atlanta, georgia. so soon as your men are sufficiently rested, and preparations can be made, it is desirable that another campaign should be commenced. we want to keep the enemy constantly pressed to the end of the war. if we give him no peace whilst the war lasts, the end cannot be distant. now that we have all of mobile bay that is valuable, i do not know but it will be the best move to transfer canby's troops to act upon savannah, whilst you move on augusta. i should like to hear from you, however, in this matter. u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. sherman replied promptly: "if i could be sure of finding provisions and ammunition at augusta, or columbus, georgia, i can march to milledgeville, and compel hood to give up augusta or macon, and then turn on the other. * * * if you can manage to take the savannah river as high up as augusta, or the chattahoochee as far up as columbus, i can sweep the whole state of georgia." on the 12th i sent a special messenger, one of my own staff, with a letter inviting sherman's views about the next campaign. city point, va., sept. 12, 1864. major-general w. t. sherman, commanding mill division of the mississippi. i send lieutenant-colonel porter, of my staff, with this. colonel porter will explain to you the exact condition of affairs here better than i can do in the limits of a letter. although i feel myself strong enough for offensive operations, i am holding on quietly to get advantage of recruits and convalescents, who are coming forward very rapidly. my lines are necessarily very long, extending from deep bottom north of the james across the peninsula formed by the appomattox and the james, and south of the appomattox to the weldon road. this line is very strongly fortified, and can be held with comparatively few men, but from its great length takes many in the aggregate. i propose, when i do move, to extend my left so as to control what is known as the south side, or lynchburg and petersburg road, then if possible to keep the danville road cut. at the same time this move is made, i want to send a force of from six to ten thousand men against wilmington. the way i propose to do this is to land the men north of fort fisher, and hold that point. at the same time a large naval fleet will be assembled there, and the iron-clads will run the batteries as they did at mobile. this will give us the same control of the harbor of wilmington that we now have of the harbor of mobile. what you are to do with the forces at your command, i do not see. the difficulties of supplying your army, except when you are constantly moving, beyond where you are, i plainly see. if it had not been for price's movements canby would have sent twelve thousand more men to mobile. from your command on the mississippi an equal number could have been taken. with these forces my idea would have been to divide them, sending one half to mobile and the other half to savannah. you could then move as proposed in your telegram, so as to threaten macon and augusta equally. whichever was abandoned by the enemy you could take and open up a new base of supplies. my object now in sending a staff officer is not so much to suggest operations for you, as to get your views and have plans matured by the time everything can be got ready. it will probably be the 5th of october before any of the plans herein indicated will be executed. if you have any promotions to recommend, send the names forward and i will approve them. * * * u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. this reached sherman on september 20th. on the 25th of september sherman reported to washington that hood's troops were in his rear. he had provided against this by sending a division to chattanooga and a division to rome, georgia, which was in the rear of hood, supposing that hood would fall back in the direction from which he had come to reach the railroad. at the same time sherman and hood kept up a correspondence relative to the exchange of prisoners, the treatment of citizens, and other matters suitable to be arranged between hostile commanders in the field. on the 27th of september i telegraphed sherman as follows: city point, va., september 27, 1864--10.30 a.m. major-general sherman: i have directed all recruits and new troops from the western states to be sent to nashville, to receive their further orders from you. * * * u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. on the 29th sherman sent thomas back to chattanooga, and afterwards to nashville, with another division (morgan's) of the advanced army. sherman then suggested that, when he was prepared, his movements should take place against milledgeville and then to savannah. his expectation at that time was, to make this movement as soon as he could get up his supplies. hood was moving in his own country, and was moving light so that he could make two miles to sherman's one. he depended upon the country to gather his supplies, and so was not affected by delays. as i have said, until this unexpected state of affairs happened, mobile had been looked upon as the objective point of sherman's army. it had been a favorite move of mine from 1862, when i first suggested to the then commander-in-chief that the troops in louisiana, instead of frittering away their time in the trans-mississippi, should move against mobile. i recommended this from time to time until i came into command of the army, the last of march 1864. having the power in my own hands, i now ordered the concentration of supplies, stores and troops, in the department of the gulf about new orleans, with a view to a move against mobile, in support of, and in conjunction with, the other armies operating in the field. before i came into command, these troops had been scattered over the trans-mississippi department in such a way that they could not be, or were not, gotten back in time to take any part in the original movement; hence the consideration, which had caused mobile to be selected as the objective point for sherman's army to find his next base of supplies after having cut loose from atlanta, no longer existed. general g. m. dodge, an exceedingly efficient officer, having been badly wounded, had to leave the army about the first of october. he was in command of two divisions of the 16th corps, consolidated into one. sherman then divided his army into the right and left wings the right commanded by general o. o. howard and the left by general slocum. general dodge's two divisions were assigned, one to each of these wings. howard's command embraced the 15th and 17th corps, and slocum's the 14th and 20th corps, commanded by generals jeff. c. davis and a. s. williams. generals logan and blair commanded the two corps composing the right wing. about this time they left to take part in the presidential election, which took place that year, leaving their corps to osterhaus and ransom. i have no doubt that their leaving was at the earnest solicitation of the war department. general blair got back in time to resume his command and to proceed with it throughout the march to the sea and back to the grand review at washington. general logan did not return to his command until after it reached savannah. logan felt very much aggrieved at the transfer of general howard from that portion of the army of the potomac which was then with the western army, to the command of the army of the tennessee, with which army general logan had served from the battle of belmont to the fall of atlanta--having passed successively through all grades from colonel commanding a regiment to general commanding a brigade, division and army corps, until upon the death of mcpherson the command of the entire army of the tennessee devolved upon him in the midst of a hotly contested battle. he conceived that he had done his full duty as commander in that engagement; and i can bear testimony, from personal observation, that he had proved himself fully equal to all the lower positions which he had occupied as a soldier. i will not pretend to question the motive which actuated sherman in taking an officer from another army to supersede general logan. i have no doubt, whatever, that he did this for what he considered would be to the good of the service, which was more important than that the personal feelings of any individual should not be aggrieved; though i doubt whether he had an officer with him who could have filled the place as logan would have done. differences of opinion must exist between the best of friends as to policies in war, and of judgment as to men's fitness. the officer who has the command, however, should be allowed to judge of the fitness of the officers under him, unless he is very manifestly wrong. sherman's army, after all the depletions, numbered about sixty thousand effective men. all weak men had been left to hold the rear, and those remaining were not only well men, but strong and hardy, so that he had sixty thousand as good soldiers as ever trod the earth; better than any european soldiers, because they not only worked like a machine but the machine thought. european armies know very little what they are fighting for, and care less. included in these sixty thousand troops, there were two small divisions of cavalry, numbering altogether about four thousand men. hood had about thirty-five to forty thousand men, independent of forrest, whose forces were operating in tennessee and kentucky, as mr. davis had promised they should. this part of mr. davis's military plan was admirable, and promised the best results of anything he could have done, according to my judgment. i say this because i have criticised his military judgment in the removal of johnston, and also in the appointment of hood. i am aware, however, that there was high feeling existing at that time between davis and his subordinate, whom i regarded as one of his ablest lieutenants. on the 5th of october the railroad back from atlanta was again very badly broken, hood having got on the track with his army. sherman saw after night, from a high point, the road burning for miles. the defence of the railroad by our troops was very gallant, but they could not hold points between their intrenched positions against hood's whole army; in fact they made no attempt to do so; but generally the intrenched positions were held, as well as important bridges, and store located at them. allatoona, for instance, was defended by a small force of men under the command of general corse, one of the very able and efficient volunteer officers produced by the war. he, with a small force, was cut off from the remainder of the national army and was attacked with great vigor by many times his own number. sherman from his high position could see the battle raging, with the confederate troops between him and his subordinate. he sent men, of course, to raise the temporary siege, but the time that would be necessarily consumed in reaching corse, would be so great that all occupying the intrenchments might be dead. corse was a man who would never surrender. from a high position some of sherman's signal corps discovered a signal flag waving from a hole in the block house at allatoona. it was from corse. he had been shot through the face, but he signalled to his chief a message which left no doubt of his determination to hold his post at all hazards. it was at this point probably, that sherman first realized that with the forces at his disposal, the keeping open of his line of communication with the north would be impossible if he expected to retain any force with which to operate offensively beyond atlanta. he proposed, therefore, to destroy the roads back to chattanooga, when all ready to move, and leave the latter place garrisoned. yet, before abandoning the railroad, it was necessary that he should repair damages already done, and hold the road until he could get forward such supplies, ordnance stores and small rations, as he wanted to carry with him on his proposed march, and to return to the north his surplus artillery; his object being to move light and to have no more artillery than could be used to advantage on the field. sherman thought hood would follow him, though he proposed to prepare for the contingency of the latter moving the other way while he was moving south, by making thomas strong enough to hold tennessee and kentucky. i, myself, was thoroughly satisfied that hood would go north, as he did. on the 2d of november i telegraphed sherman authorizing him definitely to move according to the plan he had proposed: that is, cutting loose from his base, giving up atlanta and the railroad back to chattanooga. to strengthen thomas he sent stanley (4th corps) back, and also ordered schofield, commanding the army of the ohio, twelve thousand strong, to report to him. in addition to this, a. j. smith, who, with two divisions of sherman's army, was in missouri aiding rosecrans in driving the enemy from that state, was under orders to return to thomas and, under the most unfavorable circumstances, might be expected to arrive there long before hood could reach nashville. in addition to this, the new levies of troops that were being raised in the north-west went to thomas as rapidly as enrolled and equipped. thomas, without any of these additions spoken of, had a garrison at chattanooga which had been strengthened by one division and garrisons at bridgeport, stevenson, decatur, murfreesboro, and florence. there were already with him in nashville ten thousand soldiers in round numbers, and many thousands of employees in the quartermaster's and other departments who could be put in the intrenchments in front of nashville, for its defence. also, wilson was there with ten thousand dismounted cavalrymen, who were being equipped for the field. thomas had at this time about forty-five thousand men without any of the reinforcements here above enumerated. these reinforcements gave him altogether about seventy thousand men, without counting what might be added by the new levies already spoken of. about this time beauregard arrived upon the field, not to supersede hood in command, but to take general charge over the entire district in which hood and sherman were, or might be, operating. he made the most frantic appeals to the citizens for assistance to be rendered in every way: by sending reinforcements, by destroying supplies on the line of march of the invaders, by destroying the bridges over which they would have to cross, and by, in every way, obstructing the roads to their front. but it was hard to convince the people of the propriety of destroying supplies which were so much needed by themselves, and each one hoped that his own possessions might escape. hood soon started north, and went into camp near decatur, alabama, where he remained until the 29th of october, but without making an attack on the garrison of that place. the tennessee river was patrolled by gunboats, from muscle shoals east; and, also, below the second shoals out to the ohio river. these, with the troops that might be concentrated from the garrisons along the river at any point where hood might choose to attempt to cross, made it impossible for him to cross the tennessee at any place where it was navigable. but muscle shoals is not navigable, and below them again is another shoal which also obstructs navigation. hood therefore moved down to a point nearly opposite florence, alabama, crossed over and remained there for some time, collecting supplies of food, forage and ammunition. all of these had to come from a considerable distance south, because the region in which he was then situated was mountainous, with small valleys which produced but little, and what they had produced had long since been exhausted. on the 1st of november i suggested to sherman, and also asked his views thereon, the propriety of destroying hood before he started on his campaign. on the 2d of november, as stated, i approved definitely his making his proposed campaign through georgia, leaving hood behind to the tender mercy of thomas and the troops in his command. sherman fixed the 10th of november as the day of starting. sherman started on that day to get back to atlanta, and on the 15th the real march to the sea commenced. the right wing, under howard, and the cavalry went to jonesboro, milledgeville, then the capital of georgia, being sherman's objective or stopping place on the way to savannah. the left wing moved to stone mountain, along roads much farther east than those taken by the right wing. slocum was in command, and threatened augusta as the point to which he was moving, but he was to turn off and meet the right wing at milledgeville. atlanta was destroyed so far as to render it worthless for military purposes before starting, sherman himself remaining over a day to superintend the work, and see that it was well done. sherman's orders for this campaign were perfect. before starting, he had sent back all sick, disabled and weak men, retaining nothing but the hardy, well-inured soldiers to accompany him on his long march in prospect. his artillery was reduced to sixty-five guns. the ammunition carried with them was two hundred rounds for musket and gun. small rations were taken in a small wagon train, which was loaded to its capacity for rapid movement. the army was expected to live on the country, and to always keep the wagons full of forage and provisions against a possible delay of a few days. the troops, both of the right and left wings, made most of their advance along the line of railroads, which they destroyed. the method adopted to perform this work, was to burn and destroy all the bridges and culverts, and for a long distance, at places, to tear up the track and bend the rails. soldiers to do this rapidly would form a line along one side of the road with crowbars and poles, place these under the rails and, hoisting all at once, turn over many rods of road at one time. the ties would then be placed in piles, and the rails, as they were loosened, would be carried and put across these log heaps. when a sufficient number of rails were placed upon a pile of ties it would be set on fire. this would heat the rails very much more in the middle, that being over the main part of the fire, than at the ends, so that they would naturally bend of their own weight; but the soldiers, to increase the damage, would take tongs and, one or two men at each end of the rail, carry it with force against the nearest tree and twist it around, thus leaving rails forming bands to ornament the forest trees of georgia. all this work was going on at the same time, there being a sufficient number of men detailed for that purpose. some piled the logs and built the fire; some put the rails upon the fire; while others would bend those that were sufficiently heated: so that, by the time the last bit of road was torn up, that it was designed to destroy at a certain place, the rails previously taken up were already destroyed. the organization for supplying the army was very complete. each brigade furnished a company to gather supplies of forage and provisions for the command to which they belonged. strict injunctions were issued against pillaging, or otherwise unnecessarily annoying the people; but everything in shape of food for man and forage for beast was taken. the supplies were turned over to the brigade commissary and quartermaster, and were issued by them to their respective commands precisely the same as if they had been purchased. the captures consisted largely of cattle, sheep, poultry, some bacon, cornmeal, often molasses, and occasionally coffee or other small rations. the skill of these men, called by themselves and the army "bummers," in collecting their loads and getting back to their respective commands, was marvellous. when they started out in the morning, they were always on foot; but scarcely one of them returned in the evening without being mounted on a horse or mule. these would be turned in for the general use of the army, and the next day these men would start out afoot and return again in the evening mounted. many of the exploits of these men would fall under the head of romance; indeed, i am afraid that in telling some of their experiences, the romance got the better of the truth upon which the story was founded, and that, in the way many of these anecdotes are told, very little of the foundation is left. i suspect that most of them consist chiefly of the fiction added to make the stories better. in one instance it was reported that a few men of sherman's army passed a house where they discovered some chickens under the dwelling. they immediately proceeded to capture them, to add to the army's supplies. the lady of the house, who happened to be at home, made piteous appeals to have these spared, saying they were a few she had put away to save by permission of other parties who had preceded and who had taken all the others that she had. the soldiers seemed moved at her appeal; but looking at the chickens again they were tempted and one of them replied: "the rebellion must be suppressed if it takes the last chicken in the confederacy," and proceeded to appropriate the last one. another anecdote characteristic of these times has been told. the south, prior to the rebellion, kept bloodhounds to pursue runaway slaves who took refuge in the neighboring swamps, and also to hunt convicts. orders were issued to kill all these animals as they were met with. on one occasion a soldier picked up a poodle, the favorite pet of its mistress, and was carrying it off to execution when the lady made a strong appeal to him to spare it. the soldier replied, "madam, our orders are to kill every bloodhound." "but this is not a bloodhound," said the lady. "well, madam, we cannot tell what it will grow into if we leave it behind," said the soldier as he went off with it. notwithstanding these anecdotes, and the necessary hardship they would seem to imply, i do not believe there was much unwarrantable pillaging considering that we were in the enemy's territory and without any supplies except such as the country afforded. on the 23d sherman, with the left wing, reached milledgeville. the right wing was not far off: but proceeded on its way towards savannah destroying the road as it went. the troops at milledgeville remained over a day to destroy factories, buildings used for military purposes, etc., before resuming its march. the governor, who had been almost defying mr. davis before this, now fled precipitately, as did the legislature of the state and all the state officers. the governor, sherman says, was careful to carry away even his garden vegetables, while he left the archives of the state to fall into our hands. the only military force that was opposed to sherman's forward march was the georgia militia, a division under the command of general g. w. smith, and a battalion under harry wayne. neither the quality of the forces nor their numbers was sufficient to even retard the progress of sherman's army. the people at the south became so frantic at this time at the successful invasion of georgia that they took the cadets from the military college and added them to the ranks of the militia. they even liberated the state convicts under promise from them that they would serve in the army. i have but little doubt that the worst acts that were attributed to sherman's army were committed by these convicts, and by other southern people who ought to have been under sentence--such people as could be found in every community, north and south--who took advantage of their country being invaded to commit crime. they were in but little danger of detection, or of arrest even if detected. the southern papers in commenting upon sherman's movements pictured him as in the most deplorable condition: stating that his men were starving, that they were demoralized and wandering about almost without object, aiming only to reach the sea coast and get under the protection of our navy. these papers got to the north and had more or less effect upon the minds of the people, causing much distress to all loyal persons particularly to those who had husbands, sons or brothers with sherman. mr. lincoln seeing these accounts, had a letter written asking me if i could give him anything that he could say to the loyal people that would comfort them. i told him there was not the slightest occasion for alarm; that with 60,000 such men as sherman had with him, such a commanding officer as he was could not be cut off in the open country. he might possibly be prevented from reaching the point he had started out to reach, but he would get through somewhere and would finally get to his chosen destination: and even if worst came to worst he could return north. i heard afterwards of mr. lincoln's saying, to those who would inquire of him as to what he thought about the safety of sherman's army, that sherman was all right: "grant says they are safe with such a general, and that if they cannot get out where they want to, they can crawl back by the hole they went in at." while at milledgeville the soldiers met at the state house, organized a legislature, and proceeded to business precisely as if they were the legislative body belonging to the state of georgia. the debates were exciting, and were upon the subject of the situation the south was in at that time, particularly the state of georgia. they went so far as to repeal, after a spirited and acrimonious debate, the ordinance of secession. the next day (24th) sherman continued his march, going by the way of waynesboro and louisville, millen being the next objective and where the two columns (the right and left wings) were to meet. the left wing moved to the left of the direct road, and the cavalry still farther off so as to make it look as though augusta was the point they were aiming for. they moved on all the roads they could find leading in that direction. the cavalry was sent to make a rapid march in hope of surprising millen before the union prisoners could be carried away; but they failed in this. the distance from milledgeville to millen was about one hundred miles. at this point wheeler, who had been ordered from tennessee, arrived and swelled the numbers and efficiency of the troops confronting sherman. hardee, a native of georgia, also came, but brought no troops with him. it was intended that he should raise as large an army as possible with which to intercept sherman's march. he did succeed in raising some troops, and with these and those under the command of wheeler and wayne, had an army sufficient to cause some annoyance but no great detention. our cavalry and wheeler's had a pretty severe engagement, in which wheeler was driven towards augusta, thus giving the idea that sherman was probably making for that point. millen was reached on the 3d of december, and the march was resumed the following day for savannah, the final objective. bragg had now been sent to augusta with some troops. wade hampton was there also trying to raise cavalry sufficient to destroy sherman's army. if he ever raised a force it was too late to do the work expected of it. hardee's whole force probably numbered less than ten thousand men. from millen to savannah the country is sandy and poor, and affords but very little forage other than rice straw, which was then growing. this answered a very good purpose as forage, and the rice grain was an addition to the soldier's rations. no further resistance worthy of note was met with, until within a few miles of savannah. this place was found to be intrenched and garrisoned. sherman proceeded at once on his arrival to invest the place, and found that the enemy had placed torpedoes in the ground, which were to explode when stepped on by man or beast. one of these exploded under an officer's horse, blowing the animal to pieces and tearing one of the legs of the officer so badly that it had to be amputated. sherman at once ordered his prisoners to the front, moving them in a compact body in advance, to either explode the torpedoes or dig them up. no further explosion took place. on the 10th of december the siege of savannah commenced. sherman then, before proceeding any further with operations for the capture of the place, started with some troops to open communication with our fleet, which he expected to find in the lower harbor or as near by as the forts of the enemy would permit. in marching to the coast he encountered fort mcallister, which it was necessary to reduce before the supplies he might find on shipboard could be made available. fort mcallister was soon captured by an assault made by general hazen's division. communication was then established with the fleet. the capture of savannah then only occupied a few days, and involved no great loss of life. the garrison, however, as we shall see, was enabled to escape by crossing the river and moving eastward. when sherman had opened communication with the fleet he found there a steamer, which i had forwarded to him, carrying the accumulated mails for his army, also supplies which i supposed he would be in need of. general j. g. foster, who commanded all the troops south of north carolina on the atlantic sea-board, visited general sherman before he had opened communication with the fleet, with the view of ascertaining what assistance he could be to him. foster returned immediately to his own headquarters at hilton head, for the purpose of sending sherman siege guns, and also if he should find he had them to spare, supplies of clothing, hard bread, etc., thinking that these articles might not be found outside. the mail on the steamer which i sent down, had been collected by colonel a. h. markland of the post office department, who went in charge of it. on this same vessel i sent an officer of my staff (lieutenant dunn) with the following letter to general sherman: city point, va., dec. 3, 1864. major-general w. t. sherman, commanding armies near savannah, ga. the little information gleaned from the southern press, indicating no great obstacle to your progress, i have directed your mails (which had been previously collected at baltimore by colonel markland, special agent of the post office department) to be sent as far as the blockading squadron off savannah, to be forwarded to you as soon as heard from on the coast. not liking to rejoice before the victory is assured, i abstain from congratulating you and those under your command, until bottom has been struck. i have never had a fear, however, for the result. since you left atlanta, no very great progress has been made here. the enemy has been closely watched though, and prevented from detaching against you. i think not one man has gone from here, except some twelve or fifteen hundred dismounted cavalry. bragg has gone from wilmington. i am trying to take advantage of his absence to get possession of that place. owing to some preparations admiral porter and general butler are making to blow up fort fisher (which, while hoping for the best, i do not believe a particle in), there is a delay in getting this expedition off. i hope they will be ready to start by the 7th, and that bragg will not have started back by that time. in this letter i do not intend to give you anything like directions for future action, but will state a general idea i have, and will get your views after you have established yourself on the sea-coast. with your veteran army i hope to get control of the only two through routes from east to west possessed by the enemy before the fall of atlanta. the condition will be filled by holding savannah and augusta, or by holding any other port to the east of savannah and branchville. if wilmington falls, a force from there can co-operate with you. thomas has got back into the defences of nashville, with hood close upon him. decatur has been abandoned, and so have all the roads except the main one leading to chattanooga. part of this falling back was undoubtedly necessary and all of it may have been. it did not look so, however, to me. in my opinion, thomas far outnumbers hood in infantry. in cavalry, hood has the advantage in morale and numbers. i hope yet that hood will be badly crippled if not destroyed. the general news you will learn from the papers better than i could give it. after all becomes quiet, and roads become so bad up here that there is likely to be a week or two when nothing can be done, i will run down the coast to see you. if you desire it, i will ask mrs. sherman to go with me. yours truly, u. s. grant, lieutenant-general i quote this letter because it gives the reader a full knowledge of the events of that period. sherman now (the 15th) returned to savannah to complete its investment and insure the surrender of the garrison. the country about savannah is low and marshy, and the city was well intrenched from the river above to the river below; and assaults could not be made except along a comparatively narrow causeway. for this reason assaults must have resulted in serious destruction of life to the union troops, with the chance of failing altogether. sherman therefore decided upon a complete investment of the place. when he believed this investment completed, he summoned the garrison to surrender. general hardee, who was in command, replied in substance that the condition of affairs was not such as sherman had described. he said he was in full communication with his department and was receiving supplies constantly. hardee, however, was cut off entirely from all communication with the west side of the river, and by the river itself to the north and south. on the south carolina side the country was all rice fields, through which it would have been impossible to bring supplies so that hardee had no possible communication with the outside world except by a dilapidated plank road starting from the west bank of the river. sherman, receiving this reply, proceeded in person to a point on the coast, where general foster had troops stationed under general hatch, for the purpose of making arrangements with the latter officer to go through by one of the numerous channels running inland along that part of the coast of south carolina, to the plank road which general hardee still possessed, and thus to cut him off from the last means he had of getting supplies, if not of communication. while arranging for this movement, and before the attempt to execute the plan had been commenced, sherman received information through one of his staff officers that the enemy had evacuated savannah the night before. this was the night of the 21st of december. before evacuating the place hardee had blown up the navy yard. some iron-clads had been destroyed, as well as other property that might have been valuable to us; but he left an immense amount of stores untouched, consisting of cotton, railroad cars, workshops, numerous pieces of artillery, and several thousand stands of small arms. a little incident occurred, soon after the fall of savannah, which sherman relates in his memoirs, and which is worthy of repetition. savannah was one of the points where blockade runners entered. shortly after the city fell into our possession, a blockade runner came sailing up serenely, not doubting but the confederates were still in possession. it was not molested, and the captain did not find out his mistake until he had tied up and gone to the custom house, where he found a new occupant of the building, and made a less profitable disposition of his vessel and cargo than he had expected. as there was some discussion as to the authorship of sherman's march to the sea, by critics of his book when it appeared before the public, i want to state here that no question upon that subject was ever raised between general sherman and myself. circumstances made the plan on which sherman expected to act impracticable, as as commander of the forces he necessarily had to devise a new on which would give more promise of success: consequently he recommended the destruction of the railroad back to chattanooga, and that he should be authorized then to move, as he did, from atlanta forward. his suggestions were finally approved, although they did not immediately find favor in washington. even when it came to the time of starting, the greatest apprehension, as to the propriety of the campaign he was about commence, filled the mind of the president, induced no doubt by his advisers. this went so far as to move the president to ask me to suspend sherman's march for a day or two until i could think the matter over. my recollection is, though i find no record to show it, that out of deference to the president's wish i did send a dispatch to sherman asking him to wait a day or two, or else the connections between us were already cut so that i could not do so. however this may be, the question of who devised the plan of march from atlanta to savannah is easily answered: it was clearly sherman, and to him also belongs the credit of its brilliant execution. it was hardly possible that any one else than those on the spot could have devised a new plan of campaign to supersede one that did not promise success. (*40) i was in favor of sherman's plan from the time it was first submitted to me. my chief of staff, however, was very bitterly opposed to it and, as i learned subsequently, finding that he could not move me, he appealed to the authorities at washington to stop it. chapter lx. the battle of franklin--the battle of nashville. as we have seen, hood succeeded in crossing the tennessee river between muscle shoals and the lower shoals at the end of october, 1864. thomas sent schofield with the 4th and 23d corps, together with three brigades of wilson's cavalry to pulaski to watch him. on the 17th of november hood started and moved in such a manner as to avoid schofield, thereby turning his position. hood had with him three infantry corps, commanded respectively by stephen d. lee, stewart and cheatham. these, with his cavalry, numbered about forty-five thousand men. schofield had, of all arms, about thirty thousand. thomas's orders were, therefore, for schofield to watch the movements of the enemy, but not to fight a battle if he could avoid it; but to fall back in case of an advance on nashville, and to fight the enemy, as he fell back, so as to retard the enemy's movements until he could be reinforced by thomas himself. as soon as schofield saw this movement of hood's, he sent his trains to the rear, but did not fall back himself until the 21st, and then only to columbia. at columbia there was a slight skirmish but no battle. from this place schofield then retreated to franklin. he had sent his wagons in advance, and stanley had gone with them with two divisions to protect them. cheatham's corps of hood's army pursued the wagon train and went into camp at spring hill, for the night of the 29th. schofield retreating from columbia on the 29th, passed spring hill, where cheatham was bivouacked, during the night without molestation, though within half a mile of where the confederates were encamped. on the morning of the 30th he had arrived at franklin. hood followed closely and reached franklin in time to make an attack the same day. the fight was very desperate and sanguinary. the confederate generals led their men in the repeated charges, and the loss among them was of unusual proportions. this fighting continued with great severity until long after the night closed in, when the confederates drew off. general stanley, who commanded two divisions of the union troops, and whose troops bore the brunt of the battle, was wounded in the fight, but maintained his position. the enemy's loss at franklin, according to thomas's report, was 1,750 buried upon the field by our troops, 3,800 in the hospital, and 702 prisoners besides. schofield's loss, as officially reported, was 189 killed, 1,033 wounded, and 1,104 captured and missing. thomas made no effort to reinforce schofield at franklin, as it seemed to me at the time he should have done, and fight out the battle there. he simply ordered schofield to continue his retreat to nashville, which the latter did during that night and the next day. thomas, in the meantime, was making his preparations to receive hood. the road to chattanooga was still well guarded with strong garrisons at murfreesboro, stevenson, bridgeport and chattanooga. thomas had previously given up decatur and had been reinforced by a. j. smith's two divisions just returned from missouri. he also had steedman's division and r. s. granger's, which he had drawn from the front. his quartermaster's men, about ten thousand in number, had been organized and armed under the command of the chief quartermaster, general j. l. donaldson, and placed in the fortifications under the general supervision of general z. b. tower, of the united states engineers. hood was allowed to move upon nashville, and to invest that place almost without interference. thomas was strongly fortified in his position, so that he would have been safe against the attack of hood. he had troops enough even to annihilate him in the open field. to me his delay was unaccountable--sitting there and permitting himself to be invested, so that, in the end, to raise the siege he would have to fight the enemy strongly posted behind fortifications. it is true the weather was very bad. the rain was falling and freezing as it fell, so that the ground was covered with a sheet of ice, that made it very difficult to move. but i was afraid that the enemy would find means of moving, elude thomas and manage to get north of the cumberland river. if he did this, i apprehended most serious results from the campaign in the north, and was afraid we might even have to send troops from the east to head him off if he got there, general thomas's movements being always so deliberate and so slow, though effective in defence. i consequently urged thomas in frequent dispatches sent from city point(*41) to make the attack at once. the country was alarmed, the administration was alarmed, and i was alarmed lest the very thing would take place which i have just described that is, hood would get north. it was all without avail further than to elicit dispatches from thomas saying that he was getting ready to move as soon as he could, that he was making preparations, etc. at last i had to say to general thomas that i should be obliged to remove him unless he acted promptly. he replied that he was very sorry, but he would move as soon as he could. general logan happening to visit city point about that time, and knowing him as a prompt, gallant and efficient officer, i gave him an order to proceed to nashville to relieve thomas. i directed him, however, not to deliver the order or publish it until he reached there, and if thomas had moved, then not to deliver it at all, but communicate with me by telegraph. after logan started, in thinking over the situation, i became restless, and concluded to go myself. i went as far as washington city, when a dispatch was received from general thomas announcing his readiness at last to move, and designating the time of his movement. i concluded to wait until that time. he did move, and was successful from the start. this was on the 15th of december. general logan was at louisville at the time this movement was made, and telegraphed the fact to washington, and proceeded no farther himself. the battle during the 15th was severe, but favorable to the union troops, and continued until night closed in upon the combat. the next day the battle was renewed. after a successful assault upon hood's men in their intrenchments the enemy fled in disorder, routed and broken, leaving their dead, their artillery and small arms in great numbers on the field, besides the wounded that were captured. our cavalry had fought on foot as infantry, and had not their horses with them; so that they were not ready to join in the pursuit the moment the enemy retreated. they sent back, however, for their horses, and endeavored to get to franklin ahead of hood's broken army by the granny white road, but too much time was consumed in getting started. they had got but a few miles beyond the scene of the battle when they found the enemy's cavalry dismounted and behind intrenchments covering the road on which they were advancing. here another battle ensued, our men dismounting and fighting on foot, in which the confederates were again routed and driven in great disorder. our cavalry then went into bivouac, and renewed the pursuit on the following morning. they were too late. the enemy already had possession of franklin, and was beyond them. it now became a chase in which the confederates had the lead. our troops continued the pursuit to within a few miles of columbia, where they found the rebels had destroyed the railroad bridge as well as all other bridges over duck river. the heavy rains of a few days before had swelled the stream into a mad torrent, impassable except on bridges. unfortunately, either through a mistake in the wording of the order or otherwise, the pontoon bridge which was to have been sent by rail out to franklin, to be taken thence with the pursuing column, had gone toward chattanooga. there was, consequently, a delay of some four days in building bridges out of the remains of the old railroad bridge. of course hood got such a start in this time that farther pursuit was useless, although it was continued for some distance, but without coming upon him again. chapter lxi. expedition against fort fisher--attack on the fort--failure of the expedition--second expedition against the fort--capture of fort fisher. up to january, 1865, the enemy occupied fort fisher, at the mouth of cape fear river and below the city of wilmington. this port was of immense importance to the confederates, because it formed their principal inlet for blockade runners by means of which they brought in from abroad such supplies and munitions of war as they could not produce at home. it was equally important to us to get possession of it, not only because it was desirable to cut off their supplies so as to insure a speedy termination of the war, but also because foreign governments, particularly the british government, were constantly threatening that unless ours could maintain the blockade of that coast they should cease to recognize any blockade. for these reasons i determined, with the concurrence of the navy department, in december, to send an expedition against fort fisher for the purpose of capturing it. to show the difficulty experienced in maintaining the blockade, i will mention a circumstance that took place at fort fisher after its fall. two english blockade runners came in at night. their commanders, not supposing the fort had fallen, worked their way through all our fleet and got into the river unobserved. they then signalled the fort, announcing their arrival. there was a colored man in the fort who had been there before and who understood these signals. he informed general terry what reply he should make to have them come in, and terry did as he advised. the vessels came in, their officers entirely unconscious that they were falling into the hands of the union forces. even after they were brought in to the fort they were entertained in conversation for some little time before suspecting that the union troops were occupying the fort. they were finally informed that their vessels and cargoes were prizes. i selected general weitzel, of the army of the james, to go with the expedition, but gave instructions through general butler. he commanded the department within whose geographical limits fort fisher was situated, as well as beaufort and other points on that coast held by our troops; he was, therefore, entitled to the right of fitting out the expedition against fort fisher. general butler conceived the idea that if a steamer loaded heavily with powder could be run up to near the shore under the fort and exploded, it would create great havoc and make the capture an easy matter. admiral porter, who was to command the naval squadron, seemed to fall in with the idea, and it was not disapproved of in washington; the navy was therefore given the task of preparing the steamer for this purpose. i had no confidence in the success of the scheme, and so expressed myself; but as no serious harm could come of the experiment, and the authorities at washington seemed desirous to have it tried, i permitted it. the steamer was sent to beaufort, north carolina, and was there loaded with powder and prepared for the part she was to play in the reduction of fort fisher. general butler chose to go in command of the expedition himself, and was all ready to sail by the 9th of december (1864). very heavy storms prevailed, however, at that time along that part of the sea-coast, and prevented him from getting off until the 13th or 14th. his advance arrived off fort fisher on the 15th. the naval force had been already assembled, or was assembling, but they were obliged to run into beaufort for munitions, coal, etc.; then, too, the powder-boat was not yet fully prepared. the fleet was ready to proceed on the 18th; but butler, who had remained outside from the 15th up to that time, now found himself out of coal, fresh water, etc., and had to put into beaufort to replenish. another storm overtook him, and several days more were lost before the army and navy were both ready at the same time to co-operate. on the night of the 23d the powder-boat was towed in by a gunboat as near to the fort as it was safe to run. she was then propelled by her own machinery to within about five hundred yards of the shore. there the clockwork, which was to explode her within a certain length of time, was set and she was abandoned. everybody left, and even the vessels put out to sea to prevent the effect of the explosion upon them. at two o'clock in the morning the explosion took place--and produced no more effect on the fort, or anything else on land, than the bursting of a boiler anywhere on the atlantic ocean would have done. indeed when the troops in fort fisher heard the explosion they supposed it was the bursting of a boiler in one of the yankee gunboats. fort fisher was situated upon a low, flat peninsula north of cape fear river. the soil is sandy. back a little the peninsula is very heavily wooded, and covered with fresh-water swamps. the fort ran across this peninsula, about five hundred yards in width, and extended along the sea coast about thirteen hundred yards. the fort had an armament of 21 guns and 3 mortars on the land side, and 24 guns on the sea front. at that time it was only garrisoned by four companies of infantry, one light battery and the gunners at the heavy guns less than seven hundred men with a reserve of less than a thousand men five miles up the peninsula. general whiting of the confederate army was in command, and general bragg was in command of the force at wilmington. both commenced calling for reinforcements the moment they saw our troops landing. the governor of north carolina called for everybody who could stand behind a parapet and shoot a gun, to join them. in this way they got two or three hundred additional men into fort fisher; and hoke's division, five or six thousand strong, was sent down from richmond. a few of these troops arrived the very day that butler was ready to advance. on the 24th the fleet formed for an attack in arcs of concentric circles, their heavy iron-clads going in very close range, being nearest the shore, and leaving intervals or spaces so that the outer vessels could fire between them. porter was thus enabled to throw one hundred and fifteen shells per minute. the damage done to the fort by these shells was very slight, only two or three cannon being disabled in the fort. but the firing silenced all the guns by making it too hot for the men to maintain their positions about them and compelling them to seek shelter in the bomb-proofs. on the next day part of butler's troops under general adelbert ames effected a landing out of range of the fort without difficulty. this was accomplished under the protection of gunboats sent for the purpose, and under cover of a renewed attack upon the fort by the fleet. they formed a line across the peninsula and advanced, part going north and part toward the fort, covering themselves as they did so. curtis pushed forward and came near to fort fisher, capturing the small garrison at what was called the flag pond battery. weitzel accompanied him to within a half a mile of the works. here he saw that the fort had not been injured, and so reported to butler, advising against an assault. ames, who had gone north in his advance, captured 228 of the reserves. these prisoners reported to butler that sixteen hundred of hoke's division of six thousand from richmond had already arrived and the rest would soon be in his rear. upon these reports butler determined to withdraw his troops from the peninsula and return to the fleet. at that time there had not been a man on our side injured except by one of the shells from the fleet. curtis had got within a few yards of the works. some of his men had snatched a flag from the parapet of the fort, and others had taken a horse from the inside of the stockade. at night butler informed porter of his withdrawal, giving the reasons above stated, and announced his purpose as soon as his men could embark to start for hampton roads. porter represented to him that he had sent to beaufort for more ammunition. he could fire much faster than he had been doing, and would keep the enemy from showing himself until our men were within twenty yards of the fort, and he begged that butler would leave some brave fellows like those who had snatched the flag from the parapet and taken the horse from the fort. butler was unchangeable. he got all his troops aboard, except curtis's brigade, and started back. in doing this, butler made a fearful mistake. my instructions to him, or to the officer who went in command of the expedition, were explicit in the statement that to effect a landing would be of itself a great victory, and if one should be effected, the foothold must not be relinquished; on the contrary, a regular siege of the fort must be commenced and, to guard against interference by reason of storms, supplies of provisions must be laid in as soon as they could be got on shore. but general butler seems to have lost sight of this part of his instructions, and was back at fort monroe on the 28th. i telegraphed to the president as follows: city point, va., dec. 28, 1864.--8.30 p.m. the wilmington expedition has proven a gross and culpable failure. many of the troops are back here. delays and free talk of the object of the expedition enabled the enemy to move troops to wilmington to defeat it. after the expedition sailed from fort monroe, three days of fine weather were squandered, during which the enemy was without a force to protect himself. who is to blame will, i hope, be known. u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. porter sent dispatches to the navy department in which he complained bitterly of having been abandoned by the army just when the fort was nearly in our possession, and begged that our troops might be sent back again to cooperate, but with a different commander. as soon as i heard this i sent a messenger to porter with a letter asking him to hold on. i assured him that i fully sympathized with him in his disappointment, and that i would send the same troops back with a different commander, with some reinforcements to offset those which the enemy had received. i told him it would take some little time to get transportation for the additional troops; but as soon as it could be had the men should be on their way to him, and there would be no delay on my part. i selected a. h. terry to command. it was the 6th of january before the transports could be got ready and the troops aboard. they sailed from fortress monroe on that day. the object and destination of the second expedition were at the time kept a secret to all except a few in the navy department and in the army to whom it was necessary to impart the information. general terry had not the slightest idea of where he was going or what he was to do. he simply knew that he was going to sea and that he had his orders with him, which were to be opened when out at sea. he was instructed to communicate freely with porter and have entire harmony between army and navy, because the work before them would require the best efforts of both arms of service. they arrived off beaufort on the 8th. a heavy storm, however, prevented a landing at forth fisher until the 13th. the navy prepared itself for attack about as before, and the same time assisted the army in landing, this time five miles away. only iron-clads fired at first; the object being to draw the fire of the enemy's guns so as to ascertain their positions. this object being accomplished, they then let in their shots thick and fast. very soon the guns were all silenced, and the fort showed evident signs of being much injured. terry deployed his men across the peninsula as had been done before, and at two o'clock on the following morning was up within two miles of the fort with a respectable abatis in front of his line. his artillery was all landed on that day, the 14th. again curtis's brigade of ame's division had the lead. by noon they had carried an unfinished work less than a half mile from the fort, and turned it so as to face the other way. terry now saw porter and arranged for an assault on the following day. the two commanders arranged their signals so that they could communicate with each other from time to time as they might have occasion. at day light the fleet commenced its firing. the time agreed upon for the assault was the middle of the afternoon, and ames who commanded the assaulting column moved at 3.30. porter landed a force of sailors and marines to move against the sea-front in co-operation with ames's assault. they were under commander breese of the navy. these sailors and marines had worked their way up to within a couple of hundred yards of the fort before the assault. the signal was given and the assault was made; but the poor sailors and marines were repulsed and very badly handled by the enemy, losing 280 killed and wounded out of their number. curtis's brigade charged successfully though met by a heavy fire, some of the men having to wade through the swamp up to their waists to reach the fort. many were wounded, of course, and some killed; but they soon reached the palisades. these they cut away, and pushed on through. the other troops then came up, pennypacker's following curtis, and bell, who commanded the 3d brigade of ames's division, following pennypacker. but the fort was not yet captured though the parapet was gained. the works were very extensive. the large parapet around the work would have been but very little protection to those inside except when they were close up under it. traverses had, therefore, been run until really the work was a succession of small forts enclosed by a large one. the rebels made a desperate effort to hold the fort, and had to be driven from these traverses one by one. the fight continued till long after night. our troops gained first one traverse and then another, and by 10 o'clock at night the place was carried. during this engagement the sailors, who had been repulsed in their assault on the bastion, rendered the best service they could by reinforcing terry's northern line--thus enabling him to send a detachment to the assistance of ames. the fleet kept up a continuous fire upon that part of the fort which was still occupied by the enemy. by means of signals they could be informed where to direct their shots. during the succeeding nights the enemy blew up fort caswell on the opposite side of cape fear river, and abandoned two extensive works on smith's island in the river. our captures in all amounted to 169 guns, besides small-arms, with full supplies of ammunition, and 2,083 prisoners. in addition to these, there were about 700 dead and wounded left there. we had lost 110 killed and 536 wounded. in this assault on fort fisher, bell, one of the brigade commanders, was killed, and two, curtis and pennypacker, were badly wounded. secretary stanton, who was on his way back from savannah, arrived off fort fisher soon after it fell. when he heard the good news he promoted all the officers of any considerable rank for their conspicuous gallantry. terry had been nominated for major-general, but had not been confirmed. this confirmed him; and soon after i recommended him for a brigadier-generalcy in the regular army, and it was given to him for this victory. personal memoirs of u. s. grant (part 4) volume ii. contents. chapter xl. first meeting with secretary stanton--general rosecrans --commanding military division of mississippi--andrew johnson's address --arrival at chattanooga. chapter xli. assuming the command at chattanooga--opening a line of supplies--battle of wauhatchie--on the picket line. chapter xlii. condition of the army--rebuilding the railroad--general burnside's situation--orders for battle--plans for the attack--hooker's position--sherman's movements. chapter xliii. preparations for battle--thomas carries the first line of the enemy--sherman carries missionary ridge--battle of lookout mountain --general hooker's fight. chapter xliv. battle of chattanooga--a gallant charge--complete rout of the enemy--pursuit of the confederates--general bragg--remarks on chattanooga. chapter xlv. the relief of knoxville--headquarters moved to nashville --visiting knoxville--cipher dispatches--withholding orders. chapter xlvi. operations in mississippi--longstreet in east tennessee --commissioned lieutenant-general--commanding the armies of the united states--first interview with president lincoln. chapter xlvii. the military situation--plans for the campaign--sheridan assigned to command of the cavalry--flank movements--forrest at fort pillow--general banks's expedition--colonel mosby--an incident of the wilderness campaign. chapter xlviii. commencement of the grand campaign--general butler's position--sheridan's first raid. chapter xlix. sherman s campaign in georgia--siege of atlanta--death of general mcpherson--attempt to capture andersonville--capture of atlanta. chapter l. grand movement of the army of the potomac--crossing the rapidan--entering the wilderness--battle of the wilderness. chapter li. after the battle--telegraph and signal service--movement by the left flank. chapter lii. battle of spottsylvania--hancock's position--assault of warren's and wright's corps--upton promoted on the field--good news from butler and sheridan. chapter liii. hancock's assault--losses of the confederates--promotions recommended--discomfiture of the enemy--ewell's attack--reducing the artillery. chapter liv. movement by the left flank--battle of north anna--an incident of the march--moving on richmond--south of the pamunkey --position of the national army. chapter lv. advance on cold harbor--an anecdote of the war--battle of cold harbor--correspondence with lee retrospective. chapter lvi. left flank movement across the chickahominy and james --general lee--visit to butler--the movement on petersburg --the investment of petersburg. chapter lvii. raid on the virginia central railroad--raid on the weldon railroad--early's movement upon washington--mining the works before petersburg--explosion of the mine before petersburg--campaign in the shenandoah valley--capture of the weldon railroad. chapter lviii. sheridan's advance--visit to sheridan--sheridan's victory in the shenandoah--sheridan's ride to winchester--close of the campaign for the winter. chapter lix. the campaign in georgia--sherman's march to the sea--war anecdotes--the march on savannah--investment of savannah--capture of savannah. chapter lx. the battle of franklin--the battle of nashville chapter lxi. expedition against fort fisher--attack on the fort--failure of the expedition--second expedition against the fort--capture of fort fisher. chapter lxii. sherman's march north--sheridan ordered to lynchburg --canby ordered to move against mobile--movements of schofield and thomas --capture of columbia, south carolina--sherman in the carolinas. chapter lxiii. arrival of the peace commissioners--lincoln and the peace commissioners--an anecdote of lincoln--the winter before petersburg --sheridan destroys the railroad--gordon carries the picket line--parke recaptures the line--the battle of white oak road. chapter lxiv. interview with sheridan--grand movement of the army of the potomac--sheridan's advance on five forks--battle of five forks--parke and wright storm the enemy's line--battles before petersburg. chapter lxv. the capture of petersburg--meeting president lincoln in petersburg--the capture of richmond--pursuing the enemy--visit to sheridan and meade. chapter lxvi. battle of sailor's creek--engagement at farmville --correspondence with general lee--sheridan intercepts the enemy. chapter lxvii. negotiations at appomattox--interview with lee at mclean's house--the terms of surrender--lee's surrender--interview with lee after the surrender. chapter lxviii. morale of the two armies--relative conditions of the north and south--president lincoln visits richmond--arrival at washington--president lincoln's assassination--president johnson's policy. chapter lxix. sherman and johnston--johnston's surrender to sherman --capture of mobile--wilson's expedition--capture of jefferson davis --general thomas's qualities--estimate of general canby. chapter lxx. the end of the war--the march to washington--one of lincoln's anecdotes--grand review at washington--characteristics of lincoln and stanton--estimate of the different corps commanders. conclusion appendix chapter xl. first meeting with secretary stanton--general rosecrans--commanding military division of mississippi--andrew johnson's address--arrival at chattanooga. the reply (to my telegram of october 16, 1863, from cairo, announcing my arrival at that point) came on the morning of the 17th, directing me to proceed immediately to the galt house, louisville, where i would meet an officer of the war department with my instructions. i left cairo within an hour or two after the receipt of this dispatch, going by rail via indianapolis. just as the train i was on was starting out of the depot at indianapolis a messenger came running up to stop it, saying the secretary of war was coming into the station and wanted to see me. i had never met mr. stanton up to that time, though we had held frequent conversations over the wires the year before, when i was in tennessee. occasionally at night he would order the wires between the war department and my headquarters to be connected, and we would hold a conversation for an hour or two. on this occasion the secretary was accompanied by governor brough of ohio, whom i had never met, though he and my father had been old acquaintances. mr. stanton dismissed the special train that had brought him to indianapolis, and accompanied me to louisville. up to this time no hint had been given me of what was wanted after i left vicksburg, except the suggestion in one of halleck's dispatches that i had better go to nashville and superintend the operation of troops sent to relieve rosecrans. soon after we started the secretary handed me two orders, saying that i might take my choice of them. the two were identical in all but one particular. both created the "military division of mississippi," (giving me the command) composed of the departments of the ohio, the cumberland, and the tennessee, and all the territory from the alleghanies to the mississippi river north of banks's command in the south-west. one order left the department commanders as they were, while the other relieved rosecrans and assigned thomas to his place. i accepted the latter. we reached louisville after night and, if i remember rightly, in a cold, drizzling rain. the secretary of war told me afterwards that he caught a cold on that occasion from which he never expected to recover. he never did. a day was spent in louisville, the secretary giving me the military news at the capital and talking about the disappointment at the results of some of the campaigns. by the evening of the day after our arrival all matters of discussion seemed exhausted, and i left the hotel to spend the evening away, both mrs. grant (who was with me) and myself having relatives living in louisville. in the course of the evening mr. stanton received a dispatch from mr. c. a. dana, then in chattanooga, informing him that unless prevented rosecrans would retreat, and advising peremptory orders against his doing so. as stated before, after the fall of vicksburg i urged strongly upon the government the propriety of a movement against mobile. general rosecrans had been at murfreesboro', tennessee, with a large and well-equipped army from early in the year 1863, with bragg confronting him with a force quite equal to his own at first, considering it was on the defensive. but after the investment of vicksburg bragg's army was largely depleted to strengthen johnston, in mississippi, who was being reinforced to raise the siege. i frequently wrote general halleck suggesting that rosecrans should move against bragg. by so doing he would either detain the latter's troops where they were or lay chattanooga open to capture. general halleck strongly approved the suggestion, and finally wrote me that he had repeatedly ordered rosecrans to advance, but that the latter had constantly failed to comply with the order, and at last, after having held a council of war, had replied in effect that it was a military maxim "not to fight two decisive battles at the same time." if true, the maxim was not applicable in this case. it would be bad to be defeated in two decisive battles fought the same day, but it would not be bad to win them. i, however, was fighting no battle, and the siege of vicksburg had drawn from rosecrans' front so many of the enemy that his chances of victory were much greater than they would be if he waited until the siege was over, when these troops could be returned. rosecrans was ordered to move against the army that was detaching troops to raise the siege. finally he did move, on the 24th of june, but ten days afterwards vicksburg surrendered, and the troops sent from bragg were free to return. it was at this time that i recommended to the general-in-chief the movement against mobile. i knew the peril the army of the cumberland was in, being depleted continually, not only by ordinary casualties, but also by having to detach troops to hold its constantly extending line over which to draw supplies, while the enemy in front was as constantly being strengthened. mobile was important to the enemy, and in the absence of a threatening force was guarded by little else than artillery. if threatened by land and from the water at the same time the prize would fall easily, or troops would have to be sent to its defence. those troops would necessarily come from bragg. my judgment was overruled, and the troops under my command were dissipated over other parts of the country where it was thought they could render the most service. soon it was discovered in washington that rosecrans was in trouble and required assistance. the emergency was now too immediate to allow us to give this assistance by making an attack in rear of bragg upon mobile. it was therefore necessary to reinforce directly, and troops were sent from every available point. rosecrans had very skilfully manoeuvred bragg south of the tennessee river, and through and beyond chattanooga. if he had stopped and intrenched, and made himself strong there, all would have been right and the mistake of not moving earlier partially compensated. but he pushed on, with his forces very much scattered, until bragg's troops from mississippi began to join him. then bragg took the initiative. rosecrans had to fall back in turn, and was able to get his army together at chickamauga, some miles south-east of chattanooga, before the main battle was brought on. the battle was fought on the 19th and 20th of september, and rosecrans was badly defeated, with a heavy loss in artillery and some sixteen thousand men killed, wounded and captured. the corps under major-general george h. thomas stood its ground, while rosecrans, with crittenden and mccook, returned to chattanooga. thomas returned also, but later, and with his troops in good order. bragg followed and took possession of missionary ridge, overlooking chattanooga. he also occupied lookout mountain, west of the town, which rosecrans had abandoned, and with it his control of the river and the river road as far back as bridgeport. the national troops were now strongly intrenched in chattanooga valley, with the tennessee river behind them and the enemy occupying commanding heights to the east and west, with a strong line across the valley from mountain to mountain, and with chattanooga creek, for a large part of the way, in front of their line. on the 29th halleck telegraphed me the above results, and directed all the forces that could be spared from my department to be sent to rosecrans. long before this dispatch was received sherman was on his way, and mcpherson was moving east with most of the garrison of vicksburg. a retreat at that time would have been a terrible disaster. it would not only have been the loss of a most important strategic position to us, but it would have been attended with the loss of all the artillery still left with the army of the cumberland and the annihilation of that army itself, either by capture or demoralization. all supplies for rosecrans had to be brought from nashville. the railroad between this base and the army was in possession of the government up to bridgeport, the point at which the road crosses to the south side of the tennessee river; but bragg, holding lookout and raccoon mountains west of chattanooga, commanded the railroad, the river and the shortest and best wagon-roads, both south and north of the tennessee, between chattanooga and bridgeport. the distance between these two places is but twenty-six miles by rail, but owing to the position of bragg, all supplies for rosecrans had to be hauled by a circuitous route north of the river and over a mountainous country, increasing the distance to over sixty miles. this country afforded but little food for his animals, nearly ten thousand of which had already starved, and not enough were left to draw a single piece of artillery or even the ambulances to convey the sick. the men had been on half rations of hard bread for a considerable time, with but few other supplies except beef driven from nashville across the country. the region along the road became so exhausted of food for the cattle that by the time they reached chattanooga they were much in the condition of the few animals left alive there--"on the lift." indeed, the beef was so poor that the soldiers were in the habit of saying, with a faint facetiousness, that they were living on "half rations of hard bread and beef dried on the hoof." nothing could be transported but food, and the troops were without sufficient shoes or other clothing suitable for the advancing season. what they had was well worn. the fuel within the federal lines was exhausted, even to the stumps of trees. there were no teams to draw it from the opposite bank, where it was abundant. the only way of supplying fuel, for some time before my arrival, had been to cut trees on the north bank of the river at a considerable distance up the stream, form rafts of it and float it down with the current, effecting a landing on the south side within our lines by the use of paddles or poles. it would then be carried on the shoulders of the men to their camps. if a retreat had occurred at this time it is not probable that any of the army would have reached the railroad as an organized body, if followed by the enemy. on the receipt of mr. dana's dispatch mr. stanton sent for me. finding that i was out he became nervous and excited, inquiring of every person he met, including guests of the house, whether they knew where i was, and bidding them find me and send me to him at once. about eleven o'clock i returned to the hotel, and on my way, when near the house, every person met was a messenger from the secretary, apparently partaking of his impatience to see me. i hastened to the room of the secretary and found him pacing the floor rapidly in his dressing-gown. saying that the retreat must be prevented, he showed me the dispatch. i immediately wrote an order assuming command of the military division of the mississippi, and telegraphed it to general rosecrans. i then telegraphed to him the order from washington assigning thomas to the command of the army of the cumberland; and to thomas that he must hold chattanooga at all hazards, informing him at the same time that i would be at the front as soon as possible. a prompt reply was received from thomas, saying, "we will hold the town till we starve." i appreciated the force of this dispatch later when i witnessed the condition of affairs which prompted it. it looked, indeed, as if but two courses were open: one to starve, the other to surrender or be captured. on the morning of the 20th of october i started, with my staff, and proceeded as far as nashville. at that time it was not prudent to travel beyond that point by night, so i remained in nashville until the next morning. here i met for the first time andrew johnson, military governor of tennessee. he delivered a speech of welcome. his composure showed that it was by no means his maiden effort. it was long, and i was in torture while he was delivering it, fearing something would be expected from me in response. i was relieved, however, the people assembled having apparently heard enough. at all events they commenced a general hand-shaking, which, although trying where there is so much of it, was a great relief to me in this emergency. from nashville i telegraphed to burnside, who was then at knoxville, that important points in his department ought to be fortified, so that they could be held with the least number of men; to admiral porter at cairo, that sherman's advance had passed eastport, mississippi, that rations were probably on their way from st. louis by boat for supplying his army, and requesting him to send a gunboat to convoy them; and to thomas, suggesting that large parties should be put at work on the wagon-road then in use back to bridgeport. on the morning of the 21st we took the train for the front, reaching stevenson alabama, after dark. rosecrans was there on his way north. he came into my car and we held a brief interview, in which he described very clearly the situation at chattanooga, and made some excellent suggestions as to what should be done. my only wonder was that he had not carried them out. we then proceeded to bridgeport, where we stopped for the night. from here we took horses and made our way by jasper and over waldron's ridge to chattanooga. there had been much rain, and the roads were almost impassable from mud, knee-deep in places, and from wash-outs on the mountain sides. i had been on crutches since the time of my fall in new orleans, and had to be carried over places where it was not safe to cross on horseback. the roads were strewn with the debris of broken wagons and the carcasses of thousands of starved mules and horses. at jasper, some ten or twelve miles from bridgeport, there was a halt. general o. o. howard had his headquarters there. from this point i telegraphed burnside to make every effort to secure five hundred rounds of ammunition for his artillery and small-arms. we stopped for the night at a little hamlet some ten or twelve miles farther on. the next day we reached chattanooga a little before dark. i went directly to general thomas's headquarters, and remaining there a few days, until i could establish my own. during the evening most of the general officers called in to pay their respects and to talk about the condition of affairs. they pointed out on the map the line, marked with a red or blue pencil, which rosecrans had contemplated falling back upon. if any of them had approved the move they did not say so to me. i found general w. f. smith occupying the position of chief engineer of the army of the cumberland. i had known smith as a cadet at west point, but had no recollection of having met him after my graduation, in 1843, up to this time. he explained the situation of the two armies and the topography of the country so plainly that i could see it without an inspection. i found that he had established a saw-mill on the banks of the river, by utilizing an old engine found in the neighborhood; and, by rafting logs from the north side of the river above, had got out the lumber and completed pontoons and roadway plank for a second bridge, one flying bridge being there already. he was also rapidly getting out the materials and constructing the boats for a third bridge. in addition to this he had far under way a steamer for plying between chattanooga and bridgeport whenever we might get possession of the river. this boat consisted of a scow, made of the plank sawed out at the mill, housed in, and a stern wheel attached which was propelled by a second engine taken from some shop or factory. i telegraphed to washington this night, notifying general halleck of my arrival, and asking to have general sherman assigned to the command of the army of the tennessee, headquarters in the field. the request was at once complied with. chapter xli. assuming the command at chattanooga--opening a line of supplies--battle of wauhatchie--on the picket line. the next day, the 24th, i started out to make a personal inspection, taking thomas and smith with me, besides most of the members of my personal staff. we crossed to the north side of the river, and, moving to the north of detached spurs of hills, reached the tennessee at brown's ferry, some three miles below lookout mountain, unobserved by the enemy. here we left our horses back from the river and approached the water on foot. there was a picket station of the enemy on the opposite side, of about twenty men, in full view, and we were within easy range. they did not fire upon us nor seem to be disturbed by our presence. they must have seen that we were all commissioned officers. but, i suppose, they looked upon the garrison of chattanooga as prisoners of war, feeding or starving themselves, and thought it would be inhuman to kill any of them except in self-defence. that night i issued orders for opening the route to bridgeport--a cracker line, as the soldiers appropriately termed it. they had been so long on short rations that my first thought was the establishment of a line over which food might reach them. chattanooga is on the south bank of the tennessee, where that river runs nearly due west. it is at the northern end of a valley five or six miles in width, through which chattanooga creek runs. to the east of the valley is missionary ridge, rising from five to eight hundred feet above the creek and terminating somewhat abruptly a half mile or more before reaching the tennessee. on the west of the valley is lookout mountain, twenty-two hundred feet above-tide water. just below the town the tennessee makes a turn to the south and runs to the base of lookout mountain, leaving no level ground between the mountain and river. the memphis and charleston railroad passes this point, where the mountain stands nearly perpendicular. east of missionary ridge flows the south chickamauga river; west of lookout mountain is lookout creek; and west of that, raccoon mountains. lookout mountain, at its northern end, rises almost perpendicularly for some distance, then breaks off in a gentle slope of cultivated fields to near the summit, where it ends in a palisade thirty or more feet in height. on the gently sloping ground, between the upper and lower palisades, there is a single farmhouse, which is reached by a wagon-road from the valley east. the intrenched line of the enemy commenced on the north end of missionary ridge and extended along the crest for some distance south, thence across chattanooga valley to lookout mountain. lookout mountain was also fortified and held by the enemy, who also kept troops in lookout valley west, and on raccoon mountain, with pickets extending down the river so as to command the road on the north bank and render it useless to us. in addition to this there was an intrenched line in chattanooga valley extending from the river east of the town to lookout mountain, to make the investment complete. besides the fortifications on mission ridge, there was a line at the base of the hill, with occasional spurs of rifle-pits half-way up the front. the enemy's pickets extended out into the valley towards the town, so far that the pickets of the two armies could converse. at one point they were separated only by the narrow creek which gives its name to the valley and town, and from which both sides drew water. the union lines were shorter than those of the enemy. thus the enemy, with a vastly superior force, was strongly fortified to the east, south, and west, and commanded the river below. practically, the army of the cumberland was besieged. the enemy had stopped with his cavalry north of the river the passing of a train loaded with ammunition and medical supplies. the union army was short of both, not having ammunition enough for a day's fighting. general halleck had, long before my coming into this new field, ordered parts of the 11th and 12th corps, commanded respectively by generals howard and slocum, hooker in command of the whole, from the army of the potomac to reinforce rosecrans. it would have been folly to send them to chattanooga to help eat up the few rations left there. they were consequently left on the railroad, where supplies could be brought to them. before my arrival, thomas ordered their concentration at bridgeport. general w. f. smith had been so instrumental in preparing for the move which i was now about to make, and so clear in his judgment about the manner of making it, that i deemed it but just to him that he should have command of the troops detailed to execute the design, although he was then acting as a staff officer and was not in command of troops. on the 24th of october, after my return to chattanooga, the following details were made: general hooker, who was now at bridgeport, was ordered to cross to the south side of the tennessee and march up by whitesides and wauhatchie to brown's ferry. general palmer, with a division of the 14th corps, army of the cumberland, was ordered to move down the river on the north side, by a back road, until opposite whitesides, then cross and hold the road in hooker's rear after he had passed. four thousand men were at the same time detailed to act under general smith directly from chattanooga. eighteen hundred of them, under general hazen, were to take sixty pontoon boats, and under cover of night float by the pickets of the enemy at the north base of lookout, down to brown's ferry, then land on the south side and capture or drive away the pickets at that point. smith was to march with the remainder of the detail, also under cover of night, by the north bank of the river to brown's ferry, taking with him all the material for laying the bridge as soon as the crossing was secured. on the 26th, hooker crossed the river at bridgeport and commenced his eastward march. at three o'clock on the morning of the 27th, hazen moved into the stream with his sixty pontoons and eighteen hundred brave and well-equipped men. smith started enough in advance to be near the river when hazen should arrive. there are a number of detached spurs of hills north of the river at chattanooga, back of which is a good road parallel to the stream, sheltered from the view from the top of lookout. it was over this road smith marched. at five o'clock hazen landed at brown's ferry, surprised the picket guard, and captured most of it. by seven o'clock the whole of smith's force was ferried over and in possession of a height commanding the ferry. this was speedily fortified, while a detail was laying the pontoon bridge. by ten o'clock the bridge was laid, and our extreme right, now in lookout valley, was fortified and connected with the rest of the army. the two bridges over the tennessee river--a flying one at chattanooga and the new one at brown's ferry--with the road north of the river, covered from both the fire and the view of the enemy, made the connection complete. hooker found but slight obstacles in his way, and on the afternoon of the 28th emerged into lookout valley at wauhatchie. howard marched on to brown's ferry, while geary, who commanded a division in the 12th corps, stopped three miles south. the pickets of the enemy on the river below were now cut off, and soon came in and surrendered. the river was now opened to us from lookout valley to bridgeport. between brown's ferry and kelly's ferry the tennessee runs through a narrow gorge in the mountains, which contracts the stream so much as to increase the current beyond the capacity of an ordinary steamer to stem it. to get up these rapids, steamers must be cordelled; that is, pulled up by ropes from the shore. but there is no difficulty in navigating the stream from bridgeport to kelly's ferry. the latter point is only eight miles from chattanooga and connected with it by a good wagon-road, which runs through a low pass in the raccoon mountains on the south side of the river to brown's ferry, thence on the north side to the river opposite chattanooga. there were several steamers at bridgeport, and abundance of forage, clothing and provisions. on the way to chattanooga i had telegraphed back to nashville for a good supply of vegetables and small rations, which the troops had been so long deprived of. hooker had brought with him from the east a full supply of land transportation. his animals had not been subjected to hard work on bad roads without forage, but were in good condition. in five days from my arrival in chattanooga the way was open to bridgeport and, with the aid of steamers and hooker's teams, in a week the troops were receiving full rations. it is hard for any one not an eye-witness to realize the relief this brought. the men were soon reclothed and also well fed, an abundance of ammunition was brought up, and a cheerfulness prevailed not before enjoyed in many weeks. neither officers nor men looked upon themselves any longer as doomed. the weak and languid appearance of the troops, so visible before, disappeared at once. i do not know what the effect was on the other side, but assume it must have been correspondingly depressing. mr. davis had visited bragg but a short time before, and must have perceived our condition to be about as bragg described it in his subsequent report. "these dispositions," he said, "faithfully sustained, insured the enemy's speedy evacuation of chattanooga for want of food and forage. possessed of the shortest route to his depot, and the one by which reinforcements must reach him, we held him at our mercy, and his destruction was only a question of time." but the dispositions were not "faithfully sustained," and i doubt not but thousands of men engaged in trying to "sustain" them now rejoice that they were not. there was no time during the rebellion when i did not think, and often say, that the south was more to be benefited by its defeat than the north. the latter had the people, the institutions, and the territory to make a great and prosperous nation. the former was burdened with an institution abhorrent to all civilized people not brought up under it, and one which degraded labor, kept it in ignorance, and enervated the governing class. with the outside world at war with this institution, they could not have extended their territory. the labor of the country was not skilled, nor allowed to become so. the whites could not toil without becoming degraded, and those who did were denominated "poor white trash." the system of labor would have soon exhausted the soil and left the people poor. the non-slaveholders would have left the country, and the small slaveholder must have sold out to his more fortunate neighbor. soon the slaves would have outnumbered the masters, and, not being in sympathy with them, would have risen in their might and exterminated them. the war was expensive to the south as well as to the north, both in blood and treasure, but it was worth all it cost. the enemy was surprised by the movements which secured to us a line of supplies. he appreciated its importance, and hastened to try to recover the line from us. his strength on lookout mountain was not equal to hooker's command in the valley below. from missionary ridge he had to march twice the distance we had from chattanooga, in order to reach lookout valley; but on the night of the 28th and 29th an attack was made on geary at wauhatchie by longstreet's corps. when the battle commenced, hooker ordered howard up from brown's ferry. he had three miles to march to reach geary. on his way he was fired upon by rebel troops from a foot-hill to the left of the road and from which the road was commanded. howard turned to the left, charged up the hill and captured it before the enemy had time to intrench, taking many prisoners. leaving sufficient men to hold this height, he pushed on to reinforce geary. before he got up, geary had been engaged for about three hours against a vastly superior force. the night was so dark that the men could not distinguish one from another except by the light of the flashes of their muskets. in the darkness and uproar hooker's teamsters became frightened and deserted their teams. the mules also became frightened, and breaking loose from their fastenings stampeded directly towards the enemy. the latter, no doubt, took this for a charge, and stampeded in turn. by four o'clock in the morning the battle had entirely ceased, and our "cracker line" was never afterward disturbed. in securing possession of lookout valley, smith lost one man killed and four or five wounded. the enemy lost most of his pickets at the ferry, captured. in the night engagement of the 28th-9th hooker lost 416 killed and wounded. i never knew the loss of the enemy, but our troops buried over one hundred and fifty of his dead and captured more than a hundred. after we had secured the opening of a line over which to bring our supplies to the army, i made a personal inspection to see the situation of the pickets of the two armies. as i have stated, chattanooga creek comes down the centre of the valley to within a mile or such a matter of the town of chattanooga, then bears off westerly, then north-westerly, and enters the tennessee river at the foot of lookout mountain. this creek, from its mouth up to where it bears off west, lay between the two lines of pickets, and the guards of both armies drew their water from the same stream. as i would be under short-range fire and in an open country, i took nobody with me, except, i believe, a bugler, who stayed some distance to the rear. i rode from our right around to our left. when i came to the camp of the picket guard of our side, i heard the call, "turn out the guard for the commanding general." i replied, "never mind the guard," and they were dismissed and went back to their tents. just back of these, and about equally distant from the creek, were the guards of the confederate pickets. the sentinel on their post called out in like manner, "turn out the guard for the commanding general," and, i believe, added, "general grant." their line in a moment front-faced to the north, facing me, and gave a salute, which i returned. the most friendly relations seemed to exist between the pickets of the two armies. at one place there was a tree which had fallen across the stream, and which was used by the soldiers of both armies in drawing water for their camps. general longstreet's corps was stationed there at the time, and wore blue of a little different shade from our uniform. seeing a soldier in blue on this log, i rode up to him, commenced conversing with him, and asked whose corps he belonged to. he was very polite, and, touching his hat to me, said he belonged to general longstreet's corps. i asked him a few questions--but not with a view of gaining any particular information--all of which he answered, and i rode off. chapter xlii. condition of the army--rebuilding the railroad--general burnside's situation--orders for battle--plans for the attack--hooker's position --sherman's movements. having got the army of the cumberland in a comfortable position, i now began to look after the remainder of my new command. burnside was in about as desperate a condition as the army of the cumberland had been, only he was not yet besieged. he was a hundred miles from the nearest possible base, big south fork of the cumberland river, and much farther from any railroad we had possession of. the roads back were over mountains, and all supplies along the line had long since been exhausted. his animals, too, had been starved, and their carcasses lined the road from cumberland gap, and far back towards lexington, ky. east tennessee still furnished supplies of beef, bread and forage, but it did not supply ammunition, clothing, medical supplies, or small rations, such as coffee, sugar, salt and rice. sherman had started from memphis for corinth on the 11th of october. his instructions required him to repair the road in his rear in order to bring up supplies. the distance was about three hundred and thirty miles through a hostile country. his entire command could not have maintained the road if it had been completed. the bridges had all been destroyed by the enemy, and much other damage done. a hostile community lived along the road; guerilla bands infested the country, and more or less of the cavalry of the enemy was still in the west. often sherman's work was destroyed as soon as completed, and he only a short distance away. the memphis and charleston railroad strikes the tennessee river at eastport, mississippi. knowing the difficulty sherman would have to supply himself from memphis, i had previously ordered supplies sent from st. louis on small steamers, to be convoyed by the navy, to meet him at eastport. these he got. i now ordered him to discontinue his work of repairing roads and to move on with his whole force to stevenson, alabama, without delay. this order was borne to sherman by a messenger, who paddled down the tennessee in a canoe and floated over muscle shoals; it was delivered at iuka on the 27th. in this sherman was notified that the rebels were moving a force towards cleveland, east tennessee, and might be going to nashville, in which event his troops were in the best position to beat them there. sherman, with his characteristic promptness, abandoned the work he was engaged upon and pushed on at once. on the 1st of november he crossed the tennessee at eastport, and that day was in florence, alabama, with the head of column, while his troops were still crossing at eastport, with blair bringing up the rear. sherman's force made an additional army, with cavalry, artillery, and trains, all to be supplied by the single track road from nashville. all indications pointed also to the probable necessity of supplying burnside's command in east tennessee, twenty-five thousand more, by the same route. a single track could not do this. i gave, therefore, an order to sherman to halt general g. m. dodge's command, of about eight thousand men, at athens, and subsequently directed the latter to arrange his troops along the railroad from decatur north towards nashville, and to rebuild that road. the road from nashville to decatur passes over a broken country, cut up with innumerable streams, many of them of considerable width, and with valleys far below the road-bed. all the bridges over these had been destroyed, and the rails taken up and twisted by the enemy. all the cars and locomotives not carried off had been destroyed as effectually as they knew how to destroy them. all bridges and culverts had been destroyed between nashville and decatur, and thence to stevenson, where the memphis and charleston and the nashville and chattanooga roads unite. the rebuilding of this road would give us two roads as far as stevenson over which to supply the army. from bridgeport, a short distance farther east, the river supplements the road. general dodge, besides being a most capable soldier, was an experienced railroad builder. he had no tools to work with except those of the pioneers--axes, picks, and spades. with these he was able to intrench his men and protect them against surprises by small parties of the enemy. as he had no base of supplies until the road could be completed back to nashville, the first matter to consider after protecting his men was the getting in of food and forage from the surrounding country. he had his men and teams bring in all the grain they could find, or all they needed, and all the cattle for beef, and such other food as could be found. millers were detailed from the ranks to run the mills along the line of the army. when these were not near enough to the troops for protection they were taken down and moved up to the line of the road. blacksmith shops, with all the iron and steel found in them, were moved up in like manner. blacksmiths were detailed and set to work making the tools necessary in railroad and bridge building. axemen were put to work getting out timber for bridges and cutting fuel for locomotives when the road should be completed. car-builders were set to work repairing the locomotives and cars. thus every branch of railroad building, making tools to work with, and supplying the workmen with food, was all going on at once, and without the aid of a mechanic or laborer except what the command itself furnished. but rails and cars the men could not make without material, and there was not enough rolling stock to keep the road we already had worked to its full capacity. there were no rails except those in use. to supply these deficiencies i ordered eight of the ten engines general mcpherson had at vicksburg to be sent to nashville, and all the cars he had except ten. i also ordered the troops in west tennessee to points on the river and on the memphis and charleston road, and ordered the cars, locomotives and rails from all the railroads except the memphis and charleston to nashville. the military manager of railroads also was directed to furnish more rolling stock and, as far as he could, bridge material. general dodge had the work assigned him finished within forty days after receiving his orders. the number of bridges to rebuild was one hundred and eighty-two, many of them over deep and wide chasms; the length of road repaired was one hundred and two miles. the enemy's troops, which it was thought were either moving against burnside or were going to nashville, went no farther than cleveland. their presence there, however, alarmed the authorities at washington, and, on account of our helpless condition at chattanooga, caused me much uneasiness. dispatches were constantly coming, urging me to do something for burnside's relief; calling attention to the importance of holding east tennessee; saying the president was much concerned for the protection of the loyal people in that section, etc. we had not at chattanooga animals to pull a single piece of artillery, much less a supply train. reinforcements could not help burnside, because he had neither supplies nor ammunition sufficient for them; hardly, indeed, bread and meat for the men he had. there was no relief possible for him except by expelling the enemy from missionary ridge and about chattanooga. on the 4th of november longstreet left our front with about fifteen thousand troops, besides wheeler's cavalry, five thousand more, to go against burnside. the situation seemed desperate, and was more aggravating because nothing could be done until sherman should get up. the authorities at washington were now more than ever anxious for the safety of burnside's army, and plied me with dispatches faster than ever, urging that something should be done for his relief. on the 7th, before longstreet could possibly have reached knoxville, i ordered thomas peremptorily to attack the enemy's right, so as to force the return of the troops that had gone up the valley. i directed him to take mules, officers' horses, or animals wherever he could get them to move the necessary artillery. but he persisted in the declaration that he could not move a single piece of artillery, and could not see how he could possibly comply with the order. nothing was left to be done but to answer washington dispatches as best i could; urge sherman forward, although he was making every effort to get forward, and encourage burnside to hold on, assuring him that in a short time he should be relieved. all of burnside's dispatches showed the greatest confidence in his ability to hold his position as long as his ammunition held out. he even suggested the propriety of abandoning the territory he held south and west of knoxville, so as to draw the enemy farther from his base and make it more difficult for him to get back to chattanooga when the battle should begin. longstreet had a railroad as far as loudon; but from there to knoxville he had to rely on wagon trains. burnside's suggestion, therefore, was a good one, and it was adopted. on the 14th i telegraphed him: "sherman's advance has reached bridgeport. his whole force will be ready to move from there by tuesday at farthest. if you can hold longstreet in check until he gets up, or by skirmishing and falling back can avoid serious loss to yourself and gain time, i will be able to force the enemy back from here and place a force between longstreet and bragg that must inevitably make the former take to the mountain-passes by every available road, to get to his supplies. sherman would have been here before this but for high water in elk river driving him some thirty miles up that river to cross." and again later in the day, indicating my plans for his relief, as follows: "your dispatch and dana's just received. being there, you can tell better how to resist longstreet's attack than i can direct. with your showing you had better give up kingston at the last moment and save the most productive part of your possessions. every arrangement is now made to throw sherman's force across the river, just at and below the mouth of chickamauga creek, as soon as it arrives. thomas will attack on his left at the same time, and together it is expected to carry missionary ridge, and from there push a force on to the railroad between cleveland and dalton. hooker will at the same time attack, and, if he can, carry lookout mountain. the enemy now seems to be looking for an attack on his left flank. this favors us. to further confirm this, sherman's advance division will march direct from whiteside to trenton. the remainder of his force will pass over a new road just made from whiteside to kelly's ferry, thus being concealed from the enemy, and leave him to suppose the whole force is going up lookout valley. sherman's advance has only just reached bridgeport. the rear will only reach there on the 16th. this will bring it to the 19th as the earliest day for making the combined movement as desired. inform me if you think you can sustain yourself until this time. i can hardly conceive of the enemy breaking through at kingston and pushing for kentucky. if they should, however, a new problem would be left for solution. thomas has ordered a division of cavalry to the vicinity of sparta. i will ascertain if they have started, and inform you. it will be entirely out of the question to send you ten thousand men, not because they cannot be spared, but how would they be fed after they got even one day east from here?" longstreet, for some reason or other, stopped at loudon until the 13th. that being the terminus of his railroad communications, it is probable he was directed to remain there awaiting orders. he was in a position threatening knoxville, and at the same time where he could be brought back speedily to chattanooga. the day after longstreet left loudon, sherman reached bridgeport in person and proceeded on to see me that evening, the 14th, and reached chattanooga the next day. my orders for battle were all prepared in advance of sherman's arrival (*15), except the dates, which could not be fixed while troops to be engaged were so far away. the possession of lookout mountain was of no special advantage to us now. hooker was instructed to send howard's corps to the north side of the tennessee, thence up behind the hills on the north side, and to go into camp opposite chattanooga; with the remainder of the command, hooker was, at a time to be afterwards appointed, to ascend the western slope between the upper and lower palisades, and so get into chattanooga valley. the plan of battle was for sherman to attack the enemy's right flank, form a line across it, extend our left over south chickamauga river so as to threaten or hold the railroad in bragg's rear, and thus force him either to weaken his lines elsewhere or lose his connection with his base at chickamauga station. hooker was to perform like service on our right. his problem was to get from lookout valley to chattanooga valley in the most expeditious way possible; cross the latter valley rapidly to rossville, south of bragg's line on missionary ridge, form line there across the ridge facing north, with his right flank extended to chickamauga valley east of the ridge, thus threatening the enemy's rear on that flank and compelling him to reinforce this also. thomas, with the army of the cumberland, occupied the centre, and was to assault while the enemy was engaged with most of his forces on his two flanks. to carry out this plan, sherman was to cross the tennessee at brown's ferry and move east of chattanooga to a point opposite the north end of mission ridge, and to place his command back of the foot-hills out of sight of the enemy on the ridge. there are two streams called chickamauga emptying into the tennessee river east of chattanooga--north chickamauga, taking its rise in tennessee, flowing south, and emptying into the river some seven or eight miles east; while the south chickamauga, which takes its rise in georgia, flows northward, and empties into the tennessee some three or four miles above the town. there were now one hundred and sixteen pontoons in the north chickamauga river, their presence there being unknown to the enemy. at night a division was to be marched up to that point, and at two o'clock in the morning moved down with the current, thirty men in each boat. a few were to land east of the mouth of the south chickamauga, capture the pickets there, and then lay a bridge connecting the two banks of the river. the rest were to land on the south side of the tennessee, where missionary ridge would strike it if prolonged, and a sufficient number of men to man the boats were to push to the north side to ferry over the main body of sherman's command while those left on the south side intrenched themselves. thomas was to move out from his lines facing the ridge, leaving enough of palmer's corps to guard against an attack down the valley. lookout valley being of no present value to us, and being untenable by the enemy if we should secure missionary ridge, hooker's orders were changed. his revised orders brought him to chattanooga by the established route north of the tennessee. he was then to move out to the right to rossville. hooker's position in lookout valley was absolutely essential to us so long as chattanooga was besieged. it was the key to our line for supplying the army. but it was not essential after the enemy was dispersed from our front, or even after the battle for this purpose was begun. hooker's orders, therefore, were designed to get his force past lookout mountain and chattanooga valley, and up to missionary ridge. by crossing the north face of lookout the troops would come into chattanooga valley in rear of the line held by the enemy across the valley, and would necessarily force its evacuation. orders were accordingly given to march by this route. but days before the battle began the advantages as well as the disadvantages of this plan of action were all considered. the passage over the mountain was a difficult one to make in the face of an enemy. it might consume so much time as to lose us the use of the troops engaged in it at other points where they were more wanted. after reaching chattanooga valley, the creek of the same name, quite a formidable stream to get an army over, had to be crossed. i was perfectly willing that the enemy should keep lookout mountain until we got through with the troops on missionary ridge. by marching hooker to the north side of the river, thence up the stream, and recrossing at the town, he could be got in position at any named time; when in this new position, he would have chattanooga creek behind him, and the attack on missionary ridge would unquestionably cause the evacuation by the enemy of his line across the valley and on lookout mountain. hooker's order was changed accordingly. as explained elsewhere, the original order had to be reverted to, because of a flood in the river rendering the bridge at brown's ferry unsafe for the passage of troops at the exact juncture when it was wanted to bring all the troops together against missionary ridge. the next day after sherman's arrival i took him, with generals thomas and smith and other officers, to the north side of the river, and showed them the ground over which sherman had to march, and pointed out generally what he was expected to do. i, as well as the authorities in washington, was still in a great state of anxiety for burnside's safety. burnside himself, i believe, was the only one who did not share in this anxiety. nothing could be done for him, however, until sherman's troops were up. as soon, therefore, as the inspection was over, sherman started for bridgeport to hasten matters, rowing a boat himself, i believe, from kelly's ferry. sherman had left bridgeport the night of the 14th, reached chattanooga the evening of the 15th, made the above-described inspection on the morning of the 16th, and started back the same evening to hurry up his command, fully appreciating the importance of time. his march was conducted with as much expedition as the roads and season would admit of. by the 20th he was himself at brown's ferry with the head of column, but many of his troops were far behind, and one division (ewing's) was at trenton, sent that way to create the impression that lookout was to be taken from the south. sherman received his orders at the ferry, and was asked if he could not be ready for the assault the following morning. news had been received that the battle had been commenced at knoxville. burnside had been cut off from telegraphic communications. the president, the secretary of war, and general halleck, were in an agony of suspense. my suspense was also great, but more endurable, because i was where i could soon do something to relieve the situation. it was impossible to get sherman's troops up for the next day. i then asked him if they could not be got up to make the assault on the morning of the 22d, and ordered thomas to move on that date. but the elements were against us. it rained all the 20th and 21st. the river rose so rapidly that it was difficult to keep the pontoons in place. general orlando b. willcox, a division commander under burnside, was at this time occupying a position farther up the valley than knoxville --about maynardville--and was still in telegraphic communication with the north. a dispatch was received from him saying that he was threatened from the east. the following was sent in reply: "if you can communicate with general burnside, say to him that our attack on bragg will commence in the morning. if successful, such a move will be made as i think will relieve east tennessee, if he can hold out. longstreet passing through our lines to kentucky need not cause alarm. he would find the country so bare that he would lose his transportation and artillery before reaching kentucky, and would meet such a force before he got through, that he could not return." meantime, sherman continued his crossing without intermission as fast as his troops could be got up. the crossing had to be effected in full view of the enemy on the top of lookout mountain. once over, however, the troops soon disappeared behind the detached hill on the north side, and would not come to view again, either to watchmen on lookout mountain or missionary ridge, until they emerged between the hills to strike the bank of the river. but when sherman's advance reached a point opposite the town of chattanooga, howard, who, it will be remembered, had been concealed behind the hills on the north side, took up his line of march to join the troops on the south side. his crossing was in full view both from missionary ridge and the top of lookout, and the enemy of course supposed these troops to be sherman's. this enabled sherman to get to his assigned position without discovery. chapter xliii. preparations for battle--thomas carries the first line of the enemy --sherman carries missionary ridge--battle of lookout mountain --general hooker's fight. on the 20th, when so much was occurring to discourage--rains falling so heavily as to delay the passage of troops over the river at brown's ferry and threatening the entire breaking of the bridge; news coming of a battle raging at knoxville; of willcox being threatened by a force from the east--a letter was received from bragg which contained these words: "as there may still be some non-combatants in chattanooga, i deem it proper to notify you that prudence would dictate their early withdrawal." of course, i understood that this was a device intended to deceive; but i did not know what the intended deception was. on the 22d, however, a deserter came in who informed me that bragg was leaving our front, and on that day buckner's division was sent to reinforce longstreet at knoxville, and another division started to follow but was recalled. the object of bragg's letter, no doubt, was in some way to detain me until knoxville could be captured, and his troops there be returned to chattanooga. during the night of the 21st the rest of the pontoon boats, completed, one hundred and sixteen in all, were carried up to and placed in north chickamauga. the material for the roadway over these was deposited out of view of the enemy within a few hundred yards of the bank of the tennessee, where the north end of the bridge was to rest. hearing nothing from burnside, and hearing much of the distress in washington on his account, i could no longer defer operations for his relief. i determined, therefore, to do on the 23d, with the army of the cumberland, what had been intended to be done on the 24th. the position occupied by the army of the cumberland had been made very strong for defence during the months it had been besieged. the line was about a mile from the town, and extended from citico creek, a small stream running near the base of missionary ridge and emptying into the tennessee about two miles below the mouth of the south chickamauga, on the left, to chattanooga creek on the right. all commanding points on the line were well fortified and well equipped with artillery. the important elevations within the line had all been carefully fortified and supplied with a proper armament. among the elevations so fortified was one to the east of the town, named fort wood. it owed its importance chiefly to the fact that it lay between the town and missionary ridge, where most of the strength of the enemy was. fort wood had in it twenty-two pieces of artillery, most of which would reach the nearer points of the enemy's line. on the morning of the 23d thomas, according to instructions, moved granger's corps of two divisions, sheridan and t. j. wood commanding, to the foot of fort wood, and formed them into line as if going on parade, sheridan on the right, wood to the left, extending to or near citico creek. palmer, commanding the 14th corps, held that part of our line facing south and southwest. he supported sheridan with one division (baird's), while his other division under johnson remained in the trenches, under arms, ready to be moved to any point. howard's corps was moved in rear of the centre. the picket lines were within a few hundred yards of each other. at two o'clock in the afternoon all were ready to advance. by this time the clouds had lifted so that the enemy could see from his elevated position all that was going on. the signal for advance was given by a booming of cannon from fort wood and other points on the line. the rebel pickets were soon driven back upon the main guards, which occupied minor and detached heights between the main ridge and our lines. these too were carried before halting, and before the enemy had time to reinforce their advance guards. but it was not without loss on both sides. this movement secured to us a line fully a mile in advance of the one we occupied in the morning, and the one which the enemy had occupied up to this time. the fortifications were rapidly turned to face the other way. during the following night they were made strong. we lost in this preliminary action about eleven hundred killed and wounded, while the enemy probably lost quite as heavily, including the prisoners that were captured. with the exception of the firing of artillery, kept up from missionary ridge and fort wood until night closed in, this ended the fighting for the first day. the advantage was greatly on our side now, and if i could only have been assured that burnside could hold out ten days longer i should have rested more easily. but we were doing the best we could for him and the cause. by the night of the 23d sherman's command was in a position to move, though one division (osterhaus's) had not yet crossed the river at brown's ferry. the continuous rise in the tennessee had rendered it impossible to keep the bridge at that point in condition for troops to cross; but i was determined to move that night even without this division. orders were sent to osterhaus accordingly to report to hooker, if he could not cross by eight o'clock on the morning of the 24th. because of the break in the bridge, hooker's orders were again changed, but this time only back to those first given to him. general w. f. smith had been assigned to duty as chief engineer of the military division. to him were given the general direction of moving troops by the boats from north chickamauga, laying the bridge after they reached their position, and generally all the duties pertaining to his office of chief engineer. during the night general morgan l. smith's division was marched to the point where the pontoons were, and the brigade of giles a. smith was selected for the delicate duty of manning the boats and surprising the enemy's pickets on the south bank of the river. during this night also general j. m. brannan, chief of artillery, moved forty pieces of artillery, belonging to the army of the cumberland, and placed them on the north side of the river so as to command the ground opposite, to aid in protecting the approach to the point where the south end of the bridge was to rest. he had to use sherman's artillery horses for this purpose, thomas having none. at two o'clock in the morning, november 24th, giles a. smith pushed out from the north chickamauga with his one hundred and sixteen boats, each loaded with thirty brave and well-armed men. the boats with their precious freight dropped down quietly with the current to avoid attracting the attention of any one who could convey information to the enemy, until arriving near the mouth of south chickamauga. here a few boats were landed, the troops debarked, and a rush was made upon the picket guard known to be at that point. the guard were surprised, and twenty of their number captured. the remainder of the troops effected a landing at the point where the bridge was to start, with equally good results. the work of ferrying over sherman's command from the north side of the tennessee was at once commenced, using the pontoons for the purpose. a steamer was also brought up from the town to assist. the rest of m. l. smith's division came first, then the division of john e. smith. the troops as they landed were put to work intrenching their position. by daylight the two entire divisions were over, and well covered by the works they had built. the work of laying the bridge, on which to cross the artillery and cavalry, was now begun. the ferrying over the infantry was continued with the steamer and the pontoons, taking the pontoons, however, as fast as they were wanted to put in their place in the bridge. by a little past noon the bridge was completed, as well as one over the south chickamauga connecting the troops left on that side with their comrades below, and all the infantry and artillery were on the south bank of the tennessee. sherman at once formed his troops for assault on missionary ridge. by one o'clock he started with m. l. smith on his left, keeping nearly the course of chickamauga river; j. e. smith next to the right and a little to the rear; and ewing still farther to the right and also a little to the rear of j. e. smith's command, in column, ready to deploy to the right if an enemy should come from that direction. a good skirmish line preceded each of these columns. soon the foot of the hill was reached; the skirmishers pushed directly up, followed closely by their supports. by half-past three sherman was in possession of the height without having sustained much loss. a brigade from each division was now brought up, and artillery was dragged to the top of the hill by hand. the enemy did not seem to be aware of this movement until the top of the hill was gained. there had been a drizzling rain during the day, and the clouds were so low that lookout mountain and the top of missionary ridge were obscured from the view of persons in the valley. but now the enemy opened fire upon their assailants, and made several attempts with their skirmishers to drive them away, but without avail. later in the day a more determined attack was made, but this, too, failed, and sherman was left to fortify what he had gained. sherman's cavalry took up its line of march soon after the bridge was completed, and by half-past three the whole of it was over both bridges and on its way to strike the enemy's communications at chickamauga station. all of sherman's command was now south of the tennessee. during the afternoon general giles a. smith was severely wounded and carried from the field. thomas having done on the 23d what was expected of him on the 24th, there was nothing for him to do this day except to strengthen his position. howard, however, effected a crossing of citico creek and a junction with sherman, and was directed to report to him. with two or three regiments of his command he moved in the morning along the banks of the tennessee, and reached the point where the bridge was being laid. he went out on the bridge as far as it was completed from the south end, and saw sherman superintending the work from the north side and moving himself south as fast as an additional boat was put in and the roadway put upon it. howard reported to his new chief across the chasm between them, which was now narrow and in a few minutes closed. while these operations were going on to the east of chattanooga, hooker was engaged on the west. he had three divisions: osterhaus's, of the 15th corps, army of the tennessee; geary's, 12th corps, army of the potomac; and cruft's, 14th corps, army of the cumberland. geary was on the right at wauhatchie, cruft at the centre, and osterhaus near brown's ferry. these troops were all west of lookout creek. the enemy had the east bank of the creek strongly picketed and intrenched, and three brigades of troops in the rear to reinforce them if attacked. these brigades occupied the summit of the mountain. general carter l. stevenson was in command of the whole. why any troops, except artillery with a small infantry guard, were kept on the mountain-top, i do not see. a hundred men could have held the summit--which is a palisade for more than thirty feet down--against the assault of any number of men from the position hooker occupied. the side of lookout mountain confronting hooker's command was rugged, heavily timbered, and full of chasms, making it difficult to advance with troops, even in the absence of an opposing force. farther up, the ground becomes more even and level, and was in cultivation. on the east side the slope is much more gradual, and a good wagon road, zigzagging up it, connects the town of chattanooga with the summit. early on the morning of the 24th hooker moved geary's division, supported by a brigade of cruft's, up lookout creek, to effect a crossing. the remainder of cruft's division was to seize the bridge over the creek, near the crossing of the railroad. osterhaus was to move up to the bridge and cross it. the bridge was seized by gross's brigade after a slight skirmish with the pickets guarding it. this attracted the enemy so that geary's movement farther up was not observed. a heavy mist obscured him from the view of the troops on the top of the mountain. he crossed the creek almost unobserved, and captured the picket of over forty men on guard near by. he then commenced ascending the mountain directly in his front. by this time the enemy was seen coming down from their camps on the mountain slope, and filing into their rifle-pits to contest the crossing of the bridge. by eleven o'clock the bridge was complete. osterhaus was up, and after some sharp skirmishing the enemy was driven away with considerable loss in killed and captured. while the operations at the bridge were progressing, geary was pushing up the hill over great obstacles, resisted by the enemy directly in his front, and in face of the guns on top of the mountain. the enemy, seeing their left flank and rear menaced, gave way, and were followed by cruft and osterhaus. soon these were up abreast of geary, and the whole command pushed up the hill, driving the enemy in advance. by noon geary had gained the open ground on the north slope of the mountain, with his right close up to the base of the upper palisade, but there were strong fortifications in his front. the rest of the command coming up, a line was formed from the base of the upper palisade to the mouth of chattanooga creek. thomas and i were on the top of orchard knob. hooker's advance now made our line a continuous one. it was in full view, extending from the tennessee river, where sherman had crossed, up chickamauga river to the base of mission ridge, over the top of the north end of the ridge to chattanooga valley, then along parallel to the ridge a mile or more, across the valley to the mouth of chattanooga creek, thence up the slope of lookout mountain to the foot of the upper palisade. the day was hazy, so that hooker's operations were not visible to us except at moments when the clouds would rise. but the sound of his artillery and musketry was heard incessantly. the enemy on his front was partially fortified, but was soon driven out of his works. during the afternoon the clouds, which had so obscured the top of lookout all day as to hide whatever was going on from the view of those below, settled down and made it so dark where hooker was as to stop operations for the time. at four o'clock hooker reported his position as impregnable. by a little after five direct communication was established, and a brigade of troops was sent from chattanooga to reinforce him. these troops had to cross chattanooga creek and met with some opposition, but soon overcame it, and by night the commander, general carlin, reported to hooker and was assigned to his left. i now telegraphed to washington: "the fight to-day progressed favorably. sherman carried the end of missionary ridge, and his right is now at the tunnel, and his left at chickamauga creek. troops from lookout valley carried the point of the mountain, and now hold the eastern slope and a point high up. hooker reports two thousand prisoners taken, besides which a small number have fallen into our hands from missionary ridge." the next day the president replied: "your dispatches as to fighting on monday and tuesday are here. well done. many thanks to all. remember burnside." and halleck also telegraphed: "i congratulate you on the success thus far of your plans. i fear that burnside is hard pushed, and that any further delay may prove fatal. i know you will do all in your power to relieve him." the division of jefferson c. davis, army of the cumberland, had been sent to the north chickamauga to guard the pontoons as they were deposited in the river, and to prevent all ingress or egress of citizens. on the night of the 24th his division, having crossed with sherman, occupied our extreme left from the upper bridge over the plain to the north base of missionary ridge. firing continued to a late hour in the night, but it was not connected with an assault at any point. chapter xliv. battle of chattanooga--a gallant charge--complete rout of the enemy --pursuit of the confederates--general bragg--remarks on chattanooga. at twelve o'clock at night, when all was quiet, i began to give orders for the next day, and sent a dispatch to willcox to encourage burnside. sherman was directed to attack at daylight. hooker was ordered to move at the same hour, and endeavor to intercept the enemy's retreat if he still remained; if he had gone, then to move directly to rossville and operate against the left and rear of the force on missionary ridge. thomas was not to move until hooker had reached missionary ridge. as i was with him on orchard knob, he would not move without further orders from me. the morning of the 25th opened clear and bright, and the whole field was in full view from the top of orchard knob. it remained so all day. bragg's headquarters were in full view, and officers--presumably staff officers--could be seen coming and going constantly. the point of ground which sherman had carried on the 24th was almost disconnected from the main ridge occupied by the enemy. a low pass, over which there is a wagon road crossing the hill, and near which there is a railroad tunnel, intervenes between the two hills. the problem now was to get to the main ridge. the enemy was fortified on the point; and back farther, where the ground was still higher, was a second fortification commanding the first. sherman was out as soon as it was light enough to see, and by sunrise his command was in motion. three brigades held the hill already gained. morgan l. smith moved along the east base of missionary ridge; loomis along the west base, supported by two brigades of john e. smith's division; and corse with his brigade was between the two, moving directly towards the hill to be captured. the ridge is steep and heavily wooded on the east side, where m. l. smith's troops were advancing, but cleared and with a more gentle slope on the west side. the troops advanced rapidly and carried the extreme end of the rebel works. morgan l. smith advanced to a point which cut the enemy off from the railroad bridge and the means of bringing up supplies by rail from chickamauga station, where the main depot was located. the enemy made brave and strenuous efforts to drive our troops from the position we had gained, but without success. the contest lasted for two hours. corse, a brave and efficient commander, was badly wounded in this assault. sherman now threatened both bragg's flank and his stores, and made it necessary for him to weaken other points of his line to strengthen his right. from the position i occupied i could see column after column of bragg's forces moving against sherman. every confederate gun that could be brought to bear upon the union forces was concentrated upon him. j. e. smith, with two brigades, charged up the west side of the ridge to the support of corse's command, over open ground and in the face of a heavy fire of both artillery and musketry, and reached the very parapet of the enemy. he lay here for a time, but the enemy coming with a heavy force upon his right flank, he was compelled to fall back, followed by the foe. a few hundred yards brought smith's troops into a wood, where they were speedily reformed, when they charged and drove the attacking party back to his intrenchments. seeing the advance, repulse, and second advance of j. e. smith from the position i occupied, i directed thomas to send a division to reinforce him. baird's division was accordingly sent from the right of orchard knob. it had to march a considerable distance directly under the eye of the enemy to reach its position. bragg at once commenced massing in the same direction. this was what i wanted. but it had now got to be late in the afternoon, and i had expected before this to see hooker crossing the ridge in the neighborhood of rossville and compelling bragg to mass in that direction also. the enemy had evacuated lookout mountain during the night, as i expected he would. in crossing the valley he burned the bridge over chattanooga creek, and did all he could to obstruct the roads behind him. hooker was off bright and early, with no obstructions in his front but distance and the destruction above named. he was detained four hours crossing chattanooga creek, and thus was lost the immediate advantage i expected from his forces. his reaching bragg's flank and extending across it was to be the signal for thomas's assault of the ridge. but sherman's condition was getting so critical that the assault for his relief could not be delayed any longer. sheridan's and wood's divisions had been lying under arms from early morning, ready to move the instant the signal was given. i now directed thomas to order the charge at once (*16). i watched eagerly to see the effect, and became impatient at last that there was no indication of any charge being made. the centre of the line which was to make the charge was near where thomas and i stood, but concealed from view by an intervening forest. turning to thomas to inquire what caused the delay, i was surprised to see thomas j. wood, one of the division commanders who was to make the charge, standing talking to him. i spoke to general wood, asking him why he did not charge as ordered an hour before. he replied very promptly that this was the first he had heard of it, but that he had been ready all day to move at a moment's notice. i told him to make the charge at once. he was off in a moment, and in an incredibly short time loud cheering was heard, and he and sheridan were driving the enemy's advance before them towards missionary ridge. the confederates were strongly intrenched on the crest of the ridge in front of us, and had a second line half-way down and another at the base. our men drove the troops in front of the lower line of rifle-pits so rapidly, and followed them so closely, that rebel and union troops went over the first line of works almost at the same time. many rebels were captured and sent to the rear under the fire of their own friends higher up the hill. those that were not captured retreated, and were pursued. the retreating hordes being between friends and pursuers caused the enemy to fire high to avoid killing their own men. in fact, on that occasion the union soldier nearest the enemy was in the safest position. without awaiting further orders or stopping to reform, on our troops went to the second line of works; over that and on for the crest--thus effectually carrying out my orders of the 18th for the battle and of the 24th (*17) for this charge. i watched their progress with intense interest. the fire along the rebel line was terrific. cannon and musket balls filled the air: but the damage done was in small proportion to the ammunition expended. the pursuit continued until the crest was reached, and soon our men were seen climbing over the confederate barriers at different points in front of both sheridan's and wood's divisions. the retreat of the enemy along most of his line was precipitate and the panic so great that bragg and his officers lost all control over their men. many were captured, and thousands threw away their arms in their flight. sheridan pushed forward until he reached the chickamauga river at a point above where the enemy crossed. he met some resistance from troops occupying a second hill in rear of missionary ridge, probably to cover the retreat of the main body and of the artillery and trains. it was now getting dark, but sheridan, without halting on that account pushed his men forward up this second hill slowly and without attracting the attention of the men placed to defend it, while he detached to the right and left to surround the position. the enemy discovered the movement before these dispositions were complete, and beat a hasty retreat, leaving artillery, wagon trains, and many prisoners in our hands. to sheridan's prompt movement the army of the cumberland, and the nation, are indebted for the bulk of the capture of prisoners, artillery, and small-arms that day. except for his prompt pursuit, so much in this way would not have been accomplished. while the advance up mission ridge was going forward, general thomas with staff, general gordon granger, commander of the corps making the assault, and myself and staff occupied orchard knob, from which the entire field could be observed. the moment the troops were seen going over the last line of rebel defences, i ordered granger to join his command, and mounting my horse i rode to the front. general thomas left about the same time. sheridan on the extreme right was already in pursuit of the enemy east of the ridge. wood, who commanded the division to the left of sheridan, accompanied his men on horseback in the charge, but did not join sheridan in the pursuit. to the left, in baird's front where bragg's troops had massed against sherman, the resistance was more stubborn and the contest lasted longer. i ordered granger to follow the enemy with wood's division, but he was so much excited, and kept up such a roar of musketry in the direction the enemy had taken, that by the time i could stop the firing the enemy had got well out of the way. the enemy confronting sherman, now seeing everything to their left giving way, fled also. sherman, however, was not aware of the extent of our success until after nightfall, when he received orders to pursue at daylight in the morning. as soon as sherman discovered that the enemy had left his front he directed his reserves, davis's division of the army of the cumberland, to push over the pontoon-bridge at the mouth of the chickamauga, and to move forward to chickamauga station. he ordered howard to move up the stream some two miles to where there was an old bridge, repair it during the night, and follow davis at four o'clock in the morning. morgan l. smith was ordered to reconnoitre the tunnel to see if that was still held. nothing was found there but dead bodies of men of both armies. the rest of sherman's command was directed to follow howard at daylight in the morning to get on to the railroad towards graysville. hooker, as stated, was detained at chattanooga creek by the destruction of the bridge at that point. he got his troops over, with the exception of the artillery, by fording the stream at a little after three o'clock. leaving his artillery to follow when the bridge should be reconstructed, he pushed on with the remainder of his command. at rossville he came upon the flank of a division of the enemy, which soon commenced a retreat along the ridge. this threw them on palmer. they could make but little resistance in the position they were caught in, and as many of them as could do so escaped. many, however, were captured. hooker's position during the night of the 25th was near rossville, extending east of the ridge. palmer was on his left, on the road to graysville. during the night i telegraphed to willcox that bragg had been defeated, and that immediate relief would be sent to burnside if he could hold out; to halleck i sent an announcement of our victory, and informed him that forces would be sent up the valley to relieve burnside. before the battle of chattanooga opened i had taken measures for the relief of burnside the moment the way should be clear. thomas was directed to have the little steamer that had been built at chattanooga loaded to its capacity with rations and ammunition. granger's corps was to move by the south bank of the tennessee river to the mouth of the holston, and up that to knoxville accompanied by the boat. in addition to the supplies transported by boat, the men were to carry forty rounds of ammunition in their cartridge-boxes, and four days' rations in haversacks. in the battle of chattanooga, troops from the army of the potomac, from the army of the tennessee, and from the army of the cumberland participated. in fact, the accidents growing out of the heavy rains and the sudden rise in the tennessee river so mingled the troops that the organizations were not kept together, under their respective commanders, during the battle. hooker, on the right, had geary's division of the 12th corps, army of the potomac; osterhaus's division of the 15th corps, army of the tennessee; and cruft's division of the army of the cumberland. sherman had three divisions of his own army, howard's corps from the army of the potomac, and jefferson c. davis's division of the army of the cumberland. there was no jealousy--hardly rivalry. indeed, i doubt whether officers or men took any note at the time of the fact of this intermingling of commands. all saw a defiant foe surrounding them, and took it for granted that every move was intended to dislodge him, and it made no difference where the troops came from so that the end was accomplished. the victory at chattanooga was won against great odds, considering the advantage the enemy had of position, and was accomplished more easily than was expected by reason of bragg's making several grave mistakes: first, in sending away his ablest corps commander with over twenty thousand troops; second, in sending away a division of troops on the eve of battle; third, in placing so much of a force on the plain in front of his impregnable position. it was known that mr. jefferson davis had visited bragg on missionary ridge a short time before my reaching chattanooga. it was reported and believed that he had come out to reconcile a serious difference between bragg and longstreet, and finding this difficult to do, planned the campaign against knoxville, to be conducted by the latter general. i had known both bragg and longstreet before the war, the latter very well. we had been three years at west point together, and, after my graduation, for a time in the same regiment. then we served together in the mexican war. i had known bragg in mexico, and met him occasionally subsequently. i could well understand how there might be an irreconcilable difference between them. bragg was a remarkably intelligent and well-informed man, professionally and otherwise. he was also thoroughly upright. but he was possessed of an irascible temper, and was naturally disputatious. a man of the highest moral character and the most correct habits, yet in the old army he was in frequent trouble. as a subordinate he was always on the lookout to catch his commanding officer infringing his prerogatives; as a post commander he was equally vigilant to detect the slightest neglect, even of the most trivial order. i have heard in the old army an anecdote very characteristic of bragg. on one occasion, when stationed at a post of several companies commanded by a field officer, he was himself commanding one of the companies and at the same time acting as post quartermaster and commissary. he was first lieutenant at the time, but his captain was detached on other duty. as commander of the company he made a requisition upon the quartermaster--himself--for something he wanted. as quartermaster he declined to fill the requisition, and endorsed on the back of it his reasons for so doing. as company commander he responded to this, urging that his requisition called for nothing but what he was entitled to, and that it was the duty of the quartermaster to fill it. as quartermaster he still persisted that he was right. in this condition of affairs bragg referred the whole matter to the commanding officer of the post. the latter, when he saw the nature of the matter referred, exclaimed: "my god, mr. bragg, you have quarrelled with every officer in the army, and now you are quarrelling with yourself!" longstreet was an entirely different man. he was brave, honest, intelligent, a very capable soldier, subordinate to his superiors, just and kind to his subordinates, but jealous of his own rights, which he had the courage to maintain. he was never on the lookout to detect a slight, but saw one as soon as anybody when intentionally given. it may be that longstreet was not sent to knoxville for the reason stated, but because mr. davis had an exalted opinion of his own military genius, and thought he saw a chance of "killing two birds with one stone." on several occasions during the war he came to the relief of the union army by means of his superior military genius. i speak advisedly when i saw mr. davis prided himself on his military capacity. he says so himself, virtually, in his answer to the notice of his nomination to the confederate presidency. some of his generals have said so in their writings since the downfall of the confederacy. my recollection is that my first orders for the battle of chattanooga were as fought. sherman was to get on missionary ridge, as he did; hooker to cross the north end of lookout mountain, as he did, sweep across chattanooga valley and get across the south end of the ridge near rossville. when hooker had secured that position the army of the cumberland was to assault in the centre. before sherman arrived, however, the order was so changed as that hooker was directed to come to chattanooga by the north bank of the tennessee river. the waters in the river, owing to heavy rains, rose so fast that the bridge at brown's ferry could not be maintained in a condition to be used in crossing troops upon it. for this reason hooker's orders were changed by telegraph back to what they were originally.-----note.--from this point on this volume was written (with the exception of the campaign in the wilderness, which had been previously written) by general grant, after his great illness in april, and the present arrangement of the subject-matter was made by him between the 10th and 18th of july, 1885. chapter xlv. the relief of knoxville--headquarters moved to nashville--visiting knoxville-cipher cipher dispatches--withholding orders. chattanooga now being secure to the national troops beyond any doubt, i immediately turned my attention to relieving knoxville, about the situation of which the president, in particular, was very anxious. prior to the battles, i had made preparations for sending troops to the relief of burnside at the very earliest moment after securing chattanooga. we had there two little steamers which had been built and fitted up from the remains of old boats and put in condition to run. general thomas was directed to have one of these boats loaded with rations and ammunition and move up the tennessee river to the mouth of the holston, keeping the boat all the time abreast of the troops. general granger, with the 4th corps reinforced to make twenty thousand men, was to start the moment missionary ridge was carried, and under no circumstances were the troops to return to their old camps. with the provisions carried, and the little that could be got in the country, it was supposed he could hold out until longstreet was driven away, after which event east tennessee would furnish abundance of food for burnside's army and his own also. while following the enemy on the 26th, and again on the morning of the 27th, part of the time by the road to ringgold, i directed thomas, verbally, not to start granger until he received further orders from me; advising him that i was going to the front to more fully see the situation. i was not right sure but that bragg's troops might be over their stampede by the time they reached dalton. in that case bragg might think it well to take the road back to cleveland, move thence towards knoxville, and, uniting with longstreet, make a sudden dash upon burnside. when i arrived at ringgold, however, on the 27th, i saw that the retreat was most earnest. the enemy had been throwing away guns, caissons and small-arms, abandoning provisions, and, altogether, seemed to be moving like a disorganized mob, with the exception of cleburne's division, which was acting as rear-guard to cover the retreat. when hooker moved from rossville toward ringgold palmer's division took the road to graysville, and sherman moved by the way of chickamauga station toward the same point. as soon as i saw the situation at ringgold i sent a staff officer back to chattanooga to advise thomas of the condition of affairs, and direct him by my orders to start granger at once. feeling now that the troops were already on the march for the relief of burnside i was in no hurry to get back, but stayed at ringgold through the day to prepare for the return of our troops. ringgold is in a valley in the mountains, situated between east chickamauga creek and taylor's ridge, and about twenty miles south-east from chattanooga. i arrived just as the artillery that hooker had left behind at chattanooga creek got up. his men were attacking cleburne's division, which had taken a strong position in the adjacent hills so as to cover the retreat of the confederate army through a narrow gorge which presents itself at that point. just beyond the gorge the valley is narrow, and the creek so tortuous that it has to be crossed a great many times in the course of the first mile. this attack was unfortunate, and cost us some men unnecessarily. hooker captured, however, 3 pieces of artillery and 230 prisoners, and 130 rebel dead were left upon the field. i directed general hooker to collect the flour and wheat in the neighboring mills for the use of the troops, and then to destroy the mills and all other property that could be of use to the enemy, but not to make any wanton destruction. at this point sherman came up, having reached graysville with his troops, where he found palmer had preceded him. palmer had picked up many prisoners and much abandoned property on the route. i went back in the evening to graysville with sherman, remained there over night and did not return to chattanooga until the following night, the 29th. i then found that thomas had not yet started granger, thus having lost a full day which i deemed of so much importance in determining the fate of knoxville. thomas and granger were aware that on the 23d of the month burnside had telegraphed that his supplies would last for ten or twelve days and during that time he could hold out against longstreet, but if not relieved within the time indicated he would be obliged to surrender or attempt to retreat. to effect a retreat would have been an impossibility. he was already very low in ammunition, and with an army pursuing he would not have been able to gather supplies. finding that granger had not only not started but was very reluctant to go, he having decided for himself that it was a very bad move to make, i sent word to general sherman of the situation and directed him to march to the relief of knoxville. i also gave him the problem that we had to solve--that burnside had now but four to six days supplies left, and that he must be relieved within that time. sherman, fortunately, had not started on his return from graysville, having sent out detachments on the railroad which runs from dalton to cleveland and knoxville to thoroughly destroy that road, and these troops had not yet returned to camp. i was very loath to send sherman, because his men needed rest after their long march from memphis and hard fighting at chattanooga. but i had become satisfied that burnside would not be rescued if his relief depended upon general granger's movements. sherman had left his camp on the north side of the tennessee river, near chattanooga, on the night of the 23d, the men having two days' cooked rations in their haversacks. expecting to be back in their tents by that time and to be engaged in battle while out, they took with them neither overcoats nor blankets. the weather was already cold, and at night they must have suffered more or less. the two days' rations had already lasted them five days; and they were now to go through a country which had been run over so much by confederate troops that there was but little probability of finding much food. they did, however, succeed in capturing some flour. they also found a good deal of bran in some of the mills, which the men made up into bread; and in this and other ways they eked out an existence until they could reach knoxville. i was so very anxious that burnside should get news of the steps being taken for his relief, and thus induce him to hold out a little longer if it became necessary, that i determined to send a message to him. i therefore sent a member of my staff, colonel j. h. wilson, to get into knoxville if he could report to burnside the situation fully, and give him all the encouragement possible. mr. charles a. dana was at chattanooga during the battle, and had been there even before i assumed command. mr. dana volunteered to accompany colonel wilson, and did accompany him. i put the information of what was being done for the relief of knoxville into writing, and directed that in some way or other it must be secretly managed so as to have a copy of this fall into the hands of general longstreet. they made the trip safely; general longstreet did learn of sherman's coming in advance of his reaching there, and burnside was prepared to hold out even for a longer time if it had been necessary. burnside had stretched a boom across the holston river to catch scows and flats as they floated down. on these, by previous arrangements with the loyal people of east tennessee, were placed flour and corn, with forage and provisions generally, and were thus secured for the use of the union troops. they also drove cattle into knoxville by the east side, which was not covered by the enemy; so that when relief arrived burnside had more provisions on hand than when he had last reported. our total loss (not including burnside's) in all these engagements amounted to 757 killed, 4,529 wounded and 330 missing. we captured 6,142 prisoners--about 50 per cent. more than the enemy reported for their total loss--40 pieces of artillery, 69 artillery carriages and caissons and over 7,000 stands of small-arms. the enemy's loss in arms was probably much greater than here reported, because we picked up a great many that were found abandoned. i had at chattanooga, in round numbers, about 60,000 men. bragg had about half this number, but his position was supposed to be impregnable. it was his own fault that he did not have more men present. he had sent longstreet away with his corps swelled by reinforcements up to over twenty thousand men, thus reducing his own force more than one-third and depriving himself of the presence of the ablest general of his command. he did this, too, after our troops had opened a line of communication by way of brown's and kelly's ferries with bridgeport, thus securing full rations and supplies of every kind; and also when he knew reinforcements were coming to me. knoxville was of no earthly use to him while chattanooga was in our hands. if he should capture chattanooga, knoxville with its garrison would have fallen into his hands without a struggle. i have never been able to see the wisdom of this move. then, too, after sherman had arrived, and when bragg knew that he was on the north side of the tennessee river, he sent buckner's division to reinforce longstreet. he also started another division a day later, but our attack having commenced before it reached knoxville bragg ordered it back. it had got so far, however, that it could not return to chattanooga in time to be of service there. it is possible this latter blunder may have been made by bragg having become confused as to what was going on on our side. sherman had, as already stated, crossed to the north side of the tennessee river at brown's ferry, in full view of bragg's troops from lookout mountain, a few days before the attack. they then disappeared behind foot hills, and did not come to the view of the troops on missionary ridge until they met their assault. bragg knew it was sherman's troops that had crossed, and, they being so long out of view, may have supposed that they had gone up the north bank of the tennessee river to the relief of knoxville and that longstreet was therefore in danger. but the first great blunder, detaching longstreet, cannot be accounted for in any way i know of. if he had captured chattanooga, east tennessee would have fallen without a struggle. it would have been a victory for us to have got our army away from chattanooga safely. it was a manifold greater victory to drive away the besieging army; a still greater one to defeat that army in his chosen ground and nearly annihilate it. the probabilities are that our loss in killed was the heavier, as we were the attacking party. the enemy reported his loss in killed at 361: but as he reported his missing at 4,146, while we held over 6,000 of them as prisoners, and there must have been hundreds if not thousands who deserted, but little reliance can be placed on this report. there was certainly great dissatisfaction with bragg on the part of the soldiers for his harsh treatment of them, and a disposition to get away if they could. then, too, chattanooga, following in the same half year with gettysburg in the east and vicksburg in the west, there was much the same feeling in the south at this time that there had been in the north the fall and winter before. if the same license had been allowed the people and press in the south that was allowed in the north, chattanooga would probably have been the last battle fought for the preservation of the union. general william f. smith's services in these battles had been such that i thought him eminently entitled to promotion. i was aware that he had previously been named by the president for promotion to the grade of major-general, but that the senate had rejected the nomination. i was not aware of the reasons for this course, and therefore strongly recommended him for a major-generalcy. my recommendation was heeded and the appointment made. upon the raising of the siege of knoxville i, of course, informed the authorities at washington--the president and secretary of war--of the fact, which caused great rejoicing there. the president especially was rejoiced that knoxville had been relieved (*18) without further bloodshed. the safety of burnside's army and the loyal people of east tennessee had been the subject of much anxiety to the president for several months, during which time he was doing all he could to relieve the situation; sending a new commander (*19) with a few thousand troops by the way of cumberland gap, and telegraphing me daily, almost hourly, to "remember burnside," "do something for burnside," and other appeals of like tenor. he saw no escape for east tennessee until after our victory at chattanooga. even then he was afraid that burnside might be out of ammunition, in a starving condition, or overpowered: and his anxiety was still intense until he heard that longstreet had been driven from the field. burnside followed longstreet only to strawberry plains, some twenty miles or more east, and then stopped, believing that longstreet would leave the state. the latter did not do so, however, but stopped only a short distance farther on and subsisted his army for the entire winter off east tennessee. foster now relieved burnside. sherman made disposition of his troops along the tennessee river in accordance with instructions. i left thomas in command at chattanooga, and, about the 20th of december, moved my headquarters to nashville, tennessee. nashville was the most central point from which to communicate with my entire military division, and also with the authorities at washington. while remaining at chattanooga i was liable to have my telegraphic communications cut so as to throw me out of communication with both my command and washington. nothing occurred at nashville worthy of mention during the winter, (*20) so i set myself to the task of having troops in positions from which they could move to advantage, and in collecting all necessary supplies so as to be ready to claim a due share of the enemy's attention upon the appearance of the first good weather in the spring. i expected to retain the command i then had, and prepared myself for the campaign against atlanta. i also had great hopes of having a campaign made against mobile from the gulf. i expected after atlanta fell to occupy that place permanently, and to cut off lee's army from the west by way of the road running through augusta to atlanta and thence south-west. i was preparing to hold atlanta with a small garrison, and it was my expectation to push through to mobile if that city was in our possession: if not, to savannah; and in this manner to get possession of the only east and west railroad that would then be left to the enemy. but the spring campaign against mobile was not made. the army of the ohio had been getting supplies over cumberland gap until their animals had nearly all starved. i now determined to go myself to see if there was any possible chance of using that route in the spring, and if not to abandon it. accordingly i left nashville in the latter part of december by rail for chattanooga. from chattanooga i took one of the little steamers previously spoken of as having been built there, and, putting my horses aboard, went up to the junction of the clinch with the tennessee. from that point the railroad had been repaired up to knoxville and out east to strawberry plains. i went by rail therefore to knoxville, where i remained for several days. general john g. foster was then commanding the department of the ohio. it was an intensely cold winter, the thermometer being down as low as zero every morning for more than a week while i was at knoxville and on my way from there on horseback to lexington, kentucky, the first point where i could reach rail to carry me back to my headquarters at nashville. the road over cumberland gap, and back of it, was strewn with debris of broken wagons and dead animals, much as i had found it on my first trip to chattanooga over waldron's ridge. the road had been cut up to as great a depth as clay could be by mules and wagons, and in that condition frozen; so that the ride of six days from strawberry plains to lexington over these holes and knobs in the road was a very cheerless one, and very disagreeable. i found a great many people at home along that route, both in tennessee and kentucky, and, almost universally, intensely loyal. they would collect in little places where we would stop of evenings, to see me, generally hearing of my approach before we arrived. the people naturally expected to see the commanding general the oldest person in the party. i was then forty-one years of age, while my medical director was gray-haired and probably twelve or more years my senior. the crowds would generally swarm around him, and thus give me an opportunity of quietly dismounting and getting into the house. it also gave me an opportunity of hearing passing remarks from one spectator to another about their general. those remarks were apt to be more complimentary to the cause than to the appearance of the supposed general, owing to his being muffled up, and also owing to the travel-worn condition we were all in after a hard day's ride. i was back in nashville by the 13th of january, 1864. when i started on this trip it was necessary for me to have some person along who could turn dispatches into cipher, and who could also read the cipher dispatches which i was liable to receive daily and almost hourly. under the rules of the war department at that time, mr. stanton had taken entire control of the matter of regulating the telegraph and determining how it should be used, and of saying who, and who alone, should have the ciphers. the operators possessed of the ciphers, as well as the ciphers used, were practically independent of the commanders whom they were serving immediately under, and had to report to the war department through general stager all the dispatches which they received or forwarded. i was obliged to leave the telegraphic operator back at nashville, because that was the point at which all dispatches to me would come, to be forwarded from there. as i have said, it was necessary for me also to have an operator during this inspection who had possession of this cipher to enable me to telegraph to my division and to the war department without my dispatches being read by all the operators along the line of wires over which they were transmitted. accordingly i ordered the cipher operator to turn over the key to captain cyrus b. comstock, of the corps of engineers, whom i had selected as a wise and discreet man who certainly could be trusted with the cipher if the operator at my headquarters could. the operator refused point blank to turn over the key to captain comstock as directed by me, stating that his orders from the war department were not to give it to anybody--the commanding general or any one else. i told him i would see whether he would or not. he said that if he did he would be punished. i told him if he did not he most certainly would be punished. finally, seeing that punishment was certain if he refused longer to obey my order, and being somewhat remote (even if he was not protected altogether from the consequences of his disobedience to his orders) from the war department, he yielded. when i returned from knoxville i found quite a commotion. the operator had been reprimanded very severely and ordered to be relieved. i informed the secretary of war, or his assistant secretary in charge of the telegraph, stager, that the man could not be relieved, for he had only obeyed my orders. it was absolutely necessary for me to have the cipher, and the man would most certainly have been punished if he had not delivered it; that they would have to punish me if they punished anybody, or words to that effect. this was about the only thing approaching a disagreeable difference between the secretary of war and myself that occurred until the war was over, when we had another little spat. owing to his natural disposition to assume all power and control in all matters that he had anything whatever to do with, he boldly took command of the armies, and, while issuing no orders on the subject, prohibited any order from me going out of the adjutant-general's office until he had approved it. this was done by directing the adjutant-general to hold any orders that came from me to be issued from the adjutant-general's office until he had examined them and given his approval. he never disturbed himself, either, in examining my orders until it was entirely convenient for him; so that orders which i had prepared would often lie there three or four days before he would sanction them. i remonstrated against this in writing, and the secretary apologetically restored me to my rightful position of general-in-chief of the army. but he soon lapsed again and took control much as before. after the relief of knoxville sherman had proposed to burnside that he should go with him to drive longstreet out of tennessee; but burnside assured him that with the troops which had been brought by granger, and which were to be left, he would be amply prepared to dispose of longstreet without availing himself of this offer. as before stated sherman's command had left their camps north of the tennessee, near chattanooga, with two days' rations in their haversacks, without coats or blankets, and without many wagons, expecting to return to their camps by the end of that time. the weather was now cold and they were suffering, but still they were ready to make the further sacrifice, had it been required, for the good of the cause which had brought them into service. sherman, having accomplished the object for which he was sent, marched back leisurely to his old camp on the tennessee river. chapter xlvi. operations in mississippi--longstreet in east tennessee--commissioned lieutenant-general--commanding the armies of the united states--first interview with president lincoln. soon after his return from knoxville i ordered sherman to distribute his forces from stevenson to decatur and thence north to nashville; sherman suggested that he be permitted to go back to mississippi, to the limits of his own department and where most of his army still remained, for the purpose of clearing out what confederates might still be left on the east bank of the mississippi river to impede its navigation by our boats. he expected also to have the co-operation of banks to do the same thing on the west shore. of course i approved heartily. about the 10th of january sherman was back in memphis, where hurlbut commanded, and got together his memphis men, or ordered them collected and sent to vicksburg. he then went to vicksburg and out to where mcpherson was in command, and had him organize his surplus troops so as to give him about 20,000 men in all. sherman knew that general (bishop) polk was occupying meridian with his headquarters, and had two divisions of infantry with a considerable force of cavalry scattered west of him. he determined, therefore, to move directly upon meridian. i had sent some 2,500 cavalry under general sooy smith to sherman's department, and they had mostly arrived before sherman got to memphis. hurlbut had 7,000 cavalry, and sherman ordered him to reinforce smith so as to give the latter a force of about 7,000 with which to go against forrest, who was then known to be south-east from memphis. smith was ordered to move about the 1st of february. while sherman was waiting at vicksburg for the arrival of hurlbut with his surplus men, he sent out scouts to ascertain the position and strength of the enemy and to bring back all the information they could gather. when these scouts returned it was through them that he got the information of general polk's being at meridian, and of the strength and disposition of his command. forrest had about 4,000 cavalry with him, composed of thoroughly well-disciplined men, who under so able a leader were very effective. smith's command was nearly double that of forrest, but not equal, man to man, for the lack of a successful experience such as forrest's men had had. the fact is, troops who have fought a few battles and won, and followed up their victories, improve upon what they were before to an extent that can hardly be counted by percentage. the difference in result is often decisive victory instead of inglorious defeat. this same difference, too, is often due to the way troops are officered, and for the particular kind of warfare which forrest had carried on neither army could present a more effective officer than he was. sherman got off on the 3d of february and moved out on his expedition, meeting with no opposition whatever until he crossed the big black, and with no great deal of opposition after that until he reached jackson, mississippi. this latter place he reached on the 6th or 7th, brandon on the 8th, and morton on the 9th. up to this time he moved in two columns to enable him to get a good supply of forage, etc., and expedite the march. here, however, there were indications of the concentration of confederate infantry, and he was obliged to keep his army close together. he had no serious engagement; but he met some of the enemy who destroyed a few of his wagons about decatur, mississippi, where, by the way, sherman himself came near being picked up. he entered meridian on the 14th of the month, the enemy having retreated toward demopolis, alabama. he spent several days in meridian in thoroughly destroying the railroad to the north and south, and also for the purpose of hearing from sooy smith, who he supposed had met forrest before this time and he hoped had gained a decisive victory because of a superiority of numbers. hearing nothing of him, however, he started on his return trip to vicksburg. there he learned that smith, while waiting for a few of his men who had been ice-bound in the ohio river, instead of getting off on the 1st as expected, had not left until the 11th. smith did meet forrest, but the result was decidedly in forrest's favor. sherman had written a letter to banks, proposing a co-operative movement with him against shreveport, subject to my approval. i disapproved of sherman's going himself, because i had other important work for him to do, but consented that he might send a few troops to the aid of banks, though their time to remain absent must be limited. we must have them for the spring campaign. the trans-mississippi movement proved abortive. my eldest son, who had accompanied me on the vicksburg campaign and siege, had while there contracted disease, which grew worse, until he had grown so dangerously ill that on the 24th of january i obtained permission to go to st. louis, where he was staying at the time, to see him, hardly expecting to find him alive on my arrival. while i was permitted to go, i was not permitted to turn over my command to any one else, but was directed to keep the headquarters with me and to communicate regularly with all parts of my division and with washington, just as though i had remained at nashville. when i obtained this leave i was at chattanooga, having gone there again to make preparations to have the troops of thomas in the southern part of tennessee co-operate with sherman's movement in mississippi. i directed thomas, and logan who was at scottsboro, alabama, to keep up a threatening movement to the south against j. e. johnston, who had again relieved bragg, for the purpose of making him keep as many troops as possible there. i learned through confederate sources that johnston had already sent two divisions in the direction of mobile, presumably to operate against sherman, and two more divisions to longstreet in east tennessee. seeing that johnston had depleted in this way, i directed thomas to send at least ten thousand men, besides stanley's division which was already to the east, into east tennessee, and notified schofield, who was now in command in east tennessee, of this movement of troops into his department and also of the reinforcements longstreet had received. my object was to drive longstreet out of east tennessee as a part of the preparations for my spring campaign. about this time general foster, who had been in command of the department of the ohio after burnside until schofield relieved him (*21), advised me that he thought it would be a good thing to keep longstreet just where he was; that he was perfectly quiet in east tennessee, and if he was forced to leave there, his whole well-equipped army would be free to go to any place where it could effect the most for their cause. i thought the advice was good, and, adopting that view, countermanded the orders for pursuit of longstreet. on the 12th of february i ordered thomas to take dalton and hold it, if possible; and i directed him to move without delay. finding that he had not moved, on the 17th i urged him again to start, telling him how important it was, that the object of the movement was to co-operate with sherman, who was moving eastward and might be in danger. then again on the 21st, he not yet having started, i asked him if he could not start the next day. he finally got off on the 22d or 23d. the enemy fell back from his front without a battle, but took a new position quite as strong and farther to the rear. thomas reported that he could not go any farther, because it was impossible with his poor teams, nearly starved, to keep up supplies until the railroads were repaired. he soon fell back. schofield also had to return for the same reason. he could not carry supplies with him, and longstreet was between him and the supplies still left in the country. longstreet, in his retreat, would be moving towards his supplies, while our forces, following, would be receding from theirs. on the 2d of march, however, i learned of sherman's success, which eased my mind very much. the next day, the 3d, i was ordered to washington. the bill restoring the grade of lieutenant-general of the army had passed through congress and became a law on the 26th of february. my nomination had been sent to the senate on the 1st of march and confirmed the next day (the 2d). i was ordered to washington on the 3d to receive my commission, and started the day following that. the commission was handed to me on the 9th. it was delivered to me at the executive mansion by president lincoln in the presence of his cabinet, my eldest son, those of my staff who were with me and and a few other visitors. the president in presenting my commission read from a paper--stating, however, as a preliminary, and prior to the delivery of it, that he had drawn that up on paper, knowing my disinclination to speak in public, and handed me a copy in advance so that i might prepare a few lines of reply. the president said: "general grant, the nation's appreciation of what you have done, and its reliance upon you for what remains to be done in the existing great struggle, are now presented, with this commission constituting you lieutenant-general in the army of the united states. with this high honor, devolves upon you, also, a corresponding responsibility. as the country herein trusts you, so, under god, it will sustain you. i scarcely need to add, that, with what i here speak for the nation, goes my own hearty personal concurrence." to this i replied: "mr. president, i accept the commission, with gratitude for the high honor conferred. with the aid of the noble armies that have fought in so many fields for our common country, it will be my earnest endeavor not to disappoint your expectations. i feel the full weight of the responsibilities now devolving on me; and i know that if they are met, it will be due to those armies, and above all, to the favor of that providence which leads both nations and men." on the 10th i visited the headquarters of the army of the potomac at brandy station; then returned to washington, and pushed west at once to make my arrangements for turning over the commands there and giving general directions for the preparations to be made for the spring campaign. it had been my intention before this to remain in the west, even if i was made lieutenant-general; but when i got to washington and saw the situation it was plain that here was the point for the commanding general to be. no one else could, probably, resist the pressure that would be brought to bear upon him to desist from his own plans and pursue others. i determined, therefore, before i started back to have sherman advanced to my late position, mcpherson to sherman's in command of the department, and logan to the command of mcpherson's corps. these changes were all made on my recommendation and without hesitation. my commission as lieutenant-general was given to me on the 9th of march, 1864. on the following day, as already stated, i visited general meade, commanding the army of the potomac, at his headquarters at brandy station, north of the rapidan. i had known general meade slightly in the mexican war, but had not met him since until this visit. i was a stranger to most of the army of the potomac, i might say to all except the officers of the regular army who had served in the mexican war. there had been some changes ordered in the organization of that army before my promotion. one was the consolidation of five corps into three, thus throwing some officers of rank out of important commands. meade evidently thought that i might want to make still one more change not yet ordered. he said to me that i might want an officer who had served with me in the west, mentioning sherman specially, to take his place. if so, he begged me not to hesitate about making the change. he urged that the work before us was of such vast importance to the whole nation that the feeling or wishes of no one person should stand in the way of selecting the right men for all positions. for himself, he would serve to the best of his ability wherever placed. i assured him that i had no thought of substituting any one for him. as to sherman, he could not be spared from the west. this incident gave me even a more favorable opinion of meade than did his great victory at gettysburg the july before. it is men who wait to be selected, and not those who seek, from whom we may always expect the most efficient service. meade's position afterwards proved embarrassing to me if not to him. he was commanding an army and, for nearly a year previous to my taking command of all the armies, was in supreme command of the army of the potomac--except from the authorities at washington. all other general officers occupying similar positions were independent in their commands so far as any one present with them was concerned. i tried to make general meade's position as nearly as possible what it would have been if i had been in washington or any other place away from his command. i therefore gave all orders for the movements of the army of the potomac to meade to have them executed. to avoid the necessity of having to give orders direct, i established my headquarters near his, unless there were reasons for locating them elsewhere. this sometimes happened, and i had on occasions to give orders direct to the troops affected. on the 11th i returned to washington and, on the day after, orders were published by the war department placing me in command of all the armies. i had left washington the night before to return to my old command in the west and to meet sherman whom i had telegraphed to join me in nashville. sherman assumed command of the military division of the mississippi on the 18th of march, and we left nashville together for cincinnati. i had sherman accompany me that far on my way back to washington so that we could talk over the matters about which i wanted to see him, without losing any more time from my new command than was necessary. the first point which i wished to discuss was particularly about the co-operation of his command with mine when the spring campaign should commence. there were also other and minor points, minor as compared with the great importance of the question to be decided by sanguinary war--the restoration to duty of officers who had been relieved from important commands, namely mcclellan, burnside and fremont in the east, and buell, mccook, negley and crittenden in the west. some time in the winter of 1863-64 i had been invited by the general-in-chief to give my views of the campaign i thought advisable for the command under me--now sherman's. general j. e. johnston was defending atlanta and the interior of georgia with an army, the largest part of which was stationed at dalton, about 38 miles south of chattanooga. dalton is at the junction of the railroad from cleveland with the one from chattanooga to atlanta. there could have been no difference of opinion as to the first duty of the armies of the military division of the mississippi. johnston's army was the first objective, and that important railroad centre, atlanta, the second. at the time i wrote general halleck giving my views of the approaching campaign, and at the time i met general sherman, it was expected that general banks would be through with the campaign which he had been ordered upon before my appointment to the command of all the armies, and would be ready to co-operate with the armies east of the mississippi, his part in the programme being to move upon mobile by land while the navy would close the harbor and assist to the best of its ability. (*22) the plan therefore was for sherman to attack johnston and destroy his army if possible, to capture atlanta and hold it, and with his troops and those of banks to hold a line through to mobile, or at least to hold atlanta and command the railroad running east and west, and the troops from one or other of the armies to hold important points on the southern road, the only east and west road that would be left in the possession of the enemy. this would cut the confederacy in two again, as our gaining possession of the mississippi river had done before. banks was not ready in time for the part assigned to him, and circumstances that could not be foreseen determined the campaign which was afterwards made, the success and grandeur of which has resounded throughout all lands. in regard to restoring officers who had been relieved from important commands to duty again, i left sherman to look after those who had been removed in the west while i looked out for the rest. i directed, however, that he should make no assignment until i could speak to the secretary of war about the matter. i shortly after recommended to the secretary the assignment of general buell to duty. i received the assurance that duty would be offered to him; and afterwards the secretary told me that he had offered buell an assignment and that the latter had declined it, saying that it would be degradation to accept the assignment offered. i understood afterwards that he refused to serve under either sherman or canby because he had ranked them both. both graduated before him and ranked him in the old army. sherman ranked him as a brigadier-general. all of them ranked me in the old army, and sherman and buell did as brigadiers. the worst excuse a soldier can make for declining service is that he once ranked the commander he is ordered to report to. on the 23d of march i was back in washington, and on the 26th took up my headquarters at culpeper court-house, a few miles south of the headquarters of the army of the potomac. although hailing from illinois myself, the state of the president, i never met mr. lincoln until called to the capital to receive my commission as lieutenant-general. i knew him, however, very well and favorably from the accounts given by officers under me at the west who had known him all their lives. i had also read the remarkable series of debates between lincoln and douglas a few years before, when they were rival candidates for the united states senate. i was then a resident of missouri, and by no means a "lincoln man" in that contest; but i recognized then his great ability. in my first interview with mr. lincoln alone he stated to me that he had never professed to be a military man or to know how campaigns should be conducted, and never wanted to interfere in them: but that procrastination on the part of commanders, and the pressure from the people at the north and congress, which was always with him, forced him into issuing his series of "military orders"--one, two, three, etc. he did not know but they were all wrong, and did know that some of them were. all he wanted or had ever wanted was some one who would take the responsibility and act, and call on him for all the assistance needed, pledging himself to use all the power of the government in rendering such assistance. assuring him that i would do the best i could with the means at hand, and avoid as far as possible annoying him or the war department, our first interview ended. the secretary of war i had met once before only, but felt that i knew him better. while commanding in west tennessee we had occasionally held conversations over the wires, at night, when they were not being otherwise used. he and general halleck both cautioned me against giving the president my plans of campaign, saying that he was so kind-hearted, so averse to refusing anything asked of him, that some friend would be sure to get from him all he knew. i should have said that in our interview the president told me he did not want to know what i proposed to do. but he submitted a plan of campaign of his own which he wanted me to hear and then do as i pleased about. he brought out a map of virginia on which he had evidently marked every position occupied by the federal and confederate armies up to that time. he pointed out on the map two streams which empty into the potomac, and suggested that the army might be moved on boats and landed between the mouths of these streams. we would then have the potomac to bring our supplies, and the tributaries would protect our flanks while we moved out. i listened respectfully, but did not suggest that the same streams would protect lee's flanks while he was shutting us up. i did not communicate my plans to the president, nor did i to the secretary of war or to general halleck. march the 26th my headquarters were, as stated, at culpeper, and the work of preparing for an early campaign commenced. chapter xlvii. the military situation--plans for the campaign--sheridan assigned to command of the cavalry--flank movements--forrest at fort pillow--general banks's expedition--colonel mosby--an incident of the wilderness campaign. when i assumed command of all the armies the situation was about this: the mississippi river was guarded from st. louis to its mouth; the line of the arkansas was held, thus giving us all the north-west north of that river. a few points in louisiana not remote from the river were held by the federal troops, as was also the mouth of the rio grande. east of the mississippi we held substantially all north of the memphis and charleston railroad as far east as chattanooga, thence along the line of the tennessee and holston rivers, taking in nearly all of the state of tennessee. west virginia was in our hands; and that part of old virginia north of the rapidan and east of the blue ridge we also held. on the sea-coast we had fortress monroe and norfolk in virginia; plymouth, washington and new berne in north carolina; beaufort, folly and morris islands, hilton head, port royal and fort pulaski in south carolina and georgia; fernandina, st. augustine, key west and pensacola in florida. the balance of the southern territory, an empire in extent, was still in the hands of the enemy. sherman, who had succeeded me in the command of the military division of the mississippi, commanded all the troops in the territory west of the alleghanies and north of natchez, with a large movable force about chattanooga. his command was subdivided into four departments, but the commanders all reported to sherman and were subject to his orders. this arrangement, however, insured the better protection of all lines of communication through the acquired territory, for the reason that these different department commanders could act promptly in case of a sudden or unexpected raid within their respective jurisdictions without awaiting the orders of the division commander. in the east the opposing forces stood in substantially the same relations towards each other as three years before, or when the war began; they were both between the federal and confederate capitals. it is true, footholds had been secured by us on the sea-coast, in virginia and north carolina, but, beyond that, no substantial advantage had been gained by either side. battles had been fought of as great severity as had ever been known in war, over ground from the james river and chickahominy, near richmond, to gettysburg and chambersburg, in pennsylvania, with indecisive results, sometimes favorable to the national army, sometimes to the confederate army; but in every instance, i believe, claimed as victories for the south by the southern press if not by the southern generals. the northern press, as a whole, did not discourage these claims; a portion of it always magnified rebel success and belittled ours, while another portion, most sincerely earnest in their desire for the preservation of the union and the overwhelming success of the federal armies, would nevertheless generally express dissatisfaction with whatever victories were gained because they were not more complete. that portion of the army of the potomac not engaged in guarding lines of communication was on the northern bank of the rapidan. the army of northern virginia confronting it on the opposite bank of the same river, was strongly intrenched and commanded by the acknowledged ablest general in the confederate army. the country back to the james river is cut up with many streams, generally narrow, deep, and difficult to cross except where bridged. the region is heavily timbered, and the roads narrow, and very bad after the least rain. such an enemy was not, of course, unprepared with adequate fortifications at convenient intervals all the way back to richmond, so that when driven from one fortified position they would always have another farther to the rear to fall back into. to provision an army, campaigning against so formidable a foe through such a country, from wagons alone seemed almost impossible. system and discipline were both essential to its accomplishment. the union armies were now divided into nineteen departments, though four of them in the west had been concentrated into a single military division. the army of the potomac was a separate command and had no territorial limits. there were thus seventeen distinct commanders. before this time these various armies had acted separately and independently of each other, giving the enemy an opportunity often of depleting one command, not pressed, to reinforce another more actively engaged. i determined to stop this. to this end i regarded the army of the potomac as the centre, and all west to memphis along the line described as our position at the time, and north of it, the right wing; the army of the james, under general butler, as the left wing, and all the troops south, as a force in rear of the enemy. some of these latter were occupying positions from which they could not render service proportionate to their numerical strength. all such were depleted to the minimum necessary to hold their positions as a guard against blockade runners; where they could not do this their positions were abandoned altogether. in this way ten thousand men were added to the army of the james from south carolina alone, with general gillmore in command. it was not contemplated that general gillmore should leave his department; but as most of his troops were taken, presumably for active service, he asked to accompany them and was permitted to do so. officers and soldiers on furlough, of whom there were many thousands, were ordered to their proper commands; concentration was the order of the day, and to have it accomplished in time to advance at the earliest moment the roads would permit was the problem. as a reinforcement to the army of the potomac, or to act in support of it, the 9th army corps, over twenty thousand strong, under general burnside, had been rendezvoused at annapolis, maryland. this was an admirable position for such a reinforcement. the corps could be brought at the last moment as a reinforcement to the army of the potomac, or it could be thrown on the sea-coast, south of norfolk, in virginia or north carolina, to operate against richmond from that direction. in fact burnside and the war department both thought the 9th corps was intended for such an expedition up to the last moment. my general plan now was to concentrate all the force possible against the confederate armies in the field. there were but two such, as we have seen, east of the mississippi river and facing north. the army of northern virginia, general robert e. lee commanding, was on the south bank of the rapidan, confronting the army of the potomac; the second, under general joseph e. johnston, was at dalton, georgia, opposed to sherman who was still at chattanooga. beside these main armies the confederates had to guard the shenandoah valley, a great storehouse to feed their armies from, and their line of communications from richmond to tennessee. forrest, a brave and intrepid cavalry general, was in the west with a large force; making a larger command necessary to hold what we had gained in middle and west tennessee. we could not abandon any territory north of the line held by the enemy because it would lay the northern states open to invasion. but as the army of the potomac was the principal garrison for the protection of washington even while it was moving on lee, so all the forces to the west, and the army of the james, guarded their special trusts when advancing from them as well as when remaining at them. better indeed, for they forced the enemy to guard his own lines and resources at a greater distance from ours, and with a greater force. little expeditions could not so well be sent out to destroy a bridge or tear up a few miles of railroad track, burn a storehouse, or inflict other little annoyances. accordingly i arranged for a simultaneous movement all along the line. sherman was to move from chattanooga, johnston's army and atlanta being his objective points. (*23) crook, commanding in west virginia, was to move from the mouth of the gauley river with a cavalry force and some artillery, the virginia and tennessee railroad to be his objective. either the enemy would have to keep a large force to protect their communications, or see them destroyed and a large amount of forage and provision, which they so much needed, fall into our hands. sigel was in command in the valley of virginia. he was to advance up the valley, covering the north from an invasion through that channel as well while advancing as by remaining near harper's ferry. every mile he advanced also gave us possession of stores on which lee relied. butler was to advance by the james river, having richmond and petersburg as his objective. before the advance commenced i visited butler at fort monroe. this was the first time i had ever met him. before giving him any order as to the part he was to play in the approaching campaign i invited his views. they were very much such as i intended to direct, and as i did direct (*24), in writing, before leaving. general w. f. smith, who had been promoted to the rank of major-general shortly after the battle of chattanooga on my recommendation, had not yet been confirmed. i found a decided prejudice against his confirmation by a majority of the senate, but i insisted that his services had been such that he should be rewarded. my wishes were now reluctantly complied with, and i assigned him to the command of one of the corps under general butler. i was not long in finding out that the objections to smith's promotion were well founded. in one of my early interviews with the president i expressed my dissatisfaction with the little that had been accomplished by the cavalry so far in the war, and the belief that it was capable of accomplishing much more than it had done if under a thorough leader. i said i wanted the very best man in the army for that command. halleck was present and spoke up, saying: "how would sheridan do?" i replied: "the very man i want." the president said i could have anybody i wanted. sheridan was telegraphed for that day, and on his arrival was assigned to the command of the cavalry corps with the army of the potomac. this relieved general alfred pleasonton. it was not a reflection on that officer, however, for i did not know but that he had been as efficient as any other cavalry commander. banks in the department of the gulf was ordered to assemble all the troops he had at new orleans in time to join in the general move, mobile to be his objective. at this time i was not entirely decided as to whether i should move the army of the potomac by the right flank of the enemy, or by his left. each plan presented advantages. (*25) if by his right--my left--the potomac, chesapeake bay and tributaries would furnish us an easy hauling distance of every position the army could occupy from the rapidan to the james river. but lee could, if he chose, detach or move his whole army north on a line rather interior to the one i would have to take in following. a movement by his left--our right--would obviate this; but all that was done would have to be done with the supplies and ammunition we started with. all idea of adopting this latter plan was abandoned when the limited quantity of supplies possible to take with us was considered. the country over which we would have to pass was so exhausted of all food or forage that we would be obliged to carry everything with us. while these preparations were going on the enemy was not entirely idle. in the west forrest made a raid in west tennessee up to the northern border, capturing the garrison of four or five hundred men at union city, and followed it up by an attack on paducah, kentucky, on the banks of the ohio. while he was able to enter the city he failed to capture the forts or any part of the garrison. on the first intelligence of forrest's raid i telegraphed sherman to send all his cavalry against him, and not to let him get out of the trap he had put himself into. sherman had anticipated me by sending troops against him before he got my order. forrest, however, fell back rapidly, and attacked the troops at fort pillow, a station for the protection of the navigation of the mississippi river. the garrison consisted of a regiment of colored troops, infantry, and a detachment of tennessee cavalry. these troops fought bravely, but were overpowered. i will leave forrest in his dispatches to tell what he did with them. "the river was dyed," he says, "with the blood of the slaughtered for two hundred yards. the approximate loss was upward of five hundred killed, but few of the officers escaping. my loss was about twenty killed. it is hoped that these facts will demonstrate to the northern people that negro soldiers cannot cope with southerners." subsequently forrest made a report in which he left out the part which shocks humanity to read. at the east, also, the rebels were busy. i had said to halleck that plymouth and washington, north carolina, were unnecessary to hold. it would be better to have the garrisons engaged there added to butler's command. if success attended our arms both places, and others too, would fall into our hands naturally. these places had been occupied by federal troops before i took command of the armies, and i knew that the executive would be reluctant to abandon them, and therefore explained my views; but before my views were carried out the rebels captured the garrison at plymouth. i then ordered the abandonment of washington, but directed the holding of new berne at all hazards. this was essential because new berne was a port into which blockade runners could enter. general banks had gone on an expedition up the red river long before my promotion to general command. i had opposed the movement strenuously, but acquiesced because it was the order of my superior at the time. by direction of halleck i had reinforced banks with a corps of about ten thousand men from sherman's command. this reinforcement was wanted back badly before the forward movement commenced. but banks had got so far that it seemed best that he should take shreveport on the red river, and turn over the line of that river to steele, who commanded in arkansas, to hold instead of the line of the arkansas. orders were given accordingly, and with the expectation that the campaign would be ended in time for banks to return a. j. smith's command to where it belonged and get back to new orleans himself in time to execute his part in the general plan. but the expedition was a failure. banks did not get back in time to take part in the programme as laid down. nor was smith returned until long after the movements of may, 1864, had been begun. the services of forty thousand veteran troops, over and above the number required to hold all that was necessary in the department of the gulf, were thus paralyzed. it is but just to banks, however, to say that his expedition was ordered from washington and he was in no way responsible except for the conduct of it. i make no criticism on this point. he opposed the expedition. by the 27th of april spring had so far advanced as to justify me in fixing a day for the great move. on that day burnside left annapolis to occupy meade's position between bull run and the rappahannock. meade was notified and directed to bring his troops forward to his advance. on the following day butler was notified of my intended advance on the 4th of may, and he was directed to move the night of the same day and get as far up the james river as possible by daylight, and push on from there to accomplish the task given him. he was also notified that reinforcements were being collected in washington city, which would be forwarded to him should the enemy fall back into the trenches at richmond. the same day sherman was directed to get his forces up ready to advance on the 5th. sigel was in winchester and was notified to move in conjunction with the others. the criticism has been made by writers on the campaign from the rapidan to the james river that all the loss of life could have been obviated by moving the army there on transports. richmond was fortified and intrenched so perfectly that one man inside to defend was more than equal to five outside besieging or assaulting. to get possession of lee's army was the first great object. with the capture of his army richmond would necessarily follow. it was better to fight him outside of his stronghold than in it. if the army of the potomac had been moved bodily to the james river by water lee could have moved a part of his forces back to richmond, called beauregard from the south to reinforce it, and with the balance moved on to washington. then, too, i ordered a move, simultaneous with that of the army of the potomac, up the james river by a formidable army already collected at the mouth of the river. while my headquarters were at culpeper, from the 26th of march to the 4th of may, i generally visited washington once a week to confer with the secretary of war and president. on the last occasion, a few days before moving, a circumstance occurred which came near postponing my part in the campaign altogether. colonel john s. mosby had for a long time been commanding a partisan corps, or regiment, which operated in the rear of the army of the potomac. on my return to the field on this occasion, as the train approached warrenton junction, a heavy cloud of dust was seen to the east of the road as if made by a body of cavalry on a charge. arriving at the junction the train was stopped and inquiries made as to the cause of the dust. there was but one man at the station, and he informed us that mosby had crossed a few minutes before at full speed in pursuit of federal cavalry. had he seen our train coming, no doubt he would have let his prisoners escape to capture the train. i was on a special train, if i remember correctly, without any guard. since the close of the war i have come to know colonel mosby personally, and somewhat intimately. he is a different man entirely from what i had supposed. he is slender, not tall, wiry, and looks as if he could endure any amount of physical exercise. he is able, and thoroughly honest and truthful. there were probably but few men in the south who could have commanded successfully a separate detachment in the rear of an opposing army, and so near the border of hostilities, as long as he did without losing his entire command. on this same visit to washington i had my last interview with the president before reaching the james river. he had of course become acquainted with the fact that a general movement had been ordered all along the line, and seemed to think it a new feature in war. i explained to him that it was necessary to have a great number of troops to guard and hold the territory we had captured, and to prevent incursions into the northern states. these troops could perform this service just as well by advancing as by remaining still; and by advancing they would compel the enemy to keep detachments to hold them back, or else lay his own territory open to invasion. his answer was: "oh, yes! i see that. as we say out west, if a man can't skin he must hold a leg while somebody else does." there was a certain incident connected with the wilderness campaign of which it may not be out of place to speak; and to avoid a digression further on i will mention it here. a few days before my departure from culpeper the honorable e. b. washburne visited me there, and remained with my headquarters for some distance south, through the battle in the wilderness and, i think, to spottsylvania. he was accompanied by a mr. swinton, whom he presented as a literary gentleman who wished to accompany the army with a view of writing a history of the war when it was over. he assured me--and i have no doubt swinton gave him the assurance--that he was not present as a correspondent of the press. i expressed an entire willingness to have him (swinton) accompany the army, and would have allowed him to do so as a correspondent, restricted, however, in the character of the information he could give. we received richmond papers with about as much regularity as if there had been no war, and knew that our papers were received with equal regularity by the confederates. it was desirable, therefore, that correspondents should not be privileged spies of the enemy within our lines. probably mr. swinton expected to be an invited guest at my headquarters, and was disappointed that he was not asked to become so. at all events he was not invited, and soon i found that he was corresponding with some paper (i have now forgotten which one), thus violating his word either expressed or implied. he knew of the assurance washburne had given as to the character of his mission. i never saw the man from the day of our introduction to the present that i recollect. he accompanied us, however, for a time at least. the second night after crossing the rapidan (the night of the 5th of may) colonel w. r. rowley, of my staff, was acting as night officer at my headquarters. a short time before midnight i gave him verbal instructions for the night. three days later i read in a richmond paper a verbatim report of these instructions. a few nights still later (after the first, and possibly after the second, day's fighting in the wilderness) general meade came to my tent for consultation, bringing with him some of his staff officers. both his staff and mine retired to the camp-fire some yards in front of the tent, thinking our conversation should be private. there was a stump a little to one side, and between the front of the tent and camp-fire. one of my staff, colonel t. s. bowers, saw what he took to be a man seated on the ground and leaning against the stump, listening to the conversation between meade and myself. he called the attention of colonel rowley to it. the latter immediately took the man by the shoulder and asked him, in language more forcible than polite, what he was doing there. the man proved to be swinton, the "historian," and his replies to the question were evasive and unsatisfactory, and he was warned against further eaves-dropping. the next i heard of mr. swinton was at cold harbor. general meade came to my headquarters saying that general burnside had arrested swinton, who at some previous time had given great offence, and had ordered him to be shot that afternoon. i promptly ordered the prisoner to be released, but that he must be expelled from the lines of the army not to return again on pain of punishment. chapter xlviii. commencement of the grand campaign--general butler's position --sheridan's first raid. the armies were now all ready to move for the accomplishment of a single object. they were acting as a unit so far as such a thing was possible over such a vast field. lee, with the capital of the confederacy, was the main end to which all were working. johnston, with atlanta, was an important obstacle in the way of our accomplishing the result aimed at, and was therefore almost an independent objective. it was of less importance only because the capture of johnston and his army would not produce so immediate and decisive a result in closing the rebellion as would the possession of richmond, lee and his army. all other troops were employed exclusively in support of these two movements. this was the plan; and i will now endeavor to give, as concisely as i can, the method of its execution, outlining first the operations of minor detached but co-operative columns. as stated before, banks failed to accomplish what he had been sent to do on the red river, and eliminated the use of forty thousand veterans whose cooperation in the grand campaign had been expected--ten thousand with sherman and thirty thousand against mobile. sigel's record is almost equally brief. he moved out, it is true, according to programme; but just when i was hoping to hear of good work being done in the valley i received instead the following announcement from halleck: "sigel is in full retreat on strasburg. he will do nothing but run; never did anything else." the enemy had intercepted him about new market and handled him roughly, leaving him short six guns, and some nine hundred men out of his six thousand. the plan had been for an advance of sigel's forces in two columns. though the one under his immediate command failed ingloriously the other proved more fortunate. under crook and averell his western column advanced from the gauley in west virginia at the appointed time, and with more happy results. they reached the virginia and tennessee railroad at dublin and destroyed a depot of supplies, besides tearing up several miles of road and burning the bridge over new river. having accomplished this they recrossed the alleghanies to meadow bluffs and there awaited further orders. butler embarked at fort monroe with all his command, except the cavalry and some artillery which moved up the south bank of the james river. his steamers moved first up chesapeake bay and york river as if threatening the rear of lee's army. at midnight they turned back, and butler by daylight was far up the james river. he seized city point and bermuda hundred early in the day, without loss and, no doubt, very much to the surprise of the enemy. this was the accomplishment of the first step contemplated in my instructions to butler. he was to act from here, looking to richmond as his objective point. i had given him to understand that i should aim to fight lee between the rapidan and richmond if he would stand; but should lee fall back into richmond i would follow up and make a junction of the armies of the potomac and the james on the james river. he was directed to secure a footing as far up the south side of the river as he could at as early a date as possible. butler was in position by the 6th of may and had begun intrenching, and on the 7th he sent out his cavalry from suffolk to cut the weldon railroad. he also sent out detachments to destroy the railroad between petersburg and richmond, but no great success attended these latter efforts. he made no great effort to establish himself on that road and neglected to attack petersburg, which was almost defenceless. about the 11th he advanced slowly until he reached the works at drury's bluff, about half way between bermuda hundred and richmond. in the mean time beauregard had been gathering reinforcements. on the 16th he attacked butler with great vigor, and with such success as to limit very materially the further usefulness of the army of the james as a distinct factor in the campaign. i afterward ordered a portion of it to join the army of the potomac, leaving a sufficient force with butler to man his works, hold securely the footing he had already gained and maintain a threatening front toward the rear of the confederate capital. the position which general butler had chosen between the two rivers, the james and appomattox, was one of great natural strength, one where a large area of ground might be thoroughly inclosed by means of a single intrenched line, and that a very short one in comparison with the extent of territory which it thoroughly protected. his right was protected by the james river, his left by the appomattox, and his rear by their junction--the two streams uniting near by. the bends of the two streams shortened the line that had been chosen for intrenchments, while it increased the area which the line inclosed. previous to ordering any troops from butler i sent my chief engineer, general barnard, from the army of the potomac to that of the james to inspect butler's position and ascertain whether i could again safely make an order for general butler's movement in co-operation with mine, now that i was getting so near richmond; or, if i could not, whether his position was strong enough to justify me in withdrawing some of his troops and having them brought round by water to white house to join me and reinforce the army of the potomac. general barnard reported the position very strong for defensive purposes, and that i could do the latter with great security; but that general butler could not move from where he was, in co-operation, to produce any effect. he said that the general occupied a place between the james and appomattox rivers which was of great strength, and where with an inferior force he could hold it for an indefinite length of time against a superior; but that he could do nothing offensively. i then asked him why butler could not move out from his lines and push across the richmond and petersburg railroad to the rear and on the south side of richmond. he replied that it was impracticable, because the enemy had substantially the same line across the neck of land that general butler had. he then took out his pencil and drew a sketch of the locality, remarking that the position was like a bottle and that butler's line of intrenchments across the neck represented the cork; that the enemy had built an equally strong line immediately in front of him across the neck; and it was therefore as if butler was in a bottle. he was perfectly safe against an attack; but, as barnard expressed it, the enemy had corked the bottle and with a small force could hold the cork in its place. this struck me as being very expressive of his position, particularly when i saw the hasty sketch which general barnard had drawn; and in making my subsequent report i used that expression without adding quotation marks, never thinking that anything had been said that would attract attention--as this did, very much to the annoyance, no doubt, of general butler and, i know, very much to my own. i found afterwards that this was mentioned in the notes of general badeau's book, which, when they were shown to me, i asked to have stricken out; yet it was retained there, though against my wishes. i make this statement here because, although i have often made it before, it has never been in my power until now to place it where it will correct history; and i desire to rectify all injustice that i may have done to individuals, particularly to officers who were gallantly serving their country during the trying period of the war for the preservation of the union. general butler certainly gave his very earnest support to the war; and he gave his own best efforts personally to the suppression of the rebellion. the further operations of the army of the james can best be treated of in connection with those of the army of the potomac, the two being so intimately associated and connected as to be substantially one body in which the individuality of the supporting wing is merged. before giving the reader a summary of sherman's great atlanta campaign, which must conclude my description of the various co-operative movements preparatory to proceeding with that of the operations of the centre, i will briefly mention sheridan's first raid upon lee's communications which, though an incident of the operations on the main line and not specifically marked out in the original plan, attained in its brilliant execution and results all the proportions of an independent campaign. by thus anticipating, in point of time, i will be able to more perfectly observe the continuity of events occurring in my immediate front when i shall have undertaken to describe our advance from the rapidan. on the 8th of may, just after the battle of the wilderness and when we were moving on spottsylvania i directed sheridan verbally to cut loose from the army of the potomac, pass around the left of lee's army and attack his cavalry: to cut the two roads--one running west through gordonsville, charlottesville and lynchburg, the other to richmond, and, when compelled to do so for want of forage and rations, to move on to the james river and draw these from butler's supplies. this move took him past the entire rear of lee's army. these orders were also given in writing through meade. the object of this move was three-fold. first, if successfully executed, and it was, he would annoy the enemy by cutting his line of supplies and telegraphic communications, and destroy or get for his own use supplies in store in the rear and coming up. second, he would draw the enemy's cavalry after him, and thus better protect our flanks, rear and trains than by remaining with the army. third, his absence would save the trains drawing his forage and other supplies from fredericksburg, which had now become our base. he started at daylight the next morning, and accomplished more than was expected. it was sixteen days before he got back to the army of the potomac. the course sheridan took was directly to richmond. before night stuart, commanding the confederate cavalry, came on to the rear of his command. but the advance kept on, crossed the north anna, and at beaver dam, a station on the virginia central railroad, recaptured four hundred union prisoners on their way to richmond, destroyed the road and used and destroyed a large amount of subsistence and medical stores. stuart, seeing that our cavalry was pushing towards richmond, abandoned the pursuit on the morning of the 10th and, by a detour and an exhausting march, interposed between sheridan and richmond at yellow tavern, only about six miles north of the city. sheridan destroyed the railroad and more supplies at ashland, and on the 11th arrived in stuart's front. a severe engagement ensued in which the losses were heavy on both sides, but the rebels were beaten, their leader mortally wounded, and some guns and many prisoners were captured. sheridan passed through the outer defences of richmond, and could, no doubt, have passed through the inner ones. but having no supports near he could not have remained. after caring for his wounded he struck for the james river below the city, to communicate with butler and to rest his men and horses as well as to get food and forage for them. he moved first between the chickahominy and the james, but in the morning (the 12th) he was stopped by batteries at mechanicsville. he then turned to cross to the north side of the chickahominy by meadow bridge. he found this barred, and the defeated confederate cavalry, reorganized, occupying the opposite side. the panic created by his first entrance within the outer works of richmond having subsided troops were sent out to attack his rear. he was now in a perilous position, one from which but few generals could have extricated themselves. the defences of richmond, manned, were to the right, the chickahominy was to the left with no bridge remaining and the opposite bank guarded, to the rear was a force from richmond. this force was attacked and beaten by wilson's and gregg's divisions, while sheridan turned to the left with the remaining division and hastily built a bridge over the chickahominy under the fire of the enemy, forced a crossing and soon dispersed the confederates he found there. the enemy was held back from the stream by the fire of the troops not engaged in bridge building. on the 13th sheridan was at bottom's bridge, over the chickahominy. on the 14th he crossed this stream and on that day went into camp on the james river at haxall's landing. he at once put himself into communication with general butler, who directed all the supplies he wanted to be furnished. sheridan had left the army of the potomac at spottsylvania, but did not know where either this or lee's army was now. great caution therefore had to be exercised in getting back. on the 17th, after resting his command for three days, he started on his return. he moved by the way of white house. the bridge over the pamunkey had been burned by the enemy, but a new one was speedily improvised and the cavalry crossed over it. on the 22d he was at aylett's on the matapony, where he learned the position of the two armies. on the 24th he joined us on the march from north anna to cold harbor, in the vicinity of chesterfield. sheridan in this memorable raid passed entirely around lee's army: encountered his cavalry in four engagements, and defeated them in all; recaptured four hundred union prisoners and killed and captured many of the enemy; destroyed and used many supplies and munitions of war; destroyed miles of railroad and telegraph, and freed us from annoyance by the cavalry of the enemy for more than two weeks. chapter xlix. sherman's campaign in georgia--siege of atlanta--death of general mcpherson--attempt to capture andersonville--capture of atlanta. after separating from sherman in cincinnati i went on to washington, as already stated, while he returned to nashville to assume the duties of his new command. his military division was now composed of four departments and embraced all the territory west of the alleghany mountains and east of the mississippi river, together with the state of arkansas in the trans-mississippi. the most easterly of these was the department of the ohio, general schofield commanding; the next was the department of the cumberland, general thomas commanding; the third the department of the tennessee, general mcpherson commanding; and general steele still commanded the trans-mississippi, or department of arkansas. the last-named department was so far away that sherman could not communicate with it very readily after starting on his spring campaign, and it was therefore soon transferred from his military division to that of the gulf, where general canby, who had relieved general banks, was in command. the movements of the armies, as i have stated in a former chapter, were to be simultaneous, i fixing the day to start when the season should be far enough advanced, it was hoped, for the roads to be in a condition for the troops to march. general sherman at once set himself to work preparing for the task which was assigned him to accomplish in the spring campaign. mcpherson lay at huntsville with about twenty-four thousand men, guarding those points of tennessee which were regarded as most worth holding; thomas, with over sixty thousand men of the army of the cumberland, was at chattanooga; and schofield, with about fourteen thousand men, was at knoxville. with these three armies, numbering about one hundred thousand men in all, sherman was to move on the day fixed for the general advance, with a view of destroying johnston's army and capturing atlanta. he visited each of these commands to inform himself as to their condition, and it was found to be, speaking generally, good. one of the first matters to turn his attention to was that of getting, before the time arrived for starting, an accumulation of supplies forward to chattanooga, sufficiently large to warrant a movement. he found, when he got to that place, that the trains over the single-track railroad, which was frequently interrupted for a day or two at a time, were only sufficient to meet the daily wants of the troops without bringing forward any surplus of any kind. he found, however, that trains were being used to transport all the beef cattle, horses for the cavalry, and even teams that were being brought to the front. he at once changed all this, and required beef cattle, teams, cavalry horses, and everything that could travel, even the troops, to be marched, and used the road exclusively for transporting supplies. in this way he was able to accumulate an abundance before the time finally fixed upon for the move, the 4th of may. as i have said already, johnston was at dalton, which was nearly one-fourth of the way between chattanooga and atlanta. the country is mountainous all the way to atlanta, abounding in mountain streams, some of them of considerable volume. dalton is on ground where water drains towards atlanta and into one of the main streams rising north-east from there and flowing south-west--this being the general direction which all the main streams of that section take, with smaller tributaries entering into them. johnston had been preparing himself for this campaign during the entire winter. the best positions for defence had been selected all the way from dalton back to atlanta, and very strongly intrenched; so that, as he might be forced to fall back from one position, he would have another to fall into in his rear. his position at dalton was so very strongly intrenched that no doubt he expected, or at least hoped, to hold sherman there and prevent him from getting any further. with a less skilful general, and one disposed to take no risks, i have no doubt that he would have succeeded. sherman's plan was to start schofield, who was farthest back, a few days in advance from knoxville, having him move on the direct road to dalton. thomas was to move out to ringgold. it had been sherman's intention to cross mcpherson over the tennessee river at huntsville or decatur, and move him south from there so as to have him come into the road running from chattanooga to atlanta a good distance to the rear of the point johnston was occupying; but when that was contemplated it was hoped that mcpherson alone would have troops enough to cope with johnston, if the latter should move against him while unsupported by the balance of the army. in this he was disappointed. two of mcpherson's veteran divisions had re-enlisted on the express provision that they were to have a furlough. this furlough had not yet expired, and they were not back. then, again, sherman had lent banks two divisions under a. j. smith, the winter before, to co-operate with the trans-mississippi forces, and this with the express pledge that they should be back by a time specified, so as to be prepared for this very campaign. it is hardly necessary to say they were not returned. that department continued to absorb troops to no purpose to the end of the war. this left mcpherson so weak that the part of the plan above indicated had to be changed. he was therefore brought up to chattanooga and moved from there on a road to the right of thomas--the two coming together about dalton. the three armies were abreast, all ready to start promptly on time. sherman soon found that dalton was so strongly fortified that it was useless to make any attempt to carry it by assault; and even to carry it by regular approaches was impracticable. there was a narrowing up in the mountain, between the national and confederate armies, through which a stream, a wagon road and a railroad ran. besides, the stream had been dammed so that the valley was a lake. through this gorge the troops would have to pass. mcpherson was therefore sent around by the right, to come out by the way of snake creek gap into the rear of the enemy. this was a surprise to johnston, and about the 13th he decided to abandon his position at dalton. on the 15th there was very hard fighting about resaca; but our cavalry having been sent around to the right got near the road in the enemy's rear. again johnston fell back, our army pursuing. the pursuit was continued to kingston, which was reached on the 19th with very little fighting, except that newton's division overtook the rear of johnston's army and engaged it. sherman was now obliged to halt for the purpose of bringing up his railroad trains. he was depending upon the railroad for all of his supplies, and as of course the railroad was wholly destroyed as johnston fell back, it had to be rebuilt. this work was pushed forward night and day, and caused much less delay than most persons would naturally expect in a mountainous country where there were so many bridges to be rebuilt. the campaign to atlanta was managed with the most consummate skill, the enemy being flanked out of one position after another all the way there. it is true this was not accomplished without a good deal of fighting --some of it very hard fighting, rising to the dignity of very important battles--neither were single positions gained in a day. on the contrary, weeks were spent at some; and about atlanta more than a month was consumed. it was the 23d of may before the road was finished up to the rear of sherman's army and the pursuit renewed. this pursuit brought him up to the vicinity of allatoona. this place was very strongly intrenched, and naturally a very defensible position. an assault upon it was not thought of, but preparations were made to flank the enemy out of it. this was done by sending a large force around our right, by the way of dallas, to reach the rear of the enemy. before reaching there, however, they found the enemy fortified in their way, and there resulted hard fighting for about a week at a place called new hope church. on the left our troops also were fortified, and as close up to the enemy as they could get. they kept working still farther around to the left toward the railroad. this was the case more particularly with the cavalry. by the 4th of june johnston found that he was being hemmed in so rapidly that he drew off and allatoona was left in our possession. allatoona, being an important place, was strongly intrenched for occupation by our troops before advancing farther, and made a secondary base of supplies. the railroad was finished up to that point, the intrenchments completed, storehouses provided for food, and the army got in readiness for a further advance. the rains, however, were falling in such torrents that it was impossible to move the army by the side roads which they would have to move upon in order to turn johnston out of his new position. while sherman's army lay here, general f. p. blair returned to it, bringing with him the two divisions of veterans who had been on furlough. johnston had fallen back to marietta and kenesaw mountain, where strong intrenchments awaited him. at this latter place our troops made an assault upon the enemy's lines after having got their own lines up close to him, and failed, sustaining considerable loss. but during the progress of the battle schofield was gaining ground to the left; and the cavalry on his left were gaining still more toward the enemy's rear. these operations were completed by the 3d of july, when it was found that johnston had evacuated the place. he was pursued at once. sherman had made every preparation to abandon the railroad, leaving a strong guard in his intrenchments. he had intended, moving out with twenty days' rations and plenty of ammunition, to come in on the railroad again at the chattahoochee river. johnston frustrated this plan by himself starting back as above stated. this time he fell back to the chattahoochee. about the 5th of july he was besieged again, sherman getting easy possession of the chattahoochee river both above and below him. the enemy was again flanked out of his position, or so frightened by flanking movements that on the night of the 9th he fell back across the river. here johnston made a stand until the 17th, when sherman's old tactics prevailed again and the final movement toward atlanta began. johnston was now relieved of the command, and hood superseded him. johnston's tactics in this campaign do not seem to have met with much favor, either in the eyes of the administration at richmond, or of the people of that section of the south in which he was commanding. the very fact of a change of commanders being ordered under such circumstances was an indication of a change of policy, and that now they would become the aggressors--the very thing our troops wanted. for my own part, i think that johnston's tactics were right. anything that could have prolonged the war a year beyond the time that it did finally close, would probably have exhausted the north to such an extent that they might then have abandoned the contest and agreed to a separation. atlanta was very strongly intrenched all the way around in a circle about a mile and a half outside of the city. in addition to this, there were advanced intrenchments which had to be taken before a close siege could be commenced. sure enough, as indicated by the change of commanders, the enemy was about to assume the offensive. on the 20th he came out and attacked the army of the cumberland most furiously. hooker's corps, and newton's and johnson's divisions were the principal ones engaged in this contest, which lasted more than an hour; but the confederates were then forced to fall back inside their main lines. the losses were quite heavy on both sides. on this day general gresham, since our postmaster-general, was very badly wounded. during the night hood abandoned his outer lines, and our troops were advanced. the investment had not been relinquished for a moment during the day. during the night of the 21st hood moved out again, passing by our left flank, which was then in motion to get a position farther in rear of him, and a desperate battle ensued, which lasted most of the day of the 22d. at first the battle went very much in favor of the confederates, our troops being somewhat surprised. while our troops were advancing they were struck in flank, and their flank was enveloped. but they had become too thorough veterans to be thrown into irreparable confusion by an unexpected attack when off their guard, and soon they were in order and engaging the enemy, with the advantage now of knowing where their antagonist was. the field of battle continued to expand until it embraced about seven miles of ground. finally, however, and before night, the enemy was driven back into the city (*26). it was during this battle that mcpherson, while passing from one column to another, was instantly killed. in his death the army lost one of its ablest, purest and best generals. garrard had been sent out with his cavalry to get upon the railroad east of atlanta and to cut it in the direction of augusta. he was successful in this, and returned about the time of the battle. rousseau had also come up from tennessee with a small division of cavalry, having crossed the tennessee river about decatur and made a raid into alabama. finally, when hard pressed, he had come in, striking the railroad in rear of sherman, and reported to him about this time. the battle of the 22d is usually known as the battle of atlanta, although the city did not fall into our hands until the 2d of september. preparations went on, as before, to flank the enemy out of his position. the work was tedious, and the lines that had to be maintained were very long. our troops were gradually worked around to the east until they struck the road between decatur and atlanta. these lines were strongly fortified, as were those to the north and west of the city--all as close up to the enemy's lines as practicable--in order to hold them with the smallest possible number of men, the design being to detach an army to move by our right and try to get upon the railroad down south of atlanta. on the 27th the movement by the right flank commenced. on the 28th the enemy struck our right flank, general logan commanding, with great vigor. logan intrenched himself hastily, and by that means was enabled to resist all assaults and inflict a great deal of damage upon the enemy. these assaults were continued to the middle of the afternoon, and resumed once or twice still later in the day. the enemy's losses in these unsuccessful assaults were fearful. during that evening the enemy in logan's front withdrew into the town. this now left sherman's army close up to the confederate lines, extending from a point directly east of the city around by the north and west of it for a distance of fully ten miles; the whole of this line being intrenched, and made stronger every day they remained there. in the latter part of july sherman sent stoneman to destroy the railroads to the south, about macon. he was then to go east and, if possible, release our prisoners about andersonville. there were painful stories current at the time about the great hardships these prisoners had to endure in the way of general bad treatment, in the way in which they were housed, and in the way in which they were fed. great sympathy was felt for them; and it was thought that even if they could be turned loose upon the country it would be a great relief to them. but the attempt proved a failure. mccook, who commanded a small brigade, was first reported to have been captured; but he got back, having inflicted a good deal of damage upon the enemy. he had also taken some prisoners; but encountering afterwards a largely superior force of the enemy he was obliged to drop his prisoners and get back as best he could with what men he had left. he had lost several hundred men out of his small command. on the 4th of august colonel adams, commanding a little brigade of about a thousand men, returned reporting stoneman and all but himself as lost. i myself had heard around richmond of the capture of stoneman, and had sent sherman word, which he received. the rumor was confirmed there, also, from other sources. a few days after colonel adams's return colonel capron also got in with a small detachment and confirmed the report of the capture of stoneman with something less than a thousand men. it seems that stoneman, finding the escape of all his force was impossible, had made arrangements for the escape of two divisions. he covered the movement of these divisions to the rear with a force of about seven hundred men, and at length surrendered himself and this detachment to the commanding confederate. in this raid, however, much damage was inflicted upon the enemy by the destruction of cars, locomotives, army wagons, manufactories of military supplies, etc. on the 4th and 5th sherman endeavored to get upon the railroad to our right, where schofield was in command, but these attempts failed utterly. general palmer was charged with being the cause of this failure, to a great extent, by both general sherman and general schofield; but i am not prepared to say this, although a question seems to have arisen with palmer as to whether schofield had any right to command him. if he did raise this question while an action was going on, that act alone was exceedingly reprehensible. about the same time wheeler got upon our railroad north of resaca and destroyed it nearly up to dalton. this cut sherman off from communication with the north for several days. sherman responded to this attack on his lines of communication by directing one upon theirs. kilpatrick started on the night of the 18th of august to reach the macon road about jonesboro. he succeeded in doing so, passed entirely around the confederate lines of atlanta, and was back again in his former position on our left by the 22d. these little affairs, however, contributed but very little to the grand result. they annoyed, it is true, but any damage thus done to a railroad by any cavalry expedition is soon repaired. sherman made preparations for a repetition of his tactics; that is, for a flank movement with as large a force as could be got together to some point in the enemy's rear. sherman commenced this last movement on the 25th of august, and on the 1st of september was well up towards the railroad twenty miles south of atlanta. here he found hardee intrenched, ready to meet him. a battle ensued, but he was unable to drive hardee away before night set in. under cover of the night, however, hardee left of his own accord. that night hood blew up his military works, such as he thought would be valuable in our hands, and decamped. the next morning at daylight general h. w. slocum, who was commanding north of the city, moved in and took possession of atlanta, and notified sherman. sherman then moved deliberately back, taking three days to reach the city, and occupied a line extending from decatur on the left to atlanta in the centre, with his troops extending out of the city for some distance to the right. the campaign had lasted about four months, and was one of the most memorable in history. there was but little if anything in the whole campaign, now that it is over, to criticise at all, and nothing to criticise severely. it was creditable alike to the general who commanded and the army which had executed it. sherman had on this campaign some bright, wide-awake division and brigade commanders whose alertness added a host to the efficiency of his command. the troops now went to work to make themselves comfortable, and to enjoy a little rest after their arduous campaign. the city of atlanta was turned into a military base. the citizens were all compelled to leave. sherman also very wisely prohibited the assembling of the army of sutlers and traders who always follow in the wake of an army in the field, if permitted to do so, from trading with the citizens and getting the money of the soldiers for articles of but little use to them, and for which they are made to pay most exorbitant prices. he limited the number of these traders to one for each of his three armies. the news of sherman's success reached the north instantaneously, and set the country all aglow. this was the first great political campaign for the republicans in their canvass of 1864. it was followed later by sheridan's campaign in the shenandoah valley; and these two campaigns probably had more effect in settling the election of the following november than all the speeches, all the bonfires, and all the parading with banners and bands of music in the north. chapter l. grand movement of the army of the potomac--crossing the rapidan --entering the wilderness--battle of the wilderness. soon after midnight, may 3d-4th, the army of the potomac moved out from its position north rapidan, to start upon that memorable campaign, destined to result in the capture of the confederate capital and the army defending it. this was not to be accomplished, however, without as desperate fighting as the world has ever witnessed; not to be consummated in a day, a week, a month, single season. the losses inflicted, and endured, were destined to be severe; but the armies now confronting each other had already been in deadly conflict for a period of three years, with immense losses in killed, by death from sickness, captured and wounded; and neither had made any real progress accomplishing the final end. it is true the confederates had, so far, held their capital, and they claimed this to be their sole object. but previously they had boldly proclaimed their intention to capture philadelphia, new york, and the national capital, and had made several attempts to do so, and once or twice had come fearfully near making their boast good--too near for complacent contemplation by the loyal north. they had also come near losing their own capital on at least one occasion. so here was a stand-off. the campaign now begun was destined to result in heavier losses, to both armies, in a given time, than any previously suffered; but the carnage was to be limited to a single year, and to accomplish all that had been anticipated or desired at the beginning in that time. we had to have hard fighting to achieve this. the two armies had been confronting each other so long, without any decisive result, that they hardly knew which could whip. ten days' rations, with a supply of forage and ammunition were taken in wagons. beef cattle were driven with the trains, and butchered as wanted. three days rations in addition, in haversacks, and fifty rounds of cartridges, were carried on the person of each soldier. the country over which the army had to operate, from the rapidan to the crossing of the james river, is rather flat, and is cut by numerous streams which make their way to the chesapeake bay. the crossings of these streams by the army were generally made not far above tide-water, and where they formed a considerable obstacle to the rapid advance of troops even when the enemy did not appear in opposition. the country roads were narrow and poor. most of the country is covered with a dense forest, in places, like the wilderness and along the chickahominy, almost impenetrable even for infantry except along the roads. all bridges were naturally destroyed before the national troops came to them. the army of the potomac was composed of three infantry and one cavalry corps, commanded respectively by generals w. s. hancock, g. k. warren, (*27) john sedgwick and p. h. sheridan. the artillery was commanded by general henry j. hunt. this arm was in such abundance that the fourth of it could not be used to advantage in such a country as we were destined to pass through. the surplus was much in the way, taking up as it did so much of the narrow and bad roads, and consuming so much of the forage and other stores brought up by the trains. the 5th corps, general warren commanding, was in advance on the right, and marched directly for germania ford, preceded by one division of cavalry, under general j. h. wilson. general sedgwick followed warren with the 6th corps. germania ford was nine or ten miles below the right of lee's line. hancock, with the 2d corps, moved by another road, farther east, directly upon ely's ford, six miles below germania, preceded by gregg's division of cavalry, and followed by the artillery. torbert's division of cavalry was left north of the rapidan, for the time, to picket the river and prevent the enemy from crossing and getting into our rear. the cavalry seized the two crossings before daylight, drove the enemy's pickets guarding them away, and by six o'clock a.m. had the pontoons laid ready for the crossing of the infantry and artillery. this was undoubtedly a surprise to lee. the fact that the movement was unopposed proves this. burnside, with the 9th corps, was left back at warrenton, guarding the railroad from bull run forward to preserve control of it in case our crossing the rapidan should be long delayed. he was instructed, however, to advance at once on receiving notice that the army had crossed; and a dispatch was sent to him a little after one p.m. giving the information that our crossing had been successful. the country was heavily wooded at all the points of crossing, particularly on the south side of the river. the battle-field from the crossing of the rapidan until the final movement from the wilderness toward spottsylvania was of the same character. there were some clearings and small farms within what might be termed the battle-field; but generally the country was covered with a dense forest. the roads were narrow and bad. all the conditions were favorable for defensive operations. there are two roads, good for that part of virginia, running from orange court house to the battle-field. the most southerly of these roads is known as the orange court house plank road, the northern one as the orange turnpike. there are also roads from east of the battle-field running to spottsylvania court house, one from chancellorsville, branching at aldrich's; the western branch going by piney branch church, alsop's, thence by the brock road to spottsylvania; the east branch goes by gates's, thence to spottsylvania. the brock road runs from germania ford through the battle-field and on to the court house. as spottsylvania is approached the country is cut up with numerous roads, some going to the town direct, and others crossing so as to connect the farms with roads going there. lee's headquarters were at orange court house. from there to fredericksburg he had the use of the two roads above described running nearly parallel to the wilderness. this gave him unusual facilities, for that country, for concentrating his forces to his right. these roads strike the road from germania ford in the wilderness. as soon as the crossing of the infantry was assured, the cavalry pushed forward, wilson's division by wilderness tavern to parker's store, on the orange plank road; gregg to the left towards chancellorsville. warren followed wilson and reached the wilderness tavern by noon, took position there and intrenched. sedgwick followed warren. he was across the river and in camp on the south bank, on the right of warren, by sundown. hancock, with the 2d corps, moved parallel with warren and camped about six miles east of him. before night all the troops, and by the evening of the 5th the trains of more than four thousand wagons, were safely on the south side of the river. there never was a corps better organized than was the quartermaster's corps with the army of the potomac in 1864. with a wagon-train that would have extended from the rapidan to richmond, stretched along in single file and separated as the teams necessarily would be when moving, we could still carry only three days' forage and about ten to twelve days' rations, besides a supply of ammunition. to overcome all difficulties, the chief quartermaster, general rufus ingalls, had marked on each wagon the corps badge with the division color and the number of the brigade. at a glance, the particular brigade to which any wagon belonged could be told. the wagons were also marked to note the contents: if ammunition, whether for artillery or infantry; if forage, whether grain or hay; if rations, whether, bread, pork, beans, rice, sugar, coffee or whatever it might be. empty wagons were never allowed to follow the army or stay in camp. as soon as a wagon was empty it would return to the base of supply for a load of precisely the same article that had been taken from it. empty trains were obliged to leave the road free for loaded ones. arriving near the army they would be parked in fields nearest to the brigades they belonged to. issues, except of ammunition, were made at night in all cases. by this system the hauling of forage for the supply train was almost wholly dispensed with. they consumed theirs at the depots. i left culpeper court house after all the troops had been put in motion, and passing rapidly to the front, crossed the rapidan in advance of sedgwick's corps; and established headquarters for the afternoon and night in a deserted house near the river. orders had been given, long before this movement began, to cut down the baggage of officers and men to the lowest point possible. notwithstanding this i saw scattered along the road from culpeper to germania ford wagon-loads of new blankets and overcoats, thrown away by the troops to lighten their knapsacks; an improvidence i had never witnessed before. lee, while his pickets and signal corps must have discovered at a very early hour on the morning of the 4th of may, that the army of the potomac was moving, evidently did not learn until about one o'clock in the afternoon by what route we would confront his army. this i judge from the fact that at 1.15 p.m., an hour and a quarter after warren had reached old wilderness tavern, our officers took off rebel signals which, when translated, were seen to be an order to his troops to occupy their intrenchments at mine run. here at night dispatches were received announcing that sherman, butler and crook had moved according to programme. on discovering the advance of the army of the potomac, lee ordered hill, ewell and longstreet, each commanding corps, to move to the right to attack us, hill on the orange plank road, longstreet to follow on the same road. longstreet was at this time--middle of the afternoon--at gordonsville, twenty or more miles away. ewell was ordered by the orange pike. he was near by and arrived some four miles east of mine run before bivouacking for the night. my orders were given through general meade for an early advance on the morning of the 5th. warren was to move to parker's store, and wilson's cavalry--then at parker's store--to move on to craig's meeting-house. sedgwick followed warren, closing in on his right. the army of the potomac was facing to the west, though our advance was made to the south, except when facing the enemy. hancock was to move south-westward to join on the left of warren, his left to reach to shady grove church. at six o'clock, before reaching parker's store, warren discovered the enemy. he sent word back to this effect, and was ordered to halt and prepare to meet and attack him. wright, with his division of sedgwick's corps, was ordered, by any road he could find, to join on to warren's right, and getty with his division, also of sedgwick's corps, was ordered to move rapidly by warren's rear and get on his left. this was the speediest way to reinforce warren who was confronting the enemy on both the orange plank and turnpike roads. burnside had moved promptly on the 4th, on receiving word that the army of the potomac had safely crossed the rapidan. by making a night march, although some of his troops had to march forty miles to reach the river, he was crossing with the head of his column early on the morning of the 5th. meade moved his headquarters on to old wilderness tavern, four miles south of the river, as soon as it was light enough to see the road. i remained to hasten burnside's crossing and to put him in position. burnside at this time was not under meade's command, and was his senior in rank. getting information of the proximity of the enemy, i informed meade, and without waiting to see burnside, at once moved forward my headquarters to where meade was. it was my plan then, as it was on all other occasions, to take the initiative whenever the enemy could be drawn from his intrenchments if we were not intrenched ourselves. warren had not yet reached the point where he was to halt, when he discovered the enemy near by. neither party had any advantage of position. warren was, therefore, ordered to attack as soon as he could prepare for it. at nine o'clock hancock was ordered to come up to the support of getty. he himself arrived at getty's front about noon, but his troops were yet far in the rear. getty was directed to hold his position at all hazards until relieved. about this hour warren was ready, and attacked with favorable though not decisive results. getty was somewhat isolated from warren and was in a precarious condition for a time. wilson, with his division of cavalry, was farther south, and was cut off from the rest of the army. at two o'clock hancock's troops began to arrive, and immediately he was ordered to join getty and attack the enemy. but the heavy timber and narrow roads prevented him from getting into position for attack as promptly as he generally did when receiving such orders. at four o'clock he again received his orders to attack, and general getty received orders from meade a few minutes later to attack whether hancock was ready or not. he met the enemy under heth within a few hundred yards. hancock immediately sent two divisions, commanded by birney and mott, and later two brigades, carroll's and owen's, to the support of getty. this was timely and saved getty. during the battle getty and carroll were wounded, but remained on the field. one of birney's most gallant brigade commanders--alexander hays--was killed. i had been at west point with hays for three years, and had served with him through the mexican war, a portion of the time in the same regiment. he was a most gallant officer, ready to lead his command wherever ordered. with him it was "come, boys," not "go." wadsworth's division and baxter's brigade of the 2d division were sent to reinforce hancock and getty; but the density of the intervening forest was such that, there being no road to march upon, they did not get up with the head of column until night, and bivouacked where they were without getting into position. during the afternoon sheridan sent gregg's division of cavalry to todd's tavern in search of wilson. this was fortunate. he found wilson engaged with a superior force under general rosser, supported by infantry, and falling back before it. together they were strong enough to turn the tables upon the enemy and themselves become aggressive. they soon drove the rebel cavalry back beyond corbin's bridge. fighting between hancock and hill continued until night put a close to it. neither side made any special progress. after the close of the battle of the 5th of may my orders were given for the following morning. we knew longstreet with 12,000 men was on his way to join hill's right, near the brock road, and might arrive during the night. i was anxious that the rebels should not take the initiative in the morning, and therefore ordered hancock to make an assault at 4.30 o'clock. meade asked to have the hour changed to six. deferring to his wishes as far as i was willing, the order was modified and five was fixed as the hour to move. hancock had now fully one-half of the army of the potomac. wadsworth with his division, which had arrived the night before, lay in a line perpendicular to that held by hill, and to the right of hancock. he was directed to move at the same time, and to attack hill's left. burnside, who was coming up with two divisions, was directed to get in between warren and wadsworth, and attack as soon as he could get in position to do so. sedgwick and warren were to make attacks in their front, to detain as many of the enemy as they could and to take advantage of any attempt to reinforce hill from that quarter. burnside was ordered if he should succeed in breaking the enemy's centre, to swing around to the left and envelop the right of lee's army. hancock was informed of all the movements ordered. burnside had three divisions, but one of them--a colored division--was sent to guard the wagon train, and he did not see it again until july. lee was evidently very anxious that there should be no battle on his right until longstreet got up. this is evident from the fact that notwithstanding the early hour at which i had ordered the assault, both for the purpose of being the attacking party and to strike before longstreet got up, lee was ahead in his assault on our right. his purpose was evident, but he failed. hancock was ready to advance by the hour named, but learning in time that longstreet was moving a part of his corps by the catharpin road, thus threatening his left flank, sent a division of infantry, commanded by general barlow, with all his artillery, to cover the approaches by which longstreet was expected. this disposition was made in time to attack as ordered. hancock moved by the left of the orange plank road, and wadsworth by the right of it. the fighting was desperate for about an hour, when the enemy began to break up in great confusion. i believed then, and see no reason to change that opinion now, that if the country had been such that hancock and his command could have seen the confusion and panic in the lines of the enemy, it would have been taken advantage of so effectually that lee would not have made another stand outside of his richmond defences. gibbon commanded hancock's left, and was ordered to attack, but was not able to accomplish much. on the morning of the 6th sheridan was sent to connect with hancock's left and attack the enemy's cavalry who were trying to get on our left and rear. he met them at the intersection of the furnace and brock roads and at todd's tavern, and defeated them at both places. later he was attacked, and again the enemy was repulsed. hancock heard the firing between sheridan and stuart, and thinking the enemy coming by that road, still further reinforced his position guarding the entrance to the brock road. another incident happened during the day to further induce hancock to weaken his attacking column. word reached him that troops were seen moving towards him from the direction of todd's tavern, and brooke's brigade was detached to meet this new enemy; but the troops approaching proved to be several hundred convalescents coming from chancellorsville, by the road hancock had advanced upon, to join their respective commands. at 6.50 o'clock a.m., burnside, who had passed wilderness tavern at six o'clock, was ordered to send a division to the support of hancock, but to continue with the remainder of his command in the execution of his previous order. the difficulty of making a way through the dense forests prevented burnside from getting up in time to be of any service on the forenoon of the sixth. hancock followed hill's retreating forces, in the morning, a mile or more. he maintained this position until, along in the afternoon, longstreet came upon him. the retreating column of hill meeting reinforcements that had not yet been engaged, became encouraged and returned with them. they were enabled, from the density of the forest, to approach within a few hundred yards of our advance before being discovered. falling upon a brigade of hancock's corps thrown to the advance, they swept it away almost instantly. the enemy followed up his advantage and soon came upon mott's division, which fell back in great confusion. hancock made dispositions to hold his advanced position, but after holding it for a time, fell back into the position that he had held in the morning, which was strongly intrenched. in this engagement the intrepid wadsworth while trying to rally his men was mortally wounded and fell into the hands of the enemy. the enemy followed up, but made no immediate attack. the confederate general jenkins was killed and longstreet seriously wounded in this engagement. longstreet had to leave the field, not to resume command for many weeks. his loss was a severe one to lee, and compensated in a great measure for the mishap, or misapprehensions, which had fallen to our lot during the day. after longstreet's removal from the field lee took command of his right in person. he was not able, however, to rally his men to attack hancock's position, and withdrew from our front for the purpose of reforming. hancock sent a brigade to clear his front of all remnants that might be left of longstreet's or hill's commands. this brigade having been formed at right angles to the intrenchments held by hancock's command, swept down the whole length of them from left to right. a brigade of the enemy was encountered in this move; but it broke and disappeared without a contest. firing was continued after this, but with less fury. burnside had not yet been able to get up to render any assistance. but it was now only about nine in the morning, and he was getting into position on hancock's right. at 4.15 in the afternoon lee attacked our left. his line moved up to within a hundred yards of ours and opened a heavy fire. this status was maintained for about half an hour. then a part of mott's division and ward's brigade of birney's division gave way and retired in disorder. the enemy under r. h. anderson took advantage of this and pushed through our line, planting their flags on a part of the intrenchments not on fire. but owing to the efforts of hancock, their success was but temporary. carroll, of gibbon's division, moved at a double quick with his brigade and drove back the enemy, inflicting great loss. fighting had continued from five in the morning sometimes along the whole line, at other times only in places. the ground fought over had varied in width, but averaged three-quarters of a mile. the killed, and many of the severely wounded, of both armies, lay within this belt where it was impossible to reach them. the woods were set on fire by the bursting shells, and the conflagration raged. the wounded who had not strength to move themselves were either suffocated or burned to death. finally the fire communicated with our breastworks, in places. being constructed of wood, they burned with great fury. but the battle still raged, our men firing through the flames until it became too hot to remain longer. lee was now in distress. his men were in confusion, and his personal efforts failed to restore order. these facts, however, were learned subsequently, or we would have taken advantage of his condition and no doubt gained a decisive success. his troops were withdrawn now, but i revoked the order, which i had given previously to this assault, for hancock to attack, because his troops had exhausted their ammunition and did not have time to replenish from the train, which was at some distance. burnside, sedgwick, and warren had all kept up an assault during all this time; but their efforts had no other effect than to prevent the enemy from reinforcing his right from the troops in their front. i had, on the 5th, ordered all the bridges over the rapidan to be taken up except one at germania ford. the troops on sedgwick's right had been sent to enforce our left. this left our right in danger of being turned, and us of being cut off from all present base of supplies. sedgwick had refused his right and intrenched it for protection against attack. but late in the afternoon of the 6th early came out from his lines in considerable force and got in upon sedgwick's right, notwithstanding the precautions taken, and created considerable confusion. early captured several hundred prisoners, among them two general officers. the defence, however, was vigorous; and night coming on, the enemy was thrown into as much confusion as our troops, engaged, were. early says in his memoirs that if we had discovered the confusion in his lines we might have brought fresh troops to his great discomfort. many officers, who had not been attacked by early, continued coming to my headquarters even after sedgwick had rectified his lines a little farther to the rear, with news of the disaster, fully impressed with the idea that the enemy was pushing on and would soon be upon me. during the night all of lee's army withdrew within their intrenchments. on the morning of the 7th general custer drove the enemy's cavalry from catharpin furnace to todd's tavern. pickets and skirmishers were sent along our entire front to find the position of the enemy. some went as far as a mile and a half before finding him. but lee showed no disposition to come out of his works. there was no battle during the day, and but little firing except in warren's front; he being directed about noon to make a reconnoissance in force. this drew some sharp firing, but there was no attempt on the part of lee to drive him back. this ended the battle of the wilderness. chapter li. after the battle--telegraph and signal service--movement by the left flank. more desperate fighting has not been witnessed on this continent than that of the 5th and 6th of may. our victory consisted in having successfully crossed a formidable stream, almost in the face of an enemy, and in getting the army together as a unit. we gained an advantage on the morning of the 6th, which, if it had been followed up, must have proven very decisive. in the evening the enemy gained an advantage; but was speedily repulsed. as we stood at the close, the two armies were relatively in about the same condition to meet each other as when the river divided them. but the fact of having safely crossed was a victory. our losses in the wilderness were very severe. those of the confederates must have been even more so; but i have no means of speaking with accuracy upon this point. the germania ford bridge was transferred to ely's ford to facilitate the transportation of the wounded to washington. it may be as well here as elsewhere to state two things connected with all movements of the army of the potomac: first, in every change of position or halt for the night, whether confronting the enemy or not, the moment arms were stacked the men intrenched themselves. for this purpose they would build up piles of logs or rails if they could be found in their front, and dig a ditch, throwing the dirt forward on the timber. thus the digging they did counted in making a depression to stand in, and increased the elevation in front of them. it was wonderful how quickly they could in this way construct defences of considerable strength. when a halt was made with the view of assaulting the enemy, or in his presence, these would be strengthened or their positions changed under the direction of engineer officers. the second was, the use made of the telegraph and signal corps. nothing could be more complete than the organization and discipline of this body of brave and intelligent men. insulated wires--insulated so that they would transmit messages in a storm, on the ground or under water--were wound upon reels, making about two hundred pounds weight of wire to each reel. two men and one mule were detailed to each reel. the pack-saddle on which this was carried was provided with a rack like a sawbuck placed crosswise of the saddle, and raised above it so that the reel, with its wire, would revolve freely. there was a wagon, supplied with a telegraph operator, battery and telegraph instruments for each division, each corps, each army, and one for my headquarters. there were wagons also loaded with light poles, about the size and length of a wall tent pole, supplied with an iron spike in one end, used to hold the wires up when laid, so that wagons and artillery would not run over them. the mules thus loaded were assigned to brigades, and always kept with the command they were assigned to. the operators were also assigned to particular headquarters, and never changed except by special orders. the moment the troops were put in position to go into camp all the men connected with this branch of service would proceed to put up their wires. a mule loaded with a coil of wire would be led to the rear of the nearest flank of the brigade he belonged to, and would be led in a line parallel thereto, while one man would hold an end of the wire and uncoil it as the mule was led off. when he had walked the length of the wire the whole of it would be on the ground. this would be done in rear of every brigade at the same time. the ends of all the wires would then be joined, making a continuous wire in the rear of the whole army. the men, attached to brigades or divisions, would all commence at once raising the wires with their telegraph poles. this was done by making a loop in the wire and putting it over the spike and raising the pole to a perpendicular position. at intervals the wire would be attached to trees, or some other permanent object, so that one pole was sufficient at a place. in the absence of such a support two poles would have to be used, at intervals, placed at an angle so as to hold the wire firm in its place. while this was being done the telegraph wagons would take their positions near where the headquarters they belonged to were to be established, and would connect with the wire. thus, in a few minutes longer time than it took a mule to walk the length of its coil, telegraphic communication would be effected between all the headquarters of the army. no orders ever had to be given to establish the telegraph. the signal service was used on the march. the men composing this corps were assigned to specified commands. when movements were made, they would go in advance, or on the flanks, and seize upon high points of ground giving a commanding view of the country, if cleared, or would climb tall trees on the highest points if not cleared, and would denote, by signals, the positions of different parts of our own army, and often the movements of the enemy. they would also take off the signals of the enemy and transmit them. it would sometimes take too long a time to make translations of intercepted dispatches for us to receive any benefit from them. but sometimes they gave useful information. on the afternoon of the 7th i received news from washington announcing that sherman had probably attacked johnston that day, and that butler had reached city point safely and taken it by surprise on the 5th. i had given orders for a movement by the left flank, fearing that lee might move rapidly to richmond to crush butler before i could get there. my order for this movement was as follows: headquarters armies of the u. s., may 7, 1864, 6.30 a.m. major-general meade, commanding a. p. make all preparations during the day for a night march to take position at spottsylvania c. h. with one army corps, at todd's tavern with one, and another near the intersection of the piney branch and spottsylvania road with the road from alsop's to old court house. if this move is made the trains should be thrown forward early in the morning to the ny river. i think it would be advisable in making the change to leave hancock where he is until warren passes him. he could then follow and become the right of the new line. burnside will move to piney branch church. sedgwick can move along the pike to chancellorsville and on to his destination. burnside will move on the plank road to the intersection of it with the orange and fredericksburg plank road, then follow sedgwick to his place of destination. all vehicles should be got out of hearing of the enemy before the troops move, and then move off quietly. it is more than probable that the enemy concentrate for a heavy attack on hancock this afternoon. in case they do we must be prepared to resist them, and follow up any success we may gain, with our whole force. such a result would necessarily modify these instructions. all the hospitals should be moved to-day to chancellorsville. u. s. grant, lieut.-general. during the 7th sheridan had a fight with the rebel cavalry at todd's tavern, but routed them, thus opening the way for the troops that were to go by that route at night. soon after dark warren withdrew from the front of the enemy, and was soon followed by sedgwick. warren's march carried him immediately behind the works where hancock's command lay on the brock road. with my staff and a small escort of cavalry i preceded the troops. meade with his staff accompanied me. the greatest enthusiasm was manifested by hancock's men as we passed by. no doubt it was inspired by the fact that the movement was south. it indicated to them that they had passed through the "beginning of the end" in the battle just fought. the cheering was so lusty that the enemy must have taken it for a night attack. at all events it drew from him a furious fusillade of artillery and musketry, plainly heard but not felt by us. meade and i rode in advance. we had passed but a little way beyond our left when the road forked. we looked to see, if we could, which road sheridan had taken with his cavalry during the day. it seemed to be the right-hand one, and accordingly we took it. we had not gone far, however, when colonel c. b. comstock, of my staff, with the instinct of the engineer, suspecting that we were on a road that would lead us into the lines of the enemy, if he, too, should be moving, dashed by at a rapid gallop and all alone. in a few minutes he returned and reported that lee was moving, and that the road we were on would bring us into his lines in a short distance. we returned to the forks of the road, left a man to indicate the right road to the head of warren's column when it should come up, and continued our journey to todd's tavern, where we arrived after midnight. my object in moving to spottsylvania was two-fold: first, i did not want lee to get back to richmond in time to attempt to crush butler before i could get there; second, i wanted to get between his army and richmond if possible; and, if not, to draw him into the open field. but lee, by accident, beat us to spottsylvania. our wagon trains had been ordered easterly of the roads the troops were to march upon before the movement commenced. lee interpreted this as a semi-retreat of the army of the potomac to fredericksburg, and so informed his government. accordingly he ordered longstreet's corps--now commanded by anderson--to move in the morning (the 8th) to spottsylvania. but the woods being still on fire, anderson could not go into bivouac, and marched directly on to his destination that night. by this accident lee got possession of spottsylvania. it is impossible to say now what would have been the result if lee's orders had been obeyed as given; but it is certain that we would have been in spottsylvania, and between him and his capital. my belief is that there would have been a race between the two armies to see which could reach richmond first, and the army of the potomac would have had the shorter line. thus, twice since crossing the rapidan we came near closing the campaign, so far as battles were concerned, from the rapidan to the james river or richmond. the first failure was caused by our not following up the success gained over hill's corps on the morning of the 6th, as before described: the second, when fires caused by that battle drove anderson to make a march during the night of the 7th-8th which he was ordered to commence on the morning of the 8th. but accident often decides the fate of battle. sheridan's cavalry had had considerable fighting during the afternoon of the 7th, lasting at todd's tavern until after night, with the field his at the close. he issued the necessary orders for seizing spottsylvania and holding the bridge over the po river, which lee's troops would have to cross to get to spottsylvania. but meade changed sheridan's orders to merritt--who was holding the bridge--on his arrival at todd's tavern, and thereby left the road free for anderson when he came up. wilson, who was ordered to seize the town, did so, with his division of cavalry; but he could not hold it against the confederate corps which had not been detained at the crossing of the po, as it would have been but for the unfortunate change in merritt's orders. had he been permitted to execute the orders sheridan gave him, he would have been guarding with two brigades of cavalry the bridge over the po river which anderson had to cross, and must have detained him long enough to enable warren to reinforce wilson and hold the town. anderson soon intrenched himself--if indeed the intrenchments were not already made--immediately across warren's front. warren was not aware of his presence, but probably supposed it was the cavalry which merritt had engaged earlier in the day. he assaulted at once, but was repulsed. he soon organized his men, as they were not pursued by the enemy, and made a second attack, this time with his whole corps. this time he succeeded in gaining a position immediately in the enemy's front, where he intrenched. his right and left divisions--the former crawford's, the latter wadsworth's, now commanded by cutler--drove the enemy back some distance. at this time my headquarters had been advanced to piney branch church. i was anxious to crush anderson before lee could get a force to his support. to this end sedgwick who was at piney branch church, was ordered to warren's support. hancock, who was at todd's tavern, was notified of warren's engagement, and was directed to be in readiness to come up. burnside, who was with the wagon trains at aldrich's on our extreme left, received the same instructions. sedgwick was slow in getting up for some reason--probably unavoidable, because he was never at fault when serious work was to be done--so that it was near night before the combined forces were ready to attack. even then all of sedgwick's command did not get into the engagement. warren led the last assault, one division at a time, and of course it failed. warren's difficulty was twofold: when he received an order to do anything, it would at once occur to his mind how all the balance of the army should be engaged so as properly to co-operate with him. his ideas were generally good, but he would forget that the person giving him orders had thought of others at the time he had of him. in like manner, when he did get ready to execute an order, after giving most intelligent instructions to division commanders, he would go in with one division, holding the others in reserve until he could superintend their movements in person also, forgetting that division commanders could execute an order without his presence. his difficulty was constitutional and beyond his control. he was an officer of superior ability, quick perceptions, and personal courage to accomplish anything that could be done with a small command. lee had ordered hill's corps--now commanded by early--to move by the very road we had marched upon. this shows that even early in the morning of the 8th lee had not yet become acquainted with my move, but still thought that the army of the potomac had gone to fredericksburg. indeed, he informed the authorities at richmond he had possession of spottsylvania and was on my flank. anderson was in possession of spottsylvania, through no foresight of lee, however. early only found that he had been following us when he ran against hancock at todd's tavern. his coming detained hancock from the battle-field of spottsylvania for that day; but he, in like manner, kept early back and forced him to move by another route. had i ordered the movement for the night of the 7th by my left flank, it would have put hancock in the lead. it would also have given us an hour or earlier start. it took all that time for warren to get the head of his column to the left of hancock after he had got his troops out of their line confronting the enemy. this hour, and hancock's capacity to use his whole force when necessary, would, no doubt, have enabled him to crush anderson before he could be reinforced. but the movement made was tactical. it kept the troops in mass against a possible assault by the enemy. our left occupied its intrenchments while the two corps to the right passed. if an attack had been made by the enemy he would have found the 2d corps in position, fortified, and, practically, the 5th and 6th corps in position as reserves, until his entire front was passed. by a left flank movement the army would have been scattered while still passing the front of the enemy, and before the extreme right had got by it would have been very much exposed. then, too, i had not yet learned the special qualifications of the different corps commanders. at that time my judgment was that warren was the man i would suggest to succeed meade should anything happen to that gallant soldier to take him from the field. as i have before said, warren was a gallant soldier, an able man; and he was beside thoroughly imbued with the solemnity and importance of the duty he had to perform. personal memoirs of u. s. grant, part 1. by u. s. grant preface. "man proposes and god disposes." there are but few important events in the affairs of men brought about by their own choice. although frequently urged by friends to write my memoirs i had determined never to do so, nor to write anything for publication. at the age of nearly sixty-two i received an injury from a fall, which confined me closely to the house while it did not apparently affect my general health. this made study a pleasant pastime. shortly after, the rascality of a business partner developed itself by the announcement of a failure. this was followed soon after by universal depression of all securities, which seemed to threaten the extinction of a good part of the income still retained, and for which i am indebted to the kindly act of friends. at this juncture the editor of the century magazine asked me to write a few articles for him. i consented for the money it gave me; for at that moment i was living upon borrowed money. the work i found congenial, and i determined to continue it. the event is an important one for me, for good or evil; i hope for the former. in preparing these volumes for the public, i have entered upon the task with the sincere desire to avoid doing injustice to any one, whether on the national or confederate side, other than the unavoidable injustice of not making mention often where special mention is due. there must be many errors of omission in this work, because the subject is too large to be treated of in two volumes in such way as to do justice to all the officers and men engaged. there were thousands of instances, during the rebellion, of individual, company, regimental and brigade deeds of heroism which deserve special mention and are not here alluded to. the troops engaged in them will have to look to the detailed reports of their individual commanders for the full history of those deeds. the first volume, as well as a portion of the second, was written before i had reason to suppose i was in a critical condition of health. later i was reduced almost to the point of death, and it became impossible for me to attend to anything for weeks. i have, however, somewhat regained my strength, and am able, often, to devote as many hours a day as a person should devote to such work. i would have more hope of satisfying the expectation of the public if i could have allowed myself more time. i have used my best efforts, with the aid of my eldest son, f. d. grant, assisted by his brothers, to verify from the records every statement of fact given. the comments are my own, and show how i saw the matters treated of whether others saw them in the same light or not. with these remarks i present these volumes to the public, asking no favor but hoping they will meet the approval of the reader. u. s. grant. mount macgregor, new york, july 1, 1885. contents volume i. chapter i. ancestry--birth--boyhood. chapter ii. west point--graduation. chapter iii. army life--causes of the mexican war--camp salubrity. chapter iv. corpus christi--mexican smuggling--spanish rule in mexico --supplying transportation. chapter v. trip to austin--promotion to full second-lieutenant--army of occupation. chapter vi. advance of the army--crossing the colorado--the rio grande. chapter vii. the mexican war--the battle of palo alto--the battle of resaca de la palma--army of invasion--general taylor--movement on camargo. chapter viii. advance on monterey--the black fort--the battle of monterey--surrender of the city. chapter ix. political intrigue--buena vista--movement against vera cruz --siege and capture of vera cruz. chapter x. march to jalapa--battle of cerro gordo--perote--puebla--scott and taylor. chapter xi. advance on the city of mexico--battle of contreras--assault at churubusco--negotiations for peace--battle of molino del rey --storming of chapultepec--san cosme--evacuation of the city--halls of the montezumas. chapter xii. promotion to first lieutenant--capture of the city of mexico--the army--mexican soldiers--peace negotiations. chapter xiii. treaty of peace--mexican bull fights--regimental quartermaster--trip to popocatapetl--trip to the caves of mexico. chapter xiv. return of the army--marriage--ordered to the pacific coast --crossing the isthmus--arrival at san francisco. chapter xv. san francisco--early california experiences--life on the pacific coast--promoted captain--flush times in california. chapter xvi. resignation--private life--life at galena--the coming crisis. chapter xvii. outbreak of the rebellion--presiding at a union meeting --mustering officer of state troops--lyon at camp jackson--services tendered to the government. chapter xviii. appointed colonel of the 21st illinois--personnel of the regiment--general logan--march to missouri--movement against harris at florida, mo.--general pope in command--stationed at mexico, mo. chapter xix. commissioned brigadier-general--command at ironton, mo. --jefferson city--cape girardeau--general prentiss--seizure of paducah --headquarters at cairo. chapter xx. general fremont in command--movement against belmont--battle of belmont--a narrow escape--after the battle. chapter xxi. general halleck in command--commanding the district of cairo--movement on fort henry--capture of fort henry. chapter xxii. investment of fort donelson--the naval operations--attack of the enemy--assaulting the works--surrender of the fort. chapter xxiii. promoted major-general of volunteers--unoccupied territory--advance upon nashville--situation of the troops--confederate retreat--relieved of the command--restored to the command--general smith. chapter xxiv. the army at pittsburg landing--injured by a fall--the confederate attack at shiloh--the first day's fight at shiloh--general sherman--condition of the army--close of the first day's fight--the second day's fight--retreat and defeat of the confederates. chapter xxv. struck by a bullet--precipitate retreat of the confederates--intrenchments at shiloh--general buell--general johnston --remarks on shiloh. chapter xxvi. halleck assumes command in the field--the advance upon corinth--occupation of corinth--the army separated. chapter xxvii. headquarters moved to memphis--on the road to memphis --escaping jackson--complaints and requests--halleck appointed commander-in-chief--return to corinth--movements of bragg--surrender of clarksville--the advance upon chattanooga--sheridan colonel of a michigan regiment. chapter xxviii. advance of van dorn and price--price enters iuka--battle of iuka. chapter xxix. van dorn's movements--battle of corinth--command of the department of the tennessee. chapter xxx. the campaign against vicksburg--employing the freedmen --occupation of holly springs--sherman ordered to memphis--sherman's movements down the mississippi--van dorn captures holly springs --collecting forage and food. chapter xxxi. headquarters moved to holly springs--general mcclernand in command--assuming command at young's point--operations above vicksburg --fortifications about vicksburg--the canal--lake providence--operations at yazoo pass. chapter xxxii. the bayous west of the mississippi--criticisms of the northern press--running the batteries--loss of the indianola --disposition of the troops. chapter xxxiii. attack on grand gulf--operations below vicksburg. chapter xxxiv. capture of port gibson--grierson's raid--occupation of grand gulf--movement up the big black--battle of raymond. chapter xxxv. movement against jackson--fall of jackson--intercepting the enemy--battle of champion's hill. chapter xxxvi. battle of black river bridge--crossing the big black --investment of vicksburg--assaulting the works. chapter xxxvii. siege of vicksburg. chapter xxxviii. johnston's movements--fortifications at haines's bluff --explosion of the mine--explosion of the second mine--preparing for the assault--the flag of truce--meeting with pemberton--negotiations for surrender--accepting the terms--surrender of vicksburg. chapter xxxix. retrospect of the campaign--sherman's movements--proposed movement upon mobile--a painful accident--ordered to report at cairo. volume one begins: chapter i. ancestry--birth--boyhood. my family is american, and has been for generations, in all its branches, direct and collateral. mathew grant, the founder of the branch in america, of which i am a descendant, reached dorchester, massachusetts, in may, 1630. in 1635 he moved to what is now windsor, connecticut, and was the surveyor for that colony for more than forty years. he was also, for many years of the time, town clerk. he was a married man when he arrived at dorchester, but his children were all born in this country. his eldest son, samuel, took lands on the east side of the connecticut river, opposite windsor, which have been held and occupied by descendants of his to this day. i am of the eighth generation from mathew grant, and seventh from samuel. mathew grant's first wife died a few years after their settlement in windsor, and he soon after married the widow rockwell, who, with her first husband, had been fellow-passengers with him and his first wife, on the ship mary and john, from dorchester, england, in 1630. mrs. rockwell had several children by her first marriage, and others by her second. by intermarriage, two or three generations later, i am descended from both the wives of mathew grant. in the fifth descending generation my great grandfather, noah grant, and his younger brother, solomon, held commissions in the english army, in 1756, in the war against the french and indians. both were killed that year. my grandfather, also named noah, was then but nine years old. at the breaking out of the war of the revolution, after the battles of concord and lexington, he went with a connecticut company to join the continental army, and was present at the battle of bunker hill. he served until the fall of yorktown, or through the entire revolutionary war. he must, however, have been on furlough part of the time--as i believe most of the soldiers of that period were--for he married in connecticut during the war, had two children, and was a widower at the close. soon after this he emigrated to westmoreland county, pennsylvania, and settled near the town of greensburg in that county. he took with him the younger of his two children, peter grant. the elder, solomon, remained with his relatives in connecticut until old enough to do for himself, when he emigrated to the british west indies. not long after his settlement in pennsylvania, my grandfather, captain noah grant, married a miss kelly, and in 1799 he emigrated again, this time to ohio, and settled where the town of deerfield now stands. he had now five children, including peter, a son by his first marriage. my father, jesse r. grant, was the second child--oldest son, by the second marriage. peter grant went early to maysville, kentucky, where he was very prosperous, married, had a family of nine children, and was drowned at the mouth of the kanawha river, virginia, in 1825, being at the time one of the wealthy men of the west. my grandmother grant died in 1805, leaving seven children. this broke up the family. captain noah grant was not thrifty in the way of "laying up stores on earth," and, after the death of his second wife, he went, with the two youngest children, to live with his son peter, in maysville. the rest of the family found homes in the neighborhood of deerfield, my father in the family of judge tod, the father of the late governor tod, of ohio. his industry and independence of character were such, that i imagine his labor compensated fully for the expense of his maintenance. there must have been a cordiality in his welcome into the tod family, for to the day of his death he looked upon judge tod and his wife, with all the reverence he could have felt if they had been parents instead of benefactors. i have often heard him speak of mrs. tod as the most admirable woman he had ever known. he remained with the tod family only a few years, until old enough to learn a trade. he went first, i believe, with his half-brother, peter grant, who, though not a tanner himself, owned a tannery in maysville, kentucky. here he learned his trade, and in a few years returned to deerfield and worked for, and lived in the family of a mr. brown, the father of john brown--"whose body lies mouldering in the grave, while his soul goes marching on." i have often heard my father speak of john brown, particularly since the events at harper's ferry. brown was a boy when they lived in the same house, but he knew him afterwards, and regarded him as a man of great purity of character, of high moral and physical courage, but a fanatic and extremist in whatever he advocated. it was certainly the act of an insane man to attempt the invasion of the south, and the overthrow of slavery, with less than twenty men. my father set up for himself in business, establishing a tannery at ravenna, the county seat of portage county. in a few years he removed from ravenna, and set up the same business at point pleasant, clermont county, ohio. during the minority of my father, the west afforded but poor facilities for the most opulent of the youth to acquire an education, and the majority were dependent, almost exclusively, upon their own exertions for whatever learning they obtained. i have often heard him say that his time at school was limited to six months, when he was very young, too young, indeed, to learn much, or to appreciate the advantages of an education, and to a "quarter's schooling" afterwards, probably while living with judge tod. but his thirst for education was intense. he learned rapidly, and was a constant reader up to the day of his death in his eightieth year. books were scarce in the western reserve during his youth, but he read every book he could borrow in the neighborhood where he lived. this scarcity gave him the early habit of studying everything he read, so that when he got through with a book, he knew everything in it. the habit continued through life. even after reading the daily papers--which he never neglected--he could give all the important information they contained. he made himself an excellent english scholar, and before he was twenty years of age was a constant contributor to western newspapers, and was also, from that time until he was fifty years old, an able debater in the societies for this purpose, which were common in the west at that time. he always took an active part in politics, but was never a candidate for office, except, i believe, that he was the first mayor of georgetown. he supported jackson for the presidency; but he was a whig, a great admirer of henry clay, and never voted for any other democrat for high office after jackson. my mother's family lived in montgomery county, pennsylvania, for several generations. i have little information about her ancestors. her family took no interest in genealogy, so that my grandfather, who died when i was sixteen years old, knew only back to his grandfather. on the other side, my father took a great interest in the subject, and in his researches, he found that there was an entailed estate in windsor, connecticut, belonging to the family, to which his nephew, lawson grant --still living--was the heir. he was so much interested in the subject that he got his nephew to empower him to act in the matter, and in 1832 or 1833, when i was a boy ten or eleven years old, he went to windsor, proved the title beyond dispute, and perfected the claim of the owners for a consideration--three thousand dollars, i think. i remember the circumstance well, and remember, too, hearing him say on his return that he found some widows living on the property, who had little or nothing beyond their homes. from these he refused to receive any recompense. my mother's father, john simpson, moved from montgomery county, pennsylvania, to clermont county, ohio, about the year 1819, taking with him his four children, three daughters and one son. my mother, hannah simpson, was the third of these children, and was then over twenty years of age. her oldest sister was at that time married, and had several children. she still lives in clermont county at this writing, october 5th, 1884, and is over ninety ears of age. until her memory failed her, a few years ago, she thought the country ruined beyond recovery when the democratic party lost control in 1860. her family, which was large, inherited her views, with the exception of one son who settled in kentucky before the war. he was the only one of the children who entered the volunteer service to suppress the rebellion. her brother, next of age and now past eighty-eight, is also still living in clermont county, within a few miles of the old homestead, and is as active in mind as ever. he was a supporter of the government during the war, and remains a firm believer, that national success by the democratic party means irretrievable ruin. in june, 1821, my father, jesse r. grant, married hannah simpson. i was born on the 27th of april, 1822, at point pleasant, clermont county, ohio. in the fall of 1823 we moved to georgetown, the county seat of brown, the adjoining county east. this place remained my home, until at the age of seventeen, in 1839, i went to west point. the schools, at the time of which i write, were very indifferent. there were no free schools, and none in which the scholars were classified. they were all supported by subscription, and a single teacher--who was often a man or a woman incapable of teaching much, even if they imparted all they knew--would have thirty or forty scholars, male and female, from the infant learning the a b c's up to the young lady of eighteen and the boy of twenty, studying the highest branches taught--the three r's, "reading, 'riting, 'rithmetic." i never saw an algebra, or other mathematical work higher than the arithmetic, in georgetown, until after i was appointed to west point. i then bought a work on algebra in cincinnati; but having no teacher it was greek to me. my life in georgetown was uneventful. from the age of five or six until seventeen, i attended the subscription schools of the village, except during the winters of 1836-7 and 1838-9. the former period was spent in maysville, kentucky, attending the school of richardson and rand; the latter in ripley, ohio, at a private school. i was not studious in habit, and probably did not make progress enough to compensate for the outlay for board and tuition. at all events both winters were spent in going over the same old arithmetic which i knew every word of before, and repeating: "a noun is the name of a thing," which i had also heard my georgetown teachers repeat, until i had come to believe it--but i cast no reflections upon my old teacher, richardson. he turned out bright scholars from his school, many of whom have filled conspicuous places in the service of their states. two of my contemporaries there --who, i believe, never attended any other institution of learning--have held seats in congress, and one, if not both, other high offices; these are wadsworth and brewster. my father was, from my earliest recollection, in comfortable circumstances, considering the times, his place of residence, and the community in which he lived. mindful of his own lack of facilities for acquiring an education, his greatest desire in maturer years was for the education of his children. consequently, as stated before, i never missed a quarter from school from the time i was old enough to attend till the time of leaving home. this did not exempt me from labor. in my early days, every one labored more or less, in the region where my youth was spent, and more in proportion to their private means. it was only the very poor who were exempt. while my father carried on the manufacture of leather and worked at the trade himself, he owned and tilled considerable land. i detested the trade, preferring almost any other labor; but i was fond of agriculture, and of all employment in which horses were used. we had, among other lands, fifty acres of forest within a mile of the village. in the fall of the year choppers were employed to cut enough wood to last a twelve-month. when i was seven or eight years of age, i began hauling all the wood used in the house and shops. i could not load it on the wagons, of course, at that time, but i could drive, and the choppers would load, and some one at the house unload. when about eleven years old, i was strong enough to hold a plough. from that age until seventeen i did all the work done with horses, such as breaking up the land, furrowing, ploughing corn and potatoes, bringing in the crops when harvested, hauling all the wood, besides tending two or three horses, a cow or two, and sawing wood for stoves, etc., while still attending school. for this i was compensated by the fact that there was never any scolding or punishing by my parents; no objection to rational enjoyments, such as fishing, going to the creek a mile away to swim in summer, taking a horse and visiting my grandparents in the adjoining county, fifteen miles off, skating on the ice in winter, or taking a horse and sleigh when there was snow on the ground. while still quite young i had visited cincinnati, forty-five miles away, several times, alone; also maysville, kentucky, often, and once louisville. the journey to louisville was a big one for a boy of that day. i had also gone once with a two-horse carriage to chilicothe, about seventy miles, with a neighbor's family, who were removing to toledo, ohio, and returned alone; and had gone once, in like manner, to flat rock, kentucky, about seventy miles away. on this latter occasion i was fifteen years of age. while at flat rock, at the house of a mr. payne, whom i was visiting with his brother, a neighbor of ours in georgetown, i saw a very fine saddle horse, which i rather coveted, and proposed to mr. payne, the owner, to trade him for one of the two i was driving. payne hesitated to trade with a boy, but asking his brother about it, the latter told him that it would be all right, that i was allowed to do as i pleased with the horses. i was seventy miles from home, with a carriage to take back, and mr. payne said he did not know that his horse had ever had a collar on. i asked to have him hitched to a farm wagon and we would soon see whether he would work. it was soon evident that the horse had never worn harness before; but he showed no viciousness, and i expressed a confidence that i could manage him. a trade was at once struck, i receiving ten dollars difference. the next day mr. payne, of georgetown, and i started on our return. we got along very well for a few miles, when we encountered a ferocious dog that frightened the horses and made them run. the new animal kicked at every jump he made. i got the horses stopped, however, before any damage was done, and without running into anything. after giving them a little rest, to quiet their fears, we started again. that instant the new horse kicked, and started to run once more. the road we were on, struck the turnpike within half a mile of the point where the second runaway commenced, and there there was an embankment twenty or more feet deep on the opposite side of the pike. i got the horses stopped on the very brink of the precipice. my new horse was terribly frightened and trembled like an aspen; but he was not half so badly frightened as my companion, mr. payne, who deserted me after this last experience, and took passage on a freight wagon for maysville. every time i attempted to start, my new horse would commence to kick. i was in quite a dilemma for a time. once in maysville i could borrow a horse from an uncle who lived there; but i was more than a day's travel from that point. finally i took out my bandanna--the style of handkerchief in universal use then--and with this blindfolded my horse. in this way i reached maysville safely the next day, no doubt much to the surprise of my friend. here i borrowed a horse from my uncle, and the following day we proceeded on our journey. about half my school-days in georgetown were spent at the school of john d. white, a north carolinian, and the father of chilton white who represented the district in congress for one term during the rebellion. mr. white was always a democrat in politics, and chilton followed his father. he had two older brothers--all three being school-mates of mine at their father's school--who did not go the same way. the second brother died before the rebellion began; he was a whig, and afterwards a republican. his oldest brother was a republican and brave soldier during the rebellion. chilton is reported as having told of an earlier horse-trade of mine. as he told the story, there was a mr. ralston living within a few miles of the village, who owned a colt which i very much wanted. my father had offered twenty dollars for it, but ralston wanted twenty-five. i was so anxious to have the colt, that after the owner left, i begged to be allowed to take him at the price demanded. my father yielded, but said twenty dollars was all the horse was worth, and told me to offer that price; if it was not accepted i was to offer twenty-two and a half, and if that would not get him, to give the twenty-five. i at once mounted a horse and went for the colt. when i got to mr. ralston's house, i said to him: "papa says i may offer you twenty dollars for the colt, but if you won't take that, i am to offer twenty-two and a half, and if you won't take that, to give you twenty-five." it would not require a connecticut man to guess the price finally agreed upon. this story is nearly true. i certainly showed very plainly that i had come for the colt and meant to have him. i could not have been over eight years old at the time. this transaction caused me great heart-burning. the story got out among the boys of the village, and it was a long time before i heard the last of it. boys enjoy the misery of their companions, at least village boys in that day did, and in later life i have found that all adults are not free from the peculiarity. i kept the horse until he was four years old, when he went blind, and i sold him for twenty dollars. when i went to maysville to school, in 1836, at the age of fourteen, i recognized my colt as one of the blind horses working on the tread-wheel of the ferry-boat. i have describes enough of my early life to give an impression of the whole. i did not like to work; but i did as much of it, while young, as grown men can be hired to do in these days, and attended school at the same time. i had as many privileges as any boy in the village, and probably more than most of them. i have no recollection of ever having been punished at home, either by scolding or by the rod. but at school the case was different. the rod was freely used there, and i was not exempt from its influence. i can see john d. white--the school teacher --now, with his long beech switch always in his hand. it was not always the same one, either. switches were brought in bundles, from a beech wood near the school house, by the boys for whose benefit they were intended. often a whole bundle would be used up in a single day. i never had any hard feelings against my teacher, either while attending the school, or in later years when reflecting upon my experience. mr. white was a kindhearted man, and was much respected by the community in which he lived. he only followed the universal custom of the period, and that under which he had received his own education. chapter ii. west point--graduation. in the winter of 1838-9 i was attending school at ripley, only ten miles distant from georgetown, but spent the christmas holidays at home. during this vacation my father received a letter from the honorable thomas morris, then united states senator from ohio. when he read it he said to me, "ulysses, i believe you are going to receive the appointment." "what appointment?" i inquired. "to west point; i have applied for it." "but i won't go," i said. he said he thought i would, and i thought so too, if he did. i really had no objection to going to west point, except that i had a very exalted idea of the acquirements necessary to get through. i did not believe i possessed them, and could not bear the idea of failing. there had been four boys from our village, or its immediate neighborhood, who had been graduated from west point, and never a failure of any one appointed from georgetown, except in the case of the one whose place i was to take. he was the son of dr. bailey, our nearest and most intimate neighbor. young bailey had been appointed in 1837. finding before the january examination following, that he could not pass, he resigned and went to a private school, and remained there until the following year, when he was reappointed. before the next examination he was dismissed. dr. bailey was a proud and sensitive man, and felt the failure of his son so keenly that he forbade his return home. there were no telegraphs in those days to disseminate news rapidly, no railroads west of the alleghanies, and but few east; and above all, there were no reporters prying into other people's private affairs. consequently it did not become generally known that there was a vacancy at west point from our district until i was appointed. i presume mrs. bailey confided to my mother the fact that bartlett had been dismissed, and that the doctor had forbidden his son's return home. the honorable thomas l. hamer, one of the ablest men ohio ever produced, was our member of congress at the time, and had the right of nomination. he and my father had been members of the same debating society (where they were generally pitted on opposite sides), and intimate personal friends from their early manhood up to a few years before. in politics they differed. hamer was a life-long democrat, while my father was a whig. they had a warm discussion, which finally became angry--over some act of president jackson, the removal of the deposit of public moneys, i think--after which they never spoke until after my appointment. i know both of them felt badly over this estrangement, and would have been glad at any time to come to a reconciliation; but neither would make the advance. under these circumstances my father would not write to hamer for the appointment, but he wrote to thomas morris, united states senator from ohio, informing him that there was a vacancy at west point from our district, and that he would be glad if i could be appointed to fill it. this letter, i presume, was turned over to mr. hamer, and, as there was no other applicant, he cheerfully appointed me. this healed the breach between the two, never after reopened. besides the argument used by my father in favor of my going to west point--that "he thought i would go"--there was another very strong inducement. i had always a great desire to travel. i was already the best travelled boy in georgetown, except the sons of one man, john walker, who had emigrated to texas with his family, and immigrated back as soon as he could get the means to do so. in his short stay in texas he acquired a very different opinion of the country from what one would form going there now. i had been east to wheeling, virginia, and north to the western reserve, in ohio, west to louisville, and south to bourbon county, kentucky, besides having driven or ridden pretty much over the whole country within fifty miles of home. going to west point would give me the opportunity of visiting the two great cities of the continent, philadelphia and new york. this was enough. when these places were visited i would have been glad to have had a steamboat or railroad collision, or any other accident happen, by which i might have received a temporary injury sufficient to make me ineligible, for a time, to enter the academy. nothing of the kind occurred, and i had to face the music. georgetown has a remarkable record for a western village. it is, and has been from its earliest existence, a democratic town. there was probably no time during the rebellion when, if the opportunity could have been afforded, it would not have voted for jefferson davis for president of the united states, over mr. lincoln, or any other representative of his party; unless it was immediately after some of john morgan's men, in his celebrated raid through ohio, spent a few hours in the village. the rebels helped themselves to whatever they could find, horses, boots and shoes, especially horses, and many ordered meals to be prepared for them by the families. this was no doubt a far pleasanter duty for some families than it would have been to render a like service for union soldiers. the line between the rebel and union element in georgetown was so marked that it led to divisions even in the churches. there were churches in that part of ohio where treason was preached regularly, and where, to secure membership, hostility to the government, to the war and to the liberation of the slaves, was far more essential than a belief in the authenticity or credibility of the bible. there were men in georgetown who filled all the requirements for membership in these churches. yet this far-off western village, with a population, including old and young, male and female, of about one thousand--about enough for the organization of a single regiment if all had been men capable of bearing arms--furnished the union army four general officers and one colonel, west point graduates, and nine generals and field officers of volunteers, that i can think of. of the graduates from west point, all had citizenship elsewhere at the breaking out of the rebellion, except possibly general a. v. kautz, who had remained in the army from his graduation. two of the colonels also entered the service from other localities. the other seven, general mcgroierty, colonels white, fyffe, loudon and marshall, majors king and bailey, were all residents of georgetown when the war broke out, and all of them, who were alive at the close, returned there. major bailey was the cadet who had preceded me at west point. he was killed in west virginia, in his first engagement. as far as i know, every boy who has entered west point from that village since my time has been graduated. i took passage on a steamer at ripley, ohio, for pittsburg, about the middle of may, 1839. western boats at that day did not make regular trips at stated times, but would stop anywhere, and for any length of time, for passengers or freight. i have myself been detained two or three days at a place after steam was up, the gang planks, all but one, drawn in, and after the time advertised for starting had expired. on this occasion we had no vexatious delays, and in about three days pittsburg was reached. from pittsburg i chose passage by the canal to harrisburg, rather than by the more expeditious stage. this gave a better opportunity of enjoying the fine scenery of western pennsylvania, and i had rather a dread of reaching my destination at all. at that time the canal was much patronized by travellers, and, with the comfortable packets of the period, no mode of conveyance could be more pleasant, when time was not an object. from harrisburg to philadelphia there was a railroad, the first i had ever seen, except the one on which i had just crossed the summit of the alleghany mountains, and over which canal boats were transported. in travelling by the road from harrisburg, i thought the perfection of rapid transit had been reached. we travelled at least eighteen miles an hour, when at full speed, and made the whole distance averaging probably as much as twelve miles an hour. this seemed like annihilating space. i stopped five days in philadelphia, saw about every street in the city, attended the theatre, visited girard college (which was then in course of construction), and got reprimanded from home afterwards, for dallying by the way so long. my sojourn in new york was shorter, but long enough to enable me to see the city very well. i reported at west point on the 30th or 31st of may, and about two weeks later passed my examination for admission, without difficulty, very much to my surprise. a military life had no charms for me, and i had not the faintest idea of staying in the army even if i should be graduated, which i did not expect. the encampment which preceded the commencement of academic studies was very wearisome and uninteresting. when the 28th of august came--the date for breaking up camp and going into barracks--i felt as though i had been at west point always, and that if i staid to graduation, i would have to remain always. i did not take hold of my studies with avidity, in fact i rarely ever read over a lesson the second time during my entire cadetship. i could not sit in my room doing nothing. there is a fine library connected with the academy from which cadets can get books to read in their quarters. i devoted more time to these, than to books relating to the course of studies. much of the time, i am sorry to say, was devoted to novels, but not those of a trashy sort. i read all of bulwer's then published, cooper's, marryat's, scott's, washington irving's works, lever's, and many others that i do not now remember. mathematics was very easy to me, so that when january came, i passed the examination, taking a good standing in that branch. in french, the only other study at that time in the first year's course, my standing was very low. in fact, if the class had been turned the other end foremost i should have been near head. i never succeeded in getting squarely at either end of my class, in any one study, during the four years. i came near it in french, artillery, infantry and cavalry tactics, and conduct. early in the session of the congress which met in december, 1839, a bill was discussed abolishing the military academy. i saw in this an honorable way to obtain a discharge, and read the debates with much interest, but with impatience at the delay in taking action, for i was selfish enough to favor the bill. it never passed, and a year later, although the time hung drearily with me, i would have been sorry to have seen it succeed. my idea then was to get through the course, secure a detail for a few years as assistant professor of mathematics at the academy, and afterwards obtain a permanent position as professor in some respectable college; but circumstances always did shape my course different from my plans. at the end of two years the class received the usual furlough, extending from the close of the june examination to the 28th of august. this i enjoyed beyond any other period of my life. my father had sold out his business in georgetown--where my youth had been spent, and to which my day-dreams carried me back as my future home, if i should ever be able to retire on a competency. he had moved to bethel, only twelve miles away, in the adjoining county of clermont, and had bought a young horse that had never been in harness, for my special use under the saddle during my furlough. most of my time was spent among my old school-mates--these ten weeks were shorter than one week at west point. persons acquainted with the academy know that the corps of cadets is divided into four companies for the purpose of military exercises. these companies are officered from the cadets, the superintendent and commandant selecting the officers for their military bearing and qualifications. the adjutant, quartermaster, four captains and twelve lieutenants are taken from the first, or senior class; the sergeants from the second, or junior class; and the corporals from the third, or sophomore class. i had not been "called out" as a corporal, but when i returned from furlough i found myself the last but one--about my standing in all the tactics--of eighteen sergeants. the promotion was too much for me. that year my standing in the class--as shown by the number of demerits of the year--was about the same as it was among the sergeants, and i was dropped, and served the fourth year as a private. during my first year's encampment general scott visited west point, and reviewed the cadets. with his commanding figure, his quite colossal size and showy uniform, i thought him the finest specimen of manhood my eyes had ever beheld, and the most to be envied. i could never resemble him in appearance, but i believe i did have a presentiment for a moment that some day i should occupy his place on review--although i had no intention then of remaining in the army. my experience in a horse-trade ten years before, and the ridicule it caused me, were too fresh in my mind for me to communicate this presentiment to even my most intimate chum. the next summer martin van buren, then president of the united states, visited west point and reviewed the cadets; he did not impress me with the awe which scott had inspired. in fact i regarded general scott and captain c. f. smith, the commandant of cadets, as the two men most to be envied in the nation. i retained a high regard for both up to the day of their death. the last two years wore away more rapidly than the first two, but they still seemed about five times as long as ohio years, to me. at last all the examinations were passed, and the members of the class were called upon to record their choice of arms of service and regiments. i was anxious to enter the cavalry, or dragoons as they were then called, but there was only one regiment of dragoons in the army at that time, and attached to that, besides the full complement of officers, there were at least four brevet second lieutenants. i recorded therefore my first choice, dragoons; second, 4th infantry; and got the latter. again there was a furlough--or, more properly speaking, leave of absence for the class were now commissioned officers--this time to the end of september. again i went to ohio to spend my vacation among my old school-mates; and again i found a fine saddle horse purchased for my special use, besides a horse and buggy that i could drive--but i was not in a physical condition to enjoy myself quite as well as on the former occasion. for six months before graduation i had had a desperate cough ("tyler's grip" it was called), and i was very much reduced, weighing but one hundred and seventeen pounds, just my weight at entrance, though i had grown six inches in stature in the mean time. there was consumption in my father's family, two of his brothers having died of that disease, which made my symptoms more alarming. the brother and sister next younger than myself died, during the rebellion, of the same disease, and i seemed the most promising subject for it of the three in 1843. having made alternate choice of two different arms of service with different uniforms, i could not get a uniform suit until notified of my assignment. i left my measurement with a tailor, with directions not to make the uniform until i notified him whether it was to be for infantry or dragoons. notice did not reach me for several weeks, and then it took at least a week to get the letter of instructions to the tailor and two more to make the clothes and have them sent to me. this was a time of great suspense. i was impatient to get on my uniform and see how it looked, and probably wanted my old school-mates, particularly the girls, to see me in it. the conceit was knocked out of me by two little circumstances that happened soon after the arrival of the clothes, which gave me a distaste for military uniform that i never recovered from. soon after the arrival of the suit i donned it, and put off for cincinnati on horseback. while i was riding along a street of that city, imagining that every one was looking at me, with a feeling akin to mine when i first saw general scott, a little urchin, bareheaded, footed, with dirty and ragged pants held up by bare a single gallows--that's what suspenders were called then--and a shirt that had not seen a wash-tub for weeks, turned to me and cried: "soldier! will you work? no, sir--ee; i'll sell my shirt first!!" the horse trade and its dire consequences were recalled to mind. the other circumstance occurred at home. opposite our house in bethel stood the old stage tavern where "man and beast" found accommodation, the stable-man was rather dissipated, but possessed of some humor. on my return i found him parading the streets, and attending in the stable, barefooted, but in a pair of sky-blue nankeen pantaloons--just the color of my uniform trousers--with a strip of white cotton sheeting sewed down the outside seams in imitation of mine. the joke was a huge one in the mind of many of the people, and was much enjoyed by them; but i did not appreciate it so highly. during the remainder of my leave of absence, my time was spent in visiting friends in georgetown and cincinnati, and occasionally other towns in that part of the state. chapter iii. army life--causes of the mexican war--camp salubrity. on the 30th of september i reported for duty at jefferson barracks, st. louis, with the 4th united states infantry. it was the largest military post in the country at that time, being garrisoned by sixteen companies of infantry, eight of the 3d regiment, the remainder of the 4th. colonel steven kearney, one of the ablest officers of the day, commanded the post, and under him discipline was kept at a high standard, but without vexatious rules or regulations. every drill and roll-call had to be attended, but in the intervals officers were permitted to enjoy themselves, leaving the garrison, and going where they pleased, without making written application to state where they were going for how long, etc., so that they were back for their next duty. it did seem to me, in my early army days, that too many of the older officers, when they came to command posts, made it a study to think what orders they could publish to annoy their subordinates and render them uncomfortable. i noticed, however, a few years later, when the mexican war broke out, that most of this class of officers discovered they were possessed of disabilities which entirely incapacitated them for active field service. they had the moral courage to proclaim it, too. they were right; but they did not always give their disease the right name. at west point i had a class-mate--in the last year of our studies he was room-mate also--f. t. dent, whose family resided some five miles west of jefferson barracks. two of his unmarried brothers were living at home at that time, and as i had taken with me from ohio, my horse, saddle and bridle, i soon found my way out to white haven, the name of the dent estate. as i found the family congenial my visits became frequent. there were at home, besides the young men, two daughters, one a school miss of fifteen, the other a girl of eight or nine. there was still an older daughter of seventeen, who had been spending several years at boarding-school in st. louis, but who, though through school, had not yet returned home. she was spending the winter in the city with connections, the family of colonel john o'fallon, well known in st. louis. in february she returned to her country home. after that i do not know but my visits became more frequent; they certainly did become more enjoyable. we would often take walks, or go on horseback to visit the neighbors, until i became quite well acquainted in that vicinity. sometimes one of the brothers would accompany us, sometimes one of the younger sisters. if the 4th infantry had remained at jefferson barracks it is possible, even probable, that this life might have continued for some years without my finding out that there was anything serious the matter with me; but in the following may a circumstance occurred which developed my sentiment so palpably that there was no mistaking it. the annexation of texas was at this time the subject of violent discussion in congress, in the press, and by individuals. the administration of president tyler, then in power, was making the most strenuous efforts to effect the annexation, which was, indeed, the great and absorbing question of the day. during these discussions the greater part of the single rifle regiment in the army--the 2d dragoons, which had been dismounted a year or two before, and designated "dismounted rifles"--was stationed at fort jessup, louisiana, some twenty-five miles east of the texas line, to observe the frontier. about the 1st of may the 3d infantry was ordered from jefferson barracks to louisiana, to go into camp in the neighborhood of fort jessup, and there await further orders. the troops were embarked on steamers and were on their way down the mississippi within a few days after the receipt of this order. about the time they started i obtained a leave of absence for twenty days to go to ohio to visit my parents. i was obliged to go to st. louis to take a steamer for louisville or cincinnati, or the first steamer going up the ohio river to any point. before i left st. louis orders were received at jefferson barracks for the 4th infantry to follow the 3d. a messenger was sent after me to stop my leaving; but before he could reach me i was off, totally ignorant of these events. a day or two after my arrival at bethel i received a letter from a classmate and fellow lieutenant in the 4th, informing me of the circumstances related above, and advising me not to open any letter post marked st. louis or jefferson barracks, until the expiration of my leave, and saying that he would pack up my things and take them along for me. his advice was not necessary, for no other letter was sent to me. i now discovered that i was exceedingly anxious to get back to jefferson barracks, and i understood the reason without explanation from any one. my leave of absence required me to report for duty, at jefferson barracks, at the end of twenty days. i knew my regiment had gone up the red river, but i was not disposed to break the letter of my leave; besides, if i had proceeded to louisiana direct, i could not have reached there until after the expiration of my leave. accordingly, at the end of the twenty days, i reported for duty to lieutenant ewell, commanding at jefferson barracks, handing him at the same time my leave of absence. after noticing the phraseology of the order--leaves of absence were generally worded, "at the end of which time he will report for duty with his proper command"--he said he would give me an order to join my regiment in louisiana. i then asked for a few days' leave before starting, which he readily granted. this was the same ewell who acquired considerable reputation as a confederate general during the rebellion. he was a man much esteemed, and deservedly so, in the old army, and proved himself a gallant and efficient officer in two wars --both in my estimation unholy. i immediately procured a horse and started for the country, taking no baggage with me, of course. there is an insignificant creek--the gravois--between jefferson barracks and the place to which i was going, and at that day there was not a bridge over it from its source to its mouth. there is not water enough in the creek at ordinary stages to run a coffee mill, and at low water there is none running whatever. on this occasion it had been raining heavily, and, when the creek was reached, i found the banks full to overflowing, and the current rapid. i looked at it a moment to consider what to do. one of my superstitions had always been when i started to go any where, or to do anything, not to turn back, or stop until the thing intended was accomplished. i have frequently started to go to places where i had never been and to which i did not know the way, depending upon making inquiries on the road, and if i got past the place without knowing it, instead of turning back, i would go on until a road was found turning in the right direction, take that, and come in by the other side. so i struck into the stream, and in an instant the horse was swimming and i being carried down by the current. i headed the horse towards the other bank and soon reached it, wet through and without other clothes on that side of the stream. i went on, however, to my destination and borrowed a dry suit from my --future--brother-in-law. we were not of the same size, but the clothes answered every purpose until i got more of my own. before i returned i mustered up courage to make known, in the most awkward manner imaginable, the discovery i had made on learning that the 4th infantry had been ordered away from jefferson barracks. the young lady afterwards admitted that she too, although until then she had never looked upon me other than as a visitor whose company was agreeable to her, had experienced a depression of spirits she could not account for when the regiment left. before separating it was definitely understood that at a convenient time we would join our fortunes, and not let the removal of a regiment trouble us. this was in may, 1844. it was the 22d of august, 1848, before the fulfilment of this agreement. my duties kept me on the frontier of louisiana with the army of observation during the pendency of annexation; and afterwards i was absent through the war with mexico, provoked by the action of the army, if not by the annexation itself. during that time there was a constant correspondence between miss dent and myself, but we only met once in the period of four years and three months. in may, 1845, i procured a leave for twenty days, visited st. louis, and obtained the consent of the parents for the union, which had not been asked for before. as already stated, it was never my intention to remain in the army long, but to prepare myself for a professorship in some college. accordingly, soon after i was settled at jefferson barracks, i wrote a letter to professor church--professor of mathematics at west point--requesting him to ask my designation as his assistant, when next a detail had to be made. assistant professors at west point are all officers of the army, supposed to be selected for their special fitness for the particular branch of study they are assigned to teach. the answer from professor church was entirely satisfactory, and no doubt i should have been detailed a year or two later but for the mexican war coming on. accordingly i laid out for myself a course of studies to be pursued in garrison, with regularity, if not persistency. i reviewed my west point course of mathematics during the seven months at jefferson barracks, and read many valuable historical works, besides an occasional novel. to help my memory i kept a book in which i would write up, from time to time, my recollections of all i had read since last posting it. when the regiment was ordered away, i being absent at the time, my effects were packed up by lieutenant haslett, of the 4th infantry, and taken along. i never saw my journal after, nor did i ever keep another, except for a portion of the time while travelling abroad. often since a fear has crossed my mind lest that book might turn up yet, and fall into the hands of some malicious person who would publish it. i know its appearance would cause me as much heart-burning as my youthful horse-trade, or the later rebuke for wearing uniform clothes. the 3d infantry had selected camping grounds on the reservation at fort jessup, about midway between the red river and the sabine. our orders required us to go into camp in the same neighborhood, and await further instructions. those authorized to do so selected a place in the pine woods, between the old town of natchitoches and grand ecore, about three miles from each, and on high ground back from the river. the place was given the name of camp salubrity, and proved entitled to it. the camp was on a high, sandy, pine ridge, with spring branches in the valley, in front and rear. the springs furnished an abundance of cool, pure water, and the ridge was above the flight of mosquitoes, which abound in that region in great multitudes and of great voracity. in the valley they swarmed in myriads, but never came to the summit of the ridge. the regiment occupied this camp six months before the first death occurred, and that was caused by an accident. there was no intimation given that the removal of the 3d and 4th regiments of infantry to the western border of louisiana was occasioned in any way by the prospective annexation of texas, but it was generally understood that such was the case. ostensibly we were intended to prevent filibustering into texas, but really as a menace to mexico in case she appeared to contemplate war. generally the officers of the army were indifferent whether the annexation was consummated or not; but not so all of them. for myself, i was bitterly opposed to the measure, and to this day regard the war, which resulted, as one of the most unjust ever waged by a stronger against a weaker nation. it was an instance of a republic following the bad example of european monarchies, in not considering justice in their desire to acquire additional territory. texas was originally a state belonging to the republic of mexico. it extended from the sabine river on the east to the rio grande on the west, and from the gulf of mexico on the south and east to the territory of the united states and new mexico--another mexican state at that time--on the north and west. an empire in territory, it had but a very sparse population, until settled by americans who had received authority from mexico to colonize. these colonists paid very little attention to the supreme government, and introduced slavery into the state almost from the start, though the constitution of mexico did not, nor does it now, sanction that institution. soon they set up an independent government of their own, and war existed, between texas and mexico, in name from that time until 1836, when active hostilities very nearly ceased upon the capture of santa anna, the mexican president. before long, however, the same people--who with permission of mexico had colonized texas, and afterwards set up slavery there, and then seceded as soon as they felt strong enough to do so--offered themselves and the state to the united states, and in 1845 their offer was accepted. the occupation, separation and annexation were, from the inception of the movement to its final consummation, a conspiracy to acquire territory out of which slave states might be formed for the american union. even if the annexation itself could be justified, the manner in which the subsequent war was forced upon mexico cannot. the fact is, annexationists wanted more territory than they could possibly lay any claim to, as part of the new acquisition. texas, as an independent state, never had exercised jurisdiction over the territory between the nueces river and the rio grande. mexico had never recognized the independence of texas, and maintained that, even if independent, the state had no claim south of the nueces. i am aware that a treaty, made by the texans with santa anna while he was under duress, ceded all the territory between the nueces and the rio grande--, but he was a prisoner of war when the treaty was made, and his life was in jeopardy. he knew, too, that he deserved execution at the hands of the texans, if they should ever capture him. the texans, if they had taken his life, would have only followed the example set by santa anna himself a few years before, when he executed the entire garrison of the alamo and the villagers of goliad. in taking military possession of texas after annexation, the army of occupation, under general taylor, was directed to occupy the disputed territory. the army did not stop at the nueces and offer to negotiate for a settlement of the boundary question, but went beyond, apparently in order to force mexico to initiate war. it is to the credit of the american nation, however, that after conquering mexico, and while practically holding the country in our possession, so that we could have retained the whole of it, or made any terms we chose, we paid a round sum for the additional territory taken; more than it was worth, or was likely to be, to mexico. to us it was an empire and of incalculable value; but it might have been obtained by other means. the southern rebellion was largely the outgrowth of the mexican war. nations, like individuals, are punished for their transgressions. we got our punishment in the most sanguinary and expensive war of modern times. the 4th infantry went into camp at salubrity in the month of may, 1844, with instructions, as i have said, to await further orders. at first, officers and men occupied ordinary tents. as the summer heat increased these were covered by sheds to break the rays of the sun. the summer was whiled away in social enjoyments among the officers, in visiting those stationed at, and near, fort jessup, twenty-five miles away, visiting the planters on the red river, and the citizens of natchitoches and grand ecore. there was much pleasant intercourse between the inhabitants and the officers of the army. i retain very agreeable recollections of my stay at camp salubrity, and of the acquaintances made there, and no doubt my feeling is shared by the few officers living who were there at the time. i can call to mind only two officers of the 4th infantry, besides myself, who were at camp salubrity with the regiment, who are now alive. with a war in prospect, and belonging to a regiment that had an unusual number of officers detailed on special duty away from the regiment, my hopes of being ordered to west point as instructor vanished. at the time of which i now write, officers in the quartermaster's, commissary's and adjutant--general's departments were appointed from the line of the army, and did not vacate their regimental commissions until their regimental and staff commissions were for the same grades. generally lieutenants were appointed to captaincies to fill vacancies in the staff corps. if they should reach a captaincy in the line before they arrived at a majority in the staff, they would elect which commission they would retain. in the 4th infantry, in 1844, at least six line officers were on duty in the staff, and therefore permanently detached from the regiment. under these circumstances i gave up everything like a special course of reading, and only read thereafter for my own amusement, and not very much for that, until the war was over. i kept a horse and rode, and staid out of doors most of the time by day, and entirely recovered from the cough which i had carried from west point, and from all indications of consumption. i have often thought that my life was saved, and my health restored, by exercise and exposure, enforced by an administrative act, and a war, both of which i disapproved. as summer wore away, and cool days and colder nights came upon us, the tents we were occupying ceased to afford comfortable quarters; and "further orders" not reaching us, we began to look about to remedy the hardship. men were put to work getting out timber to build huts, and in a very short time all were comfortably housed--privates as well as officers. the outlay by the government in accomplishing this was nothing, or nearly nothing. the winter was spent more agreeably than the summer had been. there were occasional parties given by the planters along the "coast"--as the bottom lands on the red river were called. the climate was delightful. near the close of the short session of congress of 1844-5, the bill for the annexation of texas to the united states was passed. it reached president tyler on the 1st of march, 1845, and promptly received his approval. when the news reached us we began to look again for "further orders." they did not arrive promptly, and on the 1st of may following i asked and obtained a leave of absence for twenty days, for the purpose of visiting--st. louis. the object of this visit has been before stated. early in july the long expected orders were received, but they only took the regiment to new orleans barracks. we reached there before the middle of the month, and again waited weeks for still further orders. the yellow fever was raging in new orleans during the time we remained there, and the streets of the city had the appearance of a continuous well-observed sunday. i recollect but one occasion when this observance seemed to be broken by the inhabitants. one morning about daylight i happened to be awake, and, hearing the discharge of a rifle not far off, i looked out to ascertain where the sound came from. i observed a couple of clusters of men near by, and learned afterwards that "it was nothing; only a couple of gentlemen deciding a difference of opinion with rifles, at twenty paces." i do not remember if either was killed, or even hurt, but no doubt the question of difference was settled satisfactorily, and "honorably," in the estimation of the parties engaged. i do not believe i ever would have the courage to fight a duel. if any man should wrong me to the extent of my being willing to kill him, i would not be willing to give him the choice of weapons with which it should be done, and of the time, place and distance separating us, when i executed him. if i should do another such a wrong as to justify him in killing me, i would make any reasonable atonement within my power, if convinced of the wrong done. i place my opposition to duelling on higher grounds than here stated. no doubt a majority of the duels fought have been for want of moral courage on the part of those engaged to decline. at camp salubrity, and when we went to new orleans barracks, the 4th infantry was commanded by colonel vose, then an old gentleman who had not commanded on drill for a number of years. he was not a man to discover infirmity in the presence of danger. it now appeared that war was imminent, and he felt that it was his duty to brush up his tactics. accordingly, when we got settled down at our new post, he took command of the regiment at a battalion drill. only two or three evolutions had been gone through when he dismissed the battalion, and, turning to go to his own quarters, dropped dead. he had not been complaining of ill health, but no doubt died of heart disease. he was a most estimable man, of exemplary habits, and by no means the author of his own disease. chapter iv. corpus christi--mexican smuggling--spanish rule in mexico--supplying transportation. early in september the regiment left new orleans for corpus christi, now in texas. ocean steamers were not then common, and the passage was made in sailing vessels. at that time there was not more than three feet of water in the channel at the outlet of corpus christi bay; the debarkation, therefore, had to take place by small steamers, and at an island in the channel called shell island, the ships anchoring some miles out from shore. this made the work slow, and as the army was only supplied with one or two steamers, it took a number of days to effect the landing of a single regiment with its stores, camp and garrison equipage, etc. there happened to be pleasant weather while this was going on, but the land-swell was so great that when the ship and steamer were on opposite sides of the same wave they would be at considerable distance apart. the men and baggage were let down to a point higher than the lower deck of the steamer, and when ship and steamer got into the trough between the waves, and were close together, the load would be drawn over the steamer and rapidly run down until it rested on the deck. after i had gone ashore, and had been on guard several days at shell island, quite six miles from the ship, i had occasion for some reason or other to return on board. while on the suviah--i think that was the name of our vessel--i heard a tremendous racket at the other end of the ship, and much and excited sailor language, such as "damn your eyes," etc. in a moment or two the captain, who was an excitable little man, dying with consumption, and not weighing much over a hundred pounds, came running out, carrying a sabre nearly as large and as heavy as he was, and crying, that his men had mutinied. it was necessary to sustain the captain without question, and in a few minutes all the sailors charged with mutiny were in irons. i rather felt for a time a wish that i had not gone aboard just then. as the men charged with mutiny submitted to being placed in irons without resistance, i always doubted if they knew that they had mutinied until they were told. by the time i was ready to leave the ship again i thought i had learned enough of the working of the double and single pulley, by which passengers were let down from the upper deck of the ship to the steamer below, and determined to let myself down without assistance. without saying anything of my intentions to any one, i mounted the railing, and taking hold of the centre rope, just below the upper block, i put one foot on the hook below the lower block, and stepped off just as i did so some one called out "hold on." it was too late. i tried to "hold on" with all my might, but my heels went up, and my head went down so rapidly that my hold broke, and i plunged head foremost into the water, some twenty-five feet below, with such velocity that it seemed to me i never would stop. when i came to the surface again, being a fair swimmer, and not having lost my presence of mind, i swam around until a bucket was let down for me, and i was drawn up without a scratch or injury. i do not believe there was a man on board who sympathized with me in the least when they found me uninjured. i rather enjoyed the joke myself. the captain of the suviah died of his disease a few months later, and i believe before the mutineers were tried. i hope they got clear, because, as before stated, i always thought the mutiny was all in the brain of a very weak and sick man. after reaching shore, or shell island, the labor of getting to corpus christi was slow and tedious. there was, if my memory serves me, but one small steamer to transport troops and baggage when the 4th infantry arrived. others were procured later. the distance from shell island to corpus christi was some sixteen or eighteen miles. the channel to the bay was so shallow that the steamer, small as it was, had to be dragged over the bottom when loaded. not more than one trip a day could be effected. later this was remedied, by deepening the channel and increasing the number of vessels suitable to its navigation. corpus christi is near the head of the bay of the same name, formed by the entrance of the nueces river into tide-water, and is on the west bank of that bay. at the time of its first occupancy by united states troops there was a small mexican hamlet there, containing probably less than one hundred souls. there was, in addition, a small american trading post, at which goods were sold to mexican smugglers. all goods were put up in compact packages of about one hundred pounds each, suitable for loading on pack mules. two of these packages made a load for an ordinary mexican mule, and three for the larger ones. the bulk of the trade was in leaf tobacco, and domestic cotton-cloths and calicoes. the mexicans had, before the arrival of the army, but little to offer in exchange except silver. the trade in tobacco was enormous, considering the population to be supplied. almost every mexican above the age of ten years, and many much younger, smoked the cigarette. nearly every mexican carried a pouch of leaf tobacco, powdered by rolling in the hands, and a roll of corn husks to make wrappers. the cigarettes were made by the smokers as they used them. up to the time of which i write, and for years afterwards--i think until the administration of president juarez--the cultivation, manufacture and sale of tobacco constituted a government monopoly, and paid the bulk of the revenue collected from internal sources. the price was enormously high, and made successful smuggling very profitable. the difficulty of obtaining tobacco is probably the reason why everybody, male and female, used it at that time. i know from my own experience that when i was at west point, the fact that tobacco, in every form, was prohibited, and the mere possession of the weed severely punished, made the majority of the cadets, myself included, try to acquire the habit of using it. i failed utterly at the time and for many years afterward; but the majority accomplished the object of their youthful ambition. under spanish rule mexico was prohibited from producing anything that the mother-country could supply. this rule excluded the cultivation of the grape, olive and many other articles to which the soil and climate were well adapted. the country was governed for "revenue only;" and tobacco, which cannot be raised in spain, but is indigenous to mexico, offered a fine instrumentality for securing this prime object of government. the native population had been in the habit of using "the weed" from a period, back of any recorded history of this continent. bad habits--if not restrained by law or public opinion--spread more rapidly and universally than good ones, and the spanish colonists adopted the use of tobacco almost as generally as the natives. spain, therefore, in order to secure the largest revenue from this source, prohibited the cultivation, except in specified localities--and in these places farmed out the privilege at a very high price. the tobacco when raised could only be sold to the government, and the price to the consumer was limited only by the avarice of the authorities, and the capacity of the people to pay. all laws for the government of the country were enacted in spain, and the officers for their execution were appointed by the crown, and sent out to the new el dorado. the mexicans had been brought up ignorant of how to legislate or how to rule. when they gained their independence, after many years of war, it was the most natural thing in the world that they should adopt as their own the laws then in existence. the only change was, that mexico became her own executor of the laws and the recipient of the revenues. the tobacco tax, yielding so large a revenue under the law as it stood, was one of the last, if not the very last, of the obnoxious imposts to be repealed. now, the citizens are allowed to cultivate any crops the soil will yield. tobacco is cheap, and every quality can be produced. its use is by no means so general as when i first visited the country. gradually the "army of occupation" assembled at corpus christi. when it was all together it consisted of seven companies of the 2d regiment of dragoons, four companies of light artillery, five regiments of infantry --the 3d, 4th, 5th, 7th and 8th--and one regiment of artillery acting as infantry--not more than three thousand men in all. general zachary taylor commanded the whole. there were troops enough in one body to establish a drill and discipline sufficient to fit men and officers for all they were capable of in case of battle. the rank and file were composed of men who had enlisted in time of peace, to serve for seven dollars a month, and were necessarily inferior as material to the average volunteers enlisted later in the war expressly to fight, and also to the volunteers in the war for the preservation of the union. the men engaged in the mexican war were brave, and the officers of the regular army, from highest to lowest, were educated in their profession. a more efficient army for its number and armament, i do not believe ever fought a battle than the one commanded by general taylor in his first two engagements on mexican--or texan soil. the presence of united states troops on the edge of the disputed territory furthest from the mexican settlements, was not sufficient to provoke hostilities. we were sent to provoke a fight, but it was essential that mexico should commence it. it was very doubtful whether congress would declare war; but if mexico should attack our troops, the executive could announce, "whereas, war exists by the acts of, etc.," and prosecute the contest with vigor. once initiated there were but few public men who would have the courage to oppose it. experience proves that the man who obstructs a war in which his nation is engaged, no matter whether right or wrong, occupies no enviable place in life or history. better for him, individually, to advocate "war, pestilence, and famine," than to act as obstructionist to a war already begun. the history of the defeated rebel will be honorable hereafter, compared with that of the northern man who aided him by conspiring against his government while protected by it. the most favorable posthumous history the stay-at-home traitor can hope for is--oblivion. mexico showing no willingness to come to the nueces to drive the invaders from her soil, it became necessary for the "invaders" to approach to within a convenient distance to be struck. accordingly, preparations were begun for moving the army to the rio grande, to a point near matamoras. it was desirable to occupy a position near the largest centre of population possible to reach, without absolutely invading territory to which we set up no claim whatever. the distance from corpus christi to matamoras is about one hundred and fifty miles. the country does not abound in fresh water, and the length of the marches had to be regulated by the distance between water supplies. besides the streams, there were occasional pools, filled during the rainy season, some probably made by the traders, who travelled constantly between corpus christi and the rio grande, and some by the buffalo. there was not at that time a single habitation, cultivated field, or herd of domestic animals, between corpus christi and matamoras. it was necessary, therefore, to have a wagon train sufficiently large to transport the camp and garrison equipage, officers' baggage, rations for the army, and part rations of grain for the artillery horses and all the animals taken from the north, where they had been accustomed to having their forage furnished them. the army was but indifferently supplied with transportation. wagons and harness could easily be supplied from the north but mules and horses could not so readily be brought. the american traders and mexican smugglers came to the relief. contracts were made for mules at from eight to eleven dollars each. the smugglers furnished the animals, and took their pay in goods of the description before mentioned. i doubt whether the mexicans received in value from the traders five dollars per head for the animals they furnished, and still more, whether they paid anything but their own time in procuring them. such is trade; such is war. the government paid in hard cash to the contractor the stipulated price. between the rio grande and the nueces there was at that time a large band of wild horses feeding; as numerous, probably, as the band of buffalo roaming further north was before its rapid extermination commenced. the mexicans used to capture these in large numbers and bring them into the american settlements and sell them. a picked animal could be purchased at from eight to twelve dollars, but taken at wholesale, they could be bought for thirty-six dollars a dozen. some of these were purchased for the army, and answered a most useful purpose. the horses were generally very strong, formed much like the norman horse, and with very heavy manes and tails. a number of officers supplied themselves with these, and they generally rendered as useful service as the northern animal in fact they were much better when grazing was the only means of supplying forage. there was no need for haste, and some months were consumed in the necessary preparations for a move. in the meantime the army was engaged in all the duties pertaining to the officer and the soldier. twice, that i remember, small trains were sent from corpus christi, with cavalry escorts, to san antonio and austin, with paymasters and funds to pay off small detachments of troops stationed at those places. general taylor encouraged officers to accompany these expeditions. i accompanied one of them in december, 1845. the distance from corpus christi to san antonio was then computed at one hundred and fifty miles. now that roads exist it is probably less. from san antonio to austin we computed the distance at one hundred and ten miles, and from the latter place back to corpus christi at over two hundred miles. i know the distance now from san antonio to austin is but little over eighty miles, so that our computation was probably too high. there was not at the time an individual living between corpus christi and san antonio until within about thirty miles of the latter point, where there were a few scattering mexican settlements along the san antonio river. the people in at least one of these hamlets lived underground for protection against the indians. the country abounded in game, such as deer and antelope, with abundance of wild turkeys along the streams and where there were nut-bearing woods. on the nueces, about twenty-five miles up from corpus christi, were a few log cabins, the remains of a town called san patricio, but the inhabitants had all been massacred by the indians, or driven away. san antonio was about equally divided in population between americans and mexicans. from there to austin there was not a single residence except at new braunfels, on the guadalupe river. at that point was a settlement of germans who had only that year come into the state. at all events they were living in small huts, about such as soldiers would hastily construct for temporary occupation. from austin to corpus christi there was only a small settlement at bastrop, with a few farms along the colorado river; but after leaving that, there were no settlements except the home of one man, with one female slave, at the old town of goliad. some of the houses were still standing. goliad had been quite a village for the period and region, but some years before there had been a mexican massacre, in which every inhabitant had been killed or driven away. this, with the massacre of the prisoners in the alamo, san antonio, about the same time, more than three hundred men in all, furnished the strongest justification the texans had for carrying on the war with so much cruelty. in fact, from that time until the mexican war, the hostilities between texans and mexicans was so great that neither was safe in the neighborhood of the other who might be in superior numbers or possessed of superior arms. the man we found living there seemed like an old friend; he had come from near fort jessup, louisiana, where the officers of the 3d and 4th infantry and the 2d dragoons had known him and his family. he had emigrated in advance of his family to build up a home for them. chapter v. trip to austin--promotion to full second lieutenant--army of occupation. when our party left corpus christi it was quite large, including the cavalry escort, paymaster, major dix, his clerk and the officers who, like myself, were simply on leave; but all the officers on leave, except lieutenant benjamin--afterwards killed in the valley of mexico --lieutenant, now general, augur, and myself, concluded to spend their allotted time at san antonio and return from there. we were all to be back at corpus christi by the end of the month. the paymaster was detained in austin so long that, if we had waited for him, we would have exceeded our leave. we concluded, therefore, to start back at once with the animals we had, and having to rely principally on grass for their food, it was a good six days' journey. we had to sleep on the prairie every night, except at goliad, and possibly one night on the colorado, without shelter and with only such food as we carried with us, and prepared ourselves. the journey was hazardous on account of indians, and there were white men in texas whom i would not have cared to meet in a secluded place. lieutenant augur was taken seriously sick before we reached goliad and at a distance from any habitation. to add to the complication, his horse--a mustang that had probably been captured from the band of wild horses before alluded to, and of undoubted longevity at his capture--gave out. it was absolutely necessary to get for ward to goliad to find a shelter for our sick companion. by dint of patience and exceedingly slow movements, goliad was at last reached, and a shelter and bed secured for our patient. we remained over a day, hoping that augur might recover sufficiently to resume his travels. he did not, however, and knowing that major dix would be along in a few days, with his wagon-train, now empty, and escort, we arranged with our louisiana friend to take the best of care of the sick lieutenant until thus relieved, and went on. i had never been a sportsman in my life; had scarcely ever gone in search of game, and rarely seen any when looking for it. on this trip there was no minute of time while travelling between san patricio and the settlements on the san antonio river, from san antonio to austin, and again from the colorado river back to san patricio, when deer or antelope could not be seen in great numbers. each officer carried a shot-gun, and every evening, after going into camp, some would go out and soon return with venison and wild turkeys enough for the entire camp. i, however, never went out, and had no occasion to fire my gun; except, being detained over a day at goliad, benjamin and i concluded to go down to the creek--which was fringed with timber, much of it the pecan--and bring back a few turkeys. we had scarcely reached the edge of the timber when i heard the flutter of wings overhead, and in an instant i saw two or three turkeys flying away. these were soon followed by more, then more, and more, until a flock of twenty or thirty had left from just over my head. all this time i stood watching the turkeys to see where they flew--with my gun on my shoulder, and never once thought of levelling it at the birds. when i had time to reflect upon the matter, i came to the conclusion that as a sportsman i was a failure, and went back to the house. benjamin remained out, and got as many turkeys as he wanted to carry back. after the second night at goliad, benjamin and i started to make the remainder of the journey alone. we reached corpus christi just in time to avoid "absence without leave." we met no one not even an indian --during the remainder of our journey, except at san patricio. a new settlement had been started there in our absence of three weeks, induced possibly by the fact that there were houses already built, while the proximity of troops gave protection against the indians. on the evening of the first day out from goliad we heard the most unearthly howling of wolves, directly in our front. the prairie grass was tall and we could not see the beasts, but the sound indicated that they were near. to my ear it appeared that there must have been enough of them to devour our party, horses and all, at a single meal. the part of ohio that i hailed from was not thickly settled, but wolves had been driven out long before i left. benjamin was from indiana, still less populated, where the wolf yet roamed over the prairies. he understood the nature of the animal and the capacity of a few to make believe there was an unlimited number of them. he kept on towards the noise, unmoved. i followed in his trail, lacking moral courage to turn back and join our sick companion. i have no doubt that if benjamin had proposed returning to goliad, i would not only have "seconded the motion" but have suggested that it was very hard-hearted in us to leave augur sick there in the first place; but benjamin did not propose turning back. when he did speak it was to ask: "grant, how many wolves do you think there are in that pack?" knowing where he was from, and suspecting that he thought i would over-estimate the number, i determined to show my acquaintance with the animal by putting the estimate below what possibly could be correct, and answered: "oh, about twenty," very indifferently. he smiled and rode on. in a minute we were close upon them, and before they saw us. there were just two of them. seated upon their haunches, with their mouths close together, they had made all the noise we had been hearing for the past ten minutes. i have often thought of this incident since when i have heard the noise of a few disappointed politicians who had deserted their associates. there are always more of them before they are counted. a week or two before leaving corpus christi on this trip, i had been promoted from brevet second-lieutenant, 4th infantry, to full second-lieutenant, 7th infantry. frank gardner,(*1) of the 7th, was promoted to the 4th in the same orders. we immediately made application to be transferred, so as to get back to our old regiments. on my return, i found that our application had been approved at washington. while in the 7th infantry i was in the company of captain holmes, afterwards a lieutenant-general in the confederate army. i never came in contact with him in the war of the rebellion, nor did he render any very conspicuous service in his high rank. my transfer carried me to the company of captain mccall, who resigned from the army after the mexican war and settled in philadelphia. he was prompt, however, to volunteer when the rebellion broke out, and soon rose to the rank of major-general in the union army. i was not fortunate enough to meet him after he resigned. in the old army he was esteemed very highly as a soldier and gentleman. our relations were always most pleasant. the preparations at corpus christi for an advance progressed as rapidly in the absence of some twenty or more lieutenants as if we had been there. the principal business consisted in securing mules, and getting them broken to harness. the process was slow but amusing. the animals sold to the government were all young and unbroken, even to the saddle, and were quite as wild as the wild horses of the prairie. usually a number would be brought in by a company of mexicans, partners in the delivery. the mules were first driven into a stockade, called a corral, inclosing an acre or more of ground. the mexicans,--who were all experienced in throwing the lasso,--would go into the corral on horseback, with their lassos attached to the pommels of their saddles. soldiers detailed as teamsters and black smiths would also enter the corral, the former with ropes to serve as halters, the latter with branding irons and a fire to keep the irons heated. a lasso was then thrown over the neck of a mule, when he would immediately go to the length of his tether, first one end, then the other in the air. while he was thus plunging and gyrating, another lasso would be thrown by another mexican, catching the animal by a fore-foot. this would bring the mule to the ground, when he was seized and held by the teamsters while the blacksmith put upon him, with hot irons, the initials "u. s." ropes were then put about the neck, with a slipnoose which would tighten around the throat if pulled. with a man on each side holding these ropes, the mule was released from his other bindings and allowed to rise. with more or less difficulty he would be conducted to a picket rope outside and fastened there. the delivery of that mule was then complete. this process was gone through with every mule and wild horse with the army of occupation. the method of breaking them was less cruel and much more amusing. it is a well-known fact that where domestic animals are used for specific purposes from generation to generation, the descendants are easily, as a rule, subdued to the same uses. at that time in northern mexico the mule, or his ancestors, the horse and the ass, was seldom used except for the saddle or pack. at all events the corpus christi mule resisted the new use to which he was being put. the treatment he was subjected to in order to overcome his prejudices was summary and effective. the soldiers were principally foreigners who had enlisted in our large cities, and, with the exception of a chance drayman among them, it is not probable that any of the men who reported themselves as competent teamsters had ever driven a mule-team in their lives, or indeed that many had had any previous experience in driving any animal whatever to harness. numbers together can accomplish what twice their number acting individually could not perform. five mules were allotted to each wagon. a teamster would select at the picket rope five animals of nearly the same color and general appearance for his team. with a full corps of assistants, other teamsters, he would then proceed to get his mules together. in two's the men would approach each animal selected, avoiding as far as possible its heels. two ropes would be put about the neck of each animal, with a slip noose, so that he could be choked if too unruly. they were then led out, harnessed by force and hitched to the wagon in the position they had to keep ever after. two men remained on either side of the leader, with the lassos about its neck, and one man retained the same restraining influence over each of the others. all being ready, the hold would be slackened and the team started. the first motion was generally five mules in the air at one time, backs bowed, hind feet extended to the rear. after repeating this movement a few times the leaders would start to run. this would bring the breeching tight against the mules at the wheels, which these last seemed to regard as a most unwarrantable attempt at coercion and would resist by taking a seat, sometimes going so far as to lie down. in time all were broken in to do their duty submissively if not cheerfully, but there never was a time during the war when it was safe to let a mexican mule get entirely loose. their drivers were all teamsters by the time they got through. i recollect one case of a mule that had worked in a team under the saddle, not only for some time at corpus christi, where he was broken, but all the way to the point opposite matamoras, then to camargo, where he got loose from his fastenings during the night. he did not run away at first, but staid in the neighborhood for a day or two, coming up sometimes to the feed trough even; but on the approach of the teamster he always got out of the way. at last, growing tired of the constant effort to catch him, he disappeared altogether. nothing short of a mexican with his lasso could have caught him. regulations would not have warranted the expenditure of a dollar in hiring a man with a lasso to catch that mule; but they did allow the expenditure "of the mule," on a certificate that he had run away without any fault of the quartermaster on whose returns he was borne, and also the purchase of another to take his place. i am a competent witness, for i was regimental quartermaster at the time. while at corpus christi all the officers who had a fancy for riding kept horses. the animals cost but little in the first instance, and when picketed they would get their living without any cost. i had three not long before the army moved, but a sad accident bereft me of them all at one time. a colored boy who gave them all the attention they got --besides looking after my tent and that of a class-mate and fellow-lieutenant and cooking for us, all for about eight dollars per month, was riding one to water and leading the other two. the led horses pulled him from his seat and all three ran away. they never were heard of afterwards. shortly after that some one told captain bliss, general taylor's adjutant-general, of my misfortune. "yes; i heard grant lost five or six dollars' worth of horses the other day," he replied. that was a slander; they were broken to the saddle when i got them and cost nearly twenty dollars. i never suspected the colored boy of malicious intent in letting them get away, because, if they had not escaped, he could have had one of them to ride on the long march then in prospect. chapter vi. advance of the army--crossing the colorado--the rio grande. at last the preparations were complete and orders were issued for the advance to begin on the 8th of march. general taylor had an army of not more than three thousand men. one battery, the siege guns and all the convalescent troops were sent on by water to brazos santiago, at the mouth of the rio grande. a guard was left back at corpus christi to look after public property and to take care of those who were too sick to be removed. the remainder of the army, probably not more than twenty five hundred men, was divided into three brigades, with the cavalry independent. colonel twiggs, with seven companies of dragoons and a battery of light artillery, moved on the 8th. he was followed by the three infantry brigades, with a day's interval between the commands. thus the rear brigade did not move from corpus christi until the 11th of march. in view of the immense bodies of men moved on the same day over narrow roads, through dense forests and across large streams, in our late war, it seems strange now that a body of less than three thousand men should have been broken into four columns, separated by a day's march. general taylor was opposed to anything like plundering by the troops, and in this instance, i doubt not, he looked upon the enemy as the aggrieved party and was not willing to injure them further than his instructions from washington demanded. his orders to the troops enjoined scrupulous regard for the rights of all peaceable persons and the payment of the highest price for all supplies taken for the use of the army. all officers of foot regiments who had horses were permitted to ride them on the march when it did not interfere with their military duties. as already related, having lost my "five or six dollars' worth of horses" but a short time before i determined not to get another, but to make the journey on foot. my company commander, captain mccall, had two good american horses, of considerably more value in that country, where native horses were cheap, than they were in the states. he used one himself and wanted the other for his servant. he was quite anxious to know whether i did not intend to get me another horse before the march began. i told him no; i belonged to a foot regiment. i did not understand the object of his solicitude at the time, but, when we were about to start, he said: "there, grant, is a horse for you." i found that he could not bear the idea of his servant riding on a long march while his lieutenant went a-foot. he had found a mustang, a three-year old colt only recently captured, which had been purchased by one of the colored servants with the regiment for the sum of three dollars. it was probably the only horse at corpus christi that could have been purchased just then for any reasonable price. five dollars, sixty-six and two-thirds per cent. advance, induced the owner to part with the mustang. i was sorry to take him, because i really felt that, belonging to a foot regiment, it was my duty to march with the men. but i saw the captain's earnestness in the matter, and accepted the horse for the trip. the day we started was the first time the horse had ever been under saddle. i had, however, but little difficulty in breaking him, though for the first day there were frequent disagreements between us as to which way we should go, and sometimes whether we should go at all. at no time during the day could i choose exactly the part of the column i would march with; but after that, i had as tractable a horse as any with the army, and there was none that stood the trip better. he never ate a mouthful of food on the journey except the grass he could pick within the length of his picket rope. a few days out from corpus christi, the immense herd of wild horses that ranged at that time between the nueces and the rio grande was seen directly in advance of the head of the column and but a few miles off. it was the very band from which the horse i was riding had been captured but a few weeks before. the column was halted for a rest, and a number of officers, myself among them, rode out two or three miles to the right to see the extent of the herd. the country was a rolling prairie, and, from the higher ground, the vision was obstructed only by the earth's curvature. as far as the eye could reach to our right, the herd extended. to the left, it extended equally. there was no estimating the number of animals in it; i have no idea that they could all have been corralled in the state of rhode island, or delaware, at one time. if they had been, they would have been so thick that the pasturage would have given out the first day. people who saw the southern herd of buffalo, fifteen or twenty years ago, can appreciate the size of the texas band of wild horses in 1846. at the point where the army struck the little colorado river, the stream was quite wide and of sufficient depth for navigation. the water was brackish and the banks were fringed with timber. here the whole army concentrated before attempting to cross. the army was not accompanied by a pontoon train, and at that time the troops were not instructed in bridge building. to add to the embarrassment of the situation, the army was here, for the first time, threatened with opposition. buglers, concealed from our view by the brush on the opposite side, sounded the "assembly," and other military calls. like the wolves before spoken of, they gave the impression that there was a large number of them and that, if the troops were in proportion to the noise, they were sufficient to devour general taylor and his army. there were probably but few troops, and those engaged principally in watching the movements of the "invader." a few of our cavalry dashed in, and forded and swam the stream, and all opposition was soon dispersed. i do not remember that a single shot was fired. the troops waded the stream, which was up to their necks in the deepest part. teams were crossed by attaching a long rope to the end of the wagon tongue passing it between the two swing mules and by the side of the leader, hitching his bridle as well as the bridle of the mules in rear to it, and carrying the end to men on the opposite shore. the bank down to the water was steep on both sides. a rope long enough to cross the river, therefore, was attached to the back axle of the wagon, and men behind would hold the rope to prevent the wagon "beating" the mules into the water. this latter rope also served the purpose of bringing the end of the forward one back, to be used over again. the water was deep enough for a short distance to swim the little mexican mules which the army was then using, but they, and the wagons, were pulled through so fast by the men at the end of the rope ahead, that no time was left them to show their obstinacy. in this manner the artillery and transportation of the "army of occupation" crossed the colorado river. about the middle of the month of march the advance of the army reached the rio grande and went into camp near the banks of the river, opposite the city of matamoras and almost under the guns of a small fort at the lower end of the town. there was not at that time a single habitation from corpus christi until the rio grande was reached. the work of fortifying was commenced at once. the fort was laid out by the engineers, but the work was done by the soldiers under the supervision of their officers, the chief engineer retaining general directions. the mexicans now became so incensed at our near approach that some of their troops crossed the river above us, and made it unsafe for small bodies of men to go far beyond the limits of camp. they captured two companies of dragoons, commanded by captains thornton and hardee. the latter figured as a general in the late war, on the confederate side, and was author of the tactics first used by both armies. lieutenant theodric porter, of the 4th infantry, was killed while out with a small detachment; and major cross, the assistant quartermaster-general, had also been killed not far from camp. there was no base of supplies nearer than point isabel, on the coast, north of the mouth of the rio grande and twenty-five miles away. the enemy, if the mexicans could be called such at this time when no war had been declared, hovered about in such numbers that it was not safe to send a wagon train after supplies with any escort that could be spared. i have already said that general taylor's whole command on the rio grande numbered less than three thousand men. he had, however, a few more troops at point isabel or brazos santiago. the supplies brought from corpus christi in wagons were running short. work was therefore pushed with great vigor on the defences, to enable the minimum number of troops to hold the fort. all the men who could be employed, were kept at work from early dawn until darkness closed the labors of the day. with all this the fort was not completed until the supplies grew so short that further delay in obtaining more could not be thought of. by the latter part of april the work was in a partially defensible condition, and the 7th infantry, major jacob brown commanding, was marched in to garrison it, with some few pieces of artillery. all the supplies on hand, with the exception of enough to carry the rest of the army to point isabel, were left with the garrison, and the march was commenced with the remainder of the command, every wagon being taken with the army. early on the second day after starting the force reached its destination, without opposition from the mexicans. there was some delay in getting supplies ashore from vessels at anchor in the open roadstead. chapter vii. the mexican war--the battle of palo alto--the battle of resaca de la palma--army of invasion--general taylor--movement on camargo. while general taylor was away with the bulk of his army, the little garrison up the river was besieged. as we lay in our tents upon the sea-shore, the artillery at the fort on the rio grande could be distinctly heard. the war had begun. there were no possible means of obtaining news from the garrison, and information from outside could not be otherwise than unfavorable. what general taylor's feelings were during this suspense i do not know; but for myself, a young second-lieutenant who had never heard a hostile gun before, i felt sorry that i had enlisted. a great many men, when they smell battle afar off, chafe to get into the fray. when they say so themselves they generally fail to convince their hearers that they are as anxious as they would like to make believe, and as they approach danger they become more subdued. this rule is not universal, for i have known a few men who were always aching for a fight when there was no enemy near, who were as good as their word when the battle did come. but the number of such men is small. on the 7th of may the wagons were all loaded and general taylor started on his return, with his army reinforced at point isabel, but still less than three thousand strong, to relieve the garrison on the rio grande. the road from point isabel to matamoras is over an open, rolling, treeless prairie, until the timber that borders the bank of the rio grande is reached. this river, like the mississippi, flows through a rich alluvial valley in the most meandering manner, running towards all points of the compass at times within a few miles. formerly the river ran by resaca de la palma, some four or five miles east of the present channel. the old bed of the river at resaca had become filled at places, leaving a succession of little lakes. the timber that had formerly grown upon both banks, and for a considerable distance out, was still standing. this timber was struck six or eight miles out from the besieged garrison, at a point known as palo alto--"tall trees" or "woods." early in the forenoon of the 8th of may as palo alto was approached, an army, certainly outnumbering our little force, was seen, drawn up in line of battle just in front of the timber. their bayonets and spearheads glistened in the sunlight formidably. the force was composed largely of cavalry armed with lances. where we were the grass was tall, reaching nearly to the shoulders of the men, very stiff, and each stock was pointed at the top, and hard and almost as sharp as a darning-needle. general taylor halted his army before the head of column came in range of the artillery of the mexicans. he then formed a line of battle, facing the enemy. his artillery, two batteries and two eighteen-pounder iron guns, drawn by oxen, were placed in position at intervals along the line. a battalion was thrown to the rear, commanded by lieutenant-colonel childs, of the artillery, as reserves. these preparations completed, orders were given for a platoon of each company to stack arms and go to a stream off to the right of the command, to fill their canteens and also those of the rest of their respective companies. when the men were all back in their places in line, the command to advance was given. as i looked down that long line of about three thousand armed men, advancing towards a larger force also armed, i thought what a fearful responsibility general taylor must feel, commanding such a host and so far away from friends. the mexicans immediately opened fire upon us, first with artillery and then with infantry. at first their shots did not reach us, and the advance was continued. as we got nearer, the cannon balls commenced going through the ranks. they hurt no one, however, during this advance, because they would strike the ground long before they reached our line, and ricochetted through the tall grass so slowly that the men would see them and open ranks and let them pass. when we got to a point where the artillery could be used with effect, a halt was called, and the battle opened on both sides. the infantry under general taylor was armed with flint-lock muskets, and paper cartridges charged with powder, buck-shot and ball. at the distance of a few hundred yards a man might fire at you all day without your finding it out. the artillery was generally six-pounder brass guns throwing only solid shot; but general taylor had with him three or four twelve-pounder howitzers throwing shell, besides his eighteen-pounders before spoken of, that had a long range. this made a powerful armament. the mexicans were armed about as we were so far as their infantry was concerned, but their artillery only fired solid shot. we had greatly the advantage in this arm. the artillery was advanced a rod or two in front of the line, and opened fire. the infantry stood at order arms as spectators, watching the effect of our shots upon the enemy, and watching his shots so as to step out of their way. it could be seen that the eighteen-pounders and the howitzers did a great deal of execution. on our side there was little or no loss while we occupied this position. during the battle major ringgold, an accomplished and brave artillery officer, was mortally wounded, and lieutenant luther, also of the artillery, was struck. during the day several advances were made, and just at dusk it became evident that the mexicans were falling back. we again advanced, and occupied at the close of the battle substantially the ground held by the enemy at the beginning. in this last move there was a brisk fire upon our troops, and some execution was done. one cannon-ball passed through our ranks, not far from me. it took off the head of an enlisted man, and the under jaw of captain page of my regiment, while the splinters from the musket of the killed soldier, and his brains and bones, knocked down two or three others, including one officer, lieutenant wallen, --hurting them more or less. our casualties for the day were nine killed and forty-seven wounded. at the break of day on the 9th, the army under taylor was ready to renew the battle; but an advance showed that the enemy had entirely left our front during the night. the chaparral before us was impenetrable except where there were roads or trails, with occasionally clear or bare spots of small dimensions. a body of men penetrating it might easily be ambushed. it was better to have a few men caught in this way than the whole army, yet it was necessary that the garrison at the river should be relieved. to get to them the chaparral had to be passed. thus i assume general taylor reasoned. he halted the army not far in advance of the ground occupied by the mexicans the day before, and selected captain c. f. smith, of the artillery, and captain mccall, of my company, to take one hundred and fifty picked men each and find where the enemy had gone. this left me in command of the company, an honor and responsibility i thought very great. smith and mccall found no obstruction in the way of their advance until they came up to the succession of ponds, before describes, at resaca. the mexicans had passed them and formed their lines on the opposite bank. this position they had strengthened a little by throwing up dead trees and brush in their front, and by placing artillery to cover the approaches and open places. smith and mccall deployed on each side of the road as well as they could, and engaged the enemy at long range. word was sent back, and the advance of the whole army was at once commenced. as we came up we were deployed in like manner. i was with the right wing, and led my company through the thicket wherever a penetrable place could be found, taking advantage of any clear spot that would carry me towards the enemy. at last i got pretty close up without knowing it. the balls commenced to whistle very thick overhead, cutting the limbs of the chaparral right and left. we could not see the enemy, so i ordered my men to lie down, an order that did not have to be enforced. we kept our position until it became evident that the enemy were not firing at us, and then withdrew to find better ground to advance upon. by this time some progress had been made on our left. a section of artillery had been captured by the cavalry, and some prisoners had been taken. the mexicans were giving way all along the line, and many of them had, no doubt, left early. i at last found a clear space separating two ponds. there seemed to be a few men in front and i charged upon them with my company. there was no resistance, and we captured a mexican colonel, who had been wounded, and a few men. just as i was sending them to the rear with a guard of two or three men, a private came from the front bringing back one of our officers, who had been badly wounded in advance of where i was. the ground had been charged over before. my exploit was equal to that of the soldier who boasted that he had cut off the leg of one of the enemy. when asked why he did not cut off his head, he replied: "some one had done that before." this left no doubt in my mind but that the battle of resaca de la palma would have been won, just as it was, if i had not been there. there was no further resistance. the evening of the 9th the army was encamped on its old ground near the fort, and the garrison was relieved. the siege had lasted a number of days, but the casualties were few in number. major jacob brown, of the 7th infantry, the commanding officer, had been killed, and in his honor the fort was named. since then a town of considerable importance has sprung up on the ground occupied by the fort and troops, which has also taken his name. the battles of palo alto and resaca de la palma seemed to us engaged, as pretty important affairs; but we had only a faint conception of their magnitude until they were fought over in the north by the press and the reports came back to us. at the same time, or about the same time, we learned that war existed between the united states and mexico, by the acts of the latter country. on learning this fact general taylor transferred our camps to the south or west bank of the river, and matamoras was occupied. we then became the "army of invasion." up to this time taylor had none but regular troops in his command; but now that invasion had already taken place, volunteers for one year commenced arriving. the army remained at matamoras until sufficiently reinforced to warrant a movement into the interior. general taylor was not an officer to trouble the administration much with his demands, but was inclined to do the best he could with the means given him. he felt his responsibility as going no further. if he had thought that he was sent to perform an impossibility with the means given him, he would probably have informed the authorities of his opinion and left them to determine what should be done. if the judgment was against him he would have gone on and done the best he could with the means at hand without parading his grievance before the public. no soldier could face either danger or responsibility more calmly than he. these are qualities more rarely found than genius or physical courage. general taylor never made any great show or parade, either of uniform or retinue. in dress he was possibly too plain, rarely wearing anything in the field to indicate his rank, or even that he was an officer; but he was known to every soldier in his army, and was respected by all. i can call to mind only one instance when i saw him in uniform, and one other when i heard of his wearing it, on both occasions he was unfortunate. the first was at corpus christi. he had concluded to review his army before starting on the march and gave orders accordingly. colonel twiggs was then second in rank with the army, and to him was given the command of the review. colonel and brevet brigadier-general worth, a far different soldier from taylor in the use of the uniform, was next to twiggs in rank, and claimed superiority by virtue of his brevet rank when the accidents of service threw them where one or the other had to command. worth declined to attend the review as subordinate to twiggs until the question was settled by the highest authority. this broke up the review, and the question was referred to washington for final decision. general taylor was himself only a colonel, in real rank, at that time, and a brigadier-general by brevet. he was assigned to duty, however, by the president, with the rank which his brevet gave him. worth was not so assigned, but by virtue of commanding a division he must, under the army regulations of that day, have drawn the pay of his brevet rank. the question was submitted to washington, and no response was received until after the army had reached the rio grande. it was decided against general worth, who at once tendered his resignation and left the army, going north, no doubt, by the same vessel that carried it. this kept him out of the battles of palo alto and resaca de la palma. either the resignation was not accepted, or general worth withdrew it before action had been taken. at all events he returned to the army in time to command his division in the battle of monterey, and served with it to the end of the war. the second occasion on which general taylor was said to have donned his uniform, was in order to receive a visit from the flag officer of the naval squadron off the mouth of the rio grande. while the army was on that river the flag officer sent word that he would call on the general to pay his respects on a certain day. general taylor, knowing that naval officers habitually wore all the uniform the "law allowed" on all occasions of ceremony, thought it would be only civil to receive his guest in the same style. his uniform was therefore got out, brushed up, and put on, in advance of the visit. the flag officer, knowing general taylor's aversion to the wearing of the uniform, and feeling that it would be regarded as a compliment should he meet him in civilian's dress, left off his uniform for this occasion. the meeting was said to have been embarrassing to both, and the conversation was principally apologetic. the time was whiled away pleasantly enough at matamoras, while we were waiting for volunteers. it is probable that all the most important people of the territory occupied by our army left their homes before we got there, but with those remaining the best of relations apparently existed. it was the policy of the commanding general to allow no pillaging, no taking of private property for public or individual use without satisfactory compensation, so that a better market was afforded than the people had ever known before. among the troops that joined us at matamoras was an ohio regiment, of which thomas l. hamer, the member of congress who had given me my appointment to west point, was major. he told me then that he could have had the colonelcy, but that as he knew he was to be appointed a brigadier-general, he preferred at first to take the lower grade. i have said before that hamer was one of the ablest men ohio ever produced. at that time he was in the prime of life, being less than fifty years of age, and possessed an admirable physique, promising long life. but he was taken sick before monterey, and died within a few days. i have always believed that had his life been spared, he would have been president of the united states during the term filled by president pierce. had hamer filled that office his partiality for me was such, there is but little doubt i should have been appointed to one of the staff corps of the army--the pay department probably--and would therefore now be preparing to retire. neither of these speculations is unreasonable, and they are mentioned to show how little men control their own destiny. reinforcements having arrived, in the month of august the movement commenced from matamoras to camargo, the head of navigation on the rio grande. the line of the rio grande was all that was necessary to hold, unless it was intended to invade mexico from the north. in that case the most natural route to take was the one which general taylor selected. it entered a pass in the sierra madre mountains, at monterey, through which the main road runs to the city of mexico. monterey itself was a good point to hold, even if the line of the rio grande covered all the territory we desired to occupy at that time. it is built on a plain two thousand feet above tide water, where the air is bracing and the situation healthy. on the 19th of august the army started for monterey, leaving a small garrison at matamoras. the troops, with the exception of the artillery, cavalry, and the brigade to which i belonged, were moved up the river to camargo on steamers. as there were but two or three of these, the boats had to make a number of trips before the last of the troops were up. those who marched did so by the south side of the river. lieutenant-colonel garland, of the 4th infantry, was the brigade commander, and on this occasion commanded the entire marching force. one day out convinced him that marching by day in that latitude, in the month of august, was not a beneficial sanitary measure, particularly for northern men. the order of marching was changed and night marches were substituted with the best results. when camargo was reached, we found a city of tents outside the mexican hamlet. i was detailed to act as quartermaster and commissary to the regiment. the teams that had proven abundantly sufficient to transport all supplies from corpus christi to the rio grande over the level prairies of texas, were entirely inadequate to the needs of the reinforced army in a mountainous country. to obviate the deficiency, pack mules were hired, with mexicans to pack and drive them. i had charge of the few wagons allotted to the 4th infantry and of the pack train to supplement them. there were not men enough in the army to manage that train without the help of mexicans who had learned how. as it was the difficulty was great enough. the troops would take up their march at an early hour each day. after they had started, the tents and cooking utensils had to be made into packages, so that they could be lashed to the backs of the mules. sheet-iron kettles, tent-poles and mess chests were inconvenient articles to transport in that way. it took several hours to get ready to start each morning, and by the time we were ready some of the mules first loaded would be tired of standing so long with their loads on their backs. sometimes one would start to run, bowing his back and kicking up until he scattered his load; others would lie down and try to disarrange their loads by attempting to get on the top of them by rolling on them; others with tent-poles for part of their loads would manage to run a tent-pole on one side of a sapling while they would take the other. i am not aware of ever having used a profane expletive in my life; but i would have the charity to excuse those who may have done so, if they were in charge of a train of mexican pack mules at the time. chapter viii. advance on monterey--the black fort--the battle of monterey--surrender of the city. the advance from camargo was commenced on the 5th of september. the army was divided into four columns, separated from each other by one day's march. the advance reached cerralvo in four days and halted for the remainder of the troops to come up. by the 13th the rear-guard had arrived, and the same day the advance resumed its march, followed as before, a day separating the divisions. the forward division halted again at marin, twenty-four miles from monterey. both this place and cerralvo were nearly deserted, and men, women and children were seen running and scattered over the hills as we approached; but when the people returned they found all their abandoned property safe, which must have given them a favorable opinion of los grengos--"the yankees." from marin the movement was in mass. on the 19th general taylor, with is army, was encamped at walnut springs, within three miles of monterey. the town is on a small stream coming out of the mountain-pass, and is backed by a range of hills of moderate elevation. to the north, between the city and walnut springs, stretches an extensive plain. on this plain, and entirely outside of the last houses of the city, stood a strong fort, enclosed on all sides, to which our army gave the name of "black fort." its guns commanded the approaches to the city to the full extent of their range. there were two detached spurs of hills or mountains to the north and northwest of the city, which were also fortified. on one of these stood the bishop's palace. the road to saltillo leaves the upper or western end of the city under the fire of the guns from these heights. the lower or eastern end was defended by two or three small detached works, armed with artillery and infantry. to the south was the mountain stream before mentioned, and back of that the range of foot-hills. the plaza in the centre of the city was the citadel, properly speaking. all the streets leading from it were swept by artillery, cannon being intrenched behind temporary parapets. the house-tops near the plaza were converted into infantry fortifications by the use of sand-bags for parapets. such were the defences of monterey in september, 1847. general ampudia, with a force of certainly ten thousand men, was in command. general taylor's force was about six thousand five hundred strong, in three divisions, under generals butler, twiggs and worth. the troops went into camp at walnut springs, while the engineer officers, under major mansfield--a general in the late war--commenced their reconnoissance. major mansfield found that it would be practicable to get troops around, out of range of the black fort and the works on the detached hills to the north-west of the city, to the saltillo road. with this road in our possession, the enemy would be cut off from receiving further supplies, if not from all communication with the interior. general worth, with his division somewhat reinforced, was given the task of gaining possession of the saltillo road, and of carrying the detached works outside the city, in that quarter. he started on his march early in the afternoon of the 20th. the divisions under generals butler and twiggs were drawn up to threaten the east and north sides of the city and the works on those fronts, in support of the movement under general worth. worth's was regarded as the main attack on monterey, and all other operations were in support of it. his march this day was uninterrupted; but the enemy was seen to reinforce heavily about the bishop's palace and the other outside fortifications on their left. general worth reached a defensible position just out of range of the enemy's guns on the heights north-west of the city, and bivouacked for the night. the engineer officers with him--captain sanders and lieutenant george g. meade, afterwards the commander of the victorious national army at the battle of gettysburg--made a reconnoissance to the saltillo road under cover of night. during the night of the 20th general taylor had established a battery, consisting of two twenty-four-pounder howitzers and a ten inch mortar, at a point from which they could play upon black fort. a natural depression in the plain, sufficiently deep to protect men standing in it from the fire from the fort, was selected and the battery established on the crest nearest the enemy. the 4th infantry, then consisting of but six reduced companies, was ordered to support the artillerists while they were intrenching themselves and their guns. i was regimental quartermaster at the time and was ordered to remain in charge of camp and the public property at walnut springs. it was supposed that the regiment would return to its camp in the morning. the point for establishing the siege battery was reached and the work performed without attracting the attention of the enemy. at daylight the next morning fire was opened on both sides and continued with, what seemed to me at that day, great fury. my curiosity got the better of my judgment, and i mounted a horse and rode to the front to see what was going on. i had been there but a short time when an order to charge was given, and lacking the moral courage to return to camp--where i had been ordered to stay--i charged with the regiment as soon as the troops were out of the depression they came under the fire of black fort. as they advanced they got under fire from batteries guarding the east, or lower, end of the city, and of musketry. about one-third of the men engaged in the charge were killed or wounded in the space of a few minutes. we retreated to get out of fire, not backward, but eastward and perpendicular to the direct road running into the city from walnut springs. i was, i believe, the only person in the 4th infantry in the charge who was on horseback. when we got to a lace of safety the regiment halted and drew itself together--what was left of it. the adjutant of the regiment, lieutenant hoskins, who was not in robust health, found himself very much fatigued from running on foot in the charge and retreat, and, seeing me on horseback, expressed a wish that he could be mounted also. i offered him my horse and he accepted the offer. a few minutes later i saw a soldier, a quartermaster's man, mounted, not far away. i ran to him, took his horse and was back with the regiment in a few minutes. in a short time we were off again; and the next place of safety from the shots of the enemy that i recollect of being in, was a field of cane or corn to the north-east of the lower batteries. the adjutant to whom i had loaned my horse was killed, and i was designated to act in his place. this charge was ill-conceived, or badly executed. we belonged to the brigade commanded by lieutenant-colonel garland, and he had received orders to charge the lower batteries of the city, and carry them if he could without too much loss, for the purpose of creating a diversion in favor of worth, who was conducting the movement which it was intended should be decisive. by a movement by the left flank garland could have led his men beyond the range of the fire from black fort and advanced towards the northeast angle of the city, as well covered from fire as could be expected. there was no undue loss of life in reaching the lower end of monterey, except that sustained by garland's command. meanwhile quitman's brigade, conducted by an officer of engineers, had reached the eastern end of the city, and was placed under cover of the houses without much loss. colonel garland's brigade also arrived at the suburbs, and, by the assistance of some of our troops that had reached house-tops from which they could fire into a little battery covering the approaches to the lower end of the city, the battery was speedily captured and its guns were turned upon another work of the enemy. an entrance into the east end of the city was now secured, and the houses protected our troops so long as they were inactive. on the west general worth had reached the saltillo road after some fighting but without heavy loss. he turned from his new position and captured the forts on both heights in that quarter. this gave him possession of the upper or west end of monterey. troops from both twiggs's and butler's divisions were in possession of the east end of the town, but the black fort to the north of the town and the plaza in the centre were still in the possession of the enemy. our camps at walnut springs, three miles away, were guarded by a company from each regiment. a regiment of kentucky volunteers guarded the mortars and howitzers engaged against black fort. practically monterey was invested. there was nothing done on the 22d by the united states troops; but the enemy kept up a harmless fire upon us from black fort and the batteries still in their possession at the east end of the city. during the night they evacuated these; so that on the morning of the 23d we held undisputed possession of the east end of monterey. twiggs's division was at the lower end of the city, and well covered from the fire of the enemy. but the streets leading to the plaza--all spanish or spanish-american towns have near their centres a square called a plaza--were commanded from all directions by artillery. the houses were flat-roofed and but one or two stories high, and about the plaza the roofs were manned with infantry, the troops being protected from our fire by parapets made of sand-bags. all advances into the city were thus attended with much danger. while moving along streets which did not lead to the plaza, our men were protected from the fire, and from the view, of the enemy except at the crossings; but at these a volley of musketry and a discharge of grape-shot were invariably encountered. the 3d and 4th regiments of infantry made an advance nearly to the plaza in this way and with heavy loss. the loss of the 3d infantry in commissioned officers was especially severe. there were only five companies of the regiment and not over twelve officers present, and five of these officers were killed. when within a square of the plaza this small command, ten companies in all, was brought to a halt. placing themselves under cover from the shots of the enemy, the men would watch to detect a head above the sand-bags on the neighboring houses. the exposure of a single head would bring a volley from our soldiers. we had not occupied this position long when it was discovered that our ammunition was growing low. i volunteered to go back (*2) to the point we had started from, report our position to general twiggs, and ask for ammunition to be forwarded. we were at this time occupying ground off from the street, in rear of the houses. my ride back was an exposed one. before starting i adjusted myself on the side of my horse furthest from the enemy, and with only one foot holding to the cantle of the saddle, and an arm over the neck of the horse exposed, i started at full run. it was only at street crossings that my horse was under fire, but these i crossed at such a flying rate that generally i was past and under cover of the next block of houses before the enemy fired. i got out safely without a scratch. at one place on my ride, i saw a sentry walking in front of a house, and stopped to inquire what he was doing there. finding that the house was full of wounded american officers and soldiers, i dismounted and went in. i found there captain williams, of the engineer corps, wounded in the head, probably fatally, and lieutenant territt, also badly wounded his bowels protruding from his wound. there were quite a number of soldiers also. promising them to report their situation, i left, readjusted myself to my horse, recommenced the run, and was soon with the troops at the east end. before ammunition could be collected, the two regiments i had been with were seen returning, running the same gauntlet in getting out that they had passed in going in, but with comparatively little loss. the movement was countermanded and the troops were withdrawn. the poor wounded officers and men i had found, fell into the hands of the enemy during the night, and died. while this was going on at the east, general worth, with a small division of troops, was advancing towards the plaza from the opposite end of the city. he resorted to a better expedient for getting to the plaza--the citadel--than we did on the east. instead of moving by the open streets, he advanced through the houses, cutting passageways from one to another. without much loss of life, he got so near the plaza during the night that before morning, ampudia, the mexican commander, made overtures for the surrender of the city and garrison. this stopped all further hostilities. the terms of surrender were soon agreed upon. the prisoners were paroled and permitted to take their horses and personal property with them. my pity was aroused by the sight of the mexican garrison of monterey marching out of town as prisoners, and no doubt the same feeling was experienced by most of our army who witnessed it. many of the prisoners were cavalry, armed with lances, and mounted on miserable little half-starved horses that did not look as if they could carry their riders out of town. the men looked in but little better condition. i thought how little interest the men before me had in the results of the war, and how little knowledge they had of "what it was all about." after the surrender of the garrison of monterey a quiet camp life was led until midwinter. as had been the case on the rio grande, the people who remained at their homes fraternized with the "yankees" in the pleasantest manner. in fact, under the humane policy of our commander, i question whether the great majority of the mexican people did not regret our departure as much as they had regretted our coming. property and person were thoroughly protected, and a market was afforded for all the products of the country such as the people had never enjoyed before. the educated and wealthy portion of the population here, as elsewhere, abandoned their homes and remained away from them as long as they were in the possession of the invaders; but this class formed a very small percentage of the whole population. chapter ix. political intrigue--buena vista--movement against vera cruz--siege and capture of vera cruz. the mexican war was a political war, and the administration conducting it desired to make party capital out of it. general scott was at the head of the army, and, being a soldier of acknowledged professional capacity, his claim to the command of the forces in the field was almost indisputable and does not seem to have been denied by president polk, or marcy, his secretary of war. scott was a whig and the administration was democratic. general scott was also known to have political aspirations, and nothing so popularizes a candidate for high civil positions as military victories. it would not do therefore to give him command of the "army of conquest." the plans submitted by scott for a campaign in mexico were disapproved by the administration, and he replied, in a tone possibly a little disrespectful, to the effect that, if a soldier's plans were not to be supported by the administration, success could not be expected. this was on the 27th of may, 1846. four days later general scott was notified that he need not go to mexico. general gaines was next in rank, but he was too old and feeble to take the field. colonel zachary taylor--a brigadier-general by brevet--was therefore left in command. he, too, was a whig, but was not supposed to entertain any political ambitions; nor did he; but after the fall of monterey, his third battle and third complete victory, the whig papers at home began to speak of him as the candidate of their party for the presidency. something had to be done to neutralize his growing popularity. he could not be relieved from duty in the field where all his battles had been victories: the design would have been too transparent. it was finally decided to send general scott to mexico in chief command, and to authorize him to carry out his own original plan: that is, capture vera cruz and march upon the capital of the country. it was no doubt supposed that scott's ambition would lead him to slaughter taylor or destroy his chances for the presidency, and yet it was hoped that he would not make sufficient capital himself to secure the prize. the administration had indeed a most embarrassing problem to solve. it was engaged in a war of conquest which must be carried to a successful issue, or the political object would be unattained. yet all the capable officers of the requisite rank belonged to the opposition, and the man selected for his lack of political ambition had himself become a prominent candidate for the presidency. it was necessary to destroy his chances promptly. the problem was to do this without the loss of conquest and without permitting another general of the same political party to acquire like popularity. the fact is, the administration of mr. polk made every preparation to disgrace scott, or, to speak more correctly, to drive him to such desperation that he would disgrace himself. general scott had opposed conquest by the way of the rio grande, matamoras and saltillo from the first. now that he was in command of all the forces in mexico, he withdrew from taylor most of his regular troops and left him only enough volunteers, as he thought, to hold the line then in possession of the invading army. indeed scott did not deem it important to hold anything beyond the rio grande, and authorized taylor to fall back to that line if he chose. general taylor protested against the depletion of his army, and his subsequent movement upon buena vista would indicate that he did not share the views of his chief in regard to the unimportance of conquest beyond the rio grande. scott had estimated the men and material that would be required to capture vera cruz and to march on the capital of the country, two hundred and sixty miles in the interior. he was promised all he asked and seemed to have not only the confidence of the president, but his sincere good wishes. the promises were all broken. only about half the troops were furnished that had been pledged, other war material was withheld and scott had scarcely started for mexico before the president undertook to supersede him by the appointment of senator thomas h. benton as lieutenant-general. this being refused by congress, the president asked legislative authority to place a junior over a senior of the same grade, with the view of appointing benton to the rank of major-general and then placing him in command of the army, but congress failed to accede to this proposition as well, and scott remained in command: but every general appointed to serve under him was politically opposed to the chief, and several were personally hostile. general scott reached brazos santiago or point isabel, at the mouth of the rio grande, late in december, 1846, and proceeded at once up the river to camargo, where he had written general taylor to meet him. taylor, however, had gone to, or towards tampico, for the purpose of establishing a post there. he had started on this march before he was aware of general scott being in the country. under these circumstances scott had to issue his orders designating the troops to be withdrawn from taylor, without the personal consultation he had expected to hold with his subordinate. general taylor's victory at buena vista, february 22d, 23d, and 24th, 1847, with an army composed almost entirely of volunteers who had not been in battle before, and over a vastly superior force numerically, made his nomination for the presidency by the whigs a foregone conclusion. he was nominated and elected in 1848. i believe that he sincerely regretted this turn in his fortunes, preferring the peace afforded by a quiet life free from abuse to the honor of filling the highest office in the gift of any people, the presidency of the united states. when general scott assumed command of the army of invasion, i was in the division of general david twiggs, in taylor's command; but under the new orders my regiment was transferred to the division of general william worth, in which i served to the close of the war. the troops withdrawn from taylor to form part of the forces to operate against vera cruz, were assembled at the mouth of the rio grande preparatory to embarkation for their destination. i found general worth a different man from any i had before served directly under. he was nervous, impatient and restless on the march, or when important or responsible duty confronted him. there was not the least reason for haste on the march, for it was known that it would take weeks to assemble shipping enough at the point of our embarkation to carry the army, but general worth moved his division with a rapidity that would have been commendable had he been going to the relief of a beleaguered garrison. the length of the marches was regulated by the distances between places affording a supply of water for the troops, and these distances were sometimes long and sometimes short. general worth on one occasion at least, after having made the full distance intended for the day, and after the troops were in camp and preparing their food, ordered tents struck and made the march that night which had been intended for the next day. some commanders can move troops so as to get the maximum distance out of them without fatigue, while others can wear them out in a few days without accomplishing so much. general worth belonged to this latter class. he enjoyed, however, a fine reputation for his fighting qualities, and thus attached his officers and men to him. the army lay in camp upon the sand-beach in the neighborhood of the mouth of the rio grande for several weeks, awaiting the arrival of transports to carry it to its new field of operations. the transports were all sailing vessels. the passage was a tedious one, and many of the troops were on shipboard over thirty days from the embarkation at the mouth of the rio grande to the time of debarkation south of vera cruz. the trip was a comfortless one for officers and men. the transports used were built for carrying freight and possessed but limited accommodations for passengers, and the climate added to the discomfort of all. the transports with troops were assembled in the harbor of anton lizardo, some sixteen miles south of vera cruz, as they arrived, and there awaited the remainder of the fleet, bringing artillery, ammunition and supplies of all kinds from the north. with the fleet there was a little steam propeller dispatch-boat--the first vessel of the kind i had ever seen, and probably the first of its kind ever seen by any one then with the army. at that day ocean steamers were rare, and what there were were sidewheelers. this little vessel, going through the fleet so fast, so noiselessly and with its propeller under water out of view, attracted a great deal of attention. i recollect that lieutenant sidney smith, of the 4th infantry, by whom i happened to be standing on the deck of a vessel when this propeller was passing, exclaimed, "why, the thing looks as if it was propelled by the force of circumstances." finally on the 7th of march, 1847, the little army of ten or twelve thousand men, given scott to invade a country with a population of seven or eight millions, a mountainous country affording the greatest possible natural advantages for defence, was all assembled and ready to commence the perilous task of landing from vessels lying in the open sea. the debarkation took place inside of the little island of sacrificios, some three miles south of vera cruz. the vessels could not get anywhere near shore, so that everything had to be landed in lighters or surf-boats; general scott had provided these before leaving the north. the breakers were sometimes high, so that the landing was tedious. the men were got ashore rapidly, because they could wade when they came to shallow water; but the camp and garrison equipage, provisions, ammunition and all stores had to be protected from the salt water, and therefore their landing took several days. the mexicans were very kind to us, however, and threw no obstacles in the way of our landing except an occasional shot from their nearest fort. during the debarkation one shot took off the head of major albertis. no other, i believe, reached anywhere near the same distance. on the 9th of march the troops were landed and the investment of vera cruz, from the gulf of mexico south of the city to the gulf again on the north, was soon and easily effected. the landing of stores was continued until everything was got ashore. vera cruz, at the time of which i write and up to 1880, was a walled city. the wall extended from the water's edge south of the town to the water again on the north. there were fortifications at intervals along the line and at the angles. in front of the city, and on an island half a mile out in the gulf, stands san juan de ulloa, an enclosed fortification of large dimensions and great strength for that period. against artillery of the present day the land forts and walls would prove elements of weakness rather than strength. after the invading army had established their camps out of range of the fire from the city, batteries were established, under cover of night, far to the front of the line where the troops lay. these batteries were intrenched and the approaches sufficiently protected. if a sortie had been made at any time by the mexicans, the men serving the batteries could have been quickly reinforced without great exposure to the fire from the enemy's main line. no serious attempt was made to capture the batteries or to drive our troops away. the siege continued with brisk firing on our side till the 27th of march, by which time a considerable breach had been made in the wall surrounding the city. upon this general morales, who was governor of both the city and of san juan de ulloa, commenced a correspondence with general scott looking to the surrender of the town, forts and garrison. on the 29th vera cruz and san juan de ulloa were occupied by scott's army. about five thousand prisoners and four hundred pieces of artillery, besides large amounts of small arms and ammunition, fell into the hands of the victorious force. the casualties on our side during the siege amounted to sixty-four officers and men, killed and wounded. chapter x. march to jalapa--battle of cerro gordo--perote--puebla--scott and taylor. general scott had less than twelve thousand men at vera cruz. he had been promised by the administration a very much larger force, or claimed that he had, and he was a man of veracity. twelve thousand was a very small army with which to penetrate two hundred and sixty miles into an enemy's country, and to besiege the capital; a city, at that time, of largely over one hundred thousand inhabitants. then, too, any line of march that could be selected led through mountain passes easily defended. in fact, there were at that time but two roads from vera cruz to the city of mexico that could be taken by an army; one by jalapa and perote, the other by cordova and orizaba, the two coming together on the great plain which extends to the city of mexico after the range of mountains is passed. it was very important to get the army away from vera cruz as soon as possible, in order to avoid the yellow fever, or vomito, which usually visits that city early in the year, and is very fatal to persons not acclimated; but transportation, which was expected from the north, was arriving very slowly. it was absolutely necessary to have enough to supply the army to jalapa, sixty-five miles in the interior and above the fevers of the coast. at that point the country is fertile, and an army of the size of general scott's could subsist there for an indefinite period. not counting the sick, the weak and the garrisons for the captured city and fort, the moving column was now less than ten thousand strong. this force was composed of three divisions, under generals twiggs, patterson, and worth. the importance of escaping the vomito was so great that as soon as transportation enough could be got together to move a division the advance was commenced. on the 8th of april, twiggs's division started for jalapa. he was followed very soon by patterson, with his division. general worth was to bring up the rear with his command as soon as transportation enough was assembled to carry six days' rations for his troops with the necessary ammunition and camp and garrison equipage. it was the 13th of april before this division left vera cruz. the leading division ran against the enemy at cerro gordo, some fifty miles west, on the road to jalapa, and went into camp at plan del rio, about three miles from the fortifications. general patterson reached plan del rio with his division soon after twiggs arrived. the two were then secure against an attack from santa anna, who commanded the mexican forces. at all events they confronted the enemy without reinforcements and without molestation, until the 18th of april. general scott had remained at vera cruz to hasten preparations for the field; but on the 12th, learning the situation at the front, he hastened on to take personal supervision. he at once commenced his preparations for the capture of the position held by santa anna and of the troops holding it. cerro gordo is one of the higher spurs of the mountains some twelve to fifteen miles east of jalapa, and santa anna had selected this point as the easiest to defend against an invading army. the road, said to have been built by cortez, zigzags around the mountain-side and was defended at every turn by artillery. on either side were deep chasms or mountain walls. a direct attack along the road was an impossibility. a flank movement seemed equally impossible. after the arrival of the commanding-general upon the scene, reconnoissances were sent out to find, or to make, a road by which the rear of the enemy's works might be reached without a front attack. these reconnoissances were made under the supervision of captain robert e. lee, assisted by lieutenants p. g. t. beauregard, isaac i. stevens, z. b. tower, g. w. smith, george b. mcclellan, and j. g. foster, of the corps of engineers, all officers who attained rank and fame, on one side or the other, in the great conflict for the preservation of the unity of the nation. the reconnoissance was completed, and the labor of cutting out and making roads by the flank of the enemy was effected by the 17th of the month. this was accomplished without the knowledge of santa anna or his army, and over ground where he supposed it impossible. on the same day general scott issued his order for the attack on the 18th. the attack was made as ordered, and perhaps there was not a battle of the mexican war, or of any other, where orders issued before an engagement were nearer being a correct report of what afterwards took place. under the supervision of the engineers, roadways had been opened over chasms to the right where the walls were so steep that men could barely climb them. animals could not. these had been opened under cover of night, without attracting the notice of the enemy. the engineers, who had directed the opening, led the way and the troops followed. artillery was let down the steep slopes by hand, the men engaged attaching a strong rope to the rear axle and letting the guns down, a piece at a time, while the men at the ropes kept their ground on top, paying out gradually, while a few at the front directed the course of the piece. in like manner the guns were drawn by hand up the opposite slopes. in this way scott's troops reached their assigned position in rear of most of the intrenchments of the enemy, unobserved. the attack was made, the mexican reserves behind the works beat a hasty retreat, and those occupying them surrendered. on the left general pillow's command made a formidable demonstration, which doubtless held a part of the enemy in his front and contributed to the victory. i am not pretending to give full details of all the battles fought, but of the portion that i saw. there were troops engaged on both sides at other points in which both sustained losses; but the battle was won as here narrated. the surprise of the enemy was complete, the victory overwhelming; some three thousand prisoners fell into scott's hands, also a large amount of ordnance and ordnance stores. the prisoners were paroled, the artillery parked and the small arms and ammunition destroyed. the battle of buena vista was probably very important to the success of general scott at cerro gordo and in his entire campaign from vera cruz to the great plains reaching to the city of mexico. the only army santa anna had to protect his capital and the mountain passes west of vera cruz, was the one he had with him confronting general taylor. it is not likely that he would have gone as far north as monterey to attack the united states troops when he knew his country was threatened with invasion further south. when taylor moved to saltillo and then advanced on to buena vista, santa anna crossed the desert confronting the invading army, hoping no doubt to crush it and get back in time to meet general scott in the mountain passes west of vera cruz. his attack on taylor was disastrous to the mexican army, but, notwithstanding this, he marched his army to cerro gordo, a distance not much short of one thousand miles by the line he had to travel, in time to intrench himself well before scott got there. if he had been successful at buena vista his troops would no doubt have made a more stubborn resistance at cerro gordo. had the battle of buena vista not been fought santa anna would have had time to move leisurely to meet the invader further south and with an army not demoralized nor depleted by defeat. after the battle the victorious army moved on to jalapa, where it was in a beautiful, productive and healthy country, far above the fevers of the coast. jalapa, however, is still in the mountains, and between there and the great plain the whole line of the road is easy of defence. it was important, therefore, to get possession of the great highway between the sea-coast and the capital up to the point where it leaves the mountains, before the enemy could have time to re-organize and fortify in our front. worth's division was selected to go forward to secure this result. the division marched to perote on the great plain, not far from where the road debouches from the mountains. there is a low, strong fort on the plain in front of the town, known as the castle of perote. this, however, offered no resistance and fell into our hands, with its armament. general scott having now only nine or ten thousand men west of vera cruz, and the time of some four thousand of them being about to expire, a long delay was the consequence. the troops were in a healthy climate, and where they could subsist for an indefinite period even if their line back to vera cruz should be cut off. it being ascertained that the men whose time would expire before the city of mexico could possibly fall into the hands of the american army, would not remain beyond the term for which they had volunteered, the commanding-general determined to discharge them at once, for a delay until the expiration of their time would have compelled them to pass through vera cruz during the season of the vomito. this reduced scott's force in the field to about five thousand men. early in may, worth, with his division, left perote and marched on to puebla. the roads were wide and the country open except through one pass in a spur of mountains coming up from the south, through which the road runs. notwithstanding this the small column was divided into two bodies, moving a day apart. nothing occurred on the march of special note, except that while lying at the town of amozoque--an easy day's march east of puebla--a body of the enemy's cavalry, two or three thousand strong, was seen to our right, not more than a mile away. a battery or two, with two or three infantry regiments, was sent against them and they soon disappeared. on the 15th of may we entered the city of puebla. general worth was in command at puebla until the latter end of may, when general scott arrived. here, as well as on the march up, his restlessness, particularly under responsibilities, showed itself. during his brief command he had the enemy hovering around near the city, in vastly superior numbers to his own. the brigade to which i was attached changed quarters three different times in about a week, occupying at first quarters near the plaza, in the heart of the city; then at the western entrance; then at the extreme east. on one occasion general worth had the troops in line, under arms, all day, with three days' cooked rations in their haversacks. he galloped from one command to another proclaiming the near proximity of santa anna with an army vastly superior to his own. general scott arrived upon the scene the latter part of the month, and nothing more was heard of santa anna and his myriads. there were, of course, bodies of mounted mexicans hovering around to watch our movements and to pick up stragglers, or small bodies of troops, if they ventured too far out. these always withdrew on the approach of any considerable number of our soldiers. after the arrival of general scott i was sent, as quartermaster, with a large train of wagons, back two days' march at least, to procure forage. we had less than a thousand men as escort, and never thought of danger. we procured full loads for our entire train at two plantations, which could easily have furnished as much more. there had been great delay in obtaining the authority of congress for the raising of the troops asked for by the administration. a bill was before the national legislature from early in the session of 1846-7, authorizing the creation of ten additional regiments for the war to be attached to the regular army, but it was the middle of february before it became a law. appointments of commissioned officers had then to be made; men had to be enlisted, the regiments equipped and the whole transported to mexico. it was august before general scott received reinforcement sufficient to warrant an advance. his moving column, not even now more than ten thousand strong, was in four divisions, commanded by generals twiggs, worth, pillow and quitman. there was also a cavalry corps under general harney, composed of detachments of the 1st, 2d, and 3d dragoons. the advance commenced on the 7th of august with twiggs's division in front. the remaining three divisions followed, with an interval of a day between. the marches were short, to make concentration easier in case of attack. i had now been in battle with the two leading commanders conducting armies in a foreign land. the contrast between the two was very marked. general taylor never wore uniform, but dressed himself entirely for comfort. he moved about the field in which he was operating to see through his own eyes the situation. often he would be without staff officers, and when he was accompanied by them there was no prescribed order in which they followed. he was very much given to sit his horse side-ways--with both feet on one side--particularly on the battlefield. general scott was the reverse in all these particulars. he always wore all the uniform prescribed or allowed by law when he inspected his lines; word would be sent to all division and brigade commanders in advance, notifying them of the hour when the commanding general might be expected. this was done so that all the army might be under arms to salute their chief as he passed. on these occasions he wore his dress uniform, cocked hat, aiguillettes, sabre and spurs. his staff proper, besides all officers constructively on his staff--engineers, inspectors, quartermasters, etc., that could be spared--followed, also in uniform and in prescribed order. orders were prepared with great care and evidently with the view that they should be a history of what followed. in their modes of expressing thought, these two generals contrasted quite as strongly as in their other characteristics. general scott was precise in language, cultivated a style peculiarly his own; was proud of his rhetoric; not averse to speaking of himself, often in the third person, and he could bestow praise upon the person he was talking about without the least embarrassment. taylor was not a conversationalist, but on paper he could put his meaning so plainly that there could be no mistaking it. he knew how to express what he wanted to say in the fewest well-chosen words, but would not sacrifice meaning to the construction of high-sounding sentences. but with their opposite characteristics both were great and successful soldiers; both were true, patriotic and upright in all their dealings. both were pleasant to serve under--taylor was pleasant to serve with. scott saw more through the eyes of his staff officers than through his own. his plans were deliberately prepared, and fully expressed in orders. taylor saw for himself, and gave orders to meet the emergency without reference to how they would read in history. chapter xi. advance on the city of mexico--battle of contreras--assault at churubusco--negotiations for peace--battle of molino del rey--storming of chapultepec--san cosme--evacuation of the city--halls of the montezumas. the route followed by the army from puebla to the city of mexico was over rio frio mountain, the road leading over which, at the highest point, is about eleven thousand feet above tide water. the pass through this mountain might have been easily defended, but it was not; and the advanced division reached the summit in three days after leaving puebla. the city of mexico lies west of rio frio mountain, on a plain backed by another mountain six miles farther west, with others still nearer on the north and south. between the western base of rio frio and the city of mexico there are three lakes, chalco and xochimilco on the left and texcoco on the right, extending to the east end of the city of mexico. chalco and texcoco are divided by a narrow strip of land over which the direct road to the city runs. xochimilco is also to the left of the road, but at a considerable distance south of it, and is connected with lake chalco by a narrow channel. there is a high rocky mound, called el penon, on the right of the road, springing up from the low flat ground dividing the lakes. this mound was strengthened by intrenchments at its base and summit, and rendered a direct attack impracticable. scott's army was rapidly concentrated about ayotla and other points near the eastern end of lake chalco. reconnoissances were made up to within gun-shot of el penon, while engineers were seeking a route by the south side of lake chalco to flank the city, and come upon it from the south and south-west. a way was found around the lake, and by the 18th of august troops were in st. augustin tlalpam, a town about eleven miles due south from the plaza of the capital. between st. augustin tlalpam and the city lie the hacienda of san antonio and the village of churubusco, and south-west of them is contreras. all these points, except st. augustin tlalpam, were intrenched and strongly garrisoned. contreras is situated on the side of a mountain, near its base, where volcanic rocks are piled in great confusion, reaching nearly to san antonio. this made the approach to the city from the south very difficult. the brigade to which i was attached--garland's, of worth's division--was sent to confront san antonio, two or three miles from st. augustin tlalpam, on the road to churubusco and the city of mexico. the ground on which san antonio stands is completely in the valley, and the surface of the land is only a little above the level of the lakes, and, except to the south-west, it was cut up by deep ditches filled with water. to the south-west is the pedregal--the volcanic rock before spoken of--over which cavalry or artillery could not be passed, and infantry would make but poor progress if confronted by an enemy. from the position occupied by garland's brigade, therefore, no movement could be made against the defences of san antonio except to the front, and by a narrow causeway, over perfectly level ground, every inch of which was commanded by the enemy's artillery and infantry. if contreras, some three miles west and south, should fall into our hands, troops from there could move to the right flank of all the positions held by the enemy between us and the city. under these circumstances general scott directed the holding of the front of the enemy without making an attack until further orders. on the 18th of august, the day of reaching san augustin tlalpam, garland's brigade secured a position within easy range of the advanced intrenchments of san antonio, but where his troops were protected by an artificial embankment that had been thrown up for some other purpose than defense. general scott at once set his engineers reconnoitring the works about contreras, and on the 19th movements were commenced to get troops into positions from which an assault could be made upon the force occupying that place. the pedregal on the north and north-east, and the mountain on the south, made the passage by either flank of the enemy's defences difficult, for their work stood exactly between those natural bulwarks; but a road was completed during the day and night of the 19th, and troops were got to the north and west of the enemy. this affair, like that of cerro gordo, was an engagement in which the officers of the engineer corps won special distinction. in fact, in both cases, tasks which seemed difficult at first sight were made easier for the troops that had to execute them than they would have been on an ordinary field. the very strength of each of these positions was, by the skill of the engineers, converted into a defence for the assaulting parties while securing their positions for final attack. all the troops with general scott in the valley of mexico, except a part of the division of general quitman at san augustin tlalpam and the brigade of garland (worth's division) at san antonio, were engaged at the battle of contreras, or were on their way, in obedience to the orders of their chief, to reinforce those who were engaged. the assault was made on the morning of the 20th, and in less than half an hour from the sound of the advance the position was in our hands, with many prisoners and large quantities of ordnance and other stores. the brigade commanded by general riley was from its position the most conspicuous in the final assault, but all did well, volunteers and regulars. from the point occupied by garland's brigade we could see the progress made at contreras and the movement of troops toward the flank and rear of the enemy opposing us. the mexicans all the way back to the city could see the same thing, and their conduct showed plainly that they did not enjoy the sight. we moved out at once, and found them gone from our immediate front. clarke's brigade of worth's division now moved west over the point of the pedregal, and after having passed to the north sufficiently to clear san antonio, turned east and got on the causeway leading to churubusco and the city of mexico. when he approached churubusco his left, under colonel hoffman, attacked a tete-de-pont at that place and brought on an engagement. about an hour after, garland was ordered to advance directly along the causeway, and got up in time to take part in the engagement. san antonio was found evacuated, the evacuation having probably taken place immediately upon the enemy seeing the stars and stripes waving over contreras. the troops that had been engaged at contreras, and even then on their way to that battle-field, were moved by a causeway west of, and parallel to the one by way of san antonio and churubusco. it was expected by the commanding general that these troops would move north sufficiently far to flank the enemy out of his position at churubusco, before turning east to reach the san antonio road, but they did not succeed in this, and churubusco proved to be about the severest battle fought in the valley of mexico. general scott coming upon the battle-field about this juncture, ordered two brigades, under shields, to move north and turn the right of the enemy. this shields did, but not without hard fighting and heavy loss. the enemy finally gave way, leaving in our hands prisoners, artillery and small arms. the balance of the causeway held by the enemy, up to the very gates of the city, fell in like manner. i recollect at this place that some of the gunners who had stood their ground, were deserters from general taylor's army on the rio grande. both the strategy and tactics displayed by general scott in these various engagements of the 20th of august, 1847, were faultless as i look upon them now, after the lapse of so many years. as before stated, the work of the engineer officers who made the reconnoissances and led the different commands to their destinations, was so perfect that the chief was able to give his orders to his various subordinates with all the precision he could use on an ordinary march. i mean, up to the points from which the attack was to commence. after that point is reached the enemy often induces a change of orders not before contemplated. the enemy outside the city outnumbered our soldiery quite three to one, but they had become so demoralized by the succession of defeats this day, that the city of mexico could have been entered without much further bloodshed. in fact, captain philip kearney --afterwards a general in the war of the rebellion--rode with a squadron of cavalry to the very gates of the city, and would no doubt have entered with his little force, only at that point he was badly wounded, as were several of his officers. he had not heard the call for a halt. general franklin pierce had joined the army in mexico, at puebla, a short time before the advance upon the capital commenced. he had consequently not been in any of the engagements of the war up to the battle of contreras. by an unfortunate fall of his horse on the afternoon of the 19th he was painfully injured. the next day, when his brigade, with the other troops engaged on the same field, was ordered against the flank and rear of the enemy guarding the different points of the road from san augustin tlalpam to the city, general pierce attempted to accompany them. he was not sufficiently recovered to do so, and fainted. this circumstance gave rise to exceedingly unfair and unjust criticisms of him when he became a candidate for the presidency. whatever general pierce's qualifications may have been for the presidency, he was a gentleman and a man of courage. i was not a supporter of him politically, but i knew him more intimately than i did any other of the volunteer generals. general scott abstained from entering the city at this time, because mr. nicholas p. trist, the commissioner on the part of the united states to negotiate a treaty of peace with mexico, was with the army, and either he or general scott thought--probably both of them--that a treaty would be more possible while the mexican government was in possession of the capital than if it was scattered and the capital in the hands of an invader. be this as it may, we did not enter at that time. the army took up positions along the slopes of the mountains south of the city, as far west as tacubaya. negotiations were at once entered into with santa anna, who was then practically the government and the immediate commander of all the troops engaged in defence of the country. a truce was signed which denied to either party the right to strengthen its position, or to receive reinforcements during the continuance of the armistices, but authorized general scott to draw supplies for his army from the city in the meantime. negotiations were commenced at once and were kept up vigorously between mr. trist and the commissioners appointed on the part of mexico, until the 2d of september. at that time mr. trist handed in his ultimatum. texas was to be given up absolutely by mexico, and new mexico and california ceded to the united states for a stipulated sum to be afterwards determined. i do not suppose mr. trist had any discretion whatever in regard to boundaries. the war was one of conquest, in the interest of an institution, and the probabilities are that private instructions were for the acquisition of territory out of which new states might be carved. at all events the mexicans felt so outraged at the terms proposed that they commenced preparations for defence, without giving notice of the termination of the armistice. the terms of the truce had been violated before, when teams had been sent into the city to bring out supplies for the army. the first train entering the city was very severely threatened by a mob. this, however, was apologized for by the authorities and all responsibility for it denied; and thereafter, to avoid exciting the mexican people and soldiery, our teams with their escorts were sent in at night, when the troops were in barracks and the citizens in bed. the circumstance was overlooked and negotiations continued. as soon as the news reached general scott of the second violation of the armistice, about the 4th of september, he wrote a vigorous note to president santa anna, calling his attention to it, and, receiving an unsatisfactory reply, declared the armistice at an end. general scott, with worth's division, was now occupying tacubaya, a village some four miles south-west of the city of mexico, and extending from the base up the mountain-side for the distance of half a mile. more than a mile west, and also a little above the plain, stands molino del rey. the mill is a long stone structure, one story high and several hundred feet in length. at the period of which i speak general scott supposed a portion of the mill to be used as a foundry for the casting of guns. this, however, proved to be a mistake. it was valuable to the mexicans because of the quantity of grain it contained. the building is flat roofed, and a line of sand-bags over the outer walls rendered the top quite a formidable defence for infantry. chapultepec is a mound springing up from the plain to the height of probably three hundred feet, and almost in a direct line between molino del rey and the western part of the city. it was fortified both on the top and on the rocky and precipitous sides. the city of mexico is supplied with water by two aqueducts, resting on strong stone arches. one of these aqueducts draws its supply of water from a mountain stream coming into it at or near molino del rey, and runs north close to the west base of chapultepec; thence along the centre of a wide road, until it reaches the road running east into the city by the garita san cosme; from which point the aqueduct and road both run east to the city. the second aqueduct starts from the east base of chapultepec, where it is fed by a spring, and runs north-east to the city. this aqueduct, like the other, runs in the middle of a broad road-way, thus leaving a space on each side. the arches supporting the aqueduct afforded protection for advancing troops as well as to those engaged defensively. at points on the san cosme road parapets were thrown across, with an embrasure for a single piece of artillery in each. at the point where both road and aqueduct turn at right angles from north to east, there was not only one of these parapets supplied by one gun and infantry supports, but the houses to the north of the san cosme road, facing south and commanding a view of the road back to chapultepec, were covered with infantry, protected by parapets made of sandbags. the roads leading to garitas (the gates) san cosme and belen, by which these aqueducts enter the city, were strongly intrenched. deep, wide ditches, filled with water, lined the sides of both roads. such were the defences of the city of mexico in september, 1847, on the routes over which general scott entered. prior to the mexican war general scott had been very partial to general worth--indeed he continued so up to the close of hostilities--but, for some reason, worth had become estranged from his chief. scott evidently took this coldness somewhat to heart. he did not retaliate, however, but on the contrary showed every disposition to appease his subordinate. it was understood at the time that he gave worth authority to plan and execute the battle of molino del rey without dictation or interference from any one, for the very purpose of restoring their former relations. the effort failed, and the two generals remained ever after cold and indifferent towards each other, if not actually hostile. the battle of molino del rey was fought on the 8th of september. the night of the 7th, worth sent for his brigade and regimental commanders, with their staffs, to come to his quarters to receive instructions for the morrow. these orders contemplated a movement up to within striking distance of the mills before daylight. the engineers had reconnoitred the ground as well as possible, and had acquired all the information necessary to base proper orders both for approach and attack. by daylight on the morning of the 8th, the troops to be engaged at molino were all at the places designated. the ground in front of the mills, to the south, was commanded by the artillery from the summit of chapultepec as well as by the lighter batteries at hand; but a charge was made, and soon all was over. worth's troops entered the mills by every door, and the enemy beat a hasty retreat back to chapultepec. had this victory been followed up promptly, no doubt americans and mexicans would have gone over the defences of chapultepec so near together that the place would have fallen into our hands without further loss. the defenders of the works could not have fired upon us without endangering their own men. this was not done, and five days later more valuable lives were sacrificed to carry works which had been so nearly in our possession on the 8th. i do not criticise the failure to capture chapultepec at this time. the result that followed the first assault could not possibly have been foreseen, and to profit by the unexpected advantage, the commanding general must have been on the spot and given the necessary instructions at the moment, or the troops must have kept on without orders. it is always, however, in order to follow a retreating foe, unless stopped or otherwise directed. the loss on our side at molino del rey was severe for the numbers engaged. it was especially so among commissioned officers. i was with the earliest of the troops to enter the mills. in passing through to the north side, looking towards chapultepec, i happened to notice that there were armed mexicans still on top of the building, only a few feet from many of our men. not seeing any stairway or ladder reaching to the top of the building, i took a few soldiers, and had a cart that happened to be standing near brought up, and, placing the shafts against the wall and chocking the wheels so that the cart could not back, used the shafts as a sort of ladder extending to within three or four feet of the top. by this i climbed to the roof of the building, followed by a few men, but found a private soldier had preceded me by some other way. there were still quite a number of mexicans on the roof, among them a major and five or six officers of lower grades, who had not succeeded in getting away before our troops occupied the building. they still had their arms, while the soldier before mentioned was walking as sentry, guarding the prisoners he had surrounded, all by himself. i halted the sentinel, received the swords from the commissioned officers, and proceeded, with the assistance of the soldiers now with me, to disable the muskets by striking them against the edge of the wall, and throw them to the ground below. molino del rey was now captured, and the troops engaged, with the exception of an appropriate guard over the captured position and property, were marched back to their quarters in tacubaya. the engagement did not last many minutes, but the killed and wounded were numerous for the number of troops engaged. during the night of the 11th batteries were established which could play upon the fortifications of chapultepec. the bombardment commenced early on the morning of the 12th, but there was no further engagement during this day than that of the artillery. general scott assigned the capture of chapultepec to general pillow, but did not leave the details to his judgment. two assaulting columns, two hundred and fifty men each, composed of volunteers for the occasion, were formed. they were commanded by captains mckinzie and casey respectively. the assault was successful, but bloody. in later years, if not at the time, the battles of molino del rey and chapultepec have seemed to me to have been wholly unnecessary. when the assaults upon the garitas of san cosme and belen were determined upon, the road running east to the former gate could have been reached easily, without an engagement, by moving along south of the mills until west of them sufficiently far to be out of range, thence north to the road above mentioned; or, if desirable to keep the two attacking columns nearer together, the troops could have been turned east so as to come on the aqueduct road out of range of the guns from chapultepec. in like manner, the troops designated to act against belen could have kept east of chapultepec, out of range, and come on to the aqueduct, also out of range of chapultepec. molino del rey and chapultepec would both have been necessarily evacuated if this course had been pursued, for they would have been turned. general quitman, a volunteer from the state of mississippi, who stood well with the army both as a soldier and as a man, commanded the column acting against belen. general worth commanded the column against san cosme. when chapultepec fell the advance commenced along the two aqueduct roads. i was on the road to san cosme, and witnessed most that took place on that route. when opposition was encountered our troops sheltered themselves by keeping under the arches supporting the aqueduct, advancing an arch at a time. we encountered no serious obstruction until within gun-shot of the point where the road we were on intersects that running east to the city, the point where the aqueduct turns at a right angle. i have described the defences of this position before. there were but three commissioned officers besides myself, that i can now call to mind, with the advance when the above position was reached. one of these officers was a lieutenant semmes, of the marine corps. i think captain gore, and lieutenant judah, of the 4th infantry, were the others. our progress was stopped for the time by the single piece of artillery at the angle of the roads and the infantry occupying the house-tops back from it. west of the road from where we were, stood a house occupying the south-west angle made by the san cosme road and the road we were moving upon. a stone wall ran from the house along each of these roads for a considerable distance and thence back until it joined, enclosing quite a yard about the house. i watched my opportunity and skipped across the road and behind the south wall. proceeding cautiously to the west corner of the enclosure, i peeped around and seeing nobody, continued, still cautiously, until the road running east and west was reached. i then returned to the troops, and called for volunteers. all that were close to me, or that heard me, about a dozen, offered their services. commanding them to carry their arms at a trail, i watched our opportunity and got them across the road and under cover of the wall beyond, before the enemy had a shot at us. our men under cover of the arches kept a close watch on the intrenchments that crossed our path and the house-tops beyond, and whenever a head showed itself above the parapets they would fire at it. our crossing was thus made practicable without loss. when we reached a safe position i instructed my little command again to carry their arms at a trail, not to fire at the enemy until they were ordered, and to move very cautiously following me until the san cosme road was reached; we would then be on the flank of the men serving the gun on the road, and with no obstruction between us and them. when we reached the south-west corner of the enclosure before described, i saw some united states troops pushing north through a shallow ditch near by, who had come up since my reconnaissance. this was the company of captain horace brooks, of the artillery, acting as infantry. i explained to brooks briefly what i had discovered and what i was about to do. he said, as i knew the ground and he did not, i might go on and he would follow. as soon as we got on the road leading to the city the troops serving the gun on the parapet retreated, and those on the house-tops near by followed; our men went after them in such close pursuit--the troops we had left under the arches joining--that a second line across the road, about half-way between the first and the garita, was carried. no reinforcements had yet come up except brooks's company, and the position we had taken was too advanced to be held by so small a force. it was given up, but retaken later in the day, with some loss. worth's command gradually advanced to the front now open to it. later in the day in reconnoitring i found a church off to the south of the road, which looked to me as if the belfry would command the ground back of the garita san cosme. i got an officer of the voltigeurs, with a mountain howitzer and men to work it, to go with me. the road being in possession of the enemy, we had to take the field to the south to reach the church. this took us over several ditches breast deep in water and grown up with water plants. these ditches, however, were not over eight or ten feet in width. the howitzer was taken to pieces and carried by the men to its destination. when i knocked for admission a priest came to the door who, while extremely polite, declined to admit us. with the little spanish then at my command, i explained to him that he might save property by opening the door, and he certainly would save himself from becoming a prisoner, for a time at least; and besides, i intended to go in whether he consented or not. he began to see his duty in the same light that i did, and opened the door, though he did not look as if it gave him special pleasure to do so. the gun was carried to the belfry and put together. we were not more than two or three hundred yards from san cosme. the shots from our little gun dropped in upon the enemy and created great confusion. why they did not send out a small party and capture us, i do not know. we had no infantry or other defences besides our one gun. the effect of this gun upon the troops about the gate of the city was so marked that general worth saw it from his position. (*3) he was so pleased that he sent a staff officer, lieutenant pemberton--later lieutenant-general commanding the defences of vicksburg--to bring me to him. he expressed his gratification at the services the howitzer in the church steeple was doing, saying that every shot was effective, and ordered a captain of voltigeurs to report to me with another howitzer to be placed along with the one already rendering so much service. i could not tell the general that there was not room enough in the steeple for another gun, because he probably would have looked upon such a statement as a contradiction from a second lieutenant. i took the captain with me, but did not use his gun. the night of the 13th of september was spent by the troops under general worth in the houses near san cosme, and in line confronting the general line of the enemy across to belen. the troops that i was with were in the houses north of the road leading into the city, and were engaged during the night in cutting passage-ways from one house to another towards the town. during the night santa anna, with his army--except the deserters--left the city. he liberated all the convicts confined in the town, hoping, no doubt, that they would inflict upon us some injury before daylight; but several hours after santa anna was out of the way, the city authorities sent a delegation to general scott to ask--if not demand--an armistice, respecting church property, the rights of citizens and the supremacy of the city government in the management of municipal affairs. general scott declined to trammel himself with conditions, but gave assurances that those who chose to remain within our lines would be protected so long as they behaved themselves properly. general quitman had advanced along his line very successfully on the 13th, so that at night his command occupied nearly the same position at belen that worth's troops did about san cosme. after the interview above related between general scott and the city council, orders were issued for the cautious entry of both columns in the morning. the troops under worth were to stop at the alameda, a park near the west end of the city. quitman was to go directly to the plaza, and take possession of the palace--a mass of buildings on the east side in which congress has its sessions, the national courts are held, the public offices are all located, the president resides, and much room is left for museums, receptions, etc. this is the building generally designated as the "halls of the montezumas." chapter xii. promotion to first lieutenant--capture of the city of mexico--the army --mexican soldiers--peace negotiations. on entering the city the troops were fired upon by the released convicts, and possibly by deserters and hostile citizens. the streets were deserted, and the place presented the appearance of a "city of the dead," except for this firing by unseen persons from house-tops, windows, and around corners. in this firing the lieutenant-colonel of my regiment, garland, was badly wounded, lieutenant sidney smith, of the 4th infantry, was also wounded mortally. he died a few days after, and by his death i was promoted to the grade of first lieutenant.(*4) i had gone into the battle of palo alto in may, 1846, a second lieutenant, and i entered the city of mexico sixteen months later with the same rank, after having been in all the engagements possible for any one man and in a regiment that lost more officers during the war than it ever had present at any one engagement. my regiment lost four commissioned officers, all senior to me, by steamboat explosions during the mexican war. the mexicans were not so discriminating. they sometimes picked off my juniors. general scott soon followed the troops into the city, in state. i wonder that he was not fired upon, but i believe he was not; at all events he was not hurt. he took quarters at first in the "halls of the montezumas," and from there issued his wise and discreet orders for the government of a conquered city, and for suppressing the hostile acts of liberated convicts already spoken of--orders which challenge the respect of all who study them. lawlessness was soon suppressed, and the city of mexico settled down into a quiet, law-abiding place. the people began to make their appearance upon the streets without fear of the invaders. shortly afterwards the bulk of the troops were sent from the city to the villages at the foot of the mountains, four or five miles to the south and south-west. whether general scott approved of the mexican war and the manner in which it was brought about, i have no means of knowing. his orders to troops indicate only a soldierly spirit, with probably a little regard for the perpetuation of his own fame. on the other hand, general taylor's, i think, indicate that he considered the administration accountable for the war, and felt no responsibility resting on himself further than for the faithful performance of his duties. both generals deserve the commendations of their countrymen and to live in the grateful memory of this people to the latest generation. earlier in this narrative i have stated that the plain, reached after passing the mountains east of perote, extends to the cities of puebla and mexico. the route travelled by the army before reaching puebla, goes over a pass in a spur of mountain coming up from the south. this pass is very susceptible of defence by a smaller against a larger force. again, the highest point of the road-bed between vera cruz and the city of mexico is over rio frio mountain, which also might have been successfully defended by an inferior against a superior force. but by moving north of the mountains, and about thirty miles north of puebla, both of these passes would have been avoided. the road from perote to the city of mexico, by this latter route, is as level as the prairies in our west. arriving due north from puebla, troops could have been detached to take possession of that place, and then proceeding west with the rest of the army no mountain would have been encountered before reaching the city of mexico. it is true this road would have brought troops in by guadalupe--a town, church and detached spur of mountain about two miles north of the capital, all bearing the same general name --and at this point lake texcoco comes near to the mountain, which was fortified both at the base and on the sides: but troops could have passed north of the mountain and come in only a few miles to the north-west, and so flanked the position, as they actually did on the south. it has always seemed to me that this northern route to the city of mexico, would have been the better one to have taken. but my later experience has taught me two lessons: first, that things are seen plainer after the events have occurred; second, that the most confident critics are generally those who know the least about the matter criticised. i know just enough about the mexican war to approve heartily of most of the generalship, but to differ with a little of it. it is natural that an important city like puebla should not have been passed with contempt; it may be natural that the direct road to it should have been taken; but it could have been passed, its evacuation insured and possession acquired without danger of encountering the enemy in intricate mountain defiles. in this same way the city of mexico could have been approached without any danger of opposition, except in the open field. but general scott's successes are an answer to all criticism. he invaded a populous country, penetrating two hundred and sixty miles into the interior, with a force at no time equal to one-half of that opposed to him; he was without a base; the enemy was always intrenched, always on the defensive; yet he won every battle, he captured the capital, and conquered the government. credit is due to the troops engaged, it is true, but the plans and the strategy were the general's. i had now made marches and been in battle under both general scott and general taylor. the former divided his force of 10,500 men into four columns, starting a day apart, in moving from puebla to the capital of the nation, when it was known that an army more than twice as large as his own stood ready to resist his coming. the road was broad and the country open except in crossing the rio frio mountain. general taylor pursued the same course in marching toward an enemy. he moved even in smaller bodies. i never thought at the time to doubt the infallibility of these two generals in all matters pertaining to their profession. i supposed they moved in small bodies because more men could not be passed over a single road on the same day with their artillery and necessary trains. later i found the fallacy of this belief. the rebellion, which followed as a sequence to the mexican war, never could have been suppressed if larger bodies of men could not have been moved at the same time than was the custom under scott and taylor. the victories in mexico were, in every instance, over vastly superior numbers. there were two reasons for this. both general scott and general taylor had such armies as are not often got together. at the battles of palo alto and resaca-de-la-palma, general taylor had a small army, but it was composed exclusively of regular troops, under the best of drill and discipline. every officer, from the highest to the lowest, was educated in his profession, not at west point necessarily, but in the camp, in garrison, and many of them in indian wars. the rank and file were probably inferior, as material out of which to make an army, to the volunteers that participated in all the later battles of the war; but they were brave men, and then drill and discipline brought out all there was in them. a better army, man for man, probably never faced an enemy than the one commanded by general taylor in the earliest two engagements of the mexican war. the volunteers who followed were of better material, but without drill or discipline at the start. they were associated with so many disciplined men and professionally educated officers, that when they went into engagements it was with a confidence they would not have felt otherwise. they became soldiers themselves almost at once. all these conditions we would enjoy again in case of war. the mexican army of that day was hardly an organization. the private soldier was picked up from the lower class of the inhabitants when wanted; his consent was not asked; he was poorly clothed, worse fed, and seldom paid. he was turned adrift when no longer wanted. the officers of the lower grades were but little superior to the men. with all this i have seen as brave stands made by some of these men as i have ever seen made by soldiers. now mexico has a standing army larger than that of the united states. they have a military school modelled after west point. their officers are educated and, no doubt, generally brave. the mexican war of 1846-8 would be an impossibility in this generation. the mexicans have shown a patriotism which it would be well if we would imitate in part, but with more regard to truth. they celebrate the anniversaries of chapultepec and molino del rey as of very great victories. the anniversaries are recognized as national holidays. at these two battles, while the united states troops were victorious, it was at very great sacrifice of life compared with what the mexicans suffered. the mexicans, as on many other occasions, stood up as well as any troops ever did. the trouble seemed to be the lack of experience among the officers, which led them after a certain time to simply quit, without being particularly whipped, but because they had fought enough. their authorities of the present day grow enthusiastic over their theme when telling of these victories, and speak with pride of the large sum of money they forced us to pay in the end. with us, now twenty years after the close of the most stupendous war ever known, we have writers --who profess devotion to the nation--engaged in trying to prove that the union forces were not victorious; practically, they say, we were slashed around from donelson to vicksburg and to chattanooga; and in the east from gettysburg to appomattox, when the physical rebellion gave out from sheer exhaustion. there is no difference in the amount of romance in the two stories. i would not have the anniversaries of our victories celebrated, nor those of our defeats made fast days and spent in humiliation and prayer; but i would like to see truthful history written. such history will do full credit to the courage, endurance and soldierly ability of the american citizen, no matter what section of the country he hailed from, or in what ranks he fought. the justice of the cause which in the end prevailed, will, i doubt not, come to be acknowledged by every citizen of the land, in time. for the present, and so long as there are living witnesses of the great war of sections, there will be people who will not be consoled for the loss of a cause which they believed to be holy. as time passes, people, even of the south, will begin to wonder how it was possible that their ancestors ever fought for or justified institutions which acknowledged the right of property in man. after the fall of the capital and the dispersal of the government of mexico, it looked very much as if military occupation of the country for a long time might be necessary. general scott at once began the preparation of orders, regulations and laws in view of this contingency. he contemplated making the country pay all the expenses of the occupation, without the army becoming a perceptible burden upon the people. his plan was to levy a direct tax upon the separate states, and collect, at the ports left open to trade, a duty on all imports. from the beginning of the war private property had not been taken, either for the use of the army or of individuals, without full compensation. this policy was to be pursued. there were not troops enough in the valley of mexico to occupy many points, but now that there was no organized army of the enemy of any size, reinforcements could be got from the rio grande, and there were also new volunteers arriving from time to time, all by way of vera cruz. military possession was taken of cuernavaca, fifty miles south of the city of mexico; of toluca, nearly as far west, and of pachuca, a mining town of great importance, some sixty miles to the north-east. vera cruz, jalapa, orizaba, and puebla were already in our possession. meanwhile the mexican government had departed in the person of santa anna, and it looked doubtful for a time whether the united states commissioner, mr. trist, would find anybody to negotiate with. a temporary government, however, was soon established at queretaro, and trist began negotiations for a conclusion of the war. before terms were finally agreed upon he was ordered back to washington, but general scott prevailed upon him to remain, as an arrangement had been so nearly reached, and the administration must approve his acts if he succeeded in making such a treaty as had been contemplated in his instructions. the treaty was finally signed the 2d of february, 1848, and accepted by the government at washington. it is that known as the "treaty of guadalupe hidalgo," and secured to the united states the rio grande as the boundary of texas, and the whole territory then included in new mexico and upper california, for the sum of $15,000,000. soon after entering the city of mexico, the opposition of generals pillow, worth and colonel duncan to general scott became very marked. scott claimed that they had demanded of the president his removal. i do not know whether this is so or not, but i do know of their unconcealed hostility to their chief. at last he placed them in arrest, and preferred charges against them of insubordination and disrespect. this act brought on a crisis in the career of the general commanding. he had asserted from the beginning that the administration was hostile to him; that it had failed in its promises of men and war material; that the president himself had shown duplicity if not treachery in the endeavor to procure the appointment of benton: and the administration now gave open evidence of its enmity. about the middle of february orders came convening a court of inquiry, composed of brevet brigadier-general towson, the paymaster-general of the army, brigadier-general cushing and colonel belknap, to inquire into the conduct of the accused and the accuser, and shortly afterwards orders were received from washington, relieving scott of the command of the army in the field and assigning major-general william o. butler of kentucky to the place. this order also released pillow, worth and duncan from arrest. if a change was to be made the selection of general butler was agreeable to every one concerned, so far as i remember to have heard expressions on the subject. there were many who regarded the treatment of general scott as harsh and unjust. it is quite possible that the vanity of the general had led him to say and do things that afforded a plausible pretext to the administration for doing just what it did and what it had wanted to do from the start. the court tried the accuser quite as much as the accused. it was adjourned before completing its labors, to meet in frederick, maryland. general scott left the country, and never after had more than the nominal command of the army until early in 1861. he certainly was not sustained in his efforts to maintain discipline in high places. the efforts to kill off politically the two successful generals, made them both candidates for the presidency. general taylor was nominated in 1848, and was elected. four years later general scott received the nomination but was badly beaten, and the party nominating him died with his defeat.(*5) chapter xiii. treaty of peace--mexican bull fights--regimental quartermaster--trip to popocatapetl--trip to the caves of mexico. the treaty of peace between the two countries was signed by the commissioners of each side early in february, 1848. it took a considerable time for it to reach washington, receive the approval of the administration, and be finally ratified by the senate. it was naturally supposed by the army that there would be no more fighting, and officers and men were of course anxious to get home, but knowing there must be delay they contented themselves as best they could. every sunday there was a bull fight for the amusement of those who would pay their fifty cents. i attended one of them--just one--not wishing to leave the country without having witnessed the national sport. the sight to me was sickening. i could not see how human beings could enjoy the sufferings of beasts, and often of men, as they seemed to do on these occasions. at these sports there are usually from four to six bulls sacrificed. the audience occupies seats around the ring in which the exhibition is given, each seat but the foremost rising higher than the one in front, so that every one can get a full view of the sport. when all is ready a bull is turned into the ring. three or four men come in, mounted on the merest skeletons of horses blind or blind-folded and so weak that they could not make a sudden turn with their riders without danger of falling down. the men are armed with spears having a point as sharp as a needle. other men enter the arena on foot, armed with red flags and explosives about the size of a musket cartridge. to each of these explosives is fastened a barbed needle which serves the purpose of attaching them to the bull by running the needle into the skin. before the animal is turned loose a lot of these explosives are attached to him. the pain from the pricking of the skin by the needles is exasperating; but when the explosions of the cartridges commence the animal becomes frantic. as he makes a lunge towards one horseman, another runs a spear into him. he turns towards his last tormentor when a man on foot holds out a red flag; the bull rushes for this and is allowed to take it on his horns. the flag drops and covers the eyes of the animal so that he is at a loss what to do; it is jerked from him and the torment is renewed. when the animal is worked into an uncontrollable frenzy, the horsemen withdraw, and the matadores --literally murderers--enter, armed with knives having blades twelve or eighteen inches long, and sharp. the trick is to dodge an attack from the animal and stab him to the heart as he passes. if these efforts fail the bull is finally lassoed, held fast and killed by driving a knife blade into the spinal column just back of the horns. he is then dragged out by horses or mules, another is let into the ring, and the same performance is renewed. on the occasion when i was present one of the bulls was not turned aside by the attacks in the rear, the presentations of the red flag, etc., etc., but kept right on, and placing his horns under the flanks of a horse threw him and his rider to the ground with great force. the horse was killed and the rider lay prostrate as if dead. the bull was then lassoed and killed in the manner above described. men came in and carried the dead man off in a litter. when the slaughtered bull and horse were dragged out, a fresh bull was turned into the ring. conspicuous among the spectators was the man who had been carried out on a litter but a few minutes before. he was only dead so far as that performance went; but the corpse was so lively that it could not forego the chance of witnessing the discomfiture of some of his brethren who might not be so fortunate. there was a feeling of disgust manifested by the audience to find that he had come to life again. i confess that i felt sorry to see the cruelty to the bull and the horse. i did not stay for the conclusion of the performance; but while i did stay, there was not a bull killed in the prescribed way. bull fights are now prohibited in the federal district--embracing a territory around the city of mexico, somewhat larger than the district of columbia--and they are not an institution in any part of the country. during one of my recent visits to mexico, bull fights were got up in my honor at puebla and at pachuca. i was not notified in advance so as to be able to decline and thus prevent the performance; but in both cases i civilly declined to attend. another amusement of the people of mexico of that day, and one which nearly all indulged in, male and female, old and young, priest and layman, was monte playing. regular feast weeks were held every year at what was then known as st. augustin tlalpam, eleven miles out of town. there were dealers to suit every class and condition of people. in many of the booths clackos--the copper coin of the country, four of them making six and a quarter cents of our money--were piled up in great quantities, with some silver, to accommodate the people who could not bet more than a few pennies at a time. in other booths silver formed the bulk of the capital of the bank, with a few doubloons to be changed if there should be a run of luck against the bank. in some there was no coin except gold. here the rich were said to bet away their entire estates in a single day. all this is stopped now. for myself, i was kept somewhat busy during the winter of 1847-8. my regiment was stationed in tacubaya. i was regimental quartermaster and commissary. general scott had been unable to get clothing for the troops from the north. the men were becoming--well, they needed clothing. material had to be purchased, such as could be obtained, and people employed to make it up into "yankee uniforms." a quartermaster in the city was designated to attend to this special duty; but clothing was so much needed that it was seized as fast as made up. a regiment was glad to get a dozen suits at a time. i had to look after this matter for the 4th infantry. then our regimental fund had run down and some of the musicians in the band had been without their extra pay for a number of months. the regimental bands at that day were kept up partly by pay from the government, and partly by pay from the regimental fund. there was authority of law for enlisting a certain number of men as musicians. so many could receive the pay of non-commissioned officers of the various grades, and the remainder the pay of privates. this would not secure a band leader, nor good players on certain instruments. in garrison there are various ways of keeping up a regimental fund sufficient to give extra pay to musicians, establish libraries and ten-pin alleys, subscribe to magazines and furnish many extra comforts to the men. the best device for supplying the fund is to issue bread to the soldiers instead of flour. the ration used to be eighteen ounces per day of either flour or bread; and one hundred pounds of flour will make one hundred and forty pounds of bread. this saving was purchased by the commissary for the benefit of the fund. in the emergency the 4th infantry was laboring under, i rented a bakery in the city, hired bakers--mexicans--bought fuel and whatever was necessary, and i also got a contract from the chief commissary of the army for baking a large amount of hard bread. in two months i made more money for the fund than my pay amounted to during the entire war. while stationed at monterey i had relieved the post fund in the same way. there, however, was no profit except in the saving of flour by converting it into bread. in the spring of 1848 a party of officers obtained leave to visit popocatapetl, the highest volcano in america, and to take an escort. i went with the party, many of whom afterwards occupied conspicuous positions before the country. of those who "went south," and attained high rank, there was lieutenant richard anderson, who commanded a corps at spottsylvania; captain sibley, a major-general, and, after the war, for a number of years in the employ of the khedive of egypt; captain george crittenden, a rebel general; s. b. buckner, who surrendered fort donelson; and mansfield lovell, who commanded at new orleans before that city fell into the hands of the national troops. of those who remained on our side there were captain andrew porter, lieutenant c. p. stone and lieutenant z. b. tower. there were quite a number of other officers, whose names i cannot recollect. at a little village (ozumba) near the base of popocatapetl, where we purposed to commence the ascent, we procured guides and two pack mules with forage for our horses. high up on the mountain there was a deserted house of one room, called the vaqueria, which had been occupied years before by men in charge of cattle ranging on the mountain. the pasturage up there was very fine when we saw it, and there were still some cattle, descendants of the former domestic herd, which had now become wild. it was possible to go on horseback as far as the vaqueria, though the road was somewhat hazardous in places. sometimes it was very narrow with a yawning precipice on one side, hundreds of feet down to a roaring mountain torrent below, and almost perpendicular walls on the other side. at one of these places one of our mules loaded with two sacks of barley, one on each side, the two about as big as he was, struck his load against the mountain-side and was precipitated to the bottom. the descent was steep but not perpendicular. the mule rolled over and over until the bottom was reached, and we supposed of course the poor animal was dashed to pieces. what was our surprise, not long after we had gone into bivouac, to see the lost mule, cargo and owner coming up the ascent. the load had protected the animal from serious injury; and his owner had gone after him and found a way back to the path leading up to the hut where we were to stay. the night at the vaqueria was one of the most unpleasant i ever knew. it was very cold and the rain fell in torrents. a little higher up the rain ceased and snow began. the wind blew with great velocity. the log-cabin we were in had lost the roof entirely on one side, and on the other it was hardly better then a sieve. there was little or no sleep that night. as soon as it was light the next morning, we started to make the ascent to the summit. the wind continued to blow with violence and the weather was still cloudy, but there was neither rain nor snow. the clouds, however, concealed from our view the country below us, except at times a momentary glimpse could be got through a clear space between them. the wind carried the loose snow around the mountain-sides in such volumes as to make it almost impossible to stand up against it. we labored on and on, until it became evident that the top could not be reached before night, if at all in such a storm, and we concluded to return. the descent was easy and rapid, though dangerous, until we got below the snow line. at the cabin we mounted our horses, and by night were at ozumba. the fatigues of the day and the loss of sleep the night before drove us to bed early. our beds consisted of a place on the dirt-floor with a blanket under us. soon all were asleep; but long before morning first one and then another of our party began to cry out with excruciating pain in the eyes. not one escaped it. by morning the eyes of half the party were so swollen that they were entirely closed. the others suffered pain equally. the feeling was about what might be expected from the prick of a sharp needle at a white heat. we remained in quarters until the afternoon bathing our eyes in cold water. this relieved us very much, and before night the pain had entirely left. the swelling, however, continued, and about half the party still had their eyes entirely closed; but we concluded to make a start back, those who could see a little leading the horses of those who could not see at all. we moved back to the village of ameca ameca, some six miles, and stopped again for the night. the next morning all were entirely well and free from pain. the weather was clear and popocatapetl stood out in all its beauty, the top looking as if not a mile away, and inviting us to return. about half the party were anxious to try the ascent again, and concluded to do so. the remainder--i was with the remainder--concluded that we had got all the pleasure there was to be had out of mountain climbing, and that we would visit the great caves of mexico, some ninety miles from where we then were, on the road to acapulco. the party that ascended the mountain the second time succeeded in reaching the crater at the top, with but little of the labor they encountered in their first attempt. three of them--anderson, stone and buckner--wrote accounts of their journey, which were published at the time. i made no notes of this excursion, and have read nothing about it since, but it seems to me that i can see the whole of it as vividly as if it were but yesterday. i have been back at ameca ameca, and the village beyond, twice in the last five years. the scene had not changed materially from my recollection of it. the party which i was with moved south down the valley to the town of cuantla, some forty miles from ameca ameca. the latter stands on the plain at the foot of popocatapetl, at an elevation of about eight thousand feet above tide water. the slope down is gradual as the traveller moves south, but one would not judge that, in going to cuantla, descent enough had been made to occasion a material change in the climate and productions of the soil; but such is the case. in the morning we left a temperate climate where the cereals and fruits are those common to the united states, we halted in the evening in a tropical climate where the orange and banana, the coffee and the sugar-cane were flourishing. we had been travelling, apparently, on a plain all day, but in the direction of the flow of water. soon after the capture of the city of mexico an armistice had been agreed to, designating the limits beyond which troops of the respective armies were not to go during its continuance. our party knew nothing about these limits. as we approached cuantla bugles sounded the assembly, and soldiers rushed from the guard-house in the edge of the town towards us. our party halted, and i tied a white pocket handkerchief to a stick and, using it as a flag of truce, proceeded on to the town. captains sibley and porter followed a few hundred yards behind. i was detained at the guard-house until a messenger could be dispatched to the quarters of the commanding general, who authorized that i should be conducted to him. i had been with the general but a few minutes when the two officers following announced themselves. the mexican general reminded us that it was a violation of the truce for us to be there. however, as we had no special authority from our own commanding general, and as we knew nothing about the terms of the truce, we were permitted to occupy a vacant house outside the guard for the night, with the promise of a guide to put us on the road to cuernavaca the next morning. cuernavaca is a town west of guantla. the country through which we passed, between these two towns, is tropical in climate and productions and rich in scenery. at one point, about half-way between the two places, the road goes over a low pass in the mountains in which there is a very quaint old town, the inhabitants of which at that day were nearly all full-blooded indians. very few of them even spoke spanish. the houses were built of stone and generally only one story high. the streets were narrow, and had probably been paved before cortez visited the country. they had not been graded, but the paving had been done on the natural surface. we had with us one vehicle, a cart, which was probably the first wheeled vehicle that had ever passed through that town. on a hill overlooking this town stands the tomb of an ancient king; and it was understood that the inhabitants venerated this tomb very highly, as well as the memory of the ruler who was supposed to be buried in it. we ascended the mountain and surveyed the tomb; but it showed no particular marks of architectural taste, mechanical skill or advanced civilization. the next day we went into cuernavaca. after a day's rest at cuernavaca our party set out again on the journey to the great caves of mexico. we had proceeded but a few miles when we were stopped, as before, by a guard and notified that the terms of the existing armistice did not permit us to go further in that direction. upon convincing the guard that we were a mere party of pleasure seekers desirous of visiting the great natural curiosities of the country which we expected soon to leave, we were conducted to a large hacienda near by, and directed to remain there until the commanding general of that department could be communicated with and his decision obtained as to whether we should be permitted to pursue our journey. the guard promised to send a messenger at once, and expected a reply by night. at night there was no response from the commanding general, but the captain of the guard was sure he would have a reply by morning. again in the morning there was no reply. the second evening the same thing happened, and finally we learned that the guard had sent no message or messenger to the department commander. we determined therefore to go on unless stopped by a force sufficient to compel obedience. after a few hours' travel we came to a town where a scene similar to the one at cuantia occurred. the commanding officer sent a guide to conduct our party around the village and to put us upon our road again. this was the last interruption: that night we rested at a large coffee plantation, some eight miles from the cave we were on the way to visit. it must have been a saturday night; the peons had been paid off, and spent part of the night in gambling away their scanty week's earnings. their coin was principally copper, and i do not believe there was a man among them who had received as much as twenty-five cents in money. they were as much excited, however, as if they had been staking thousands. i recollect one poor fellow, who had lost his last tlacko, pulled off his shirt and, in the most excited manner, put that up on the turn of a card. monte was the game played, the place out of doors, near the window of the room occupied by the officers of our party. the next morning we were at the mouth of the cave at an early hour, provided with guides, candles and rockets. we explored to a distance of about three miles from the entrance, and found a succession of chambers of great dimensions and of great beauty when lit up with our rockets. stalactites and stalagmites of all sizes were discovered. some of the former were many feet in diameter and extended from ceiling to floor; some of the latter were but a few feet high from the floor; but the formation is going on constantly, and many centuries hence these stalagmites will extend to the ceiling and become complete columns. the stalagmites were all a little concave, and the cavities were filled with water. the water percolates through the roof, a drop at a time--often the drops several minutes apart--and more or less charged with mineral matter. evaporation goes on slowly, leaving the mineral behind. this in time makes the immense columns, many of them thousands of tons in weight, which serve to support the roofs over the vast chambers. i recollect that at one point in the cave one of these columns is of such huge proportions that there is only a narrow passage left on either side of it. some of our party became satisfied with their explorations before we had reached the point to which the guides were accustomed to take explorers, and started back without guides. coming to the large column spoken of, they followed it entirely around, and commenced retracing their steps into the bowels of the mountain, without being aware of the fact. when the rest of us had completed our explorations, we started out with our guides, but had not gone far before we saw the torches of an approaching party. we could not conceive who these could be, for all of us had come in together, and there were none but ourselves at the entrance when we started in. very soon we found it was our friends. it took them some time to conceive how they had got where they were. they were sure they had kept straight on for the mouth of the cave, and had gone about far enough to have reached it. personal memoirs of u. s. grant, part 2. by u. s. grant chapter xiv. return of the army--marriage--ordered to the pacific coast--crossing the isthmus--arrival at san francisco. my experience in the mexican war was of great advantage to me afterwards. besides the many practical lessons it taught, the war brought nearly all the officers of the regular army together so as to make them personally acquainted. it also brought them in contact with volunteers, many of whom served in the war of the rebellion afterwards. then, in my particular case, i had been at west point at about the right time to meet most of the graduates who were of a suitable age at the breaking out of the rebellion to be trusted with large commands. graduating in 1843, i was at the military academy from one to four years with all cadets who graduated between 1840 and 1846--seven classes. these classes embraced more than fifty officers who afterwards became generals on one side or the other in the rebellion, many of them holding high commands. all the older officers, who became conspicuous in the rebellion, i had also served with and known in mexico: lee, j. e. johnston, a. s. johnston, holmes, hebert and a number of others on the confederate side; mccall, mansfield, phil. kearney and others on the national side. the acquaintance thus formed was of immense service to me in the war of the rebellion--i mean what i learned of the characters of those to whom i was afterwards opposed. i do not pretend to say that all movements, or even many of them, were made with special reference to the characteristics of the commander against whom they were directed. but my appreciation of my enemies was certainly affected by this knowledge. the natural disposition of most people is to clothe a commander of a large army whom they do not know, with almost superhuman abilities. a large part of the national army, for instance, and most of the press of the country, clothed general lee with just such qualities, but i had known him personally, and knew that he was mortal; and it was just as well that i felt this. the treaty of peace was at last ratified, and the evacuation of mexico by united states troops was ordered. early in june the troops in the city of mexico began to move out. many of them, including the brigade to which i belonged, were assembled at jalapa, above the vomito, to await the arrival of transports at vera cruz: but with all this precaution my regiment and others were in camp on the sand beach in a july sun, for about a week before embarking, while the fever raged with great virulence in vera cruz, not two miles away. i can call to mind only one person, an officer, who died of the disease. my regiment was sent to pascagoula, mississippi, to spend the summer. as soon as it was settled in camp i obtained a leave of absence for four months and proceeded to st. louis. on the 22d of august, 1848, i was married to miss julia dent, the lady of whom i have before spoken. we visited my parents and relations in ohio, and, at the end of my leave, proceeded to my post at sackett's harbor, new york. in april following i was ordered to detroit, michigan, where two years were spent with but few important incidents. the present constitution of the state of michigan was ratified during this time. by the terms of one of its provisions, all citizens of the united states residing within the state at the time of the ratification became citizens of michigan also. during my stay in detroit there was an election for city officers. mr. zachariah chandler was the candidate of the whigs for the office of mayor, and was elected, although the city was then reckoned democratic. all the officers stationed there at the time who offered their votes were permitted to cast them. i did not offer mine, however, as i did not wish to consider myself a citizen of michigan. this was mr. chandler's first entry into politics, a career he followed ever after with great success, and in which he died enjoying the friendship, esteem and love of his countrymen. in the spring of 1851 the garrison at detroit was transferred to sackett's harbor, and in the following spring the entire 4th infantry was ordered to the pacific coast. it was decided that mrs. grant should visit my parents at first for a few months, and then remain with her own family at their st. louis home until an opportunity offered of sending for her. in the month of april the regiment was assembled at governor's island, new york harbor, and on the 5th of july eight companies sailed for aspinwall. we numbered a little over seven hundred persons, including the families of officers and soldiers. passage was secured for us on the old steamer ohio, commanded at the time by captain schenck, of the navy. it had not been determined, until a day or two before starting, that the 4th infantry should go by the ohio; consequently, a complement of passengers had already been secured. the addition of over seven hundred to this list crowded the steamer most uncomfortably, especially for the tropics in july. in eight days aspinwall was reached. at that time the streets of the town were eight or ten inches under water, and foot passengers passed from place to place on raised foot-walks. july is at the height of the wet season, on the isthmus. at intervals the rain would pour down in streams, followed in not many minutes by a blazing, tropical summer's sun. these alternate changes, from rain to sunshine, were continuous in the afternoons. i wondered how any person could live many months in aspinwall, and wondered still more why any one tried. in the summer of 1852 the panama railroad was completed only to the point where it now crosses the chagres river. from there passengers were carried by boats to gorgona, at which place they took mules for panama, some twenty-five miles further. those who travelled over the isthmus in those days will remember that boats on the chagres river were propelled by natives not inconveniently burdened with clothing. these boats carried thirty to forty passengers each. the crews consisted of six men to a boat, armed with long poles. there were planks wide enough for a man to walk on conveniently, running along the sides of each boat from end to end. the men would start from the bow, place one end of their poles against the river bottom, brace their shoulders against the other end, and then walk to the stern as rapidly as they could. in this way from a mile to a mile and a half an hour could be made, against the current of the river. i, as regimental quartermaster, had charge of the public property and had also to look after the transportation. a contract had been entered into with the steamship company in new york for the transportation of the regiment to california, including the isthmus transit. a certain amount of baggage was allowed per man, and saddle animals were to be furnished to commissioned officers and to all disabled persons. the regiment, with the exception of one company left as guards to the public property--camp and garrison equipage principally--and the soldiers with families, took boats, propelled as above described, for gorgona. from this place they marched to panama, and were soon comfortably on the steamer anchored in the bay, some three or four miles from the town. i, with one company of troops and all the soldiers with families, all the tents, mess chests and camp kettles, was sent to cruces, a town a few miles higher up the chagres river than gorgona. there i found an impecunious american who had taken the contract to furnish transportation for the regiment at a stipulated price per hundred pounds for the freight and so much for each saddle animal. but when we reached cruces there was not a mule, either for pack or saddle, in the place. the contractor promised that the animals should be on hand in the morning. in the morning he said that they were on the way from some imaginary place, and would arrive in the course of the day. this went on until i saw that he could not procure the animals at all at the price he had promised to furnish them for. the unusual number of passengers that had come over on the steamer, and the large amount of freight to pack, had created an unprecedented demand for mules. some of the passengers paid as high as forty dollars for the use of a mule to ride twenty-five miles, when the mule would not have sold for ten dollars in that market at other times. meanwhile the cholera had broken out, and men were dying every hour. to diminish the food for the disease, i permitted the company detailed with me to proceed to panama. the captain and the doctors accompanied the men, and i was left alone with the sick and the soldiers who had families. the regiment at panama was also affected with the disease; but there were better accommodations for the well on the steamer, and a hospital, for those taken with the disease, on an old hulk anchored a mile off. there were also hospital tents on shore on the island of flamingo, which stands in the bay. i was about a week at cruces before transportation began to come in. about one-third of the people with me died, either at cruces or on the way to panama. there was no agent of the transportation company at cruces to consult, or to take the responsibility of procuring transportation at a price which would secure it. i therefore myself dismissed the contractor and made a new contract with a native, at more than double the original price. thus we finally reached panama. the steamer, however, could not proceed until the cholera abated, and the regiment was detained still longer. altogether, on the isthmus and on the pacific side, we were delayed six weeks. about one-seventh of those who left new york harbor with the 4th infantry on the 5th of july, now lie buried on the isthmus of panama or on flamingo island in panama bay. one amusing circumstance occurred while we were lying at anchor in panama bay. in the regiment there was a lieutenant slaughter who was very liable to sea-sickness. it almost made him sick to see the wave of a table-cloth when the servants were spreading it. soon after his graduation, slaughter was ordered to california and took passage by a sailing vessel going around cape horn. the vessel was seven months making the voyage, and slaughter was sick every moment of the time, never more so than while lying at anchor after reaching his place of destination. on landing in california he found orders which had come by the isthmus, notifying him of a mistake in his assignment; he should have been ordered to the northern lakes. he started back by the isthmus route and was sick all the way. but when he arrived at the east he was again ordered to california, this time definitely, and at this date was making his third trip. he was as sick as ever, and had been so for more than a month while lying at anchor in the bay. i remember him well, seated with his elbows on the table in front of him, his chin between his hands, and looking the picture of despair. at last he broke out, "i wish i had taken my father's advice; he wanted me to go into the navy; if i had done so, i should not have had to go to sea so much." poor slaughter! it was his last sea voyage. he was killed by indians in oregon. by the last of august the cholera had so abated that it was deemed safe to start. the disease did not break out again on the way to california, and we reached san francisco early in september. chapter xv. san francisco--early california experiences--life on the pacific coast --promoted captain--flush times in california. san francisco at that day was a lively place. gold, or placer digging as it was called, was at its height. steamers plied daily between san francisco and both stockton and sacramento. passengers and gold from the southern mines came by the stockton boat; from the northern mines by sacramento. in the evening when these boats arrived, long wharf--there was but one wharf in san francisco in 1852--was alive with people crowding to meet the miners as they came down to sell their "dust" and to "have a time." of these some were runners for hotels, boarding houses or restaurants; others belonged to a class of impecunious adventurers, of good manners and good presence, who were ever on the alert to make the acquaintance of people with some ready means, in the hope of being asked to take a meal at a restaurant. many were young men of good family, good education and gentlemanly instincts. their parents had been able to support them during their minority, and to give them good educations, but not to maintain them afterwards. from 1849 to 1853 there was a rush of people to the pacific coast, of the class described. all thought that fortunes were to be picked up, without effort, in the gold fields on the pacific. some realized more than their most sanguine expectations; but for one such there were hundreds disappointed, many of whom now fill unknown graves; others died wrecks of their former selves, and many, without a vicious instinct, became criminals and outcasts. many of the real scenes in early california life exceed in strangeness and interest any of the mere products of the brain of the novelist. those early days in california brought out character. it was a long way off then, and the journey was expensive. the fortunate could go by cape horn or by the isthmus of panama; but the mass of pioneers crossed the plains with their ox-teams. this took an entire summer. they were very lucky when they got through with a yoke of worn-out cattle. all other means were exhausted in procuring the outfit on the missouri river. the immigrant, on arriving, found himself a stranger, in a strange land, far from friends. time pressed, for the little means that could be realized from the sale of what was left of the outfit would not support a man long at california prices. many became discouraged. others would take off their coats and look for a job, no matter what it might be. these succeeded as a rule. there were many young men who had studied professions before they went to california, and who had never done a day's manual labor in their lives, who took in the situation at once and went to work to make a start at anything they could get to do. some supplied carpenters and masons with material--carrying plank, brick, or mortar, as the case might be; others drove stages, drays, or baggage wagons, until they could do better. more became discouraged early and spent their time looking up people who would "treat," or lounging about restaurants and gambling houses where free lunches were furnished daily. they were welcomed at these places because they often brought in miners who proved good customers. my regiment spent a few weeks at benicia barracks, and then was ordered to fort vancouver, on the columbia river, then in oregon territory. during the winter of 1852-3 the territory was divided, all north of the columbia river being taken from oregon to make washington territory. prices for all kinds of supplies were so high on the pacific coast from 1849 until at least 1853--that it would have been impossible for officers of the army to exist upon their pay, if it had not been that authority was given them to purchase from the commissary such supplies as he kept, at new orleans wholesale prices. a cook could not be hired for the pay of a captain. the cook could do better. at benicia, in 1852, flour was 25 cents per pound; potatoes were 16 cents; beets, turnips and cabbage, 6 cents; onions, 37 1/2 cents; meat and other articles in proportion. in 1853 at vancouver vegetables were a little lower. i with three other officers concluded that we would raise a crop for ourselves, and by selling the surplus realize something handsome. i bought a pair of horses that had crossed the plains that summer and were very poor. they recuperated rapidly, however, and proved a good team to break up the ground with. i performed all the labor of breaking up the ground while the other officers planted the potatoes. our crop was enormous. luckily for us the columbia river rose to a great height from the melting of the snow in the mountains in june, and overflowed and killed most of our crop. this saved digging it up, for everybody on the pacific coast seemed to have come to the conclusion at the same time that agriculture would be profitable. in 1853 more than three-quarters of the potatoes raised were permitted to rot in the ground, or had to be thrown away. the only potatoes we sold were to our own mess. while i was stationed on the pacific coast we were free from indian wars. there were quite a number of remnants of tribes in the vicinity of portland in oregon, and of fort vancouver in washington territory. they had generally acquired some of the vices of civilization, but none of the virtues, except in individual cases. the hudson's bay company had held the north-west with their trading posts for many years before the united states was represented on the pacific coast. they still retained posts along the columbia river and one at fort vancouver, when i was there. their treatment of the indians had brought out the better qualities of the savages. farming had been undertaken by the company to supply the indians with bread and vegetables; they raised some cattle and horses; and they had now taught the indians to do the labor of the farm and herd. they always compensated them for their labor, and always gave them goods of uniform quality and at uniform price. before the advent of the american, the medium of exchange between the indian and the white man was pelts. afterward it was silver coin. if an indian received in the sale of a horse a fifty dollar gold piece, not an infrequent occurrence, the first thing he did was to exchange it for american half dollars. these he could count. he would then commence his purchases, paying for each article separately, as he got it. he would not trust any one to add up the bill and pay it all at once. at that day fifty dollar gold pieces, not the issue of the government, were common on the pacific coast. they were called slugs. the indians, along the lower columbia as far as the cascades and on the lower willamette, died off very fast during the year i spent in that section; for besides acquiring the vices of the white people they had acquired also their diseases. the measles and the small-pox were both amazingly fatal. in their wild state, before the appearance of the white man among them, the principal complaints they were subject to were those produced by long involuntary fasting, violent exercise in pursuit of game, and over-eating. instinct more than reason had taught them a remedy for these ills. it was the steam bath. something like a bake-oven was built, large enough to admit a man lying down. bushes were stuck in the ground in two rows, about six feet long and some two or three feet apart; other bushes connected the rows at one end. the tops of the bushes were drawn together to interlace, and confined in that position; the whole was then plastered over with wet clay until every opening was filled. just inside the open end of the oven the floor was scooped out so as to make a hole that would hold a bucket or two of water. these ovens were always built on the banks of a stream, a big spring, or pool of water. when a patient required a bath, a fire was built near the oven and a pile of stones put upon it. the cavity at the front was then filled with water. when the stones were sufficiently heated, the patient would draw himself into the oven; a blanket would be thrown over the open end, and hot stones put into the water until the patient could stand it no longer. he was then withdrawn from his steam bath and doused into the cold stream near by. this treatment may have answered with the early ailments of the indians. with the measles or small-pox it would kill every time. during my year on the columbia river, the small-pox exterminated one small remnant of a band of indians entirely, and reduced others materially. i do not think there was a case of recovery among them, until the doctor with the hudson bay company took the matter in hand and established a hospital. nearly every case he treated recovered. i never, myself, saw the treatment described in the preceding paragraph, but have heard it described by persons who have witnessed it. the decimation among the indians i knew of personally, and the hospital, established for their benefit, was a hudson's bay building not a stone's throw from my own quarters. the death of colonel bliss, of the adjutant general's department, which occurred july 5th, 1853, promoted me to the captaincy of a company then stationed at humboldt bay, california. the notice reached me in september of the same year, and i very soon started to join my new command. there was no way of reaching humboldt at that time except to take passage on a san francisco sailing vessel going after lumber. red wood, a species of cedar, which on the pacific coast takes the place filled by white pine in the east, then abounded on the banks of humboldt bay. there were extensive saw-mills engaged in preparing this lumber for the san francisco market, and sailing vessels, used in getting it to market, furnished the only means of communication between humboldt and the balance of the world. i was obliged to remain in san francisco for several days before i found a vessel. this gave me a good opportunity of comparing the san francisco of 1852 with that of 1853. as before stated, there had been but one wharf in front of the city in 1852--long wharf. in 1853 the town had grown out into the bay beyond what was the end of this wharf when i first saw it. streets and houses had been built out on piles where the year before the largest vessels visiting the port lay at anchor or tied to the wharf. there was no filling under the streets or houses. san francisco presented the same general appearance as the year before; that is, eating, drinking and gambling houses were conspicuous for their number and publicity. they were on the first floor, with doors wide open. at all hours of the day and night in walking the streets, the eye was regaled, on every block near the water front, by the sight of players at faro. often broken places were found in the street, large enough to let a man down into the water below. i have but little doubt that many of the people who went to the pacific coast in the early days of the gold excitement, and have never been heard from since, or who were heard from for a time and then ceased to write, found watery graves beneath the houses or streets built over san francisco bay. besides the gambling in cards there was gambling on a larger scale in city lots. these were sold "on change," much as stocks are now sold on wall street. cash, at time of purchase, was always paid by the broker; but the purchaser had only to put up his margin. he was charged at the rate of two or three per cent. a month on the difference, besides commissions. the sand hills, some of them almost inaccessible to foot-passengers, were surveyed off and mapped into fifty vara lots--a vara being a spanish yard. these were sold at first at very low prices, but were sold and resold for higher prices until they went up to many thousands of dollars. the brokers did a fine business, and so did many such purchasers as were sharp enough to quit purchasing before the final crash came. as the city grew, the sand hills back of the town furnished material for filling up the bay under the houses and streets, and still further out. the temporary houses, first built over the water in the harbor, soon gave way to more solid structures. the main business part of the city now is on solid ground, made where vessels of the largest class lay at anchor in the early days. i was in san francisco again in 1854. gambling houses had disappeared from public view. the city had become staid and orderly. chapter xvi. resignation--private life--life at galena--the coming crisis. my family, all this while, was at the east. it consisted now of a wife and two children. i saw no chance of supporting them on the pacific coast out of my pay as an army officer. i concluded, therefore, to resign, and in march applied for a leave of absence until the end of the july following, tendering my resignation to take effect at the end of that time. i left the pacific coast very much attached to it, and with the full expectation of making it my future home. that expectation and that hope remained uppermost in my mind until the lieutenant-generalcy bill was introduced into congress in the winter of 1863-4. the passage of that bill, and my promotion, blasted my last hope of ever becoming a citizen of the further west. in the late summer of 1854 i rejoined my family, to find in it a son whom i had never seen, born while i was on the isthmus of panama. i was now to commence, at the age of thirty-two, a new struggle for our support. my wife had a farm near st. louis, to which we went, but i had no means to stock it. a house had to be built also. i worked very hard, never losing a day because of bad weather, and accomplished the object in a moderate way. if nothing else could be done i would load a cord of wood on a wagon and take it to the city for sale. i managed to keep along very well until 1858, when i was attacked by fever and ague. i had suffered very severely and for a long time from this disease, while a boy in ohio. it lasted now over a year, and, while it did not keep me in the house, it did interfere greatly with the amount of work i was able to perform. in the fall of 1858 i sold out my stock, crops and farming utensils at auction, and gave up farming. in the winter i established a partnership with harry boggs, a cousin of mrs. grant, in the real estate agency business. i spent that winter at st. louis myself, but did not take my family into town until the spring. our business might have become prosperous if i had been able to wait for it to grow. as it was, there was no more than one person could attend to, and not enough to support two families. while a citizen of st. louis and engaged in the real estate agency business, i was a candidate for the office of county engineer, an office of respectability and emolument which would have been very acceptable to me at that time. the incumbent was appointed by the county court, which consisted of five members. my opponent had the advantage of birth over me (he was a citizen by adoption) and carried off the prize. i now withdrew from the co-partnership with boggs, and, in may, 1860, removed to galena, illinois, and took a clerkship in my father's store. while a citizen of missouri, my first opportunity for casting a vote at a presidential election occurred. i had been in the army from before attaining my majority and had thought but little about politics, although i was a whig by education and a great admirer of mr. clay. but the whig party had ceased to exist before i had an opportunity of exercising the privilege of casting a ballot; the know-nothing party had taken its place, but was on the wane; and the republican party was in a chaotic state and had not yet received a name. it had no existence in the slave states except at points on the borders next to free states. in st. louis city and county, what afterwards became the republican party was known as the free-soil democracy, led by the honorable frank p. blair. most of my neighbors had known me as an officer of the army with whig proclivities. they had been on the same side, and, on the death of their party, many had become know-nothings, or members of the american party. there was a lodge near my new home, and i was invited to join it. i accepted the invitation; was initiated; attended a meeting just one week later, and never went to another afterwards. i have no apologies to make for having been one week a member of the american party; for i still think native-born citizens of the united states should have as much protection, as many privileges in their native country, as those who voluntarily select it for a home. but all secret, oath-bound political parties are dangerous to any nation, no matter how pure or how patriotic the motives and principles which first bring them together. no political party can or ought to exist when one of its corner-stones is opposition to freedom of thought and to the right to worship god "according to the dictate of one's own conscience," or according to the creed of any religious denomination whatever. nevertheless, if a sect sets up its laws as binding above the state laws, wherever the two come in conflict this claim must be resisted and suppressed at whatever cost. up to the mexican war there were a few out and out abolitionists, men who carried their hostility to slavery into all elections, from those for a justice of the peace up to the presidency of the united states. they were noisy but not numerous. but the great majority of people at the north, where slavery did not exist, were opposed to the institution, and looked upon its existence in any part of the country as unfortunate. they did not hold the states where slavery existed responsible for it; and believed that protection should be given to the right of property in slaves until some satisfactory way could be reached to be rid of the institution. opposition to slavery was not a creed of either political party. in some sections more anti-slavery men belonged to the democratic party, and in others to the whigs. but with the inauguration of the mexican war, in fact with the annexation of texas, "the inevitable conflict" commenced. as the time for the presidential election of 1856--the first at which i had the opportunity of voting--approached, party feeling began to run high. the republican party was regarded in the south and the border states not only as opposed to the extension of slavery, but as favoring the compulsory abolition of the institution without compensation to the owners. the most horrible visions seemed to present themselves to the minds of people who, one would suppose, ought to have known better. many educated and, otherwise, sensible persons appeared to believe that emancipation meant social equality. treason to the government was openly advocated and was not rebuked. it was evident to my mind that the election of a republican president in 1856 meant the secession of all the slave states, and rebellion. under these circumstances i preferred the success of a candidate whose election would prevent or postpone secession, to seeing the country plunged into a war the end of which no man could foretell. with a democrat elected by the unanimous vote of the slave states, there could be no pretext for secession for four years. i very much hoped that the passions of the people would subside in that time, and the catastrophe be averted altogether; if it was not, i believed the country would be better prepared to receive the shock and to resist it. i therefore voted for james buchanan for president. four years later the republican party was successful in electing its candidate to the presidency. the civilized world has learned the consequence. four millions of human beings held as chattels have been liberated; the ballot has been given to them; the free schools of the country have been opened to their children. the nation still lives, and the people are just as free to avoid social intimacy with the blacks as ever they were, or as they are with white people. while living in galena i was nominally only a clerk supporting myself and family on a stipulated salary. in reality my position was different. my father had never lived in galena himself, but had established my two brothers there, the one next younger than myself in charge of the business, assisted by the youngest. when i went there it was my father's intention to give up all connection with the business himself, and to establish his three sons in it: but the brother who had really built up the business was sinking with consumption, and it was not thought best to make any change while he was in this condition. he lived until september, 1861, when he succumbed to that insidious disease which always flatters its victims into the belief that they are growing better up to the close of life. a more honorable man never transacted business. in september, 1861, i was engaged in an employment which required all my attention elsewhere. during the eleven months that i lived in galena prior to the first call for volunteers, i had been strictly attentive to my business, and had made but few acquaintances other than customers and people engaged in the same line with myself. when the election took place in november, 1860, i had not been a resident of illinois long enough to gain citizenship and could not, therefore, vote. i was really glad of this at the time, for my pledges would have compelled me to vote for stephen a. douglas, who had no possible chance of election. the contest was really between mr. breckinridge and mr. lincoln; between minority rule and rule by the majority. i wanted, as between these candidates, to see mr. lincoln elected. excitement ran high during the canvass, and torch-light processions enlivened the scene in the generally quiet streets of galena many nights during the campaign. i did not parade with either party, but occasionally met with the "wide awakes" --republicans--in their rooms, and superintended their drill. it was evident, from the time of the chicago nomination to the close of the canvass, that the election of the republican candidate would be the signal for some of the southern states to secede. i still had hopes that the four years which had elapsed since the first nomination of a presidential candidate by a party distinctly opposed to slavery extension, had given time for the extreme pro-slavery sentiment to cool down; for the southerners to think well before they took the awful leap which they had so vehemently threatened. but i was mistaken. the republican candidate was elected, and solid substantial people of the north-west, and i presume the same order of people throughout the entire north, felt very serious, but determined, after this event. it was very much discussed whether the south would carry out its threat to secede and set up a separate government, the corner-stone of which should be, protection to the "divine" institution of slavery. for there were people who believed in the "divinity" of human slavery, as there are now people who believe mormonism and polygamy to be ordained by the most high. we forgive them for entertaining such notions, but forbid their practice. it was generally believed that there would be a flurry; that some of the extreme southern states would go so far as to pass ordinances of secession. but the common impression was that this step was so plainly suicidal for the south, that the movement would not spread over much of the territory and would not last long. doubtless the founders of our government, the majority of them at least, regarded the confederation of the colonies as an experiment. each colony considered itself a separate government; that the confederation was for mutual protection against a foreign foe, and the prevention of strife and war among themselves. if there had been a desire on the part of any single state to withdraw from the compact at any time while the number of states was limited to the original thirteen, i do not suppose there would have been any to contest the right, no matter how much the determination might have been regretted. the problem changed on the ratification of the constitution by all the colonies; it changed still more when amendments were added; and if the right of any one state to withdraw continued to exist at all after the ratification of the constitution, it certainly ceased on the formation of new states, at least so far as the new states themselves were concerned. it was never possessed at all by florida or the states west of the mississippi, all of which were purchased by the treasury of the entire nation. texas and the territory brought into the union in consequence of annexation, were purchased with both blood and treasure; and texas, with a domain greater than that of any european state except russia, was permitted to retain as state property all the public lands within its borders. it would have been ingratitude and injustice of the most flagrant sort for this state to withdraw from the union after all that had been spent and done to introduce her; yet, if separation had actually occurred, texas must necessarily have gone with the south, both on account of her institutions and her geographical position. secession was illogical as well as impracticable; it was revolution. now, the right of revolution is an inherent one. when people are oppressed by their government, it is a natural right they enjoy to relieve themselves of the oppression, if they are strong enough, either by withdrawal from it, or by overthrowing it and substituting a government more acceptable. but any people or part of a people who resort to this remedy, stake their lives, their property, and every claim for protection given by citizenship--on the issue. victory, or the conditions imposed by the conqueror--must be the result. in the case of the war between the states it would have been the exact truth if the south had said,--"we do not want to live with you northern people any longer; we know our institution of slavery is obnoxious to you, and, as you are growing numerically stronger than we, it may at some time in the future be endangered. so long as you permitted us to control the government, and with the aid of a few friends at the north to enact laws constituting your section a guard against the escape of our property, we were willing to live with you. you have been submissive to our rule heretofore; but it looks now as if you did not intend to continue so, and we will remain in the union no longer." instead of this the seceding states cried lustily,--"let us alone; you have no constitutional power to interfere with us." newspapers and people at the north reiterated the cry. individuals might ignore the constitution; but the nation itself must not only obey it, but must enforce the strictest construction of that instrument; the construction put upon it by the southerners themselves. the fact is the constitution did not apply to any such contingency as the one existing from 1861 to 1865. its framers never dreamed of such a contingency occurring. if they had foreseen it, the probabilities are they would have sanctioned the right of a state or states to withdraw rather than that there should be war between brothers. the framers were wise in their generation and wanted to do the very best possible to secure their own liberty and independence, and that also of their descendants to the latest days. it is preposterous to suppose that the people of one generation can lay down the best and only rules of government for all who are to come after them, and under unforeseen contingencies. at the time of the framing of our constitution the only physical forces that had been subdued and made to serve man and do his labor, were the currents in the streams and in the air we breathe. rude machinery, propelled by water power, had been invented; sails to propel ships upon the waters had been set to catch the passing breeze--but the application of stream to propel vessels against both wind and current, and machinery to do all manner of work had not been thought of. the instantaneous transmission of messages around the world by means of electricity would probably at that day have been attributed to witchcraft or a league with the devil. immaterial circumstances had changed as greatly as material ones. we could not and ought not to be rigidly bound by the rules laid down under circumstances so different for emergencies so utterly unanticipated. the fathers themselves would have been the first to declare that their prerogatives were not irrevocable. they would surely have resisted secession could they have lived to see the shape it assumed. i travelled through the northwest considerably during the winter of 1860-1. we had customers in all the little towns in south-west wisconsin, south-east minnesota and north-east iowa. these generally knew i had been a captain in the regular army and had served through the mexican war. consequently wherever i stopped at night, some of the people would come to the public-house where i was, and sit till a late hour discussing the probabilities of the future. my own views at that time were like those officially expressed by mr. seward at a later day, that "the war would be over in ninety days." i continued to entertain these views until after the battle of shiloh. i believe now that there would have been no more battles at the west after the capture of fort donelson if all the troops in that region had been under a single commander who would have followed up that victory. there is little doubt in my mind now that the prevailing sentiment of the south would have been opposed to secession in 1860 and 1861, if there had been a fair and calm expression of opinion, unbiased by threats, and if the ballot of one legal voter had counted for as much as that of any other. but there was no calm discussion of the question. demagogues who were too old to enter the army if there should be a war, others who entertained so high an opinion of their own ability that they did not believe they could be spared from the direction of the affairs of state in such an event, declaimed vehemently and unceasingly against the north; against its aggressions upon the south; its interference with southern rights, etc., etc. they denounced the northerners as cowards, poltroons, negro-worshippers; claimed that one southern man was equal to five northern men in battle; that if the south would stand up for its rights the north would back down. mr. jefferson davis said in a speech, delivered at la grange, mississippi, before the secession of that state, that he would agree to drink all the blood spilled south of mason and dixon's line if there should be a war. the young men who would have the fighting to do in case of war, believed all these statements, both in regard to the aggressiveness of the north and its cowardice. they, too, cried out for a separation from such people. the great bulk of the legal voters of the south were men who owned no slaves; their homes were generally in the hills and poor country; their facilities for educating their children, even up to the point of reading and writing, were very limited; their interest in the contest was very meagre--what there was, if they had been capable of seeing it, was with the north; they too needed emancipation. under the old regime they were looked down upon by those who controlled all the affairs in the interest of slave-owners, as poor white trash who were allowed the ballot so long as they cast it according to direction. i am aware that this last statement may be disputed and individual testimony perhaps adduced to show that in ante-bellum days the ballot was as untrammelled in the south as in any section of the country; but in the face of any such contradiction i reassert the statement. the shot-gun was not resorted to. masked men did not ride over the country at night intimidating voters; but there was a firm feeling that a class existed in every state with a sort of divine right to control public affairs. if they could not get this control by one means they must by another. the end justified the means. the coercion, if mild, was complete. there were two political parties, it is true, in all the states, both strong in numbers and respectability, but both equally loyal to the institution which stood paramount in southern eyes to all other institutions in state or nation. the slave-owners were the minority, but governed both parties. had politics ever divided the slave-holders and the non-slave-holders, the majority would have been obliged to yield, or internecine war would have been the consequence. i do not know that the southern people were to blame for this condition of affairs. there was a time when slavery was not profitable, and the discussion of the merits of the institution was confined almost exclusively to the territory where it existed. the states of virginia and kentucky came near abolishing slavery by their own acts, one state defeating the measure by a tie vote and the other only lacking one. but when the institution became profitable, all talk of its abolition ceased where it existed; and naturally, as human nature is constituted, arguments were adduced in its support. the cotton-gin probably had much to do with the justification of slavery. the winter of 1860-1 will be remembered by middle-aged people of to-day as one of great excitement. south carolina promptly seceded after the result of the presidential election was known. other southern states proposed to follow. in some of them the union sentiment was so strong that it had to be suppressed by force. maryland, delaware, kentucky and missouri, all slave states, failed to pass ordinances of secession; but they were all represented in the so-called congress of the so-called confederate states. the governor and lieutenant-governor of missouri, in 1861, jackson and reynolds, were both supporters of the rebellion and took refuge with the enemy. the governor soon died, and the lieutenant-governor assumed his office; issued proclamations as governor of the state; was recognized as such by the confederate government, and continued his pretensions until the collapse of the rebellion. the south claimed the sovereignty of states, but claimed the right to coerce into their confederation such states as they wanted, that is, all the states where slavery existed. they did not seem to think this course inconsistent. the fact is, the southern slave-owners believed that, in some way, the ownership of slaves conferred a sort of patent of nobility--a right to govern independent of the interest or wishes of those who did not hold such property. they convinced themselves, first, of the divine origin of the institution and, next, that that particular institution was not safe in the hands of any body of legislators but themselves. meanwhile the administration of president buchanan looked helplessly on and proclaimed that the general government had no power to interfere; that the nation had no power to save its own life. mr. buchanan had in his cabinet two members at least, who were as earnest--to use a mild term--in the cause of secession as mr. davis or any southern statesman. one of them, floyd, the secretary of war, scattered the army so that much of it could be captured when hostilities should commence, and distributed the cannon and small arms from northern arsenals throughout the south so as to be on hand when treason wanted them. the navy was scattered in like manner. the president did not prevent his cabinet preparing for war upon their government, either by destroying its resources or storing them in the south until a de facto government was established with jefferson davis as its president, and montgomery, alabama, as the capital. the secessionists had then to leave the cabinet. in their own estimation they were aliens in the country which had given them birth. loyal men were put into their places. treason in the executive branch of the government was estopped. but the harm had already been done. the stable door was locked after the horse had been stolen. during all of the trying winter of 1860-1, when the southerners were so defiant that they would not allow within their borders the expression of a sentiment hostile to their views, it was a brave man indeed who could stand up and proclaim his loyalty to the union. on the other hand men at the north--prominent men--proclaimed that the government had no power to coerce the south into submission to the laws of the land; that if the north undertook to raise armies to go south, these armies would have to march over the dead bodies of the speakers. a portion of the press of the north was constantly proclaiming similar views. when the time arrived for the president-elect to go to the capital of the nation to be sworn into office, it was deemed unsafe for him to travel, not only as a president-elect, but as any private citizen should be allowed to do. instead of going in a special car, receiving the good wishes of his constituents at all the stations along the road, he was obliged to stop on the way and to be smuggled into the capital. he disappeared from public view on his journey, and the next the country knew, his arrival was announced at the capital. there is little doubt that he would have been assassinated if he had attempted to travel openly throughout his journey. chapter xvii. outbreak of the rebellion--presiding at a union meeting--mustering officer of state troops--lyon at camp jackson--services tendered to the government. the 4th of march, 1861, came, and abraham lincoln was sworn to maintain the union against all its enemies. the secession of one state after another followed, until eleven had gone out. on the 11th of april fort sumter, a national fort in the harbor of charleston, south carolina, was fired upon by the southerners and a few days after was captured. the confederates proclaimed themselves aliens, and thereby debarred themselves of all right to claim protection under the constitution of the united states. we did not admit the fact that they were aliens, but all the same, they debarred themselves of the right to expect better treatment than people of any other foreign state who make war upon an independent nation. upon the firing on sumter president lincoln issued his first call for troops and soon after a proclamation convening congress in extra session. the call was for 75,000 volunteers for ninety days' service. if the shot fired at fort sumter "was heard around the world," the call of the president for 75,000 men was heard throughout the northern states. there was not a state in the north of a million of inhabitants that would not have furnished the entire number faster than arms could have been supplied to them, if it had been necessary. as soon as the news of the call for volunteers reached galena, posters were stuck up calling for a meeting of the citizens at the court-house in the evening. business ceased entirely; all was excitement; for a time there were no party distinctions; all were union men, determined to avenge the insult to the national flag. in the evening the court-house was packed. although a comparative stranger i was called upon to preside; the sole reason, possibly, was that i had been in the army and had seen service. with much embarrassment and some prompting i made out to announce the object of the meeting. speeches were in order, but it is doubtful whether it would have been safe just then to make other than patriotic ones. there was probably no one in the house, however, who felt like making any other. the two principal speeches were by b. b. howard, the post-master and a breckinridge democrat at the november election the fall before, and john a. rawlins, an elector on the douglas ticket. e. b. washburne, with whom i was not acquainted at that time, came in after the meeting had been organized, and expressed, i understood afterwards, a little surprise that galena could not furnish a presiding officer for such an occasion without taking a stranger. he came forward and was introduced, and made a speech appealing to the patriotism of the meeting. after the speaking was over volunteers were called for to form a company. the quota of illinois had been fixed at six regiments; and it was supposed that one company would be as much as would be accepted from galena. the company was raised and the officers and non-commissioned officers elected before the meeting adjourned. i declined the captaincy before the balloting, but announced that i would aid the company in every way i could and would be found in the service in some position if there should be a war. i never went into our leather store after that meeting, to put up a package or do other business. the ladies of galena were quite as patriotic as the men. they could not enlist, but they conceived the idea of sending their first company to the field uniformed. they came to me to get a description of the united states uniform for infantry; subscribed and bought the material; procured tailors to cut out the garments, and the ladies made them up. in a few days the company was in uniform and ready to report at the state capital for assignment. the men all turned out the morning after their enlistment, and i took charge, divided them into squads and superintended their drill. when they were ready to go to springfield i went with them and remained there until they were assigned to a regiment. there were so many more volunteers than had been called for that the question whom to accept was quite embarrassing to the governor, richard yates. the legislature was in session at the time, however, and came to his relief. a law was enacted authorizing the governor to accept the services of ten additional regiments, one from each congressional district, for one month, to be paid by the state, but pledged to go into the service of the united states if there should be a further call during their term. even with this relief the governor was still very much embarrassed. before the war was over he was like the president when he was taken with the varioloid: "at last he had something he could give to all who wanted it." in time the galena company was mustered into the united states service, forming a part of the 11th illinois volunteer infantry. my duties, i thought, had ended at springfield, and i was prepared to start home by the evening train, leaving at nine o'clock. up to that time i do not think i had been introduced to governor yates, or had ever spoken to him. i knew him by sight, however, because he was living at the same hotel and i often saw him at table. the evening i was to quit the capital i left the supper room before the governor and was standing at the front door when he came out. he spoke to me, calling me by my old army title "captain," and said he understood that i was about leaving the city. i answered that i was. he said he would be glad if i would remain over-night and call at the executive office the next morning. i complied with his request, and was asked to go into the adjutant-general's office and render such assistance as i could, the governor saying that my army experience would be of great service there. i accepted the proposition. my old army experience i found indeed of very great service. i was no clerk, nor had i any capacity to become one. the only place i ever found in my life to put a paper so as to find it again was either a side coat-pocket or the hands of a clerk or secretary more careful than myself. but i had been quartermaster, commissary and adjutant in the field. the army forms were familiar to me and i could direct how they should be made out. there was a clerk in the office of the adjutant-general who supplied my deficiencies. the ease with which the state of illinois settled its accounts with the government at the close of the war is evidence of the efficiency of mr. loomis as an accountant on a large scale. he remained in the office until that time. as i have stated, the legislature authorized the governor to accept the services of ten additional regiments. i had charge of mustering these regiments into the state service. they were assembled at the most convenient railroad centres in their respective congressional districts. i detailed officers to muster in a portion of them, but mustered three in the southern part of the state myself. one of these was to assemble at belleville, some eighteen miles south-east of st. louis. when i got there i found that only one or two companies had arrived. there was no probability of the regiment coming together under five days. this gave me a few idle days which i concluded to spend in st. louis. there was a considerable force of state militia at camp jackson, on the outskirts of st. louis, at the time. there is but little doubt that it was the design of governor claiborn jackson to have these troops ready to seize the united states arsenal and the city of st. louis. why they did not do so i do not know. there was but a small garrison, two companies i think, under captain n. lyon at the arsenal, and but for the timely services of the hon. f. p. blair, i have little doubt that st. louis would have gone into rebel hands, and with it the arsenal with all its arms and ammunition. blair was a leader among the union men of st. louis in 1861. there was no state government in missouri at the time that would sanction the raising of troops or commissioned officers to protect united states property, but blair had probably procured some form of authority from the president to raise troops in missouri and to muster them into the service of the united states. at all events, he did raise a regiment and took command himself as colonel. with this force he reported to captain lyon and placed himself and regiment under his orders. it was whispered that lyon thus reinforced intended to break up camp jackson and capture the militia. i went down to the arsenal in the morning to see the troops start out. i had known lyon for two years at west point and in the old army afterwards. blair i knew very well by sight. i had heard him speak in the canvass of 1858, possibly several times, but i had never spoken to him. as the troops marched out of the enclosure around the arsenal, blair was on his horse outside forming them into line preparatory to their march. i introduced myself to him and had a few moments' conversation and expressed my sympathy with his purpose. this was my first personal acquaintance with the honorable--afterwards major-general f. p. blair. camp jackson surrendered without a fight and the garrison was marched down to the arsenal as prisoners of war. up to this time the enemies of the government in st. louis had been bold and defiant, while union men were quiet but determined. the enemies had their head-quarters in a central and public position on pine street, near fifth--from which the rebel flag was flaunted boldly. the union men had a place of meeting somewhere in the city, i did not know where, and i doubt whether they dared to enrage the enemies of the government by placing the national flag outside their head-quarters. as soon as the news of the capture of camp jackson reached the city the condition of affairs was changed. union men became rampant, aggressive, and, if you will, intolerant. they proclaimed their sentiments boldly, and were impatient at anything like disrespect for the union. the secessionists became quiet but were filled with suppressed rage. they had been playing the bully. the union men ordered the rebel flag taken down from the building on pine street. the command was given in tones of authority and it was taken down, never to be raised again in st. louis. i witnessed the scene. i had heard of the surrender of the camp and that the garrison was on its way to the arsenal. i had seen the troops start out in the morning and had wished them success. i now determined to go to the arsenal and await their arrival and congratulate them. i stepped on a car standing at the corner of 4th and pine streets, and saw a crowd of people standing quietly in front of the head-quarters, who were there for the purpose of hauling down the flag. there were squads of other people at intervals down the street. they too were quiet but filled with suppressed rage, and muttered their resentment at the insult to, what they called, "their" flag. before the car i was in had started, a dapper little fellow--he would be called a dude at this day --stepped in. he was in a great state of excitement and used adjectives freely to express his contempt for the union and for those who had just perpetrated such an outrage upon the rights of a free people. there was only one other passenger in the car besides myself when this young man entered. he evidently expected to find nothing but sympathy when he got away from the "mud sills" engaged in compelling a "free people" to pull down a flag they adored. he turned to me saying: "things have come to a ---pretty pass when a free people can't choose their own flag. where i came from if a man dares to say a word in favor of the union we hang him to a limb of the first tree we come to." i replied that "after all we were not so intolerant in st. louis as we might be; i had not seen a single rebel hung yet, nor heard of one; there were plenty of them who ought to be, however." the young man subsided. he was so crestfallen that i believe if i had ordered him to leave the car he would have gone quietly out, saying to himself: "more yankee oppression." by nightfall the late defenders of camp jackson were all within the walls of the st. louis arsenal, prisoners of war. the next day i left st. louis for mattoon, illinois, where i was to muster in the regiment from that congressional district. this was the 21st illinois infantry, the regiment of which i subsequently became colonel. i mustered one regiment afterwards, when my services for the state were about closed. brigadier-general john pope was stationed at springfield, as united states mustering officer, all the time i was in the state service. he was a native of illinois and well acquainted with most of the prominent men in the state. i was a carpet-bagger and knew but few of them. while i was on duty at springfield the senators, representatives in congress, ax-governors and the state legislators were nearly all at the state capital. the only acquaintance i made among them was with the governor, whom i was serving, and, by chance, with senator s. a. douglas. the only members of congress i knew were washburne and philip foulk. with the former, though he represented my district and we were citizens of the same town, i only became acquainted at the meeting when the first company of galena volunteers was raised. foulk i had known in st. louis when i was a citizen of that city. i had been three years at west point with pope and had served with him a short time during the mexican war, under general taylor. i saw a good deal of him during my service with the state. on one occasion he said to me that i ought to go into the united states service. i told him i intended to do so if there was a war. he spoke of his acquaintance with the public men of the state, and said he could get them to recommend me for a position and that he would do all he could for me. i declined to receive endorsement for permission to fight for my country. going home for a day or two soon after this conversation with general pope, i wrote from galena the following letter to the adjutant-general of the army. galena, illinois, may 24, 1861. col. l. thomas adjt. gen. u. s. a., washington, d. c. sir:--having served for fifteen years in the regular army, including four years at west point, and feeling it the duty of every one who has been educated at the government expense to offer their services for the support of that government, i have the honor, very respectfully, to tender my services, until the close of the war, in such capacity as may be offered. i would say, in view of my present age and length of service, i feel myself competent to command a regiment, if the president, in his judgment, should see fit to intrust one to me. since the first call of the president i have been serving on the staff of the governor of this state, rendering such aid as i could in the organization of our state militia, and am still engaged in that capacity. a letter addressed to me at springfield, illinois, will reach me. i am very respectfully, your obt. svt., u. s. grant. this letter failed to elicit an answer from the adjutant-general of the army. i presume it was hardly read by him, and certainly it could not have been submitted to higher authority. subsequent to the war general badeau having heard of this letter applied to the war department for a copy of it. the letter could not be found and no one recollected ever having seen it. i took no copy when it was written. long after the application of general badeau, general townsend, who had become adjutant-general of the army, while packing up papers preparatory to the removal of his office, found this letter in some out-of-the-way place. it had not been destroyed, but it had not been regularly filed away. i felt some hesitation in suggesting rank as high as the colonelcy of a regiment, feeling somewhat doubtful whether i would be equal to the position. but i had seen nearly every colonel who had been mustered in from the state of illinois, and some from indiana, and felt that if they could command a regiment properly, and with credit, i could also. having but little to do after the muster of the last of the regiments authorized by the state legislature, i asked and obtained of the governor leave of absence for a week to visit my parents in covington, kentucky, immediately opposite cincinnati. general mcclellan had been made a major-general and had his headquarters at cincinnati. in reality i wanted to see him. i had known him slightly at west point, where we served one year together, and in the mexican war. i was in hopes that when he saw me he would offer me a position on his staff. i called on two successive days at his office but failed to see him on either occasion, and returned to springfield. chapter xviii. appointed colonel of the 21st illinois--personnel of the regiment --general logan--march to missouri--movement against harris at florida, mo.--general pope in command--stationed at mexico, mo. while i was absent from the state capital on this occasion the president's second call for troops was issued. this time it was for 300,000 men, for three years or the war. this brought into the united states service all the regiments then in the state service. these had elected their officers from highest to lowest and were accepted with their organizations as they were, except in two instances. a chicago regiment, the 19th infantry, had elected a very young man to the colonelcy. when it came to taking the field the regiment asked to have another appointed colonel and the one they had previously chosen made lieutenant-colonel. the 21st regiment of infantry, mustered in by me at mattoon, refused to go into the service with the colonel of their selection in any position. while i was still absent governor yates appointed me colonel of this latter regiment. a few days after i was in charge of it and in camp on the fair grounds near springfield. my regiment was composed in large part of young men of as good social position as any in their section of the state. it embraced the sons of farmers, lawyers, physicians, politicians, merchants, bankers and ministers, and some men of maturer years who had filled such positions themselves. there were also men in it who could be led astray; and the colonel, elected by the votes of the regiment, had proved to be fully capable of developing all there was in his men of recklessness. it was said that he even went so far at times as to take the guard from their posts and go with them to the village near by and make a night of it. when there came a prospect of battle the regiment wanted to have some one else to lead them. i found it very hard work for a few days to bring all the men into anything like subordination; but the great majority favored discipline, and by the application of a little regular army punishment all were reduced to as good discipline as one could ask. the ten regiments which had volunteered in the state service for thirty days, it will be remembered, had done so with a pledge to go into the national service if called upon within that time. when they volunteered the government had only called for ninety days' enlistments. men were called now for three years or the war. they felt that this change of period released them from the obligation of re-volunteering. when i was appointed colonel, the 21st regiment was still in the state service. about the time they were to be mustered into the united states service, such of them as would go, two members of congress from the state, mcclernand and logan, appeared at the capital and i was introduced to them. i had never seen either of them before, but i had read a great deal about them, and particularly about logan, in the newspapers. both were democratic members of congress, and logan had been elected from the southern district of the state, where he had a majority of eighteen thousand over his republican competitor. his district had been settled originally by people from the southern states, and at the breaking out of secession they sympathized with the south. at the first outbreak of war some of them joined the southern army; many others were preparing to do so; others rode over the country at night denouncing the union, and made it as necessary to guard railroad bridges over which national troops had to pass in southern illinois, as it was in kentucky or any of the border slave states. logan's popularity in this district was unbounded. he knew almost enough of the people in it by their christian names, to form an ordinary congressional district. as he went in politics, so his district was sure to go. the republican papers had been demanding that he should announce where he stood on the questions which at that time engrossed the whole of public thought. some were very bitter in their denunciations of his silence. logan was not a man to be coerced into an utterance by threats. he did, however, come out in a speech before the adjournment of the special session of congress which was convened by the president soon after his inauguration, and announced his undying loyalty and devotion to the union. but i had not happened to see that speech, so that when i first met logan my impressions were those formed from reading denunciations of him. mcclernand, on the other hand, had early taken strong grounds for the maintenance of the union and had been praised accordingly by the republican papers. the gentlemen who presented these two members of congress asked me if i would have any objections to their addressing my regiment. i hesitated a little before answering. it was but a few days before the time set for mustering into the united states service such of the men as were willing to volunteer for three years or the war. i had some doubt as to the effect a speech from logan might have; but as he was with mcclernand, whose sentiments on the all-absorbing questions of the day were well known, i gave my consent. mcclernand spoke first; and logan followed in a speech which he has hardly equalled since for force and eloquence. it breathed a loyalty and devotion to the union which inspired my men to such a point that they would have volunteered to remain in the army as long as an enemy of the country continued to bear arms against it. they entered the united states service almost to a man. general logan went to his part of the state and gave his attention to raising troops. the very men who at first made it necessary to guard the roads in southern illinois became the defenders of the union. logan entered the service himself as colonel of a regiment and rapidly rose to the rank of major-general. his district, which had promised at first to give much trouble to the government, filled every call made upon it for troops, without resorting to the draft. there was no call made when there were not more volunteers than were asked for. that congressional district stands credited at the war department to-day with furnishing more men for the army than it was called on to supply. i remained in springfield with my regiment until the 3d of july, when i was ordered to quincy, illinois. by that time the regiment was in a good state of discipline and the officers and men were well up in the company drill. there was direct railroad communication between springfield and quincy, but i thought it would be good preparation for the troops to march there. we had no transportation for our camp and garrison equipage, so wagons were hired for the occasion and on the 3d of july we started. there was no hurry, but fair marches were made every day until the illinois river was crossed. there i was overtaken by a dispatch saying that the destination of the regiment had been changed to ironton, missouri, and ordering me to halt where i was and await the arrival of a steamer which had been dispatched up the illinois river to take the regiment to st. louis. the boat, when it did come, grounded on a sand-bar a few miles below where we were in camp. we remained there several days waiting to have the boat get off the bar, but before this occurred news came that an illinois regiment was surrounded by rebels at a point on the hannibal and st. joe railroad some miles west of palmyra, in missouri, and i was ordered to proceed with all dispatch to their relief. we took the cars and reached quincy in a few hours. when i left galena for the last time to take command of the 21st regiment i took with me my oldest son, frederick d. grant, then a lad of eleven years of age. on receiving the order to take rail for quincy i wrote to mrs. grant, to relieve what i supposed would be her great anxiety for one so young going into danger, that i would send fred home from quincy by river. i received a prompt letter in reply decidedly disapproving my proposition, and urging that the lad should be allowed to accompany me. it came too late. fred was already on his way up the mississippi bound for dubuque, iowa, from which place there was a railroad to galena. my sensations as we approached what i supposed might be "a field of battle" were anything but agreeable. i had been in all the engagements in mexico that it was possible for one person to be in; but not in command. if some one else had been colonel and i had been lieutenant-colonel i do not think i would have felt any trepidation. before we were prepared to cross the mississippi river at quincy my anxiety was relieved; for the men of the besieged regiment came straggling into town. i am inclined to think both sides got frightened and ran away. i took my regiment to palmyra and remained there for a few days, until relieved by the 19th illinois infantry. from palmyra i proceeded to salt river, the railroad bridge over which had been destroyed by the enemy. colonel john m. palmer at that time commanded the 13th illinois, which was acting as a guard to workmen who were engaged in rebuilding this bridge. palmer was my senior and commanded the two regiments as long as we remained together. the bridge was finished in about two weeks, and i received orders to move against colonel thomas harris, who was said to be encamped at the little town of florida, some twenty-five miles south of where we then were. at the time of which i now write we had no transportation and the country about salt river was sparsely settled, so that it took some days to collect teams and drivers enough to move the camp and garrison equipage of a regiment nearly a thousand strong, together with a week's supply of provision and some ammunition. while preparations for the move were going on i felt quite comfortable; but when we got on the road and found every house deserted i was anything but easy. in the twenty-five miles we had to march we did not see a person, old or young, male or female, except two horsemen who were on a road that crossed ours. as soon as they saw us they decamped as fast as their horses could carry them. i kept my men in the ranks and forbade their entering any of the deserted houses or taking anything from them. we halted at night on the road and proceeded the next morning at an early hour. harris had been encamped in a creek bottom for the sake of being near water. the hills on either side of the creek extend to a considerable height, possibly more than a hundred feet. as we approached the brow of the hill from which it was expected we could see harris' camp, and possibly find his men ready formed to meet us, my heart kept getting higher and higher until it felt to me as though it was in my throat. i would have given anything then to have been back in illinois, but i had not the moral courage to halt and consider what to do; i kept right on. when we reached a point from which the valley below was in full view i halted. the place where harris had been encamped a few days before was still there and the marks of a recent encampment were plainly visible, but the troops were gone. my heart resumed its place. it occurred to me at once that harris had been as much afraid of me as i had been of him. this was a view of the question i had never taken before; but it was one i never forgot afterwards. from that event to the close of the war, i never experienced trepidation upon confronting an enemy, though i always felt more or less anxiety. i never forgot that he had as much reason to fear my forces as i had his. the lesson was valuable. inquiries at the village of florida divulged the fact that colonel harris, learning of my intended movement, while my transportation was being collected took time by the forelock and left florida before i had started from salt river. he had increased the distance between us by forty miles. the next day i started back to my old camp at salt river bridge. the citizens living on the line of our march had returned to their houses after we passed, and finding everything in good order, nothing carried away, they were at their front doors ready to greet us now. they had evidently been led to believe that the national troops carried death and devastation with them wherever they went. in a short time after our return to salt river bridge i was ordered with my regiment to the town of mexico. general pope was then commanding the district embracing all of the state of missouri between the mississippi and missouri rivers, with his headquarters in the village of mexico. i was assigned to the command of a sub-district embracing the troops in the immediate neighborhood, some three regiments of infantry and a section of artillery. there was one regiment encamped by the side of mine. i assumed command of the whole and the first night sent the commander of the other regiment the parole and countersign. not wishing to be outdone in courtesy, he immediately sent me the countersign for his regiment for the night. when he was informed that the countersign sent to him was for use with his regiment as well as mine, it was difficult to make him understand that this was not an unwarranted interference of one colonel over another. no doubt he attributed it for the time to the presumption of a graduate of west point over a volunteer pure and simple. but the question was soon settled and we had no further trouble. my arrival in mexico had been preceded by that of two or three regiments in which proper discipline had not been maintained, and the men had been in the habit of visiting houses without invitation and helping themselves to food and drink, or demanding them from the occupants. they carried their muskets while out of camp and made every man they found take the oath of allegiance to the government. i at once published orders prohibiting the soldiers from going into private houses unless invited by the inhabitants, and from appropriating private property to their own or to government uses. the people were no longer molested or made afraid. i received the most marked courtesy from the citizens of mexico as long as i remained there. up to this time my regiment had not been carried in the school of the soldier beyond the company drill, except that it had received some training on the march from springfield to the illinois river. there was now a good opportunity of exercising it in the battalion drill. while i was at west point the tactics used in the army had been scott's and the musket the flint lock. i had never looked at a copy of tactics from the time of my graduation. my standing in that branch of studies had been near the foot of the class. in the mexican war in the summer of 1846, i had been appointed regimental quartermaster and commissary and had not been at a battalion drill since. the arms had been changed since then and hardee's tactics had been adopted. i got a copy of tactics and studied one lesson, intending to confine the exercise of the first day to the commands i had thus learned. by pursuing this course from day to day i thought i would soon get through the volume. we were encamped just outside of town on the common, among scattering suburban houses with enclosed gardens, and when i got my regiment in line and rode to the front i soon saw that if i attempted to follow the lesson i had studied i would have to clear away some of the houses and garden fences to make room. i perceived at once, however, that hardee's tactics--a mere translation from the french with hardee's name attached --was nothing more than common sense and the progress of the age applied to scott's system. the commands were abbreviated and the movement expedited. under the old tactics almost every change in the order of march was preceded by a "halt," then came the change, and then the "forward march." with the new tactics all these changes could be made while in motion. i found no trouble in giving commands that would take my regiment where i wanted it to go and carry it around all obstacles. i do not believe that the officers of the regiment ever discovered that i had never studied the tactics that i used. chapter xix. commissioned brigadier-general--command at ironton, mo.--jefferson city --cape girardeau--general prentiss--seizure of paducah--headquarters at cairo. i had not been in mexico many weeks when, reading a st. louis paper, i found the president had asked the illinois delegation in congress to recommend some citizens of the state for the position of brigadier-general, and that they had unanimously recommended me as first on a list of seven. i was very much surprised because, as i have said, my acquaintance with the congressmen was very limited and i did not know of anything i had done to inspire such confidence. the papers of the next day announced that my name, with three others, had been sent to the senate, and a few days after our confirmation was announced. when appointed brigadier-general i at once thought it proper that one of my aides should come from the regiment i had been commanding, and so selected lieutenant c. b. lagow. while living in st. louis, i had had a desk in the law office of mcclellan, moody and hillyer. difference in views between the members of the firm on the questions of the day, and general hard times in the border cities, had broken up this firm. hillyer was quite a young man, then in his twenties, and very brilliant. i asked him to accept a place on my staff. i also wanted to take one man from my new home, galena. the canvass in the presidential campaign the fall before had brought out a young lawyer by the name of john a. rawlins, who proved himself one of the ablest speakers in the state. he was also a candidate for elector on the douglas ticket. when sumter was fired upon and the integrity of the union threatened, there was no man more ready to serve his country than he. i wrote at once asking him to accept the position of assistant adjutant-general with the rank of captain, on my staff. he was about entering the service as major of a new regiment then organizing in the north-western part of the state; but he threw this up and accepted my offer. neither hillyer nor lagow proved to have any particular taste or special qualifications for the duties of the soldier, and the former resigned during the vicksburg campaign; the latter i relieved after the battle of chattanooga. rawlins remained with me as long as he lived, and rose to the rank of brigadier general and chief-of-staff to the general of the army--an office created for him--before the war closed. he was an able man, possessed of great firmness, and could say "no" so emphatically to a request which he thought should not be granted that the person he was addressing would understand at once that there was no use of pressing the matter. general rawlins was a very useful officer in other ways than this. i became very much attached to him. shortly after my promotion i was ordered to ironton, missouri, to command a district in that part of the state, and took the 21st illinois, my old regiment, with me. several other regiments were ordered to the same destination about the same time. ironton is on the iron mountain railroad, about seventy miles south of st. louis, and situated among hills rising almost to the dignity of mountains. when i reached there, about the 8th of august, colonel b. gratz brown --afterwards governor of missouri and in 1872 vice-presidential candidate --was in command. some of his troops were ninety days' men and their time had expired some time before. the men had no clothing but what they had volunteered in, and much of this was so worn that it would hardly stay on. general hardee--the author of the tactics i did not study--was at greenville some twenty-five miles further south, it was said, with five thousand confederate troops. under these circumstances colonel brown's command was very much demoralized. a squadron of cavalry could have ridden into the valley and captured the entire force. brown himself was gladder to see me on that occasion than he ever has been since. i relieved him and sent all his men home within a day or two, to be mustered out of service. within ten days after reading ironton i was prepared to take the offensive against the enemy at greenville. i sent a column east out of the valley we were in, with orders to swing around to the south and west and come into the greenville road ten miles south of ironton. another column marched on the direct road and went into camp at the point designated for the two columns to meet. i was to ride out the next morning and take personal command of the movement. my experience against harris, in northern missouri, had inspired me with confidence. but when the evening train came in, it brought general b. m. prentiss with orders to take command of the district. his orders did not relieve me, but i knew that by law i was senior, and at that time even the president did not have the authority to assign a junior to command a senior of the same grade. i therefore gave general prentiss the situation of the troops and the general condition of affairs, and started for st. louis the same day. the movement against the rebels at greenville went no further. from st. louis i was ordered to jefferson city, the capital of the state, to take command. general sterling price, of the confederate army, was thought to be threatening the capital, lexington, chillicothe and other comparatively large towns in the central part of missouri. i found a good many troops in jefferson city, but in the greatest confusion, and no one person knew where they all were. colonel mulligan, a gallant man, was in command, but he had not been educated as yet to his new profession and did not know how to maintain discipline. i found that volunteers had obtained permission from the department commander, or claimed they had, to raise, some of them, regiments; some battalions; some companies--the officers to be commissioned according to the number of men they brought into the service. there were recruiting stations all over town, with notices, rudely lettered on boards over the doors, announcing the arm of service and length of time for which recruits at that station would be received. the law required all volunteers to serve for three years or the war. but in jefferson city in august, 1861, they were recruited for different periods and on different conditions; some were enlisted for six months, some for a year, some without any condition as to where they were to serve, others were not to be sent out of the state. the recruits were principally men from regiments stationed there and already in the service, bound for three years if the war lasted that long. the city was filled with union fugitives who had been driven by guerilla bands to take refuge with the national troops. they were in a deplorable condition and must have starved but for the support the government gave them. they had generally made their escape with a team or two, sometimes a yoke of oxen with a mule or a horse in the lead. a little bedding besides their clothing and some food had been thrown into the wagon. all else of their worldly goods were abandoned and appropriated by their former neighbors; for the union man in missouri who staid at home during the rebellion, if he was not immediately under the protection of the national troops, was at perpetual war with his neighbors. i stopped the recruiting service, and disposed the troops about the outskirts of the city so as to guard all approaches. order was soon restored. i had been at jefferson city but a few days when i was directed from department headquarters to fit out an expedition to lexington, booneville and chillicothe, in order to take from the banks in those cities all the funds they had and send them to st. louis. the western army had not yet been supplied with transportation. it became necessary therefore to press into the service teams belonging to sympathizers with the rebellion or to hire those of union men. this afforded an opportunity of giving employment to such of the refugees within our lines as had teams suitable for our purposes. they accepted the service with alacrity. as fast as troops could be got off they were moved west some twenty miles or more. in seven or eight days from my assuming command at jefferson city, i had all the troops, except a small garrison, at an advanced position and expected to join them myself the next day. but my campaigns had not yet begun, for while seated at my office door, with nothing further to do until it was time to start for the front, i saw an officer of rank approaching, who proved to be colonel jefferson c. davis. i had never met him before, but he introduced himself by handing me an order for him to proceed to jefferson city and relieve me of the command. the orders directed that i should report at department headquarters at st. louis without delay, to receive important special instructions. it was about an hour before the only regular train of the day would start. i therefore turned over to colonel davis my orders, and hurriedly stated to him the progress that had been made to carry out the department instructions already described. i had at that time but one staff officer, doing myself all the detail work usually performed by an adjutant-general. in an hour after being relieved from the command i was on my way to st. louis, leaving my single staff officer(*6) to follow the next day with our horses and baggage. the "important special instructions" which i received the next day, assigned me to the command of the district of south-east missouri, embracing all the territory south of st. louis, in missouri, as well as all southern illinois. at first i was to take personal command of a combined expedition that had been ordered for the capture of colonel jeff. thompson, a sort of independent or partisan commander who was disputing with us the possession of south-east missouri. troops had been ordered to move from ironton to cape girardeau, sixty or seventy miles to the south-east, on the mississippi river; while the forces at cape girardeau had been ordered to move to jacksonville, ten miles out towards ironton; and troops at cairo and bird's point, at the junction of the ohio and mississippi rivers, were to hold themselves in readiness to go down the mississippi to belmont, eighteen miles below, to be moved west from there when an officer should come to command them. i was the officer who had been selected for this purpose. cairo was to become my headquarters when the expedition terminated. in pursuance of my orders i established my temporary headquarters at cape girardeau and sent instructions to the commanding officer at jackson, to inform me of the approach of general prentiss from ironton. hired wagons were kept moving night and day to take additional rations to jackson, to supply the troops when they started from there. neither general prentiss nor colonel marsh, who commanded at jackson, knew their destination. i drew up all the instructions for the contemplated move, and kept them in my pocket until i should hear of the junction of our troops at jackson. two or three days after my arrival at cape girardeau, word came that general prentiss was approaching that place (jackson). i started at once to meet him there and to give him his orders. as i turned the first corner of a street after starting, i saw a column of cavalry passing the next street in front of me. i turned and rode around the block the other way, so as to meet the head of the column. i found there general prentiss himself, with a large escort. he had halted his troops at jackson for the night, and had come on himself to cape girardeau, leaving orders for his command to follow him in the morning. i gave the general his orders--which stopped him at jackson--but he was very much aggrieved at being placed under another brigadier-general, particularly as he believed himself to be the senior. he had been a brigadier, in command at cairo, while i was mustering officer at springfield without any rank. but we were nominated at the same time for the united states service, and both our commissions bore date may 17th, 1861. by virtue of my former army rank i was, by law, the senior. general prentiss failed to get orders to his troops to remain at jackson, and the next morning early they were reported as approaching cape girardeau. i then ordered the general very peremptorily to countermarch his command and take it back to jackson. he obeyed the order, but bade his command adieu when he got them to jackson, and went to st. louis and reported himself. this broke up the expedition. but little harm was done, as jeff. thompson moved light and had no fixed place for even nominal headquarters. he was as much at home in arkansas as he was in missouri and would keep out of the way of a superior force. prentiss was sent to another part of the state. general prentiss made a great mistake on the above occasion, one that he would not have committed later in the war. when i came to know him better, i regretted it much. in consequence of this occurrence he was off duty in the field when the principal campaign at the west was going on, and his juniors received promotion while he was where none could be obtained. he would have been next to myself in rank in the district of south-east missouri, by virtue of his services in the mexican war. he was a brave and very earnest soldier. no man in the service was more sincere in his devotion to the cause for which we were battling; none more ready to make sacrifices or risk life in it. on the 4th of september i removed my headquarters to cairo and found colonel richard oglesby in command of the post. we had never met, at least not to my knowledge. after my promotion i had ordered my brigadier-general's uniform from new york, but it had not yet arrived, so that i was in citizen's dress. the colonel had his office full of people, mostly from the neighboring states of missouri and kentucky, making complaints or asking favors. he evidently did not catch my name when i was presented, for on my taking a piece of paper from the table where he was seated and writing the order assuming command of the district of south-east missouri, colonel richard j. oglesby to command the post at bird's point, and handing it to him, he put on an expression of surprise that looked a little as if he would like to have some one identify me. but he surrendered the office without question. the day after i assumed command at cairo a man came to me who said he was a scout of general fremont. he reported that he had just come from columbus, a point on the mississippi twenty miles below on the kentucky side, and that troops had started from there, or were about to start, to seize paducah, at the mouth of the tennessee. there was no time for delay; i reported by telegraph to the department commander the information i had received, and added that i was taking steps to get off that night to be in advance of the enemy in securing that important point. there was a large number of steamers lying at cairo and a good many boatmen were staying in the town. it was the work of only a few hours to get the boats manned, with coal aboard and steam up. troops were also designated to go aboard. the distance from cairo to paducah is about forty-five miles. i did not wish to get there before daylight of the 6th, and directed therefore that the boats should lie at anchor out in the stream until the time to start. not having received an answer to my first dispatch, i again telegraphed to department headquarters that i should start for paducah that night unless i received further orders. hearing nothing, we started before midnight and arrived early the following morning, anticipating the enemy by probably not over six or eight hours. it proved very fortunate that the expedition against jeff. thompson had been broken up. had it not been, the enemy would have seized paducah and fortified it, to our very great annoyance. when the national troops entered the town the citizens were taken by surprise. i never after saw such consternation depicted on the faces of the people. men, women and children came out of their doors looking pale and frightened at the presence of the invader. they were expecting rebel troops that day. in fact, nearly four thousand men from columbus were at that time within ten or fifteen miles of paducah on their way to occupy the place. i had but two regiments and one battery with me, but the enemy did not know this and returned to columbus. i stationed my troops at the best points to guard the roads leading into the city, left gunboats to guard the river fronts and by noon was ready to start on my return to cairo. before leaving, however, i addressed a short printed proclamation to the citizens of paducah assuring them of our peaceful intentions, that we had come among them to protect them against the enemies of our country, and that all who chose could continue their usual avocations with assurance of the protection of the government. this was evidently a relief to them; but the majority would have much preferred the presence of the other army. i reinforced paducah rapidly from the troops at cape girardeau; and a day or two later general c. f. smith, a most accomplished soldier, reported at cairo and was assigned to the command of the post at the mouth of the tennessee. in a short time it was well fortified and a detachment was sent to occupy smithland, at the mouth of the cumberland. the state government of kentucky at that time was rebel in sentiment, but wanted to preserve an armed neutrality between the north and the south, and the governor really seemed to think the state had a perfect right to maintain a neutral position. the rebels already occupied two towns in the state, columbus and hickman, on the mississippi; and at the very moment the national troops were entering paducah from the ohio front, general lloyd tilghman--a confederate--with his staff and a small detachment of men, were getting out in the other direction, while, as i have already said, nearly four thousand confederate troops were on kentucky soil on their way to take possession of the town. but, in the estimation of the governor and of those who thought with him, this did not justify the national authorities in invading the soil of kentucky. i informed the legislature of the state of what i was doing, and my action was approved by the majority of that body. on my return to cairo i found authority from department headquarters for me to take paducah "if i felt strong enough," but very soon after i was reprimanded from the same quarters for my correspondence with the legislature and warned against a repetition of the offence. soon after i took command at cairo, general fremont entered into arrangements for the exchange of the prisoners captured at camp jackson in the month of may. i received orders to pass them through my lines to columbus as they presented themselves with proper credentials. quite a number of these prisoners i had been personally acquainted with before the war. such of them as i had so known were received at my headquarters as old acquaintances, and ordinary routine business was not disturbed by their presence. on one occasion when several were present in my office my intention to visit cape girardeau the next day, to inspect the troops at that point, was mentioned. something transpired which postponed my trip; but a steamer employed by the government was passing a point some twenty or more miles above cairo, the next day, when a section of rebel artillery with proper escort brought her to. a major, one of those who had been at my headquarters the day before, came at once aboard and after some search made a direct demand for my delivery. it was hard to persuade him that i was not there. this officer was major barrett, of st. louis. i had been acquainted with his family before the war. chapter xx. general fremont in command--movement against belmont--battle of belmont --a narrow escape--after the battle. from the occupation of paducah up to the early part of november nothing important occurred with the troops under my command. i was reinforced from time to time and the men were drilled and disciplined preparatory for the service which was sure to come. by the 1st of november i had not fewer than 20,000 men, most of them under good drill and ready to meet any equal body of men who, like themselves, had not yet been in an engagement. they were growing impatient at lying idle so long, almost in hearing of the guns of the enemy they had volunteered to fight against. i asked on one or two occasions to be allowed to move against columbus. it could have been taken soon after the occupation of paducah; but before november it was so strongly fortified that it would have required a large force and a long siege to capture it. in the latter part of october general fremont took the field in person and moved from jefferson city against general sterling price, who was then in the state of missouri with a considerable command. about the first of november i was directed from department headquarters to make a demonstration on both sides of the mississippi river with the view of detaining the rebels at columbus within their lines. before my troops could be got off, i was notified from the same quarter that there were some 3,000 of the enemy on the st. francis river about fifty miles west, or south-west, from cairo, and was ordered to send another force against them. i dispatched colonel oglesby at once with troops sufficient to compete with the reported number of the enemy. on the 5th word came from the same source that the rebels were about to detach a large force from columbus to be moved by boats down the mississippi and up the white river, in arkansas, in order to reinforce price, and i was directed to prevent this movement if possible. i accordingly sent a regiment from bird's point under colonel w. h. l. wallace to overtake and reinforce oglesby, with orders to march to new madrid, a point some distance below columbus, on the missouri side. at the same time i directed general c. f. smith to move all the troops he could spare from paducah directly against columbus, halting them, however, a few miles from the town to await further orders from me. then i gathered up all the troops at cairo and fort holt, except suitable guards, and moved them down the river on steamers convoyed by two gunboats, accompanying them myself. my force consisted of a little over 3,000 men and embraced five regiments of infantry, two guns and two companies of cavalry. we dropped down the river on the 6th to within about six miles of columbus, debarked a few men on the kentucky side and established pickets to connect with the troops from paducah. i had no orders which contemplated an attack by the national troops, nor did i intend anything of the kind when i started out from cairo; but after we started i saw that the officers and men were elated at the prospect of at last having the opportunity of doing what they had volunteered to do--fight the enemies of their country. i did not see how i could maintain discipline, or retain the confidence of my command, if we should return to cairo without an effort to do something. columbus, besides being strongly fortified, contained a garrison much more numerous than the force i had with me. it would not do, therefore, to attack that point. about two o'clock on the morning of the 7th, i learned that the enemy was crossing troops from columbus to the west bank to be dispatched, presumably, after oglesby. i knew there was a small camp of confederates at belmont, immediately opposite columbus, and i speedily resolved to push down the river, land on the missouri side, capture belmont, break up the camp and return. accordingly, the pickets above columbus were drawn in at once, and about daylight the boats moved out from shore. in an hour we were debarking on the west bank of the mississippi, just out of range of the batteries at columbus. the ground on the west shore of the river, opposite columbus, is low and in places marshy and cut up with sloughs. the soil is rich and the timber large and heavy. there were some small clearings between belmont and the point where we landed, but most of the country was covered with the native forests. we landed in front of a cornfield. when the debarkation commenced, i took a regiment down the river to post it as a guard against surprise. at that time i had no staff officer who could be trusted with that duty. in the woods, at a short distance below the clearing, i found a depression, dry at the time, but which at high water became a slough or bayou. i placed the men in the hollow, gave them their instructions and ordered them to remain there until they were properly relieved. these troops, with the gunboats, were to protect our transports. up to this time the enemy had evidently failed to divine our intentions. from columbus they could, of course, see our gunboats and transports loaded with troops. but the force from paducah was threatening them from the land side, and it was hardly to be expected that if columbus was our object we would separate our troops by a wide river. they doubtless thought we meant to draw a large force from the east bank, then embark ourselves, land on the east bank and make a sudden assault on columbus before their divided command could be united. about eight o'clock we started from the point of debarkation, marching by the flank. after moving in this way for a mile or a mile and a half, i halted where there was marshy ground covered with a heavy growth of timber in our front, and deployed a large part of my force as skirmishers. by this time the enemy discovered that we were moving upon belmont and sent out troops to meet us. soon after we had started in line, his skirmishers were encountered and fighting commenced. this continued, growing fiercer and fiercer, for about four hours, the enemy being forced back gradually until he was driven into his camp. early in this engagement my horse was shot under me, but i got another from one of my staff and kept well up with the advance until the river was reached. the officers and men engaged at belmont were then under fire for the first time. veterans could not have behaved better than they did up to the moment of reaching the rebel camp. at this point they became demoralized from their victory and failed to reap its full reward. the enemy had been followed so closely that when he reached the clear ground on which his camp was pitched he beat a hasty retreat over the river bank, which protected him from our shots and from view. this precipitate retreat at the last moment enabled the national forces to pick their way without hinderance through the abatis--the only artificial defence the enemy had. the moment the camp was reached our men laid down their arms and commenced rummaging the tents to pick up trophies. some of the higher officers were little better than the privates. they galloped about from one cluster of men to another and at every halt delivered a short eulogy upon the union cause and the achievements of the command. all this time the troops we had been engaged with for four hours, lay crouched under cover of the river bank, ready to come up and surrender if summoned to do so; but finding that they were not pursued, they worked their way up the river and came up on the bank between us and our transports. i saw at the same time two steamers coming from the columbus side towards the west shore, above us, black--or gray--with soldiers from boiler-deck to roof. some of my men were engaged in firing from captured guns at empty steamers down the river, out of range, cheering at every shot. i tried to get them to turn their guns upon the loaded steamers above and not so far away. my efforts were in vain. at last i directed my staff officers to set fire to the camps. this drew the fire of the enemy's guns located on the heights of columbus. they had abstained from firing before, probably because they were afraid of hitting their own men; or they may have supposed, until the camp was on fire, that it was still in the possession of their friends. about this time, too, the men we had driven over the bank were seen in line up the river between us and our transports. the alarm "surrounded" was given. the guns of the enemy and the report of being surrounded, brought officers and men completely under control. at first some of the officers seemed to think that to be surrounded was to be placed in a hopeless position, where there was nothing to do but surrender. but when i announced that we had cut our way in and could cut our way out just as well, it seemed a new revelation to officers and soldiers. they formed line rapidly and we started back to our boats, with the men deployed as skirmishers as they had been on entering camp. the enemy was soon encountered, but his resistance this time was feeble. again the confederates sought shelter under the river banks. we could not stop, however, to pick them up, because the troops we had seen crossing the river had debarked by this time and were nearer our transports than we were. it would be prudent to get them behind us; but we were not again molested on our way to the boats. from the beginning of the fighting our wounded had been carried to the houses at the rear, near the place of debarkation. i now set the troops to bringing their wounded to the boats. after this had gone on for some little time i rode down the road, without even a staff officer, to visit the guard i had stationed over the approach to our transports. i knew the enemy had crossed over from columbus in considerable numbers and might be expected to attack us as we were embarking. this guard would be encountered first and, as they were in a natural intrenchment, would be able to hold the enemy for a considerable time. my surprise was great to find there was not a single man in the trench. riding back to the boat i found the officer who had commanded the guard and learned that he had withdrawn his force when the main body fell back. at first i ordered the guard to return, but finding that it would take some time to get the men together and march them back to their position, i countermanded the order. then fearing that the enemy we had seen crossing the river below might be coming upon us unawares, i rode out in the field to our front, still entirely alone, to observe whether the enemy was passing. the field was grown up with corn so tall and thick as to cut off the view of even a person on horseback, except directly along the rows. even in that direction, owing to the overhanging blades of corn, the view was not extensive. i had not gone more than a few hundred yards when i saw a body of troops marching past me not fifty yards away. i looked at them for a moment and then turned my horse towards the river and started back, first in a walk, and when i thought myself concealed from the view of the enemy, as fast as my horse could carry me. when at the river bank i still had to ride a few hundred yards to the point where the nearest transport lay. the cornfield in front of our transports terminated at the edge of a dense forest. before i got back the enemy had entered this forest and had opened a brisk fire upon the boats. our men, with the exception of details that had gone to the front after the wounded, were now either aboard the transports or very near them. those who were not aboard soon got there, and the boats pushed off. i was the only man of the national army between the rebels and our transports. the captain of a boat that had just pushed out but had not started, recognized me and ordered the engineer not to start the engine; he then had a plank run out for me. my horse seemed to take in the situation. there was no path down the bank and every one acquainted with the mississippi river knows that its banks, in a natural state, do not vary at any great angle from the perpendicular. my horse put his fore feet over the bank without hesitation or urging, and with his hind feet well under him, slid down the bank and trotted aboard the boat, twelve or fifteen feet away, over a single gang plank. i dismounted and went at once to the upper deck. the mississippi river was low on the 7th of november, 1861, so that the banks were higher than the heads of men standing on the upper decks of the steamers. the rebels were some distance back from the river, so that their fire was high and did us but little harm. our smoke-stack was riddled with bullets, but there were only three men wounded on the boats, two of whom were soldiers. when i first went on deck i entered the captain's room adjoining the pilot-house, and threw myself on a sofa. i did not keep that position a moment, but rose to go out on the deck to observe what was going on. i had scarcely left when a musket ball entered the room, struck the head of the sofa, passed through it and lodged in the foot. when the enemy opened fire on the transports our gunboats returned it with vigor. they were well out in the stream and some distance down, so that they had to give but very little elevation to their guns to clear the banks of the river. their position very nearly enfiladed the line of the enemy while he was marching through the cornfield. the execution was very great, as we could see at the time and as i afterwards learned more positively. we were very soon out of range and went peacefully on our way to cairo, every man feeling that belmont was a great victory and that he had contributed his share to it. our loss at belmont was 485 in killed, wounded and missing. about 125 of our wounded fell into the hands of the enemy. we returned with 175 prisoners and two guns, and spiked four other pieces. the loss of the enemy, as officially reported, was 642 men, killed, wounded and missing. we had engaged about 2,500 men, exclusive of the guard left with the transports. the enemy had about 7,000; but this includes the troops brought over from columbus who were not engaged in the first defence of belmont. the two objects for which the battle of belmont was fought were fully accomplished. the enemy gave up all idea of detaching troops from columbus. his losses were very heavy for that period of the war. columbus was beset by people looking for their wounded or dead kin, to take them home for medical treatment or burial. i learned later, when i had moved further south, that belmont had caused more mourning than almost any other battle up to that time. the national troops acquired a confidence in themselves at belmont that did not desert them through the war. the day after the battle i met some officers from general polk's command, arranged for permission to bury our dead at belmont and also commenced negotiations for the exchange of prisoners. when our men went to bury their dead, before they were allowed to land they were conducted below the point where the enemy had engaged our transports. some of the officers expressed a desire to see the field; but the request was refused with the statement that we had no dead there. while on the truce-boat i mentioned to an officer, whom i had known both at west point and in the mexican war, that i was in the cornfield near their troops when they passed; that i had been on horseback and had worn a soldier's overcoat at the time. this officer was on general polk's staff. he said both he and the general had seen me and that polk had said to his men, "there is a yankee; you may try your marksmanship on him if you wish," but nobody fired at me. belmont was severely criticised in the north as a wholly unnecessary battle, barren of results, or the possibility of them from the beginning. if it had not been fought, colonel oglesby would probably have been captured or destroyed with his three thousand men. then i should have been culpable indeed. chapter xxi. general halleck in command--commanding the district of cairo--movement on fort henry--capture of fort henry. while at cairo i had frequent opportunities of meeting the rebel officers of the columbus garrison. they seemed to be very fond of coming up on steamers under flags of truce. on two or three occasions i went down in like manner. when one of their boats was seen coming up carrying a white flag, a gun would be fired from the lower battery at fort holt, throwing a shot across the bow as a signal to come no farther. i would then take a steamer and, with my staff and occasionally a few other officers, go down to receive the party. there were several officers among them whom i had known before, both at west point and in mexico. seeing these officers who had been educated for the profession of arms, both at school and in actual war, which is a far more efficient training, impressed me with the great advantage the south possessed over the north at the beginning of the rebellion. they had from thirty to forty per cent. of the educated soldiers of the nation. they had no standing army and, consequently, these trained soldiers had to find employment with the troops from their own states. in this way what there was of military education and training was distributed throughout their whole army. the whole loaf was leavened. the north had a great number of educated and trained soldiers, but the bulk of them were still in the army and were retained, generally with their old commands and rank, until the war had lasted many months. in the army of the potomac there was what was known as the "regular brigade," in which, from the commanding officer down to the youngest second lieutenant, every one was educated to his profession. so, too, with many of the batteries; all the officers, generally four in number to each, were men educated for their profession. some of these went into battle at the beginning under division commanders who were entirely without military training. this state of affairs gave me an idea which i expressed while at cairo; that the government ought to disband the regular army, with the exception of the staff corps, and notify the disbanded officers that they would receive no compensation while the war lasted except as volunteers. the register should be kept up, but the names of all officers who were not in the volunteer service at the close, should be stricken from it. on the 9th of november, two days after the battle of belmont, major-general h. w. halleck superseded general fremont in command of the department of the missouri. the limits of his command took in arkansas and west kentucky east to the cumberland river. from the battle of belmont until early in february, 1862, the troops under my command did little except prepare for the long struggle which proved to be before them. the enemy at this time occupied a line running from the mississippi river at columbus to bowling green and mill springs, kentucky. each of these positions was strongly fortified, as were also points on the tennessee and cumberland rivers near the tennessee state line. the works on the tennessee were called fort heiman and fort henry, and that on the cumberland was fort donelson. at these points the two rivers approached within eleven miles of each other. the lines of rifle pits at each place extended back from the water at least two miles, so that the garrisons were in reality only seven miles apart. these positions were of immense importance to the enemy; and of course correspondingly important for us to possess ourselves of. with fort henry in our hands we had a navigable stream open to us up to muscle shoals, in alabama. the memphis and charleston railroad strikes the tennessee at eastport, mississippi, and follows close to the banks of the river up to the shoals. this road, of vast importance to the enemy, would cease to be of use to them for through traffic the moment fort henry became ours. fort donelson was the gate to nashville--a place of great military and political importance--and to a rich country extending far east in kentucky. these two points in our possession the enemy would necessarily be thrown back to the memphis and charleston road, or to the boundary of the cotton states, and, as before stated, that road would be lost to them for through communication. the designation of my command had been changed after halleck's arrival, from the district of south-east missouri to the district of cairo, and the small district commanded by general c. f. smith, embracing the mouths of the tennessee and cumberland rivers, had been added to my jurisdiction. early in january, 1862, i was directed by general mcclellan, through my department commander, to make a reconnoissance in favor of brigadier-general don carlos buell, who commanded the department of the ohio, with headquarters at louisville, and who was confronting general s. b. buckner with a larger confederate force at bowling green. it was supposed that buell was about to make some move against the enemy, and my demonstration was intended to prevent the sending of troops from columbus, fort henry or donelson to buckner. i at once ordered general smith to send a force up the west bank of the tennessee to threaten forts heiman and henry; mcclernand at the same time with a force of 6,000 men was sent out into west kentucky, threatening columbus with one column and the tennessee river with another. i went with mcclernand's command. the weather was very bad; snow and rain fell; the roads, never good in that section, were intolerable. we were out more than a week splashing through the mud, snow and rain, the men suffering very much. the object of the expedition was accomplished. the enemy did not send reinforcements to bowling green, and general george h. thomas fought and won the battle of mill springs before we returned. as a result of this expedition general smith reported that he thought it practicable to capture fort heiman. this fort stood on high ground, completely commanding fort henry on the opposite side of the river, and its possession by us, with the aid of our gunboats, would insure the capture of fort henry. this report of smith's confirmed views i had previously held, that the true line of operations for us was up the tennessee and cumberland rivers. with us there, the enemy would be compelled to fall back on the east and west entirely out of the state of kentucky. on the 6th of january, before receiving orders for this expedition, i had asked permission of the general commanding the department to go to see him at st. louis. my object was to lay this plan of campaign before him. now that my views had been confirmed by so able a general as smith, i renewed my request to go to st. louis on what i deemed important military business. the leave was granted, but not graciously. i had known general halleck but very slightly in the old army, not having met him either at west point or during the mexican war. i was received with so little cordiality that i perhaps stated the object of my visit with less clearness than i might have done, and i had not uttered many sentences before i was cut short as if my plan was preposterous. i returned to cairo very much crestfallen. flag-officer foote commanded the little fleet of gunboats then in the neighborhood of cairo and, though in another branch of the service, was subject to the command of general halleck. he and i consulted freely upon military matters and he agreed with me perfectly as to the feasibility of the campaign up the tennessee. notwithstanding the rebuff i had received from my immediate chief, i therefore, on the 28th of january, renewed the suggestion by telegraph that "if permitted, i could take and hold fort henry on the tennessee." this time i was backed by flag-officer foote, who sent a similar dispatch. on the 29th i wrote fully in support of the proposition. on the 1st of february i received full instructions from department headquarters to move upon fort henry. on the 2d the expedition started. in february, 1862, there were quite a good many steamers laid up at cairo for want of employment, the mississippi river being closed against navigation below that point. there were also many men in the town whose occupation had been following the river in various capacities, from captain down to deck hand but there were not enough of either boats or men to move at one time the 17,000 men i proposed to take with me up the tennessee. i loaded the boats with more than half the force, however, and sent general mcclernand in command. i followed with one of the later boats and found mcclernand had stopped, very properly, nine miles below fort henry. seven gunboats under flag-officer foote had accompanied the advance. the transports we had with us had to return to paducah to bring up a division from there, with general c. f. smith in command. before sending the boats back i wanted to get the troops as near to the enemy as i could without coming within range of their guns. there was a stream emptying into the tennessee on the east side, apparently at about long range distance below the fort. on account of the narrow water-shed separating the tennessee and cumberland rivers at that point, the stream must be insignificant at ordinary stages, but when we were there, in february, it was a torrent. it would facilitate the investment of fort henry materially if the troops could be landed south of that stream. to test whether this could be done i boarded the gunboat essex and requested captain wm. porter commanding it, to approach the fort to draw its fire. after we had gone some distance past the mouth of the stream we drew the fire of the fort, which fell much short of us. in consequence i had made up my mind to return and bring the troops to the upper side of the creek, when the enemy opened upon us with a rifled gun that sent shot far beyond us and beyond the stream. one shot passed very near where captain porter and i were standing, struck the deck near the stern, penetrated and passed through the cabin and so out into the river. we immediately turned back, and the troops were debarked below the mouth of the creek. when the landing was completed i returned with the transports to paducah to hasten up the balance of the troops. i got back on the 5th with the advance the remainder following as rapidly as the steamers could carry them. at ten o'clock at night, on the 5th, the whole command was not yet up. being anxious to commence operations as soon as possible before the enemy could reinforce heavily, i issued my orders for an advance at 11 a.m. on the 6th. i felt sure that all the troops would be up by that time. fort henry occupies a bend in the river which gave the guns in the water battery a direct fire down the stream. the camp outside the fort was intrenched, with rifle pits and outworks two miles back on the road to donelson and dover. the garrison of the fort and camp was about 2,800, with strong reinforcements from donelson halted some miles out. there were seventeen heavy guns in the fort. the river was very high, the banks being overflowed except where the bluffs come to the water's edge. a portion of the ground on which fort henry stood was two feet deep in water. below, the water extended into the woods several hundred yards back from the bank on the east side. on the west bank fort heiman stood on high ground, completely commanding fort henry. the distance from fort henry to donelson is but eleven miles. the two positions were so important to the enemy, as he saw his interest, that it was natural to suppose that reinforcements would come from every quarter from which they could be got. prompt action on our part was imperative. the plan was for the troops and gunboats to start at the same moment. the troops were to invest the garrison and the gunboats to attack the fort at close quarters. general smith was to land a brigade of his division on the west bank during the night of the 5th and get it in rear of heiman. at the hour designated the troops and gunboats started. general smith found fort heiman had been evacuated before his men arrived. the gunboats soon engaged the water batteries at very close quarters, but the troops which were to invest fort henry were delayed for want of roads, as well as by the dense forest and the high water in what would in dry weather have been unimportant beds of streams. this delay made no difference in the result. on our first appearance tilghman had sent his entire command, with the exception of about one hundred men left to man the guns in the fort, to the outworks on the road to dover and donelson, so as to have them out of range of the guns of our navy; and before any attack on the 6th he had ordered them to retreat on donelson. he stated in his subsequent report that the defence was intended solely to give his troops time to make their escape. tilghman was captured with his staff and ninety men, as well as the armament of the fort, the ammunition and whatever stores were there. our cavalry pursued the retreating column towards donelson and picked up two guns and a few stragglers; but the enemy had so much the start, that the pursuing force did not get in sight of any except the stragglers. all the gunboats engaged were hit many times. the damage, however, beyond what could be repaired by a small expenditure of money, was slight, except to the essex. a shell penetrated the boiler of that vessel and exploded it, killing and wounding forty-eight men, nineteen of whom were soldiers who had been detailed to act with the navy. on several occasions during the war such details were made when the complement of men with the navy was insufficient for the duty before them. after the fall of fort henry captain phelps, commanding the iron-clad carondelet, at my request ascended the tennessee river and thoroughly destroyed the bridge of the memphis and ohio railroad. chapter xxii. investment of fort donelson--the naval operations--attack of the enemy --assaulting the works--surrender of the fort. i informed the department commander of our success at fort henry and that on the 8th i would take fort donelson. but the rain continued to fall so heavily that the roads became impassable for artillery and wagon trains. then, too, it would not have been prudent to proceed without the gunboats. at least it would have been leaving behind a valuable part of our available force. on the 7th, the day after the fall of fort henry, i took my staff and the cavalry--a part of one regiment--and made a reconnoissance to within about a mile of the outer line of works at donelson. i had known general pillow in mexico, and judged that with any force, no matter how small, i could march up to within gunshot of any intrenchments he was given to hold. i said this to the officers of my staff at the time. i knew that floyd was in command, but he was no soldier, and i judged that he would yield to pillow's pretensions. i met, as i expected, no opposition in making the reconnoissance and, besides learning the topography of the country on the way and around fort donelson, found that there were two roads available for marching; one leading to the village of dover, the other to donelson. fort donelson is two miles north, or down the river, from dover. the fort, as it stood in 1861, embraced about one hundred acres of land. on the east it fronted the cumberland; to the north it faced hickman's creek, a small stream which at that time was deep and wide because of the back-water from the river; on the south was another small stream, or rather a ravine, opening into the cumberland. this also was filled with back-water from the river. the fort stood on high ground, some of it as much as a hundred feet above the cumberland. strong protection to the heavy guns in the water batteries had been obtained by cutting away places for them in the bluff. to the west there was a line of rifle pits some two miles back from the river at the farthest point. this line ran generally along the crest of high ground, but in one place crossed a ravine which opens into the river between the village and the fort. the ground inside and outside of this intrenched line was very broken and generally wooded. the trees outside of the rifle-pits had been cut down for a considerable way out, and had been felled so that their tops lay outwards from the intrenchments. the limbs had been trimmed and pointed, and thus formed an abatis in front of the greater part of the line. outside of this intrenched line, and extending about half the entire length of it, is a ravine running north and south and opening into hickman creek at a point north of the fort. the entire side of this ravine next to the works was one long abatis. general halleck commenced his efforts in all quarters to get reinforcements to forward to me immediately on my departure from cairo. general hunter sent men freely from kansas, and a large division under general nelson, from buell's army, was also dispatched. orders went out from the war department to consolidate fragments of companies that were being recruited in the western states so as to make full companies, and to consolidate companies into regiments. general halleck did not approve or disapprove of my going to fort donelson. he said nothing whatever to me on the subject. he informed buell on the 7th that i would march against fort donelson the next day; but on the 10th he directed me to fortify fort henry strongly, particularly to the land side, saying that he forwarded me intrenching tools for that purpose. i received this dispatch in front of fort donelson. i was very impatient to get to fort donelson because i knew the importance of the place to the enemy and supposed he would reinforce it rapidly. i felt that 15,000 men on the 8th would be more effective than 50,000 a month later. i asked flag-officer foote, therefore, to order his gunboats still about cairo to proceed up the cumberland river and not to wait for those gone to eastport and florence; but the others got back in time and we started on the 12th. i had moved mcclernand out a few miles the night before so as to leave the road as free as possible. just as we were about to start the first reinforcement reached me on transports. it was a brigade composed of six full regiments commanded by colonel thayer, of nebraska. as the gunboats were going around to donelson by the tennessee, ohio and cumberland rivers, i directed thayer to turn about and go under their convoy. i started from fort henry with 15,000 men, including eight batteries and part of a regiment of cavalry, and, meeting with no obstruction to detain us, the advance arrived in front of the enemy by noon. that afternoon and the next day were spent in taking up ground to make the investment as complete as possible. general smith had been directed to leave a portion of his division behind to guard forts henry and heiman. he left general lew. wallace with 2,500 men. with the remainder of his division he occupied our left, extending to hickman creek. mcclernand was on the right and covered the roads running south and south-west from dover. his right extended to the back-water up the ravine opening into the cumberland south of the village. the troops were not intrenched, but the nature of the ground was such that they were just as well protected from the fire of the enemy as if rifle-pits had been thrown up. our line was generally along the crest of ridges. the artillery was protected by being sunk in the ground. the men who were not serving the guns were perfectly covered from fire on taking position a little back from the crest. the greatest suffering was from want of shelter. it was midwinter and during the siege we had rain and snow, thawing and freezing alternately. it would not do to allow camp-fires except far down the hill out of sight of the enemy, and it would not do to allow many of the troops to remain there at the same time. in the march over from fort henry numbers of the men had thrown away their blankets and overcoats. there was therefore much discomfort and absolute suffering. during the 12th and 13th, and until the arrival of wallace and thayer on the 14th, the national forces, composed of but 15,000 men, without intrenchments, confronted an intrenched army of 21,000, without conflict further than what was brought on by ourselves. only one gunboat had arrived. there was a little skirmishing each day, brought on by the movement of our troops in securing commanding positions; but there was no actual fighting during this time except once, on the 13th, in front of mcclernand's command. that general had undertaken to capture a battery of the enemy which was annoying his men. without orders or authority he sent three regiments to make the assault. the battery was in the main line of the enemy, which was defended by his whole army present. of course the assault was a failure, and of course the loss on our side was great for the number of men engaged. in this assault colonel william morrison fell badly wounded. up to this time the surgeons with the army had no difficulty in finding room in the houses near our line for all the sick and wounded; but now hospitals were overcrowded. owing, however, to the energy and skill of the surgeons the suffering was not so great as it might have been. the hospital arrangements at fort donelson were as complete as it was possible to make them, considering the inclemency of the weather and the lack of tents, in a sparsely settled country where the houses were generally of but one or two rooms. on the return of captain walke to fort henry on the 10th, i had requested him to take the vessels that had accompanied him on his expedition up the tennessee, and get possession of the cumberland as far up towards donelson as possible. he started without delay, taking, however, only his own gunboat, the carondelet, towed by the steamer alps. captain walke arrived a few miles below donelson on the 12th, a little after noon. about the time the advance of troops reached a point within gunshot of the fort on the land side, he engaged the water batteries at long range. on the 13th i informed him of my arrival the day before and of the establishment of most of our batteries, requesting him at the same time to attack again that day so that i might take advantage of any diversion. the attack was made and many shots fell within the fort, creating some consternation, as we now know. the investment on the land side was made as complete as the number of troops engaged would admit of. during the night of the 13th flag-officer foote arrived with the iron-clads st. louis, louisville and pittsburg and the wooden gunboats tyler and conestoga, convoying thayer's brigade. on the morning of the 14th thayer was landed. wallace, whom i had ordered over from fort henry, also arrived about the same time. up to this time he had been commanding a brigade belonging to the division of general c. f. smith. these troops were now restored to the division they belonged to, and general lew. wallace was assigned to the command of a division composed of the brigade of colonel thayer and other reinforcements that arrived the same day. this new division was assigned to the centre, giving the two flanking divisions an opportunity to close up and form a stronger line. the plan was for the troops to hold the enemy within his lines, while the gunboats should attack the water batteries at close quarters and silence his guns if possible. some of the gunboats were to run the batteries, get above the fort and above the village of dover. i had ordered a reconnoissance made with the view of getting troops to the river above dover in case they should be needed there. that position attained by the gunboats it would have been but a question of time--and a very short time, too--when the garrison would have been compelled to surrender. by three in the afternoon of the 14th flag-officer foote was ready, and advanced upon the water batteries with his entire fleet. after coming in range of the batteries of the enemy the advance was slow, but a constant fire was delivered from every gun that could be brought to bear upon the fort. i occupied a position on shore from which i could see the advancing navy. the leading boat got within a very short distance of the water battery, not further off i think than two hundred yards, and i soon saw one and then another of them dropping down the river, visibly disabled. then the whole fleet followed and the engagement closed for the day. the gunboat which flag-officer foote was on, besides having been hit about sixty times, several of the shots passing through near the waterline, had a shot enter the pilot-house which killed the pilot, carried away the wheel and wounded the flag-officer himself. the tiller-ropes of another vessel were carried away and she, too, dropped helplessly back. two others had their pilot-houses so injured that they scarcely formed a protection to the men at the wheel. the enemy had evidently been much demoralized by the assault, but they were jubilant when they saw the disabled vessels dropping down the river entirely out of the control of the men on board. of course i only witnessed the falling back of our gunboats and felt sad enough at the time over the repulse. subsequent reports, now published, show that the enemy telegraphed a great victory to richmond. the sun went down on the night of the 14th of february, 1862, leaving the army confronting fort donelson anything but comforted over the prospects. the weather had turned intensely cold; the men were without tents and could not keep up fires where most of them had to stay, and, as previously stated, many had thrown away their overcoats and blankets. two of the strongest of our gunboats had been disabled, presumably beyond the possibility of rendering any present assistance. i retired this night not knowing but that i would have to intrench my position, and bring up tents for the men or build huts under the cover of the hills. on the morning of the 15th, before it was yet broad day, a messenger from flag-officer foote handed me a note, expressing a desire to see me on the flag-ship and saying that he had been injured the day before so much that he could not come himself to me. i at once made my preparations for starting. i directed my adjutant-general to notify each of the division commanders of my absence and instruct them to do nothing to bring on an engagement until they received further orders, but to hold their positions. from the heavy rains that had fallen for days and weeks preceding and from the constant use of the roads between the troops and the landing four to seven miles below, these roads had become cut up so as to be hardly passable. the intense cold of the night of the 14th-15th had frozen the ground solid. this made travel on horseback even slower than through the mud; but i went as fast as the roads would allow. when i reached the fleet i found the flag-ship was anchored out in the stream. a small boat, however, awaited my arrival and i was soon on board with the flag-officer. he explained to me in short the condition in which he was left by the engagement of the evening before, and suggested that i should intrench while he returned to mound city with his disabled boats, expressing at the time the belief that he could have the necessary repairs made and be back in ten days. i saw the absolute necessity of his gunboats going into hospital and did not know but i should be forced to the alternative of going through a siege. but the enemy relieved me from this necessity. when i left the national line to visit flag-officer foote i had no idea that there would be any engagement on land unless i brought it on myself. the conditions for battle were much more favorable to us than they had been for the first two days of the investment. from the 12th to the 14th we had but 15,000 men of all arms and no gunboats. now we had been reinforced by a fleet of six naval vessels, a large division of troops under general l. wallace and 2,500 men brought over from fort henry belonging to the division of c. f. smith. the enemy, however, had taken the initiative. just as i landed i met captain hillyer of my staff, white with fear, not for his personal safety, but for the safety of the national troops. he said the enemy had come out of his lines in full force and attacked and scattered mcclernand's division, which was in full retreat. the roads, as i have said, were unfit for making fast time, but i got to my command as soon as possible. the attack had been made on the national right. i was some four or five miles north of our left. the line was about three miles long. in reaching the point where the disaster had occurred i had to pass the divisions of smith and wallace. i saw no sign of excitement on the portion of the line held by smith; wallace was nearer the scene of conflict and had taken part in it. he had, at an opportune time, sent thayer's brigade to the support of mcclernand and thereby contributed to hold the enemy within his lines. i saw everything favorable for us along the line of our left and centre. when i came to the right appearances were different. the enemy had come out in full force to cut his way out and make his escape. mcclernand's division had to bear the brunt of the attack from this combined force. his men had stood up gallantly until the ammunition in their cartridge-boxes gave out. there was abundance of ammunition near by lying on the ground in boxes, but at that stage of the war it was not all of our commanders of regiments, brigades, or even divisions, who had been educated up to the point of seeing that their men were constantly supplied with ammunition during an engagement. when the men found themselves without ammunition they could not stand up against troops who seemed to have plenty of it. the division broke and a portion fled, but most of the men, as they were not pursued, only fell back out of range of the fire of the enemy. it must have been about this time that thayer pushed his brigade in between the enemy and those of our troops that were without ammunition. at all events the enemy fell back within his intrenchments and was there when i got on the field. i saw the men standing in knots talking in the most excited manner. no officer seemed to be giving any directions. the soldiers had their muskets, but no ammunition, while there were tons of it close at hand. i heard some of the men say that the enemy had come out with knapsacks, and haversacks filled with rations. they seemed to think this indicated a determination on his part to stay out and fight just as long as the provisions held out. i turned to colonel j. d. webster, of my staff, who was with me, and said: "some of our men are pretty badly demoralized, but the enemy must be more so, for he has attempted to force his way out, but has fallen back: the one who attacks first now will be victorious and the enemy will have to be in a hurry if he gets ahead of me." i determined to make the assault at once on our left. it was clear to my mind that the enemy had started to march out with his entire force, except a few pickets, and if our attack could be made on the left before the enemy could redistribute his forces along the line, we would find but little opposition except from the intervening abatis. i directed colonel webster to ride with me and call out to the men as we passed: "fill your cartridge-boxes, quick, and get into line; the enemy is trying to escape and he must not be permitted to do so." this acted like a charm. the men only wanted some one to give them a command. we rode rapidly to smith's quarters, when i explained the situation to him and directed him to charge the enemy's works in his front with his whole division, saying at the same time that he would find nothing but a very thin line to contend with. the general was off in an incredibly short time, going in advance himself to keep his men from firing while they were working their way through the abatis intervening between them and the enemy. the outer line of rifle-pits was passed, and the night of the 15th general smith, with much of his division, bivouacked within the lines of the enemy. there was now no doubt but that the confederates must surrender or be captured the next day. there seems from subsequent accounts to have been much consternation, particularly among the officers of high rank, in dover during the night of the 15th. general floyd, the commanding officer, who was a man of talent enough for any civil position, was no soldier and, possibly, did not possess the elements of one. he was further unfitted for command, for the reason that his conscience must have troubled him and made him afraid. as secretary of war he had taken a solemn oath to maintain the constitution of the united states and to uphold the same against all its enemies. he had betrayed that trust. as secretary of war he was reported through the northern press to have scattered the little army the country had so that the most of it could be picked up in detail when secession occurred. about a year before leaving the cabinet he had removed arms from northern to southern arsenals. he continued in the cabinet of president buchanan until about the 1st of january, 1861, while he was working vigilantly for the establishment of a confederacy made out of united states territory. well may he have been afraid to fall into the hands of national troops. he would no doubt have been tried for misappropriating public property, if not for treason, had he been captured. general pillow, next in command, was conceited, and prided himself much on his services in the mexican war. he telegraphed to general johnston, at nashville, after our men were within the rebel rifle-pits, and almost on the eve of his making his escape, that the southern troops had had great success all day. johnston forwarded the dispatch to richmond. while the authorities at the capital were reading it floyd and pillow were fugitives. a council of war was held by the enemy at which all agreed that it would be impossible to hold out longer. general buckner, who was third in rank in the garrison but much the most capable soldier, seems to have regarded it a duty to hold the fort until the general commanding the department, a. s. johnston, should get back to his headquarters at nashville. buckner's report shows, however, that he considered donelson lost and that any attempt to hold the place longer would be at the sacrifice of the command. being assured that johnston was already in nashville, buckner too agreed that surrender was the proper thing. floyd turned over the command to pillow, who declined it. it then devolved upon buckner, who accepted the responsibility of the position. floyd and pillow took possession of all the river transports at dover and before morning both were on their way to nashville, with the brigade formerly commanded by floyd and some other troops, in all about 3,000. some marched up the east bank of the cumberland; others went on the steamers. during the night forrest also, with his cavalry and some other troops about a thousand in all, made their way out, passing between our right and the river. they had to ford or swim over the back-water in the little creek just south of dover. before daylight general smith brought to me the following letter from general buckner: headquarters, fort donelson, february 16, 1862. sir:--in consideration of all the circumstances governing the present situation of affairs at this station, i propose to the commanding officer of the federal forces the appointment of commissioners to agree upon terms of capitulation of the forces and fort under my command, and in that view suggest an armistice until 12 o'clock to-day. i am, sir, very respectfully, your ob't se'v't, s. b. buckner, brig. gen. c. s. a. to brigadier-general u. s. grant, com'ding u. s. forces, near fort donelson. to this i responded as follows: headquarters army in the field, camp near donelson, february 16, 1862. general s. b. buckner, confederate army. sir:--yours of this date, proposing armistice and appointment of commissioners to settle terms of capitulation, is just received. no terms except an unconditional and immediate surrender can be accepted. i propose to move immediately upon your works. i am, sir, very respectfully, your ob't se'v't, u. s. grant, brig. gen. to this i received the following reply: headquarters, dover, tennessee, february 16, 1862. to brig. gen'l u. s. grant, u. s. army. sir:--the distribution of the forces under my command, incident to an unexpected change of commanders, and the overwhelming force under your command, compel me, notwithstanding the brilliant success of the confederate arms yesterday, to accept the ungenerous and unchivalrous terms which you propose. i am, sir, your very ob't se'v't, s. b. buckner, brig. gen. c. s. a. general buckner, as soon as he had dispatched the first of the above letters, sent word to his different commanders on the line of rifle-pits, notifying them that he had made a proposition looking to the surrender of the garrison, and directing them to notify national troops in their front so that all fighting might be prevented. white flags were stuck at intervals along the line of rifle-pits, but none over the fort. as soon as the last letter from buckner was received i mounted my horse and rode to dover. general wallace, i found, had preceded me an hour or more. i presume that, seeing white flags exposed in his front, he rode up to see what they meant and, not being fired upon or halted, he kept on until he found himself at the headquarters of general buckner. i had been at west point three years with buckner and afterwards served with him in the army, so that we were quite well acquainted. in the course of our conversation, which was very friendly, he said to me that if he had been in command i would not have got up to donelson as easily as i did. i told him that if he had been in command i should not have tried in the way i did: i had invested their lines with a smaller force than they had to defend them, and at the same time had sent a brigade full 5,000 strong, around by water; i had relied very much upon their commander to allow me to come safely up to the outside of their works. i asked general buckner about what force he had to surrender. he replied that he could not tell with any degree of accuracy; that all the sick and weak had been sent to nashville while we were about fort henry; that floyd and pillow had left during the night, taking many men with them; and that forrest, and probably others, had also escaped during the preceding night: the number of casualties he could not tell; but he said i would not find fewer than 12,000, nor more than 15,000. he asked permission to send parties outside of the lines to bury his dead, who had fallen on the 15th when they tried to get out. i gave directions that his permit to pass our limits should be recognized. i have no reason to believe that this privilege was abused, but it familiarized our guards so much with the sight of confederates passing to and fro that i have no doubt many got beyond our pickets unobserved and went on. the most of the men who went in that way no doubt thought they had had war enough, and left with the intention of remaining out of the army. some came to me and asked permission to go, saying that they were tired of the war and would not be caught in the ranks again, and i bade them go. the actual number of confederates at fort donelson can never be given with entire accuracy. the largest number admitted by any writer on the southern side, is by colonel preston johnston. he gives the number at 17,000. but this must be an underestimate. the commissary general of prisoners reported having issued rations to 14,623 fort donelson prisoners at cairo, as they passed that point. general pillow reported the killed and wounded at 2,000; but he had less opportunity of knowing the actual numbers than the officers of mcclernand's division, for most of the killed and wounded fell outside their works, in front of that division, and were buried or cared for by buckner after the surrender and when pillow was a fugitive. it is known that floyd and pillow escaped during the night of the 15th, taking with them not less than 3,000 men. forrest escaped with about 1,000 and others were leaving singly and in squads all night. it is probable that the confederate force at donelson, on the 15th of february, 1862, was 21,000 in round numbers. on the day fort donelson fell i had 27,000 men to confront the confederate lines and guard the road four or five miles to the left, over which all our supplies had to be drawn on wagons. during the 16th, after the surrender, additional reinforcements arrived. during the siege general sherman had been sent to smithland, at the mouth of the cumberland river, to forward reinforcements and supplies to me. at that time he was my senior in rank and there was no authority of law to assign a junior to command a senior of the same grade. but every boat that came up with supplies or reinforcements brought a note of encouragement from sherman, asking me to call upon him for any assistance he could render and saying that if he could be of service at the front i might send for him and he would waive rank. chapter xxiii. promoted major-general of volunteers--unoccupied territory--advance upon nashville--situation of the troops--confederate retreat--relieved of the command--restored to the command--general smith. the news of the fall of fort donelson caused great delight all over the north. at the south, particularly in richmond, the effect was correspondingly depressing. i was promptly promoted to the grade of major-general of volunteers, and confirmed by the senate. all three of my division commanders were promoted to the same grade and the colonels who commanded brigades were made brigadier-generals in the volunteer service. my chief, who was in st. louis, telegraphed his congratulations to general hunter in kansas for the services he had rendered in securing the fall of fort donelson by sending reinforcements so rapidly. to washington he telegraphed that the victory was due to general c. f. smith; "promote him," he said, "and the whole country will applaud." on the 19th there was published at st. louis a formal order thanking flag-officer foote and myself, and the forces under our command, for the victories on the tennessee and the cumberland. i received no other recognition whatever from general halleck. but general cullum, his chief of staff, who was at cairo, wrote me a warm congratulatory letter on his own behalf. i approved of general smith's promotion highly, as i did all the promotions that were made. my opinion was and still is that immediately after the fall of fort donelson the way was opened to the national forces all over the south-west without much resistance. if one general who would have taken the responsibility had been in command of all the troops west of the alleghanies, he could have marched to chattanooga, corinth, memphis and vicksburg with the troops we then had, and as volunteering was going on rapidly over the north there would soon have been force enough at all these centres to operate offensively against any body of the enemy that might be found near them. rapid movements and the acquisition of rebellious territory would have promoted volunteering, so that reinforcements could have been had as fast as transportation could have been obtained to carry them to their destination. on the other hand there were tens of thousands of strong able-bodied young men still at their homes in the south-western states, who had not gone into the confederate army in february, 1862, and who had no particular desire to go. if our lines had been extended to protect their homes, many of them never would have gone. providence ruled differently. time was given the enemy to collect armies and fortify his new positions; and twice afterwards he came near forcing his north-western front up to the ohio river. i promptly informed the department commander of our success at fort donelson and that the way was open now to clarksville and nashville; and that unless i received orders to the contrary i should take clarksville on the 21st and nashville about the 1st of march. both these places are on the cumberland river above fort donelson. as i heard nothing from headquarters on the subject, general c. f. smith was sent to clarksville at the time designated and found the place evacuated. the capture of forts henry and donelson had broken the line the enemy had taken from columbus to bowling green, and it was known that he was falling back from the eastern point of this line and that buell was following, or at least advancing. i should have sent troops to nashville at the time i sent to clarksville, but my transportation was limited and there were many prisoners to be forwarded north. none of the reinforcements from buell's army arrived until the 24th of february. then general nelson came up, with orders to report to me with two brigades, he having sent one brigade to cairo. i knew general buell was advancing on nashville from the north, and i was advised by scouts that the rebels were leaving that place, and trying to get out all the supplies they could. nashville was, at that time, one of the best provisioned posts in the south. i had no use for reinforcements now, and thinking buell would like to have his troops again, i ordered nelson to proceed to nashville without debarking at fort donelson. i sent a gunboat also as a convoy. the cumberland river was very high at the time; the railroad bridge at nashville had been burned, and all river craft had been destroyed, or would be before the enemy left. nashville is on the west bank of the cumberland, and buell was approaching from the east. i thought the steamers carrying nelson's division would be useful in ferrying the balance of buell's forces across. i ordered nelson to put himself in communication with buell as soon as possible, and if he found him more than two days off from nashville to return below the city and await orders. buell, however, had already arrived in person at edgefield, opposite nashville, and mitchell's division of his command reached there the same day. nelson immediately took possession of the city. after nelson had gone and before i had learned of buell's arrival, i sent word to department headquarters that i should go to nashville myself on the 28th if i received no orders to the contrary. hearing nothing, i went as i had informed my superior officer i would do. on arriving at clarksville i saw a fleet of steamers at the shore--the same that had taken nelson's division--and troops going aboard. i landed and called on the commanding officer, general c. f. smith. as soon as he saw me he showed an order he had just received from buell in these words: nashville, february 25, 1862. general c. f. smith, commanding u. s. forces, clarksville. general:--the landing of a portion of our troops, contrary to my intentions, on the south side of the river has compelled me to hold this side at every hazard. if the enemy should assume the offensive, and i am assured by reliable persons that in view of my position such is his intention, my force present is altogether inadequate, consisting of only 15,000 men. i have to request you, therefore, to come forward with all the available force under your command. so important do i consider the occasion that i think it necessary to give this communication all the force of orders, and i send four boats, the diana, woodford, john rain, and autocrat, to bring you up. in five or six days my force will probably be sufficient to relieve you. very respectfully, your ob't srv't, d. c. buell, brigadier-general comd'g. p. s.--the steamers will leave here at 12 o'clock to-night. general smith said this order was nonsense. but i told him it was better to obey it. the general replied, "of course i must obey," and said his men were embarking as fast as they could. i went on up to nashville and inspected the position taken by nelson's troops. i did not see buell during the day, and wrote him a note saying that i had been in nashville since early morning and had hoped to meet him. on my return to the boat we met. his troops were still east of the river, and the steamers that had carried nelson's division up were mostly at clarksville to bring smith's division. i said to general buell my information was that the enemy was retreating as fast as possible. general buell said there was fighting going on then only ten or twelve miles away. i said: "quite probably; nashville contained valuable stores of arms, ammunition and provisions, and the enemy is probably trying to carry away all he can. the fighting is doubtless with the rear-guard who are trying to protect the trains they are getting away with." buell spoke very positively of the danger nashville was in of an attack from the enemy. i said, in the absence of positive information, i believed my information was correct. he responded that he "knew." "well," i said, "i do not know; but as i came by clarksville general smith's troops were embarking to join you." smith's troops were returned the same day. the enemy were trying to get away from nashville and not to return to it. at this time general albert sidney johnston commanded all the confederate troops west of the alleghany mountains, with the exception of those in the extreme south. on the national side the forces confronting him were divided into, at first three, then four separate departments. johnston had greatly the advantage in having supreme command over all troops that could possibly be brought to bear upon one point, while the forces similarly situated on the national side, divided into independent commands, could not be brought into harmonious action except by orders from washington. at the beginning of 1862 johnston's troops east of the mississippi occupied a line extending from columbus, on his left, to mill springs, on his right. as we have seen, columbus, both banks of the tennessee river, the west bank of the cumberland and bowling green, all were strongly fortified. mill springs was intrenched. the national troops occupied no territory south of the ohio, except three small garrisons along its bank and a force thrown out from louisville to confront that at bowling green. johnston's strength was no doubt numerically inferior to that of the national troops; but this was compensated for by the advantage of being sole commander of all the confederate forces at the west, and of operating in a country where his friends would take care of his rear without any detail of soldiers. but when general george h. thomas moved upon the enemy at mill springs and totally routed him, inflicting a loss of some 300 killed and wounded, and forts henry and heiman fell into the hands of the national forces, with their armaments and about 100 prisoners, those losses seemed to dishearten the confederate commander so much that he immediately commenced a retreat from bowling green on nashville. he reached this latter place on the 14th of february, while donelson was still besieged. buell followed with a portion of the army of the ohio, but he had to march and did not reach the east bank of the cumberland opposite nashville until the 24th of the month, and then with only one division of his army. the bridge at nashville had been destroyed and all boats removed or disabled, so that a small garrison could have held the place against any national troops that could have been brought against it within ten days after the arrival of the force from bowling green. johnston seemed to lie quietly at nashville to await the result at fort donelson, on which he had staked the possession of most of the territory embraced in the states of kentucky and tennessee. it is true, the two generals senior in rank at fort donelson were sending him encouraging dispatches, even claiming great confederate victories up to the night of the 16th when they must have been preparing for their individual escape. johnston made a fatal mistake in intrusting so important a command to floyd, who he must have known was no soldier even if he possessed the elements of one. pillow's presence as second was also a mistake. if these officers had been forced upon him and designated for that particular command, then he should have left nashville with a small garrison under a trusty officer, and with the remainder of his force gone to donelson himself. if he had been captured the result could not have been worse than it was. johnston's heart failed him upon the first advance of national troops. he wrote to richmond on the 8th of february, "i think the gunboats of the enemy will probably take fort donelson without the necessity of employing their land force in cooperation." after the fall of that place he abandoned nashville and chattanooga without an effort to save either, and fell back into northern mississippi, where, six weeks later, he was destined to end his career. from the time of leaving cairo i was singularly unfortunate in not receiving dispatches from general halleck. the order of the 10th of february directing me to fortify fort henry strongly, particularly to the land side, and saying that intrenching tools had been sent for that purpose, reached me after donelson was invested. i received nothing direct which indicated that the department commander knew we were in possession of donelson. i was reporting regularly to the chief of staff, who had been sent to cairo, soon after the troops left there, to receive all reports from the front and to telegraph the substance to the st. louis headquarters. cairo was at the southern end of the telegraph wire. another line was started at once from cairo to paducah and smithland, at the mouths of the tennessee and cumberland respectively. my dispatches were all sent to cairo by boat, but many of those addressed to me were sent to the operator at the end of the advancing wire and he failed to forward them. this operator afterwards proved to be a rebel; he deserted his post after a short time and went south taking his dispatches with him. a telegram from general mcclellan to me of february 16th, the day of the surrender, directing me to report in full the situation, was not received at my headquarters until the 3d of march. on the 2d of march i received orders dated march 1st to move my command back to fort henry, leaving only a small garrison at donelson. from fort henry expeditions were to be sent against eastport, mississippi, and paris, tennessee. we started from donelson on the 4th, and the same day i was back on the tennessee river. on march 4th i also received the following dispatch from general halleck: maj.-gen. u. s. grant, fort henry: you will place maj.-gen. c. f. smith in command of expedition, and remain yourself at fort henry. why do you not obey my orders to report strength and positions of your command? h. w. halleck, major-general. i was surprised. this was the first intimation i had received that general halleck had called for information as to the strength of my command. on the 6th he wrote to me again. "your going to nashville without authority, and when your presence with your troops was of the utmost importance, was a matter of very serious complaint at washington, so much so that i was advised to arrest you on your return." this was the first i knew of his objecting to my going to nashville. that place was not beyond the limits of my command, which, it had been expressly declared in orders, were "not defined." nashville is west of the cumberland river, and i had sent troops that had reported to me for duty to occupy the place. i turned over the command as directed and then replied to general halleck courteously, but asked to be relieved from further duty under him. later i learned that general halleck had been calling lustily for more troops, promising that he would do something important if he could only be sufficiently reinforced. mcclellan asked him what force he then had. halleck telegraphed me to supply the information so far as my command was concerned, but i received none of his dispatches. at last halleck reported to washington that he had repeatedly ordered me to give the strength of my force, but could get nothing out of me; that i had gone to nashville, beyond the limits of my command, without his authority, and that my army was more demoralized by victory than the army at bull run had been by defeat. general mcclellan, on this information, ordered that i should be relieved from duty and that an investigation should be made into any charges against me. he even authorized my arrest. thus in less than two weeks after the victory at donelson, the two leading generals in the army were in correspondence as to what disposition should be made of me, and in less than three weeks i was virtually in arrest and without a command. on the 13th of march i was restored to command, and on the 17th halleck sent me a copy of an order from the war department which stated that accounts of my misbehavior had reached washington and directed him to investigate and report the facts. he forwarded also a copy of a detailed dispatch from himself to washington entirely exonerating me; but he did not inform me that it was his own reports that had created all the trouble. on the contrary, he wrote to me, "instead of relieving you, i wish you, as soon as your new army is in the field, to assume immediate command, and lead it to new victories." in consequence i felt very grateful to him, and supposed it was his interposition that had set me right with the government. i never knew the truth until general badeau unearthed the facts in his researches for his history of my campaigns. general halleck unquestionably deemed general c. f. smith a much fitter officer for the command of all the forces in the military district than i was, and, to render him available for such command, desired his promotion to antedate mine and those of the other division commanders. it is probable that the general opinion was that smith's long services in the army and distinguished deeds rendered him the more proper person for such command. indeed i was rather inclined to this opinion myself at that time, and would have served as faithfully under smith as he had done under me. but this did not justify the dispatches which general halleck sent to washington, or his subsequent concealment of them from me when pretending to explain the action of my superiors. on receipt of the order restoring me to command i proceeded to savannah on the tennessee, to which point my troops had advanced. general smith was delighted to see me and was unhesitating in his denunciation of the treatment i had received. he was on a sick bed at the time, from which he never came away alive. his death was a severe loss to our western army. his personal courage was unquestioned, his judgment and professional acquirements were unsurpassed, and he had the confidence of those he commanded as well as of those over him. chapter xxiv. the army at pittsburg landing--injured by a fall--the confederate attack at shiloh--the first day's fight at shiloh--general sherman--condition of the army--close of the first day's fight--the second day's fight --retreat and defeat of the confederates. when i reassumed command on the 17th of march i found the army divided, about half being on the east bank of the tennessee at savannah, while one division was at crump's landing on the west bank about four miles higher up, and the remainder at pittsburg landing, five miles above crump's. the enemy was in force at corinth, the junction of the two most important railroads in the mississippi valley--one connecting memphis and the mississippi river with the east, and the other leading south to all the cotton states. still another railroad connects corinth with jackson, in west tennessee. if we obtained possession of corinth the enemy would have no railroad for the transportation of armies or supplies until that running east from vicksburg was reached. it was the great strategic position at the west between the tennessee and the mississippi rivers and between nashville and vicksburg. i at once put all the troops at savannah in motion for pittsburg landing, knowing that the enemy was fortifying at corinth and collecting an army there under johnston. it was my expectation to march against that army as soon as buell, who had been ordered to reinforce me with the army of the ohio, should arrive; and the west bank of the river was the place to start from. pittsburg is only about twenty miles from corinth, and hamburg landing, four miles further up the river, is a mile or two nearer. i had not been in command long before i selected hamburg as the place to put the army of the ohio when it arrived. the roads from pittsburg and hamburg to corinth converge some eight miles out. this disposition of the troops would have given additional roads to march over when the advance commenced, within supporting distance of each other. before i arrived at savannah, sherman, who had joined the army of the tennessee and been placed in command of a division, had made an expedition on steamers convoyed by gunboats to the neighborhood of eastport, thirty miles south, for the purpose of destroying the railroad east of corinth. the rains had been so heavy for some time before that the low-lands had become impassable swamps. sherman debarked his troops and started out to accomplish the object of the expedition; but the river was rising so rapidly that the back-water up the small tributaries threatened to cut off the possibility of getting back to the boats, and the expedition had to return without reaching the railroad. the guns had to be hauled by hand through the water to get back to the boats. on the 17th of march the army on the tennessee river consisted of five divisions, commanded respectively by generals c. f. smith, mcclernand, l. wallace, hurlbut and sherman. general w. h. l. wallace was temporarily in command of smith's division, general smith, as i have said, being confined to his bed. reinforcements were arriving daily and as they came up they were organized, first into brigades, then into a division, and the command given to general prentiss, who had been ordered to report to me. general buell was on his way from nashville with 40,000 veterans. on the 19th of march he was at columbia, tennessee, eighty-five miles from pittsburg. when all reinforcements should have arrived i expected to take the initiative by marching on corinth, and had no expectation of needing fortifications, though this subject was taken into consideration. mcpherson, my only military engineer, was directed to lay out a line to intrench. he did so, but reported that it would have to be made in rear of the line of encampment as it then ran. the new line, while it would be nearer the river, was yet too far away from the tennessee, or even from the creeks, to be easily supplied with water, and in case of attack these creeks would be in the hands of the enemy. the fact is, i regarded the campaign we were engaged in as an offensive one and had no idea that the enemy would leave strong intrenchments to take the initiative when he knew he would be attacked where he was if he remained. this view, however, did not prevent every precaution being taken and every effort made to keep advised of all movements of the enemy. johnston's cavalry meanwhile had been well out towards our front, and occasional encounters occurred between it and our outposts. on the 1st of april this cavalry became bold and approached our lines, showing that an advance of some kind was contemplated. on the 2d johnston left corinth in force to attack my army. on the 4th his cavalry dashed down and captured a small picket guard of six or seven men, stationed some five miles out from pittsburg on the corinth road. colonel buckland sent relief to the guard at once and soon followed in person with an entire regiment, and general sherman followed buckland taking the remainder of a brigade. the pursuit was kept up for some three miles beyond the point where the picket guard had been captured, and after nightfall sherman returned to camp and reported to me by letter what had occurred. at this time a large body of the enemy was hovering to the west of us, along the line of the mobile and ohio railroad. my apprehension was much greater for the safety of crump's landing than it was for pittsburg. i had no apprehension that the enemy could really capture either place. but i feared it was possible that he might make a rapid dash upon crump's and destroy our transports and stores, most of which were kept at that point, and then retreat before wallace could be reinforced. lew. wallace's position i regarded as so well chosen that he was not removed. at this time i generally spent the day at pittsburg and returned to savannah in the evening. i was intending to remove my headquarters to pittsburg, but buell was expected daily and would come in at savannah. i remained at this point, therefore, a few days longer than i otherwise should have done, in order to meet him on his arrival. the skirmishing in our front, however, had been so continuous from about the 3d of april that i did not leave pittsburg each night until an hour when i felt there would be no further danger before the morning. on friday the 4th, the day of buckland's advance, i was very much injured by my horse falling with me, and on me, while i was trying to get to the front where firing had been heard. the night was one of impenetrable darkness, with rain pouring down in torrents; nothing was visible to the eye except as revealed by the frequent flashes of lightning. under these circumstances i had to trust to the horse, without guidance, to keep the road. i had not gone far, however, when i met general w. h. l. wallace and colonel (afterwards general) mcpherson coming from the direction of the front. they said all was quiet so far as the enemy was concerned. on the way back to the boat my horse's feet slipped from under him, and he fell with my leg under his body. the extreme softness of the ground, from the excessive rains of the few preceding days, no doubt saved me from a severe injury and protracted lameness. as it was, my ankle was very much injured, so much so that my boot had to be cut off. for two or three days after i was unable to walk except with crutches. on the 5th general nelson, with a division of buell's army, arrived at savannah and i ordered him to move up the east bank of the river, to be in a position where he could be ferried over to crump's landing or pittsburg as occasion required. i had learned that general buell himself would be at savannah the next day, and desired to meet me on his arrival. affairs at pittsburg landing had been such for several days that i did not want to be away during the day. i determined, therefore, to take a very early breakfast and ride out to meet buell, and thus save time. he had arrived on the evening of the 5th, but had not advised me of the fact and i was not aware of it until some time after. while i was at breakfast, however, heavy firing was heard in the direction of pittsburg landing, and i hastened there, sending a hurried note to buell informing him of the reason why i could not meet him at savannah. on the way up the river i directed the dispatch-boat to run in close to crump's landing, so that i could communicate with general lew. wallace. i found him waiting on a boat apparently expecting to see me, and i directed him to get his troops in line ready to execute any orders he might receive. he replied that his troops were already under arms and prepared to move. up to that time i had felt by no means certain that crump's landing might not be the point of attack. on reaching the front, however, about eight a.m., i found that the attack on pittsburg was unmistakable, and that nothing more than a small guard, to protect our transports and stores, was needed at crump's. captain baxter, a quartermaster on my staff, was accordingly directed to go back and order general wallace to march immediately to pittsburg by the road nearest the river. captain baxter made a memorandum of this order. about one p.m., not hearing from wallace and being much in need of reinforcements, i sent two more of my staff, colonel mcpherson and captain rowley, to bring him up with his division. they reported finding him marching towards purdy, bethel, or some point west from the river, and farther from pittsburg by several miles than when he started. the road from his first position to pittsburg landing was direct and near the river. between the two points a bridge had been built across snake creek by our troops, at which wallace's command had assisted, expressly to enable the troops at the two places to support each other in case of need. wallace did not arrive in time to take part in the first day's fight. general wallace has since claimed that the order delivered to him by captain baxter was simply to join the right of the army, and that the road over which he marched would have taken him to the road from pittsburg to purdy where it crosses owl creek on the right of sherman; but this is not where i had ordered him nor where i wanted him to go. i never could see and do not now see why any order was necessary further than to direct him to come to pittsburg landing, without specifying by what route. his was one of three veteran divisions that had been in battle, and its absence was severely felt. later in the war general wallace would not have made the mistake that he committed on the 6th of april, 1862. i presume his idea was that by taking the route he did he would be able to come around on the flank or rear of the enemy, and thus perform an act of heroism that would redound to the credit of his command, as well as to the benefit of his country. some two or three miles from pittsburg landing was a log meeting-house called shiloh. it stood on the ridge which divides the waters of snake and lick creeks, the former emptying into the tennessee just north of pittsburg landing, and the latter south. this point was the key to our position and was held by sherman. his division was at that time wholly raw, no part of it ever having been in an engagement; but i thought this deficiency was more than made up by the superiority of the commander. mcclernand was on sherman's left, with troops that had been engaged at forts henry and donelson and were therefore veterans so far as western troops had become such at that stage of the war. next to mcclernand came prentiss with a raw division, and on the extreme left, stuart with one brigade of sherman's division. hurlbut was in rear of prentiss, massed, and in reserve at the time of the onset. the division of general c. f. smith was on the right, also in reserve. general smith was still sick in bed at savannah, but within hearing of our guns. his services would no doubt have been of inestimable value had his health permitted his presence. the command of his division devolved upon brigadier-general w. h. l. wallace, a most estimable and able officer; a veteran too, for he had served a year in the mexican war and had been with his command at henry and donelson. wallace was mortally wounded in the first day's engagement, and with the change of commanders thus necessarily effected in the heat of battle the efficiency of his division was much weakened. the position of our troops made a continuous line from lick creek on the left to owl creek, a branch of snake creek, on the right, facing nearly south and possibly a little west. the water in all these streams was very high at the time and contributed to protect our flanks. the enemy was compelled, therefore, to attack directly in front. this he did with great vigor, inflicting heavy losses on the national side, but suffering much heavier on his own. the confederate assaults were made with such a disregard of losses on their own side that our line of tents soon fell into their hands. the ground on which the battle was fought was undulating, heavily timbered with scattered clearings, the woods giving some protection to the troops on both sides. there was also considerable underbrush. a number of attempts were made by the enemy to turn our right flank, where sherman was posted, but every effort was repulsed with heavy loss. but the front attack was kept up so vigorously that, to prevent the success of these attempts to get on our flanks, the national troops were compelled, several times, to take positions to the rear nearer pittsburg landing. when the firing ceased at night the national line was all of a mile in rear of the position it had occupied in the morning. in one of the backward moves, on the 6th, the division commanded by general prentiss did not fall back with the others. this left his flanks exposed and enabled the enemy to capture him with about 2,200 of his officers and men. general badeau gives four o'clock of the 6th as about the time this capture took place. he may be right as to the time, but my recollection is that the hour was later. general prentiss himself gave the hour as half-past five. i was with him, as i was with each of the division commanders that day, several times, and my recollection is that the last time i was with him was about half-past four, when his division was standing up firmly and the general was as cool as if expecting victory. but no matter whether it was four or later, the story that he and his command were surprised and captured in their camps is without any foundation whatever. if it had been true, as currently reported at the time and yet believed by thousands of people, that prentiss and his division had been captured in their beds, there would not have been an all-day struggle, with the loss of thousands killed and wounded on the confederate side. with the single exception of a few minutes after the capture of prentiss, a continuous and unbroken line was maintained all day from snake creek or its tributaries on the right to lick creek or the tennessee on the left above pittsburg. there was no hour during the day when there was not heavy firing and generally hard fighting at some point on the line, but seldom at all points at the same time. it was a case of southern dash against northern pluck and endurance. three of the five divisions engaged on sunday were entirely raw, and many of the men had only received their arms on the way from their states to the field. many of them had arrived but a day or two before and were hardly able to load their muskets according to the manual. their officers were equally ignorant of their duties. under these circumstances it is not astonishing that many of the regiments broke at the first fire. in two cases, as i now remember, colonels led their regiments from the field on first hearing the whistle of the enemy's bullets. in these cases the colonels were constitutional cowards, unfit for any military position; but not so the officers and men led out of danger by them. better troops never went upon a battle-field than many of these, officers and men, afterwards proved themselves to be, who fled panic stricken at the first whistle of bullets and shell at shiloh. during the whole of sunday i was continuously engaged in passing from one part of the field to another, giving directions to division commanders. in thus moving along the line, however, i never deemed it important to stay long with sherman. although his troops were then under fire for the first time, their commander, by his constant presence with them, inspired a confidence in officers and men that enabled them to render services on that bloody battle-field worthy of the best of veterans. mcclernand was next to sherman, and the hardest fighting was in front of these two divisions. mcclernand told me on that day, the 6th, that he profited much by having so able a commander supporting him. a casualty to sherman that would have taken him from the field that day would have been a sad one for the troops engaged at shiloh. and how near we came to this! on the 6th sherman was shot twice, once in the hand, once in the shoulder, the ball cutting his coat and making a slight wound, and a third ball passed through his hat. in addition to this he had several horses shot during the day. the nature of this battle was such that cavalry could not be used in front; i therefore formed ours into line in rear, to stop stragglers--of whom there were many. when there would be enough of them to make a show, and after they had recovered from their fright, they would be sent to reinforce some part of the line which needed support, without regard to their companies, regiments or brigades. on one occasion during the day i rode back as far as the river and met general buell, who had just arrived; i do not remember the hour, but at that time there probably were as many as four or five thousand stragglers lying under cover of the river bluff, panic-stricken, most of whom would have been shot where they lay, without resistance, before they would have taken muskets and marched to the front to protect themselves. this meeting between general buell and myself was on the dispatch-boat used to run between the landing and savannah. it was brief, and related specially to his getting his troops over the river. as we left the boat together, buell's attention was attracted by the men lying under cover of the river bank. i saw him berating them and trying to shame them into joining their regiments. he even threatened them with shells from the gunboats near by. but it was all to no effect. most of these men afterward proved themselves as gallant as any of those who saved the battle from which they had deserted. i have no doubt that this sight impressed general buell with the idea that a line of retreat would be a good thing just then. if he had come in by the front instead of through the stragglers in the rear, he would have thought and felt differently. could he have come through the confederate rear, he would have witnessed there a scene similar to that at our own. the distant rear of an army engaged in battle is not the best place from which to judge correctly what is going on in front. later in the war, while occupying the country between the tennessee and the mississippi, i learned that the panic in the confederate lines had not differed much from that within our own. some of the country people estimated the stragglers from johnston's army as high as 20,000. of course this was an exaggeration. the situation at the close of sunday was as follows: along the top of the bluff just south of the log-house which stood at pittsburg landing, colonel j. d. webster, of my staff, had arranged twenty or more pieces of artillery facing south or up the river. this line of artillery was on the crest of a hill overlooking a deep ravine opening into the tennessee. hurlbut with his division intact was on the right of this artillery, extending west and possibly a little north. mcclernand came next in the general line, looking more to the west. his division was complete in its organization and ready for any duty. sherman came next, his right extending to snake creek. his command, like the other two, was complete in its organization and ready, like its chief, for any service it might be called upon to render. all three divisions were, as a matter of course, more or less shattered and depleted in numbers from the terrible battle of the day. the division of w. h. l. wallace, as much from the disorder arising from changes of division and brigade commanders, under heavy fire, as from any other cause, had lost its organization and did not occupy a place in the line as a division. prentiss' command was gone as a division, many of its members having been killed, wounded or captured, but it had rendered valiant services before its final dispersal, and had contributed a good share to the defence of shiloh. the right of my line rested near the bank of snake creek, a short distance above the bridge which had been built by the troops for the purpose of connecting crump's landing and pittsburg landing. sherman had posted some troops in a log-house and out-buildings which overlooked both the bridge over which wallace was expected and the creek above that point. in this last position sherman was frequently attacked before night, but held the point until he voluntarily abandoned it to advance in order to make room for lew. wallace, who came up after dark. there was, as i have said, a deep ravine in front of our left. the tennessee river was very high and there was water to a considerable depth in the ravine. here the enemy made a last desperate effort to turn our flank, but was repelled. the gunboats tyler and lexington, gwin and shirk commanding, with the artillery under webster, aided the army and effectually checked their further progress. before any of buell's troops had reached the west bank of the tennessee, firing had almost entirely ceased; anything like an attempt on the part of the enemy to advance had absolutely ceased. there was some artillery firing from an unseen enemy, some of his shells passing beyond us; but i do not remember that there was the whistle of a single musket-ball heard. as his troops arrived in the dusk general buell marched several of his regiments part way down the face of the hill where they fired briskly for some minutes, but i do not think a single man engaged in this firing received an injury. the attack had spent its force. general lew. wallace, with 5,000 effective men, arrived after firing had ceased for the day, and was placed on the right. thus night came, wallace came, and the advance of nelson's division came; but none --unless night--in time to be of material service to the gallant men who saved shiloh on that first day against large odds. buell's loss on the 6th of april was two men killed and one wounded, all members of the 36th indiana infantry. the army of the tennessee lost on that day at least 7,000 men. the presence of two or three regiments of buell's army on the west bank before firing ceased had not the slightest effect in preventing the capture of pittsburg landing. so confident was i before firing had ceased on the 6th that the next day would bring victory to our arms if we could only take the initiative, that i visited each division commander in person before any reinforcements had reached the field. i directed them to throw out heavy lines of skirmishers in the morning as soon as they could see, and push them forward until they found the enemy, following with their entire divisions in supporting distance, and to engage the enemy as soon as found. to sherman i told the story of the assault at fort donelson, and said that the same tactics would win at shiloh. victory was assured when wallace arrived, even if there had been no other support. i was glad, however, to see the reinforcements of buell and credit them with doing all there was for them to do. during the night of the 6th the remainder of nelson's division, buell's army crossed the river and were ready to advance in the morning, forming the left wing. two other divisions, crittenden's and mccook's, came up the river from savannah in the transports and were on the west bank early on the 7th. buell commanded them in person. my command was thus nearly doubled in numbers and efficiency. during the night rain fell in torrents and our troops were exposed to the storm without shelter. i made my headquarters under a tree a few hundred yards back from the river bank. my ankle was so much swollen from the fall of my horse the friday night preceding, and the bruise was so painful, that i could get no rest. the drenching rain would have precluded the possibility of sleep without this additional cause. some time after midnight, growing restive under the storm and the continuous pain, i moved back to the log-house under the bank. this had been taken as a hospital, and all night wounded men were being brought in, their wounds dressed, a leg or an arm amputated as the case might require, and everything being done to save life or alleviate suffering. the sight was more unendurable than encountering the enemy's fire, and i returned to my tree in the rain. the advance on the morning of the 7th developed the enemy in the camps occupied by our troops before the battle began, more than a mile back from the most advanced position of the confederates on the day before. it is known now that they had not yet learned of the arrival of buell's command. possibly they fell back so far to get the shelter of our tents during the rain, and also to get away from the shells that were dropped upon them by the gunboats every fifteen minutes during the night. the position of the union troops on the morning of the 7th was as follows: general lew. wallace on the right; sherman on his left; then mcclernand and then hurlbut. nelson, of buell's army, was on our extreme left, next to the river. crittenden was next in line after nelson and on his right, mccook followed and formed the extreme right of buell's command. my old command thus formed the right wing, while the troops directly under buell constituted the left wing of the army. these relative positions were retained during the entire day, or until the enemy was driven from the field. in a very short time the battle became general all along the line. this day everything was favorable to the union side. we had now become the attacking party. the enemy was driven back all day, as we had been the day before, until finally he beat a precipitate retreat. the last point held by him was near the road leading from the landing to corinth, on the left of sherman and right of mcclernand. about three o'clock, being near that point and seeing that the enemy was giving way everywhere else, i gathered up a couple of regiments, or parts of regiments, from troops near by, formed them in line of battle and marched them forward, going in front myself to prevent premature or long-range firing. at this point there was a clearing between us and the enemy favorable for charging, although exposed. i knew the enemy were ready to break and only wanted a little encouragement from us to go quickly and join their friends who had started earlier. after marching to within musket-range i stopped and let the troops pass. the command, charge, was given, and was executed with loud cheers and with a run; when the last of the enemy broke. (*7) chapter xxv. struck by a bullet--precipitate retreat of the confederates --intrenchments at shiloh--general buell--general johnston--remarks on shiloh. during this second day of the battle i had been moving from right to left and back, to see for myself the progress made. in the early part of the afternoon, while riding with colonel mcpherson and major hawkins, then my chief commissary, we got beyond the left of our troops. we were moving along the northern edge of a clearing, very leisurely, toward the river above the landing. there did not appear to be an enemy to our right, until suddenly a battery with musketry opened upon us from the edge of the woods on the other side of the clearing. the shells and balls whistled about our ears very fast for about a minute. i do not think it took us longer than that to get out of range and out of sight. in the sudden start we made, major hawkins lost his hat. he did not stop to pick it up. when we arrived at a perfectly safe position we halted to take an account of damages. mcpherson's horse was panting as if ready to drop. on examination it was found that a ball had struck him forward of the flank just back of the saddle, and had gone entirely through. in a few minutes the poor beast dropped dead; he had given no sign of injury until we came to a stop. a ball had struck the metal scabbard of my sword, just below the hilt, and broken it nearly off; before the battle was over it had broken off entirely. there were three of us: one had lost a horse, killed; one a hat and one a sword-scabbard. all were thankful that it was no worse. after the rain of the night before and the frequent and heavy rains for some days previous, the roads were almost impassable. the enemy carrying his artillery and supply trains over them in his retreat, made them still worse for troops following. i wanted to pursue, but had not the heart to order the men who had fought desperately for two days, lying in the mud and rain whenever not fighting, and i did (*8) not feel disposed to positively order buell, or any part of his command, to pursue. although the senior in rank at the time i had been so only a few weeks. buell was, and had been for some time past, a department commander, while i commanded only a district. i did not meet buell in person until too late to get troops ready and pursue with effect; but had i seen him at the moment of the last charge i should have at least requested him to follow. i rode forward several miles the day after the battle, and found that the enemy had dropped much, if not all, of their provisions, some ammunition and the extra wheels of their caissons, lightening their loads to enable them to get off their guns. about five miles out we found their field hospital abandoned. an immediate pursuit must have resulted in the capture of a considerable number of prisoners and probably some guns. shiloh was the severest battle fought at the west during the war, and but few in the east equalled it for hard, determined fighting. i saw an open field, in our possession on the second day, over which the confederates had made repeated charges the day before, so covered with dead that it would have been possible to walk across the clearing, in any direction, stepping on dead bodies, without a foot touching the ground. on our side national and confederate troops were mingled together in about equal proportions; but on the remainder of the field nearly all were confederates. on one part, which had evidently not been ploughed for several years, probably because the land was poor, bushes had grown up, some to the height of eight or ten feet. there was not one of these left standing unpierced by bullets. the smaller ones were all cut down. contrary to all my experience up to that time, and to the experience of the army i was then commanding, we were on the defensive. we were without intrenchments or defensive advantages of any sort, and more than half the army engaged the first day was without experience or even drill as soldiers. the officers with them, except the division commanders and possibly two or three of the brigade commanders, were equally inexperienced in war. the result was a union victory that gave the men who achieved it great confidence in themselves ever after. the enemy fought bravely, but they had started out to defeat and destroy an army and capture a position. they failed in both, with very heavy loss in killed and wounded, and must have gone back discouraged and convinced that the "yankee" was not an enemy to be despised. after the battle i gave verbal instructions to division commanders to let the regiments send out parties to bury their own dead, and to detail parties, under commissioned officers from each division, to bury the confederate dead in their respective fronts and to report the numbers so buried. the latter part of these instructions was not carried out by all; but they were by those sent from sherman's division, and by some of the parties sent out by mcclernand. the heaviest loss sustained by the enemy was in front of these two divisions. the criticism has often been made that the union troops should have been intrenched at shiloh. up to that time the pick and spade had been but little resorted to at the west. i had, however, taken this subject under consideration soon after re-assuming command in the field, and, as already stated, my only military engineer reported unfavorably. besides this, the troops with me, officers and men, needed discipline and drill more than they did experience with the pick, shovel and axe. reinforcements were arriving almost daily, composed of troops that had been hastily thrown together into companies and regiments--fragments of incomplete organizations, the men and officers strangers to each other. under all these circumstances i concluded that drill and discipline were worth more to our men than fortifications. general buell was a brave, intelligent officer, with as much professional pride and ambition of a commendable sort as i ever knew. i had been two years at west point with him, and had served with him afterwards, in garrison and in the mexican war, several years more. he was not given in early life or in mature years to forming intimate acquaintances. he was studious by habit, and commanded the confidence and respect of all who knew him. he was a strict disciplinarian, and perhaps did not distinguish sufficiently between the volunteer who "enlisted for the war" and the soldier who serves in time of peace. one system embraced men who risked life for a principle, and often men of social standing, competence, or wealth and independence of character. the other includes, as a rule, only men who could not do as well in any other occupation. general buell became an object of harsh criticism later, some going so far as to challenge his loyalty. no one who knew him ever believed him capable of a dishonorable act, and nothing could be more dishonorable than to accept high rank and command in war and then betray the trust. when i came into command of the army in 1864, i requested the secretary of war to restore general buell to duty. after the war, during the summer of 1865, i travelled considerably through the north, and was everywhere met by large numbers of people. every one had his opinion about the manner in which the war had been conducted: who among the generals had failed, how, and why. correspondents of the press were ever on hand to hear every word dropped, and were not always disposed to report correctly what did not confirm their preconceived notions, either about the conduct of the war or the individuals concerned in it. the opportunity frequently occurred for me to defend general buell against what i believed to be most unjust charges. on one occasion a correspondent put in my mouth the very charge i had so often refuted--of disloyalty. this brought from general buell a very severe retort, which i saw in the new york world some time before i received the letter itself. i could very well understand his grievance at seeing untrue and disgraceful charges apparently sustained by an officer who, at the time, was at the head of the army. i replied to him, but not through the press. i kept no copy of my letter, nor did i ever see it in print; neither did i receive an answer. general albert sidney johnston, who commanded the confederate forces at the beginning of the battle, was disabled by a wound on the afternoon of the first day. this wound, as i understood afterwards, was not necessarily fatal, or even dangerous. but he was a man who would not abandon what he deemed an important trust in the face of danger and consequently continued in the saddle, commanding, until so exhausted by the loss of blood that he had to be taken from his horse, and soon after died. the news was not long in reaching our side and i suppose was quite an encouragement to the national soldiers. i had known johnston slightly in the mexican war and later as an officer in the regular army. he was a man of high character and ability. his contemporaries at west point, and officers generally who came to know him personally later and who remained on our side, expected him to prove the most formidable man to meet that the confederacy would produce. i once wrote that nothing occurred in his brief command of an army to prove or disprove the high estimate that had been placed upon his military ability; but after studying the orders and dispatches of johnston i am compelled to materially modify my views of that officer's qualifications as a soldier. my judgment now is that he was vacillating and undecided in his actions. all the disasters in kentucky and tennessee were so discouraging to the authorities in richmond that jefferson davis wrote an unofficial letter to johnston expressing his own anxiety and that of the public, and saying that he had made such defence as was dictated by long friendship, but that in the absence of a report he needed facts. the letter was not a reprimand in direct terms, but it was evidently as much felt as though it had been one. general johnston raised another army as rapidly as he could, and fortified or strongly intrenched at corinth. he knew the national troops were preparing to attack him in his chosen position. but he had evidently become so disturbed at the results of his operations that he resolved to strike out in an offensive campaign which would restore all that was lost, and if successful accomplish still more. we have the authority of his son and biographer for saying that his plan was to attack the forces at shiloh and crush them; then to cross the tennessee and destroy the army of buell, and push the war across the ohio river. the design was a bold one; but we have the same authority for saying that in the execution johnston showed vacillation and indecision. he left corinth on the 2d of april and was not ready to attack until the 6th. the distance his army had to march was less than twenty miles. beauregard, his second in command, was opposed to the attack for two reasons: first, he thought, if let alone the national troops would attack the confederates in their intrenchments; second, we were in ground of our own choosing and would necessarily be intrenched. johnston not only listened to the objection of beauregard to an attack, but held a council of war on the subject on the morning of the 5th. on the evening of the same day he was in consultation with some of his generals on the same subject, and still again on the morning of the 6th. during this last consultation, and before a decision had been reached, the battle began by the national troops opening fire on the enemy. this seemed to settle the question as to whether there was to be any battle of shiloh. it also seems to me to settle the question as to whether there was a surprise. i do not question the personal courage of general johnston, or his ability. but he did not win the distinction predicted for him by many of his friends. he did prove that as a general he was over-estimated. general beauregard was next in rank to johnston and succeeded to the command, which he retained to the close of the battle and during the subsequent retreat on corinth, as well as in the siege of that place. his tactics have been severely criticised by confederate writers, but i do not believe his fallen chief could have done any better under the circumstances. some of these critics claim that shiloh was won when johnston fell, and that if he had not fallen the army under me would have been annihilated or captured. ifs defeated the confederates at shiloh. there is little doubt that we would have been disgracefully beaten if all the shells and bullets fired by us had passed harmlessly over the enemy and if all of theirs had taken effect. commanding generals are liable to be killed during engagements; and the fact that when he was shot johnston was leading a brigade to induce it to make a charge which had been repeatedly ordered, is evidence that there was neither the universal demoralization on our side nor the unbounded confidence on theirs which has been claimed. there was, in fact, no hour during the day when i doubted the eventual defeat of the enemy, although i was disappointed that reinforcements so near at hand did not arrive at an earlier hour. the description of the battle of shiloh given by colonel wm. preston johnston is very graphic and well told. the reader will imagine that he can see each blow struck, a demoralized and broken mob of union soldiers, each blow sending the enemy more demoralized than ever towards the tennessee river, which was a little more than two miles away at the beginning of the onset. if the reader does not stop to inquire why, with such confederate success for more than twelve hours of hard fighting, the national troops were not all killed, captured or driven into the river, he will regard the pen picture as perfect. but i witnessed the fight from the national side from eight o'clock in the morning until night closed the contest. i see but little in the description that i can recognize. the confederate troops fought well and deserve commendation enough for their bravery and endurance on the 6th of april, without detracting from their antagonists or claiming anything more than their just dues. the reports of the enemy show that their condition at the end of the first day was deplorable; their losses in killed and wounded had been very heavy, and their stragglers had been quite as numerous as on the national side, with the difference that those of the enemy left the field entirely and were not brought back to their respective commands for many days. on the union side but few of the stragglers fell back further than the landing on the river, and many of these were in line for duty on the second day. the admissions of the highest confederate officers engaged at shiloh make the claim of a victory for them absurd. the victory was not to either party until the battle was over. it was then a union victory, in which the armies of the tennessee and the ohio both participated. but the army of the tennessee fought the entire rebel army on the 6th and held it at bay until near night; and night alone closed the conflict and not the three regiments of nelson's division. the confederates fought with courage at shiloh, but the particular skill claimed i could not and still cannot see; though there is nothing to criticise except the claims put forward for it since. but the confederate claimants for superiority in strategy, superiority in generalship and superiority in dash and prowess are not so unjust to the union troops engaged at shiloh as are many northern writers. the troops on both sides were american, and united they need not fear any foreign foe. it is possible that the southern man started in with a little more dash than his northern brother; but he was correspondingly less enduring. the endeavor of the enemy on the first day was simply to hurl their men against ours--first at one point, then at another, sometimes at several points at once. this they did with daring and energy, until at night the rebel troops were worn out. our effort during the same time was to be prepared to resist assaults wherever made. the object of the confederates on the second day was to get away with as much of their army and material as possible. ours then was to drive them from our front, and to capture or destroy as great a part as possible of their men and material. we were successful in driving them back, but not so successful in captures as if farther pursuit could have been made. as it was, we captured or recaptured on the second day about as much artillery as we lost on the first; and, leaving out the one great capture of prentiss, we took more prisoners on monday than the enemy gained from us on sunday. on the 6th sherman lost seven pieces of artillery, mcclernand six, prentiss eight, and hurlbut two batteries. on the 7th sherman captured seven guns, mcclernand three and the army of the ohio twenty. at shiloh the effective strength of the union forces on the morning of the 6th was 33,000 men. lew. wallace brought 5,000 more after nightfall. beauregard reported the enemy's strength at 40,955. according to the custom of enumeration in the south, this number probably excluded every man enlisted as musician or detailed as guard or nurse, and all commissioned officers--everybody who did not carry a musket or serve a cannon. with us everybody in the field receiving pay from the government is counted. excluding the troops who fled, panic-stricken, before they had fired a shot, there was not a time during the 6th when we had more than 25,000 men in line. on the 7th buell brought 20,000 more. of his remaining two divisions, thomas's did not reach the field during the engagement; wood's arrived before firing had ceased, but not in time to be of much service. our loss in the two days' fight was 1,754 killed, 8,408 wounded and 2,885 missing. of these, 2,103 were in the army of the ohio. beauregard reported a total loss of 10,699, of whom 1,728 were killed, 8,012 wounded and 957 missing. this estimate must be incorrect. we buried, by actual count, more of the enemy's dead in front of the divisions of mcclernand and sherman alone than here reported, and 4,000 was the estimate of the burial parties of the whole field. beauregard reports the confederate force on the 6th at over 40,000, and their total loss during the two days at 10,699; and at the same time declares that he could put only 20,000 men in battle on the morning of the 7th. the navy gave a hearty support to the army at shiloh, as indeed it always did both before and subsequently when i was in command. the nature of the ground was such, however, that on this occasion it could do nothing in aid of the troops until sundown on the first day. the country was broken and heavily timbered, cutting off all view of the battle from the river, so that friends would be as much in danger from fire from the gunboats as the foe. but about sundown, when the national troops were back in their last position, the right of the enemy was near the river and exposed to the fire of the two gun-boats, which was delivered with vigor and effect. after nightfall, when firing had entirely ceased on land, the commander of the fleet informed himself, approximately, of the position of our troops and suggested the idea of dropping a shell within the lines of the enemy every fifteen minutes during the night. this was done with effect, as is proved by the confederate reports. up to the battle of shiloh i, as well as thousands of other citizens, believed that the rebellion against the government would collapse suddenly and soon, if a decisive victory could be gained over any of its armies. donelson and henry were such victories. an army of more than 21,000 men was captured or destroyed. bowling green, columbus and hickman, kentucky, fell in consequence, and clarksville and nashville, tennessee, the last two with an immense amount of stores, also fell into our hands. the tennessee and cumberland rivers, from their mouths to the head of navigation, were secured. but when confederate armies were collected which not only attempted to hold a line farther south, from memphis to chattanooga, knoxville and on to the atlantic, but assumed the offensive and made such a gallant effort to regain what had been lost, then, indeed, i gave up all idea of saving the union except by complete conquest. up to that time it had been the policy of our army, certainly of that portion commanded by me, to protect the property of the citizens whose territory was invaded, without regard to their sentiments, whether union or secession. after this, however, i regarded it as humane to both sides to protect the persons of those found at their homes, but to consume everything that could be used to support or supply armies. protection was still continued over such supplies as were within lines held by us and which we expected to continue to hold; but such supplies within the reach of confederate armies i regarded as much contraband as arms or ordnance stores. their destruction was accomplished without bloodshed and tended to the same result as the destruction of armies. i continued this policy to the close of the war. promiscuous pillaging, however, was discouraged and punished. instructions were always given to take provisions and forage under the direction of commissioned officers who should give receipts to owners, if at home, and turn the property over to officers of the quartermaster or commissary departments to be issued as if furnished from our northern depots. but much was destroyed without receipts to owners, when it could not be brought within our lines and would otherwise have gone to the support of secession and rebellion. this policy i believe exercised a material influence in hastening the end. the battle of shiloh, or pittsburg landing, has been perhaps less understood, or, to state the case more accurately, more persistently misunderstood, than any other engagement between national and confederate troops during the entire rebellion. correct reports of the battle have been published, notably by sherman, badeau and, in a speech before a meeting of veterans, by general prentiss; but all of these appeared long subsequent to the close of the rebellion and after public opinion had been most erroneously formed. i myself made no report to general halleck, further than was contained in a letter, written immediately after the battle informing him that an engagement had been fought and announcing the result. a few days afterwards general halleck moved his headquarters to pittsburg landing and assumed command of the troops in the field. although next to him in rank, and nominally in command of my old district and army, i was ignored as much as if i had been at the most distant point of territory within my jurisdiction; and although i was in command of all the troops engaged at shiloh i was not permitted to see one of the reports of general buell or his subordinates in that battle, until they were published by the war department long after the event. for this reason i never made a full official report of this engagement. chapter xxvi. halleck assumes command in the field--the advance upon corinth --occupation of corinth--the army separated. general halleck arrived at pittsburg landing on the 11th of april and immediately assumed command in the field. on the 21st general pope arrived with an army 30,000 strong, fresh from the capture of island number ten in the mississippi river. he went into camp at hamburg landing five miles above pittsburg. halleck had now three armies: the army of the ohio, buell commanding; the army of the mississippi, pope commanding; and the army of the tennessee. his orders divided the combined force into the right wing, reserve, centre and left wing. major-general george h. thomas, who had been in buell's army, was transferred with his division to the army of the tennessee and given command of the right wing, composed of all of that army except mcclernand's and lew. wallace's divisions. mcclernand was assigned to the command of the reserve, composed of his own and lew. wallace's divisions. buell commanded the centre, the army of the ohio; and pope the left wing, the army of the mississippi. i was named second in command of the whole, and was also supposed to be in command of the right wing and reserve. orders were given to all the commanders engaged at shiloh to send in their reports without delay to department headquarters. those from officers of the army of the tennessee were sent through me; but from the army of the ohio they were sent by general buell without passing through my hands. general halleck ordered me, verbally, to send in my report, but i positively declined on the ground that he had received the reports of a part of the army engaged at shiloh without their coming through me. he admitted that my refusal was justifiable under the circumstances, but explained that he had wanted to get the reports off before moving the command, and as fast as a report had come to him he had forwarded it to washington. preparations were at once made upon the arrival of the new commander for an advance on corinth. owl creek, on our right, was bridged, and expeditions were sent to the north-west and west to ascertain if our position was being threatened from those quarters; the roads towards corinth were corduroyed and new ones made; lateral roads were also constructed, so that in case of necessity troops marching by different routes could reinforce each other. all commanders were cautioned against bringing on an engagement and informed in so many words that it would be better to retreat than to fight. by the 30th of april all preparations were complete; the country west to the mobile and ohio railroad had been reconnoitred, as well as the road to corinth as far as monterey twelve miles from pittsburg. everywhere small bodies of the enemy had been encountered, but they were observers and not in force to fight battles. corinth, mississippi, lies in a south-westerly direction from pittsburg landing and about nineteen miles away as the bird would fly, but probably twenty-two by the nearest wagon-road. it is about four miles south of the line dividing the states of tennessee and mississippi, and at the junction of the mississippi and chattanooga railroad with the mobile and ohio road which runs from columbus to mobile. from pittsburg to corinth the land is rolling, but at no point reaching an elevation that makes high hills to pass over. in 1862 the greater part of the country was covered with forest with intervening clearings and houses. underbrush was dense in the low grounds along the creeks and ravines, but generally not so thick on the high land as to prevent men passing through with ease. there are two small creeks running from north of the town and connecting some four miles south, where they form bridge creek which empties into the tuscumbia river. corinth is on the ridge between these streams and is a naturally strong defensive position. the creeks are insignificant in volume of water, but the stream to the east widens out in front of the town into a swamp impassable in the presence of an enemy. on the crest of the west bank of this stream the enemy was strongly intrenched. corinth was a valuable strategic point for the enemy to hold, and consequently a valuable one for us to possess ourselves of. we ought to have seized it immediately after the fall of donelson and nashville, when it could have been taken without a battle, but failing then it should have been taken, without delay on the concentration of troops at pittsburg landing after the battle of shiloh. in fact the arrival of pope should not have been awaited. there was no time from the battle of shiloh up to the evacuation of corinth when the enemy would not have left if pushed. the demoralization among the confederates from their defeats at henry and donelson; their long marches from bowling green, columbus, and nashville, and their failure at shiloh; in fact from having been driven out of kentucky and tennessee, was so great that a stand for the time would have been impossible. beauregard made strenuous efforts to reinforce himself and partially succeeded. he appealed to the people of the south-west for new regiments, and received a few. a. s. johnston had made efforts to reinforce in the same quarter, before the battle of shiloh, but in a different way. he had negroes sent out to him to take the place of teamsters, company cooks and laborers in every capacity, so as to put all his white men into the ranks. the people, while willing to send their sons to the field, were not willing to part with their negroes. it is only fair to state that they probably wanted their blacks to raise supplies for the army and for the families left at home. beauregard, however, was reinforced by van dorn immediately after shiloh with 17,000 men. interior points, less exposed, were also depleted to add to the strength at corinth. with these reinforcements and the new regiments, beauregard had, during the month of may, 1862, a large force on paper, but probably not much over 50,000 effective men. we estimated his strength at 70,000. our own was, in round numbers, 120,000. the defensible nature of the ground at corinth, and the fortifications, made 50,000 then enough to maintain their position against double that number for an indefinite time but for the demoralization spoken of. on the 30th of april the grand army commenced its advance from shiloh upon corinth. the movement was a siege from the start to the close. the national troops were always behind intrenchments, except of course the small reconnoitring parties sent to the front to clear the way for an advance. even the commanders of these parties were cautioned, "not to bring on an engagement." "it is better to retreat than to fight." the enemy were constantly watching our advance, but as they were simply observers there were but few engagements that even threatened to become battles. all the engagements fought ought to have served to encourage the enemy. roads were again made in our front, and again corduroyed; a line was intrenched, and the troops were advanced to the new position. cross roads were constructed to these new positions to enable the troops to concentrate in case of attack. the national armies were thoroughly intrenched all the way from the tennessee river to corinth. for myself i was little more than an observer. orders were sent direct to the right wing or reserve, ignoring me, and advances were made from one line of intrenchments to another without notifying me. my position was so embarrassing in fact that i made several applications during the siege to be relieved. general halleck kept his headquarters generally, if not all the time, with the right wing. pope being on the extreme left did not see so much of his chief, and consequently got loose as it were at times. on the 3d of may he was at seven mile creek with the main body of his command, but threw forward a division to farmington, within four miles of corinth. his troops had quite a little engagement at farmington on that day, but carried the place with considerable loss to the enemy. there would then have been no difficulty in advancing the centre and right so as to form a new line well up to the enemy, but pope was ordered back to conform with the general line. on the 8th of may he moved again, taking his whole force to farmington, and pushed out two divisions close to the rebel line. again he was ordered back. by the 4th of may the centre and right wing reached monterey, twelve miles out. their advance was slow from there, for they intrenched with every forward movement. the left wing moved up again on the 25th of may and intrenched itself close to the enemy. the creek with the marsh before described, separated the two lines. skirmishers thirty feet apart could have maintained either line at this point. our centre and right were, at this time, extended so that the right of the right wing was probably five miles from corinth and four from the works in their front. the creek, which was a formidable obstacle for either side to pass on our left, became a very slight obstacle on our right. here the enemy occupied two positions. one of them, as much as two miles out from his main line, was on a commanding elevation and defended by an intrenched battery with infantry supports. a heavy wood intervened between this work and the national forces. in rear to the south there was a clearing extending a mile or more, and south of this clearing a log-house which had been loop-holed and was occupied by infantry. sherman's division carried these two positions with some loss to himself, but with probably greater to the enemy, on the 28th of may, and on that day the investment of corinth was complete, or as complete as it was ever made. thomas' right now rested west of the mobile and ohio railroad. pope's left commanded the memphis and charleston railroad east of corinth. some days before i had suggested to the commanding general that i thought if he would move the army of the mississippi at night, by the rear of the centre and right, ready to advance at daylight, pope would find no natural obstacle in his front and, i believed, no serious artificial one. the ground, or works, occupied by our left could be held by a thin picket line, owing to the stream and swamp in front. to the right the troops would have a dry ridge to march over. i was silenced so quickly that i felt that possibly i had suggested an unmilitary movement. later, probably on the 28th of may, general logan, whose command was then on the mobile and ohio railroad, said to me that the enemy had been evacuating for several days and that if allowed he could go into corinth with his brigade. trains of cars were heard coming in and going out of corinth constantly. some of the men who had been engaged in various capacities on railroads before the war claimed that they could tell, by putting their ears to the rail, not only which way the trains were moving but which trains were loaded and which were empty. they said loaded trains had been going out for several days and empty ones coming in. subsequent events proved the correctness of their judgment. beauregard published his orders for the evacuation of corinth on the 26th of may and fixed the 29th for the departure of his troops, and on the 30th of may general halleck had his whole army drawn up prepared for battle and announced in orders that there was every indication that our left was to be attacked that morning. corinth had already been evacuated and the national troops marched on and took possession without opposition. everything had been destroyed or carried away. the confederate commander had instructed his soldiers to cheer on the arrival of every train to create the impression among the yankees that reinforcements were arriving. there was not a sick or wounded man left by the confederates, nor stores of any kind. some ammunition had been blown up--not removed--but the trophies of war were a few quaker guns, logs of about the diameter of ordinary cannon, mounted on wheels of wagons and pointed in the most threatening manner towards us. the possession of corinth by the national troops was of strategic importance, but the victory was barren in every other particular. it was nearly bloodless. it is a question whether the morale of the confederate troops engaged at corinth was not improved by the immunity with which they were permitted to remove all public property and then withdraw themselves. on our side i know officers and men of the army of the tennessee--and i presume the same is true of those of the other commands--were disappointed at the result. they could not see how the mere occupation of places was to close the war while large and effective rebel armies existed. they believed that a well-directed attack would at least have partially destroyed the army defending corinth. for myself i am satisfied that corinth could have been captured in a two days' campaign commenced promptly on the arrival of reinforcements after the battle of shiloh. general halleck at once commenced erecting fortifications around corinth on a scale to indicate that this one point must be held if it took the whole national army to do it. all commanding points two or three miles to the south, south-east and south-west were strongly fortified. it was expected in case of necessity to connect these forts by rifle-pits. they were laid out on a scale that would have required 100,000 men to fully man them. it was probably thought that a final battle of the war would be fought at that point. these fortifications were never used. immediately after the occupation of corinth by the national troops, general pope was sent in pursuit of the retreating garrison and general buell soon followed. buell was the senior of the two generals and commanded the entire column. the pursuit was kept up for some thirty miles, but did not result in the capture of any material of war or prisoners, unless a few stragglers who had fallen behind and were willing captives. on the 10th of june the pursuing column was all back at corinth. the army of the tennessee was not engaged in any of these movements. the confederates were now driven out of west tennessee, and on the 6th of june, after a well-contested naval battle, the national forces took possession of memphis and held the mississippi river from its source to that point. the railroad from columbus to corinth was at once put in good condition and held by us. we had garrisons at donelson, clarksville and nashville, on the cumberland river, and held the tennessee river from its mouth to eastport. new orleans and baton rouge had fallen into the possession of the national forces, so that now the confederates at the west were narrowed down for all communication with richmond to the single line of road running east from vicksburg. to dispossess them of this, therefore, became a matter of the first importance. the possession of the mississippi by us from memphis to baton rouge was also a most important object. it would be equal to the amputation of a limb in its weakening effects upon the enemy. after the capture of corinth a movable force of 80,000 men, besides enough to hold all the territory acquired, could have been set in motion for the accomplishment of any great campaign for the suppression of the rebellion. in addition to this fresh troops were being raised to swell the effective force. but the work of depletion commenced. buell with the army of the ohio was sent east, following the line of the memphis and charleston railroad. this he was ordered to repair as he advanced --only to have it destroyed by small guerilla bands or other troops as soon as he was out of the way. if he had been sent directly to chattanooga as rapidly as he could march, leaving two or three divisions along the line of the railroad from nashville forward, he could have arrived with but little fighting, and would have saved much of the loss of life which was afterwards incurred in gaining chattanooga. bragg would then not have had time to raise an army to contest the possession of middle and east tennessee and kentucky; the battles of stone river and chickamauga would not necessarily have been fought; burnside would not have been besieged in knoxville without the power of helping himself or escaping; the battle of chattanooga would not have been fought. these are the negative advantages, if the term negative is applicable, which would probably have resulted from prompt movements after corinth fell into the possession of the national forces. the positive results might have been: a bloodless advance to atlanta, to vicksburg, or to any other desired point south of corinth in the interior of mississippi. personal memoirs of u. s. grant, part 3. by u. s. grant chapter xxvii. headquarters moved to memphis--on the road to memphis--escaping jackson --complaints and requests--halleck appointed commander-in-chief--return to corinth--movements of bragg--surrender of clarksville--the advance upon chattanooga--sheridan colonel of a michigan regiment. my position at corinth, with a nominal command and yet no command, became so unbearable that i asked permission of halleck to remove my headquarters to memphis. i had repeatedly asked, between the fall of donelson and the evacuation of corinth, to be relieved from duty under halleck; but all my applications were refused until the occupation of the town. i then obtained permission to leave the department, but general sherman happened to call on me as i was about starting and urged me so strongly not to think of going, that i concluded to remain. my application to be permitted to remove my headquarters to memphis was, however, approved, and on the 21st of june i started for that point with my staff and a cavalry escort of only a part of one company. there was a detachment of two or three companies going some twenty-five miles west to be stationed as a guard to the railroad. i went under cover of this escort to the end of their march, and the next morning proceeded to la grange with no convoy but the few cavalry men i had with me. from la grange to memphis the distance is forty-seven miles. there were no troops stationed between these two points, except a small force guarding a working party which was engaged in repairing the railroad. not knowing where this party would be found i halted at la grange. general hurlbut was in command there at the time and had his headquarters tents pitched on the lawn of a very commodious country house. the proprietor was at home and, learning of my arrival, he invited general hurlbut and me to dine with him. i accepted the invitation and spent a very pleasant afternoon with my host, who was a thorough southern gentleman fully convinced of the justice of secession. after dinner, seated in the capacious porch, he entertained me with a recital of the services he was rendering the cause. he was too old to be in the ranks himself--he must have been quite seventy then--but his means enabled him to be useful in other ways. in ordinary times the homestead where he was now living produced the bread and meat to supply the slaves on his main plantation, in the low-lands of mississippi. now he raised food and forage on both places, and thought he would have that year a surplus sufficient to feed three hundred families of poor men who had gone into the war and left their families dependent upon the "patriotism" of those better off. the crops around me looked fine, and i had at the moment an idea that about the time they were ready to be gathered the "yankee" troops would be in the neighborhood and harvest them for the benefit of those engaged in the suppression of the rebellion instead of its support. i felt, however, the greatest respect for the candor of my host and for his zeal in a cause he thoroughly believed in, though our views were as wide apart as it is possible to conceive. the 23d of june, 1862, on the road from la grange to memphis was very warm, even for that latitude and season. with my staff and small escort i started at an early hour, and before noon we arrived within twenty miles of memphis. at this point i saw a very comfortable-looking white-haired gentleman seated at the front of his house, a little distance from the road. i let my staff and escort ride ahead while i halted and, for an excuse, asked for a glass of water. i was invited at once to dismount and come in. i found my host very genial and communicative, and staid longer than i had intended, until the lady of the house announced dinner and asked me to join them. the host, however, was not pressing, so that i declined the invitation and, mounting my horse, rode on. about a mile west from where i had been stopping a road comes up from the southeast, joining that from la grange to memphis. a mile west of this junction i found my staff and escort halted and enjoying the shade of forest trees on the lawn of a house located several hundred feet back from the road, their horses hitched to the fence along the line of the road. i, too, stopped and we remained there until the cool of the afternoon, and then rode into memphis. the gentleman with whom i had stopped twenty miles from memphis was a mr. de loche, a man loyal to the union. he had not pressed me to tarry longer with him because in the early part of my visit a neighbor, a dr. smith, had called and, on being presented to me, backed off the porch as if something had hit him. mr. de loche knew that the rebel general jackson was in that neighborhood with a detachment of cavalry. his neighbor was as earnest in the southern cause as was mr. de loche in that of the union. the exact location of jackson was entirely unknown to mr. de loche; but he was sure that his neighbor would know it and would give information of my presence, and this made my stay unpleasant to him after the call of dr. smith. i have stated that a detachment of troops was engaged in guarding workmen who were repairing the railroad east of memphis. on the day i entered memphis, jackson captured a small herd of beef cattle which had been sent east for the troops so engaged. the drovers were not enlisted men and he released them. a day or two after one of these drovers came to my headquarters and, relating the circumstances of his capture, said jackson was very much disappointed that he had not captured me; that he was six or seven miles south of the memphis and charleston railroad when he learned that i was stopping at the house of mr. de loche, and had ridden with his command to the junction of the road he was on with that from la grange and memphis, where he learned that i had passed three-quarters of an hour before. he thought it would be useless to pursue with jaded horses a well-mounted party with so much of a start. had he gone three-quarters of a mile farther he would have found me with my party quietly resting under the shade of trees and without even arms in our hands with which to defend ourselves. general jackson of course did not communicate his disappointment at not capturing me to a prisoner, a young drover; but from the talk among the soldiers the facts related were learned. a day or two later mr. de loche called on me in memphis to apologize for his apparent incivility in not insisting on my staying for dinner. he said that his wife accused him of marked discourtesy, but that, after the call of his neighbor, he had felt restless until i got away. i never met general jackson before the war, nor during it, but have met him since at his very comfortable summer home at manitou springs, colorado. i reminded him of the above incident, and this drew from him the response that he was thankful now he had not captured me. i certainly was very thankful too. my occupation of memphis as district headquarters did not last long. the period, however, was marked by a few incidents which were novel to me. up to that time i had not occupied any place in the south where the citizens were at home in any great numbers. dover was within the fortifications at fort donelson, and, as far as i remember, every citizen was gone. there were no people living at pittsburg landing, and but very few at corinth. memphis, however, was a populous city, and there were many of the citizens remaining there who were not only thoroughly impressed with the justice of their cause, but who thought that even the "yankee soldiery" must entertain the same views if they could only be induced to make an honest confession. it took hours of my time every day to listen to complaints and requests. the latter were generally reasonable, and if so they were granted; but the complaints were not always, or even often, well founded. two instances will mark the general character. first: the officer who commanded at memphis immediately after the city fell into the hands of the national troops had ordered one of the churches of the city to be opened to the soldiers. army chaplains were authorized to occupy the pulpit. second: at the beginning of the war the confederate congress had passed a law confiscating all property of "alien enemies" at the south, including the debts of southerners to northern men. in consequence of this law, when memphis was occupied the provost-marshal had forcibly collected all the evidences he could obtain of such debts. almost the first complaints made to me were these two outrages. the gentleman who made the complaints informed me first of his own high standing as a lawyer, a citizen and a christian. he was a deacon in the church which had been defiled by the occupation of union troops, and by a union chaplain filling the pulpit. he did not use the word "defile," but he expressed the idea very clearly. he asked that the church be restored to the former congregation. i told him that no order had been issued prohibiting the congregation attending the church. he said of course the congregation could not hear a northern clergyman who differed so radically with them on questions of government. i told him the troops would continue to occupy that church for the present, and that they would not be called upon to hear disloyal sentiments proclaimed from the pulpit. this closed the argument on the first point. then came the second. the complainant said that he wanted the papers restored to him which had been surrendered to the provost-marshal under protest; he was a lawyer, and before the establishment of the "confederate states government" had been the attorney for a number of large business houses at the north; that "his government" had confiscated all debts due "alien enemies," and appointed commissioners, or officers, to collect such debts and pay them over to the "government": but in his case, owing to his high standing, he had been permitted to hold these claims for collection, the responsible officials knowing that he would account to the "government" for every dollar received. he said that his "government," when it came in possession of all its territory, would hold him personally responsible for the claims he had surrendered to the provost-marshal. his impudence was so sublime that i was rather amused than indignant. i told him, however, that if he would remain in memphis i did not believe the confederate government would ever molest him. he left, no doubt, as much amazed at my assurance as i was at the brazenness of his request. on the 11th of july general halleck received telegraphic orders appointing him to the command of all the armies, with headquarters in washington. his instructions pressed him to proceed to his new field of duty with as little delay as was consistent with the safety and interests of his previous command. i was next in rank, and he telegraphed me the same day to report at department headquarters at corinth. i was not informed by the dispatch that my chief had been ordered to a different field and did not know whether to move my headquarters or not. i telegraphed asking if i was to take my staff with me, and received word in reply: "this place will be your headquarters. you can judge for yourself." i left memphis for my new field without delay, and reached corinth on the 15th of the month. general halleck remained until the 17th of july; but he was very uncommunicative, and gave me no information as to what i had been called to corinth for. when general halleck left to assume the duties of general-in-chief i remained in command of the district of west tennessee. practically i became a department commander, because no one was assigned to that position over me and i made my reports direct to the general-in-chief; but i was not assigned to the position of department commander until the 25th of october. general halleck while commanding the department of the mississippi had had control as far east as a line drawn from chattanooga north. my district only embraced west tennessee and kentucky west of the cumberland river. buell, with the army of the ohio, had, as previously stated, been ordered east towards chattanooga, with instructions to repair the memphis and charleston railroad as he advanced. troops had been sent north by halleck along the line of the mobile and ohio railroad to put it in repair as far as columbus. other troops were stationed on the railroad from jackson, tennessee, to grand junction, and still others on the road west to memphis. the remainder of the magnificent army of 120,000 men which entered corinth on the 30th of may had now become so scattered that i was put entirely on the defensive in a territory whose population was hostile to the union. one of the first things i had to do was to construct fortifications at corinth better suited to the garrison that could be spared to man them. the structures that had been built during the months of may and june were left as monuments to the skill of the engineer, and others were constructed in a few days, plainer in design but suited to the command available to defend them. i disposed the troops belonging to the district in conformity with the situation as rapidly as possible. the forces at donelson, clarksville and nashville, with those at corinth and along the railroad eastward, i regarded as sufficient for protection against any attack from the west. the mobile and ohio railroad was guarded from rienzi, south of corinth, to columbus; and the mississippi central railroad from jackson, tennessee, to bolivar. grand junction and la grange on the memphis railroad were abandoned. south of the army of the tennessee, and confronting it, was van dorn, with a sufficient force to organize a movable army of thirty-five to forty thousand men, after being reinforced by price from missouri. this movable force could be thrown against either corinth, bolivar or memphis; and the best that could be done in such event would be to weaken the points not threatened in order to reinforce the one that was. nothing could be gained on the national side by attacking elsewhere, because the territory already occupied was as much as the force present could guard. the most anxious period of the war, to me, was during the time the army of the tennessee was guarding the territory acquired by the fall of corinth and memphis and before i was sufficiently reinforced to take the offensive. the enemy also had cavalry operating in our rear, making it necessary to guard every point of the railroad back to columbus, on the security of which we were dependent for all our supplies. headquarters were connected by telegraph with all points of the command except memphis and the mississippi below columbus. with these points communication was had by the railroad to columbus, then down the river by boat. to reinforce memphis would take three or four days, and to get an order there for troops to move elsewhere would have taken at least two days. memphis therefore was practically isolated from the balance of the command. but it was in sherman's hands. then too the troops were well intrenched and the gunboats made a valuable auxiliary. during the two months after the departure of general halleck there was much fighting between small bodies of the contending armies, but these encounters were dwarfed by the magnitude of the main battles so as to be now almost forgotten except by those engaged in them. some of them, however, estimated by the losses on both sides in killed and wounded, were equal in hard fighting to most of the battles of the mexican war which attracted so much of the attention of the public when they occurred. about the 23d of july colonel ross, commanding at bolivar, was threatened by a large force of the enemy so that he had to be reinforced from jackson and corinth. on the 27th there was skirmishing on the hatchie river, eight miles from bolivar. on the 30th i learned from colonel p. h. sheridan, who had been far to the south, that bragg in person was at rome, georgia, with his troops moving by rail (by way of mobile) to chattanooga and his wagon train marching overland to join him at rome. price was at this time at holly springs, mississippi, with a large force, and occupied grand junction as an outpost. i proposed to the general-in-chief to be permitted to drive him away, but was informed that, while i had to judge for myself, the best use to make of my troops was not to scatter them, but hold them ready to reinforce buell. the movement of bragg himself with his wagon trains to chattanooga across country, while his troops were transported over a long round-about road to the same destination, without need of guards except when in my immediate front, demonstrates the advantage which troops enjoy while acting in a country where the people are friendly. buell was marching through a hostile region and had to have his communications thoroughly guarded back to a base of supplies. more men were required the farther the national troops penetrated into the enemy's country. i, with an army sufficiently powerful to have destroyed bragg, was purely on the defensive and accomplishing no more than to hold a force far inferior to my own. on the 2d of august i was ordered from washington to live upon the country, on the resources of citizens hostile to the government, so far as practicable. i was also directed to "handle rebels within our lines without gloves," to imprison them, or to expel them from their homes and from our lines. i do not recollect having arrested and confined a citizen (not a soldier) during the entire rebellion. i am aware that a great many were sent to northern prisons, particularly to joliet, illinois, by some of my subordinates with the statement that it was my order. i had all such released the moment i learned of their arrest; and finally sent a staff officer north to release every prisoner who was said to be confined by my order. there were many citizens at home who deserved punishment because they were soldiers when an opportunity was afforded to inflict an injury to the national cause. this class was not of the kind that were apt to get arrested, and i deemed it better that a few guilty men should escape than that a great many innocent ones should suffer. on the 14th of august i was ordered to send two more divisions to buell. they were sent the same day by way of decatur. on the 22d colonel rodney mason surrendered clarksville with six companies of his regiment. colonel mason was one of the officers who had led their regiments off the field at almost the first fire of the rebels at shiloh. he was by nature and education a gentleman, and was terribly mortified at his action when the battle was over. he came to me with tears in his eyes and begged to be allowed to have another trial. i felt great sympathy for him and sent him, with his regiment, to garrison clarksville and donelson. he selected clarksville for his headquarters, no doubt because he regarded it as the post of danger, it being nearer the enemy. but when he was summoned to surrender by a band of guerillas, his constitutional weakness overcame him. he inquired the number of men the enemy had, and receiving a response indicating a force greater than his own he said if he could be satisfied of that fact he would surrender. arrangements were made for him to count the guerillas, and having satisfied himself that the enemy had the greater force he surrendered and informed his subordinate at donelson of the fact, advising him to do the same. the guerillas paroled their prisoners and moved upon donelson, but the officer in command at that point marched out to meet them and drove them away. among other embarrassments, at the time of which i now write, was the fact that the government wanted to get out all the cotton possible from the south and directed me to give every facility toward that end. pay in gold was authorized, and stations on the mississippi river and on the railroad in our possession had to be designated where cotton would be received. this opened to the enemy not only the means of converting cotton into money, which had a value all over the world and which they so much needed, but it afforded them means of obtaining accurate and intelligent information in regard to our position and strength. it was also demoralizing to the troops. citizens obtaining permits from the treasury department had to be protected within our lines and given facilities to get out cotton by which they realized enormous profits. men who had enlisted to fight the battles of their country did not like to be engaged in protecting a traffic which went to the support of an enemy they had to fight, and the profits of which went to men who shared none of their dangers. on the 30th of august colonel m. d. leggett, near bolivar, with the 20th and 29th ohio volunteer infantry, was attacked by a force supposed to be about 4,000 strong. the enemy was driven away with a loss of more than one hundred men. on the 1st of september the bridge guard at medon was attacked by guerillas. the guard held the position until reinforced, when the enemy were routed leaving about fifty of their number on the field dead or wounded, our loss being only two killed and fifteen wounded. on the same day colonel dennis, with a force of less than 500 infantry and two pieces of artillery, met the cavalry of the enemy in strong force, a few miles west of medon, and drove them away with great loss. our troops buried 179 of the enemy's dead, left upon the field. afterwards it was found that all the houses in the vicinity of the battlefield were turned into hospitals for the wounded. our loss, as reported at the time, was forty-five killed and wounded. on the 2d of september i was ordered to send more reinforcements to buell. jackson and bolivar were yet threatened, but i sent the reinforcements. on the 4th i received direct orders to send granger's division also to louisville, kentucky. general buell had left corinth about the 10th of june to march upon chattanooga; bragg, who had superseded beauregard in command, sent one division from tupelo on the 27th of june for the same place. this gave buell about seventeen days' start. if he had not been required to repair the railroad as he advanced, the march could have been made in eighteen days at the outside, and chattanooga must have been reached by the national forces before the rebels could have possibly got there. the road between nashville and chattanooga could easily have been put in repair by other troops, so that communication with the north would have been opened in a short time after the occupation of the place by the national troops. if buell had been permitted to move in the first instance, with the whole of the army of the ohio and that portion of the army of the mississippi afterwards sent to him, he could have thrown four divisions from his own command along the line of road to repair and guard it. granger's division was promptly sent on the 4th of september. i was at the station at corinth when the troops reached that point, and found general p. h. sheridan with them. i expressed surprise at seeing him and said that i had not expected him to go. he showed decided disappointment at the prospect of being detained. i felt a little nettled at his desire to get away and did not detain him. sheridan was a first lieutenant in the regiment in which i had served eleven years, the 4th infantry, and stationed on the pacific coast when the war broke out. he was promoted to a captaincy in may, 1861, and before the close of the year managed in some way, i do not know how, to get east. he went to missouri. halleck had known him as a very successful young officer in managing campaigns against the indians on the pacific coast, and appointed him acting-quartermaster in south-west missouri. there was no difficulty in getting supplies forward while sheridan served in that capacity; but he got into difficulty with his immediate superiors because of his stringent rules for preventing the use of public transportation for private purposes. he asked to be relieved from further duty in the capacity in which he was engaged and his request was granted. when general halleck took the field in april, 1862, sheridan was assigned to duty on his staff. during the advance on corinth a vacancy occurred in the colonelcy of the 2d michigan cavalry. governor blair, of michigan, telegraphed general halleck asking him to suggest the name of a professional soldier for the vacancy, saying he would appoint a good man without reference to his state. sheridan was named; and was so conspicuously efficient that when corinth was reached he was assigned to command a cavalry brigade in the army of the mississippi. he was in command at booneville on the 1st of july with two small regiments, when he was attacked by a force full three times as numerous as his own. by very skilful manoeuvres and boldness of attack he completely routed the enemy. for this he was made a brigadier-general and became a conspicuous figure in the army about corinth. on this account i was sorry to see him leaving me. his departure was probably fortunate, for he rendered distinguished services in his new field. granger and sheridan reached louisville before buell got there, and on the night of their arrival sheridan with his command threw up works around the railroad station for the defence of troops as they came from the front. chapter xxviii. advance of van dorn and price--price enters iuka--battle of iuka. at this time, september 4th, i had two divisions of the army of the mississippi stationed at corinth, rienzi, jacinto and danville. there were at corinth also davies' division and two brigades of mcarthur's, besides cavalry and artillery. this force constituted my left wing, of which rosecrans was in command. general ord commanded the centre, from bethel to humboldt on the mobile and ohio railroad and from jackson to bolivar where the mississippi central is crossed by the hatchie river. general sherman commanded on the right at memphis with two of his brigades back at brownsville, at the crossing of the hatchie river by the memphis and ohio railroad. this made the most convenient arrangement i could devise for concentrating all my spare forces upon any threatened point. all the troops of the command were within telegraphic communication of each other, except those under sherman. by bringing a portion of his command to brownsville, from which point there was a railroad and telegraph back to memphis, communication could be had with that part of my command within a few hours by the use of couriers. in case it became necessary to reinforce corinth, by this arrangement all the troops at bolivar, except a small guard, could be sent by rail by the way of jackson in less than twenty-four hours; while the troops from brownsville could march up to bolivar to take their place. on the 7th of september i learned of the advance of van dorn and price, apparently upon corinth. one division was brought from memphis to bolivar to meet any emergency that might arise from this move of the enemy. i was much concerned because my first duty, after holding the territory acquired within my command, was to prevent further reinforcing of bragg in middle tennessee. already the army of northern virginia had defeated the army under general pope and was invading maryland. in the centre general buell was on his way to louisville and bragg marching parallel to him with a large confederate force for the ohio river. i had been constantly called upon to reinforce buell until at this time my entire force numbered less than 50,000 men, of all arms. this included everything from cairo south within my jurisdiction. if i too should be driven back, the ohio river would become the line dividing the belligerents west of the alleghanies, while at the east the line was already farther north than when hostilities commenced at the opening of the war. it is true nashville was never given up after its first capture, but it would have been isolated and the garrison there would have been obliged to beat a hasty retreat if the troops in west tennessee had been compelled to fall back. to say at the end of the second year of the war the line dividing the contestants at the east was pushed north of maryland, a state that had not seceded, and at the west beyond kentucky, another state which had been always loyal, would have been discouraging indeed. as it was, many loyal people despaired in the fall of 1862 of ever saving the union. the administration at washington was much concerned for the safety of the cause it held so dear. but i believe there was never a day when the president did not think that, in some way or other, a cause so just as ours would come out triumphant. up to the 11th of september rosecrans still had troops on the railroad east of corinth, but they had all been ordered in. by the 12th all were in except a small force under colonel murphy of the 8th wisconsin. he had been detained to guard the remainder of the stores which had not yet been brought in to corinth. on the 13th of september general sterling price entered iuka, a town about twenty miles east of corinth on the memphis and charleston railroad. colonel murphy with a few men was guarding the place. he made no resistance, but evacuated the town on the approach of the enemy. i was apprehensive lest the object of the rebels might be to get troops into tennessee to reinforce bragg, as it was afterwards ascertained to be. the authorities at washington, including the general-in-chief of the army, were very anxious, as i have said, about affairs both in east and middle tennessee; and my anxiety was quite as great on their account as for any danger threatening my command. i had not force enough at corinth to attack price even by stripping everything; and there was danger that before troops could be got from other points he might be far on his way across the tennessee. to prevent this all spare forces at bolivar and jackson were ordered to corinth, and cars were concentrated at jackson for their transportation. within twenty-four hours from the transmission of the order the troops were at their destination, although there had been a delay of four hours resulting from the forward train getting off the track and stopping all the others. this gave a reinforcement of near 8,000 men, general ord in command. general rosecrans commanded the district of corinth with a movable force of about 9,000 independent of the garrison deemed necessary to be left behind. it was known that general van dorn was about a four days' march south of us, with a large force. it might have been part of his plan to attack at corinth, price coming from the east while he came up from the south. my desire was to attack price before van dorn could reach corinth or go to his relief. general rosecrans had previously had his headquarters at iuka, where his command was spread out along the memphis and charleston railroad eastward. while there he had a most excellent map prepared showing all the roads and streams in the surrounding country. he was also personally familiar with the ground, so that i deferred very much to him in my plans for the approach. we had cars enough to transport all of general ord's command, which was to go by rail to burnsville, a point on the road about seven miles west of iuka. from there his troops were to march by the north side of the railroad and attack price from the north-west, while rosecrans was to move eastward from his position south of corinth by way of the jacinto road. a small force was to hold the jacinto road where it turns to the north-east, while the main force moved on the fulton road which comes into iuka further east. this plan was suggested by rosecrans. bear creek, a few miles to the east of the fulton road, is a formidable obstacle to the movement of troops in the absence of bridges, all of which, in september, 1862, had been destroyed in that vicinity. the tennessee, to the north-east, not many miles away, was also a formidable obstacle for an army followed by a pursuing force. ord was on the north-west, and even if a rebel movement had been possible in that direction it could have brought only temporary relief, for it would have carried price's army to the rear of the national forces and isolated it from all support. it looked to me that, if price would remain in iuka until we could get there, his annihilation was inevitable. on the morning of the 18th of september general ord moved by rail to burnsville, and there left the cars and moved out to perform his part of the programme. he was to get as near the enemy as possible during the day and intrench himself so as to hold his position until the next morning. rosecrans was to be up by the morning of the 19th on the two roads before described, and the attack was to be from all three quarters simultaneously. troops enough were left at jacinto and rienzi to detain any cavalry that van dorn might send out to make a sudden dash into corinth until i could be notified. there was a telegraph wire along the railroad, so there would be no delay in communication. i detained cars and locomotives enough at burnsville to transport the whole of ord's command at once, and if van dorn had moved against corinth instead of iuka i could have thrown in reinforcements to the number of 7,000 or 8,000 before he could have arrived. i remained at burnsville with a detachment of about 900 men from ord's command and communicated with my two wings by courier. ord met the advance of the enemy soon after leaving burnsville. quite a sharp engagement ensued, but he drove the rebels back with considerable loss, including one general officer killed. he maintained his position and was ready to attack by daylight the next morning. i was very much disappointed at receiving a dispatch from rosecrans after midnight from jacinto, twenty-two miles from iuka, saying that some of his command had been delayed, and that the rear of his column was not yet up as far as jacinto. he said, however, that he would still be at iuka by two o'clock the next day. i did not believe this possible because of the distance and the condition of the roads, which was bad; besides, troops after a forced march of twenty miles are not in a good condition for fighting the moment they get through. it might do in marching to relieve a beleaguered garrison, but not to make an assault. i immediately sent ord a copy of rosecrans' dispatch and ordered him to be in readiness to attack the moment he heard the sound of guns to the south or south-east. he was instructed to notify his officers to be on the alert for any indications of battle. during the 19th the wind blew in the wrong direction to transmit sound either towards the point where ord was, or to burnsville where i had remained. a couple of hours before dark on the 19th rosecrans arrived with the head of his column at garnets, the point where the jacinto road to iuka leaves the road going east. he here turned north without sending any troops to the fulton road. while still moving in column up the jacinto road he met a force of the enemy and had his advance badly beaten and driven back upon the main road. in this short engagement his loss was considerable for the number engaged, and one battery was taken from him. the wind was still blowing hard and in the wrong direction to transmit sounds towards either ord or me. neither he nor i nor any one in either command heard a gun that was fired upon the battle-field. after the engagement rosecrans sent me a dispatch announcing the result. this was brought by a courier. there was no road between burnsville and the position then occupied by rosecrans and the country was impassable for a man on horseback. the courier bearing the message was compelled to move west nearly to jacinto before he found a road leading to burnsville. this made it a late hour of the night before i learned of the battle that had taken place during the afternoon. i at once notified ord of the fact and ordered him to attack early in the morning. the next morning rosecrans himself renewed the attack and went into iuka with but little resistance. ord also went in according to orders, without hearing a gun from the south of town but supposing the troops coming from the south-west must be up by that time. rosecrans, however, had put no troops upon the fulton road, and the enemy had taken advantage of this neglect and retreated by that road during the night. word was soon brought to me that our troops were in iuka. i immediately rode into town and found that the enemy was not being pursued even by the cavalry. i ordered pursuit by the whole of rosecrans' command and went on with him a few miles in person. he followed only a few miles after i left him and then went into camp, and the pursuit was continued no further. i was disappointed at the result of the battle of iuka--but i had so high an opinion of general rosecrans that i found no fault at the time. chapter xxix. van dorn's movements--battle of corinth--command of the department of the tennessee. on the 19th of september general geo. h. thomas was ordered east to reinforce buell. this threw the army at my command still more on the defensive. the memphis and charleston railroad was abandoned, except at corinth, and small forces were left at chewalla and grand junction. soon afterwards the latter of these two places was given up and bolivar became our most advanced position on the mississippi central railroad. our cavalry was kept well to the front and frequent expeditions were sent out to watch the movements of the enemy. we were in a country where nearly all the people, except the negroes, were hostile to us and friendly to the cause we were trying to suppress. it was easy, therefore, for the enemy to get early information of our every move. we, on the contrary, had to go after our information in force, and then often returned without it. on the 22d bolivar was threatened by a large force from south of grand junction, supposed to be twenty regiments of infantry with cavalry and artillery. i reinforced bolivar, and went to jackson in person to superintend the movement of troops to whatever point the attack might be made upon. the troops from corinth were brought up in time to repel the threatened movement without a battle. our cavalry followed the enemy south of davis' mills in mississippi. on the 30th i found that van dorn was apparently endeavoring to strike the mississippi river above memphis. at the same time other points within my command were so threatened that it was impossible to concentrate a force to drive him away. there was at this juncture a large union force at helena, arkansas, which, had it been within my command, i could have ordered across the river to attack and break up the mississippi central railroad far to the south. this would not only have called van dorn back, but would have compelled the retention of a large rebel force far to the south to prevent a repetition of such raids on the enemy's line of supplies. geographical lines between the commands during the rebellion were not always well chosen, or they were too rigidly adhered to. van dorn did not attempt to get upon the line above memphis, as had apparently been his intention. he was simply covering a deeper design; one much more important to his cause. by the 1st of october it was fully apparent that corinth was to be attacked with great force and determination, and that van dorn, lovell, price, villepigue and rust had joined their strength for this purpose. there was some skirmishing outside of corinth with the advance of the enemy on the 3d. the rebels massed in the north-west angle of the memphis and charleston and the mobile and ohio railroads, and were thus between the troops at corinth and all possible reinforcements. any fresh troops for us must come by a circuitous route. on the night of the 3d, accordingly, i ordered general mcpherson, who was at jackson, to join rosecrans at corinth with reinforcements picked up along the line of the railroad equal to a brigade. hurlbut had been ordered from bolivar to march for the same destination; and as van dorn was coming upon corinth from the north-west some of his men fell in with the advance of hurlbut's and some skirmishing ensued on the evening of the 3d. on the 4th van dorn made a dashing attack, hoping, no doubt, to capture rosecrans before his reinforcements could come up. in that case the enemy himself could have occupied the defences of corinth and held at bay all the union troops that arrived. in fact he could have taken the offensive against the reinforcements with three or four times their number and still left a sufficient garrison in the works about corinth to hold them. he came near success, some of his troops penetrating the national lines at least once, but the works that were built after halleck's departure enabled rosecrans to hold his position until the troops of both mcpherson and hurlbut approached towards the rebel front and rear. the enemy was finally driven back with great slaughter: all their charges, made with great gallantry, were repulsed. the loss on our side was heavy, but nothing to compare with van dorn's. mcpherson came up with the train of cars bearing his command as close to the enemy as was prudent, debarked on the rebel flank and got in to the support of rosecrans just after the repulse. his approach, as well as that of hurlbut, was known to the enemy and had a moral effect. general rosecrans, however, failed to follow up the victory, although i had given specific orders in advance of the battle for him to pursue the moment the enemy was repelled. he did not do so, and i repeated the order after the battle. in the first order he was notified that the force of 4,000 men which was going to his assistance would be in great peril if the enemy was not pursued. general ord had joined hurlbut on the 4th and being senior took command of his troops. this force encountered the head of van dorn's retreating column just as it was crossing the hatchie by a bridge some ten miles out from corinth. the bottom land here was swampy and bad for the operations of troops, making a good place to get an enemy into. ord attacked the troops that had crossed the bridge and drove them back in a panic. many were killed, and others were drowned by being pushed off the bridge in their hurried retreat. ord followed and met the main force. he was too weak in numbers to assault, but he held the bridge and compelled the enemy to resume his retreat by another bridge higher up the stream. ord was wounded in this engagement and the command devolved on hurlbut. rosecrans did not start in pursuit till the morning of the 5th and then took the wrong road. moving in the enemy's country he travelled with a wagon train to carry his provisions and munitions of war. his march was therefore slower than that of the enemy, who was moving towards his supplies. two or three hours of pursuit on the day of battle, without anything except what the men carried on their persons, would have been worth more than any pursuit commenced the next day could have possibly been. even when he did start, if rosecrans had followed the route taken by the enemy, he would have come upon van dorn in a swamp with a stream in front and ord holding the only bridge; but he took the road leading north and towards chewalla instead of west, and, after having marched as far as the enemy had moved to get to the hatchie, he was as far from battle as when he started. hurlbut had not the numbers to meet any such force as van dorn's if they had been in any mood for fighting, and he might have been in great peril. i now regarded the time to accomplish anything by pursuit as past and, after rosecrans reached jonesboro, i ordered him to return. he kept on to ripley, however, and was persistent in wanting to go farther. i thereupon ordered him to halt and submitted the matter to the general-in-chief, who allowed me to exercise my judgment in the matter, but inquired "why not pursue?" upon this i ordered rosecrans back. had he gone much farther he would have met a greater force than van dorn had at corinth and behind intrenchments or on chosen ground, and the probabilities are he would have lost his army. the battle of corinth was bloody, our loss being 315 killed, 1,812 wounded and 232 missing. the enemy lost many more. rosecrans reported 1,423 dead and 2,225 prisoners. we fought behind breastworks, which accounts in some degree for the disparity. among the killed on our side was general hackelman. general oglesby was badly, it was for some time supposed mortally, wounded. i received a congratulatory letter from the president, which expressed also his sorrow for the losses. this battle was recognized by me as being a decided victory, though not so complete as i had hoped for, nor nearly so complete as i now think was within the easy grasp of the commanding officer at corinth. since the war it is known that the result, as it was, was a crushing blow to the enemy, and felt by him much more than it was appreciated at the north. the battle relieved me from any further anxiety for the safety of the territory within my jurisdiction, and soon after receiving reinforcements i suggested to the general-in-chief a forward movement against vicksburg. on the 23d of october i learned of pemberton's being in command at holly springs and much reinforced by conscripts and troops from alabama and texas. the same day general rosecrans was relieved from duty with my command, and shortly after he succeeded buell in the command of the army in middle tennessee. i was delighted at the promotion of general rosecrans to a separate command, because i still believed that when independent of an immediate superior the qualities which i, at that time, credited him with possessing, would show themselves. as a subordinate i found that i could not make him do as i wished, and had determined to relieve him from duty that very day. at the close of the operations just described my force, in round numbers, was 48,500. of these 4,800 were in kentucky and illinois, 7,000 in memphis, 19,200 from mound city south, and 17,500 at corinth. general mcclernand had been authorized from washington to go north and organize troops to be used in opening the mississippi. these new levies with other reinforcements now began to come in. on the 25th of october i was placed in command of the department of the tennessee. reinforcements continued to come from the north and by the 2d of november i was prepared to take the initiative. this was a great relief after the two and a half months of continued defence over a large district of country, and where nearly every citizen was an enemy ready to give information of our every move. i have described very imperfectly a few of the battles and skirmishes that took place during this time. to describe all would take more space than i can allot to the purpose; to make special mention of all the officers and troops who distinguished themselves, would take a volume. (*9) chapter xxx. the campaign against vicksburg--employing the freedmen--occupation of holly springs--sherman ordered to memphis--sherman's movements down the mississippi--van dorn captures holly springs--collecting forage and food. vicksburg was important to the enemy because it occupied the first high ground coming close to the river below memphis. from there a railroad runs east, connecting with other roads leading to all points of the southern states. a railroad also starts from the opposite side of the river, extending west as far as shreveport, louisiana. vicksburg was the only channel, at the time of the events of which this chapter treats, connecting the parts of the confederacy divided by the mississippi. so long as it was held by the enemy, the free navigation of the river was prevented. hence its importance. points on the river between vicksburg and port hudson were held as dependencies; but their fall was sure to follow the capture of the former place. the campaign against vicksburg commenced on the 2d of november as indicated in a dispatch to the general-in-chief in the following words: "i have commenced a movement on grand junction, with three divisions from corinth and two from bolivar. will leave here [jackson, tennessee] to-morrow, and take command in person. if found practicable, i will go to holly springs, and, may be, grenada, completing railroad and telegraph as i go." at this time my command was holding the mobile and ohio railroad from about twenty-five miles south of corinth, north to columbus, kentucky; the mississippi central from bolivar north to its junction with the mobile and ohio; the memphis and charleston from corinth east to bear creek, and the mississippi river from cairo to memphis. my entire command was no more than was necessary to hold these lines, and hardly that if kept on the defensive. by moving against the enemy and into his unsubdued, or not yet captured, territory, driving their army before us, these lines would nearly hold themselves; thus affording a large force for field operations. my moving force at that time was about 30,000 men, and i estimated the enemy confronting me, under pemberton, at about the same number. general mcpherson commanded my left wing and general c. s. hamilton the centre, while sherman was at memphis with the right wing. pemberton was fortified at the tallahatchie, but occupied holly springs and grand junction on the mississippi central railroad. on the 8th we occupied grand junction and la grange, throwing a considerable force seven or eight miles south, along the line of the railroad. the road from bolivar forward was repaired and put in running order as the troops advanced. up to this time it had been regarded as an axiom in war that large bodies of troops must operate from a base of supplies which they always covered and guarded in all forward movements. there was delay therefore in repairing the road back, and in gathering and forwarding supplies to the front. by my orders, and in accordance with previous instructions from washington, all the forage within reach was collected under the supervision of the chief quartermaster and the provisions under the chief commissary, receipts being given when there was any one to take them; the supplies in any event to be accounted for as government stores. the stock was bountiful, but still it gave me no idea of the possibility of supplying a moving column in an enemy's country from the country itself. it was at this point, probably, where the first idea of a "freedman's bureau" took its origin. orders of the government prohibited the expulsion of the negroes from the protection of the army, when they came in voluntarily. humanity forbade allowing them to starve. with such an army of them, of all ages and both sexes, as had congregated about grand junction, amounting to many thousands, it was impossible to advance. there was no special authority for feeding them unless they were employed as teamsters, cooks and pioneers with the army; but only able-bodied young men were suitable for such work. this labor would support but a very limited percentage of them. the plantations were all deserted; the cotton and corn were ripe: men, women and children above ten years of age could be employed in saving these crops. to do this work with contrabands, or to have it done, organization under a competent chief was necessary. on inquiring for such a man chaplain eaton, now and for many years the very able united states commissioner of education, was suggested. he proved as efficient in that field as he has since done in his present one. i gave him all the assistants and guards he called for. we together fixed the prices to be paid for the negro labor, whether rendered to the government or to individuals. the cotton was to be picked from abandoned plantations, the laborers to receive the stipulated price (my recollection is twelve and a half cents per pound for picking and ginning) from the quartermaster, he shipping the cotton north to be sold for the benefit of the government. citizens remaining on their plantations were allowed the privilege of having their crops saved by freedmen on the same terms. at once the freedmen became self-sustaining. the money was not paid to them directly, but was expended judiciously and for their benefit. they gave me no trouble afterwards. later the freedmen were engaged in cutting wood along the mississippi river to supply the large number of steamers on that stream. a good price was paid for chopping wood used for the supply of government steamers (steamers chartered and which the government had to supply with fuel). those supplying their own fuel paid a much higher price. in this way a fund was created not only sufficient to feed and clothe all, old and young, male and female, but to build them comfortable cabins, hospitals for the sick, and to supply them with many comforts they had never known before. at this stage of the campaign against vicksburg i was very much disturbed by newspaper rumors that general mcclernand was to have a separate and independent command within mine, to operate against vicksburg by way of the mississippi river. two commanders on the same field are always one too many, and in this case i did not think the general selected had either the experience or the qualifications to fit him for so important a position. i feared for the safety of the troops intrusted to him, especially as he was to raise new levies, raw troops, to execute so important a trust. but on the 12th i received a dispatch from general halleck saying that i had command of all the troops sent to my department and authorizing me to fight the enemy where i pleased. the next day my cavalry was in holly springs, and the enemy fell back south of the tallahatchie. holly springs i selected for my depot of supplies and munitions of war, all of which at that time came by rail from columbus, kentucky, except the few stores collected about la grange and grand junction. this was a long line (increasing in length as we moved south) to maintain in an enemy's country. on the 15th of november, while i was still at holly springs, i sent word to sherman to meet me at columbus. we were but forty-seven miles apart, yet the most expeditious way for us to meet was for me to take the rail to columbus and sherman a steamer for the same place. at that meeting, besides talking over my general plans i gave him his orders to join me with two divisions and to march them down the mississippi central railroad if he could. sherman, who was always prompt, was up by the 29th to cottage hill, ten miles north of oxford. he brought three divisions with him, leaving a garrison of only four regiments of infantry, a couple of pieces of artillery and a small detachment of cavalry. further reinforcements he knew were on their way from the north to memphis. about this time general halleck ordered troops from helena, arkansas (territory west of the mississippi was not under my command then) to cut the road in pemberton's rear. the expedition was under generals hovey and c. c. washburn and was successful so far as reaching the railroad was concerned, but the damage done was very slight and was soon repaired. the tallahatchie, which confronted me, was very high, the railroad bridge destroyed and pemberton strongly fortified on the south side. a crossing would have been impossible in the presence of an enemy. i sent the cavalry higher up the stream and they secured a crossing. this caused the enemy to evacuate their position, which was possibly accelerated by the expedition of hovey and washburn. the enemy was followed as far south as oxford by the main body of troops, and some seventeen miles farther by mcpherson's command. here the pursuit was halted to repair the railroad from the tallahatchie northward, in order to bring up supplies. the piles on which the railroad bridge rested had been left standing. the work of constructing a roadway for the troops was but a short matter, and, later, rails were laid for cars. during the delay at oxford in repairing railroads i learned that an expedition down the mississippi now was inevitable and, desiring to have a competent commander in charge, i ordered sherman on the 8th of december back to memphis to take charge. the following were his orders: headquarters 13th army corps, department of the tennessee. oxford, mississippi, december 8,1862. major-general w. t. sherman, commanding right wing: you will proceed, with as little delay as possible, to memphis, tennessee, taking with you one division of your present command. on your arrival at memphis you will assume command of all the troops there, and that portion of general curtis's forces at present east of the mississippi river, and organize them into brigades and divisions in your own army. as soon as possible move with them down the river to the vicinity of vicksburg, and with the co-operation of the gunboat fleet under command of flag-officer porter proceed to the reduction of that place in such a manner as circumstances, and your own judgment, may dictate. the amount of rations, forage, land transportation, etc., necessary to take, will be left entirely with yourself. the quartermaster at st. louis will be instructed to send you transportation for 30,000 men; should you still find yourself deficient, your quartermaster will be authorized to make up the deficiency from such transports as may come into the port of memphis. on arriving in memphis, put yourself in communication with admiral porter, and arrange with him for his co-operation. inform me at the earliest practicable day of the time when you will embark, and such plans as may then be matured. i will hold the forces here in readiness to co-operate with you in such manner as the movements of the enemy may make necessary. leave the district of memphis in the command of an efficient officer, and with a garrison of four regiments of infantry, the siege guns, and whatever cavalry may be there. u. s. grant, major-general. this idea had presented itself to my mind earlier, for on the 3d of december i asked halleck if it would not be well to hold the enemy south of the yallabusha and move a force from helena and memphis on vicksburg. on the 5th again i suggested, from oxford, to halleck that if the helena troops were at my command i though it would be possible to take them and the memphis forces south of the mouth of the yazoo river, and thus secure vicksburg and the state of mississippi. halleck on the same day, the 5th of december, directed me not to attempt to hold the country south of the tallahatchie, but to collect 25,000 troops at memphis by the 20th for the vicksburg expedition. i sent sherman with two divisions at once, informed the general-in-chief of the fact, and asked whether i should command the expedition down the river myself or send sherman. i was authorized to do as i though best for the accomplishment of the great object in view. i sent sherman and so informed general halleck. as stated, my action in sending sherman back was expedited by a desire to get him in command of the forces separated from my direct supervision. i feared that delay might bring mcclernand, who was his senior and who had authority from the president and secretary of war to exercise that particular command,--and independently. i doubted mcclernand's fitness; and i had good reason to believe that in forestalling him i was by no means giving offence to those whose authority to command was above both him and me. neither my orders to general sherman, nor the correspondence between us or between general halleck and myself, contemplated at the time my going further south than the yallabusha. pemberton's force in my front was the main part of the garrison of vicksburg, as the force with me was the defence of the territory held by us in west tennessee and kentucky. i hoped to hold pemberton in my front while sherman should get in his rear and into vicksburg. the further north the enemy could be held the better. it was understood, however, between general sherman and myself that our movements were to be co-operative; if pemberton could not be held away from vicksburg i was to follow him; but at that time it was not expected to abandon the railroad north of the yallabusha. with that point as a secondary base of supplies, the possibility of moving down the yazoo until communications could be opened with the mississippi was contemplated. it was my intention, and so understood by sherman and his command, that if the enemy should fall back i would follow him even to the gates of vicksburg. i intended in such an event to hold the road to grenada on the yallabusha and cut loose from there, expecting to establish a new base of supplies on the yazoo, or at vicksburg itself, with grenada to fall back upon in case of failure. it should be remembered that at the time i speak of it had not been demonstrated that an army could operate in an enemy's territory depending upon the country for supplies. a halt was called at oxford with the advance seventeen miles south of there, to bring up the road to the latter point and to bring supplies of food, forage and munitions to the front. on the 18th of december i received orders from washington to divide my command into four army corps, with general mcclernand to command one of them and to be assigned to that part of the army which was to operate down the mississippi. this interfered with my plans, but probably resulted in my ultimately taking the command in person. mcclernand was at that time in springfield, illinois. the order was obeyed without any delay. dispatches were sent to him the same day in conformity. on the 20th general van dorn appeared at holly springs, my secondary base of supplies, captured the garrison of 1,500 men commanded by colonel murphy, of the 8th wisconsin regiment, and destroyed all our munitions of war, food and forage. the capture was a disgraceful one to the officer commanding but not to the troops under him. at the same time forrest got on our line of railroad between jackson, tennessee, and columbus, kentucky, doing much damage to it. this cut me off from all communication with the north for more than a week, and it was more than two weeks before rations or forage could be issued from stores obtained in the regular way. this demonstrated the impossibility of maintaining so long a line of road over which to draw supplies for an army moving in an enemy's country. i determined, therefore, to abandon my campaign into the interior with columbus as a base, and returned to la grange and grand junction destroying the road to my front and repairing the road to memphis, making the mississippi river the line over which to draw supplies. pemberton was falling back at the same time. the moment i received the news of van dorn's success i sent the cavalry at the front back to drive him from the country. he had start enough to move north destroying the railroad in many places, and to attack several small garrisons intrenched as guards to the railroad. all these he found warned of his coming and prepared to receive him. van dorn did not succeed in capturing a single garrison except the one at holly springs, which was larger than all the others attacked by him put together. murphy was also warned of van dorn's approach, but made no preparations to meet him. he did not even notify his command. colonel murphy was the officer who, two months before, had evacuated iuka on the approach of the enemy. general rosecrans denounced him for the act and desired to have him tried and punished. i sustained the colonel at the time because his command was a small one compared with that of the enemy--not one-tenth as large--and i thought he had done well to get away without falling into their hands. his leaving large stores to fall into price's possession i looked upon as an oversight and excused it on the ground of inexperience in military matters. he should, however, have destroyed them. this last surrender demonstrated to my mind that rosecrans' judgment of murphy's conduct at iuka was correct. the surrender of holly springs was most reprehensible and showed either the disloyalty of colonel murphy to the cause which he professed to serve, or gross cowardice. after the war was over i read from the diary of a lady who accompanied general pemberton in his retreat from the tallahatchie, that the retreat was almost a panic. the roads were bad and it was difficult to move the artillery and trains. why there should have been a panic i do not see. no expedition had yet started down the mississippi river. had i known the demoralized condition of the enemy, or the fact that central mississippi abounded so in all army supplies, i would have been in pursuit of pemberton while his cavalry was destroying the roads in my rear. after sending cavalry to drive van dorn away, my next order was to dispatch all the wagons we had, under proper escort, to collect and bring in all supplies of forage and food from a region of fifteen miles east and west of the road from our front back to grand junction, leaving two months' supplies for the families of those whose stores were taken. i was amazed at the quantity of supplies the country afforded. it showed that we could have subsisted off the country for two months instead of two weeks without going beyond the limits designated. this taught me a lesson which was taken advantage of later in the campaign when our army lived twenty days with the issue of only five days' rations by the commissary. our loss of supplies was great at holly springs, but it was more than compensated for by those taken from the country and by the lesson taught. the news of the capture of holly springs and the destruction of our supplies caused much rejoicing among the people remaining in oxford. they came with broad smiles on their faces, indicating intense joy, to ask what i was going to do now without anything for my soldiers to eat. i told them that i was not disturbed; that i had already sent troops and wagons to collect all the food and forage they could find for fifteen miles on each side of the road. countenances soon changed, and so did the inquiry. the next was, "what are we to do?" my response was that we had endeavored to feed ourselves from our own northern resources while visiting them; but their friends in gray had been uncivil enough to destroy what we had brought along, and it could not be expected that men, with arms in their hands, would starve in the midst of plenty. i advised them to emigrate east, or west, fifteen miles and assist in eating up what we left. chapter xxxi. headquarters moved to holly springs--general m'clernand in command --assuming command at young's point--operations above vicksburg --fortifications about vicksburg--the canal--lake providence --operations at yazoo pass. this interruption in my communications north--i was really cut off from communication with a great part of my own command during this time --resulted in sherman's moving from memphis before mcclernand could arrive, for my dispatch of the 18th did not reach mcclernand. pemberton got back to vicksburg before sherman got there. the rebel positions were on a bluff on the yazoo river, some miles above its mouth. the waters were high so that the bottoms were generally overflowed, leaving only narrow causeways of dry land between points of debarkation and the high bluffs. these were fortified and defended at all points. the rebel position was impregnable against any force that could be brought against its front. sherman could not use one-fourth of his force. his efforts to capture the city, or the high ground north of it, were necessarily unavailing. sherman's attack was very unfortunate, but i had no opportunity of communicating with him after the destruction of the road and telegraph to my rear on the 20th. he did not know but what i was in the rear of the enemy and depending on him to open a new base of supplies for the troops with me. i had, before he started from memphis, directed him to take with him a few small steamers suitable for the navigation of the yazoo, not knowing but that i might want them to supply me after cutting loose from my base at grenada. on the 23d i removed my headquarters back to holly springs. the troops were drawn back gradually, but without haste or confusion, finding supplies abundant and no enemy following. the road was not damaged south of holly springs by van dorn, at least not to an extent to cause any delay. as i had resolved to move headquarters to memphis, and to repair the road to that point, i remained at holly springs until this work was completed. on the 10th of january, the work on the road from holly springs to grand junction and thence to memphis being completed, i moved my headquarters to the latter place. during the campaign here described, the losses (mostly captures) were about equal, crediting the rebels with their holly springs capture, which they could not hold. when sherman started on his expedition down the river he had 20,000 men, taken from memphis, and was reinforced by 12,000 more at helena, arkansas. the troops on the west bank of the river had previously been assigned to my command. mcclernand having received the orders for his assignment reached the mouth of the yazoo on the 2d of january, and immediately assumed command of all the troops with sherman, being a part of his own corps, the 13th, and all of sherman's, the 15th. sherman, and admiral porter with the fleet, had withdrawn from the yazoo. after consultation they decided that neither the army nor navy could render service to the cause where they were, and learning that i had withdrawn from the interior of mississippi, they determined to return to the arkansas river and to attack arkansas post, about fifty miles up that stream and garrisoned by about five or six thousand men. sherman had learned of the existence of this force through a man who had been captured by the enemy with a steamer loaded with ammunition and other supplies intended for his command. the man had made his escape. mcclernand approved this move reluctantly, as sherman says. no obstacle was encountered until the gunboats and transports were within range of the fort. after three days' bombardment by the navy an assault was made by the troops and marines, resulting in the capture of the place, and in taking 5,000 prisoners and 17 guns. i was at first disposed to disapprove of this move as an unnecessary side movement having no especial bearing upon the work before us; but when the result was understood i regarded it as very important. five thousand confederate troops left in the rear might have caused us much trouble and loss of property while navigating the mississippi. immediately after the reduction of arkansas post and the capture of the garrison, mcclernand returned with his entire force to napoleon, at the mouth of the arkansas river. from here i received messages from both sherman and admiral porter, urging me to come and take command in person, and expressing their distrust of mcclernand's ability and fitness for so important and intricate an expedition. on the 17th i visited mcclernand and his command at napoleon. it was here made evident to me that both the army and navy were so distrustful of mcclernand's fitness to command that, while they would do all they could to insure success, this distrust was an element of weakness. it would have been criminal to send troops under these circumstances into such danger. by this time i had received authority to relieve mcclernand, or to assign any person else to the command of the river expedition, or to assume command in person. i felt great embarrassment about mcclernand. he was the senior major-general after myself within the department. it would not do, with his rank and ambition, to assign a junior over him. nothing was left, therefore, but to assume the command myself. i would have been glad to put sherman in command, to give him an opportunity to accomplish what he had failed in the december before; but there seemed no other way out of the difficulty, for he was junior to mcclernand. sherman's failure needs no apology. on the 20th i ordered general mcclernand with the entire command, to young's point and milliken's bend, while i returned to memphis to make all the necessary preparation for leaving the territory behind me secure. general hurlbut with the 16th corps was left in command. the memphis and charleston railroad was held, while the mississippi central was given up. columbus was the only point between cairo and memphis, on the river, left with a garrison. all the troops and guns from the posts on the abandoned railroad and river were sent to the front. on the 29th of january i arrived at young's point and assumed command the following day. general mcclernand took exception in a most characteristic way--for him. his correspondence with me on the subject was more in the nature of a reprimand than a protest. it was highly insubordinate, but i overlooked it, as i believed, for the good of the service. general mcclernand was a politician of very considerable prominence in his state; he was a member of congress when the secession war broke out; he belonged to that political party which furnished all the opposition there was to a vigorous prosecution of the war for saving the union; there was no delay in his declaring himself for the union at all hazards, and there was no uncertain sound in his declaration of where he stood in the contest before the country. he also gave up his seat in congress to take the field in defence of the principles he had proclaimed. the real work of the campaign and siege of vicksburg now began. the problem was to secure a footing upon dry ground on the east side of the river from which the troops could operate against vicksburg. the mississippi river, from cairo south, runs through a rich alluvial valley of many miles in width, bound on the east by land running from eighty up to two or more hundred feet above the river. on the west side the highest land, except in a few places, is but little above the highest water. through this valley the river meanders in the most tortuous way, varying in direction to all points of the compass. at places it runs to the very foot of the bluffs. after leaving memphis, there are no such highlands coming to the water's edge on the east shore until vicksburg is reached. the intervening land is cut up by bayous filled from the river in high water--many of them navigable for steamers. all of them would be, except for overhanging trees, narrowness and tortuous course, making it impossible to turn the bends with vessels of any considerable length. marching across this country in the face of an enemy was impossible; navigating it proved equally impracticable. the strategical way according to the rule, therefore, would have been to go back to memphis; establish that as a base of supplies; fortify it so that the storehouses could be held by a small garrison, and move from there along the line of railroad, repairing as we advanced, to the yallabusha, or to jackson, mississippi. at this time the north had become very much discouraged. many strong union men believed that the war must prove a failure. the elections of 1862 had gone against the party which was for the prosecution of the war to save the union if it took the last man and the last dollar. voluntary enlistments had ceased throughout the greater part of the north, and the draft had been resorted to to fill up our ranks. it was my judgment at the time that to make a backward movement as long as that from vicksburg to memphis, would be interpreted, by many of those yet full of hope for the preservation of the union, as a defeat, and that the draft would be resisted, desertions ensue and the power to capture and punish deserters lost. there was nothing left to be done but to go forward to a decisive victory. this was in my mind from the moment i took command in person at young's point. the winter of 1862-3 was a noted one for continuous high water in the mississippi and for heavy rains along the lower river. to get dry land, or rather land above the water, to encamp the troops upon, took many miles of river front. we had to occupy the levees and the ground immediately behind. this was so limited that one corps, the 17th, under general mcpherson, was at lake providence, seventy miles above vicksburg. it was in january the troops took their position opposite vicksburg. the water was very high and the rains were incessant. there seemed no possibility of a land movement before the end of march or later, and it would not do to lie idle all this time. the effect would be demoralizing to the troops and injurious to their health. friends in the north would have grown more and more discouraged, and enemies in the same section more and more insolent in their gibes and denunciation of the cause and those engaged in it. i always admired the south, as bad as i thought their cause, for the boldness with which they silenced all opposition and all croaking, by press or by individuals, within their control. war at all times, whether a civil war between sections of a common country or between nations, ought to be avoided, if possible with honor. but, once entered into, it is too much for human nature to tolerate an enemy within their ranks to give aid and comfort to the armies of the opposing section or nation. vicksburg, as stated before, is on the first high land coming to the river's edge, below that on which memphis stands. the bluff, or high land, follows the left bank of the yazoo for some distance and continues in a southerly direction to the mississippi river, thence it runs along the mississippi to warrenton, six miles below. the yazoo river leaves the high land a short distance below haines' bluff and empties into the mississippi nine miles above vicksburg. vicksburg is built on this high land where the mississippi washes the base of the hill. haines' bluff, eleven miles from vicksburg, on the yazoo river, was strongly fortified. the whole distance from there to vicksburg and thence to warrenton was also intrenched, with batteries at suitable distances and rifle-pits connecting them. from young's point the mississippi turns in a north-easterly direction to a point just above the city, when it again turns and runs south-westerly, leaving vessels, which might attempt to run the blockade, exposed to the fire of batteries six miles below the city before they were in range of the upper batteries. since then the river has made a cut-off, leaving what was the peninsula in front of the city, an island. north of the yazoo was all a marsh, heavily timbered, cut up with bayous, and much overflowed. a front attack was therefore impossible, and was never contemplated; certainly not by me. the problem then became, how to secure a landing on high ground east of the mississippi without an apparent retreat. then commenced a series of experiments to consume time, and to divert the attention of the enemy, of my troops and of the public generally. i, myself, never felt great confidence that any of the experiments resorted to would prove successful. nevertheless i was always prepared to take advantage of them in case they did. in 1862 general thomas williams had come up from new orleans and cut a ditch ten or twelve feet wide and about as deep, straight across from young's point to the river below. the distance across was a little over a mile. it was williams' expectation that when the river rose it would cut a navigable channel through; but the canal started in an eddy from both ends, and, of course, it only filled up with water on the rise without doing any execution in the way of cutting. mr. lincoln had navigated the mississippi in his younger days and understood well its tendency to change its channel, in places, from time to time. he set much store accordingly by this canal. general mcclernand had been, therefore, directed before i went to young's point to push the work of widening and deepening this canal. after my arrival the work was diligently pushed with about 4,000 men--as many as could be used to advantage--until interrupted by a sudden rise in the river that broke a dam at the upper end, which had been put there to keep the water out until the excavation was completed. this was on the 8th of march. even if the canal had proven a success, so far as to be navigable for steamers, it could not have been of much advantage to us. it runs in a direction almost perpendicular to the line of bluffs on the opposite side, or east bank, of the river. as soon as the enemy discovered what we were doing he established a battery commanding the canal throughout its length. this battery soon drove out our dredges, two in number, which were doing the work of thousands of men. had the canal been completed it might have proven of some use in running transports through, under the cover of night, to use below; but they would yet have to run batteries, though for a much shorter distance. while this work was progressing we were busy in other directions, trying to find an available landing on high ground on the east bank of the river, or to make water-ways to get below the city, avoiding the batteries. on the 30th of january, the day after my arrival at the front, i ordered general mcpherson, stationed with his corps at lake providence, to cut the levee at that point. if successful in opening a channel for navigation by this route, it would carry us to the mississippi river through the mouth of the red river, just above port hudson and four hundred miles below vicksburg by the river. lake providence is a part of the old bed of the mississippi, about a mile from the present channel. it is six miles long and has its outlet through bayou baxter, bayou macon, and the tensas, washita and red rivers. the last three are navigable streams at all seasons. bayous baxter and macon are narrow and tortuous, and the banks are covered with dense forests overhanging the channel. they were also filled with fallen timber, the accumulation of years. the land along the mississippi river, from memphis down, is in all instances highest next to the river, except where the river washes the bluffs which form the boundary of the valley through which it winds. bayou baxter, as it reaches lower land, begins to spread out and disappears entirely in a cypress swamp before it reaches the macon. there was about two feet of water in this swamp at the time. to get through it, even with vessels of the lightest draft, it was necessary to clear off a belt of heavy timber wide enough to make a passage way. as the trees would have to be cut close to the bottom--under water--it was an undertaking of great magnitude. on the 4th of february i visited general mcpherson, and remained with him several days. the work had not progressed so far as to admit the water from the river into the lake, but the troops had succeeded in drawing a small steamer, of probably not over thirty tons' capacity, from the river into the lake. with this we were able to explore the lake and bayou as far as cleared. i saw then that there was scarcely a chance of this ever becoming a practicable route for moving troops through an enemy's country. the distance from lake providence to the point where vessels going by that route would enter the mississippi again, is about four hundred and seventy miles by the main river. the distance would probably be greater by the tortuous bayous through which this new route would carry us. the enemy held port hudson, below where the red river debouches, and all the mississippi above to vicksburg. the red river, washita and tensas were, as has been said, all navigable streams, on which the enemy could throw small bodies of men to obstruct our passage and pick off our troops with their sharpshooters. i let the work go on, believing employment was better than idleness for the men. then, too, it served as a cover for other efforts which gave a better prospect of success. this work was abandoned after the canal proved a failure. lieutenant-colonel wilson of my staff was sent to helena, arkansas, to examine and open a way through moon lake and the yazoo pass if possible. formerly there was a route by way of an inlet from the mississippi river into moon lake, a mile east of the river, thence east through yazoo pass to coldwater, along the latter to the tallahatchie, which joins the yallabusha about two hundred and fifty miles below moon lake and forms the yazoo river. these were formerly navigated by steamers trading with the rich plantations along their banks; but the state of mississippi had built a strong levee across the inlet some years before, leaving the only entrance for vessels into this rich region the one by way of the mouth of the yazoo several hundreds of miles below. on the 2d of february this dam, or levee, was cut. the river being high the rush of water through the cut was so great that in a very short time the entire obstruction was washed away. the bayous were soon filled and much of the country was overflowed. this pass leaves the mississippi river but a few miles below helena. on the 24th general ross, with his brigade of about 4,500 men on transports, moved into this new water-way. the rebels had obstructed the navigation of yazoo pass and the coldwater by felling trees into them. much of the timber in this region being of greater specific gravity than water, and being of great size, their removal was a matter of great labor; but it was finally accomplished, and on the 11th of march ross found himself, accompanied by two gunboats under the command of lieutenant-commander watson smith, confronting a fortification at greenwood, where the tallahatchie and yallabusha unite and the yazoo begins. the bends of the rivers are such at this point as to almost form an island, scarcely above water at that stage of the river. this island was fortified and manned. it was named fort pemberton after the commander at vicksburg. no land approach was accessible. the troops, therefore, could render no assistance towards an assault further than to establish a battery on a little piece of ground which was discovered above water. the gunboats, however, attacked on the 11th and again on the 13th of march. both efforts were failures and were not renewed. one gunboat was disabled and we lost six men killed and twenty-five wounded. the loss of the enemy was less. fort pemberton was so little above the water that it was thought that a rise of two feet would drive the enemy out. in hope of enlisting the elements on our side, which had been so much against us up to this time, a second cut was made in the mississippi levee, this time directly opposite helena, or six miles above the former cut. it did not accomplish the desired result, and ross, with his fleet, started back. on the 22d he met quinby with a brigade at yazoo pass. quinby was the senior of ross, and assumed command. he was not satisfied with returning to his former position without seeing for himself whether anything could be accomplished. accordingly fort pemberton was revisited by our troops; but an inspection was sufficient this time without an attack. quinby, with his command, returned with but little delay. in the meantime i was much exercised for the safety of ross, not knowing that quinby had been able to join him. reinforcements were of no use in a country covered with water, as they would have to remain on board of their transports. relief had to come from another quarter. so i determined to get into the yazoo below fort pemberton. steel's bayou empties into the yazoo river between haines' bluff and its mouth. it is narrow, very tortuous, and fringed with a very heavy growth of timber, but it is deep. it approaches to within one mile of the mississippi at eagle bend, thirty miles above young's point. steel's bayou connects with black bayou, black bayou with deer creek, deer creek with rolling fork, rolling fork with the big sunflower river, and the big sunflower with the yazoo river about ten miles above haines' bluff in a right line but probably twenty or twenty-five miles by the winding of the river. all these waterways are of about the same nature so far as navigation is concerned, until the sunflower is reached; this affords free navigation. admiral porter explored this waterway as far as deer creek on the 14th of march, and reported it navigable. on the next day he started with five gunboats and four mortar-boats. i went with him for some distance. the heavy overhanging timber retarded progress very much, as did also the short turns in so narrow a stream. the gunboats, however, ploughed their way through without other damage than to their appearance. the transports did not fare so well although they followed behind. the road was somewhat cleared for them by the gunboats. in the evening i returned to headquarters to hurry up reinforcements. sherman went in person on the 16th, taking with him stuart's division of the 15th corps. they took large river transports to eagle bend on the mississippi, where they debarked and marched across to steel's bayou, where they re-embarked on the transports. the river steamers, with their tall smokestacks and light guards extending out, were so much impeded that the gunboats got far ahead. porter, with his fleet, got within a few hundred yards of where the sailing would have been clear and free from the obstructions caused by felling trees into the water, when he encountered rebel sharp-shooters, and his progress was delayed by obstructions in his front. he could do nothing with gunboats against sharpshooters. the rebels, learning his route, had sent in about 4,000 men--many more than there were sailors in the fleet. sherman went back, at the request of the admiral, to clear out black bayou and to hurry up reinforcements, which were far behind. on the night of the 19th he received notice from the admiral that he had been attacked by sharp-shooters and was in imminent peril. sherman at once returned through black bayou in a canoe, and passed on until he met a steamer, with the last of the reinforcements he had, coming up. they tried to force their way through black bayou with their steamer, but, finding it slow and tedious work, debarked and pushed forward on foot. it was night when they landed, and intensely dark. there was but a narrow strip of land above water, and that was grown up with underbrush or cane. the troops lighted their way through this with candles carried in their hands for a mile and a half, when they came to an open plantation. here the troops rested until morning. they made twenty-one miles from this resting-place by noon the next day, and were in time to rescue the fleet. porter had fully made up his mind to blow up the gunboats rather than have them fall into the hands of the enemy. more welcome visitors he probably never met than the "boys in blue" on this occasion. the vessels were backed out and returned to their rendezvous on the mississippi; and thus ended in failure the fourth attempt to get in rear of vicksburg. chapter xxxii. the bayous west of the mississippi--criticisms of the northern press --running the batteries--loss of the indianola--disposition of the troops. the original canal scheme was also abandoned on the 27th of march. the effort to make a waterway through lake providence and the connecting bayous was abandoned as wholly impracticable about the same time. at milliken's bend, and also at young's point, bayous or channels start, which connecting with other bayous passing richmond, louisiana, enter the mississippi at carthage twenty-five or thirty miles above grand gulf. the mississippi levee cuts the supply of water off from these bayous or channels, but all the rainfall behind the levee, at these points, is carried through these same channels to the river below. in case of a crevasse in this vicinity, the water escaping would find its outlet through the same channels. the dredges and laborers from the canal having been driven out by overflow and the enemy's batteries, i determined to open these other channels, if possible. if successful the effort would afford a route, away from the enemy's batteries, for our transports. there was a good road back of the levees, along these bayous, to carry the troops, artillery and wagon trains over whenever the water receded a little, and after a few days of dry weather. accordingly, with the abandonment of all the other plans for reaching a base heretofore described, this new one was undertaken. as early as the 4th of february i had written to halleck about this route, stating that i thought it much more practicable than the other undertaking (the lake providence route), and that it would have been accomplished with much less labor if commenced before the water had got all over the country. the upper end of these bayous being cut off from a water supply, further than the rainfall back of the levees, was grown up with dense timber for a distance of several miles from their source. it was necessary, therefore, to clear this out before letting in the water from the river. this work was continued until the waters of the river began to recede and the road to richmond, louisiana, emerged from the water. one small steamer and some barges were got through this channel, but no further use could be made of it because of the fall in the river. beyond this it was no more successful than the other experiments with which the winter was whiled away. all these failures would have been very discouraging if i had expected much from the efforts; but i had not. from the first the most i hoped to accomplish was the passage of transports, to be used below vicksburg, without exposure to the long line of batteries defending that city. this long, dreary and, for heavy and continuous rains and high water, unprecedented winter was one of great hardship to all engaged about vicksburg. the river was higher than its natural banks from december, 1862, to the following april. the war had suspended peaceful pursuits in the south, further than the production of army supplies, and in consequence the levees were neglected and broken in many places and the whole country was covered with water. troops could scarcely find dry ground on which to pitch their tents. malarial fevers broke out among the men. measles and small-pox also attacked them. the hospital arrangements and medical attendance were so perfect, however, that the loss of life was much less than might have been expected. visitors to the camps went home with dismal stories to relate; northern papers came back to the soldiers with these stories exaggerated. because i would not divulge my ultimate plans to visitors, they pronounced me idle, incompetent and unfit to command men in an emergency, and clamored for my removal. they were not to be satisfied, many of them, with my simple removal, but named who my successor should be. mcclernand, fremont, hunter and mcclellan were all mentioned in this connection. i took no steps to answer these complaints, but continued to do my duty, as i understood it, to the best of my ability. every one has his superstitions. one of mine is that in positions of great responsibility every one should do his duty to the best of his ability where assigned by competent authority, without application or the use of influence to change his position. while at cairo i had watched with very great interest the operations of the army of the potomac, looking upon that as the main field of the war. i had no idea, myself, of ever having any large command, nor did i suppose that i was equal to one; but i had the vanity to think that as a cavalry officer i might succeed very well in the command of a brigade. on one occasion, in talking about this to my staff officers, all of whom were civilians without any military education whatever, i said that i would give anything if i were commanding a brigade of cavalry in the army of the potomac and i believed i could do some good. captain hillyer spoke up and suggested that i make application to be transferred there to command the cavalry. i then told him that i would cut my right arm off first, and mentioned this superstition. in time of war the president, being by the constitution commander-in-chief of the army and navy, is responsible for the selection of commanders. he should not be embarrassed in making his selections. i having been selected, my responsibility ended with my doing the best i knew how. if i had sought the place, or obtained it through personal or political influence, my belief is that i would have feared to undertake any plan of my own conception, and would probably have awaited direct orders from my distant superiors. persons obtaining important commands by application or political influence are apt to keep a written record of complaints and predictions of defeat, which are shown in case of disaster. somebody must be responsible for their failures. with all the pressure brought to bear upon them, both president lincoln and general halleck stood by me to the end of the campaign. i had never met mr. lincoln, but his support was constant. at last the waters began to recede; the roads crossing the peninsula behind the levees of the bayous, were emerging from the waters; the troops were all concentrated from distant points at milliken's bend preparatory to a final move which was to crown the long, tedious and discouraging labors with success. i had had in contemplation the whole winter the movement by land to a point below vicksburg from which to operate, subject only to the possible but not expected success of some one of the expedients resorted to for the purpose of giving us a different base. this could not be undertaken until the waters receded. i did not therefore communicate this plan, even to an officer of my staff, until it was necessary to make preparations for the start. my recollection is that admiral porter was the first one to whom i mentioned it. the co-operation of the navy was absolutely essential to the success (even to the contemplation) of such an enterprise. i had no more authority to command porter than he had to command me. it was necessary to have part of his fleet below vicksburg if the troops went there. steamers to use as ferries were also essential. the navy was the only escort and protection for these steamers, all of which in getting below had to run about fourteen miles of batteries. porter fell into the plan at once, and suggested that he had better superintend the preparation of the steamers selected to run the batteries, as sailors would probably understand the work better than soldiers. i was glad to accept his proposition, not only because i admitted his argument, but because it would enable me to keep from the enemy a little longer our designs. porter's fleet was on the east side of the river above the mouth of the yazoo, entirely concealed from the enemy by the dense forests that intervened. even spies could not get near him, on account of the undergrowth and overflowed lands. suspicions of some mysterious movements were aroused. our river guards discovered one day a small skiff moving quietly and mysteriously up the river near the east shore, from the direction of vicksburg, towards the fleet. on overhauling the boat they found a small white flag, not much larger than a handkerchief, set up in the stern, no doubt intended as a flag of truce in case of discovery. the boat, crew and passengers were brought ashore to me. the chief personage aboard proved to be jacob thompson, secretary of the interior under the administration of president buchanan. after a pleasant conversation of half an hour or more i allowed the boat and crew, passengers and all, to return to vicksburg, without creating a suspicion that there was a doubt in my mind as to the good faith of mr. thompson and his flag. admiral porter proceeded with the preparation of the steamers for their hazardous passage of the enemy's batteries. the great essential was to protect the boilers from the enemy's shot, and to conceal the fires under the boilers from view. this he accomplished by loading the steamers, between the guards and boilers on the boiler deck up to the deck above, with bales of hay and cotton, and the deck in front of the boilers in the same way, adding sacks of grain. the hay and grain would be wanted below, and could not be transported in sufficient quantity by the muddy roads over which we expected to march. before this i had been collecting, from st. louis and chicago, yawls and barges to be used as ferries when we got below. by the 16th of april porter was ready to start on his perilous trip. the advance, flagship benton, porter commanding, started at ten o'clock at night, followed at intervals of a few minutes by the lafayette with a captured steamer, the price, lashed to her side, the louisville, mound city, pittsburgh and carondelet--all of these being naval vessels. next came the transports --forest queen, silver wave and henry clay, each towing barges loaded with coal to be used as fuel by the naval and transport steamers when below the batteries. the gunboat tuscumbia brought up the rear. soon after the start a battery between vicksburg and warrenton opened fire across the intervening peninsula, followed by the upper batteries, and then by batteries all along the line. the gunboats ran up close under the bluffs, delivering their fire in return at short distances, probably without much effect. they were under fire for more than two hours and every vessel was struck many times, but with little damage to the gunboats. the transports did not fare so well. the henry clay was disabled and deserted by her crew. soon after a shell burst in the cotton packed about the boilers, set the vessel on fire and burned her to the water's edge. the burning mass, however, floated down to carthage before grounding, as did also one of the barges in tow. the enemy were evidently expecting our fleet, for they were ready to light up the river by means of bonfires on the east side and by firing houses on the point of land opposite the city on the louisiana side. the sight was magnificent, but terrible. i witnessed it from the deck of a river transport, run out into the middle of the river and as low down as it was prudent to go. my mind was much relieved when i learned that no one on the transports had been killed and but few, if any, wounded. during the running of the batteries men were stationed in the holds of the transports to partially stop with cotton shot-holes that might be made in the hulls. all damage was afterwards soon repaired under the direction of admiral porter. the experiment of passing batteries had been tried before this, however, during the war. admiral farragut had run the batteries at port hudson with the flagship hartford and one iron-clad and visited me from below vicksburg. the 13th of february admiral porter had sent the gunboat indianola, lieutenant-commander george brown commanding, below. she met colonel ellet of the marine brigade below natchez on a captured steamer. two of the colonel's fleet had previously run the batteries, producing the greatest consternation among the people along the mississippi from vicksburg (*10) to the red river. the indianola remained about the mouth of the red river some days, and then started up the mississippi. the confederates soon raised the queen of the west, (*11) and repaired her. with this vessel and the ram webb, which they had had for some time in the red river, and two other steamers, they followed the indianola. the latter was encumbered with barges of coal in tow, and consequently could make but little speed against the rapid current of the mississippi. the confederate fleet overtook her just above grand gulf, and attacked her after dark on the 24th of february. the indianola was superior to all the others in armament, and probably would have destroyed them or driven them away, but for her encumbrance. as it was she fought them for an hour and a half, but, in the dark, was struck seven or eight times by the ram and other vessels, and was finally disabled and reduced to a sinking condition. the armament was thrown overboard and the vessel run ashore. officers and crew then surrendered. i had started mcclernand with his corps of four divisions on the 29th of march, by way of richmond, louisiana, to new carthage, hoping that he might capture grand gulf before the balance of the troops could get there; but the roads were very bad, scarcely above water yet. some miles from new carthage the levee to bayou vidal was broken in several places, overflowing the roads for the distance of two miles. boats were collected from the surrounding bayous, and some constructed on the spot from such material as could be collected, to transport the troops across the overflowed interval. by the 6th of april mcclernand had reached new carthage with one division and its artillery, the latter ferried through the woods by these boats. on the 17th i visited new carthage in person, and saw that the process of getting troops through in the way we were doing was so tedious that a better method must be devised. the water was falling, and in a few days there would not be depth enough to use boats; nor would the land be dry enough to march over. mcclernand had already found a new route from smith's plantation where the crevasse occurred, to perkins' plantation, eight to twelve miles below new carthage. this increased the march from milliken's bend from twenty-seven to nearly forty miles. four bridges had to be built across bayous, two of them each over six hundred feet long, making about two thousand feet of bridging in all. the river falling made the current in these bayous very rapid, increasing the difficulty of building and permanently fastening these bridges; but the ingenuity of the "yankee soldier" was equal to any emergency. the bridges were soon built of such material as could be found near by, and so substantial were they that not a single mishap occurred in crossing all the army with artillery, cavalry and wagon trains, except the loss of one siege gun (a thirty-two pounder). this, if my memory serves me correctly, broke through the only pontoon bridge we had in all our march across the peninsula. these bridges were all built by mcclernand's command, under the supervision of lieutenant hains of the engineer corps. i returned to milliken's bend on the 18th or 19th, and on the 20th issued the following final order for the movement of troops: headquarters department of the tennessee, milliken's bend, louisiana, april 20, 1863. special orders, no. 110. * * * * * * * viii. the following orders are published for the information and guidance of the "army in the field," in its present movement to obtain a foothold on the east bank of the mississippi river, from which vicksburg can be approached by practicable roads. first.--the thirteenth army corps, major-general john a. mcclernand commanding, will constitute the right wing. second.--the fifteenth army corps, major-general w. t. sherman commanding, will constitute the left wing. third.--the seventeenth army corps, major-general james b. mcpherson commanding, will constitute the centre. fourth.--the order of march to new carthage will be from right to left. fifth.--reserves will be formed by divisions from each army corps; or, an entire army corps will be held as a reserve, as necessity may require. when the reserve is formed by divisions, each division will remain under the immediate command of its respective corps commander, unless otherwise specially ordered for a particular emergency. sixth.--troops will be required to bivouac, until proper facilities can be afforded for the transportation of camp equipage. seventh.--in the present movement, one tent will be allowed to each company for the protection of rations from rain; one wall tent for each regimental headquarters; one wall tent for each brigade headquarters; and one wall tent for each division headquarters; corps commanders having the books and blanks of their respective commands to provide for, are authorized to take such tents as are absolutely necessary, but not to exceed the number allowed by general orders no. 160, a. g. o., series of 1862. eighth.--all the teams of the three army corps, under the immediate charge of the quartermasters bearing them on their returns, will constitute a train for carrying supplies and ordnance and the authorized camp equipage of the army. ninth.--as fast as the thirteenth army corps advances, the seventeenth army corps will take its place; and it, in turn, will be followed in like manner by the fifteenth army corps. tenth.--two regiments from each army corps will be detailed by corps commanders, to guard the lines from richmond to new carthage. eleventh.--general hospitals will be established by the medical director between duckport and milliken's bend. all sick and disabled soldiers will be left in these hospitals. surgeons in charge of hospitals will report convalescents as fast as they become fit for duty. each corps commander will detail an intelligent and good drill officer, to remain behind and take charge of the convalescents of their respective corps; officers so detailed will organize the men under their charge into squads and companies, without regard to the regiments they belong to; and in the absence of convalescent commissioned officers to command them, will appoint non-commissioned officers or privates. the force so organized will constitute the guard of the line from duckport to milliken's bend. they will furnish all the guards and details required for general hospitals, and with the contrabands that may be about the camps, will furnish all the details for loading and unloading boats. twelfth.--the movement of troops from milliken's bend to new carthage will be so conducted as to allow the transportation of ten days' supply of rations, and one-half the allowance of ordnance, required by previous orders. thirteenth.--commanders are authorized and enjoined to collect all the beef cattle, corn and other necessary supplies on the line of march; but wanton destruction of property, taking of articles useless for military purposes, insulting citizens, going into and searching houses without proper orders from division commanders, are positively prohibited. all such irregularities must be summarily punished. fourteenth.--brigadier-general j. c. sullivan is appointed to the command of all the forces detailed for the protection of the line from here to new carthage. his particular attention is called to general orders, no. 69, from adjutant-general's office, washington, of date march 20, 1863. by order of major-general u. s. grant. mcclernand was already below on the mississippi. two of mcpherson's divisions were put upon the march immediately. the third had not yet arrived from lake providence; it was on its way to milliken's bend and was to follow on arrival. sherman was to follow mcpherson. two of his divisions were at duckport and young's point, and the third under steele was under orders to return from greenville, mississippi, where it had been sent to expel a rebel battery that had been annoying our transports. it had now become evident that the army could not be rationed by a wagon train over the single narrow and almost impassable road between milliken's bend and perkins' plantation. accordingly six more steamers were protected as before, to run the batteries, and were loaded with supplies. they took twelve barges in tow, loaded also with rations. on the night of the 22d of april they ran the batteries, five getting through more or less disabled while one was sunk. about half the barges got through with their needed freight. when it was first proposed to run the blockade at vicksburg with river steamers there were but two captains or masters who were willing to accompany their vessels, and but one crew. volunteers were called for from the army, men who had had experience in any capacity in navigating the western rivers. captains, pilots, mates, engineers and deck-hands enough presented themselves to take five times the number of vessels we were moving through this dangerous ordeal. most of them were from logan's division, composed generally of men from the southern part of illinois and from missouri. all but two of the steamers were commanded by volunteers from the army, and all but one so manned. in this instance, as in all others during the war, i found that volunteers could be found in the ranks and among the commissioned officers to meet every call for aid whether mechanical or professional. colonel w. s. oliver was master of transportation on this occasion by special detail. chapter xxxiii. attack on grand gulf--operations below vicksburg. on the 24th my headquarters were with the advance at perkins' plantation. reconnoissances were made in boats to ascertain whether there was high land on the east shore of the river where we might land above grand gulf. there was none practicable. accordingly the troops were set in motion for hard times, twenty-two miles farther down the river and nearly opposite grand gulf. the loss of two steamers and six barges reduced our transportation so that only 10,000 men could be moved by water. some of the steamers that had got below were injured in their machinery, so that they were only useful as barges towed by those less severely injured. all the troops, therefore, except what could be transported in one trip, had to march. the road lay west of lake st. joseph. three large bayous had to be crossed. they were rapidly bridged in the same manner as those previously encountered. (*12) on the 27th mcclernand's corps was all at hard times, and mcpherson's was following closely. i had determined to make the attempt to effect a landing on the east side of the river as soon as possible. accordingly, on the morning of the 29th, mcclernand was directed to embark all the troops from his corps that our transports and barges could carry. about 10,000 men were so embarked. the plan was to have the navy silence the guns at grand gulf, and to have as many men as possible ready to debark in the shortest possible time under cover of the fire of the navy and carry the works by storm. the following order was issued: perkins plantation, la., april 27,1863. major-general j. a. mcclernand, commanding 13th a. c. commence immediately the embarkation of your corps, or so much of it as there is transportation for. have put aboard the artillery and every article authorized in orders limiting baggage, except the men, and hold them in readiness, with their places assigned, to be moved at a moment's warning. all the troops you may have, except those ordered to remain behind, send to a point nearly opposite grand gulf, where you see, by special orders of this date, general mcpherson is ordered to send one division. the plan of the attack will be for the navy to attack and silence all the batteries commanding the river. your corps will be on the river, ready to run to and debark on the nearest eligible land below the promontory first brought to view passing down the river. once on shore, have each commander instructed beforehand to form his men the best the ground will admit of, and take possession of the most commanding points, but avoid separating your command so that it cannot support itself. the first object is to get a foothold where our troops can maintain themselves until such time as preparations can be made and troops collected for a forward movement. admiral porter has proposed to place his boats in the position indicated to you a few days ago, and to bring over with them such troops as may be below the city after the guns of the enemy are silenced. it may be that the enemy will occupy positions back from the city, out of range of the gunboats, so as to make it desirable to run past grand gulf and land at rodney. in case this should prove the plan, a signal will be arranged and you duly informed, when the transports are to start with this view. or, it may be expedient for the boats to run past, but not the men. in this case, then, the transports would have to be brought back to where the men could land and move by forced marches to below grand gulf, re-embark rapidly and proceed to the latter place. there will be required, then, three signals; one, to indicate that the transports can run down and debark the troops at grand gulf; one, that the transports can run by without the troops; and the last, that the transports can run by with the troops on board. should the men have to march, all baggage and artillery will be left to run the blockade. if not already directed, require your men to keep three days' rations in their haversacks, not to be touched until a movement commences. u. s. grant, major-general. at 8 o'clock a.m., 29th, porter made the attack with his entire strength present, eight gunboats. for nearly five and a half hours the attack was kept up without silencing a single gun of the enemy. all this time mcclernand's 10,000 men were huddled together on the transports in the stream ready to attempt a landing if signalled. i occupied a tug from which i could see the effect of the battle on both sides, within range of the enemy's guns; but a small tug, without armament, was not calculated to attract the fire of batteries while they were being assailed themselves. about half-past one the fleet withdrew, seeing their efforts were entirely unavailing. the enemy ceased firing as soon as we withdrew. i immediately signalled the admiral and went aboard his ship. the navy lost in this engagement eighteen killed and fifty-six wounded. a large proportion of these were of the crew of the flagship, and most of those from a single shell which penetrated the ship's side and exploded between decks where the men were working their guns. the sight of the mangled and dying men which met my eye as i boarded the ship was sickening. grand gulf is on a high bluff where the river runs at the very foot of it. it is as defensible upon its front as vicksburg and, at that time, would have been just as impossible to capture by a front attack. i therefore requested porter to run the batteries with his fleet that night, and to take charge of the transports, all of which would be wanted below. there is a long tongue of land from the louisiana side extending towards grand gulf, made by the river running nearly east from about three miles above and nearly in the opposite direction from that point for about the same distance below. the land was so low and wet that it would not have been practicable to march an army across but for a levee. i had had this explored before, as well as the east bank below to ascertain if there was a possible point of debarkation north of rodney. it was found that the top of the levee afforded a good road to march upon. porter, as was always the case with him, not only acquiesced in the plan, but volunteered to use his entire fleet as transports. i had intended to make this request, but he anticipated me. at dusk, when concealed from the view of the enemy at grand gulf, mcclernand landed his command on the west bank. the navy and transports ran the batteries successfully. the troops marched across the point of land under cover of night, unobserved. by the time it was light the enemy saw our whole fleet, ironclads, gunboats, river steamers and barges, quietly moving down the river three miles below them, black, or rather blue, with national troops. when the troops debarked, the evening of the 29th, it was expected that we would have to go to rodney, about nine miles below, to find a landing; but that night a colored man came in who informed me that a good landing would be found at bruinsburg, a few miles above rodney, from which point there was a good road leading to port gibson some twelve miles in the interior. the information was found correct, and our landing was effected without opposition. sherman had not left his position above vicksburg yet. on the morning of the 27th i ordered him to create a diversion by moving his corps up the yazoo and threatening an attack on haines' bluff. my object was to compel pemberton to keep as much force about vicksburg as i could, until i could secure a good footing on high land east of the river. the move was eminently successful and, as we afterwards learned, created great confusion about vicksburg and doubts about our real design. sherman moved the day of our attack on grand gulf, the 29th, with ten regiments of his command and eight gunboats which porter had left above vicksburg. he debarked his troops and apparently made every preparation to attack the enemy while the navy bombarded the main forts at haines' bluff. this move was made without a single casualty in either branch of the service. on the first of may sherman received orders from me (sent from hard times the evening of the 29th of april) to withdraw from the front of haines' bluff and follow mcpherson with two divisions as fast as he could. i had established a depot of supplies at perkins' plantation. now that all our gunboats were below grand gulf it was possible that the enemy might fit out boats in the big black with improvised armament and attempt to destroy these supplies. mcpherson was at hard times with a portion of his corps, and the depot was protected by a part of his command. the night of the 29th i directed him to arm one of the transports with artillery and send it up to perkins' plantation as a guard; and also to have the siege guns we had brought along moved there and put in position. the embarkation below grand gulf took place at de shroon's, louisiana, six miles above bruinsburg, mississippi. early on the morning of 30th of april mcclernand's corps and one division of mcpherson's corps were speedily landed. when this was effected i felt a degree of relief scarcely ever equalled since. vicksburg was not yet taken it is true, nor were its defenders demoralized by any of our previous moves. i was now in the enemy's country, with a vast river and the stronghold of vicksburg between me and my base of supplies. but i was on dry ground on the same side of the river with the enemy. all the campaigns, labors, hardships and exposures from the month of december previous to this time that had been made and endured, were for the accomplishment of this one object. i had with me the 13th corps, general mcclernand commanding, and two brigades of logan's division of the 17th corps, general mcpherson commanding--in all not more than twenty thousand men to commence the campaign with. these were soon reinforced by the remaining brigade of logan's division and crocker's division of the 17th corps. on the 7th of may i was further reinforced by sherman with two divisions of his, the 15th corps. my total force was then about thirty-three thousand men. the enemy occupied grand gulf, haines' bluff and jackson with a force of nearly sixty thousand men. jackson is fifty miles east of vicksburg and is connected with it by a railroad. my first problem was to capture grand gulf to use as a base. bruinsburg is two miles from high ground. the bottom at that point is higher than most of the low land in the valley of the mississippi, and a good road leads to the bluff. it was natural to expect the garrison from grand gulf to come out to meet us and prevent, if they could, our reaching this solid base. bayou pierre enters the mississippi just above bruinsburg and, as it is a navigable stream and was high at the time, in order to intercept us they had to go by port gibson, the nearest point where there was a bridge to cross upon. this more than doubled the distance from grand gulf to the high land back of bruinsburg. no time was to be lost in securing this foothold. our transportation was not sufficient to move all the army across the river at one trip, or even two; but the landing of the 13th corps and one division of the 17th was effected during the day, april 30th, and early evening. mcclernand was advanced as soon as ammunition and two days' rations (to last five) could be issued to his men. the bluffs were reached an hour before sunset and mcclernand was pushed on, hoping to reach port gibson and save the bridge spanning the bayou pierre before the enemy could get there; for crossing a stream in the presence of an enemy is always difficult. port gibson, too, is the starting point of roads to grand gulf, vicksburg and jackson. mcclernand's advance met the enemy about five miles west of port gibson at thompson's plantation. there was some firing during the night, but nothing rising to the dignity of a battle until daylight. the enemy had taken a strong natural position with most of the grand gulf garrison, numbering about seven or eight thousand men, under general bowen. his hope was to hold me in check until reinforcements under loring could reach him from vicksburg; but loring did not come in time to render much assistance south of port gibson. two brigades of mcpherson's corps followed mcclernand as fast as rations and ammunition could be issued, and were ready to take position upon the battlefield whenever the 13th corps could be got out of the way. the country in this part of mississippi stands on edge, as it were, the roads running along the ridges except when they occasionally pass from one ridge to another. where there are no clearings the sides of the hills are covered with a very heavy growth of timber and with undergrowth, and the ravines are filled with vines and canebrakes, almost impenetrable. this makes it easy for an inferior force to delay, if not defeat, a far superior one. near the point selected by bowen to defend, the road to port gibson divides, taking two ridges which do not diverge more than a mile or two at the widest point. these roads unite just outside the town. this made it necessary for mcclernand to divide his force. it was not only divided, but it was separated by a deep ravine of the character above described. one flank could not reinforce the other except by marching back to the junction of the roads. mcclernand put the divisions of hovey, carr and a. j. smith upon the right-hand branch and osterhaus on the left. i was on the field by ten a.m., and inspected both flanks in person. on the right the enemy, if not being pressed back, was at least not repulsing our advance. on the left, however, osterhaus was not faring so well. he had been repulsed with some loss. as soon as the road could be cleared of mcclernand's troops i ordered up mcpherson, who was close upon the rear of the 13th corps, with two brigades of logan's division. this was about noon. i ordered him to send one brigade (general john e. smith's was selected) to support osterhaus, and to move to the left and flank the enemy out of his position. this movement carried the brigade over a deep ravine to a third ridge and, when smith's troops were seen well through the ravine, osterhaus was directed to renew his front attack. it was successful and unattended by heavy loss. the enemy was sent in full retreat on their right, and their left followed before sunset. while the movement to our left was going on, mcclernand, who was with his right flank, sent me frequent requests for reinforcements, although the force with him was not being pressed. i had been upon the ground and knew it did not admit of his engaging all the men he had. we followed up our victory until night overtook us about two miles from port gibson; then the troops went into bivouac for the night. chapter xxxiv. capture of port gibson--grierson's raid--occupation of grand gulf --movement up the big black--battle of raymond. we started next morning for port gibson as soon as it was light enough to see the road. we were soon in the town, and i was delighted to find that the enemy had not stopped to contest our crossing further at the bridge, which he had burned. the troops were set to work at once to construct a bridge across the south fork of the bayou pierre. at this time the water was high and the current rapid. what might be called a raft-bridge was soon constructed from material obtained from wooden buildings, stables, fences, etc., which sufficed for carrying the whole army over safely. colonel j. h. wilson, a member of my staff, planned and superintended the construction of this bridge, going into the water and working as hard as any one engaged. officers and men generally joined in this work. when it was finished the army crossed and marched eight miles beyond to the north fork that day. one brigade of logan's division was sent down the stream to occupy the attention of a rebel battery, which had been left behind with infantry supports to prevent our repairing the burnt railroad bridge. two of his brigades were sent up the bayou to find a crossing and reach the north fork to repair the bridge there. the enemy soon left when he found we were building a bridge elsewhere. before leaving port gibson we were reinforced by crocker's division, mcpherson's corps, which had crossed the mississippi at bruinsburg and come up without stopping except to get two days' rations. mcpherson still had one division west of the mississippi river, guarding the road from milliken's bend to the river below until sherman's command should relieve it. on leaving bruinsburg for the front i left my son frederick, who had joined me a few weeks before, on board one of the gunboats asleep, and hoped to get away without him until after grand gulf should fall into our hands; but on waking up he learned that i had gone, and being guided by the sound of the battle raging at thompson's hill--called the battle of port gibson--found his way to where i was. he had no horse to ride at the time, and i had no facilities for even preparing a meal. he, therefore, foraged around the best he could until we reached grand gulf. mr. c. a. dana, then an officer of the war department, accompanied me on the vicksburg campaign and through a portion of the siege. he was in the same situation as fred so far as transportation and mess arrangements were concerned. the first time i call to mind seeing either of them, after the battle, they were mounted on two enormous horses, grown white from age, each equipped with dilapidated saddles and bridles. our trains arrived a few days later, after which we were all perfectly equipped. my son accompanied me throughout the campaign and siege, and caused no anxiety either to me or to his mother, who was at home. he looked out for himself and was in every battle of the campaign. his age, then not quite thirteen, enabled him to take in all he saw, and to retain a recollection of it that would not be possible in more mature years. when the movement from bruinsburg commenced we were without a wagon train. the train still west of the mississippi was carried around with proper escort, by a circuitous route from milliken's bend to hard times seventy or more miles below, and did not get up for some days after the battle of port gibson. my own horses, headquarters' transportation, servants, mess chest, and everything except what i had on, was with this train. general a. j. smith happened to have an extra horse at bruinsburg which i borrowed, with a saddle-tree without upholstering further than stirrups. i had no other for nearly a week. it was necessary to have transportation for ammunition. provisions could be taken from the country; but all the ammunition that can be carried on the person is soon exhausted when there is much fighting. i directed, therefore, immediately on landing that all the vehicles and draft animals, whether horses, mules, or oxen, in the vicinity should be collected and loaded to their capacity with ammunition. quite a train was collected during the 30th, and a motley train it was. in it could be found fine carriages, loaded nearly to the top with boxes of cartridges that had been pitched in promiscuously, drawn by mules with plough, harness, straw collars, rope-lines, etc.; long-coupled wagons, with racks for carrying cotton bales, drawn by oxen, and everything that could be found in the way of transportation on a plantation, either for use or pleasure. the making out of provision returns was stopped for the time. no formalities were to retard our progress until a position was secured when the time could be spared to observe them. it was at port gibson i first heard through a southern paper of the complete success of colonel grierson, who was making a raid through central mississippi. he had started from la grange april 17th with three regiments of about 1,700 men. on the 21st he had detached colonel hatch with one regiment to destroy the railroad between columbus and macon and then return to la grange. hatch had a sharp fight with the enemy at columbus and retreated along the railroad, destroying it at okalona and tupelo, and arriving in la grange april 26. grierson continued his movement with about 1,000 men, breaking the vicksburg and meridian railroad and the new orleans and jackson railroad, arriving at baton rouge may 2d. this raid was of great importance, for grierson had attracted the attention of the enemy from the main movement against vicksburg. during the night of the 2d of may the bridge over the north fork was repaired, and the troops commenced crossing at five the next morning. before the leading brigade was over it was fired upon by the enemy from a commanding position; but they were soon driven off. it was evident that the enemy was covering a retreat from grand gulf to vicksburg. every commanding position from this (grindstone) crossing to hankinson's ferry over the big black was occupied by the retreating foe to delay our progress. mcpherson, however, reached hankinson's ferry before night, seized the ferry boat, and sent a detachment of his command across and several miles north on the road to vicksburg. when the junction of the road going to vicksburg with the road from grand gulf to raymond and jackson was reached, logan with his division was turned to the left towards grand gulf. i went with him a short distance from this junction. mcpherson had encountered the largest force yet met since the battle of port gibson and had a skirmish nearly approaching a battle; but the road logan had taken enabled him to come up on the enemy's right flank, and they soon gave way. mcpherson was ordered to hold hankinson's ferry and the road back to willow springs with one division; mcclernand, who was now in the rear, was to join in this as well as to guard the line back down the bayou. i did not want to take the chances of having an enemy lurking in our rear. on the way from the junction to grand gulf, where the road comes into the one from vicksburg to the same place six or seven miles out, i learned that the last of the enemy had retreated past that place on their way to vicksburg. i left logan to make the proper disposition of his troops for the night, while i rode into the town with an escort of about twenty cavalry. admiral porter had already arrived with his fleet. the enemy had abandoned his heavy guns and evacuated the place. when i reached grand gulf may 3d i had not been with my baggage since the 27th of april and consequently had had no change of underclothing, no meal except such as i could pick up sometimes at other headquarters, and no tent to cover me. the first thing i did was to get a bath, borrow some fresh underclothing from one of the naval officers and get a good meal on the flag-ship. then i wrote letters to the general-in-chief informing him of our present position, dispatches to be telegraphed from cairo, orders to general sullivan commanding above vicksburg, and gave orders to all my corps commanders. about twelve o'clock at night i was through my work and started for hankinson's ferry, arriving there before daylight. while at grand gulf i heard from banks, who was on the red river, and who said that he could not be at port hudson before the 10th of may and then with only 15,000 men. up to this time my intention had been to secure grand gulf, as a base of supplies, detach mcclernand's corps to banks and co-operate with him in the reduction of port hudson. the news from banks forced upon me a different plan of campaign from the one intended. to wait for his co-operation would have detained me at least a month. the reinforcements would not have reached ten thousand men after deducting casualties and necessary river guards at all high points close to the river for over three hundred miles. the enemy would have strengthened his position and been reinforced by more men than banks could have brought. i therefore determined to move independently of banks, cut loose from my base, destroy the rebel force in rear of vicksburg and invest or capture the city. grand gulf was accordingly given up as a base and the authorities at washington were notified. i knew well that halleck's caution would lead him to disapprove of this course; but it was the only one that gave any chance of success. the time it would take to communicate with washington and get a reply would be so great that i could not be interfered with until it was demonstrated whether my plan was practicable. even sherman, who afterwards ignored bases of supplies other than what were afforded by the country while marching through four states of the confederacy with an army more than twice as large as mine at this time, wrote me from hankinson's ferry, advising me of the impossibility of supplying our army over a single road. he urged me to "stop all troops till your army is partially supplied with wagons, and then act as quick as possible; for this road will be jammed, as sure as life." to this i replied: "i do not calculate upon the possibility of supplying the army with full rations from grand gulf. i know it will be impossible without constructing additional roads. what i do expect is to get up what rations of hard bread, coffee and salt we can, and make the country furnish the balance." we started from bruinsburg with an average of about two days' rations, and received no more from our own supplies for some days; abundance was found in the mean time. a delay would give the enemy time to reinforce and fortify. mcclernand's and mcpherson's commands were kept substantially as they were on the night of the 2d, awaiting supplies sufficient to give them three days' rations in haversacks. beef, mutton, poultry and forage were found in abundance. quite a quantity of bacon and molasses was also secured from the country, but bread and coffee could not be obtained in quantity sufficient for all the men. every plantation, however, had a run of stone, propelled by mule power, to grind corn for the owners and their slaves. all these were kept running while we were stopping, day and night, and when we were marching, during the night, at all plantations covered by the troops. but the product was taken by the troops nearest by, so that the majority of the command was destined to go without bread until a new base was established on the yazoo above vicksburg. while the troops were awaiting the arrival of rations i ordered reconnoissances made by mcclernand and mcpherson, with the view of leading the enemy to believe that we intended to cross the big black and attack the city at once. on the 6th sherman arrived at grand gulf and crossed his command that night and the next day. three days' rations had been brought up from grand gulf for the advanced troops and were issued. orders were given for a forward movement the next day. sherman was directed to order up blair, who had been left behind to guard the road from milliken's bend to hard times with two brigades. the quartermaster at young's point was ordered to send two hundred wagons with blair, and the commissary was to load them with hard bread, coffee, sugar, salt and one hundred thousand pounds of salt meat. on the 3d hurlbut, who had been left at memphis, was ordered to send four regiments from his command to milliken's bend to relieve blair's division, and on the 5th he was ordered to send lauman's division in addition, the latter to join the army in the field. the four regiments were to be taken from troops near the river so that there would be no delay. during the night of the 6th mcpherson drew in his troops north of the big black and was off at an early hour on the road to jackson, via rocky springs, utica and raymond. that night he and mcclernand were both at rocky springs ten miles from hankinson's ferry. mcpherson remained there during the 8th, while mcclernand moved to big sandy and sherman marched from grand gulf to hankinson's ferry. the 9th, mcpherson moved to a point within a few miles west of utica; mcclernand and sherman remained where they were. on the 10th mcpherson moved to utica, sherman to big sandy; mcclernand was still at big sandy. the 11th, mcclernand was at five mile creek; sherman at auburn; mcpherson five miles advanced from utica. may 12th, mcclernand was at fourteen mile creek; sherman at fourteen mile creek; mcpherson at raymond after a battle. after mcpherson crossed the big black at hankinson's ferry vicksburg could have been approached and besieged by the south side. it is not probable, however, that pemberton would have permitted a close besiegement. the broken nature of the ground would have enabled him to hold a strong defensible line from the river south of the city to the big black, retaining possession of the railroad back to that point. it was my plan, therefore, to get to the railroad east of vicksburg, and approach from that direction. accordingly, mcpherson's troops that had crossed the big black were withdrawn and the movement east to jackson commenced. as has been stated before, the country is very much broken and the roads generally confined to the tops of the hills. the troops were moved one (sometimes two) corps at a time to reach designated points out parallel to the railroad and only from six to ten miles from it. mcclernand's corps was kept with its left flank on the big black guarding all the crossings. fourteen mile creek, a stream substantially parallel with the railroad, was reached and crossings effected by mcclernand and sherman with slight loss. mcpherson was to the right of sherman, extending to raymond. the cavalry was used in this advance in reconnoitring to find the roads: to cover our advances and to find the most practicable routes from one command to another so they could support each other in case of an attack. in making this move i estimated pemberton's movable force at vicksburg at about eighteen thousand men, with smaller forces at haines' bluff and jackson. it would not be possible for pemberton to attack me with all his troops at one place, and i determined to throw my army between his and fight him in detail. this was done with success, but i found afterwards that i had entirely under-estimated pemberton's strength. up to this point our movements had been made without serious opposition. my line was now nearly parallel with the jackson and vicksburg railroad and about seven miles south of it. the right was at raymond eighteen miles from jackson, mcpherson commanding; sherman in the centre on fourteen mile creek, his advance thrown across; mcclernand to the left, also on fourteen mile creek, advance across, and his pickets within two miles of edward's station, where the enemy had concentrated a considerable force and where they undoubtedly expected us to attack. mcclernand's left was on the big black. in all our moves, up to this time, the left had hugged the big black closely, and all the ferries had been guarded to prevent the enemy throwing a force on our rear. mcpherson encountered the enemy, five thousand strong with two batteries under general gregg, about two miles out of raymond. this was about two p.m. logan was in advance with one of his brigades. he deployed and moved up to engage the enemy. mcpherson ordered the road in rear to be cleared of wagons, and the balance of logan's division, and crocker's, which was still farther in rear, to come forward with all dispatch. the order was obeyed with alacrity. logan got his division in position for assault before crocker could get up, and attacked with vigor, carrying the enemy's position easily, sending gregg flying from the field not to appear against our front again until we met at jackson. in this battle mcpherson lost 66 killed, 339 wounded, and 37 missing --nearly or quite all from logan's division. the enemy's loss was 100 killed, 305 wounded, besides 415 taken prisoners. i regarded logan and crocker as being as competent division commanders as could be found in or out of the army and both equal to a much higher command. crocker, however, was dying of consumption when he volunteered. his weak condition never put him on the sick report when there was a battle in prospect, as long as he could keep on his feet. he died not long after the close of the rebellion. chapter xxxv. movement against jackson--fall of jackson--intercepting the enemy --battle of champion's hill. when the news reached me of mcpherson's victory at raymond about sundown my position was with sherman. i decided at once to turn the whole column towards jackson and capture that place without delay. pemberton was now on my left, with, as i supposed, about 18,000 men; in fact, as i learned afterwards, with nearly 50,000. a force was also collecting on my right, at jackson, the point where all the railroads communicating with vicksburg connect. all the enemy's supplies of men and stores would come by that point. as i hoped in the end to besiege vicksburg i must first destroy all possibility of aid. i therefore determined to move swiftly towards jackson, destroy or drive any force in that direction and then turn upon pemberton. but by moving against jackson, i uncovered my own communication. so i finally decided to have none--to cut loose altogether from my base and move my whole force eastward. i then had no fears for my communications, and if i moved quickly enough could turn upon pemberton before he could attack me in the rear. accordingly, all previous orders given during the day for movements on the 13th were annulled by new ones. mcpherson was ordered at daylight to move on clinton, ten miles from jackson; sherman was notified of my determination to capture jackson and work from there westward. he was ordered to start at four in the morning and march to raymond. mcclernand was ordered to march with three divisions by dillon's to raymond. one was left to guard the crossing of the big black. on the 10th i had received a letter from banks, on the red river, asking reinforcements. porter had gone to his assistance with a part of his fleet on the 3d, and i now wrote to him describing my position and declining to send any troops. i looked upon side movements as long as the enemy held port hudson and vicksburg as a waste of time and material. general joseph e. johnston arrived at jackson in the night of the 13th from tennessee, and immediately assumed command of all the confederate troops in mississippi. i knew he was expecting reinforcements from the south and east. on the 6th i had written to general halleck: "information from the other side leaves me to believe the enemy are bringing forces from tullahoma." up to this time my troops had been kept in supporting distances of each other, as far as the nature of the country would admit. reconnoissances were constantly made from each corps to enable them to acquaint themselves with the most practicable routes from one to another in case a union became necessary. mcpherson reached clinton with the advance early on the 13th and immediately set to work destroying the railroad. sherman's advance reached raymond before the last of mcpherson's command had got out of the town. mcclernand withdrew from the front of the enemy, at edward's station, with much skill and without loss, and reached his position for the night in good order. on the night of the 13th, mcpherson was ordered to march at early dawn upon jackson, only fifteen miles away. sherman was given the same order; but he was to move by the direct road from raymond to jackson, which is south of the road mcpherson was on and does not approach within two miles of it at the point where it crossed the line of intrenchments which, at that time, defended the city. mcclernand was ordered to move one division of his command to clinton, one division a few miles beyond mississippi springs following sherman's line, and a third to raymond. he was also directed to send his siege guns, four in number with the troops going by mississippi springs. mcclernand's position was an advantageous one in any event. with one division at clinton he was in position to reinforce mcpherson, at jackson, rapidly if it became necessary; the division beyond mississippi springs was equally available to reinforce sherman; the one at raymond could take either road. he still had two other divisions farther back now that blair had come up, available within a day at jackson. if this last command should not be wanted at jackson, they were already one day's march from there on their way to vicksburg and on three different roads leading to the latter city. but the most important consideration in my mind was to have a force confronting pemberton if he should come out to attack my rear. this i expected him to do; as shown further on, he was directed by johnston to make this very move. i notified general halleck that i should attack the state capital on the 14th. a courier carried the dispatch to grand gulf through an unprotected country. sherman and mcpherson communicated with each other during the night and arranged to reach jackson at about the same hour. it rained in torrents during the night of the 13th and the fore part of the day of the 14th. the roads were intolerable, and in some places on sherman's line, where the land was low, they were covered more than a foot deep with water. but the troops never murmured. by nine o'clock crocker, of mcpherson's corps, who was now in advance, came upon the enemy's pickets and speedily drove them in upon the main body. they were outside of the intrenchments in a strong position, and proved to be the troops that had been driven out of raymond. johnston had been reinforced; during the night by georgia and south carolina regiments, so that his force amounted to eleven thousand men, and he was expecting still more. sherman also came upon the rebel pickets some distance out from the town, but speedily drove them in. he was now on the south and south-west of jackson confronting the confederates behind their breastworks, while mcpherson's right was nearly two miles north, occupying a line running north and south across the vicksburg railroad. artillery was brought up and reconnoissances made preparatory to an assault. mcpherson brought up logan's division while he deployed crocker's for the assault. sherman made similar dispositions on the right. by eleven a.m. both were ready to attack. crocker moved his division forward, preceded by a strong skirmish line. these troops at once encountered the enemy's advance and drove it back on the main body, when they returned to their proper regiment and the whole division charged, routing the enemy completely and driving him into this main line. this stand by the enemy was made more than two miles outside of his main fortifications. mcpherson followed up with his command until within range of the guns of the enemy from their intrenchments, when he halted to bring his troops into line and reconnoitre to determine the next move. it was now about noon. while this was going on sherman was confronting a rebel battery which enfiladed the road on which he was marching--the mississippi springs road--and commanded a bridge spanning a stream over which he had to pass. by detaching right and left the stream was forced and the enemy flanked and speedily driven within the main line. this brought our whole line in front of the enemy's line of works, which was continuous on the north, west and south sides from the pearl river north of the city to the same river south. i was with sherman. he was confronted by a force sufficient to hold us back. appearances did not justify an assault where we were. i had directed sherman to send a force to the right, and to reconnoitre as far as to the pearl river. this force, tuttle's division, not returning i rode to the right with my staff, and soon found that the enemy had left that part of the line. tuttle's movement or mcpherson's pressure had no doubt led johnston to order a retreat, leaving only the men at the guns to retard us while he was getting away. tuttle had seen this and, passing through the lines without resistance, came up in the rear of the artillerists confronting sherman and captured them with ten pieces of artillery. i rode immediately to the state house, where i was soon followed by sherman. about the same time mcpherson discovered that the enemy was leaving his front, and advanced crocker, who was so close upon the enemy that they could not move their guns or destroy them. he captured seven guns and, moving on, hoisted the national flag over the rebel capital of mississippi. stevenson's brigade was sent to cut off the rebel retreat, but was too late or not expeditious enough. our loss in this engagement was: mcpherson, 37 killed, 228 wounded; sherman, 4 killed and 21 wounded and missing. the enemy lost 845 killed, wounded and captured. seventeen guns fell into our hands, and the enemy destroyed by fire their store-houses, containing a large amount of commissary stores. on this day blair reached new auburn and joined mcclernand's 4th division. he had with him two hundred wagons loaded with rations, the only commissary supplies received during the entire campaign. i slept that night in the room that johnston was said to have occupied the night before. about four in the afternoon i sent for the corps commanders and directed the dispositions to be made of their troops. sherman was to remain in jackson until he destroyed that place as a railroad centre, and manufacturing city of military supplies. he did the work most effectually. sherman and i went together into a manufactory which had not ceased work on account of the battle nor for the entrance of yankee troops. our presence did not seem to attract the attention of either the manager or the operatives, most of whom were girls. we looked on for a while to see the tent cloth which they were making roll out of the looms, with "c. s. a." woven in each bolt. there was an immense amount of cotton, in bales, stacked outside. finally i told sherman i thought they had done work enough. the operatives were told they could leave and take with them what cloth they could carry. in a few minutes cotton and factory were in a blaze. the proprietor visited washington while i was president to get his pay for this property, claiming that it was private. he asked me to give him a statement of the fact that his property had been destroyed by national troops, so that he might use it with congress where he was pressing, or proposed to press, his claim. i declined. on the night of the 13th johnston sent the following dispatch to pemberton at edward's station: "i have lately arrived, and learn that major-general sherman is between us with four divisions at clinton. it is important to establish communication, that you may be reinforced. if practicable, come up in his rear at once. to beat such a detachment would be of immense value. all the troops you can quickly assemble should be brought. time is all-important." this dispatch was sent in triplicate, by different messengers. one of the messengers happened to be a loyal man who had been expelled from memphis some months before by hurlbut for uttering disloyal and threatening sentiments. there was a good deal of parade about his expulsion, ostensibly as a warning to those who entertained the sentiments he expressed; but hurlbut and the expelled man understood each other. he delivered his copy of johnston's dispatch to mcpherson who forwarded it to me. receiving this dispatch on the 14th i ordered mcpherson to move promptly in the morning back to bolton, the nearest point where johnston could reach the road. bolton is about twenty miles west of jackson. i also informed mcclernand of the capture of jackson and sent him the following order: "it is evidently the design of the enemy to get north of us and cross the big black, and beat us into vicksburg. we must not allow them to do this. turn all your forces towards bolton station, and make all dispatch in getting there. move troops by the most direct road from wherever they may be on the receipt of this order." and to blair i wrote: "their design is evidently to cross the big black and pass down the peninsula between the big black and yazoo rivers. we must beat them. turn your troops immediately to bolton; take all the trains with you. smith's division, and any other troops now with you, will go to the same place. if practicable, take parallel roads, so as to divide your troops and train." johnston stopped on the canton road only six miles north of jackson, the night of the 14th. he sent from there to pemberton dispatches announcing the loss of jackson, and the following order: "as soon as the reinforcements are all up, they must be united to the rest of the army. i am anxious to see a force assembled that may be able to inflict a heavy blow upon the enemy. can grant supply himself from the mississippi? can you not cut him off from it, and above all, should he be compelled to fall back for want of supplies, beat him." the concentration of my troops was easy, considering the character of the country. mcpherson moved along the road parallel with and near the railroad. mcclernand's command was, one division (hovey's) on the road mcpherson had to take, but with a start of four miles. one (osterhaus) was at raymond, on a converging road that intersected the other near champion's hill; one (carr's) had to pass over the same road with osterhaus, but being back at mississippi springs, would not be detained by it; the fourth (smith's) with blair's division, was near auburn with a different road to pass over. mcclernand faced about and moved promptly. his cavalry from raymond seized bolton by half-past nine in the morning, driving out the enemy's pickets and capturing several men. the night of the 15th hovey was at bolton; carr and osterhaus were about three miles south, but abreast, facing west; smith was north of raymond with blair in his rear. mcpherson's command, with logan in front, had marched at seven o'clock, and by four reached hovey and went into camp; crocker bivouacked just in hovey's rear on the clinton road. sherman with two divisions, was in jackson, completing the destruction of roads, bridges and military factories. i rode in person out to clinton. on my arrival i ordered mcclernand to move early in the morning on edward's station, cautioning him to watch for the enemy and not bring on an engagement unless he felt very certain of success. i naturally expected that pemberton would endeavor to obey the orders of his superior, which i have shown were to attack us at clinton. this, indeed, i knew he could not do; but i felt sure he would make the attempt to reach that point. it turned out, however, that he had decided his superior's plans were impracticable, and consequently determined to move south from edward's station and get between me and my base. i, however, had no base, having abandoned it more than a week before. on the 15th pemberton had actually marched south from edward's station, but the rains had swollen baker's creek, which he had to cross so much that he could not ford it, and the bridges were washed away. this brought him back to the jackson road, on which there was a good bridge over baker's creek. some of his troops were marching until midnight to get there. receiving here early on the 16th a repetition of his order to join johnston at clinton, he concluded to obey, and sent a dispatch to his chief, informing him of the route by which he might be expected. about five o'clock in the morning (16th) two men, who had been employed on the jackson and vicksburg railroad, were brought to me. they reported that they had passed through pemberton's army in the night, and that it was still marching east. they reported him to have eighty regiments of infantry and ten batteries; in all, about twenty-five thousand men. i had expected to leave sherman at jackson another day in order to complete his work; but getting the above information i sent him orders to move with all dispatch to bolton, and to put one division with an ammunition train on the road at once, with directions to its commander to march with all possible speed until he came up to our rear. within an hour after receiving this order steele's division was on the road. at the same time i dispatched to blair, who was near auburn, to move with all speed to edward's station. mcclernand was directed to embrace blair in his command for the present. blair's division was a part of the 15th army corps (sherman's); but as it was on its way to join its corps, it naturally struck our left first, now that we had faced about and were moving west. the 15th corps, when it got up, would be on our extreme right. mcpherson was directed to get his trains out of the way of the troops, and to follow hovey's division as closely as possible. mcclernand had two roads about three miles apart, converging at edward's station, over which to march his troops. hovey's division of his corps had the advance on a third road (the clinton) still farther north. mcclernand was directed to move blair's and a. j. smith's divisions by the southernmost of these roads, and osterhaus and carr by the middle road. orders were to move cautiously with skirmishers to the front to feel for the enemy. smith's division on the most southern road was the first to encounter the enemy's pickets, who were speedily driven in. osterhaus, on the middle road, hearing the firing, pushed his skirmishers forward, found the enemy's pickets and forced them back to the main line. about the same time hovey encountered the enemy on the northern or direct wagon road from jackson to vicksburg. mcpherson was hastening up to join hovey, but was embarrassed by hovey's trains occupying the roads. i was still back at clinton. mcpherson sent me word of the situation, and expressed the wish that i was up. by half-past seven i was on the road and proceeded rapidly to the front, ordering all trains that were in front of troops off the road. when i arrived hovey's skirmishing amounted almost to a battle. mcclernand was in person on the middle road and had a shorter distance to march to reach the enemy's position than mcpherson. i sent him word by a staff officer to push forward and attack. these orders were repeated several times without apparently expediting mcclernand's advance. champion's hill, where pemberton had chosen his position to receive us, whether taken by accident or design, was well selected. it is one of the highest points in that section, and commanded all the ground in range. on the east side of the ridge, which is quite precipitous, is a ravine running first north, then westerly, terminating at baker's creek. it was grown up thickly with large trees and undergrowth, making it difficult to penetrate with troops, even when not defended. the ridge occupied by the enemy terminated abruptly where the ravine turns westerly. the left of the enemy occupied the north end of this ridge. the bolton and edward's station wagon-road turns almost due south at this point and ascends the ridge, which it follows for about a mile; then turning west, descends by a gentle declivity to baker's creek, nearly a mile away. on the west side the slope of the ridge is gradual and is cultivated from near the summit to the creek. there was, when we were there, a narrow belt of timber near the summit west of the road. from raymond there is a direct road to edward's station, some three miles west of champion's hill. there is one also to bolton. from this latter road there is still another, leaving it about three and a half miles before reaching bolton and leads direct to the same station. it was along these two roads that three divisions of mcclernand's corps, and blair of sherman's, temporarily under mcclernand, were moving. hovey of mcclernand's command was with mcpherson, farther north on the road from bolton direct to edward's station. the middle road comes into the northern road at the point where the latter turns to the west and descends to baker's creek; the southern road is still several miles south and does not intersect the others until it reaches edward's station. pemberton's lines covered all these roads, and faced east. hovey's line, when it first drove in the enemy's pickets, was formed parallel to that of the enemy and confronted his left. by eleven o'clock the skirmishing had grown into a hard-contested battle. hovey alone, before other troops could be got to assist him, had captured a battery of the enemy. but he was not able to hold his position and had to abandon the artillery. mcpherson brought up his troops as fast as possible, logan in front, and posted them on the right of hovey and across the flank of the enemy. logan reinforced hovey with one brigade from his division; with his other two he moved farther west to make room for crocker, who was coming up as rapidly as the roads would admit. hovey was still being heavily pressed, and was calling on me for more reinforcements. i ordered crocker, who was now coming up, to send one brigade from his division. mcpherson ordered two batteries to be stationed where they nearly enfiladed the enemy's line, and they did good execution. from logan's position now a direct forward movement carried him over open fields, in rear of the enemy and in a line parallel with them. he did make exactly this move, attacking, however, the enemy through the belt of woods covering the west slope of the hill for a short distance. up to this time i had kept my position near hovey where we were the most heavily pressed; but about noon i moved with a part of my staff by our right around, until i came up with logan himself. i found him near the road leading down to baker's creek. he was actually in command of the only road over which the enemy could retreat; hovey, reinforced by two brigades from mcpherson's command, confronted the enemy's left; crocker, with two brigades, covered their left flank; mcclernand two hours before, had been within two miles and a half of their centre with two divisions, and the two divisions, blair's and a. j. smith's, were confronting the rebel right; ransom, with a brigade of mcarthur's division of the 17th corps (mcpherson's), had crossed the river at grand gulf a few days before, and was coming up on their right flank. neither logan nor i knew that we had cut off the retreat of the enemy. just at this juncture a messenger came from hovey, asking for more reinforcements. there were none to spare. i then gave an order to move mcpherson's command by the left flank around to hovey. this uncovered the rebel line of retreat, which was soon taken advantage of by the enemy. during all this time, hovey, reinforced as he was by a brigade from logan and another from crocker, and by crocker gallantly coming up with two other brigades on his right, had made several assaults, the last one about the time the road was opened to the rear. the enemy fled precipitately. this was between three and four o'clock. i rode forward, or rather back, to where the middle road intersects the north road, and found the skirmishers of carr's division just coming in. osterhaus was farther south and soon after came up with skirmishers advanced in like manner. hovey's division, and mcpherson's two divisions with him, had marched and fought from early dawn, and were not in the best condition to follow the retreating foe. i sent orders to osterhaus to pursue the enemy, and to carr, whom i saw personally, i explained the situation and directed him to pursue vigorously as far as the big black, and to cross it if he could; osterhaus to follow him. the pursuit was continued until after dark. the battle of champion's hill lasted about four hours, hard fighting, preceded by two or three hours of skirmishing, some of which almost rose to the dignity of battle. every man of hovey's division and of mcpherson's two divisions was engaged during the battle. no other part of my command was engaged at all, except that as described before. osterhaus's and a. j. smith's divisions had encountered the rebel advanced pickets as early as half-past seven. their positions were admirable for advancing upon the enemy's line. mcclernand, with two divisions, was within a few miles of the battle-field long before noon and in easy hearing. i sent him repeated orders by staff officers fully competent to explain to him the situation. these traversed the wood separating us, without escort, and directed him to push forward; but he did not come. it is true, in front of mcclernand there was a small force of the enemy and posted in a good position behind a ravine obstructing his advance; but if he had moved to the right by the road my staff officers had followed the enemy must either have fallen back or been cut off. instead of this he sent orders to hovey, who belonged to his corps, to join on to his right flank. hovey was bearing the brunt of the battle at the time. to obey the order he would have had to pull out from the front of the enemy and march back as far as mcclernand had to advance to get into battle and substantially over the same ground. of course i did not permit hovey to obey the order of his intermediate superior. we had in this battle about 15,000 men absolutely engaged. this excludes those that did not get up, all of mcclernand's command except hovey. our loss was 410 killed, 1,844 wounded and 187 missing. hovey alone lost 1,200 killed, wounded and missing--more than one-third of his division. had mcclernand come up with reasonable promptness, or had i known the ground as i did afterwards, i cannot see how pemberton could have escaped with any organized force. as it was he lost over three thousand killed and wounded and about three thousand captured in battle and in pursuit. loring's division, which was the right of pemberton's line, was cut off from the retreating army and never got back into vicksburg. pemberton himself fell back that night to the big black river. his troops did not stop before midnight and many of them left before the general retreat commenced, and no doubt a good part of them returned to their homes. logan alone captured 1,300 prisoners and eleven guns. hovey captured 300 under fire and about 700 in all, exclusive of 500 sick and wounded whom he paroled, thus making 1,200. mcpherson joined in the advance as soon as his men could fill their cartridge-boxes, leaving one brigade to guard our wounded. the pursuit was continued as long as it was light enough to see the road. the night of the 16th of may found mcpherson's command bivouacked from two to six miles west of the battlefield, along the line of the road to vicksburg. carr and osterhaus were at edward's station, and blair was about three miles south-east; hovey remained on the field where his troops had fought so bravely and bled so freely. much war material abandoned by the enemy was picked up on the battle-field, among it thirty pieces of artillery. i pushed through the advancing column with my staff and kept in advance until after night. finding ourselves alone we stopped and took possession of a vacant house. as no troops came up we moved back a mile or more until we met the head of the column just going into bivouac on the road. we had no tents, so we occupied the porch of a house which had been taken for a rebel hospital and which was filled with wounded and dying who had been brought from the battle-field we had just left. while a battle is raging one can see his enemy mowed down by the thousand, or the ten thousand, with great composure; but after the battle these scenes are distressing, and one is naturally disposed to do as much to alleviate the suffering of an enemy as a friend. chapter xxxvi. battle of black river bridge--crossing the big black--investment of vicksburg--assaulting the works. we were now assured of our position between johnston and pemberton, without a possibility of a junction of their forces. pemberton might have made a night march to the big black, crossed the bridge there and, by moving north on the west side, have eluded us and finally returned to johnston. but this would have given us vicksburg. it would have been his proper move, however, and the one johnston would have made had he been in pemberton's place. in fact it would have been in conformity with johnston's orders to pemberton. sherman left jackson with the last of his troops about noon on the 16th and reached bolton, twenty miles west, before halting. his rear guard did not get in until two a.m. the 17th, but renewed their march by daylight. he paroled his prisoners at jackson, and was forced to leave his own wounded in care of surgeons and attendants. at bolton he was informed of our victory. he was directed to commence the march early next day, and to diverge from the road he was on to bridgeport on the big black river, some eleven miles above the point where we expected to find the enemy. blair was ordered to join him there with the pontoon train as early as possible. this movement brought sherman's corps together, and at a point where i hoped a crossing of the big black might be effected and sherman's corps used to flank the enemy out of his position in our front, thus opening a crossing for the remainder of the army. i informed him that i would endeavor to hold the enemy in my front while he crossed the river. the advance division, carr's (mcclernand's corps), resumed the pursuit at half-past three a.m. on the 17th, followed closely by osterhaus, mcpherson bringing up the rear with his corps. as i expected, the enemy was found in position on the big black. the point was only six miles from that where my advance had rested for the night, and was reached at an early hour. here the river makes a turn to the west, and has washed close up to the high land; the east side is a low bottom, sometimes overflowed at very high water, but was cleared and in cultivation. a bayou runs irregularly across this low land, the bottom of which, however, is above the surface of the big black at ordinary stages. when the river is full water runs through it, converting the point of land into an island. the bayou was grown up with timber, which the enemy had felled into the ditch. at this time there was a foot or two of water in it. the rebels had constructed a parapet along the inner bank of this bayou by using cotton bales from the plantation close by and throwing dirt over them. the whole was thoroughly commanded from the height west of the river. at the upper end of the bayou there was a strip of uncleared land which afforded a cover for a portion of our men. carr's division was deployed on our right, lawler's brigade forming his extreme right and reaching through these woods to the river above. osterhaus' division was deployed to the left of carr and covered the enemy's entire front. mcpherson was in column on the road, the head close by, ready to come in wherever he could be of assistance. while the troops were standing as here described an officer from banks' staff came up and presented me with a letter from general halleck, dated the 11th of may. it had been sent by the way of new orleans to banks to be forwarded to me. it ordered me to return to grand gulf and to co-operate from there with banks against port hudson, and then to return with our combined forces to besiege vicksburg. i told the officer that the order came too late, and that halleck would not give it now if he knew our position. the bearer of the dispatch insisted that i ought to obey the order, and was giving arguments to support his position when i heard great cheering to the right of our line and, looking in that direction, saw lawler in his shirt sleeves leading a charge upon the enemy. i immediately mounted my horse and rode in the direction of the charge, and saw no more of the officer who delivered the dispatch; i think not even to this day. the assault was successful. but little resistance was made. the enemy fled from the west bank of the river, burning the bridge behind him and leaving the men and guns on the east side to fall into our hands. many tried to escape by swimming the river. some succeeded and some were drowned in the attempt. eighteen guns were captured and 1,751 prisoners. our loss was 39 killed, 237 wounded and 3 missing. the enemy probably lost but few men except those captured and drowned. but for the successful and complete destruction of the bridge, i have but little doubt that we should have followed the enemy so closely as to prevent his occupying his defences around vicksburg. as the bridge was destroyed and the river was high, new bridges had to be built. it was but little after nine o'clock a.m. when the capture took place. as soon as work could be commenced, orders were given for the construction of three bridges. one was taken charge of by lieutenant hains, of the engineer corps, one by general mcpherson himself and one by general ransom, a most gallant and intelligent volunteer officer. my recollection is that hains built a raft bridge; mcpherson a pontoon, using cotton bales in large numbers, for pontoons; and that ransom felled trees on opposite banks of the river, cutting only on one side of the tree, so that they would fall with their tops interlacing in the river, without the trees being entirely severed from their stumps. a bridge was then made with these trees to support the roadway. lumber was taken from buildings, cotton gins and wherever found, for this purpose. by eight o'clock in the morning of the 18th all three bridges were complete and the troops were crossing. sherman reached bridgeport about noon of the 17th and found blair with the pontoon train already there. a few of the enemy were intrenched on the west bank, but they made little resistance and soon surrendered. two divisions were crossed that night and the third the following morning. on the 18th i moved along the vicksburg road in advance of the troops and as soon as possible joined sherman. my first anxiety was to secure a base of supplies on the yazoo river above vicksburg. sherman's line of march led him to the very point on walnut hills occupied by the enemy the december before when he was repulsed. sherman was equally anxious with myself. our impatience led us to move in advance of the column and well up with the advanced skirmishers. there were some detached works along the crest of the hill. these were still occupied by the enemy, or else the garrison from haines' bluff had not all got past on their way to vicksburg. at all events the bullets of the enemy whistled by thick and fast for a short time. in a few minutes sherman had the pleasure of looking down from the spot coveted so much by him the december before on the ground where his command had lain so helpless for offensive action. he turned to me, saying that up to this minute he had felt no positive assurance of success. this, however, he said was the end of one of the greatest campaigns in history and i ought to make a report of it at once. vicksburg was not yet captured, and there was no telling what might happen before it was taken; but whether captured or not, this was a complete and successful campaign. i do not claim to quote sherman's language; but the substance only. my reason for mentioning this incident will appear further on. mcpherson, after crossing the big black, came into the jackson and vicksburg road which sherman was on, but to his rear. he arrived at night near the lines of the enemy, and went into camp. mcclernand moved by the direct road near the railroad to mount albans, and then turned to the left and put his troops on the road from baldwin's ferry to vicksburg. this brought him south of mcpherson. i now had my three corps up the works built for the defence of vicksburg, on three roads --one to the north, one to the east and one to the south-east of the city. by the morning of the 19th the investment was as complete as my limited number of troops would allow. sherman was on the right, and covered the high ground from where it overlooked the yazoo as far south-east as his troops would extend. mcpherson joined on to his left, and occupied ground on both sides of the jackson road. mcclernand took up the ground to his left and extended as far towards warrenton as he could, keeping a continuous line. on the 19th there was constant skirmishing with the enemy while we were getting into better position. the enemy had been much demoralized by his defeats at champion's hill and the big black, and i believed he would not make much effort to hold vicksburg. accordingly, at two o'clock i ordered an assault. it resulted in securing more advanced positions for all our troops where they were fully covered from the fire of the enemy. the 20th and 21st were spent in strengthening our position and in making roads in rear of the army, from yazoo river or chickasaw bayou. most of the army had now been for three weeks with only five days' rations issued by the commissary. they had an abundance of food, however, but began to feel the want of bread. i remember that in passing around to the left of the line on the 21st, a soldier, recognizing me, said in rather a low voice, but yet so that i heard him, "hard tack." in a moment the cry was taken up all along the line, "hard tack! hard tack!" i told the men nearest to me that we had been engaged ever since the arrival of the troops in building a road over which to supply them with everything they needed. the cry was instantly changed to cheers. by the night of the 21st all the troops had full rations issued to them. the bread and coffee were highly appreciated. i now determined on a second assault. johnston was in my rear, only fifty miles away, with an army not much inferior in numbers to the one i had with me, and i knew he was being reinforced. there was danger of his coming to the assistance of pemberton, and after all he might defeat my anticipations of capturing the garrison if, indeed, he did not prevent the capture of the city. the immediate capture of vicksburg would save sending me the reinforcements which were so much wanted elsewhere, and would set free the army under me to drive johnston from the state. but the first consideration of all was--the troops believed they could carry the works in their front, and would not have worked so patiently in the trenches if they had not been allowed to try. the attack was ordered to commence on all parts of the line at ten o'clock a.m. on the 22d with a furious cannonade from every battery in position. all the corps commanders set their time by mine so that all might open the engagement at the same minute. the attack was gallant, and portions of each of the three corps succeeded in getting up to the very parapets of the enemy and in planting their battle flags upon them; but at no place were we able to enter. general mcclernand reported that he had gained the enemy's intrenchments at several points, and wanted reinforcements. i occupied a position from which i believed i could see as well as he what took place in his front, and i did not see the success he reported. but his request for reinforcements being repeated i could not ignore it, and sent him quinby's division of the 17th corps. sherman and mcpherson were both ordered to renew their assaults as a diversion in favor of mcclernand. this last attack only served to increase our casualties without giving any benefit whatever. as soon as it was dark our troops that had reached the enemy's line and been obliged to remain there for security all day, were withdrawn; and thus ended the last assault upon vicksburg. chapter xxxvii siege of vicksburg. i now determined upon a regular siege--to "out-camp the enemy," as it were, and to incur no more losses. the experience of the 22d convinced officers and men that this was best, and they went to work on the defences and approaches with a will. with the navy holding the river, the investment of vicksburg was complete. as long as we could hold our position the enemy was limited in supplies of food, men and munitions of war to what they had on hand. these could not last always. the crossing of troops at bruinsburg commenced april 30th. on the 18th of may the army was in rear of vicksburg. on the 19th, just twenty days after the crossing, the city was completely invested and an assault had been made: five distinct battles (besides continuous skirmishing) had been fought and won by the union forces; the capital of the state had fallen and its arsenals, military manufactories and everything useful for military purposes had been destroyed; an average of about one hundred and eighty miles had been marched by the troops engaged; but five days' rations had been issued, and no forage; over six thousand prisoners had been captured, and as many more of the enemy had been killed or wounded; twenty-seven heavy cannon and sixty-one field-pieces had fallen into our hands; and four hundred miles of the river, from vicksburg to port hudson, had become ours. the union force that had crossed the mississippi river up to this time was less than forty-three thousand men. one division of these, blair's, only arrived in time to take part in the battle of champion's hill, but was not engaged there; and one brigade, ransom's of mcpherson's corps, reached the field after the battle. the enemy had at vicksburg, grand gulf, jackson, and on the roads between these places, over sixty thousand men. they were in their own country, where no rear guards were necessary. the country is admirable for defence, but difficult for the conduct of an offensive campaign. all their troops had to be met. we were fortunate, to say the least, in meeting them in detail: at port gibson seven or eight thousand; at raymond, five thousand; at jackson, from eight to eleven thousand; at champion's hill, twenty-five thousand; at the big black, four thousand. a part of those met at jackson were all that was left of those encountered at raymond. they were beaten in detail by a force smaller than their own, upon their own ground. our loss up to this time was: killed wounded missing port gibson..... 131 719 25 south fork bayou pierre..... .. 1 .. skirmishes, may 3 ..... 1 9 .. fourteen mile creek..... 6 24 .. raymond............... 66 339 39 jackson..... 42 251 7 champion's hill..... 410 1,844 187 big black..... 39 237 3 bridgeport..... .. 1 .. total..... 695 3,425 259 of the wounded many were but slightly so, and continued on duty. not half of them were disabled for any length of time. after the unsuccessful assault of the 22d the work of the regular siege began. sherman occupied the right starting from the river above vicksburg, mcpherson the centre (mcarthur's division now with him) and mcclernand the left, holding the road south to warrenton. lauman's division arrived at this time and was placed on the extreme left of the line. in the interval between the assaults of the 19th and 22d, roads had been completed from the yazoo river and chickasaw bayou, around the rear of the army, to enable us to bring up supplies of food and ammunition; ground had been selected and cleared on which the troops were to be encamped, and tents and cooking utensils were brought up. the troops had been without these from the time of crossing the mississippi up to this time. all was now ready for the pick and spade. prentiss and hurlbut were ordered to send forward every man that could be spared. cavalry especially was wanted to watch the fords along the big black, and to observe johnston. i knew that johnston was receiving reinforcements from bragg, who was confronting rosecrans in tennessee. vicksburg was so important to the enemy that i believed he would make the most strenuous efforts to raise the siege, even at the risk of losing ground elsewhere. my line was more than fifteen miles long, extending from haines' bluff to vicksburg, thence to warrenton. the line of the enemy was about seven. in addition to this, having an enemy at canton and jackson, in our rear, who was being constantly reinforced, we required a second line of defence facing the other way. i had not troops enough under my command to man these. general halleck appreciated the situation and, without being asked, forwarded reinforcements with all possible dispatch. the ground about vicksburg is admirable for defence. on the north it is about two hundred feet above the mississippi river at the highest point and very much cut up by the washing rains; the ravines were grown up with cane and underbrush, while the sides and tops were covered with a dense forest. farther south the ground flattens out somewhat, and was in cultivation. but here, too, it was cut up by ravines and small streams. the enemy's line of defence followed the crest of a ridge from the river north of the city eastward, then southerly around to the jackson road, full three miles back of the city; thence in a southwesterly direction to the river. deep ravines of the description given lay in front of these defences. as there is a succession of gullies, cut out by rains along the side of the ridge, the line was necessarily very irregular. to follow each of these spurs with intrenchments, so as to command the slopes on either side, would have lengthened their line very much. generally therefore, or in many places, their line would run from near the head of one gully nearly straight to the head of another, and an outer work triangular in shape, generally open in the rear, was thrown up on the point; with a few men in this outer work they commanded the approaches to the main line completely. the work to be done, to make our position as strong against the enemy as his was against us, was very great. the problem was also complicated by our wanting our line as near that of the enemy as possible. we had but four engineer officers with us. captain prime, of the engineer corps, was the chief, and the work at the beginning was mainly directed by him. his health soon gave out, when he was succeeded by captain comstock, also of the engineer corps. to provide assistants on such a long line i directed that all officers who had graduated at west point, where they had necessarily to study military engineering, should in addition to their other duties assist in the work. the chief quartermaster and the chief commissary were graduates. the chief commissary, now the commissary-general of the army, begged off, however, saying that there was nothing in engineering that he was good for unless he would do for a sap-roller. as soldiers require rations while working in the ditches as well as when marching and fighting, and as we would be sure to lose him if he was used as a sap-roller, i let him off. the general is a large man; weighs two hundred and twenty pounds, and is not tall. we had no siege guns except six thirty-two pounders, and there were none at the west to draw from. admiral porter, however, supplied us with a battery of navy-guns of large calibre, and with these, and the field artillery used in the campaign, the siege began. the first thing to do was to get the artillery in batteries where they would occupy commanding positions; then establish the camps, under cover from the fire of the enemy but as near up as possible; and then construct rifle-pits and covered ways, to connect the entire command by the shortest route. the enemy did not harass us much while we were constructing our batteries. probably their artillery ammunition was short; and their infantry was kept down by our sharpshooters, who were always on the alert and ready to fire at a head whenever it showed itself above the rebel works. in no place were our lines more than six hundred yards from the enemy. it was necessary, therefore, to cover our men by something more than the ordinary parapet. to give additional protection sand bags, bullet-proof, were placed along the tops of the parapets far enough apart to make loop-holes for musketry. on top of these, logs were put. by these means the men were enabled to walk about erect when off duty, without fear of annoyance from sharpshooters. the enemy used in their defence explosive musket-balls, no doubt thinking that, bursting over our men in the trenches, they would do some execution; but i do not remember a single case where a man was injured by a piece of one of these shells. when they were hit and the ball exploded, the wound was terrible. in these cases a solid ball would have hit as well. their use is barbarous, because they produce increased suffering without any corresponding advantage to those using them. the enemy could not resort to our method to protect their men, because we had an inexhaustible supply of ammunition to draw upon and used it freely. splinters from the timber would have made havoc among the men behind. there were no mortars with the besiegers, except what the navy had in front of the city; but wooden ones were made by taking logs of the toughest wood that could be found, boring them out for six or twelve pound shells and binding them with strong iron bands. these answered as cochorns, and shells were successfully thrown from them into the trenches of the enemy. the labor of building the batteries and intrenching was largely done by the pioneers, assisted by negroes who came within our lines and who were paid for their work; but details from the troops had often to be made. the work was pushed forward as rapidly as possible, and when an advanced position was secured and covered from the fire of the enemy the batteries were advanced. by the 30th of june there were two hundred and twenty guns in position, mostly light field-pieces, besides a battery of heavy guns belonging to, manned and commanded by the navy. we were now as strong for defence against the garrison of vicksburg as they were against us; but i knew that johnston was in our rear, and was receiving constant reinforcements from the east. he had at this time a larger force than i had had at any time prior to the battle of champion's hill. as soon as the news of the arrival of the union army behind vicksburg reached the north, floods of visitors began to pour in. some came to gratify curiosity; some to see sons or brothers who had passed through the terrible ordeal; members of the christian and sanitary associations came to minister to the wants of the sick and the wounded. often those coming to see a son or brother would bring a dozen or two of poultry. they did not know how little the gift would be appreciated. many of the soldiers had lived so much on chickens, ducks and turkeys without bread during the march, that the sight of poultry, if they could get bacon, almost took away their appetite. but the intention was good. among the earliest arrivals was the governor of illinois, with most of the state officers. i naturally wanted to show them what there was of most interest. in sherman's front the ground was the most broken and most wooded, and more was to be seen without exposure. i therefore took them to sherman's headquarters and presented them. before starting out to look at the lines--possibly while sherman's horse was being saddled --there were many questions asked about the late campaign, about which the north had been so imperfectly informed. there was a little knot around sherman and another around me, and i heard sherman repeating, in the most animated manner, what he had said to me when we first looked down from walnut hills upon the land below on the 18th of may, adding: "grant is entitled to every bit of the credit for the campaign; i opposed it. i wrote him a letter about it." but for this speech it is not likely that sherman's opposition would have ever been heard of. his untiring energy and great efficiency during the campaign entitle him to a full share of all the credit due for its success. he could not have done more if the plan had been his own. (*13) on the 26th of may i sent blair's division up the yazoo to drive out a force of the enemy supposed to be between the big black and the yazoo. the country was rich and full of supplies of both food and forage. blair was instructed to take all of it. the cattle were to be driven in for the use of our army, and the food and forage to be consumed by our troops or destroyed by fire; all bridges were to be destroyed, and the roads rendered as nearly impassable as possible. blair went forty-five miles and was gone almost a week. his work was effectually done. i requested porter at this time to send the marine brigade, a floating nondescript force which had been assigned to his command and which proved very useful, up to haines' bluff to hold it until reinforcements could be sent. on the 26th i also received a letter from banks, asking me to reinforce him with ten thousand men at port hudson. of course i could not comply with his request, nor did i think he needed them. he was in no danger of an attack by the garrison in his front, and there was no army organizing in his rear to raise the siege. on the 3d of june a brigade from hurlbut's command arrived, general kimball commanding. it was sent to mechanicsburg, some miles north-east of haines' bluff and about midway between the big black and the yazoo. a brigade of blair's division and twelve hundred cavalry had already, on blair's return from the yazoo, been sent to the same place with instructions to watch the crossings of the big black river, to destroy the roads in his (blair's) front, and to gather or destroy all supplies. on the 7th of june our little force of colored and white troops across the mississippi, at milliken's bend, were attacked by about 3,000 men from richard taylor's trans-mississippi command. with the aid of the gunboats they were speedily repelled. i sent mower's brigade over with instructions to drive the enemy beyond the tensas bayou; and we had no further trouble in that quarter during the siege. this was the first important engagement of the war in which colored troops were under fire. these men were very raw, having all been enlisted since the beginning of the siege, but they behaved well. on the 8th of june a full division arrived from hurlbut's command, under general sooy smith. it was sent immediately to haines' bluff, and general c. c. washburn was assigned to the general command at that point. on the 11th a strong division arrived from the department of the missouri under general herron, which was placed on our left. this cut off the last possible chance of communication between pemberton and johnston, as it enabled lauman to close up on mcclernand's left while herron intrenched from lauman to the water's edge. at this point the water recedes a few hundred yards from the high land. through this opening no doubt the confederate commanders had been able to get messengers under cover of night. on the 14th general parke arrived with two divisions of burnside's corps, and was immediately dispatched to haines' bluff. these latter troops--herron's and parke's--were the reinforcements already spoken of sent by halleck in anticipation of their being needed. they arrived none too soon. i now had about seventy-one thousand men. more than half were disposed across the peninsula, between the yazoo at haines' bluff and the big black, with the division of osterhaus watching the crossings of the latter river farther south and west from the crossing of the jackson road to baldwin's ferry and below. there were eight roads leading into vicksburg, along which and their immediate sides, our work was specially pushed and batteries advanced; but no commanding point within range of the enemy was neglected. on the 17th i received a letter from general sherman and one on the 18th from general mcpherson, saying that their respective commands had complained to them of a fulsome, congratulatory order published by general mcclernand to the 13th corps, which did great injustice to the other troops engaged in the campaign. this order had been sent north and published, and now papers containing it had reached our camps. the order had not been heard of by me, and certainly not by troops outside of mcclernand's command until brought in this way. i at once wrote to mcclernand, directing him to send me a copy of this order. he did so, and i at once relieved him from the command of the 13th army corps and ordered him back to springfield, illinois. the publication of his order in the press was in violation of war department orders and also of mine. chapter xxxviii. johnston's movements--fortifications at haines' bluff--explosion of the mine--explosion of the second mine--preparing for the assault--the flag of truce--meeting with pemberton--negotiations for surrender--accepting the terms--surrender of vicksburg. on the 22d of june positive information was received that johnston had crossed the big black river for the purpose of attacking our rear, to raise the siege and release pemberton. the correspondence between johnston and pemberton shows that all expectation of holding vicksburg had by this time passed from johnston's mind. i immediately ordered sherman to the command of all the forces from haines' bluff to the big black river. this amounted now to quite half the troops about vicksburg. besides these, herron and a. j. smith's divisions were ordered to hold themselves in readiness to reinforce sherman. haines' bluff had been strongly fortified on the land side, and on all commanding points from there to the big black at the railroad crossing batteries had been constructed. the work of connecting by rifle-pits where this was not already done, was an easy task for the troops that were to defend them. we were now looking west, besieging pemberton, while we were also looking east to defend ourselves against an expected siege by johnston. but as against the garrison of vicksburg we were as substantially protected as they were against us. where we were looking east and north we were strongly fortified, and on the defensive. johnston evidently took in the situation and wisely, i think, abstained from making an assault on us because it would simply have inflicted loss on both sides without accomplishing any result. we were strong enough to have taken the offensive against him; but i did not feel disposed to take any risk of losing our hold upon pemberton's army, while i would have rejoiced at the opportunity of defending ourselves against an attack by johnston. from the 23d of may the work of fortifying and pushing forward our position nearer to the enemy had been steadily progressing. at three points on the jackson road, in front of leggett's brigade, a sap was run up to the enemy's parapet, and by the 25th of june we had it undermined and the mine charged. the enemy had countermined, but did not succeed in reaching our mine. at this particular point the hill on which the rebel work stands rises abruptly. our sap ran close up to the outside of the enemy's parapet. in fact this parapet was also our protection. the soldiers of the two sides occasionally conversed pleasantly across this barrier; sometimes they exchanged the hard bread of the union soldiers for the tobacco of the confederates; at other times the enemy threw over hand-grenades, and often our men, catching them in their hands, returned them. our mine had been started some distance back down the hill; consequently when it had extended as far as the parapet it was many feet below it. this caused the failure of the enemy in his search to find and destroy it. on the 25th of june at three o'clock, all being ready, the mine was exploded. a heavy artillery fire all along the line had been ordered to open with the explosion. the effect was to blow the top of the hill off and make a crater where it stood. the breach was not sufficient to enable us to pass a column of attack through. in fact, the enemy having failed to reach our mine had thrown up a line farther back, where most of the men guarding that point were placed. there were a few men, however, left at the advance line, and others working in the countermine, which was still being pushed to find ours. all that were there were thrown into the air, some of them coming down on our side, still alive. i remember one colored man, who had been under ground at work when the explosion took place, who was thrown to our side. he was not much hurt, but terribly frightened. some one asked him how high he had gone up. "dun no, massa, but t'ink 'bout t'ree mile," was his reply. general logan commanded at this point and took this colored man to his quarters, where he did service to the end of the siege. as soon as the explosion took place the crater was seized by two regiments of our troops who were near by, under cover, where they had been placed for the express purpose. the enemy made a desperate effort to expel them, but failed, and soon retired behind the new line. from here, however, they threw hand-grenades, which did some execution. the compliment was returned by our men, but not with so much effect. the enemy could lay their grenades on the parapet, which alone divided the contestants, and roll them down upon us; while from our side they had to be thrown over the parapet, which was at considerable elevation. during the night we made efforts to secure our position in the crater against the missiles of the enemy, so as to run trenches along the outer base of their parapet, right and left; but the enemy continued throwing their grenades, and brought boxes of field ammunition (shells), the fuses of which they would light with portfires, and throw them by hand into our ranks. we found it impossible to continue this work. another mine was consequently started which was exploded on the 1st of july, destroying an entire rebel redan, killing and wounding a considerable number of its occupants and leaving an immense chasm where it stood. no attempt to charge was made this time, the experience of the 25th admonishing us. our loss in the first affair was about thirty killed and wounded. the enemy must have lost more in the two explosions than we did in the first. we lost none in the second. from this time forward the work of mining and pushing our position nearer to the enemy was prosecuted with vigor, and i determined to explode no more mines until we were ready to explode a number at different points and assault immediately after. we were up now at three different points, one in front of each corps, to where only the parapet of the enemy divided us. at this time an intercepted dispatch from johnston to pemberton informed me that johnston intended to make a determined attack upon us in order to relieve the garrison at vicksburg. i knew the garrison would make no formidable effort to relieve itself. the picket lines were so close to each other--where there was space enough between the lines to post pickets--that the men could converse. on the 21st of june i was informed, through this means, that pemberton was preparing to escape, by crossing to the louisiana side under cover of night; that he had employed workmen in making boats for that purpose; that the men had been canvassed to ascertain if they would make an assault on the "yankees" to cut their way out; that they had refused, and almost mutinied, because their commander would not surrender and relieve their sufferings, and had only been pacified by the assurance that boats enough would be finished in a week to carry them all over. the rebel pickets also said that houses in the city had been pulled down to get material to build these boats with. afterwards this story was verified: on entering the city we found a large number of very rudely constructed boats. all necessary steps were at once taken to render such an attempt abortive. our pickets were doubled; admiral porter was notified, so that the river might be more closely watched; material was collected on the west bank of the river to be set on fire and light up the river if the attempt was made; and batteries were established along the levee crossing the peninsula on the louisiana side. had the attempt been made the garrison of vicksburg would have been drowned, or made prisoners on the louisiana side. general richard taylor was expected on the west bank to co-operate in this movement, i believe, but he did not come, nor could he have done so with a force sufficient to be of service. the mississippi was now in our possession from its source to its mouth, except in the immediate front of vicksburg and of port hudson. we had nearly exhausted the country, along a line drawn from lake providence to opposite bruinsburg. the roads west were not of a character to draw supplies over for any considerable force. by the 1st of july our approaches had reached the enemy's ditch at a number of places. at ten points we could move under cover to within from five to one hundred yards of the enemy. orders were given to make all preparations for assault on the 6th of july. the debouches were ordered widened to afford easy egress, while the approaches were also to be widened to admit the troops to pass through four abreast. plank, and bags filled with cotton packed in tightly, were ordered prepared, to enable the troops to cross the ditches. on the night of the 1st of july johnston was between brownsville and the big black, and wrote pemberton from there that about the 7th of the month an attempt would be made to create a diversion to enable him to cut his way out. pemberton was a prisoner before this message reached him. on july 1st pemberton, seeing no hope of outside relief, addressed the following letter to each of his four division commanders: "unless the siege of vicksburg is raised, or supplies are thrown in, it will become necessary very shortly to evacuate the place. i see no prospect of the former, and there are many great, if not insuperable obstacles in the way of the latter. you are, therefore, requested to inform me with as little delay as possible, as to the condition of your troops and their ability to make the marches and undergo the fatigues necessary to accomplish a successful evacuation." two of his generals suggested surrender, and the other two practically did the same. they expressed the opinion that an attempt to evacuate would fail. pemberton had previously got a message to johnston suggesting that he should try to negotiate with me for a release of the garrison with their arms. johnston replied that it would be a confession of weakness for him to do so; but he authorized pemberton to use his name in making such an arrangement. on the 3d about ten o'clock a.m. white flags appeared on a portion of the rebel works. hostilities along that part of the line ceased at once. soon two persons were seen coming towards our lines bearing a white flag. they proved to be general bowen, a division commander, and colonel montgomery, aide-de-camp to pemberton, bearing the following letter to me: "i have the honor to propose an armistice for--hours, with the view to arranging terms for the capitulation of vicksburg. to this end, if agreeable to you, i will appoint three commissioners, to meet a like number to be named by yourself at such place and hour to-day as you may find convenient. i make this proposition to save the further effusion of blood, which must otherwise be shed to a frightful extent, feeling myself fully able to maintain my position for a yet indefinite period. this communication will be handed you under a flag of truce, by major-general john s. bowen." it was a glorious sight to officers and soldiers on the line where these white flags were visible, and the news soon spread to all parts of the command. the troops felt that their long and weary marches, hard fighting, ceaseless watching by night and day, in a hot climate, exposure to all sorts of weather, to diseases and, worst of all, to the gibes of many northern papers that came to them saying all their suffering was in vain, that vicksburg would never be taken, were at last at an end and the union sure to be saved. bowen was received by general a. j. smith, and asked to see me. i had been a neighbor of bowen's in missouri, and knew him well and favorably before the war; but his request was refused. he then suggested that i should meet pemberton. to this i sent a verbal message saying that, if pemberton desired it, i would meet him in front of mcpherson's corps at three o'clock that afternoon. i also sent the following written reply to pemberton's letter: "your note of this date is just received, proposing an armistice for several hours, for the purpose of arranging terms of capitulation through commissioners, to be appointed, etc. the useless effusion of blood you propose stopping by this course can be ended at any time you may choose, by the unconditional surrender of the city and garrison. men who have shown so much endurance and courage as those now in vicksburg, will always challenge the respect of an adversary, and i can assure you will be treated with all the respect due to prisoners of war. i do not favor the proposition of appointing commissioners to arrange the terms of capitulation, because i have no terms other than those indicated above." at three o'clock pemberton appeared at the point suggested in my verbal message, accompanied by the same officers who had borne his letter of the morning. generals ord, mcpherson, logan and a. j. smith, and several officers of my staff, accompanied me. our place of meeting was on a hillside within a few hundred feet of the rebel lines. near by stood a stunted oak-tree, which was made historical by the event. it was but a short time before the last vestige of its body, root and limb had disappeared, the fragments taken as trophies. since then the same tree has furnished as many cords of wood, in the shape of trophies, as "the true cross." pemberton and i had served in the same division during part of the mexican war. i knew him very well therefore, and greeted him as an old acquaintance. he soon asked what terms i proposed to give his army if it surrendered. my answer was the same as proposed in my reply to his letter. pemberton then said, rather snappishly, "the conference might as well end," and turned abruptly as if to leave. i said, "very well." general bowen, i saw, was very anxious that the surrender should be consummated. his manner and remarks while pemberton and i were talking, showed this. he now proposed that he and one of our generals should have a conference. i had no objection to this, as nothing could be made binding upon me that they might propose. smith and bowen accordingly had a conference, during which pemberton and i, moving a short distance away towards the enemy's lines were in conversation. after a while bowen suggested that the confederate army should be allowed to march out with the honors of war, carrying their small arms and field artillery. this was promptly and unceremoniously rejected. the interview here ended, i agreeing, however, to send a letter giving final terms by ten o'clock that night. word was sent to admiral porter soon after the correspondence with pemberton commenced, so that hostilities might be stopped on the part of both army and navy. it was agreed on my paging with pemberton that they should not be renewed until our correspondence ceased. when i returned to my headquarters i sent for all the corps and division commanders with the army immediately confronting vicksburg. half the army was from eight to twelve miles off, waiting for johnston. i informed them of the contents of pemberton's letters, of my reply and the substance of the interview, and that i was ready to hear any suggestion; but would hold the power of deciding entirely in my own hands. this was the nearest approach to a "council of war" i ever held. against the general, and almost unanimous judgment of the council i sent the following letter: "in conformity with agreement of this afternoon, i will submit the following proposition for the surrender of the city of vicksburg, public stores, etc. on your accepting the terms proposed, i will march in one division as a guard, and take possession at eight a.m. to-morrow. as soon as rolls can be made out, and paroles be signed by officers and men, you will be allowed to march out of our lines, the officers taking with them their side-arms and clothing, and the field, staff and cavalry officers one horse each. the rank and file will be allowed all their clothing, but no other property. if these conditions are accepted, any amount of rations you may deem necessary can be taken from the stores you now have, and also the necessary cooking utensils for preparing them. thirty wagons also, counting two two-horse or mule teams as one, will be allowed to transport such articles as cannot be carried along. the same conditions will be allowed to all sick and wounded officers and soldiers as fast as they become able to travel. the paroles for these latter must be signed, however, whilst officers present are authorized to sign the roll of prisoners." by the terms of the cartel then in force, prisoners captured by either army were required to be forwarded as soon as possible to either aiken's landing below dutch gap on the james river, or to vicksburg, there to be exchanged, or paroled until they could be exchanged. there was a confederate commissioner at vicksburg, authorized to make the exchange. i did not propose to take him a prisoner, but to leave him free to perform the functions of his office. had i insisted upon an unconditional surrender there would have been over thirty thousand men to transport to cairo, very much to the inconvenience of the army on the mississippi. thence the prisoners would have had to be transported by rail to washington or baltimore; thence again by steamer to aiken's--all at very great expense. at aiken's they would have had to be paroled, because the confederates did not have union prisoners to give in exchange. then again pemberton's army was largely composed of men whose homes were in the south-west; i knew many of them were tired of the war and would get home just as soon as they could. a large number of them had voluntarily come into our lines during the siege, and requested to be sent north where they could get employment until the war was over and they could go to their homes. late at night i received the following reply to my last letter: "i have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of this date, proposing terms of capitulation for this garrison and post. in the main your terms are accepted; but, in justice both to the honor and spirit of my troops manifested in the defence of vicksburg, i have to submit the following amendments, which, if acceded to by you, will perfect the agreement between us. at ten o'clock a.m. to-morrow, i propose to evacuate the works in and around vicksburg, and to surrender the city and garrison under my command, by marching out with my colors and arms, stacking them in front of my present lines. after which you will take possession. officers to retain their side-arms and personal property, and the rights and property of citizens to be respected." this was received after midnight. my reply was as follows: "i have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of 3d july. the amendment proposed by you cannot be acceded to in full. it will be necessary to furnish every officer and man with a parole signed by himself, which, with the completion of the roll of prisoners, will necessarily take some time. again, i can make no stipulations with regard to the treatment of citizens and their private property. while i do not propose to cause them any undue annoyance or loss, i cannot consent to leave myself under any restraint by stipulations. the property which officers will be allowed to take with them will be as stated in my proposition of last evening; that is, officers will be allowed their private baggage and side-arms, and mounted officers one horse each. if you mean by your proposition for each brigade to march to the front of the lines now occupied by it, and stack arms at ten o'clock a.m., and then return to the inside and there remain as prisoners until properly paroled, i will make no objection to it. should no notification be received of your acceptance of my terms by nine o'clock a.m. i shall regard them as having been rejected, and shall act accordingly. should these terms be accepted, white flags should be displayed along your lines to prevent such of my troops as may not have been notified, from firing upon your men." pemberton promptly accepted these terms. during the siege there had been a good deal of friendly sparring between the soldiers of the two armies, on picket and where the lines were close together. all rebels were known as "johnnies," all union troops as "yanks." often "johnny" would call: "well, yank, when are you coming into town?" the reply was sometimes: "we propose to celebrate the 4th of july there." sometimes it would be: "we always treat our prisoners with kindness and do not want to hurt them;" or, "we are holding you as prisoners of war while you are feeding yourselves." the garrison, from the commanding general down, undoubtedly expected an assault on the fourth. they knew from the temper of their men it would be successful when made; and that would be a greater humiliation than to surrender. besides it would be attended with severe loss to them. the vicksburg paper, which we received regularly through the courtesy of the rebel pickets, said prior to the fourth, in speaking of the "yankee" boast that they would take dinner in vicksburg that day, that the best receipt for cooking a rabbit was "first ketch your rabbit." the paper at this time and for some time previous was printed on the plain side of wall paper. the last number was issued on the fourth and announced that we had "caught our rabbit." i have no doubt that pemberton commenced his correspondence on the third with a two-fold purpose: first, to avoid an assault, which he knew would be successful, and second, to prevent the capture taking place on the great national holiday, the anniversary of the declaration of american independence. holding out for better terms as he did he defeated his aim in the latter particular. at the appointed hour the garrison of vicksburg marched out of their works and formed line in front, stacked arms and marched back in good order. our whole army present witnessed this scene without cheering. logan's division, which had approached nearest the rebel works, was the first to march in; and the flag of one of the regiments of his division was soon floating over the court-house. our soldiers were no sooner inside the lines than the two armies began to fraternize. our men had had full rations from the time the siege commenced, to the close. the enemy had been suffering, particularly towards the last. i myself saw our men taking bread from their haversacks and giving it to the enemy they had so recently been engaged in starving out. it was accepted with avidity and with thanks. pemberton says in his report: "if it should be asked why the 4th of july was selected as the day for surrender, the answer is obvious. i believed that upon that day i should obtain better terms. well aware of the vanity of our foe, i knew they would attach vast importance to the entrance on the 4th of july into the stronghold of the great river, and that, to gratify their national vanity, they would yield then what could not be extorted from them at any other time." this does not support my view of his reasons for selecting the day he did for surrendering. but it must be recollected that his first letter asking terms was received about 10 o'clock a.m., july 3d. it then could hardly be expected that it would take twenty-four hours to effect a surrender. he knew that johnston was in our rear for the purpose of raising the siege, and he naturally would want to hold out as long as he could. he knew his men would not resist an assault, and one was expected on the fourth. in our interview he told me he had rations enough to hold out for some time--my recollection is two weeks. it was this statement that induced me to insert in the terms that he was to draw rations for his men from his own supplies. on the 4th of july general holmes, with an army of eight or nine thousand men belonging to the trans-mississippi department, made an attack upon helena, arkansas. he was totally defeated by general prentiss, who was holding helena with less than forty-two hundred soldiers. holmes reported his loss at 1,636, of which 173 were killed; but as prentiss buried 400, holmes evidently understated his losses. the union loss was 57 killed, 127 wounded, and between 30 and 40 missing. this was the last effort on the part of the confederacy to raise the siege of vicksburg. on the third, as soon as negotiations were commenced, i notified sherman and directed him to be ready to take the offensive against johnston, drive him out of the state and destroy his army if he could. steele and ord were directed at the same time to be in readiness to join sherman as soon as the surrender took place. of this sherman was notified. i rode into vicksburg with the troops, and went to the river to exchange congratulations with the navy upon our joint victory. at that time i found that many of the citizens had been living under ground. the ridges upon which vicksburg is built, and those back to the big black, are composed of a deep yellow clay of great tenacity. where roads and streets are cut through, perpendicular banks are left and stand as well as if composed of stone. the magazines of the enemy were made by running passage-ways into this clay at places where there were deep cuts. many citizens secured places of safety for their families by carving out rooms in these embankments. a door-way in these cases would be cut in a high bank, starting from the level of the road or street, and after running in a few feet a room of the size required was carved out of the clay, the dirt being removed by the door-way. in some instances i saw where two rooms were cut out, for a single family, with a door-way in the clay wall separating them. some of these were carpeted and furnished with considerable elaboration. in these the occupants were fully secure from the shells of the navy, which were dropped into the city night and dav without intermission. i returned to my old headquarters outside in the afternoon, and did not move into the town until the sixth. on the afternoon of the fourth i sent captain wm. m. dunn of my staff to cairo, the nearest point where the telegraph could be reached, with a dispatch to the general-in-chief. it was as follows: "the enemy surrendered this morning. the only terms allowed is their parole as prisoners of war. this i regard as a great advantage to us at this moment. it saves, probably, several days in the capture, and leaves troops and transports ready for immediate service. sherman, with a large force, moves immediately on johnston, to drive him from the state. i will send troops to the relief of banks, and return the 9th army corps to burnside." this news, with the victory at gettysburg won the same day, lifted a great load of anxiety from the minds of the president, his cabinet and the loyal people all over the north. the fate of the confederacy was sealed when vicksburg fell. much hard fighting was to be done afterwards and many precious lives were to be sacrificed; but the morale was with the supporters of the union ever after. i at the same time wrote to general banks informing him of the fall and sending him a copy of the terms; also saying i would send him all the troops he wanted to insure the capture of the only foothold the enemy now had on the mississippi river. general banks had a number of copies of this letter printed, or at least a synopsis of it, and very soon a copy fell into the hands of general gardner, who was then in command of port hudson. gardner at once sent a letter to the commander of the national forces saying that he had been informed of the surrender of vicksburg and telling how the information reached him. he added that if this was true, it was useless for him to hold out longer. general banks gave him assurances that vicksburg had been surrendered, and general gardner surrendered unconditionally on the 9th of july. port hudson with nearly 6,000 prisoners, 51 guns, 5,000 small-arms and other stores fell into the hands of the union forces: from that day to the close of the rebellion the mississippi river, from its source to its mouth, remained in the control of the national troops. pemberton and his army were kept in vicksburg until the whole could be paroled. the paroles were in duplicate, by organization (one copy for each, federals and confederates), and signed by the commanding officers of the companies or regiments. duplicates were also made for each soldier and signed by each individually, one to be retained by the soldier signing and one to be retained by us. several hundred refused to sign their paroles, preferring to be sent to the north as prisoners to being sent back to fight again. others again kept out of the way, hoping to escape either alternative. pemberton appealed to me in person to compel these men to sign their paroles, but i declined. it also leaked out that many of the men who had signed their paroles, intended to desert and go to their homes as soon as they got out of our lines. pemberton hearing this, again appealed to me to assist him. he wanted arms for a battalion, to act as guards in keeping his men together while being marched to a camp of instruction, where he expected to keep them until exchanged. this request was also declined. it was precisely what i expected and hoped that they would do. i told him, however, that i would see that they marched beyond our lines in good order. by the eleventh, just one week after the surrender, the paroles were completed and the confederate garrison marched out. many deserted, and fewer of them were ever returned to the ranks to fight again than would have been the case had the surrender been unconditional and the prisoners sent to the james river to be paroled. as soon as our troops took possession of the city guards were established along the whole line of parapet, from the river above to the river below. the prisoners were allowed to occupy their old camps behind the intrenchments. no restraint was put upon them, except by their own commanders. they were rationed about as our own men, and from our supplies. the men of the two armies fraternized as if they had been fighting for the same cause. when they passed out of the works they had so long and so gallantly defended, between lines of their late antagonists, not a cheer went up, not a remark was made that would give pain. really, i believe there was a feeling of sadness just then in the breasts of most of the union soldiers at seeing the dejection of their late antagonists. the day before the departure the following order was issued: "paroled prisoners will be sent out of here to-morrow. they will be authorized to cross at the railroad bridge, and move from there to edward's ferry, (*14) and on by way of raymond. instruct the commands to be orderly and quiet as these prisoners pass, to make no offensive remarks, and not to harbor any who fall out of ranks after they have passed." chapter xxxix. retrospect of the campaign--sherman's movements--proposed movement upon mobile--a painful accident--ordered to report at cairo. the capture of vicksburg, with its garrison, ordnance and ordnance stores, and the successful battles fought in reaching them, gave new spirit to the loyal people of the north. new hopes for the final success of the cause of the union were inspired. the victory gained at gettysburg, upon the same day, added to their hopes. now the mississippi river was entirely in the possession of the national troops; for the fall of vicksburg gave us port hudson at once. the army of northern virginia was driven out of pennsylvania and forced back to about the same ground it occupied in 1861. the army of the tennessee united with the army of the gulf, dividing the confederate states completely. the first dispatch i received from the government after the fall of vicksburg was in these words: "i fear your paroling the prisoners at vicksburg, without actual delivery to a proper agent as required by the seventh article of the cartel, may be construed into an absolute release, and that the men will immediately be placed in the ranks of the enemy. such has been the case elsewhere. if these prisoners have not been allowed to depart, you will detain them until further orders." halleck did not know that they had already been delivered into the hands of major watts, confederate commissioner for the exchange of prisoners. at vicksburg 31,600 prisoners were surrendered, together with 172 cannon about 60,000 muskets and a large amount of ammunition. the small-arms of the enemy were far superior to the bulk of ours. up to this time our troops at the west had been limited to the old united states flint-lock muskets changed into percussion, or the belgian musket imported early in the war--almost as dangerous to the person firing it as to the one aimed at--and a few new and improved arms. these were of many different calibers, a fact that caused much trouble in distributing ammunition during an engagement. the enemy had generally new arms which had run the blockade and were of uniform caliber. after the surrender i authorized all colonels whose regiments were armed with inferior muskets, to place them in the stack of captured arms and replace them with the latter. a large number of arms turned in to the ordnance department as captured, were thus arms that had really been used by the union army in the capture of vicksburg. in this narrative i have not made the mention i should like of officers, dead and alive, whose services entitle them to special mention. neither have i made that mention of the navy which its services deserve. suffice it to say, the close of the siege of vicksburg found us with an army unsurpassed, in proportion to its numbers, taken as a whole of officers and men. a military education was acquired which no other school could have given. men who thought a company was quite enough for them to command properly at the beginning, would have made good regimental or brigade commanders; most of the brigade commanders were equal to the command of a division, and one, ransom, would have been equal to the command of a corps at least. logan and crocker ended the campaign fitted to command independent armies. general f. p. blair joined me at milliken's bend a full-fledged general, without having served in a lower grade. he commanded a division in the campaign. i had known blair in missouri, where i had voted against him in 1858 when he ran for congress. i knew him as a frank, positive and generous man, true to his friends even to a fault, but always a leader. i dreaded his coming; i knew from experience that it was more difficult to command two generals desiring to be leaders than it was to command one army officered intelligently and with subordination. it affords me the greatest pleasure to record now my agreeable disappointment in respect to his character. there was no man braver than he, nor was there any who obeyed all orders of his superior in rank with more unquestioning alacrity. he was one man as a soldier, another as a politician. the navy under porter was all it could be, during the entire campaign. without its assistance the campaign could not have been successfully made with twice the number of men engaged. it could not have been made at all, in the way it was, with any number of men without such assistance. the most perfect harmony reigned between the two arms of the service. there never was a request made, that i am aware of, either of the flag-officer or any of his subordinates, that was not promptly complied with. the campaign of vicksburg was suggested and developed by circumstances. the elections of 1862 had gone against the prosecution of the war. voluntary enlistments had nearly ceased and the draft had been resorted to; this was resisted, and a defeat or backward movement would have made its execution impossible. a forward movement to a decisive victory was necessary. accordingly i resolved to get below vicksburg, unite with banks against port hudson, make new orleans a base and, with that base and grand gulf as a starting point, move our combined forces against vicksburg. upon reaching grand gulf, after running its batteries and fighting a battle, i received a letter from banks informing me that he could not be at port hudson under ten days, and then with only fifteen thousand men. the time was worth more than the reinforcements; i therefore determined to push into the interior of the enemy's country. with a large river behind us, held above and below by the enemy, rapid movements were essential to success. jackson was captured the day after a new commander had arrived, and only a few days before large reinforcements were expected. a rapid movement west was made; the garrison of vicksburg was met in two engagements and badly defeated, and driven back into its stronghold and there successfully besieged. it looks now as though providence had directed the course of the campaign while the army of the tennessee executed the decree. upon the surrender of the garrison of vicksburg there were three things that required immediate attention. the first was to send a force to drive the enemy from our rear, and out of the state. the second was to send reinforcements to banks near port hudson, if necessary, to complete the triumph of opening the mississippi from its source to its mouth to the free navigation of vessels bearing the stars and stripes. the third was to inform the authorities at washington and the north of the good news, to relieve their long suspense and strengthen their confidence in the ultimate success of the cause they had so much at heart. soon after negotiations were opened with general pemberton for the surrender of the city, i notified sherman, whose troops extended from haines' bluff on the left to the crossing of the vicksburg and jackson road over the big black on the right, and directed him to hold his command in readiness to advance and drive the enemy from the state as soon as vicksburg surrendered. steele and ord were directed to be in readiness to join sherman in his move against general johnston, and sherman was advised of this also. sherman moved promptly, crossing the big black at three different points with as many columns, all concentrating at bolton, twenty miles west of jackson. johnston heard of the surrender of vicksburg almost as soon as it occurred, and immediately fell back on jackson. on the 8th of july sherman was within ten miles of jackson and on the 11th was close up to the defences of the city and shelling the town. the siege was kept up until the morning of the 17th, when it was found that the enemy had evacuated during the night. the weather was very hot, the roads dusty and the water bad. johnston destroyed the roads as he passed and had so much the start that pursuit was useless; but sherman sent one division, steele's, to brandon, fourteen miles east of jackson. the national loss in the second capture of jackson was less than one thousand men, killed, wounded and missing. the confederate loss was probably less, except in captured. more than this number fell into our hands as prisoners. medicines and food were left for the confederate wounded and sick who had to be left behind. a large amount of rations was issued to the families that remained in jackson. medicine and food were also sent to raymond for the destitute families as well as the sick and wounded, as i thought it only fair that we should return to these people some of the articles we had taken while marching through the country. i wrote to sherman: "impress upon the men the importance of going through the state in an orderly manner, abstaining from taking anything not absolutely necessary for their subsistence while travelling. they should try to create as favorable an impression as possible upon the people." provisions and forage, when called for by them, were issued to all the people, from bruinsburg to jackson and back to vicksburg, whose resources had been taken for the supply of our army. very large quantities of groceries and provisions were so issued. sherman was ordered back to vicksburg, and his troops took much the same position they had occupied before--from the big black to haines' bluff. having cleaned up about vicksburg and captured or routed all regular confederate forces for more than a hundred miles in all directions, i felt that the troops that had done so much should be allowed to do more before the enemy could recover from the blow he had received, and while important points might be captured without bloodshed. i suggested to the general-in-chief the idea of a campaign against mobile, starting from lake pontchartrain. halleck preferred another course. the possession of the trans-mississippi by the union forces seemed to possess more importance in his mind than almost any campaign east of the mississippi. i am well aware that the president was very anxious to have a foothold in texas, to stop the clamor of some of the foreign governments which seemed to be seeking a pretext to interfere in the war, at least so far as to recognize belligerent rights to the confederate states. this, however, could have been easily done without wasting troops in western louisiana and eastern texas, by sending a garrison at once to brownsville on the rio grande. halleck disapproved of my proposition to go against mobile, so that i was obliged to settle down and see myself put again on the defensive as i had been a year before in west tennessee. it would have been an easy thing to capture mobile at the time i proposed to go there. having that as a base of operations, troops could have been thrown into the interior to operate against general bragg's army. this would necessarily have compelled bragg to detach in order to meet this fire in his rear. if he had not done this the troops from mobile could have inflicted inestimable damage upon much of the country from which his army and lee's were yet receiving their supplies. i was so much impressed with this idea that i renewed my request later in july and again about the 1st of august, and proposed sending all the troops necessary, asking only the assistance of the navy to protect the debarkation of troops at or near mobile. i also asked for a leave of absence to visit new orleans, particularly if my suggestion to move against mobile should be approved. both requests were refused. so far as my experience with general halleck went it was very much easier for him to refuse a favor than to grant one. but i did not regard this as a favor. it was simply in line of duty, though out of my department. the general-in-chief having decided against me, the depletion of an army, which had won a succession of great victories, commenced, as had been the case the year before after the fall of corinth when the army was sent where it would do the least good. by orders, i sent to banks a force of 4,000 men; returned the 9th corps to kentucky and, when transportation had been collected, started a division of 5,000 men to schofield in missouri where price was raiding the state. i also detached a brigade under ransom to natchez, to garrison that place permanently. this latter move was quite fortunate as to the time when ransom arrived there. the enemy happened to have a large number, about 5,000 head, of beef cattle there on the way from texas to feed the eastern armies, and also a large amount of munitions of war which had probably come through texas from the rio grande and which were on the way to lee's and other armies in the east. the troops that were left with me around vicksburg were very busily and unpleasantly employed in making expeditions against guerilla bands and small detachments of cavalry which infested the interior, and in destroying mills, bridges and rolling stock on the railroads. the guerillas and cavalry were not there to fight but to annoy, and therefore disappeared on the first approach of our troops. the country back of vicksburg was filled with deserters from pemberton's army and, it was reported, many from johnston's also. the men determined not to fight again while the war lasted. those who lived beyond the reach of the confederate army wanted to get to their homes. those who did not, wanted to get north where they could work for their support till the war was over. besides all this there was quite a peace feeling, for the time being, among the citizens of that part of mississippi, but this feeling soon subsided. it is not probable that pemberton got off with over 4,000 of his army to the camp where he proposed taking them, and these were in a demoralized condition. on the 7th of august i further depleted my army by sending the 13th corps, general ord commanding, to banks. besides this i received orders to co-operate with the latter general in movements west of the mississippi. having received this order i went to new orleans to confer with banks about the proposed movement. all these movements came to naught. during this visit i reviewed banks' army a short distance above carrollton. the horse i rode was vicious and but little used, and on my return to new orleans ran away and, shying at a locomotive in the street, fell, probably on me. i was rendered insensible, and when i regained consciousness i found myself in a hotel near by with several doctors attending me. my leg was swollen from the knee to the thigh, and the swelling, almost to the point of bursting, extended along the body up to the arm-pit. the pain was almost beyond endurance. i lay at the hotel something over a week without being able to turn myself in bed. i had a steamer stop at the nearest point possible, and was carried to it on a litter. i was then taken to vicksburg, where i remained unable to move for some time afterwards. while i was absent general sherman declined to assume command because, he said, it would confuse the records; but he let all the orders be made in my name, and was glad to render any assistance he could. no orders were issued by my staff, certainly no important orders, except upon consultation with and approval of sherman. on the 13th of september, while i was still in new orleans, halleck telegraphed to me to send all available forces to memphis and thence to tuscumbia, to co-operate with rosecrans for the relief of chattanooga. on the 15th he telegraphed again for all available forces to go to rosecrans. this was received on the 27th. i was still confined to my bed, unable to rise from it without assistance; but i at once ordered sherman to send one division to memphis as fast as transports could be provided. the division of mcpherson's corps, which had got off and was on the way to join steele in arkansas, was recalled and sent, likewise, to report to hurlbut at memphis. hurlbut was directed to forward these two divisions with two others from his own corps at once, and also to send any other troops that might be returning there. halleck suggested that some good man, like sherman or mcpherson, should be sent to memphis to take charge of the troops going east. on this i sent sherman, as being, i thought, the most suitable person for an independent command, and besides he was entitled to it if it had to be given to any one. he was directed to take with him another division of his corps. this left one back, but having one of mcpherson's divisions he had still the equivalent. before the receipt by me of these orders the battle of chickamauga had been fought and rosecrans forced back into chattanooga. the administration as well as the general-in-chief was nearly frantic at the situation of affairs there. mr. charles a. dana, an officer of the war department, was sent to rosecrans' headquarters. i do not know what his instructions were, but he was still in chattanooga when i arrived there at a later period. it seems that halleck suggested that i should go to nashville as soon as able to move and take general direction of the troops moving from the west. i received the following dispatch dated october 3d: "it is the wish of the secretary of war that as soon as general grant is able he will come to cairo and report by telegraph." i was still very lame, but started without delay. arriving at columbus on the 16th i reported by telegraph: "your dispatch from cairo of the 3d directing me to report from cairo was received at 11.30 on the 10th. left the same day with staff and headquarters and am here en route for cairo." end of volume i. on the trail of grant and lee by frederick trevor hill to howard ogden wood, jr. forward during the early years of the civil war someone tauntingly asked mr. charles francis adams, the united states minister to england, what he thought of the brilliant victories which the confederate armies were then gaining in the field. "i think they have been won by my fellow countrymen," was the quiet answer. almost half a century has passed since that reproof was uttered, but its full force is only just beginning to be understood. for nearly fifty years the story of the civil war has been twisted to suit local pride or prejudice in various parts of the union, with the result that much which passes for american history is not history at all, and whatever else it may be, it is certainly not american. assuredly, the day has now arrived when such historical "make-believes" should be discountenanced, both in the north and in the south. americans of the present and the coming generations are entitled to take a common pride in whatever lent nobility to the fraternal strife of the sixties, and to gather equal inspiration from every achievement that reflected credit on american manhood during those years when the existence of the union was at stake. until this is rendered possible by the elimination of error and falsehood, the sacrifices of the civil war will, to a large extent, have been endured in vain. in some respects this result has already been realized. lincoln is no longer a local hero. he is a national heritage. to distort or belittle the characters of other men who strove to the end that their land "might have a new birth of freedom," is to deprive the younger generations of part of their birthright. they are entitled to the facts from which to form a just estimate of the lives of all such men, regardless of uniforms. it is in this spirit that the strangely interwoven trials of grant and lee are followed in these pages. both were americans, and widely as they differed in opinions, tastes and sympathies, each exhibited qualities of mind and character which should appeal to all their fellow countrymen and make them proud of the land that gave them birth. neither man, in his life, posed before the public as a hero, and the writer has made no attempt to place either of them on a pedestal. theirs is a very human story, requiring neither color nor concealment, but illustrating a high development of those traits that make for manhood and national greatness. the writer hereby acknowledges his indebtedness to all those historians whose scholarly research has made it possible to trace the careers of these two great commanders with confidence in the accuracy of the facts presented. where equally high authorities have differed he has been guided by those who, in his judgment, have displayed the most scrupulous impartiality, and wherever possible he has availed himself of official records and documents. the generous service rendered by mr. samuel palmer griffin in testing the vast record upon which these pages are based, his exhaustive research and scientific analysis of the facts, have given whatever of authority may be claimed for the text, and of this the writer hereby makes grateful acknowledgment. to mr. arthur becher he is likewise indebted for his careful studies at west point and elsewhere which have resulted in illustrations conforming to history. frederick trevor hill. new york, september, 1911. contents chapter i.--three civil wars . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 ii.--washington and lee . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 iii.--lee at west point . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 iv.--the boyhood of grant . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 v.--grant at west point . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 vi.--lieutenant grant under fire . . . . . . . . 35 vii.--captain lee at the front . . . . . . . . . . 44 viii.--colonel lee after the mexican war . . . . . 52 ix.--captain grant in a hard fight . . . . . . . 59 x.--grant's difficulties in securing a command . 67 xi.--lee at the parting of the ways . . . . . . . 75 xii.--opening moves . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83 xiii.--grant's first success . . . . . . . . . . . 93 xiv.--the battle of shiloh . . . . . . . . . . . . 106 xv.--lee in the saddle . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116 xvi.--a game of strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125 xvii.--lee and the invasion of maryland . . . . . . 133 xviii.--the battle of antietam or sharpsburg . . . . 141 xix.--lee against burnside and hooker . . . . . . 148 xx.--in the hour of triumph . . . . . . . . . . . 163 xxi.--grant at vicksburg . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171 xxii.--the battle of gettysburg . . . . . . . . . . 180 xxiii.--in the face of disaster . . . . . . . . . . 193 xxiv.--the rescue of two armies . . . . . . . . . . 201 xxv.--lieutenant-general grant . . . . . . . . . . 213 xxvi.--a duel to the death . . . . . . . . . . . . 224 xxvii.--check and countercheck . . . . . . . . . . . 238 xxviii.--the beginning of the end . . . . . . . . . . 248 xxix.--at bay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 256 xxx.--the surrender . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269 xxxi.--lee's years of peace . . . . . . . . . . . . 280 xxxii.--the head of the nation . . . . . . . . . . . 294 list of illustrations illustrations in color grant running the gauntlet of the mexicans at monterey in riding to the relief of his comrades . . frontispiece september 23, 1846. lee with mrs. lewis (nellie custis) applying to general andrew jackson to aid in securing his cadetship at west point . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 1825. grant on his horse, "york," making exhibition jump in the riding academy at west point . . . . . . . . . . 32 june, 1843. lee sending the rockbridge battery into action for the second time at antietam or sharpsburg . . . . . . . 144 september 17, 1862. lee rallying his troops at the battle of the wilderness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232 may 6, 1864. grant at the entrenchments before petersburg . . . . . 260 march, 1865. illustrations in the text signature of grant on reporting at west point . . . . 25 (from the original records of the u. s. military academy.) first signature of grant as u. s. grant . . . . . . . 27 (from the original records of the u.s. military academy.) grant's letter demanding unconditional surrender of forces at fort donnelson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103 diagram map (not drawn to scale) showing strategy of the opening of the battle of chancellorsville, may 1 and 2, 1863 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157 diagram map (not drawn to scale) showing grant's series of movements by the left flank from the wilderness to petersburg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229 facsimile of telegraphic message drafted by lieutenant general grant, announcing lee's surrender, may 9, 1865 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 275 lee's letter of august 3, 1866, acknowledging receipt of the extension of his furlough . . . . . . . . . . . 283 chapter i. -three civil wars england was an uncomfortable place to live in during the reign of charles the first. almost from the moment that that ill-fated monarch ascended the throne he began quarreling with parliament; and when he decided to dismiss its members and make himself the supreme ruler of the land, he practically forced his subjects into a revolution. twelve feverish years followed--years of discontent, indignation and passion--which arrayed the cavaliers, who supported the king, against the roundheads, who upheld parliament, and finally flung them at each other's throats to drench the soil of england with their blood. meanwhile, the gathering storm of civil war caused many a resident of the british isles to seek peace and security across the seas, and among those who turned toward america were mathew grant and richard lee. it is not probable that either of these men had ever heard of the other, for they came from widely separated parts of the kingdom and were even more effectually divided by the walls of caste. there is no positive proof that mathew grant (whose people probably came from scotland) was a roundhead, but he was a man of humble origin who would naturally have favored the parliamentary or popular party, while richard lee, whose ancestors had fought at hastings and in the crusades, is known to have been an ardent cavalier, devoted to the king. but whether their opinions on politics differed or agreed, it was apparently the conflict between the king and parliament that drove them from england. in any event they arrived in america at almost the same moment; grant reaching massachusetts in 1630, the year after king charles dismissed his parliament, and lee visiting virginia about this time to prepare for his permanent residence in the dominion which began when actual hostilities opened in the mother land. the trails of grant and lee, therefore, first approach each other from out of the smoke of a civil war. this is a strangely significant fact, but it might be regarded merely as a curious coincidence were it not for other and stranger events which seem to suggest that the hand of fate was guiding the destinies of these two men. mathew grant originally settled in massachusetts but he soon moved to connecticut, where he became clerk of the town of windsor and official surveyor of the whole colony--a position which he held for many years. meanwhile richard lee became the colonial secretary and a member of the king's privy council in virginia, and thenceforward the name of his family is closely associated with the history of that colony. lee bore the title of colonel, but it was to statesmanship and not to military achievements that he and his early descendants owed their fame; while the family of grant, the surveyor, sought glory at the cannon's mouth, two of its members fighting and dying for their country as officers in the french and indian war of 1756. in that very year, however, a military genius was born to the virginia family in the person of harry lee, whose brilliant cavalry exploits were to make him known to history as "light horse harry." but before his great career began, the house of grant was represented in the revolution, for captain noah grant of connecticut drew his sword in defense of the colonies at the outbreak of hostilities, taking part in the battle of bunker hill; and from that time forward he and "light horse harry" served in the continental army under washington until cornwallis surrendered at yorktown. here the trails of the two families, again drawn together by a civil strife, merge for an historic moment and then cross; that of the grants turning toward the west, and that of the lees keeping within the confines of virginia. it was in 1799 that captain noah grant migrated to ohio, and during the same year henry lee delivered the memorial address upon the death of washington, coining the immortal phrase "first in war, first in peace and first in the hearts of his countrymen." ulysses grant, the commander of the union forces in the civil war, was the grandson of captain grant, who served with "light horse harry" lee during the revolution; and robert lee, the confederate general, was "light horse harry's" son. thus, for the third time in two and a half centuries, a civil conflict between men of the english-speaking race blazed the trails of grant and lee. chapter ii. -washington and lee "wakefield," westmoreland county, virginia, was the birthplace of washington, and at stratford in the same county and state, only a few miles from wakefield, robert edward lee was born on january 19, 1807. seventy-five years had intervened between those events but, except in the matter of population, westmoreland county remained much the same as it had been during washington's youth. indians, it is true, no longer lurked in he surrounding forests or paddled the broad potomac in their frail canoes, but the life had much of the same freedom and charm which had endeared it to washington. all the streams and woods and haunts which he had known and loved were known and loved by lee, not only for their own sake, but because they were associated with the memory of the great commander-in-chief who had been his father's dearest friend. it would have been surprising, under such circumstances, if washington had not been lee's hero, but he was more than a hero to the boy. from his father's lips he had learned to know him, not merely as a famous personage of history, but as a man and a leader of men. indeed, his influence and example were those of a living presence in the household of "light horse harry;" and thus to young lee he early became the ideal of manhood upon which, consciously or unconsciously, he molded his own character and life. but quite apart from this, the careers of these two great virginians were astonishingly alike. washington's father had been married twice, and so had lee's; each was a son of the second marriage, and each had a number of brothers and sisters. washington lost his father when he was only eleven years old, and lee was exactly the same age when his father died. mrs. washington had almost the entire care of her son during his early years, and lee was under the sole guidance of his mother until he had almost grown to manhood. washington repaid his mother's devotion by caring for her and her affairs with notable fidelity, and lee's tenderness and consideration for his mother were such that she was accustomed to remark that he was both a son and a daughter to her. washington's ancestors were notable, if not distinguished, people in england; while lee could trace his descent, through his father, to lancelot lee, who fought at the battle of hastings, and through his mother to robert the bruce of scotland. neither man, however, prided himself in the least on his ancestry. indeed, neither of them knew anything of his family history until his own achievements brought the facts to light. washington was a born and bred country boy and so was lee. both delighted in outdoor life, loving horses and animals of all kinds and each was noted for his skillful riding in a region which was famous for its horsemanship. there was, however, a vast difference between washington's education and that of lee. the virginian schools were very rudimentary in washington's day; but lee attended two excellent institutions of learning, where he had every opportunity, and of this he availed himself, displaying much the same thoroughness that characterized washington's work, and the same manly modesty about any success that he achieved. by reason of his father's death and other circumstances washington was burdened with responsibility long before he arrived at manhood, making him far more reserved and serious-minded than most school boys. this was precisely the case with lee, for his father's death, the ill health of his mother and the care of younger children virtually made him the head of the family, so that he became unusually mature and self-contained at an early age. neither boy, however, held aloof from the sports and pastimes of his schoolmates and both were regarded as quiet, manly fellows, with no nonsense about them, and with those qualities of leadership that made each in turn the great military leader of his age. never has history recorded a stranger similarity in the circumstances surrounding the youth of two famous men, but the facts which linked their careers in later years are even stranger still. chapter iii. -lee at west point as his school days drew to a close, it became necessary for lee to determine his future calling. but the choice of a career, often so perplexing to young men, presented no difficulty to "light horse harry's" son. he had apparently always intended to become a soldier and no other thought had seemingly ever occurred to any member of his family. appointments to the united states military academy were far more a matter of favor than they are to-day, and young lee, accompanied by mrs. lewis (better known as nellie custis, the belle of mount vernon and washington's favorite grandchild), sought the assistance of general andrew jackson. rough "old hickory" was not the easiest sort of person to approach with a request of any kind and, doubtless, his young visitor had grave misgivings as to the manner in which his application would be received. but jackson, the hero of the battle of new orleans in the war of 1812, only needed to be told that his caller was "light horse harry's" son to proffer assistance; and in his nineteenth year, the boy left home for the first time in his life to enroll himself as a cadet at west point. very few young men enter that institution so well prepared for military life as was lee, for he had been accustomed to responsibility and had thoroughly mastered the art of self-control many years before he stepped within its walls. he was neither a prig nor a "grind," but he regarded his cadetship as part of the life work which he had voluntarily chosen, and he had no inclination to let pleasure interfere with it. with his comrades he was companionable, entering into all their pastimes with zest and spirit, but he let it be understood, without much talk, that attention to duty was a principle with him and his serious purpose soon won respect. rigid discipline was then, as it is to-day, strictly enforced at west point, and demerits were freely inflicted upon cadets for even the slightest infraction of the rules. indeed, the regulations were so severe that it was almost impossible for a cadet to avoid making at least a few slips at some time during his career. but lee accomplished the impossible, for not once throughout his entire four years did he incur even a single demerit--a record that still remains practically unique in the history of west point. this and his good scholarship won him high rank; first, as cadet officer of his class, and finally, as adjutant of the whole battalion, the most coveted honor of the academy, from which he graduated in 1829, standing second in a class of forty-six. men of the highest rating at west point may choose whatever arm of the service they prefer, and lee, selecting the engineer corps, was appointed a second lieutenant and assigned to fortification work at hampton roads, in his twenty-second year. the work there was not hard but it was dull. there was absolutely no opportunity to distinguish oneself in any way, and time hung heavy on most of the officers' hands. but lee was in his native state and not far from his home, where he spent most of his spare time until his mother died. camp and garrison life had very little charm for him, but he was socially inclined and, renewing his acquaintance with his boyhood friends, he was soon in demand at all the dances and country houses at which the young people of the neighborhood assembled. among the many homes that welcomed him at this time was that of mr. george washington parke custis (washington's adopted grandson), whose beautiful estate known as "arlington" lay within a short distance of alexandria, where lee had lived for many years. here he had, during his school days, met the daughter of the house and, their boy-and-girl friendship culminating in an engagement shortly after his return from west point, he and mary custis were married in his twenty-fifth year. lee thus became related by marriage to washington, and another link was formed in the strange chain of circumstances which unite their careers. a more ideal marriage than that of these two young people cannot be imagined. simple in their tastes and of home-loving dispositions, they would have been well content to settle down quietly to country life in their beloved virginia, surrounded by their family and friends. but the duties of an army officer did not admit of this, and after a few years' service as assistant to the chief engineer of the army in washington, lee was ordered to take charge of the improvements of the mississippi river at st. louis, where, in the face of violent opposition from the inhabitants, he performed such valuable service that in 1839 he was offered the position of instructor at west point. this, however, he declined, and in 1842 he was entrusted with the task of improving the defenses of new york harbor and moved with his family to fort hamilton, where he remained for several years. meanwhile, he had been successively promoted to a first lieutenancy and a captaincy, and in his thirty-eighth year he was appointed one of the visitors to west point, whose duty it was to inspect the academy and report at stated intervals on its condition. this appointment, insignificant in itself, is notable because it marks the point at which the trails of grant and lee first approach each other, for at the time that captain lee was serving as an official visitor, ulysses grant was attempting to secure an assistant professorship at west point. chapter iv. -the boyhood of grant deerfield, ohio, was not a place of any importance when captain noah grant of bunker hill fame arrived there from the east. indeed, it was not then much more than a spot on the map and it has ever won any great renown. yet in this tiny ohio village there lived at one and the same time owen brown, the father of john brown, who virtually began the civil war, and jesse grant, the father of ulysses grant, who practically brought it to a close. it is certainly strange that these two men should, with all the world to choose from, have chanced upon the same obscure little village, but it is still stranger that one of them should have become the employer of the other and that they should both have lived in the very same house. such, however, is the fact, for when jesse grant first began to earn his living as a tanner, he worked for and boarded with owen brown, little dreaming that his son and his employer's son would some day shake the world. it was not at deerfield, however, but at point pleasant, ohio, that jesse grant's distinguished son was born on april 27, 1822, in a cottage not much larger than the cabin in which abraham lincoln first saw the light. mr. and mrs. grant and other members of their family differed among themselves as to what the boy should be called, but they settled the question by each writing his or her favorite name on a slip of paper and then depositing all the slips in a hat, with the understanding that the child should receive the first two names drawn from that receptacle. this resulted in the selection of hiram and ulysses, and the boy was accordingly called hiram ulysses grant until the united states government re-christened him in a curious fashion many years later. to his immediate family, however, he was always known as ulysses, which his playmates soon twisted into the nickname "useless," more or less good-naturedly applied. grant's father moved to georgetown, ohio, soon after his son's birth, and there his boyhood days were passed. the place was not at that time much more than a frontier village and its inhabitants were mostly pioneers--not the adventurous, exploring pioneers who discover new countries, but the hardy advance-guard of civilization, who clear the forests and transform the wilderness into farming land. naturally, there was no culture and very little education among these people. they were a sturdy, self-respecting, hard-working lot, of whom every man was the equal of every other, and to whom riches and poverty were alike unknown. in a community of this sort there was, of course, no pampering of the children, and if there had been, grant's parents would probably have been the last to indulge in it. his father, jesse grant, was a stern and very busy man who had neither the time nor the inclination to coddle the boy, and his mother, absorbed in her household duties and the care of a numerous family, gave him only such attention as was necessary to keep him in good health. young ulysses was, therefore, left to his own devices almost as soon as he could toddle, and he quickly became self-reliant to a degree that alarmed the neighbors. indeed, some of them rushed into the house one morning shouting that the boy was out in the barn swinging himself on the farm horses' tails and in momentary danger of being kicked to pieces; but mrs. grant received the announcement with perfect calmness, feeling sure that ulysses would not amuse himself in that way unless he knew the animals thoroughly understood what he was doing. certainly this confidence in the boy's judgment was entirely justified as far as horses were concerned, for they were the joy of his life and he was never so happy as when playing or working in or about the stables. indeed, he was not nine years old when he began to handle a team in the fields. from that time forward he welcomed every duty that involved riding, driving or caring for horses, and shirked every other sort of work about the farm and tannery. fortunately, there was plenty of employment for him in the line of carting materials or driving the hay wagons and harrows, and his father, finding that he could be trusted with such duties, allowed him, before he reached his teens, to drive a 'bus or stage between georgetown and the neighboring villages entirely by himself. in fact, he was given such free use of the horses that when it became necessary for him to help in the tannery, he would take a team and do odd jobs for the neighbors until he earned enough, with the aid of the horses, to hire a boy to take his place in the hated tan-yard. this and other work was, of course, only done out of school hours, for his parents sent him as early as possible to a local "subscription" school, which he attended regularly for many years. "spare the rod and spoil the child" was one of the maxims of the school, and the first duty of the boys on assembling each morning was to gather a good-sized bundle of beech-wood switches, of which the schoolmaster made such vigorous use that before the sessions ended the supply was generally exhausted. grant received his fair share of this discipline, but as he never resented it, he doubtless got no more of it than he deserved and it probably did him good. among his schoolmates he had the reputation of talking less than any of the other boys and of knowing more about horses than all of them put together. an opportunity to prove this came when he was about eleven, for a circus appeared in the village with a trick pony, and during the performance the clown offered five dollars to any boy who could ride him. several of ulysses' friends immediately volunteered, but he sat quietly watching the fun while one after another of the boys fell victim to the pony's powers. finally, when the little animal's triumph seemed complete, grant stepped into the ring and sprang upon his back. a tremendous tussle for the mastery immediately ensued, but though he reared and shied and kicked, the tricky little beast was utterly unable to throw its fearless young rider, and amid the shouts of the audience the clown at last stopped the contest and paid ulysses the promised reward. from that time forward his superiority as a horseman was firmly established, and as he grew older and his father allowed him to take longer and longer trips with the teams, he came to be the most widely traveled boy in the village. indeed, he was only about fifteen when he covered nearly a hundred and fifty miles in the course of one of his journeys, taking as good care of his horses as he did of himself, and transacting the business entrusted to him with entire satisfaction to all concerned. these long, and often lonely, trips increased his independence and so encouraged his habit of silence that many of the village people began to think him a dunce. his father, however, was unmistakably proud of the quiet boy who did what he was told to do without talking about it, and though he rarely displayed his feelings, the whole village knew that he thought "useless" was a wonder and smiled at his parental pride. but the smile almost turned to a laugh when it became known that he proposed to send the boy to west point, for the last cadet appointed from georgetown had failed in his examinations before he had been a year at the academy, and few of the neighbors believed that ulysses would survive as long. certainly, the boy himself had never aspired to a cadetship, and when his father suddenly remarked to him one morning that he was likely to obtain the appointment, he receive the announcement with uncomprehending surprise. "what appointment?" he asked "to west point," replied his father. "i have applied for it." "but i won't go!" gasped the astonished youth. "i think you will," was the quiet but firm response, and grant, who had been taught obedience almost from his cradle, decided that if his father thought so, he did, too. but, though the young man yielded to his parent's wishes, he had no desire to become a soldier and entirely agreed with the opinion of the village that he had neither the ability nor the education to acquit himself with credit. in fact, the whole idea of military life was so distasteful to him that he almost hoped he would not fulfill the physical and other requirements for admission. indeed, the only thought that reconciled him to the attempt was that it necessitated a trip from ohio to new york, which gratified his longing to see more of the world. this was so consoling that it was almost with a gay heart that he set out of the hudson in the middle of may, 1839. for a boy who had lived all his life in an inland village on the outskirts of civilization the journey was absolutely adventurous, for although he was then in his eighteenth year, he had never even as much as seen a railroad and his experiences on the cars, canal boats and steamers were all delightfully surprising. therefore, long as the journey was, it was far too short for him, and on may 25th he reached his destination. two lonely and homesick weeks followed, and then, much to his astonishment and somewhat to his regret, he received word that he had passed the examination for admission and was a full-fledged member of the cadet corps of west point. chapter v. -grant at west point grant's father had obtained his son's appointment to the academy through the intervention of a member of congress, who, remembering that the boy was known as ulysses and that his mother's name before her marriage was simpson, had written to the secretary of war at washington, requesting a cadetship for u. s. grant. this mistake in his initials was not discovered until the young man presented himself at west point, but when he explained that his name was hiram ulysses grant and not u. s. grant, the officials would not correct the error. the secretary of war had appointed u. s. grant to the academy and u. s. grant was the only person they would officially recognize without further orders. they, therefore, intimated that he could either enroll himself as u. s. grant or stay out of the academy, making it quite plain that they cared very little which course he adopted. confronted with this situation, he signed the enlistment paper as u. s. grant and the document, bearing his name, which thus became his, can be seen to-day among the records at west point. this re-christening, of course, supplied his comrades with endless suggestions for nicknames and they immediately interpreted his new initials to suit themselves. "united states," "under sized" and "uncle sam" all seemed to be appropriate, but the last was the favorite until the day arrived when a more significant meaning was found in "unconditional surrender" grant. the restrictions and discipline of west point bore much more harshly on country-bred boys in those years than they do to-day when so many schools prepare students for military duties. but to a green lad like grant, who had been exceptionally independent all his life, the preliminary training was positive torture. it was then that his habitual silence stood him in good stead, for a talkative, argumentative boy could never have survived the breaking-in process which eventually transformed him from a slouchy bumpkin into a smart, soldier-like young fellow who made the most of his not excessive inches. still, he hated almost every moment of his first year and ardently hoped that the bill for abolishing the academy, which was under discussion in congress, would become a law and enable him to return home without disgrace. but no such law was passed and more experience convinced him that west point was a very valuable institution which should be strengthened rather than abolished. he had not reached this conclusion, however, at the time of his first furlough, and when he returned to his more and found that his father had procured a fine horse for his exclusive use during his holiday, it was hard to tear himself away and resume his duties. nevertheless, he did so; and, considering the fact that he was not fond of studying, he made fair progress, especially in mathematics, never reaching the head of his class, but never quite sinking to the bottom. indeed, if he had not been careless in the matter of incurring demerits from small infractions of the rules, he might have attained respectable, if not high rank in the corps, for he was a clean living, clean spoken boy, without a vicious trait of any kind. even as it was, he became a sergeant, but inattention to details of discipline finally cost him his promotion and reduced him again to the ranks. at no time, however, did he acquire any real love for the military profession. his sole ambition was to pass the examinations and retire from the service as soon as he could obtain a professorship at some good school or college. at this, he might easily have succeeded with his unmistakable talent for mathematics, and it is even conceivable that he might have qualified as a drawing master or an architect, if not as an artist, for he was fond of sketching and some of his works in this line which have been preserved shows a surprisingly artistic touch. graduation day at the academy brought no distinguished honors to grant, where he stood twenty-first in a class of thirty-nine, but it did win him one small triumph. as almost everyone knows, the west point cadets are trained for all arms of the service, sometimes doing duty as infantry, sometimes as artillery and at other times acting as engineers or cavalry; and during the closing week of the year, they give public exhibitions of their proficiency before the official visitors. on this particular occasion the cavalry drill was held in the great riding hall, and after the whole corps had completed their evolutions and were formed in line ready to be dismissed, the commanding officer ordered an extraordinarily high hurdle to be placed in position, and while the great throng of spectators were wondering what this meant they heard the sharp command, "cadet grant." a young man of slight stature, not weighing more than a hundred and twenty pounds, and mounted on a powerful chestnut horse, sprang from the ranks with a quick salute, dashed to the further end of the hall and, swinging his mount about, faced the hurdle. there was a moment's pause and then the rider, putting spurs to his steed, rushed him straight at the obstruction and, lifting him in masterly fashion, cleared the bar as though he and the animal were one. a thunder of applause followed as the horseman quietly resumed his place in the ranks, and after the corps had been dismissed grant was sought out and congratulated on his remarkable feat. but his response was characteristic of the boy that was, and the man that was to be. "yes, 'york' is a wonderfully good horse," was all he said. a lieutenancy in the engineers or cavalry was more than a man of low standing in the academy could expect, and grant was assigned to the fourth infantry, with orders to report for duty at jefferson barracks, st. louis, missouri, at the end of a short leave of absence. the prospect of active service, far from his native state, was anything but pleasing to the new officer; but he had come home with a bad cough, and had he not been ordered to the south, it is highly probable that he would have fallen a victim to consumption, of which two of his uncles had already died. the air of camp salubrity, louisiana, where his regiment was quartered, and the healthy, outdoor life, however, quickly checked the disease, and at the end of two years he had acquired a constitution of iron. meanwhile, he had met miss julia dent, the sister of one of his classmates whose home was near st. louis, and had written to the professor of mathematics at west point, requesting his aid in securing an appointment there as his assistant, to which application he received a most encouraging reply. doubtless, his courtship of miss dent made him doubly anxious to realize his long-cherished plan of settling down to the quiet life of a professor. but all hope of this was completely shattered by the orders of the fourth infantry which directed it to proceed at once to texas. long before the regiment marched, however, he was engaged to "the girl he left behind him" and, although his dream of an instructorship at west point had vanished, he probably did not altogether abandon his ambition for a career at teaching. but fate had other plans for him as he journeyed toward mexico, where the war clouds were gathering. lee was moving in the same direction and their trails were soon to merge at the siege of vera cruz. chapter vi. -lieutenant grant under fire the movement of the united states troops towards mexico did not take the country by surprise. it was the direct result of the action of congress admitting texas to the union. ever since it had won its independence from mexico, texas had been seeking to become part of the united states; but there had been violent objection in the north to the admission of any new slave state, and this opposition had effectually prevented its annexation. at the last election (1844), however, a majority of the voters apparently favored the admission of texas, which was accordingly received into the union, and the long-standing dispute which it had waged with mexico as to its proper boundaries was assumed by the united states. texas claimed to own far more territory than mexico was willing to concede, but the facts might easily have been ascertained had the united states government desired to avoid a war. unfortunately, it had no such desire, and general zachary taylor was soon ordered to occupy the disputed territory with about 3,000 men. this force, of which grant's regiment formed a part, was called the army of observation, but it might better have been called the army of provocation, for it was obviously intended to provoke an attack on the part of mexico and to give the united states an excuse for declaring war and settling the boundary question to suit itself. probably, there were not many in the army who thought much about the rights or the wrongs of the impending war. there had been no fighting in the united states for more than thirty years, and most of the officers were more interested in seeing real service in the field than they were in discussing the justice or injustice of the cause. grant was as anxious for glory as any of his comrades, but he cherished no illusions as to the merits of the dispute in which his country was involved. with the clear vision of the silent man who reads and thinks for himself, he saw through the thinly disguised pretenses of the politicians and, recognizing that force was being used against a weaker nation in order to add more slave states to the union, he formed a very positive opinion that the war was unjustifiable. but though he was forced to this disagreeable conclusion, the young lieutenant was not the sort of man to criticize his country once she was attacked, or to shirk his duty as a soldier because he did not agree with his superiors on questions of national policy. he thought and said what he liked in private, but he kept his mouth closed in public, feeling that his duties as an officer were quite sufficient without assuming responsibilities which belonged to the authorities in washington. war was inevitable almost from the moment that texas was annexed, but with full knowledge of this fact neither the president nor congress made any effective preparations for meeting the impending crisis, and when hostilities actually began, general taylor was directed to advance under conditions which virtually required him to fight his way to safety. indeed, he was practically cut off from all hope of reã«nforcement as soon as the first shot was fired, for his orders obliged him to move into the interior of the country, and had his opponents been properly commanded, they could have overwhelmed him and annihilated his whole force. the very audacity of the little american army, however, seemed to paralyze the mexicans who practically made no resistance until taylor reached a place called palo alto, which in spanish means "tall trees." meanwhile grant had been made regimental quartermaster, charged with the duty of seeing that the troops were furnished with proper food and caring for all property and supplies. heartily as he disliked this task, which was not only dull and difficult, but also bade fair to prevent him from taking active part in the prospective battles, he set to work with the utmost energy. by the time the enemy began to dispute the road, he had overcome the immense difficulty of supplying troops on a march through a tropical country and was prepared to take part in any fighting that occurred. but the mexicans gathered at tall trees on may 8, 1846, were not prepared for a serious encounter. they fired at the invaders, but their short-range cannon loaded with solid shot rarely reached the americans, and when a ball did come rolling towards them on the ground, the troops merely stepped to one side and allowed the missile to pass harmlessly through their opened ranks. after the american artillery reached the field, however, the enemy was driven from its position and the next day the advance was resumed to resaca de la palma, where stronger opposition was encountered. grant was on the right wing of the army as it pressed forward through dense undergrowth to drive the mexicans from the coverts in which they had taken shelter. it was impossible to give any exact orders in advancing through this jungle, and the men under grant's command struggled forward until they reached a clearing where they caught sight of a small body of mexicans. the young lieutenant instantly ordered a charge and, dashing across the open ground, captured the party only to discover that they were merely stragglers left behind by other american troops who had already charged over the same ground. no one appreciated the humor of this exploit more than grant. it reminded him, he said, of the soldier who boasted that he had been in a charge and had cut off the leg of one of the enemy's officers. "why didn't you cut off his head?" inquired his commander. "oh, somebody had done that already," replied the valiant hero. slight as the fighting was at resaca, it completely satisfied the mexicans, and for over three months they left the americans severely alone. meanwhile, general taylor received reã«nforcements and in august, 1846, he proceeded against the town of monterey, which the enemy had fortified with considerable skill and where they were evidently prepared to make a desperate resistance. grant was again quartermaster, and the terrific heat which forced the army to do its marching at night or during the early hours of the morning, greatly increased his labors and severely tested his patience. almost all the transportation animals were mules, and as very few of them were trained for the work, they were hard to load and even harder to handle after their burdens were adjusted. one refractory animal would often stampede all the rest, scattering provisions and ammunition in their tracks, driving the teamsters to the point of frenzy and generally hurling confusion through the camp. even grant, who never uttered an oath in his life, was often sorely tried by these exasperating experiences, but he kept command of his temper and by his quiet persistence brought order out of chaos in spite of beasts and men. his disappointment was bitter, however, when the attack on monterey began and he found himself left without any assignment in the field. lieutenant meade, destined at a later date to command the union forces at gettysburg, was one of the officers entrusted with the preliminary reconnoissance against the city, and when the fighting actually commenced on september 21st, 1846, the deserted quartermaster mounted his horse and rode to the scene of the action, determined to see something of the battle even if he could not take part in it. he arrived at the moment when his regiment was ordered to charge against what was known as the black fort, and dashed forward with his men into the very jaws of death. certainly "someone had blundered," for the charge which had been intended merely as a feint was carried too far and scores of men were mowed down under the terrible fire of the enemy's guns. temporary shelter was at last reached, however, and under cover of it the adjutant borrowed grant's horse; but he fell soon after the charge was renewed and the colonel, noticing the impetuous quartermaster, promptly appointed him to take the fallen officer's place. by this time the troops had fought their way into the town and the enemy, posted in the plaza or principal square, commanded every approach to it. as long as the americans kept in the side streets they were comparatively safe, but the moment they showed themselves in any of the avenues leading to the plaza, they encountered a hail of bullets. this was serious enough; but at the end of two days the situation became critical, for the ammunition began to run low, and it was realized that, if the mexicans discovered this, they would sweep down and cut their defenseless opponents to pieces. face to face with this predicament, the colonel on september 23rd, called for a volunteer to carry a dispatch to headquarters, and grant instantly responded. to reach his destination it was necessary to run the gantlet of the enemy, for every opening from the plaza was completely exposed to their fire. but trusting in the fleetness of his horse, the young lieutenant leaped into the saddle and, swinging himself down, indian fashion, on one side of his steed so as to shield himself behind its body, he dashed away on his perilous mission. a roar of muskets greeted him at every corner, but he flashed safely by, leaping a high wall which lay across his path and then, speeding straight for the east end of the town, reached the commanding general and reported the peril of his friends. meanwhile the americans began one of the most curious advances ever made by an army, for general worth, finding that he could not force his troops through the streets leading to the plaza without great loss of life, ordered them to enter the houses and break down the intervening walls, so that they could pass from one adjoining house to another under cover, directly to the heart of the city. this tunneling maneuver was executed with great skill, and when the walls of the houses nearest the plaza were reached and masses of men stood ready to pour through the openings into the square, its astonished defenders gave up the fight and promptly surrendered the city. chapter vii. -captain lee at the front astonishing as general taylor's success had been, the authorities at washington decided, largely for political reasons, to appoint a new commander, and three months after the battle of monterey, general winfield scott, the commander-in-chief of the united states army, was ordered to the seat of the war. it would be impossible to imagine two officers more utterly different than taylor and scott, but each in his own way exerted a profound influence upon the careers of grant and lee. taylor was a rough, uncultivated man, fearless, shrewd and entirely capable, but with nothing to suggest the soldier in his appearance, dress or dignity. on the contrary, he usually appeared sitting slouchily on some woe-begone old animal, his long legs dangling on one side of the saddle, the bridle rein looped over his arm and a straw hat on his head, more like a ploughman than an officer of high rank. indeed, he seldom donned a uniform of any description, and his only known appearance in full dress occurred during an official meeting with an admiral, when, out of regard for naval etiquette, he attired himself in his finest array. but this effort at politeness was not calculated to encourage him, for the admiral, knowing his host's objection to uniforms, had been careful to leave his on his ship and appeared in civilian attire. scott, on the other hand, was a fussy and rather pompous individual, who delighted in brass buttons and gold lace and invariably presented a magnificent appearance. but, like taylor, he was an excellent officer and thoroughly competent to handle an army in the field. he was, moreover, entirely familiar with the material of which the american army was composed, and his first move on assuming command was to order practically all the regular united states troops and their officers to join him near vera cruz, leaving taylor virtually nothing but volunteer regiments. the fourth infantry accordingly parted with its old commander and reported to scott, where it was assigned to the division of general worth, and for the first time grant met many of the men with and against whom he was to be thrown during the civil war. it was certainly a remarkable body of officers that scott gathered about him at the outset of his campaign, for it included such men as stonewall jackson, jefferson davis, mcclellan, joseph johnson, jubal early, a. p. hill, meade, beauregard, hooker, longstreet, hancock, thomas and, last but not least, ulysses grant and robert lee. lee had arrived in mexico soon after the battle of monterey, but he had no opportunity for distinction until the spring of 1847, when preparations were begun for the siege of vera cruz. he had, however, already demonstrated his ability as an engineer, and with lieutenant beauregard who, fourteen years later, commanded the attack on fort sumter, he was entrusted with posting the american batteries at vera cruz. this he did to such advantage that they made short work of the city which fell into the invaders' hands, march 29, 1847, after a week's siege. scott was quick to recognize the merit of officers, and lee was straightway attached to his personal staff, with the result that when the army began its forward movement most of the difficult and delicate work was confided to his care. scott's object was the capture of the city of mexico, the capital of the republic, and against this stronghold he moved with energy and skill. at cerro gordo the mexicans opposed him with considerable force, but maneuvers, suggested by lee, enabled him to outflank the enemy and drive them, without much trouble, from his path. again at contreras a check occurred, part of the army having advanced over a well-nigh impassable country and lost touch with the commander-in-chief. one after another seven officers were dispatched to carry the necessary orders, but all returned without effecting their purpose. but at midnight, in the midst of a torrential storm lee arrived from the front, having overcome all difficulties--an achievement which scott subsequently described as "the greatest feat of physical and moral courage performed by any individual in my knowledge, pending the campaign." but lee was more than merely brave and daring. he was thorough. when work was entrusted to his care he performed it personally, never relying on others further than was absolutely necessary, and never resting satisfied until he was certain that he had accomplished his task. on one of his most important reconnoissances he rode into the interior of the country at night to locate the position of the enemy, and after he had proceeded a considerable distance his guide informed him that if he went any further he would be a prisoner, for the whole mexican army lay directly in his path. he, accordingly, advanced more cautiously, but the guide again begged him to halt, declaring that he could already see the enemies' tents lying on the hillside below. peering through the darkness in the direction indicated, lee discovered what appeared to be an encampment of many thousand men, and for the moment he was tempted to accept his companion's conclusion that this was the main force of the mexicans. second thoughts, however, convinced him that he ought not to make a report based upon the eyes of the guide, and, despite the man's frightened protests, he decided to stay where he was and see the situation for himself by daylight. but, before the morning fairly dawned, it was apparent that the supposed army of mexicans was nothing but a huge flock of sheep and, galloping back with the news that the road was clear, he led a troop of cavalry forward and located the enemy posted many miles away in an entirely different position. the mexicans stubbornly, though unsuccessfully, resisted the american army as it pushed toward their capital, and in the battles which ensued lee was so active that his gallant conduct was praised in almost every dispatch of his chief, who subsequently attributed much of his success "to the skill and valor of robert e. lee," whom he did not hesitate to describe as "the greatest military genius in america." continuous praise from such a source would have been more than sufficient to turn the average officer's head, but lee continued to perform his duties without showing the least sign of vanity or conceit. quiet, thoughtful, quick to take advantage of any opportunity, but greedy of neither honors nor personal distinction of any kind, he won the admiration of his comrades as well as the confidence of his superiors, and his promotion, first to the rank of major and then to that of lieutenant-colonel, was universally approved. meanwhile, grant had been acquitting himself with high credit in all the work which fell to his share. he was in no position to render service of anything like the importance of lee's, but he did what he was ordered to do and did it well, being brevetted a first lieutenant for conspicuous gallantry at the battle of molino del rey, september 8, 1847. again, on september 13, in the fighting around chapultepec, where lee, though wounded, remained in the saddle until he fell fainting from his horse, grant gained considerable distinction by his quick action in relieving a dangerous pressure on part of the american lines by posting a small gun in the belfry of a church and galling the enemy with his deadly accurate fire. it was characteristic of the man that when complimented upon this achievement and told that a second gun would be sent to him, grant merely saluted. he might, with truth, have informed his commanding officer that the belfry could not accommodate another gun, but it was not his habit to talk when there was no need of it, or to question the wisdom of his superior officer. he, therefore, quietly accepted the praise and the superfluous gun and, returning to his post, resumed his excellent service. this and other similar conduct won him further promotion, and on september 14, 1847, when the americans marched triumphantly into the mexican capital, he was brevetted a captain. the war practically ended with this event and within a year grant was married to miss julia dent and stationed at sackett's harbor, new york, while lee was assigned to the defenses of baltimore, not far from his old home. chapter viii. -colonel lee after the mexican war it is probable that lee would have been well content to remain indefinitely at baltimore, for his duties there enabled him to be more with his family than had been possible for some years. to his boys and girls he was both a companion and a friend and in their company he took the keenest delight. in fact, he and his wife made their home the center of attraction for all the young people of the neighborhood, and no happier household existed within the confines of their beloved virginia. it was not to be expected, however, that an officer of lee's reputation would be allowed to remain long in obscurity, and in 1852, he was appointed superintendent at west point. a wiser selection for this important post could scarcely have been made, for colonel lee, then in his forty-sixth year, possessed rare qualifications for the duties entrusted to his charge. he was not only a man whose splendid presence, magnificent physique and distinguished record were certain to win the admiration and respect of young men, but he combined in his character and temperament all the qualities of a tactful teacher and an inspiring leader. quiet and dignified, but extremely sympathetic, he governed the cadets without seeming to command them and, as at his own home, he exerted a peculiarly happy influence upon all with whom he came into personal contact. among the cadets during his service at west point were j. e. b. stuart, who was to prove himself one of the greatest cavalry leaders that this country has ever produced, and his elder son, custis lee, who, improving on his father's almost perfect record, graduated first in his class. about this time certain important changes were effected in the organization of the regular army, and the popular superintendent of west point was immediately appointed lieutenant-colonel of the newly formed second cavalry, with orders to proceed to texas and protect the settlers against the attacks of hostile indians. it was with keen regret that lee received this assignment, for, though intended as a promotion, it removed him from the corps of engineers to which he had always been attached and obliged him to break all his home ties for what was practically police duty in the wilderness. nevertheless, no thought of resigning from the army apparently crossed his mind. he soon joined his regiment in texas, where, for almost three years, he patrolled the country, ruling the indians by diplomacy or force, as occasion required, practically living in the saddle and experiencing all the discomforts and privations of garrison life at an outpost of civilization. almost his only relaxation during this lonely and exhausting service was his correspondence with his wife and children, and his letters to them, written in rough camps and on the march, show that his thoughts were constantly with his home and loved ones. "it has been said that our letters are good representations of our minds," he wrote his youngest daughter from texas in 1857; and certainly lee's correspondence, exhibiting as it does, consideration for others, modesty, conscientiousness, affection and a spirit of fun, affords an admirable reflection of the writer. "did i tell you that 'jim nooks,' mrs. waite's cat, was dead?" he wrote one of his girls. "he died of apoplexy. i foretold his end. coffee and cream for breakfast, pound cake for lunch, turtle and oysters for dinner, buttered toast for tea and mexican rats, taken raw, for supper! he grew enormously and ended in a spasm. his beauty could not save him.... but i saw 'cats as is cats' at sarassa.... the entrance of madame [his hostess] was foreshadowed by the coming in of her stately cats with visages grim and tails erect, who preceded, surrounded and followed her. they are of french breed and education, and when the claret and water were poured out for my refreshment they jumped on the table for a sit-to.... i had to leave the wild-cat on the rio grande; he was too savage and had grown as large as a small sized dog. he would pounce on a kid as tom tita [his daughter's cat] would on a mouse and would whistle like a tiger when you approached him." but it was not always in this chatty fashion that he wrote, for in 1856, when the question of slavery was being fiercely discussed throughout the country, he expressed his views on the subject with a moderation and broadmindedness exceedingly rare in those excited times. "in this enlightened age," he wrote his wife, "there are few, i believe, but will acknowledge that slavery as an institution is a moral and political evil in any country. i think it, however, a greater evil to the white than to the black race; and while my feelings are strongly interested in behalf of the latter, my sympathies are stronger for the former. the blacks are immeasurably better off here than in africa--morally, socially and physically. the painful discipline they are undergoing is necessary for their instruction as a race and i hope it will prepare and lead them to better things. how long this subjection may be necessary is known and ordered by a wise and merciful providence. their emancipation will sooner result from a mild and melting influence than from the storms and contests of fiery controversy. this influence though slow is sure." such were the views of robert lee on this great question of the day, and even as he wrote the country was beginning to notice a country lawyer named abraham lincoln, who was expressing almost identically the same opinions in no uncertain terms. but the calm advice of lincoln and lee did not appeal to the hot-heads who were for abolishing slavery instantly at any and every cost. in october, 1859, when lee was on a short visit to arlington, john brown, whose father had once lived with grant's father, attempted to take the whole matter into his already blood-stained hands. it is a strange coincidence that lee should have chanced to be in virginia just at this particular crisis, and still stranger that the errand which had called him home should have related to the emancipation of slaves. but the facts were that mr. custis, his father-in-law, had died a few weeks previously, leaving him as the executor of his will, which provided, among other things, for the gradual emancipation of all his slaves. lee had accordingly obtained leave of absence to make a flying trip to virginia for the purpose of undertaking this duty, and he was actually making arrangements to carry out mr. custis's wishes in respect to his slaves when the news of john brown's raid on harper's ferry reached arlington. word of this reckless attempt to free the slaves by force reached him in the form of a dispatch from the secretary of war, ordering him to take immediate charge of the united states marines who were being hurried to the scene of action. he instantly obeyed and, with lieutenant j. e. b. stuart as his second in command, hastened to harper's ferry and, directing his troops to storm the engine-house where brown and his followers had taken refuge, effected their capture almost without striking a blow. then, after delivering his prisoners to the proper authorities, he completed his work at arlington and returned to texas and the rough life of guarding the frontier line. from this duty he was recalled to washington in march, 1861, when the southern states were rapidly forming the confederacy, the whole country was in wild confusion and the nation was facing the prospect of a terrific civil war. chapter ix. -captain grant in a hard fight meanwhile, what had become of grant? the war department did not know and apparently did not care. jefferson davis, the secretary of war, responded to his father's anxious inquiry that captain u. s. grant had resigned from the army in july, 1854, but that he had no official knowledge as to why he had taken this action. mr. grant, however, soon learned the facts from other sources, and in his bitter disappointment was heard to exclaim that "west point had ruined one of his boys for him." it was natural enough that the stern and proud old gentleman should have blamed west point for the heart-breaking failure of his favorite son, but, as a matter of fact, west point was in no way responsible for what had occurred. neither during his cadetship at the academy nor for some years after his graduation from that institution had ulysses grant touched wine or stimulants in any form. he had, indeed, tried to learn to smoke during his west point days but had merely succeeded in making himself ill. during his hard campaigning in mexico, however, he had learned not only to smoke, but to drink, though it was not until some years after the war closed that he began to indulge to excess. as a matter of fact, he ought never to have touched a drop of any intoxicant, for a very little was always too much for him, and the result was that he soon came to be known in the army as a drinking man. had he been at home, surrounded by his wife and children and busily engaged, perhaps he might not have yielded to his weakness. but his orders carried him to lonely posts on the pacific, many hundreds of miles away from his family, with no duties worthy of the name, and the habit grew on him until the exasperated colonel of his regiment at last gave him the choice of resigning or being court-martialed for conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman. face to face with this ugly alternative, he chose resignation, and the army, officially, knew him no more. it was not only social and professional disgrace, but financial ruin which confronted the broken officer as he bade good-bye to his regiment at its desolate quarters in california, after fifteen years of service to the army. he was absolutely without money and, at the age of thirty-two, it was by no means easy for him to begin life all over again and earn his own living at a new calling. his fellow officers provided him with enough cash for his immediate wants, and with their help he managed to find his way back to sackett's harbor, new york, where there was a little money owing him. but he failed to collect this and remained hopelessly stranded until another officer came to his rescue and provided him with sufficient funds to take him to his home. this friend in time of need was simon b. buckner, whom he was to meet again under strange and dramatic circumstances. it was hardly to be expected, under such conditions, that stern old jesse grant would welcome the home-coming of his eldest son. nevertheless, he helped him on his way to his wife and children, and, sick at heart and broken in health, the young man joined his family and began a desperate struggle to earn his own living. mrs. grant's father was a slave owner and a sympathizer with the south in the growing trouble between that section of the country and the north. but the quarrel had not yet reached the breaking point, and although he did not approve of his son-in-law's northern views and heartily disapproved of his conduct, he gave him a start as a farmer and then left him to work out his own salvation. farming was the only occupation at which grant could hope to make a living, but he soon found that he did not know enough about this to make a success of it, and gradually fell back on his youthful experience as a teamster, hauling wood to the city where he sold it to the railroad or to anyone that would buy. at this he was fairly successful and, encouraged by his wife who stood bravely by him, he built a house with his own hands, which, although it was not much more than a log cabin, was sufficiently large to shelter his small family. all this time he was making a hard fight to conquer his drinking habits, but the vice had taken a terrible hold on him and he could not easily shake it off. it was only a matter of time, therefore, before his experiment at farming failed and with the aid of his father-in-law he entered business as a real estate broker in st. louis. but for this calling he had no qualification whatsoever, and after a disheartening experience in attempting to secure the post of county engineer, he accepted his father's suggestion that he join his brothers in the leather business in galena, illinois, and retired there with his family in the spring of 1860. the position which his father had made for him was not much more than a clerkship and the work was dull for a man who had been accustomed to active, outdoor life; but he was received with tact and kindness, no reference was made to his past record of failure and all this helped him to continue the successful struggle which he was making to regain control of himself and his habits. indeed, from the time he began his residence in galena he already had the battle well in hand and he fought it out with such grim resolution that before a year had passed his victory was complete. scarcely anyone in the little town knew of this silent struggle for self-mastery. indeed, very few people knew anything at all about the newcomer, save that he was a quiet, hard-working man who occasionally appeared on the streets wearing a blue army overcoat which had seen rough service. this weather-stained garment, however, forced grant to break his habitual silence, for he fully shared general taylor's prejudice against a uniform and felt obliged to apologize for wearing even part of one. so one day he explained to a neighbor that he wore the coat because it was made of good material and he thought he ought to use it as long as it lasted. that was all the citizens of galena then learned of the record of the man who had served with high honor in well-nigh every battle of the mexican war. had it depended upon him, their information would probably have begun and ended there. during all this time the feeling between the north and the south was growing more and more bitter, but galena was a town divided against itself on the slavery question. grant himself was a democrat. if he was not in favor of slavery, he certainly was not opposed to it, for he favored douglas and not lincoln in the contest for the presidency, and douglas was strongly against any interference with slavery. indeed, it is a curious coincidence that at or about the time when lee's family was ceasing to own slaves, grant's family acquired some. such, however, is the fact, for on the death of her father, mrs. grant inherited several negroes and there is some evidence that grant himself sold or attempted to sell them. but, though he was at that time no champion of the black race, grant was always a strong union man, opposed heart and soul to secession. indeed, when news of the attack upon fort sumter arrived in galena, he arrayed himself with the defenders of the flag gathered at a mass meeting held in the town to form a company in response to the president's call for 75,000 volunteers. moreover, this meeting had no sooner been called to order than someone proposed him as chairman, and to his utter astonishment, he found himself pushed from the rear of the room to the front and from the front to the platform. probably few in the audience knew who or what he was, and his embarrassment was such that for a few minutes no words came to his lips. finally, however, he managed to announce the object of the meeting, warning those who intended to enlist that they would be engaged in serious business involving hard work and privation, expressing his willingness to aid in forming the galena company and ending with a simple statement of his own intention to reã«nter the army. there was nothing eloquent about his short speech but it had the tone of a man who knew what he was talking about, and the audience, availing itself of his military experience, immediately voted to entrust the organization and drilling of the volunteers to his care, and from that moment he never again entered his father's place of business. chapter x. -grant's difficulties in securing a command the command of the local company was, of course, offered to grant as soon as it was formed, but he declined, believing himself qualified for somewhat higher rank than a captaincy of volunteers. nevertheless, he did all he could to prepare the recruits for active service in the field and when they were ordered to springfield, the capital of illinois, he journeyed there to see them properly mustered into the service of the state. springfield was a hubbub of noise and a rallying point for well-meaning incompetence when he arrived upon the scene. new officers in new uniforms swaggered in every public meeting place, bands of music played martial airs at every street corner and volunteers sky-larked and paraded in all sorts of impossible uniforms and with every form of theatric display. but system and order were absolutely lacking, and the adjutant-general's office, littered with blanks and well-nigh knee deep with papers, was the most helpless spot in the welter of confusion. all the material for a respectable army was at hand, but how to form it into an effective force was more than anyone seemed to know. the mass of military forms and blanks intended for that purpose was mere waste paper in the hands of the amiable but ignorant insurance agent who bore the title of adjutant-general, and no one of the patriotic mob had sufficient knowledge to instruct him in his duties. in the midst of all this hopeless confusion, however, someone suggested that a man by the name of grant, who had come down with the galena company, had been in the army and ought to know about such things. the governor accordingly sought out "the man from galena" just as he was starting for his home, with the result that he was soon at a desk in the adjutant's office, filling out the necessary papers at three dollars a day, while the brand new captains, colonels and generals posed in the foreground to the tune of popular applause. from this time forward order gradually took the place of chaos and the political generals and comic-opera soldiers were slowly shifted from the scene. but scarcely anyone noticed the silent man, hard at work in his shirt sleeves in a corner of the adjutant's room, and such inquiries as were made concerning him elicited the information that he was a cast-off of the regular army, with a dubious reputation for sobriety, who had been hired as a clerk. but the governor of illinois was an intelligent man, and he was well aware of the service which the ex-captain of regulars was performing for the state, and on the completion of his work in the adjutant's office grant was given a nominal title and assigned to visit the various regiments at their encampments to see that they were properly mustered in. he, accordingly, straightway set to work at this task, and his brisk, business-like manner of handling it made an impression upon those with whom he came in contact, for one of the temporary camps became known as camp grant. meanwhile, seeing his duties coming to an end without much hope of further employment, he wrote the following letter to the adjutant-general of the united states army at washington: "sir: "having served for fifteen years in the regular army, including four years at west point, and feeling it the duty of every one who has been educated at the government expense to offer their services for the support of that government, i have the honor, very respectfully, to tender my services until the close of the war in such capacity as may be offered. i would say in view of my present age and length of service, i feel myself competent to command a regiment, if the president, in his judgment, should see fit to entrust one to me. since the first call of the president i have been serving on the staff of the governor of this state, rendering such aid as i could in the organization of our state militia, and am still engaged in that capacity. a letter addressed to me at springfield, ill., will reach me." but the authorities at washington took no notice whatsoever of this modest letter, which was evidently tossed aside and completely forgotten. indeed, it was so completely buried in the files of the war department that it disappeared for years and, when it was at last discovered, the war was a thing of the past. this silent rebuff was enough to discourage any sensitive man and grant felt it keenly, but he did not entirely despair of accomplishing his end. he tried to gain an interview with general frã©mont who was stationed in a neighboring state and, failing in this, sought out mcclellan, his comrade in the mexican war, who had been made a major-general and was then in the vicinity of covington, kentucky, where grant had gone to visit his parents. but mcclellan either would not or could not see him. indeed, he had about reached the conclusion that his quest was hopeless, when he happened to meet a friend who offered to tell the governor of ohio that he wished to reenter the army, with the result that before long he was tendered the colonelcy of an ohio regiment. in the meantime, however, he had unexpectedly received a telegram from the governor of illinois, appointing him to the command of the 21st illinois regiment, and this he had instantly accepted. had he known the exact circumstances under which this post was offered him, perhaps he might not have acted so promptly, but he knew enough to make him aware that the appointment was not altogether complimentary and it is quite likely that he would have accepted it in any event. the facts were, however, that the colonel of the 21st regiment had proved to be an ignorant and bombastic adventurer, who had appeared before his troops clothed in a ridiculous costume and armed like a pirate king, and there was such dissatisfaction among both the officers and men that a new commander was urgently demanded. of this grant already knew something, but he was not advised that the regiment had become so utterly demoralized by its incompetent leader that it was nothing less than a dangerous and unruly mob, of which the governor could not induce any self-respecting officer to take charge. he had, indeed, offered the command to at least half a dozen other men before he tendered it to grant, and he must have been intensely relieved to receive his prompt acceptance. the new colonel did not wait to procure a new uniform before reporting for duty, but, hastening to the fair grounds close to springfield where his troops were stationed, ordered them to assemble for inspection. but incompetent leadership had played havoc with the discipline of the regiment, and the men shambled from their tents without any attempt at military formation, more from curiosity than in obedience to orders. the new colonel stepped to the front, wearing a rusty suit of civilian's clothes, his trousers tucked into his dusty boots, a battered hat on his head, a bandanna handkerchief tied around his waist in place of a sash and carrying a stick in place of a sword. altogether he presented a most unimpressive figure and it would not have been surprising if a wild guffaw of laughter had greeted him, but the troops, studying his strong, calm face, contented themselves with calling for a speech. then they waited in silence for his response and they did not have to wait long. "men!" he commanded sharply. "go to your quarters!" the regiment fairly gasped its astonishment. it had never heard a speech like that before and, taken completely by surprise, it moved quietly from the field. sentries were instantly posted, camp limits established and preparations made for enforcing strict discipline. it was not to be supposed that such prompt reforms would pass unchallenged, but arrests followed the first signs of disobedience and punishment swiftly followed the arrests. "for every minute i'm kept here i'll have an ounce of your blood!" threatened a dangerous offender whom the colonel had ordered to be tied up. "gag that man!" was the quiet response. "and when his time is up i'll cut him loose myself." before night, all was quiet in the camp of the 21st regiment of illinois volunteers. grant was in command. chapter xi. -lee at the parting of the ways while grant was thus striving to reã«nter the army, lee was having a struggle of a very different sort. summoned from his distant post in texas, where only an occasional rumble of the coming tempest reached his ears, he suddenly found himself in the center of the storm which threatened to wreck the republic. in the far south seven states had already seceded; in washington, congressmen, senators, and members of the cabinet were abandoning their posts; in the army and navy his friends were daily tendering their resignations; and his own state, divided between love for the union and sympathy with its neighbors, was hovering on the brink of secession. the issue in lee's mind was not the existence of slavery. he had long been in favor of emancipation, and virginia had more than once come so close to abolishing slavery by law that its disappearance from her borders was practically assured within a very short period. all his own slaves he had long since freed and he was gradually emancipating his father-in-law's, according to the directions of mr. custis's will. but the right of each state to govern itself without interference from the federal government seemed to lee essential to the freedom of the people. he recognized, however, that secession was revolution and, calmly and conscientiously examining the question, he concluded that, if force were used to compel any state to remain in the union, resistance would be justifiable. most virginians reached this decision impulsively, light-heartedly, defiantly or vindictively, and more or less angrily, according to their temperaments and the spirit of the times, but not so lee. he unaffectedly prayed god for guidance in the struggle between his patriotism and his devotion to a principle which he deemed essential to liberty and justice. he loved his country as only a man in close touch with its history and with a deep reverence for its great founder, washington, could love it; he had fought for its flag; he wore its uniform; he had been educated at its expense; and general scott, the commander of the army, a devoted union man, was his warm personal friend. patriotism, personal pride, loyalty and even gratitude, therefore, urged him toward the support of the union, and only his adherence to a principle and the claims of his kinsmen and friends forbade. for a time virginia resisted every effort to induce her to cast her lot with the confederacy. indeed she actually voted against secession when the question was first presented. but when fort sumter resisted attack on april 12, 1861, and the president called upon the various states to furnish troops to enforce the national authority, practically all affection for the union disappeared and by a decisive vote virginia determined to uphold the southern cause. at that crisis president lincoln made a strong effort to induce lee to support the union, for he actually offered him the command of the united states army which was about to take the field. the full force of this remarkable tribute to his professional skill was not lost upon lee. he had devoted his whole life to the army, and to be a successor of washington in the command of that army meant more to him than perhaps to any other soldier in the land. certainly, if he had consulted his own ambition or been influenced by any but the most unselfish motives, he would have accepted the call as the highest honor in the gift of the nation. but to do so he would have been obliged to surrender his private principles and desert his native state, and it is impossible to imagine that a man of his character would, even for an instant, consider such a course. gravely and sadly he declined the mighty office, and two days later he tendered his resignation from the service he had honored for almost six and thirty years. for this and his subsequent action lee has been called a traitor and severely criticized for well-nigh fifty years. but, when a nation has been divided against itself upon a great issue of government, millions upon one side and millions upon the other, and half a century has intervened, it is high time that justice be given to the man who did what he thought right and honorably fought for a principle which he could have surrendered only at the expense of his conscience and his honor. lee was a traitor to the united states in the same sense that washington was a traitor to england. no more and no less. england takes pride to-day in having given washington to the world. americans deprive their country of one of her claims to greatness when they fail to honor the character and the genius of robert lee. it was in a letter to his old commander, scott, that lee announced his momentous decision, and its tone well indicated what the parting cost him. "arlington, va., april 20, 1861. "general: "since my interview with you on the 18th inst., i have felt that i ought not longer to retain my commission in the army. i, therefore, tender my resignation, which i request you will recommend for acceptance. it would have been presented at once but for the struggle it has cost me to separate myself from a service to which i have devoted the best years of my life and all the ability i possessed. during the whole of that time...i have experienced nothing but kindness from my superiors and a most cordial friendship from my comrades. to no one, general, have i been as much indebted as to yourself for uniform kindness and consideration.... save in the defense of my native state, i never desire again to draw my sword." lee was fully aware of the serious nature of the conflict in which the country was about to engage. americans were to be pitted against americans and he knew what that meant. wise men, both north and south, were prophesying that the war would not last more than ninety days, and foolish ones were bragging of their own powers and questioning the courage of their opponents, quite oblivious of the adage that when greek meets greek there comes a tug of war. but lee did not concern himself with such childish exhibitions of judgment and temper. "do not put your faith in rumors of adjustment," he wrote his wife before serious fighting had begun. "i see no prospect of it. it cannot be while passions on both sides are so infuriated. make your plans for several years of war. i agree with you that the inflammatory articles in the papers do us much harm. i object particularly to those in the southern papers, as i wish them to take a firm, dignified course, free from bravado and boasting. the times are indeed calamitous. the brightness of god's countenance seems turned from us. it may not always be so dark and he may in time pardon our sins and take us under his protection." up to this time his son custis, who had graduated first in his class at west point, was still in the service of the united states as a lieutenant in the engineers and of him lee wrote to his wife in the same comradely spirit that he had always shown toward his boys. "tell custis he must consult his own judgment, reason and conscience, as to the course he may take. the present is a momentous question which every man must settle for himself, and upon principle. i do not wish him to be guided by my wishes or example. if i have done wrong let him do better." virginia was not slow in recognizing that she had within her borders the soldiers whom the chief general of the united states described as the greatest military genius in america, and within three days of his resignation from the old army, lee was tendered the command of all the virginia troops. convinced that the brunt of the heavy fighting would fall on his native state, to whose defense he had dedicated his sword, he accepted the offer and thus there came to the aid of the confederacy one of the few really great commanders that the world has ever seen. chapter xii. -opening moves it was to no very agreeable task that lee was assigned at the outset of his command. the forces of the confederacy were even less prepared to take the field than those of the united states, and for three months lee was hard at work organizing and equipping the army for effective service. this important but dull duty prevented him from taking any active part in the first great battle of the war at bull run (july 21, 1861), but it was his rare judgment in massing the troops where they could readily reã«nforce each other that enabled the confederate commanders on that occasion to form the junction which resulted in the overwhelming defeat of the union army. this fact was well recognized by the authorities and, when the situation in western virginia assumed a threatening aspect, he was ordered there with the highest hopes that he would repeat the success of bull run and speedily expel the union forces from that part of the state. a more unpromising field of operation than western virginia could scarcely have been selected for the new commander. the people of that region generally favored the union, and the federal troops had already obtained possession of the strongest positions, while some of the confederate commanders were quarreling with each other and otherwise working at cross purposes. for a time, therefore, lee had to devote himself to smoothing over the differences which had arisen among his jealous subordinates, but when he at last began an aggressive movement, bad weather and a lack of coã¶peration between the various parts of his small army defeated his designs, and in october, 1861, the three-months' campaign came to an inglorious close. this complete failure was a bitter disappointment to the confederate hopes and lee was severely blamed for the result. indeed, for the time being he was regarded as an overrated individual who had had his opportunity and had proved unequal to the task of conducting military operations on a large scale. it was not easy to suffer this unjust criticism to pass unnoticed, but the discipline of the army life had taught lee to control his tongue, and he made no protest even when he found himself removed from the front to superintend the fortifying of the coast. a small-minded man would probably have retired in sulky silence under such circumstances, but lee entered upon his new duties with cheerful energy, and in four months he devised such skillful defenses for charleston, savannah and other points on the confederate coast line, that they were enabled to defy all assaults of the union army and navy until almost the close of the war. this invaluable service attracted no public attention, but it was fully appreciated by the confederate authorities, who in no wise shared the popular opinion concerning lee's talents. on the contrary, president jefferson davis, himself a graduate of west point, continued to have the highest regard for his ability, and in march, 1862, he reappointed him as his chief military adviser at richmond. it was about this time that the roar of cannon in the west attracted the attention of the country, making it realize for the first time how far flung was the battle line of the contending armies; and on hard-fought fields, hundreds and hundreds of miles away from washington and richmond, the mud-splashed figure of grant began to loom through heavy clouds of smoke. it was by no brilliant achievement that grant regained his standing in the army. the unruly 21st illinois had been sufficiently disciplined within a fortnight after he assumed command to take some pride in itself as an organization and when its short term of service expired, it responded to the eloquence of mcclernand and logan, two visiting orators, by reã«nlisting almost to a man. then the colonel set to work in earnest to make his regiment ready for the field, drilling and hardening the men for their duties and waiting for an opportunity to show that this was a fighting force with no nonsense about it. the opportunity came sooner than he expected, for about two weeks after he had assumed command, his regiment was ordered to northern missouri, and a railroad official called at his camp to inquire how many cars he would need for the transportation of his men. "i don't want any," was the bluff response; and, to the astonishment of the local authorities who, at that period of the war, never dreamed of moving troops except by rail or river, the energetic colonel assembled his regiment in marching order and started it at a brisk pace straight across country. but, though he had moved with such commendable promptness, grant was not nearly so confident as his actions seemed to imply. in fact, before he reached his destination, he heartily wished himself back again, and by the time he arrived at the point where the enemy was expected his nerves were completely unstrung. it was not the fright of cowardice that unmanned him, but rather the terror of responsibility. again and again he had braved death in battle but now, for the first time, the safety of an entire regiment depended solely upon him as he approached the summit of the hill from which he expected to catch sight of his opponents he dreaded to fight them, lest he prove unequal to the emergency. but, while he was tormenting himself with this over-anxiety, he suddenly remembered that his opponent was just as new at his duties as he was and probably quite as nervous, and from that moment his confidence gradually returned. as a matter of fact, colonel harris, who commanded the confederate force, displayed far more prudence than valor, for, on hearing of the advance of the union troops, he speedily retreated and the 21st illinois encountered no opposition whatever. but the march taught grant a lesson he never forgot and, thereafter, in the hour of peril, he invariably consoled himself by remembering that his opponents were not free from danger and the more he made them look to their own safety the less time they would have for worrying him. it was in july, 1861, when grant entered missouri, and about a month later the astonishing news reached his headquarters that president lincoln had appointed him a brigadier general of volunteers. the explanation of this unexpected honor was that the illinois congressmen had included his name with seven others on a list of possible brigadiers, and the president had appointed four of them without further evidence of their qualifications. under such circumstances, the promotion was not much of an honor, but it placed grant in immediate command of an important district involving the control of an army of quite respectable size. for a time the new general was exclusively occupied with perfecting the organization of his increased command, but to this hard, dull work he devoted himself in a manner that astonished some of the other brigadiers whose ideas of the position involved a showy staff of officers and a deal of picturesque posing in resplendent uniforms. but grant had no patience with such foolery. he had work to do and when his headquarters were established at cairo, illinois, he took charge of them himself, keeping his eyes on all the details like any careful business man. in fact he was, as far as appearances were concerned, a man of business, for he seldom wore a uniform and worked at his desk all day in his shirt sleeves, behind ramparts of maps and papers, with no regard whatever for military ceremony or display. a month of this arduous preparation found his force ready for active duty and about this time he became convinced that the confederates intended to seize paducah, an important position in kentucky at the mouth of the tennessee river, just beyond the limits of his command. he, accordingly, telegraphed his superiors for permission to occupy the place. no reply came to this request and a more timid man would have hesitated to move without orders. but grant saw the danger and, assuming the responsibility, landed his troops in the town just in time to prevent its capture by the confederates. paducah was in sympathy with the south, and on entering it the union commander issued an address to the inhabitants which attracted far more attention than the occupation of the town, for it contained nothing of the silly brag and bluster so common then in military proclamations on both sides. on the contrary, it was so modest and sensible, and yet so firm, that lincoln, on reading it, is said to have remarked: "the man who can write like that is fitted to command." paducah was destined to be the last of grant's bloodless victories, for in november, 1861, he was ordered to threaten the confederates near belmont, missouri, as a feint to keep them from reã«nforcing another point where a real assault was planned. the maneuver was conducted with great energy and promised to be completely successful, but after grant's raw troops had made their first onslaught and had driven their opponents from the field, they became disorderly and before he could control them the enemy reappeared in overwhelming numbers and compelled them to fight their way back to the river steamers which had carried them to the scene of action. this they succeeded in doing, but such was their haste to escape capture that they actually tumbled on board the boats and pushed off from the shore without waiting for their commander. by this time the confederates were rapidly approaching with the intention of sweeping the decks of the crowded steamboats before they could get out of range, and grant was apparently cut off from all chance of escape. directly in front of him lay the precipitous river bank, while below only one transport was within hail and that had already started from its moorings. its captain, however, caught sight of him as he came galloping through a corn field and instantly pushed his vessel as close to the shore as he dared, at the same time throwing out a single plank about fifteen feet in length to serve as an emergency gangway. to force a horse down the cliff-like bank of the river and up the narrow plank to the steamer's deck, was a daring feat, but the officer who was riding for his life had not forgotten the skill which had marked him at west point and, compelling his mount to slide on its haunches down the slippery mud precipice, he trotted coolly up the dangerous incline to safety. the battle of belmont (november 7, 1861), as this baptism of fire was called, is said to have caused more mourning than almost any other engagement of the war, for up to that time there had been but little loss of life and its list of killed and wounded, mounting into the hundreds, made a painfully deep impression. in this respect, it was decidedly ominous of grant's future record, but it accomplished his purpose in detaining the confederates and he was soon to prove his willingness to accept defeats as necessary incidents to any successful campaign and to fight on undismayed. chapter xiii. -grant's first success up to this time the war in the west had been largely an affair of skirmishes. a body of union troops would find itself confronting a confederate force, one of the two commanders would attack and a fight would follow; or the confederates would march into a town and their opponents would attempt to drive them out of it, not because it was of any particular value, but because the other side held it. "see-a-head-and-hit-it" strategy governed the day and no plan worthy of the name had been adopted for conducting the war on scientific principles. but grant had studied the maps to some purpose in his office at cairo and he realized that the possession of the mississippi river was the key to the situation in the west. as long as the confederates controlled that great waterway which afforded them free access to the ocean and fairly divided the eastern from the western states, they might reasonably hope to defy their opponents to the end of time. but, if they lost it, one part of the confederacy would be almost completely cut off from the rest. doubtless, other men saw this just as clearly and quite as soon as grant did; but having once grasped an idea he never lost sight of it, and while others were diverted by minor matters, he concentrated his whole attention on what he believed to be the vital object of all campaigning in the west. the tennessee river and the cumberland river both flow into the ohio, not far from where that river empties into the mississippi. they, therefore, formed the principal means of water communication with the mississippi for the state of tennessee, and the confederates had created forts to protect them at points well within supporting distance of each other. fort henry, guarding the tennessee river, and fort donelson, commanding the cumberland river, were both in grant's district, and in january, 1862, he wrote to general halleck, his superior officer in st. louis, calling attention to the importance of these posts and offering suggestions for their capture. but halleck did not take any notice of this communication and grant thereupon resolved to go to st. louis and present his plans in person. this was the first time he had been in the city since the great change in his circumstances and those who had known him only a few years before as a poverty-stricken farmer and wagoner could scarcely believe that he was the same man. he had, as yet, done nothing very remarkable, but he held an important command, his name was well and favorably known and he had already begun to pay off his old debts. all this enabled his father and mother to regain something of the pride they had once felt for their eldest son, and his former friends were glad to welcome him and claim his acquaintance. pleasant as this was, the trip to st. louis was a bitter disappointment in other respects, for halleck not only rejected his subordinate's proposition for the capture of fort henry and fort donelson, but dismissed him without even listening to the details of his plan. most officers would have been completely discouraged by such treatment, but grant had been accustomed to disappointments for many years and did not readily despair. meeting flag-officer foote who had charge of a fleet of gun boats near cairo, he explained his idea and finding him not only sympathetic, but enthusiastic, he and foote each sent a telegram to halleck assuring him that fort henry could be taken if he would only give his consent. these messages brought no immediate response, but grant continued to request permission to advance until, on the 1st of february, 1862, the necessary order was obtained and within twenty-four hours the persistent officer had his expedition well upon its way. his force consisted of some 15,000 men and seven gun boats, and halleck promised him reã«nforcements, sending a capable officer to see that they were promptly forwarded. this officer was brigadier general sherman who thus, for the first time, came in touch with the man with whom he was destined to bring the war to a close. four days after the troops started they were ready to attack and the gun-boats at once proceeded to shell the fort, with the result that its garrison almost immediately surrendered (february 6, 1862), practically all of its defenders having retreated to fort donelson as soon as they saw that their position was seriously threatened. grant promptly notified his chief of this easy conquest, at the same time adding that he would take fort donelson within forty-eight hours, but he soon had reason to regret this boast--one of the few of which he was ever guilty. indeed, his troops had scarcely started on their journey when rapid progress became impossible, for the rain descended in torrents, rendering the roads impassable for wagons and cannon, and almost impracticable for infantry or cavalry. moreover, many of the men had foolishly thrown away their blankets and overcoats during the march from fort henry and their suffering under the freezing winter blasts was exceedingly severe, especially as camp fires were not permitted for fear that their smoke would attract the gunners in the fort. under these circumstances the advance was seriously delayed, and it was february 14, 1862--six days after he had prophesied that he would take the place--before grant had his army in position. by this time, however, the gun-boats had arrived and he determined to attack at once, although halleck had advised him to wait for reã«nforcements to occupy fort henry, lest the confederates should recapture it while his back was turned. there was, of course, a chance of this, but grant felt sure that if he delayed the confederates would seize the opportunity to strengthen fort donelson, and then 50,000 men would not be able to accomplish what 15,000 might immediately effect. he, accordingly, directed foote to bombard the fort at once from the river front and try to run its batteries. desperate as this attempt appeared his orders were instantly obeyed, the fearless naval officer forcing his little vessels into the very jaws of death under a terrific fire, to which he responded with a hail of shot and shell. grant watched this spectacular combat with intense interest, waiting for a favorable moment to order an advance of his troops, but to his bitter disappointment one after another of foote's vessels succumbed to the deadly fire of the water batteries and drifted helplessly back with the current. indeed, the flagship was struck more than sixty times and foote himself was so severely wounded that he could not report in person, but requested that the general come on board his ship for a conference, which disclosed the fact that the fleet was in no condition to continue the combat and must retire for repairs. there was nothing for grant to do, therefore, but prepare for a siege, and with a heavy heart he returned from the battered gun-boat to give the necessary orders. he had scarcely set his foot on shore, however, before a staff officer dashed up with the startling intelligence that the confederates had sallied forth and attacked a division of the army commanded by general mcclernand and that his troops were fleeing in a panic which threatened to involve the entire army. grant knew mcclernand well. he was one of the congressmen who had made speeches to the 21st illinois and, realizing that the man was almost wholly ignorant of military matters and utterly incapable of handling such a situation, he leaped on his horse and, spurring his way across the frozen ground to the sound of the firing, confronted the huddled and beaten division just in the nick of time. meanwhile, general lew wallace--afterwards famous as the author "ben hur"--had arrived and thrown forward a brigade to cover the confused retreat, so that for the moment the confederate advance was held in check. but despite this, mcclernand's men continued to give way, muttering that their ammunition was exhausted. there were tons of ammunition close at hand, as the officers ought to have known had they understood their duties, but even when assured of this the panic-stricken soldiers refused to return to the field. they were in no condition to resist attack, they declared, and the enemy was evidently intending to make a long fight of it, as the haversacks of those who had fallen contained at least three days' rations. this excuse was overheard by grant and instantly riveted his attention. "let me see some of those haversacks," he commanded sharply, and one glance at their contents convinced him that the confederates were not attempting to crush his army, but were trying to break through his lines and escape. if they intended to stay and defend the fortress, they would not carry haversacks at all; but if they contemplated a retreat, they would not only take them, but fill them with enough provisions to last for several days. in reaching this conclusion grant was greatly aided by his knowledge of the men opposing him. he had served in mexico with general pillow, the second in command at fort donelson, and, knowing him to be a timid man, felt certain that nothing but desperation would ever induce him to risk an attack. he also knew that floyd, his immediate superior, who had recently been the united states secretary of war, had excellent reasons for avoiding capture and, putting all these facts together, he instantly rose to the occasion. "fill your cartridge boxes, quick, and get into line," was his order to the men as he dashed down the wavering lines. "the enemy is trying to escape and he must not be permitted to do so!" the word flew through the disordered ranks, transforming them as it passed, and at the same time orders were issued for the entire left wing to advance and attack without a moment's delay. this unexpected onslaught quickly threw the confederates back into the fortress, but before they again reached the shelter of its walls the union forces had carried all the outer defenses and had virtually locked the door behind their retreating adversaries. from that moment the capture of the imprisoned garrison was only a question of time, and within twenty-four hours grant received a communication from the confederate commander asking for a truce to consider the terms of surrender. to his utter astonishment, however, this suggestion did not come from either general floyd or general pillow but from simon buckner, his old friend at west point, who had so generously aided him when he reached new york, penniless and disgraced after his resignation from the army. this was an embarrassing situation, indeed, but while he would have done anything he could for buckner personally, grant realized that he must not allow gratitude or friendship to interfere with his duty. he, therefore, promptly answered the proposal for a truce in these words: "no terms except an unconditional and immediate surrender can be accepted. i propose to move immediately upon your works." [note from brett: the full letter is also shown in grant's handwriting which leaves something to be desired. i will do my best to transcribe it below: hd qrs. army in the field camp fort donelson, feb. 16th 1862 cmdr. s. b. buckner confed. army. sir, yours of this inst. proposing armistice, and appointment of commissioners to settle terms of capitulation is just received. no terms except an unconditional and immediate surrender can be accepted. i propose to move immediately upon your works. i am sir, very respectfully, your obt. svt. [obedient servant], u. s. grant brig. gen.] but no more fighting was necessary, for buckner yielded as gracefully as he could, and on february 16, 1862, he and the entire garrison of about 15,000 men became prisoners of war. generals pillow and floyd, it appeared, had fled with some 4,000 men the night before, leaving buckner in charge and as grant's force had by that time been increased to 27,000 men, further resistance would have been useless. the capture of these two forts gave the union forces command of the tennessee and the cumberland rivers, and to that extent cleared the way for the control of the mississippi. it was the first real success which had greeted the union cause and it raised grant to a major-generalship of volunteers, gave him a national reputation and supplied a better interpretation of his initial than west point had provided, for from the date of his letter to buckner he was known as "unconditional surrender" grant. chapter xiv. -the battle of shiloh grant did not waste any time in rejoicing over his success. the capture of fort henry and fort donelson was an important achievement but it was only one step toward the control of the mississippi river, which was the main object of the campaign. the next step in that direction was toward corinth a strategically important point in mississippi, and he immediately concentrated his attention upon getting the army in position to attack that stronghold. some of his fellow commanders, however, were extremely cautious and he had to labor for days before he could persuade general buell, who was stationed at nashville, tennessee, with a large army, to advance his troops to a point where they could be of service. but in the midst of this work he was suddenly interrupted by an order which removed him from his command and virtually placed him under arrest on charges of disregarding instructions and of being absent from his department without permission. these astonishing accusations were caused by his failure to answer dispatches from headquarters which had never reached him, and by his visit to general buell which had obliged him to travel beyond the strict limits of his command. the whole matter was soon explained by the discovery that a confederate had been tampering with the dispatches in the telegraph office, but it was exceedingly annoying to grant to find himself publicly condemned without a hearing. nevertheless, it supplied a very fair test of his character, for he neither lost his temper nor displayed any excitement whatsoever. on the contrary, he remained perfectly calm in the face of grave provocation, replying firmly but respectfully to the harsh criticisms of his superiors, and behaving generally with a dignity and composure that won the silent approval of all observers. of course, as soon as the facts were known he was restored to his command with an ample apology, but his preparations for the advance against corinth had been seriously interrupted and it was some time before he again had the work in hand. nevertheless, within five weeks of the surrender of fort donelson, he was headed toward mississippi with over 30,000 men, having arranged with general buell to follow and support him with his army of 40,000, the combined forces being amply sufficient to overpower the confederates who were guarding corinth. this vast superiority, however, probably served to put grant off his guard, for on march 16, 1862, his advance under general sherman reached pittsburg landing, not far from corinth, and encamped there without taking the precaution to intrench. sherman reported on april 5th that he had no fear of being attacked and grant, who had been injured the day before by the fall of his horse and was still on crutches, remained some distance in the rear, feeling confident that there would be no serious fighting for several days. but the union commander, who had studied his opponents with such good results at fort donelson, made a terrible mistake in failing to do so on this occasion, for he knew, or ought to have known, that general albert sidney johnston and general beauregard, the confederate commanders were bold and energetic officers who were well advised of the military situation and ready to take advantage of every opportunity. indeed, their sharp eyes had already noted the gap between grant's and buell's armies and at the moment sherman was penning his dispatch to his superior, informing him that all was well, a force of 40,000 men was preparing to crush his unprotected advance guard before buell could reach the field. it was sunday morning, april 6, 1862, when the ominous sound of firing in the direction of shiloh church smote grant's ears. for a few moments he could not believe that it indicated a serious attack, but the roar of heavy guns soon convinced him that a desperate battle had begun and, directing his orderlies to lift him into the saddle, he dashed to the nearest boat landing and proceeded to the front with all possible speed. before he reached the ground, however, the confederates had driven the union outposts from the field in frightful disorder and were hurling themselves with ferocious energy upon those who still held fast. the surprise had been well-nigh complete and the first rush of the gray infantry carried everything before it, leaving the foremost union camp in their hands. indeed, for a time the federal army was not much more than a disorganized mob, completely bewildered by the shock of battle, and thousands of men blindly sought refuge in the rear, heedless of their officers who, with a few exceptions, strove valiantly to organize an effective defense. the tumult and confusion were at their worst when grant reached the field and it seemed almost hopeless to check the panic and prevent the destruction of his entire army. but in the midst of the maddening turmoil and wild scenes of disaster he kept his head and, dashing from one end of the line to the other, ordered regiments into position with a force and energy that compelled obedience. there was no time to formulate any plan of battle. each officer had to do whatever he thought best to hold back the confederates in his immediate front, and for hours the fight was conducted practically without orders. but grant supplied his gallant subordinates with something far more important than orders at that crisis. undismayed by the chaos about him he remained cool and inspired them with confidence. not for one instant would he admit the possibility of defeat, and under his strong hand the huddled lines were quickly reformed, the onrush of the confederates was gradually checked and a desperate conflict begun for every inch of ground. for a time the victorious gray-coats continued to push their opponents back and another line of tents fell into their hands. but their advance was stubbornly contested and knowing that buell was at hand, grant fought hard for delay, using every effort to encourage his men to stand fast and present the boldest possible front to the foe. meanwhile, however, sherman was wounded, and when darkness put an end to the furious combat the shattered union army was on the verge of collapse. so perilous, indeed, was the situation that when buell arrived on the field his first inquiry was as to what preparations grant had made to effect a retreat. but the silent commander instantly shook his head and announced, to the intense astonishment of his questioner, that he did not intend to retreat but to attack at daylight the next morning with every man at his disposal, leaving no reserves. such was grant at one of the darkest moments of his career. behind him lay the battered remnants of regiments, screening a welter of confusion and fear; before him stretched the blood-soaked field of shiloh held by the confident confederate host; while at his elbow stood anxious officers, well satisfied to have saved the army from destruction and ready to point out a convenient line of retreat. all his surroundings, in fact, were calculated to discourage him and the intense pain of his injured leg, which allowed him neither rest nor sleep, was a severe strain upon his nerves. yet he would not yield to weakness of any kind. he was responsible for the position in which the union army found itself and he determined to retrieve its fortunes. therefore, all night long while reã«nforcements were steadily arriving, he developed his plans for assuming the offensive, and at break of day his troops hurled themselves against the opposing lines with dauntless energy. meanwhile the confederates had sustained an irreparable loss, for albert sidney johnston, their brilliant leader, had fallen. moreover, they had no reserves to meet the union reã«nforcements. nevertheless, they received the vigorous onslaught with splendid courage and another terrible day of carnage followed. again and again grant exposed himself with reckless daring, narrowly escaping death from a bullet which carried away the scabbard of his sword as he reconnoitered in advance of his men, but despite his utmost efforts the gray lines held fast, and for hours no apparent advantage was gained. then, little by little, the heavy union battalions began to push them back until all the lost ground was recovered, but the confederates conducted their retreat in good order and finally reached a point of safety, leaving very few prisoners in their pursuers' hands. grant had saved his army from destruction and had even driven his adversary from the field, but at a fearful cost, for no less than 10,000 union soldiers were killed or wounded in the two days' desperate fighting at shiloh and almost 3,000 had been captured. the confederates, it is true, had lost nearly 10,000 men, but their army, which should have been crushed by the combined efforts of grant and buell, was still in possession of corinth and had come dangerously near to annihilating half of the union forces. the results of the battle were, therefore, received at washington with surprise and indignation; the country at large, horrified at the frightful slaughter, denounced it as a useless butchery; halleck hastily assumed charge of all the forces in the field and from that time forward grant, though nominally the second in command, was deprived of all power and virtually reduced to the rã´le of a mere spectator. indeed, serious efforts were made to have him dismissed from the service, but lincoln after carefully considering the charges, refused to act. "i can't spare this man," was his comment. "he fights." lincoln intended to imply by that remark that there were generals in the army who did not fight, and halleck was certainly one of them, for he took thirty-one days to march the distance that the confederates had covered in three. indeed, he displayed such extraordinary caution that with an army of 100,000 at his back he inched his way toward corinth, erecting intrenchments at every halt, only to find, after a month, that he had been frightened by shadows and dummy guns and that the city had been abandoned by the confederates. no commander responsible for such a ridiculous performance could retain the confidence of an army in the field, and sherman assured grant that halleck would not long survive the fiasco. this advice was sorely needed, for grant had grown tired of being constantly humiliated and had already requested halleck to relieve him from duty when sherman persuaded him to remain and wait for something to happen. something happened sooner then either man expected, for halleck was suddenly "kicked up stairs" by his appointment to the chief command with headquarters in washington, and on july 11, 1862, about three months after the battle of shiloh, grant found himself again at the head of a powerful army. chapter xv. -lee in the saddle while grant was earning a reputation as a fighting general in the west, lee had been at a desk in richmond attending to his duties as chief military adviser to the confederate president, which prevented him from taking active part in any operations in the field. as a matter of fact, however, there had been no important engagements in the east, for "on to richmond!" had become the war cry of the north, and all the energies of the federal government had been centered on preparations for the capture of the southern capital. indeed, if richmond had been the treasure house and last refuge of the confederacy, no greater efforts could have been made to secure it, although it was by no means essential to either the north or the south and the war would have continued no matter which flag floated above its roofs. nevertheless, the idea of marching into the enemy's capital appealed to the popular imagination and this undoubtedly dictated much of the early strategy of the war. at all events, while the opening moves in the campaign for the possession of the mississippi were being made, a vast army was being equipped near washington for the express purpose of capturing richmond. the preparation of this force had been entrusted to general george b. mcclellan whose ability in organizing, drilling and disciplining the troops had made him a popular hero and given him such a reputation as a military genius that he was universally hailed as "the young napoleon." he had, indeed, created the most thoroughly equipped army ever seen in america, and when he advanced toward virginia in april, 1862, at the head of over 100,000 men the supporters of the union believed that the doom of the confederacy was already sealed. from this office in richmond lee watched these formidable preparations for invading the south with no little apprehension. he knew that the confederates had only about 50,000 available troops with which to oppose mcclellan's great army and had the union commander been aware of this he might have moved straight against the city and swept its defenders from his path. but mcclellan always believed that he was outnumbered and on this occasion he wildly exaggerated his opponents' strength. in fact, he crept forward so cautiously that the confederates, who had almost resigned themselves to losing the city, hastened to bring up reã«nforcements and erect defensive works of a really formidable character. the best that was hoped for, however, was to delay the union army. to defeat it, or even to check its advance, seemed impossible, and doubtless it would have proved so had it not been for the brilliant exploits of the man who was destined to become lee's "right hand." this man was general thomas jonathan jackson, who had earned the nickname of "stonewall" at bull run and was at that time in command of about 15,000 men guarding the fertile shenandoah valley, the "granary of virginia." opposing this comparatively small army were several strong union forces which were considered amply sufficient to capture or destroy it, and mcclellan proceeded southward, with no misgivings concerning jackson. but the wily confederate had no intention of remaining idle and mcclellan's back was scarcely turned before he attacked and utterly routed his nearest opponents. a second, third and even a fourth army was launched against him, but he twisted, turned and doubled on his tracks with bewildering rapidity, cleverly luring his opponents apart; and then, falling on each in turn with overwhelming numbers, hurled them from his path with astonishing ease and suddenly appeared before washington threatening its capture. astounded and alarmed at this unexpected peril, the federal authorities instantly ordered mcdowell's corps of 40,000 men, which was on the point of joining mcclellan, to remain and defend the capital. this was a serious blow to mcclellan who had counted upon using these troops, though even without them he greatly outnumbered the confederates. but the idea that he was opposed by an overwhelming force had taken such a firm hold on his mind that he was almost afraid to move, and while he was timidly feeling his way general joseph johnston, commanding the defenses at richmond, attacked his advance corps at seven pines, may 31, 1862. a fierce contest followed, during which johnston was severely wounded, and jefferson davis, who was on the field, promptly summoned general lee to the command. it was a serious situation which confronted lee when he was thus suddenly recalled to active duty, for mcclellan's army outnumbered his by at least 40,000 men and it was within six miles of richmond, from the roofs of whose houses the glow of the union campfires was plainly visible. nevertheless, he determined to put on a bold front and attack his opponent at his weakest point. but how to discover this was a difficult problem and the situation did not admit of a moment's delay. under ordinary circumstances the information might have been secured through spies, but there was no time for this and confronted by the necessity for immediate action, lee thought of "jeb" stuart, his son's classmate at west point, who had acted as aide in the capture of john brown. stuart was only twenty-nine years old but he had already made a name for himself as a general of cavalry, and lee knew him well enough to feel confident that, if there was any one in the army who could procure the needed information, he was the man. he, accordingly, ordered him to take 1,200 troopers and a few field guns and ride straight at the right flank of the union army until he got near enough to learn how mcclellan's forces were posted at that point. this perilous errand was just the opportunity for which stuart had been waiting, and without the loss of a moment he set his horsemen in motion. directly in his path lay the federal cavalry but within twenty-four hours he had forced his way through them and carefully noted the exact position of the union troops. his mission was then accomplished, but by this time the federal camp was thoroughly aroused and, knowing that if he attempted to retrace his steps his capture was almost certain, he pushed rapidly forward and, passing around the right wing, proceeded to circle the rear of mcclellan's entire army. so speedily did he move that the alarm of his approach was no sooner given in one quarter than he appeared in another and thus, like a boy disturbing a row of hornets' nests with a long stick, he flashed by the whole line, reached the union left, swung around it and reported to lee with his command practically intact. that a few squadrons of cavalry should have been able to ride around his army of 100,000 men and escape unscathed astonished and annoyed mcclellan but he utterly failed to grasp the true purpose of this brilliant exploit, and lee took the utmost care to see that his suspicions were not aroused. stuart's information had convinced him that the right wing of the union army was badly exposed and might be attacked with every prospect of success, but to insure this it was necessary that mcclellan's attention should be distracted from the real point of danger. the confederate commander thoroughly understood his opponent's character and failings, for he had taken his measure during the mexican war and knowing his cautious nature, he spread the news that heavy reã«nforcements had been forwarded to jackson in the shenandoah valley. this he felt sure would confirm mcclellan's belief that he had such overwhelming numbers that he could afford to withdraw troops from richmond, and the ruse was entirely successful, for the union commander hesitated to advance, and the federal authorities, hearing of jackson's supposed reã«nforcement, became increasingly alarmed for the safety of washington. meanwhile, a courier had been secretly hurried to jackson, ordering him to rush his troops from the shenandoah valley and attack mcclellan's right wing from the rear while lee assaulted it from the front. but the union right wing numbered fully 25,000 men and jackson had only 15,000. so to make the attack overwhelming it was necessary for lee to withdraw 40,000 men from the defenses of richmond, leaving the city practically unprotected. unquestionably, this was a most dangerous move, for had mcclellan suspected the truth he might have forced his way into the capital without much difficulty. but here again lee counted upon his adversary's character, for he directed the troops that remained in the trenches to keep up a continuous feint of attacking the union left wing, in the hope that this show of force would cause mcclellan to look to his safety in that quarter, which is precisely what he did. indeed, he was still busy reporting the threatening movements against his left, when lee and jackson's combined force of 55,000 men fell upon his right with fearful effect at gaines' mill (june 27, 1862). from that moment his campaign for the capture of richmond became a struggle to save his own army from capture or destruction. the only safety lay in flight but at the moment of defeat and impending disaster it was not easy to extricate the troops from their dangerous position, and mcclellan showed high skill in masking his line of retreat. lee did not, therefore, immediately discover the direction in which he was moving and this delay probably prevented him from annihilating the remnants of the union army. once on the trail, however, he lost no time and, loosing "his dogs of war," they fell upon the retreating columns again and again in the series of terrible conflicts known as the "seven days' battles." but the union army was struggling for its life and, like a stag at bay, it fought off its pursuers with desperate courage, until finally at malvern hill (july 1, 1862), it rolled them back with such slaughter that a bolder leader might have been encouraged to advance again toward richmond. as it was, however, mcclellan was well content to remove his shattered legions to a point of safety at harrison's landing, leaving lee in undisturbed possession of the field dyed with the blood of well-nigh 30,000 men. chapter xvi. -a game of strategy while the remnants of mcclellan's fine army were recuperating from the rough handling they had received, lee was developing a plan to remove them still further from the vicinity of richmond. harrison's landing was too close to the confederate capital for comfort and the breastworks which the union commander erected there were too formidable to be attacked. but, though he could not hope to drive his adversary away by force, lee believed that he could lure him from his stronghold by carrying the war into another part of virginia. the opportunity to do this was particularly favorable, for the union forces in front of washington, consisting of about 45,000 men, had been placed under the command of general john pope. pope had served with grant in the mississippi campaign and had begun his career in the east by boasting of the great things he was about to accomplish, referring contemptuously to his opponents and otherwise advertising himself as a braggart and a babbler. he had come, so he told his soldiers in a flamboyant address, from an army which had seen only the backs of its enemies. he had come to lead them to victories. he wanted to hear no more of "lines of retreat" or backward movements of any kind. his headquarters were "in the saddle" and his mission was to terrorize the foe. these absurd proclamations pretty thoroughly exposed pope's character, but he had been at west point with general longstreet, one of lee's ablest advisers, and that officer speedily acquainted his chief with the full measure of his opponent's weaknesses. this was exceedingly useful to lee and when he discovered that mcclellan and pope were pulling at different directions like balky circus horses, while halleck with one foot on each was in imminent peril of a fall, he determined to take advantage of the situation and hasten the disaster. mcclellan, having 90,000 men, wanted pope to reã«nforce him with his 45,000, and thus insure a renewal of his campaign against richmond. but this, of course, did not suit pope who wished mcclellan's army to reã«nforce him and march to victory under his banner. but while each of the rivals was insisting that his plan should be adopted and halleck, who held the chief of command, was wobbling between them, trying to make up his mind to favor one or the other, lee took the whole matter out of his hands and decided it for him. he did not want mcclellan to be reã«nforced; first, because he was the abler officer and, second, because he had or soon would have more than sufficient men to capture richmond and might wake to a realization of this fact at any moment. from the confederate standpoint it was much safer to have pope reã«nforced, for he did not have the experience necessary to handle a large army. therefore, the more troops he had to mismanage the better. moreover, lee knew that mcclellan would cease to be dangerous as soon as he was obliged to send any part of his forces away, for, as usual, he imagined that his opponents already outnumbered him and that the withdrawal of even a single regiment would place him practically at their mercy. carefully bearing all these facts in mind and thinking that it was about time to force halleck to transfer some of mcclellan's troops to pope, lee ordered jackson to attack the man who thus far had seen "only the backs of his foes." but at the battle of cedar mountain, which followed (august 9, 1862), his enemies would not turn their backs and the fact evidently alarmed him, for he immediately began shouting lustily for help. perhaps he called a little louder than was necessary in order to get as many of his rival's men as possible under his own command, but the result was that mcclellan's army began rapidly melting away under orders to hurry to the rescue. lee's first object was, therefore, accomplished at one stroke and, as fast as mcclellan's troops moved northward, he withdrew the forces guarding richmond and rushed them by shorter routes to confront pope, whom he had determined to destroy before his reã«nforcements reached the field. indeed, a very neat trap had already been prepared for that gentleman who was on the point of stepping into it when he intercepted one of his adversary's letters which gave him sufficient warning to escape by beating a hasty retreat across the rappahannock river. this was a perfectly proper movement under the circumstances, but in view of his absurd ideas concerning retreats it opened him up to public ridicule which was almost more than a man of his character could endure. he was soon busy, therefore, complaining, explaining, and protesting his readiness to recross the river at a moment's notice. but, while he was thus foolishly wearing out the telegraph lines between his headquarters and washington, lee was putting into operation a plan which would have been rash to the point of folly against a really able soldier but which was perfectly justified against an incompetent. this plan was to divide his army, which numbered less than 50,000 men, into two parts, sending "stonewall" jackson with 25,000 to get behind the union forces, while he attracted their commander's attention at the front. of course, if pope had discovered this audacious move, he could easily have crushed the divided confederate forces in turn before either could have come to the other's rescue, for he had 70,000 at his command. but the armies were not far from manassas or bull run, where the first important engagement of the war had been fought and lee know every inch of the ground. moreover, he believed that all pope's provisions and supplies upon which he depended for feeding his army were behind him, and that, if jackson succeeded in seizing them and getting between the union army and washington, pope would lose his head and dash to the rescue regardless of consequences. great, therefore, as the risk was he determined to take it, and jackson circled away with his 25,000 men, leaving lee with the same number confronting an army of 70,000 which might have swept the field. but its commander never dreamed of the opportunity which lay before him and he remained utterly unsuspicious until the night of august 26, 1862, when his flow of telegrams was suddenly checked and he was informed that there was something the matter with the wires connecting him to washington. there was, indeed, something the matter with them, for jackson's men had cut them down and were at that moment greedily devouring pope's provisions, helping themselves to new uniforms and shoes and leaving facetious letters complaining of the quality of the supplies. for a while, however, the union general had no suspicion of what was happening, for he interpreted the interference with the telegraph wires as the work of cavalry riders whom a comparatively small force could quickly disperse. but when the troops dispatched for this purpose came hurrying back with the news that jackson's whole army was behind them, he acted precisely as lee had expected, and completely forgetting to close the doors behind him, dashed madly after "stonewall," whom he regarded as safe as a cat in a bag. the door which he should have closed was thoroughfare gap, for that was the only opening through which lee could have led his men with any hope of arriving in time to help his friends, and a few troops could have blocked it with the utmost ease. but it was left unguarded and pope had scarcely turned his back to spring on jackson before lee slid through the gap and sprang on him. the contest that followed, called the second battle of bull run or manassas (august 30, 1862), was almost a repetition of the first, except that in the earlier battle the union soldiers had a fair chance and on this occasion they had none at all. indeed, lee and jackson had pope so situated that, despite the bravery of his men, they battered and pounded him until he staggered from the field in a state of hysterical confusion, wildly telegraphing that the enemy was badly crippled and that everything would be well, and following up this by asking if the capital would be safe, if his army should be destroyed. it is indeed possible that his army would have been reduced to a mere mob, had it not been for the proximity of the fortifications of washington, into which his exhausted regiments were safely tumbled on the 2nd of september, 1862. thus, for the second time in two months, lee calmly confronted the wreck of an opposing host, which, at the outset, had outnumbered him and confidently planned for his destruction. chapter xvii. -lee and the invasion of maryland lee's masterly defense of richmond, and his complete triumph over mcclellan and pope had, in three months, made him the idol of the confederacy. in all military matters his word was law, while the army adored him and the people of the south as a whole regarded him with a feeling akin to reverence. this was not entirely the result of his achievements on the field. jackson had displayed an equal genius for the art of war and in the opinion of many experts he was entitled to more credit than his chief. but jackson was regarded with awe and curiosity rather than affection. he was hailed as a great commander, while lee was recognized as a great man. it was not by spectacular efforts or assertiveness of any kind that lee had gained this hold upon his countrymen. he avoided everything that even tended toward self-display. his army reports were not only models of modesty, but generous acknowledgements of all he owed to his officers and men. he addressed none but respectful words to his superiors and indulged in no criticisms or complaints. he accepted the entire responsibility for whatever reverses occurred to the forces under his command and never attempted to place the blame on the shoulders of any other man. in a word, he was so absolutely free from personal ambition that the political schemers unconsciously stood abashed in his presence, and citizens and soldiers alike instinctively saluted the mere mention of his name. never by any chance did he utter a word of abuse against the north. even when his beloved arlington was seized, and the swords, pictures, silverware and other precious mementos of washington were carried off, his protest was couched in quiet and dignified language, well calculated to make those to whom it was addressed (and later every american) blush with shame. likewise in the heat of battle, when wild tongues were loosed and each side accused the other of all that hate could suggest, he never forgot that his opponents were americans. "drive those people back," or "don't let those people pass you," were the harshest words he ever uttered of his foes. to him war was not a mere license to destroy human life. it was a terrible weapon to be used scientifically, not with the idea of slaughtering as many of the enemy as possible, but to protect the state for whose defense he had drawn his sword. this was distinctly his attitude as he watched pope's defeated columns reeling from the field. neither by word nor deed did he exult over the fallen foe or indulge in self-glorification at his expense. his sole thought was to utilize the victory that the war would be speedily brought to a successful close; and, spreading out his maps in the quiet of his tent, he proceeded to study them with this idea. almost directly in front of his victorious army stretched the intrenchments of washington but, although he knew something of the panic into which that city had been thrown by the last battle, he had not troops enough to risk assaulting fortifications to the defense of which well-nigh every able-bodied man in the vicinity had been called. the fall of washington might perhaps have ended the war, but the loss of the neighboring state of maryland and an attack on some of the pennsylvania cities, such as harrisburg and philadelphia, promised to prove equally effective. the chances of wresting maryland from the union seemed particularly favorable, for it had come very close to casting its lot with the confederacy and thousands of its citizens were serving in the southern ranks. he, accordingly, made up his mind to march through maryland, arousing its people to the support of the confederate cause, and then carry the war into pennsylvania where a decisive victory might pave the way to an acknowledgment of the independence of the southern states and satisfactory terms of peace. thus, four days after pope's defeat at manassas saw lee's tattered battle flags slanted toward the north, and on september 6, 1862, the vanguard under "stonewall" jackson passed through the streets of frederick city, singing "maryland, my maryland!" this was the moment which whittier immortalized in his verses recording the dramatic meeting between "stonewall" and barbara frietchie [note from brett: the poem is entitled "barbara frietchie" and there is some question as to the accuracy of the details of the poem. in general, however, whittier retold the story (poetically) that he claims he heard ("from respectable and trustworthy sources") and barbara frietchie was strongly against the confederacy and was not a fictional character. it is believed that ms. frietchie, who was 95 at the time, was sick in bed on the day the soldiers marched through, but did wave her flag when the union army marched through two days later. a ms. quantrill and her daughters, however, did wave the union flag as the confederate soldiers marched through the town, so there is some thought that the two got combined.]; but, though no such event ever took place, the poet was correctly informed as to the condition of jackson's men, for they certainly were a "famished rebel horde." indeed, several thousand of them had to be left behind because they could no longer march in their bare feet, and those who had shoes were sorry-looking scarecrows whose one square meal had been obtained at pope's expense. for all practical purposes maryland was the enemy's country, but into this hostile region they advanced carrying very little in the way of provisions except salt for the ears of corn that they might pick up in the fields. the authorities at washington watched lee's movement with mingled feelings of anxiety and relief. they were relieved because he was evidently not aiming at the national capital. they were alarmed because the real point of attack was unknown. sixty thousand men, flushed with triumph and under seemingly invincible leadership were headed somewhere, and as the rumor spread that that "somewhere" was harrisburg or philadelphia, the north stood aghast with consternation. face to face with this desperate crisis, mcclellan, who had been practically removed from command, was restored to duty and given charge of all the union forces in the field. had he been invested with supreme authority, at least one grievous blunder might have been avoided, for as he proceeded to the front, calling loudly as usual for reã«nforcements, he advised the evacuation of harper's ferry, garrisoned by some 12,000 men who were exposed to capture by lee's advance on frederick city. but halleck rejected this advice and on september 15, 1862, "stonewall" jackson, with about 20,000 men, swooped down upon the defenseless post and gobbled up almost the entire garrison with all its guns and stores. to accomplish this, however, he was forced to separate himself from lee, and while mcclellan, with over 87,000 men, was protesting that his opponent had 120,000 and that it was impossible to win against such odds, lee's strength had been reduced to about 35,000 and his safety absolutely depended upon his adversary's fears. it was hardly to be hoped, however, that mcclellan's imagination would cause him to see three men for every one opposed to him, but such was the fact, and even when one of lee's confidential orders fell into his hands, revealing the fact that jackson's whole force was absent, he still thought himself outnumbered. the discovery of this order was a serious blow to lee, for it not only exposed his immediate weakness, but actually disclosed his entire plan. how it was lost has never been explained, for its importance was so fully realized that one of the officers who received a copy pinned it in the inside pocket of his coat, another memorized his copy and then chewed it up and others took similar precautions to protect its secret. some officer, however, must have been careless, for when the union troops halted at frederick city, through which the confederates had just passed, a private in an indiana regiment found it lying on the ground wrapped around some cigars and, recognizing its value, carried it straight to his superiors who promptly bore it to headquarters. had lee remained ignorant of this discovery it is possible that mcclellan might have effected the capture of his army. but a civilian, favoring the south who happened to be present when the paper reached headquarters, slipped through the union lines and put the confederate commander on his guard. lee had already noted that mcclellan was moving toward him at unusual speed for so cautious an officer and, this was readily explained by the news that his plans were known and jackson's absence discovered. he accordingly posted his troops so that he could form a junction with the rest of the army at the earliest possible moment and halted in the vicinity of sharpsburg near antietam creek. chapter xviii. -the battle of antietam or sharpsburg had mcclellan not absurdly overestimated the number of troops opposed to him when his army neared sharpsburg on the 15th of september, 1862, he might have defeated lee and possibly destroyed or captured his entire force. never before had a union commander had such an opportunity to deliver a crushing blow. he had more than 80,000 men under his control--fully twice as many as his adversary; he had the confederate plan of campaign in his hands and such fighting as had occurred with the exception of that at harper's ferry had been decidedly in his favor. moreover, lee had recently met with a serious accident, his horse having knocked him down and trampled on him, breaking the bones of one hand, and otherwise injuring him so severely that he had been obliged to superintend most of the posting of his army from an ambulance. by a curious coincidence, too, "stonewall" jackson had been hurt in a similar manner a few days previously, so that if the battle had begun promptly, it is highly probable that he, too, would have been physically handicapped, and it is certain that his troops could not have reached the field in time to be of any assistance. to lee's immense relief, however, mcclellan made no serious attack on either the 15th or 16th of september, but spent those two days in putting his finishing touches on his preparations, and before he completed them that opportunity "which knocks but once at each man's gate" had passed him by, never to return. the battle of antietam or sharpsburg began at dawn of the 17th, but by that time jackson had arrived and both he and lee had so far recovered from their injuries that they were able to be in the saddle and personally direct the movements of their men. the confederate position had been skillfully selected for defense on the hills back of antietam creek and mcclellan's plan was to break through his opponent's line, gain his rear and cut him off from retreat. but lee, who had closely watched the elaborate massing of the union forces for this attempt, was fully prepared for it and the first assault against his line was repulsed with fearful slaughter. no subtle strategy or brilliant tactics of any kind marked mcclellan's conduct of the battle. time and again he hurled his heavy battalions against his opponent's left, center and right in a desperate effort to pierce the wall of gray, and once or twice his heroic veterans almost succeeded in battering their way through. but at every crisis lee rose to the emergency and moved his regiments as a skillful chess player manipulates his pieces on the board, now massing his troops at the danger point and now diverting his adversary's attack by a swift counter-stroke delivered by men unacquainted with defeat. both his hands were heavily swathed in bandages and far too painful to admit of his even touching the bridle rein, but he had had himself lifted into the saddle and for fully fourteen hours he remained mounted on "traveller," his famous war horse, watching every movement with the inspiring calmness of a commander born to rule the storm. the situation was perilous and no one realized its dangers more keenly than he, but not a trace of anxiety appeared upon his face. only twice was he betrayed into an expression of his feelings, once when he asked general hood where the splendid division was which he had commanded in the morning and received the reply: "they are lying in the field where you sent them," and again when he directed the rockbridge battery to go into action for a second time after three of its four guns had been disabled. the captain of this battery had halted to make a report of its condition and receive instructions, and lee, gazing at the group of begrimed and tattered privates behind the officer, ordered them to renew their desperate work before he recognized that among them stood his youngest son, robert. very few men in the confederate commander's position would have suffered a son to serve in the ranks. a word from him would, of course, have made the boy an officer. but that was not lee's way. to advance an inexperienced lad over the heads of older men was, to his mind, unjust and he would not do it even for his own flesh and blood. nor had his son himself expected it, for he had eagerly accepted his father's permission to enter the ranks and had cheerfully performed his full duty, never presuming on his relationship to the commander-in-chief or asking favors of any kind. all this was known to lee but this unexpected meeting at a moment when privates were being mowed down like grass was a terrible shock and strain. nevertheless, it was characteristic of the man that no change was made in the orders of the rockbridge battery, which continued on its way to the post of danger and, with young lee, gallantly performed the work he had called on it to do. by night the confederates still held the field, but the struggle had cost them nearly 11,000 men, reducing their force to less than 45,000, while mcclellan, despite even heavier losses, had more than 74,000 left. lee, accordingly, withdrew his army under cover of darkness to another part of the field and again awaited attack. but mcclellan neither attacked nor attempted anything like a pursuit until his opponent was safely out of reach, being well satisfied with having checked the advance of his formidable foe and spoiled his plans. this he was certainly entitled to claim, for lee's campaign against maryland and pennsylvania was effectually balked by his enforced retreat. indeed, it is quite possible that had mcclellan been adventurous he might have ended the war at antietam, for the day after the battle he outnumbered his opponents at least two to one and possessed enormous advantage in the way of equipment and supplies. but the union commander, though he possessed a genius for army organization and knew the art of inspiring confidence in his men, was no match for lee in the field, and he probably realized this. at all events, he displayed no anxiety to renew hostilities and when urged, and at last positively ordered to advance, he argued, protested, offered excuses for delay and in fact did everything but obey. weeks thus slipped by and finally lee himself became impatient to know what his adversary was doing. he, accordingly, again summoned stuart and ordered him to repeat the experiment of riding around the opposing army. news of this second, almost derisive defiance of mcclellan soon reached the north, for stuart, swiftly circling his right flank, suddenly appeared with 1,800 men at chambersburg, pennsylvania, terrorizing the country and destroying vast quantities of stores. stern and indignant orders from washington warned the union commander that this time he must not permit the daring troopers to escape. but only a few scouts were captured, and once more stuart sped safely back to his chief with full information as to the strength and position of the federal lines. even this did not arouse mcclellan, and two more weeks of inaction passed before he again set his vast army in motion. but by this time, the demand for his dismissal had become clamorous and, on november 5, 1862, president lincoln reluctantly removed him from command. chapter xix. -lee against burnside and hooker lincoln had good reason for hesitating to change commanders, for, unsatisfactory as mcclellan had proved, the president was by no means sure that any of his other generals would do better. in fact, with all his defects, there was much to be said in mcclellan's favor. as an organizer of troops or chief of staff he had displayed talents of the highest possible order, transforming the armed mob which had flocked to the defense of the union at the opening of the war into a well-drilled and disciplined army. that he had not accomplished much with this great engine of war after it had been constructed, had not been wholly his fault, for he had never been entirely free from interference at the hands of incompetent superiors, and he had had the misfortune to be pitted against a past master of the art of war. moreover, he had been called to the chief command at a moment of panic and peril and, if he had not succeeded in defeating lee, he had, at antietam, given the north the only semblance of victory which it could claim in all its campaigning in the south. but that one taste of triumph had whetted the public appetite for more. despite mcclellan's continuous talk about the overpowering numbers of his foes, the supporters of the union knew that they outmatched the confederacy in men, arms, ships, money, and resources of every kind. they accordingly insisted that the immense army which had lain idle in its camps for almost two months after the drawn battle at antietam should be set to work. in response to this popular demand, general ambrose burnside was appointed to take mcclellan's place, and a more utterly unfitted man for prosecuting a successful campaign against lee could scarcely have been selected. he himself fully realized this. indeed, he had already twice refused the chief command on the ground that he did not feel competent to conduct a great campaign. but the public, which had become disgusted with boasters, admired his modesty, and his preparations for carrying the war again into virginia were followed with high hopes for his success. the officers of the army, however, did not share the popular confidence in their new chief and some of those highest in authority gave him only a half-hearted support. but nothing could have saved burnside's extraordinary campaign. had he been assigned to lead a forlorn hope, regardless of consequences, his plan, if it can be called a plan, might have been justified, but under the existing circumstances it was reckless to the point of madness. his first moves, however, were characterized by an excess of caution and so slowly did he advance that before he was fairly started for the south, lee blocked the road, concentrating his whole army on the hills behind the city of fredericksburg in a position practically defying attack. to attempt a direct assault against this fortress-like post was suicidal, but apparently no thought of maneuvering crossed burnside's mind. his one idea was to brush aside the foe. but before he could even reach him his army had to cross the rappahannock, a formidable river, and march over an open plain, absolutely at the mercy of its intrenched opponents, who could, as one of their artillery officers expressed it, "comb the ground" with their cannon. nevertheless, into this death trap the union troops were plunged on the 13th of december, 1862, and they advanced to destruction with a dash and courage that won the admiration of friends and foes alike. the result was, of course, inevitable. no human beings could withstand the storm of shot and shell which burst upon them, and though some of the devoted columns actually reached the foot of the confederate breastworks, they could do no more, and over 12,000 men fell victims to the disastrous attack. for once, lee was at an utter loss to comprehend his adversary's plan. he could not believe that this wanton butchery of men was all there was to the contest. to his mind such an awful sacrifice of human life would never have been made unless for the purpose of paving the way for another enterprise absolutely certain of success. but nothing more was attempted and the battle of fredericksburg, reflecting the conception of a disordered brain rather than the trained intelligence of a graduate of west point, was added to the already long list of blunders which prolonged the war. burnside brought severe charges against several of his generals for their failure to support his sorry tactics, and even went so far as to demand their dismissal from the army. there was undoubtedly some ground for his complaints, but such obviously incompetent leadership was enough to demoralize any army, and not long after his crippled battalions retreated behind the rappahannock he was relieved of his command, which was given to general joseph hooker, one of the officers he most seriously accused. hooker was familiarly known to the country as "fighting joe," a name he had well earned on many a hard-fought field. he, like his predecessors, was a graduate of west point and his record, in many respects worthy of the best traditions of that famous school, inspired the army with the belief that it had, at last, found a leader who would pilot it to victory. certainly, the new commander was not troubled with burnside's self-distrust. his confidence in himself and in his plans was unbounded, and there was no little justification for his hopes, for his campaign was well thought out and he had a force of over 130,000 men under his orders--fully 70,000 more than his adversary could bring into the field. lee still lay intrenched on the hills behind fredericksburg, and there hooker ordered general sedgwick to hold him with part of the army while he himself, with another and more powerful part, crossed the rappahannock river by a ford twenty-seven miles above. by this move he hoped to get behind lee and then crush him, as nut-crackers would crush a nut, by closing in on him with a front and rear attack. this was not a strikingly original plan. it was in fact merely a flanking movement on a huge scale, but compared to burnside's performance it was highly scientific and the vast superiority of the union forces almost insured its success. hooker was certainly convinced that he had at last solved the great problem of the war and that lee was practically in his power. indeed, as his flanking army forded the river, he issued an address of congratulation in which he informed his troops that they had the confederates in a position from which they must either "ingloriously fly" or come out in the open where certain defeat awaited them. but "fighting joe" was soon to learn the folly of crowing until one is out of the woods, for as he emerged from the forests sheltering the fords, he discovered that lee's army had not remained tamely in its intrenchments, but had quietly slipped away and planted itself squarely across his path. for a moment the union commander was fairly astounded. he had prophesied that his adversary would fly from fredericksburg, but he had not expected him to move so soon or in this direction. indeed, his well-matured plans were based on the supposition that lee would remain where he wanted him to be until he was ready to spring his trap, quite forgetting that though it is easy to catch birds after you have put salt on their tails, it is rather difficult to make them wait while you salt them. as a matter of fact, lee had taken alarm the moment his cavalry scouts reported his opponent's movement towards the fords and, realizing that he would be caught if he remained where he was, he had rapidly departed from fredericksburg, leaving only enough force to occupy sedgwick's attention. even then he was in a precarious position, for hooker's flanking army alone outnumbered him and the force threatening fredericksburg would certainly start in pursuit of him as soon as it discovered that the bulk of his army had withdrawn from that city. all this was equally clear to hooker after his first gasp of astonishment, and as he hurriedly ordered sedgwick to attack fredericksburg with part of his forces and to send the rest as reã«nforcement against lee, he confidently believed that his foe had delivered himself into his hands. but lee, though cornered, was not yet caught. he had to think and act quickly but though he had only 45,000 men and hooker had 70,000 on the spot, his idea was not to escape but to attack. a close examination of the opposing lines in front and at the federal left disclosed no weakness, but the right beyond chancellorsville looked more hopeful. then a brilliant idea suddenly occurred to his mind. the union commander was evidently awaiting or meditating a direct attack and had no fear except that his prey might escape him. might it not be possible to keep him busily occupied in front, while a force stole behind his right wing and caught it between two fires? this was precisely what hooker had been endeavoring to do to him, but lee was well aware that what was safe for a large army might be ruinous for a small one and that his proposed maneuver would require him to divide his small army into two smaller parts, both of which would be annihilated if the move was discovered. but capture or destruction stared him in the face any way, so, learning from a certain colonel welford that a road used by him in former years for transporting materials to a local furnace could be utilized to swing a considerable force behind hooker's right, he determined to take the desperate chance. the necessary orders were accordingly issued during the night of may 1, 1863, and by daylight the next morning jackson started off on the back trail with about 30,000 men, leaving lee with only 15,000 to face hooker's overwhelming array. the success of the whole enterprise depended upon the secrecy and speed with which it was conducted, but jackson had already proved his ability in such work and his men set off at a brisk pace well screened by vigilant cavalry. it was not possible, however, wholly to conceal the march, and not long after it began several quite definite reports of its progress reached hooker. but though he duly warned his corps commanders to be on their guard against a flank movement, he himself evidently interpreted it as the beginning of a retreat. indeed, by four o'clock in the afternoon of may 2nd he became convinced that his victims were striving to escape, for he advised sedgwick, "we know that the enemy is fleeing, trying to save his trains." but even as he dispatched this message jackson was behind at the union right and his men were forming in line of battle under cover of a heavy curtain of woods. meanwhile, some of the division commanders at the threatened position had become disquieted by the reports that a large body of confederates was marching somewhere, though just where no one seemed to know. two of them accordingly faced their men toward the rear in readiness for an attack from that direction. but the assurances which reached them from headquarters that the enemy was in full flight discouraged precautions of this kind, and when jackson crept up a neighboring hill to examine the union position, he found most of the troops had their backs turned to the point of danger. in fact, the camp, as a whole presented a most inviting spectacle, for the soldiers were scattered about it, playing cards or preparing their evening meal, with their arms stacked in the rear, little dreaming that one of their most dreaded foes was watching them from a hilltop, behind which crouched thousands of his men. every detail of the scene was impressed on jackson's memory when he quietly slipped back into the woods, and for the next two hours he busied himself posting his troops to the best advantage. it was six o'clock when the order to attack was given and most of the union soldiers were still at their suppers when deer, foxes, rabbits and other animals, alarmed by a mass of men advancing through the forest, began to tear through the camp as though fleeing from a prairie fire. but before the startled soldiers could ask an explanation of this strange stampede, the answer came in the form of a scattering musketry fire and the fearsome yells of 26,000 charging men. the panic that followed beggars description. regiments huddled against regiments in helpless confusion; artillery, infantry and cavalry became wedged in narrow roads and remained hopelessly jammed; officers and men fought with one another; generals were swept aside or carried forward on the human waves, hoarsely bellowing orders which no one heeded, while into the welter the confederates poured a deadly fire and rounded up masses of bewildered prisoners. it was well-nigh dusk before even the semblance of a line of defense could be formed to cover the disorganized masses of men, but the gathering darkness increased the terror of the hapless fugitives, who, stumbling and crashing their way to safety, carried confusion in their wake. meanwhile lee, advised of what was happening at the union right, vigorously attacked hooker's left, and a fierce conflict at that point added to the general turmoil until the contending forces could no longer distinguish each other, save by the flashing of their guns. the fighting then ceased all along the line and both sides busied themselves with preparations for renewing the struggle at the earliest possible moment. jackson, accompanied by some of his staff, instantly began a reconnoissance of the union position. he had just completed this and was returning to his lines when some of his own pickets, mistaking his party for union cavalry, fired on them killing a captain and a sergeant. the confederate commander immediately turned his horse and sought safety at another point, but he had not progressed far before he drew the fire of another picket squad and fell desperately wounded. general a. p. hill then assumed command, but fighting had scarcely been resumed the next morning before he was wounded and jeb stuart took his place. meanwhile, hooker had been injured and the next day lee fiercely assailed sedgwick. for the best part of two days the battle raged with varying success. but, little by little, the confederates edged their opponents toward the rappahannock, and by the night of may 5th, 1863, hooker withdrew his exhausted forces across the river. the battle of chancellorsville cost lee over 12,000 men; but with a force which never exceeded 60,000, he had not only extricated himself from a perilous position, but had inflicted a crushing blow on an army of 130,000, an achievement which has passed into history as one of the most brilliant feats of modern warfare. chapter xx. -in the hour of triumph great as lee's reputation had been before the battle of chancellorsville, it was immensely increased by that unexpected triumph. but no trace of vanity or self-gratulation of any kind marked his reception of the chorus of praise that greeted him. on the contrary, he modestly disclaimed the honors from the very first and insisted that to jackson belonged the credit of the day. "could i have directed events," he wrote the wounded general, "i should have chosen to have been disabled in your stead. i congratulate you on the victory which is due to your skill and energy." indeed, when the news first reached him that jackson's left arm had been amputated, he sent him a cheery message, saying, "you are better off than i am, for while you have only lost your left, i have lost my right arm." and when, at last, he learned that "stonewall" had passed away, he no longer thought of the victory but only of his dead comrade and friend. "any victory would be dear at such a price," was his sorrowful comment on the day. jackson was indeed lee's "right arm" and his place among the great captains of the world is well indicated by the fact that a study of his campaign is to-day part of the education of all english and american officers. nevertheless, it was unquestionably lee's genius that enabled his great lieutenant to accomplish what he did, and this jackson himself fully realized. "better that ten jacksons should fall than one lee," was his response to his commander's generous words. but though lee had won an international reputation, anyone seeing him in the field among his soldiers might well have imagined that he was wholly unaware that the world was ringing with his fame. he steadily declined all offers to provide comfortable quarters for his accommodation, preferring to live in a simple tent and share with his men the discomforts of the field. indeed, his thoughts were constantly of others, never of himself, and when gifts of fruit and other dainties for his table were tendered him, he thanked the givers but suggested that they were needed for the sick and wounded in the hospitals, where they would be gratefully received. "...i should certainly have endeavored to throw the enemy north of the potomac," he wrote his wife, "but thousands of our men were barefooted, thousands with fragments of shoes, and all without overcoats, blankets or warm clothing. i could not bear to expose them to certain suffering.... i am glad you have some socks for the army. send them to me.... tell the girls to send all they can. i wish they could make some shoes, too." even the hardships of the dumb animals moved him to a ready sympathy, and he was constantly planning to spare them in every possible way. "our horses and mules suffer most," he wrote one of his daughters. "they have to bear the cold and rain, tug through the mud and suffer all the time with hunger." and again on another occasion he wrote his wife: "this morning the whole country is covered with a mantle of snow, fully a foot deep.... our poor horses were enveloped. we have dug them out...but it will be terrible.... i fear our short rations for man and horse will have to be curtailed." the whole army realized the great-hearted nature of its chief, and its confidence in his thought and care is well illustrated by a letter which a private addressed to him, asking him if he knew upon what short rations the men were living. if he did, the writer stated, their privations were doubtless necessary and everyone would cheerfully accept them, knowing that he had the comfort of his men continually in mind. war had no illusions for this simple, god-fearing man. he regarded it as a terrible punishment for the shortcomings of mankind. for him it had no glory. "the country here looks very green and pretty, notwithstanding the ravages of war," he wrote his wife. "what a beautiful world god, in his loving kindness to his creatures, has given us! what a shame that men endowed with reason and knowledge of right should mar his gifts." the awful responsibility of his public duty was almost more than any man could bear, but he had also to endure personal anxiety and sorrow of the keenest kind. during his absence in the field one of his daughters died, his wife was in failing health and his three sons were in the army daily exposed to injury and death. fitzhugh and custis had been made generals, and robert had been promoted to a lieutenancy and assigned to his elder brother's staff. up to the battle of chancellorsville they had escaped unharmed, but while the contending armies lay watching each other on either side of the rappahannock, fitzhugh was severely wounded in a cavalry engagement and lee's first thought was to comfort and reassure the young man's wife. "i am so grieved," ...he wrote her, "to send fitzhugh to you wounded.... with his youth and strength to aid him, and your tender care to nurse him, i trust he will soon be well again. i know that you will unite with me in thanks to almighty god, who has so often sheltered him in the hour of danger." then came the news that the young general had been captured by federal troops who surrounded the house to which he had been removed, and again lee sought, in the midst of all his cares, to cheer his daughter-in-law who was herself becoming ill. "i can see no harm that can result from fitzhugh's capture except his detention.... he will be in the hands of old army officers and surgeons, most of whom are men of principle and humanity. his wound, i understand, has not been injured by his removal, but is doing well. nothing would do him more harm than for him to learn that you were sick and sad. how could he get well? so cheer up and prove your fortitude.... you may think of fitzhugh and love him as much as you please, but do not grieve over him or grow sad." but the young wife grew steadily worse and, when her life was despaired of, custis lee offered to take his brother's place in prison, if the authorities would allow him to visit his dying wife. but, when this was refused and news of her death reached lee, he refrained from all bitterness. "...i grieve," he wrote his wife, "...as a father only can grieve for a daughter, and my sorrow is heightened by the thought of the anguish her death will cause our dear son, and the poignancy it will give to the bars of his prison. may god in his mercy enable him to bear the blow...." it was in the midst of such severe afflictions that lee conducted some of the most important moves of his campaign, and while family anxieties were beginning to crowd on him, the condition of his army and the political situation were already demanding another invasion of the north. as far as spirit and discipline were concerned, his troops were never more ready for active service and their numbers had been so considerably increased during the weeks that followed the battle of chancellorsville that by the 1st of june, 1863, he could count on almost 70,000 fairly well-armed men, supported by over two hundred cannon. but the question of supplying food for this great array was every day becoming more urgent, and the remark of the commissary-general that his chief would soon have to seek his provisions in pennsylvania was significant of the situation. lee thoroughly realized that the strength of the confederacy was waning and that unless some great success in the field should soon force the union to make terms, the end of the struggle was in sight. great victories had already been won, but always on southern soil, and the news that grant was closing in on vicksburg demanded that a supreme effort be made to offset that impending disaster in the west. if the southern army could force its way into the north and there repeat its triumphs, england and france would probably recognize the confederacy and the half-hearted supporters of the union, already murmuring against the war, would clamor for peace. with this idea lee devoted the month following the battle of chancellorsville to recruiting his strength and watching for some move on hooker's part. but hooker remained quietly within his lines, so on june 3, 1863, his opponent, concealing his purpose, moved rapidly and secretly toward pennsylvania. chapter xxi. -grant at vicksburg while lee had been disposing of mcclellan, pope and burnside, grant had remained in comparative idleness near corinth, mississippi. he had, it is true, been assigned to high command in the west when halleck was ordered to washington, but the battle of shiloh had prejudiced the authorities against him and his troops were gradually transferred to other commanders, leaving him with an army barely sufficient to guard the territory it already held. this treatment seriously depressed him and with plenty of time to brood over his troubles, he was in some danger of lapsing into the bad habits which had once had such a fatal hold upon him. but at this crisis his wife was by his side to steady and encourage him, and the confederates soon diverted his thoughts from his own grievances by giving him plenty of work to keep them at arm's length. meanwhile, however, something much more disturbing occurred, for he suddenly discovered that preparations were being made to place his long-cherished campaign for the opening of the mississippi river in the hands of mcclernand, the political general whose conduct at fort donelson had demonstrated his ignorance of military affairs. that aroused grant to action and hastily summoning admiral porter and general sherman to his aid, he started towards vicksburg, mississippi, on november 2, 1862, determined to be the first in the field and thus head off any attempt to displace him from the command. mcclernand's project was accordingly nipped in the bud, for, of course, he could not be authorized to conduct a campaign already undertaken by a superior officer, and the troops which had been intended for him were immediately forwarded to grant. doubtless, the president was not displeased at this turn of affairs, for although mcclernand was a highly important person in the political world and had rendered valuable services in raising troops, his defects as a general were widely recognized, and there had been grave doubts as to the wisdom of permitting him to attempt so difficult an undertaking as the capture of vicksburg. within a few months, however, there were even graver doubts as to the wisdom of having entrusted the enterprise to grant, for by the end of march, 1863, the general opinion was that no one could have made a worse mess of it than he was making, and that it was hopeless to expect anything as long as he was in authority. as a matter of fact, the immense difficulty of capturing a city such as vicksburg had not been realized until the work was actually undertaken. it was practically a fortress commanding the mississippi, and whoever held it ruled the river. the confederate leaders understood this very thoroughly and they had accordingly fortified the place, which was admirably adapted for defense, with great care and skill. in front of it flowed the mississippi, twisting and turning in such snake-like conditions that it could be navigated only by boats of a certain length and build, and on either side of the city stretched wide swamp lands and bayous completely commanded by batteries well posted on the high ground occupied by the town. all this was formidable enough in itself, but shortly after grant began his campaign, the river overflowed its banks and the whole country for miles was under water which, while not deep enough for steamers, was an absolute barrier to the approach of an army. indeed, the capture of the city seemed hopeless from a military standpoint, but grant would not abandon the task. finding traces of an abandoned canal, he attempted to complete it in the hope of changing the course of the river, or at least of diverting some of the water from the overflowed land, but the effort was a stupendous failure almost from the start. then he ordered the levees of the mississippi protecting two great lakes to be cut, with the idea of flooding the adjacent streams and providing a waterway for his ships. this gigantic enterprise was actually put into operation, the dams were removed, and gun-boats were forced on the swollen watercourses far into the interior until some of them became hopelessly tangled in the submerged forests and their crews, attacked by the confederate sharpshooters, were glad to make their escape. week after week and month after month this exhausting work continued, but, at the end of it all, vicksburg was no nearer capture than before. indeed, the only result of the campaign was the loss of thousands of men who died of malaria, yellow fever, smallpox, and all the diseases which swamp lands breed. for this, of course, grant was severely criticized and the denunciations at last became so bitter that an order removing him from the command was entrusted to an official who was directed to deliver it, if, on investigation, the facts seemed to warrant it. but the visiting official, after arriving at the front, soon learned that the army had complete confidence in its commander and that it would be a mistake to interfere with him. indeed, by this time "the silent general," who had neither answered the numerous complaints against him nor paid the least attention to the storm of public indignation raging beyond his camp, had abandoned his efforts to reach vicksburg from the front and was busily engaged in swinging his army behind it by a long overland route in the face of appalling difficulties, but with a grim resolution which forced all obstructions from his path. meanwhile, the gun-boats under admiral porter were ordered to attempt to run the land batteries, and april 16, 1863, was selected as the date for their perilous mission. each vessel had been carefully protected by cotton bales, and the crews stood ready with great wads of cotton to stop leaks, while all lights were extinguished except one in the stern of each ship to guide the one that followed. it was a black night when the admiral started down the river in his flagship, and for a while it was hoped that the fleet would slip by the batteries under cover of darkness. the leading vessels did, indeed, escape the lookouts of the first forts, but before long a warning rocket shot into the sky and the river was instantly lit by immense bonfires which had been prepared for just this emergency, and by the glare of their flames the gunners poured shot and shell at the black hulls as they sped swiftly by. shot after shot found its mark, but still the fleet continued on its course. then, after the bonfires died down, houses were set on fire to enable the artillerists to see their targets, but before daylight the whole fleet had run the gauntlet and lay almost uninjured below vicksburg, ready to coã¶perate with grant's advancing army. by this time the confederates must have realized that they were facing defeat. nevertheless, for fully a month they stubbornly contested every foot of ground. but grant, approaching the rear by his long, roundabout marches, handled his veteran troops with rare good judgment, moving swiftly and allowing his adversaries no rest, so that by the 17th of may, 1863, general pemberton, commanding the defenses of vicksburg, was forced to take refuge in the town. grant immediately swung his army into position, blocking every avenue of escape and began a close siege. the prize for which he had been struggling for more than half a year was now fairly within his grasp, but there was still a chance that it might slip through his fingers, for close on his heels came general joseph johnston with a powerful army intent upon rescuing general pemberton and his gallant garrison. if johnston could come to pemberton's relief or if pemberton could break through and unite with johnston, they could together save vicksburg. but grant had resolved that they should not join forces, and to the problem confronting him he devoted himself body and mind. constantly in the saddle, watching every detail of the work as the attacking army slowly dug its way toward the city and personally posting the troops holding johnston at bay, his quiet, determined face and mud-splashed uniform became familiar sights to the soldiers, and his appearance on the lines was invariably greeted with inspiring cheers. by july, the trenches of the besieged and the besiegers were so close together that the opposing pickets could take to each other, and the gun-boats threw shells night and day into the town. still pemberton would not surrender and many of the inhabitants of vicksburg were forced to leave their houses and dig caves in the cliffs upon which the city was built to protect themselves and their families from the iron hail. it was only when food of every kind had been practically exhausted and his garrison was threatened with starvation that pemberton yielded. on july 3, 1863, however, he realized that the end had come and raised the white flag. nearly twenty-four hours passed before the terms of surrender were agreed upon, but grant, who had served in the same division with pemberton in the mexican war, was not inclined to exact humiliating conditions upon his old acquaintance whose men had made such a long and gallant fight. he, accordingly, offered to free all the prisoners upon their signing a written promise not to take arms again unless properly exchanged, and to allow all the officers to retain their side arms and horses. these generous terms were finally accepted, and on july 4, 1863, the confederate army, numbering about 30,000, marched out in the presence of their opponents and stacked their arms, receiving the tribute of absolute silence from the 75,000 men who watched them from the union ranks. four months before this event, halleck, the commander-in-chief, had advised grant and other officers of his rank that there was a major generalship in the regular army for the man who should first win a decisive victory in the field. the captor of vicksburg had certainly earned this promotion, for with its fall the mississippi river was controlled by the union and, in the words of lincoln, "the father of waters again ran unvexed to the sea." chapter xxii. -the battle of gettysburg the news that grant was slowly, but surely, tightening his grip upon vicksburg, and that nothing but an accident could prevent its capture, was known to the whole country for fully a week before the surrender occurred, but it neither encouraged the north nor discouraged the south. to the minds of many people no victory in the west could save the union, for lee was already in pennsylvania, sweeping northward toward harrisburg and philadelphia, and even threatening new york. hooker, in the field, and halleck, in washington, were squabbling as to what should be done, and the union army was groping blindly after the invaders without any leadership worthy of the name. it was certainly a critical moment demanding absolute harmony on the part of the union leaders; but while the fate of the union trembled in the balance, hooker and halleck wrangled and contradicted each other, apparently regardless of consequences, and the climax of this disgraceful exhibition was a petulant telegram from hooker (june 27, 1863) resigning his command. had "fighting joe" been the greatest general in the world this resignation, in the presence of the enemy, would have ruined his reputation, and the moment president lincoln accepted it hooker was a discredited man. to change commanders at such a crisis was a desperately perilous move, but the president knew that the army had lost confidence in its leader since the battle of chancellorsville and the fact that he could even think of resigning on the eve of a battle demonstrated his utter unfitness for the task at hand. it was, therefore, with something of relief that lincoln ordered general meade to take immediate charge of all the troops in the field, and the new commander assumed the responsibility in these words, "as a soldier i obey the order placing me in command of this army and to the utmost of my ability will execute it." at the moment he dispatched this manly and modest response to the unexpected call to duty, meade knew little of hooker's plans and had only a vague idea of where his troops were posted. under such conditions success in the coming battle was almost impossible, but he wasted no time in complaints or excuses, but instantly began to move his forces northward to incept the line of lee's advance. even up to this time, however, the exact position of the confederate army had not been ascertained, for lee had concealed his infantry behind his cavalry, which effectually prevented his adversaries from getting near enough to discover the direction of his march. another "cavalry screen," however, covered the union forces and though lee dispatched stuart to break through and discover what lay behind it, the daring officer for once failed to accomplish his purpose and lee had to proceed without the information he usually possessed. this was highly advantageous to meade, for his forces were badly scattered and had lee known that fact he might have crushed the various parts of the army before they united, or at least have prevented some of them from reaching the field in time. he soon learned, of course, that meade had taken hooker's place, but if he had not heard the news directly, he would have guessed that some great change had occurred in the generalship of his opponents, for within twenty-four hours of his appointment meade had his army well in hand, and two days later the rapid and skillful concentration of his force was clear to lee's experienced eyes. by this time both armies had passed beyond their cavalry screens, and on the 30th of june, 1863, the advance of the confederate troops neared the little town of gettysburg. but lee was not yet ready to fight, for, although he was better prepared than his adversary, he wanted to select the best possible ground before joining battle. by a strange chance, however, it was not lee but his bare-footed followers who decided where the battle should be fought, for as his advance-guard approached gettysburg one of the brigade commanders asked and received permission from his superior to enter the town and procure shoes for his men. but gettysburg was found to be occupied by union cavalry and the next day (july 1st) a larger force was ordered forward to drive them away and "get the shoes." meanwhile, the union cavalry had been reã«nforced and, to offset this, more confederates were ordered to the support of their comrades. once more union reã«nforcements were hurried to the front, and again the confederates responded to the challenge, until over 50,000 men were engaged in a savage conflict, and before noon the battle of gettysburg, one of the greatest battles of history, had begun. the men in gray, who thus unwittingly forced the fighting, were veterans of many campaigns and they attacked with a fury that carried all before them. the union troops fought with courage, but general reynolds, their commander, one of the ablest officers in the army, was soon shot through the head and instantly killed, and from that moment the confederates crowded them to the point of panic. indeed, two of meade's most effective fighting corps were practically annihilated and the shattered remnants of the defenders of gettysburg were hurled through the town in headlong flight toward what was known as cemetery hill, where their new commander, general hancock, found them huddled in confusion. meade had displayed good judgment in selecting hancock to take reynolds' place, for he was just the man to inspire confidence in the disheartened soldiers and rise to the emergency that confronted him. but, though he performed wonders in the way of restoring order and encouraging his men to make a desperate resistance, it is more than probable that the confederates would have swept the field and gained the important position of cemetery hill had they followed up their victory. fortunately for the union cause, however, the pursuit was not continued much beyond the limits of gettysburg and, as though well satisfied to have got the shoes they came for, the victors contented themselves with the undisputed possession of the town. neither lee nor meade took any part in this unexpected battle, but lee arrived during the afternoon while the union troops were in full flight for the hills and, seeing the opportunity of delivering a crushing blow, advised ewell, the commanding general, to pursue. his suggestion, however, was disregarded, and being unwilling to interfere with another officer in the midst of an engagement, he did not give a positive order, with the result that cemetery hill was left in possession of the federal troops. meanwhile meade, having learned of the situation, was hurrying to the scene of action, where he arrived late at night, half dead with exhaustion and on the verge of nervous collapse from the fearful responsibilities which had been heaped upon him during the previous days. but the spirit of the man rose superior to his physical weakness and, keeping his head in the whirlwind of hurry and confusion, he issued orders rushing every available man to the front, made a careful examination of the ground and chose an admirable position for defense. to this inspiring example the whole army made a magnificent response, and before the 2nd of july dawned the widely scattered troops began pouring in and silently moving into position for the desperate work confronting them. meade had determined to await an attack from lee and he had accordingly selected cemetery ridge as the position best adapted for defense. this line of hills not only provided a natural breastwork, but at the left and a little in front lay two hillocks knows as round top and little round top, which, when crowned by artillery, were perfect fortresses of strength. strange as it may seem, however, round top was not immediately occupied by the union troops and had it not been for the quick eye and prompt action of general warren, little round top, the key to the entire union position, would have been similarly neglected. lee was reasonably assured, at the end of the first day's fighting, that his adversary had not succeeded in getting all his troops upon the field and, realizing what an advantage this gave him, he determined to begin the battle at daylight, before the union reã«nforcements could arrive. but for once, at least, the great commander received more objections than obedience from his subordinates, general longstreet, one of his most trusted lieutenants, being the principal offender. longstreet had, up to this moment, made a splendid record in the campaigns and lee had such confidence in his skill that he seldom gave him a peremptory order, finding that a suggestion carried all the weight of a command. but, on this occasion, longstreet did not agree with the chief's plan of battle and he accordingly took advantage of the discretion reposed in him to postpone making an attack until he received a sharp and positive order to put his force in action. by this time, the whole morning had passed and every hour had brought more and more union troops into the field, so that by the afternoon meade had over 90,000 men opposing lee's 70,000 veterans. there was nothing half-hearted about longstreet once he was in motion and the struggle for the possession of little round top was as desperate a conflict as was ever waged on any field. again and again the gray regiments hurled themselves into the very jaws of death to gain the coveted vantage ground, and again and again the blue lines, torn, battered and well-nigh crushed to earth, re-formed and hurled back the assault. dash and daring were met by courage and firmness, and at nightfall, though the confederates had gained some ground, their opponents still held their original position. both sides had paid dearly, however, for whatever successes they had gained, the union army alone having lost at least 20,000 men [note from brett: while this is possible, it is highly unlikely as the total casualties for the three day battle from the unionist side were 23,053 according to official records. current (circa 2000) estimates are that both sides lost about 9,000 soldiers on this day.]. indeed, the confederate attack had been so formidable that meade called a council of war at night to determine whether the army should remain where it was for another day or retreat to a still stronger position. the council, however, voted unanimously to "stay and fight it out," and the next morning (july 3rd) saw the two armies facing each other in much the same positions as they had occupied the day before, the unionists crowding the heights of cemetery ridge and the confederates holding the hills known as seminary ridge and clinging to the bases of round top and little round top, to which point the tide of valor had carried them. a mile of valley and undulating slopes separated cemetery hill from seminary ridge, and their crests were crowded with artillery when the sun rose on july 3, 1863. but for a time the battle was confined to the infantry, the confederates continuing fierce assaults of the previous evening. then, suddenly, all their troops were withdrawn, firing ceased and absolute silence ensued along their whole lines. at an utter loss to understand this complete disappearance of the foe, the union commanders peered through their glasses at the silent and apparently deserted heights of seminary ridge, growing more and more nervous as time wore on. what was the explanation of this ominous silence? was it possible that lee had retreated? was he trying to lure them out of their position and catch them in some giant ambuscade? was he engaged in a flanking movement such as had crumpled them to pieces at chancellorsville? doubtless, more than one soldier shot an apprehensive glance toward the rear during the strange hush as he remembered the terrifying appearance of jackson on that fearful day. but no jackson stood at lee's right hand, and suddenly two sharp reports rang out from the opposing height. then, in answer to this signal, came the crash of a hundred and thirty cannon and instantly eighty union guns responded to the challenge with a roar which shook the earth, while the air was filled with exploding shells and the ground was literally ploughed with shot. for an hour and a half this terrific duel continued; and then the union chief of artillery, seeing that his supply of ammunition was sinking, ordered the guns to cease firing and the confederates, believing that they had completely demolished the opposing batteries, soon followed their example. another awful silence ensued and when the union troops peered cautiously from behind the stone walls and slopes which had completely protected them from the wild storm of shot and shell, they saw a sight which filled them with admiration and awe. from the woods fringing the opposing heights 15,000 men [note from brett: (circa 2000) just under 12,000 men] were sweeping in perfect order with battle flags flying, bayonets glistening and guidons fluttering as though on dress parade. well to the front rode a gallant officer with a cap perched jauntily over his right ear and his long auburn hair hanging almost to his shoulders flying in the wind. this was general pickett, and he and the men behind him had almost a mile of open ground to cross in the charge which was to bring them immortal fame. for half the distance they moved triumphantly forward, unscathed by the already thundering artillery, and then the union cannon which had apparently been silenced by the confederate fire began to pour death and destruction into their ranks. whole rows of men were mowed down by the awful cannonade, but their comrades pressed forward undismayed, halting for a moment under cover of a ravine to re-form their ranks and then springing on again with a heroism unsurpassed in the history of war. a hail of bullets from the union trenches fairly staggered them, yet on and on they charged. once they actually halted in the face of the blazing breastworks, deliberately fired a volley and came on again with a rush, seized some of the still smoking guns that had sought to annihilate them and, beating back the gunners in a hand-to-hand conflict, actually planted their battle flags on the crest of cemetery ridge. then the whole union army seemed to leap from the ground and hurl itself upon them. they reeled, turned, broke into fragments and fled, leaving 5,000 dead and wounded in their trail. such was pickett's charge--a wave of human courage which recorded "the high-water mark of the rebellion." chapter xxiii. -in the face of disaster as the survivors of pickett's heroic legion came streaming back toward the confederate lines lee stood face to face with defeat for the first time in his career. his long series of victories had not spoiled him and the hour of triumph had always found him calm and thankful, rather than elated and arrogant. but many a modest and generous winner has proved himself a poor loser. it is the moment of adversity that tries men's souls and revels the greatness or smallness of character, and subjected to this test more than one commander in the war had been found wanting. mcclellan, staggering from his campaign against richmond, blamed almost everyone but himself for the result; pope, scurrying toward the fortifications of washington, was as ready with excuses as he had been with boasts; burnside, reeling from the slaughter-pen of fredericksburg, had demanded the dismissal of his principal officers, and hooker hurled accusations right and left in explaining the chancellorsville surprise. but lee resorted neither to accusation nor excuse for the battle of gettysburg. with the tide of disaster sweeping relentlessly down upon him, he hastened to assume entire responsibility for the result. "it is all my fault," he exclaimed, as the exhausted and shattered troops were seeking shelter from the iron hail, and then as calmly and firmly as though no peril threatened, he strove to rally the disorganized fugitives and present a bold front to the foe. it was no easy task, even with a veteran army, to prevent a panic and restore order and confidence in the midst of the uproar and confusion of defeat, but the quiet dignity and perfect control of their commander steadied the men, and at sight of him even the wounded raised themselves from the ground and cheered. "all this will come right in the end," he assured the wavering troops, as he passed among them. "we'll talk it over afterwards, but in the meantime all good men must rally." not a sign of excitement or alarm was to be detected in his face, as he issued his orders and moved along the lines. "all this has been my fault," he repeated soothingly to a discouraged officer. "it is i that have lost this fight and you must help me out of it the best way you can.... don't whip your horse, captain," he quietly remarked, as he noted another officer belaboring his mount for shying at an exploding shell.... "i've got just another foolish horse myself, and whipping does no good." nothing escaped his watchful eyes, nothing irritated him, and nothing provoked him to hasty words or actions. completely master of himself, he rose superior to the whirling storm about him and, commanding order out of chaos, held his shattered army under such perfect control that had meade rushed forward in pursuit he might have met with a decisive check. but meade did not attempt to leave his intrenchments and the confederate army slowly and defiantly moved toward the south. the situation was perilous--desperately perilous for lee. his troops were in no condition to fight after battling for three days, their ammunition was almost exhausted, their food supply was low and they were retreating through a hostile country with a victorious army behind them and a broad river in their path. but not a man in the gray ranks detected even a shadow of anxiety on his commander's face, and when the potomac was reached and it was discovered that the river was impassable owing to an unexpected flood, the army faced about and awaited attack with sublime confidence in the powers of its chief. meanwhile meade, who had been cautiously following his adversary, began to receive telegrams and dispatches urging him to throw himself upon the confederates before they could recross the potomac and thus end the war. but this, in the opinion of the union commander, was easier said than done, and he continued to advance with the utmost deliberation while lee, momentarily expecting attack, ferried his sick and wounded across the river and prepared for a desperate resistance. absolute ruin now stared him in the face, for no reã«nforcements of any kind could reach him and a severe engagement would soon place him completely at his opponent's mercy. nevertheless, he presented a front so menacing and unafraid that when meade called his officers to a council of war all but two voted against risking an attack. in the meantime the river began to fall, and without the loss of a moment lee commenced building a bridge across which his troops started to safety on the night of july 13th, ten days after the battle. even then the situation was perilous in the extreme, for had meade discovered the movement in time he could undoubtedly have destroyed a large part of the retreating forces, but when he appeared on the scene practically the whole army was on the other side of the river and only a few stragglers fell into his hands. great as lee's success had been he never appeared to better advantage than during this masterly retreat, when, surrounded by difficulties and confronted by overwhelming numbers, he held his army together and led it to safety. through the dust of defeat he loomed up greater as a man and greater as a soldier than at any other moment of his career. even the decisive victories at gettysburg and vicksburg failed to offset president lincoln's bitter disappointment at lee's miraculous escape, and had it not been for his success on the field of battle, meade would undoubtedly have been removed from the chief command. as it was, however, he retained his position and for months he lay comparatively idle, watching his opponent who busied himself with filling the broken ranks of his army for a renewal of the struggle. meanwhile, the confederate newspapers began a bitter criticism of lee, charging that he had displayed bad judgment and worse generalship in attempting to invade the north. a man of different caliber would, doubtless, have answered these attacks by exposing some of the officers whose conduct was largely responsible for the failure of the campaign. indeed, the facts would have justified him in dismissing more than one of his subordinates from the army in disgrace, and had he chosen to speak the word he might easily have ruined the reputation of at least one distinguished general. but no such selfish or vindictive thought ever crossed lee's mind. keenly as he suffered from the abuse which was heaped upon him, he endured it without a murmur and, when at last he felt obliged to notice it, his reply took the form of a letter to the confederate president requesting his permission to resign. "the general remedy for the want of success in a military commander is his removal," he wrote a month after the battle of gettysburg. "i do not know how far the expressions of discontent in the public journals extend in the army. my brother officers have been too kind to report it and, so far, the troops have been too generous to exhibit it. i, therefore, beg you to take measures to supply my place, because if i cannot accomplish what i myself desire, how can i fulfill the expectations of others? i must confess, too that my eyesight is not good and that i am so dull that in making use of the eyes of others i am frequently misled. everything, therefore, points to the advantages to be derived from a new commander. a younger and abler man can readily be obtained--one that would accomplish more than i can perform and all that i have wished. i have no complaints to make of anyone but myself. i have received nothing but kindness from those above me and the most considerate attention from my comrades and companions in arms." this generous, dignified statement, modest to the point of self-effacement, instantly hushed all discontent and, before it, even the newspaper editors stood abashed. "where am i to find the new commander who is to possess that greater ability which you believe to be required?" wrote jefferson davis in reply. "if providence should kindly offer such a person i would not hesitate to avail myself of his services. but my sight is not sufficiently penetrating to discover such hidden merit, if it exists. to ask me to substitute you by someone more fit to command is to demand an impossibility." in the face of this graceful response lee could no longer urge his resignation, and after waiting for more than three months for meade to attack, he suddenly assumed the offensive and during the next five months he and meade maneuvered their armies as two chess experts handle the pieces on the board. again and again, meade swung his powerful army into a favorable position and, again and again, lee responded with a move which placed his opponent on the defensive. but while this game of check and countercheck was being played, the north was becoming more and more impatient and events were rapidly bringing another player to the fore. chapter xxiv. -the rescue of two armies the defeats and disappointments of the various campaigns in virginia had gradually convinced the authorities at washington that too many people were trying to direct the union forces. with lee there was practically no interference; but the commanders who opposed him were subject to the orders of the general-in-chief at washington, who was, to some extent, controlled by the secretary of war, whose superior was the president, and after almost every engagement a congressional committee, known as the "committee on the conduct of the war," held a solemn investigation in which praise and blame were distributed with the best intentions and worst possible results. all these offices and officials were accordingly more or less responsible for everything that occurred, but not one of them was ever wholly to blame. this mistake, however, was at last fully realized and a careful search began for some one man to whom the supreme command could be entrusted. but for a long time no one apparently thought that the western army contained any very promising material. nevertheless, grant, sheridan, sherman and rosecrans were then in that army and, of these four; rosecrans was regarded by many as the only real possibility. indeed, at the moment when grant was closing in upon vicksburg, and lee and meade were struggling at gettysburg, rosecrans, who had been entrusted with the important duty of conducting a campaign to drive the confederates out of tennessee, was fully justifying the high opinions of his admirers. between june 24, 1863, and september 9th of that year he certainly outmaneuvered his opponents, occupying the all-important position of chattanooga, and forcing the able confederate general bragg to fall back with more speed than order. during all this time the north had been insisting that the army should be placed in charge of some commander who could master lee, and this demand had found expression in a popular poem bearing the refrain "abraham lincoln! give us a man!" to the minds of many people rosecrans had clearly demonstrated that he was "the man," and it is possible that his subsequent acts were prompted by over-eagerness to end his already successful campaign with a startlingly brilliant feat of arms. at all events, he determined not to rest satisfied with having driven the confederates from the field, but to capture or destroy their entire force. with this idea he divided his army and rushed it by different routes over the mountains in hot pursuit of the foe. but the trouble with this program was that bragg had not really retreated at all, having merely moved his army aside waiting for an opportunity to strike. indeed, rosecrans had barely plunged his troops into the various mountain passes on their fruitless errand before the whole confederate force loomed up, threatening to destroy his widely-separated, pursuing columns, one by one, before they could be united. this unexpected turn of affairs utterly unnerved the union general, and although he did manage by desperate exertions to collect his scattered army, he completely lost his head when bragg attacked him at chickamauga, georgia, on the 19th of september, 1863, and before the savage battle of that name had ended he retired from the field, believing that his army had been totally destroyed. such, undoubtedly, would have been its fate had not general thomas and his brave troops covered the retreat, by holding the whole confederate army in check for hours and even forcing it to yield portions of the bloody field. from that day forward thomas was known as "the rock of chickamauga," but the heroic stand of his gallant men barely sufficed to save the union army, which reached the intrenchments of chattanooga only just in time, with the confederates hot upon its trail. had bragg overtaken his flying opponent, he would doubtless have made an end of him then and there, but it was not altogether with regret that he saw him enter chattanooga, for with the roads properly blocked he knew the place would prove a perfect trap. he, accordingly, began a close siege which instantly cut off all rosecrans' communication with the outside world, except by one road which was in such a wretched condition as to be impossible for a retreating army. indeed, the heavy autumn rains soon rendered it impracticable even for provision wagons, and as no supplies could reach the army by any other route, it was not long before starvation began to stare the besieged garrison in the face. meanwhile, rosecrans, almost wild with anxiety and mortification, sent dispatch after dispatch to washington describing his condition and imploring aid, but though he still had an effective army under his command and plenty of ammunition, he made no attempt whatever to save himself from his impending doom. day by day the situation grew more and more perilous; thousands upon thousands of horses and mules died for lack of food and the men were so nearly reduced to starvation that they greedily devoured the dry corn intended for the animals. all this time the authorities in washington were straining every nerve to rescue the beleaguered army. sixteen thousand men under general hooker were rushed to its relief, provisions were forwarded within a day's march of the town, awaiting the opening of new roads, and finally, when the stream of frantic telegrams from the front showed that the army had practically no leadership, hurried orders were forwarded to grant, authorizing him to remove rosecrans, place thomas temporarily in control and take the field himself at the earliest possible moment. this unexpected summons found grant in a serious condition, for some weeks earlier his horse had fallen under him, crushing his leg so severely that for a time it was feared he might be crippled for life, and he was still on crutches suffering intense pain when the exciting orders were placed in his hands. nevertheless, he promptly started on his desperate errand, traveling at first by rail and steamer and then in an ambulance, until its jolting motion became unbearable when he had himself lifted into the saddle with the grim determination of riding the remainder of the way. even for a man in perfect physical condition the journey would have been distressing, for the roads, poor at their best, were knee deep in mud and a wild storm of wind and rain was raging. time and again his escort had to lift the general from his horse and carry him across dangerous washouts and unaffordable streams, but at the earliest possible moment they were always ordered to swing him into the saddle again. thus, mile after mile and hour after hour, the little cavalcade crept toward chattanooga, grant's face becoming more haggard and furrowed with pain at every step, but showing a fixed determination to reach his goal at any cost. on every side signs of the desperate plight of the besieged garrison were only too apparent. thousands of carcasses of starved horses and mules lay beside the road amid broken-down wagons, abandoned provisions and all the wreckage of a disorganized and demoralized army. but if the suffering officer noted these ominous evidences of disaster, his face afforded no expression of his thought. plastered with mud and drenched to the skin, he rode steadily forward, speaking no word and scarcely glancing to the right or left, and when at last the excruciating journey came to an end, he hastened to interview thomas and hear his report, without even waiting to change his clothes or obtain refreshment of any kind. it was not a very cheerful story which thomas confided to his chief before the blazing headquarters' fire, but the dripping and exhausted general listened to it with no indication of discouragement or dismay. "what efforts have been made to open up other roads for provisioning the army?" was the first question, and thomas showed him a plan which he and rosecrans had worked out. grant considered it in silence for a moment and then nodded his approval. the only thing wrong with the plan was that it had not been carried out, was his comment, and after a personal inspection of the lines he gave the necessary authority for putting it into immediate operation. orders accordingly began flying right and left, and within twenty-four hours the army was busily engaged in gnawing a way out of the trap. additional roads were essential for safety but to gain them the confederates had to be attacked and a heavy force was therefore ordered to seize and hold a point known as brown's ferry. this relieved the situation at once and meanwhile the new commander had hurried a special messenger to sherman, ordering him to drop everything else and march his vicksburg veterans toward chattanooga without an instant's delay. the advance of this strong reã«nforcement was promptly reported to bragg, who saw at a glance that unless it could be stopped there was every prospect that his chattanooga victims would escape. he accordingly determined upon a very bold but very dangerous move. not far away lay general burnside and a small union army, guarding the important city of knoxville, tennessee, and against this the confederate commander dispatched a heavy force, in the hope that grant would be compelled to send sherman to the rescue. but the effect of this news upon grant was very different from bragg's expectations, for realizing that his adversary must have seriously weakened himself in sending the expedition against burnside, he ordered hooker, whose 16,000 men were already on hand, to make an immediate attack with a force drawn from various parts of the army, and on november 24, 1863, after a fierce engagement known as the battle of lookout mountain, the union troops drove their opponents from one of the two important heights commanding chattanooga. in this success sherman had effectively cooperated by attacking and holding the northern end of missionary ridge and grant determined to follow up his advantage by moving the very next morning against this second and more formidable range of hills. therefore, ordering hooker to attack the confederate right on missionary ridge and get in their rear at that point while sherman assaulted their left, he held thomas's troops lying in their trenches at the front awaiting a favorable opportunity to send them crashing through the center. the main field of battle was plainly visible to the silent commander as he looked down upon it from a hill known as orchard knob, and he watched the effect of the attacks on both wings of the confederate line with intense interest. reã«nforcements were evidently being hurried to the confederate right and left and hooker, delayed by the destruction of a bridge, did not appear at the critical moment. nevertheless, for some time sherman continued to advance, but as grant saw him making slower progress and noted the heavy massing of troops in his path, he ordered thomas's waiting columns to attack the center and carry the breastworks at the foot of missionary ridge. with a blare of bugles, 20,000 blue-coated men seemed to leap from the ground and 20,000 bayonets pointed at missionary ridge whose summits began to blaze forth shot and shell. death met them at every stride but the charging troops covered the ground between them and the rifle pits they had been ordered to take in one wild rush and tore over them like an angry sea. then, to the utter astonishment of all beholders, instead of halting, they continued charging up the face of missionary ridge, straight into the mouths of the murderous cannon. "by whose order is this?" grant demanded sternly. "by their own, i fancy," answered thomas. incredible as this suggestion seemed, it offered the only possible explanation of the scene. no officer would have dared to order troops to such certain destruction as apparently awaited them on the fire-crowned slopes of missionary ridge. spellbound grant followed the men as they crept further and further up the height, expecting every instant to see them hurled back as pickett's heroes were at gettysburg, when suddenly wave upon wave of blue broke over the crest, the union flags fluttered all along the line and before this extraordinary charge the confederates broke and fled in disorder. setting spur to his horse, grant dashed across the hard-fought field and up the formidable ridge, issuing orders for securing all that had been gained. an opening wedge had now been inserted in chattanooga's prison doors, and by midnight the silent captain had thrown his whole weight against them and they fell. then calmly turning his attention to burnside, he ordered him to hold his position at every hazard until he could come to the rescue and, setting part of his victorious veterans in motion toward knoxville, soon relieved its garrison from all danger. with the rescue of two union armies to his credit grant was generally regarded as the most fitting candidate for the chief command of the army, but by this time it was fully realized that the man who held that position would have to be invested with far greater powers than any union general had thus far possessed. halleck expressed himself as only too anxious to resign; congress passed a law reviving the grade of lieutenant-general with powers which, up to that time, had never been entrusted to anyone save washington, and responded to the cry, "abraham lincoln! give us a man!" the president, on march 1st, 1864, nominated ulysses grant as commander-in-chief of all the armies of the united states. chapter xxv. -lieutenant-general grant until he arrived in washington lincoln had never met the man to whom he had entrusted the supreme command of the army, and the new general was a very different individual from those who had been previously appointed to high rank. some of his predecessors had possessed undoubted ability, but most of them had soon acquired an exaggerated idea of their own importance, surrounding themselves with showy staffs in gorgeous attire, delighting in military pomp and etiquette of every kind, and generally displaying a great weakness for popular admiration and applause. moreover, all of them, with the exception of meade, had talked too much for their own good and that of the army, so that many of their plans had become known in richmond almost as soon as they had been formed. indeed, they not only talked, but wrote too much, and in discussions with their superiors and wrangling with their fellow officers more than one proved far mightier with the pen than with the sword. all this, to a very large extent, was the fault of the public, for it had made an idol of each new general, deluging him with praise, flattering his vanity and fawning on him until he came to regard the war as a sort of background for his own greatness. thus, for almost three years, the war was conducted more like a great game than a grim business, and not until it began visibly to sap the life blood and resources of the nation did the people, as a whole, realize the awful task confronting them. both sides had begun the conflict in much the same careless fashion, but the south had immediately become the battle ground, and the horrors of war actually seen and felt by its people quickly sobered even the most irresponsible. but from the very first lee had taken a serious view of the whole situation. every word he spoke or wrote concerning it was distinctly tinged with solemnity, if not sadness, and his sense of responsibility had a marked influence upon the whole confederacy. it had taken the north almost three years to respond in a similar spirit, but by that time it was ready for a leader who knew what war really meant and for whom it had no glory, and such a leader had undoubtedly been found in grant. in the evening of march 8, 1864, the new commander arrived in washington and made his way, without attracting any attention, to one of the hotels. there was nothing in his presence or manner to indicate that he was a person of any importance. indeed, he presented a decidedly commonplace appearance, for he walked with an awkward lurch and bore himself in a slouchy fashion which made him even shorter than he was. moreover, his uniform was faded and travel-stained, his close-cropped beard and hair were unkempt, and his attire was careless to the point of slovenliness. there was, however, something in the man's clear-cut features, firm mouth and chin and resolute blue eyes which suggested strength, and while his face, as a whole, would not have attracted any particular notice in a crowd, no one in glancing at it would have been inclined to take any liberties with its owner. but though grant had arrived unheralded and unrecognized at the national capital, he had barely given his name to the hotel clerk before the whole city was surging about him eager to catch a glimpse of the new hero and cheer him to the echo. but however much notoriety of this sort had pleased some of his predecessors, grant soon showed that he wanted no applauding mob to greet him in the streets, for he quickly escaped to the seclusion of his own room. but the same public that had cheered itself hoarse for mcclellan, pope and hooker, and then hissed them all in turn, had found another hero and was not to be cheated of its prey. indeed, the newcomer was not even allowed to eat his dinner in peace, for a crowd of gaping and congratulating enthusiasts descended upon him the moment he reappeared and soon drove him from the dining room in sheer disgust. possibly the fate of the fallen idols had warned grant against making a public exhibition of himself or encouraging the hysterical acclamations of the crowd, but he was naturally a man of sound, common sense, entirely free from conceit, and he had no idea of allowing the idle or curious mob to amuse itself at his expense. he, therefore, quickly made it plain that he had serious work to do and that he intended to do it without nonsense of any kind. ceremonies and forms with such a man would have been impossible, and on march 9, 1864, president lincoln handed him his commission as a lieutenant-general, with a few earnest words to which he made a modest reply, and then, with the same calmness he had displayed in assuming the colonelcy of the 21st illinois, he turned to the duties involved in the command of half a million men. from that time forward no more councils of war were held at the white house and no more military secrets were disclosed to the confederate chiefs. "i do not know general grant's plans, and i do not want to know them!" exclaimed lincoln with relief. but other people did want to know them and the newspaper reporters and busybodies of all sorts incessantly buzzed about him, employing every device from subtle flattery to masked threats to discover his designs. but grant knew "how to keep silent in seven different languages" and no one could beguile him into opening his lips. neither had he time nor inclination to listen to other people talk. his troops were spread over a thousand miles of territory, and never before had they been under the absolute control of any one man. with the army of the potomac he had had but little practical experience; of the country in which its campaigns had been conducted he knew nothing at first hand; with a few exceptions he had no personal acquaintance with the officers under his immediate command, and there were countless other difficulties which had to be overcome. he, therefore, had no leisure for trifling and quickly sent all intruders about their business while he attended to his own. the problem involved in a grand campaign was in many respects new to him, but doing his own thinking in silence, instead of puzzling himself with the contradictory opinions of other men, grant reached a more accurate conclusion in regard to the war than any of his predecessors. in the first place, he saw that the various campaigns which had been conducted in different parts of the country would have been far more effective had they all formed part of one plan enabling the different armies to coã¶perate with each other. he, accordingly, determined to conduct the war on a gigantic scale, keeping the confederates in the west so busy that they would not be able to reã«nforce lee and giving lee no chance to help them. in a word, he intended to substitute team play for individual effort all along the line. again, he saw the capture of richmond, upon which the army of the potomac had expended all its efforts, would be futile if lee's army remained undefeated in the field, and he resolved that lee and not richmond should thereafter be the main object of the campaign. "where lee's army goes, there you will go also," was the substance of his first order to meade who virtually became his chief of staff, and those who were straining every nerve to discover his plan and expecting something very brilliant or subtle never guessed that those nine words contained the open secret of his whole campaign. such, however, was the fact. "i never maneuver," he remarked to his chief of staff; and meade, who had spent the best part of a year in a great series of maneuvers with lee, listened to this confession with astonishment and dismay, scarcely believing that his superior really meant what he said. but grant did mean it. no elaborate moves or delicate strategy had been employed in any of his campaigns and he had yet to meet with a serious defeat. to make his first experiment in maneuvering against such an expert in the science of war as lee, would have been to foredoom himself to defeat. with a far smaller force then either mcclellan, pope, burnside, hooker or meade had possessed, the confederate leader had practically fought a drawn battle with them for three years. his science had not, it is true, been able to overcome their numbers, but their numbers had not overpowered him. this, as far as anyone could see, might go on forever. but grant knew that the north had long been tiring of the war and that unless it were speedily closed the union might be sacrificed in order to obtain peace. moreover, he saw that every day the war lasted cost an enormous sum of money, and that the loss of life on the battle field was nothing compared to that in the hospitals and prisons, where disease and starvation were claiming scores of victims every hour. he, therefore, determined to fight and continue fighting until he pounded his opponent to pieces, well knowing that almost every able-bodied man in the south was already in the army and that there was practically no one left to take the place of those who fell. this policy, in the minds of many people, proves that grant was no general, but merely a brute and a butcher. but history has never yet revealed a military leader who, having the advantage of numbers, did not make the most of it. had grant been waging war for war's sake, or been so enamored with his profession as to care more for its fine points than for the success of his cause, he might have evolved some more subtle and less brutal plan. but he had no love for soldiering and no sentimental ideas whatever about the war. common sense, with which he was liberally supplied, told him that the only excuse for fighting was to uphold principles which were vital to the national life and the only way to have those principles upheld was to defeat those who opposed them and to do this he determined to use all the resources at his command. the two men whom fate or chance had been drawing together for over two hundred years were utterly different in appearance and manner, but in other respects they were singularly alike. lee was, at the time of their meeting, already in his 58th year, his hair and beard were almost white, but his calm, handsome face, clear eyes and ruddy complexion, made him appear younger than he was. his bearing also was that of a young man, for his erect, soldierly carriage showed his height to full advantage; his well-knit figure was almost slight for a man standing over six feet, and, mounted on his favorite horse "traveller," he was the ideal soldier. grant was barely forty-two years of age, short of stature, careless in dress and generally indifferent to appearances. his face, though strong, was somewhat coarse, his manners were not polished and he had nothing of the cultivation or charm which lee so unmistakably possessed. but though grant thus reflected his roundhead ancestors and lee his cavalier descent, the contrast between them was mainly external. both were modest and courageous; both were self-contained; each had his tongue and temper under complete control; each was essentially an american in his ideas and ideals; each fought for a principle in which he sincerely believed, and neither took the least delight in war. had they met in times of peace, it is not probable that they would have become intimate friends, but it is certain that each would have respected, if not admired the other for his fine qualities, and this was undoubtedly their attitude toward each other from the beginning of the struggle. chapter xxvi. -a duel to the death for nearly two months after grant assumed command no important move was attempted by either the union or the confederate forces except in mississippi. both sides realized that a desperate struggle was impending and each needed all the time it could gain to prepare for the coming fray. heavy reã«nforcements were hurried to grant, until the army of the potomac under his immediate command included over 120,000 men; a hundred thousand more were assembled at chattanooga in charge of sherman; and two other forces of considerable size were formed to coã¶perate with grant--one being entrusted to general benjamin butler and the other to general franz sigel. to oppose this vast army lee had less than 65,000 men in the army of northern virginia and the only other formidable confederate force in the field was that commanded by general joseph johnston, who, with some 53,000 men, was stationed in georgia guarding the cotton states and the far south. if these two armies could be captured or destroyed, all organized resistance to the union would be at an end, and grant, accordingly, determined to throw his entire weight upon them, sending sherman against johnston, butler against the city of richmond and sigel against the rich shenandoah valley which supplied the confederate armies with food, while he himself attacked lee with an overwhelming force. never before had a union general undertaken a campaign covering such a vast extent of country and never before had such a united effort been made to exhaust the armies and the resources of the south. with his own forces threatened by superior numbers lee would not be able to reã«nforce johnston with safety and, confronted by sherman, johnston would find it impossible to send assistance to lee. this promised to bring the war to a speedy close, and the supporters of the union redoubled their praises of the lieutenant-general as they began to understand his plan. indeed, the more he avoided publicity and applause and the more indifference he showed for popular opinion, the more the newspapers and the general public fawned upon him, and when, on may 3, 1864, he ordered his armies to advance, the whole north was fairly aflame with enthusiasm. it was certainly a momentous occasion. three years earlier grant had been utterly unknown to the country at large and the small group who acknowledged his acquaintance had regarded him as a rather pitiful failure, while the government to whom he had offered his services had ignored him altogether. now, at his nod, hundreds of thousands of men instantly sprang to arms and the most powerful armies that america had ever seen moved forward in obedience to his will, sherman marching southward, butler creeping toward richmond, sigel advancing into the fertile shenandoah valley, and the army of the potomac crossing the rapidan river to renew its struggle with lee. lee had watched the elaborate preparations of his new antagonist with keen interest and no little apprehension, for grant's record as a fighting man promised a duel to the death and the south had no more men. the situation was certainly serious but, anxious as he was, the confederate commander did not by any means despair. he was familiar with every inch of the country through which grant would have to advance and the chances were that this would, sooner or later, give him not only the advantage of position, but possibly the choice of weapons. with this idea he allowed the union forces to cross the rapidan unopposed, hoping that he would soon be able to drive them back and that the river would then be as valuable as cavalry in hampering their retreat. just beyond the rapidan lay the dense thickets and waste lands of scrub oak and undergrowth known as the wilderness, which had witnessed the chancellorsville surprise and virtually sealed the fate of hooker's army. if the union forces advanced directly through this jungle, there was more than a possibility that they might outflank their opponents and gain the road to richmond, but lee scarcely dared hope that his adversary would attempt so dangerous a route. nevertheless, he maneuvered to leave the trap undisturbed, and when he saw the union columns entering the forests he felt that they were actually being delivered into his hands. once in those tangled thickets he knew that grant's artillery and cavalry would be practically useless and without them his superiority in numbers disappeared. of course, it would be impossible to conduct a scientific battle in such a region, for it would virtually be fighting in the dark, but knowing that his men were thoroughly familiar with the ground, lee determined to hurl them upon the advancing bluecoats, trusting to the gloom and the terrors of the unknown to create confusion and panic in their ranks. but the men whom grant commanded were no longer the inexperienced volunteers who had been stampeded at bull run. they were veterans of many campaigns and, though they staggered for a moment under the shock of battle, they speedily rallied and fought with stubborn courage. the conflict that followed was one of the most brutal recorded in the annals of modern war. whole regiments sprang at each other's throats, the men fighting each other like animals; trees were cut down by the bullets which tore through them from every direction; bursting shells set fire to the woods, suffocating the wounded or burning them to death; wild charges were made, ending in wilder stampedes or bloody repulses; the crackle of flames rose high above the pandemonium of battle and dense smoke-clouds drifted chokingly above this hideous carnival of death. thus for two days the armies staggered backward and forward with no result save a horrible loss of life. once the union forces almost succeeded in gaining a position which would have disposed of their adversaries, but lee saw the danger just in the nick of time and, rushing a texas brigade to the rescue, led the charge in person until his troops recognized him and forced him to retire. it was may 7, 1864, when this blind slaughter known as the battle of the wilderness ceased, but by that time nearly 18,000 union soldiers and 12,000 confederates lay upon the field. lee could not claim a victory but he still held his ground and he felt confident that grant would fall back behind the rapidan river to recuperate his shattered forces. no union commander, thus far, had tarried long on virginian soil after such a baptism of blood, and when the news that grant's columns were retreating reached the confederate commander he breathed a sigh of thanksgiving and relief. to the veterans who had served under mcclellan, pope, burnside and hooker, retreats were a wretchedly familiar experience, but they had not been long on the road before they realized that they were not retreating but were marching southward. as the truth of this dawned upon the disheartened columns they burst into frantic cheers for grant and pressed forward with springy steps, shouting and singing for joy. a less able commander would have been fatally misled by grant's apparent retreat, but lee knew that he might again attempt to swing around his right flank and edge toward richmond by way of spotsylvania, and to guard against this a body of troops had been ordered to block that road. therefore, by the time grant began his great turning movement, lee was planted squarely across his path and another series of battles followed. here the union commander was able to make some use of his cavalry and artillery, but the confederates offset this by fighting behind intrenchments and they repulsed charge after charge with fearful slaughter. again, as at the battle of the wilderness, the gray line was pierced, this time at a point known as the "bloody angle" or "hell's half acre," and twice lee sprang forward to lead a desperate charge to recover the lost ground. but each time the troops refused to advance until their beloved leader retired to a point of safety, and when he yielded they whirled forward, sweeping everything before them. these charges saved the battle of spotsylvania for the confederates. but though lee had again blocked his opponent, the fact that he had thrice had to rally his troops at the peril of his life showed that he had been harder pressed than in any of his other virginia campaigns. nevertheless, when the last furious attack had been repulsed and grant began moving sullenly away, it seemed as though he had at last been compelled to abandon the campaign. but the wearied confederates had yet to learn that their terrible opponent was a man who did not know when he was beaten, for in spite of his awful losses he had written his government may 11, 1864, "i propose to fight it out on this line if it takes all summer," and his army, instead of retreating, continued to move southward, crossing the north anna river and circling once more toward the left flank. again grant was on the road to richmond, but in crossing the north anna river he left an opening between the two wings of his army and before he could close it lee threw his whole force into the breach and, completely cutting off one part of the union army from the other, held both firmly in check. this masterly move might have brought grant's campaign to a disastrous end, but just as he was planning to take full advantage of it, lee fell ill and during his absence from the field grant made his first backward move, recrossing the north anna river and, bringing the two wings of his army together, rescued it from its perilous position. the moment he reached a point of safety, however, the persistent commander recommenced his march by the left flank, sidling once more toward richmond until he reached cold harbor, only eight miles from the confederate capital. here lee once more interposed his battered forces, strongly intrenching them in a position that fairly defied attack. with any other adversary against him he would have concluded that the game was won, for by all the rules of war the union army was completely balked and could not avoid a retreat. but grant was a man of a different caliber from any he had encountered heretofore. in spite of checks and disasters and unheard-of slaughter he had pushed inexorably forward; foiled in front he had merely turned aside to hew another bloody path. to him defeat only seemed to mean delay, and apparently he could not be shaken from his dogged purpose, no matter what the cost. at cold harbor, however, the confederate position was so strong that to assault it was madness, and lee could not believe that even his grim opponent would resort to such a suicidal attempt. but retreat or attack offered no choice to grant's mind, and on june 2, 1864, the troops were fiercely hurled against the confederate works, only to be repulsed with fearful slaughter. a few hours later orders were issued to renew the assault, and then postponed for a day. that delay gave the soldiers an opportunity to understand the desperate nature of the work that lay before them and, realizing that charging against murderous batteries and trenches meant rushing into the jaws of death, they offered a silent protest. not a man refused to obey orders, not one fell from his place in the line, but to their coats they sewed strips of cloth bearing their names and addresses so that their bodies might be identified upon the field. this dramatic spectacle might well have warned their commander of the hopelessness of his attempt, but fixed in his resolve to thrust his opponent from his path, he gave the fatal order to charge, and twenty minutes later 3,000 of his best troops fell before the smoking trenches and the balance reeled back aghast at the useless sacrifice. this horrifying slaughter, which grant himself confessed was a grievous blunder, brought the first stage of his campaign to a close. in but little over a month he had lost nearly 55,000 men--almost as many as lee had had in his entire army, and almost in sight of the spires of richmond his adversary held him securely at arm's length. a wave of horror, indignation and disappointment, swept over the north. another campaign had proved a failure. there were, however, two men who did not agree with this conclusion. one was grant, pouring over the maps showing the movements of all his armies. the other was lee, looking in vain for reã«nforcements to fill the gaps in his fast thinning lines. chapter xxvii. -check and countercheck the six-weeks' campaign in virginia had been quite sufficient to check all enthusiasm for grant, but the fact that he was no longer a popular hero did not trouble him at all. indeed, he displayed the same indifference to the storm of angry criticism that he had shown for the salvos of applause. he had made no claims or boasts before he took the field and he returned no answers to the accusations and complaints after his apparent failures. had he posed before the public as a hero or been tempted to prophesy a speedy triumph for his army, the humiliation and disappointment might have driven him to resign from the command. but he had recognized the difficulty of his task from the outset, modestly accepting it with no promise save that he would do his best, and he silently resolved to pursue the campaign he had originally mapped out in spite of all reverses. certainly, he required all his calmness and steadfastness to overcome his discouragement and disgust at the manner in which the coã¶perating armies had been handled. in the shenandoah valley sigel had proved utterly incompetent and the confederates, instead of having been driven from that important storehouse, had tightened their hold upon it. moreover, butler, who was supposed to threaten richmond while grant fought lee, had made a sorry mess of that part of the program. in fact he had maneuvered in such a ridiculous fashion that he and about 35,000 troops were soon cooped up by a far smaller force of confederates who held them as a cork holds the contents of a bottle; and last, but not least, the army of potomac lay badly mutilated before the impassable intrenchments of lee. in one particular, however, grant's expectations bade fair to be realized, for sherman was steadily pushing his way through georgia, driving johnston before him, and inflicting terrible damage upon the country through which he passed. as grant watched this triumphant advance he silently resolved upon another move. the north or front door of richmond was closed and firmly barred. there was nothing to be gained by further battering at that portal. but the southern or rear door had not yet been thoroughly tried and upon that he concluded to make a determined assault. to do this it would be necessary to renew his movement around his opponent's right flank by crossing the formidable james river--a difficult feat at any time, but double difficult at that moment, owing to the fact that butler's "bottled" force might be crushed by a confederate attack while the hazardous passage of the river was being effected. nevertheless, he decided to risk this bold stroke, and during the night of june 12, 1864, about ten days after the repulse at cold harbor, the great movement was begun. meanwhile lee, confident that he had completely checked his opponent, but disappointed that he had not forced him to retreat, determined to drive him away by carrying the war into the north and threatening the federal capital. that he should have been able to attempt this in the midst of a campaign deliberately planned to destroy him, affords some of the indication of the brilliant generalship he had displayed. but it does not fully reflect his masterful daring. at the outset of the campaign the union forces had outnumbered him two to one and its losses had been offset by reã«nforcements, while every man that had fallen in the confederate ranks had left an empty space. it is highly probable, therefore, that at the moment he resolved to turn the tables on his adversary and transform the campaign against richmond into a campaign against washington, he had not much more than one man to his opponent's three. nevertheless, in the face of these overwhelming numbers, he maintained a bold front towards grant and detached general jubal early with 20,000 men to the shenandoah valley, with orders to clear that region of union troops, cross the potomac river and then march straight on washington. it was at this moment that grant began creeping cautiously away toward the rear door of richmond. to keep a vigilant enemy in entire ignorance of such a tremendous move was, of course, impossible, but the system and discipline which he had instilled into his army almost accomplished the feat. indeed, so rapidly and silently did the troops move, so perfect were the arrangements for transporting their baggage and supplies, so completely were the details of the whole undertaking ordered and systematized, that over a hundred thousand men, infantry, cavalry, and artillery, with their horses, hospital and wagon trains, and all the paraphernalia of a vast army virtually faded away, and when lee gazed from his intrenchments on june 13, 1864, there was no sign of his opponent and he did not discover where he had gone for fully four days. in the meantime, grant had thrown his entire army across the james river and was advancing, horse and foot, on petersburg, the key to the approach to richmond from the south, and butler, whose troops had been extricated from their difficulties, was ordered to seize it. petersburg was at that moment wholly unprepared to resist a strong attack. indeed, there were only a handful of men guarding the fortification, the capture of which would case the fall of richmond, but butler was not the man to take advantage of this great opportunity. on the contrary, he delayed his advance and otherwise displayed such wretched judgment that the confederates had time to rush reã«nforcements to the rescue, and when grant arrived on the scene the intrenchments were strongly occupied. notwithstanding this the union commander ordered a vigorous assault, and for three days the troops were hurled against the breastworks without result. the last attack was made on june 18, 1864, but by this time 10,000 union soldiers had been sacrificed and lee had arrived in person with strong support. grant accordingly, abandoning his efforts to carry the place by storm, began to close in upon it for a grimly sullen siege. meanwhile, general early, to whom lee had entrusted his counter-move, was sweeping away the federal forces in the shenandoah valley with resistless fury, and suddenly, to the intense surprise and mortification of the whole north, advanced upon washington, threatening it with capture. washington was almost as completely unprepared for resistance as petersburg had been, its defenses being manned by only a small force mainly composed of raw recruits and invalid soldiers, while outside the city there was but one body of troops near enough to oppose the confederate advance. that little army, however, was commanded by general lew wallace, later the famous author of "ben hur," and he had the intelligence to see that he might at least delay early by offering battle and that gaining time might prove as valuable as gaining a victory. accordingly, he threw himself across the confederate's path and, though roughly handled and at last driven from the field, he hung on long enough to accomplish his purpose and although his adversary attempted to make up for lost time by rapid marching he did not succeed. this undoubtedly saved washington from capture, for shortly after early appeared on the 7th street road leading to the capital, the reã«nforcements which grant had rushed forward reached the city, and before any attack on the intrenchments was attempted they were fully defended and practically unassailable. seeing this, early retreated with the union troops following in half-hearted pursuit. it was the 12th of july, 1864, when, with a sigh of intense relief, washington saw the backs of the retreating confederates, but its satisfaction at its escape was mingled with indignation against grant for having left it open to attack. indeed, he was regarded by many people as the greatest failure of all the union commanders, for he had lost more men in sixty days than mcclellan had lost in all his campaigns without getting any nearer to richmond, and by the end of july another lamentable failure was recorded against him. in the intrenchments facing petersburg lay the 48th pennsylvania volunteers, largely composed of miners from the coal regions of that state. late in june colonel pleasants of this regiment had submitted a plan whereby his men were to dig a tunnel to a point directly under one of the confederate forts, plant a gunpowder mine there and blow a breach in the defenses through which troops could be poured and the town carried by assault. the scheme was plausible, provided the tunnel could be bored and grant gave his consent, with the result that within a month an underground passage over 500 feet long was completed, a mine was planted with four tons of powder and elaborate preparations made for storming the confederate works. grant's orders were that all obstructions in front of the union lines should be removed to enable the troops to charge the moment the explosion occurred, and that they should be rushed forward without delay until they were all within the confederate lines. accordingly, in the dead of night on july 29th, the assaulting columns were moved into position and when everything was in apparent readiness the signal was given to explode the mine. but though the match was applied no explosion occurred, and in the awful hush that followed lieut. jacob douty and sergeant henry rees volunteered to crawl into the tunnel and see what was wrong. to enter the passage at that moment was almost defying death, but the two men took their lives in their hands and, creeping in, discovered that the fuse had smoldered and gone out. they then relit it and made their escape just as a fearful explosion rent the air and great masses of earth, stones and timbers, intermingled with human bodies, leaped toward the sky. for a moment the waiting troops watched this terrifying spectacle and then, as the cloud of wreckage apparently swerved toward them threatening to descend and bury them beneath it, they fell back in great confusion and some time elapsed before order was restored and the charge begun. but grant's orders to clear their path had not been obeyed, and the charging troops had to climb over their own breastworks, causing more delay and confusion. finally, however, the leading brigades reached the great excavation torn by the mine, and there they halted awaiting further orders. but no orders came, for their terror-stricken commander had sought safety in a bomb-proof and when his hiding place was discovered the miserable cur merely mumbled something about "moving forward" and remained cowering in his refuge. meanwhile, other regiments rushed forward, tumbling in upon one another, until the chasm was choked with men upon whom the confederates began to pour shot, shell and canister. from that moment everything was lost and at last orders came from grant to rescue the struggling mass of men from the awful death trap into which they had been plunged, but despite all exertions fully 4,000 were killed, wounded or captured. again his subordinates had blundered terribly but grant accepted the responsibility and assumed the blame, waiting patiently for the hour, then near at hand, when he would find commanders he could trust to carry out his plans. chapter xxviii. -the beginning of the end the right man to conduct the shenandoah campaign was already in the army of the potomac, but it was not until about a week after the failure of the petersburg mine that circumstances enabled grant to place general philip sheridan in charge of that important task. sheridan, like sherman, had served with grant in the west and had developed into a brilliant cavalry leader. indeed, he was the only man in the northern armies whose record could be compared with that of jeb stuart and many other great cavalry commanders in the south. but grant felt that sheridan could handle an entire army as well as he had handled the cavalry alone and he soon showed himself fully worthy of this confidence, for from the moment he took over the command of the union forces in the shenandoah valley, the confederates were compelled to fight for it as they had never fought before. up to this time, the war had been conducted with comparatively little destruction of private property on either side. but the moment had now arrived for harsher measures, for sherman had occupied atlanta on september 2, 1864, and was preparing to march to the sea coast and cut the confederacy in two. if grant's plan of depriving lee of the fertile valley to the north was to be put in operation, there was no time to lose. sheridan, accordingly, at once proceeded to attack the confederates with the utmost vigor, defeating them in two engagements at winchester and fisher's hill, and following up this success by laying waste the fields and ruthlessly destroying all the stores of grain and provisions which might prove useful to lee's army. for a month or more he continued to sweep through the country practically unchecked. but on october 19.1864, during his absence, his army was surprised and furiously attacked by general early's men at cedar creek, and before long they had the union troops in a perilous position which threatened to end in their destruction and the recapture of the entire valley. sheridan was at winchester on his way to the front from washington when the news of this impending disaster reached him and, mounting his horse, he dashed straight across country for the scene of action. he was then, however, fully twenty miles from the field and there seemed but little chance of his reaching it any time to be of any service. nevertheless, he spurred forward at a breakneck pace and his splendid horse, responding gamely, fairly flew over the ground, racing along mile after mile at killing speed in a lather of foam and sweat, until the battle field was reached just as the union troops came reeling back, panic-stricken, under cover of a thin line of troops who had at last succeeded in making a stand. instantly, the general was among the fugitives ordering them to turn and follow him and inspired by his presence, they wheeled as he dashed down their broken lines and, madly cheering, hurled themselves upon their pursuers. completely surprised by this unexpected recovery, the confederates faltered and the union troops, gathering force as they charged, rolled them back with irresistible fury and finally swept them completely from the field. indeed, early's force was so badly shattered and scattered by this overwhelming defeat that it virtually abandoned the valley and sheridan continued his work of destruction almost unopposed, until the whole region was so barren that, as he reported, a crow flying across it would have to carry his own provisions or starve to death. meanwhile, sherman had begun to march from atlanta to savannah, georgia, where he intended to get in touch with the navy guarding the coast and then sweep northward to grant. behind him lay the confederate army, formerly commanded by general joseph johnston but now led by general hood, a daring officer who was expected to retrieve johnston's failure by some brilliant feat of arms. whether he would attempt this by following sherman and attacking him at the first favorable moment or take advantage of his departure to turn north and play havoc with tennessee and the region thus exposed to attack, was uncertain. to meet either of these moves sherman sent a substantial part of his army to general thomas at nashville, tennessee, and swung off with the rest of his troops toward the sea. hood instantly advanced against thomas, and grant at petersburg, closely watching the movement saw a great opportunity to dispose of one of the confederate armies. he, accordingly, ordered thomas to attack with his whole strength as soon as hood reached nashville, but although the confederates reached that point considerably weakened by a partial defeat inflicted on them by a retreating union column, thomas delayed his assault. days of anxious waiting followed and then grant hurried general logan, one of his most trusted officers, to the scene of action with orders to take over the command, unless thomas immediately obeyed his instructions. in the meantime, however, thomas, slow but sure, had completed his preparations and, hurling himself upon hood with a vastly superior force, pursued his retreating columns (dec. 16, 1864) until they were split into fragments, never again to be reunited as a fighting force. it was not until this practical annihilation of hood that the north began to realize how far reaching and complete grant's plans were. but that event and the shenandoah campaign made it clear that he had determined that no army worthy of the name should be left to the confederacy when he finally closed in upon lee, so that with his destruction or surrender there should be no excuse for prolonging the war. it was in furtherance of this plan that sherman left ruin and desolation behind him as he blazed his way up from the south. the inhabitants of the region through which he was marching had, up to this time, been living in perfect security and sherman intended to make war so hideous that they would have no desire to prolong the contest. he, accordingly, tore up the railroads, heating the rails and then twisting them about trees so that they could never be used again, burned public buildings and private dwellings, allowed his army to live on whatever food they could find in the houses, stores or barns, and generally made it a terror to all who lay in the broad path he was sweeping towards petersburg. grant then had lee fairly caught. his only possible chances of prolonging the contest lay in taking refuge in the mountains or joining his forces with the remnants of hood's army which had been gathered together and again entrusted with other troops to the command of general joseph johnston. had it been possible to do this, nothing practical would have been achieved, for he had less than 30,000 effective men and johnston's whole force did not amount to much more than 30,000, while grant, sherman and sheridan together had a quarter of a million men under arms. from a military standpoint lee knew that the situation was hopeless, but until the authorities who had placed him in the field gave up the cause he felt in duty bound to continue the fight to the bitter end. had the union army been his only opponent, it is possible that he might have succeeded in escaping the rings of steel which grant was daily riveting around him. but he had to fight hunger, and from the day that sheridan mastered the shenandoah valley and sherman cut off all supplies from the south starvation stared him in the face. meanwhile, his troops, though almost reduced to skeletons and clothed in rags, confidently believed that in spite of everything he would find some way of leading them out of grant's clutches and, inspired by this implicit faith, they hurled themselves again and again upon the masses of troops which were steadily closing around them. but though they frequently checked the advancing columns and sometimes even threw them back, inflicting heavy losses and taking many prisoners, the blue lines soon crept forward again, closing up gap after gap with a resistless tide of men. at last the road to the west leading toward the mountains beyond lynchburg alone remained open. but to avail himself of this lee knew that he would have to abandon petersburg and richmond and he hesitated to take this step; while grant, seeing the opening and fearing that his opponent would take advantage of it, strained every nerve to get his troops into a position where they could block the road. such was the condition of affairs at the end of march, 1865, but neither the starving soldiers in the confederate trenches nor the people of richmond or petersburg imagined that the end was desperately near. while "marse robert," as lee's men affectionately called him, was in command they felt that no real danger could come nigh them, and their idol was outwardly as calm as in the hour of his greatest triumph. chapter xxix. -at bay it would be impossible to imagine a more hopeless situation than that which had confronted lee for many months. to guard the line of intrenchments stretching around petersburg and richmond for more than thirty-five miles, he had less than 30,000 effective men, and starvation and disease were daily thinning their impoverished ranks; the soldiers were resorting to the corn intended for the horses, and the cavalry were obliged to disperse through the country seeking fodder for their animals in the wasted fields; the defenders of the trenches, barefooted and in rags, lay exposed to the cold and wet, day and night; there were no medicines for the sick and no great supply of ammunition for the guns. perhaps no one but lee fully realized to what desperate straits his army had been reduced. certainly his opponents were ignorant of the real condition of affairs or they would have smashed his feeble defenses at a blow, and the fact that he held over a hundred thousand troops at bay for months with a skeleton army shows how skillfully he placed his men. but though his brilliant career threatened to end in defeat and disaster, no thought of himself ever crossed lee's mind. regardless of his own comfort and convenience, he devoted himself day and night to relieving the suffering of his men, who jestingly called themselves "lee's miserables," but grimly stuck to their posts with unshaken faith in their beloved chief who, in the midst of confusion and helplessness, remained calm and resourceful, never displaying irritation, never blaming anyone for mistakes, but courageously attempting to make the best of everything and finding time, in spite of all distractions, for the courtesy and the thoughtfulness of a gentleman unafraid. his letters to his wife and children during these perilous days reveal no anxiety save for the comfort of his men, and no haste except to provide for their wants. at home his wife--confined to an invalid's chair--was busily knitting socks for the soldiers, and to her he wrote in the face of impending disaster: ..."after sending my note this morning i received from the express office a bag of socks. you will have to send down your offerings as soon as you can, and bring your work to a close, for i think general grant will move against us soon--within a week if nothing prevents--and no man can tell what will be the result; but trusting to a merciful god, who does not always give the battle to the strong, i pray we may not be overwhelmed. i shall, however, endeavor to do my duty and fight to the last. should it be necessary to abandon our position to prevent being surrounded, what will you do? you must consider the question and make up your mind. it is a fearful condition and we must rely for guidance and protection upon a kind providence...." shortly after this letter was written lee made a desperate effort to force his adversary to loosen his grip but though the exhausted and starved troops attacked with splendid courage, they could not pierce the solid walls of infantry and fell back with heavy losses. then sheridan, who had been steadily closing in from the shenandoah, swung 10,000 sabres into position and the fate of petersburg was practically sealed. but, face to face with this calamity, lee calmly wrote his wife: "i have received your note with a bag of socks. i return the bag and receipt. i have put in the bag general scott's autobiography which i thought you might like to read. the general, of course, stands out prominently and does not hide his light under a bushel, but he appears the bold, sagacious, truthful man that he is. i enclose a note from little agnes. i shall be very glad to see her to-morrow but cannot recommend pleasure trips now...." at every point grant was tightening his hold upon the imprisoned garrison and difficulties were crowding fast upon their commander, but he exhibited neither excitement nor alarm. bending all his energies upon preparations for a retreat, he carefully considered the best plan for moving his troops and supplying their needs on the march, quietly giving his orders to meet emergencies, but allowing no one to see even a shadow of despair on his face. concerning the gravity of the situation he neither deceived himself nor attempted to deceive others who were entitled to know it, and with absolute accuracy he prophesied the movements of his adversary long before they were made. ..."you may expect sheridan to move up the valley," he wrote the confederate secretary of war.... "grant, i think, is now preparing to draw out by his left with the intent of enveloping me. he may wait till his other columns approach nearer, or he may be preparing to anticipate my withdrawal. i cannot tell yet.... everything of value should be removed from richmond. it is of the first importance to save all the powder. the cavalry and artillery of the army are still scattered for want of provender and our supply and ammunition trains, which ought to be with the army in case of a sudden movement, are absent collecting provisions and forage. you will see to what straits we are reduced; but i trust to work out." at last, on march 29th, 1865, grant pushed forward 50,000 cavalry and infantry to execute the very move which lee had outlined and for which he was as thoroughly prepared as it was possible to be with the men he had on hand. but to check this advance which threatened to surround his army and cut off his retreat, he had to withdraw the troops guarding the defenses of petersburg, abandoning some of the intrenchments altogether and leaving nothing much more formidable than a skirmish line anywhere along his front. even then he could not stop the onrush of the union troops, which, under sheridan, circled his right on april 1st and drove back his men in the fierce engagement known as the battle of five forks. with the news of this success grant promptly ordered an assault against the intrenchments and his troops tore through the almost defenseless lines in several places, encountering little or no resistance. petersburg was not yet taken, but lee immediately saw that to protect it further would be to sacrifice his entire army. he, therefore, sent a dispatch to richmond, advising the immediate evacuation of the city. "i see no prospect of doing more than hold our position here till night. i am not certain that i can do that," he wrote. but he did hold on till the confederate authorities had made their escape, and then on the night of april 2nd he abandoned the capital which he had successfully defended for four years and started on a hazardous retreat. the one chance of saving his army lay in reaching the mountains to the west, before grant could bar the road, but his men were in no condition for swift marching and the provision train which he had ordered to meet him at amelia court house failed to put in an appearance, necessitating a halt. every moment was precious and the delay was exasperating, but he did his best to provide some sort of food for his famished men and again sent them on their way. by this time, however, the union troops were hot upon their trail and soon their rear-guard was fighting desperately to hold the pursuit in check. now and again they shook themselves free, but the moment they paused for food or rest they were overtaken and the running fight went on. then, little by little, the pursuing columns began to creep past the crumbling rear-guard; cavalry pounced on the foragers searching the countryside for food and captured the lumbering provision-wagons and the railroad supply trains which had been ordered to meet the fleeting army, while hundreds upon hundreds of starving men dropped from the ranks as they neared the bypaths leading to their homes. still some thousands held together, many begging piteously for food at every house they passed and growing weaker with each step, but turning again and again with a burst of their old spirit to beat back the advance-guard of the forces that were slowly enfolding them. "there was as much gallantry displayed by some of the confederates in these little engagements as was displayed at any time during the war, notwithstanding the sad defeats of the past week," wrote grant many years later, and it was this splendid courage in the face of hardship and disaster that enabled the remnants of the once invincible army to keep up their exhausting flight. as they neared appomattox court house, however, the blue battalions were closing in on them from every side like a pack of hounds in full cry of a long-hunted quarry and escape was practically cut off. for five days grant had been in the saddle personally conducting the pursuit with restless energy, and he knew that he was now in a position to strike a crushing blow, but instead of ordering a merciless attack, he sent the following letter to lee: "headquarters armies of the u.s. "5 p.m. apr. 7, 1865. "general r. e. lee,--commanding confederate states armies. "the results of the last week must convince you of the hopelessness of further resistance on the part of the army of northern virginia in this struggle. i feel that it is so and regard it as my duty to shift from myself the responsibility of any further effusion of blood by asking of you the surrender of that portion of the confederate states army known as the army of northern virginia. "u. s. grant, "lieut. general." meanwhile the retreating columns staggered along, their pace growing slower and slower with every mile, and at last a courier arrived bearing lee's reply. "general: "i have received your note of this day. though not entertaining the opinion you express on the hopelessness of further resistance on the part of the army of northern virginia i reciprocate your desire to avoid useless effusion of blood and therefore, before considering your proposition, ask the terms you will offer on condition of its surrender. "r. e. lee, "general." grant promptly responded that peace being his great desire, there was only one condition he would insist upon and that was that the surrendered men and officers should not again take up arms against the united states until properly exchanged. but lee was not yet ready to yield and continuing to move forward with his faithful veterans, he sent a dignified reply, declining to surrender but suggesting a meeting between himself and grant, with the idea of seeing if some agreement could not be reached for making peace between the two sections of the country. this was not the answer that grant had hoped for, but he had too much admiration for his gallant adversary to ride rough shod over him when he held him completely in his power, and while he gave the necessary orders to prepare for closing in, he sent another courteous note to lee dated april 9, 1865: "general. "your note of yesterday is received. i have no authority to treat on the subject of peace; the meeting proposed for 10 a.m. today could lead to no good. i will state, however, general, that i am equally anxious for peace with yourself and the whole north entertains the same feeling. the terms upon which peace can be had are well understood.... seriously hoping that all our difficulties may be settled without the loss of another life, i subscribe myself, etc., "u. s. grant, "lt. general." the courier bearing this message dashed off and disappeared and the chase continued, masses of blue infantry pressing forward under cover of darkness and overlapping the weary columns of gray that stumbled on with lagging steps. meanwhile, the morning of april 9th dawned and lee determined to make one more desperate effort at escape. behind him an overwhelming force was crowding and threatening to crush his rear-guard; on either flank the blue-coated lines were edging closer and closer; but in front there appeared to be only a thin screen of cavalry which might be pierced; and beyond lay the mountains and safety. at this cavalry then he hurled his horsemen with orders to cut their way through and force an opening for the rest of the army, who vigorously supported the attack. it was, indeed, a forlorn hope that was thus entrusted to the faithful squadrons, but they responded with matchless dash and spirit, tearing a wide gap through the opposing cavalry and capturing guns and prisoners. then they suddenly halted and surveyed the field with dumb despair. behind the parted screen of horsemen lay a solid wall of blue infantry arrayed in line of battle and hopelessly blocking the road. one glance was enough to show them what grant's night march had accomplished, and the baffled riders wheeled and reported the situation to their chief. lee listened calmly to the news which was not wholly unexpected. there was still a chance that a portion of his force might escape, if he was willing to let them attempt to fight their way out against awful odds, but no thought of permitting such a sacrifice crossed his mind. "then there is nothing left for me but to go and see gen. grant," he observed to those around him. but desperate as their plight had been for days, his officers were unprepared for this announcement. "oh, general!" one of them protested, "what will history say of the surrender of the army in the field?" "yes," he replied. "i know they will say hard things of us; they will not understand how we were overwhelmed by numbers. but that is not the question, colonel. the question is, is it right to surrender this army? if it is right, then i will take all the responsibility." no response was offered by the little group and turning to one of his staff, lee quietly gave an order. a few moments later white flags were fluttering at the head of the halted columns and an officer rode out slowly from the lines bearing a note to grant. chapter xxx. -the surrender while lee's messenger was making his way toward the union lines, grant was riding rapidly to the front where his forces had foiled the confederate cavalry. for more than a week he had been constantly in the saddle, moving from one point on his lines to another and begrudging even the time for food and sleep in his efforts to hasten the pursuit. but the tremendous physical and mental strain to which he had subjected himself had already begun to tell upon him, and he had passed the previous night under a surgeon's care endeavoring to put himself in fit condition for the final struggle which lee's refusal to surrender led him to expect. the dawn of april 9th, however, found him suffering with a raging headache, and well-nigh exhausted after his sleepless night he rode forward feeling more like going to the hospital than taking active command in the field. he had already advanced some distance and was within two or three miles of appomattox court house, when an officer overtook him and handed him these lines from lee: "apr. 9, 1865. "general: "i received your note of this morning on the picket line whither i had come to meet you and ascertain definitely what terms were embraced in your proposal of yesterday with reference to the surrender of this army. i now ask an interview in accordance with the offer contained in your letter of yesterday for that purpose. "r. e. lee, "general." the moment grant's eyes rested on these words his headache disappeared, and instantly writing the following reply, he put spurs to his horse and galloped on: "apr. 9, 1865. "your note of this date is but this moment (11:50 a. m.) received in consequence of my having passed from the richmond and lynchburg road to the farmville and lynchburg road. i am at this writing about four miles west of walker's church and will push forward to the front for the purpose of meeting you. notice sent to me on this road where you wish the interview to take place will meet me. "u. s. grant, "lt. general." the troops under sheridan were drawn up in line of battle when grant arrived on the scene and his officers, highly excited at the favorable opportunity for attacking the confederates, urged him to allow no cessation of hostilities until the surrender was actually made. but grant would not listen to anything of this sort, and directing that he be at once conducted to general lee, followed an orderly who led him toward a comfortable two-story, brick dwelling in appomattox village owned by a mr. mclean who had placed it at the disposal of the confederate commander. mounting the broad piazza steps, grant entered the house, followed by his principal generals and the members of his staff, and was ushered into a room at the left of the hall, where lee, accompanied by only one officer, awaited him. as the two commanders shook hands the union officers passed toward the rear of the room and remained standing apart. then lee motioned grant to a chair placed beside a small marble-topped table, at the same time seating himself near another table close at hand. neither man exhibited the slightest embarrassment and grant, recalling that they had served together during the mexican war, reminded lee of this fact, saying that he remembered him very distinctly as general scott's chief of staff but did not suppose that an older and superior officer would remember him. but lee did remember him and in a few minutes he was chatting quietly with his former comrade about the mexican campaign and old army days. it would be impossible to imagine a greater contrast than that afforded by the two men as they thus sat conversing. lee wore a spotless gray uniform, long cavalry boots, spurs and gauntlets, and carried the beautiful sword given to him by virginia, presenting altogether a most impressive appearance; and his tall, splendidly proportioned figure and grave dignified bearing heightened the effect. his well-trimmed hair and beard were almost snow white, adding distinction to his calm, handsome face without suggesting age, and his clear eyes and complexion and erect carriage were remarkable for a man of fifty-eight. grant was barely forty-three, and his hair and beard were brown with a touch of gray, but his face was worn and haggard from recent illness, and his thickset figure and drooping shoulders were those of a man well advanced in years. for uniform he wore the blouse of a private, to which the shoulder straps of a lieutenant-general had been stitched; his trousers were tucked into top boots worn without spurs; he carried no sword and from head to foot he was splashed with mud. he, himself, was conscious of the strange contrast between his appearance and that of his faultlessly attired opponent, for he apologized for his unkempt condition, explaining that he had come straight from active duty in the field, and then as the conversation regarding mexico continued he grew so pleasantly interested that the object of the meeting almost passed from his mind, and it was lee who first recalled it to his attention. he then called for pencil and paper, and without having previously mapped out any phrases in his mind, he began to draft an informal letter to lee, outlining the terms of surrender. nothing could have been more clear and simple than the agreement which he drafted, nor could the document have been more free from anything tending to humiliate or offend his adversary. it provided merely for the stacking of guns, the parking of cannon and the proper enrollment of the confederate troops, all of whom were to remain unmolested as long as they obeyed the laws and did not again take up arms against the government, and it concluded with the statement that the side arms of the officers were not to be surrendered and that all such officers who owned their own horses should be permitted to retain them. lee watched the writing of this letter in silence, and when grant handed it to him he read it slowly, merely remarking as he returned it that the provision allowing the officers to keep their horses would have a happy effect, but that in the confederate army the cavalry and artillerymen likewise owned their own horses. that hint was quite sufficient for grant, who immediately agreed to make the concession apply to all the soldiers, whether officers or privates, observing as he again handed the paper to lee that his men would probably find their horses useful in the spring ploughing when they returned to their farms. lee responded that the concession would prove most gratifying to his soldiers, and, turning to his secretary, dictated a short, simple reply to his opponent, accepting his conditions. while these letters were being copied in ink, grant introduced his officers to lee and strove to make the situation as easy as possible for him. indeed, throughout the whole interview he displayed the most admirable spirit, tactfully conceding all that his adversary might reasonably have asked, thus saving him from the embarrassment of making any request and generally exhibiting a delicate courtesy and generosity which astonished those who judged him merely by his rough exterior. but grant, though uncouth in appearance and unpolished in manners, was a gentleman in the best sense of the word, and he rose to the occasion with an ease and grace that left nothing to be desired. as soon as the letters were signed the confederate commander shook his late opponent's hand and turned to leave the room. the union officers followed him to the door as he departed but tactfully refrained from accompanying him further and attended only by his secretary, he passed down the broad steps of the piazza, gravely saluted the group of officers gathered there who respectfully rose at his approach, mounted his old favorite "traveller" and rode slowly toward his own lines. by this time the news of the surrender had reached the union army and cannon began booming a salute in honor of the joyful tidings. but grant instantly stopped this and ordered that there should be no demonstrations or exultation of any kind which would offend lee's men. in the same generous spirit he kept his men strictly within their own lines when the confederates stacked their guns and no one, except the officers assigned to receive the arms, was permitted to witness this final act of surrender[1]. he likewise declined to visit richmond lest his presence should be regarded as the triumphal entry of a conqueror or smack of exulting over his fallen foes, and with fully a million bayonets behind him ready to win him further glory, his foremost thought was to end the war without the loss of another life. with this idea, on the morning after the surrender, he sought another interview with lee. [1]since the first edition of this volume was published the writer has been furnished, through the courtesy of mr. jefferson k. cole of massachusetts, with documentary proof that the formal surrender of what remained of lee's infantry was made in the presence of the first division of the 5th corps of the army of the potomac, general joshua l. chamberlain commanding. therefore, although it is true that grant avoided all humiliation of the confederates, it is evident that a small portion of his troops did witness the final act of surrender, and the statement in the text should be accordingly amended. chapter xxxi. -lee's years of peace desperate as their plight had been for many days, lee's men had not wholly abandoned the hope of escape, but when their beloved commander returned from the federal lines they saw by his face that the end had come, and crowding around him, they pressed his hands, even the strongest among them shedding bitter tears. for a time he was unable to respond in words to this touching demonstration, but finally, with a great effort, he mastered his emotion and bravely faced his comrades. "men," he said, "we have fought through the war together; i have done my best for you; my heart is too full to say more." brief as these words were, all who heard them realized that lee saw no prospect of continuing the struggle and meant to say so. he was, of course, well aware that the confederates had many thousand men still in the field, and that by separating into armed bands they could postpone the end for a considerable period. but this to his mind was not war and he had no sympathy with such methods and no belief that they could result in anything but more bloodshed and harsher terms for the south. a word from him would have been quite sufficient to encourage the other commanders to hold out and prolong the cruelly hopeless contest, but he had determined not to utter it. grant was firmly convinced that this would be his attitude, but whether he would actually advise the abandonment of the cause was another question, and it was to suggest this course that the union commander sought him out on the morning after the surrender. this second interview occurred between the lines of the respective armies and as the former adversaries sat conversing on horseback, grant tactfully introduced the subject of ending the war. he knew, he told lee, that no man possessed more influence with the soldiers and the south in general than he did, and that if he felt justified in advising submission his word would doubtless have all the effect of law. but to this suggestion lee gravely shook his head. he frankly admitted that further resistance was useless, but he was unwilling to pledge himself to give the proposed advice until he had consulted with the confederate president, and grant did not urge him, feeling certain that he would do what he thought right. nor was this confidence misplaced, for though lee never positively advised a general surrender, his opinions soon came to be known and in a short time all the confederate forces in the field yielded. but though peace was thus restored, the war had left two countries where it had found one, and to the minds of many people they could never be united again. it was then that lee showed his true greatness, for from the moment of his surrender he diligently strove by voice and pen and example to create harmony between the north and south and to help in the rebuilding of the nation. to those who asked his opinion as to whether they should submit to the federal authorities and take the required oath of allegiance, he unhesitatingly replied, "if you intend to reside in this country and wish to do your part in the restoration of your state and in the government of the country, which i think is the duty of every citizen, i know of no objection to your taking the oath." he denounced the assassination of lincoln as a crime to be abhorred by every american, discountenanced the idea of southerners seeking refuge in foreign lands, scrupulously obeyed every regulation of the military authorities regarding paroled prisoners and exerted all the influence at his command to induce his friends to work with him for the reconciliation of the country. even when it was proposed to indict and try him for treason he displayed no resentment or bitterness. "i have no wish to avoid any trial that the government may order. i hope others may go unmolested," was his only comment. but no such persecution was to be permitted, for grant interfered the moment he heard of it, insisting that his honor and that of the nation forbade that lee should be disturbed in any way, and his indignant protest straightway brought the authorities to their senses. in the meanwhile, innumerable propositions reached lee, offering him great monetary inducements to lend his name and fame to business enterprises of various kinds, but although he had lost all his property and was practically penniless, he would not consent to undertake work that he did not feel competent to perform and would listen to no suggestion of receiving compensation merely for the use of his name. his desire was to identify himself with an institution of learning where he could be of some public service, and at the same time gain the peaceful home life of which he had dreamed for so many years. as soon as this was understood offers came to him from the university of virginia and the university of the south at suwannee, tennessee, but he feared that his association with a state institution like the university of virginia might create a feeling of hostility against it on the part of the federal government, and the vice-chancellorship of the tennessee university would have required him to leave his native state. finally, the trustees of washington college offered him the presidency of that institution and the fact that it bore the name of the first president and had been endowed by him straightway appealed to his imagination. at one time the college had been in a flourishing condition but it had suffered severely from the war, much of its property having been destroyed and only a handful of students remained when he was invited to take charge of its tottering fortunes. indeed, the trustees themselves were so impoverished that none of them possessed even a decent suit of clothes in which to appear before lee and submit their proposition. nevertheless, one of them borrowed a respectable outfit for the occasion and presented the offer with much dignity and effect and lee, after modestly expressing some doubts as to whether he could "discharge the duties to the satisfaction of the trustees or to the benefit of the country," accepted the office at a merely nominal salary, closing his formal acceptance of aug. 11, 1865, with these words: "i think it the duty of every citizen in the present condition of the country to do all in his power to aid in the restoration of peace and harmony and in no way to oppose the policy of the state or general government directed to that object." this was the key-note of his thought from this time forward. "life is indeed gliding away and i have nothing of good to show for mine that is past," he wrote shortly after assuming his new duties. "i pray i may be spared to accomplish something for the benefit of mankind and the honor of god." it was no easy task to reã«stablish an institution practically destitute of resources in a poverty-stricken community struggling for a bare subsistence after the ravages of war. but lee devoted himself body and soul to the work, living in the simplest possible fashion. indeed, he refused to accept an increase in his meager salary, which would have provided him with some of the ordinary comforts of life, on the ground that the institution needed every penny of its funds for its development. but though the work was hard he took keen pleasure in seeing it grow under his hands, and, little by little, the college regained its prestige, while with the help of his daughters he made his new home a place of beauty, planting flowers about the little house and doing all in his power to make it attractive for his invalid wife. thus, for five years he lived far removed from the turmoil of public life, performing a constant public service by exerting a direct personal influence upon the students who came under his charge, and by doing everything in his power to reunite the nation. suggestions were constantly made to him to enter politics and had he cared to do so, he could undoubtedly have been elected to the governorship of virginia. but he steadily declined to consider this, declaring that it might injure the state to have a man so closely identified with the war at its head and that he could best help in restoring harmony to the country in the capacity of a private citizen. during all this time he took an active interest in his sons, encouraging them in their efforts to establish themselves and earn their own living, visiting their farms and advising them in the comradely spirit which had always characterized his relations with them. indeed, every moment he could spare from his collegiate duties was devoted to his family, and his letters to his children, always cheerful and affectionate and sometimes even humorously gay, expressed contentment and unselfishness in every line. at times it required great self-restraint to avoid bitterness toward the government, but even when congress refused his wife's petition for the restoration of the mementos of washington, taken from her home in arlington during the war, he refrained from making any public protest and his private comment showed how completely he subordinated his personal wishes to the good of the country. "in reference to certain articles which were taken from arlington..." he wrote, "mrs. lee is indebted...for the order from the present administration for their restoration to her. congress, however, passed a resolution forbidding their return. they were valuable to her as having belonged to her great grandmother (mrs. general washington) and having been bequeathed to her by her father. but as the country desires them she must give them up. i hope their presence at the capital will keep in the remembrance of all americans the principles and virtues of washington." [these articles were restored to lee's family by the order of president mckinley in 1903.] toward the individuals, however, who had looted his house and appropriated its treasures to their own use, he felt rather differently. but his rebuke to them was written rather more in sorrow than in anger and it likewise reflects the regard for his country which was ever the uppermost thought in his mind. "...a great many things formerly belonging to general washington, bequeathed to mrs. lee by her father, in the shape of books, furniture, camp equipage, etc., were carried away by individuals and are now scattered over the land," he wrote. "i hope the possessors appreciate them and may imitate the example of their original owners whose conduct must at times be brought to their recollection by these silent monitors. in this way they will accomplish good to the country...." for his first four years at washington college lee accomplished his arduous duties with scarcely a sign of fatigue, but from that time forward his health began to fail and though he kept at his work, it told so heavily upon him that his friends at last persuaded him to take a vacation. he, accordingly, started south with his daughter in march, 1870. had he permitted it, his journey would have been one continual ovation, for this was the first time he had traveled any considerable distance from his home since the war and people flocked to greet him from all sides with bands and speeches and cart-loads of flowers and fruits. indeed, it was extremely difficult to escape the public receptions, serenades and other honors thrust upon him, and though he returned to his duties in somewhat better condition, he was soon obliged to retire to hot springs, virginia, for another rest, from which he returned toward the end of the summer vacation apparently restored to health. meanwhile he had undertaken various other duties in addition to his collegiate work and some two weeks after the reopening of the college he attended a vestry meeting of the episcopal church. at this meeting the subject of rebuilding the church and increasing the rector's salary was under discussion and the session lasted for three hours, at the close of which he volunteered to subscribe from his own meager funds the sum needed to complete the proposed increase of the clergyman's salary. by this time it was seven in the evening and he at once returned to his own house, and finding his family ready for tea, stood at the head of the table as he usually did to say grace. but no words came from his lips, and with an expression of resignation on his face he quietly slipped into his chair and sat there upright as though he had heard an order to which he was endeavoring to respond by remaining at "attention." physicians were immediately called who diagnosed the trouble as hardening of the arteries combined with rheumatism of the heart, and though their patient never quite lost consciousness, he gradually fell asleep, and on october 12, 1870, passed quietly away. three days later "traveller," led by two old soldiers and followed by a small but distinguished assemblage, accompanied his master to the grave outside the little chapel which lee had helped to build for the college which soon thereafter changed its name to washington and lee university. nothing could have been more grateful to lee then to have his name thus associated with that of the man whom he revered above all other men and upon whom he had patterned his whole life, and in this graceful tribute he had his heart's desire. chapter xxxii. -the head of the nation while lee was passing the closing years of his life in tranquility, grant was entering upon a stormy career in politics. but before he had any thought of the honors that lay before him he proved himself a good friend to the south and a really great american. toward his late adversaries he maintained that the true policy was "to make friends of enemies," and by word and deed he earnestly strove to accomplish that result, never losing an opportunity to protect the people of the south from humiliation and injustice. indeed, if he and some of the other union commanders had been given complete authority directly after the war, the south would have been spared much suffering and the nation would have escaped some of the evils which inflict it to this day. but grant's service to the country, as a whole, was far greater than that which he undertook on behalf of any particular section, for at a critical moment he held the destiny of the nation in the hollow of his hand and a word from him would have subjected the people to a military control from which they might never have recovered. at the time of lee's surrender the united states had probably the most powerful and the most perfectly equipped army in the world. it was absolutely at grant's disposal and there were plenty of excuses for employing it in the field, had he been ambitious for military glory. an attack on the french in mexico or the english in canada would have been regarded by many people as perfectly justified by their treatment of the united states during the civil war. but no idea of perpetuating his own power or of making his country a military nation entered grant's mind. on the contrary, his first thought was to hasten by every possible means the disbanding of the mighty army which hailed him as its chief. at the close of the war that army numbered over a million men. six months later only 183,000 remained in the service, and in eight months more the whole force of volunteers had disappeared. no other great commander in the history of the world ever strove thus to deprive himself of power, or with a gigantic instrument of war under his control thought only of peace. grant was not the greatest military genius of the ages, or even of his own time, but when, with a million bayonets responsive to his nod, he uttered the benediction, "let us have peace," he took a place apart among those americans whose fame will never die. one great triumphant pageant marked the success of the union cause when the returning armies were reviewed by the president in washington, cavalry, infantry and artillery by the tens of thousands passing down pennsylvania avenue for two whole days, presenting a magnificent spectacle never surpassed in the military annals of any land. but the same spirit which had actuated grant in refusing to visit richmond caused him to shun any part of this historic parade, and those who expected to see him on a prancing horse at the head of his veteran troops had little knowledge of his character. he had never made an exhibition of himself at any time during the war, and though he was present on this occasion, he kept in the background and few people caught even a glimpse of him as the well-nigh endless ranks of blue swept by in proud array. for a time the work of disbanding the army obliged him to remain at washington, but at the first opportunity he started west to revisit galena, georgetown and the scenes of his boyhood days. but, if he hoped to renew his acquaintance with old friends without public recognition and acclaim he was speedily disillusioned, for the whole countryside turned out to welcome him with processions, banners and triumphal arches, hailing as a hero the man who had lived among them almost unnoticed and somewhat despised. many people had already declared that he would be the next president of the united states, but when some prophecy of this kind had been repeated to him, he had laughingly replied that he did not want any political office, though he would like to be mayor of galena long enough to have a sidewalk laid near his home, and this rumor had reached the town. the first sight that greeted his eyes, therefore, as he entered galena was an arch bearing the words "general, the sidewalk is laid!" and his fellow townsmen straightway carried him off to inspect this improvement, at the same time showing him a new house built and furnished by his neighbors for his use and in which they begged that he would make himself at home. it was a proud moment for his father and mother when they saw the son who had once disappointed them so deeply received with such marks of affection and honored as the greatest man of his day, and their joy was the most satisfying reward he was ever destined to obtain. but gratifying as all these kindly attentions were the returning hero was somewhat relieved to find that georgetown, which had largely sympathized with the confederacy, offered him a less demonstrative welcome. nevertheless, even there curiosity and admiration combined to rob him of all privacy, and he at last decided to avoid the public gaze by slipping away for one of those long solitary drives which had been his delight in boyhood days. but the residents of the village toward which he turned received word of his coming and started a delegation out to meet him half way. after journeying many miles, however, without seeing any signs of the cavalcade they were expecting, the procession encountered a dusty traveler driving a team in a light road wagon, and halting him asked if he had heard anything of general grant. "yes," he reported, "he's on the way," and clicking to his horses quickly disappeared from view. then someone suggested that perhaps the general might not be traveling on horseback surrounded by his staff and that the dusty traveler who had reported grant as on the way looked somewhat like the man himself. but the solitary stranger "who looked like grant" was miles away before this was realized, and when the procession started on his track he was safely out of reach. doubtless, the sight of this unpretentious man in citizen attire was disappointing to many who expected to see a dashing hero in a gorgeous uniform, but his dislike of all military parade soon came to be widely known. his hosts at one village, however, were not well informed of this, for they urged him to prolong his stay with them in order that he might see and review the local troops which were to assemble in his honor, but he quickly begged to be excused, remarking that he wished he might never see a uniform again. certainly there was nothing of the conquering hero or even of the soldier about him when a little later in the course of his duty, he made a tour of the south in order to report on its general condition, and in many places he came and went entirely unnoticed. but though the mass of the people did not know of his presence, he formed an unusually accurate estimate of their views on public questions. "the citizens of the southern states,..." he reported, "are in earnest in wishing to do what is required by the government, not humiliating them as citizens, and if such a course was pointed out they would pursue it in good faith." happy would it have been for the south and for the whole country if this advice had been followed, but the president and congress were soon engaged in a violent struggle over the reconstruction of the seceded states, and anger, rather than wisdom, ruled the day. in the course of this quarrel stanton, the secretary of war, was removed and grant, temporarily appointed in his place (aug. 12, 1867), held the office for about five months, thus taking the first step in the long political career which lay before him. ten months later he was elected president of the united states and at the end of his term (1872) he was reã«lected by an overwhelming vote. those eight years were years of stress and strain, and his judgment in surrounding himself with men unworthy of his confidence made bitter enemies of many of those who had once supported him. he was, however, intensely loyal by nature and having once made a friend he stuck to him through thick and thin, making his cause his own and defending him, even in the face of the facts, against any and all attack. he, accordingly, assumed a heavy burden of blame that did not rightly rest upon his shoulders, but in spite of this many people desired to see him again elected to the presidency and they were sorely disappointed when he refused to become a candidate. on the whole, he had deserved well of the country and the people recognized that he had done much to uphold their honor and dignity, even though he had been too often imposed upon by unreliable and even dangerous friends. a long tour around the world followed his retirement from the presidency and his reception in the various countries was a magnificent tribute to his record as a general and a ruler. meanwhile, an effort was being made by his friends to secure his nomination for a third presidential term, and shortly after he returned home (1880) he was persuaded to enter the field again. at first he regarded the result with indifference, but as time wore on he warmed with the enthusiasm of his friends and keenly desired to secure the honor. but no man had ever been elected three times to the presidency and there was a deep-centered prejudice against breaking this tradition. grant's candidacy therefore encountered bitter opposition, and though a large number of his friends held out for him to the last and almost forced his nomination, general garfield was finally selected in his place. this virtually retired him from politics, and to occupy himself and make a living he went into business with one of his sons who had associated himself with certain bankers in wall street. here, however, his notoriously bad judgment of men and his utter ignorance of the business world soon brought him to grief, for he and his son left the management of their firm to the other partners who outrageously imposed upon them for a time and then left them face to face with ruin and disgrace. the shock of this disaster fairly staggered grant, but he bravely met the situation and stripping himself of every vestige of his property, including the swords that had been presented him and the gifts bestowed by foreign nations, strove to pay his debts. but, though reduced to penury, he was able to prove his entire innocence of the rascality of his partners and the general verdict of the country acquitted him of any dishonorable act. to earn sufficient money for his family in their dire necessity he then began to write the story of his military life and campaigns, but in the midst of this employment he was stricken with a most painful disease which incapacitated him for work and left him well-nigh helpless. at this crisis congress came to his rescue by restoring him to his former rank in the army, with sufficient pay to meet his immediate needs. then, to the amazement of his physicians, he rallied, and, though still suffering intensely and greatly enfeebled, he at once recommenced work upon his book. from that time forward his one thought was to live long enough to complete this task, and to it he devoted himself with almost superhuman courage and persistence, in the hope of being able to provide for his wife and family after he had gone. indeed, in this daily struggle against disease and death he showed, not only all the qualities that had made him invincible in the field, but also the higher qualities of patience and unselfishness with which he had not been fully credited. uncomplaining and considerate of everyone but himself, he looked death steadily in the face and wrote on day after day while the whole nation, lost in admiration of his dauntless courage, watched at his bedside with tender solicitude. at last, on july 23, 1885, the pencil slipped from his fingers. but his heroic task was done and no monument which has been or ever will be erected to his memory will serve as will those pages to insure him immortality, for "grant's memoirs," modest as the man himself, have become a part of the literature of the world. authorities the following is a partial list of the authorities relied upon in the text: grant's personal memoirs; recollections and letters of general robert e. lee (captain r. e. lee); life of robert e. lee (fitzhugh lee); robert e. lee--memoirs of his military and personal history (long); military history of u. s. grant (badeau); grant in peace (badeau); r. e. lee--the southerner (page); robert e. lee (trent); robert e. lee and the southern confederacy (white); mcclelland's own story; stonewall jackson and the american civil war (henderson); the story of the civil war (ropes); the rise and fall of the confederate government (davis); history of the united states (1850-1877 rhodes); the campaign of chancellorsville (bigelow); personal memoirs (sheridan); memoirs of general sherman; reminiscences of carl shurz; from manassas to appomattox (longstreet); abraham lincoln--a history (nicolay and hay); the army under pope (ropes); the antietam and fredericksburg (palfrey); the virginia campaign of 1864 and 1865 (humphreys); chncellorsville (doubleday); life and letters of robert e. lee (jones); ulysses s. grant (wister); ulysses s. grant (garland); campaigning with grant (porter); autobiography of o. o. howard. personal memoirs of u. s. grant, part 6. by u. s. grant (plus footnotes for parts 1 to 6) chapter lxii. sherman's march north--sheridan ordered to lynchburg--canby ordered to move against mobile--movements of schofield and thomas--capture of columbia, south carolina--sherman in the carolinas. when news of sherman being in possession of savannah reached the north, distinguished statesmen and visitors began to pour in to see him. among others who went was the secretary of war, who seemed much pleased at the result of his campaign. mr. draper, the collector of customs of new york, who was with mr. stanton's party, was put in charge of the public property that had been abandoned and captured. savannah was then turned over to general foster's command to hold, so that sherman might have his own entire army free to operate as might be decided upon in the future. i sent the chief engineer of the army of the potomac (general barnard) with letters to general sherman. he remained some time with the general, and when he returned brought back letters, one of which contained suggestions from sherman as to what ought to be done in co-operation with him, when he should have started upon his march northward. i must not neglect to state here the fact that i had no idea originally of having sherman march from savannah to richmond, or even to north carolina. the season was bad, the roads impassable for anything except such an army as he had, and i should not have thought of ordering such a move. i had, therefore, made preparations to collect transports to carry sherman and his army around to the james river by water, and so informed him. on receiving this letter he went to work immediately to prepare for the move, but seeing that it would require a long time to collect the transports, he suggested the idea then of marching up north through the carolinas. i was only too happy to approve this; for if successful, it promised every advantage. his march through georgia had thoroughly destroyed all lines of transportation in that state, and had completely cut the enemy off from all sources of supply to the west of it. if north and south carolina were rendered helpless so far as capacity for feeding lee's army was concerned, the confederate garrison at richmond would be reduced in territory, from which to draw supplies, to very narrow limits in the state of virginia; and, although that section of the country was fertile, it was already well exhausted of both forage and food. i approved sherman's suggestion therefore at once. the work of preparation was tedious, because supplies, to load the wagons for the march, had to be brought from a long distance. sherman would now have to march through a country furnishing fewer provisions than that he had previously been operating in during his march to the sea. besides, he was confronting, or marching toward, a force of the enemy vastly superior to any his troops had encountered on their previous march; and the territory through which he had to pass had now become of such vast importance to the very existence of the confederate army, that the most desperate efforts were to be expected in order to save it. sherman, therefore, while collecting the necessary supplies to start with, made arrangements with admiral dahlgren, who commanded that part of the navy on the south carolina and georgia coast, and general foster, commanding the troops, to take positions, and hold a few points on the sea coast, which he (sherman) designated, in the neighborhood of charleston. this provision was made to enable him to fall back upon the sea coast, in case he should encounter a force sufficient to stop his onward progress. he also wrote me a letter, making suggestions as to what he would like to have done in support of his movement farther north. this letter was brought to city point by general barnard at a time when i happened to be going to washington city, where i arrived on the 21st of january. i cannot tell the provision i had already made to co-operate with sherman, in anticipation of his expected movement, better than by giving my reply to this letter. headquarters armies of the united states, washington, d. c., jan. 21, 1865. major-general w. t. sherman, commanding mill div. of the mississippi. general:--your letters brought by general barnard were received at city point, and read with interest. not having them with me, however, i cannot say that in this i will be able to satisfy you on all points of recommendation. as i arrived here at one p.m., and must leave at six p.m., having in the meantime spent over three hours with the secretary and general halleck, i must be brief. before your last request to have thomas make a campaign into the heart of alabama, i had ordered schofield to annapolis, md., with his corps. the advance (six thousand) will reach the seaboard by the 23d, the remainder following as rapidly as railroad transportation can be procured from cincinnati. the corps numbers over twenty-one thousand men. i was induced to do this because i did not believe thomas could possibly be got off before spring. his pursuit of hood indicated a sluggishness that satisfied me that he would never do to conduct one of your campaigns. the command of the advance of the pursuit was left to subordinates, whilst thomas followed far behind. when hood had crossed the tennessee, and those in pursuit had reached it, thomas had not much more than half crossed the state, from whence he returned to nashville to take steamer for eastport. he is possessed of excellent judgment, great coolness and honesty, but he is not good on a pursuit. he also reported his troops fagged, and that it was necessary to equip up. this report and a determination to give the enemy no rest determined me to use his surplus troops elsewhere. thomas is still left with a sufficient force surplus to go to selma under an energetic leader. he has been telegraphed to, to know whether he could go, and, if so, which of the several routes he would select. no reply is yet received. canby has been ordered to act offensively from the sea-coast to the interior, towards montgomery and selma. thomas's forces will move from the north at an early day, or some of his troops will be sent to canby. without further reinforcements canby will have a moving column of twenty thousand men. fort fisher, you are aware, has been captured. we have a force there of eight thousand effective. at new bern about half the number. it is rumored, through deserters, that wilmington also has fallen. i am inclined to believe the rumor, because on the 17th we knew the enemy were blowing up their works about fort caswell, and that on the 18th terry moved on wilmington. if wilmington is captured, schofield will go there. if not, he will be sent to new bern. in either event, all the surplus forces at the two points will move to the interior toward goldsboro' in co-operation with your movements. from either point, railroad communications can be run out, there being here abundance of rolling-stock suited to the gauge of those roads. there have been about sixteen thousand men sent from lee's army south. of these, you will have fourteen thousand against you, if wilmington is not held by the enemy, casualties at fort fisher having overtaken about two thousand. all these troops are subject to your orders as you come in communication with them. they will be so instructed. from about richmond i will watch lee closely, and if he detaches much more, or attempts to evacuate, will pitch in. in the meantime, should you be brought to a halt anywhere, i can send two corps of thirty thousand effective men to your support, from the troops about richmond. to resume: canby is ordered to operate to the interior from the gulf. a. j. smith may go from the north, but i think it doubtful. a force of twenty-eight or thirty thousand will co-operate with you from new bern or wilmington, or both. you can call for reinforcements. this will be handed you by captain hudson, of my staff, who will return with any message you may have for me. if there is anything i can do for you in the way of having supplies on ship-board, at any point on the sea-coast, ready for you, let me know it. yours truly, u. s. grant, lieut.-general. i had written on the 18th of january to general sherman, giving him the news of the battle of nashville. he was much pleased at the result, although, like myself, he had been very much disappointed at thomas for permitting hood to cross the tennessee river and nearly the whole state of tennessee, and come to nashville to be attacked there. he, however, as i had done, sent thomas a warm congratulatory letter. on the 10th of january, 1865, the resolutions of thanks to sherman and his army passed by congress were approved. sherman, after the capture, at once had the debris cleared up, commencing the work by removing the piling and torpedoes from the river, and taking up all obstructions. he had then intrenched the city, so that it could be held by a small garrison. by the middle of january all his work was done, except the accumulation of supplies to commence his movement with. he proposed to move in two columns, one from savannah, going along by the river of the same name, and the other by roads farther east, threatening charleston. he commenced the advance by moving his right wing to beaufort, south carolina, then to pocotaligo by water. this column, in moving north, threatened charleston, and, indeed, it was not determined at first that they would have a force visit charleston. south carolina had done so much to prepare the public mind of the south for secession, and had been so active in precipitating the decision of the question before the south was fully prepared to meet it, that there was, at that time, a feeling throughout the north and also largely entertained by people of the south, that the state of south carolina, and charleston, the hot-bed of secession in particular, ought to have a heavy hand laid upon them. in fact, nothing but the decisive results that followed, deterred the radical portion of the people from condemning the movement, because charleston had been left out. to pass into the interior would, however, be to insure the evacuation of the city, and its possession by the navy and foster's troops. it is so situated between two formidable rivers that a small garrison could have held it against all odds as long as their supplies would hold out. sherman therefore passed it by. by the first of february all preparations were completed for the final march, columbia, south carolina, being the first objective; fayetteville, north carolina, the second; and goldsboro, or neighborhood, the final one, unless something further should be determined upon. the right wing went from pocotaligo, and the left from about hardeeville on the savannah river, both columns taking a pretty direct route for columbia. the cavalry, however, were to threaten charleston on the right, and augusta on the left. on the 15th of january fort fisher had fallen, news of which sherman had received before starting out on his march. we already had new bern and had soon wilmington, whose fall followed that of fort fisher; as did other points on the sea coast, where the national troops were now in readiness to co-operate with sherman's advance when he had passed fayetteville. on the 18th of january i ordered canby, in command at new orleans, to move against mobile, montgomery and selma, alabama, for the purpose of destroying roads, machine shops, etc. on the 8th of february i ordered sheridan, who was in the valley of virginia, to push forward as soon as the weather would permit and strike the canal west of richmond at or about lynchburg; and on the 20th i made the order to go to lynchburg as soon as the roads would permit, saying: "as soon as it is possible to travel, i think you will have no difficulty about reaching lynchburg with a cavalry force alone. from there you could destroy the railroad and canal in every direction, so as to be of no further use to the rebellion. * * * this additional raid, with one starting from east tennessee under stoneman, numbering about four or five thousand cavalry; one from eastport, mississippi, ten thousand cavalry; canby, from mobile bay, with about eighteen thousand mixed troops--these three latter pushing for tuscaloosa, selma and montgomery; and sherman with a large army eating out the vitals of south carolina--is all that will be wanted to leave nothing for the rebellion to stand upon. i would advise you to overcome great obstacles to accomplish this. charleston was evacuated on tuesday last." on the 27th of february, more than a month after canby had received his orders, i again wrote to him, saying that i was extremely anxious to hear of his being in alabama. i notified him, also, that i had sent grierson to take command of his cavalry, he being a very efficient officer. i further suggested that forrest was probably in mississippi, and if he was there, he would find him an officer of great courage and capacity whom it would be difficult to get by. i still further informed him that thomas had been ordered to start a cavalry force into mississippi on the 20th of february, or as soon as possible thereafter. this force did not get off however. all these movements were designed to be in support of sherman's march, the object being to keep the confederate troops in the west from leaving there. but neither canby nor thomas could be got off in time. i had some time before depleted thomas's army to reinforce canby, for the reason that thomas had failed to start an expedition which he had been ordered to send out, and to have the troops where they might do something. canby seemed to be equally deliberate in all of his movements. i ordered him to go in person; but he prepared to send a detachment under another officer. general granger had got down to new orleans, in some way or other, and i wrote canby that he must not put him in command of troops. in spite of this he asked the war department to assign granger to the command of a corps. almost in despair of having adequate service rendered to the cause in that quarter, i said to canby: "i am in receipt of a dispatch * * * informing me that you have made requisitions for a construction corps and material to build seventy miles of railroad. i have directed that none be sent. thomas's army has been depleted to send a force to you that they might be where they could act in winter, and at least detain the force the enemy had in the west. if there had been any idea of repairing railroads, it could have been done much better from the north, where we already had the troops. i expected your movements to be co-operative with sherman's last. this has now entirely failed. i wrote to you long ago, urging you to push promptly and to live upon the country, and destroy railroads, machine shops, etc., not to build them. take mobile and hold it, and push your forces to the interior--to montgomery and to selma. destroy railroads, rolling stock, and everything useful for carrying on war, and, when you have done this, take such positions as can be supplied by water. by this means alone you can occupy positions from which the enemy's roads in the interior can be kept broken." most of these expeditions got off finally, but too late to render any service in the direction for which they were designed. the enemy, ready to intercept his advance, consisted of hardee's troops and wheeler's cavalry, perhaps less than fifteen thousand men in all; but frantic efforts were being made in richmond, as i was sure would be the case, to retard sherman's movements. everything possible was being done to raise troops in the south. lee dispatched against sherman the troops which had been sent to relieve fort fisher, which, including those of the other defences of the harbor and its neighborhood, amounted, after deducting the two thousand killed, wounded and captured, to fourteen thousand men. after thomas's victory at nashville what remained, of hood's army were gathered together and forwarded as rapidly as possible to the east to co-operate with these forces; and, finally, general joseph e. johnston, one of the ablest commanders of the south though not in favor with the administration (or at least with mr. davis), was put in command of all the troops in north and south carolina. schofield arrived at annapolis in the latter part of january, but before sending his troops to north carolina i went with him down the coast to see the situation of affairs, as i could give fuller directions after being on the ground than i could very well have given without. we soon returned, and the troops were sent by sea to cape fear river. both new bern and wilmington are connected with raleigh by railroads which unite at goldsboro. schofield was to land troops at smithville, near the mouth of the cape fear river on the west side, and move up to secure the wilmington and charlotteville railroad. this column took their pontoon bridges with them, to enable them to cross over to the island south of the city of wilmington. a large body was sent by the north side to co-operate with them. they succeeded in taking the city on the 22d of february. i took the precaution to provide for sherman's army, in case he should be forced to turn in toward the sea coast before reaching north carolina, by forwarding supplies to every place where he was liable to have to make such a deflection from his projected march. i also sent railroad rolling stock, of which we had a great abundance, now that we were not operating the roads in virginia. the gauge of the north carolina railroads being the same as the virginia railroads had been altered too; these cars and locomotives were ready for use there without any change. on the 31st of january i countermanded the orders given to thomas to move south to alabama and georgia. (i had previously reduced his force by sending a portion of it to terry.) i directed in lieu of this movement, that he should send stoneman through east tennessee, and push him well down toward columbia, south carolina, in support of sherman. thomas did not get stoneman off in time, but, on the contrary, when i had supposed he was on his march in support of sherman i heard of his being in louisville, kentucky. i immediately changed the order, and directed thomas to send him toward lynchburg. finally, however, on the 12th of march, he did push down through the north-western end of south carolina, creating some consternation. i also ordered thomas to send the 4th corps (stanley's) to bull gap and to destroy no more roads east of that. i also directed him to concentrate supplies at knoxville, with a view to a probable movement of his army through that way toward lynchburg. goldsboro is four hundred and twenty-five miles from savannah. sherman's march was without much incident until he entered columbia, on the 17th of february. he was detained in his progress by having to repair and corduroy the roads, and rebuild the bridges. there was constant skirmishing and fighting between the cavalry of the two armies, but this did not retard the advance of the infantry. four days, also, were lost in making complete the destruction of the most important railroads south of columbia; there was also some delay caused by the high water, and the destruction of the bridges on the line of the road. a formidable river had to be crossed near columbia, and that in the face of a small garrison under general wade hampton. there was but little delay, however, further than that caused by high water in the stream. hampton left as sherman approached, and the city was found to be on fire. there has since been a great deal of acrimony displayed in discussions of the question as to who set columbia on fire. sherman denies it on the part of his troops, and hampton denies it on the part of the confederates. one thing is certain: as soon as our troops took possession, they at once proceeded to extinguish the flames to the best of their ability with the limited means at hand. in any case, the example set by the confederates in burning the village of chambersburg, pa., a town which was not garrisoned, would seem to make a defence of the act of firing the seat of government of the state most responsible for the conflict then raging, not imperative. the confederate troops having vacated the city, the mayor took possession, and sallied forth to meet the commander of the national forces for the purpose of surrendering the town, making terms for the protection of property, etc. sherman paid no attention at all to the overture, but pushed forward and took the town without making any conditions whatever with its citizens. he then, however, co-operated with the mayor in extinguishing the flames and providing for the people who were rendered destitute by this destruction of their homes. when he left there he even gave the mayor five hundred head of cattle to be distributed among the citizens, to tide them over until some arrangement could be made for their future supplies. he remained in columbia until the roads, public buildings, workshops and everything that could be useful to the enemy were destroyed. while at columbia, sherman learned for the first time that what remained of hood's army was confronting him, under the command of general beauregard. charleston was evacuated on the 18th of february, and foster garrisoned the place. wilmington was captured on the 22d. columbia and cheraw farther north, were regarded as so secure from invasion that the wealthy people of charleston and augusta had sent much of their valuable property to these two points to be stored. among the goods sent there were valuable carpets, tons of old madeira, silverware, and furniture. i am afraid much of these goods fell into the hands of our troops. there was found at columbia a large amount of powder, some artillery, small-arms and fixed ammunition. these, of course were among the articles destroyed. while here, sherman also learned of johnston's restoration to command. the latter was given, as already stated, all troops in north and south carolina. after the completion of the destruction of public property about columbia, sherman proceeded on his march and reached cheraw without any special opposition and without incident to relate. the railroads, of course, were thoroughly destroyed on the way. sherman remained a day or two at cheraw; and, finally, on the 6th of march crossed his troops over the pedee and advanced straight for fayetteville. hardee and hampton were there, and barely escaped. sherman reached fayetteville on the 11th of march. he had dispatched scouts from cheraw with letters to general terry, at wilmington, asking him to send a steamer with some supplies of bread, clothing and other articles which he enumerated. the scouts got through successfully, and a boat was sent with the mail and such articles for which sherman had asked as were in store at wilmington; unfortunately, however, those stores did not contain clothing. four days later, on the 15th, sherman left fayetteville for goldsboro. the march, now, had to be made with great caution, for he was approaching lee's army and nearing the country that still remained open to the enemy. besides, he was confronting all that he had had to confront in his previous march up to that point, reinforced by the garrisons along the road and by what remained of hood's army. frantic appeals were made to the people to come in voluntarily and swell the ranks of our foe. i presume, however, that johnston did not have in all over 35,000 or 40,000 men. the people had grown tired of the war, and desertions from the confederate army were much more numerous than the voluntary accessions. there was some fighting at averysboro on the 16th between johnston's troops and sherman's, with some loss; and at bentonville on the 19th and 21st of march, but johnston withdrew from the contest before the morning of the 22d. sherman's loss in these last engagements in killed, wounded, and missing, was about sixteen hundred. sherman's troops at last reached goldsboro on the 23d of the month and went into bivouac; and there his men were destined to have a long rest. schofield was there to meet him with the troops which had been sent to wilmington. sherman was no longer in danger. he had johnston confronting him; but with an army much inferior to his own, both in numbers and morale. he had lee to the north of him with a force largely superior; but i was holding lee with a still greater force, and had he made his escape and gotten down to reinforce johnston, sherman, with the reinforcements he now had from schofield and terry, would have been able to hold the confederates at bay for an indefinite period. he was near the sea-shore with his back to it, and our navy occupied the harbors. he had a railroad to both wilmington and new bern, and his flanks were thoroughly protected by streams, which intersect that part of the country and deepen as they approach the sea. then, too, sherman knew that if lee should escape me i would be on his heels, and he and johnson together would be crushed in one blow if they attempted to make a stand. with the loss of their capital, it is doubtful whether lee's army would have amounted to much as an army when it reached north carolina. johnston's army was demoralized by constant defeat and would hardly have made an offensive movement, even if they could have been induced to remain on duty. the men of both lee's and johnston's armies were, like their brethren of the north, as brave as men can be; but no man is so brave that he may not meet such defeats and disasters as to discourage him and dampen his ardor for any cause, no matter how just he deems it. chapter lxiii. arrival of the peace commissioners--lincoln and the peace commissioners --an anecdote of lincoln--the winter before petersburg--sheridan destroys the railroad--gordon carries the picket line--parke recaptures the line --the line of battle of white oak road. on the last of january, 1865, peace commissioners from the so-called confederate states presented themselves on our lines around petersburg, and were immediately conducted to my headquarters at city point. they proved to be alexander h. stephens, vice-president of the confederacy, judge campbell, assistant-secretary of war, and r. m. t. hunt, formerly united states senator and then a member of the confederate senate. it was about dark when they reached my headquarters, and i at once conducted them to the steam mary martin, a hudson river boat which was very comfortably fitted up for the use of passengers. i at once communicated by telegraph with washington and informed the secretary of war and the president of the arrival of these commissioners and that their object was to negotiate terms of peace between he united states and, as they termed it, the confederate government. i was instructed to retain them at city point, until the president, or some one whom he would designate, should come to meet them. they remained several days as guests on board the boat. i saw them quite frequently, though i have no recollection of having had any conversation whatever with them on the subject of their mission. it was something i had nothing to do with, and i therefore did not wish to express any views on the subject. for my own part i never had admitted, and never was ready to admit, that they were the representatives of a government. there had been too great a waste of blood and treasure to concede anything of the kind. as long as they remained there, however, our relations were pleasant and i found them all very agreeable gentlemen. i directed the captain to furnish them with the best the boat afforded, and to administer to their comfort in every way possible. no guard was placed over them and no restriction was put upon their movements; nor was there any pledge asked that they would not abuse the privileges extended to them. they were permitted to leave the boat when they felt like it, and did so, coming up on the bank and visiting me at my headquarters. i had never met either of these gentlemen before the war, but knew them well by reputation and through their public services, and i had been a particular admirer of mr. stephens. i had always supposed that he was a very small man, but when i saw him in the dusk of the evening i was very much surprised to find so large a man as he seemed to be. when he got down on to the boat i found that he was wearing a coarse gray woollen overcoat, a manufacture that had been introduced into the south during the rebellion. the cloth was thicker than anything of the kind i had ever seen, even in canada. the overcoat extended nearly to his feet, and was so large that it gave him the appearance of being an average-sized man. he took this off when he reached the cabin of the boat, and i was struck with the apparent change in size, in the coat and out of it. after a few days, about the 2d of february, i received a dispatch from washington, directing me to send the commissioners to hampton roads to meet the president and a member of the cabinet. mr. lincoln met them there and had an interview of short duration. it was not a great while after they met that the president visited me at city point. he spoke of his having met the commissioners, and said he had told them that there would be no use in entering into any negotiations unless they would recognize, first: that the union as a whole must be forever preserved, and second: that slavery must be abolished. if they were willing to concede these two points, then he was ready to enter into negotiations and was almost willing to hand them a blank sheet of paper with his signature attached for them to fill in the terms upon which they were willing to live with us in the union and be one people. he always showed a generous and kindly spirit toward the southern people, and i never heard him abuse an enemy. some of the cruel things said about president lincoln, particularly in the north, used to pierce him to the heart; but never in my presence did he evince a revengeful disposition and i saw a great deal of him at city point, for he seemed glad to get away from the cares and anxieties of the capital. right here i might relate an anecdote of mr. lincoln. it was on the occasion of his visit to me just after he had talked with the peace commissioners at hampton roads. after a little conversation, he asked me if i had seen that overcoat of stephens's. i replied that i had. "well," said he, "did you see him take it off?" i said yes. "well," said he, "didn't you think it was the biggest shuck and the littlest ear that ever you did see?" long afterwards i told this story to the confederate general j. b. gordon, at the time a member of the senate. he repeated it to stephens, and, as i heard afterwards, stephens laughed immoderately at the simile of mr. lincoln. the rest of the winter, after the departure of the peace commissioners, passed off quietly and uneventfully, except for two or three little incidents. on one occasion during this period, while i was visiting washington city for the purpose of conferring with the administration, the enemy's cavalry under general wade hampton, passing our extreme left and then going to the south, got in east of us. before their presence was known, they had driven off a large number of beef cattle that were grazing in that section. it was a fair capture, and they were sufficiently needed by the confederates. it was only retaliating for what we had done, sometimes for many weeks at a time, when out of supplies taking what the confederate army otherwise would have gotten. as appears in this book, on one single occasion we captured five thousand head of cattle which were crossing the mississippi river near port hudson on their way from texas to supply the confederate army in the east. one of the most anxious periods of my experience during the rebellion was the last few weeks before petersburg. i felt that the situation of the confederate army was such that they would try to make an escape at the earliest practicable moment, and i was afraid, every morning, that i would awake from my sleep to hear that lee had gone, and that nothing was left but a picket line. he had his railroad by the way of danville south, and i was afraid that he was running off his men and all stores and ordnance except such as it would be necessary to carry with him for his immediate defence. i knew he could move much more lightly and more rapidly than i, and that, if he got the start, he would leave me behind so that we would have the same army to fight again farther south and the war might be prolonged another year. i was led to this fear by the fact that i could not see how it was possible for the confederates to hold out much longer where they were. there is no doubt that richmond would have been evacuated much sooner than it was, if it had not been that it was the capital of the so-called confederacy, and the fact of evacuating the capital would, of course, have had a very demoralizing effect upon the confederate army. when it was evacuated (as we shall see further on), the confederacy at once began to crumble and fade away. then, too, desertions were taking place, not only among those who were with general lee in the neighborhood of their capital, but throughout the whole confederacy. i remember that in a conversation with me on one occasion long prior to this, general butler remarked that the confederates would find great difficulty in getting more men for their army; possibly adding, though i am not certain as to this, "unless they should arm the slave." the south, as we all knew, were conscripting every able-bodied man between the ages of eighteen and forty-five; and now they had passed a law for the further conscription of boys from fourteen to eighteen, calling them the junior reserves, and men from forty-five to sixty to be called the senior reserves. the latter were to hold the necessary points not in immediate danger, and especially those in the rear. general butler, in alluding to this conscription, remarked that they were thus "robbing both the cradle and the grave," an expression which i afterwards used in writing a letter to mr. washburn. it was my belief that while the enemy could get no more recruits they were losing at least a regiment a day, taking it throughout the entire army, by desertions alone. then by casualties of war, sickness, and other natural causes, their losses were much heavier. it was a mere question of arithmetic to calculate how long they could hold out while that rate of depletion was going on. of course long before their army would be thus reduced to nothing the army which we had in the field would have been able to capture theirs. then too i knew from the great number of desertions, that the men who had fought so bravely, so gallantly and so long for the cause which they believed in--and as earnestly, i take it, as our men believed in the cause for which they were fighting--had lost hope and become despondent. many of them were making application to be sent north where they might get employment until the war was over, when they could return to their southern homes. for these and other reasons i was naturally very impatient for the time to come when i could commence the spring campaign, which i thoroughly believed would close the war. there were two considerations i had to observe, however, and which detained me. one was the fact that the winter had been one of heavy rains, and the roads were impassable for artillery and teams. it was necessary to wait until they had dried sufficiently to enable us to move the wagon trains and artillery necessary to the efficiency of an army operating in the enemy's country. the other consideration was that general sheridan with the cavalry of the army of the potomac was operating on the north side of the james river, having come down from the shenandoah. it was necessary that i should have his cavalry with me, and i was therefore obliged to wait until he could join me south of the james river. let us now take account of what he was doing. on the 5th of march i had heard from sheridan. he had met early between staunton and charlottesville and defeated him, capturing nearly his entire command. early and some of his officers escaped by finding refuge in the neighboring houses or in the woods. on the 12th i heard from him again. he had turned east, to come to white house. he could not go to lynchburg as ordered, because the rains had been so very heavy and the streams were so very much swollen. he had a pontoon train with him, but it would not reach half way across some of the streams, at their then stage of water, which he would have to get over in going south as first ordered. i had supplies sent around to white house for him, and kept the depot there open until he arrived. we had intended to abandon it because the james river had now become our base of supplies. sheridan had about ten thousand cavalry with him, divided into two divisions commanded respectively by custer and devin. general merritt was acting as chief of cavalry. sheridan moved very light, carrying only four days' provisions with him, with a larger supply of coffee, salt and other small rations, and a very little else besides ammunition. they stopped at charlottesville and commenced tearing up the railroad back toward lynchburg. he also sent a division along the james river canal to destroy locks, culverts etc. all mills and factories along the lines of march of his troops were destroyed also. sheridan had in this way consumed so much time that his making a march to white house was now somewhat hazardous. he determined therefore to fight his way along the railroad and canal till he was as near to richmond as it was possible to get, or until attacked. he did this, destroying the canal as far as goochland, and the railroad to a point as near richmond as he could get. on the 10th he was at columbia. negroes had joined his column to the number of two thousand or more, and they assisted considerably in the work of destroying the railroads and the canal. his cavalry was in as fine a condition as when he started, because he had been able to find plenty of forage. he had captured most of early's horses and picked up a good many others on the road. when he reached ashland he was assailed by the enemy in force. he resisted their assault with part of his command, moved quickly across the south and north anna, going north, and reached white house safely on the 19th. the time for sherman to move had to be fixed with reference to the time he could get away from goldsboro where he then was. supplies had to be got up to him which would last him through a long march, as there would probably not be much to be obtained in the country through which he would pass. i had to arrange, therefore, that he should start from where he was, in the neighborhood of goldsboro on the 18th of april, the earliest day at which he supposed he could be ready. sherman was anxious that i should wait where i was until he could come up, and make a sure thing of it; but i had determined to move as soon as the roads and weather would admit of my doing so. i had been tied down somewhat in the matter of fixing any time at my pleasure for starting, until sheridan, who was on his way from the shenandoah valley to join me, should arrive, as both his presence and that of his cavalry were necessary to the execution of the plans which i had in mind. however, having arrived at white house on the 19th of march, i was enabled to make my plans. prompted by my anxiety lest lee should get away some night before i was aware of it, and having the lead of me, push into north carolina to join with johnston in attempting to crush out sherman, i had, as early as the 1st of the month of march, given instructions to the troops around petersburg to keep a sharp lookout to see that such a movement should not escape their notice, and to be ready strike at once if it was undertaken. it is now known that early in the month of march mr. davis and general lee had a consultation about the situation of affairs in and about and petersburg, and they both agreed places were no longer tenable for them, and that they must get away as soon as possible. they, too, were waiting for dry roads, or a condition of the roads which would make it possible to move. general lee, in aid of his plan of escape, and to secure a wider opening to enable them to reach the danville road with greater security than he would have in the way the two armies were situated, determined upon an assault upon the right of our lines around petersburg. the night of the 24th of march was fixed upon for this assault, and general gordon was assigned to the execution of the plan. the point between fort stedman and battery no. 10, where our lines were closest together, was selected as the point of his attack. the attack was to be made at night, and the troops were to get possession of the higher ground in the rear where they supposed we had intrenchments, then sweep to the right and left, create a panic in the lines of our army, and force me to contract my lines. lee hoped this would detain me a few days longer and give him an opportunity of escape. the plan was well conceived and the execution of it very well done indeed, up to the point of carrying a portion of our line. gordon assembled his troops under the cover of night, at the point at which they were to make their charge, and got possession of our picket-line, entirely without the knowledge of the troops inside of our main line of intrenchments; this reduced the distance he would have to charge over to not much more than fifty yards. for some time before the deserters had been coming in with great frequency, often bringing their arms with them, and this the confederate general knew. taking advantage of this knowledge he sent his pickets, with their arms, creeping through to ours as if to desert. when they got to our lines they at once took possession and sent our pickets to the rear as prisoners. in the main line our men were sleeping serenely, as if in great security. this plan was to have been executed and much damage done before daylight; but the troops that were to reinforce gordon had to be brought from the north side of the james river and, by some accident on the railroad on their way over, they were detained for a considerable time; so that it got to be nearly daylight before they were ready to make the charge. the charge, however, was successful and almost without loss, the enemy passing through our lines between fort stedman and battery no. 10. then turning to the right and left they captured the fort and the battery, with all the arms and troops in them. continuing the charge, they also carried batteries eleven and twelve to our left, which they turned toward city point. meade happened to be at city point that night, and this break in his line cut him off from all communication with his headquarters. parke, however, commanding the 9th corps when this breach took place, telegraphed the facts to meade's headquarters, and learning that the general was away, assumed command himself and with commendable promptitude made all preparations to drive the enemy back. general tidball gathered a large number of pieces of artillery and planted them in rear of the captured works so as to sweep the narrow space of ground between the lines very thoroughly. hartranft was soon out with his division, as also was willcox. hartranft to the right of the breach headed the rebels off in that direction and rapidly drove them back into fort stedman. on the other side they were driven back into the intrenchments which they had captured, and batteries eleven and twelve were retaken by willcox early in the morning. parke then threw a line around outside of the captured fort and batteries, and communication was once more established. the artillery fire was kept up so continuously that it was impossible for the confederates to retreat, and equally impossible for reinforcements to join them. they all, therefore, fell captives into our hands. this effort of lee's cost him about four thousand men, and resulted in their killing, wounding and capturing about two thousand of ours. after the recapture of the batteries taken by the confederates, our troops made a charge and carried the enemy's intrenched picket line, which they strengthened and held. this, in turn, gave us but a short distance to charge over when our attack came to be made a few days later. the day that gordon was making dispositions for this attack (24th of march) i issued my orders for the movement to commence on the 29th. ord, with three divisions of infantry and mackenzie's cavalry, was to move in advance on the night of the 27th, from the north side of the james river and take his place on our extreme left, thirty miles away. he left weitzel with the rest of the army of the james to hold bermuda hundred and the north of the james river. the engineer brigade was to be left at city point, and parke's corps in the lines about petersburg. (*42) ord was at his place promptly. humphreys and warren were then on our extreme left with the 2d and 5th corps. they were directed on the arrival of ord, and on his getting into position in their places, to cross hatcher's run and extend out west toward five forks, the object being to get into a position from which we could strike the south side railroad and ultimately the danville railroad. there was considerable fighting in taking up these new positions for the 2d and 5th corps, in which the army of the james had also to participate somewhat, and the losses were quite severe. this was what was known as the battle of white oak road. chapter lxiv. interview with sheridan--grand movement of the army of the potomac --sheridan's advance on five forks--battle of five forks--parke and wright storm the enemy's line--battles before petersburg. sheridan reached city point on the 26th day of march. his horses, of course, were jaded and many of them had lost their shoes. a few days of rest were necessary to recuperate the animals and also to have them shod and put in condition for moving. immediately on general sheridan's arrival at city point i prepared his instructions for the move which i had decided upon. the movement was to commence on the 29th of the month. after reading the instructions i had given him, sheridan walked out of my tent, and i followed to have some conversation with him by himself --not in the presence of anybody else, even of a member of my staff. in preparing his instructions i contemplated just what took place; that is to say, capturing five forks, driving the enemy from petersburg and richmond and terminating the contest before separating from the enemy. but the nation had already become restless and discouraged at the prolongation of the war, and many believed that it would never terminate except by compromise. knowing that unless my plan proved an entire success it would be interpreted as a disastrous defeat, i provided in these instructions that in a certain event he was to cut loose from the army of the potomac and his base of supplies, and living upon the country proceed south by the way of the danville railroad, or near it, across the roanoke, get in the rear of johnston, who was guarding that road, and cooperate with sherman in destroying johnston; then with these combined forces to help carry out the instructions which sherman already had received, to act in cooperation with the armies around petersburg and richmond. i saw that after sheridan had read his instructions he seemed somewhat disappointed at the idea, possibly, of having to cut loose again from the army of the potomac, and place himself between the two main armies of the enemy. i said to him: "general, this portion of your instructions i have put in merely as a blind;" and gave him the reason for doing so, heretofore described. i told him that, as a matter of fact, i intended to close the war right here, with this movement, and that he should go no farther. his face at once brightened up, and slapping his hand on his leg he said: "i am glad to hear it, and we can do it." sheridan was not however to make his movement against five forks until he got further instructions from me. one day, after the movement i am about to describe had commenced, and when his cavalry was on our extreme left and far to the rear, south, sheridan rode up to where my headquarters were then established, at dabney's mills. he met some of my staff officers outside, and was highly jubilant over the prospects of success, giving reasons why he believed this would prove the final and successful effort. although my chief-of-staff had urged very strongly that we return to our position about city point and in the lines around petersburg, he asked sheridan to come in to see me and say to me what he had been saying to them. sheridan felt a little modest about giving his advice where it had not been asked; so one of my staff came in and told me that sheridan had what they considered important news, and suggested that i send for him. i did so, and was glad to see the spirit of confidence with which he was imbued. knowing as i did from experience, of what great value that feeling of confidence by a commander was, i determined to make a movement at once, although on account of the rains which had fallen after i had started out the roads were still very heavy. orders were given accordingly. finally the 29th of march came, and fortunately there having been a few days free from rain, the surface of the ground was dry, giving indications that the time had come when we could move. on that date i moved out with all the army available after leaving sufficient force to hold the line about petersburg. it soon set in raining again however, and in a very short time the roads became practically impassable for teams, and almost so for cavalry. sometimes a horse or mule would be standing apparently on firm ground, when all at once one foot would sink, and as he commenced scrambling to catch himself all his feet would sink and he would have to be drawn by hand out of the quicksands so common in that part of virginia and other southern states. it became necessary therefore to build corduroy roads every foot of the way as we advanced, to move our artillery upon. the army had become so accustomed to this kind of work, and were so well prepared for it, that it was done very rapidly. the next day, march 30th, we had made sufficient progress to the south-west to warrant me in starting sheridan with his cavalry over by dinwiddie with instructions to then come up by the road leading north-west to five forks, thus menacing the right of lee's line. this movement was made for the purpose of extending our lines to the west as far as practicable towards the enemy's extreme right, or five forks. the column moving detached from the army still in the trenches was, excluding the cavalry, very small. the forces in the trenches were themselves extending to the left flank. warren was on the extreme left when the extension began, but humphreys was marched around later and thrown into line between him and five forks. my hope was that sheridan would be able to carry five forks, get on the enemy's right flank and rear, and force them to weaken their centre to protect their right so that an assault in the centre might be successfully made. general wright's corps had been designated to make this assault, which i intended to order as soon as information reached me of sheridan's success. he was to move under cover as close to the enemy as he could get. it is natural to suppose that lee would understand my design to be to get up to the south side and ultimately to the danville railroad, as soon as he had heard of the movement commenced on the 29th. these roads were so important to his very existence while he remained in richmond and petersburg, and of such vital importance to him even in case of retreat, that naturally he would make most strenuous efforts to defend them. he did on the 30th send pickett with five brigades to reinforce five forks. he also sent around to the right of his army some two or three other divisions, besides directing that other troops be held in readiness on the north side of the james river to come over on call. he came over himself to superintend in person the defence of his right flank. sheridan moved back to dinwiddie court-house on the night of the 30th, and then took a road leading north-west to five forks. he had only his cavalry with him. soon encountering the rebel cavalry he met with a very stout resistance. he gradually drove them back however until in the neighborhood of five forks. here he had to encounter other troops besides those he had been contending with, and was forced to give way. in this condition of affairs he notified me of what had taken place and stated that he was falling back toward dinwiddie gradually and slowly, and asked me to send wright's corps to his assistance. i replied to him that it was impossible to send wright's corps because that corps was already in line close up to the enemy, where we should want to assault when the proper time came, and was besides a long distance from him; but the 2d (humphreys's) and 5th (warren's) corps were on our extreme left and a little to the rear of it in a position to threaten the left flank of the enemy at five forks, and that i would send warren. accordingly orders were sent to warren to move at once that night (the 31st) to dinwiddie court house and put himself in communication with sheridan as soon as possible, and report to him. he was very slow in moving, some of his troops not starting until after 5 o'clock next morning. when he did move it was done very deliberately, and on arriving at gravelly run he found the stream swollen from the recent rains so that he regarded it as not fordable. sheridan of course knew of his coming, and being impatient to get the troops up as soon as possible, sent orders to him to hasten. he was also hastened or at least ordered to move up rapidly by general meade. he now felt that he could not cross that creek without bridges, and his orders were changed to move so as to strike the pursuing enemy in flank or get in their rear; but he was so late in getting up that sheridan determined to move forward without him. however, ayres's division of warren's corps reached him in time to be in the fight all day, most of the time separated from the remainder of the 5th corps and fighting directly under sheridan. warren reported to sheridan about 11 o'clock on the 1st, but the whole of his troops were not up so as to be much engaged until late in the afternoon. griffin's division in backing to get out of the way of a severe cross fire of the enemy was found marching away from the fighting. this did not continue long, however; the division was brought back and with ayres's division did most excellent service during the day. crawford's division of the same corps had backed still farther off, and although orders were sent repeatedly to bring it up, it was late before it finally got to where it could be of material assistance. once there it did very excellent service. sheridan succeeded by the middle of the afternoon or a little later, in advancing up to the point from which to make his designed assault upon five forks itself. he was very impatient to make the assault and have it all over before night, because the ground he occupied would be untenable for him in bivouac during the night. unless the assault was made and was successful, he would be obliged to return to dinwiddie court-house, or even further than that for the night. it was at this junction of affairs that sheridan wanted to get crawford's division in hand, and he also wanted warren. he sent staff officer after staff officer in search of warren, directing that general to report to him, but they were unable to find him. at all events sheridan was unable to get that officer to him. finally he went himself. he issued an order relieving warren and assigning griffin to the command of the 5th corps. the troops were then brought up and the assault successfully made. i was so much dissatisfied with warren's dilatory movements in the battle of white oak road and in his failure to reach sheridan in time, that i was very much afraid that at the last moment he would fail sheridan. he was a man of fine intelligence, great earnestness, quick perception, and could make his dispositions as quickly as any officer, under difficulties where he was forced to act. but i had before discovered a defect which was beyond his control, that was very prejudicial to his usefulness in emergencies like the one just before us. he could see every danger at a glance before he had encountered it. he would not only make preparations to meet the danger which might occur, but he would inform his commanding officer what others should do while he was executing his move. i had sent a staff officer to general sheridan to call his attention to these defects, and to say that as much as i liked general warren, now was not a time when we could let our personal feelings for any one stand in the way of success; and if his removal was necessary to success, not to hesitate. it was upon that authorization that sheridan removed warren. i was very sorry that it had been done, and regretted still more that i had not long before taken occasion to assign him to another field of duty. it was dusk when our troops under sheridan went over the parapets of the enemy. the two armies were mingled together there for a time in such manner that it was almost a question which one was going to demand the surrender of the other. soon, however, the enemy broke and ran in every direction; some six thousand prisoners, besides artillery and small-arms in large quantities, falling into our hands. the flying troops were pursued in different directions, the cavalry and 5th corps under sheridan pursuing the larger body which moved north-west. this pursuit continued until about nine o'clock at night, when sheridan halted his troops, and knowing the importance to him of the part of the enemy's line which had been captured, returned, sending the 5th corps across hatcher's run to just south-west of petersburg, and facing them toward it. merritt, with the cavalry, stopped and bivouacked west of five forks. this was the condition which affairs were in on the night of the 1st of april. i then issued orders for an assault by wright and parke at four o'clock on the morning of the 2d. i also ordered the 2d corps, general humphreys, and general ord with the army of the james, on the left, to hold themselves in readiness to take any advantage that could be taken from weakening in their front. i notified mr. lincoln at city point of the success of the day; in fact i had reported to him during the day and evening as i got news, because he was so much interested in the movements taking place that i wanted to relieve his mind as much as i could. i notified weitzel on the north side of the james river, directing him, also, to keep close up to the enemy, and take advantage of the withdrawal of troops from there to promptly enter the city of richmond. i was afraid that lee would regard the possession of five forks as of so much importance that he would make a last desperate effort to retake it, risking everything upon the cast of a single die. it was for this reason that i had ordered the assault to take place at once, as soon as i had received the news of the capture of five forks. the corps commanders, however, reported that it was so dark that the men could not see to move, and it would be impossible to make the assault then. but we kept up a continuous artillery fire upon the enemy around the whole line including that north of the james river, until it was light enough to move, which was about a quarter to five in the morning. at that hour parke's and wright's corps moved out as directed, brushed the abatis from their front as they advanced under a heavy fire of musketry and artillery, and went without flinching directly on till they mounted the parapets and threw themselves inside of the enemy's line. parke, who was on the right, swept down to the right and captured a very considerable length of line in that direction, but at that point the outer was so near the inner line which closely enveloped the city of petersburg that he could make no advance forward and, in fact, had a very serious task to turn the lines which he had captured to the defence of his own troops and to hold them; but he succeeded in this. wright swung around to his left and moved to hatcher's run, sweeping everything before him. the enemy had traverses in rear of his captured line, under cover of which he made something of a stand, from one to another, as wright moved on; but the latter met no serious obstacle. as you proceed to the left the outer line becomes gradually much farther from the inner one, and along about hatcher's run they must be nearly two miles apart. both parke and wright captured a considerable amount of artillery and some prisoners--wright about three thousand of them. in the meantime ord and humphreys, in obedience to the instructions they had received, had succeeded by daylight, or very early in the morning, in capturing the intrenched picket-lines in their front; and before wright got up to that point, ord had also succeeded in getting inside of the enemy's intrenchments. the second corps soon followed; and the outer works of petersburg were in the hands of the national troops, never to be wrenched from them again. when wright reached hatcher's run, he sent a regiment to destroy the south side railroad just outside of the city. my headquarters were still at dabney's saw-mills. as soon as i received the news of wright's success, i sent dispatches announcing the fact to all points around the line, including the troops at bermuda hundred and those on the north side of the james, and to the president at city point. further dispatches kept coming in, and as they did i sent the additional news to these points. finding at length that they were all in, i mounted my horse to join the troops who were inside the works. when i arrived there i rode my horse over the parapet just as wright's three thousand prisoners were coming out. i was soon joined inside by general meade and his staff. lee made frantic efforts to recover at least part of the lost ground. parke on our right was repeatedly assaulted, but repulsed every effort. before noon longstreet was ordered up from the north side of the james river thus bringing the bulk of lee's army around to the support of his extreme right. as soon as i learned this i notified weitzel and directed him to keep up close to the enemy and to have hartsuff, commanding the bermuda hundred front, to do the same thing, and if they found any break to go in; hartsuff especially should do so, for this would separate richmond and petersburg. sheridan, after he had returned to five forks, swept down to petersburg, coming in on our left. this gave us a continuous line from the appomattox river below the city to the same river above. at eleven o'clock, not having heard from sheridan, i reinforced parke with two brigades from city point. with this additional force he completed his captured works for better defence, and built back from his right, so as to protect his flank. he also carried in and made an abatis between himself and the enemy. lee brought additional troops and artillery against parke even after this was done, and made several assaults with very heavy losses. the enemy had in addition to their intrenched line close up to petersburg, two enclosed works outside of it, fort gregg and fort whitworth. we thought it had now become necessary to carry them by assault. about one o'clock in the day, fort gregg was assaulted by foster's division of the 24th corps (gibbon's), supported by two brigades from ord's command. the battle was desperate and the national troops were repulsed several times; but it was finally carried, and immediately the troops in fort whitworth evacuated the place. the guns of fort gregg were turned upon the retreating enemy, and the commanding officer with some sixty of the men of fort whitworth surrendered. i had ordered miles in the morning to report to sheridan. in moving to execute this order he came upon the enemy at the intersection of the white oak road and the claiborne road. the enemy fell back to sutherland station on the south side road and were followed by miles. this position, naturally a strong and defensible one, was also strongly intrenched. sheridan now came up and miles asked permission from him to make the assault, which sheridan gave. by this time humphreys had got through the outer works in his front, and came up also and assumed command over miles, who commanded a division in his corps. i had sent an order to humphreys to turn to his right and move towards petersburg. this order he now got, and started off, thus leaving miles alone. the latter made two assaults, both of which failed, and he had to fall back a few hundred yards. hearing that miles had been left in this position, i directed humphreys to send a division back to his relief. he went himself. sheridan before starting to sweep down to petersburg had sent merritt with his cavalry to the west to attack some confederate cavalry that had assembled there. merritt drove them north to the appomattox river. sheridan then took the enemy at sutherland station on the reverse side from where miles was, and the two together captured the place, with a large number of prisoners and some pieces of artillery, and put the remainder, portions of three confederate corps, to flight. sheridan followed, and drove them until night, when further pursuit was stopped. miles bivouacked for the night on the ground which he with sheridan had carried so handsomely by assault. i cannot explain the situation here better than by giving my dispatch to city point that evening: boydton road, near petersburg, april 2, 1865.--4.40 p.m. colonel t. s. bowers, city point. we are now up and have a continuous line of troops, and in a few hours will be intrenched from the appomattox below petersburg to the river above. heth's and wilcox's divisions, such part of them as were not captured, were cut off from town, either designedly on their part or because they could not help it. sheridan with the cavalry and 5th corps is above them. miles's division, 2d corps, was sent from the white oak road to sutherland station on the south side railroad, where he met them, and at last accounts was engaged with them. not knowing whether sheridan would get up in time, general humphreys was sent with another division from here. the whole captures since the army started out gunning will amount to not less than twelve thousand men, and probably fifty pieces of artillery. i do not know the number of men and guns accurately however. * * * i think the president might come out and pay us a visit tomorrow. u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. during the night of april 2d our line was intrenched from the river above to the river below. i ordered a bombardment to be commenced the next morning at five a.m., to be followed by an assault at six o'clock; but the enemy evacuated petersburg early in the morning. chapter lxv. the capture of petersburg--meeting president lincoln in petersburg--the capture of richmond--pursuing the enemy--visit to sheridan and meade. general meade and i entered petersburg on the morning of the 3d and took a position under cover of a house which protected us from the enemy's musketry which was flying thick and fast there. as we would occasionally look around the corner we could see the streets and the appomattox bottom, presumably near the bridge, packed with the confederate army. i did not have artillery brought up, because i was sure lee was trying to make his escape, and i wanted to push immediately in pursuit. at all events i had not the heart to turn the artillery upon such a mass of defeated and fleeing men, and i hoped to capture them soon. soon after the enemy had entirely evacuated petersburg, a man came in who represented himself to be an engineer of the army of northern virginia. he said that lee had for some time been at work preparing a strong enclosed intrenchment, into which he would throw himself when forced out of petersburg, and fight his final battle there; that he was actually at that time drawing his troops from richmond, and falling back into this prepared work. this statement was made to general meade and myself when we were together. i had already given orders for the movement up the south side of the appomattox for the purpose of heading off lee; but meade was so much impressed by this man's story that he thought we ought to cross the appomattox there at once and move against lee in his new position. i knew that lee was no fool, as he would have been to have put himself and his army between two formidable streams like the james and appomattox rivers, and between two such armies as those of the potomac and the james. then these streams coming together as they did to the east of him, it would be only necessary to close up in the west to have him thoroughly cut off from all supplies or possibility of reinforcement. it would only have been a question of days, and not many of them, if he had taken the position assigned to him by the so-called engineer, when he would have been obliged to surrender his army. such is one of the ruses resorted to in war to deceive your antagonist. my judgment was that lee would necessarily have to evacuate richmond, and that the only course for him to pursue would be to follow the danville road. accordingly my object was to secure a point on that road south of lee, and i told meade this. he suggested that if lee was going that way we would follow him. my reply was that we did not want to follow him; we wanted to get ahead of him and cut him off, and if he would only stay in the position he (meade) believed him to be in at that time, i wanted nothing better; that when we got in possession of the danville railroad, at its crossing of the appomattox river, if we still found him between the two rivers, all we had to do was to move eastward and close him up. that we would then have all the advantage we could possibly have by moving directly against him from petersburg, even if he remained in the position assigned him by the engineer officer. i had held most of the command aloof from the intrenchments, so as to start them out on the danville road early in the morning, supposing that lee would be gone during the night. during the night i strengthened sheridan by sending him humphreys's corps. lee, as we now know, had advised the authorities at richmond, during the day, of the condition of affairs, and told them it would be impossible for him to hold out longer than night, if he could hold out that long. davis was at church when he received lee's dispatch. the congregation was dismissed with the notice that there would be no evening service. the rebel government left richmond about two o'clock in the afternoon of the 2d. at night lee ordered his troops to assemble at amelia court house, his object being to get away, join johnston if possible, and to try to crush sherman before i could get there. as soon as i was sure of this i notified sheridan and directed him to move out on the danville railroad to the south side of the appomattox river as speedily as possible. he replied that he already had some of his command nine miles out. i then ordered the rest of the army of the potomac under meade to follow the same road in the morning. parke's corps followed by the same road, and the army of the james was directed to follow the road which ran alongside of the south side railroad to burke's station, and to repair the railroad and telegraph as they proceeded. that road was a 5 feet gauge, while our rolling stock was all of the 4 feet 8 1/2 inches gauge; consequently the rail on one side of the track had to be taken up throughout the whole length and relaid so as to conform to the gauge of our cars and locomotives. mr. lincoln was at city point at the time, and had been for some days. i would have let him know what i contemplated doing, only while i felt a strong conviction that the move was going to be successful, yet it might not prove so; and then i would have only added another to the many disappointments he had been suffering for the past three years. but when we started out he saw that we were moving for a purpose, and bidding us godspeed, remained there to hear the result. the next morning after the capture of petersburg, i telegraphed mr. lincoln asking him to ride out there and see me, while i would await his arrival. i had started all the troops out early in the morning, so that after the national army left petersburg there was not a soul to be seen, not even an animal in the streets. there was absolutely no one there, except my staff officers and, possibly, a small escort of cavalry. we had selected the piazza of a deserted house, and occupied it until the president arrived. about the first thing that mr. lincoln said to me, after warm congratulations for the victory, and thanks both to myself and to the army which had accomplished it, was: "do you know, general, that i have had a sort of a sneaking idea for some days that you intended to do something like this." our movements having been successful up to this point, i no longer had any object in concealing from the president all my movements, and the objects i had in view. he remained for some days near city point, and i communicated with him frequently and fully by telegraph. mr. lincoln knew that it had been arranged for sherman to join me at a fixed time, to co-operate in the destruction of lee's army. i told him that i had been very anxious to have the eastern armies vanquish their old enemy who had so long resisted all their repeated and gallant attempts to subdue them or drive them from their capital. the western armies had been in the main successful until they had conquered all the territory from the mississippi river to the state of north carolina, and were now almost ready to knock at the back door of richmond, asking admittance. i said to him that if the western armies should be even upon the field, operating against richmond and lee, the credit would be given to them for the capture, by politicians and non-combatants from the section of country which those troops hailed from. it might lead to disagreeable bickerings between members of congress of the east and those of the west in some of their debates. western members might be throwing it up to the members of the east that in the suppression of the rebellion they were not able to capture an army, or to accomplish much in the way of contributing toward that end, but had to wait until the western armies had conquered all the territory south and west of them, and then come on to help them capture the only army they had been engaged with. mr. lincoln said he saw that now, but had never thought of it before, because his anxiety was so great that he did not care where the aid came from so the work was done. the army of the potomac has every reason to be proud of its four years' record in the suppression of the rebellion. the army it had to fight was the protection to the capital of a people which was attempting to found a nation upon the territory of the united states. its loss would be the loss of the cause. every energy, therefore, was put forth by the confederacy to protect and maintain their capital. everything else would go if it went. lee's army had to be strengthened to enable it to maintain its position, no matter what territory was wrested from the south in another quarter. i never expected any such bickering as i have indicated, between the soldiers of the two sections; and, fortunately, there has been none between the politicians. possibly i am the only one who thought of the liability of such a state of things in advance. when our conversation was at an end mr. lincoln mounted his horse and started on his return to city point, while i and my staff started to join the army, now a good many miles in advance. up to this time i had not received the report of the capture of richmond. soon after i left president lincoln i received a dispatch from general weitzel which notified me that he had taken possession of richmond at about 8.15 o'clock in the morning of that day, the 3d, and that he had found the city on fire in two places. the city was in the most utter confusion. the authorities had taken the precaution to empty all the liquor into the gutter, and to throw out the provisions which the confederate government had left, for the people to gather up. the city had been deserted by the authorities, civil and military, without any notice whatever that they were about to leave. in fact, up to the very hour of the evacuation the people had been led to believe that lee had gained an important victory somewhere around petersburg. weitzel's command found evidence of great demoralization in lee's army, there being still a great many men and even officers in the town. the city was on fire. our troops were directed to extinguish the flames, which they finally succeeded in doing. the fire had been started by some one connected with the retreating army. all authorities deny that it was authorized, and i presume it was the work of excited men who were leaving what they regarded as their capital and may have felt that it was better to destroy it than have it fall into the hands of their enemy. be that as it may, the national troops found the city in flames, and used every effort to extinguish them. the troops that had formed lee's right, a great many of them, were cut off from getting back into petersburg, and were pursued by our cavalry so hotly and closely that they threw away caissons, ammunition, clothing, and almost everything to lighten their loads, and pushed along up the appomattox river until finally they took water and crossed over. i left mr. lincoln and started, as i have already said, to join the command, which halted at sutherland station, about nine miles out. we had still time to march as much farther, and time was an object; but the roads were bad and the trains belonging to the advance corps had blocked up the road so that it was impossible to get on. then, again, our cavalry had struck some of the enemy and were pursuing them; and the orders were that the roads should be given up to the cavalry whenever they appeared. this caused further delay. general wright, who was in command of one of the corps which were left back, thought to gain time by letting his men go into bivouac and trying to get up some rations for them, and clearing out the road, so that when they did start they would be uninterrupted. humphreys, who was far ahead, was also out of rations. they did not succeed in getting them up through the night; but the army of the potomac, officers and men, were so elated by the reflection that at last they were following up a victory to its end, that they preferred marching without rations to running a possible risk of letting the enemy elude them. so the march was resumed at three o'clock in the morning. merritt's cavalry had struck the enemy at deep creek, and driven them north to the appomattox, where, i presume, most of them were forced to cross. on the morning of the 4th i learned that lee had ordered rations up from danville for his famishing army, and that they were to meet him at farmville. this showed that lee had already abandoned the idea of following the railroad down to danville, but had determined to go farther west, by the way of farmville. i notified sheridan of this and directed him to get possession of the road before the supplies could reach lee. he responded that he had already sent crook's division to get upon the road between burkesville and jetersville, then to face north and march along the road upon the latter place; and he thought crook must be there now. the bulk of the army moved directly for jetersville by two roads. after i had received the dispatch from sheridan saying that crook was on the danville road, i immediately ordered meade to make a forced march with the army of the potomac, and to send parke's corps across from the road they were on to the south side railroad, to fall in the rear of the army of the james and to protect the railroad which that army was repairing as it went along. our troops took possession of jetersville and in the telegraph office, they found a dispatch from lee, ordering two hundred thousand rations from danville. the dispatch had not been sent, but sheridan sent a special messenger with it to burkesville and had it forwarded from there. in the meantime, however, dispatches from other sources had reached danville, and they knew there that our army was on the line of the road; so that they sent no further supplies from that quarter. at this time merritt and mackenzie, with the cavalry, were off between the road which the army of the potomac was marching on and the appomattox river, and were attacking the enemy in flank. they picked up a great many prisoners and forced the abandonment of some property. lee intrenched himself at amelia court house, and also his advance north of jetersville, and sent his troops out to collect forage. the country was very poor and afforded but very little. his foragers scattered a great deal; many of them were picked up by our men, and many others never returned to the army of northern virginia. griffin's corps was intrenched across the railroad south of jetersville, and sheridan notified me of the situation. i again ordered meade up with all dispatch, sheridan having but the one corps of infantry with a little cavalry confronting lee's entire army. meade, always prompt in obeying orders, now pushed forward with great energy, although he was himself sick and hardly able to be out of bed. humphreys moved at two, and wright at three o'clock in the morning, without rations, as i have said, the wagons being far in the rear. i stayed that night at wilson's station on the south side railroad. on the morning of the 5th i sent word to sheridan of the progress meade was making, and suggested that he might now attack lee. we had now no other objective than the confederate armies, and i was anxious to close the thing up at once. on the 5th i marched again with ord's command until within about ten miles of burkesville, where i stopped to let his army pass. i then received from sheridan the following dispatch: "the whole of lee's army is at or near amelia court house, and on this side of it. general davies, whom i sent out to painesville on their right flank, has just captured six pieces of artillery and some wagons. we can capture the army of northern virginia if force enough can be thrown to this point, and then advance upon it. my cavalry was at burkesville yesterday, and six miles beyond, on the danville road, last night. general lee is at amelia court house in person. they are out of rations, or nearly so. they were advancing up the railroad towards burkesville yesterday, when we intercepted them at this point." it now became a life and death struggle with lee to get south to his provisions. sheridan, thinking the enemy might turn off immediately towards farmville, moved davies's brigade of cavalry out to watch him. davies found the movement had already commenced. he attacked and drove away their cavalry which was escorting wagons to the west, capturing and burning 180 wagons. he also captured five pieces of artillery. the confederate infantry then moved against him and probably would have handled him very roughly, but sheridan had sent two more brigades of cavalry to follow davies, and they came to his relief in time. a sharp engagement took place between these three brigades of cavalry and the enemy's infantry, but the latter was repulsed. meade himself reached jetersville about two o'clock in the afternoon, but in advance of all his troops. the head of humphreys's corps followed in about an hour afterwards. sheridan stationed the troops as they came up, at meade's request, the latter still being very sick. he extended two divisions of this corps off to the west of the road to the left of griffin's corps, and one division to the right. the cavalry by this time had also come up, and they were put still farther off to the left, sheridan feeling certain that there lay the route by which the enemy intended to escape. he wanted to attack, feeling that if time was given, the enemy would get away; but meade prevented this, preferring to wait till his troops were all up. at this juncture sheridan sent me a letter which had been handed to him by a colored man, with a note from himself saying that he wished i was there myself. the letter was dated amelia court house, april 5th, and signed by colonel taylor. it was to his mother, and showed the demoralization of the confederate army. sheridan's note also gave me the information as here related of the movements of that day. i received a second message from sheridan on the 5th, in which he urged more emphatically the importance of my presence. this was brought to me by a scout in gray uniform. it was written on tissue paper, and wrapped up in tin-foil such as chewing tobacco is folded in. this was a precaution taken so that if the scout should be captured he could take this tin-foil out of his pocket and putting it into his mouth, chew it. it would cause no surprise at all to see a confederate soldier chewing tobacco. it was nearly night when this letter was received. i gave ord directions to continue his march to burkesville and there intrench himself for the night, and in the morning to move west to cut off all the roads between there and farmville. i then started with a few of my staff and a very small escort of cavalry, going directly through the woods, to join meade's army. the distance was about sixteen miles; but the night being dark our progress was slow through the woods in the absence of direct roads. however, we got to the outposts about ten o'clock in the evening, and after some little parley convinced the sentinels of our identity and were conducted in to where sheridan was bivouacked. we talked over the situation for some little time, sheridan explaining to me what he thought lee was trying to do, and that meade's orders, if carried out, moving to the right flank, would give him the coveted opportunity of escaping us and putting us in rear of him. we then together visited meade, reaching his headquarters about midnight. i explained to meade that we did not want to follow the enemy; we wanted to get ahead of him, and that his orders would allow the enemy to escape, and besides that, i had no doubt that lee was moving right then. meade changed his orders at once. they were now given for an advance on amelia court house, at an early hour in the morning, as the army then lay; that is, the infantry being across the railroad, most of it to the west of the road, with the cavalry swung out still farther to the left. chapter lxvi. battle of sailor's creek--engagement at farmville--correspondence with general lee--sheridan intercepts the enemy. the appomattox, going westward, takes a long sweep to the south-west from the neighborhood of the richmond and danville railroad bridge, and then trends north-westerly. sailor's creek, an insignificant stream, running northward, empties into the appomattox between the high bridge and jetersville. near the high bridge the stage road from petersburg to lynchburg crosses the appomattox river, also on a bridge. the railroad runs on the north side of the river to farmville, a few miles west, and from there, recrossing, continues on the south side of it. the roads coming up from the south-east to farmville cross the appomattox river there on a bridge and run on the north side, leaving the lynchburg and petersburg railroad well to the left. lee, in pushing out from amelia court house, availed himself of all the roads between the danville road and appomattox river to move upon, and never permitted the head of his columns to stop because of any fighting that might be going on in his rear. in this way he came very near succeeding in getting to his provision trains and eluding us with at least part of his army. as expected, lee's troops had moved during the night before, and our army in moving upon amelia court house soon encountered them. there was a good deal of fighting before sailor's creek was reached. our cavalry charged in upon a body of theirs which was escorting a wagon train in order to get it past our left. a severe engagement ensued, in which we captured many prisoners, and many men also were killed and wounded. there was as much gallantry displayed by some of the confederates in these little engagements as was displayed at any time during the war, notwithstanding the sad defeats of the past week. the armies finally met on sailor's creek, when a heavy engagement took place, in which infantry, artillery and cavalry were all brought into action. our men on the right, as they were brought in against the enemy, came in on higher ground, and upon his flank, giving us every advantage to be derived from the lay of the country. our firing was also very much more rapid, because the enemy commenced his retreat westward and in firing as he retreated had to turn around every time he fired. the enemy's loss was very heavy, as well in killed and wounded as in captures. some six general officers fell into our hands in this engagement, and seven thousand men were made prisoners. this engagement was commenced in the middle of the afternoon of the 6th, and the retreat and pursuit were continued until nightfall, when the armies bivouacked upon the ground where the night had overtaken them. when the move towards amelia court house had commenced that morning, i ordered wright's corps, which was on the extreme right, to be moved to the left past the whole army, to take the place of griffin's, and ordered the latter at the same time to move by and place itself on the right. the object of this movement was to get the 6th corps, wright's, next to the cavalry, with which they had formerly served so harmoniously and so efficiently in the valley of virginia. the 6th corps now remained with the cavalry and under sheridan's direct command until after the surrender. ord had been directed to take possession of all the roads southward between burkesville and the high bridge. on the morning of the 6th he sent colonel washburn with two infantry regiments with instructions to destroy high bridge and to return rapidly to burkesville station; and he prepared himself to resist the enemy there. soon after washburn had started ord became a little alarmed as to his safety and sent colonel read, of his staff, with about eighty cavalrymen, to overtake him and bring him back. very shortly after this he heard that the head of lee's column had got up to the road between him and where washburn now was, and attempted to send reinforcements, but the reinforcements could not get through. read, however, had got through ahead of the enemy. he rode on to farmville and was on his way back again when he found his return cut off, and washburn confronting apparently the advance of lee's army. read drew his men up into line of battle, his force now consisting of less than six hundred men, infantry and cavalry, and rode along their front, making a speech to his men to inspire them with the same enthusiasm that he himself felt. he then gave the order to charge. this little band made several charges, of course unsuccessful ones, but inflicted a loss upon the enemy more than equal to their own entire number. colonel read fell mortally wounded, and then washburn; and at the close of the conflict nearly every officer of the command and most of the rank and file had been either killed or wounded. the remainder then surrendered. the confederates took this to be only the advance of a larger column which had headed them off, and so stopped to intrench; so that this gallant band of six hundred had checked the progress of a strong detachment of the confederate army. this stoppage of lee's column no doubt saved to us the trains following. lee himself pushed on and crossed the wagon road bridge near the high bridge, and attempted to destroy it. he did set fire to it, but the flames had made but little headway when humphreys came up with his corps and drove away the rear-guard which had been left to protect it while it was being burned up. humphreys forced his way across with some loss, and followed lee to the intersection of the road crossing at farmville with the one from petersburg. here lee held a position which was very strong, naturally, besides being intrenched. humphreys was alone, confronting him all through the day, and in a very hazardous position. he put on a bold face, however, and assaulted with some loss, but was not assaulted in return. our cavalry had gone farther south by the way of prince edward's court house, along with the 5th corps (griffin's), ord falling in between griffin and the appomattox. crook's division of cavalry and wright's corps pushed on west of farmville. when the cavalry reached farmville they found that some of the confederates were in ahead of them, and had already got their trains of provisions back to that point; but our troops were in time to prevent them from securing anything to eat, although they succeeded in again running the trains off, so that we did not get them for some time. these troops retreated to the north side of the appomattox to join lee, and succeeded in destroying the bridge after them. considerable fighting ensued there between wright's corps and a portion of our cavalry and the confederates, but finally the cavalry forded the stream and drove them away. wright built a foot-bridge for his men to march over on and then marched out to the junction of the roads to relieve humphreys, arriving there that night. i had stopped the night before at burkesville junction. our troops were then pretty much all out of the place, but we had a field hospital there, and ord's command was extended from that point towards farmville. here i met dr. smith, a virginian and an officer of the regular army, who told me that in a conversation with general ewell, one of the prisoners and a relative of his, ewell had said that when we had got across the james river he knew their cause was lost, and it was the duty of their authorities to make the best terms they could while they still had a right to claim concessions. the authorities thought differently, however. now the cause was lost and they had no right to claim anything. he said further, that for every man that was killed after this in the war somebody is responsible, and it would be but very little better than murder. he was not sure that lee would consent to surrender his army without being able to consult with the president, but he hoped he would. i rode in to farmville on the 7th, arriving there early in the day. sheridan and ord were pushing through, away to the south. meade was back towards the high bridge, and humphreys confronting lee as before stated. after having gone into bivouac at prince edward's court house, sheridan learned that seven trains of provisions and forage were at appomattox, and determined to start at once and capture them; and a forced march was necessary in order to get there before lee's army could secure them. he wrote me a note telling me this. this fact, together with the incident related the night before by dr. smith, gave me the idea of opening correspondence with general lee on the subject of the surrender of his army. i therefore wrote to him on this day, as follows: headquarters armies of the u. s., 5 p.m., april 7, 1865. general r. e. lee commanding c. s. a. the result of the last week must convince you of the hopelessness of further resistance on the part of the army of northern virginia in this struggle. i feel that it is so, and regard it as my duty to shift from myself the responsibility of any further effusion of blood, by asking of you the surrender of that portion of the confederate states army known as the army of northern virginia. u. s. grant, lieut.-general. lee replied on the evening of the same day as follows: april 7, 1865. general: i have received your note of this day. though not entertaining the opinion you express on the hopelessness of further resistance on the part of the army of northern virginia, i reciprocate your desire to avoid useless effusion of blood, and therefore before considering your proposition, ask the terms you will offer on condition of its surrender. r. e. lee, general. lieut.-general u. s. grant, commanding armies of the u. s. this was not satisfactory, but i regarded it as deserving another letter and wrote him as follows: april 8, 1865. general r. e. lee, commanding c. s. a. your note of last evening in reply to mine of same date, asking the condition on which i will accept the surrender of the army of northern virginia is just received. in reply i would say that, peace being my great desire, there is but one condition i would insist upon, namely: that the men and officers surrendered shall be disqualified for taking up arms again against the government of the united states until properly exchanged. i will meet you, or will designate officers to meet any officers you may name for the same purpose, at any point agreeable to you, for the purpose of arranging definitely the terms upon which the surrender of the army of northern virginia will be received. u. s. grant, lieut.-general. lee's army was rapidly crumbling. many of his soldiers had enlisted from that part of the state where they now were, and were continually dropping out of the ranks and going to their homes. i know that i occupied a hotel almost destitute of furniture at farmville, which had probably been used as a confederate hospital. the next morning when i came out i found a confederate colonel there, who reported to me and said that he was the proprietor of that house, and that he was a colonel of a regiment that had been raised in that neighborhood. he said that when he came along past home, he found that he was the only man of the regiment remaining with lee's army, so he just dropped out, and now wanted to surrender himself. i told him to stay there and he would not be molested. that was one regiment which had been eliminated from lee's force by this crumbling process. although sheridan had been marching all day, his troops moved with alacrity and without any straggling. they began to see the end of what they had been fighting four years for. nothing seemed to fatigue them. they were ready to move without rations and travel without rest until the end. straggling had entirely ceased, and every man was now a rival for the front. the infantry marched about as rapidly as the cavalry could. sheridan sent custer with his division to move south of appomattox station, which is about five miles south-west of the court house, to get west of the trains and destroy the roads to the rear. they got there the night of the 8th, and succeeded partially; but some of the train men had just discovered the movement of our troops and succeeded in running off three of the trains. the other four were held by custer. the head of lee's column came marching up there on the morning of the 9th, not dreaming, i suppose, that there were any union soldiers near. the confederates were surprised to find our cavalry had possession of the trains. however, they were desperate and at once assaulted, hoping to recover them. in the melee that ensued they succeeded in burning one of the trains, but not in getting anything from it. custer then ordered the other trains run back on the road towards farmville, and the fight continued. so far, only our cavalry and the advance of lee's army were engaged. soon, however, lee's men were brought up from the rear, no doubt expecting they had nothing to meet but our cavalry. but our infantry had pushed forward so rapidly that by the time the enemy got up they found griffin's corps and the army of the james confronting them. a sharp engagement ensued, but lee quickly set up a white flag. chapter lxvii. negotiations at appomattox--interview with lee at mclean's house--the terms of surrender--lee's surrender--interview with lee after the surrender. on the 8th i had followed the army of the potomac in rear of lee. i was suffering very severely with a sick headache, and stopped at a farmhouse on the road some distance in rear of the main body of the army. i spent the night in bathing my feet in hot water and mustard, and putting mustard plasters on my wrists and the back part of my neck, hoping to be cured by morning. during the night i received lee's answer to my letter of the 8th, inviting an interview between the lines on the following morning. (*43) but it was for a different purpose from that of surrendering his army, and i answered him as follows: headquarters armies of the u. s., april 9, 1865. general r. e. lee, commanding c. s. a. your note of yesterday is received. as i have no authority to treat on the subject of peace, the meeting proposed for ten a.m. to-day could lead to no good. i will state, however, general, that i am equally anxious for peace with yourself, and the whole north entertains the same feeling. the terms upon which peace can be had are well understood. by the south laying down their arms they will hasten that most desirable event, save thousands of human lives and hundreds of millions of property not yet destroyed. sincerely hoping that all our difficulties may be settled without the loss of another life, i subscribe myself, etc., u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. i proceeded at an early hour in the morning, still suffering with the headache, to get to the head of the column. i was not more than two or three miles from appomattox court house at the time, but to go direct i would have to pass through lee's army, or a portion of it. i had therefore to move south in order to get upon a road coming up from another direction. when the white flag was put out by lee, as already described, i was in this way moving towards appomattox court house, and consequently could not be communicated with immediately, and be informed of what lee had done. lee, therefore, sent a flag to the rear to advise meade and one to the front to sheridan, saying that he had sent a message to me for the purpose of having a meeting to consult about the surrender of his army, and asked for a suspension of hostilities until i could be communicated with. as they had heard nothing of this until the fighting had got to be severe and all going against lee, both of these commanders hesitated very considerably about suspending hostilities at all. they were afraid it was not in good faith, and we had the army of northern virginia where it could not escape except by some deception. they, however, finally consented to a suspension of hostilities for two hours to give an opportunity of communicating with me in that time, if possible. it was found that, from the route i had taken, they would probably not be able to communicate with me and get an answer back within the time fixed unless the messenger should pass through the rebel lines. lee, therefore, sent an escort with the officer bearing this message through his lines to me. april 9, 1865. general: i received your note of this morning on the picket-line whither i had come to meet you and ascertain definitely what terms were embraced in your proposal of yesterday with reference to the surrender of this army. i now request an interview in accordance with the offer contained in your letter of yesterday for that purpose. r. e. lee, general. lieutenant-general u. s. grant commanding u. s. armies. when the officer reached me i was still suffering with the sick headache, but the instant i saw the contents of the note i was cured. i wrote the following note in reply and hastened on: april 9, 1865. general r. e. lee, commanding c. s. armies. your note of this date is but this moment (11.50 a.m.) received, in consequence of my having passed from the richmond and lynchburg road to the farmville and lynchburg road. i am at this writing about four miles west of walker's church and will push forward to the front for the purpose of meeting you. notice sent to me on this road where you wish the interview to take place will meet me. u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. i was conducted at once to where sheridan was located with his troops drawn up in line of battle facing the confederate army near by. they were very much excited, and expressed their view that this was all a ruse employed to enable the confederates to get away. they said they believed that johnston was marching up from north carolina now, and lee was moving to join him; and they would whip the rebels where they now were in five minutes if i would only let them go in. but i had no doubt about the good faith of lee, and pretty soon was conducted to where he was. i found him at the house of a mr. mclean, at appomattox court house, with colonel marshall, one of his staff officers, awaiting my arrival. the head of his column was occupying a hill, on a portion of which was an apple orchard, beyond a little valley which separated it from that on the crest of which sheridan's forces were drawn up in line of battle to the south. before stating what took place between general lee and myself, i will give all there is of the story of the famous apple tree. wars produce many stories of fiction, some of which are told until they are believed to be true. the war of the rebellion was no exception to this rule, and the story of the apple tree is one of those fictions based on a slight foundation of fact. as i have said, there was an apple orchard on the side of the hill occupied by the confederate forces. running diagonally up the hill was a wagon road, which, at one point, ran very near one of the trees, so that the wheels of vehicles had, on that side, cut off the roots of this tree, leaving a little embankment. general babcock, of my staff, reported to me that when he first met general lee he was sitting upon this embankment with his feet in the road below and his back resting against the tree. the story had no other foundation than that. like many other stories, it would be very good if it was only true. i had known general lee in the old army, and had served with him in the mexican war; but did not suppose, owing to the difference in our age and rank, that he would remember me, while i would more naturally remember him distinctly, because he was the chief of staff of general scott in the mexican war. when i had left camp that morning i had not expected so soon the result that was then taking place, and consequently was in rough garb. i was without a sword, as i usually was when on horseback on the field, and wore a soldier's blouse for a coat, with the shoulder straps of my rank to indicate to the army who i was. when i went into the house i found general lee. we greeted each other, and after shaking hands took our seats. i had my staff with me, a good portion of whom were in the room during the whole of the interview. what general lee's feelings were i do not know. as he was a man of much dignity, with an impassible face, it was impossible to say whether he felt inwardly glad that the end had finally come, or felt sad over the result, and was too manly to show it. whatever his feelings, they were entirely concealed from my observation; but my own feelings, which had been quite jubilant on the receipt of his letter, were sad and depressed. i felt like anything rather than rejoicing at the downfall of a foe who had fought so long and valiantly, and had suffered so much for a cause, though that cause was, i believe, one of the worst for which a people ever fought, and one for which there was the least excuse. i do not question, however, the sincerity of the great mass of those who were opposed to us. general lee was dressed in a full uniform which was entirely new, and was wearing a sword of considerable value, very likely the sword which had been presented by the state of virginia; at all events, it was an entirely different sword from the one that would ordinarily be worn in the field. in my rough traveling suit, the uniform of a private with the straps of a lieutenant-general, i must have contrasted very strangely with a man so handsomely dressed, six feet high and of faultless form. but this was not a matter that i thought of until afterwards. we soon fell into a conversation about old army times. he remarked that he remembered me very well in the old army; and i told him that as a matter of course i remembered him perfectly, but from the difference in our rank and years (there being about sixteen years' difference in our ages), i had thought it very likely that i had not attracted his attention sufficiently to be remembered by him after such a long interval. our conversation grew so pleasant that i almost forgot the object of our meeting. after the conversation had run on in this style for some time, general lee called my attention to the object of our meeting, and said that he had asked for this interview for the purpose of getting from me the terms i proposed to give his army. i said that i meant merely that his army should lay down their arms, not to take them up again during the continuance of the war unless duly and properly exchanged. he said that he had so understood my letter. then we gradually fell off again into conversation about matters foreign to the subject which had brought us together. this continued for some little time, when general lee again interrupted the course of the conversation by suggesting that the terms i proposed to give his army ought to be written out. i called to general parker, secretary on my staff, for writing materials, and commenced writing out the following terms: appomattox c. h., va., ap 19th, 1865. gen. r. e. lee, comd'g c. s. a. gen: in accordance with the substance of my letter to you of the 8th inst., i propose to receive the surrender of the army of n. va. on the following terms, to wit: rolls of all the officers and men to be made in duplicate. one copy to be given to an officer designated by me, the other to be retained by such officer or officers as you may designate. the officers to give their individual paroles not to take up arms against the government of the united states until properly exchanged, and each company or regimental commander sign a like parole for the men of their commands. the arms, artillery and public property to be parked and stacked, and turned over to the officer appointed by me to receive them. this will not embrace the side-arms of the officers, nor their private horses or baggage. this done, each officer and man will be allowed to return to their homes, not to be disturbed by united states authority so long as they observe their paroles and the laws in force where they may reside. very respectfully, u. s. grant, lt. gen. when i put my pen to the paper i did not know the first word that i should make use of in writing the terms. i only knew what was in my mind, and i wished to express it clearly, so that there could be no mistaking it. as i wrote on, the thought occurred to me that the officers had their own private horses and effects, which were important to them, but of no value to us; also that it would be an unnecessary humiliation to call upon them to deliver their side arms. no conversation, not one word, passed between general lee and myself, either about private property, side arms, or kindred subjects. he appeared to have no objections to the terms first proposed; or if he had a point to make against them he wished to wait until they were in writing to make it. when he read over that part of the terms about side arms, horses and private property of the officers, he remarked, with some feeling, i thought, that this would have a happy effect upon his army. then, after a little further conversation, general lee remarked to me again that their army was organized a little differently from the army of the united states (still maintaining by implication that we were two countries); that in their army the cavalrymen and artillerists owned their own horses; and he asked if he was to understand that the men who so owned their horses were to be permitted to retain them. i told him that as the terms were written they would not; that only the officers were permitted to take their private property. he then, after reading over the terms a second time, remarked that that was clear. i then said to him that i thought this would be about the last battle of the war--i sincerely hoped so; and i said further i took it that most of the men in the ranks were small farmers. the whole country had been so raided by the two armies that it was doubtful whether they would be able to put in a crop to carry themselves and their families through the next winter without the aid of the horses they were then riding. the united states did not want them and i would, therefore, instruct the officers i left behind to receive the paroles of his troops to let every man of the confederate army who claimed to own a horse or mule take the animal to his home. lee remarked again that this would have a happy effect. he then sat down and wrote out the following letter: headquarters army of northern virginia, april 9, 1865. general:--i received your letter of this date containing the terms of the surrender of the army of northern virginia as proposed by you. as they are substantially the same as those expressed in your letter of the 8th inst., they are accepted. i will proceed to designate the proper officers to carry the stipulations into effect. r. e. lee, general. lieut.-general u. s. grant. while duplicates of the two letters were being made, the union generals present were severally presented to general lee. the much talked of surrendering of lee's sword and my handing it back, this and much more that has been said about it is the purest romance. the word sword or side arms was not mentioned by either of us until i wrote it in the terms. there was no premeditation, and it did not occur to me until the moment i wrote it down. if i had happened to omit it, and general lee had called my attention to it, i should have put it in the terms precisely as i acceded to the provision about the soldiers retaining their horses. general lee, after all was completed and before taking his leave, remarked that his army was in a very bad condition for want of food, and that they were without forage; that his men had been living for some days on parched corn exclusively, and that he would have to ask me for rations and forage. i told him "certainly," and asked for how many men he wanted rations. his answer was "about twenty-five thousand;" and i authorized him to send his own commissary and quartermaster to appomattox station, two or three miles away, where he could have, out of the trains we had stopped, all the provisions wanted. as for forage, we had ourselves depended almost entirely upon the country for that. generals gibbon, griffin and merritt were designated by me to carry into effect the paroling of lee's troops before they should start for their homes--general lee leaving generals longstreet, gordon and pendleton for them to confer with in order to facilitate this work. lee and i then separated as cordially as we had met, he returning to his own lines, and all went into bivouac for the night at appomattox. soon after lee's departure i telegraphed to washington as follows: headquarters appomattox c. h., va., april 9th, 1865, 4.30 p.m. hon. e. m. stanton, secretary of war, washington. general lee surrendered the army of northern virginia this afternoon on terms proposed by myself. the accompanying additional correspondence will show the conditions fully. u. s. grant, lieut.-general. when news of the surrender first reached our lines our men commenced firing a salute of a hundred guns in honor of the victory. i at once sent word, however, to have it stopped. the confederates were now our prisoners, and we did not want to exult over their downfall. i determined to return to washington at once, with a view to putting a stop to the purchase of supplies, and what i now deemed other useless outlay of money. before leaving, however, i thought i (*44) would like to see general lee again; so next morning i rode out beyond our lines towards his headquarters, preceded by a bugler and a staff-officer carrying a white flag. lee soon mounted his horse, seeing who it was, and met me. we had there between the lines, sitting on horseback, a very pleasant conversation of over half an hour, in the course of which lee said to me that the south was a big country and that we might have to march over it three or four times before the war entirely ended, but that we would now be able to do it as they could no longer resist us. he expressed it as his earnest hope, however, that we would not be called upon to cause more loss and sacrifice of life; but he could not foretell the result. i then suggested to general lee that there was not a man in the confederacy whose influence with the soldiery and the whole people was as great as his, and that if he would now advise the surrender of all the armies i had no doubt his advice would be followed with alacrity. but lee said, that he could not do that without consulting the president first. i knew there was no use to urge him to do anything against his ideas of what was right. i was accompanied by my staff and other officers, some of whom seemed to have a great desire to go inside the confederate lines. they finally asked permission of lee to do so for the purpose of seeing some of their old army friends, and the permission was granted. they went over, had a very pleasant time with their old friends, and brought some of them back with them when they returned. when lee and i separated he went back to his lines and i returned to the house of mr. mclean. here the officers of both armies came in great numbers, and seemed to enjoy the meeting as much as though they had been friends separated for a long time while fighting battles under the same flag. for the time being it looked very much as if all thought of the war had escaped their minds. after an hour pleasantly passed in this way i set out on horseback, accompanied by my staff and a small escort, for burkesville junction, up to which point the railroad had by this time been repaired. chapter lxviii. morale of the two armies--relative conditions of the north and south --president lincoln visits richmond--arrival at washington--president lincoln's assassination--president johnson's policy. after the fall of petersburg, and when the armies of the potomac and the james were in motion to head off lee's army, the morale of the national troops had greatly improved. there was no more straggling, no more rear guards. the men who in former times had been falling back, were now, as i have already stated, striving to get to the front. for the first time in four weary years they felt that they were now nearing the time when they could return to their homes with their country saved. on the other hand, the confederates were more than correspondingly depressed. their despondency increased with each returning day, and especially after the battle of sailor's creek. they threw away their arms in constantly increasing numbers, dropping out of the ranks and betaking themselves to the woods in the hope of reaching their homes. i have already instanced the case of the entire disintegration of a regiment whose colonel i met at farmville. as a result of these and other influences, when lee finally surrendered at appomattox, there were only 28,356 officers and men left to be paroled, and many of these were without arms. it was probably this latter fact which gave rise to the statement sometimes made, north and south, that lee surrendered a smaller number of men than what the official figures show. as a matter of official record, and in addition to the number paroled as given above, we captured between march 29th and the date of surrender 19,132 confederates, to say nothing of lee's other losses, killed, wounded and missing, during the series of desperate conflicts which marked his headlong and determined flight. the same record shows the number of cannon, including those at appomattox, to have been 689 between the dates named. there has always been a great conflict of opinion as to the number of troops engaged in every battle, or all important battles, fought between the sections, the south magnifying the number of union troops engaged and belittling their own. northern writers have fallen, in many instances, into the same error. i have often heard gentlemen, who were thoroughly loyal to the union, speak of what a splendid fight the south had made and successfully continued for four years before yielding, with their twelve million of people against our twenty, and of the twelve four being colored slaves, non-combatants. i will add to their argument. we had many regiments of brave and loyal men who volunteered under great difficulty from the twelve million belonging to the south. but the south had rebelled against the national government. it was not bound by any constitutional restrictions. the whole south was a military camp. the occupation of the colored people was to furnish supplies for the army. conscription was resorted to early, and embraced every male from the age of eighteen to forty-five, excluding only those physically unfit to serve in the field, and the necessary number of civil officers of state and intended national government. the old and physically disabled furnished a good portion of these. the slaves, the non-combatants, one-third of the whole, were required to work in the field without regard to sex, and almost without regard to age. children from the age of eight years could and did handle the hoe; they were not much older when they began to hold the plough. the four million of colored non-combatants were equal to more than three times their number in the north, age for age and sex for sex, in supplying food from the soil to support armies. women did not work in the fields in the north, and children attended school. the arts of peace were carried on in the north. towns and cities grew during the war. inventions were made in all kinds of machinery to increase the products of a day's labor in the shop, and in the field. in the south no opposition was allowed to the government which had been set up and which would have become real and respected if the rebellion had been successful. no rear had to be protected. all the troops in service could be brought to the front to contest every inch of ground threatened with invasion. the press of the south, like the people who remained at home, were loyal to the southern cause. in the north, the country, the towns and the cities presented about the same appearance they do in time of peace. the furnace was in blast, the shops were filled with workmen, the fields were cultivated, not only to supply the population of the north and the troops invading the south, but to ship abroad to pay a part of the expense of the war. in the north the press was free up to the point of open treason. the citizen could entertain his views and express them. troops were necessary in the northern states to prevent prisoners from the southern army being released by outside force, armed and set at large to destroy by fire our northern cities. plans were formed by northern and southern citizens to burn our cities, to poison the water supplying them, to spread infection by importing clothing from infected regions, to blow up our river and lake steamers--regardless of the destruction of innocent lives. the copperhead disreputable portion of the press magnified rebel successes, and belittled those of the union army. it was, with a large following, an auxiliary to the confederate army. the north would have been much stronger with a hundred thousand of these men in the confederate ranks and the rest of their kind thoroughly subdued, as the union sentiment was in the south, than we were as the battle was fought. as i have said, the whole south was a military camp. the colored people, four million in number, were submissive, and worked in the field and took care of the families while the able-bodied white men were at the front fighting for a cause destined to defeat. the cause was popular, and was enthusiastically supported by the young men. the conscription took all of them. before the war was over, further conscriptions took those between fourteen and eighteen years of age as junior reserves, and those between forty-five and sixty as senior reserves. it would have been an offence, directly after the war, and perhaps it would be now, to ask any able-bodied man in the south, who was between the ages of fourteen and sixty at any time during the war, whether he had been in the confederate army. he would assert that he had, or account for his absence from the ranks. under such circumstances it is hard to conceive how the north showed such a superiority of force in every battle fought. i know they did not. during 1862 and '3, john h. morgan, a partisan officer, of no military education, but possessed of courage and endurance, operated in the rear of the army of the ohio in kentucky and tennessee. he had no base of supplies to protect, but was at home wherever he went. the army operating against the south, on the contrary, had to protect its lines of communication with the north, from which all supplies had to come to the front. every foot of road had to be guarded by troops stationed at convenient distances apart. these guards could not render assistance beyond the points where stationed. morgan was foot-loose and could operate where, his information--always correct--led him to believe he could do the greatest damage. during the time he was operating in this way he killed, wounded and captured several times the number he ever had under his command at any one time. he destroyed many millions of property in addition. places he did not attack had to be guarded as if threatened by him. forrest, an abler soldier, operated farther west, and held from the national front quite as many men as could be spared for offensive operations. it is safe to say that more than half the national army was engaged in guarding lines of supplies, or were on leave, sick in hospital or on detail which prevented their bearing arms. then, again, large forces were employed where no confederate army confronted them. i deem it safe to say that there were no large engagements where the national numbers compensated for the advantage of position and intrenchment occupied by the enemy. while i was in pursuit of general lee, the president went to richmond in company with admiral porter, and on board his flagship. he found the people of that city in great consternation. the leading citizens among the people who had remained at home surrounded him, anxious that something should be done to relieve them from suspense. general weitzel was not then in the city, having taken offices in one of the neighboring villages after his troops had succeeded in subduing the conflagration which they had found in progress on entering the confederate capital. the president sent for him, and, on his arrival, a short interview was had on board the vessel, admiral porter and a leading citizen of virginia being also present. after this interview the president wrote an order in about these words, which i quote from memory: "general weitzel is authorized to permit the body calling itself the legislature of virginia to meet for the purpose of recalling the virginia troops from the confederate armies." immediately some of the gentlemen composing that body wrote out a call for a meeting and had it published in their papers. this call, however, went very much further than mr. lincoln had contemplated, as he did not say the "legislature of virginia" but "the body which called itself the legislature of virginia." mr. stanton saw the call as published in the northern papers the very next issue and took the liberty of countermanding the order authorizing any meeting of the legislature, or any other body, and this notwithstanding the fact that the president was nearer the spot than he was. this was characteristic of mr. stanton. he was a man who never questioned his own authority, and who always did in war time what he wanted to do. he was an able constitutional lawyer and jurist; but the constitution was not an impediment to him while the war lasted. in this latter particular i entirely agree with the view he evidently held. the constitution was not framed with a view to any such rebellion as that of 1861-5. while it did not authorize rebellion it made no provision against it. yet the right to resist or suppress rebellion is as inherent as the right of self-defence, and as natural as the right of an individual to preserve his life when in jeopardy. the constitution was therefore in abeyance for the time being, so far as it in any way affected the progress and termination of the war. those in rebellion against the government of the united states were not restricted by constitutional provisions, or any other, except the acts of their congress, which was loyal and devoted to the cause for which the south was then fighting. it would be a hard case when one-third of a nation, united in rebellion against the national authority, is entirely untrammeled, that the other two-thirds, in their efforts to maintain the union intact, should be restrained by a constitution prepared by our ancestors for the express purpose of insuring the permanency of the confederation of the states. after i left general lee at appomattox station, i went with my staff and a few others directly to burkesville station on my way to washington. the road from burkesville back having been newly repaired and the ground being soft, the train got off the track frequently, and, as a result, it was after midnight of the second day when i reached city point. as soon as possible i took a dispatch-boat thence to washington city. while in washington i was very busy for a time in preparing the necessary orders for the new state of affairs; communicating with my different commanders of separate departments, bodies of troops, etc. but by the 14th i was pretty well through with this work, so as to be able to visit my children, who were then in burlington, new jersey, attending school. mrs. grant was with me in washington at the time, and we were invited by president and mrs. lincoln to accompany them to the theatre on the evening of that day. i replied to the president's verbal invitation to the effect, that if we were in the city we would take great pleasure in accompanying them; but that i was very anxious to get away and visit my children, and if i could get through my work during the day i should do so. i did get through and started by the evening train on the 14th, sending mr. lincoln word, of course, that i would not be at the theatre. at that time the railroad to new york entered philadelphia on broad street; passengers were conveyed in ambulances to the delaware river, and then ferried to camden, at which point they took the cars again. when i reached the ferry, on the east side of the city of philadelphia, i found people awaiting my arrival there; and also dispatches informing me of the assassination of the president and mr. seward, and of the probable assassination of the vice president, mr. johnson, and requesting my immediate return. it would be impossible for me to describe the feeling that overcame me at the news of these assassinations, more especially the assassination of the president. i knew his goodness of heart, his generosity, his yielding disposition, his desire to have everybody happy, and above all his desire to see all the people of the united states enter again upon the full privileges of citizenship with equality among all. i knew also the feeling that mr. johnson had expressed in speeches and conversation against the southern people, and i feared that his course towards them would be such as to repel, and make them unwilling citizens; and if they became such they would remain so for a long while. i felt that reconstruction had been set back, no telling how far. i immediately arranged for getting a train to take me back to washington city; but mrs. grant was with me; it was after midnight and burlington was but an hour away. finding that i could accompany her to our house and return about as soon as they would be ready to take me from the philadelphia station, i went up with her and returned immediately by the same special train. the joy that i had witnessed among the people in the street and in public places in washington when i left there, had been turned to grief; the city was in reality a city of mourning. i have stated what i believed then the effect of this would be, and my judgment now is that i was right. i believe the south would have been saved from very much of the hardness of feeling that was engendered by mr. johnson's course towards them during the first few months of his administration. be this as it may, mr. lincoln's assassination was particularly unfortunate for the entire nation. mr. johnson's course towards the south did engender bitterness of feeling. his denunciations of treason and his ever-ready remark, "treason is a crime and must be made odious," was repeated to all those men of the south who came to him to get some assurances of safety so that they might go to work at something with the feeling that what they obtained would be secure to them. he uttered his denunciations with great vehemence, and as they were accompanied with no assurances of safety, many southerners were driven to a point almost beyond endurance. the president of the united states is, in a large degree, or ought to be, a representative of the feeling, wishes and judgment of those over whom he presides; and the southerners who read the denunciations of themselves and their people must have come to the conclusion that he uttered the sentiments of the northern people; whereas, as a matter of fact, but for the assassination of mr. lincoln, i believe the great majority of the northern people, and the soldiers unanimously, would have been in favor of a speedy reconstruction on terms that would be the least humiliating to the people who had rebelled against their government. they believed, i have no doubt, as i did, that besides being the mildest, it was also the wisest, policy. the people who had been in rebellion must necessarily come back into the union, and be incorporated as an integral part of the nation. naturally the nearer they were placed to an equality with the people who had not rebelled, the more reconciled they would feel with their old antagonists, and the better citizens they would be from the beginning. they surely would not make good citizens if they felt that they had a yoke around their necks. i do not believe that the majority of the northern people at that time were in favor of negro suffrage. they supposed that it would naturally follow the freedom of the negro, but that there would be a time of probation, in which the ex-slaves could prepare themselves for the privileges of citizenship before the full right would be conferred; but mr. johnson, after a complete revolution of sentiment, seemed to regard the south not only as an oppressed people, but as the people best entitled to consideration of any of our citizens. this was more than the people who had secured to us the perpetuation of the union were prepared for, and they became more radical in their views. the southerners had the most power in the executive branch, mr. johnson having gone to their side; and with a compact south, and such sympathy and support as they could get from the north, they felt that they would be able to control the nation at once, and already many of them acted as if they thought they were entitled to do so. thus mr. johnson, fighting congress on the one hand, and receiving the support of the south on the other, drove congress, which was overwhelmingly republican, to the passing of first one measure and then another to restrict his power. there being a solid south on one side that was in accord with the political party in the north which had sympathized with the rebellion, it finally, in the judgment of congress and of the majority of the legislatures of the states, became necessary to enfranchise the negro, in all his ignorance. in this work, i shall not discuss the question of how far the policy of congress in this particular proved a wise one. it became an absolute necessity, however, because of the foolhardiness of the president and the blindness of the southern people to their own interest. as to myself, while strongly favoring the course that would be the least humiliating to the people who had been in rebellion, i gradually worked up to the point where, with the majority of the people, i favored immediate enfranchisement. chapter lxix. sherman and johnston--johnston's surrender to sherman--capture of mobile--wilson's expedition--capture of jefferson davis--general thomas's qualities--estimate of general canby. when i left appomattox i ordered general meade to proceed leisurely back to burkesville station with the army of the potomac and the army of the james, and to go into camp there until further orders from me. general johnston, as has been stated before, was in north carolina confronting general sherman. it could not be known positively, of course, whether johnston would surrender on the news of lee's surrender, though i supposed he would; and if he did not, burkesville station was the natural point from which to move to attack him. the army which i could have sent against him was superior to his, and that with which sherman confronted him was also superior; and between the two he would necessarily have been crushed, or driven away. with the loss of their capital and the army of northern virginia it was doubtful whether johnston's men would have the spirit to stand. my belief was that he would make no such attempt; but i adopted this course as a precaution against what might happen, however improbable. simultaneously with my starting from city point, i sent a messenger to north carolina by boat with dispatches to general sherman, informing him of the surrender of lee and his army; also of the terms which i had given him; and i authorized sherman to give the same terms to johnston if the latter chose to accept them. the country is familiar with the terms that sherman agreed to conditionally, because they embraced a political question as well as a military one and he would therefore have to confer with the government before agreeing to them definitely. general sherman had met mr. lincoln at city point while visiting there to confer with me about our final movement, and knew what mr. lincoln had said to the peace commissioners when he met them at hampton roads, viz.: that before he could enter into negotiations with them they would have to agree to two points: one being that the union should be preserved, and the other that slavery should be abolished; and if they were ready to concede these two points he was almost ready to sign his name to a blank piece of paper and permit them to fill out the balance of the terms upon which we would live together. he had also seen notices in the newspapers of mr. lincoln's visit to richmond, and had read in the same papers that while there he had authorized the convening of the legislature of virginia. sherman thought, no doubt, in adding to the terms that i had made with general lee, that he was but carrying out the wishes of the president of the united states. but seeing that he was going beyond his authority, he made it a point that the terms were only conditional. they signed them with this understanding, and agreed to a truce until the terms could be sent to washington for approval; if approved by the proper authorities there, they would then be final; if not approved, then he would give due notice, before resuming hostilities. as the world knows, sherman, from being one of the most popular generals of the land (congress having even gone so far as to propose a bill providing for a second lieutenant-general for the purpose of advancing him to that grade), was denounced by the president and secretary of war in very bitter terms. some people went so far as to denounce him as a traitor --a most preposterous term to apply to a man who had rendered so much service as he had, even supposing he had made a mistake in granting such terms as he did to johnston and his army. if sherman had taken authority to send johnston with his army home, with their arms to be put in the arsenals of their own states, without submitting the question to the authorities at washington, the suspicions against him might have some foundation. but the feeling against sherman died out very rapidly, and it was not many weeks before he was restored to the fullest confidence of the american people. when, some days after my return to washington, president johnson and the secretary of war received the terms which general sherman had forwarded for approval, a cabinet meeting was immediately called and i was sent for. there seemed to be the greatest consternation, lest sherman would commit the government to terms which they were not willing to accede to and which he had no right to grant. a message went out directing the troops in the south not to obey general sherman. i was ordered to proceed at once to north carolina and take charge of matter there myself. of course i started without delay, and reached there as soon as possible. i repaired to raleigh, where sherman was, as quietly as possible, hoping to see him without even his army learning of my presence. when i arrived i went to sherman's headquarters, and we were at once closeted together. i showed him the instruction and orders under which i visited him. i told him that i wanted him to notify general johnston that the terms which they had conditionally agreed upon had not been approved in washington, and that he was authorized to offer the same terms i had given general lee. i sent sherman to do this himself. i did not wish the knowledge of my presence to be known to the army generally; so i left it to sherman to negotiate the terms of the surrender solely by himself, and without the enemy knowing that i was anywhere near the field. as soon as possible i started to get away, to leave sherman quite free and untrammelled. at goldsboro', on my way back, i met a mail, containing the last newspapers, and i found in them indications of great excitement in the north over the terms sherman had given johnston; and harsh orders that had been promulgated by the president and secretary of war. i knew that sherman must see these papers, and i fully realized what great indignation they would cause him, though i do not think his feelings could have been more excited than were my own. but like the true and loyal soldier that he was, he carried out the instructions i had given him, obtained the surrender of johnston's army, and settled down in his camp about raleigh, to await final orders. there were still a few expeditions out in the south that could not be communicated with, and had to be left to act according to the judgment of their respective commanders. with these it was impossible to tell how the news of the surrender of lee and johnston, of which they must have heard, might affect their judgment as to what was best to do. the three expeditions which i had tried so hard to get off from the commands of thomas and canby did finally get off: one under canby himself, against mobile, late in march; that under stoneman from east tennessee on the 20th; and the one under wilson, starting from eastport, mississippi, on the 22d of march. they were all eminently successful, but without any good result. indeed much valuable property was destroyed and many lives lost at a time when we would have liked to spare them. the war was practically over before their victories were gained. they were so late in commencing operations, that they did not hold any troops away that otherwise would have been operating against the armies which were gradually forcing the confederate armies to a surrender. the only possible good that we may have experienced from these raids was by stoneman's getting near lynchburg about the time the armies of the potomac and the james were closing in on lee at appomattox. stoneman entered north carolina and then pushed north to strike the virginia and tennessee railroad. he got upon that road, destroyed its bridges at different places and rendered the road useless to the enemy up to within a few miles of lynchburg. his approach caused the evacuation of that city about the time we were at appomattox, and was the cause of a commotion we heard of there. he then pushed south, and was operating in the rear of johnston's army about the time the negotiations were going on between sherman and johnston for the latter's surrender. in this raid stoneman captured and destroyed a large amount of stores, while fourteen guns and nearly two thousand prisoners were the trophies of his success. canby appeared before mobile on the 27th of march. the city of mobile was protected by two forts, besides other intrenchments--spanish fort, on the east side of the bay, and fort blakely, north of the city. these forts were invested. on the night of the 8th of april, the national troops having carried the enemy's works at one point, spanish fort was evacuated; and on the 9th, the very day of lee's surrender, blakely was carried by assault, with a considerable loss to us. on the 11th the city was evacuated. i had tried for more than two years to have an expedition sent against mobile when its possession by us would have been of great advantage. it finally cost lives to take it when its possession was of no importance, and when, if left alone, it would within a few days have fallen into our hands without any bloodshed whatever. wilson moved out with full 12,000 men, well equipped and well armed. he was an energetic officer and accomplished his work rapidly. forrest was in his front, but with neither his old-time army nor his old-time prestige. he now had principally conscripts. his conscripts were generally old men and boys. he had a few thousand regular cavalry left, but not enough to even retard materially the progress of wilson's cavalry. selma fell on the 2d of april, with a large number of prisoners and a large quantity of war material, machine shops, etc., to be disposed of by the victors. tuscaloosa, montgomery and west point fell in quick succession. these were all important points to the enemy by reason of their railroad connections, as depots of supplies, and because of their manufactories of war material. they were fortified or intrenched, and there was considerable fighting before they were captured. macon surrendered on the 21st of april. here news was received of the negotiations for the surrender of johnston's army. wilson belonged to the military division commanded by sherman, and of course was bound by his terms. this stopped all fighting. general richard taylor had now become the senior confederate officer still at liberty east of the mississippi river, and on the 4th of may he surrendered everything within the limits of this extensive command. general e. kirby smith surrendered the trans-mississippi department on the 26th of may, leaving no other confederate army at liberty to continue the war. wilson's raid resulted in the capture of the fugitive president of the defunct confederacy before he got out of the country. this occurred at irwinsville, georgia, on the 11th of may. for myself, and i believe mr. lincoln shared the feeling, i would have been very glad to have seen mr. davis succeed in escaping, but for one reason: i feared that if not captured, he might get into the trans-mississippi region and there set up a more contracted confederacy. the young men now out of homes and out of employment might have rallied under his standard and protracted the war yet another year. the northern people were tired of the war, they were tired of piling up a debt which would be a further mortgage upon their homes. mr. lincoln, i believe, wanted mr. davis to escape, because he did not wish to deal with the matter of his punishment. he knew there would be people clamoring for the punishment of the ex-confederate president, for high treason. he thought blood enough had already been spilled to atone for our wickedness as a nation. at all events he did not wish to be the judge to decide whether more should be shed or not. but his own life was sacrificed at the hands of an assassin before the ex-president of the confederacy was a prisoner in the hands of the government which he had lent all his talent and all his energies to destroy. all things are said to be wisely directed, and for the best interest of all concerned. this reflection does not, however, abate in the slightest our sense of bereavement in the untimely loss of so good and great a man as abraham lincoln. he would have proven the best friend the south could have had, and saved much of the wrangling and bitterness of feeling brought out by reconstruction under a president who at first wished to revenge himself upon southern men of better social standing than himself, but who still sought their recognition, and in a short time conceived the idea and advanced the proposition to become their moses to lead them triumphantly out of all their difficulties. the story of the legislation enacted during the reconstruction period to stay the hands of the president is too fresh in the minds of the people to be told now. much of it, no doubt, was unconstitutional; but it was hoped that the laws enacted would serve their purpose before the question of constitutionality could be submitted to the judiciary and a decision obtained. these laws did serve their purpose, and now remain "a dead letter" upon the statute books of the united states, no one taking interest enough in them to give them a passing thought. much was said at the time about the garb mr. davis was wearing when he was captured. i cannot settle this question from personal knowledge of the facts; but i have been under the belief, from information given to me by general wilson shortly after the event, that when mr. davis learned that he was surrounded by our cavalry he was in his tent dressed in a gentleman's dressing gown. naturally enough, mr. davis wanted to escape, and would not reflect much how this should be accomplished provided it might be done successfully. if captured, he would be no ordinary prisoner. he represented all there was of that hostility to the government which had caused four years of the bloodiest war--and the most costly in other respects of which history makes any record. every one supposed he would be tried for treason if captured, and that he would be executed. had he succeeded in making his escape in any disguise it would have been adjudged a good thing afterwards by his admirers. as my official letters on file in the war department, as well as my remarks in this book, reflect upon general thomas by dwelling somewhat upon his tardiness, it is due to myself, as well as to him, that i give my estimate of him as a soldier. the same remark will apply also in the case of general canby. i had been at west point with thomas one year, and had known him later in the old army. he was a man of commanding appearance, slow and deliberate in speech and action; sensible, honest and brave. he possessed valuable soldierly qualities in an eminent degree. he gained the confidence of all who served under him, and almost their love. this implies a very valuable quality. it is a quality which calls out the most efficient services of the troops serving under the commander possessing it. thomas's dispositions were deliberately made, and always good. he could not be driven from a point he was given to hold. he was not as good, however, in pursuit as he was in action. i do not believe that he could ever have conducted sherman's army from chattanooga to atlanta against the defences and the commander guarding that line in 1864. on the other hand, if it had been given him to hold the line which johnston tried to hold, neither that general nor sherman, nor any other officer could have done it better. thomas was a valuable officer, who richly deserved, as he has received, the plaudits of his countrymen for the part he played in the great tragedy of 1861-5. general canby was an officer of great merit. he was naturally studious, and inclined to the law. there have been in the army but very few, if any, officers who took as much interest in reading and digesting every act of congress and every regulation for the government of the army as he. his knowledge gained in this way made him a most valuable staff officer, a capacity in which almost all his army services were rendered up to the time of his being assigned to the military division of the gulf. he was an exceedingly modest officer, though of great talent and learning. i presume his feelings when first called upon to command a large army against a fortified city, were somewhat like my own when marching a regiment against general thomas harris in missouri in 1861. neither of us would have felt the slightest trepidation in going into battle with some one else commanding. had canby been in other engagements afterwards, he would, i have no doubt, have advanced without any fear arising from a sense of the responsibility. he was afterwards killed in the lava beds of southern oregon, while in pursuit of the hostile modoc indians. his character was as pure as his talent and learning were great. his services were valuable during the war, but principally as a bureau officer. i have no idea that it was from choice that his services were rendered in an office, but because of his superior efficiency there. chapter lxx. the end of the war--the march to washington--one of lincoln's anecdotes --grand review at washington--characteristics of lincoln and stanton --estimate of the different corps commanders. things began to quiet down, and as the certainty that there would be no more armed resistance became clearer, the troops in north carolina and virginia were ordered to march immediately to the capital, and go into camp there until mustered out. suitable garrisons were left at the prominent places throughout the south to insure obedience to the laws that might be enacted for the government of the several states, and to insure security to the lives and property of all classes. i do not know how far this was necessary, but i deemed it necessary, at that time, that such a course should be pursued. i think now that these garrisons were continued after they ceased to be absolutely required; but it is not to be expected that such a rebellion as was fought between the sections from 1861 to 1865 could terminate without leaving many serious apprehensions in the mind of the people as to what should be done. sherman marched his troops from goldsboro, up to manchester, on the south side of the james river, opposite richmond, and there put them in camp, while he went back to savannah to see what the situation was there. it was during this trip that the last outrage was committed upon him. halleck had been sent to richmond to command virginia, and had issued orders prohibiting even sherman's own troops from obeying his, sherman's, orders. sherman met the papers on his return, containing this order of halleck, and very justly felt indignant at the outrage. on his arrival at fortress monroe returning from savannah, sherman received an invitation from halleck to come to richmond and be his guest. this he indignantly refused, and informed halleck, furthermore, that he had seen his order. he also stated that he was coming up to take command of his troops, and as he marched through it would probably be as well for halleck not to show himself, because he (sherman) would not be responsible for what some rash person might do through indignation for the treatment he had received. very soon after that, sherman received orders from me to proceed to washington city, and to go into camp on the south side of the city pending the mustering-out of the troops. there was no incident worth noting in the march northward from goldsboro, to richmond, or in that from richmond to washington city. the army, however, commanded by sherman, which had been engaged in all the battles of the west and had marched from the mississippi through the southern states to the sea, from there to goldsboro, and thence to washington city, had passed over many of the battle-fields of the army of the potomac, thus having seen, to a greater extent than any other body of troops, the entire theatre of the four years' war for the preservation of the union. the march of sherman's army from atlanta to the sea and north to goldsboro, while it was not accompanied with the danger that was anticipated, yet was magnificent in its results, and equally magnificent in the way it was conducted. it had an important bearing, in various ways, upon the great object we had in view, that of closing the war. all the states east of the mississippi river up to the state of georgia, had felt the hardships of the war. georgia, and south carolina, and almost all of north carolina, up to this time, had been exempt from invasion by the northern armies, except upon their immediate sea coasts. their newspapers had given such an account of confederate success, that the people who remained at home had been convinced that the yankees had been whipped from first to last, and driven from pillar to post, and that now they could hardly be holding out for any other purpose than to find a way out of the war with honor to themselves. even during this march of sherman's the newspapers in his front were proclaiming daily that his army was nothing better than a mob of men who were frightened out of their wits and hastening, panic-stricken, to try to get under the cover of our navy for protection against the southern people. as the army was seen marching on triumphantly, however, the minds of the people became disabused and they saw the true state of affairs. in turn they became disheartened, and would have been glad to submit without compromise. another great advantage resulting from this march, and which was calculated to hasten the end, was the fact that the great storehouse of georgia was entirely cut off from the confederate armies. as the troops advanced north from savannah, the destruction of the railroads in south carolina and the southern part of north carolina, further cut off their resources and left the armies still in virginia and north carolina dependent for supplies upon a very small area of country, already very much exhausted of food and forage. in due time the two armies, one from burkesville junction and the other from the neighborhood of raleigh, north carolina, arrived and went into camp near the capital, as directed. the troops were hardy, being inured to fatigue, and they appeared in their respective camps as ready and fit for duty as they had ever been in their lives. i doubt whether an equal body of men of any nation, take them man for man, officer for officer, was ever gotten together that would have proved their equal in a great battle. the armies of europe are machines; the men are brave and the officers capable; but the majority of the soldiers in most of the nations of europe are taken from a class of people who are not very intelligent and who have very little interest in the contest in which they are called upon to take part. our armies were composed of men who were able to read, men who knew what they were fighting for, and could not be induced to serve as soldiers, except in an emergency when the safety of the nation was involved, and so necessarily must have been more than equal to men who fought merely because they were brave and because they were thoroughly drilled and inured to hardships. there was nothing of particular importance occurred during the time these troops were in camp before starting north. i remember one little incident which i will relate as an anecdote characteristic of mr. lincoln. it occurred a day after i reached washington, and about the time general meade reached burkesville with the army. governor smith of virginia had left richmond with the confederate states government, and had gone to danville. supposing i was necessarily with the army at burkesville, he addressed a letter to me there informing me that, as governor of the commonwealth of the state of virginia, he had temporarily removed the state capital from richmond to danville, and asking if he would be permitted to perform the functions of his office there without molestation by the federal authorities. i give this letter only in substance. he also inquired of me whether in case he was not allowed to perform the duties of his office, he with a few others might not be permitted to leave the country and go abroad without interference. general meade being informed that a flag of truce was outside his pickets with a letter to me, at once sent out and had the letter brought in without informing the officer who brought it that i was not present. he read the letter and telegraphed me its contents. meeting mr. lincoln shortly after receiving this dispatch, i repeated its contents to him. mr. lincoln, supposing i was asking for instructions, said, in reply to that part of governor smith's letter which inquired whether he with a few friends would be permitted to leave the country unmolested, that his position was like that of a certain irishman (giving the name) he knew in springfield who was very popular with the people, a man of considerable promise, and very much liked. unfortunately he had acquired the habit of drinking, and his friends could see that the habit was growing on him. these friends determined to make an effort to save him, and to do this they drew up a pledge to abstain from all alcoholic drinks. they asked pat to join them in signing the pledge, and he consented. he had been so long out of the habit of using plain water as a beverage that he resorted to soda-water as a substitute. after a few days this began to grow distasteful to him. so holding the glass behind him, he said: "doctor, couldn't you drop a bit of brandy in that unbeknownst to myself." i do not remember what the instructions were the president gave me, but i know that governor smith was not permitted to perform the duties of his office. i also know that if mr. lincoln had been spared, there would have been no efforts made to prevent any one from leaving the country who desired to do so. he would have been equally willing to permit the return of the same expatriated citizens after they had time to repent of their choice. on the 18th of may orders were issued by the adjutant-general for a grand review by the president and his cabinet of sherman's and meade's armies. the review commenced on the 23d and lasted two days. meade's army occupied over six hours of the first day in passing the grand stand which had been erected in front of the president's house. sherman witnessed this review from the grand stand which was occupied by the president and his cabinet. here he showed his resentment for the cruel and harsh treatment that had unnecessarily been inflicted upon him by the secretary of war, by refusing to take his extended hand. sherman's troops had been in camp on the south side of the potomac. during the night of the 23d he crossed over and bivouacked not far from the capitol. promptly at ten o'clock on the morning of the 24th, his troops commenced to pass in review. sherman's army made a different appearance from that of the army of the potomac. the latter had been operating where they received directly from the north full supplies of food and clothing regularly: the review of this army therefore was the review of a body of 65,000 well-drilled, well-disciplined and orderly soldiers inured to hardship and fit for any duty, but without the experience of gathering their own food and supplies in an enemy's country, and of being ever on the watch. sherman's army was not so well-dressed as the army of the potomac, but their marching could not be excelled; they gave the appearance of men who had been thoroughly drilled to endure hardships, either by long and continuous marches or through exposure to any climate, without the ordinary shelter of a camp. they exhibited also some of the order of march through georgia where the "sweet potatoes sprung up from the ground" as sherman's army went marching through. in the rear of a company there would be a captured horse or mule loaded with small cooking utensils, captured chickens and other food picked up for the use of the men. negro families who had followed the army would sometimes come along in the rear of a company, with three or four children packed upon a single mule, and the mother leading it. the sight was varied and grand: nearly all day for two successive days, from the capitol to the treasury building, could be seen a mass of orderly soldiers marching in columns of companies. the national flag was flying from almost every house and store; the windows were filled with spectators; the door-steps and side-walks were crowded with colored people and poor whites who did not succeed in securing better quarters from which to get a view of the grand armies. the city was about as full of strangers who had come to see the sights as it usually is on inauguration day when a new president takes his seat. it may not be out of place to again allude to president lincoln and the secretary of war, mr. stanton, who were the great conspicuous figures in the executive branch of the government. there is no great difference of opinion now, in the public mind, as to the characteristics of the president. with mr. stanton the case is different. they were the very opposite of each other in almost every particular, except that each possessed great ability. mr. lincoln gained influence over men by making them feel that it was a pleasure to serve him. he preferred yielding his own wish to gratify others, rather than to insist upon having his own way. it distressed him to disappoint others. in matters of public duty, however, he had what he wished, but in the least offensive way. mr. stanton never questioned his own authority to command, unless resisted. he cared nothing for the feeling of others. in fact it seemed to be pleasanter to him to disappoint than to gratify. he felt no hesitation in assuming the functions of the executive, or in acting without advising with him. if his act was not sustained, he would change it--if he saw the matter would be followed up until he did so. it was generally supposed that these two officials formed the complement of each other. the secretary was required to prevent the president's being imposed upon. the president was required in the more responsible place of seeing that injustice was not done to others. i do not know that this view of these two men is still entertained by the majority of the people. it is not a correct view, however, in my estimation. mr. lincoln did not require a guardian to aid him in the fulfilment of a public trust. mr. lincoln was not timid, and he was willing to trust his generals in making and executing their plans. the secretary was very timid, and it was impossible for him to avoid interfering with the armies covering the capital when it was sought to defend it by an offensive movement against the army guarding the confederate capital. he could see our weakness, but he could not see that the enemy was in danger. the enemy would not have been in danger if mr. stanton had been in the field. these characteristics of the two officials were clearly shown shortly after early came so near getting into the capital. among the army and corps commanders who served with me during the war between the states, and who attracted much public attention, but of whose ability as soldiers i have not yet given any estimate, are meade, hancock, sedgwick, burnside, terry and hooker. there were others of great merit, such as griffin, humphreys, wright and mackenzie. of those first named, burnside at one time had command of the army of the potomac, and later of the army of the ohio. hooker also commanded the army of the potomac for a short time. general meade was an officer of great merit, with drawbacks to his usefulness that were beyond his control. he had been an officer of the engineer corps before the war, and consequently had never served with troops until he was over forty-six years of age. he never had, i believe, a command of less than a brigade. he saw clearly and distinctly the position of the enemy, and the topography of the country in front of his own position. his first idea was to take advantage of the lay of the ground, sometimes without reference to the direction we wanted to move afterwards. he was subordinate to his superiors in rank to the extent that he could execute an order which changed his own plans with the same zeal he would have displayed if the plan had been his own. he was brave and conscientious, and commanded the respect of all who knew him. he was unfortunately of a temper that would get beyond his control, at times, and make him speak to officers of high rank in the most offensive manner. no one saw this fault more plainly than he himself, and no one regretted it more. this made it unpleasant at times, even in battle, for those around him to approach him even with information. in spite of this defect he was a most valuable officer and deserves a high place in the annals of his country. general burnside was an officer who was generally liked and respected. he was not, however, fitted to command an army. no one knew this better than himself. he always admitted his blunders, and extenuated those of officers under him beyond what they were entitled to. it was hardly his fault that he was ever assigned to a separate command. of hooker i saw but little during the war. i had known him very well before, however. where i did see him, at chattanooga, his achievement in bringing his command around the point of lookout mountain and into chattanooga valley was brilliant. i nevertheless regarded him as a dangerous man. he was not subordinate to his superiors. he was ambitious to the extent of caring nothing for the rights of others. his disposition was, when engaged in battle, to get detached from the main body of the army and exercise a separate command, gathering to his standard all he could of his juniors. hancock stands the most conspicuous figure of all the general officers who did not exercise a separate command. he commanded a corps longer than any other one, and his name was never mentioned as having committed in battle a blunder for which he was responsible. he was a man of very conspicuous personal appearance. tall, well-formed and, at the time of which i now write, young and fresh-looking, he presented an appearance that would attract the attention of an army as he passed. his genial disposition made him friends, and his personal courage and his presence with his command in the thickest of the fight won for him the confidence of troops serving under him. no matter how hard the fight, the 2d corps always felt that their commander was looking after them. sedgwick was killed at spottsylvania before i had an opportunity of forming an estimate of his qualifications as a soldier from personal observation. i had known him in mexico when both of us were lieutenants, and when our service gave no indication that either of us would ever be equal to the command of a brigade. he stood very high in the army, however, as an officer and a man. he was brave and conscientious. his ambition was not great, and he seemed to dread responsibility. he was willing to do any amount of battling, but always wanted some one else to direct. he declined the command of the army of the potomac once, if not oftener. general alfred h. terry came into the army as a volunteer without a military education. his way was won without political influence up to an important separate command--the expedition against fort fisher, in january, 1865. his success there was most brilliant, and won for him the rank of brigadier-general in the regular army and of major-general of volunteers. he is a man who makes friends of those under him by his consideration of their wants and their dues. as a commander, he won their confidence by his coolness in action and by his clearness of perception in taking in the situation under which he was placed at any given time. griffin, humphreys, and mackenzie were good corps commanders, but came into that position so near to the close of the war as not to attract public attention. all three served as such, in the last campaign of the armies of the potomac and the james, which culminated at appomattox court house, on the 9th of april, 1865. the sudden collapse of the rebellion monopolized attention to the exclusion of almost everything else. i regarded mackenzie as the most promising young officer in the army. graduating at west point, as he did, during the second year of the war, he had won his way up to the command of a corps before its close. this he did upon his own merit and without influence. conclusion. the cause of the great war of the rebellion against the united status will have to be attributed to slavery. for some years before the war began it was a trite saying among some politicians that "a state half slave and half free cannot exist." all must become slave or all free, or the state will go down. i took no part myself in any such view of the case at the time, but since the war is over, reviewing the whole question, i have come to the conclusion that the saying is quite true. slavery was an institution that required unusual guarantees for its security wherever it existed; and in a country like ours where the larger portion of it was free territory inhabited by an intelligent and well-to-do population, the people would naturally have but little sympathy with demands upon them for its protection. hence the people of the south were dependent upon keeping control of the general government to secure the perpetuation of their favorite institution. they were enabled to maintain this control long after the states where slavery existed had ceased to have the controlling power, through the assistance they received from odd men here and there throughout the northern states. they saw their power waning, and this led them to encroach upon the prerogatives and independence of the northern states by enacting such laws as the fugitive slave law. by this law every northern man was obliged, when properly summoned, to turn out and help apprehend the runaway slave of a southern man. northern marshals became slave-catchers, and northern courts had to contribute to the support and protection of the institution. this was a degradation which the north would not permit any longer than until they could get the power to expunge such laws from the statute books. prior to the time of these encroachments the great majority of the people of the north had no particular quarrel with slavery, so long as they were not forced to have it themselves. but they were not willing to play the role of police for the south in the protection of this particular institution. in the early days of the country, before we had railroads, telegraphs and steamboats--in a word, rapid transit of any sort--the states were each almost a separate nationality. at that time the subject of slavery caused but little or no disturbance to the public mind. but the country grew, rapid transit was established, and trade and commerce between the states got to be so much greater than before, that the power of the national government became more felt and recognized and, therefore, had to be enlisted in the cause of this institution. it is probably well that we had the war when we did. we are better off now than we would have been without it, and have made more rapid progress than we otherwise should have made. the civilized nations of europe have been stimulated into unusual activity, so that commerce, trade, travel, and thorough acquaintance among people of different nationalities, has become common; whereas, before, it was but the few who had ever had the privilege of going beyond the limits of their own country or who knew anything about other people. then, too, our republican institutions were regarded as experiments up to the breaking out of the rebellion, and monarchical europe generally believed that our republic was a rope of sand that would part the moment the slightest strain was brought upon it. now it has shown itself capable of dealing with one of the greatest wars that was ever made, and our people have proven themselves to be the most formidable in war of any nationality. but this war was a fearful lesson, and should teach us the necessity of avoiding wars in the future. the conduct of some of the european states during our troubles shows the lack of conscience of communities where the responsibility does not come upon a single individual. seeing a nation that extended from ocean to ocean, embracing the better part of a continent, growing as we were growing in population, wealth and intelligence, the european nations thought it would be well to give us a check. we might, possibly, after a while threaten their peace, or, at least, the perpetuity of their institutions. hence, england was constantly finding fault with the administration at washington because we were not able to keep up an effective blockade. she also joined, at first, with france and spain in setting up an austrian prince upon the throne in mexico, totally disregarding any rights or claims that mexico had of being treated as an independent power. it is true they trumped up grievances as a pretext, but they were only pretexts which can always be found when wanted. mexico, in her various revolutions, had been unable to give that protection to the subjects of foreign nations which she would have liked to give, and some of her revolutionary leaders had forced loans from them. under pretence of protecting their citizens, these nations seized upon mexico as a foothold for establishing a european monarchy upon our continent, thus threatening our peace at home. i, myself, regarded this as a direct act of war against the united states by the powers engaged, and supposed as a matter of course that the united states would treat it as such when their hands were free to strike. i often spoke of the matter to mr. lincoln and the secretary of war, but never heard any special views from them to enable me to judge what they thought or felt about it. i inferred that they felt a good deal as i did, but were unwilling to commit themselves while we had our own troubles upon our hands. all of the powers except france very soon withdrew from the armed intervention for the establishment of an austrian prince upon the throne of mexico; but the governing people of these countries continued to the close of the war to throw obstacles in our way. after the surrender of lee, therefore, entertaining the opinion here expressed, i sent sheridan with a corps to the rio grande to have him where he might aid juarez in expelling the french from mexico. these troops got off before they could be stopped; and went to the rio grande, where sheridan distributed them up and down the river, much to the consternation of the troops in the quarter of mexico bordering on that stream. this soon led to a request from france that we should withdraw our troops from the rio grande and to negotiations for the withdrawal of theirs. finally bazaine was withdrawn from mexico by order of the french government. from that day the empire began to totter. mexico was then able to maintain her independence without aid from us. france is the traditional ally and friend of the united states. i did not blame france for her part in the scheme to erect a monarchy upon the ruins of the mexican republic. that was the scheme of one man, an imitator without genius or merit. he had succeeded in stealing the government of his country, and made a change in its form against the wishes and instincts of his people. he tried to play the part of the first napoleon, without the ability to sustain that role. he sought by new conquests to add to his empire and his glory; but the signal failure of his scheme of conquest was the precursor of his own overthrow. like our own war between the states, the franco-prussian war was an expensive one; but it was worth to france all it cost her people. it was the completion of the downfall of napoleon iii. the beginning was when he landed troops on this continent. failing here, the prestige of his name--all the prestige he ever had--was gone. he must achieve a success or fall. he tried to strike down his neighbor, prussia--and fell. i never admired the character of the first napoleon; but i recognize his great genius. his work, too, has left its impress for good on the face of europe. the third napoleon could have no claim to having done a good or just act. to maintain peace in the future it is necessary to be prepared for war. there can scarcely be a possible chance of a conflict, such as the last one, occurring among our own people again; but, growing as we are, in population, wealth and military power, we may become the envy of nations which led us in all these particulars only a few years ago; and unless we are prepared for it we may be in danger of a combined movement being some day made to crush us out. now, scarcely twenty years after the war, we seem to have forgotten the lessons it taught, and are going on as if in the greatest security, without the power to resist an invasion by the fleets of fourth-rate european powers for a time until we could prepare for them. we should have a good navy, and our sea-coast defences should be put in the finest possible condition. neither of these cost much when it is considered where the money goes, and what we get in return. money expended in a fine navy, not only adds to our security and tends to prevent war in the future, but is very material aid to our commerce with foreign nations in the meantime. money spent upon sea-coast defences is spent among our own people, and all goes back again among the people. the work accomplished, too, like that of the navy, gives us a feeling of security. england's course towards the united states during the rebellion exasperated the people of this country very much against the mother country. i regretted it. england and the united states are natural allies, and should be the best of friends. they speak one language, and are related by blood and other ties. we together, or even either separately, are better qualified than any other people to establish commerce between all the nationalities of the world. england governs her own colonies, and particularly those embracing the people of different races from her own, better than any other nation. she is just to the conquered, but rigid. she makes them self-supporting, but gives the benefit of labor to the laborer. she does not seem to look upon the colonies as outside possessions which she is at liberty to work for the support and aggrandizement of the home government. the hostility of england to the united states during our rebellion was not so much real as it was apparent. it was the hostility of the leaders of one political party. i am told that there was no time during the civil war when they were able to get up in england a demonstration in favor of secession, while these were constantly being gotten up in favor of the union, or, as they called it, in favor of the north. even in manchester, which suffered so fearfully by having the cotton cut off from her mills, they had a monster demonstration in favor of the north at the very time when their workmen were almost famishing. it is possible that the question of a conflict between races may come up in the future, as did that between freedom and slavery before. the condition of the colored man within our borders may become a source of anxiety, to say the least. but he was brought to our shores by compulsion, and he now should be considered as having as good a right to remain here as any other class of our citizens. it was looking to a settlement of this question that led me to urge the annexation of santo domingo during the time i was president of the united states. santo domingo was freely offered to us, not only by the administration, but by all the people, almost without price. the island is upon our shores, is very fertile, and is capable of supporting fifteen millions of people. the products of the soil are so valuable that labor in her fields would be so compensated as to enable those who wished to go there to quickly repay the cost of their passage. i took it that the colored people would go there in great numbers, so as to have independent states governed by their own race. they would still be states of the union, and under the protection of the general government; but the citizens would be almost wholly colored. by the war with mexico, we had acquired, as we have seen, territory almost equal in extent to that we already possessed. it was seen that the volunteers of the mexican war largely composed the pioneers to settle up the pacific coast country. their numbers, however, were scarcely sufficient to be a nucleus for the population of the important points of the territory acquired by that war. after our rebellion, when so many young men were at liberty to return to their homes, they found they were not satisfied with the farm, the store, or the work-shop of the villages, but wanted larger fields. the mines of the mountains first attracted them; but afterwards they found that rich valleys and productive grazing and farming lands were there. this territory, the geography of which was not known to us at the close of the rebellion, is now as well mapped as any portion of our country. railroads traverse it in every direction, north, south, east, and west. the mines are worked. the high lands are used for grazing purposes, and rich agricultural lands are found in many of the valleys. this is the work of the volunteer. it is probable that the indians would have had control of these lands for a century yet but for the war. we must conclude, therefore, that wars are not always evils unmixed with some good. prior to the rebellion the great mass of the people were satisfied to remain near the scenes of their birth. in fact an immense majority of the whole people did not feel secure against coming to want should they move among entire strangers. so much was the country divided into small communities that localized idioms had grown up, so that you could almost tell what section a person was from by hearing him speak. before, new territories were settled by a "class"; people who shunned contact with others; people who, when the country began to settle up around them, would push out farther from civilization. their guns furnished meat, and the cultivation of a very limited amount of the soil, their bread and vegetables. all the streams abounded with fish. trapping would furnish pelts to be brought into the states once a year, to pay for necessary articles which they could not raise--powder, lead, whiskey, tobacco and some store goods. occasionally some little articles of luxury would enter into these purchases--a quarter of a pound of tea, two or three pounds of coffee, more of sugar, some playing cards, and if anything was left over of the proceeds of the sale, more whiskey. little was known of the topography of the country beyond the settlements of these frontiersmen. this is all changed now. the war begot a spirit of independence and enterprise. the feeling now is, that a youth must cut loose from his old surroundings to enable him to get up in the world. there is now such a commingling of the people that particular idioms and pronunciation are no longer localized to any great extent; the country has filled up "from the centre all around to the sea"; railroads connect the two oceans and all parts of the interior; maps, nearly perfect, of every part of the country are now furnished the student of geography. the war has made us a nation of great power and intelligence. we have but little to do to preserve peace, happiness and prosperity at home, and the respect of other nations. our experience ought to teach us the necessity of the first; our power secures the latter. i feel that we are on the eve of a new era, when there is to be great harmony between the federal and confederate. i cannot stay to be a living witness to the correctness of this prophecy; but i feel it within me that it is to be so. the universally kind feeling expressed for me at a time when it was supposed that each day would prove my last, seemed to me the beginning of the answer to "let us have peace." the expression of these kindly feelings were not restricted to a section of the country, nor to a division of the people. they came from individual citizens of all nationalities; from all denominations--the protestant, the catholic, and the jew; and from the various societies of the land--scientific, educational, religious or otherwise. politics did not enter into the matter at all. i am not egotist enough to suppose all this significance should be given because i was the object of it. but the war between the states was a very bloody and a very costly war. one side or the other had to yield principles they deemed dearer than life before it could be brought to an end. i commanded the whole of the mighty host engaged on the victorious side. i was, no matter whether deservedly so or not, a representative of that side of the controversy. it is a significant and gratifying fact that confederates should have joined heartily in this spontaneous move. i hope the good feeling inaugurated may continue to the end. appendix. report of lieutenant-general u. s. grant, of the united states armies 1864-65. headquarters armies of the united states, washington, d. c., july 22, 1865. hon. e. m. stanton, secretary of war. sir: i have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of the armies of the united states from the date of my appointment to command the same. from an early period in the rebellion i had been impressed with the idea that active and continuous operations of all the troops that could be brought into the field, regardless of season and weather, were necessary to a speedy termination of the war. the resources of the enemy and his numerical strength were far inferior to ours; but as an offset to this, we had a vast territory, with a population hostile to the government, to garrison, and long lines of river and railroad communications to protect, to enable us to supply the operating armies. the armies in the east and west acted independently and without concert, like a balky team, no two ever pulling together, enabling the enemy to use to great advantage his interior lines of communication for transporting troops from east to west, reinforcing the army most vigorously pressed, and to furlough large numbers, during seasons of inactivity on our part, to go to their homes and do the work of producing, for the support of their armies. it was a question whether our numerical strength and resources were not more than balanced by these disadvantages and the enemy's superior position. from the first, i was firm in the conviction that no peace could be had that would be stable and conducive to the happiness of the people, both north and south, until the military power of the rebellion was entirely broken. i therefore determined, first, to use the greatest number of troops practicable against the armed force of the enemy; preventing him from using the same force at different seasons against first one and then another of our armies, and the possibility of repose for refitting and producing necessary supplies for carrying on resistance. second, to hammer continuously against the armed force of the enemy and his resources, until by mere attrition, if in no other way, there should be nothing left to him but an equal submission with the loyal section of our common country to the constitution and laws of the land. these views have been kept constantly in mind, and orders given and campaigns made to carry them out. whether they might have been better in conception and execution is for the people, who mourn the loss of friends fallen, and who have to pay the pecuniary cost, to say. all i can say is, that what i have done has been done conscientiously, to the best of my ability, and in what i conceived to be for the best interests of the whole country. at the date when this report begins, the situation of the contending forces was about as follows: the mississippi river was strongly garrisoned by federal troops, from st. louis, missouri, to its mouth. the line of the arkansas was also held, thus giving us armed possession of all west of the mississippi, north of that stream. a few points in southern louisiana, not remote from the river, were held by us, together with a small garrison at and near the mouth of the rio grande. all the balance of the vast territory of arkansas, louisiana, and texas was in the almost undisputed possession of the enemy, with an army of probably not less than eighty thousand effective men, that could have been brought into the field had there been sufficient opposition to have brought them out. the let-alone policy had demoralized this force so that probably but little more than one-half of it was ever present in garrison at any one time. but the one-half, or forty thousand men, with the bands of guerillas scattered through missouri, arkansas, and along the mississippi river, and the disloyal character of much of the population, compelled the use of a large number of troops to keep navigation open on the river, and to protect the loyal people to the west of it. to the east of the mississippi we held substantially with the line of the tennessee and holston rivers, running eastward to include nearly all of the state of tennessee. south of chattanooga, a small foothold had been obtained in georgia, sufficient to protect east tennessee from incursions from the enemy's force at dalton, georgia. west virginia was substantially within our lines. virginia, with the exception of the northern border, the potomac river, a small area about the mouth of james river, covered by the troops at norfolk and fort monroe, and the territory covered by the army of the potomac lying along the rapidan, was in the possession of the enemy. along the sea-coast footholds had been obtained at plymouth, washington, and new bern, in north carolina; beaufort, folly and morris islands, hilton head, fort pulaski, and port royal, in south carolina; fernandina and st. augustine, in florida. key west and pensacola were also in our possession, while all the important ports were blockaded by the navy. the accompanying map, a copy of which was sent to general sherman and other commanders in march, 1864, shows by red lines the territory occupied by us at the beginning of the rebellion, and at the opening of the campaign of 1864, while those in blue are the lines which it was proposed to occupy. behind the union lines there were many bands of guerillas and a large population disloyal to the government, making it necessary to guard every foot of road or river used in supplying our armies. in the south, a reign of military despotism prevailed, which made every man and boy capable of bearing arms a soldier; and those who could not bear arms in the field acted as provosts for collecting deserters and returning them. this enabled the enemy to bring almost his entire strength into the field. the enemy had concentrated the bulk of his forces east of the mississippi into two armies, commanded by generals r. e. lee and j. e. johnston, his ablest and best generals. the army commanded by lee occupied the south bank of the rapidan, extending from mine run westward, strongly intrenched, covering and defending richmond, the rebel capital, against the army of the potomac. the army under johnston occupied a strongly intrenched position at dalton, georgia, covering and defending atlanta, georgia, a place of great importance as a railroad centre, against the armies under major-general w. t. sherman. in addition to these armies he had a large cavalry force under forrest, in north-east mississippi; a considerable force, of all arms, in the shenandoah valley, and in the western part of virginia and extreme eastern part of tennessee; and also confronting our sea-coast garrisons, and holding blockaded ports where we had no foothold upon land. these two armies, and the cities covered and defended by them, were the main objective points of the campaign. major-general w. t. sherman, who was appointed to the command of the military division of the mississippi, embracing all the armies and territory east of the mississippi river to the alleghanies and the department of arkansas, west of the mississippi, had the immediate command of the armies operating against johnston. major-general george g. meade had the immediate command of the army of the potomac, from where i exercised general supervision of the movements of all our armies. general sherman was instructed to move against johnston's army, to break it up, and to go into the interior of the enemy's country as far as he could, inflicting all the damage he could upon their war resources. if the enemy in his front showed signs of joining lee, to follow him up to the full extent of his ability, while i would prevent the concentration of lee upon him, if it was in the power of the army of the potomac to do so. more specific written instructions were not given, for the reason that i had talked over with him the plans of the campaign, and was satisfied that he understood them and would execute them to the fullest extent possible. major-general n. p. banks, then on an expedition up red river against shreveport, louisiana (which had been organized previous to my appointment to command), was notified by me on the 15th of march, of the importance it was that shreveport should be taken at the earliest possible day, and that if he found that the taking of it would occupy from ten to fifteen days' more time than general sherman had given his troops to be absent from their command, he would send them back at the time specified by general sherman, even if it led to the abandonment of the main object of the red river expedition, for this force was necessary to movements east of the mississippi; that should his expedition prove successful, he would hold shreveport and the red river with such force as he might deem necessary, and return the balance of his troops to the neighborhood of new orleans, commencing no move for the further acquisition of territory, unless it was to make that then held by him more easily held; that it might be a part of the spring campaign to move against mobile; that it certainly would be, if troops enough could be obtained to make it without embarrassing other movements; that new orleans would be the point of departure for such an expedition; also, that i had directed general steele to make a real move from arkansas, as suggested by him (general banks), instead of a demonstration, as steele thought advisable. on the 31st of march, in addition to the foregoing notification and directions, he was instructed as follows: "1st. if successful in your expedition against shreveport, that you turn over the defence of the red river to general steele and the navy. "2d. that you abandon texas entirely, with the exception of your hold upon the rio grande. this can be held with four thousand men, if they will turn their attention immediately to fortifying their positions. at least one-half of the force required for this service might be taken from the colored troops. "3d. by properly fortifying on the mississippi river, the force to guard it from port hudson to new orleans can be reduced to ten thousand men, if not to a less number. six thousand more would then hold all the rest of the territory necessary to hold until active operations can again be resumed west of the river. according to your last return, this would give you a force of over thirty thousand effective men with which to move against mobile. to this i expect to add five thousand men from missouri. if however, you think the force here stated too small to hold the territory regarded as necessary to hold possession of, i would say concentrate at least twenty-five thousand men of your present command for operations against mobile. with these and such additions as i can give you from elsewhere, lose no time in making a demonstration, to be followed by an attack upon mobile. two or more iron-clads will be ordered to report to admiral farragut. this gives him a strong naval fleet with which to co-operate. you can make your own arrangements with the admiral for his co-operation, and select your own line of approach. my own idea of the matter is that pascagoula should be your base; but, from your long service in the gulf department, you will know best about the matter. it is intended that your movements shall be co-operative with movements elsewhere, and you cannot now start too soon. all i would now add is, that you commence the concentration of your forces at once. preserve a profound secrecy of what you intend doing, and start at the earliest possible moment. "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "major-general n. p. banks." major-general meade was instructed that lee's army would be his objective point; that wherever lee went he would go also. for his movement two plans presented themselves: one to cross the rapidan below lee, moving by his right flank; the other above, moving by his left. each presented advantages over the other, with corresponding objections. by crossing above, lee would be cut off from all chance of ignoring richmond or going north on a raid. but if we took this route, all we did would have to be done whilst the rations we started with held out; besides, it separated us from butler, so that he could not be directed how to cooperate. if we took the other route, brandy station could be used as a base of supplies until another was secured on the york or james rivers. of these, however, it was decided to take the lower route. the following letter of instruction was addressed to major-general b. f. butler: "fort monroe, virginia, april 2, 1864. "general:-in the spring campaign, which it is desirable shall commence at as early a day as practicable, it is proposed to have cooperative action of all the armies in the field, as far as this object can be accomplished. "it will not be possible to unite our armies into two or three large ones to act as so many units, owing to the absolute necessity of holding on to the territory already taken from the enemy. but, generally speaking, concentration can be practically effected by armies moving to the interior of the enemy's country from the territory they have to guard. by such movement, they interpose themselves between the enemy and the country to be guarded, thereby reducing the number necessary to guard important points, or at least occupy the attention of a part of the enemy's force, if no greater object is gained. lee's army and richmond being the greater objects towards which our attention must be directed in the next campaign, it is desirable to unite all the force we can against them. the necessity of covering washington with the army of the potomac, and of covering your department with your army, makes it impossible to unite these forces at the beginning of any move. i propose, therefore, what comes nearest this of anything that seems practicable: the army of the potomac will act from its present base, lee's army being the objective point. you will collect all the forces from your command that can be spared from garrison duty--i should say not less than twenty thousand effective men--to operate on the south side of james river, richmond being your objective point. to the force you already have will be added about ten thousand men from south carolina, under major-general gillmore, who will command them in person. major-general w. f. smith is ordered to report to you, to command the troops sent into the field from your own department. "general gillmore will be ordered to report to you at fortress monroe, with all the troops on transports, by the 18th instant, or as soon thereafter as practicable. should you not receive notice by that time to move, you will make such disposition of them and your other forces as you may deem best calculated to deceive the enemy as to the real move to be made. "when you are notified to move, take city point with as much force as possible. fortify, or rather intrench, at once, and concentrate all your troops for the field there as rapidly as you can. from city point directions cannot be given at this time for your further movements. "the fact that has already been stated--that is, that richmond is to be your objective point, and that there is to be co-operation between your force and the army of the potomac--must be your guide. this indicates the necessity of your holding close to the south bank of the james river as you advance. then, should the enemy be forced into his intrenchments in richmond, the army of the potomac would follow, and by means of transports the two armies would become a unit. "all the minor details of your advance are left entirely to your direction. if, however, you think it practicable to use your cavalry south of you, so as to cut the railroad about hicksford, about the time of the general advance, it would be of immense advantage. "you will please forward for my information, at the earliest practicable day, all orders, details, and instructions you may give for the execution of this order. "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "major-general b. f. butler." on the 16th these instructions were substantially reiterated. on the 19th, in order to secure full co-operation between his army and that of general meade, he was informed that i expected him to move from fort monroe the same day that general meade moved from culpeper. the exact time i was to telegraph him as soon as it was fixed, and that it would not be earlier than the 27th of april; that it was my intention to fight lee between culpeper and richmond, if he would stand. should he, however, fall back into richmond, i would follow up and make a junction with his (general butler's) army on the james river; that, could i be certain he would be able to invest richmond on the south side, so as to have his left resting on the james, above the city, i would form the junction there; that circumstances might make this course advisable anyhow; that he should use every exertion to secure footing as far up the south side of the river as he could, and as soon as possible after the receipt of orders to move; that if he could not carry the city, he should at least detain as large a force there as possible. in co-operation with the main movements against lee and johnston, i was desirous of using all other troops necessarily kept in departments remote from the fields of immediate operations, and also those kept in the background for the protection of our extended lines between the loyal states and the armies operating against them. a very considerable force, under command of major-general sigel, was so held for the protection of west virginia, and the frontiers of maryland and pennsylvania. whilst these troops could not be withdrawn to distant fields without exposing the north to invasion by comparatively small bodies of the enemy, they could act directly to their front, and give better protection than if lying idle in garrison. by such a movement they would either compel the enemy to detach largely for the protection of his supplies and lines of communication, or he would lose them. general sigel was therefore directed to organize all his available force into two expeditions, to move from beverly and charleston, under command of generals ord and crook, against the east tennessee and virginia railroad. subsequently, general ord having been relieved at his own request, general sigel was instructed at his own suggestion, to give up the expedition by beverly, and to form two columns, one under general crook, on the kanawha, numbering about ten thousand men, and one on the shenandoah, numbering about seven thousand men. the one on the shenandoah to assemble between cumberland and the shenandoah, and the infantry and artillery advanced to cedar creek with such cavalry as could be made available at the moment, to threaten the enemy in the shenandoah valley, and advance as far as possible; while general crook would take possession of lewisburg with part of his force and move down the tennessee railroad, doing as much damage as he could, destroying the new river bridge and the salt-works, at saltville, va. owing to the weather and bad condition of the roads, operations were delayed until the 1st of may, when, everything being in readiness and the roads favorable, orders were given for a general movement of all the armies not later than the 4th of may. my first object being to break the military power of the rebellion, and capture the enemy's important strongholds, made me desirous that general butler should succeed in his movement against richmond, as that would tend more than anything else, unless it were the capture of lee's army, to accomplish this desired result in the east. if he failed, it was my determination, by hard fighting, either to compel lee to retreat, or to so cripple him that he could not detach a large force to go north, and still retain enough for the defence of richmond. it was well understood, by both generals butler and meade, before starting on the campaign, that it was my intention to put both their armies south of the james river, in case of failure to destroy lee without it. before giving general butler his instructions, i visited him at fort monroe, and in conversation pointed out the apparent importance of getting possession of petersburg, and destroying railroad communication as far south as possible. believing, however, in the practicability of capturing richmond unless it was reinforced, i made that the objective point of his operations. as the army of the potomac was to move simultaneously with him, lee could not detach from his army with safety, and the enemy did not have troops elsewhere to bring to the defence of the city in time to meet a rapid movement from the north of james river. i may here state that, commanding all the armies as i did, i tried, as far as possible, to leave general meade in independent command of the army of the potomac. my instructions for that army were all through him, and were general in their nature, leaving all the details and the execution to him. the campaigns that followed proved him to be the right man in the right place. his commanding always in the presence of an officer superior to him in rank, has drawn from him much of that public attention that his zeal and ability entitle him to, and which he would otherwise have received. the movement of the army of the potomac commenced early on the morning of the 4th of may, under the immediate direction and orders of major-general meade, pursuant to instructions. before night, the whole army was across the rapidan (the fifth and sixth corps crossing at germania ford, and the second corps at ely's ford, the cavalry, under major-general sheridan, moving in advance,) with the greater part of its trains, numbering about four thousand wagons, meeting with but slight opposition. the average distance travelled by the troops that day was about twelve miles. this i regarded as a great success, and it removed from my mind the most serious apprehensions i had entertained, that of crossing the river in the face of an active, large, well-appointed, and ably commanded army, and how so large a train was to be carried through a hostile country, and protected. early on the 5th, the advance corps (the fifth, major-general g. k. warren commanding) met and engaged the enemy outside his intrenchments near mine run. the battle raged furiously all day, the whole army being brought into the fight as fast as the corps could be got upon the field, which, considering the density of the forest and narrowness of the roads, was done with commendable promptness. general burnside, with the ninth corps, was, at the time the army of the potomac moved, left with the bulk of his corps at the crossing of the rappahannock river and alexandria railroad, holding the road back to bull run, with instructions not to move until he received notice that a crossing of the rapidan was secured, but to move promptly as soon as such notice was received. this crossing he was apprised of on the afternoon of the 4th. by six o'clock of the morning of the 6th he was leading his corps into action near the wilderness tavern, some of his troops having marched a distance of over thirty miles, crossing both the rappahannock and rapidan rivers. considering that a large proportion, probably two-thirds of his command, was composed of new troops, unaccustomed to marches, and carrying the accoutrements of a soldier, this was a remarkable march. the battle of the wilderness was renewed by us at five o'clock on the morning of the 6th, and continued with unabated fury until darkness set in, each army holding substantially the same position that they had on the evening of the 5th. after dark, the enemy made a feeble attempt to turn our right flank, capturing several hundred prisoners and creating considerable confusion. but the promptness of general sedgwick, who was personally present and commanded that part of our line, soon reformed it and restored order. on the morning of the 7th, reconnoissances showed that the enemy had fallen behind his intrenched lines, with pickets to the front, covering a part of the battle-field. from this it was evident to my mind that the two days' fighting had satisfied him of his inability to further maintain the contest in the open field, notwithstanding his advantage of position, and that he would wait an attack behind his works. i therefore determined to push on and put my whole force between him and richmond; and orders were at once issued for a movement by his right flank. on the night of the 7th, the march was commenced towards spottsylvania court house, the fifth corps moving on the most direct road. but the enemy having become apprised of our movement, and having the shorter line, was enabled to reach there first. on the 8th, general warren met a force of the enemy, which had been sent out to oppose and delay his advance, to gain time to fortify the line taken up at spottsylvania. this force was steadily driven back on the main force, within the recently constructed works, after considerable fighting, resulting in severe loss to both sides. on the morning of the 9th, general sheridan started on a raid against the enemy's lines of communication with richmond. the 9th, 10th, and 11th were spent in manoeuvring and fighting, without decisive results. among the killed on the 9th was that able and distinguished soldier major-general john sedgwick, commanding the sixth army corps. major-general h. g. wright succeeded him in command. early on the morning of the 12th a general attack was made on the enemy in position. the second corps, major-general hancock commanding, carried a salient of his line, capturing most of johnson's division of ewell's corps and twenty pieces of artillery. but the resistance was so obstinate that the advantage gained did not prove decisive. the 13th, 14th, 15th, 16th, 17th, and 18th, were consumed in manoeuvring and awaiting the arrival of reinforcements from washington. deeming it impracticable to make any further attack upon the enemy at spottsylvania court house, orders were issued on the 15th with a view to a movement to the north anna, to commence at twelve o'clock on the night of the 19th. late in the afternoon of the 19th, ewell's corps came out of its works on our extreme right flank; but the attack was promptly repulsed, with heavy loss. this delayed the movement to the north anna until the night of the 21st, when it was commenced. but the enemy again, having the shorter line, and being in possession of the main roads, was enabled to reach the north anna in advance of us, and took position behind it. the fifth corps reached the north anna on the afternoon of the 23d, closely followed by the sixth corps. the second and ninth corps got up about the same time, the second holding the railroad bridge, and the ninth lying between that and jericho ford. general warren effected a crossing the same afternoon, and got a position without much opposition. soon after getting into position he was violently attacked, but repulsed the enemy with great slaughter. on the 25th, general sheridan rejoined the army of the potomac from the raid on which he started from spottsylvania, having destroyed the depots at beaver dam and ashland stations, four trains of cars, large supplies of rations, and many miles of railroad-track; recaptured about four hundred of our men on their way to richmond as prisoners of war; met and defeated the enemy's cavalry at yellow tavern; carried the first line of works around richmond (but finding the second line too strong to be carried by assault), recrossed to the north bank of the chickahominy at meadow bridge under heavy fire, and moved by a detour to haxall's landing, on the james river, where he communicated with general butler. this raid had the effect of drawing off the whole of the enemy's cavalry force, making it comparatively easy to guard our trains. general butler moved his main force up the james river, in pursuance of instructions, on the 4th of may, general gillmore having joined him with the tenth corps. at the same time he sent a force of one thousand eight hundred cavalry, by way of west point, to form a junction with him wherever he might get a foothold, and a force of three thousand cavalry, under general kautz, from suffolk, to operate against the road south of petersburg and richmond. on the 5th, he occupied, without opposition, both city point and bermuda hundred, his movement being a complete surprise. on the 6th, he was in position with his main army, and commenced intrenching. on the 7th he made a reconnoissance against the petersburg and richmond railroad, destroying a portion of it after some fighting. on the 9th he telegraphed as follows: "headquarters, near bermuda landing, may 9, 1864. "hon. e. m. stanton, secretary of war. "our operations may be summed up in a few words. with one thousand seven hundred cavalry we have advanced up the peninsula, forced the chickahominy, and have safely, brought them to their present position. these were colored cavalry, and are now holding our advance pickets towards richmond. "general kautz, with three thousand cavalry from suffolk, on the same day with our movement up james river, forced the black water, burned the railroad bridge at stony creek, below petersburg, cutting into beauregard's force at that point. "we have landed here, intrenched ourselves, destroyed many miles of railroad, and got a position which, with proper supplies, we can hold out against the whole of lee's army. i have ordered up the supplies. "beauregard, with a large portion of his force, was left south by the cutting of the railroads by kautz. that portion which reached petersburg under hill i have whipped to-day, killing and wounding many, and taking many prisoners, after a severe and well-contested fight. "general grant will not be troubled with any further reinforcements to lee from beauregard's force. "benj. f. butler, major-general." on the evening of the 13th and morning of the 14th he carried a portion of the enemy's first line of defences at drury's bluff, or fort darling, with small loss. the time thus consumed from the 6th lost to us the benefit of the surprise and capture of richmond and petersburg, enabling, as it did, beauregard to collect his loose forces in north and south carolina, and bring them to the defence of those places. on the 16th, the enemy attacked general butler in his position in front of drury's bluff. he was forced back, or drew back, into his intrenchments between the forks of the james and appomattox rivers, the enemy intrenching strongly in his front, thus covering his railroads, the city, and all that was valuable to him. his army, therefore, though in a position of great security, was as completely shut off from further operations directly against richmond as if it had been in a bottle strongly corked. it required but a comparatively small force of the enemy to hold it there. on the 12th, general kautz, with his cavalry, was started on a raid against the danville railroad, which he struck at coalfield, powhatan, and chula stations, destroying them, the railroad-track, two freight trains, and one locomotive, together with large quantities of commissary and other stores; thence, crossing to the south side road, struck it at wilson's, wellsville, and black's and white's stations, destroying the road and station-houses; thence he proceeded to city point, which he reached on the 18th. on the 19th of april, and prior to the movement of general butler, the enemy, with a land force under general hoke and an iron-clad ram, attacked plymouth, n. c., commanded by general h. w. wessells, and our gunboats there, and, after severe fighting, the place was carried by assault, and the entire garrison and armament captured. the gunboat smithfield was sunk, and the miami disabled. the army sent to operate against richmond having hermetically sealed itself up at bermuda hundred, the enemy was enabled to bring the most, if not all, the reinforcements brought from the south by beauregard against the army of the potomac. in addition to this reinforcement, a very considerable one, probably not less than fifteen thousand men, was obtained by calling in the scattered troops under breckinridge from the western part of virginia. the position of bermuda hundred was as easy to defend as it was difficult to operate from against the enemy. i determined, therefore, to bring from it all available forces, leaving enough only to secure what had been gained; and accordingly, on the 22d, i directed that they be sent forward, under command of major-general w. f. smith, to join the army of the potomac. on the 24th of may, the 9th army corps, commanded by major-general a. e. burnside, was assigned to the army of the potomac, and from this time forward constituted a portion of major-general meade's command. finding the enemy's position on the north anna stronger than either of his previous ones, i withdrew on the night of the 26th to the north bank of the north anna, and moved via hanover town to turn the enemy's position by his right. generals torbert's and merritt's divisions of cavalry, under sheridan, and the 6th corps, led the advance, crossed the pamunkey river at hanover town, after considerable fighting, and on the 28th the two divisions of cavalry had a severe, but successful engagement with the enemy at hawes's shop. on the 29th and 30th we advanced, with heavy skirmishing, to the hanover court house and cold harbor road, and developed the enemy's position north of the chickahominy. late on the evening of the last day the enemy came out and attacked our left, but was repulsed with very considerable loss. an attack was immediately ordered by general meade, along his whole line, which resulted in driving the enemy from a part of his intrenched skirmish line. on the 31st, general wilson's division of cavalry destroyed the railroad bridges over the south anna river, after defeating the enemy's cavalry. general sheridan, on the same day, reached cold harbor, and held it until relieved by the 6th corps and general smith's command, which had just arrived, via white house, from general butler's army. on the 1st day of june an attack was made at five p.m. by the 6th corps and the troops under general smith, the other corps being held in readiness to advance on the receipt of orders. this resulted in our carrying and holding the enemy's first line of works in front of the right of the 6th corps, and in front of general smith. during the attack the enemy made repeated assaults on each of the corps not engaged in the main attack, but was repulsed with heavy loss in every instance. that night he made several assaults to regain what he had lost in the day, but failed. the 2d was spent in getting troops into position for an attack on the 3d. on the 3d of june we again assaulted the enemy's works, in the hope of driving him from his position. in this attempt our loss was heavy, while that of the enemy, i have reason to believe, was comparatively light. it was the only general attack made from the rapidan to the james which did not inflict upon the enemy losses to compensate for our own losses. i would not be understood as saying that all previous attacks resulted in victories to our arms, or accomplished as much as i had hoped from them; but they inflicted upon the enemy severe losses, which tended, in the end, to the complete overthrow of the rebellion. from the proximity of the enemy to his defences around richmond, it was impossible, by any flank movement, to interpose between him and the city. i was still in a condition to either move by his left flank, and invest richmond from the north side, or continue my move by his right flank to the south side of the james. while the former might have been better as a covering for washington, yet a full survey of all the ground satisfied me that it would be impracticable to hold a line north and east of richmond that would protect the fredericksburg railroad, a long, vulnerable line, which would exhaust much of our strength to guard, and that would have to be protected to supply the army, and would leave open to the enemy all his lines of communication on the south side of the james. my idea, from the start, had been to beat lee's army north of richmond, if possible. then, after destroying his lines of communication north of the james river, to transfer the army to the south side, and besiege lee in richmond, or follow him south if he should retreat. after the battle of the wilderness, it was evident that the enemy deemed it of the first importance to run no risks with the army he then had. he acted purely on the defensive, behind breastworks, or feebly on the offensive immediately in front of them, and where, in case of repulse, he could easily retire behind them. without a greater sacrifice of life than i was willing to make, all could not be accomplished that i had designed north of richmond. i therefore determined to continue to hold substantially the ground we then occupied, taking advantage of any favorable circumstances that might present themselves, until the cavalry could be sent to charlottesville and gordonsville to effectually break up the railroad connection between richmond and the shenandoah valley and lynchburg; and when the cavalry got well off, to move the army to the south side of the james river, by the enemy's right flank, where i felt i could cut off all his sources of supply, except by the canal. on the 7th, two divisions of cavalry, under general sheridan, got off on the expedition against the virginia central railroad, with instructions to hunter, whom i hoped he would meet near charlottesville, to join his forces to sheridan's, and after the work laid out for them was thoroughly done, to join the army of the potomac by the route laid down in sheridan's instructions. on the 10th of june, general butler sent a force of infantry, under general gillmore, and of cavalry under general kautz, to capture petersburg, if possible, and destroy the railroad and common bridges across the appomattox. the cavalry carried the works on the south side, and penetrated well in towards the town, but were forced to retire. general gillmore, finding the works which he approached very strong, and deeming an assault impracticable, returned to bermuda hundred without attempting one. attaching great importance to the possession of petersburg, i sent back to bermuda hundred and city point, general smith's command by water, via the white house, to reach there in advance of the army of the potomac. this was for the express purpose of securing petersburg before the enemy, becoming aware of our intention, could reinforce the place. the movement from cold harbor commenced after dark on the evening of the 12th. one division of cavalry, under general wilson, and the 5th corps, crossed the chickahominy at long bridge, and moved out to white oak swamp, to cover the crossings of the other corps. the advance corps reached james river, at wilcox's landing and charles city court house, on the night of the 13th. during three long years the armies of the potomac and northern virginia had been confronting each other. in that time they had fought more desperate battles than it probably ever before fell to the lot of two armies to fight, without materially changing the vantage ground of either. the southern press and people, with more shrewdness than was displayed in the north, finding that they had failed to capture washington and march on to new york, as they had boasted they would do, assumed that they only defended their capital and southern territory. hence, antietam, gettysburg, and all the other battles that had been fought, were by them set down as failures on our part, and victories for them. their army believed this. it produced a morale which could only be overcome by desperate and continuous hard fighting. the battles of the wilderness, spottsylvania, north anna and cold harbor, bloody and terrible as they were on our side, were even more damaging to the enemy, and so crippled him as to make him wary ever after of taking the offensive. his losses in men were probably not so great, owing to the fact that we were, save in the wilderness, almost invariably the attacking party; and when he did attack, it was in the open field. the details of these battles, which for endurance and bravery on the part of the soldiery, have rarely been surpassed, are given in the report of major-general meade, and the subordinate reports accompanying it. during the campaign of forty-three days, from the rapidan to the james river, the army had to be supplied from an ever-shifting base, by wagons, over narrow roads, through a densely wooded country, with a lack of wharves at each new base from which to conveniently discharge vessels. too much credit cannot, therefore, be awarded to the quartermaster and commissary departments for the zeal and efficiency displayed by them. under the general supervision of the chief quartermaster, brigadier-general r. ingalls, the trains were made to occupy all the available roads between the army and our water-base, and but little difficulty was experienced in protecting them. the movement in the kanawha and shenandoah valleys, under general sigel, commenced on the 1st of may. general crook, who had the immediate command of the kanawha expedition, divided his forces into two columns, giving one, composed of cavalry, to general averell. they crossed the mountains by separate routes. averell struck the tennessee and virginia railroad, near wytheville, on the 10th, and proceeding to new river and christiansburg, destroyed the road, several important bridges and depots, including new river bridge, forming a junction with crook at union on the 15th. general sigel moved up the shenandoah valley, met the enemy at new market on the 15th, and, after a severe engagement, was defeated with heavy loss, and retired behind cedar creek. not regarding the operations of general sigel as satisfactory, i asked his removal from command, and major-general hunter appointed to supersede him. his instructions were embraced in the following dispatches to major-general h. w. halleck, chief of staff of the army: "near spottsylvania court house, va. "may 20, 1864. * * * * * * * "the enemy are evidently relying for supplies greatly on such as are brought over the branch road running through staunton. on the whole, therefore, i think it would be better for general hunter to move in that direction; reach staunton and gordonsville or charlottesville, if he does not meet too much opposition. if he can hold at bay a force equal to his own, he will be doing good service. * * * "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "major-general h. w. halleck." "jericho ford, va., may 25, 1864. "if hunter can possibly get to charlottesville and lynchburg, he should do so, living on the country. the railroads and canal should be destroyed beyond possibility of repairs for weeks. completing this, he could find his way back to his original base, or from about gordonsville join this army. "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "major-general h. w. halleck." general hunter immediately took up the offensive, and, moving up the shenandoah valley, met the enemy on the 5th of june at piedmont, and, after a battle of ten hours, routed and defeated him, capturing on the field of battle one thousand five hundred men, three pieces of artillery, and three hundred stand of small arms. on the 8th of the same month he formed a junction with crook and averell at staunton, from which place he moved direct on lynchburg, via lexington, which place he reached and invested on the 16th day of june. up to this time he was very successful; and but for the difficulty of taking with him sufficient ordnance stores over so long a march, through a hostile country, he would, no doubt, have captured that, to the enemy important, point. the destruction of the enemy's supplies and manufactories was very great. to meet this movement under general hunter, general lee sent a force, perhaps equal to a corps, a part of which reached lynchburg a short time before hunter. after some skirmishing on the 17th and 18th, general hunter, owing to a want of ammunition to give battle, retired from before the place. unfortunately, this want of ammunition left him no choice of route for his return but by way of kanawha. this lost to us the use of his troops for several weeks from the defence of the north. had general hunter moved by way of charlottesville, instead of lexington, as his instructions contemplated, he would have been in a position to have covered the shenandoah valley against the enemy, should the force he met have seemed to endanger it. if it did not, he would have been within easy distance of the james river canal, on the main line of communication between lynchburg and the force sent for its defence. i have never taken exception to the operations of general hunter, and am not now disposed to find fault with him, for i have no doubt he acted within what he conceived to be the spirit of his instructions and the interests of the service. the promptitude of his movements and his gallantry should entitle him to the commendation of his country. to return to the army of the potomac: the 2d corps commenced crossing the james river on the morning of the 14th by ferry-boats at wilcox's landing. the laying of the pontoon-bridge was completed about midnight of the 14th, and the crossing of the balance of the army was rapidly pushed forward by both bridge and ferry. after the crossing had commenced, i proceeded by steamer to bermuda hundred to give the necessary orders for the immediate capture of petersburg. the instructions to general butler were verbal, and were for him to send general smith immediately, that night, with all the troops he could give him without sacrificing the position he then held. i told him that i would return at once to the army of the potomac, hasten its crossing and throw it forward to petersburg by divisions as rapidly as it could be done, that we could reinforce our armies more rapidly there than the enemy could bring troops against us. general smith got off as directed, and confronted the enemy's pickets near petersburg before daylight next morning, but for some reason that i have never been able to satisfactorily understand, did not get ready to assault his main lines until near sundown. then, with a part of his command only, he made the assault, and carried the lines north-east of petersburg from the appomattox river, for a distance of over two and a half miles, capturing fifteen pieces of artillery and three hundred prisoners. this was about seven p.m. between the line thus captured and petersburg there were no other works, and there was no evidence that the enemy had reinforced petersburg with a single brigade from any source. the night was clear the moon shining brightly and favorable to further operations. general hancock, with two divisions of the 2d corps, reached general smith just after dark, and offered the service of these troops as he (smith) might wish, waiving rank to the named commander, who he naturally supposed knew best the position of affairs, and what to do with the troops. but instead of taking these troops and pushing at once into petersburg, he requested general hancock to relieve a part of his line in the captured works, which was done before midnight. by the time i arrived the next morning the enemy was in force. an attack was ordered to be made at six o'clock that evening by the troops under smith and the 2d and 9th corps. it required until that time for the 9th corps to get up and into position. the attack was made as ordered, and the fighting continued with but little intermission until six o'clock the next morning, and resulted in our carrying the advance and some of the main works of the enemy to the right (our left) of those previously captured by general smith, several pieces of artillery, and over four hundred prisoners. the 5th corps having got up, the attacks were renewed and persisted in with great vigor on the 17th and 18th, but only resulted in forcing the enemy into an interior line, from which he could not be dislodged. the advantages of position gained by us were very great. the army then proceeded to envelop petersburg towards the south side railroad as far as possible without attacking fortifications. on the 16th the enemy, to reinforce petersburg, withdrew from a part of his intrenchment in front of bermuda hundred, expecting, no doubt, to get troops from north of the james to take the place of those withdrawn before we could discover it. general butler, taking advantage of this, at once moved a force on the railroad between petersburg and richmond. as soon as i was apprised of the advantage thus gained, to retain it i ordered two divisions of the 6th corps, general wright commanding, that were embarking at wilcox's landing, under orders for city point, to report to general butler at bermuda hundred, of which general butler was notified, and the importance of holding a position in advance of his present line urged upon him. about two o'clock in the afternoon general butler was forced back to the line the enemy had withdrawn from in the morning. general wright, with his two divisions, joined general butler on the forenoon of the 17th, the latter still holding with a strong picket-line the enemy's works. but instead of putting these divisions into the enemy's works to hold them, he permitted them to halt and rest some distance in the rear of his own line. between four and five o'clock in the afternoon the enemy attacked and drove in his pickets and re-occupied his old line. on the night of the 20th and morning of the 21st a lodgment was effected by general butler, with one brigade of infantry, on the north bank of the james, at deep bottom, and connected by pontoon-bridge with bermuda hundred. on the 19th, general sheridan, on his return from his expedition against the virginia central railroad, arrived at the white house just as the enemy's cavalry was about to attack it, and compelled it to retire. the result of this expedition was, that general sheridan met the enemy's cavalry near trevilian station, on the morning of the 11th of june, whom he attacked, and after an obstinate contest drove from the field in complete rout. he left his dead and nearly all his wounded in our hands, and about four hundred prisoners and several hundred horses. on the 12th he destroyed the railroad from trevilian station to louisa court house. this occupied until three o'clock p.m., when he advanced in the direction of gordonsville. he found the enemy reinforced by infantry, behind well-constructed rifle-pits, about five miles from the latter place and too strong to successfully assault. on the extreme right, however, his reserve brigade carried the enemy's works twice, and was twice driven therefrom by infantry. night closed the contest. not having sufficient ammunition to continue the engagement, and his animals being without forage (the country furnishing but inferior grazing), and hearing nothing from general hunter, he withdrew his command to the north side of the north anna, and commenced his return march, reaching white house at the time before stated. after breaking up the depot at that place, he moved to the james river, which he reached safely after heavy fighting. he commenced crossing on the 25th, near fort powhatan, without further molestation, and rejoined the army of the potomac. on the 22d, general wilson, with his own division of cavalry of the army of the potomac, and general kautz's division of cavalry of the army of the james moved against the enemy's railroads south of richmond. striking the weldon railroad at reams's station, destroying the depot and several miles of the road, and the south side road about fifteen miles from petersburg, to near nottoway station, where he met and defeated a force of the enemy's cavalry. he reached burkesville station on the afternoon of the 23d, and from there destroyed the danville railroad to roanoke bridge, a distance of twenty-five miles, where he found the enemy in force, and in a position from which he could not dislodge him. he then commenced his return march, and on the 28th met the enemy's cavalry in force at the weldon railroad crossing of stony creek, where he had a severe but not decisive engagement. thence he made a detour from his left with a view of reaching reams's station (supposing it to be in our possession). at this place he was met by the enemy's cavalry, supported by infantry, and forced to retire, with the loss of his artillery and trains. in this last encounter, general kautz, with a part of his command, became separated, and made his way into our lines. general wilson, with the remainder of his force, succeeded in crossing the nottoway river and coming in safely on our left and rear. the damage to the enemy in this expedition more than compensated for the losses we sustained. it severed all connection by railroad with richmond for several weeks. with a view of cutting the enemy's railroad from near richmond to the anna rivers, and making him wary of the situation of his army in the shenandoah, and, in the event of failure in this, to take advantage of his necessary withdrawal of troops from petersburg, to explode a mine that had been prepared in front of the 9th corps and assault the enemy's lines at that place, on the night of the 26th of july the 2d corps and two divisions of the cavalry corps and kautz's cavalry were crossed to the north bank of the james river and joined the force general butler had there. on the 27th the enemy was driven from his intrenched position, with the loss of four pieces of artillery. on the 28th our lines were extended from deep bottom to new market road, but in getting this position were attacked by the enemy in heavy force. the fighting lasted for several hours, resulting in considerable loss to both sides. the first object of this move having failed, by reason of the very large force thrown there by the enemy, i determined to take advantage of the diversion made, by assaulting petersburg before he could get his force back there. one division of the 2d corps was withdrawn on the night of the 28th, and moved during the night to the rear of the 18th corps, to relieve that corps in the line, that it might be foot-loose in the assault to be made. the other two divisions of the 2d corps and sheridan's cavalry were crossed over on the night of the 29th and moved in front of petersburg. on the morning of the 30th, between four and five o'clock, the mine was sprung, blowing up a battery and most of a regiment, and the advance of the assaulting column, formed of the 9th corps, immediately took possession of the crater made by the explosion, and the line for some distance to the right and left of it, and a detached line in front of it, but for some cause failed to advance promptly to the ridge beyond. had they done this, i have every reason to believe that petersburg would have fallen. other troops were immediately pushed forward, but the time consumed in getting them up enabled the enemy to rally from his surprise (which had been complete), and get forces to this point for its defence. the captured line thus held being untenable, and of no advantage to us, the troops were withdrawn, but not without heavy loss. thus terminated in disaster what promised to be the most successful assault of the campaign. immediately upon the enemy's ascertaining that general hunter was retreating from lynchburg by way of the kanawha river, thus laying the shenandoah valley open for raid into maryland and pennsylvania, he returned northward and moved down that valley. as soon as this movement of the enemy was ascertained, general hunter, who had reached the kanawha river, was directed to move his troops without delay, by river and railroad, to harper's ferry; but owing to the difficulty of navigation by reason of low water and breaks in the railroad, great delay was experienced in getting there. it became necessary, therefore, to find other troops to check this movement of the enemy. for this purpose the 6th corps was taken from the armies operating against richmond, to which was added the 19th corps, then fortunately beginning to arrive in hampton roads from the gulf department, under orders issued immediately after the ascertainment of the result of the red river expedition. the garrisons of baltimore and washington were at this time made up of heavy-artillery regiments, hundred days' men, and detachments from the invalid corps. one division under command of general ricketts, of the 6th corps, was sent to baltimore, and the remaining two divisions of the 6th corps, under general wright, were subsequently sent to washington. on the 3d of july the enemy approached martinsburg. general sigel, who was in command of our forces there, retreated across the potomac at shepherdtown; and general weber, commanding at harper's ferry, crossed the occupied hagerstown, moving a strong column towards frederick city. general wallace, with rickett's division and his own command, the latter mostly new and undisciplined troops, pushed out from baltimore with great promptness, and met the enemy in force on the monocacy, near the crossing of the railroad bridge. his force was not sufficient to insure success, but he fought the enemy nevertheless, and although it resulted in a defeat to our arms, yet it detained the enemy, and thereby served to enable general wright to reach washington with two division of the 6th corps, and the advance of the 19th corps, before him. from monocacy the enemy moved on washington, his cavalry advance reaching rockville on the evening of the 10th. on the 12th a reconnoissance was thrown out in front of fort stevens, to ascertain the enemy's position and force. a severe skirmish ensued, in which we lost about two hundred and eighty in killed and wounded. the enemy's loss was probably greater. he commenced retreating during the night. learning the exact condition of affairs at washington, i requested by telegraph, at forty-five minutes past eleven p.m., on the 12th, the assignment of major-general h. g. wright to the command of all the troops that could be made available to operate in the field against the enemy, and directed that he should get outside of the trenches with all the force he could, and push early to the last moment. general wright commenced the pursuit on the 13th; on the 18th the enemy was overtaken at snicker's ferry, on the shenandoah, when a sharp skirmish occurred; and on the 20th, general averell encountered and defeated a portion of the rebel army at winchester, capturing four pieces of artillery and several hundred prisoners. learning that early was retreating south towards lynchburg or richmond, i directed that the 6th and 19th corps be got back to the armies operating against richmond, so that they might be used in a movement against lee before the return of the troops sent by him into the valley; and that hunter should remain in the shenandoah valley, keeping between any force of the enemy and washington, acting on the defensive as much as possible. i felt that if the enemy had any notion of returning, the fact would be developed before the 6th and 19th corps could leave washington. subsequently, the 19th corps was excepted form the order to return to the james. about the 25th it became evident that the enemy was again advancing upon maryland and pennsylvania, and the 6th corps, then at washington, was ordered back to the vicinity of harper's ferry. the rebel force moved down the valley, and sent a raiding party into pennsylvania which on the 30th burned chambersburg, and then retreated, pursued by our cavalry, towards cumberland. they were met and defeated by general kelley, and with diminished numbers escaped into the mountains of west virginia. from the time of the first raid the telegraph wires were frequently down between washington and city point, making it necessary to transmit messages a part of the way by boat. it took from twenty-four to thirty-six hours to get dispatches through and return answers would be received showing a different state of facts from those on which they were based, causing confusion and apparent contradiction of orders that must have considerably embarrassed those who had to execute them, and rendered operations against the enemy less effective than they otherwise would have been. to remedy this evil, it was evident to my mind that some person should have the supreme command of all the forces in the department of west virginia, washington, susquehanna, and the middle department, and i so recommended. on the 2d of august, i ordered general sheridan to report in person to major-general halleck, chief of staff, at washington, with a view to his assignment to the command of all the forces against early. at this time the enemy was concentrated in the neighborhood of winchester, while our forces, under general hunter, were concentrated on the monocacy, at the crossing of the baltimore and ohio railroad, leaving open to the enemy western maryland and southern pennsylvania. from where i was, i hesitated to give positive orders for the movement of our forces at monocacy, lest by so doing i should expose washington. therefore, on the 4th, i left city point to visit hunter's command, and determine for myself what was best to be done. on arrival there, and after consultation with general hunter, i issued to him the following instructions: "monocacy bridge, maryland, august 5, 1864--8 p.m. "general:--concentrate all your available force without delay in the vicinity of harper's ferry, leaving only such railroad guards and garrisons for public property as may be necessary. use, in this concentrating, the railroad, if by so doing time can be saved. from harper's ferry, if it is found that the enemy has moved north of the potomac in large force, push north, following him and attacking him wherever found; follow him, if driven south of the potomac, as long as it is safe to do so. if it is ascertained that the enemy has but a small force north of the potomac, then push south with the main force, detaching under a competent commander, a sufficient force to look after the raiders, and drive them to their homes. in detaching such a force, the brigade of the cavalry now en route from washington via rockville may be taken into account. "there are now on their way to join you three other brigades of the best cavalry, numbering at least five thousand men and horses. these will be instructed, in the absence of further orders, to join you by the south side of the potomac. one brigade will probably start to-morrow. in pushing up the shenandoah valley, where it is expected you will have to go first or last, it is desirable that nothing should be left to invite the enemy to return. take all provisions, forage, and stock wanted for the use of your command; such as cannot be consumed, destroy. it is not desirable that the buildings should be destroyed--they should rather be protected; but the people should be informed that, so long as an army can subsist among them, recurrence of theses raids must be expected, and we are determined to stop them at all hazards. "bear in mind, the object is to drive the enemy south; and to do this you want to keep him always in sight. be guided in your course by the course he takes. "make your own arrangements for supplies of all kinds, giving regular vouchers for such as may be taken from loyal citizens in the country through which you march. "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "major-general d. hunter." the troops were immediately put in motion, and the advance reached halltown that night. general hunter having, in our conversation, expressed a willingness to be relieved from command, i telegraphed to have general sheridan, then at washington, sent to harper's ferry by the morning train, with orders to take general command of all the troops in the field, and to call on general hunter at monocacy, who would turn over to him my letter of instructions. i remained at monocacy until general sheridan arrived, on the morning of the 6th, and, after a conference with him in relation to military affairs in that vicinity, i returned to city point by way of washington. on the 7th of august, the middle department, and the departments of west virginia, washington, and susquehanna, were constituted into the "middle military division," and major-general sheridan was assigned to temporary command of the same. two divisions of cavalry, commanded by generals torbert and wilson, were sent to sheridan from the army of the potomac. the first reached him at harper's ferry about the 11th of august. his operations during the month of august and the fore part of september were both of an offensive and defensive character, resulting in many severe skirmishes, principally by the cavalry, in which we were generally successful, but no general engagement took place. the two armies lay in such a position--the enemy on the west bank of the opequon creek covering winchester, and our forces in front of berryville--that either could bring on a battle at any time. defeat to us would lay open to the enemy the states of maryland and pennsylvania for long distances before another army could be interposed to check him. under these circumstances i hesitated about allowing the initiative to be taken. finally, the use of the baltimore and ohio railroad, and the chesapeake and ohio canal, which were both obstructed by the enemy, became so indispensably necessary to us, and the importance of relieving pennsylvania and maryland from continuously threatened invasion so great, that i determined the risk should be taken. but fearing to telegraph the order for an attack without knowing more than i did of general sheridan's feelings as to what would be the probable result, i left city point on the 15th of september to visit him at his headquarters, to decide, after conference with him, what should be done. i met him at charlestown, and he pointed out so distinctly how each army lay; what he could do the moment he was authorized, and expressed such confidence of success, that i saw there were but two words of instructions necessary--go in! for the conveniences of forage, the teams for supplying the army were kept at harper's ferry. i asked him if he could get out his teams and supplies in time to make an attack on the ensuing tuesday morning. his reply was, that he could before daylight on monday. he was off promptly to time, and i may here add, that the result was such that i have never since deemed it necessary to visit general sheridan before giving him orders. early on the morning of the 19th, general sheridan attacked general early at the crossing on the opequon creek, and after a most sanguinary and bloody battle, lasting until five o'clock in the evening, defeated him with heavy loss, carrying his entire position from opequon creek to winchester, capturing several thousand prisoners and five pieces of artillery. the enemy rallied, and made a stand in a strong position at fisher's hill, where he was attacked, and again defeated with heavy loss on the 20th [22d]. sheridan pursued him with great energy through harrisonburg, staunton, and the gaps of the blue ridge. after stripping the upper valley of most of the supplies and provisions for the rebel army, he returned to strasburg, and took position on the north side of cedar creek. having received considerable reinforcements, general early again returned to the valley, and, on the 9th of october, his cavalry encountered ours near strasburg, where the rebels were defeated, with the loss of eleven pieces of artillery and three hundred and fifty prisoners. on the night of the 18th, the enemy crossed the mountains which separate the branches of the shenandoah, forded the north fork, and early on the morning of the 19th, under cover of the darkness and the fog, surprised and turned our left flank, and captured the batteries which enfiladed our whole line. our troops fell back with heavy loss and in much confusion, but were finally rallied between middletown and newtown. at this juncture, general sheridan, who was at winchester when the battle commenced arrived on the field, arranged his lines just in time to repulse a heavy attack of the enemy, and immediately assuming the offensive, he attacked in turn with great vigor. the enemy was defeated with great slaughter, and the loss of most of his artillery and trains, and the trophies he had captured in the morning. the wreck of his army escaped during the night, and fled in the direction of staunton and lynchburg. pursuit was made to mount jackson. thus ended this, the enemy's last attempt to invade the north via the shenandoah valley. i was now enabled to return the 6th corps to the army of the potomac, and to send one division from sheridan's army to the army of the james, and another to savannah, georgia, to hold sherman's new acquisitions on the sea-coast, and thus enable him to move without detaching from his force for that purpose. reports from various sources led me to believe that the enemy had detached three divisions from petersburg to reinforce early in the shenandoah valley. i therefore sent the 2d corps and gregg's division of cavalry, of the army of the potomac, and a force of general butler's army, on the night of the 13th of august, to threaten richmond from the north side of the james, to prevent him from sending troops away, and, if possible, to draw back those sent. in this move we captured six pieces of artillery and several hundred prisoners, detained troops that were under marching orders, and ascertained that but one division (kershaw's), of the three reputed detached, had gone. the enemy having withdrawn heavily from petersburg to resist this movement, the 5th corps, general warren commanding, was moved out on the 18th, and took possession of the weldon railroad. during the day he had considerable fighting. to regain possession of the road, the enemy made repeated and desperate assaults, but was each time repulsed with great loss. on the night of the 20th, the troops on the north side of the james were withdrawn, and hancock and gregg returned to the front at petersburg. on the 25th, the 2d corps and gregg's division of cavalry, while at reams's station destroying the railroad, were attacked, and after desperate fighting, a part of our line gave way, and five pieces of artillery fell into the hands of the enemy. by the 12th of september, a branch railroad was completed from the city point and petersburg railroad to the weldon railroad, enabling us to supply, without difficulty, in all weather, the army in front of petersburg. the extension of our lines across the weldon railroad compelled the enemy to so extend his, that it seemed he could have but few troops north of the james for the defence of richmond. on the night of the 28th, the 10th corps, major-general birney, and the 18th corps, major-general ord commanding, of general butler's army, were crossed to the north side of the james, and advanced on the morning of the 29th, carrying the very strong fortifications and intrenchments below chaffin's farm, known as fort harrison, capturing fifteen pieces of artillery, and the new market road and intrenchments. this success was followed up by a gallant assault upon fort gilmer, immediately in front of the chaffin farm fortifications, in which we were repulsed with heavy loss. kautz's cavalry was pushed forward on the road to the right of this, supported by infantry, and reached the enemy's inner line, but was unable to get further. the position captured from the enemy was so threatening to richmond, that i determined to hold it. the enemy made several desperate attempts to dislodge us, all of which were unsuccessful, and for which he paid dearly. on the morning of the 30th, general meade sent out a reconnoissance with a view to attacking the enemy's line, if it was found sufficiently weakened by withdrawal of troops to the north side. in this reconnoissance we captured and held the enemy's works near poplar spring church. in the afternoon, troops moving to get to the left of the point gained were attacked by the enemy in heavy force, and compelled to fall back until supported by the forces holding the captured works. our cavalry under gregg was also attacked, but repulsed the enemy with great loss. on the 7th of october, the enemy attacked kautz's cavalry north of the james, and drove it back with heavy loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners, and the loss of all the artillery eight or nine pieces. this he followed up by an attack on our intrenched infantry line, but was repulsed with severe slaughter. on the 13th, a reconnoissance was sent out by general butler, with a view to drive the enemy from some new works he was constructing, which resulted in very heavy loss to us. on the 27th, the army of the potomac, leaving only sufficient men to hold its fortified line, moved by the enemy's right flank. the 2d corps, followed by two divisions of the 5th corps, with the cavalry in advance and covering our left flank, forced a passage of hatcher's run, and moved up the south side of it towards the south side railroad, until the 2d corps and part of the cavalry reached the boydton plank road where it crosses hatcher's run. at this point we were six miles distant from the south side railroad, which i had hoped by this movement to reach and hold. but finding that we had not reached the end of the enemy's fortifications, and no place presenting itself for a successful assault by which he might be doubled up and shortened, i determined to withdraw to within our fortified line. orders were given accordingly. immediately upon receiving a report that general warren had connected with general hancock, i returned to my headquarters. soon after i left the enemy moved out across hatcher's run, in the gap between generals hancock and warren, which was not closed as reported, and made a desperate attack on general hancock's right and rear. general hancock immediately faced his corps to meet it, and after a bloody combat drove the enemy within his works, and withdrew that night to his old position. in support of this movement, general butler made a demonstration on the north side of the james, and attacked the enemy on the williamsburg road, and also on the york river railroad. in the former he was unsuccessful; in the latter he succeeded in carrying a work which was afterwards abandoned, and his forces withdrawn to their former positions. from this time forward the operations in front of petersburg and richmond, until the spring campaign of 1865, were confined to the defence and extension of our lines, and to offensive movements for crippling the enemy's lines of communication, and to prevent his detaching any considerable force to send south. by the 7th of february, our lines were extended to hatcher's run, and the weldon railroad had been destroyed to hicksford. general sherman moved from chattanooga on the 6th of may, with the armies of the cumberland, tennessee, and ohio, commanded, respectively, by generals thomas mcpherson, and schofield, upon johnston's army at dalton; but finding the enemy's position at buzzard's roost, covering dalton, too strong to be assaulted, general mcpherson was sent through snake gap to turn it, while generals thomas and schofield threatened it in front and on the north. this movement was successful. johnston, finding his retreat likely to be cut off, fell back to his fortified position at resaca, where he was attacked on the afternoon of may 15th. a heavy battle ensued. during the night the enemy retreated south. late on the 17th, his rear-guard was overtaken near adairsville, and heavy skirmishing followed. the next morning, however, he had again disappeared. he was vigorously pursued, and was overtaken at cassville on the 19th, but during the ensuing night retreated across the etowah. while these operations were going on, general jefferson c. davis's division of thomas's army was sent to rome, capturing it with its forts and artillery, and its valuable mills and foundries. general sherman, having give his army a few days' rest at this point, again put it in motion on the 23d, for dallas, with a view of turning the difficult pass at allatoona. on the afternoon of the 25th, the advance, under general hooker, had a severe battle with the enemy, driving him back to new hope church, near dallas. several sharp encounters occurred at this point. the most important was on the 28th, when the enemy assaulted general mcpherson at dallas, but received a terrible and bloody repulse. on the 4th of june, johnston abandoned his intrenched position at new hope church, and retreated to the strong positions of kenesaw, pine, and lost mountains. he was forced to yield the two last-named places, and concentrate his army on kenesaw, where, on the 27th, generals thomas and mcpherson made a determined but unsuccessful assault. on the night of the 2d of july, sherman commenced moving his army by the right flank, and on the morning of the 3d, found that the enemy, in consequence of this movement, had abandoned kenesaw and retreated across the chattahoochee. general sherman remained on the chattahoochee to give his men rest and get up stores until the 17th of july, when he resumed his operations, crossed the chattahoochee, destroyed a large portion of the railroad to augusta, and drove the enemy back to atlanta. at this place general hood succeeded general johnston in command of the rebel army, and assuming the offensive-defensive policy, made several severe attacks upon sherman in the vicinity of atlanta, the most desperate and determined of which was on the 22d of july. about one p.m. of this day the brave, accomplished, and noble-hearted mcpherson was killed. general logan succeeded him, and commanded the army of the tennessee through this desperate battle, and until he was superseded by major-general howard, on the 26th, with the same success and ability that had characterized him in the command of a corps or division. in all these attacks the enemy was repulsed with great loss. finding it impossible to entirely invest the place, general sherman, after securing his line of communications across the chattahoochee, moved his main force round by the enemy's left flank upon the montgomery and macon roads, to draw the enemy from his fortifications. in this he succeeded, and after defeating the enemy near rough-and-ready, jonesboro, and lovejoy's, forcing him to retreat to the south, on the 2d of september occupied atlanta, the objective point of his campaign. about the time of this move, the rebel cavalry, under wheeler, attempted to cut his communications in the rear, but was repulsed at dalton, and driven into east tennessee, whence it proceeded west to mcminnville, murfreesboro, and franklin, and was finally driven south of the tennessee. the damage done by this raid was repaired in a few days. during the partial investment of atlanta, general rousseau joined general sherman with a force of cavalry from decatur, having made a successful raid upon the atlanta and montgomery railroad, and its branches near opelika. cavalry raids were also made by generals mccook, garrard, and stoneman, to cut the remaining railroad communication with atlanta. the first two were successful the latter, disastrous. general sherman's movement from chattanooga to atlanta was prompt, skilful, and brilliant. the history of his flank movements and battles during that memorable campaign will ever be read with an interest unsurpassed by anything in history. his own report, and those of his subordinate commanders, accompanying it, give the details of that most successful campaign. he was dependent for the supply of his armies upon a single-track railroad from nashville to the point where he was operating. this passed the entire distance through a hostile country, and every foot of it had to be protected by troops. the cavalry force of the enemy under forrest, in northern mississippi, was evidently waiting for sherman to advance far enough into the mountains of georgia, to make a retreat disastrous, to get upon this line and destroy it beyond the possibility of further use. to guard against this danger, sherman left what he supposed to be a sufficient force to operate against forrest in west tennessee. he directed general washburn, who commanded there, to send brigadier-general s. d. sturgis in command of this force to attack him. on the morning of the 10th of june, general sturgis met the enemy near guntown, mississippi, was badly beaten, and driven back in utter rout and confusion to memphis, a distance of about one hundred miles, hotly pursued by the enemy. by this, however, the enemy was defeated in his designs upon sherman's line of communications. the persistency with which he followed up this success exhausted him, and made a season for rest and repairs necessary. in the meantime, major-general a. j. smith, with the troops of the army of the tennessee that had been sent by general sherman to general banks, arrived at memphis on their return from red river, where they had done most excellent service. he was directed by general sherman to immediately take the offensive against forrest. this he did with the promptness and effect which has characterized his whole military career. on the 14th of july, he met the enemy at tupelo, mississippi, and whipped him badly. the fighting continued through three days. our loss was small compared with that of the enemy. having accomplished the object of his expedition, general smith returned to memphis. during the months of march and april this same force under forrest annoyed us considerably. on the 24th of march it captured union city, kentucky, and its garrison, and on the 24th attacked paducah, commanded by colonel s. g. hicks, 40th illinois volunteers. colonel h., having but a small force, withdrew to the forts near the river, from where he repulsed the enemy and drove him from the place. on the 13th of april, part of this force, under the rebel general buford, summoned the garrison of columbus, kentucky, to surrender, but received for reply from colonel lawrence, 34th new jersey volunteers, that being placed there by his government with adequate force to hold his post and repel all enemies from it, surrender was out of the question. on the morning of the same day forrest attacked fort pillow, tennessee, garrisoned by a detachment of tennessee cavalry and the 1st regiment alabama colored troops, commanded by major booth. the garrison fought bravely until about three o'clock in the afternoon, when the enemy carried the works by assault; and, after our men threw down their arms, proceeded to an inhuman and merciless massacre of the garrison. on the 14th, general buford, having failed at columbus, appeared before paducah, but was again driven off. guerillas and raiders, seemingly emboldened by forrest's operations, were also very active in kentucky. the most noted of these was morgan. with a force of from two to three thousand cavalry, he entered the state through pound gap in the latter part of may. on the 11th of june they attacked and captured cynthiana, with its entire garrison. on the 12th he was overtaken by general burbridge, and completely routed with heavy loss, and was finally driven out of the state. this notorious guerilla was afterwards surprised and killed near greenville, tennessee, and his command captured and dispersed by general gillem. in the absence of official reports of the commencement of the red river expedition, except so far as relates to the movements of the troops sent by general sherman under general a. j. smith, i am unable to give the date of its starting. the troops under general smith, comprising two divisions of the 16th and a detachment of the 17th army corps, left vicksburg on the 10th of march, and reached the designated point on red river one day earlier than that appointed by general banks. the rebel forces at fort de russy, thinking to defeat him, left the fort on the 14th to give him battle in the open field; but, while occupying the enemy with skirmishing and demonstrations, smith pushed forward to fort de russy, which had been left with a weak garrison, and captured it with its garrison about three hundred and fifty men, eleven pieces of artillery, and many small-arms. our loss was but slight. on the 15th he pushed forward to alexandria, which place he reached on the 18th. on the 21st he had an engagement with the enemy at henderson's hill, in which he defeated him, capturing two hundred and ten prisoners and four pieces of artillery. on the 28th, he again attacked and defeated the enemy under the rebel general taylor, at cane river. by the 26th, general banks had assembled his whole army at alexandria, and pushed forward to grand ecore. on the morning of april 6th he moved from grand ecore. on the afternoon of the 7th, he advanced and met the enemy near pleasant hill, and drove him from the field. on the same afternoon the enemy made a stand eight miles beyond pleasant hill, but was again compelled to retreat. on the 8th, at sabine cross roads and peach hill, the enemy attacked and defeated his advance, capturing nineteen pieces of artillery and an immense amount of transportation and stores. during the night, general banks fell back to pleasant hill, where another battle was fought on the 9th, and the enemy repulsed with great loss. during the night, general banks continued his retrograde movement to grand ecore, and thence to alexandria, which he reached on the 27th of april. here a serious difficulty arose in getting admiral porter's fleet which accompanied the expedition, over the rapids, the water having fallen so much since they passed up as to prevent their return. at the suggestion of colonel (now brigadier-general) bailey, and under his superintendence, wing-dams were constructed, by which the channel was contracted so that the fleet passed down the rapids in safety. the army evacuated alexandria on the 14th of may, after considerable skirmishing with the enemy's advance, and reached morganzia and point coupee near the end of the month. the disastrous termination of this expedition, and the lateness of the season, rendered impracticable the carrying out of my plans of a movement in force sufficient to insure the capture of mobile. on the 23d of march, major-general steele left little rock with the 7th army corps, to cooperate with general banks's expedition on the red river, and reached arkadelphia on the 28th. on the 16th of april, after driving the enemy before him, he was joined, near elkin's ferry, in washita county, by general thayer, who had marched from fort smith. after several severe skirmishes, in which the enemy was defeated, general steele reached camden, which he occupied about the middle of april. on learning the defeat and consequent retreat of general banks on red river, and the loss of one of his own trains at mark's mill, in dallas county, general steele determined to fall back to the arkansas river. he left camden on the 26th of april, and reached little rock on the 2d of may. on the 30th of april, the enemy attacked him while crossing saline river at jenkins's ferry, but was repulsed with considerable loss. our loss was about six hundred in killed, wounded and prisoners. major-general canby, who had been assigned to the command of the "military division of the west mississippi," was therefore directed to send the 19th army corps to join the armies operating against richmond, and to limit the remainder of his command to such operations as might be necessary to hold the positions and lines of communications he then occupied. before starting general a. j. smith's troops back to sherman, general canby sent a part of it to disperse a force of the enemy that was collecting near the mississippi river. general smith met and defeated this force near lake chicot on the 5th of june. our loss was about forty killed and seventy wounded. in the latter part of july, general canby sent major-general gordon granger, with such forces as he could collect, to co-operate with admiral farragut against the defences of mobile bay. on the 8th of august, fort gaines surrendered to the combined naval and land forces. fort powell was blown up and abandoned. on the 9th, fort morgan was invested, and, after a severe bombardment, surrendered on the 23d. the total captures amounted to one thousand four hundred and sixty-four prisoners, and one hundred and four pieces of artillery. about the last of august, it being reported that the rebel general price, with a force of about ten thousand men, had reached jacksonport, on his way to invade missouri, general a. j. smith's command, then en route from memphis to join sherman, was ordered to missouri. a cavalry force was also, at the same time, sent from memphis, under command of colonel winslow. this made general rosecrans's forces superior to those of price, and no doubt was entertained he would be able to check price and drive him back; while the forces under general steele, in arkansas, would cut off his retreat. on the 26th day of september, price attacked pilot knob and forced the garrison to retreat, and thence moved north to the missouri river, and continued up that river towards kansas. general curtis, commanding department of kansas, immediately collected such forces as he could to repel the invasion of kansas, while general rosecrans's cavalry was operating in his rear. the enemy was brought to battle on the big blue and defeated, with the loss of nearly all his artillery and trains and a large number of prisoners. he made a precipitate retreat to northern arkansas. the impunity with which price was enabled to roam over the state of missouri for a long time, and the incalculable mischief done by him, show to how little purpose a superior force may be used. there is no reason why general rosecrans should not have concentrated his forces, and beaten and driven price before the latter reached pilot knob. september 20th, the enemy's cavalry, under forrest, crossed the tennessee near waterloo, alabama, and on the 23d attacked the garrison at athens, consisting of six hundred men, which capitulated on the 24th. soon after the surrender two regiments of reinforcements arrived, and after a severe fight were compelled to surrender. forrest destroyed the railroad westward, captured the garrison at sulphur branch trestle, skirmished with the garrison at pulaski on the 27th, and on the same day cut the nashville and chattanooga railroad near tullahoma and dechard. on the morning of the 30th, one column of forrest's command, under buford, appeared before huntsville, and summoned the surrender of the garrison. receiving an answer in the negative, he remained in the vicinity of the place until next morning, when he again summoned its surrender, and received the same reply as on the night before. he withdrew in the direction of athens which place had been regarrisoned, and attacked it on the afternoon of the 1st of october, but without success. on the morning of the 2d he renewed his attack, but was handsomely repulsed. another column under forrest appeared before columbia on the morning of the 1st, but did not make an attack. on the morning of the 3d he moved towards mount pleasant. while these operations were going on, every exertion was made by general thomas to destroy the forces under forrest before he could recross the tennessee, but was unable to prevent his escape to corinth, mississippi. in september, an expedition under general burbridge was sent to destroy the saltworks at saltville, virginia. he met the enemy on the 2d of october, about three miles and a half from saltville, and drove him into his strongly intrenched position around the salt-works, from which he was unable to dislodge him. during the night he withdrew his command and returned to kentucky. general sherman, immediately after the fall of atlanta, put his armies in camp in and about the place, and made all preparations for refitting and supplying them for future service. the great length of road from atlanta to the cumberland river, however, which had to be guarded, allowed the troops but little rest. during this time jefferson davis made a speech in macon, georgia, which was reported in the papers of the south, and soon became known to the whole country, disclosing the plans of the enemy, thus enabling general sherman to fully meet them. he exhibited the weakness of supposing that an army that had been beaten and fearfully decimated in a vain attempt at the defensive, could successfully undertake the offensive against the army that had so often defeated it. in execution of this plan, hood, with this army, was soon reported to the south-west of atlanta. moving far to sherman's right, he succeeded in reaching the railroad about big shanty, and moved north on it. general sherman, leaving a force to hold atlanta, with the remainder of his army fell upon him and drove him to gadsden, alabama. seeing the constant annoyance he would have with the roads to his rear if he attempted to hold atlanta, general sherman proposed the abandonment and destruction of that place, with all the railroads leading to it, and telegraphed me as follows: "centreville, georgia", october 10--noon. "dispatch about wilson just received. hood is now crossing coosa river, twelve miles below rome, bound west. if he passes over the mobile and ohio road, had i not better execute the plan of my letter sent by colonel porter, and leave general thomas with the troops now in tennessee to defend the state? he will have an ample force when the reinforcements ordered reach nashville. "w. t. sherman, major-general. "lieutenant-general grant." for a full understanding of the plan referred to in this dispatch, i quote from the letter sent by colonel porter: "i will therefore give my opinion, that your army and canby's should be reinforced to the maximum; that after you get wilmington, you strike for savannah and the river; that canby be instructed to hold the mississippi river, and send a force to get columbus, georgia, either by the way of the alabama or the appalachicola, and that i keep hood employed and put my army in final order for a march on augusta, columbia, and charleston, to be ready as soon as wilmington is sealed as to commerce and the city of savannah is in our possession." this was in reply to a letter of mine of date september 12th, in answer to a dispatch of his containing substantially the same proposition, and in which i informed him of a proposed movement against wilmington, and of the situation in virginia, etc. "city point, virginia, "october 11, 1864--11 a.m. "your dispatch of october 10th received. does it not look as if hood was going to attempt the invasion of middle tennessee, using the mobile and ohio and memphis and charleston roads to supply his base on the tennessee river, about florence or decatur? if he does this, he ought to be met and prevented from getting north of the tennessee river. if you were to cut loose, i do not believe you would meet hood's army, but would be bushwhacked by all the old men and little boys, and such railroad guards as are still left at home. hood would probably strike for nashville, thinking that by going north he could inflict greater damage upon us than we could upon the rebels by going south. if there is any way of getting at hood's army, i would prefer that, but i must trust to your own judgment. i find i shall not be able to send a force from here to act with you on savannah. your movements, therefore, will be independent of mine; at least until the fall of richmond takes place. i am afraid thomas, with such lines of road as he has to protect, could not prevent hood from going north. with wilson turned loose, with all your cavalry, you will find the rebels put much more on the defensive than heretofore. "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "major-general w. t. sherman." "kingston, georgia, "october 11--11 a.m. "hood moved his army from palmetto station across by dallas and cedartown, and is now on the coosa river, south of rome. he threw one corps on my road at acworth, and i was forced to follow. i hold atlanta with the 20th corps, and have strong detachments along my line. this reduces my active force to a comparatively small army. we cannot remain here on the defensive. with the twenty-five thousand men, and the bold cavalry he has, he can constantly break my roads. i would infinitely prefer to make a wreck of the road, and of the country from chattanooga to atlanta including the latter city send back all my wounded and worthless, and with my effective army, move through georgia, smashing things, to the sea. hood may turn into tennessee and kentucky, but i believe he will be forced to follow me. instead of my being on the defensive, i would be on the offensive; instead of guessing at what he means to do, he would have to guess at my plans. the difference in war is full twenty-five per cent. i can make savannah, charleston, or the mouth of the chattahoochee. "answer quick, as i know we will not have the telegraph long. "w. t. sherman, major-general. "lieutenant-general grant." "city point, virginia, "october 11,1864--11.30 p.m. "your dispatch of to-day received. if you are satisfied the trip to the sea-coast can be made, holding the line of the tennessee river firmly, you may make it, destroying all the railroad south of dalton or chattanooga, as you think best. "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "major-general w. t. sherman." it was the original design to hold atlanta, and by getting through to the coast, with a garrison left on the southern railroads, leading east and west, through georgia, to effectually sever the east from the west. in other words, cut the would-be confederacy in two again, as it had been cut once by our gaining possession of the mississippi river. general sherman's plan virtually effected this object. general sherman commenced at once his preparations for his proposed movement, keeping his army in position in the meantime to watch hood. becoming satisfied that hood had moved westward from gadsden across sand mountain, general sherman sent the 4th corps, major-general stanley commanding, and the 23d corps, major-general schofield commanding, back to chattanooga to report to major-general thomas, at nashville, whom he had placed in command of all the troops of his military division, save the four army corps and cavalry division he designed to move with through georgia. with the troops thus left at his disposal, there was little doubt that general thomas could hold the line of the tennessee, or, in the event hood should force it, would be able to concentrate and beat him in battle. it was therefore readily consented to that sherman should start for the sea-coast. having concentrated his troops at atlanta by the 14th of november, he commenced his march, threatening both augusta and macon. his coming-out point could not be definitely fixed. having to gather his subsistence as he marched through the country, it was not impossible that a force inferior to his own might compel him to head for such point as he could reach, instead of such as he might prefer. the blindness of the enemy, however, in ignoring his movement, and sending hood's army, the only considerable force he had west of richmond and east of the mississippi river, northward on an offensive campaign, left the whole country open, and sherman's route to his own choice. how that campaign was conducted, how little opposition was met with, the condition of the country through which the armies passed, the capture of fort mcallister, on the savannah river, and the occupation of savannah on the 21st of december, are all clearly set forth in general sherman's admirable report. soon after general sherman commenced his march from atlanta, two expeditions, one from baton rouge, louisiana, and one from vicksburg, mississippi, were started by general canby to cut the enemy's lines of communication with mobile and detain troops in that field. general foster, commanding department of the south, also sent an expedition, via broad river, to destroy the railroad between charleston and savannah. the expedition from vicksburg, under command of brevet brigadier-general e. d. osband (colonel 3d united states colored cavalry), captured, on the 27th of november, and destroyed the mississippi central railroad bridge and trestle-work over big black river, near canton, thirty miles of the road, and two locomotives, besides large amounts of stores. the expedition from baton rouge was without favorable results. the expedition from the department of the south, under the immediate command of brigadier-general john p. hatch, consisting of about five thousand men of all arms, including a brigade from the navy, proceeded up broad river and debarked at boyd's neck on the 29th of november, from where it moved to strike the railroad at grahamsville. at honey hill, about three miles from grahamsville, the enemy was found and attacked in a strongly fortified position, which resulted, after severe fighting, in our repulse with a loss of seven hundred and forty-six in killed, wounded, and missing. during the night general hatch withdrew. on the 6th of december general foster obtained a position covering the charleston and savannah railroad, between the coosawhatchie and tulifinny rivers. hood, instead of following sherman, continued his move northward, which seemed to me to be leading to his certain doom. at all events, had i had the power to command both armies, i should not have changed the orders under which he seemed to be acting. on the 26th of october, the advance of hood's army attacked the garrison at decatur, alabama, but failing to carry the place, withdrew towards courtland, and succeeded, in the face of our cavalry, in effecting a lodgment on the north side of the tennessee river, near florence. on the 28th, forrest reached the tennessee, at fort heiman, and captured a gunboat and three transports. on the 2d of november he planted batteries above and below johnsonville, on the opposite side of the river, isolating three gunboats and eight transports. on the 4th the enemy opened his batteries upon the place, and was replied to from the gunboats and the garrison. the gunboats becoming disabled were set on fire, as also were the transports, to prevent their falling into the hands of the enemy. about a million and a half dollars' worth of store and property on the levee and in storehouses was consumed by fire. on the 5th the enemy disappeared and crossed to the north side of the tennessee river, above johnsonville, moving towards clifton, and subsequently joined hood. on the night of the 5th, general schofield, with the advance of the 23d corps, reached johnsonville, but finding the enemy gone, was ordered to pulaski, and was put in command of all the troopers there, with instruction to watch the movements of hood and retard his advance, but not to risk a general engagement until the arrival of general a. j. smith's command from missouri, and until general wilson could get his cavalry remounted. on the 19th, general hood continued his advance. general thomas, retarding him as much as possible, fell back towards nashville for the purpose of concentrating his command and gaining time for the arrival of reinforcements. the enemy coming up with our main force, commanded by general schofield, at franklin, on the 30th, assaulted our works repeatedly during the afternoon until late at night, but were in every instance repulsed. his loss in this battle was one thousand seven hundred and fifty killed, seven hundred and two prisoners, and three thousand eight hundred wounded. among his losses were six general officers killed, six wounded, and one captured. our entire loss was two thousand three hundred. this was the first serious opposition the enemy met with, and i am satisfied was the fatal blow to all his expectations. during the night, general schofield fell back towards nashville. this left the field to the enemy--not lost by battle, but voluntarily abandoned--so that general thomas's whole force might be brought together. the enemy followed up and commenced the establishment of his line in front of nashville on the 2d of december. as soon as it was ascertained that hood was crossing the tennessee river, and that price was going out of missouri, general rosecrans was ordered to send to general thomas the troops of general a. j. smith's command, and such other troops as he could spare. the advance of this reinforcement reached nashville on the 30th of november. on the morning of the 15th december, general thomas attacked hood in position, and, in a battle lasting two days, defeated and drove him from the field in the utmost confusion, leaving in our hand most of his artillery and many thousand prisoners, including four general officers. before the battle of nashville i grew very impatient over, as it appeared to me, the unnecessary delay. this impatience was increased upon learning that the enemy had sent a force of cavalry across the cumberland into kentucky. i feared hood would cross his whole army and give us great trouble there. after urging upon general thomas the necessity of immediately assuming the offensive, i started west to superintend matters there in person. reaching washington city, i received general thomas's dispatch announcing his attack upon the enemy, and the result as far as the battle had progressed. i was delighted. all fears and apprehensions were dispelled. i am not yet satisfied but that general thomas, immediately upon the appearance of hood before nashville, and before he had time to fortify, should have moved out with his whole force and given him battle, instead of waiting to remount his cavalry, which delayed him until the inclemency of the weather made it impracticable to attack earlier than he did. but his final defeat of hood was so complete, that it will be accepted as a vindication of that distinguished officer's judgment. after hood's defeat at nashville he retreated, closely pursued by cavalry and infantry, to the tennessee river, being forced to abandon many pieces of artillery and most of his transportation. on the 28th of december our advanced forces ascertained that he had made good his escape to the south side of the river. about this time, the rains having set in heavily in tennessee and north alabama, making it difficult to move army transportation and artillery, general thomas stopped the pursuit by his main force at the tennessee river. a small force of cavalry, under colonel w. j. palmer, 15th pennsylvania volunteers, continued to follow hood for some distance, capturing considerable transportation and all the enemy's pontoon-bridge. the details of these operations will be found clearly set forth in general thomas's report. a cavalry expedition, under brevet major-general grierson, started from memphis on the 21st of december. on the 25th he surprised and captured forrest's dismounted camp at verona, mississippi, on the mobile and ohio railroad, destroyed the railroad, sixteen cars loaded with wagons and pontoons for hood's army, four thousand new english carbines, and large amounts of public stores. on the morning of the 28th he attacked and captured a force of the enemy at egypt, and destroyed a train of fourteen cars; thence turning to the south-west, he struck the mississippi central railroad at winona, destroyed the factories and large amounts of stores at bankston, and the machine-shops and public property at grenada, arriving at vicksburg january 5th. during the operations in middle tennessee, the enemy, with a force under general breckinridge, entered east tennessee. on the 13th of november he attacked general gillem, near morristown, capturing his artillery and several hundred prisoners. gillem, with what was left of his command, retreated to knoxville. following up his success, breckinridge moved to near knoxville, but withdrew on the 18th, followed by general ammen. under the directions of general thomas, general stoneman concentrated the commands of generals burbridge and gillem near bean's station to operate against breckinridge, and destroy or drive him into virginia --destroy the salt-works at saltville, and the railroad into virginia as far as he could go without endangering his command. on the 12th of december he commenced his movement, capturing and dispersing the enemy's forces wherever he met them. on the 16th he struck the enemy, under vaughn, at marion, completely routing and pursuing him to wytheville, capturing all his artillery, trains, and one hundred and ninety-eight prisoners; and destroyed wytheville, with its stores and supplies, and the extensive lead-works near there. returning to marion, he met a force under breckinridge, consisting, among other troops, of the garrison of saltville, that had started in pursuit. he at once made arrangements to attack it the next morning; but morning found breckinridge gone. he then moved directly to saltville, and destroyed the extensive salt-works at that place, a large amount of stores, and captured eight pieces of artillery. having thus successfully executed his instructions, he returned general burbridge to lexington and general gillem to knoxville. wilmington, north carolina, was the most important sea-coast port left to the enemy through which to get supplies from abroad, and send cotton and other products out by blockade-runners, besides being a place of great strategic value. the navy had been making strenuous exertions to seal the harbor of wilmington, but with only partial effect. the nature of the outlet of cape fear river was such, that it required watching for so great a distance that, without possession of the land north of new inlet, or fort fisher, it was impossible for the navy to entirely close the harbor against the entrance of blockade-runners. to secure the possession of this land required the co-operation of a land force, which i agreed to furnish. immediately commenced the assemblage in hampton roads, under admiral d. d. porter, of the most formidable armada ever collected for concentration upon one given point. this necessarily attracted the attention of the enemy, as well as that of the loyal north; and through the imprudence of the public press, and very likely of officers of both branches of service, the exact object of the expedition became a subject of common discussion in the newspapers both north and south. the enemy, thus warned, prepared to meet it. this caused a postponement of the expedition until the later part of november, when, being again called upon by hon. g. v. fox, assistant secretary of the navy, i agreed to furnish the men required at once, and went myself, in company with major-general butler, to hampton roads, where we had a conference with admiral porter as to the force required and the time of starting. a force of six thousand five hundred men was regarded as sufficient. the time of starting was not definitely arranged, but it was thought all would be ready by the 6th of december, if not before. learning, on the 30th of november, that bragg had gone to georgia, taking with him most of the forces about wilmington, i deemed it of the utmost importance that the expedition should reach its destination before the return of bragg, and directed general butler to make all arrangements for the departure of major-general weitzel, who had been designated to command the land forces, so that the navy might not be detained one moment. on the 6th of december, the following instructions were given: "city point, virginia, december 6, 1864. "general: the first object of the expedition under general weitzel is to close to the enemy the port of wilmington. if successful in this, the second will be to capture wilmington itself. there are reasonable grounds to hope for success, if advantage can be taken of the absence of the greater part of the enemy's forces now looking after sherman in georgia. the directions you have given for the numbers and equipment of the expedition are all right, except in the unimportant matter of where they embark and the amount of intrenching tools to be taken. the object of the expedition will be gained by effecting a landing on the main land between cape fear river and the atlantic, north of the north entrance to the river. should such landing be effected while the enemy still holds fort fisher and the batteries guarding the entrance to the river, then the troops should intrench themselves, and, by co-operating with the navy, effect the reduction and capture of those places. these in our hands, the navy could enter the harbor, and the port of wilmington would be sealed. should fort fisher and the point of land on which it is built fall into the hands of our troops immediately on landing, then it will be worth the attempt to capture wilmington by a forced march and surprise. if time is consumed in gaining the first object of the expedition, the second will become a matter of after consideration. "the details for execution are intrusted to you and the officer immediately in command of the troops. "should the troops under general weitzel fail to effect a landing at or near fort fisher, they will be returned to the armies operating against richmond without delay. "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "major-general b. f. butler." general butler commanding the army from which the troops were taken for this enterprise, and the territory within which they were to operate, military courtesy required that all orders and instructions should go through him. they were so sent, but general weitzel has since officially informed me that he never received the foregoing instructions, nor was he aware of their existence, until he read general butler's published official report of the fort fisher failure, with my indorsement and papers accompanying it. i had no idea of general butler's accompanying the expedition until the evening before it got off from bermuda hundred, and then did not dream but that general weitzel had received all the instructions, and would be in command. i rather formed the idea that general butler was actuated by a desire to witness the effect of the explosion of the powder-boat. the expedition was detained several days at hampton roads, awaiting the loading of the powder-boat. the importance of getting the wilmington expedition off without any delay, with or without the powder-boat, had been urged upon general butler, and he advised to so notify admiral porter. the expedition finally got off on the 13th of december, and arrived at the place of rendezvous, off new inlet, near fort fisher, on the evening of the 15th. admiral porter arrived on the evening of the 18th, having put in at beaufort to get ammunition for the monitors. the sea becoming rough, making it difficult to land troops, and the supply of water and coal being about exhausted, the transport fleet put back to beaufort to replenish; this, with the state of the weather, delayed the return to the place of rendezvous until the 24th. the powder-boat was exploded on the morning of the 24th, before the return of general butler from beaufort; but it would seem, from the notice taken of it in the southern newspapers, that the enemy were never enlightened as to the object of the explosion until they were informed by the northern press. on the 25th a landing was effected without opposition, and a reconnoissance, under brevet brigadier-general curtis, pushed up towards the fort. but before receiving a full report of the result of this reconnoissance, general butler, in direct violation of the instructions given, ordered the re-embarkation of the troops and the return of the expedition. the re-embarkation was accomplished by the morning of the 27th. on the return of the expedition officers and men among them brevet major-general (then brevet brigadier-general) n. m. curtis, first-lieutenant g. w. ross, 117th regiment new york volunteers, first-lieutenant william h. walling, and second-lieutenant george simpson, 142d new york volunteers voluntarily reported to me that when recalled they were nearly into the fort, and, in their opinion, it could have been taken without much loss. soon after the return of the expedition, i received a dispatch from the secretary of the navy, and a letter from admiral porter, informing me that the fleet was still off fort fisher, and expressing the conviction that, under a proper leader, the place could be taken. the natural supposition with me was, that when the troops abandoned the expedition, the navy would do so also. finding it had not, however, i answered on the 30th of december, advising admiral porter to hold on, and that i would send a force and make another attempt to take the place. this time i selected brevet major-general (now major-general) a. h. terry to command the expedition. the troops composing it consisted of the same that composed the former, with the addition of a small brigade, numbering about one thousand five hundred, and a small siege train. the latter it was never found necessary to land. i communicated direct to the commander of the expedition the following instructions: "city point, virginia, january 3, 1865. "general: the expedition intrusted to your command has been fitted out to renew the attempt to capture fort fisher, n. c., and wilmington ultimately, if the fort falls. you will then proceed with as little delay as possible to the naval fleet lying off cape fear river, and report the arrival of yourself and command to admiral d. d. porter, commanding north atlantic blockading squadron. "it is exceedingly desirable that the most complete understanding should exist between yourself and the naval commander. i suggest, therefore, that you consult with admiral porter freely, and get from him the part to be performed by each branch of the public service, so that there may be unity of action. it would be well to have the whole programme laid down in writing. i have served with admiral porter, and know that you can rely on his judgment and his nerve to undertake what he proposes. i would, therefore, defer to him as much as is consistent with your own responsibilities. the first object to be attained is to get a firm position on the spit of land on which fort fisher is built, from which you can operate against that fort. you want to look to the practicability of receiving your supplies, and to defending yourself against superior forces sent against you by any of the avenues left open to the enemy. if such a position can be obtained, the siege of fort fisher will not be abandoned until its reduction is accomplished, or another plan of campaign is ordered from these headquarters. "my own views are, that if you effect a landing, the navy ought to run a portion of their fleet into cape fear river, while the balance of it operates on the outside. land forces cannot invest fort fisher, or cut it off from supplies or reinforcements, while the river is in possession of the enemy. "a siege-train will be loaded on vessels and sent to fort monroe, in readiness to be sent to you if required. all other supplies can be drawn from beaufort as you need them. "keep the fleet of vessels with you until your position is assured. when you find they can be spared, order them back, or such of them as you can spare, to fort monroe, to report for orders. "in case of failure to effect a landing, bring your command back to beaufort, and report to these headquarters for further instructions. you will not debark at beaufort until so directed. "general sheridan has been ordered to send a division of troops to baltimore and place them on sea-going vessels. these troops will be brought to fort monroe and kept there on the vessels until you are heard from. should you require them, they will be sent to you. "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "brevet major-general a. h. terry." lieutenant-colonel c. b. comstock, aide-de-camp (now brevet brigadier-general), who accompanied the former expedition, was assigned, in orders, as chief-engineer to this. it will be seen that these instructions did not differ materially from those given for the first expedition, and that in neither instance was there an order to assault fort fisher. this was a matter left entirely to the discretion of the commanding officer. the expedition sailed from fort monroe on the morning of the 6th, arriving at the rendezvous, off beaufort, on the 8th, where, owing to the difficulties of the weather, it lay until the morning of the 12th, when it got under way and reached its destination that evening. under cover of the fleet, the disembarkation of the troops commenced on the morning of the 13th, and by three o'clock p.m. was completed without loss. on the 14th a reconnoissance was pushed to within five hundred yards of fort fisher, and a small advance work taken possession of and turned into a defensive line against any attempt that might be made from the fort. this reconnoissance disclosed the fact that the front of the work had been seriously injured by the navy fire. in the afternoon of the 15th the fort was assaulted, and after most desperate fighting was captured, with its entire garrison and armament. thus was secured, by the combined efforts of the navy and army, one of the most important successes of the war. our loss was: killed, one hundred and ten; wounded, five hundred and thirty-six. on the 16th and the 17th the enemy abandoned and blew up fort caswell and the works on smith's island, which were immediately occupied by us. this gave us entire control of the mouth of the cape fear river. at my request, mayor-general b. f. butler was relieved, and major-general e. o. c. ord assigned to the department of virginia and north carolina. the defence of the line of the tennessee no longer requiring the force which had beaten and nearly destroyed the only army now threatening it, i determined to find other fields of operation for general thomas's surplus troops--fields from which they would co-operate with other movements. general thomas was therefore directed to collect all troops, not essential to hold his communications at eastport, in readiness for orders. on the 7th of january, general thomas was directed, if he was assured of the departure of hood south from corinth, to send general schofield with his corps east with as little delay as possible. this direction was promptly complied with, and the advance of the corps reached washington on the 23d of the same month, whence it was sent to fort fisher and new bern. on the 26th he was directed to send general a. j. smith's command and a division of cavalry to report to general canby. by the 7th of february the whole force was en route for its destination. the state of north carolina was constituted into a military department, and general schofield assigned to command, and placed under the orders of major-general sherman. the following instructions were given him: "city point, va., january 31, 1865. "general:-* * * your movements are intended as co-operative with sherman's through the states of south and north carolina. the first point to be attained is to secure wilmington. goldsboro' will then be your objective point, moving either from wilmington or new bern, or both, as you deem best. should you not be able to reach goldsboro', you will advance on the line or lines of railway connecting that place with the sea-coast--as near to it as you can, building the road behind you. the enterprise under you has two objects: the first is to give general sherman material aid, if needed, in his march north; the second, to open a base of supplies for him on his line of march. as soon, therefore, as you can determine which of the two points, wilmington or new bern, you can best use for throwing supplies from, to the interior, you will commence the accumulation of twenty days' rations and forage for sixty thousand men and twenty thousand animals. you will get of these as many as you can house and protect to such point in the interior as you may be able to occupy. i believe general palmer has received some instructions direct from general sherman on the subject of securing supplies for his army. you will learn what steps he has taken, and be governed in your requisitions accordingly. a supply of ordnance stores will also be necessary. "make all requisitions upon the chiefs of their respective departments in the field with me at city point. communicate with me by every opportunity, and should you deem it necessary at any time, send a special boat to fortress monroe, from which point you can communicate by telegraph. "the supplies referred to in these instructions are exclusive of those required for your own command. "the movements of the enemy may justify, or even make it your imperative duty, to cut loose from your base, and strike for the interior to aid sherman. in such case you will act on your own judgment without waiting for instructions. you will report, however, what you purpose doing. the details for carrying out these instructions are necessarily left to you. i would urge, however, if i did not know that you are already fully alive to the importance of it, prompt action. sherman may be looked for in the neighborhood of goldsboro' any time from the 22d to the 28th of february; this limits your time very materially. "if rolling-stock is not secured in the capture of wilmington, it can be supplied from washington. a large force of railroad men have already been sent to beaufort, and other mechanics will go to fort fisher in a day or two. on this point i have informed you by telegraph. "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "major-general j. m. schofield." previous to giving these instructions i had visited fort fisher, accompanied by general schofield, for the purpose of seeing for myself the condition of things, and personally conferring with general terry and admiral porter as to what was best to be done. anticipating the arrival of general sherman at savannah his army entirely foot-loose, hood being then before nashville, tennessee, the southern railroads destroyed, so that it would take several months to re-establish a through line from west to east, and regarding the capture of lee's army as the most important operation towards closing the rebellion--i sent orders to general sherman on the 6th of december, that after establishing a base on the sea-coast, with necessary garrison, to include all his artillery and cavalry, to come by water to city point with the balance of his command. on the 18th of december, having received information of the defeat and utter rout of hood's army by general thomas, and that, owing to the great difficulty of procuring ocean transportation, it would take over two months to transport sherman's army, and doubting whether he might not contribute as much towards the desired result by operating from where he was, i wrote to him to that effect, and asked him for his views as to what would be best to do. a few days after this i received a communication from general sherman, of date 16th december, acknowledging the receipt of my order of the 6th, and informing me of his preparations to carry it into effect as soon as he could get transportation. also that he had expected, upon reducing savannah, instantly to march to columbia, south carolina, thence to raleigh, and thence to report to me; but that this would consume about six weeks' time after the fall of savannah, whereas by sea he could probably reach me by the middle of january. the confidence he manifested in this letter of being able to march up and join me pleased me, and, without waiting for a reply to my letter of the 18th, i directed him, on the 28th of december, to make preparations to start as he proposed, without delay, to break up the railroads in north and south carolina, and join the armies operating against richmond as soon as he could. on the 21st of january i informed general sherman that i had ordered the 23d corps, major-general schofield commanding, east; that it numbered about twenty-one thousand men; that we had at fort fisher, about eight thousand men; at new bern, about four thousand; that if wilmington was captured, general schofield would go there; if not, he would be sent to new bern; that, in either event, all the surplus force at both points would move to the interior towards goldsboro', in co-operation with his movement; that from either point railroad communication could be run out; and that all these troops would be subject to his orders as he came into communication with them. in obedience to his instructions, general schofield proceeded to reduce wilmington, north carolina, in co-operation with the navy under admiral porter, moving his forces up both sides of the cape fear river. fort anderson, the enemy's main defence on the west bank of the river, was occupied on the morning of the 19th, the enemy having evacuated it after our appearance before it. after fighting on 20th and 21st, our troops entered wilmington on the morning of the 22d, the enemy having retreated towards goldsboro' during the night. preparations were at once made for a movement on goldsboro' in two columns--one from wilmington, and the other from new bern--and to repair the railroad leading there from each place, as well as to supply general sherman by cape fear river, towards fayetteville, if it became necessary. the column from new bern was attacked on the 8th of march, at wise's forks, and driven back with the loss of several hundred prisoners. on the 11th the enemy renewed his attack upon our intrenched position, but was repulsed with severe loss, and fell back during the night. on the 14th the neuse river was crossed and kinston occupied, and on the 21st goldsboro' was entered. the column from wilmington reached cox's bridge, on the neuse river, ten miles above goldsboro', on the 22d. by the 1st of february, general sherman's whole army was in motion from savannah. he captured columbia, south carolina, on the 17th; thence moved on goldsboro', north carolina, via fayetteville, reaching the latter place on the 12th of march, opening up communication with general schofield by way of cape fear river. on the 15th he resumed his march on goldsboro'. he met a force of the enemy at averysboro', and after a severe fight defeated and compelled it to retreat. our loss in this engagement was about six hundred. the enemy's loss was much greater. on the 18th the combined forces of the enemy, under joe johnston, attacked his advance at bentonville, capturing three guns and driving it back upon the main body. general slocum, who was in the advance ascertaining that the whole of johnston's army was in the front, arranged his troops on the defensive, intrenched himself and awaited reinforcements, which were pushed forward. on the night of the 21st the enemy retreated to smithfield, leaving his dead and wounded in our hands. from there sherman continued to goldsboro', which place had been occupied by general schofield on the 21st (crossing the neuse river ten miles above there, at cox's bridge, where general terry had got possession and thrown a pontoon-bridge on the 22d), thus forming a junction with the columns from new bern and wilmington. among the important fruits of this campaign was the fall of charleston, south carolina. it was evacuated by the enemy on the night of the 17th of february, and occupied by our forces on the 18th. on the morning of the 31st of january, general thomas was directed to send a cavalry expedition, under general stoneman, from east tennessee, to penetrate south carolina well down towards columbia, to destroy the railroads and military resources of the country, and return, if he was able, to east tennessee by way of salisbury, north carolina, releasing our prisoners there, if possible. of the feasibility of this latter, however, general stoneman was to judge. sherman's movements, i had no doubt, would attract the attention of all the force the enemy could collect, and facilitate the execution of this. general stoneman was so late in making his start on this expedition (and sherman having passed out of the state of south carolina), on the 27th of february i directed general thomas to change his course, and order him to repeat his raid of last fall, destroying the railroad towards lynchburg as far as he could. this would keep him between our garrisons in east tennessee and the enemy. i regarded it not impossible that in the event of the enemy being driven from richmond, he might fall back to lynchburg and attempt a raid north through east tennessee. on the 14th of february the following communication was sent to general thomas: "city point, va., february 14, 1865. "general canby is preparing a movement from mobile bay against mobile and the interior of alabama. his force will consist of about twenty thousand men, besides a. j. smith's command. the cavalry you have sent to canby will be debarked at vicksburg. it, with the available cavalry already in that section, will move from there eastward, in co-operation. hood's army has been terribly reduced by the severe punishment you gave it in tennessee, by desertion consequent upon their defeat, and now by the withdrawal of many of them to oppose sherman. (i take it a large portion of the infantry has been so withdrawn. it is so asserted in the richmond papers, and a member of the rebel congress said a few days since in a speech, that one-half of it had been brought to south carolina to oppose sherman.) this being true, or even if it is not true, canby's movement will attract all the attention of the enemy, and leave the advance from your standpoint easy. i think it advisable, therefore, that you prepare as much of a cavalry force as you can spare, and hold it in readiness to go south. the object would be threefold: first, to attract as much of the enemy's force as possible, to insure success to canby; second, to destroy the enemy's line of communications and military resources; third, to destroy or capture their forces brought into the field. tuscaloosa and selma would probably be the points to direct the expedition against. this, however, would not be so important as the mere fact of penetrating deep into alabama. discretion should be left to the officer commanding the expedition to go where, according to the information he may receive, he will best secure the objects named above. "now that your force has been so much depleted, i do not know what number of men you can put into the field. if not more than five thousand men, however, all cavalry, i think it will be sufficient. it is not desirable that you should start this expedition until the one leaving vicksburg has been three or four days out, or even a week. i do not know when it will start, but will inform you by telegraph as soon as i learn. if you should hear through other sources before hearing from me, you can act on the information received. "to insure success your cavalry should go with as little wagon-train as possible, relying upon the country for supplies. i would also reduce the number of guns to a battery, or the number of batteries, and put the extra teams to the guns taken. no guns or caissons should be taken with less than eight horses. "please inform me by telegraph, on receipt of this, what force you think you will be able to send under these directions. "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "major-general g. h. thomas." on the 15th, he was directed to start the expedition as soon after the 20th as he could get it off. i deemed it of the utmost importance, before a general movement of the armies operating against richmond, that all communications with the city, north of james river, should be cut off. the enemy having withdrawn the bulk of his force from the shenandoah valley and sent it south, or replaced troops sent from richmond, and desiring to reinforce sherman, if practicable, whose cavalry was greatly inferior in numbers to that of the enemy, i determined to make a move from the shenandoah, which, if successful, would accomplish the first at least, and possibly the latter of the objects. i therefore telegraphed general sheridan as follows: "city point, va., february 20, 1865--1 p.m. "general:--as soon as it is possible to travel, i think you will have no difficulty about reaching lynchburg with a cavalry force alone. from there you could destroy the railroad and canal in every direction, so as to be of no further use to the rebellion. sufficient cavalry should be left behind to look after mosby's gang. from lynchburg, if information you might get there would justify it, you will strike south, heading the streams in virgina to the westward of danville, and push on and join general sherman. this additional raid, with one now about starting from east tennessee under stoneman, numbering four or give thousand cavalry, one from vicksburg, numbering seven or eight thousand cavalry, one from eastport, mississippi, then thousand cavalry, canby from mobile bay, with about thirty-eight thousand mixed troops, these three latter pushing for tuscaloosa, selma, and montgomery, and sherman with a large army eating out the vitals of south carolina, is all that will be wanted to leave nothing for the rebellion to stand upon. i would advise you to overcome great obstacles to accomplish this. charleston was evacuated on tuesday 1st. "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "major-general p. h. sheridan." on the 25th i received a dispatch from general sheridan, inquiring where sherman was aiming for, and if i could give him definite information as to the points he might be expected to move on, this side of charlotte, north carolina. in answer, the following telegram was sent him: "city point, va., february 25, 1865. "general:--sherman's movements will depend on the amount of opposition he meets with from the enemy. if strongly opposed, he may possibly have to fall back to georgetown, s. c., and fit out for a new start. i think, however, all danger for the necessity of going to that point has passed. i believe he has passed charlotte. he may take fayetteville on his way to goldsboro'. if you reach lynchburg, you will have to be guided in your after movements by the information you obtain. before you could possibly reach sherman, i think you would find him moving from goldsboro' towards raleigh, or engaging the enemy strongly posted at one or the other of these places, with railroad communications opened from his army to wilmington or new bern. "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "major-general p. h. sheridan." general sheridan moved from winchester on the 27th of february, with two divisions of cavalry, numbering about five thousand each. on the 1st of march he secured the bridge, which the enemy attempted to destroy, across the middle fork of the shenandoah, at mount crawford, and entered staunton on the 2d, the enemy having retreated to waynesboro'. thence he pushed on to waynesboro', where he found the enemy in force in an intrenched position, under general early. without stopping to make a reconnoissance, an immediate attack was made, the position was carried, and sixteen hundred prisoners, eleven pieces of artillery, with horses and caissons complete, two hundred wagons and teams loaded with subsistence, and seventeen battle-flags, were captured. the prisoners, under an escort of fifteen hundred men, were sent back to winchester. thence he marched on charlottesville, destroying effectually the railroad and bridges as he went, which place he reached on the 3d. here he remained two days, destroying the railroad towards richmond and lynchburg, including the large iron bridges over the north and south forks of the rivanna river and awaited the arrival of his trains. this necessary delay caused him to abandon the idea of capturing lynchburg. on the morning of the 6th, dividing his force into two columns, he sent one to scottsville, whence it marched up the james river canal to new market, destroying every lock, and in many places the bank of the canal. from here a force was pushed out from this column to duiguidsville, to obtain possession of the bridge across the james river at that place, but failed. the enemy burned it on our approach. the enemy also burned the bridge across the river at hardwicksville. the other column moved down the railroad towards lynchburg, destroying it as far as amherst court house, sixteen miles from lynchburg; thence across the country, uniting with the column at new market. the river being very high, his pontoons would not reach across it; and the enemy having destroyed the bridges by which he had hoped to cross the river and get on the south side railroad about farmville, and destroy it to appomattox court house, the only thing left for him was to return to winchester or strike a base at the white house. fortunately, he chose the latter. from new market he took up his line of march, following the canal towards richmond, destroying every lock upon it and cutting the banks wherever practicable, to a point eight miles east of goochland, concentrating the whole force at columbia on the 10th. here he rested one day, and sent through by scouts information of his whereabouts and purposes, and a request for supplies to meet him at white house, which reached me on the night of the 12th. an infantry force was immediately sent to get possession of white house, and supplies were forwarded. moving from columbia in a direction to threaten richmond, to near ashland station, he crossed the annas, and after having destroyed all the bridges and many miles of the railroad, proceeded down the north bank of the pamunkey to white house, which place he reached on the 19th. previous to this the following communication was sent to general thomas: "city point, virginia, march 7, 1865--9.30 a.m. "general:--i think it will be advisable now for you to repair the railroad in east tennessee, and throw a good force up to bull's gap and fortify there. supplies at knoxville could always be got forward as required. with bull's gap fortified, you can occupy as outposts about all of east tennessee, and be prepared, if it should be required of you in the spring, to make a campaign towards lynchburg, or into north carolina. i do not think stoneman should break the road until he gets into virginia, unless it should be to cut off rolling-stock that may be caught west of that. "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "major-general g. h. thomas." thus it will be seen that in march, 1865, general canby was moving an adequate force against mobile and the army defending it under general dick taylor; thomas was pushing out two large and well-appointed cavalry expeditions--one from middle tennessee under brevet major-general wilson against the enemy's vital points in alabama, the other from east tennessee, under major-general stoneman, towards lynchburg--and assembling the remainder of his available forces, preparatory to commence offensive operations from east tennessee; general sheridan's cavalry was at white house; the armies of the potomac and james were confronting the enemy, under lee, in his defences of richmond and petersburg; general sherman with his armies, reinforced by that of general schofield, was at goldsboro'; general pope was making preparations for a spring campaign against the enemy under kirby smith and price, west of the mississippi; and general hancock was concentrating a force in the vicinity of winchester, virginia, to guard against invasion or to operate offensively, as might prove necessary. after the long march by general sheridan's cavalry over winter roads, it was necessary to rest and refit at white house. at this time the greatest source of uneasiness to me was the fear that the enemy would leave his strong lines about petersburg and richmond for the purpose of uniting with johnston, and before he was driven from them by battle, or i was prepared to make an effectual pursuit. on the 24th of march, general sheridan moved from white house, crossed the james river at jones's landing, and formed a junction with the army of the potomac in front of petersburg on the 27th. during this move, general ord sent forces to cover the crossings of the chickahominy. on the 24th of march the following instructions for a general movement of the armies operating against richmond were issued: "city point, virginia, march 24, 1865. "general: on the 29th instant the armies operating against richmond will be moved by our left, for the double purpose of turning the enemy out of his present position around petersburg, and to insure the success of the cavalry under general sheridan, which will start at the same time, in its efforts to reach and destroy the south side and danville railroads. two corps of the army of the potomac will be moved at first in two columns, taking the two roads crossing hatcher's run, nearest where the present line held by us strikes that stream, both moving towards dinwiddie court house. "the cavalry under general sheridan, joined by the division now under general davies, will move at the same time by the weldon road and the jerusalem plank road, turning west from the latter before crossing the nottoway, and west with the whole column before reaching stony creek. general sheridan will then move independently, under other instructions which will be given him. all dismounted cavalry belonging to the army of the potomac, and the dismounted cavalry from the middle military division not required for guarding property belonging to their arm of service, will report to brigadier-general benham, to be added to the defences of city point. major-general parke will be left in command of all the army left for holding the lines about petersburg and city point, subject of course to orders from the commander of the army of the potomac. the 9th army corps will be left intact, to hold the present line of works so long as the whole line now occupied by us is held. if, however, the troops to the left of the 9th corps are withdrawn, then the left of the corps may be thrown back so as to occupy the position held by the army prior to the capture of the weldon road. all troops to the left of the 9th corps will be held in readiness to move at the shortest notice by such route as may be designated when the order is given. "general ord will detach three divisions, two white and one colored, or so much of them as he can, and hold his present lines, and march for the present left of the army of the potomac. in the absence of further orders, or until further orders are given, the white divisions will follow the left column of the army of the potomac, and the colored division the right column. during the movement major-general weitzel will be left in command of all the forces remaining behind from the army of the james. "the movement of troops from the army of the james will commence on the night of the 27th instant. general ord will leave behind the minimum number of cavalry necessary for picket duty, in the absence of the main army. a cavalry expedition, from general ord's command, will also be started from suffolk, to leave there on saturday, the 1st of april, under colonel sumner, for the purpose of cutting the railroad about hicksford. this, if accomplished, will have to be a surprise, and therefore from three to five hundred men will be sufficient. they should, however, be supported by all the infantry that can be spared from norfolk and portsmouth, as far out as to where the cavalry crosses the blackwater. the crossing should probably be at uniten. should colonel sumner succeed in reaching the weldon road, he will be instructed to do all the damage possible to the triangle of roads between hicksford, weldon, and gaston. the railroad bridge at weldon being fitted up for the passage of carriages, it might be practicable to destroy any accumulation of supplies the enemy may have collected south of the roanoke. all the troops will move with four days' rations in haversacks and eight days' in wagons. to avoid as much hauling as possible, and to give the army of the james the same number of days' supplies with the army of the potomac, general ord will direct his commissary and quartermaster to have sufficient supplies delivered at the terminus of the road to fill up in passing. sixty rounds of ammunition per man will be taken in wagons, and as much grain as the transportation on hand will carry, after taking the specified amount of other supplies. the densely wooded country in which the army has to operate making the use of much artillery impracticable, the amount taken with the army will be reduced to six or eight guns to each division, at the option of the army commanders. "all necessary preparations for carrying these directions into operation may be commenced at once. the reserves of the 9th corps should be massed as much as possible. while i would not now order an unconditional attack on the enemy's line by them, they should be ready and should make the attack if the enemy weakens his line in their front, without waiting for orders. in case they carry the line, then the whole of the 9th corps could follow up so as to join or co-operate with the balance of the army. to prepare for this, the 9th corps will have rations issued to them, same as the balance of the army. general weitzel will keep vigilant watch upon his front, and if found at all practicable to break through at any point, he will do so. a success north of the james should be followed up with great promptness. an attack will not be feasible unless it is found that the enemy has detached largely. in that case it may be regarded as evident that the enemy are relying upon their local reserves principally for the defence of richmond. preparations may be made for abandoning all the line north of the james, except inclosed works only to be abandoned, however, after a break is made in the lines of the enemy. "by these instructions a large part of the armies operating against richmond is left behind. the enemy, knowing this, may, as an only chance, strip their lines to the merest skeleton, in the hope of advantage not being taken of it, while they hurl everything against the moving column, and return. it cannot be impressed too strongly upon commanders of troops left in the trenches not to allow this to occur without taking advantage of it. the very fact of the enemy coming out to attack, if he does so, might be regarded as almost conclusive evidence of such a weakening of his lines. i would have it particularly enjoined upon corps commanders that, in case of an attack from the enemy, those not attacked are not to wait for orders from the commanding officer of the army to which they belong, but that they will move promptly, and notify the commander of their action. i would also enjoin the same action on the part of division commanders when other parts of their corps are engaged. in like manner, i would urge the importance of following up a repulse of the enemy. "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "major-generals meade, ord, and sheridan." early on the morning of the 25th the enemy assaulted our lines in front of the 9th corps (which held from the appomattox river towards our left), and carried fort stedman, and a part of the line to the right and left of it, established themselves and turned the guns of the fort against us, but our troops on either flank held their ground until the reserves were brought up, when the enemy was driven back with a heavy loss in killed and wounded, and one thousand nine hundred prisoners. our loss was sixty-eight killed, three hundred and thirty-seven wounded, and five hundred and six missing. general meade at once ordered the other corps to advance and feel the enemy in their respective fronts. pushing forward, they captured and held the enemy's strongly intrenched picket-line in front of the 2d and 6th corps, and eight hundred and thirty-four prisoners. the enemy made desperate attempts to retake this line, but without success. our loss in front of these was fifty-two killed, eight hundred and sixty-four wounded, and two hundred and seven missing. the enemy's loss in killed and wounded was far greater. general sherman having got his troops all quietly in camp about goldsboro', and his preparations for furnishing supplies to them perfected, visited me at city point on the 27th of march, and stated that he would be ready to move, as he had previously written me, by the 10th of april, fully equipped and rationed for twenty days, if it should become necessary to bring his command to bear against lee's army, in co-operation with our forces in front of richmond and petersburg. general sherman proposed in this movement to threaten raleigh, and then, by turning suddenly to the right, reach the roanoke at gaston or thereabouts, whence he could move on to the richmond and danville railroad, striking it in the vicinity of burkesville, or join the armies operating against richmond, as might be deemed best. this plan he was directed to carry into execution, if he received no further directions in the meantime. i explained to him the movement i had ordered to commence on the 29th of march. that if it should not prove as entirely successful as i hoped, i would cut the cavalry loose to destroy the danville and south side railroads, and thus deprive the enemy of further supplies, and also to prevent the rapid concentration of lee's and johnston's armies. i had spent days of anxiety lest each morning should bring the report that the enemy had retreated the night before. i was firmly convinced that sherman's crossing the roanoke would be the signal for lee to leave. with johnston and him combined, a long, tedious, and expensive campaign, consuming most of the summer, might become necessary. by moving out i would put the army in better condition for pursuit, and would at least, by the destruction of the danville road, retard the concentration of the two armies of lee and johnston, and cause the enemy to abandon much material that he might otherwise save. i therefore determined not to delay the movement ordered. on the night of the 27th, major-general ord, with two divisions of the 24th corps, major-general gibbon commanding, and one division of the 25th corps, brigadier-general birney commanding, and mackenzie's cavalry, took up his line of march in pursuance of the foregoing instructions, and reached the position assigned him near hatcher's run on the morning of the 29th. on the 28th the following instructions were given to general sheridan: "city point, va., march 28, 1865. "general:--the 5th army corps will move by the vaughn road at three a.m. to-morrow morning. the 2d moves at about nine a.m., having but about three miles to march to reach the point designated for it to take on the right of the 5th corps, after the latter reaching dinwiddie court house. move your cavalry at as early an hour as you can, and without being confined to any particular road or roads. you may go out by the nearest roads in rear of the 5th corps, pass by its left, and passing near to or through dinwiddie, reach the right and rear of the enemy as soon as you can. it is not the intention to attack the enemy in his intrenched position, but to force him out, if possible. should he come out and attack us, or get himself where he can be attacked, move in with your entire force in your own way, and with the full reliance that the army will engage or follow, as circumstances will dictate. i shall be on the field, and will probably be able to communicate with you. should i not do so, and you find that the enemy keeps within his main intrenched line, you may cut loose and push for the danville road. if you find it practicable, i would like you to cross the south side road, between petersburg and burkesville, and destroy it to some extent. i would not advise much detention, however, until you reach the danville road, which i would like you to strike as near to the appomattox as possible. make your destruction on that road as complete as possible. you can then pass on to the south side road, west of burkesville, and destroy that in like manner. "after having accomplished the destruction of the two railroads, which are now the only avenues of supply to lee's army, you may return to this army, selecting your road further south, or you may go on into north carolina and join general sherman. should you select the latter course, get the information to me as early as possible, so that i may send orders to meet you at goldsboro'. "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "major-general p. h. sheridan." on the morning of the 29th the movement commenced. at night the cavalry was at dinwiddie court house, and the left of our infantry line extended to the quaker road, near its intersection with the boydton plank road. the position of the troops from left to right was as follows: sheridan, warren, humphreys, ord, wright, parke. everything looked favorable to the defeat of the enemy and the capture of petersburg and richmond, if the proper effort was made. i therefore addressed the following communication to general sheridan, having previously informed him verbally not to cut loose for the raid contemplated in his orders until he received notice from me to do so: "gravelly creek, march 29, 1865. "general:--our line is now unbroken from the appomattox to dinwiddie. we are all ready, however, to give up all, from the jerusalem plank road to hatcher's run, whenever the forces can be used advantageously. after getting into line south of hatcher's, we pushed forward to find the enemy's position. general griffin was attacked near where the quaker road intersects the boydton road, but repulsed it easily, capturing about one hundred men. humphreys reached dabney's mill, and was pushing on when last heard from. "i now feel like ending the matter, if it is possible to do so, before going back. i do not want you, therefore, to cut loose and go after the enemy's roads at present. in the morning push around the enemy, if you can, and get on to his right rear. the movements of the enemy's cavalry may, of course, modify your action. we will act all together as one army here, until it is seen what can be done with the enemy. the signal-officer at cobb's hill reported, at half-past eleven a.m., that a cavalry column had passed that point from richmond towards petersburg, taking forty minutes to pass. "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "major-general p. h. sheridan." from the night of the 29th to the morning of the 31st the rain fell in such torrents as to make it impossible to move a wheeled vehicle, except as corduroy roads were laid in front of them. during the 30th, sheridan advanced from dinwiddie court house towards five forks, where he found the enemy in full force. general warren advanced and extended his line across the boydton plank road to near the white oak road, with a view of getting across the latter; but, finding the enemy strong in his front and extending beyond his left, was directed to hold on where he was, and fortify. general humphreys drove the enemy from his front into his main line on the hatcher, near burgess's mills. generals ord, wright, and parke made examinations in their fronts to determine the feasibility of an assault on the enemy's lines. the two latter reported favorably. the enemy confronting us as he did, at every point from richmond to our extreme left, i conceived his lines must be weakly held, and could be penetrated if my estimate of his forces was correct. i determined, therefore, to extend our line no farther, but to reinforce general sheridan with a corps of infantry, and thus enable him to cut loose and turn the enemy's right flank, and with the other corps assault the enemy's lines. the result of the offensive effort of the enemy the week before, when he assaulted fort stedman, particularly favored this. the enemy's intrenched picket-line captured by us at that time threw the lines occupied by the belligerents so close together at some points that it was but a moment's run from one to the other. preparations were at once made to relieve general humphreys's corps, to report to general sheridan; but the condition of the roads prevented immediate movement. on the morning of the 31st, general warren reported favorably to getting possession of the white oak road, and was directed to do so. to accomplish this, he moved with one division, instead of his whole corps, which was attacked by the enemy in superior force and driven back on the 2d division before it had time to form, and it, in turn, forced back upon the 3d division, when the enemy was checked. a division of the 2d corps was immediately sent to his support, the enemy driven back with heavy loss, and possession of the white oak road gained. sheridan advanced, and with a portion of his cavalry got possession of the five forks; but the enemy, after the affair with the 5th corps, reinforced the rebel cavalry, defending that point with infantry, and forced him back towards dinwiddie court house. here general sheridan displayed great generalship. instead of retreating with his whole command on the main army, to tell the story of superior forces encountered, he deployed his cavalry on foot, leaving only mounted men enough to take charge of the horses. this compelled the enemy to deploy over a vast extent of wooded and broken country, and made his progress slow. at this juncture he dispatched to me what had taken place, and that he was dropping back slowly on dinwiddie court house. general mackenzie's cavalry and one division of the 5th corps were immediately ordered to his assistance. soon after receiving a report from general meade that humphreys could hold our position on the boydton road, and that the other two divisions of the 5th corps could go to sheridan, they were so ordered at once. thus the operations of the day necessitated the sending of warren, because of his accessibility, instead of humphreys, as was intended, and precipitated intended movements. on the morning of the 1st of april, general sheridan, reinforced by general warren, drove the enemy back on five forks, where, late in the evening, he assaulted and carried his strongly fortified position, capturing all his artillery and between five and six thousand prisoners. about the close of this battle, brevet major-general charles griffin relieved major-general warren in command of the 5th corps. the report of this reached me after nightfall. some apprehensions filled my mind lest the enemy might desert his lines during the night, and by falling upon general sheridan before assistance could reach him, drive him from his position and open the way for retreat. to guard against this, general miles's division of humphreys's corps was sent to reinforce him, and a bombardment was commenced and kept up until four o'clock in the morning (april 2), when an assault was ordered on the enemy's lines. general wright penetrated the lines with his whole corps, sweeping everything before him, and to his left towards hatcher's run, capturing many guns and several thousand prisoners. he was closely followed by two divisions of general ord's command, until he met the other division of general ord's that had succeeded in forcing the enemy's lines near hatcher's run. generals wright and ord immediately swung to the right, and closed all of the enemy on that side of them in petersburg, while general humphreys pushed forward with two divisions and joined general wright on the left. general parke succeeded in carrying the enemy's main line, capturing guns and prisoners, but was unable to carry his inner line. general sheridan being advised of the condition of affairs, returned general miles to his proper command. on reaching the enemy's lines immediately surrounding petersburg, a portion of general gibbon's corps, by a most gallant charge, captured two strong inclosed works--the most salient and commanding south of petersburg--thus materially shortening the line of investment necessary for taking in the city. the enemy south of hatcher's run retreated westward to sutherland's station, where they were overtaken by miles's division. a severe engagement ensued, and lasted until both his right and left flanks were threatened by the approach of general sheridan, who was moving from ford's station towards petersburg, and a division sent by general meade from the front of petersburg, when he broke in the utmost confusion, leaving in our hands his guns and many prisoners. this force retreated by the main road along the appomattox river. during the night of the 2d the enemy evacuated petersburg and richmond, and retreated towards danville. on the morning of the 3d pursuit was commenced. general sheridan pushed for the danville road, keeping near the appomattox, followed by general meade with the 2d and 6th corps, while general ord moved for burkesville, along the south side road; the 9th corps stretched along that road behind him. on the 4th, general sheridan struck the danville road near jetersville, where he learned that lee was at amelia court house. he immediately intrenched himself and awaited the arrival of general meade, who reached there the next day. general ord reached burkesville on the evening of the 5th. on the morning of the 5th, i addressed major-general sherman the following communication: "wilson's station, april 5, 1865. "general: all indications now are that lee will attempt to reach danville with the remnant of his force. sheridan, who was up with him last night, reports all that is left, horse, foot, and dragoons, at twenty thousand, much demoralized. we hope to reduce this number one-half. i shall push on to burkesville, and if a stand is made at danville, will in a very few days go there. if you can possibly do so, push on from where you are, and let us see if we cannot finish the job with lee's and johnston's armies. whether it will be better for you to strike for greensboro', or nearer to danville, you will be better able to judge when you receive this. rebel armies now are the only strategic points to strike at. "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "major-general w. t. sherman." on the morning of the 6th, it was found that general lee was moving west of jetersville, towards danville. general sheridan moved with his cavalry (the 5th corps having been returned to general meade on his reaching jetersville) to strike his flank, followed by the 6th corps, while the 2d and 5th corps pressed hard after, forcing him to abandon several hundred wagons and several pieces of artillery. general ord advanced from burkesville towards farmville, sending two regiments of infantry and a squadron of cavalry, under brevet brigadier-general theodore read, to reach and destroy the bridges. this advance met the head of lee's column near farmville, which it heroically attacked and detained until general read was killed and his small force overpowered. this caused a delay in the enemy's movements, and enabled general ord to get well up with the remainder of his force, on meeting which, the enemy immediately intrenched himself. in the afternoon, general sheridan struck the enemy south of sailors' creek, captured sixteen pieces of artillery and about four hundred wagons, and detained him until the 6th corps got up, when a general attack of infantry and cavalry was made, which resulted in the capture of six or seven thousand prisoners, among whom were many general officers. the movements of the 2d corps and general ord's command contributed greatly to the day's success. on the morning of the 7th the pursuit was renewed, the cavalry, except one division, and the 5th corps moving by prince edward's court house; the 6th corps, general ord's command, and one division of cavalry, on farmville; and the 2d corps by the high bridge road. it was soon found that the enemy had crossed to the north side of the appomattox; but so close was the pursuit, that the 2d corps got possession of the common bridge at high bridge before the enemy could destroy it, and immediately crossed over. the 6th corps and a division of cavalry crossed at farmville to its support. feeling now that general lee's chance of escape was utterly hopeless, i addressed him the following communication from farmville: "april 7, 1865. "general--the result of the last week must convince you of the hopelessness of further resistance on the part of the army of northern virginia in this struggle. i feel that it is so, and regard it as my duty to shift from myself the responsibility of any further effusion of blood, by asking of you the surrender of that portion of the confederate states army known as the army of northern virginia. "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "general r. e. lee." early on the morning of the 8th, before leaving, i received at farmville the following: "april 7, 1865. "general: i have received your note of this date. though not entertaining the opinion you express on the hopelessness of further resistance on the part of the army of northern virginia, i reciprocate your desire to avoid useless effusion of blood, and therefore, before considering your proposition, ask the terms you will offer on condition of its surrender. "r. e. lee, general. "lieutenant-general u. s. grant." to this i immediately replied: "april 8, 1865. "general:--your note of last evening, in reply to mine of same date, asking the condition on which i will accept the surrender of the army of northern virginia, is just received. in reply, i would say, that peace being my great desire, there is but one condition i would insist upon --namely, that the men and officers surrendered shall be disqualified for taking up arms again against the government of the united states until properly exchanged. i will meet you, or will designate officers to meet any officers you may name for the same purpose, at any point agreeable to you, for the purpose of arranging definitely the terms upon which the surrender of the army of the northern virginia will be received. "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "general r. e. lee." early on the morning of the 8th the pursuit was resumed. general meade followed north of the appomattox, and general sheridan, with all the cavalry, pushed straight ahead for appomattox station, followed by general ord's command and the 5th corps. during the day general meade's advance had considerable fighting with the enemy's rear-guard, but was unable to bring on a general engagement. late in the evening general sheridan struck the railroad at appomattox station, drove the enemy from there, and captured twenty-five pieces of artillery, a hospital train, and four trains of cars loaded with supplies for lee's army. during this day i accompanied general meade's column, and about midnight received the following communication from general lee: april 8, 1865. "general:--i received, at a late hour, your note of to-day. in mine of yesterday i did not intend to propose the surrender of the army of northern virginia, but to ask the terms of your proposition. to be frank, i do not think the emergency has arisen to call for the surrender of this army; but as the restoration of peace should be the sole object of all, i desired to know whether your proposals would lead to that end. i cannot, therefore, meet you with a view to the surrender of the army of northern virginia; but as far as your proposal may affect the confederate states forces under my command, and tend to the restoration of peace, i should be pleased to meet you at ten a.m. to-morrow on the old stage-road to richmond, between the picket-lines of the two armies. "r. e. lee, general. "lieutenant-general u. s. grant." early on the morning of the 9th i returned him an answer as follows, and immediately started to join the column south of the appomattox: "april 9, 1865. "general:--your note of yesterday is received. i have no authority to treat on the subject of peace; the meeting proposed for ten a.m. to-day could lead to no good. i will state, however, general, that i am equally anxious for peace with yourself, and the whole north entertains the same feeling. the terms upon which peace can be had are well understood. by the south laying down their arms they will hasten that most desirable event, save thousands of human lives, and hundreds of millions of property not yet destroyed. seriously hoping that all our difficulties may be settled without the loss of another life, i subscribe myself, etc. "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "general r. e. lee." on this morning of the 9th, general ord's command and the 5th corps reached appomattox station just as the enemy was making a desperate effort to break through our cavalry. the infantry was at once thrown in. soon after a white flag was received, requesting a suspension of hostilities pending negotiations for a surrender. before reaching general sheridan's headquarters, i received the following from general lee: "april 9, 1865. "general:--i received your note of this morning on the picket-line, whither i had come to meet you, and ascertain definitely what terms were embraced in your proposal of yesterday with reference to the surrender of this army. i now ask an interview, in accordance with the offer contained in your letter of yesterday, for that purpose. "r. e. lee, general. "lieutenant-general u. s. grant." the interview was held at appomattox court-house, the result of which is set forth in the following correspondence: appomattox court-house, virginia, april 9, 1865. "general: in accordance with the substance of my letter to you of the 8th instant, i propose to receive the surrender of the army of northern virginia on the following terms, to wit: rolls of all the officers and men to be made in duplicate, one copy to be given to an officer to be designated by me, the other to be retained by such officer or officers as you may designate. the officers to give their individual paroles not to take up arms against the government of the united states until properly exchanged; and each company or regimental commander sign a like parole for the men of their commands. the arms, artillery, and public property to be parked and stacked, and turned over to the officers appointed by me to receive them. this will not embrace the side-arms of the officers, nor their private horses or baggage. this done, each officer and man will be allowed to return to his home, not to be disturbed by united states authority so long as they observe their paroles and the laws in force where they may reside. "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "general r. e. lee." "headquarters army of northern virginia, april 9, 1865. "general: i have received your letter of this date containing the terms of surrender of the army of northern virginia as proposed by you. as they are substantially the same as those expressed in your letter of the 8th instant, they are accepted. i will proceed to designate the proper officers to carry the stipulations into effect. "r. e. lee, general. "lieutenant-general u. s. grant." the command of major-general gibbon, the 5th army corps under griffin, and mackenzie's cavalry, were designated to remain at appomattox court-house until the paroling of the surrendered army was completed, and to take charge of the public property. the remainder of the army immediately returned to the vicinity of burkesville. general lee's great influence throughout the whole south caused his example to be followed, and to-day the result is that the armies lately under his leadership are at their homes, desiring peace and quiet, and their arms are in the hands of our ordnance officers. on the receipt of my letter of the 5th, general sherman moved directly against joe johnston, who retreated rapidly on and through raleigh, which place general sherman occupied on the morning of the 13th. the day preceding, news of the surrender of general lee reached him at smithfield. on the 14th a correspondence was opened between general sherman and general johnston, which resulted on the 18th in an agreement for a suspension of hostilities, and a memorandum or basis for peace, subject to the approval of the president. this agreement was disapproved by the president on the 21st, which disapproval, together with your instructions, was communicated to general sherman by me in person on the morning of the 24th, at raleigh, north carolina, in obedience to your orders. notice was at once given by him to general johnston for the termination of the truce that had been entered into. on the 25th another meeting between them was agreed upon, to take place on the 26th, which terminated in the surrender and disbandment of johnston's army upon substantially the same terms as were given to general lee. the expedition under general stoneman from east tennessee got off on the 20th of march, moving by way of boone, north carolina, and struck the railroad at wytheville, chambersburg, and big lick. the force striking it at big lick pushed on to within a few miles of lynchburg, destroying the important bridges, while with the main force he effectually destroyed it between new river and big lick, and then turned for greensboro', on the north carolina railroad; struck that road and destroyed the bridges between danville and greensboro', and between greensboro' and the yadkin, together with the depots of supplies along it, and captured four hundred prisoners. at salisbury he attacked and defeated a force of the enemy under general gardiner, capturing fourteen pieces of artillery and one thousand three hundred and sixty-four prisoners, and destroyed large amounts of army stores. at this place he destroyed fifteen miles of railroad and the bridges towards charlotte. thence he moved to slatersville. general canby, who had been directed in january to make preparations for a movement from mobile bay against mobile and the interior of alabama, commenced his movement on the 20th of march. the 16th corps, major-general a. j. smith commanding, moved from fort gaines by water to fish river; the 13th corps, under major-general gordon granger, moved from fort morgan and joined the 16th corps on fish river, both moving thence on spanish fort and investing it on the 27th; while major-general steele's command moved from pensacola, cut the railroad leading from tensas to montgomery, effected a junction with them, and partially invested fort blakely. after a severe bombardment of spanish fort, a part of its line was carried on the 8th of april. during the night the enemy evacuated the fort. fort blakely was carried by assault on the 9th, and many prisoners captured; our loss was considerable. these successes practically opened to us the alabama river, and enabled us to approach mobile from the north. on the night of the 11th the city was evacuated, and was taken possession of by our forces on the morning of the 12th. the expedition under command of brevet major-general wilson, consisting of twelve thousand five hundred mounted men, was delayed by rains until march 22d, when it moved from chickasaw, alabama. on the 1st of april, general wilson encountered the enemy in force under forrest near ebenezer church, drove him in confusion, captured three hundred prisoners and three guns, and destroyed the central bridge over the cahawba river. on the 2d he attacked and captured the fortified city of selma, defended by forrest, with seven thousand men and thirty-two guns, destroyed the arsenal, armory, naval foundry, machine-shops, vast quantities of stores, and captured three thousand prisoners. on the 4th he captured and destroyed tuscaloosa. on the 10th he crossed the alabama river, and after sending information of his operations to general canby, marched on montgomery, which place he occupied on the 14th, the enemy having abandoned it. at this place many stores and five steamboats fell into our hands. thence a force marched direct on columbus, and another on west point, both of which places were assaulted and captured on the 16th. at the former place we got one thousand five hundred prisoners and fifty-two field-guns, destroyed two gunboats, the navy yard, foundries, arsenal, many factories, and much other public property. at the latter place we got three hundred prisoners, four guns, and destroyed nineteen locomotives and three hundred cars. on the 20th he took possession of macon, georgia, with sixty field-guns, one thousand two hundred militia, and five generals, surrendered by general howell cobb. general wilson, hearing that jeff. davis was trying to make his escape, sent forces in pursuit and succeeded in capturing him on the morning of may 11th. on the 4th day of may, general dick taylor surrendered to general canby all the remaining rebel forces east of the mississippi. a force sufficient to insure an easy triumph over the enemy under kirby smith, west of the mississippi, was immediately put in motion for texas, and major-general sheridan designated for its immediate command; but on the 26th day of may, and before they reached their destination, general kirby smith surrendered his entire command to major-general canby. this surrender did not take place, however, until after the capture of the rebel president and vice-president; and the bad faith was exhibited of first disbanding most of his army and permitting an indiscriminate plunder of public property. owing to the report that many of those lately in arms against the government had taken refuge upon the soil of mexico, carrying with them arms rightfully belonging to the united states, which had been surrendered to us by agreement among them some of the leaders who had surrendered in person and the disturbed condition of affairs on the rio grande, the orders for troops to proceed to texas were not changed. there have been severe combats, raids, expeditions, and movements to defeat the designs and purposes of the enemy, most of them reflecting great credit on our arms, and which contributed greatly to our final triumph, that i have not mentioned. many of these will be found clearly set forth in the reports herewith submitted; some in the telegrams and brief dispatches announcing them, and others, i regret to say, have not as yet been officially reported. for information touching our indian difficulties, i would respectfully refer to the reports of the commanders of departments in which they have occurred. it has been my fortune to see the armies of both the west and the east fight battles, and from what i have seen i know there is no difference in their fighting qualities. all that it was possible for men to do in battle they have done. the western armies commenced their battles in the mississippi valley, and received the final surrender of the remnant of the principal army opposed to them in north carolina. the armies of the east commenced their battles on the river from which the army of the potomac derived its name, and received the final surrender of their old antagonists at appomattox court house, virginia. the splendid achievements of each have nationalized our victories removed all sectional jealousies (of which we have unfortunately experienced too much), and the cause of crimination and recrimination that might have followed had either section failed in its duty. all have a proud record, and all sections can well congratulate themselves and each other for having done their full share in restoring the supremacy of law over every foot of territory belonging to the united states. let them hope for perpetual peace and harmony with that enemy, whose manhood, however mistaken the cause, drew forth such herculean deeds of valor. i have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant, u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. the end __________ footnotes (*1) afterwards general gardner, c.s.a. (*2) general garland expressed a wish to get a message back to general twiggs, his division commander, or general taylor, to the effect that he was nearly out of ammunition and must have more sent to him, or otherwise be reinforced. deeming the return dangerous he did not like to order any one to carry it, so he called for a volunteer. lieutenant grant offered his services, which were accepted.--publishers. (*3) mentioned in the reports of major lee, colonel garland and general worth.--publishers. (*4) note.--it had been a favorite idea with general scott for a great many years before the mexican war to have established in the united states a soldiers' home, patterned after something of the kind abroad, particularly, i believe, in france. he recommended this uniformly, or at least frequently, in his annual reports to the secretary of war, but never got any hearing. now, as he had conquered the state, he made assessments upon the different large towns and cities occupied by our troops, in proportion to their capacity to pay, and appointed officers to receive the money. in addition to the sum thus realized he had derived, through capture at cerro gordo, sales of captured government tobacco, etc., sums which swelled the fund to a total of about $220,000. portions of this fund were distributed among the rank and file, given to the wounded in hospital, or applied in other ways, leaving a balance of some $118,000 remaining unapplied at the close of the war. after the war was over and the troops all home, general scott applied to have this money, which had never been turned into the treasury of the united states, expended in establishing such homes as he had previously recommended. this fund was the foundation of the soldiers' home at washington city, and also one at harrodsburgh, kentucky. the latter went into disuse many years ago. in fact it never had many soldiers in it, and was, i believe, finally sold. (*5) the mexican war made three presidential candidates, scott, taylor and pierce--and any number of aspirants for that high office. it made also governors of states, members of the cabinet, foreign ministers and other officers of high rank both in state and nation. the rebellion, which contained more war in a single day, at some critical periods, than the whole mexican war in two years, has not been so fruitful of political results to those engaged on the union side. on the other side, the side of the south, nearly every man who holds office of any sort whatever, either in the state or in the nation, was a confederate soldier, but this is easily accounted for from the fact that the south was a military camp, and there were very few people of a suitable age to be in the army who were not in it. (*6) c. b. lagow, the others not yet having joined me. (*7) note.--since writing this chapter i have received from mrs. w. h. l. wallace, widow of the gallant general who was killed in the first day's fight on the field of shiloh, a letter from general lew. wallace to him dated the morning of the 5th. at the date of this letter it was well known that the confederates had troops out along the mobile & ohio railroad west of crump's landing and pittsburg landing, and were also collecting near shiloh. this letter shows that at that time general lew. wallace was making preparations for the emergency that might happen for the passing of reinforcements between shiloh and his position, extending from crump's landing westward, and he sends it over the road running from adamsville to the pittsburg landing and purdy road. these two roads intersect nearly a mile west of the crossing of the latter over owl creek, where our right rested. in this letter general lew. wallace advises general w. h. l. wallace that he will send "to-morrow" (and his letter also says "april 5th," which is the same day the letter was dated and which, therefore, must have been written on the 4th) some cavalry to report to him at his headquarters, and suggesting the propriety of general w. h. l. wallace's sending a company back with them for the purpose of having the cavalry at the two landings familiarize themselves with the road so that they could "act promptly in case of emergency as guides to and from the different camps." this modifies very materially what i have said, and what has been said by others, of the conduct of general lew. wallace at the battle of shiloh. it shows that he naturally, with no more experience than he had at the time in the profession of arms, would take the particular road that he did start upon in the absence of orders to move by a different road. the mistake he made, and which probably caused his apparent dilatoriness, was that of advancing some distance after he found that the firing, which would be at first directly to his front and then off to the left, had fallen back until it had got very much in rear of the position of his advance. this falling back had taken place before i sent general wallace orders to move up to pittsburg landing and, naturally, my order was to follow the road nearest the river. but my order was verbal, and to a staff officer who was to deliver it to general wallace, so that i am not competent to say just what order the general actually received. general wallace's division was stationed, the first brigade at crump's landing, the second out two miles, and the third two and a half miles out. hearing the sounds of battle general wallace early ordered his first and third brigades to concentrate on the second. if the position of our front had not changed, the road which wallace took would have been somewhat shorter to our right than the river road. u. s. grant. mount macgregor, new york, june 21, 1885. (*8) note: in an article on the battle of shiloh which i wrote for the century magazine, i stated that general a. mcd. mccook, who commanded a division of buell's army, expressed some unwillingness to pursue the enemy on monday, april 7th, because of the condition of his troops. general badeau, in his history, also makes the same statement, on my authority. out of justice to general mccook and his command, i must say that they left a point twenty-two miles east of savannah on the morning of the 6th. from the heavy rains of a few days previous and the passage of trains and artillery, the roads were necessarily deep in mud, which made marching slow. the division had not only marched through this mud the day before, but it had been in the rain all night without rest. it was engaged in the battle of the second day and did as good service as its position allowed. in fact an opportunity occurred for it to perform a conspicuous act of gallantry which elicited the highest commendation from division commanders in the army of the tennessee. general sherman both in his memoirs and report makes mention of this fact. general mccook himself belongs to a family which furnished many volunteers to the army. i refer to these circumstances with minuteness because i did general mccook injustice in my article in the century, though not to the extent one would suppose from the public press. i am not willing to do any one an injustice, and if convinced that i have done one, i am always willing to make the fullest admission. (*9) note.--for gallantry in the various engagements, from the time i was left in command down to 26th of october and on my recommendation, generals mcpherson and c. s. hamilton were promoted to be major-generals, and colonels c. c. marsh, 20th illinois, m. m. crocker, 13th iowa j. a. mower, 11th missouri, m. d. leggett, 78th ohio, j. d. stevenson, 7th missouri, and john e. smith, 45th illinois, to be brigadiers. (*10) colonel ellet reported having attacked a confederate battery on the red river two days before with one of his boats, the de soto. running aground, he was obliged to abandon his vessel. however, he reported that he set fire to her and blew her up. twenty of his men fell into the hands of the enemy. with the balance he escaped on the small captured steamer, the new era, and succeeded in passing the batteries at grand gulf and reaching the vicinity of vicksburg. (*11) one of colonel ellet's vessels which had run the blockade on february the 2d and been sunk in the red river. (*12) note.--on this occasion governor richard yates, of illinois, happened to be on a visit to the army and accompanied me to carthage. i furnished an ambulance for his use and that of some of the state officers who accompanied him. (*13) note.--when general sherman first learned of the move i proposed to make, he called to see me about it. i recollect that i had transferred my headquarters from a boat in the river to a house a short distance back from the levee. i was seated on the piazza engaged in conversation with my staff when sherman came up. after a few moments' conversation he said that he would like to see me alone. we passed into the house together and shut the door after us. sherman then expressed his alarm at the move i had ordered, saying that i was putting myself in a position voluntarily which an enemy would be glad to manoeuvre a year--or a long time--to get me in. i was going into the enemy's country, with a large river behind me and the enemy holding points strongly fortified above and below. he said that it was an axiom in war that when any great body of troops moved against an enemy they should do so from a base of supplies, which they would guard as they would the apple of the eye, etc. he pointed out all the difficulties that might be encountered in the campaign proposed, and stated in turn what would be the true campaign to make. this was, in substance, to go back until high ground could be reached on the east bank of the river; fortify there and establish a depot of supplies, and move from there, being always prepared to fall back upon it in case of disaster. i said this would take us back to memphis. sherman then said that was the very place he would go to, and would move by railroad from memphis to grenada, repairing the road as we advanced. to this i replied, the country is already disheartened over the lack of success on the part of our armies; the last election went against the vigorous prosecution of the war, voluntary enlistments had ceased throughout most of the north and conscription was already resorted to, and if we went back so far as memphis it would discourage the people so much that bases of supplies would be of no use: neither men to hold them nor supplies to put in them would be furnished. the problem for us was to move forward to a decisive victory, or our cause was lost. no progress was being made in any other field, and we had to go on. sherman wrote to my adjutant general, colonel j. a. rawlins, embodying his views of the campaign that should be made, and asking him to advise me to at least get the views of my generals upon the subject. colonel rawlins showed me the letter, but i did not see any reason for changing my plans. the letter was not answered and the subject was not subsequently mentioned between sherman and myself to the end of the war, that i remember of. i did not regard the letter as official, and consequently did not preserve it. general sherman furnished a copy himself to general badeau, who printed it in his history of my campaigns. i did not regard either the conversation between us or the letter to my adjutant-general as protests, but simply friendly advice which the relations between us fully justified. sherman gave the same energy to make the campaign a success that he would or could have done if it had been ordered by himself. i make this statement here to correct an impression which was circulated at the close of the war to sherman's prejudice, and for which there was no fair foundation. (*14) meant edward's station. (*15) chattanooga, november 18, 1863. major-general w. t. sherman: enclosed herewith i send you copy of instructions to major-general thomas. you having been over the ground in person, and having heard the whole matter discussed, further instructions will not be necessary for you. it is particularly desirable that a force should be got through to the railroad between cleveland and dalton, and longstreet thus cut off from communication with the south, but being confronted by a large force here, strongly located, it is not easy to tell how this is to be effected until the result of our first effort is known. i will add, however, what is not shown in my instructions to thomas, that a brigade of cavalry has been ordered here which, if it arrives in time, will be thrown across the tennessee above chickamauga, and may be able to make the trip to cleveland or thereabouts. u. s. grant maj.-gen'l. chattanooga, november 18, 1863. major-general geo. h. thomas, chattanooga: all preparations should be made for attacking the enemy's position on missionary ridge by saturday at daylight. not being provided with a map giving names of roads, spurs of the mountains, and other places, such definite instructions cannot be given as might be desirable. however, the general plan, you understand, is for sherman, with the force brought with him strengthened by a division from your command, to effect a crossing of the tennessee river just below the mouth of chickamauga; his crossing to be protected by artillery from the heights on the north bank of the river (to be located by your chief of artillery), and to secure the heights on the northern extremity to about the railroad tunnel before the enemy can concentrate against him. you will co-operate with sherman. the troops in chattanooga valley should be well concentrated on your left flank, leaving only the necessary force to defend fortifications on the right and centre, and a movable column of one division in readiness to move wherever ordered. this division should show itself as threateningly as possible on the most practicable line for making an attack up the valley. your effort then will be to form a junction with sherman, making your advance well towards the northern end of missionary ridge, and moving as near simultaneously with him as possible. the junction once formed and the ridge carried, communications will be at once established between the two armies by roads on the south bank of the river. further movements will then depend on those of the enemy. lookout valley, i think, will be easily held by geary's division and what troops you may still have there belonging to the old army of the cumberland. howard's corps can then be held in readiness to act either with you at chattanooga or with sherman. it should be marched on friday night to a position on the north side of the river, not lower down than the first pontoon-bridge, and there held in readiness for such orders as may become necessary. all these troops will be provided with two days' cooked rations in haversacks, and one hundred rounds of ammunition on the person of each infantry soldier. special care should be taken by all officers to see that ammunition is not wasted or unnecessarily fired away. you will call on the engineer department for such preparations as you may deem necessary for carrying your infantry and artillery over the creek. u. s. grant, major-general. (*16) in this order authority was given for the troops to reform after taking the first line of rifle-pits preparatory to carrying the ridge. (*17) chattanooga, november 24,1863. major-general. ceo. h. thomas, chattanooga general sherman carried missionary ridge as far as the tunnel with only slight skirmishing. his right now rests at the tunnel and on top of the hill, his left at chickamauga creek. i have instructed general sherman to advance as soon as it is light in the morning, and your attack, which will be simultaneous, will be in cooperation. your command will either carry the rifle-pits and ridge directly in front of them, or move to the left, as the presence of the enemy may require. if hooker's position on the mountain [cannot be maintained] with a small force, and it is found impracticable to carry the top from where he is, it would be advisable for him to move up the valley with all the force he can spare, and ascend by the first practicable road. u. s. grant, major-general. (*18) washington, d. c., december 8, 1863, 10.2 a.m. maj.-general u. s. grant: understanding that your lodgment at knoxville and at chattanooga is now secure, i wish to tender you, and all under your command, my more than thanks, my profoundest gratitude for the skill, courage, and perseverance with which you and they, over so great difficulties, have effected that important object. god bless you all, a. lincoln, president u. s. (*19) general john g. foster. (*20) during this winter the citizens of jo davies county, ill., subscribed for and had a diamond-hilled sword made for general grant, which was always known as the chattanooga sword. the scabbard was of gold, and was ornamented with a scroll running nearly its entire length, displaying in engraved letters the names of the battles in which general grant had participated. congress also gave him a vote of thanks for the victories at chattanooga, and voted him a gold medal for vicksburg and chattanooga. all such things are now in the possession of the government at washington. (*21) washington, d. c. december 29, 1863. maj.-general u. s. grant: general foster has asked to be relieved from his command on account of disability from old wounds. should his request be granted, who would you like as his successor? it is possible that schofield will be sent to your command. h. w. halleck general-in-chief. (official.) (*22) see letter to banks, in general grant's report, appendix. (*23) [private and confidential.] headquarters armies of the united states, washington, d. c., april 4, 1864. major-general w. t. sherman, commanding military division of the mississippi. general:--it is my design, if the enemy keep quiet and allow me to take the initiative in the spring campaign, to work all parts of the army together, and somewhat towards a common centre. for your information i now write you my programme, as at present determined upon. i have sent orders to banks, by private messenger, to finish up his present expedition against shreveport with all dispatch; to turn over the defence of red river to general steele and the navy and to return your troops to you and his own to new orleans; to abandon all of texas, except the rio grande, and to hold that with not to exceed four thousand men; to reduce the number of troops on the mississippi to the lowest number necessary to hold it, and to collect from his command not less than twenty-five thousand men. to this i will add five thousand men from missouri. with this force he is to commence operations against mobile as soon as he can. it will be impossible for him to commence too early. gillmore joins butler with ten thousand men, and the two operate against richmond from the south side of the james river. this will give butler thirty-three thousand men to operate with, w. f. smith commanding the right wing of his forces and gillmore the left wing. i will stay with the army of the potomac, increased by burnside's corps of not less than twenty-five thousand effective men, and operate directly against lee's army, wherever it may be found. sigel collects all his available force in two columns, one, under ord and averell, to start from beverly, virginia, and the other, under crook, to start from charleston on the kanawha, to move against the virginia and tennessee railroad. crook will have all cavalry, and will endeavor to get in about saltville, and move east from there to join ord. his force will be all cavalry, while ord will have from ten to twelve thousand men of all arms. you i propose to move against johnston's army, to break it up and to get into the interior of the enemy's country as far as you can, inflicting all the damage you can against their war resources. i do not propose to lay down for you a plan of campaign, but simply lay down the work it is desirable to have done and leave you free to execute it in your own way. submit to me, however, as early as you can, your plan of operations. as stated, banks is ordered to commence operations as soon as he can. gillmore is ordered to report at fortress monroe by the 18th inst., or as soon thereafter as practicable. sigel is concentrating now. none will move from their places of rendezvous until i direct, except banks. i want to be ready to move by the 25th inst., if possible. but all i can now direct is that you get ready as soon as possible. i know you will have difficulties to encounter in getting through the mountains to where supplies are abundant, but i believe you will accomplish it. from the expedition from the department of west virginia i do not calculate on very great results; but it is the only way i can take troops from there. with the long line of railroad sigel has to protect, he can spare no troops except to move directly to his front. in this way he must get through to inflict great damage on the enemy, or the enemy must detach from one of his armies a large force to prevent it. in other words, if sigel can't skin himself he can hold a leg while some one else skins. i am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant, u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. (*24) see instructions to butler, in general grant's report, appendix. (*25) in field, culpeper c. h., va., april 9, 1864. maj.-general geo. g. meade com'd'g army of the potomac. for information and as instruction to govern your preparations for the coming campaign, the following is communicated confidentially for your own perusal alone. so far as practicable all the armies are to move together, and towards one common centre. banks has been instructed to turn over the guarding of the red river to general steele and the navy, to abandon texas with the exception of the rio grande, and to concentrate all the force he can, not less than 25,000 men, to move on mobile. this he is to do without reference to other movements. from the scattered condition of his command, however, he cannot possibly get it together to leave new orleans before the 1st of may, if so soon. sherman will move at the same time you do, or two or three days in advance, jo. johnston's army being his objective point, and the heart of georgia his ultimate aim. if successful he will secure the line from chattanooga to mobile with the aid of banks. sigel cannot spare troops from his army to reinforce either of the great armies, but he can aid them by moving directly to his front. this he has been directed to do, and is now making preparations for it. two columns of his command will make south at the same time with the general move; one from beverly, from ten to twelve thousand strong, under major-general ord; the other from charleston, va., principally cavalry, under brig.-general crook. the former of these will endeavor to reach the tennessee and virginia railroad, about south of covington, and if found practicable will work eastward to lynchburg and return to its base by way of the shenandoah valley, or join you. the other will strike at saltville, va., and come eastward to join ord. the cavalry from ord's command will try tributaries would furnish us an easy line over which to bring all supplies to within easy hauling distance of every position the army could occupy from the rapidan to the james river. but lee could, if he chose, detach or move his whole army north on a line rather interior to the one i would have to take in following. a movement by his left--our right--would obviate this; but all that was done would have to be done with the supplies and ammunition we started with. all idea of adopting this latter plan was abandoned when the limited quantity of supplies possible to take with us was considered. the country over which we would have to pass was so exhausted of all food or forage that we would be obliged to carry everything with us. while these preparations were going on the enemy was not entirely idle. in the west forrest made a raid in west tennessee up to the northern border, capturing the garrison of four or five hundred men at union city, and followed it up by an attack on paducah, kentucky, on the banks of the ohio. while he was able to enter the city he failed to capture the forts or any part of the garrison. on the first intelligence of forrest's raid i telegraphed sherman to send all his cavalry against him, and not to let him get out of the trap he had put himself into. sherman had anticipated me by sending troops against him before he got my order. forrest, however, fell back rapidly, and attacked the troops at fort pillow, a station for the protection of the navigation of the mississippi river. the garrison to force a passage southward, if they are successful in reaching the virginia and tennessee railroad, to cut the main lines of the road connecting richmond with all the south and south-west. gillmore will join butler with about 10,000 men from south carolina. butler can reduce his garrison so as to take 23,000 men into the field directly to his front. the force will be commanded by maj.-general w. f. smith. with smith and gillmore, butler will seize city point, and operate against richmond from the south side of the river. his movement will be simultaneous with yours. lee's army will be your objective point. wherever lee goes, there you will go also. the only point upon which i am now in doubt is, whether it will be better to cross the rapidan above or below him. each plan presents great advantages over the other with corresponding objections. by crossing above, lee is cut off from all chance of ignoring richmond and going north on a raid. but if we take this route, all we do must be done whilst the rations we start with hold out. we separate from butler so that he cannot be directed how to co-operate. by the other route brandy station can be used as a base of supplies until another is secured on the york or james rivers. these advantages and objections i will talk over with you more fully than i can write them. burnside with a force of probably 25,000 men will reinforce you. immediately upon his arrival, which will be shortly after the 20th inst., i will give him the defence of the road from bull run as far south as we wish to hold it. this will enable you to collect all your strength about brandy station and to the front. there will be naval co-operation on the james river, and transports and ferries will be provided so that should lee fall back into his intrenchments at richmond, butler's force and yours will be a unit, or at least can be made to act as such. what i would direct then, is that you commence at once reducing baggage to the very lowest possible standard. two wagons to a regiment of five hundred men is the greatest number that should be allowed, for all baggage, exclusive of subsistence stores and ordnance stores. one wagon to brigade and one to division headquarters is sufficient and about two to corps headquarters. should by lee's right flank be our route, you will want to make arrangements for having supplies of all sorts promptly forwarded to white house on the pamunkey. your estimates for this contingency should be made at once. if not wanted there, there is every probability they will be wanted on the james river or elsewhere. if lee's left is turned, large provision will have to be made for ordnance stores. i would say not much short of five hundred rounds of infantry ammunition would do. by the other, half the amount would be sufficient. u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. (*26) general john a. logan, upon whom devolved the command of the army of the tennessee during this battle, in his report gave our total loss in killed, wounded and missing at 3,521; and estimated that of the enemy to be not less than 10,000: and general g. m. dodge, graphically describing to general sherman the enemy's attack, the full weight of which fell first upon and was broken by his depleted command, remarks: "the disparity of forces can be seen from the fact that in the charge made by my two brigades under fuller and mersy they took 351 prisoners, representing forty-nine different regiments, eight brigades and three divisions; and brought back eight battle flags from the enemy." (*27) union army on the rapidan, may 5, 1864. [compiled.] lieutenant-general u. s. grant, commander-in-chief. major-general george g. meade, commanding army of the potomac. maj.-gen. w. s. hancock, commanding second army corps. first division, brig.-gen. francis c. barlow. first brigade, col. nelson a. miles. second brigade, col. thomas a. smyth. third brigade, col. paul frank. fourth brigade, col. john r. brooke. second division, brig.-gen. john gibbon. first brigade, brig.-gen. alex. s. webb. second brigade, brig.-gen. joshua t. owen. third brigade, col. samuel s. carroll. third division, maj.-gen. david b. birney. first brigade, brig.-gen. j. h. h. ward. second brigade, brig.-gen. alexander hays. fourth divisin, brig.-gen. gershom mott. first brigade, col. robert mcallister. second brigade, col. wm. r. brewster. artillery brigade, col. john c. tidball. maj.-gen. g. k. warren, commanding fifth army corps. first division, brig.-gen. charles griffin. first brigade, brig.-gen. romeyn b. ayres. second brigade, col. jacob b. sweitzer. third brigade, brig.-gen. j. j. bartlett. second division, brig.-gen. john c. robinson. first brigade, col. samuel h. leonard. second brigade, brig.-gen. henry baxter. third brigade, col. andrew w. denison. third division, brig.-gen. samuel w. crawford. first brigade, col. wm mccandless. third brigade, col. joseph w. fisher. fourth division, brig.-gen. james s. wadsworth. first brigade, brig.-gen. lysander cutler. second brigade brig.-gen. james c. rice. third brigade, col. roy stone artillery brigade, col. s. s. wainwright. maj.-gen. john sedgwick, commanding sixth army corps. first division, brig.-gen. h. g. wright. first brigade, col. henry w. brown. second brigade, col. emory upton. third brigade, brig.-gen. d. a. russell. fourth brigade, brig.-gen. alexander shaler. second division, brig.-gen. george w. getty. first brigade, brig.-gen. frank wheaton. second brigade, col. lewis a. grant. third brigade, brig.-gen. thos. h. neill. fourth brigade, brig.-gen. henry l. eustis. third division, brig.-gen. james ricketts. first brigade, brig.-gen. wm. h. morris. second brigade, brig.-gen. t. seymour. artillery brigade, col. c. h. tompkins maj.-gen. p. h. sheridan, commanding cavalry corps. first division, brig.-gen. a. t. a. torbert. first brigade, brig.-gen. g. a. custer. second brigade, col. thos. c. devin. reserve brigade, brig.-gen. wesley merritt second division, brig.-gen. d. mcm. gregg. first brigade, brig.-gen. henry e. davies, jr. second brigade, col. j. irvin gregg. third division, brig.-gen. j. h. wilson. first brigade, col. t. m. bryan, jr. second brigade, col. geo. h. chapman. maj.-gen. a. e. burnside, commanding ninth army corps. first division, brig.-gen. t. g. stevenson. first brigade, col. sumner carruth. second brigade, col. daniel leasure. second division, brig.-gen. robert b. potter. first brigade, col. zenas r. bliss. second brigade, col. simon g. griffin. third division, brig.-gen. orlando willcox. first brigade, col. john f. hartranft. second brigade, col. benj. c. christ. fourth division, brig.-gen. edward ferrero. first brigade, col. joshua k. sigfried. second brigade, col. henry g. thomas. provisional brigade, col. elisha g. marshall. brig.-gen. henry j. hunt, commanding artillery. reserve, col. h. s. burton. first brigade, col. j. h. kitching. second brigade, maj. j. a. tompkins. first brig. horse art., capt. j. m. robertson. second brigade, horse art., capt. d. r. ransom. third brigade, maj. r. h. fitzhugh. general headquarters....... provost guard, brig.-gen. m. r. patrick. volunteer engineers, brig.-gen. h. w. benham. confederate army. organization of the army of northern virginia, commanded by general robert e. lee, august 31st, 1834. first army corps: lieut.-gen. r. h. anderson, commanding. maj.-gen. geo. e. pickett's division. brig.-gen. seth m. barton's brigade. (a) brig.-gen. m. d. corse's " " eppa hunton's " " wm. r. terry's " maj.-gen. c. w. field's division. (b) brig.-gen. g. t. anderson's brigade " e. m. law's (c) " " john bratton's " maj.-gen. j. b. kershaw's division. (d) brig.-gen. w. t. wofford's brigade " b. g. humphreys' " " goode bryan's " " kershaw's (old) " second army corps: major-general jubal a. early, commanding maj.-gen. john b. gordon's division. brig.-gen. h. t. hays' brigade. (e) " john pegram 's " (f) " gordon's " (g) brig.-gen. r. f. hoke's " maj.-gen. edward johnson's division. stonewall brig. (brig.-gen. j. a. walker). (h) brig.-gen. j m jones' brigade. (h) " geo h. stewart's " (h) " l. a. stafford's " (e) maj.-gen. r. e. rodes' division. brig.-gen. j. daniel's brigade. (i) " geo. dole's " (k) " s. d. ramseur's brigade. " c. a. battle's " " r. d. johnston's " (f) third army corps: lieut.-gen. a. p. hill, commanding. maj.-gen. wm. mahone's division. (l) brig.-gen. j. c. c. sanders' brigade. mahone's " brig.-gen. n. h. harris's " (m) " a. r. wright's " " joseph finegan's " maj.-gen. c. m. wilcox's division. brig.-gen. e. l. thomas's brigade (n) " james h. lane's " " sam'l mccowan's " " alfred m. scale's " maj.-gen. h. heth's division. (o) brig.-gen. j. r. davis's brigade. " john r. cooke's " " d. mcrae's " " j. j. archer's " " h. h. walker's " _unattached_: 5th alabama battalion. cavalry corps: lieutenant-general wade hampton, commanding.(p) maj.-gen. fitzhugh lee's division brig.-gen. w. c. wickham's brigade " l. l. lomax's " maj.-gen. m. c. butler's division. brig.-gen. john dunovant's brigade. " p. m. b. young's " " thomas l. rosser's " maj.-gen. w. h. f. lee's division. brig.-gen. rufus barringer's brigade. " j. r. chambliss's " artillery reserve: brig.-gen. w. n. pendleton, commanding. brig.-gen. e. p. alexander's division.* cabell's battalion. manly's battery. 1st co. richmond howitzers. carleton's battery. calloway's battery. haskell's battalion. branch's battery. nelson's " garden's " rowan " huger's battalion. smith's battery. moody " woolfolk " parker's " taylor's " fickling's " martin's " gibb's battalion. davidson's battery. dickenson's " otey's " brig.-gen. a. l. long's division. braxton's battalion. lee battery. 1st md. artillery. stafford " alleghany " cutshaw's battalion. charlotteville artillery. staunton " courtney " carter's battalion. morris artillery. orange " king william artillery. jeff davis " nelson's battalion. amherst artillery. milledge " fluvauna " brown's battalion. powhatan artillery. 2d richmond howitzers. 3d " " rockbridge artillery. salem flying artillery. col r. l.walker's division. cutt's battalion. ross's battery. patterson's battery. irwin artillery. richardson's battalion. lewis artillery. donaldsonville artillery. norfolk light " huger " mclntosh 's battalion. johnson's battery. hardaway artillery. danville " 2d rockbridge artillery. pegram's battalion. peedee artillery. fredericksburg artillery. letcher " purcell battery. crenshaw's battery. poague's battalion. madison artillery. albemarle " brooke " charlotte " note. (a) col. w. r. aylett was in command aug. 29th, and probably at above date. (b) inspection report of this division shows that it also contained benning's and gregg's brigades. (c) commanded by colonel p. d. bowles. (d) only two brigadier-generals reported for duty; names not indicated. organization of the army of the valley district. (e) constituting york's brigade. (f) in ramseur's division. (g) evan's brigade, colonel e. n. atkinson commanding, and containing 12th georgia battalion. (h) the virginia regiments constituted terry's brigade, gordon's division. (i) grimes' brigade. (k) cook's " (l) returns report but one general officer present for duty; name not indicated. (m) colonel joseph m. jayne, commanding. (n) colonel thomas j. simmons, commanding. (o) four brigadier-generals reported present for duty; names not indicated. (p) on face of returns appears to have consisted of hampton's, fitz-lee's, and w. h. f. lee's division, and dearing's brigade. *but one general officer reported present for duty in the artillery, and alexander's name not on the original. (*28) headquarters armies u. s., may ii, 1864.--3 p.m. major-general meade, commanding army of the potomac. move three divisions of the 2d corps by the rear of the 5th and 6th corps, under cover of night, so as to join the 9th corps in a vigorous assault on the enemy at four o'clock a.m. to-morrow. will send one or two staff officers over to-night to stay with burnside, and impress him with the importance of a prompt and vigorous attack. warren and wright should hold their corps as close to the enemy as possible, to take advantage of any diversion caused by this attack, and to push in if any opportunity presents itself. there is but little doubt in my mind that the assault last evening would have proved entirely successful if it had commenced one hour earlier and had been heartily entered into by mott's division and the 9th corps. u. s. grant, lieut.-general. (*29) headquarters, armies u. s., may 11, 1864.-4 p.m. major-general a. e. burnside, commanding 9th army corps. major-general hancock has been ordered to move his corps under cover of night to join you in a vigorous attack against the enemy at 4 o'clock a.m. to-morrow. you will move against the enemy with your entire force promptly and with all possible vigor at precisely 4 o'clock a.m. to-morrow the 12th inst. let your preparations for this attack be conducted with the utmost secrecy and veiled entirely from the enemy. i send two of my staff officers, colonels comstock and babcock, in whom i have great confidence and who are acquainted with the direction the attack is to be made from here, to remain with you and general hancock with instructions to render you every assistance in their power. generals warren and wright will hold their corps as close to the enemy as possible, to take advantage of any diversion caused by yours and hancock's attack, and will push in their whole force if any opportunity presents itself. u. s. grant, lieut.-general. (*30) headquarters armies u. s., may 12, 1864, 6.30 p.m. major-general halleck, washington, d. c. the eighth day of the battle closes, leaving between three and four thousand prisoners in our hands for the day's work, including two general officers, and over thirty pieces of artillery. the enemy are obstinate, and seem to have found the last ditch. we have lost no organizations, not even that of a company, whilst we have destroyed and captured one division (johnson's), one brigade (doles'), and one regiment entire from the enemy. u. s. grant, lieut.-general. (*31) spottsylvania c. h., may 13, 1864. hon e. m. stanton, secretary of war, washington, d. c. i beg leave to recommend the following promotions be made for gallant and distinguished services in the last eight days' battles, to wit: brigadier-general h. g. wright and brigadier-general john gibbon to be major-generals; colonel s. s. carroll, 8th ohio volunteers colonel e. upton, 121st new york volunteers; colonel william mccandless, 2d pennsylvania reserves, to be brigadier-generals. i would also recommend major-general w. s. hancock for brigadier-general in the regular army. his services and qualifications are eminently deserving of this recognition. in making these recommendations i do not wish the claims of general g. m. dodge for promotion forgotten, but recommend his name to be sent in at the same time. i would also ask to have general wright assigned to the command of the sixth army corps. i would further ask the confirmation of general humphreys to the rank of major-general. general meade has more than met my most sanguine expectations. he and sherman are the fittest officers for large commands i have come in contact with. if their services can be rewarded by promotion to the rank of major-generals in the regular army the honor would be worthily bestowed, and i would feel personally gratified. i would not like to see one of these promotions at this time without seeing both. u. s. grant, lieut.-general. (*32) quarles' mills, va., may 26, 1864. major-general halleck, washington, d. c. the relative position of the two armies is now as follows: lee's right rests on a swamp east of the richmond and fredericksburg road and south of the north anna, his centre on the river at ox ford, and his left at little river with the crossings of little river guarded as far up as we have gone. hancock with his corps and one division of the 9th corps crossed at chesterfield ford and covers the right wing of lee's army. one division of the 9th corps is on the north bank of the anna at ox ford, with bridges above and below at points nearest to it where both banks are held by us, so that it could reinforce either wing of our army with equal facility. the 5th and 6th corps with one division of the 9th corps run from the south bank of the anna from a short distance above ox ford to little river, and parallel with and near to the enemy. to make a direct attack from either wing would cause a slaughter of our men that even success would not justify. to turn the enemy by his right, between the two annas is impossible on account of the swamp upon which his right rests. to turn him by the left leaves little river, new found river and south anna river, all of them streams presenting considerable obstacles to the movement of our army, to be crossed. i have determined therefore to turn the enemy's right by crossing at or near hanover town. this crosses all three streams at once, and leaves us still where we can draw supplies. during the last night the teams and artillery not in position, belonging to the right wing of our army, and one division of that wing were quietly withdrawn to the north bank of the river and moved down to the rear of the left. as soon as it is dark this division with most of the cavalry will commence a forced march for hanover town to seize and hold the crossings. the balance of the right wing will withdraw at the same hour, and follow as rapidly as possible. the left wing will also withdraw from the south bank of the river to-night and follow in rear of the right wing. lee's army is really whipped. the prisoners we now take show it, and the action of his army shows it unmistakably. a battle with them outside of intrenchments cannot be had. our men feel that they have gained the morale over the enemy, and attack him with confidence. i may be mistaken, but i feel that our success over lee's army is already assured. the promptness and rapidity with which you have forwarded reinforcements has contributed largely to the feeling of confidence inspired in our men, and to break down that of the enemy. we are destroying all the rails we can on the central and fredericksburg roads. i want to leave a gap on the roads north of richmond so big that to get a single track they will have to import rail from elsewhere. even if a crossing is not effected at hanover town it will probably be necessary for us to move on down the pamunkey until a crossing is effected. i think it advisable therefore to change our base of supplies from port royal to the white house. i wish you would direct this change at once, and also direct smith to put the railroad bridge there in condition for crossing troops and artillery and leave men to hold it. u. s. grant, lieut.-general. (*33) near cold harbor, june 3, 1864, 7 a.m. major-general meade, commanding a. p. the moment it becomes certain that an assault cannot succeed, suspend the offensive; but when one does succeed, push it vigorously and if necessary pile in troops at the successful point from wherever they can be taken. i shall go to where you are in the course of an hour. u. s. grant, lieut.-general. (*34) cold harbor, june 5,1864. major-general halleck, chief of staff of the army, washington, d. c. a full survey of all the ground satisfies me that it would be impracticable to hold a line north-east of richmond that would protect the fredericksburg railroad to enable us to use that road for supplying the army. to do so would give us a long vulnerable line of road to protect, exhausting much of our strength to guard it, and would leave open to the enemy all of his lines of communication on the south side of the james. my idea from the start has been to beat lee's army if possible north of richmond; then after destroying his lines of communication on the north side of the james river to transfer the army to the south side and besiege lee in richmond, or follow him south if he should retreat. i now find, after over thirty days of trial, the enemy deems it of the first importance to run no risks with the armies they now have. they act purely on the defensive behind breastworks, or feebly on the offensive immediately in front of them, and where in case of repulse they can instantly retire behind them. without a greater sacrifice of human life than i am willing to make all cannot be accomplished that i had designed outside of the city. i have therefore resolved upon the following plan: i will continue to hold substantially the ground now occupied by the army of the potomac, taking advantage of any favorable circumstance that may present itself until the cavalry can be sent west to destroy the virginia central railroad from about beaver dam for some twenty-five or thirty miles west. when this is effected i will move the army to the south side of the james river, either by crossing the chickahominy and marching near to city point, or by going to the mouth of the chickahominy on north side and crossing there. to provide for this last and most possible contingency, several ferry-boats of the largest class ought to be immediately provided. once on the south side of the james river, i can cut off all sources of supply to the enemy except what is furnished by the canal. if hunter succeeds in reaching lynchburg, that will be lost to him also. should hunter not succeed, i will still make the effort to destroy the canal by sending cavalry up the south side of the river with a pontoon train to cross wherever they can. the feeling of the two armies now seems to be that the rebels can protect themselves only by strong intrenchments, whilst our army is not only confident of protecting itself without intrenchments, but that it can beat and drive the enemy wherever and whenever he can be found without this protection. u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. (*35) cold harbor, va., june 6, 1864. major-general d. hunter commanding dept. w. va. general sheridan leaves here to-morrow morning, with instructions to proceed to charlottesville, va., and to commence there the destruction of the va. cen. r. r., destroying this way as much as possible. the complete destruction of this road and of the canal on james river is of great importance to us. according to the instructions i sent to general halleck for your guidance, you were to proceed to lynchburg and commence there. it would be of great value to us to get possession of lynchburg for a single day. but that point is of so much importance to the enemy, that in attempting to get it such resistance may be met as to defeat your getting onto the road or canal at all. i see, in looking over the letter to general halleck on the subject of your instructions, that it rather indicates that your route should be from staunton via charlottesville. if you have so understood it, you will be doing just what i want. the direction i would now give is, that if this letter reaches you in the valley between staunton and lynchburg, you immediately turn east by the most practicable road. from thence move eastward along the line of the road, destroying it completely and thoroughly, until you join general sheridan. after the work laid out for general sheridan and yourself is thoroughly done, proceed to join the army of the potomac by the route laid out in general sheridan's instructions. if any portion of your force, especially your cavalry, is needed back in your department, you are authorized to send it back. if on receipt of this you should be near to lynchburg and deem it practicable to detach a cavalry force to destroy the canal. lose no opportunity to destroy the canal. u. s. grant, lieut.-general. (*36) from a statement of losses compiled in the adjutant-general's office. field of action and date. | killed. | wounded. | missing. | aggregate. | wilderness, may 5th to 7th | 2,261 | 8,785 | 2,902 |13,948 | spottsylvania, may 8th to 21st | 2,271 | 9,360 | 1,970 | 13,601| north anna, may 23d to 27th | 186 | 792 | 165 | 1,143 | totopotomoy, may 27th to 31st | 99 | 358 | 52 | 509 | cold harbor, may 31st to june 12th | 1,769 | 6,752 | 1,537 |10,058 | total ................ | 6,586 | 26,047 | 6,626 | 39,259 | (*37) city point, va., june 17, 1864. 11 a.m. major-gen. halleck, washington, d. c. * * * * * * * the enemy in their endeavor to reinforce petersburg abandoned their intrenchments in front of bermuda hundred. they no doubt expected troops from north of the james river to take their place before we discovered it. general butler took advantage of this and moved a force at once upon the railroad and plank road between richmond and petersburg, which i hope to retain possession of. too much credit cannot be given to the troops and their commanders for the energy and fortitude displayed during the last five days. day and night has been all the same, no delays being allowed on any account. u. s. grant, lieut.-general. (*38) city point, va., july 24, 1864. major-general meade, commanding, etc. the engineer officers who made a survey of the front from bermuda hundred report against the probability of success from an attack there. the chances they think will be better on burnside's front. if this is attempted it will be necessary to concentrate all the force possible at the point in the enemy's line we expect to penetrate. all officers should be fully impressed with the absolute necessity of pushing entirely beyond the enemy's present line, if they should succeed in penetrating it, and of getting back to their present line promptly if they should not succeed in breaking through. to the right and left of the point of assault all the artillery possible should be brought to play upon the enemy in front during the assault. their lines would be sufficient for the support of the artillery, and all the reserves could be brought on the flanks of their commands nearest to the point of assault, ready to follow in if successful. the field artillery and infantry held in the lines during the first assault should be in readiness to move at a moment's notice either to their front or to follow the main assault, as they should receive orders. one thing, however, should be impressed on corps commanders. if they see the enemy giving away on their front or moving from it to reinforce a heavily assaulted portion of their line, they should take advantage of such knowledge and act promptly without waiting for orders from army commanders. general ord can co-operate with his corps in this movement, and about five thousand troops from bermuda hundred can be sent to reinforce you or can be used to threaten an assault between the appomattox and james rivers, as may be deemed best. this should be done by tuesday morning, if done at all. if not attempted, we will then start at the date indicated to destroy the railroad as far as hicksford at least, and to weldon if possible. * * * * * * * whether we send an expedition on the road or assault at petersburg, burnside's mine will be blown up.... u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. (*39) see letter, august 5th, appendix. (*40) see appendix, letters of oct. 11th. (*41) city point, va., december 2,1864. major-general thomas, nashville tenn. if hood is permitted to remain quietly about nashville, you will lose all the road back to chattanooga and possibly have to abandon the line of the tennessee. should he attack you it is all well, but if he does not you should attack him before he fortifies. arm and put in the trenches your quartermaster employees, citizens, etc. u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. city point, va., december 2, 1864.--1.30 p.m. major-general thomas, nashville, tenn. with your citizen employees armed, you can move out of nashville with all your army and force the enemy to retire or fight upon ground of your own choosing. after the repulse of hood at franklin, it looks to me that instead of falling back to nashville we should have taken the offensive against the enemy where he was. at this distance, however, i may err as to the best method of dealing with the enemy. you will now suffer incalculable injury upon your railroads if hood is not speedily disposed of. put forth therefore every possible exertion to attain this end. should you get him to retreating give him no peace. u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. city point, va., december 5, 1864. major-general thomas, nashville, tenn. is there not danger of forrest moving down the cumberland to where he can cross it? it seems to me whilst you should be getting up your cavalry as rapidly as possible to look after forrest, hood should be attacked where he is. time strengthens him in all possibility as much as it does you. u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. city point, va., december 6, 1864--4 p.m. major-general thomas, nashville, tenn. attack hood at once and wait no longer for a remnant of your cavalry. there is great danger of delay resulting in a campaign back to the ohio river. u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. city point, va., december 8, 1864.--8.30 p.m. major-general thomas, nashville, tenn. your dispatch of yesterday received. it looks to me evident the enemy are trying to cross the cumberland river, and are scattered. why not attack at once? by all means avoid the contingency of a foot race to see which, you or hood, can beat to the ohio. if you think necessary call on the governors of states to send a force into louisville to meet the enemy if he should cross the river. you clearly never should cross except in rear of the enemy. now is one of the finest opportunities ever presented of destroying one of the three armies of the enemy. if destroyed he never can replace it. use the means at your command, and you can do this and cause a rejoicing that will resound from one end of the land to the other. u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. city point, va., december 11, 1864.--4 p.m. major-general thomas, nashville, tenn. if you delay attack longer the mortifying spectacle will be witnessed of a rebel army moving for the ohio river, and you will be forced to act, accepting such weather as you find. let there be no further delay. hood cannot even stand a drawn battle so far from his supplies of ordnance stores. if he retreats and you follow, he must lose his material and much of his army. i am in hopes of receiving a dispatch from you to-day announcing that you have moved. delay no longer for weather or reinforcements. u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. washington, d. c., december 15, 1864. major-general thomas, nashville, tenn. i was just on my way to nashville, but receiving a dispatch from van duzer detailing your splendid success of to-day, i shall go no further. push the enemy now and give him no rest until he is entirely destroyed. your army will cheerfully suffer many privations to break up hood's army and render it useless for future operations. do not stop for trains or supplies, but take them from the country as the enemy have done. much is now expected. u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. (*42) see orders to major-general meade, ord, and sheridan, march 24th, appendix. (*43) see appendix. (*44) note.--the fac-simile of the terms of lee's surrender inserted at this place, was copied from the original document furnished the publishers through the courtesy of general ely s. parker, military secretary on general grant's staff at the time of the surrender. three pages of paper were prepared in general grant's manifold order book on which he wrote the terms, and the interlineations and erasures were added by general parker at the suggestion of general grant. after such alteration it was handed to general lee, who put on his glasses, read it, and handed it back to general grant. the original was then transcribed by general parker upon official headed paper and a copy furnished general lee. the fac-simile herewith shows the color of the paper of the original document and all interlineations and erasures. there is a popular error to the effect that generals grant and lee each signed the articles of surrender. the document in the form of a letter was signed only by general grant, in the parlor of mclean's house while general lee was sitting in the room, and general lee immediately wrote a letter accepting the terms and handed it to general grant. [illustration: u.s.g first in war first in peace and first in the hearts of his countrymen] =our standard-bearer;= or, the life of =general ulysses s. grant:= _his youth, his manhood, his campaigns, and his eminent services in the reconstruction of the nation his sword has redeemed:_ as seen and related by captain bernard galligasken, _cosmopolitan_, and written out by oliver optic. illustrated by thomas nast. boston: lee and shepard. 1868. entered, according to act of congress, in the year 1868, by william t. adams, in the clerk's office of the district court of the district of massachusetts. electrotyped at the boston stereotype foundry, no. 19 spring lane. to the illustrious soldier, _general ulysses s. grant,_ president of the united states from march 4, 1869, the only man who had the mental power, the moral force, the military genius to suppress the great rebellion, the mightiest the world ever saw; the man whom, first in war, and first in the hearts of his countrymen, the nation will soon acknowledge to be first in peace, =this volume= is admiringly and enthusiastically dedicated. preface. in this volume my friend captain galligasken has been permitted to tell his story very much in his own way. as i fully and heartily indorse his positions, fully and heartily share in his enthusiasm, my task has consisted of nothing more than merely writing the book; and i assure the reader that i have enjoyed quite as much as my friend the captain the pleasant contemplation of the brilliant deeds of the illustrious soldier. there is something positively inspiring in the following out of such a career as that of general grant; and when i declare that the enthusiasm of captain galligasken is nothing more than just and reasonable, i do it after a careful examination of the grounds on which it is based; after a patient, but exceedingly agreeable, study of the character of the man whom we have jointly eulogized; and after instituting a critical comparison between the general and the mighty men of the present and the past. i have twice read all that i have written, and i find no occasion to add any qualifying words, and no reason to moderate the warm enthusiasm of the captain. as the candidate for the presidency of the dominant party in the land, all of general grant's sayings and doings will be subjected to the closest scrutiny by his political opponents. all that he has said and all that he has done will be remorselessly distorted by savage critics. partisan prejudice and partisan hatred will pursue him into the privacies of life, as well as through every pathway and avenue of his public career; but captain galligasken joins me in the confident belief that no man has ever been held up to the gaze of the american people who could stand the test better; hardly one who could stand it as well. in his private life the general has been pure and guileless, while in his public history he has been animated by the most noble and exalted patriotism, ever willing to sacrifice all that he was and all that he had for the cause in which he embarked. the study of the illustrious hero's motives and character has been exceedingly refreshing to me, as well as to my friend captain galligasken, as we analyzed together the influences which guided him in his eventful experience. we were unable to find any of those selfish and belittling springs of action which rob great deeds of more than half their glory. we could see in him a simplicity of character which amazed us; a strength of mind, a singleness of heart, which caused us to envy sherman and sheridan the possession of such a man's friendship. unlike most eminent men, whose very greatness has induced them to shake off more or less of the traits of ordinary humanity, our illustrious soldier is a lovable man--an attitude in which we are seldom permitted to regard great men. he stands in violent contrast with the bombastic heroes of all times--modest, gentle-hearted, and always approachable. there is none of the frigid reserve in his manner which awes common people in the contemplation of those exalted by mighty deeds or a lofty position. captain galligasken says all this upon his honor as a soldier and an historian; and from my own personal stand-point i cordially indorse his opinion, which, in both instances, is derived from actual experience. captain galligasken was somewhat afraid of the politicians, and not a little nervous at the possible manner those of the party to which he never had the honor to belong might regard his enthusiasm. i have taken the liberty to assure him that his enthusiasm is legitimate; that he has never manifested it except on suitable occasions; that the fact always specified in connection with the glowing eulogy amply justifies his praise. i was willing to go farther, and to insist that it was impossible for the politicians of his own or any other party to resist the conclusions, or withhold the homage, after the facts were admitted. and this matter of facts, the unclothed skeleton of reliable history and biography, is a point on which my friend captain galligasken is especially sensitive. our library of reference in the agreeable task we have jointly performed included all the works bearing on the subject now extant in the country. we have used them liberally and faithfully, and, animated by a desire to set forth "the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth" in regard to the illustrious soldier, the captain feels entirely confident that he has produced a reliable history of all the important phases in his life. he has plentifully besprinkled his pages with anecdotes, some of which have never been related before, for they are the most telling illustrations of individual character. we jointly acknowledge our indebtedness to general adam badeau's "military history of ulysses s. grant," at once the most interesting and exhaustive work on the subject which has yet been issued, and which captain galligasken insists that every patriotic lover of the truth should read; to "ohio in the war;" to "grant and his campaigns," by professor coppée, who had peculiar facilities for the performance of his task; to howland's "grant as a soldier and a statesman;" to swinton's "army of the potomac;" to general shanks's "personal recollections of distinguished generals;" and, in a less degree, to other volumes. captain galligasken is especially desirous of acknowledging his obligations to his friend pollard, author of "the lost cause,"--though he thinks grant is the chief author of the _lost_ cause,--not only for the citations he has taken the liberty to make from the book, but also for some of the heartiest laughs he ever had in his life. we tender our personal thanks to those kind friends--whose names we are not even permitted to mention--for facts, suggestions, and anecdotes. when our enterprising and discriminating publishers insisted upon just this life of general grant,--which i should not have been willing to undertake without the indispensable aid of my cheerful friend the captain,--we gladly accepted the agreeable task; but i noticed that captain galligasken appeared to be disturbed in his mind about something. i asked him what it was. he replied by asking me what possible excuse a humble individual like himself could offer for inflicting upon the patient, much-enduring community another life of general grant, who was even then more fortunate than a cat, for he had more than "nine lives." i bade him tell the reason, and he did. "because i can't help it," he replied; "because i desire to have the people of the united states see general grant just as i see him. he has been nominated by the national republican party as its candidate for the presidency, on a platform which every patriot, every christian, heartily indorses, and which is the sum total of the general's political creed. i wish, if i can, to do something for his election; and i am fully persuaded that all the people would vote for him if they understood the man. i am no politician, never held an office, and never expect to hold one; but i believe in grant above and beyond all party considerations. i respect, admire, and love the man. i glory in his past, and i am confident of his future. i honestly, sincerely, and heartily believe every word we have written. nothing but the election of grant can save the nation from the infamy of practical repudiation, from the distractions which have shaken the land since the close of the rebellion, if not from another civil war and the ultimate dissolution of the union. i hope the people will read our book, think well, and be as enthusiastic as i am." it affords me very great pleasure, again and finally, to be able to indorse my friend captain galligasken. he is sincere; and before my readers condemn his enthusiasm, i beg to inquire how they can escape his conclusions. all we ask is a fair hearing, and we are confident that the people who sustained grant through the war will enable him to finish in the presidential chair the glorious work he began on the battle-fields of the republic. oliver optic. harrison square, mass., july 11, 1868. contents. chapter i. page wherein captain galligasken modestly disparages himself, and sets forth with becoming enthusiasm the virtues of the illustrious soldier whose life he insists upon writing. 15 chapter ii. wherein captain galligasken delineates the early history of the illustrious soldier, and deduces therefrom the presages of future greatness. 26 chapter iii. wherein captain galligasken "talks horse," and illustrates the subject with some anecdotes from the life of the illustrious soldier. 36 chapter iv. wherein captain galligasken follows the illustrious soldier to west point, and dilates admiringly upon the many excellent traits of character which the hero exhibited there. 46 chapter v. wherein captain galligasken accompanies the illustrious soldier to mexico, and glowingly dilates upon the gallant achievements of our arms from palo alto to monterey. 56 chapter vi. wherein captain galligasken marches with the illustrious soldier to the halls of the montezumas, and glowingly describes the brilliant campaign in mexico. 66 chapter vii. wherein captain galligasken goes with the illustrious soldier to the farm near st. louis, and observes his career through various misfortunes, till he is included in the firm of grant & sons. 76 chapter viii. wherein captain galligasken discourses upon the breaking out of the rebellion, and describes the noble and modest behavior of the illustrious soldier. 86 chapter ix. wherein captain galligasken has something to say about citizen soldiers, and follows the illustrious soldier into the field in missouri. 96 chapter x. wherein captain galligasken relates a pleasing anecdote of the illustrious soldier, and shows how and why he captured paducah. 106 chapter xi. wherein captain galligasken describes the battle of belmont, and further illustrates the military qualities of the illustrious soldier, as exhibited in that fierce fight. 117 chapter xii. wherein captain galligasken rehearses the persistent efforts of the illustrious soldier to obtain permission to attack fort henry, and follows him to the capture of that important position. 128 chapter xiii. wherein captain galligasken states the results of the victory at fort henry, and attends the illustrious soldier in the investment of fort donelson. 138 chapter xiv. wherein captain galligasken follows the illustrious soldier to the victory at fort donelson, and points out the nature and extent of that splendid achievement. 148 chapter xv. wherein captain galligasken follows the illustrious soldier through the period of his temporary disgrace and triumphant vindication to the opening scenes at shiloh. 158 chapter xvi. wherein captain galligasken views the illustrious soldier in the battle of shiloh, and corrects some popular errors in regard to that savage fight. 170 chapter xvii. wherein captain galligasken finishes the battle of shiloh, and sympathizes with the illustrious soldier in his unmerited disgrace while he is waiting, waiting, before corinth. 180 chapter xviii. wherein captain galligasken treats of the corinth campaign, and admiringly calls attention to the splendid abilities of the illustrious soldier as a district commander. 191 chapter xix. wherein captain galligasken shows how six months were spent around vicksburg by the illustrious soldier, and how the president rather liked the man, and thought he would try him a little longer. 201 chapter xx. wherein captain galligasken illustrates the temperance principles of the illustrious soldier, and proceeds with him on his conquering path to the capital of mississippi. 211 chapter xxi. wherein captain galligasken follows the illustrious soldier through the campaign in mississippi to the siege and surrender of vicksburg. 223 chapter xxii. wherein captain galligasken sums up the magnificent results of the capture of vicksburg, and starts with the illustrious soldier for chattanooga, after his appointment to the command of the combined armies of the tennessee, the cumberland, and the ohio. 234 chapter xxiii. wherein captain galligasken details the means by which the illustrious soldier relieved the army of the cumberland, and traces his career to the glorious victory of chattanooga. 246 chapter xxiv. wherein captain galligasken has something more to say about the glorious campaign of chattanooga, and illustrates some of the personal characteristics of the illustrious soldier. 259 chapter xxv. wherein captain galligasken follows the illustrious soldier to washington, where, after enduring many hardships, he is commissioned lieutenant general in the army of the united states. 272 chapter xxvi. wherein captain galligasken has something to say about the illustrious soldier's views of strategy, and follows him across the rapidan into the wilderness. 284 chapter xxvii. wherein captain galligasken follows the campaign of the army of the potomac, and the illustrious soldier announces that he shall fight it out on that line, if it takes all summer. 296 chapter xxviii. wherein captain galligasken describes in brief detail the siege of petersburg and richmond, and attends the illustrious soldier to the end of the campaign at appomattox court house. 310 chapter xxix. wherein captain galligasken has a few words to say about lee's surrender, and demonstrates to his own and his reader's entire satisfaction, that the illustrious soldier is not an accidental hero. 323 chapter xxx. wherein captain galligasken follows the illustrious soldier in his career after the war, relates several anecdotes of him, and respectfully invites the whole world to match him. 337 =our standard-bearer;= or, the life of general ulysses s. grant. chapter i. _wherein captain galligasken modestly disparages himself, and sets forth with becoming enthusiasm the virtues of the illustrious soldier whose life he insists upon writing._ who am i? it makes not the least difference who i am. if i shine at all in this veritable history,--which i honestly confess i have not the slightest desire to do,--it will be only in the reflected radiance of that great name which has become a household word in the home of every loyal citizen, north and south, of this mighty republic; a name that will shine with transcendent lustre as his fame rings along down the grand procession of the ages, growing brighter and more glorious the farther it is removed from the petty jealousies of contemporaneous heroes, statesmen, and chroniclers. what am i? it does not make the least difference what i am. i am to chronicle the deeds of that illustrious soldier, the providential man of the great rebellion, who beat down the strongholds of treason by the force of his mighty will, and by a combination of moral and mental qualifications which have been united in no other man, either in the present or the past. what was washington? god bless him! a wise and prudent statesman, a devoted patriot, the savior of the new-born nationality. what was napoleon? the greatest soldier of the century which ended with the battle of waterloo. what was andrew jackson? the patriot statesman, who had a will of his own. what were cæsar, wellington, marlborough, scott? all strong men, great soldiers, devoted patriots. what is the great captain, the illustrious hero of the modern republic? he is all these men united into one. he has held within the grasp of his mighty thought larger armies than any other general who is worthy to be mentioned in comparison with him, controlling their movements, and harmonizing their action throughout a territory vastly larger than that comprised in the battle-grounds of europe for a century. washington was great in spite of repeated defeats. grant is great through a long line of brilliant successes. napoleon won victories, and then clothed himself in the scarlet robes of an emperor, seated himself on a throne, and made his country's glory only the lever of his own glory. grant won victories not less brilliant, and then modestly smoked his cigar on the grand level of the people, diffidently accepting any such honors as a grateful people thrust upon him. as i yield the tribute of admiring homage to washington that he put the satan of sovereign power behind him when he was tempted with the glittering bait, i am amazed that grant, the very idol of a million veteran soldiers, permitted his sword to rest in its scabbard while his recreant superior, by the accident of the assassin's bullet, dared to thwart the will of the people whose ballots had elevated him to power. i can almost worship him for his forbearance under the keenest insults to which the sensitive soul of a true soldier can be subjected, that he did not smite his cunning traducer, and did not even appeal to the people. who am i? if i am seen at all in this true narrative of a sublime life, i beg to be regarded as the most humble and least deserving of columbia's chosen sons, but standing, for the moment, on a pedestal, and blushingly pointing to the historic canvas, whereon is delineated the triumphal career of the great man of the nineteenth century; the successful general, towering in lofty preëminence above every other man, who in the days of darkness struck a blow for the redemption of the nation; the fledged statesman, who, without being a politician, apprehended and vitalized the chosen policy of the sovereign people. i am nothing; he is everything. i am an enthusiast! is there nothing in the man, sublimated by glorious deeds, elevated by a conquering will far above his fellows, almost deified by the highest development of godlike faculties,--is there nothing in the man to quicken the lazy flow in the veins of the beholder? can i, who marched from belmont to appomattox court house, by the way of donelson, vicksburg, chattanooga, spottsylvania, petersburg, and five forks, who have, since the collapse of the rebellion, gazed, in common with the senators and representatives in congress, the governors of the states, the president, and the heads of the departments of state, the sovereign people, with friends and with foes of the regenerated country,--can i, who have gazed with the most intense interest at the little two-story brick building in the nation's capital, where smoked and labored the genius of the war, to see what that one man would do, to hear what that one man would say,--can i gaze and listen without realizing the throb which heaves the mighty heart of the nation? i felt as they felt, that there was only one man in the land. it mattered little what senators and representatives enacted in the halls of congress, if he did not indorse it. it mattered little what the nation's accident vetoed, if he but approved it. it was of little consequence what rebels north or rebels south planned and plotted, if only this one man frowned upon it. reconstruction could flourish only in his smile. if a department commander ambitiously or stupidly belied his war record, and attempted to bolster up with this diplomacy the treason which he had put down with his sword, the howl of the loyal millions was changed into a shout of exultation, if the one man in the little two-story brick building in washington only nodded his disapproval of the course of the recreant. that man has been the soul of the people's policy of reconstruction. conscious that he was its friend, it mattered not who was its enemy; for foes could delay, but not defeat it. can i be unmoved while i look at the man? when i behold a huge steamship, the giant of the deep, threading its way through night and storm over the pathless ocean, from continent to continent, herself a miracle to the eye, i wonder. when i see the electric telegraph, flashing a living thought from farthest east to farthest west, and even along its buried channel in the depths of the storm-tossed ocean, i wonder. can i gaze unmoved upon the man, the fulton, the morse, from whose busy brain, lighted up by an inspiration from the infinite, which common men cannot even understand, came forth the grand conception of these miracles of science? i am an enthusiast. i cannot gaze at the spectacle of a nation rent and shattered by the most stupendous treason that ever fouled historic annals, restored to peace and unity, without a thrill of emotion. i cannot follow our gallant armies in imagination now, as i did in reality then, in their triumphal march from the gloom of fredericksburg and chancellorsville to the glorious light and sunshine of vicksburg and five forks, from death at bull run, to life at fort donelson, without having my heart leap with grateful enthusiasm. in the ghastly midnight of disaster, when the nation's pulse almost ceased to beat in dread and anxiety for the fearful issue, we had men--hundreds of thousands, millions of men, the bravest and truest soldiers that ever bore a musket. thousands and tens of thousands of them sleep beneath the bloody sod of antietam, in the miry swamps of the chickahominy, and under the parching soil of the southern savannas, where they sank to their rest with the field unconquered above them. there they slumber, each of them a willing sacrifice, if his death brought the nation but one hair's breadth nearer to the final redemption, or could add one ray to the flood of light which the peace they prayed for would shed upon the land beloved. there was no lack of men, and pure patriots prayed for a leader. they sighed for a washington, a napoleon, a wellington, to guide their swelling masses of ardent warriors from the gloom of disaster to the brightness of victory. chiefs, mighty in battle, pure in purpose, skilful in device and execution, reared their banners successively at the head of the valiant hosts, then drooped and fell, as the hot blast of jealousy swept over them, or they became entangled in the silken meshes of adulation. in none of these did the soldiers find their true leader, though they fought fiercely and fell in horrid slaughter under all of them. it was only when the soul of the mustered hosts was fired by the sublime fact of a worthy leader, and their muscles nerved by the will of a mighty champion, that the thundering march of victory commenced, and the triumphal car of the conqueror swept like a whirlwind through the war-stricken south. then treason trembled, tottered, few. then the infatuated leaders of rebellion wailed in terror, and fled from the halter that dangled over their heads. then the one man of the war towered like a giant above his fellows. then he stood forth as the nation's savior, and a generous people placed the laurel on his brow. i am an enthusiast as i review the history of my country from 1862 to the present time. i watched with mcclellan in the oozy swamps of virginia, when he feared to risk his popularity by striking an avenging stroke at the exposed foe, and i joined in singing the pæan of victory with grant after five forks, when the final blow had been given to the rebellion. therefore am i enthusiastic. the people acknowledged the greatness of grant's military genius, the tremendous power of his will, and the unflinching earnestness of his patriotism. then, while salvos of artillery throughout the loyal land proclaimed the victory to the astonished nations, we hailed grant as our standard-bearer. if i am enthusiastic, so are the people, to their honor and glory be it said. i shall only ask to be their mouthpiece, assured that i cannot exceed their estimate of the hero. what he was in the storm of battle, he is in the calm pursuits of peace. what he was among the soldiers, he is among the citizens. as he possessed the unlimited confidence of the "boys in blue," so has he the unlimited confidence of the people. they are full of gratitude to him for the past, full of trust in him for the present, and full of hope in him for the future. in a tone more enthusiastic, and a voice more united than ever before since the days of washington, the people have declared that grant shall still be our standard-bearer, and i am more enthusiastic than ever. * * * * * presumptuous as it may be in one so humble and little deserving as i am to intrude himself upon the public eye, i insist upon giving my views of the life of general grant. i claim to know all about the distinguished subject of my story--which is no story at all, inasmuch as every word of it, so far as it relates to the general, is only the living truth, as i understand it. even if my kind and courteous readers should deem me a myth, i shall only have won the obscurity i covet, and succeed in concentrating their attention upon the illustrious man whose immortal name i reverently utter, and whose undying deeds i seek to illustrate. i wish to say in the beginning, that i hold it to be the sacred duty of the historian to tell the truth; so far as in him lies. for this reason i have taken the trouble, in this initial chapter of my work, to explain at some length the grounds of my individual enthusiasm in speaking and writing of the illustrious subject of this memoir. the fact, and my view of the fact, are two essentially different things. i shall state facts as i find them; and whatever view my indulgent reader may entertain in regard to me and my views, i assure him, on the honor of an historian, that all my statements are true, and worthy of the utmost credit. others may not be willing to agree with me in all respects in my estimate of particular events or incidents in the life of my illustrious subject, though i am persuaded there can be no essential difference in our view of the sum-total of the general--that he must stand unchallenged as the greatest man and the greatest soldier of the nineteenth century, if not of all time. a proper regard for the sacred truth of history compels me to make this declaration, which i do without the fear of a denial. i have been very much pained to observe that my friend, mr. pollard, author of "the lost cause," has arrived at an estimate of the merit of our distinguished general, which is, in some respects, different from my own. perhaps my valued contemporary was unable to derive the necessary inspiration from his subject to enable him to do full justice to the shining abilities of some of the heroes who, unfortunately for the lost cause, were on the other side of the unpleasant controversy. doubtless mr. pollard meant well; but it is painful to find that he has, in some cases, exhibited symptoms of prejudice, especially towards general grant, who does not seem to be a favorite general with him. i notice also on his pages a degree of partiality towards general lee which greatly astonishes me. after a careful examination of mr. pollard's voluminous work, i am surprised and grieved to find that he actually regards lee, in the matter of soldier-like qualities and in generalship, as the superior of grant! i confess my surprise at his singular position; but in view of the fact that he is writing the history of "the lost cause"--lost, the world acknowledges, through the active agency of general grant,--i am disposed to palliate, though not to excuse, my friend's departures from the sacred line of historic truth. mr. lee is doubtless a very amiable and kind-hearted gentleman, though we must protest against his inhumanity to the belle island prisoners; but i object to any comparison of him, as a general, with grant. when mr. pollard shall have time to go over the ground again, he will see his blunders, and, being an honest man, he will have the hardihood to correct them. then "the lost cause" will be to him, as to the rest of mankind, a monument of the folly and wickedness of those who engaged in it, a solemn warning to traitors and conspirators, and the best panegyric of the true hero of the war which a rebel pen could indite. though, as i said before, it makes no difference who or what i am, it will be no more than courtesy for me to satisfy the reasonable curiosity of my readers on these points, before i enter upon the pleasant task before me. though one of my ancestors, some ten generations back, was born in the parish of blarney, in the county of cork, ireland, i was not born there. sir bernard galligasken--whose name, shorn of its aristocratic handle, i have the honor to bear--was one of the earliest known, at the present time, of our stock, and emigrated to scotland, where he married one of the grants of aberdeenshire. my more immediate progenitor came over in the mayflower, and landed on plymouth rock, for which, on this account, as well as because i love the principles of those stalwart men of the olden time, i have ever had the most profound veneration. early in the present century my parents removed from eastern massachusetts to the great west. i was born at point pleasant, ohio, april 27, 1822. by a singular coincidence (on my side) was born in the same town, and on the same day, hiram ulysses grant. chapter ii. _wherein captain galligasken delineates the early history of the illustrious soldier, and deduces therefrom the presages of future greatness._ i respectfully subscribe myself a cosmopolitan, not in the sense that i am a citizen of the world--god forbid! for i am too proud of my title as an american citizen to share my nationality with any other realm under the sun. i am cosmopolitan in the "everywhere" significance of the term; and it has been a cause of sincere regret to me that i could only be in one place at one time; but i ought to be content, since i always happened to be in sight or hearing of the illustrious subject of my feeble admiration. point pleasant is a village on the ohio, twenty-five miles above cincinnati, celebrated for nothing in particular, except being the birthplace of general grant, which, however, is glory enough for any town; and passengers up and down the beautiful river, for generations to come, will gaze with wondering interest at its spires, because there first drew the breath of life the immortal man who has been and still is our standard-bearer. many people have a fanatical veneration for blood as such. i confess i yield no allegiance to this sentiment, for i expect to be what i make myself, rather than what i am made by my distinguished ancestor, sir bernard galligasken. but those who attach any weight to pedigree may be reasonably gratified in the solid character of the progenitors of general grant. he came from the grants of aberdeenshire, in scotland, whose heraldic motto was, "_stand fast, stand firm, stand sure!_" which, by an astonishing prescience of the seers of the clan, seems to have been invented expressly to describe the moral and mental attributes of the illustrious soldier of our day. matthew grant was a passenger in the mary and john, and settled in dorchester, massachusetts, in 1630. the american citizen, whose pride tempts him to look beyond the pilgrim fathers for glorious ancestors, ought to have been born in england, where pride of birth bears its legitimate fruit. grant came in a direct line from one of these worthies; but i never heard him congratulate himself even on this fortunate and happy origin. noah grant, a descendant of the stout puritan, emigrated to connecticut, and was a captain in the old french war. he was killed in battle, in 1756, having attained the rank of captain. his son, also taking the patriarchal name, was belligerent enough to have been killed in battle, for he was a soldier in the revolutionary war from lexington--where he served as a lieutenant--to yorktown, the last engagement of that seven years' strife. this faithful soldier was the general's grandfather. he had a son named for mr. chief justice jesse root, of connecticut, who was the father of our standard-bearer. jesse root grant was born in pennsylvania, but when he was ten years of age his parents removed to the western reserve of ohio. he was apprenticed to a tanner at maysville, kentucky, when he was sixteen, and set up in business for himself at ravenna, ohio, when he was of age; but severe illness compelled him to relinquish it for a time. in 1820 he settled at point pleasant, and married miss hannah simpson. here, in a little one-story house, still in existence, was born the subject of our story. the house in which peter the great lived at sardam while he worked at ship-building is still preserved, enclosed within another, tableted with inscriptions, and protected from the ravages of time for the inspection of future ages. i wonder that some ardent patriot has not already done a similar service to the little structure in which was born a greater than czar peter, and one whose memory will be cherished when the autocrat of the russias is forgotten. the house is a mere shanty, which was comfortable enough in its day, with an extension in the rear, and with the chimney on the outside of one end. it was a good enough house even for so great a man to be born in, and compares very favorably with that in which lincoln, his co-laborer in the war, first drew the breath of life. it has become historic now, and the people will always regard it with glowing interest. grant's mother was a very pretty, but not pretentious, girl; a very worthy, but not austere, matron. she was a member of the methodist church, with high views of christian duty, especially in regard to her children, whom she carefully trained and earnestly watched over in their early years. her influence as a noble christian woman has had, and is still to have, through her illustrious son, more weight and broader expansion than she ever dreamed of in the days of her poverty and toil. a year after the birth of the first born, jesse grant, then a poor man, though he afterwards accumulated a handsome property, removed from point pleasant to georgetown, ohio, where he carried on his business as a tanner; and as he tanned with nothing but oak bark, and did his work in a superior manner, his reputation was excellent. i am hard on leather myself, but my first pair of shoes was made of leather from the tannery of j.r. grant, and they wore like iron. it has been observed that this leather, made up into thick boots, was more effectual than any other when applied by the indignant owner to the purpose sometimes necessary, though always disagreeable, of kicking an unmannerly and ill-behaved ruffian out of doors. though i have not had occasion to test mr. grant's leather in this direction, i am a firm believer in its virtue. i cannot say that, as a baby, ulysses had any fore-shadowings of the brilliant destiny in store for him. it is quite possible that his fond mother regarded him as a remarkable child, if the neighbors in georgetown did not. certainly, in this instance, she was nearer right than loving mothers usually are, and is entitled to much credit for the justness of her view on this interesting subject. i am confident that the infant hercules displayed some of the energy of which has distinguished his manhood--that he declined to be washed, and held on to dangerous play-things, with greater tenacity than children of tender years usually do. still, the sacredness of historic truth does not permit me to assume that he displayed any of the traits of a great general, except the embryo of his mighty will, until he had attained his second year, when the first decided _penchant_ for the roar of artillery manifested itself on a small scale. my friend mr. pollard alludes to the incident in his valuable work on the lost cause, though, i am pained to observe, in a tone of disparagement quite unworthy of him, as a "yankee affectation." as he seems to have no scruples in telling strange stories about stonewall jackson, jeb. stuart, and other southern worthies, i am compelled to attribute this incredulity and ridicule to a foolish prejudice. though i happened to be present when the event occurred,--a cosmopolitan then, as now,--i was in the arms of my maternal parent, and being only two years old at the time, i am unable to vouch for its truth on my own personal recollection; but the father of general grant has confirmed it. "let me try the effect of a pistol report on the baby," said a young man to the anxious parent in the street, on the fourth of july, where great numbers of people were gathered. "the child has never seen a pistol or a gun in his life," replied mr. grant; "but you may try it." the hand of the baby was placed on the trigger, and pressed there till the lock sprang, and the pistol went off with a loud report. the future commander-in-chief hardly moved or twitched a muscle. "fick it again! fick it again!" cried the child, pushing away the weapon, and desiring to have the experiment repeated. "that boy will make a general; he neither winked nor dodged," added the inevitable bystander, a cosmopolitan like myself, who is ever at hand on momentous occasions. to me, the trait of character exhibited by the child is not so much the type of a taste for the rattle of musketry and the odor of gunpowder as of a higher manifestation of soldier-like qualities. after weary days and long nights of the thunder of cannon at donelson, when ordinary generals would have been disgusted and disheartened by continued failure, grant persevered, not knowing that he had been beaten, and in tones full of grand significance, though in speech more mature, he repeats his order,-"fick it again! fick it again!" when canal, and squadron, and repeated assaults had failed to reduce vicksburg, and friend and foe believed that the place was invulnerable, grant seemed to shout,-"fick it again! fick it again!" when, after the terrible onslaught of the union army at the wilderness, no advantage seemed to have been gained, and the time came when grant's predecessors had fled to recruit in a three months' respite, the heroic leader only said, in substance,-"fick it again! fick it again!" at spottsylvania he hurled his army again at the rebel host, and then fought battle after battle, never completely succeeding, but never turning his eye or his thought from the object to be gained: he still maintained his baby philosophy, and still issued the order of the day, which was, practically,-"fick it again! fick it again!" that celebrated telegram, sent to secretary stanton, which thrilled the hearts of the waiting people as they listened for the tidings of battle, and which was a most significant exponent of the man's character and purpose, "i shall fight it out on this line, if it takes all summer," was only another rendering of his childish exclamation,-"fick it again! fick it again!" fort donelson, vicksburg, richmond, the rebellion itself, were fully and completely "ficked," in the end, by the carrying out of his policy. it is an excellent rule, when a plan does not work in one way, to "fick" it again. grant's father was too poor at this time to send him to school steadily, for the boy was an industrious fellow, and had a degree of skill and tact in the management of work that rendered him a very useful assistant. he went to school three months in winter till he was eleven, when even this meagre privilege was denied him, and his subsequent means of education were very limited. but his opportunities were fully improved, and he heartily devoted himself to the cultivation of his mind. he was the original discoverer of the fact that there is no such word as "can't" in the dictionary; and it appears never to have been added to his vocabulary. grant's dictionary was a capital one for practical service; and if some of our generals had used this excellent edition, their own fame and the country's glory would have been thereby promoted. it affords me very great pleasure to be able to testify, in the most decided manner, that grant was a patriot in his boyhood, as well as in the later years of his life. as an american youth, he had a just and proper reverence for the name of washington, which is the symbol of patriotism to our countrymen. grant's cousin from canada came to live with his uncle for a time in georgetown, and went to school with the juvenile hero. this lad, though born under the shadow of the star-spangled banner, had imbibed some pestilent notions from the canadians, and had the audacity to speak ill of the immortal washington. this was not the only time that americans from canada have assailed their native land, nor was this the only time that ulysses had the honor of fighting the battle directly or indirectly against them. on the present occasion, in spite of the oft-repeated admonition of his pious mother to forgive his enemies and not to fight, he pitched into the renegade and thrashed him soundly, as he deserved to be thrashed. i never spoke ill of washington, but i should esteem it a great honor to have been thrashed by ulysses s. grant in such a cause; and doubtless his cousin, if still living, and not a canadian, is proud of his whipping. grant appears not to have been a brilliant horse-trader, at least not after the tactics of jockeys in general, though in this, as in all other purposes, he carried his point. at the age of twelve his father sent him to buy a certain horse--and it ought to be remarked that his worthy sire seems to have had as much confidence in him at that time as the sovereign people of the present day manifest in him. he was instructed to offer fifty dollars for the animal; then fifty-five if the first offer failed, with the limit at sixty. ralston, the owner of the horse, wished to know how much the youthful purchaser was authorized by his father to give for the animal. ulysses, with a degree of candor which would have confounded an ordinary jockey, explained his instructions in full, and of course the owner asked the maximum sum for him. though the youth had "shown his hand," he was not the easy victim he was supposed to be. he positively refused to give more than fifty dollars for the horse, after he had seen and examined him. he had made up his mind, and the horse was purchased for that sum. i think grant bought out the rebellion in about the same way; for while he was ready to pay "fifty-five," or even "sixty," for the prize of a nation's peace and unity, the rebels came down at the "fifty." grant was a good boy, in the reasonable sense of the term, though he did not die young. i never heard that he made any extravagant pretensions to piety himself, or that any one ever made any for him, though he attended church himself regularly, and had a profound respect for religious worship. he was a sober, quiet little fellow, indulged in no long speeches then any more than now. he was a youth of eminent gravity, rather an old head on young shoulders, and i am only surprised that neither his parents nor his instructors discovered in him the germ of greatness. as the child is father to the man, all the records of his early years concur in showing that he exhibited the same traits of character then as now. the phrenologist who examined ulysses' "bumps," and declared that "it would not be strange" if he became the president of the united states, exhibited more intelligence than others within the ring; but i am provoked with him that he did not state the case stronger; for if there is anything at all in phrenology, the gentleman ought to have been confident of this result. any man _may_ become president, as the stupendous accident of the present generation has shown, but every man is not fit for the place. it is vastly better to be qualified to fill the high position, than it is even to fill it. as grant was the providential man of the war, so shall he be the providential man of the peace that follows it in the highest office within the gift of the people. no accident can cheat him out of his destiny, which he willingly accepts, more for the glory of the nation than of the individual. chapter iii. _wherein captain galligasken "talks horse," and illustrates the subject with some anecdotes from the life of the illustrious soldier._ the horse is a noble animal, and it is by no means remarkable that a bond of sympathy has been established between great men and good horses. i have noticed that distinguished generals are always mounted on splendid steeds--a fact of which painters and sculptors have availed themselves in their delineations, on canvas or in marble, of the heroes and mighty men of history. bucephalus, the war-charger of alexander the great, seems to be almost a part of the macedonian conqueror; washington, in the various equestrian attitudes in which he is presented to the admiring gaze of the people by the artist, appears to gain power and dignity from the noble steed he rides; and scores of lesser heroes, dismounted and detached from the horse, would, so far as the eye is concerned, slip down from the pedestal of grandeur to the level of common men. though it is sometimes unfortunate that the limner's idea of the man is better than of the horse, it will be universally acknowledged that the gallant steed adds dignity and grace to the hero. although it has not yet been the good fortune of the american people to behold any worthy equestrian delineation of our illustrious soldier, either on canvas or in marble, yet the popular ideal would represent him as a sort of centaur--half horse and half grant. while i am by no means willing to acknowledge that every man who "talks horse" is necessarily a great man, it is undeniable that great military geniuses have figured attractively and appropriately in intimate association with this intelligent and noble animal. the inspired writers used the horse to add grandeur and sublimity to their imagery, and st. john's vision of death on the pale horse thrills the soul by the boldness of the equestrian attitude in which it places the grim destroyer. the centaur which the american people idolize is not an unworthy combination, and neither the man nor the horse loses by the association. from the time the embryo hero could go alone--if there ever was a time when he could not go alone--grant fancied the horse; grant loved the horse; grant conquered the horse. bucephalus was offered for sale to philip by a thessalian horse-jockey. he was a glorious horse, but neither groom nor courtier could handle him. so fierce was his untamed will, that the king ordered the jockey to take him away; but alexander, grieved at the thought of losing so fine a steed, remonstrated with his father, who promised to buy him if his son would ride him. alexander did ride him, and the horse became his war-charger in all his campaigns. in his early and intimate association with the horse, young grant exhibited the force of his immense will, even more effectively than his macedonian prototype. when children of seven "talk horse," they do so at a respectful distance from the object of their admiration, with a lively consciousness that the animal has teeth and heels. at this age grant demonstrated his enterprise by operating with a three-year-old colt. i do not profess to be a great man, as i have before had occasion to remark, or to possess any of the elements of greatness; but i do like a horse, while i am free to say i should as soon think of teaching an african lion to dance a hornpipe as to meddle with a three-year-old colt. however good-natured the creature may be, he has an innate independence of character, which makes him restive, and even vicious, under restraint. i never break colts. georgetown, where we lived in those early days, was about seven miles from the ohio. one day grant's father went to ripley, a small town on the river, and remained there all day. the juvenile centaur had an idea on that occasion, which for a seven-year-old, may be regarded as an emphatically brilliant one. on the place was a three-year-old colt, which had been used under the saddle, but never attached to a vehicle of any kind. it required some confidence on the part of the youth to think of harnessing this unbroken animal; yet he not only conceived the idea, but actually carried it out. he put the collar on the three-year-old for the first time, attached him to a sled, and hauled wood with him all day. at eight years of age he was the regular teamster on his father's place. at ten he used to drive a span of horses to cincinnati, forty miles distant, and return with a freight of passengers, but with no adult to direct or control him. the pony trick at the circuses which travel over the country is not a new thing; and when a call was made for a boy to ride the fractious little beast, trained to throw the daring youngster who had the hardihood to mount him, for the amusement of the gaping crowd, ulysses used to be a regular volunteer. i never offered my services, because i had a proper respect for the unity of my corporeal frame. grant, bent on overcoming some new obstacle, was always on hand, and always as sure to succeed as he was to undertake any difficult feat. on one occasion a peculiarly vicious little rascal of a pony was attached to one of these shows which exhibited in our town. grant, as usual, was the only youngster who had the pluck to venture upon the difficult feat of riding him. he mounted the little villain, and away he darted with the speed of the lightning, resorting to all manner of mean tricks to dismount his bold rider. round the ring he whirled, flying rather than running, and increasing his efforts to unhorse the determined youth, who sat as steadily as though he had been the veritable, instead of the figurative, centaur. grant carried too many guns for that pony. a large monkey, included in the programme of the performance, was next let loose, to assist in dismounting the rider. the little demon sprang up behind the volunteer equestrian, and away dashed the pony at redoubled speed. the intelligent but excited audience shouted with laughter, but the youth was unmoved either by the pony, the monkey, or the storming applause of the crowd. he could neither be bullied nor coaxed from his position. then the gentlemanly master of the ring caused the monkey to mount the shoulders of the intrepid youngster, and hold on at his hair. away went the pony once more, and a new effort was made to throw the unconquered young horseman. the crowd shouted and roared with renewed energy as the scene became more ludicrous and more exciting; but grant's nerves were still steady, and his face still wore its resolute, unmoved expression. as usual with those who attempt to throw him, somebody besides grant had to give in. he was too much for pony, monkey, and ring-master combined. i am well aware that i am enthusiastic; i have made full confession of my enthusiasm, and i am not ashamed of it; but i cannot help regarding this exciting incident as a type of events in the subsequent career of that bold rider. when he mounted the pony to ride into fort donelson, he was not to be shaken from his seat; he went in. that same pony--after all sorts of vicious attempts to pitch him into the mississippi, or heave him over into the swamps--carried him safely into vicksburg, after almost as many turns around the ring and the ring-master--one pemberton on this occasion--as in the circus at georgetown. on a still larger scale, with one jefferson davis as ring-master, he was induced to mount the emblematic pony of the army of the potomac, an exceedingly well-trained steed, which, however, had succeeded in throwing all his previous riders. little mac went round the ring very handsomely, and so far as the pony was concerned, proved himself to be master of the situation; but the monkey, which, in this case, appeared to be his personal reputation, too dear to be risked upon any issue short of absolute certainty, was too much for him, and he was unhorsed. his immediate successors held on well for a brief period; but the monkey of jealousy, insubordination, or vanity, very soon gave them a wretched tumble, even before the crowd had ceased to applaud. grant had ridden too many horses to be overwhelmed by this pony. the ring-master kept his eye on the daring rider, expecting soon to see him pitched off by the pony, with the assistance of the monkey. he started from the wilderness one day, and every device was used to unseat him; but he did not move a muscle when the ring-master cracked his whip, or even when the monkey perched upon his shoulders. he fought it out on _that_ line, and brought up at appomattox court house. the ring-master gave up, and closed the performance. doubtless grant would have made a capital circus-rider, for he appears to have had a taste for daring feats with horses. at five years of age he began to stand up on the bare backs of the horses as he rode them to water to the white oak river. when he was nine, he would stand on one foot, with the horse at the top of his speed, only holding on by the rein. a neighbor's boy was unfortunately killed in his attempts to keep up with him, though he did not seek to imitate him in his circus proclivities by standing on the back of the animal. grant was a perfect breaker of horses, for the independent, self-willed creature soon learned that he had a master in the youth; but he would do this kind of business only for his own amusement. he appears to have had an instinctive nobility of character, which would not assimilate with anything like the horse-jockey or the horse-trainer. though he had a remarkable tact, in his boyhood, for teaching a horse to pace, he regarded it as degrading to follow the art as a calling. while he was always willing to work, and had a just regard for the dignity of labor, he was sensitive about engaging in anything of doubtful utility or questionable respectability. a trick was resorted to by his father to induce him to teach a neighbor's horse to pace: though, in a ride of thirteen miles and back, he accomplished the feat, and returned the animal to the owner a perfect pacer, he discovered the subterfuge of which he had been made the victim, and he would never again train another. at the age of twelve the embryo hero was very small in stature, but he seems to have indulged in big ideas even then. mr. grant had a contract to build the brown county jail, and the little fellow promised to haul all the logs of which the structure was to be composed, if his father would buy a certain large-sized horse, to which the youth had taken a fancy. his father assented, but did not suppose the boy would be able to endure the fatigue for more than a week, and hired a man to take his place when he was worn out. but he did not wear out; he had a habit of never wearing out, for he imparted the firmness and solidity of his will to his slight frame. the hired man followed the team for a few days, and then declared that the boy was more competent than himself to handle the big horse. that hired man reminds me of a certain general who followed grant around for a time, ready to take his place, or give it to another, thinking the "big horse" was too much for his subordinate to manage, and who finally took the field in person; but he was obliged to acknowledge in the end, as the other hired man had, that grant could handle the "big horse" better than he could. for some reason the men who were hewing the logs in the woods for the jail did not go to work as usual one day, and there was no one to load the timber for the enterprising youth. there was only the alternative of returning to town without any logs, or of loading them himself. the latter expedient would have been sufficiently impossible to deter an ordinary boy from attempting the task. the sticks were very large and heavy, and even the gang of men used levers and handspikes in loading them. but here was grant standing before donelson or vicksburg, with this team,--before the logs, i should say,--and he had either to do a miracle or return logless to his father. if there had been no particular difficulty in the undertaking, perhaps he would not have felt compelled to do it; as it was, he felt obliged to do it, if only as an illustration of his character. a tree had been felled on the spot, the trunk resting on the branches, and the butt on the ground, forming a convenient inclined plane. the big horse was hitched to the end of the timbers, and three of them were successively "snaked" up on the trunk of the fallen tree, till their ends were high enough to permit the wagon to be backed under them. taking a long chain, so as to enable the horse to work beyond the vehicle, he whipped the end of it around each stick in turn, and hauled it into the wagon, harnessed up again, and drove to the site of the jail. i maintain that this was a great achievement for a boy of twelve, very small at that; and the people in the neighborhood talked about it as such, just as they did, years after, about the capture of vicksburg. the youth had a great deal of engineering skill, and a quickness of perception which enabled him to profit by every favorable circumstance within his reach--a faculty which has contributed in no small degree to his success as a great commander. he was a boy of expedients. the accident of that felled tree, prompt as he was to profit by it, was by no means essential to his success. it was certainly wise to use the inclined plane, which he found ready for service; but if it had not been there, grant would have made one, or loaded the logs in some other way. he would no more have gone off without them than he would have returned from vicksburg or richmond without capturing the city. there is a sort of _unexpectedness_ about grant, which he began to develop as a boy. he does just what the beholder does not anticipate, surprises by sticking to anything, when, according to ordinary rules, one ought to give up, or confounds by a course of action hitherto unheard of. he holds on to the pony when he ought to be thrown; he comes home with a load of logs when he ought to have come home empty; he accomplishes many a feat in which he ought to have failed, according to the every-day rules of life. he was fond of playing marbles, which seems to be the only strictly boys' amusement in which he indulged. he bet half a dozen marbles with a school-mate that he would jump twenty-five feet at a single leap, selecting his own ground for the feat. if i had been there, i should have taken that bet, for it seemed as impossible for a little fellow like him to do it, as it did to capture vicksburg. grant went to a perpendicular bluff, having the requisite height, and jumped down at one leap,--for if the terms of the wager had required it, it would hardly have been convenient to make two leaps of it. though he went down to his middle in the mud below, he won the bet. doubtless he came out of the slough rather the worse for the leap, so far as personal appearance was concerned, but his plight only assures us that he looked before he leaped, as he always did, for hard pan, or a solid rock, might have been trying even to his nerves, in a jump of twenty-five feet. in my opinion lee was as much astonished to see grant on the south side of richmond as the boy with whom he made the bet was to see him jump perpendicularly instead of horizontally. chapter iv. _wherein captain galligasken follows the illustrious soldier to west point, and dilates admiringly upon the many excellent traits of character which the hero exhibited there._ tanning, even with oak bark, and the strong stimulus of the paternal example, had no charms to young grant. though it was a very honorable and useful occupation, he was remorselessly opposed to it; not because he was a dandy, and it soiled his hands, nor because he was fastidious, and the odor was unpleasant, but because he had no taste for the trade. it presented nothing but the dull routine of a mechanical employment, with no difficulties to be overcome, and with no variety to enliven it. whenever his father suggested that they should grind bark, he would start for the village without a word of reply, and hire a boy to take his place in the tannery, while he earned the money to pay him in some more congenial way. grant and his father appear to have agreed remarkably, notwithstanding their dissimilarity of tastes on the subject of tanning. the giant will was under judicious control, and was not exerted in opposition to the paternal inclination. he seems to have been obedient to his parents, even while his own wishes and tastes were in violent antipathy to theirs. on one occasion, when there was a scarcity of hands in the tannery, his father told him he must have his help in the beam-room. he obeyed, and went to work, but not without renewedly expressing his dislike of the business. he told his father that he would work at it, if he wished him to do so, until he was of age, but not a day after that time. this important period was the turning-point in the career of the young man, and the country is indebted to mr. grant for his judicious handling of the difficulty before him. he did not blindly and wilfully oppose the boy's inclination, even after he had voluntarily signified his intention to be guided by his father's wishes, at the expense of his own individual tastes. perhaps, in my unbounded admiration for the man, i am hasty in catching at analogies; but i cannot help seeing the germ of another soldierly attribute in the disposition which young grant displayed on this occasion--the quality of obedience, without which the soldier is nothing. though possessed of a mighty will, grant has never been known to disobey the lawful commands of his superior, however disagreeable they were to him. mr. grant fully realized that it was time for his son to have some definite views in regard to the future; and instead of compelling the boy to bend his back over the beam in the tannery, against his settled inclination, he simply replied to his complaint that he did not wish him to follow the business if he did not like it, and could not choose it as his permanent occupation. the worthy patriarch was prudent in his treatment of the case, i repeat; and though i am not old enough to entitle my words to be regarded as the oracles of a sage, i commend his example to the attention of all ambitious parents who expect their sons to become great generals or presidents. the father asked the discontented youth what employment he thought he would like. ulysses evidently had not considered this grave matter in all its bearings, for he was not prepared to mention the particular calling which would suit him best, though he indicated three things, each as dissimilar to the others as it could be. he would like to be a farmer; a "down-the-river trader," or "to get an education." it was not convenient to establish him as a tiller of the soil; and his father apparently regarded being a "down-the-river trader" as a disreputable occupation--probably as something akin to a yankee pedler who sells wooden nutmegs; and the money it would cost to give him a liberal education could not readily be spared from the tannery, which, in former days, kept the larger portion of its capital soaking in the vats for months. but the question was a serious one, and though it could not be realized at that time, the welfare of a great nation, as well as the destiny of an unformed youth, rested upon the issue. who shall say that an inspiration higher than his own thought did not suggest to the anxious father the idea of sending his son to west point? it was a happy solution of the problem; and what was better still, it suited the boy "first rate." the idea was promptly followed up. mr. grant wrote to the hon. thomas l. hamer, the representative in congress of the district in which he resided. the letter reached the member only on the day before his term of office expired, when his right to nominate a cadet to the military academy would cease. fortunately the mail was faithful to its sacred duty on this occasion, and bore the missive to its destination in season to save grant from becoming a farmer or a "down-the-river trader," and in season to have him appointed, not alone as a cadet, but as the savior of the nation; for that nomination was the germ of the event which gave us the man that crushed the rebellion. as i think of the condition of my country when the rising sun of grant's genius pointed him out to the people as the only fit leader for the armies of the union, i tremble to think of the results which must have followed a single day's delay of that momentous letter! the providential man was providentially guided to his brilliant destiny. the bugbear of an examination for admission to west point, though it then included only reading, writing, spelling, and arithmetic to decimal fractions, had more terrors to the young aspirant for military honors than the capers of a three-year-old colt. he was not prepared by any special training for such an ordeal; and a young man, who had previously been appointed by mr. hamer, had twice failed to pass, his ill success keeping the place open for grant. the opportunities of the newly-appointed cadet had been very limited, and it would hardly have been to his discredit if he had failed to come up to the requirements of the institution. but he did not fail; with all his concentrated energy of purpose guiding and strengthening him, he could not fail; and on the 1st of july, 1839, at the age of seventeen, grant was duly admitted to the military academy to prepare himself for the glorious future which god and his country had in store for him. and then "the great ulysses reached his native shore," and entered upon the career of which we have not yet seen the full fruition. "what's in a name? a rose by any other name would smell as sweet;" and grant by any other name would have fought and conquered just as well; but it was only by a singular accident that the newspapers have had the opportunity to make such a varied play upon the initials of his name, which in themselves were sufficiently suggestive to excite the attention of the specials as far back as the victory at fort donelson. u.s. grant demanding and insisting upon unconditional surrender after a savage fight of three days was certainly a coincidence worthy of remark. perhaps, after the momentous and prolonged discussion in regard to the baby's name soon after grant was born, it was a great pity, when one had been selected, that it did not "stick" to the end; but it was doomed to be reconstructed, apparently that the initials might have a suggestive and patriotic significance. his father, mother, grandfather, and grandmother, discussed the important matter, and he was called hiram ulysses. hiram was his grandfather's proposition, simply because it was a pretty name, in his opinion. his mother's step-mother appears to have dabbled in classic lore, and to have read the odyssey. she had a warm admiration for the hero of that remarkable tale, and insisted that the infant should have the name of ulysses. as in the eternal fitness of things, this was an appropriate name, posterity will commend the taste, if not the prescience, of the venerable lady. in making the nomination, mr. hamer sent in the name of "ulysses s. grant," confounding his name with that of the applicant's brother and mother. while at west point the interloping s. stood for sidney. grant made two attempts to have the matter set right, but the fates were against him. it seemed to be foreordained that the united states and himself should be so far synonymous as to be designated in the same manner; and he accepted his "manifest destiny," only causing the s. to stand for simpson, in honor of his mother, instead of for sidney. mr. hamer, who had conferred so distinguished a favor upon grant and the nation in nominating him to a cadetship, did not live to realize the magnitude of the service he had rendered to his country and the applicant. in the mexican war he went into the army himself, as did not a few of the politicians of the country. he distinguished himself at monterey, but finally succumbed to the treacherous climate of the low lands. grant was his nurse and his friend in his final sickness, and rendered to him the last kind offices of the living to the dead. the illustrious soldier was always faithful in his friendships, never forgetting a favor or forsaking a friend. as there is "one glory of the sun, and another of the stars," it was not appointed unto grant to be everything that is grand in humanity. indeed, the very grandeur of the man consists in the harmonious development of all his faculties, rather than in the striking preëminence of a few, towering in lofty sublimity at the expense of all the others. he is not lacking in any essential quality of a great man, and his greatness is a combination of all the noble traits of character, instead of the morbid development of a few. he was not a great scholar. it was not his ambition or his destiny to be a newton, a humboldt, a milton, or an irving. the elements of a brilliant scholar would have shut him out from the distinction he has achieved. grant's previous intellectual training had not prepared him to rival in scholarship those in his class who had been over the course before. the district school in a country town had been the limit of his advantages. the class which commenced the course with him was composed of eighty-seven members, only thirty-nine of whom were graduated. the routine and discipline of the institution are exacting and severe; and it is very much to any young man's credit that he goes through at all. the statistics show that the cadets fall out by the wayside, as the lines draw taut upon them. a majority of grant's class went by the board, and no. 39--the lowest in rank who was graduated--seems to have been a better fellow than forty-eight others who "caved in," some of them, doubtless, from weakness of body, but most of them for the want of pluck. but grant was not the unhappy no. 39, who by contrast appears in an unpleasant position at the foot of the class, though, as i have shown, he was really a plucky fellow. grant was graduated the twenty-first in his class, which is certainly a very creditable position. i confess my surprise, when i consider the fact that grant's attainments, when he entered the military academy, were hardly up to those of the ordinary second class in our grammar schools, while some of his classmates were graduates of colleges, and most of them had been over a part of the regular course before,--i confess my surprise that he was not no. 39, instead of no. 21. in spite of the giant will, and his developed pluck, it is a miracle that he was not of the number of those who fell out of the class during the four years' course. certainly it is vastly more to his credit to have been able to graduate at all, than for many of the happy score who stood above to win their high rank. to have outdone eighteen of his companions in that unequal race was worthy the energy and perseverance of the man. he went through the entire course of his class, for no option was then allowed to the cadets in the choice of studies. he exhibited himself to the best advantage in the mathematics, and in the departments of tactics and engineering obtained his highest marks in these branches, thus early developing his military mind. at west point i had a warm admiration for grant, though none of us were wise enough to predict his brilliant future. i am astonished that we did not, for the grant of to-day was the grant of west point. he was the same modest, anti-sensational, unenthusiastic being that he is now. he was the boldest and apparently most reckless rider in the ring; but he always came out right then as now. he was not a dandy in any sense of the word; and though he appeared to have no regard for the elegance of his attire, he was always scrupulously neat, and paid a proper respect to the amenities of society in his personal appearance. he effectually dodged that period in the life of a young man when dress is the most important subject of consideration. i could not help admiring the embryo general, for though he did not court popularity, and seemed to be entirely indifferent to it, he was one of the most popular of the cadets. the qualities of his mind and heart were of the highest order, and no student was able to point to a low or mean trait in his character. bold, daring, and energetic, without the slightest display, without even uttering a boast, or exhibiting a particle of egotism, what wonder that he was the idol of his fellow-students! "methinks ulysses strikes my wondering eyes!" he never betrayed a trust reposed in him by friend or foe, was careful of the rights of others, and his word was as good as his bond. he was utterly forgetful of himself, never seeming to be conscious that he was of any particular consequence to others. in a word, he was then, as he is now, an honest, honorable man, true to himself, true to others. the sum of human greatness in personal character can include nothing more. i say that he was careful of the rights of others. while i shall have occasion to demonstrate this trait in his character,--which is really one of the most noble and beautiful that can adorn the human mind,--on a larger scale in the course of this true narrative, let me say that it was the foundation of his popularity at west point. he was never concerned in the disgraceful practice of "hazing," which can amuse only a mean, low, and tyrannical character. when he went to west point he carried a letter of introduction to a cadet, who explained to him some of the tricks of the institution played off upon new-comers. on the first night a young gentleman entered his room and informed him that it was customary to assign a lesson of twenty pages, to be committed to memory while the student was nervous under the excitement of his admission, to test his firmness and energy. grant assured the assumed officer that it was all right, turned over and went to sleep, while his roommate labored all night over the bogus task. grant's initials suggested for him the name of "uncle sam" at west point; but his sober, steady demeanor, which gave him a sort of my-uncle bearing and dignity, was quite as much implicated in the nickname as the accidental letters that preceded his patronymic. he was a good fellow, by the popular vote of his companions; and none but such were entitled to the distinction of a nickname. having completed his four years' course, he was graduated in 1843, at the age of twenty-one. he was appointed to the fourth regiment of infantry, with the brevet rank of second lieutenant. chapter v. _wherein captain galligasken accompanies the illustrious soldier to mexico, and glowingly dilates upon the gallant achievements of our arms from palo alto to monterey._ my distinguished ancestor, sir bernard galligasken, was a fighting man, and was knighted for meritorious services in the loyal cause in ireland. my respected progenitors in the new world were engaged in the french and indian wars, and fought their way through the revolution with credit to themselves. i inherited the military taste; but i do not mention this fact, or introduce the warlike record of my worthy ancestors, to add one jot or tittle of glory to their fame or my own, but simply to convince the reader that i have the soul to appreciate the military prowess of the illustrious soldier in the cheering light of whose brilliant deeds i am content to be ignored, eclipsed, obscured. grant's rank at the military academy consigned him to the infantry; for the best scholars of the graduating class are assigned to the more desirable arms of the service--the engineers, cavalry, artillery. but to the soldier of such transcendent abilities as those of the illustrious hero, it mattered but little to what branch he was sent. his rising star was eventually to confound all the puerile distinctions of particular arms, and to grasp them all in one comprehensive idea. he was sent to the infantry, as if to place in his path more obstacles to be overcome. when those above him had been assigned to places in the army, all the vacancies were filled, and grant was added as a supernumerary officer to the fourth infantry, with only brevet rank, there to wait till an opening was made, in those "piping times of peace," by resignation or death. his regiment was stationed in jefferson barracks, near st. louis. it was dull music here for ambitious young men, full of life, and thirsting for distinction in their chosen profession; but grant had the happiness to soften the rigor of his captivity by a pleasant episode. frederick t. dent, his classmate at the military academy, who was also assigned to the fourth infantry, resided in the vicinity of the barracks. the young officers were friends, and grant was invited to the house of dent's family, where he won the esteem and respect which have ever been accorded to him. on the mind and heart of miss julia t. dent, the sister of his professional friend, he impressed himself even more strongly than upon those of others. they were engaged; but it was not until five years later that the happy parties were married. after a residence of a year in the vicinity of st. louis, grant was ordered with his regiment to louisiana. in 1845, as the mexican imbroglio began to assume shape and form, the fourth was ordered to corpus christi to observe the movements of mexican army concentrating on the frontier. here he was commissioned as a full second lieutenant in the seventh regiment; but he was so strongly attached to the officers of the fourth that he asked permission of the war department to be retained in it; and his request was granted. i am willing to confess, that, owing to my political predilections, i had not much heart in the war that was then brewing; but i was a soldier whose only duty is obedience. grant, on the contrary, had no such scruples. his political faith fully and heartily indorsed the war, and he went into it calmly, resolutely, unflinchingly, and from a sense of duty higher even than that of soldierly obedience. i honor a man who has principles, and who has the courage to stand by them, even though he has the misfortune to disagree with me. corpus christi is situated at the mouth of the rio nueces, between which and the rio grande was the disputed territory, nominally the bone of contention between the united states and mexico. general taylor, in command of about four thousand troops at corpus christi, was ordered to advance to the rio grande. he accordingly posted himself opposite matamoras, having his base of supplies at point isabel, on the gulf, and erected defensive works to cover his army. ampudia and arista, the mexican commanders, signified that the advance of general taylor into the disputed territory was an act of war, and that hostilities would be commenced. unfortunately for the mexicans, they were commenced, and a body of dragoons under captain thornton was surprised by an overwhelming force of the enemy, and all of them killed, wounded, or captured. our blood was up then, and we had no disposition to discuss any fine political points. all my scruples vanished, for the mexicans had taken the initiative in the conflict, and struck down american soldiers. their army crossed the rio grande, and taylor, suspecting that ampudia intended to attack his base of supplies, hastened to the relief of point isabel. having reënforced the garrison, and assured himself of its ability to hold the place, he prepared to return to fort brown. during his absence the mexicans crossed the river again, and attacked the fort. general taylor started early in the morning, admonished by the sound of the guns at fort brown that assistance was needed there. lieutenant grant was in the column, with his regiment. at noon we came in sight of the mexicans drawn up in order of battle at palo alto. general taylor immediately formed his line for the conflict, and for the first time in thirty-one years an american army was drawn up before a civilized foe. lieutenant grant was there--in the first battle of the last half century, as he was in the last one. taylor formed his line half a mile from the enemy, and the battle was fought mainly with artillery. night gathered over the combatants in the same relative position. while the mexicans had been fearfully slaughtered by the weight and range of the american guns, the loss on our side was insignificant in comparison with theirs. the enemy retired in the darkness, and we encamped on the field of battle. compared with the mighty actions of the late rebellion, or even with those which followed it in the mexican war, palo alto was a trivial affair, and i dwell upon it only as the occasion in which the illustrious soldier first drew his sword in actual conflict, in which he was first under the fire of an enemy. this was his baptismal battle, and there is no difficulty in believing that he behaved like a true soldier. we slept upon the field, as we have slept upon many a field since, but only to awake to another and fiercer battle the next day. the enemy had taken up a strong position near resaca de la palma, three miles from fort brown. whatever may be said of the mexicans, judged by the measure of their success in the war of 1846, they were by no means a contemptible foe. they were not deficient in military science, and they stood their ground bravely, as the vast numbers of them slain in the various battles fully attest. at resaca they were well posted in a ravine, with their flanks protected by an impenetrable jungle of scrub oaks. the battle opened with artillery, but the enthusiasm of both sides would not permit it to be continued at long range, and infantry and cavalry made some handsome charges. the mexicans fought with dogged courage; but, in spite of this, and of the fact that they were three to our one, they were utterly defeated and routed. the mexican artillery was handled by general la vega, a brave and skilful fellow, and did us much mischief. taylor ordered captain may, of the dragoons, to charge upon this battery, which was so gallantly done that the feat has passed into history. he was supported by the infantry, and the entire mexican line was shattered by the onslaught. the demoralized foe fled in terror, leaving their guns and ammunition on the field, a prey to our conquering arms. la vega, who had no talent for running away, was taken prisoner. when the night of the second battle-day closed upon the scene, not a single mexican soldier was to be found on the east side of the rio grande. general taylor fought his battles thoroughly, and in this school of conflict lieutenant grant took his first lessons in actual warfare. his quaint criticism that the army of the potomac "did not fight its battles through" conveys a vivid impression of his views on this important subject. after blood and treasure have been freely expended to procure a military success, nothing can excuse the commander from following out the results of victory to the utmost extent within his means. this was the practice of "old rough and ready" in the mexican war. he "fought his battles through," as resaca, monterey, and buena vista fully testify, thus making a wise and economical use of the resources intrusted to his keeping. grant is a greater general than taylor ever was, and it would not be respectful to say that he followed the example of the worthy veteran; but the experience of this period doubtless assisted in the preparation of the man for the gigantic work he was to accomplish eighteen years after. three months later in the year the army of general taylor crossed the rio grande, and marched upon monterey. on the 20th of september he appeared before the city with an army of six thousand men, to attack a position strong in its natural and artificial defences, and garrisoned by ten thousand troops. the conditions of successful warfare, as usually recognized by prudent commanders, were nearly reversed against the american army. instead of having two or three to one of the garrison in force, they were nearly outnumbered in this numerical ratio. but the attack was promptly commenced, not by the slow and tedious process of regular siege operations, but by a direct assault, without wasting a single day. the battle opened on the morning following the arrival of the troops, and continued with unabated spirit during the day. several fortified heights were carried before night, and the soldiers rested only to renew the assault the next day. the bishop's palace, a strongly-fortified position in the rear of the town, and the last to yield, was gallantly carried by the force under the brave general worth. on the third day of the fight the lower city was stormed with the most tremendous fury, the troops burrowing through the stone walls of the houses in their progress, and the defenders of the place were all driven within the citadel of the town before night again settled down upon the unequal fight. penned in by their furious assailants, the mexicans had no hope in continuing the resistance after the misfortunes which overtook them. ampudia, the general in command of the city, submitted a proposition for terms which resulted in the surrender and evacuation of the town. thus, in three days, monterey, a city so strong in position, and so well defended that its commander might have confidently defied a besieging army of double the force of that which sat down before its walls, was carried by repeated assaults. this was another of the training fields of lieutenant grant. the walls of the houses within the city were strongly built, affording ample defensive positions from which the mexican soldiers could safely annoy the americans. from the windows they fired down upon their assailants, disputing the possession of each dwelling with the most dogged tenacity. in the midst of this irregular strife, while the foe in the windows were remorselessly shooting down the daring soldiers in the streets below, the ammunition of the brigade to which lieutenant grant was attached was nearly exhausted. it was an unpleasant position to be in, without powder and ball to keep the enemy at bay; and it was therefore necessary to send for a fresh supply, which could only be obtained by traversing a distance of four miles. but who should be the messenger to ride or walk beneath those death-dealing muskets in the windows, which were showering storms of bullets at every blue-coat which appeared in the streets below? the service was so fraught with peril, if not with certain death, that the general in command was not willing to issue a peremptory order for any one to undertake the mission. he called for a volunteer. it is hardly necessary to say that, while the brigade contained a grant, a volunteer for any desperate service would not be wanting. the lieutenant stepped forward, and was despatched on the important errand upon which nothing less than the safety of the command depended, without considering the ultimate success of the movement in progress. grant was a bold rider, and full of expedients. he had been among the indians of the western country, and was willing in this emergency to profit by one of their feats of horsemanship. mounting a spirited horse, he attached one of his feet to the back of the saddle, grasping the animal's mane with the other, and permitting himself to hang down by the horse's flanks, so that his body shielded the intrepid equestrian from the bullets of the foe, who occupied the windows of only one side of the street. hanging to his steed in this perilous attitude, he dashed off on his errand, at the highest speed of his charger, passing in safety through the destructive fire. he succeeded in bringing in a load of ammunition, guarded by a sufficient escort to insure its safety. the capture of monterey was a splendid feat of our arms, however it may have been cast into the shadow by the subsequent achievements of our army in mexico. history presents a record of but few parallel victories, obtained in such a brief period, against all the disadvantages of the enemy's strong position, and with such a great disparity of numbers. the result was not because the mexicans did not fight bravely and persistently, for they held their ground while the dead and wounded were piled high around them. the skilful officers and the trained soldiers of warlike france, exulting in her military prowess, won no such fields as monterey and buena vista. while seven thousand of the mexican soldiers in the city were regulars, taylor's army was composed in part of raw volunteers, who had never snuffed the smoke of battle. [illustration: grant as the messenger to procure ammunition. page 64.] the americans were brave, but they could hardly be more so than the mexicans, who had the additional stimulus of standing upon their own soil, fighting for their native land. we cannot find the secret of success in the superior bravery of our troops, and i can only attribute it to the high character, the daring courage, and the matchless skill of our officers. a few such tried and trusty spirits as grant would leaven any army, and render it capable of performing seeming miracles. president pierce, himself a general in the war with mexico, as a representative in congress, years before, spoke and voted against the appropriations for the military academy at west point, being heartily opposed to the institution. as a soldier in this brief and decisive contest, he had an opportunity to behold the representatives of the academy in the storm of battle, and in the active operations of the siege and the march. he saw that west point fought out that bloody war, and won that series of brilliant victories; and it is creditable to him to have acknowledged his error in this matter, however unrepentant he may be over other and more glaring blunders. soon after the battle of monterey, lieutenant grant's regiment was sent to vera cruz to swell the grand army which was to march directly to the halls of the montezumas. chapter vi. _wherein captain galligasken marches with the illustrious soldier to the halls of the montezumas, and glowingly describes the brilliant campaign in mexico._ general winfield scott was a great soldier, and his mexican campaign gave him a european reputation, chary as the critics of the old world are in the bestowment of praise upon american celebrities. he was never popular as an individual, for his qualities of mind and heart were not of the winning sort. his military skill must stand unchallenged, and his operations in mexico will always attest his ability. a greater than scott arose to obscure and eclipse his fame as a commander; but if the midday sun darkens the lustrous star, yet shall the star shine on bright as ever, its light paled only by the mighty contrast. scott was a well-trained, a prudent, and a skilful soldier. like taylor, he fought his battles thoroughly; and, after throwing out two or three brilliant geniuses in the art of war, he compares favorably with any of the great captains of ancient or modern times. he was the peer of wellington, marlborough, and the galaxy of able generals whom napoleon gathered around him; and his fame as a soldier will be cherished by the american people to their remotest posterity. general scott's bloody but brilliant and successful campaign was to be the next training school of lieutenant grant; and to have been a witness of the skilful strategy and the terrible fighting included in that memorable march from vera cruz to mexico was to obtain an experience of war and an insight into its mysteries which could not fail to be of incalculable value to the future chief of the armies of the union. grant was twenty-five years of age when he landed at vera cruz. among the eager young officers whose souls were fired with the military spirit, he was but a unit. as a second lieutenant, however bravely and faithfully he discharged his duties, there was no opportunity for him to attract attention beyond the limit of his own brigade. he was training for the future rather than living for the present. scott landed at the head of twelve thousand men to make the conquest of mexico. his first objective point was the famous castle of san juan de ulua, the dragon which guarded vera cruz, and lay in the path of the little army to the capital. on the 12th of march, 1847, the investment of the city was completed. ten days later the batteries opened fire upon the castle and city; and after four days of the most incessant hammering, an assault by the besieging army was planned; but the governor of the city proposed to surrender. in just twenty days after the little army landed, the stars and stripes floated victoriously over the city, and over the invulnerable castle. the amazing rapidity with which the siege operations were carried forward confounded the enemy. with the bitter experience of monterey as a specimen of the spirit of the assailants, they were not disposed to go through the form of attempting to repel an assault. the dragon in the path of the victorious army was demolished, and the road to mexico was open to the conquerors. preparations were made immediately for the grand march to the halls of the montezumas. on the 1st of april lieutenant grant was appointed quartermaster of the fourth regiment--a position requiring peculiar abilities in the incumbent. he was selected for this important office because he was a careful, substantial, and energetic person; and he continued to fill it to the entire satisfaction of his superiors until the close of the war. early in april the advance was sent forward on the road to jalapa. santa anna, routed at buena vista, had gathered together another army of fifteen thousand men, and intrenched himself in a strong position on the heights of cerro gordo, effectually commanding the only passage through the mountain gorges to the capital. six days after the appearance of the advance before this formidable position, scott, with the main army, arrived. the stronghold was immediately stormed, and after a series of brilliant operations the position was carried. three thousand prisoners and forty-three bronze guns were captured, besides seven standards and santa anna's private baggage. signor jimen, in the official journal of mexico, defended the generalship of santa anna, and innocently attributed the terrible defeat to "inevitable misfortune, the result of the tactics of the invaders." the mexicans were flanked by the passage of a portion of the american forces through a ravine which had never before been crossed, and which was deemed impassable. the "tactics" were doubtless the sore trial of the mexicans, and when i think of the material of which our officers were composed, i am hardly supprised at the magnitude of their achievements. scott believed in councils of war, and had the benefit of the united thought of his brilliant officers. by this time, grant, having been engaged in his fifth battle, was almost a veteran; and in this daring warfare was the training process carried on in his mind; in this arena of brilliant strategy was his military education perfected, and his experience enriched by an observation vouchsafed to only a few. the army, having beaten down the obstacle at cerro gordo, continued on its march towards the capital, occupying jalapa and castle perote on its way. at puebla the little force was so reduced by sickness, death, and the expiration of the term of volunteer enlistments, that the veteran general no longer deemed it prudent to advance. his numbers had dwindled down to five thousand; and he rested here, in the heart of mexico, with his handful of men, for three months, until reënforcements swelled his army to eleven thousand--an insignificant force for the conquest of the country. about the middle of august this little army reached the vicinity of the capital. the city of mexico is situated on lake tezcuco, and is approached over impassable marshes and lagoons by long causeways and bridges. the nature of the country was favorable to an effective defence of the place, especially as the mexicans had at least four times as many troops in service as their invaders. located outside of these causeways, and guarding the approaches of the city, were the strongholds of chapultepec and churubusco, and the heavy batteries of san antonio and contreras, all of them mounting about a hundred pieces of artillery. they were surrounded by morasses, by headlong steeps and rocks heaved into fantastic irregularities by volcanic action. the mexicans confidently relied upon these natural additions to the strength of their works, and regarded their positions as impregnable. turning aside from the national road, by which he had marched to ayolata, and which here presented too many difficulties for the remaining fifteen miles of his journey, scott made a detour around lake chalco, and approached the city from the south. on the 20th of august the battery on the height of contreras was captured by an impetuous assault, which occupied but seventeen minutes. the garrison of san antonio evacuated their position, being cut off from the line of defence by the fall of the supporting works. four miles nearer to the city of mexico, and commanding the road, frowned upon the invaders the strong fortification of churubusco, where the main body of the enemy's army had been concentrated for an obstinate resistance; but on the same day the stronghold was battered down, and the mexicans were driven to their only remaining fortress of chapultepec. all day long scott's gallant army had been fighting three times their own numbers, lodged in what had been deemed impenetrable works; but their arms were victorious at every point. after a delay of more than two weeks in receiving and declining some absurd terms for an armistice, offensive operations were resumed by general scott. the plain on which the city of mexico is situated is studded with volcanic heights, projecting up from the morasses and lava fields. on one of these eminences, two miles from the city, stood the strong castle of chapultepec, its base one hundred and fifty feet above the average level of the ground. it had a front of nine hundred feet, which bristled with guns, manned by a picked force, commanded by one of the ablest mexican officers. this huge work stood, like another dragon, to protect the entrance to the principal causeway leading to the city. behind it was a powder mill, called _el molino del rey_, which was fortified and occupied by troops, and constituted the principal outer defence of the castle. it was necessary that this position should be first captured, and the duty was assigned to general worth, of whose command the fourth infantry formed a part. the assault was a desperate one, and worth lost one fourth of his troops in the action, so obstinate was the defence by the mexicans, who had reached their "last ditch," and fought with corresponding valor. the position was carried, and in the sharp battle grant won his first recorded laurel. "captain brooks and lieutenant grant, with a few men of their respective regiments, by a handsome movement to the left, turned the right flank of the enemy, and the barrier was carried. second lieutenant grant behaved with distinguished gallantry on the 13th and 14th." this is the language of the official report of major francis lee, commanding the fourth infantry at the time. i have said that grant had been appointed quartermaster of his regiment. as the officer in charge of the baggage trains of the force, well-established precedents permitted him to remain in charge of them during the fierce conflict, and thus to escape the personal peril of being under fire. it would not have been dishonorable, or an imputation upon his courage, for him to do so; but to his honor and glory be it said, that he never took advantage of his non-belligerent position. he always joined his regiment when it was summoned to the strife, and "behaved with distinguished gallantry" on all occasions. for his conduct on this eventful day he was promoted to the rank of full first lieutenant. the castle of chapultepec was bombarded, and then carried by storm, after the walls had been breached. in the complicated details of the final attack the fourth infantry acted a worthy part. grant assisted in serving a howitzer, mounted on the top of a convent, by which the enemy was considerably annoyed. it was a novel position for an infantry officer; but this was not the first, and by no means the last, time he was where he was least expected to be found--in front of the enemy. colonel garland, commanding the first brigade on this occasion, officially says, "i must not omit to call attention to lieutenant grant, of the fourth infantry, who acquitted himself most nobly upon several occasions under my own observation." the result of that gallant attack shows that all the officers behaved well; so well that grant and one other only are mentioned out of the whole first brigade, and the quality of the deeds which called forth the generous compliment of his superior may be judged from this fact. all had been brave to recklessness, all had been earnest and persevering; but it was the nature of grant, even then, to surpass the bravest, the most earnest and persevering. in general worth's report of the battle, he also speaks in commendation of the gallant lieutenant. for grant's honorable mention he received the brevet rank of captain, to date from the day of the battle of chapultepec. with this strong fortress fell the city of mexico; and during the night which followed its capture, the remains of the army of santa anna, with the civil officers of the government, fled to a place of safety. on the following morning, scott and his gallant little army marched into the capital. the american flag floated proudly over the walls of the national capital, and mexico was conquered; victory had constantly perched upon our banners, and we stood in the halls of the montezumas, where we were permitted to repose in peace after the battle summer through which we had just passed. grant remained in the city of mexico while the negotiations for peace were in progress. as usual, he had a very spirited horse, for he never rode any other when one could be obtained. a mexican gentleman, with whom he was on terms of friendly intimacy, desired to borrow this animal for a ride. grant feared that the worthy señor could not handle the fiery steed; but it was not prudent to decline the request, for the spanish nature of the applicant would take offence, and misjudge his motives in the refusal. the mexican mounted the horse, but, when he had ridden a short distance, was thrown off and instantly killed. long ago i came to the conclusion that it is not safe for any man to attempt to ride grant's horses, in a literal or a figurative sense. grant's mission in mexico was finished. in that rapid and brilliant campaign from vera cruz to the capital, he had practically learned the lesson of war, and prepared himself for the great work he was to accomplish at a later period of his life, when west point was to be divided between the opposing armies, when the most brilliant genius and the most determined energy alone could win victories. the importance of this season of actual duty in the field, in all the details of siege, march, and garrison duty, can hardly be over-estimated. in the war of the great rebellion he came into the field a trained soldier, with the teachings of experience stored up for use in a broader sphere of action than he or any of his companions in arms had yet dreamed of. after the ratification of the treaty of peace between mexico and the united states, our forces evacuated mexico, and captain grant was sent to new york with his regiment, where its companies were detached and sent to the forts on the northern frontier. grant and his company were first stationed at detroit, and then transferred to sacketts harbor. in 1848 he was married to miss dent, in conformity with the engagement made five years before, to which both had religiously adhered. the treaty of peace with mexico had given us california, and coincident with the acquisition of the territory, gold was discovered there in such quantities as to attract an immense immigration, and it was necessary for the government to send out troops for the protection of the swarming hosts, both from themselves and from the indians. the fourth infantry was sent to oregon in 1851. the battalion in which grant served was stationed at fort dallas, where the illustrious soldier obtained some further experience of indian warfare. he was separated from his family, and in this wild region shut out from any employment worthy his nature, and apparently from all hope of rising either as a citizen or a soldier. it would have been surprising if grant had not been discontented. he was a man of deeds, emphatically a man of action; but there was nothing to be done worthy his ambition. in 1853 he was promoted to a full captaincy; but this advancement could not relieve him from the tedium of such a stupid life, and the following year he resigned his commission, to enter upon a new and untried career in civil life. chapter vii. _in which captain galligasken goes with the illustrious soldier to the farm near st. louis, and observes his career through various misfortunes, till he is included in the firm of grant & sons._ captain grant had been in the army eleven years. he was engaged in the first and the last battle of the mexican war; indeed, he had taken part in every action of any importance, except buena vista. this was his practical training for the great work of his life, developing his faculties and storing his mind with an experience which was to bring forth its rich fruits on the historic battle-fields of the great rebellion. in the wilds of the pacific slope,- "in the continuous woods where rolls the oregon, and hears no sound save his own dashings,"-the impatient soldier unbuckled his sword, and laid it aside. the weapon was rusting in its scabbard, and the proud spirit which had worn it honorably through a fierce war, waged upon a foreign soil, chafed under the inaction to which it was condemned in that far-off region. it was not the sphere for a great mind. it is a notable fact, that when the bugle-blast of stern necessity rallied the soldiers of the republic around her banners, to save her from destruction, some of the choicest spirits came out from the walks of civil life, whither they had fled from the dulness of an inactive life in the army. such were grant, sherman, burnside, hooker, mcclellan, and many others. at the age of thirty-two, after having been devoted exclusively to military pursuits for fifteen years, grant left the army to engage in new and untried enterprises. this was an important step of his life, but i humbly believe it was as necessary to the perfect development of the man as any other which he had taken. it was an evidence of his characteristic energy, and of the confidence he had in himself, which was displayed in so remarkable a manner in the most trying days of the rebellion. i am not disposed to magnify the deeds of the illustrious soldier,--they need no such office at mine or any man's hands,--or to praise his conduct in the glowing light of subsequent events; but i maintain that the act of resigning his commission in the army required no small degree of moral courage. the government had educated him at its own expense, and provided for him during the term of his natural life. if his had been the dull, stupid, inert character, this lot would have satisfied him. he was placed out of the reach of want in the present and the future; and the deaths and resignations in the army would have materially improved his condition if he quietly submitted to his fate. his total pay as a captain of infantry amounted to nearly a thousand dollars a year; and it was as sure as the rising and setting of the sun. this was the certainty before him; and only a man of energetic purposes, with great confidence in his own abilities, would have turned from it to strike out a new path in the tangled maze of worldly affairs. from his boyhood he had been absorbed in the pursuits of his military career, and their practical application in the field and on the march, with a limited knowledge of business; and i repeat that it required no little moral courage to abandon the certainty and grapple with the uncertainty. i am aware that a different explanation of grant's resignation has been rumored through the country, and the vile slander that he had become addicted to intemperate habits has been circulated over the land. it has even been said that his resignation was prompted by a significant warning from the war department. i am amazed that such an idle story should ever have obtained even a momentary credence. it is as impossible that grant could ever have been a drunkard as that he could ever have been a coward. "he that ruleth his spirit is mightier than he that taketh a city." under all circumstances, in the fierce storm of battle, as in the quiet of the social circle, he always maintained the most perfect control of himself. if he ever used the intoxicating cup to excess, he must have known it himself; and to know that he had a dangerous habit was to conquer it. look at the inflexible will of the man, as displayed at donelson and vicksburg! look at him, meek and modest, in the midst of the storm of applause that everywhere greeted him after his mission had been accomplished! look at him, calm and immovable, when, in the intricacies of the vicksburg campaign, he outsped the thought and the prudence of his military compeers, and the impatient people began to howl even at him! could such a man be the slave of his own appetite? the man himself is the best evidence of the falsity of the rumor. i say i am amazed that this silly story should ever have been harbored for a moment by any one, except an enemy of his country; but i am still more amazed when i realize that this is the only blemish which lukewarm friends and over-critical enemies have been able to cast upon the character of the distinguished soldier. it is the prerogative of greatness to be the mark of slander's poisoned arrows. napoleon was accused of crimes enough to banish him forever from the pale of human sympathy; wellington and marlborough escaped not the blast of calumny; jefferson was charged with the most loathsome immoralities; and even washington was systematically traduced by over-zealous partisans. it is a miracle, therefore, that grant has only been held up to obloquy for the one offence of intemperance, and that the most absurd and improbable one which could possibly have been devised. grant retired from the army for the same reason that hundreds of others have done so, in time of peace--because it did not afford a sufficient scope for his talents and energy. he returned to st. louis, where the family of his wife resided. mr. dent gave his daughter, mrs. grant, a farm at gravois, about nine miles from the city, and on this place grant located himself with his family, consisting now of his wife and two children. he built a house of hewn logs, working on the structure with his own hands, thus drawing upon the experience he had acquired in his youth. his native energy made him a hardworking man. his domain included extensive timber lands, and he attempted to better his condition by the sale of wood in the city of st. louis. he was not above his business, nor in any sense one of those dandy agriculturists called "gentleman farmers." he employed men to chop the wood, but he carted it to the city and sold it himself. he kept two teams, one of which he drove himself, while his little son had inherited enough of his father's horse nature to be competent to manage the other. grant was as thoroughly democratic in his manners as he was in his politics. he wore an old felt hat, a seedy blouse coat, and prudently tucked his trousers' legs into the tops of his boots. he appeared to be--what he was--a simple, honest woodman. his habits were plain, and he lived on the most economical scale; indeed, his means would not permit him to live in any other manner. those who had dealings with him knew him as an honest, upright man, faithful in the discharge of all obligations. grant always remembered and cherished his true friends. one day in st. louis, whither he had come with his team, he heard that professor coppée, one of his classmates at west point, was in the city. in his homely rig, with the whip in his hand, he waited upon his early friend at the hotel, where were also general reynolds, general buell, and major chapman. the "honest woodman" was asked to step to the bar and take a drink. "i will go in and look at you, for i never drink anything myself," replied he. if grant ever drank anything, this would have been an occasion, when, meeting old friends and classmates, after a separation of years, he would have been little likely to decline the social glass. i was not present on this occasion, but professor coppée publishes the incident himself, and of course there can be no doubt of its truth. other officers, who were frequently with him, declared that he drank nothing stronger than cold water; and, for my own part, i consider him eligible to the office of grand worthy patriarch of the national division of the sons of temperance, or any other position in which entire abstinence from all that can intoxicate is the essential qualification. but grant was not a successful man as a farmer. his previous training and experience did not fit him for this calling. it was not his sphere, and it was no discredit to him that he was not successful in it. he was not the man to lie supinely down and moan over his misfortunes. if one expedient failed, he tried another, in his own affairs as well as in those of the army. if a thing did not work right, it was his habit to "fick" it again. in the neighboring city, to which he moved, he resorted to several methods of eking out his failing subsistence. he tried auctioneering; but, though he had the ability to "knock down" a mighty rebellion, he was not equally fortunate in mere commercial pursuits. he had not the skill to exaggerate, nor the oily tongue to win the heart of a doubting customer. he was an applicant for the position of engineer under the city government, but his petition for appointment was "respectfully declined." his efforts to establish a remunerative business as a real estate agent were equally unfortunate. at the same time he hung out his shingle as a "collector." at this period his fortunes were at dead low tide, and not always did he know on one day where his subsistence for the next was to come from. he seemed to be foraging in an enemy's country, which had already been drained of its supplies. he was too poor to hire an office, and an obliging young lawyer, not burdened with clients, gave him desk room for the conducting of his scanty business. but he had not much use even for desk room, and the number of his customers did not wear out the patience of his accommodating host. grant was still out of his sphere; he had none of those mental qualifications which fit a man to be a successful "dunner." with all his pluck and persistence he could not worry a poor or a dishonest debtor up to the point of payment. he failed in this; the tide ran against him, and life became a bitter struggle. he obtained a place in the custom-house, which he held for two months, when the collector, who had given him the appointment, died, and he was obliged to leave. his hour of triumph had not yet come. while fortune seems to have entirely deserted the illustrious soldier in the civil walks of life, she had been more constant with his father, who had become prosperous enough to extend his business to galena, illinois, where he had established a branch leather store, conducted by two of his sons. as the worthy sire was now in easy circumstances, it seemed to be necessary to do something to redeem the failing fortunes of his oldest son. i am willing to state, on my own individual responsibility, that before he was invited to take a position in the store, or a share in the business, at galena, there was an anxious inquiry by the prosperous father and sons into the capacity of grant to fill the position to which he was to be assigned. it was even somewhat doubtful, at that time, whether the man who had the genius to control the movements of a million soldiers, had the business ability to entitle him to admission into the firm of "grant & sons." the brilliant campaign in mexico, gallant conduct at monterey and chapultepec, and turning the enemy's right flank at el molino del rey, hardly added much to the accomplishments of a suitor for the honors of the leather trade. it was asked whether fifteen years' service in the military had not disqualified him in some measure for mercantile pursuits; whether the idleness to which he had been condemned after the peace--idleness only as a civilian views it--had not impaired his native energy, and robbed him of some of the force and skill which had characterized his early years; whether he had not displayed so little ability at "getting ahead" on his own hook, as to render him at least a doubtful person to be associated with the prosperous firm. it is as creditable to the good judgment as it is to the kindly hearts of "grant & sons" that these considerations had no weight with them, and in 1860 he was admitted as a partner to the firm. the end of the night of misfortune and futile struggles had come, and the dawn of a prosperous day opened upon the retired soldier. grant took kindly to his new occupation, and, in spite of his antecedents on the battle-fields of mexico, and his connection with so "nobby" an institution as the regular army, he still continued to be a plain, modest man. he devoted himself to the leather business with the same energy that he devoted himself to the capture of vicksburg. he was regarded in this sphere as a sound, solid, common-sense man, with excellent judgment. he went to work in the leather trade as he did in the army, and in his farming operation, with industry and perseverance. he was not a great talker, but when he spoke he meant something. the solidity of his character was apparent in the firm lines of his face, and he was a man who produced an impression both by his words and his looks; and for this reason he made a good salesman. he was but little known in galena, taking no pains to extend the circle of his acquaintance. this was the position which grant occupied at the breaking out of the rebellion. i am not a fatalist, but i do believe that providence adapts means to ends in the affairs of men. i am entirely satisfied that the illustrious soldier needed his experience in the civil pursuits of life to prepare him for the great mission whose successful accomplishment gave him a wreath of glory brighter than ever adorned the brow of any other mortal man. even his misfortunes, and his struggles against the cold current of poverty, were a necessary discipline and preparation for the man. without them he could not have been what he is, and what he will yet become; for of all the atoms of experience is agglomerated the character of the man. thus prepared by the brilliant campaign of mexico, thus prepared by the events of his civil life, and thus prepared by the discipline of adversity, stood grant in the leather store at galena, when the thunder of sumter's guns struck upon his listening ears. chapter viii. _wherein captain galligasken discourses upon the breaking out of the rebellion, and describes the noble and modest behavior of the illustrious soldier._ until treason opened its treacherous batteries on fort sumter, grant had been a democrat. his sympathies, though he seldom expressed himself on political topics, were with the conservative party. abolition and abolitionists, as such, had no place in his regard, and the republican party he viewed with all the disfavor of a sturdy democrat. his father had been a democrat before him, and so far as he had any political associations, they were of this faith. in those months of dire forebodings, of anxious waiting, and of fruitless attempts to patch up a compromise, which intervened between the election of lincoln in november and the breaking out of hostilities, grant had been in favor of conceding to the south all its rights, even as they were interpreted by a democrat who lived and breathed and had his being in compromise. it cannot be said or thought that the illustrious soldier embarked in an anti-slavery war. the terrible conflict was precipitated by the madness of the south in opening its guns upon a national fort. for months the country had been waiting with breathless interest for the issue of the political complications which grew out of the secession of south carolina and the states which followed her reckless example. patriots north and patriots south were not willing to believe that the horrors of civil war were to be enacted in the land they loved. even the "fire-eaters" of the south, while they looked daggers, used none. there was no spirit of prophecy in the country which foresaw the stupendous conflict that ensued. men hoped and believed that some happy event would turn aside the impending storm. the south expected that its noisy bluster and its parade of arms would intimidate the north; and the cooler north thought that the hot blood of the south would cool itself in the lapse of time. both were mistaken. the fiery southrons ostentatiously made their preparations for a conflict which they did not believe would take place, and the north, if not unmoved, yet exercised a degree of forbearance which appeared like indifference, in the face of this parade of hostile demonstrations. the government was paralyzed by the unwonted situation; but it did not raise a finger to disturb or check the hostile operations of the rebels. the constitution and the laws were set at nought; forts, arsenals, and dock-yards were seized; the nation's property was plundered, and its honored flag insulted and trailed in the dust; but the sword of justice still rested in its scabbard. southern fanatics howled, stormed, and blustered; yet the government only waited--waited till the fiery zeal of the south appeared to be in danger of wasting itself before the purposes of its leaders were accomplished. it was necessary that something should be done to "fire the southern heart," and rekindle the enthusiasm of the people, which was waxing cold under the forbearance of an insulted government. fort sumter was bombarded; lines of batteries encircling the devoted work poured in their rain of shot and shell, and battered down the walls of the fortress, defended by only a handful of men. skilful officers, educated at the public expense to defend the government against which they were now raising their parricidal hands, conducted the cowardly enterprise, with the flower of southern chivalry gathered in thousands under their command, to a successful issue. the triumph was theirs, the glory and the endless shame in one foul deed. the south sang the pæan of victory, achieved with an odds of a hundred to one in its favor, and the southern heart was fired. by the same deed another heart was fired. the north rose as one man to resent the base outrage, the cowardly assault. the last moment when compromise was possible, passed away with the report of the first gun aimed at sumter. that gun awoke the slumbering north, and in every peaceful hamlet the drum-beat of preparation sounded, beginning on the st. croix and ending far west of the mississippi. the news that the first blow had been struck flashed through the land, silent between hope and fear, and kindled an enthusiasm which had no bound or limit. traitors north and traitors south were marked men from that thrilling hour. there was no voice but for the nation's honor and the nation's defence, in the onslaught of a treacherous foe. for years the military spirit in the people had been repressed and discouraged. the soldier was regarded as an obsolete necessity, and the profession of arms had become absolutely disreputable in many parts of the country. except here and there one who had served in the mexican war, and a superannuated veteran of 1812, there was not a soldier in the land who had any experience of actual warfare. half a century had elapsed since the fact of war in their own midst had been realized by the people, and all their traditions were of peace and prosperity. but in spite of their peaceful antecedents, in spite of the seeming indifference with which they had regarded the gathering storm, they flew to arms. without any concert of action, without any startling proclamations to rouse their sleeping energies, they rallied beneath the banner of the country, and the spectacle of a united north was held up to the view of the astonished south. the proclamation of the president calling for seventy-five thousand men--an unheard-of army within our peaceful borders--immediately followed the tidings of the shock of actual conflict. the government had come out of its lethargy with the people, and both were in hearty sympathy. to galena came the tidings from fort sumter, and to galena came the proclamation of president lincoln. we were thrilled by the treacherous deed of those who were henceforth to be our foes. we were thrilled by the note of preparation which sounded at the same time. our hearts beat the quickstep which was reverberating through the entire north, and from the depths of our souls we thanked the patriot president for his prompt and decided action. with an indignation which was characteristic of the man, captain grant read the newspaper which contained the story of the nation's dishonor. the lines which delineate on his face the force of his will seemed to deepen as he realized the fact that the first blow had actually been struck. in that cowardly army which had rained shot and shell upon a little worn-out band of regular soldiers for thirty-three hours were some of his classmates and companions in arms on the bloody fields of mexico. they had been friends, but now they were enemies. there was no halting or hesitation in the man. the blows which battered down sumter reached his great heart. his country was in peril, and his patriotic soul responded to the call for her defence. he made no noisy demonstrations, but calmly and resolutely fixed his purpose and declared his intentions. there was no foam or fury in his manner; nothing was said and nothing was done to create a sensation, though the man who had won laurels in the hard-fought battles of mexico might have been excused, on such an occasion, for a little display or a little pomposity; but that was not grant. actuated only by a sense of duty to his country, and not at all by a desire to serve himself or to win the honors of the profession he had first chosen, he was as gentle and modest as the humblest civilian. the soldier, especially the trained and experienced soldier, was a mighty man in those days. the whole country was rising in arms, and his influence was potent. the nation wanted him, and his profession, maligned and treated with contempt before, suddenly elevated him above the sphere of politicians and statesmen. grant was a soldier, and the fact that he was a graduate of west point, and had seen service in the field, made him a man to whom others looked up with respect and admiration in the new dispensation which necessity preached to the people. i dwell with pride and pleasure upon the deportment of captain grant at this exciting period. to me there was something sublime in his absolute self-negation. his antecedents, his military record, entitled him to a high position in the volunteer army which was then gathering. it would not have been immodest for him to write to the governor of illinois, asking a position as a major general in the mustering host. he did nothing of the kind; he asked for no position. he did not thrust his rank in the regular army, which he had earned by hard fighting, into the faces of civil or military officials. he claimed nothing. "uncle sam has educated me for the army," said he to a friend. "though i have served him through one war, i do not feel that i have yet repaid the debt. i am still ready to discharge my obligations. i shall therefore buckle on my sword, and see uncle sam through this war, too." the obligation could not be forgotten, for grant never permitted the remembrance of a favor to be obliterated from his heart; but high above even this sacred duty was that which he owed to his stricken country, then writhing in the gripe of the monster of treason. the purpose which gave to the united states the greatest commander the world has ever seen was formed; but he did not blow a trumpet before him in the streets of galena, and say to the people, "lo, here i am, a soldier trained to arms and fit to be your chief. behold me--a hero from monterey and chapultepec. make me your leader, and send me to battle at the head of your men, and i will win great victories for you." not thus spoke grant: save in the privacy of his narrow social circle, he spoke not at all; and even when his mighty prowess and his brilliant victories had made him famous, the people came to the shop windows of grant & sons to ascertain which of the firm was so effectually tanning rebel hides, so little was he known, and so little had he paraded himself before the citizens of the place. though like him i had been to west point; though like him i had seen the glories of palo alto, resaca, monterey, and the fourteen battles of scott from vera cruz to chapultepec; though like him i had retired from the army,--i could not regard myself as of so little consequence as he did. i felt that nothing less than the commission of a brigadier would be a proper appreciation of my record and my profession. i am sorry to be obliged to confess that i placed myself where the gaze of the multitude might rest upon me; but alas! they did not see me. i was not the providential man of the great rebellion, and the microscopes of the people failed to bring me into view. but my own position enables me to see more clearly that of the illustrious soldier of whose deeds i am the admiring chronicler. grant exhibited no ambitious spirit--he was at work for the nation, not for himself. he said nothing in public--the people of galena hardly knew the sound of his voice; but there, in the streets of his town, he raised the standard of the loyal cause, and invited the hardy and patriotic men of the place to rally for its defence. in less than a week after the news from fort sumter had arrived, he was drilling a company; but he did not claim even the rank to which he had risen in the regular army, the cause, and not himself, being still uppermost in his thought. the company proposed to elect him to this highest office within their gift. doubtless he would have accepted the position, but a gentleman with more ardent aspirations for military glory frankly acknowledged his desire to obtain this place; and grant declined the honor. he stepped out of the way to accommodate another, but he consented to go with the company to springfield, the capital of illinois. he was accompanied on his journey by the hon. e. b. washburn, who introduced him to governor yates. the chief magistrate did not appear at first to be profoundly impressed by the captain, and did not take much notice of him. grant was determined to use a laboring oar in the work before the loyal country, and he wrote to the adjutant general of the army at washington. he did not apply for a position as brigadier, but simply stated that he had been educated at the public expense at west point; and as the country was in peril, he considered it his duty to place whatever skill and experience he had acquired at the disposal of the government, offering his services in any capacity in which they might be needed. this modest offer brought no response from the war department. while grant was waiting for the moving of the waters, he visited cincinnati, where mcclellan, who had been appointed a major general of volunteers by the governor of ohio, was organizing his forces. the "little napoleon" of the first years of the rebellion had served with grant in mexico, and they had become acquainted there. both were in worth's brigade at the siege of vera cruz, and both had been honorably mentioned for gallant conduct at chapultepec and el molino del rey. grant was seeking a position in which he could make himself useful to the country. he twice called at the headquarters of general mcclellan, but failed to see him on either occasion. he thought it possible that his old comrade in arms might offer him a place on his staff, which appears to have been the highest aspiration of the great commander at this time. failing to see mcclellan, he returned to springfield. while he was waiting at the capital, governor yates sent for him, and wished to inquire whether he knew how many men belonged in a company, how many companies in a regiment, and what officers were required in such an organization--questions which seemed to have been especially perplexing to the earnest and loyal chief magistrate of the state. grant assured him that he understood all about such matters; that he had been educated at west point, and had served eleven years in the regular army. this straight-forward reply helped the governor out of his annoying dilemma, and grant was invited to take a seat at the capital and officiate as adjutant general, in which capacity he served for several weeks during the hurry of sending off the troops, rendering the most valuable assistance from his familiarity with the details of military organizations. though the future hero had made no parade of himself or his accomplishments, several regiments desired to elect him as their colonel; but for reasons of his own, which do not appear,--though i suspect that his military prejudice against electing officers was the strongest one,--he declined all these overtures. one who knew him better than others suggested to the governor that he should appoint him to some regiment, without previously consulting him. the suggestion was acted upon, and captain grant was appointed colonel of the twenty-first regiment of infantry. the commission was promptly accepted, and colonel grant hastened to mattoon, where the regiment was in camp, and assumed the command. chapter ix. _wherein captain galligasken has something to say about citizen soldiers, and follows the illustrious soldier into the field in missouri._ the "thinking bayonets" of the united states army, in a merely disciplinary point of view, were not at first the best of material of which to make soldiers. to a vastly greater extent than any other armies which have been gathered since the foundations of the earth were laid, they were composed of intelligent, educated men. they could read and write, and were competent to do their own thinking, and to form their own judgments. they had ideas of their own in regard to the war, and the means of carrying it on. the men in the ranks, as well as those with warrants and commissions in their pockets, were, without many exceptions, the graduates of the free schools which are the greatest glory of the nation. they read the newspapers, the potent educators of the people. they were the village politicians, the schoolmasters, the printers, the intelligent mechanics, the merchants, ministers, lawyers, and doctors of the country. there was no pursuit or profession in the land which was not represented in the volunteer army. all of them were thoroughly imbued with the spirit of our democratic institutions. each man in the rank and file of the grand army, as a citizen, was the peer of the president, the governor of his state, or of the mightiest man of the nation. any infraction of their rights they were ready to resent and resist. regarded, therefore, as the mere insensate humanity of which an army is composed, they were not the most hopeful material. blindly to obey without question, heavily to be hampered with the details of what seemed to them needless restrictions and regulations, meekly to ignore their own will, and follow unchallenged the will of another, was a condition of life for which their education and habits had not prepared them. they were willing to fight to the death, but to become mere stupid machines, moved by their officers, was at first hardly within the scope of their democratic philosophy. even while they acknowledged the necessity of strict discipline, and advocated its enforcement, the details of the daily routine pinched them severely. the officers of the regular army were rigid disciplinarians. those who had been in the service had been accustomed to different and coarser material than that which formed the volunteer army. their men had never had a voice in choosing their officers, whose responsibility was in the direction of the war department, and not at all in the direction of the force they commanded. it had been their province to command, as it had been that of their men to obey, not only on the battle-field, but in all the minutiæ of the camp and the garrison. one of these soldiers could be punished for neglecting to button his coat on parade, or to clean the spot of rust from the barrel of his musket; for being two inches short of the regulation step, or for a degree of variation in the angle of his feet in the line. men who had left the plough in the furrow on the farm which they had paid for and owned, to fight the battles of the republic, were at least impatient under such restraints. efficient regular officers, however popular they became on the field of battle, were in perhaps a majority of instances exceedingly obnoxious to the troops in camps of organization and discipline. with the democratic ideas of the soldiers, with their republican notions of equality, it was hardly possible that it should be otherwise; for the transition of the citizen from his social rank in the city and the village to the ranks of the army was a violent and radical change to him. doubtless, in many cases, these west point officers were martinets, and, "armed with a little brief authority," were unnecessarily arbitrary and severe; but it was not these alone who were stigmatized as "tyrants" and "oppressors." without discipline, even down to the minute details of which a civilian can have no adequate conception or appreciation, an army is inefficient, and in a measure useless. the regular officers justified themselves before the enemy, if they did not sooner, not alone in the merit of their fighting capacity, but in those obnoxious details of discipline. grant was a regular army officer, a strict but prudent disciplinarian. several regiments desired to elect him as their colonel, which amply vouches for his popularity before he had come into direct and intimate contact with the volunteer force. there was magic in the idea of having a commander who had not only received a regular military education, but who had won a reputation on the field of battle. it was a guaranty of the future welfare of the regiment. to maintain this respect, and keep up this popularity during the actual enforcement of arbitrary and disagreeable military regulations, was a vastly greater achievement. the twenty-first illinois infantry was a body of three months troops. in this, even more than in many other regiments, the democratic ideas of equality, so pernicious in a military organization, were prevalent to such an extent that the colonel, whose place grant had been appointed to fill, could not manage it. peculiar circumstances were involved in the relations of the commander and the troops; and when it is considered that the lesson of the necessity of discipline had not yet been learned, it is hardly proper to blame either party. the regiment was then in a demoralized condition, but it was composed of splendid material, and its subsequent record proves that its men were apt scholars in the school of discipline as well as in that of actual conflict. they were proud to have a regular army officer as their leader; but when he made his appearance before them, his rather rusty clothes, and plain, matter-of-fact manner, excited their ridicule. however they soon stumbled against his iron will, and promptly realized that they had a commander who had been in the habit of being obeyed, and who intended to be in the present instance. he was not a showy man, and not one who was disposed merely to play soldier. they saw that he meant fight, and meant discipline. colonel grant marched his regiment to caseyville, where he drilled the men for four weeks, transforming them from a mob into one of the best disciplined bodies of troops in the country; indeed, the twenty-first became noted for its drill and discipline. it was no easy thing at that time, when the private in the ranks regarded himself as the equal of the colonel, and was unwilling, even in his military relations, to sacrifice his own individual will,--it was no easy thing to bring order and regularity out of the chaos of equality and confusion. but grant accomplished this, and more than this; and he did it so skilfully and adroitly that no heads were broken, and no man was persuaded into the belief that he was no longer an american citizen. grant has been nominated to the highest office in the gift of the people--a position which will make him the peer of emperors and kings; and it is important to deduce from his record the evidence of his fitness for this splendid elevation. an iron will, unmodified by other noble traits of character, is an element of weakness rather than of strength, for a merely obstinate man at the helm of state is a discordant and dangerous element. a strong will, sustained and dignified by high aims and genuine principle, is a godlike attribute; without true principle and high aims, it reduces the man to the vilest brute level: it makes him a nero or a caligula. i am filled with admiration when i think of the excellent manner in which grant managed this regiment, and raised it from disgrace and inefficiency to honor and usefulness. i do not hazard much in declaring, that, under the circumstances, it was one of his most skilful achievements. then he was without influence; there was none of the magic in his name which time and victory have wreathed around it; his reputation as an officer hardly equalled that of hundreds of others around him. he took a disorganized, turbulent regiment, recruited it in a few days up to the maximum standard, and, in spite of all the disadvantages in the material and the surrounding circumstances, raised it to the highest state of discipline. his prompt and perfect success demonstrates his superior executive ability. he won the hearts of his men, so that they reënlisted for three years. he had entire control over them, and his influence was unbounded. he was obliged to educate his command up to his ideas of discipline, to exterminate their republican notions of equality, so far as they interfered with complete military subordination, and to inspire their bosoms with the true spirit of a patriot army. it does not appear that he achieved this miracle by blind, injudicious severity. his modesty and his firmness were yoked together to carry him through the emergency. he used tact and skill, as well as force, in harmonizing the discordant materials, and soon blended the whole in symmetrical union, and welded himself to the mass by a bond of sympathy, a chain of influence, which none of the accidents of hard service could break. to me this marvellous influence which he obtained over his men, and which he always obtained, however his numbers swelled, is one of the most significant indications of his greatness. the american people are no man-worshippers; i say it advisedly and confidently. they are generous in their regard, and no earnest patriot can ever want encouragement; but they judge men by the quality of their services. they praise and applaud, perhaps extravagantly, when a man does a noble deed; but they worship the deed rather than the man. general mcclellan was for a time the idol of the soldiers and the idol of the people. they cheered and shouted for him, and hailed him as their young napoleon; but when he failed to answer their reasonable expectations, they dropped him, and buried him forever and forever. so would they have done with grant, and sherman, and thomas, and sheridan, if they had failed them in the hour of trial; and so will they yet do, if they are recreant to their high estate, or false to the principles to which the people hold them. no man has been more honored or praised in his sphere than andrew johnson; and none has been more thoroughly detested, despised, and cast out. it was not the man they worshipped; it was the principle of which he was the representative. no man in all the country has a personal influence which can save him from obloquy when he deserts his colors or fails in his duty. glory and honor to the people who faithfully cling to their heroes and statesmen while they are true to their principles! glory and honor, also, to the people who sternly pull down and cast out their heroes and statesmen, whatever high eminence they may have gained, when they are recreant to the trust imposed in them! thus do our republican institutions operate, that no amount of personal popularity can save the great man from his doom when he is guilty of treachery or unjustifiable failure. they do not worship the man; if they did, they would cling to him through his shame and infidelity. neither the soldiers nor the people blindly worship grant. it always has been, and still is, possible for him to fall. if he should prove false to the principles of which an overwhelming majority of the people hold him up as the representative, both soldiers and citizens would remorselessly trample him under their feet, and forget that he had ever been their idol. i say, then, that his remarkable popularity, its steady blaze in the past, and its constant brightening, are the best evidences of his solid abilities, of his unflinching devotion to principle, of the purity of his patriotism. i know what the people would do with him if he should fail them; but in the light of his glorious record through a period of seven of the most eventful years in the history of the country, i feel that it is as impossible for him to be recreant in thought or in deed as it is for the sun to cease shining. i dwell fondly on the early days of his military career in the rebellion, for then, before fame had twined his laurel, or success had inspired him, we find that every act he performed, every order he issued, every movement he made, is fit to be recorded in the temple of his fame. those who are looking up to him, on the dazzling height to which his genius and his high principle have borne him, may be instructed by a review of his relations with the twenty-first illinois regiment. they may see the man there, as well as at vicksburg and appomattox court house. colonel grant was drilling his men at caseyville, when there was a rumor that quincy, on the mississippi river, was in danger from the guerrilla rebels of missouri. he was ordered to the exposed point, and, in the absence of transportation, marched his regiment one hundred and twenty miles of the distance. from quincy he was ordered over the river into missouri, for the protection of the hannibal and st. joseph's railroad; and brigadier general pope, then in command of the forces in that section, stationed him at mexico, forty miles north of the missouri river. on the march to this place, the twenty-first passed through a small village whose principal establishment was a grocery, at which the principal article on sale was whiskey. it was a melancholy fact that many of the citizens now transformed into soldiers had acquired a villanous habit of imbibing this fiery fluid, so destructive to good discipline. some of the troops stole out of the line, and filled their canteens with the liquor at this shop, and, lacking discretion as well as correct personal habits, were soon reeling from the effects of their frequent potations. without any violent demonstrations of indignation, which many men would have deemed necessary on such an occasion, colonel grant halted his regiment, as if to afford the men a brief rest. without giving any one an opportunity to suspect that anything was the matter, he passed along the lines, and examined each canteen. whenever he detected the odor of whiskey, he coolly emptied the contents on the ground, "without note or comment." the intoxicated ones he ordered to be tied behind the wagons, and kept there till they were animated by higher views of military discipline. whiskey and all intoxicating liquors were rigidly excluded from his camp. grant was always on time himself, and required promptness and punctuality in all his officers. he never blustered, or seemed to be in a hurry. he insisted that everything should be done at the appointed time. one morning the colonel was walking about the camp, smoking his pipe, when he discovered a company drawn up at roll call. it was half an hour after the required time, and grant quietly informed the officer that it was no time to call the roll, and ordered him to send his men immediately to their quarters. he was promptly obeyed, and the delinquent was punished for his want of punctuality. the colonel resumed his pipe and his walk, as though nothing had happened. this quiet, undemonstrative way was effective, and the offence was not again repeated. careful and particular in the minor details of duty, his regiment was brought up to the highest degree of discipline; but it was quite as much the manner as the substance which attracts attention. chapter x. _wherein captain galligasken relates a pleasing anecdote of the illustrious soldier, and shows how and why he captured paducah._ several regiments were engaged in northern missouri in guarding railroads and repressing guerrillas, and it was necessary that they should act in concert. grant was the junior in rank of the other colonels; but as they had a reasonable delicacy in issuing orders to one who had been educated at west point, and who had seen service on the battle-field, the commander of the twenty-first was appointed acting brigadier. in the latter part of july the chaplain of his regiment informed grant that he had been appointed a brigadier general of volunteers. he was quite surprised at the intelligence, for he had made no application for the promotion, either directly or through any of his friends. the appointment was obtained by mr. washburn, who had introduced him to governor yates. this gentleman exhibited a high appreciation of the abilities of grant, and it could not but be a happy thought to him, in the light of subsequent events, that he had been instrumental in bringing forward the illustrious soldier, though i doubt not that, without the aid of any influence in his favor, he would in due time have soared to his proper level. as a regimental commander, colonel grant made his mark; for he always did everything well. he was acting in this capacity in order to serve his country, and not as a stepping-stone to future eminence. he discharged his duties earnestly and faithfully in this comparatively humble sphere, as though he had already reached the height of his ambition. he gave his men an example of the most rigid simplicity of manners. he rarely wore a uniform, except on parade, and was above any vain show of "fuss and feathers." nothing ever moved him so that his emotion came to the surface, and when informed that he had been appointed a brigadier, he was as undisturbed as though the matter did not concern him. in his regimental experience, where he was more directly and intimately connected with the soldiers, he labored zealously to promote their welfare, morally and spiritually, as well as in a military point of view. he manifested a lively interest in the observance of the ordinances of religion among the men. he encouraged the chaplain in his efforts to keep the spirit of the gospel alive in the troops. he insisted upon having divine services in his camp, and used his influence to secure the attendance of all under his command. he regularly attended worship himself, except when prevented by his duties from being present. one day, at the mess table of the regiment, when the officers were all seated, colonel grant remarked that it was his custom, when at home, to invite any clergyman, who was present in his house, to ask blessing at the table, adding that a blessing was as much needed in the camp as at home, and, if it was agreeable to the views of his officers, he would like to have the chaplain ask a blessing every time they sat down to eat. the rebel general jeff. thompson, at the head of a horde of partisan cutthroats, went through a portion of the state of missouri where grant was located, committing petty outrages, and issuing absurd proclamations, probably in imitation of governor gamble, who seemed determined to fight out the battle with paper manifestoes. grant, at the head of a small force, marched in pursuit of the marauder. it is said that washington was utterly devoid of humor, and that he was not known to have made more than one joke in his lifetime. when governor trumbull, of connecticut, suggested that the standing army of the united states should be limited to four thousand men, washington moved that no enemy should invade the country with a larger force than four thousand. while it must be acknowledged that grant is not a joker, he is not without the element of humor in his composition. some of his punishments are ludicrous and amusing, though they are always judicious and effective. during the campaign in missouri, while grant was marching after jeff. thompson, his advance consisted of a body of indiana cavalry, commanded by one lieutenant wickfield, a man of expedients, especially when suggested by an empty stomach. at noon this force arrived at a farm-house, which looked sufficiently thrifty to assure the campaigners that its larder would supply wherewith to correct the vacuum which prudent nature loathes. wickfield, with two of his inferior officers, dismounted and entered the dwelling. though the great country for which grant was fighting had yet hardly heard his name, he was sufficiently well known in this locality to wield a powerful influence. wickfield realized that the potent name of the brigadier would be enough to induce the people to bring forward the best the house afforded, and he had the impudence to declare that he was brigadier general grant. the name was indeed a tower of strength, and the best that the larder contained was set before the hungry guests. they ate not merely all they wanted, but all they could, and asked how much was to be paid for their entertainment. the farmer's folks seemed to think it was a sufficient honor to have fed a live brigadier, and they declined payment. the officers went on their way, rejoicing in the plenty that filled their stomachs. the main body of the army halted a few miles from this house, to rest for a time; grant rode forward, and came to the house in which the officers of his advance had been so sumptuously regaled. he was not so ethereal as to be above the necessity of eating; and, indulging in a course of reasoning similar to that of wickfield, he rode up to the front gate of the house, and asked the occupants if they could prepare him a dinner. "no," responded the mistress of the house, in tones gruff and unamiable; "general grant and his staff have just been here and eaten up everything in the house, except one pumpkin pie." "humph," said grant, in his stoical manner, without exhibiting any surprise at the singular intelligence. "what is your name?" "selvidge," answered the woman. "will you keep that pie till i send an officer for it?" added grant, throwing a half dollar to her. "yes, i will," she replied, picking up the money; and grant rode off, doubtless thinking that he did not realize any benefit from the dinner which the brigadier and his staff had eaten, for he was probably willing to believe that the impostor had not taken his name in vain. that evening, when the force had gone into camp for the night, the several regiments were ordered to appear on parade at half past six o'clock, with particular instructions that every man should be present. the order was a very unusual one, for dress parades on the march were not required, and a decided sensation was created in the army. some thought the enemy were upon them, and various explanations of the strange order were suggested, though none of them were correct. at the appointed time the parade was formed, ten columns deep, and nearly a quarter of a mile in length. the ordinary ceremonial of the dress parade was punctiliously performed, and then the assistant adjutant general read the following luminous order:- "headquarters, army in the field. "_special order, no_. 112. "lieutenant wickfield, of the ---indiana cavalry, having on this day eaten everything in mrs. selvidge's house, except one pumpkin pie, lieutenant wickfield is hereby ordered to return with an escort of one hundred cavalry, and eat that pie also. u.s. grant, _brigadier general commanding_." as no one, or any body of men, ever presumed to disobey an order of general grant, at seven o'clock lieutenant wickfield, with his escort of one hundred men, filed out of the camp, amid the derisive cheers of the entire army. the escort unite in their testimony that he consumed the whole of the pie, and, so far as they were able to judge, are willing to affirm that he enjoyed the treat, especially as sufficient time had elapsed since his dinner to enable him to do so with impunity. grant's commission as a brigadier general reached him august 7, though it was antedated may 17. in harmony with his antecedents thus far, which placed him neither first nor last, he was the seventeenth on a list of thirty-four original appointments in the grade to which he was assigned. though mr. washburn had been forward in procuring his appointment, grant was unanimously recommended by the illinois delegation in congress--not one of whom he knew personally before the commencement of the outbreak, and not one of whom had the slightest idea of the magnificent grant they were making for the nation. at the time of general grant's appointment, the western department, which included all the region between the mississippi and the rocky mountains, with the state of illinois and such parts of western kentucky and tennessee as might be in possession of the national arms, was under command of general fremont. for his own convenience, the chief of this department divided his territory into sub-districts; and on the 1st of september grant was ordered to the command of the south-east missouri district, including western kentucky and tennessee. on the 4th of the month he established his headquarters at cairo. general grant was now in a position to make himself felt, and he began to gaze out upon the broad field of southern aggression before him. he was on the actual dividing line between loyalty and rebellion, prepared to defend the one and invade the other. governor magoffin, of kentucky, had made his sensational reply to the call for troops, that his state would furnish none for the "wicked" purpose of subduing her sister southern states, and had issued his proclamation of neutrality, which meant nothing but rebellion, as proved by the subsequent conduct of the man. there could be no neutral state between the fiery south and the indignant north. cairo was a point of the utmost importance to the loyal cause, as a depot of supplies, as a gunboat rendezvous, and as a strategetic position. the mobile and ohio railroad extended through the western part of tennessee to the northern line of that state, where it diverged into three branches, terminating respectively at hickman, columbus, and paducah, connecting these places with all the principal cities of the south, each of which might form a base of operation for offensive movements on the part of the rebels. neutrality in kentucky meant rebellion. it was proclaimed in the interests of the south, but it was not, and could not be, respected by either party. it was first violated by the rebels, who failed to sound the notes of indignation when bishop general polk marched his army into the state and seized upon hickman and columbus. general grant had studied his maps faithfully, and fully comprehended the situation, not only in its present but in its future significance. polk was in full march upon paducah, the possession of which would give the rebels the control of the navigation of the ohio and the entrance of the tennessee, at the mouth of which the town is located. grant was wide awake, and a few days after he had established his headquarters at cairo he completed his hasty preparations for the capture of paducah, and started late in the evening with two regiments and a light battery, with two gunboats--the naval force of his district having also been placed under his direction. arriving at his objective point the next morning, he landed his force, and took possession of the town, the rebels under tilghman hastily evacuating the place while the national troops were landing. paducah was a strong secession town. recruiting officers from the rebel army were enlisting its citizens to fight against the union even when grant landed. the prompt movement was a necessity, and grant made it without the order of his superior officer, though he notified fremont of the purposes of the enemy, and asked his permission to check them; but he started before this permission reached him. he also announced his purpose to the legislature of kentucky, then in session at frankfort, but neither did he wait for their permission. a few hours of delay would have defeated the objects of the expedition. he was prompt, and thus saved the west from the mortification and disaster of having the ohio closed. the inhabitants of paducah were in full sympathy with the rebellion. they believed in the neutrality of kentucky, even while they harbored and assisted in recruiting a rebel force in their midst. grant issued a proclamation, in which he informed them that he came not as an enemy, but as their fellow-citizen, to respect and enforce the rights of all loyal citizens. he declared that he had nothing to do with opinions, and should deal only with armed rebellion, its aiders and abettors. he could not help mingling a little of his quaint humor with the solid declarations of the document; adding, that whenever it was manifest the people of paducah were able to defend themselves, maintain the authority of the government, and protect the rights of loyal citizens, he should withdraw the forces under his command. it was not their style to defend themselves from rebels, or to maintain the authority of the government, so that the necessity of withdrawing the force was not realized. grant remained in the town only till noon. having garrisoned the position, he returned to cairo, where fremont's permission to capture paducah, if he felt strong enough, awaited him. he had already felt his strength, however, and bishop polk had been effectually checkmated. grant immediately took possession of smithland, at the mouth of the cumberland river; and though he was not in position to order a forward movement himself, he seems to have been preparing the way for the triumphal march of the union armies, which ended only when the hordes of treason laid down their arms at the feet of him who now opened the gates of their wide domain. it was of the highest importance that these places should be held, and grant placed general charles f. smith in command of the position, with a brigade of the most reliable troops. this man was his _beau idéal_ of a soldier, and the regular army officers regarded him as one of its most able and accomplished veterans. it is said that he had incurred the displeasure of general scott, who neither forgave nor forgot; otherwise he might have been assigned to the position taken by mcclellan. he was a stern and unyielding disciplinarian, with little or none of the tact which had characterized grant's treatment of this difficult problem, and his severity soon embroiled him with the volunteers. politicians and newspapers cried him down, and his sins were blazoned at the war department. he was in imminent peril of being sent in disgrace into the shade before he had fought a single battle. but grant understood him, and saved him; and "paducah smith" at fort donelson, leading the fiercest charge, bareheaded and inspired, justified himself and his steadfast friend. grumblers and slanderers were shamed and silenced. grant's wonderfully correct estimate of men has proved to be one of the secrets of his success; and here, in the first year of the rebellion, and before he had been a week in command of this district, he began to demonstrate in this direction not only his fidelity to a friend, but his firmness in the good cause. chapter xi. _wherein captain galligasken describes the battle of belmont, and further illustrates the military qualities of the illustrious soldier, as exhibited in that fierce fight._ with such a man as smith at paducah, placed there, and kept there, by general grant, the outlets of those great rivers, the tennessee and the cumberland, which led down into the very heart of the rebellion, were safe. we looked to grant--we, within the narrow sphere he then occupied--for another movement, for some brilliant and well-conceived operation, which would gladden the hearts and strengthen the arms of the men of the loyal cause; but we looked in vain, for he was not the commander of a department, and was held back by general fremont. but grant was busy, and not a moment of his precious time was lost, however it may have been turned aside from its highest usefulness. the hardy and enthusiastic volunteers from the north-west were poured in upon him until he had about twenty thousand. he employed himself in perfecting their organization and improving their discipline. columbus, which had been fortified and held by polk and pillow, was every day increasing its strength and importance. it had closed the mississippi, and every point in grant's district was continually menaced by it. he desired to "wipe it out," and applied to fremont for permission to do so, declaring that, with a little addition to his present force, he would take the place. his application was not even noticed, and the rebels were permitted to strengthen their works, and afford all the aid they could to the turbulent hosts in missouri. in the mean time the rebel general price had captured lexington, but abandoned his prize at the approach of fremont, and retreated to the south-western part of the state, where he remained, confronted by a small force of national troops, gathering strength for another hostile movement towards the north. polk, who was in command of columbus, occasionally sent troops over the river to belmont, on the opposite bank, from which they marched to re-enforce price. the safety of the union army before him required that this channel of communication should be closed, or at least that the enemy in missouri should be prevented for a time from receiving further assistance. general grant was therefore ordered to make a movement which should threaten columbus, and thus compel polk to retain his force. accordingly, he sent colonel oglesby towards the point he was to menace, and also directed general smith at paducah to march towards columbus, and demonstrate in the rear of that place. the point to be gained was simply to prevent reënforcements from being sent over the river, for grant was prohibited from making an attack upon the threatened point. belmont was partially fortified. it was a camp for rebel troops, from which they could conveniently be sent to coöperate with price or jeff. thompson, and a depot of supplies gathered up in missouri and arkansas, where they could be readily sent over to columbus. on the evening of november 6, grant started down the river with a fleet of steamers, under the convoy of two gunboats, to demonstrate on a larger scale against the enemy's stronghold. he had with him a force of thirty-one hundred men, comprising five regiments of infantry, two squadrons of cavalry, and a section of artillery. the movement was not intended as an attack, even upon belmont, at the beginning. his troops were exceedingly raw, some of them having received their arms only two days before. the fleet continued down the river about ten miles, and grant made a feint of landing on the kentucky side, remaining at the shore till the next morning, to give color to the idea that, with smith, he intended to attack columbus. but during the night he ascertained that polk was crossing large bodies of troops to belmont, with the evident intention of pursuing oglesby. then the intrepid general decided to "clean out" the camp at belmont. this was literally what he intended to do, and as every man's success ought to be measured by his intentions, it is very important that this fact should be fully comprehended. it is absurd to suppose that a military man of grant's experience proposed to take and hold the place. he had every reason to believe the enemy had double his force, and he knew that they were well provided with steamers and gunboats, and could send over reënforcements rapidly; and he was also aware that belmont was covered by the guns of columbus. against this odds, and under these circumstances, he could not for a moment have entertained the idea of securing a permanent advantage. he contemplated only a bold dash, which was sufficient to accomplish the object of the expedition. the little army was landed at hunter's point, three miles above the rebel works, and just out of the range of the columbus batteries. the line was formed, and, with grant in the advance with the skirmishers, moved forward. it soon encountered the enemy, and drove them before it. the action waxed warmer and warmer as the lines of national troops advanced, and the contest became very severe. grant still kept in front, animating the soldiers by his heroic example, in utter contempt of anything like danger. his horse was killed under him, and he was in peril from first to last; but his gallant behavior stimulated the civilian colonels under him, and they stood up squarely to the work before them. thus led, the raw soldiers from illinois behaved like veterans, and fought with the utmost desperation. the contest continued for four hours, at the end of which time the union troops had driven the rebels foot by foot to their works; and then, charging through the abatis which surrounded the fortifications, forced the beaten foe to the river. several hundred prisoners and all the rebel guns were captured, and the camp broken up. grant had reached his objective point, and his success was thorough and complete. he had accomplished all he proposed, and it only remained for him to retire from the field, which was of course as much a part of his original intention as was the attack. as the hour of prosperity is often the most dangerous, so was the moment of victory the most perilous to these gallant troops. their success seemed to intoxicate them, and instead of pursuing their advantage upon the rebel force, sheltering themselves beneath the bluff of the river, they went about plundering the deserted camp. their colonels, no better disciplined, indulged their vanity in making union speeches. general grant discovered that the enemy was sending steamer loads of troops across the river, to a point above the camp, to intercept his retreat; and he was anxious to get back to his transports before they arrived. he attempted to form his lines again, but the men were too much disorganized to heed orders. the general then directed his staff-officers to set fire to the camp, in order to check the plunder. the smoke attracted the attention of the rebels at columbus, who opened fire upon the unionists. shot and shell brought them to a sense of their duty; the line was formed, and they marched towards the steamers, three miles distant. the defeated rebels, under the bank of the river, having been reënforced by the arrival of three regiments from columbus, marched to a point which enabled them to intercept the victorious army. an officer, on discovering the fact, dashed furiously up to the cool commander, and in a highly-excited tone cried, "we are surrounded!" "well, if that is so, we must cut our way out, as we cut our way in," replied grant, apparently unmoved even by this tremendous circumstance. his troops were brave men, but such a disaster as being surrounded suggested to their inexperience only the alternative of surrender, and, under many commanders, such a result must have been inevitable. what paralyzes the soldier often produces the same effect upon the leader; but grant was not "demoralized." no apparent reverses could exhaust his unconquerable pluck; he never despaired, and worked up a situation out of which another could make nothing but defeat, until he brought forth victory. "we have whipped them once, and i think we can do it again," added grant, in the midst of the confusion which the unpleasant prospect caused. the troops discovered that grant had no idea of surrendering, and they gathered themselves up for a fresh onslaught. the confusion was overcome, and the little army charged the enemy, who fought less vigorously than earlier in the day, and were again forced behind the bank of the river. but, as fresh troops were continually arriving from columbus, there was no time to be wasted, and grant pressed on for his transports. there was no unseemly haste, certainly nothing like a rout, or even a defeat. everything was done in as orderly a manner as possible with undisciplined troops. [illustration: grant's escape.--page 123.] grant superintended the execution of his own orders in the embarkation of his force; and, when most of them were on board of the steamers, he sent out a party to pick up the wounded. in the morning he had posted a reserve in a suitable place for the protection of the fleet, and as soon as the main body were secure on the decks of the transports, grant, attended by a single member of his staff, rode out to withdraw this force. this guard, ignorant of the requirement of good discipline, had withdrawn themselves, and the general found himself uncovered in the presence of the advancing foe. riding up on a hillock, he found himself confronting the whole rebel force, now again increased by fresh additions from the other side of the river. it was a time for an ordinary man to put spurs to his steed; but grant had an utter contempt for danger. he stood still for a moment to examine the situation, during which he was a shining mark for rebel sharp-shooters. he wore a private's overcoat, the day being damp and chilly; and to this circumstance alone can his miraculous escape be attributed. he was looking for the party he had sent out in search of the wounded, and realized that they had been cut off by the foe. turning his horse, he rode slowly back to the landing, so as not to excite the attention of his uncomfortable neighbors, who were pouring a galling fire into the transports. the steamers suffered so much from this destructive hail of bullets, that they had cast off their fasts, and pushed away from the bank, leaving the general behind in the midst of the foe. seeing how the thing was going, grant put spurs to his horse, forcing the steed on his haunches down the bank, just as one of the steamers was swinging off from the shore. a plank was thrown out for him, up which he trotted his horse, in the midst of a storm of rebel bullets. the field being clear of national troops, the gunboats opened a fierce fire upon the rebel ranks, now within fifty or sixty yards of the shore, mowing them down with grape and canister in the most fearful slaughter. the fire of the rebels was fortunately too high to inflict any serious injury on the troops in the transports, and by five in the afternoon they were out of range. the next day grant met, under a flag of truce, an old classmate from west point, then serving on general polk's staff. he related his personal experience at belmont, stating that he had encountered the rebel line when alone. the rebel officer expressed his surprise. "was that you?" exclaimed he. "we saw you. general polk pointed you out as a yankee, and called upon the men to test their aim upon you; but they were too busy in trying their skill upon the transports to heed the suggestion." i point with admiration to the conduct of general grant during that entire day. as an example of coolness and courage, he stands unsurpassed, and even unrivalled. it was thrilling to behold him, in the midst of the trials and discouragements of that hard-fought field, the life and the soul of the whole affair. he was the only trained soldier on the field, for even general mcclernand, who was daring enough to have had three horses shot under him, had no actual experience of battle. his men, and especially his officers, were undisciplined, and the whole affair rested upon his shoulders. but the brave fellows followed his example, and the victory was made sure. the material results of the battle were one hundred and seventy-five prisoners, two guns carried off and four spiked on the field, and the total destruction of the enemy's camp. of the force engaged, grant had thirty-one hundred and fourteen men, according to his official report. general polk declared that, at the beginning of the battle, pillow had five regiments, a battery, and a squadron of cavalry; and that five more regiments were sent across the river during the fight. the rebel force, therefore, must have been double that of the unionists; and probably the disparity was still greater. my friend mr. pollard, with his usual cheerful assumption, called the battle of belmont a confederate victory! or, stating it a little more mildly, a defeat in the beginning changed in the end to an overwhelming victory! did this amiable rebel ever hear of an army defeated by an "overwhelming victory," carrying off their captured guns and prisoners, embarking leisurely in their steamers, and retiring while the victors were being mowed down in swaths? grant lost four hundred and eighty-five men in killed, wounded, and missing; while mr. pollard demolishes his own "overwhelming victory" by acknowledging a rebel loss of six hundred and forty-two, which was probably below the actual number. the moral results of the battle, which cannot be estimated in captured guns and prisoners, were even more satisfactory. belmont, as settling a question of _prestige_, was the bunker hill of the western soldiers. it gave them confidence in themselves, and prepared the way for donelson and shiloh. it prevented the forces of jeff thompson and price from being augmented. the unmilitary conduct of some of the colonels, gallantly as they fought, exposed them to merited rebuke. it is said that grant himself expected to be deprived of his command for fighting this battle, and for not effecting his retreat more promptly, having been delayed, as i have shown, by the want of proper support from these commanders of regiments, who did not control, or attempt to control, the excesses of the men. one of them, fearful that the same fate was in store for him, waited upon grant to ascertain the prospect. he obtained no satisfaction, for the general thought the lesson ought to work in his mind. "colonel ---is afraid i will report his bad conduct," said grant to one of his friends, when the repentant and anxious officer had departed. "why don't you do it?" demanded the other. "he and the other colonels are to blame for their disobedience, which had nearly involved you in a disaster." "these officers had never been under fire," replied the magnanimous hero. "they did not understand how serious an affair it was, and they will never forget the lesson they learned. i can judge from their conduct in the action that they are made of the right stuff. it is better that i should lose my position, if it must be, than that the country should lose the services of five such gallant officers when good men are scarce." grant did not lose his command; and the future justified the belief of grant, for three of the five colonels won an enviable distinction in subsequent battles. that was grant! it was the imperilled nation, and not his own glory, for which he was fighting. chapter xii. _wherein captain galligasken rehearses the persistent efforts of the illustrious soldier to obtain permission to attack fort henry, and follows him to the capture of that important position_. general grant gained no immediate credit for his brilliant action at belmont. the objects of the movement were not understood, and as the victorious army did not retain the position it had won, the general public regarded it as a defeat. the balance of injury was against the rebels, and in favor of the national arms. grant gained all, and more than all, he intended. he had no occasion to be forgiven for belmont. it was his first battle in the rebellion, and the first of the unbroken line of victories he achieved which gladdened the heart of the nation from time to time. grant was always generous, even to magnanimity. his report of the battle bestows the warmest praise upon those who deserved it. there was none of that petty, sixpenny jealousy in his composition which belittled some other able generals, and which in a few instances seriously interfered with the progress of the union arms. he had no occasion to decry others in order to magnify himself. he was willing to let his fame take care of itself. he did everything for the cause, nothing at all for himself. he was too magnanimous to mention the indiscretions of the officers who, through lack of experience, imperilled the day, for they were errors of the head, and not of the heart. a few days after the battle of belmont, fremont was superseded by halleck. the change did not injure the immediate prospects of grant, though for two months the general was employed only in organizing and drilling troops, some of which were for service in his own district, and some were intended for other parts of the department, and he was permitted to make no forward movement. for the old name the new commander substituted the district of cairo, and changed its limits so as to include the portion of kentucky west of the cumberland river. during this period of comparative inaction, flags of truce frequently passed between cairo and columbus, and interviews between the generals in command of the posts took place. general polk seems to have been a very hospitable gentleman, and at the close of each conference invariably brought out his wine to treat his guests. it was not unusual to propose a toast, and on one occasion the bishop general offered one which he declared all could drink. the glasses were filled,--grant's with water, of course,--and polk gave, "to general washington--" he paused there, and the company raised their glasses to their lips, and were in the act of honoring the great name, when the proposer of the sentiment added--"the first rebel." "that was scarcely fair, general," interposed grant, who had nearly finished his glass; "but i will be even with you some other time." it would have been called a yankee trick if it had been perpetrated by any other than a chivalrous southern soldier. two weeks later, another flag was sent down the river, and grant accompanied it. when the business of the interview was completed, polk attended to the rites of hospitality as usual. grant turned the conversation into the favorite channel of rebel politicians by introducing the subject of state rights. the southern officers were suffered to express themselves fully on their pet theme, without any serious attempt to controvert their positions. as he rose to take his departure, grant proposed, a sentiment in which he said all could agree--"equal rights to all--" he duplicated the pause which polk had made on the previous occasion, until the party had partially emptied their glasses, when he added--"white and black." "now, general, i think i am even with you," continued grant, in his quiet, unimpressible manner; and the reverend general was obliged to own that he had been flanked in his own manoeuvre. columbus was the western extreme of the rebel line of defence, which at that time included nearly the whole length of the potomac river in the east. the enemy had built fort henry on the tennessee river, and fort donelson on the cumberland, and occupied bowling green, near the centre of the state of kentucky. the line which included these points was the boundary which actually separated the territories in possession of the combatants. it was the strategic line of the rebels, on which they had placed their defences, concentrated their armies, and gathered their supplies, both for aggressive movements to the north, and to prevent a union force from penetrating to the south. bowling green, on a branch of the green river, was at the junction of the two lines of railroad from memphis and from nashville. fort henry and fort donelson were near the memphis road, protecting it from union raiders, and supplied by it with men and provisions, as well as by the two rivers. the gibraltar of the west, as columbus was called by the rebels, mounted one hundred and forty guns, was abundantly supplied with men and material, and its railway connections afforded every facility for reënforcing it in case of necessity. it closed the mississippi against the union steamers and gunboats. fort henry, the first connecting link in the rebel line of defence, was a strongly-built fortification on the right bank of the tennessee, mounting seventeen guns, and provided with accommodations for fifteen thousand men. fort donelson, on the left bank of the cumberland, was a more elaborate work, mounting forty guns, and with quarters for twenty thousand troops. these two forts effectually closed the rivers on which they were located, and were only twelve miles apart, so that they could coöperate with each other in cases of emergency. a strong rebel army at bowling green completed the defence, and an advance by land was as impracticable as by water. the problem which the western military commanders were called upon to solve was, how to break through this line. the question seems to have worried grant to no inconsiderable degree, and he studied the matter attentively during the winter. in january, by order of general halleck, he sent out a heavy force under general smith, in the direction of columbus, to aid a movement on the part of general thomas in another part of the state, and to examine the ground. no fighting was done, and the soldiers suffered severely from cold; but the object of the expedition was gained, for thomas defeated the rebels at mill springs, where the result would have been different if reënforcements had been sent from this quarter to the enemy. during the winter, the gunboat navy of the west was largely augmented and improved, under the admirable supervision of commodore foote. ordinary river steamers were shorn of their top works, and their hulls converted into iron-clad batteries, which promised to render efficient service in operations on the navigable streams of the west. the brave old salt was ably seconded by halleck and by grant, both in building and in manning his fleet. general smith, on his return from the reconnoissance in force, reported to grant that the capture of fort henry was feasible. the general of the district was ready at an early day to solve the problem of breaking the rebel line of defence. he had kept his eye and his thought on this operation; and while the movement was demanded by mcclellan, then general-in-chief, halleck appears hardly to have turned his attention in that direction; certainly he had taken no active measure to carry out the purpose. i am not willing to say that grant at this time had devised a plan for extended operations towards the south, but i am confident that he was studying his maps and measuring the comparative resources of the two armies long before his superiors had any definite ideas on the subject. i firmly believe that to him belongs the conception of that grand military movement which he so gloriously carried forward in person. on the return of smith from his expedition, grant forwarded his report to general halleck, and a day later, by permission, visited the headquarters of the commander of the department at st. louis, in order to obtain permission to attack fort henry. halleck was one of the high and mighty men, and his refusal was abrupt and sharp. grant was no orator. he proffered his request in the fewest words that would express it; and he did not attempt to sustain his views by an argument. he was wounded in his feelings by the curtness of his superior, and returned to cairo with the unpleasant impression that his commander regarded him as a tyro, capable of perpetrating the grossest military blunder. but grant had fort henry on the brain, and, in spite of his repulse, he could not be satisfied to leave with his superior the responsibility of neglecting to improve what he regarded as a golden opportunity. in the latter part of january he telegraphed to halleck that, with his permission, he would take and hold fort henry, establish and hold a large camp there. a day later he followed up his application with a letter, demonstrating the practicability of the proposed enterprise, and showing the advantage to be gained by a prompt advance. his application was warmly seconded by flag-officer foote; and this time the desired permission was obtained. grant was happy then; he had overcome the coldness of halleck, and it only remained for him to justify his predictions. grant was on the most intimate terms of friendship with foote, and these two gallant and devoted men worked harmoniously together to achieve a success. there was no bickering between them about precedence, for both of them sought only to serve the cause in which they had embarked. halleck's detailed instructions arrived on the 1st of february, and, in view of the experience of others, it is almost a miracle that there was not a delay of a month, or at least of a week. grant was a prompt man, and in spite of all the precedents made and provided for the occasion, he actually started from cairo on the day after his orders reached him. his force, embarked in transports, consisted of seventeen thousand men, and commodore foote's squadron was composed of seven gunboats, only four of which, however, were iron-clads. on the 4th of february the expedition arrived at the scene of operations. grant had given mcclernand the advance, and this officer landed his troops about eight miles below the fort. but the commanding general did not quite comprehend the situation, and he was not the man to work in the dark when light could be obtained. going on board of one of the gunboats, he directed its captain to steam up the river, and under the guns of the fort, in order to draw its fire and test its weight of metal. the rebels fired upon the daring intruder, and a shot went through the steamer. the purpose of the general was gained, and he returned to his forces below, reembarked them, and again landed them just out of the reach of cannon shot, the range of which he had practically demonstrated. the enemy were fully alive to the peril which menaced them, and made every preparation for a desperate resistance. additional troops were ordered up by the railroads, and reserves from fort donelson stationed where they could be available. the tennessee had overflowed its banks, and the country for miles around was inundated. fort henry was completely surrounded by water, and the movements of both armies were made with difficulty. but grant, no more dismayed by flood than by fire, gave orders to post his troops so as to intercept any departures or arrivals of the enemy. before the investment of the fort, intelligence of the anticipated arrival of a large rebel force compelled grant to hasten the attack, and at eleven o'clock, on the 6th of february, the army marched towards the rear of the fort, and the gunboats steamed up the river to engage the batteries. the intrepid old sea-dog opened fire upon the works, and in an hour and a half knocked them all to pieces, silencing every gun. general tilghman surrendered to commodore foote without conditions; but only the commander, his staff, and sixty men were captured, the main body of the rebel army having been sent to fort donelson. the floods of water and the miry condition of the roads prevented the army from reaching the rear of the fort in season to be of any service. the cavalry was sent in pursuit of the fleeing rebels, but they had gone too far to be overtaken. general tilghman, it appeared, did not share the confidence of his superiors in the invulnerableness of his works, and early in the morning he had posted his entire garrison, with the exception of a force sufficient to work his guns, at some outworks two miles distant, and out of the reach of the shot and shell from the gunboats, where they could be hastened to a place of safety. before the result of the battle with the gunboats was known, these forces were sent away, and no different action on the part of the union general could have captured them. the victory was a decided one, though the army was prevented from sharing in the glory of capturing the fort. the result filled the government of the confederacy with dismay. one of its strong gates had been battered down, and the tennessee was open to the navigation of those pestilent gunboats, which had already become the terror of rebeldom. prompt to assure the leaders of the confederacy of the disaster which had overtaken them, flag-officer foote sent three of his "pets" up the river, which proceeded as far as florence, alabama, destroying the railroad bridge twenty-five miles above fort henry, capturing large quantities of stores, and burning many steamers and other boats. the effect of this success was promptly realized in the sudden evacuation of bowling green; and thus two of the rebel strongholds were struck down by the same blow. but the full advantage of this capture was not to be realized until the union army was ready to move in force towards the south. the victory was an easy one, very much to the astonishment of the naval and the military officers in command. certainly the position was of importance enough for the confederacy to have staked more upon it than it did. grant's idea was triumphant, and he received the reward of his persistent application to capture the fort, and ample compensation for his harsh rebuff, in the consciousness that he had initiated one of the grandest movements of the war--grand in its ultimate results, which his far-seeing eye had already discovered, rather than in the present glory of its accomplishment. chapter xiii. _wherein captain galligasken states the results of the victory at fort henry, and attends the illustrious soldier in the investment of fort donelson_. the capture of fort henry was as inspiring to the national troops as it was discouraging to the rebels. general grant telegraphed to halleck that he had taken fort henry, and he announced his intention to serve fort donelson in the same way. not a word had been said before about the strong work on the cumberland, and grant had no instructions from his superior on this point. halleck made no reply to his despatch, though he notified general buell of the expected attack. the idea of capturing donelson was grant's from its inception to its culmination in the surrender. he had no definite information in regard to the fort, but he formed his plan, not only to attack but to capture it. it seems to have been written down in his mind from the commencement that there was to be no failure. the flood and the continued heavy rains delayed the movement, and the troops were obliged to fight with the waters to save their scanty supplies. general halleck used every exertion to supply grant with troops and material, but he did not order the movement, or even express any hopes or opinions in regard to it. he simply suffered it to proceed, yielding all the assistance required of him; but it would have been curious to know what he would have said if the enterprise had proved to be a failure. halleck sent minute orders in regard to the disposition of fort henry, instructing grant to hold it, intimating that he would send picks and shovels to strengthen the work, and directed that the guns should be changed so as to meet an attack from the land; but he does not mention donelson. he repeats his instructions very carefully on the 10th of the month, again kindly offers to send the picks and shovels, and assures the rising hero that large reënforcements would soon join him; but he is thoroughly non-committal on the subject of fort donelson. for my own part, i am thankful that he was so; for i am convinced that any man with a genius for war inferior to that of the illustrious soldier would have been a marplot if he had meddled with the matter. grant was willing to take the responsibility; and doubtless the singular silence of his superior suggested to him his fate in case of failure. grant did not wait for any of the additional force promised; and while the solemn autocrat in st. louis was prating about picks and shovels, and matters which a volunteer who had seen service for a week understood as well as he, the bold brigadier in command hurried up commodore foote, who was waiting for the gunboats he had sent up the river. he was impatient to be on the move, and chafed like a leashed tiger at the delay; for the news kept coming in that the rebels were continually strengthening donelson. on the 11th the commodore started with his fleet for the cumberland, protecting transports conveying six regiments of troops and the supplies for the entire force. on the same day mcclernand, with the advance, moved out a few miles towards the point of attack. the next morning, grant himself, with the main body of the army, consisting of fifteen thousand strong, marched from fort henry, leaving twenty-five hundred men in garrison there. the roads were inundated, and it was impossible to transport tents and baggage. but few wagons were taken, and the only food carried was in the haversacks of the soldiers. in order to understand the difficulties in the way of the gallant commander, it should be remembered that this movement was made in the month of february. the country was flooded with water, rendering the roads almost impassable, and requiring that many streams should be bridged. but without tents or baggage, the confident general moved on to do the mighty work before him. at noon he arrived at his destination, and proceeded to post his troops. grant's information in regard to the fortress was so meagre and indefinite that he could only promise to issue the necessary orders in the field. this was the task now before him. fort donelson was one of the most elaborately constructed systems of works which yet frowned on the path of the union army. it was built on a group of hills, the highest of which were not less than a hundred feet above the level of the river. it consisted of a nest of forts, thrown around the principal one, mounting, with the addition of the field guns of the batteries, sixty-five pieces. the country in which it was situated was rough, and densely wooded. the approaches to the works were rendered difficult by ingeniously-contrived abatis. above and below the fort was a stream, overflowing its banks, and protecting the right and left of the rebel line. water batteries on the river effectually guarded the approaches in that direction. the fort was garrisoned by twenty-one thousand men. for a week the rebels had been at work, day and night, increasing its defences, and calling in reënforcements from the vicinity. grant went to work with his usual promptness, and before night had surrounded the fort, so far as the overflow of the streams would permit. mcclernand's division was on the right, smith's on the left. there were but three educated officers on the field--grant, smith, and mcpherson; all the rest of the force were volunteers, most of whom had never seen a battle, and some had been in the service but a very brief period. the gunboats did not arrive the next day, as expected, but the time was occupied in perfecting the investment of the place, and in feeling of the enemy. some smart skirmishes occurred, but nothing of importance to either side resulted from them. a gallant attempt was made by mcclernand to capture a battery, but it failed. at night grant's line extended for three miles along a series of hills parallel to the enemy's line. the reënforcements did not arrive, and foote's squadron was not heard from. the weather changed from heavy rain to intense cold, and the thermometer fell nearly to zero. the troops suffered fearfully from cold; for without tents, and without sufficient clothing, they bivouacked in line of battle, sleeping, if they slept at all, on their arms. the rebel pickets were within easy range, and no fires could be built. some of the raw troops had even thrown away their blankets in the toilsome march through the mud. before morning a driving storm of hail and snow set in, horribly increasing the sufferings of the troops. what a terrible price was paid for the integrity of this blessed union! what an awful sacrifice for the liberty in which we now rejoice! i tremble when i think of the horrors of that dreadful night, in the snow, and the sleet, and the piercing cold, where the devoted patriots lay under the fire of the enemy! all night long the rebel pickets fired, and the groans of the wounded and the dying mingled with the howls of the storm. all the horrors of war seemed to be blended together in one discordant mass--hunger, cold, and all the torturing agony of suspense and anxiety. from what i know of grant, i am sure he suffered the most, for the tortures of his men were his own; but peace and freedom were the glittering prize for which he fought and endured the bitter anguish of that horrid night. i wonder that even his iron will did not yield in the presence of the calamities which were there heaped upon him and his men; for he endured all that the humblest soldier endured. besides the burden they had to bear, he carried the responsibility of the enterprise upon his shoulders; but he was as confident as he was patient and self-sacrificing. for the glorious cause in which he had embarked, he endured all which that awful period had in store for him. glory, honor, and an immortal name to the man who had the fortitude to endure the horrors of that terrible night! i am amazed as i view him, the thinking power of the expedition, resolutely maintaining his bold front through the accumulated miseries of that gloomy trial-hour! think of the man who had the hardihood to beleaguer a fortress garrisoned by twenty-one thousand men with fifteen thousand, and to stand by them confidently through such a storm and such a night! it was watching and waiting for the morning. conscious of his comparative weakness, grant sent a messenger to fort henry for the garrison which had been left there. in the gloom of the early morning came glad tidings to the anxious commander, and to his suffering force. a gunboat was coming up the river, and its presence heralded the approach of the fleet, with reënforcements and with supplies for the half-famished men in the line. though abundant rations had been issued to the troops, they were improvident, in their inexperience, both of food and clothing. the warm, humid air of the preceding day had been oppressive to them, and they had lightened their burden, reckless of the future. the sudden change of the weather and the delay of the fleet subjected them to terrible hardship. many of the wounded and others were frozen to death in the line. general lew wallace and the garrison from fort henry, arrived, and were immediately placed in the centre of the line of investment. the transports came up to a point three miles below the fort, landed their troops, who were added to the line encircling the fort, increasing the besieging force to twenty-two thousand. during the entire day, an irregular fire of sharp-shooters was kept up by the rebels, and at times the artillery played briskly upon the national lines. this was on the second day of the siege, friday, the 14th of february. early in the afternoon, six gunboats, only four of which were protected by armor, opened fire upon the fort, and continued to pour in shot and shell for an hour and a half. the water batteries had the advantage of a high position in this conflict, which enabled them to throw plunging shot at the gunboats. commodore foote was severely wounded, fifty-four of his men killed or wounded, two of his craft disabled, and the others crippled by the vigorous fire of the rebels. twenty guns had acted upon the little squadron, which could use only twelve in reply. two of the iron-clads were drifting helplessly down the river, and the others were so disabled that it was impossible to continue the action any longer. sorely against his will, the gallant commodore was compelled to withdraw from the unequal contest. it was grant's plan to take the fort by storm on the land side, as soon as the result of the naval combat warranted the step. as it failed, he was obliged to remain inactive. he feared to attempt to carry the place by assault with untrained troops, but he did not for a moment lose his confidence in the ultimate result. another night of freezing cold succeeded, and the snow and the sleet, in unison with the rebel guns, pelted the patriot host. the sufferings of the preceding night were repeated, and increased by the weakened condition of the men. grant felt for his suffering troops, but he seemed to be insensible to cold and fatigue himself, even after the long-continued strain of ceaseless action and sleepless nights upon his frame. at two o'clock on the morning of saturday he received a note from commodore foote, who was disabled by his wound, soliciting an interview with him on board of the flag-ship. before daylight grant visited the st. louis, and the flag-officer informed him that he should be compelled to return to cairo and refit his squadron, and suggested that grant should hold his line until the gunboats could return to his assistance. while this conference was in progress on board of the st. louis, the rebels massed their troops at the right of the union line, and made a tremendous sally upon the besiegers. the soldiers fought like tigers for hours in this unequal strife. all of mcclernand's division was hotly engaged. a brigade which had been posted on the extreme right, after bravely holding its ground against overwhelming odds, fell back after suffering terribly. mcclernand, sorely pressed, was hardly holding his ground, and sent to wallace in the centre for aid. messengers were hurried to the headquarters of general grant, but he was still on board of the flag-ship. wallace was afraid to weaken the centre without orders from his chief; but at last, when mcclernand declared that his flank was turned, and his whole division in peril of being cut to pieces, he marched to his assistance, drove back the rebels, and changed the fortunes of the day. in his turn wallace charged upon the rebel line; but he also was forced back, and it seemed as though the enemy had massed nearly his whole force on his left. the fighting was of the most determined and desperate character, but no decided result to either side ensued. the rebels were endeavoring to force their way through the union line, but they were defeated in their purpose, and the national troops still held their position. about nine o'clock, as grant was returning from his anxious conference with the naval commander, an aid gave him his first information of the furious assault which had been made upon his line. learning from general smith--who was in command of the left, and had not been engaged--the situation on the right, he ordered him to make instant preparations for an assault with his whole force. sudden and startling as the intelligence was to him, he was ready for the emergency, and before he had visited the scene of action his plan was formed. his splendid genius fathomed the truth, and he was prompt in his remedy. where other commanders in that trying moment would have summoned a council of war, he stood boldly up and confronted the difficulty alone. the gunboats had failed him, and there was no hope but in the army. leaving smith, he dashed on to the scene of the severest conflict. the rebels, disappointed in their attempt to break the union line, were slowly retiring. the prospect there was disheartening in the extreme. the raw troops, bravely as they had fought, were in disorder. the heavy loss of officers was severely felt, and confusion reigned in the ranks. the men were discouraged, and, in a measure, demoralized. it was grant's mission to inspire them anew, and to bring order out of confusion. it was reported to him that the rebels had come out with knapsacks and haversacks to continue the battle for an indefinite period. "are the haversacks filled?" asked grant; and, upon examination of some of the prisoners who had been taken, it was found that they were supplied with rations for three days. "they mean to cut their way out," added grant, "and have no idea of staying here to fight us. whichever party attacks first now will whip, and the rebels will have to be very quick if they beat us." thus grant rose above the presages of evil which surrounded him, and thus breathed new confidence into the sinking hearts of his troops. thus he put far from him the evil omens of the hour, and, by his vigorous measures and his personal presence, prepared to turn the discouraging circumstances which environed him into the channel of victory. the rebels appear to have comprehended the situation in front of them; for pillow was so confident they had cut a path through the national line, that he telegraphed to nashville, "on the honor of a soldier, the day is ours." he did not know what manner of man he was who commanded the national forces. chapter xiv. _wherein captain galligasken follows the illustrious soldier to the victory at fort donelson, and points out the nature and extent of that splendid achievement_. general grant, having reassured his men on the right, dashed off to the left again, where smith and his fresh troops were preparing for the assault. on their way he and his staff gladdened the hearts of the soldiers by declaring that the attempt of the rebels in the morning was not an ordinary sally; that they were becoming desperate, and desired only to cut their way through the line to a place of safety. at this stage of the battle, when a portion of the army was discouraged and disheartened, this was certainly a bold assumption, but it had an inspiring effect upon the men; they re-formed their lines, and moved towards the front. in the midst of these preparations grant sent a request to commodore foote to have all his gunboats appear before the enemy, declaring that a terrible conflict during his absence had demoralized a portion of his command. he added that, if the gunboats did not appear, the fact would encourage the enemy, and still further dishearten his own troops, and that he was obliged to order a charge "to save appearances." the naval commander complied with the request so far as he was able, and sent two of his squadrons up the river, where they demonstrated a little at long range. mcclernand and wallace were directed to renew the attack on the right as soon as smith charged upon the left. the latter, who had been accused of secession tendencies during his temporary unpopularity at paducah, had now an opportunity to set himself right before the country, and to overwhelm his defamers. he formed his line, and made one of the most impetuous and gallant charges recorded during the war. in front of him the rebel right had been reduced in force to mass the troops for the assault in the morning, and before the equilibrium could be restored, smith forced the enemy's line, and, in the face of a galling and destructive fire, made his way up the hill, over the intrenchments, gaining full possession of the key to the fort. on the right the troops of mcclernand and wallace, in spite of what they had suffered in the morning, behaved handsomely, and drove the rebels from the ground in front of them, regaining the guns which they had lost in the morning. but the greatest advantage derived from their heroic conduct was in keeping the enemy engaged, and thus preventing them from reënforcing their right, where smith was working out the real solution of the problem of capturing the fort. night closed upon the hard-fought battle-field before the day was won; but the advantage was clearly and decidedly with the national troops. smith still held the position he had won, and another half hour of daylight would have enabled him to carry the entire works. again the suffering soldiers bivouacked on the frozen ground, which they had so gallantly won from the enemy, spending the night in sleepless anxiety, for the desperate fortunes of the foe tempted him to reckless expedients. but the light of a brilliant victory was beginning to dawn upon them, and hope rendered the hours less heavy, the cold and weariness more endurable. grant, who had watched and waited through the long hours of the preceding night, without a moment of rest, and who, by night and by day, had been straining every nerve for a fortnight, slept a few hours in a negro cabin on the field, but ready at any instant to answer the summons to battle. within the rebel camp the results of the day's operations had carried dismay and despair. floyd, who was the chief in command, called together his officers for consultation. it was agreed that the situation was hopeless, and that escape or surrender was the only alternative. they discussed the feasibility of cutting their way out of the fort; but, as such a reckless movement would involve the loss of three fourths of the command, the more humane and prudent of this remarkable conclave decided that it should not be undertaken. the other alternative was surrender; but floyd, who had stolen the public property while holding his position of trust under the united states government, and dreaded a halter if captured, declined in his own person to be given up. he declared his intention to escape with the virginia troops he had brought with him, and he turned over the command to pillow, the next in rank. this gentleman decided to imitate the example of floyd, and passed it along to buckner. they had solved the problem to their own satisfaction, the two highest in command deserting their troops, and escaping by a steamer up the river. nothing better could have been expected of floyd, or even of pillow, and both of them were consistent with their treacherous natures. buckner was a gentleman and a soldier. after bravely defending his position to the best of his ability, he was obliged to surrender, and he performed the disagreeable duty like a man. buckner immediately sent a messenger to grant, asking for terms of surrender; but, while the negotiation was in progress, he permitted floyd and pillow to sneak off with about three thousand of the troops, amid the execrations of those who remained. grant was ready to renew the conflict when the white flag was raised on the battlements of the fort. buckner proposed an armistice till noon, which seemed to suggest a very complicated arrangement of details in regard to terms. in reply, grant wrote a very brief note, acknowledging the receipt of the rebel general's communication, and adding, "no terms except unconditional and immediate surrender can be accepted. i propose to move immediately upon your works." if general buckner had never been formally introduced to general grant, this little note would have been a full-length photograph of the man. the unfortunate rebel replied, accepting the terms, though not without taking occasion to protest against them as ungenerous and unchivalrous, and to remind the conqueror of "the brilliant success of the confederate arms yesterday." grant, with a generous regard for the feelings of buckner, hastened to the headquarters of the latter, at dover. the two generals had been companions at west point and in the old army, and grant displayed a tenderness for the sensitive nature of the defeated soldier which is highly creditable to him. he assured him he did not wish to subject him to any unnecessary mortification, but while all public property must be yielded up, the officers would be permitted to retain their side arms and their personal property. they breakfasted together and talked over the affair, thus happily ended for one, thus disastrously ended for the other. during the interview which followed, buckner alluded to the inferior force of his adversary at the commencement of the siege. "if i had been in command, you wouldn't have reached fort donelson so easily," said he, with a natural desire to explain the cause of his misfortune. "if you had been in command, i should have waited for reënforcements, and marched from fort henry in greater strength; for i knew that pillow would not come out of his works to fight, and i told my staff so, though i believed he would fight behind his works." grant knew not only the men upon his own side, but those on the other. he weighed and measured both floyd and pillow, and made his calculations accordingly. he did nothing in the dark, bold and daring as his movements were. he read human character with almost infallible accuracy, and it appears that his splendid victory at donelson was gained as much by his knowledge of the men whom he had to fight, as by his sudden and wonderful seizing of an advantage. he knew nothing of the obstinate battle which had been fought while he was on board of the gunboat, until he was informed of the fact after he came on shore. on the instant he ordered smith to prepare for an assault. he saw the weak point of the enemy, as well as the disordered state of his own right. here was his stroke of genius. in that he conquered, for the assault he ordered on the moment gave smith the key to the fortress. in this tremendous battle he exhibited the highest qualities of a man and a soldier, and showed that he was equal to any position to which he might be assigned. when the news of the fall of fort donelson reached washington, secretary stanton immediately recommended grant's promotion to the rank of major-general of volunteers. president lincoln nominated him to the senate on the same day, and he was instantly confirmed. the secretary of war seized eagerly upon the brilliant qualities of the man who had worked out this victory, and held him up to the admiration of the country, as he deserved to be held up, adding that "the true organization of victory, and military combination to end this war, were declared in a few words by general grant's message to general buckner: '_i propose to move immediately on your works_'" and the noble secretary clung to the successful general during the rest of the war. sixty-five guns and fifteen thousand prisoners were the spoils of war to the victor at fort donelson--a whole army of captives, such as the north had not known before. on the last day of the fight, grant had twenty-seven thousand men, and the rebels had above twenty-one thousand, so that the disparity in numbers between the combatants was by no means so great as that in position, which favored the rebels. as the steamers with the rebel prisoners were about to start for the ohio river, buckner, who was very proud of his soldiers, asked grant to go and see his own brigade. the victorious general accepted the invitation, and the prisoners crowded around him, respectfully but curiously anxious to see their captor. buckner informed them that grant had treated them very handsomely, and begged them, if ever the fortunes of war reversed the circumstances, to treat him, or any of his troops, as kindly and magnanimously as he had used them. grant has a large heart, which i have several times before indicated in mentioning his relations with his friends and benefactors. it is demonstrated even more forcibly in his generous conduct to his enemies, or, rather, the enemies of the loyal cause; for until envy and jealousy developed them, it does not appear that he had any others. the country rang with grant's praise. a new light had loomed up in the firmament of the war, and people hailed the glorious star. his initials now meant "unconditional surrender"--the only terms which he could offer to men in arms against their own country. the victory at donelson was the most important and the most suggestive one which had yet gladdened the loyal heart. it was regarded as the beginning of a new order of things; and well do i remember the confident prediction of one who weighed grant well, that he would yet be president of the united states. general halleck appears to have been a stumbling-block in the path of both grant and sherman. there was a dirty vein in his nature, which contrasts strongly with the generosity and magnanimity of the hero of fort donelson. while mccullum, halleck's chief of staff, congratulated him upon the splendid result of his "brilliant leadership," and others high in command followed his example, halleck himself sent no letter of commendation to the conqueror, but telegraphed to washington that "smith, by his coolness and bravery, when the battle was against us, turned the tide and carried the enemy's outworks. make him a major-general. you can't get a better one. honor _him_ for this victory, and the whole country will applaud." thus said halleck. buckner congratulated smith on his gallant charge, after the surrender. "yes, it was well done," he replied, "considering the smallness of the force that did it. no congratulations are due to me. i simply obeyed orders." thus said smith himself, with the ring of honor which swells the heart of a true soldier. the government practically decided that the victory belonged to general ulysses s. grant. he was promptly confirmed as a major-general, and "the whole country applauded." while the people rapturously shouted forth their joy at the signal success of our arms at forts henry and donelson, they hardly comprehended the magnificent results of these victories. the strong positions of the rebels at bowling green and columbus were flanked, and the enemy were compelled to evacuate them. the gibraltar of the west, strengthened with so much labor and expense, could no longer be held, and its garrison was transferred to island no. 10, down the river, leaving the mississippi open to the northern line of arkansas. the tennessee and cumberland rivers were also open, and the dreaded gunboats penetrated to the interior of the confederacy. nashville fell, and was speedily occupied by the national troops, while the rebel armies and the rebel legislature fled to safer localities. at this period in grant's eventful history, while he was beating down the rebel stronghold, general william t. sherman stepped prominently upon the stage. he had rendered efficient service to grant, as a subordinate of halleck, in urging forward reënforcements, and after the victory warmly congratulated him. grant replied in a feeling letter, in which he made use of this sentence, so characteristic of the man's motives: "_i care nothing for promotion so long as our arms are successful_, and no political appointments are made." they had been together one year at west point, sherman being graduated three years earlier than grant; but in their mutual sympathy, appreciation, and kindness at this trying period of the war, really commenced the friendship of these two remarkable men. before any brilliant lustre had been shed upon the name of either, they were united by a bond which no circumstances could weaken, and by an association so intimate and tender as to become the solace of each in the hour of adversity. it was certainly a poetical friendship, faithful and genuine, by which the nation, as well as the individuals themselves, have been benefited. chapter xv. _wherein captain galligasken follows the illustrious soldier through the period of his temporary disgrace and triumphant vindication to the opening scenes at shiloh._ the great strategic line of the rebels in the west had been broken; all its strong places had been taken or evacuated; and the network of railroads in kentucky and tennessee was in possession of the national troops. the new line of defence was along the railroad extending from memphis on the mississippi to charleston on the atlantic. as the rebels had fought for nashville at fort donelson, and lost it, so they indicated their intention to fight for memphis at island no. 10. it was of the utmost importance to the confederacy that the new line of defence should be held, in order to control one of the principal means of communication with the atlantic states, by which the army and the people were to be supplied with food. this line included several important railway junctions, from which roads extended down to new orleans and mobile. from chattanooga a road passed through eastern tennessee, then in possession of the rebels, to virginia, being the most direct route to richmond; and another went to atlanta, where lines diverged to the east, west, and south, by which all the southern and eastern cities of the confederacy were reached. the new defensive line was established, and strengthened with all the men and material which the resources of the confederacy would admit. the ablest and most experienced generals in its service were sent to the command of the rebel armies there. the presence of both albert sidney johnston and beauregard attested the importance with which the rebel leaders regarded this line; for, driven from it, another move to the south would drive them down to within two hundred miles of the gulf of mexico. this line had now become the objective point of the union generals in the west. on the day following the surrender of fort donelson, general grant issued his first order, taking command of the new military district of west tennessee, whose limits, however, were not defined in his appointment by general halleck. general smith, whom grant still regarded as his "right-hand man," and whom he had already strongly recommended for promotion to the rank of major general, was sent fifty miles up the cumberland, to occupy clarksville. the timid counsels of halleck restrained and annoyed the commander of the new district. his superior was constantly prating about the risk of a general battle, and urging extreme caution. general buell, in command of the department of the ohio, who had occupied bowling green, now moved forward and occupied nashville. as grant's district limits had not been defined, he visited nashville for the purpose of consulting buell in regard to this subject and the disposition of the troops of the two armies. in the mean time, by the order of general halleck, grant was engaged in organizing an expedition to go up the tennessee river, to attack the rebel line of defence, and cut the communications at corinth, mississippi--the junction of the mobile and ohio with the memphis and charleston railroads. while these preparations were in progress, halleck sent a growling complaint to washington, which i cannot help transcribing here, though more to show the excellent spirit of grant under the most terrible provocation, than to exhibit the littleness of halleck:-"i have had no communication with general grant for more than a week. he left his command without my authority, and went to nashville. his army seems to be as much demoralized by the victory of fort donelson as was that of the potomac by the defeat of bull run. it is hard to censure a successful general immediately after a victory; but i think he richly deserves it. i can get no returns, no reports, no information of any kind from him. satisfied with his victory, he sits down and enjoys it without any regard to the future. i am worn out and tired by this neglect and inefficiency. c.f. smith is almost the only officer equal to the emergency." grant seems to have been better satisfied with his victory than halleck was. up to this time grant had not received even a hint that his conduct was not approved by his superior, and it is doubtful whether halleck meant that he should know it until the crushing blow fell upon the head of the conqueror. his significant mention of general smith in his snarling, ill-natured communication to the general-in-chief at washington sufficiently indicates his purpose. the next day grant was ordered to place major general smith in command of the tennessee expedition, and remain at fort henry himself. he was shelved, and in disgrace! with this order came the first indication he had received of the cause of his superior's displeasure. "why do you not obey my orders to report strength and position of your command?" was the snapper at the end of the despatch. grant replied that the order should be obeyed; that he was not aware of having ever disobeyed an order from halleck's headquarters. he had certainly never intended such a thing. he had reported almost daily the condition and position of his troops. in conclusion, he declared that he would carry out all instructions to the extent of his ability. to this halleck replied, repeating some of the allegations of his letter to the general-in-chief, declaring that his going to nashville was a matter of very serious complaint at washington, and that he was advised to _arrest_ grant on his return! the hero defended himself from the charges, showing conclusively that he had performed his whole duty. he stated that he had done all he could to get returns of the strength of his command; that every move was reported daily to the chief of staff at st. louis; that he had averaged more than one letter a day since he left cairo; and that his visit to nashville was solely for the good of the service, not to gratify any desire of his own. "i have done my very best to obey orders, and to carry out the interests of the service," he wrote. "if my course is not satisfactory, remove me at once. _i do not wish in any way to impede the success of our arms._" in conclusion, he asked to be relieved from further duty in the department. halleck continued to pour in repeated rebukes and censures, and grant reiterated his application to be relieved. among other things, he alleged that grant had permitted marauding, in violation of the orders issued to prevent such irregularities. the general replied by referring his superior to his own orders to suppress marauding, and by pointing out to him the fact that he had arrested and sent to st. louis several officers for the offence indicated. grant was under a shadow, so far as his military superiors were concerned, though the people knew very little about the difficulty at the time. he was in disgrace. the man whom the loyal nation was lauding to the skies was actually tottering beneath the disapprobation of his commanding officer. halleck had based a portion of his severe censure upon an anonymous letter! he appears to have been too willing to take up a cause of complaint, though grant had bitter enemies in those who were jealous of his rising fame. it appears almost incredible that halleck, at such a time, when the hero's name was on every tongue, should have preferred his severe charges and uttered his galling reflections to the authorities at washington, without having previously investigated them, or even intimating to the subject of his displeasure that he was suspected of misconduct. it looks as though halleck, after the strong representations--or, rather, misrepresentations--he had made to washington, expected a peremptory order to remove grant, and appoint smith in his place. it seems, if this was his desire and anticipation, that he had been reckoning without his host. perhaps, if he had not been a timid man, he would have done the foul deed himself. instead of the order wished for came one of a different sort:- "headquarters of the army, } adjutant general's office, } washington, march 10, 1862.} "major general h.w. halleck, u.s.a., _commanding department of the mississippi_: "it has been reported that soon after the battle of fort donelson, brigadier general grant left his command without leave. by direction of the president, the secretary of war directs you to ascertain and report whether general grant left his command at any time without proper authority, and if so, for how long; whether he has made to you proper reports and returns of his forces; whether he has committed any acts which were unauthorized, or not in accordance with military subordination or propriety, and if so, what. l. thomas, _adjutant general_." it was evident that before grant could be sent into obscurity, even for a time, a searching investigation into the conduct of the culprit was to be had. the president and the secretary of war were not willing blindly to consign the hero of fort donelson to obloquy and disgrace. mr. stanton only a few days before had thrillingly defined the "organization of victory," as set forth in the words of grant; and he was not prepared to have the author of that electric sentence shoved out of the line of attack. he insisted upon knowing what wicked deeds grant had done, and halleck had permission only to "ascertain and report." he did "ascertain;" but as only five days intervene between the date of the order and that of his reply, it is not probable that he found it necessary to push his inquiries to any great extent. he did "report," as follows:- "headquarters, department of the mississippi,} st. louis, march 15, 1862.} "brigadier general l. thomas, _adjutant general of the army, washington_: "in accordance with your instructions of the 10th inst., i report that general grant and several officers of high rank in his command, immediately after the battle of fort donelson, went to nashville without my authority or knowledge. i am satisfied, however, from investigation, that general grant did this from good intentions, and from a desire to subserve the public interests. not being advised of general buell's movements, and learning that general buell had ordered smith's division of his (grant's) command to go to nashville, he deemed it his duty to go there in person. during the absence of general grant and a part of his general officers, numerous irregularities are said to have occurred at fort donelson. these were in violation of the orders issued by general grant before leaving, and probably, under the circumstances, were unavoidable. general grant has made the proper explanations, and has been directed to resume his command in the field; as he acted from a praiseworthy although mistaken zeal for the public service in going to nashville and leaving his command, i respectfully recommend that no further notice be taken of it. there never has been any want of military subordination on the part of general grant, and his failure to make returns of his forces has been explained, as resulting partly from the failure of colonels of regiments to report to him on their arrival, and partly from an interruption of telegraphic communication. all these irregularities have now been remedied. h.w. halleck, _major general_." but it did not take even five days for halleck to arrive at the conclusions set forth in this letter; for two days before its date he declined to relieve grant from his command. "instead of relieving you," he said, "i wish you, as soon as your new army is in the field, to assume the immediate command, and lead it on to new victories." he seems to have discovered, rather late in the day, that general smith was not "almost the only man equal to the emergency." during this unpleasant period, while he was in disgrace at fort henry, grant conducted himself with signal prudence and discretion. he was patient and submissive to authority. his replies, though sometimes sharp and strong, are always dignified and manly. he was even willing to be sacrificed for the good of the cause; and, while acting as a sort of adjutant general to his own subordinate in rank, he labored diligently in forwarding the preparations for the expedition up the river. though he had been virtually superseded by smith, he congratulated that officer upon his richly-deserved promotion, offering him every assistance in his power--conduct in strong contrast with that of others under analogous circumstances. general smith was the commandant at west point while grant was a cadet in that institution. the former pupil had felt a peculiar awe for his old commander, and acknowledged how unpleasant it was to give him an order. but smith, perceiving the embarrassment of his superior, explained his position with becoming delicacy. "i am a subordinate now, and i know a soldier's duty. i hope you will feel no awkwardness about our new relations." grant never had a more gallant or a more obedient officer, though he was sixty years of age. the exposure he underwent at donelson brought on the dysentery, and he died at the camp up the river. while grant was under the shadow of halleck's mighty displeasure, smith had gone up the river, and taken a position at pittsburg landing, only twenty miles from corinth, where the railroad from mobile connected with the memphis and charleston line. grant hastened to this place, and assumed the command of the forces. injustice and petty tyranny had not goaded him to a single act of disobedience, or tempted him to lay aside the noble dignity of his bearing. he had conquered in the moral battle which he fought with envy and malice, and returned to his command with the laurel of this victory on his brow. i see him now, dignified, but not triumphant, in his mien, manly and resolute as ever, but with no tinge of vanity in his looks, his words, or his manners. i see him now, as he received the hearty congratulations of the true and trusty soldiers who were too noble to be envious. he had endured a bitter trial, and the sympathy of a true friend, like sherman, was sweet to him. but not long could such a man as grant dally with private griefs or private joys. the cause he loved was still in peril. the rebels were straining every nerve to counteract the operations of the national army. at corinth they were gathering an overwhelming force to crush the army at pittsburg landing, and the restored commander could not waste a moment. promptly he examined into the condition of his forces, and within an hour after his arrival he issued orders for their immediate concentration, for they were scattered about at several localities in the vicinity. grant, though relieved from disgrace, was still tethered by the will of his tyrant at st. louis, who continually hampered him with instructions and prohibitions. his hands were tied; he was only a second in command. he was forbidden to do anything which should bring on a general battle, and was required merely to stand on the defensive. though he was too good a soldier to disobey his orders, either in the letter or in the spirit, he chafed under the restraint. he had views of his own which he desired to carry out. every day the strength of the enemy at corinth was increasing, and grant was not permitted to do anything until the arrival of buell, who was leisurely marching in that direction with forty thousand men. grant arrived at pittsburg landing march 17; but he established his headquarters at savannah, nine miles below, in order to superintend the organization of troops arriving from missouri, and because this point was more convenient for him to communicate with buell. he visited the army daily, and kept himself thoroughly acquainted with all the details of the camp. but a question of rank having been raised at the front, he decided, two days before the great battle, to remove his headquarters to pittsburg landing, in order to obviate the difficulty. as he was about to carry out his purpose, he received a message from buell, requesting him to remain at savannah, where he should arrive on the following day, april 4. it was of the utmost consequence that he should see the commander of the army of the cumberland at the earliest possible moment, for there had been frequent skirmishes along the line, and the period of actual operations could not be much longer delayed, even to please the autocrat at st. louis. grant, having made his arrangements to meet buell at savannah on the 6th of april, went up to the camp. he rode to the front with sherman, and both of them agreed that there was no danger of an immediate attack, though there had been a heavy reconnoissance by the enemy. as grant was riding back to the landing, his horse stumbled and fell, throwing his rider beneath him, and severely injuring him. he suffered great pain for several days, and was partially disabled for a week. on saturday, april 5, the cavalry of the rebels was very bold, but still it was not believed that a battle was imminent. the advance of buell's army, in command of nelson, arrived at savannah on this day, and was sent up the river by general grant, to a position five miles from pittsburg landing, on the other side of the tennessee, in readiness to reënforce the army at the front. grant was all ready to go to the scene of the expected battle, and only waited to keep his engagement with buell. chapter xvi. _wherein captain galligasken views the illustrious soldier in the battle of shiloh, and corrects some popular errors in regard to that savage fight._ in approaching the battle of shiloh, or pittsburg landing, i find myself coming to a point which envy, jealousy, and misrepresentation have battered against with the utmost fury. no action of the war has been so little understood, none so grossly misstated, none so thoroughly and maliciously criticised. it was one of the severest, if not the severest conflict of the whole war; but more doubt and uncertainty seem to hang over it than over any other event connected with the history of the national arms during the rebellion. there is no good reason that its facts should be so grossly perverted, nor that any of its details should be concealed, or apologized for. viewing general grant as the central figure in this tremendous conflict, every word he spoke was the right word, every movement he made was the right one. i find nothing in his conduct that needs to be excused, nothing to be explained, and nothing to be undone. as in every other battle of the war in which he was engaged, he was heroic, self-possessed, skilful, and, by his personal influence and exertions, saved the hard-fought field on the first day. i do not mean to say that no mistakes were made; only that grant did not make them. it is one of his crowning triumphs that he counteracted the errors of others, that he saved the army from the full consequences of the blunders, disobedience, and tardiness of subordinates, and of the partial demoralization among the raw troops. i am only surprised that we were not overwhelmed and driven into the tennessee, instead of holding the ground at the end of that awful fight, which began at daylight and continued until night. the national troops were posted on a line three miles in length, extending from a creek on the right to another on the left, each of which had overflowed its banks and effectually protected the flanks of the army. the union troops numbered at the beginning of the battle thirty-three thousand men. at crump's landing, four miles distant, was general lew wallace's division of five thousand more. the rebel troops were reported by beauregard to be over forty thousand; but there were some discrepancies in his statements which render it probable that he magnified the results of the first day by understating his force. the forward movement of the union army into the first heart of the confederacy had startled the rebel leaders, and they had decided to make a gigantic effort to overwhelm the daring invaders. for this purpose general a.s. johnston, the most accomplished soldier in the enemy's ranks, was sent to the scene of operations, with the most reliable troops in their army. beauregard, who, in spite of his sensational style, was a very able soldier, whose name carried a prestige no other rebel chief had won, was the leading spirit of the battle, while hardee, bragg, and polk, all educated military men, were in command of divisions. on the other side, only grant and sherman were trained soldiers. the confederacy was smarting under its overwhelming defeat at donelson. the boasted superiority of southern soldiers had been disproved, and, in addition to the necessity of saving the rebel cause from the disaster of having its railway communications severed, lost honor and lost prestige were to be recovered. never was an army more thoroughly stimulated to valor and desperation than that which was hurled upon the national lines at pittsburg landing. a stirring appeal had been issued by general johnston, in which he inflamed the zeal of the soldiers to the highest pitch, pointing out to them the bitter results of defeat, all of which were fully realized in the ultimate issue. everything which could rouse the men to desperation in the approaching fight was done with unsparing energy. thus goaded to madness by the hopes and fears of the future, the confident army of the mississippi marched out of corinth, under johnston, three days before the great battle. the union generals were on the alert, and during the three days that the armies confronted each other there was much heavy skirmishing. on the morning of sunday, the first day of the battle, prentiss, in the centre of the line, sent out a regiment at three o'clock to reconnoitre the position of the enemy. he had doubled his pickets on saturday, thus carefully guarding himself against the possibility of a surprise. on friday, the day on which he was injured by the fall of his horse, grant was at the front with sherman, to make sure that every preparation had been made to receive a sudden attack, though none was yet expected. at five o'clock in the morning the regiment prentiss had sent out engaged the advance pickets of the rebels, which beauregard declares was the commencement of the fight, when johnston gave orders to begin the movement. my excellent friend mr. pollard, in "the lost cause," says, "the magnificent army was moving forward to the deadly conflict; but the enemy"--the national troops--"scarcely gave time to discuss the question of attack, for soon after dawn he commenced a rapid fire on the confederate pickets." some envious, hypercritical union men made the astonishing discovery that sherman, the old soldier, who had been skirmishing for three days with the enemy, was surprised; but happily the rebels themselves have not found it out to this day. if ever an army was wide awake at an early hour in the morning, that army was grant's at shiloh. when the enemy came, they found the nationals in force at the camps, and in their advanced positions, and "in strong force along almost the entire line," according to their own acknowledgment. the onslaught was as fierce and terrible as the zeal of johnston's inflammatory appeal. the troops of prentiss were raw and inexperienced; they gave way, but formed again within their camp. sherman's troops were also new, and failed him in the critical moment, though it was hardly to be wondered at that any troops should yield before that impetuous assault of superior numbers. but the weak places in the line were strengthened, and the ground was doggedly disputed, after the recoil of the first tremendous shock. the battle raged with horrid fury along the entire line. grant himself was at savannah, in accordance with his engagement. he was taking an early breakfast with his staff in order to be in readiness to ride out and meet the commander of the army of the ohio. the scene of hostilities was nine miles distant, and the sound of the booming guns reached his anxious ears. he wrote a hasty note to buell, informing him that the battle had begun, and that, instead of meeting him, he must hasten up the river to join his forces. taking a steamer at the shore, he sped on his way to the scene of the strife, only stopping a moment at crump's landing, to leave his orders with general lew wallace, in anticipation of an emergency. hurrying on, he arrived at pittsburg landing at eight o'clock, and instantly dashed to the front, as fast as horse could carry him. the condition of the battle was not hopeful, but grant went to work with his accustomed zeal and energy. messages were sent to wallace and nelson to hasten forward their troops; wagon loads of ammunition were ordered up to the front, stragglers and panic-stricken files of men were reorganized, and every effort made to save the day. some six or eight thousand men were demoralized by the savageness of the conflict; but in spite of this mortifying fact, the line remained unbroken: indeed, only once during the day was it penetrated. thinned as it was by the misconduct of a fourth part of the troops, it still permitted no opening for the enemy. the contest had become a hand-to-hand fight, in which personal prowess and valor were to win the day. it was only a question of pluck and endurance. grant was everywhere, encouraging the faithful, and stimulating the recreant. anxiously did the hard-pressed line wait the coming of the expected reenforcements; but neither nelson nor wallace appeared in season to render any efficient service. step by step, inch by inch, the national line was forced back, until darkness suspended the conflict. johnston had fallen; beauregard was in command; and again and again did he hurl his forces against the union line: still it remained firm to the last, and still it held the battle-field in spite of the ground it had lost. my friend pollard almost curses beauregard for not striking the final blow in this sharp battle; but doubtless that distinguished rebel knew what he was about better than any civilian could teach him. he was fond enough of display and sensation to finish up the battle if it had been possible. he had found, after fighting the national forces from early dawn, what it was made of, and, with the remotest hope of driving the army of grant into the river, he would not have given the order to withdraw beyond the enemy's fire. though a portion of the army of the tennessee misbehaved before the enemy, it was not routed, nor, as an army, demoralized. technically, according to sherman, it had gained the victory: it had certainly repulsed the attack. it had not been driven into the river, and there was no thought of surrender. no transports were sent for; no attempt to bridge the river was made, in order to retreat and escape. the fiery zeal, the mad enthusiasm, of the confederates had carried them through one of the severest fights of the war. the advantage, but not the victory, was with them. it was a drawn battle. as the conflict was suspended, grant gave orders for his army to attack on the following morning. before buell's main army was heard from, even before nelson's division had crossed the river, he had decided to renew the fight at an early hour the next day, making the attack himself! it was wicked for my friend pollard to reproach his friend beauregard for not annihilating such a man; for not giving the finishing blow to an army which was at that moment making its calculations to attack with the next daylight. after dark, in the midst of a pelting storm, almost worn out by the heavy burdens of that day, and still suffering from the injuries he had received by the fall of his horse, grant went to the headquarters of each general of division, assigned to him his position, and gave him particular orders for the resumption of the battle at daylight. at midnight he had completed his rounds, and returned to the landing, where he lay down upon the soaked ground, with his head on a stump for a pillow, and slept soundly till morning. he was completely drenched with the rain, but he was confident of the victory on the morrow, and no discomfort was too great for him to endure in the holy cause in which he had embarked. while he slept, the two gunboats in the river kept up their fire over his head, throwing shells into the rebel lines. it is a popular idea that these gunboats saved the union army from total destruction; that without them the heroes of that hard-fought battle would have been obliged to surrender, or be driven into the river. the men saved and protected themselves by their strong right hands, though doubtless the gunboats rendered considerable assistance. even pollard, who generally has a proper respect for these terrible engines of war, says their fire was terrific in sound, but did no damage. a mile from the camp the wounded of the army lay in the agony of their suffering. nothing could be done for them, for they were within the enemy's line. the exhausted troops slept on their arms, pelted by the fierce tempest of the elements at night, as they had been by the bullets of a savage foe through all the long day. they were safe, or they could not have slept. most of them had performed miracles of valor, in strong contrast with the cowards who had fled. sherman had been wounded several times, and had three horses shot under him. he had fought his own division and that of an inexperienced general near him. his personal influence, backed up by his personal heroism, had kept the line firm and united under the fierce onslaughts of the enemy. grant commended him on the battle-field for his noble exertions, and there can be no doubt that, in the morning, sherman had saved the day. at half past four in the afternoon, after the conflict had been raging almost incessantly for twelve hours, it reached the culminating point of its fierceness. grant sat on his horse, calm, unmoved, and grand in his thoughtful silence. the cannon roared fearfully on the left, and seemed to be approaching nearer, as though the rebels were successful in their attempt to flank the entire position, so as to cut off the retreat of the nationals. "doesn't the prospect begin to look gloomy?" said an officer at his side, just as another was killed within a few feet of him. "not at all," replied grant, quietly. "they can't force our lines around these batteries to-night--it is too late. delay counts everything with us. tomorrow we shall attack them with fresh troops, and drive them, of course." during the night, buell's divisions arrived, were ferried over the river, and placed in line for the battle of the next day. it is almost a pity that it can never be known what grant would have done without these reënforcements, though, for my own part, i am entirely satisfied that the result would have been the same. i am quite sure that he had impressed himself upon his officers and men in such a manner as to win the victory by the plan he had laid down. his genius would have found a way to overcome all obstacles, for his will was as resolute at night as in the morning. after the battle, general buell, in a kindly way, indulged in some criticisms on grant's policy of fighting with the tennessee in his rear. "where could you have retreated if you had been beaten, general?" asked buell. "i didn't mean to be beaten," replied grant. "but suppose you had been beaten in spite of all your exertions." "well, there were all the transports to convey the remains of the command across the river." "but, general, your whole number of transports would not accommodate more than ten thousand men, and you had thirty thousand engaged," persisted buell. "well, if i had been beaten, transportation for ten thousand would have been abundant for all there would have been left of us." such was the spirit of the man in the midst of the gigantic difficulties which surrounded him. demoralized troops, the tardiness of his reënforcements, and the incapacity of some of his officers, failed to overwhelm him. he rose above all obstacles, and looked confidently to victory, even in the darkest hour of that desperate fight. it ought to be added, in justice to our army, that "straggling" was not confined to their ranks. the enemy suffered quite as much from this evil, in spite of johnston's stirring appeal. bragg, in his report, mentions the fact that the rebel ranks "were thinned by killed, wounded, and stragglers, amounting in the whole to nearly one half our force." the unparalleled length and severity of the contest may, to some extent, explain this defection on both sides. but the result of the day proved that, in pluck and endurance, the northern army was the equal, if not the superior, of its rival. chapter xvii. _wherein captain galligasken finishes the battle of shiloh, and sympathizes with the illustrious soldier in his unmerited disgrace while he is waiting, waiting, before corinth._ the rebels had no intimation of the arrival of buell's army, and though they had lost one half of their force in the battle of the first day, they stood their ground. if my innocent friend mr. pollard really believed that it only required a smart dash to finish the army of the union, he must severely censure beauregard for not following up his advantage, not knowing that buell had effected a junction with the army of the tennessee. if beauregard himself believed the sensational report he wrote of the battle, he would have made haste to drive his beaten foe into the river. he was an early riser on emergencies like this, but he does not seem to have had any fears that grant would attempt to escape in his alleged broken and helpless condition! the rebel general knew better than he wrote, and his actions speak louder than his words. he had lost half his army, according to his own confession, which was a much greater loss in proportion to the force engaged than the national army sustained. he had been repeatedly repulsed during the preceding day, and he was in no hurry to resume the conflict. the battle of monday commenced on the left and centre by the advance of nelson's fresh troops. the rebels fought well, notwithstanding the fatigues of the previous day, and gallantly disputed every inch of ground. the scene of sunday was repeated, with the results reversed. slowly and steadily the confederates were forced back, until all the lost ground had been recovered. general buell was in the field, and exhibited the most conspicuous gallantry and skill. at two o'clock in the afternoon the repulse of the rebels was complete, and they had been driven from the battle-field. before dark they were five miles from grant's front line on sunday morning. towards night a regiment of union troops was hard pressed by the enemy, in their efforts to capture a certain position which it was desirable to possess. the rebels, intent upon holding the point, had brought a heavy force to bear upon their assailants, and the regiment had begun to give way. grant saw the struggles of the overmatched union men, and deemed it of the highest importance to capture the position. an ohio regiment, marching across the field, attracted his attention. he immediately halted it, and, leading the way himself, ordered the men to charge in support of the overpowered force. they recognized grant, and shouting with enthusiasm, promptly obeyed the command. he led them into the battle himself, more exposed in person than any private in the ranks. the breaking line, seeing their general bringing assistance to them in this impressive manner, close up their files, and with thundering cheers the two regiments went into the fight, driving the enemy before them, and securing the last position on the field. the battle was ended, and the day was won. grant, desirous of fighting the battle "through," expressed his wishes to two of buell's division commanders; but they protested that their men were exhausted by their long march, and were in no condition to pursue the fleeing host, and grant was reluctantly compelled to content himself with the finale he had already achieved; though a portion of sherman's command followed the rebels a short distance on the road to corinth. the entire loss of the national army in this bloody fight, in killed, wounded, and missing, was twelve thousand two hundred and seventeen. this number included the loss in the army of the ohio. beauregard reported his total loss at ten thousand seven hundred; but he made a mistake in his footings somewhere. both he and bragg declare that the rebels could put only twenty thousand of the force they reported on sunday into the field for the second day's battle, which leaves a like number to be accounted for on the first day's engagement. his loss was heavy on the second day. he must have had at least fifteen thousand stragglers and deserters, according to his own statements, or his loss was much greater than he reported. according to general sherman, who ought to be regarded as the highest authority, the battle of shiloh was fought for _prestige_. the rebels had marched out of corinth, three days before, with the finest army they could gather, with the ablest and most experienced officers in their service in command, to overwhelm the "northern hordes." they had fought with a pluck and persistency, nay, with a savage ferocity, which certainly had not been equalled at that time, and has not since been surpassed. they were met with a correspondent obstinacy on the part of the national forces. "it was a contest for manhood," says sherman--"man to man, soldier to soldier. we fought and held our ground, and therefore counted ourselves victorious. from that time forward we had with us the prestige. the battle was worth millions and millions to us by reason of the fact of the courage displayed by the brave soldiers on that occasion; and from that time to this, i have not heard of the first want of courage on the part of our northern soldiers." thus said sherman; and what he said grant felt, as he showed in every movement he made. to have lost that battle would have been to lose vastly more than the field on which it was fought, and the attendant military advantages which it secured. the grand lesson which all our commanders had to learn was taught in this tremendous battle--that, where the two armies were so equally matched in the material of which their soldiers were composed, and in the military skill which their officers brought into the field, great victories were to be achieved only by hard fighting. i have often heard grant called a "butcher." i have often heard it revilingly said of him that he won his battles by mere brute force. on my honor and conscience as a soldier and a student of the solemn lessons of history, i believe that grant, in the matter of the expenditure of human life, was the most economical commander which the war of the rebellion produced. when he fought a battle, he won a victory from the very first to the very last. he did not waste a single precious life in all his campaigns. the manes of no slaughtered hero can rise up against him, saying, "you sacrificed me in a vain and foolish battle, wherein nothing was gained, but much was lost. by your timidity and weakness, by your vacillation and penny-wise wisdom, you gave that to the enemy for which i fought and died." not thus can the ghost of the murdered patriots reproach grant. if five thousand noble and brave men died to win shiloh and the prestige which lighted up our banners from that glorious day, they also died to save twenty thousand who would have been sacrificed in a more protracted struggle, without that inspiration of victory which blazed along the path of the army to vicksburg, to atlanta and chattanooga, and which was borne from the west to the east with the glorious hero who had kindled it in the souls of the soldiers. in giving up the lives of thousands of willing heroes he saved the lives of tens of thousands. this was true economy, and this was grant's policy, solemnly chosen, after a broad view of the situation and the fullest consideration of the awful responsibility which rests upon the commander of an army. i believe he covenanted with the nation, before god, wisely and prudently to expend the blessed lives placed in his keeping. he is a gentle and humane man, incapable of revelling in the flow of blood. i repeat emphatically that every life lost beneath his victorious banner was a life which purchased its share in the nation's redemption and peace. as i have said before, no battle has been more thoroughly misrepresented than that of shiloh. in spite of the heroic and masterly operations of grant, in spite of the success which crowned his arms, he was systematically vilified and abused. my blood boils with indignation as i think of it, that he, the brilliant soldier, the most successful commander even then upon the arena of battle, should be foully and basely maligned by his inferiors and his superiors. it is mortifying to think that his stanch friend, but former political opponent, mr. washburne, found it necessary to defend the hero of fort donelson and shiloh on the floor of congress, though it is pleasant to know that he did it effectually and enthusiastically--in just such a spirit as i would have done it had i been there. grant was accused of bad generalship, of incompetency, of being a butcher, a drunkard, and a sheep-stealer, for aught i know. his generalship was certainly of a different order from that which had been exhibited to the waiting nation by the commanders of the union, who marched, countermarched, felt of the enemy, and then retired to recruit for three or six months, rarely fighting a battle, unless compelled to do so by the pertinacity of the enemy. it was grant's policy to attack, and not wait to be attacked--his policy from the beginning to the end; and with what success it was attended is known now if it was not then. cowards and poltroons who had deserted the ranks at shiloh told exaggerated tales of the misfortunes of the battle. they were frightened and demoralized--grant was not. those who believed in carrying on war as a game of chess is played stood aghast at the real battle which the hero fought. but his mode of operations will appear so decidedly advantageous in contrast with that which immediately followed under the leadership of one who believed only in "brilliant strategy," in chess-board movements, that it is not necessary to dwell upon his defence. kid-glove critics, civilian correspondents of newspapers, and the advocates of the checker-board theory, howled because grant established his camp on the left, instead of the right, bank of the tennessee--on the same side as the enemy, instead of on the opposite side. certainly the eastern shore was the safe side; but the invincible conqueror went down in tennessee for the purpose of capturing corinth, and breaking the line of the rebel railroad communication, and he had no idea of posting himself where he could not get at the enemy. he knew very well that he was able to defend himself; and when he fought the great battle, though the enemy brought it on, he fought it for the possession of corinth; and if he had had his own way, he would have taken corinth within a fortnight after shiloh. the position was selected by general c.f. smith, the veteran soldier; it was indorsed and retained by grant; and the result fully justifies his course. the personal habits of the hero were maliciously stated to be bad. it was affirmed that he was a drunkard--that he was intoxicated in the field. mr. washburne was able to say at that time, "there is no more temperate man in the army than general grant. he never indulges in the use of intoxicating liquors at all. he is an example of courage, honor, fortitude, activity, temperance, and modesty; for he is as modest as he is brave and incorruptible." i have before shown that grant was not surprised--for if his army had been surprised, the fault would have been as justly chargeable to him as though he had been personally present on the ground. he had been to the front himself the night before and examined the situation; he had placed sherman--the tried and the true as he knew him then--in the most advanced position. grant himself says, "as to the talk of our being surprised, nothing could be more false. if the enemy had sent us word where and when they would attack, we could not have been better prepared." it was undeniable that the brave general, the successful commander, was again under a cloud. all the false rumors were in time disproved; but if there had been no malignant, jealous enemies, dreading a total eclipse of their own farthing candles in his department, the country would have believed in grant after shiloh, as they did after donelson. an effort was made to relieve him entirely from command, and to extinguish the star which was steadily rising. general halleck painfully went through the necessary form of thanking generals grant and buell for their conduct at shiloh, and immediately repaired to the scene of operations to take command of the united armies of grant and buell in person, now called "the grand army of the tennessee." it was largely reënforced, and numbered one hundred and twenty thousand men. it was divided into three corps, under thomas, pope, and buell, with mcclernand in the reserve. grant was nominally in command of the tennessee district; but his army was placed beyond his control, and orders were transmitted to his subordinates without any knowledge on his part of their purport. grant was second in command, without power or influence in the camp. halleck consoled him with a sarcastic bit of philosophy, declaring that the second in command, in case the chief was killed, ought not to be embarrassed with the immediate control of a body of troops. grant did not appreciate the situation, and evidently believed that there was no danger of his superior's falling in battle. the man who had won donelson and shiloh so heroically could not be winked entirely out of sight, or doubtless he would not have been permitted to retain even a complimentary position. grant was practically in disgrace, and was so regarded in the army. his situation was intensely disagreeable, and nothing but his unselfish devotion to the cause prevented him from retiring in disgust from the field where he was insultingly ignored. the grand army of the tennessee, under halleck, felt its way, behind a series of intrenchments, to a position in front of corinth, using up six weeks in a progress of fifteen miles. probably beauregard at corinth had seventy thousand men, though he stated his force as below fifty. the grand army was evidently superior in numbers, and both officers and men were anxious to strike a blow, confident of their ability to annihilate the rebel army. it made our blood boil to see these glorious opportunities slipping away from us. halleck only waited and waited for the rebels to come out and attack him; but beauregard had been educated up to the point of prudence by grant, and he stuck to his works as closely as halleck did. in a word, while grant was shelved as a second in command, the farce of manassas was repeated to the satisfaction of the admiring rebels, and to the disgust and mortification of the loyal people. but grant was not idle, cipher as he was in the army. he watched the enemy, and found, with unerring skill, the weak point in their line of intrenchments. he shared the general feeling of impatience which pervaded the army, and ventured to suggest to general halleck that an assault at the point indicated, followed up by a general movement, would be successful. halleck scouted the idea, and crustily told grant that when his suggestions were wanted, they would be called for. all this time beauregard was studying up a plan to escape without the knowledge of the besiegers. on the 30th of may, after the grand army had been nearly two months rusting in inactivity, the cunning rebel made a deceptive movement, and the mighty general, hoodwinked and deceived, deeming an attack imminent, drew up in line of battle his vast army, the largest ever gathered in the west, and made elaborate preparations to defend himself. but not a gun opened upon him, not a rebel was to be seen. beauregard, with wonderful skill and prudence, had fled from the toils of the overwhelming force on his front, leaving his wooden guns on the ramparts where they had confounded general halleck. corinth was evacuated, and the wily rebel had saved his army! general halleck marched in triumph into corinth! chapter xviii. _wherein captain galligasken treats of the corinth campaign, and admiringly calls attention to the splendid abilities of the illustrious soldier as a district commander._ during the quiet repose of the grand army of the tennessee before corinth, events of vast importance had transpired in the west and south. island no. 10 had been captured by the indomitable flag-officer foote; new orleans had been taken by the tremendous operations of farragut. in the east, fort pulaski had been battered down, fredericksburg captured; fort macon had fallen, following burnside's success in north carolina; and huntsville, alabama, was occupied by general mitchell. mcclellan had at last commenced a hopeful forward movement with the army of the potomac. with vast armies in the east and in the west, with strong naval forces ascending and descending the mississippi towards its obstructed points, the national cause looked exceedingly promising as the summer of 1862 opened. but the promise was not realized. the summer sun glared on many a lost battle in the east, though the conquest was uninterrupted in the west. halleck made no efficient pursuit of the enemy after they had abandoned corinth. beauregard had been successfully hiding his weakness from his prudent checker-board adversary, and, understanding his man, outwitted him completely and handsomely. grant had fought and won corinth, whether it was occupied in a week or in two months. he had taught the vaunting rebels a lesson by which halleck was too willing to profit, as he peacefully pursued his siege operations till the 1st of june. buell was a prudent man, and he was sent out to catch the retreating and demoralized foe. pope had been despatched on the same errand; but their united forces accomplished nothing. during this time, grant remained at corinth. the grand army was then broken up, and buell sent in the direction of chattanooga. from shiloh the vast army marched up the hill and then marched down again, in humble imitation of the king of france in the nursery rhyme. nothing was done except what grant had accomplished. by the continued successes of the flotilla on the mississippi, memphis, after a brilliant naval engagement, fell into the hands of the union force. grant, as the commander of the tennessee district, established his headquarters at this city. pope was ordered to virginia, to supersede fremont, where he established his celebrated "headquarters in the saddle." mcclellan had gradually felt his way down to the vicinity of richmond, when the rebels, out of patience with him, fell upon his forces, and drove him to the shelter of the gunboats on the james, after his glorious army had fought some of the most brilliant defensive battles of the war. the country cried out against him for this delay, derided his use of the pick and shovel, and unhorsed him because he neglected his opportunities. while he was still resting from his hard-fought but useless battles, the government removed him from his position of general-in-chief, and assigned general halleck to his place, probably on account of his brilliant operations before corinth, where he had played through the farce of "regular approaches," though with none of the tragic features which attended it before richmond. halleck was now in power, and one of his first acts, even before he left for washington, was to offer the command of the army of the tennessee to colonel allen, a quartermaster. this gentleman, who was to be promoted to the required rank, to enable him to accept the command, had the good sense to decline it, and grant was permitted to retain his position. he was deprived of nearly his entire force, and left to maintain a defensive position. he made his headquarters at corinth, protecting the railroad communications, and holding what had before been gained. he spent the summer in this manner, though with enough to do to keep him busy, for he was continually harassed and threatened by the enemy under van dorn and price. halleck, in his new capacity of general-in-chief, had his hands full in attending to mcclellan and pope. grant seems to have been forgotten, and was thereby permitted to manage the affairs of his district without being hampered with instructions. the north was in danger of invasion in maryland, rendered possible by the disastrous battles of pope, and in ohio by the rebel army under general bragg, who had out-generaled the prudent and deliberate buell. in these emergencies, grant's men were taken from him, till the smallness of his force afforded even him no little anxiety. van dorn, in command of the rebels in this section, ordered price to seize iuka, which was done. van dorn himself was four days' march to the south-west, threatening corinth. grant wished to overwhelm price at iuka, without exposing corinth to capture by van dorn. he sent out two columns, one under rosecrans and the other under ord, to accomplish this purpose. a sharp battle followed, but the intention to capture price's army failed, on account of a delay of one of the columns in reaching the point of attack. the rebels escaped, and effected a junction with van dorn. placing rosecrans in command of corinth, grant established his headquarters at jackson, tennessee, where he could better control the affairs of his district. on the 2d of october, the rebels united all their forces in this vicinity, and attacked corinth, making a good fight, and gaining decided advantages; but in the end they were defeated, and the place saved. the force of the enemy was double that of rosecrans, who behaved with distinguished gallantry. the defensive works which had been erected under grant's direction proved to be of immense service, and showed that the general who had been severely criticised for neglecting them before knew when and where to use them--knew when they were necessary, and where they were a hinderance. grant had marked out this campaign himself; and though the battle of corinth had been fought, and the rebels defeated, there was to be a sequel to the affair. reading the intention of the foe to attack his strong place, he sent mcpherson with a brigade to the assistance of rosecrans; but he arrived only in season to witness the conclusion of the fight, being obliged to make a detour in order to effect his junction. grant, with his usual confidence in the success of his combinations, had also sent generals ord and hurlbut, each with a brigade, to punish still further the audacious foe in his retreat. he had notified rosecrans of his plan, and directed him to follow up the retreating enemy vigorously, as well to insure his complete discomfiture, as to save either ord or hurlbut from being separately overwhelmed by a superior force. but these two commanders had joined their brigades, and ord posted the whole so as to cover a bridge on the hatchie river. van dorn's column pushed on, and its advance crossed the bridge, when ord's force attacked vigorously, and immediately routed it. a battery of artillery and several hundred men were captured, and the advance scattered, many of the rebels being drowned in their attempt to cross the river. ord held the bridge, but had not strength enough to attack the entire rebel army, which he compelled to retrace its steps, and seek another bridge six miles distant. unfortunately, ord was wounded in the conflict, and hurlbut, who succeeded to the command, did not deem it prudent even to harass the fleeing rebels in the rear or on the flanks. rosecrans permitted his men, weary after their two days' hard fight, to rest till the next morning, when he started to obey grant's order. then he mistook his road, marched eight miles in the wrong direction, but he corrected his error, and marched towards the hatchie. he was behind time, having disregarded the order of grant to march the day before, arriving at the bridge, where the rebels had crossed, just as the rear-guard was going over. had he obeyed his orders, he would have fallen on van dorn's rear, while his front was engaged with ord; and nothing could have saved the rebel army from total destruction. grant decided that the favorable moment had passed, and he ordered rosecrans back to his post. these movements relieved west tennessee from any further peril at the present time. the rebels had been whipped at iuka, at corinth, and at the hatchie. all these movements and all these victories were achieved under the direction of grant. the success of these operations was gratifying, though not all it would have been if the general had selected his own subordinates, as he did subsequently in a wider sphere. if grant had any fault as a soldier in the field, it was the result of the amiability of his character, which prompted him to save the feelings of others, even at the expense of his own reputation. he was not always obeyed, because he was not a stormy and demonstrative man, because he did not bluster and put on airs. there was nothing personally imposing or grand in him, and the officers of the army estimated him too low--so low that some of them evaded his orders. but grant could be terribly severe, terribly just, when the emergencies of the service demanded, when his devotion to the glorious cause he had espoused required it. during his brief sojourn in memphis, which was the very hotbed of treason and treachery, he breathed the spirit of loyalty to the government into the souls of the rebels, who did not scruple to carry on war by divers underhand methods within the still hostile city. no letters not examined by the provost marshal could be carried out of town without subjecting the offender to arrest. arms and ammunition were prohibited from being taken out of the city, or carried within it, on severe penalty. as these orders failed to suppress the illicit traffic with foes outside of the lines, all passes were refused, except to such as took the oath of allegiance, or parole. as confederate officers and soldiers found opportunities to communicate with their families in memphis, thereby obtaining important military information, the families of all such were banished beyond the lines. this order included the connections of other specified persons in the confederate government, and there was not much room left for rebel sympathizers to operate. as a check upon guerrillas, who were doing much mischief, grant authorized reprisals upon the personal property of those in the vicinity who were in sympathy with the rebellion, to an extent sufficient to remunerate the government for all losses by their depredations. a bitter partisan organ, the memphis avalanche, which published incendiary and treasonable articles, was promptly suppressed. he took possession of unoccupied premises belonging to persons absent and in arms against the government, rented them, and paid the proceeds into the treasury of the united states. for the benefit of the fugitive negroes, who crowded into his lines, he issued humane and just orders, particularly defining the manner in which they should be employed and paid. persons from the south who were willing to bluster, but not to fight, for the confederacy, and hastened to memphis to escape the remorseless rebel conscription, were made liable to draft. in dealing with the troops under his own command, grant was just and humane; but "bumming" and marauding on private account were prohibited. when the soldiers, in some instances, disobeyed the strict orders on this subject, the value of property taken or destroyed by them was charged to the account of their regiment, and deducted from their pay, if the offenders could not be discovered. in dealing with civil affairs, in the multitudinous details which come within the scope of a department commander, he displayed a decided talent and ability to adjust the most difficult matters. he always knew where he was, and what to do. for every difficulty he had a remedy; for every infraction of law or discipline he had a check. in the management of the trying affairs of a military district, which has so frequently proved to be the severest demand upon the wisdom, skill, and patience of the soldier holding it under martial law, he displayed the highest order of ability. his judgment, tact, and discretion would have been more than creditable in one who had spent a lifetime in the study and practice of the principles of political economy, or who had served a long apprenticeship as a magistrate. without being a politician, he was a statesman. but grant had hardly made his mark yet, and, except as the hero of donelson and shiloh, he was scarcely known to the country, before which he was soon to stand as the foremost man of his time. i watched grant at memphis, i watched him at corinth and at jackson, as he controlled the difficult details of his department, kept the rebel civilians in subjection, and directed his forces to certain conquest, and i would rather have been ulysses s. grant than my illustrious ancestor sir bernard galligasken, whose knightly prowess and whose glittering title had early tickled my imagination. even then i loved the man, and almost adored him, as i realized that a brilliant destiny was in store for him. as far back as may, 1862, when mcclellan had only proved that he was great as the organizer of an army,--and it must be conceded that he has not since proved any more than this,--my excellent friend mr. washburne, in his noble speech in congress, deemed it expedient to use these remarkable words: "let no gentleman have any fears of general grant. _he is no candidate for the presidency._" surely with only the lustre of donelson and shiloh reflected upon him, he never thought of aspiring to that magnificent position. why was it necessary, when the illustrious soldier had only taken a couple of steps towards fame, to make this astounding declaration? was it seen even then that he was a probable or a possible candidate in the future? the noble-minded and patriotic representative made this declaration to save grant from the persecution of the wire-pullers, whose friends, the possible candidates, would be damaged by the appearance of a new aspirant, who, with a fitness for the office, added thereto the merit of availability. it was well for the politicians to take the bull by the horns, but they might as well attempt to nullify the laws of nature as to defeat the will of the people. grant had then no thought of being president. his modesty, if nothing else, would have forbidden the aspiration. he was a pure patriot then, as he is now; and the only consideration with him was to suppress the rebellion. he never "pulled the wires," even for a brigadier's commission, which was not above the ambition of thousands of fourth-rate politicians. he was ready to serve the country in any capacity, obeyed his orders, and quietly submitted to disgrace and insult for the good of the cause. the people are not blind. they see and know their man. chapter xix. _wherein captain galligasken shows how six months were spent around vicksburg by the illustrious soldier, and how the president rather liked the man, and thought he would try him a little longer._ the second line of rebel defences had been broken. memphis, corinth, and the towns on the tennessee river, in northern alabama, connecting links in the chain, were in possession of the national forces. but buell had failed in his expedition to east tennessee. he had made no impression upon chattanooga; he had been beaten at perrysville, and had been superseded by rosecrans. after the departure of general halleck from the west to act as general-in-chief, grant was left virtually in charge of the department of the tennessee, and discharged all the duties of that important position. on the 16th of october, 1862, he was formally assigned to the command, and near the close of the month issued his order to that effect, and defined the limits of his jurisdiction. very soon after, he proposed to halleck to commence a movement upon vicksburg; and this was the first mention which had been made by either of them of this important point. but grant meekly and modestly added that he was ready to do with all his might whatever his superior, should order, and _without criticism_, which, i humbly submit, was a magnificent position for a man of his enlarged and comprehensive views to take, for most of our generals believed they were nothing unless they were critical. he was a grand exception, and we do not, in a single instance, outside of the line of his duty, find him analyzing and carping at the operations of others. vicksburg was now the objective point, for halleck gave the commander of the department of the tennessee full power and permission to carry out his own plans and purposes in his own way. from this time there was no clashing between the two generals. they heartily supported each other, as grant had always been willing to do, and halleck afforded him every assistance and encouragement in his power. it is possible that he had received a new revelation in regard to the abilities of the hero of donelson and shiloh; that grant's exhibition of his skill in constructing earthworks at corinth had won the heart of the general-in-chief, or that his handsome strategic movements in the operations which had included iuka, corinth, and the hatchie had demonstrated the fact that he was not a mere bull-dog thirsting for blood, and without any perception of military tact and skill. it was rather late for halleck to learn this; but to his honor and glory let it be said, that he no longer permitted himself to be a stumbling-block in the path of his subordinate; that he fairly and squarely sustained him in his grand enterprises. from the beginning of the war the confederacy had been fully alive to the vital importance of the mississippi river. from columbus to the gulf it had been fortified and protected by every means which the skill and resources of the south could afford. forts jackson and st. philip guarded its lower part, and covered new orleans; though these were nullified by the daring of farragut, and the city fell early in the war. but there were half a dozen other "gibraltars" on its long line--columbus, island no. 10, fort pillow, memphis, vicksburg, and port hudson. foote had used up island no. 10, after the rebels were compelled to evacuate columbus. fort pillow and memphis had yielded before the persuasive force of the naval squadron, and only vicksburg and port hudson were left to dispute the passage of the great river. between these two points the enemy, depending almost wholly upon texas for its supplies of cattle, ferried them over, and by the line of railroads from vicksburg to charleston, not yet approached by the national arms, were enabled still to send food to all their armies in the east and south. bold farragut had passed the batteries at port hudson with his squadron, and sailed up to vicksburg, more than five hundred miles from the gulf. here he had bombarded the strong works which protected the city; but as they were planted on high bluffs, all the advantage was in favor of the enemy, and the result was not a success. the troops which accompanied him under general williams attempted to open the canal, which was to form a new bed for the river, and enable the fleet to pass the city. but this scheme also failed, and though a part of the squadron ran the gantlet of the batteries, and joined the naval force above the city, the expedition was obliged to return to new orleans to escape the diseases incident to the climate. about the 1st of november grant initiated his movement in the direction of vicksburg. commencing on the line of defence which had just been wrested from the rebels, there was a railroad extending from memphis to grenada. fifty miles east of memphis, from near la grange, on the railroad extending east and west, was another line to the south--the mississippi central--which also went to grenada, where the two roads meeting extended to jackson, forty miles east of vicksburg, and thence to new orleans. both of these roads crossed the tallahatchie river, a branch of the yazoo, which flowed into the mississippi a few miles above vicksburg. grant's plan was to move down upon these lines of railway, depending upon them in his rear for supplies. pemberton, who was in command of vicksburg and the forces which were covering it in the state of mississippi, was holding the railroad, and made the tallahatchie river his line of defence. on the 4th of november, grant took possession of la grange, near the central railroad, driving the confederate advance to holly springs, about twenty miles farther south. while grant moved in this direction, sherman started from memphis, and another force was moved out from helena to coöperate with him. grant proceeded on the railroad, captured holly springs, and made it his depot of supplies, placing it in charge of colonel murphy. continuing on his victorious path, the enemy abandoned abbeville, and the line of the tallahatchie, without a battle, and were finally driven into grenada, with the yallabusha river as their line of defence. here the commander proposed to hold the rebels, and send an army from memphis to make the direct attack upon vicksburg. for this purpose sherman was sent back, with directions to organize the expedition, and procure the coöperation of the squadron under admiral porter. sherman executed his orders with his usual decision. with one hundred and twenty-seven steamers, and a flotilla of gunboats for his protection, he went down the river, and debarked his force at johnston's landing, near the mouth of the yazoo. in the mean time, van dorn fell upon holly springs, surprised the garrison, and captured the place, with all the supplies which had been accumulated for the support of the advancing army. colonel murphy, in command, made no resistance whatever. by this sad and unexpected blow, inflicted by the imbecility or treachery of a single officer, the entire plan of the campaign was defeated. grant, with his army, was in the heart of the enemy's country. his communications were cut in several places behind him; his base of supplies was lost, and his stores destroyed. the success of the experiment of subsisting upon the enemy had not been demonstrated then, and sorely chagrined and disappointed, the progressive general was obliged to retrace his steps. it was a bitter day to him. murphy was promptly dismissed from the army, without even the formality of a court martial. sherman, having no knowledge of the disaster which had crippled grant, attacked the enemy's positions, and gained some advantages; but the rebels were reënforced by the withdrawal of the army in the rear of vicksburg, and he reëmbarked his forces, abandoning the attempt. at this point general mcclernand appeared, and superseded sherman, who then took command of one of the corps of the army of the mississippi, as it was from that time designated. the great bugbear of grant's military existence, "a political general," was thrown into his path, and though this act of the president sorely grieved him, he made the best of the circumstances. his grand calculation had failed through the dastardly cowardice and imbecility of murphy; but grant was still serene in his disappointment, as he was in his triumphs, and immediately set himself at work to "fick it again". he was conscious of the magnitude of the enterprise he had undertaken, and of the difficulties which lay in his path. after all the minor "gibraltars" had melted away before the victorious arms of the union, jeff. davis declared that vicksburg was _the_ gibraltar of the mississippi. so thoroughly had it been fortified, with battery behind battery, with every conceivable approach guarded, with the heights for miles around the city bristling with guns, the president of the southern confederacy was perfectly confident that the place was invulnerable. above and below the city the country was intersected with bayous, lakes, and rivers, and the land so low that it hardly afforded a foothold for an army. every rood of high ground in the vicinity was occupied by the rebels, and covered with defensive works. grant knew all this, and he made up his mind to capture vicksburg. frowning heights studded with guns, fortifications overrunning with obstinate soldiers, swamps and morasses, could not deter him. "i cannot tell exactly when i shall take vicksburg," he said, "but i mean to stay here till i do, if it takes thirty years." this was the spirit of the man. he had actually begun the job, and he was determined to carry it through. towards the close of the year 1862 he issued orders for the reorganization of his army, having matured the system himself. on the 1st of january, 1863, the president issued the emancipation proclamation, taking that greatest and most decisive step of the war. it was contrary to grant's political antecedents, but he gave the measure his hearty support. many generals did otherwise, and opposed in spirit, if not in fact, the policy of the government in using negro troops. grant issued an order in relation to this subject, directing his subordinates to afford every facility for the organization of negro regiments, requesting them "especially to exert themselves in carrying out the policy of the administration, not only in organizing colored regiments and rendering them efficient, but also in removing prejudice against them." grant's force in the department of the tennessee, in january, was one hundred and thirty thousand men. fifty thousand of these he sent down the river into camp at milliken's bend and at young's point. admiral porter coöperated with him, having a fleet of sixty vessels of all classes. on the 29th of january he arrived at young's point himself, and assumed the control of operations against vicksburg, in spite of a protest on the part of mcclernand, who gave grant a great deal of trouble in one way and another. grant was then face to face with the great problem of the day, the solution of which would cut the confederacy in two, and separate the east from the cattle plains of texas, from which its armies were fed. no point was accessible from which he could operate. there was not the remotest possibility of making a successful attack in front of the city. the point was to reach a position in the rear of the place, where there was standing room to conduct siege operations. the country was flooded with water, and the troops were frequently inundated in their camps. the perils and difficulties of the gigantic enterprise were patent to all; but the troops were mostly veterans, and they worked with zeal and patience. the president had considerable confidence in the vicksburg canal, and, though grant had but little hope of its success, or little confidence in its value if completed,--as the lower end of it was covered by rebel batteries,--he labored patiently upon it for two months. his next plan was to flank the water communications of vicksburg by a navigable course by lake providence, through a series of bayous and rivers, to the wachita, and thence to the red river, by which a passage could be obtained for light steamers to the mississippi, four hundred miles below. it was an immense undertaking, which nothing but american enterprise would have considered, but which american enterprise would have accomplished if it had been possible. it was not possible, and the plan was abandoned. a similar attempt was made on the east side of the mississippi, but rather as a means of entering the yazoo to destroy the rebel steamers which had gathered there, and to break up gunboats in process of construction on its shores. there had formerly been a steamboat route through moon lake, yazoo pass, the coldwater and tallahatchie rivers, to the yazoo; but as the influx of water from the great river above inundated the whole region annually, a strong levee had been built by the state to protect the country, and the passage was thus closed. this levee was cut through, and after the most incredible exertions in removing obstructions placed in the stream by the rebels, and cutting an opening through the overhanging branches, a fleet of light gunboats and transports penetrated to the yallabusha, where its farther progress was interrupted by a battery called fort pemberton, which could neither be battered down nor drowned out. with difficulty the expedition was extricated from its perilous position, and though grant had entertained a hope from its first success that he should be able to transport his troops and supplies by this route to the rear of vicksburg, he was compelled to abandon the idea. still another attempt was made to secure the position by entering the yazoo, which our gunboats held near its mouth, passing through steele's bayou and several streams into the big sunflower, and thence into the yazoo again. this attempt was made in conjunction with the yazoo pass movement, and while general ross, in command of the military expedition connected with it, was shut up in the swamp. general grant gave his personal attention to these enterprises; but all of them were impracticable in their nature, and had to be abandoned. all the troops and vessels were brought off in safety; and if nothing was gained, nothing was lost, even in time, for the country was so flooded with water, that operations, except in boats, were difficult, if not impossible. the nation had been watching these experiments with intense interest. when they failed the people began to be impatient. demands were made for the removal of general grant from his command. again was he accused of incompetency, of drunkenness. not a success of any importance had been obtained for the national cause since his own victories at iuka and corinth. even the president appeared to be dissatisfied, and grant knew that he was in imminent peril of being displaced. some of his best friends deserted him, and one of them voluntarily demanded his removal; but the president replied, "i rather like the man. i think we'll try him a little longer." but grant was still confident of ultimate success; he was approaching the mighty idea by which vicksburg was to be brought down. chapter xx. _wherein captain galligasken illustrates the temperance principles of the illustrious soldier, and proceeds with him on his conquering path to the capital of mississippi._ i do not account it a great misfortune to the country, certainly not to grant himself, that canal and side routes had failed; for success by any of them could hardly have been achieved any sooner than by the brilliant scheme finally adopted. but the people complained, the great generals complained, the president complained. there was a general murmur against grant, and influence enough was brought to bear against him to have overwhelmed any common man. i pause in astonishment and wonder when i think that he did not turn in disgust from the grand enterprise. the people, the generals, the politicians were maligning him; even the good and patient president was dissatisfied, and put him on probation, rather than strengthened public confidence in him. halleck, as generous now as he had been cynical before, mildly expressed his confidence that grant would do all that was possible to open the mississippi. even the rebels, satisfied with the strength of their gibraltar, contemptuously dared their persistent foe, and derided him for his failures. they jeeringly hoped he would not attempt to disturb the natural features of the globe. but grant said never a word in his own defence; he only kept his eye on the prize, and declared that he would yet take vicksburg. he smoked his cigar, studied his maps, listened to the reports of spies and others who brought him information; but he deigned not a word of reply to the slanders in the newspaper, or to those which were carried to the ears of men in power. he neither authorized nor permitted any of his friends to speak for him. he knew that truth was mighty, and must prevail; and confident of the rectitude of his own motives, of the purity of his own life, he could afford to let results, rather than windy harangues, approve him and his conduct before the country. i marvel that he was not overwhelmed, when i consider the weight of influence brought to bear against him; that he had the moral courage to stand up before that storm of obloquy and complaint. i cannot help adducing a few of the evil traditions of the day, to show how cruelly he was abused. a lady in memphis lamented the drunken habits of general grant, declaring that she had seen him carousing with two boon companions, so tipsy that he was obliged to steady himself by holding on to a chair; that when he spoke to her, in answer to her petition, his speech was thick and incoherent! she added that the general was ashamed to see her the next day, and sent his surgeon to attend to her business. a gentleman who listened to her statements immediately informed her that, as one of the "boon companions" to whom she alluded, he had dined with the general that day, had spent three hours in his presence, and was with him when she entered. he was confident that grant had drank nothing stronger than mississippi water, and that he was perfectly sober and clear-headed during the interview. a letter from a respectable and reliable union man in the west was sent to a newspaper office for publication, alleging that, on a certain occasion, general grant and his staff went from cairo to springfield in the special car of the president of the illinois central railroad, that on the way all the party got drunk, and grant was the drunkest of all. it so happened that the president alluded to was present in the office when the letter was received. he promptly pronounced it a malignant falsehood. he had taken charge of the party himself, and provided the special car, because it contained conveniences for eating, sleeping, and working. dinner was provided, and wine was served for such as used it, but grant drank tea only; to his certain knowledge, he tasted no wine or liquor, and nobody was drunk on the car. grant, in the winter following the corinth campaign, worn out with watching, anxiety, and continued activity, lay sick at a hotel in memphis. his wife was with him, and was much concerned about the state of his health. one morning she joined the ladies in the parlor, seeming very much depressed. she said the surgeon had just been to see mr. grant, as she called him, and declared that he would not be able to go much farther if the patient did not stimulate. "and i cannot persuade him to do so," she added. "he says he shall not die, and will not taste a drop of liquor on any consideration." in less than a week he was on his way to vicksburg. on board of the headquarters boat at milliken's bend, grant was studying his maps and plans in the ladies' cabin, wholly absorbed in the mighty thought of planning a campaign. he heeded nothing that transpired around him, and no one ventured to interrupt him. for hours he sat in this thoughtful mood, and his friends feared that his mental labors would overwhelm his physical frame. mcpherson at last had the temerity to speak to him, and presenting a glass of whiskey, invited him to join the party in a few toasts, to shake off the burden upon his mind. "mac, you know that your whiskey will not help me to think," he replied, looking up with a smile. "give me half a dozen of the best cigars you can find, and if the ladies will excuse me for smoking, i think by the time i have finished them, i shall have this job pretty nearly planned." he continued his labor; the lines on his face deepened again; the company left him smoking and brooding over his maps and plans; but not a drop of liquor passed his lips. "i have some fine brandy on the boat," said a gentleman to him during the operations at vicksburg, when grant seemed to be exhausted by his cares and his labors; "i will send you a case or two of it." "i am greatly obliged to you," replied the general; "but i do not use the article. i have a big job on hand, and though i know i shall win, i know i must do it with a cool head. send the liquor you intend for me to my hospital in the rear. i don't think a little will hurt the poor fellows down there." none for himself, strained in mind and muscle by cares and toils that would have overcome any other man; but a blessed thought for the poor wounded ones whom he had led to victory over the couch of pain and death! at a celebration of washington's birthday before vicksburg, the company, of whom grant was one, indulged freely in champagne, drinking patriotic toasts, suggested by the day. the general pushed aside a glass of the sparkling beverage intended for his use, and took up a glass of mississippi water. "this suits the matter in hand," said he, glancing at the opaque fluid in the glass. "drink this toast: god gave us lincoln and liberty: let us fight for both." president lincoln quaintly hinted his disbelief in the popular rumors of grant's intemperance, when, after the battle of shiloh, he said, "i wish all our generals would drink grant's whiskey." before vicksburg grant stood alone. the government and the people were more than doubtful of the result. mcclernand, hunter, fremont, and mcclellan were mentioned as his successors. senators and representatives urged grant's removal, and one of his corps commanders was plotting for his place. still he was struggling for success, while friends wavered, and enemies cried out against him. to his heavy load of cares and trials was added this heaviest burden of all--the dread of being removed before he could carry out the great design which had been born in his busy brain. this great design set at nought all the formulæ of the military schools, and was in violation of all the known laws of strategy; but it was not a new idea. long before canals and operations, in accordance with the recognized rules of warfare, had been discarded as impracticable, he had cherished it as a last resort. the military engineers of the confederacy were at least the equals, as scientific men, of those of the union. with every means and material in abundance, they had fortified vicksburg on the most approved plans, and, aided by the immense natural advantages of the position, had succeeded in building up a "gibraltar" which could not be captured. to them the issue was no less than the very existence of the confederacy; for, cut off from its supplies in texas, its conquest was only a question of time. these engineers made sure that they had not deceived themselves. they piled up defences, and extended their batteries, until gibraltar and sevastopol were beggared in their strength in comparison with vicksburg. doubtless, measured by the ordinary rules of military security, and by the ability of any force governed by the recognized canons of warfare, the confederate engineers were fully justified in their perfect confidence. all the communications behind vicksburg were in their hands. no base of supplies could be established below or in the rear of the stronghold. impenetrable swamps and morasses defended it above, for they afforded no resting place whereon an army could stand. the fortified heights of walnut hills frowned for miles above the submerged lands on the yazoo. the whole strength of the rebellion was in the rear of the city, and armies could be rushed in upon a hostile force gathered there, by the railroads. to any other man than grant it would have been a hopeless task; but he set at nought the rules of war under which vicksburg was safe. he announced his plan to his generals. they were startled. all opposed it. he intended to march through a portion of louisiana to a point on the mississippi, below vicksburg, cross the river, and strike the gibraltar in the rear. the gunboats were to run by the batteries, and assist in the operations below. the scheme was full of peril. to transport the army below vicksburg was to separate it from any base of supplies; in short, to cut his own communications, to place himself in just the situation which the rebels would have selected for him. he did not call a council of war, and argue the question with his generals; he simply made up his mind to do it. sherman, logan, mcpherson, wilson, all opposed the plan when it came to their knowledge. sherman, his cherished friend, his indomitable supporter in whatever he did, whether he agreed or not with his chief, declared that the only way to take vicksburg was by going back to memphis, and following up the movement which they had attempted the preceding autumn. but grant was confident that a backward movement would be fatal to himself, that the country would not endure anything that looked like another reverse, and he adhered to his own plan. sherman then wrote out a formal paper, setting forth the advantages of his own plan very ably, and in close accord with all military rules, and sent it to grant's chief of staff. it was given to the general, and he read it carefully, and then put it in his trousers pocket. as sherman had requested in the paper, he made no reply to the argument; in fact, never mentioned it. weeks after, when prominent men in the army gave sherman the credit of the plan, he stated these facts. the disapproval of his ablest generals could not deter grant from his purpose. even sherman, as careful of the reputation of his chief as of the glory of the cause he had espoused, failed to shake his inflexible will. the army was marched and ferried from milliken's bend to de shroons' landing, three or four miles below grand gulf. the gunboats, with a fleet of barges laden with provisions for the troops, ran the gantlet of the vicksburg batteries with comparatively slight loss. such a bold movement appalled the crews of the transports, and only a few of them were willing to undergo the exposure. but grant appealed to the army, wherein were to be found the representatives of every trade and profession. and engineers, firemen, pilots, and deck hands were superabundantly supplied. through the rain of shot and shell they passed, and the army and the navy were gathered together again in the enemy's country. a new era in the campaign had been inaugurated. porter bombarded grand gulf without success, but he ran by its batteries, and was in readiness to protect the transports, in which the army was to be conveyed across the river. the troops were embarked, and it was intended to proceed down the river until high ground should be found for the landing. a negro gave information that a good road led from bruinsburg, ten miles below grand gulf, to the interior. at this point, therefore, the troops were landed april 30. the army was in the state of mississippi, with only very scanty means of obtaining supplies from above vicksburg. three days' rations were served out to the men, upon which they were required to subsist for five days. the movement was intended in the beginning as a surprise to the enemy, and was fully proved to be such. there were two rebel armies to be dealt with--that of pemberton, in and around vicksburg, and that of joe johnston, at jackson, the capital of the state, fifty miles distant. the object was to get between these two forces, and prevent them from effecting a junction. the national army was in hot haste, and grant's struggles to gain a moment of time are full of interest. red tape was cut, forms were dispensed with, and the meagre supplies of the army were hurried forward with the utmost despatch. on the 1st of may, grant attacked and defeated the enemy at port gibson, the first point which disputed his passage to the interior, before reënforcements could be sent from grand gulf, capturing six guns and six hundred and fifty prisoners. while these operations were in progress, general grant had organized the celebrated raid of grierson, which passed through the rebel country from la grange to baton rouge, spreading consternation on every side. sherman, who had not yet come down from milliken's bend, also made a demonstration in favor of the movement at haines's bluff, which prevented troops from being sent down to grand gulf. in this desperate enterprise, hardly more than wagons enough to transport the ammunition could be allowed. no tents or baggage could be carried, but the men submitted without a murmur to the hardships and privations incident to a hurried march in an enemy's country. grant stood on the same level in this respect as the humblest soldier. his entire baggage for six days was a tooth-brush! he had neither a clean shirt, an overcoat, nor a blanket; no horse, orderly, or camp chest. he slept upon the ground, with no covering but the sky and the stars, and lived on soldier's rations. the battle for grand gulf and the base of supplies was fought at port gibson. the place was evacuated, and porter took possession of it. the rebels were pursued to the big black river. the position was secure, and grant had time to breathe for a moment. he visited grand gulf, went on board of a gunboat, borrowed a shirt, and sat up till midnight writing despatches. he attended personally to all the details of the campaign. he ordered sherman to come forward, giving him the minutiæ of rations to be brought. it had been his purpose, up to this time, as it had been the expectation of the government, that he would secure a position below vicksburg, open the river to port hudson, and coöperate with general banks in the reduction of that important point. after its capture, with the mississippi open to supply the two armies, they were to unite and besiege vicksburg. but he had made some progress, and was ready to fight the battle on which the safety of the stronghold would depend. he knew that johnston was on his way to jackson, and that reënforcements were pouring into that place from the south. but banks could not reach port hudson till the 10th of may, and the delay would weaken the national force while it strengthened that of the rebels. he decided finally to pursue his own plan, and without any hesitation he pushed on towards jackson. cutting loose from his base of supplies, he marched into the interior, subsisting his army on the country. sherman, with his corps, had joined him, but this veteran was fearful of the result of the audacious movement. grant did not inform the general-in-chief of his plan, and the government was appalled at his boldness. grant was alone, but he was self-possessed and sanguine. the governor of mississippi was howling with rage, and begging the "glorious patriots" to hurry to the defence of the state. steadily the grand army marched in two columns towards the capital. at raymond a sharp battle was fought, but the enemy was routed, and the victorious column pursued them to jackson, where the rebels were again defeated. the capital was captured, the railroad destroyed, bridges, factories, arsenals, everything which could be of service to the foe in the war was blown up or burned. grant, with his staff, rode into the town; his son, then thirteen years old, galloped ahead of the column into the capital. chapter xxi. _wherein captain galligasken follows the illustrious soldier through the campaign in mississippi to the siege and surrender of vicksburg._ i am continually prompted to pause in my narrative, and dilate upon the splendid conceptions of grant, as i see him marching triumphantly over the strongholds of the rebellion; but the grand facts themselves are enough to overwhelm the imagination. never was so bold a scheme conceived on a scale so grand; never was one more brilliantly executed. behold the conqueror issuing his mandates from the state house of the rebel capital of mississippi! sternly and resolutely he cuts away the veins and arteries of the rebellion itself, as he tears up railroads and demolishes mills and public buildings. he is in the very midst of the powers of treason, but he is not dismayed. far away from his supplies, the rebel stores feed the loyal troops. dismay and demoralization radiated from his headquarters; and, astounded as the leaders of the rebellion were, they failed to realize the full extent of the disaster which had befallen them. grant had struck the heavy blow in this direction, and, gathering up his forces, he retraced his steps, leaving ruin and desolation behind him. he did not carry on the war on peace principles. months before he had solved the problem of subjugation. he had gone into the conflict as others did, with an inadequate idea of the work to be accomplished, believing that a few national victories would settle all the questions at issue. but the war was to be a death-struggle. the rebels manifested their hate and spite to a degree never before exhibited by any people. they declared that they never would submit, and their deeds did not belie their words. the question was not to be considered as settled when the national government had demonstrated that it was the stronger party of the two. the "last ditch," and a grave in the gulf of mexico, was the howl of the confederacy. the contest was to be continued not only while large armies could be held together and subsisted, but by guerrillas and partisans burrowing in the mountains after all hope and all other resources had failed. it was necessary to meet this view with one of corresponding severity. grant realized the situation. it was his purpose to destroy the armies of the rebellion, and all the material with which armies could be supplied. he did his work thoroughly, but it was a work of humanity, a saving of life and of treasure. he took a statesman's view of the situation; his solution of the great problem was the only one which could save the country, and which could confine the war within a reasonable period of time. the rebels were courting a war of extermination, but grant's policy broke the spirit of the people, if not of their leaders. the victorious general slept in the house in jackson which johnston had occupied the preceding night. while the army was at the capital, an act of poetic justice was done, though in violation of orders. a number of union prisoners had been conveyed by railroad through jackson some time before. the cattle cars, in which they were transported, stopped in front of the confederate hotel, and the thirsty captives begged of its inmates "a cup of cold water only." it was refused, with scurrilous jeers and revilings. these prisoners had been exchanged, and were now in grant's conquering army. they set fire to the hotel, and burned it to the ground: the tables were turned, and the indignity was avenged. johnston retreated towards canton, and sent despatches to pemberton, in which he suggested to him the necessity of cutting off grant's supplies from the mississippi. grant had already cut himself off from his base, and was living upon the enemy. he also intimates that it is desirable to "beat" grant, if he was compelled to fall back for the want of supplies. the rebel general was a long way behind the times, and, like many others, had entirely mistaken his man. he moved over to the north, intending to effect a junction with pemberton; but the latter defeated the plan by disobeying his orders. grant, having obtained accurate knowledge of pemberton's position, pushed forward to the battle, which was impending. johnston was in his rear, and it was necessary to use the utmost haste, in order to fight them in detail. the enemy was strongly posted on baker's creek, the left of the line resting on champion's hill, from which his artillery commanded the plains below. the national forces, nearly exhausted by hard marching, but still buoyant and uncomplaining, approached by three roads, which converged at edwards's station. as our gallant army approached, the rebels on the hill, seventy feet above the plain, opened fire, with shot and shell, from its bald summit, while a deadly fire of musketry blazed from the forest, in which the foe was concealed. the hill was the key of the position, and hovey pushed on, forcing the enemy back, till he had captured eleven guns and three hundred prisoners. but the rebels massed their men in front of him, and drove him slowly and doggedly back, until the ground gained was lost again. this was the crisis of the battle; but grant himself was on the hill, in a position where he could see all that transpired. his plan always was to take advantage of a favorable turn to repair the mischief of an unfavorable one. he sent a brigade to restore the equilibrium, and hovey held his ground. mcpherson had stationed a battery where it was mowing down the rebels in swaths, and they made an attempt to capture it, but were repulsed with severe loss. logan was sweeping all before him. again the foe drove hovey, whose battalions were worn out by an incessant fight of three hours, and were also out of ammunition. grant had been hurrying up mcclernand all day; but still he did not appear. the tide of battle seemed to have set against the national army; but this was always the hour when its heroic commander was more than himself. the delay of mcclernand galled him, and deranged his plans, but could not defeat him. he ordered mcpherson to move on the enemy's right flank, and the contest was renewed with redoubled vigor. logan marched upon the enemy's left. these dispositions, and a sharp attack, broke the rebels, and they gave way the third time. logan's movement nearly to the rear of the rebel line, had startled pemberton, and he made haste to save his line of retreat. the union troops pressed on, and the bloody battle of champion's hill was won. it had lasted six hours, and our loss was twenty-five hundred in killed, wounded, and missing. the enemy lost thirty guns, and six thousand men in killed, wounded, and prisoners. it was the severest battle of the campaign, and reflects a brilliant lustre upon the national arms. so fierce was the struggle, that the soldiers christened the bloody height, where so many had fallen, the hill of death. the pursuit of the fleeing rebels was continued until long after dark, grant and his staff being at the head of the column. in their enthusiasm they outsped the advance of the army. finding the situation unsafe, they retraced their steps, and the victorious general slept upon the porch of a house which was used as a rebel hospital, disturbed only by the groans of the wounded and the dying within. that night came to grant the order of the general-in-chief, directing him to return to the mississippi, and coöperate with banks against port hudson. of course it had been written without a knowledge of the facts. the government had been alarmed at his temerity, and expected to hear that he was crushed in the embrace of the rebel armies, which beset him on both sides. but the campaign had been fought and won; and to obey the letter of the order would have been to disobey its spirit. by the boldness of his conception and the rapidity of his execution, he had effectually prevented the junction of the armies of pemberton and johnston. sherman left jackson with his corps on the morning of the battle of champion's hill, hurried forward by an order from grant. he reached bolton the same day, and there heard of the victory. he was ordered to cross the big black at bridgeport, either to turn the enemy's flank or to move up on haines's bluff, as circumstances might dictate, for by this time it was desirable to establish a base of supplies. the main column pushed on towards vicksburg, and found the rebels posted on a bridge over the big black. they had a line of intrenchments, defended by a garrison of four thousand men, with twenty guns. as soon as the pursuing army came up with this formidable obstacle in its path, the line was formed, and a heavy fire opened upon the works, which were finally carried by storm. our men fought bravely, and the confederate line broke and fled like sheep. in their terror the rebels on the opposite side of the river set their end of the bridge on fire, before half their force had crossed. the demoralized wretches fled to the river, and attempted to escape by swimming. the fire of the cannon was turned upon them, and the stream was crimsoned with their blood. seventeen hundred and fifty prisoners, eighteen guns, and five standards were captured in this lively battle. bridging the river, grant pushed on towards vicksburg, uniting with sherman, who came by a more northerly route. the two generals rode together to the farthest height, which looked down upon the yazoo. the high ground they had longed to possess had been reached, and it was to them the promised land. they were elated at the prospect, and sherman acknowledged that, until this moment, he had not deemed the movement a success. in just twenty days grant had marched over two hundred miles, fought five distinct battles, captured eighty-eight pieces of ordnance, and deprived the enemy of the services of thirteen thousand soldiers. he had destroyed the railroad, captured jackson and grand gulf. never was so brief a campaign productive of such successes. as sherman congratulated him upon the splendid results he had achieved, he quietly smoked his cigar, but made no vain-glorious reply--no reply at all. vicksburg was immediately invested by a line which extended from the river above to the river below the town. the coveted base of supplies was obtained. pemberton had thirty thousand men--a number fully equal to that of the besiegers--with two hundred cannon. on the 18th of may johnston advised him that vicksburg could not be held without haines's bluff, and recommended him to save his troops by withdrawing; but pemberton decided, with the advice of his officers, to remain. grant's men were flushed with victory, and desired to storm the works. they were permitted to do so as soon as the line of investment was completed. a heavy attack was made all along the intrenchments, but it was not crowned with success. the people of vicksburg were requested to leave the town by the commander of the post: they declined to abandon their homes; but the heavy rain of shot and shell from the national gunboats compelled them to burrow in the sides of the hills for security, and families lived for weeks in these caves. pemberton hoped to receive assistance from johnston, who was organizing another army at canton. the knowledge of this fact prompted grant to order another assault on the 21st of may. his men were full of fight, and in this respect he was generally ready to gratify them. the most elaborate preparations were made for the great event, and as the prelude to the assault, the guns of the batteries and of the fleet in the river rained a deluge of shot and shell upon the city and its works. the thundering of guns shook the solid earth, and the place was girt with fire. at ten o'clock, after the bombardment had continued for several hours, the assault was made. the entire army pushed forward, and, though prodigies of valor were performed, the result was a failure. the strength of the works was too great to be carried by storm; but the spirit of the soldiers was unabated. grant was obliged not only to press forward the siege vigorously, but to keep a lookout upon johnston in his rear. he was reënforced, so that by the middle of june he had seventy-five thousand troops, one half of whom formed the line in the trenches, while the other half constituted an army of observation, to watch the movements of the enemy in the rear. grant was untiring in his labors, and felt that he had the place already. he had decided to save his men by regular siege operations. but the glorious day was at hand. on the morning of the 3d of july, a white flag was displayed on the rebel works, and two officers came out, announcing that they were the bearers of a sealed communication from general pemberton to general grant. they were conducted to the most convenient headquarters, and the commander of the union army notified of the fact. pemberton proposed an armistice for the purpose of making terms for the surrender of vicksburg. he stated that he submitted the proposition in order to save the effusion of blood, which must otherwise be shed to a frightful extent, for he felt fully able to maintain his position for an indefinite period. general grant replied, by letter, that the effusion of blood could be ended at any time by the unconditional surrender of the city and garrison. he complimented the endurance and courage of the defenders of vicksburg, and assured the rebel general that they should be treated with respect as prisoners of war; but he had no other terms than unconditional surrender. general bowen, the bearer of the letter, desired to see general grant, who promptly declined to meet him, but consented to see pemberton himself at three o'clock in the afternoon. the messengers returned to the city, and hostilities were immediately resumed, and continued till noon. at three o'clock pemberton, attended by his messengers of the morning, came to the appointed place, in front of mcpherson's line. the two commanders met under the shade of a huge oak, within two hundred feet of the rebel line. the works on both sides were crowded with unarmed men, gazing eagerly at the unwonted scene between these lines. the two high officers shook hands, and the other officers were formally introduced to each other. "general grant, i meet you to inquire what terms of capitulation will be allowed to me," said pemberton. "those which have been expressed in my letter of this morning," replied grant. "unconditional surrender!" exclaimed pemberton, haughtily. "unconditional surrender," added grant, quietly. "never, so long as i have a man left," protested the rebel general. "i will fight! if this is all, the conference may terminate, and hostilities will be immediately resumed." "very well," answered grant, quietly, as he turned away. general bowen proposed that two of the subordinates present should confer together, and suggest terms. grant did not object, but declined to be bound by any agreement of his officers, reserving it to himself to decide upon the terms. smith and bowen retired to consult together, while grant and pemberton walked up and down under the tree, engaged in conversation. the subordinates returned to the tree, and bowen proposed that the vicksburg garrison should march out with the honors of war, carrying their muskets and field guns, but leaving their heavy artillery, which it was not convenient for them to carry. grant smiled at the proposition, and declined it without any hesitation. it was finally agreed that grant should send his terms to pemberton before ten o'clock that night, and that hostilities should be suspended till that time. grant went to his quarters, and, for the first time, called together a council of war--not to determine how an attack should be made, but how a conquered foe should be surrendered. with the countenance of all his officers but one, grant submitted the terms, which were, that the national troops should take possession of vicksburg; the rebel army should be paroled, the officers and men to retain their private property, the troops to march out as soon as the necessary papers had been signed. after some slight variations the terms were accepted on the morning of the 4th of july; and thus one of the most glorious events of the war occurred on the anniversary of the national independence. chapter xxii. _wherein captain galligasken sums up the magnificent results of the capture of vicksburg, and starts with the illustrious soldier for chattanooga, after his appointment to the command of the combined armies of the tennessee, the cumberland, and the ohio._ vicksburg had fallen! the nation was thrilled by the news. grant's name rang throughout the land. the loyal people blessed him for the mighty deed he had done. the news flashed through the country, kindling up a joyous excitement, such as had not been known since the commencement of the war. the boasted stronghold of the rebels, the veritable gibraltar of the west, had crumbled and fallen. possibilities became facts. the decline of the southern confederacy had commenced. vicksburg had fallen! the news seemed too good to be true, and the waiting patriots of the nation trembled lest the vision of peace which it foreshadowed should be dissolved; but the telegraph flashed full confirmation, and every loyal heart beat firmer and truer than ever before. vicksburg had fallen! while the nation raised a pæan of grateful thanksgiving for the victory, and hailed grant as the mightiest man of the rebellion, the victorious general seemed hardly to be elated by his brilliant success, or to be conscious that he had achieved anything worthy of note. he smoked his cigar, calm and unmoved by the tempest of applause which began to reach him from the far north. it was hard to tell which was the more amazing--the magnitude of the victory or the modesty of the victor. on the 4th of july--hallowed anew by this crowning victory--the rebel army marched out of the works it had so bravely defended, stacked their arms, and laid down their colors, returning prisoners of war. thirty-one thousand six hundred men were surrendered to grant, including two thousand one hundred and fifty-three officers, fifteen of whom were generals. one hundred and seventy-two cannons were captured with the place. it was the largest capture of men and guns ever made, not only in this war, but in the history of the world. ulm surrendered to napoleon, with thirty thousand men and sixty guns; but this event transcended the capitulation of ulm, which alison declares was a spectacle unparalleled in modern warfare; more men, and nearly three times as many guns, were taken at vicksburg. grant and his staff, at the head of logan's division, rode into the city, where the rebel soldiers gazed curiously at their conqueror, but manifested no disrespect; wherein they exhibited a more chivalrous spirit than did their officers. the general rode to the headquarters where the principal rebel officers were assembled. no one extended to him any act of courtesy, or behaved with even common decency. as no one came out to receive him, he dismounted, and walked up to the porch where pemberton and his high-toned generals sat. they saluted him coldly, but no one proffered him a chair. by the grace of grant they wore their swords; but not even this fact spurred them up to the simplest act of courtesy. pemberton himself was as crabbed and sour as a boor whose hen-coop had been robbed. his manner was morose and ungentlemanly, and his speech cold and curt. at last one of the party, with higher notions of chivalry than his companions, brought a chair for grant. the day was hot and dusty, and the general asked for a glass of water. he was rudely informed that he could find water in the house. he entered, and searched the premises till a negro appeared, who supplied his want. returning to the porch, he found his seat had been taken; and, during the rest of the interview, which lasted half an hour, he remained standing, in the company of these conquered rebels, who kept their seats in his presence! in the light of this remarkable interview, i am inclined to believe that my friend pollard, who denounces pemberton as an imbecile, was more than half right in his estimate of the man; for no decent person, under such circumstances, would have been guilty of such flagrant discourtesy, as ridiculous as it was gross. grant was a christian. he did not even resent this incivility. "if thine enemy hunger, feed him." grant did so, literally; for at this interview pemberton requested him to supply his garrison with rations. he did not say, "let the dead bury their dead," as less magnanimous men than he might have done, after the contemptuous impoliteness of the rebels. grant immediately consented; but probably there was not "chivalry" enough left in the bantam general to feel the heat of the "coals of fire upon his head." [illustration: grant and pemberton in vicksburg.--page 236.] grant notified banks, at port hudson, of the capture of vicksburg, and offered to send him an army corps of "as good troops as ever trod american soil; no better are found on any other." four days after the surrender, port hudson followed the example of vicksburg. this event virtually completed the conquest of treason in the west. the father of waters rolled "unvexed to the sea," in the expressive language of president lincoln. to sum up the results, in the words of pollard, who is not particularly amiable at this point of his struggles through "the lost cause,"--"it was the loss of one of the largest armies which the confederates had in the field; the decisive event of the mississippi valley; and the severance of the southern confederacy." proudly would i linger over this auspicious event; but the illustrious soldier had done his work, and the deed speaks for itself. his name was written in the annals of his country, never more to be effaced, even if he added not another laurel to his wreath of glory. he had practically ended the war on the mississippi. on the day before, the great battle of gettysburg culminated in victory, and the army of lee was driven, shattered and weakened, from pennsylvania. the tidings of these two great events spread through the land together, and created universal joy. almost for the first time in two years, the loyal cause looked really hopeful. the rebellion had been struck heavily in the east and in the west. president lincoln manifested his high appreciation of the conduct of grant in the following characteristic letter:- "executive mansion, washington, july 13, 1863. "major general grant. "my dear general: i do not remember that you and i ever met personally. i write this now as a grateful acknowledgment for the almost inestimable service you have done the country. i wish to say a word further. when you first reached the vicinity of vicksburg, i thought you should do what you finally did--march the troops across the neck, run the batteries with the transports, and thus go below; and i never had any faith, except a general hope that you knew better than i, that the yazoo pass expedition and the like could succeed. when you got below, and took port gibson, grand gulf, and vicinity, i thought you should go down the river and join general banks; and when you turned northward, east of the big black, i feared it was a mistake. i now wish to make the personal acknowledgment that you were right and i was wrong. a. lincoln." halleck was almost as magnanimous as the president, and sent grant a very handsome letter of congratulation. for the brilliant campaign of vicksburg, grant was made a major-general in the regular army. he promptly recommended sherman and mcpherson for promotion to the rank of brigadier-general in the regular army, setting forth, in solid, compact arguments, the merits of these distinguished generals. these promotions were promptly made, as well as others which grant suggested. sherman was sent out with a strong force to drive johnston from the state, which he did most effectually, capturing jackson a second time in his operations. on his return, the army of the mississippi was broken up, and sent to banks, schofield, and burnside. but grant had no opportunity to rest upon his laurels; indeed, he wanted none. he gave his attention to the multiplicity of topics imposed upon him by the needs of his department. he threw all the weight of his position and influence into the task of raising and organizing negro troops. it was his intention to use them to garrison the posts on the river, believing that they would make good heavy artillerists. he was among the first to acknowledge the value of this class of troops, and to award to them the praise which their valor in the field merited. he went farther than this; for he proposed to protect them from the operation of the savage policy of the rebels in regard to them. he intimated to general dick taylor that if he hung black soldiers he should retaliate; but the rebel general repudiated any such policy. he discussed the question of trade with the enemy with secretary chase, and defended his views in opposition to it with dignity and ability. the duties of his department required a degree of statesmanship in their handling which he was found to possess; and the affairs of his jurisdiction were skilfully and prudently administered. previous to the separation of the grand army which had achieved the conquest of vicksburg, grant had proposed, and even urged, an expedition for the capture of mobile by the way of lake pontchartrain. but the general-in-chief deemed it best to "clean up" the territory which had been conquered, by driving out the rebel forces from western louisiana, arkansas, and missouri. the president declared that the enterprise was "tempting," but recent events in mexico rendered him desirous of establishing the national authority in texas, so that no foreign foe could secure a foothold there; and he left the project for halleck to dispose of. grant felt that the union was losing a splendid opportunity, for he had no doubt that a blow struck by the vicksburg veterans at mobile, before the rebels recovered from the shock of present disasters, would be entirely successful. he had the force, and only desired a couple of gunboats to cover his landing. probably, if he had been permitted to undertake the venture, he would have succeeded, and the war would have been curtailed at least one year. judging from analogy, and from the skill and spirit of the man, i am confident he would have make a success of it. i cannot conceive of such a thing as grant's failing in anything. he might have been temporarily checked and turned back--once, twice, thrice; but he was absolutely sure to carry his point in the end. "mr. grant was a very obstinate man," as his good lady remarked. while sherman was driving johnston out of mississippi, grant sent supplies of food and medicine to the enemy's sick at raymond. if any man ever demonstrated the true spirit of christianity, though without any display, grant did so in his treatment of his own and his country's enemies. the thirteenth corps had been sent down to assist in the expedition up the red river and into texas. grant was anxious to see banks, in order to arrange a plan by which he might coöperate with him, and he went to new orleans. while there he was severely injured by being thrown from his horse at a review. the animal was a strange one to him, and was frightened by a locomotive, and rushing against a vehicle, dragged his rider off. he was confined to his bed, and compelled to lie "flat on his back" for twenty days. as soon as he was able to be moved, he returned to vicksburg, but was obliged to keep his bed until the latter part of september, though he attended to all the business of his department. during the summer rosecrans had been operating in tennessee and northern georgia, and had obtained possession of chattanooga--the most important position between richmond and the mississippi. bragg was manoeuvring to cut him off from nashville, his base of supplies. grant started large reënforcements, including sherman's command, to the threatened point. on the 20th of september, rosecrans was defeated, before any of grant's army reached him, in the heavy battle of chickamauga, and compelled to retire to chattanooga. his army was saved only by the address and bravery of general thomas, who held his position in the face of an immensely superior force. a delay of ten days in the delivery of halleck's order to grant prevented the latter from sending troops in season to be of service. early in october grant was directed, as soon as he was in condition to take the field,--for he was then able to move only on crutches,--to repair to cairo, and report by telegraph. the order reached him at columbus, and the next day, feeble as he was, he started for the point indicated, with his staff and headquarters. on his arrival he was instructed to meet an officer of the war department in louisville, kentucky, to receive further orders. he started immediately by railroad, but at indianapolis he met the secretary of war himself--mr. stanton. a new command, called forth by the emergency, had been created for general grant--"the military division of the mississippi," including all the territory south of the ohio between the alleghanies and the mississippi, with the exception of that occupied by banks. it comprised, besides his own department of the tennessee, those of the cumberland, under rosecrans, and the ohio, under burnside, all of which were now placed under his command. grant had suggested this step a year before, in order to insure harmonious operations. the secretary of war also carried two other orders with him, one continuing rosecrans in his command of the army of the cumberland, and the other removing him, and putting general thomas in his place. grant was permitted to make his choice between the two, and without hesitation he preferred the latter. mr. stanton accompanied the commander of the new division to louisville, where it was rumored that rosecrans was actually preparing to abandon chattanooga, so closely was he pressed by the rebels, and harassed by the cutting off of his supplies. grant, by order of the secretary, immediately assumed his command, telegraphing his order to rosecrans, and assigning thomas to the army of the cumberland. he immediately took measures to prevent the apprehended calamity, desiring thomas to hold chattanooga at all hazards. the hero who had saved the entire army at chickamauga replied at once in those memorable words which have been so often quoted, "i will hold the town till we starve." east tennessee, that home of the tried and trusty patriots, who had been so long neglected, and who had suffered untold misery, had been occupied by the national troops, and was now held by burnside. its safety depended upon the operations in progress at chattanooga, which was the key-point of the system of railroads radiating to the east and south. it was absolutely necessary for the success of the national arms to hold this place, not only on account of its immense strategic importance, but because nearly all the people of the mountain region in which it is situated were loyal. when vicksburg fell, bragg had been strengthened by the arrival of the troops which had been operating under johnston in grant's rear. but rosecrans had out-generaled bragg by getting to the southward of him, and threatening his supplies, thus compelling him to abandon chattanooga. having been largely reënforced, the rebel general had beaten rosecrans at chickamauga, and driven him into chattanooga, where he had fortified himself, with the intention of holding the position. three miles from the tennessee was missionary ridge, a range of hills four hundred feet high, which bragg made haste to occupy. west of the town was lookout mountain, twenty-two hundred feet high, and three miles distant. under this mountain extended the nashville railroad, by which the national army received its supplies. rosecrans deemed it necessary to abandon this commanding height, which bragg instantly seized. planting his batteries upon it, he effectually held the country around it, and entirely cut off all supplies for chattanooga, except such as could be sent by the mountain passes over sixty miles of rugged roads. bragg drew his lines around the place from the river above to the river below. rosecrans's situation became desperate, for it was practically impossible to supply his troops by the mountain roads. the army was put on half rations, and three thousand sick and wounded were dying for the want of proper nourishment and medicines. fodder for the horses and mules could not be obtained, and ten thousand of them died. all the artillery horses were sent round through the mountains to bridgeport, but one third of them perished on the way. in case of retreat, it would be necessary to abandon the artillery, for the want of animals to draw it. to add to the perils of the situation, the ammunition was nearly exhausted. short of clothing, short of tents, short of food, the condition of the army was deplorable in the extreme. heavy rains deluged the earth, and the sufferings of the men were intense. it is not to be wondered at that rosecrans was prepared to resort to so mild an expedient as abandoning the place. bragg was waiting for starvation, cold, and intense suffering to fight his battle for him. he was unwilling to sacrifice a soldier in an assault, when chattanooga was sure to fall under the weight of its own miseries. only in andersonville and on belle island were the sufferings of the troops surpassed. such was the terrible condition of the army of the cumberland when grant started for the field of action. chapter xxiii. _wherein captain galligasken details the means by which the illustrious soldier relieved the army of the cumberland, and traces his career to the glorious victory of chattanooga_. the stoutest heart would have been appalled at the situation in and around chattanooga. rosecrans had failed, and the army of the cumberland was "bottled up" in the town. grant, still feeble, and unable to move without his crutches, was ordered to extricate the force from its desperate dilemma; and not only to do this, but to save the place itself. one less resolute than he, or equally resolute, but less patriotic and devoted to the loyal cause, might well have exclaimed, "i pray thee have me excused!" disabled as he was, he might have pointed to his crutches, and let them speak for him. they were not only a good excuse, but a good reason for not going upon such a perilous errand. could he have been borne at the head of the victorious veterans of vicksburg, and gone into the beleaguered and starved town to the musical tramp of a large army, it would have looked more hopeful. but this could not be. sherman had been started from memphis with a heavy force--the army of the tennessee--to assist rosecrans, and he was still struggling through the country, beset with trials and difficulties. not with this faithful friend and this tried army could the crippled general march into chattanooga. on the 20th of october, grant started with only his staff for the imperilled point, and arrived at nashville the same night. even on his route, invalid as he was, he worked at the solution of the problem which had been given him to solve. he telegraphed to burnside, foreshadowing his plans, and directing the operations of his subordinate. he requested admiral porter to send gunboats up the tennessee to insure sherman's safety, and to facilitate the passage of his supplies. to thomas, in chattanooga, he suggested the opening of the road to bridgeport. without having visited the scene of operations, he knew all about it, and was ready to grapple with the mighty difficulty. at bridgeport, on the tennessee, the general and his party took horses for chattanooga. the roads were rifted and torn up by the deluge of rains which had poured down the mountain sides. here and there the highway was but a narrow shelf on the steep mountain side, and the region was strewed with the wrecks of wagons, and the bodies of animals which had died on the route, or had been killed by being precipitated over the steep bluffs. at many points the roads were not in condition to admit of the passage of the party on horseback, and the animals were led over them; grant, still a cripple, was borne in the arms of his companions. thus journeyed the great commander to the front, issuing his mandates for the government of these armies, ordering up supplies, and indicating the means of forwarding them. i say, enthusiastically, that the spectacle of a man in his crippled condition, undertaking such an herculean task, controlling the minutest details, and moving forward confidently to retrieve the most desperate situation which the whole war presented, is sublime. i cannot fully express my admiration with any other term. it was dark, and the rain poured in torrents, when grant reached chattanooga. if he had not quailed at the prospect before, well might he then. the rebels, in greatly superior force, hemmed in the town, save on the north, where the ragged mountain steeps beyond the river were almost as forbidding as the closed-up lines of the enemy. the officers and men were sad, weary, and almost hopeless. their supplies were nearly exhausted, and there was little hope either in a battle or a retreat. to this scene of his future labors, the disabled and worn-out commander was introduced on his arrival. he did not despair; he was the messenger of hope and ultimate triumph. on the night of his arrival he requested that sherman should be placed in command of the army of the tennessee, and his wish was granted. hooker's command from the army of the potomac had been sent down to act with the army of the cumberland, and was now at bridgeport. the question of supplies was the first which engaged grant's attention. except the town of chattanooga, the rebels held all the country south of the tennessee, and frequently invaded the northern shore in cavalry raids, cutting off the union supplies. a pontoon bridge was stretched across the river at brown's ferry, the boats, each carrying thirty men, being silently floated down the river unobserved by the rebel pickets. the operation was conducted in the night, and, being a complete success, a footing was gained on the south bank of the river below the town. the nashville and chattanooga railroad crossed the tennessee at bridgeport, where hooker, with the eleventh and twelfth corps, was located, and came up to chattanooga through lookout valley, on the south side of the stream, which, being in the hands of the enemy, had cut off the supplies. hooker was ordered to cross the river, and follow the railroad up to the valley. at wauhatchie he encountered the rebels, but drove them before him, and reached a point within a mile of the new pontoon bridge on the night of the 28th of october. he was fiercely attacked by longstreet, but successfully repelled the assault, and lookout valley was virtually captured. by this movement a direct road to bridgeport, to which the railroad from nashville was in working order, was opened in five days after the arrival of grant. only a week before, jeff. davis himself had stood upon the summit of lookout mountain, and gazed down upon the union army shut up in chattanooga, absolutely sure that in a brief period, without striking a blow, it must surrender to bragg. the tables were suddenly turned by the matchless skill of grant. the ammunition and stores poured in upon the desponding army, now reënforced by two corps, and hope and joy supplanted fear and despair. the hungry men were once more fed on full rations, horses were promptly brought up, and the army of the cumberland was ready to become the assailants again. the rebels were confounded by the sudden change in the situation before them. grant arranged the details of conveying supplies to burnside, five hundred miles up the cumberland, and thence by wagons, one hundred farther, to knoxville. he repeatedly urged upon this gallant soldier the imperative necessity of holding east tennessee, though the government had some doubts in regard to his ability to do so. grant was only waiting for the arrival of sherman, with the army of tennessee, to attack the enemy; but until then he could do nothing. bragg, to better his own prospects, sent longstreet, with twenty thousand men and eighty guns, into east tennessee, and great anxiety was manifested for the safety of burnside's command. the rebels held the railroad from chattanooga nearly up to knoxville, and grant's force was insufficient to enable him to render any direct aid. burnside was sorely pressed by the foe, but maintained himself nobly. grant frequently sent him hopeful messages, and assured himself that east tennessee would be held. on the night of the 14th of november, sherman reported in chattanooga to his commander. the plan of the great battle which was to relieve burnside, and compel the enemy "to take to the mountain passes by every available road," had already been formed. the operations were delayed by savage storms, which raised the river, and damaged the pontoon bridges, employed to their utmost capacity in crossing sherman's troops; but on the 23d the line was formed for the assault. on the 20th, grant had received a letter from bragg, suggesting that if there were any non-combatants in chattanooga, prudence would suggest their early withdrawal; but this was only a trick, which did not deceive grant; and two days later he obtained information that bragg was preparing to evacuate his position on missionary ridge. thomas's line, composed of the army of the cumberland, was drawn up in front of the town. just before it were the rebel pickets in close proximity to those of the national army; indeed, both drew water from a creek which was the dividing line between them. grant occasionally rode out to this stream to observe the position of the enemy. one day he saw a party of soldiers drawing water. as they wore blue coats, he supposed they belonged to his own force, and he asked them to whose command they belonged. "to longstreet's corps," replied one of them. "what are you doing in those coats then?" demanded grant, unmoved, when almost any other general officer would have decamped in a hurry, for fear an accident might happen. "o, all our corps wear blue!" added the rebel spokesman. grant had forgotten this fact, and the rebels scrambled up their own side of the stream, little suspicious that they had been conversing with the commander of the united national armies. the guns in battery along the line opened fire, and the enemy's works on the long range of hills, replied to the vigorous salute. the line of thomas's army moved forward, and the grand spectacle commenced. it was a magnificent sight, and we who beheld it can never forget the gleam of those twenty thousand bayonets, as the column pressed steadily on. the enemy believed it was only a holiday pageant, and their pickets leaned on their muskets, and watched the brilliant movement. a few shots from the skirmishers scattered these spectators, and the battle commenced. the army of the cumberland was intent upon wiping out the stain of chickamauga, and charged impetuously upon the line of rifle-pits before them, capturing them, and carrying orchard knoll, a hill of considerable importance for future operations. the enemy had been driven back a mile, and the nationals halted, and fortified the ground they had captured. on the right was hooker, occupying lookout valley, above which frowned the heights of lookout mountain, bristling with rebel cannon. on the creek, in the middle of the valley, extended the line of confederate pickets; but there was no approach to the mountain on this side. hooker sent a column round its base to a road which conducted, by a zigzag route, to the summit. the enemy's pickets were captured, and lookout creek bridged. hooker's troops fought with the utmost bravery, and demonstrated that eastern soldiers, when well led, were fully the equals of those of the west. they swept everything before them in the fierce struggle that followed. the union batteries opened, and the rebels replied from the steeps of the mountain, drawing down, as it seemed, the thunder and the lightning from the clouds above, till the hills trembled in the commotion. the column under general geary, passing through a piece of woods, reached the road which led to the heights above. it was a steep path, and every accessible place was occupied by troops and guns for its defence. but the column dashed up the precipitous slopes, beating down all opposition, capturing guns and men on their way. onward and upward, in the literal sense of the words, they swept, penetrating the clouds, which soon hid them from the view of those below. hooker's battle in the clouds was a complete success, and lookout mountain was captured. two thousand prisoners were taken, and the victors in this remarkable contest rested from their labors on the summit. they had "gone up," in the highest sense of the phrase, and the rebels also, in another sense. hooker on the right, and thomas in the centre, had carried out their portion in the grand programme of the battle; so also had sherman on the left. the enemy had been deceived into the belief that his whole force was to operate in the vicinity of lookout mountain, while it was cautiously moved to a concealed position up the river, and in the rear of the town. one hundred and sixteen pontoons were conveyed over the land, and launched in the north chickamauga creek, five miles above the mouth of a stream with the same name on the south side of the river. on the night before the grand battle, these boats were loaded with men, and floated down the creek and the tennessee, until they reached a point immediately below south chickamauga creek, where the bridge was to be built over the river for the passage of sherman's army. all the citizens in the vicinity had been put under guard, so that the enemy might not learn what was in progress. the boats landed on the south side of the river, the troops disembarked, the enemy's outpost was captured, and a position secured for the beginning of the pontoon bridge. troops were crossed in boats continually. at noon the bridge was completed; the army crossed, and sherman commenced the march upon the enemy's positions on the left. the troops were pushed up the hill, and soon gained a commanding eminence, which was immediately fortified, and guns were dragged up for its defence. the rebels opened with artillery upon the unexpected foe, but sherman was already in possession. a sharp engagement ensued with the infantry, but the enemy soon withdrew, and the northern portion of missionary ridge was carried. the morning of the next day dawned clear and cold, revealing the two armies prepared for the final struggle, in which one was eager to engage, and which the other could not avoid. the rebels were still strongly intrenched on missionary ridge, whose summit had an extent of seven miles. grant took position with his staff on orchard knoll, where he could command a view of the entire battle-field. plainly to be seen on the heights above him were the headquarters of the rebel general. in accordance with his orders, sherman began the attack on the left, and closely pressed the confederate position. bragg saw his lines yielding, and sent reenforcements from the centre, precisely as grant intended he should do. sherman secured a position at the first onslaught, and the battle around him was waged with the most tremendous fury by both sides; but no further advantage was gained. on the right, hooker was working his way around the rebel flank, and grant, having been assured that he was in position to do his part of the work, directed thomas to move forward in the centre, the rebel general having weakened this portion of his line to strengthen his right flank. the four divisions of the army of the cumberland, one of which was commanded by sheridan, made a charge, captured the enemy's rifle-pits at the foot of the ridge, and took one thousand prisoners. thirty guns immediately opened upon them with grape and canister, cutting them down in awful slaughter; but it delayed not their march. steadily they pushed their way towards the crest of the ridge, and, halfway up, encountered another line of rifle-pits, which they charged upon and carried with the same impetuous fury which had marked their first assault. grant and thomas, on the knoll below, watched the fearful fighting, as the column mounted the hill. a portion of it was momentarily checked and turned by the savage fire poured in upon it. thomas turned to grant and said, with some hesitation, which revealed the emotion he struggled to conceal in the presence of his chief,-"general, i--i'm--i'm--afraid they won't get _up_." grant looked steadfastly at the column, waiting half a minute before he made any reply; then, coolly taking the cigar he was smoking from his mouth, he brushed away the ashes before he answered,-"o, give them time, general," and quietly returned the cigar to his mouth. they only wanted a few moments more, and gathering up their energies, the men pressed forward with redoubled zeal, and gained the summit of the ridge. with furious cheers they threw themselves upon the rebel works, and carried them almost instantly. the foe was overwhelmed in his strongest position, which, as bragg said himself, "a line of skirmishers ought to have maintained against any assaulting force." whole regiments threw down their arms, and others fled in hot haste down the eastern slope. the artillery was captured, and turned upon other portions of the rebel position. the confederate line was sundered, and the enemy were thoroughly beaten in forty-five minutes after the order to charge had been given on the plain below. in the moment of victory grant appeared upon the ridge, and, passing along with his head uncovered, received the unanimous applause of the soldiers. they were in a transport of ecstasy over the victory they had won, and gathered around him with volleys of cheers, grasping his hands, and embracing his legs. i wonder not at their enthusiasm, for these men were of the army of the cumberland, who had been "bottled up" in chattanooga, to starve and die: and while they hailed the victorious general as the author of the triumph they had achieved, they also hailed him as their own deliverer. he coolly but not insensibly received their grateful plaudits. without pausing to indulge in any self-glorification, he made the dispositions to complete the victory and pursue the fleeing host of rebels. [illustration: grant and the soldiers at missionary ridge. page 256.] the victory was thorough and entire. all the rebel positions had been captured. forty guns, seven thousand small arms, and six thousand prisoners were taken--the heaviest spoils of any battle fought in the field during the war. the loss of the union army, in killed, wounded, and missing, was fifty-six hundred and sixteen. the rebel loss in killed and wounded was much less, for they fought with all the advantages of a secure position. grant had sixty thousand men, bragg forty-five thousand; but the elevated situation, and the elaborate intrenchments in which they fought, ought to have rendered them equivalent to twice that force, as the rebel general practically admitted. the pursuit of the enemy was vigorously followed up, railroads were destroyed, and immense quantities of stores and rations captured, which the rebels could ill afford to lose. bragg had been entirely confident of his ability to hold his position, and at one time, just before thomas's troops reached the crest of the hill, he was congratulating his troops upon the victory they had won. while he was thus engaged, the army of the cumberland broke through his line, and compelled him to run for his life. during this fierce battle, phil sheridan first attracted the attention of grant, by his bold and daring conduct, no less than by his skilful movements; though the great cavalryman did not know of his good fortune for months. he had simply been "spotted" for future use. the battle of chattanooga was ended in a glorious victory for the union, and one of the saddest defeats of the war to the confederates--one which put my friend pollard into "fits," causing him to declare that "the day was shamefully lost." chapter xxiv. _wherein captain galligasken has something more to say about the glorious campaign of chattanooga, and illustrates some of the personal characteristics of the illustrious soldier_. in one month from the time of his arrival at chattanooga, grant had swept the rebels from the positions they occupied--had achieved a success which the enemy had believed was impossible. a woman, whose home was on the plateau of missionary ridge, said to one of our officers, after the battle had been fought, "before you all came up here, i asked general bragg, 'what are you going to do with me?' he replied, 'lord, madam, the yankees will never dare to come up here.' but it was not fifteen minutes before you were all around here." i have not the slightest doubt that bragg was as confident of his safety up to the moment his line was broken as he was of his own existence. relying on the immense natural advantages of his position, which had been fortified to the extent of human skill, he believed it was as impossible to move his army as it was to move the mountain itself. and it was not a merely blind confidence; for if a man ever had occasion to congratulate himself upon the security of his troops, bragg had. grant's plan for the battle, which was strictly followed out, from beginning to end, in all its details, was a masterpiece of military skill and combination. without this the brilliant, daring, and resolute assault must have ended in total failure. but it is equally certain that the splendid plan would have failed without the gallant fighting. in fact, grant commanded both armies on that day, for bragg was obliged to follow out the results of grant's combinations. the battle had continued for three days, extending over an area thirteen miles in length, to say nothing of its perpendicular ascent. two of the three subordinate commanders who directed operations under him were of his own choosing; and hooker, without being selected by him, was a man after his own heart, so far, at least, as his promptness and his fighting inclinations were concerned. yet it is marvellous that nothing went wrong on those eventful days; that all minor difficulties were overcome, and the operations brought into such glorious harmony; but this is as much due to grant's genius and foresight as the plan itself. he had skilfully and prudently weighed the conditions of success, and while the men fought well, and the generals obeyed their orders, there was no chance for failure. even general halleck, who had no partiality for the hero, and no confidence in him which had not been secured by grant's wonderful successes, became enthusiastic over this battle. "considering the strength of the rebel position and the difficulty of storming his intrenchments," said the careful general-in-chief, "the battle of chattanooga must be considered as one of _the_ _most remarkable in history_. not only did the officers and men exhibit great skill and daring in their operations in the field, but the highest praise is also due to the commanding general for his admirable dispositions for dislodging the enemy from a position apparently impregnable. moreover, by turning his right flank and throwing him back upon ringgold and dalton, sherman's forces were interposed between bragg and longstreet, so as to prevent any possibility of their forming a junction." halleck was a cautious man, and in no danger of exaggerating the merits of grant's deeds, so that the non-military public may receive his opinion without any grains of allowance. in the theory of warfare, in his complete knowledge and appreciation of the principles of strategy, however he may have failed in the practical application of the science in the field, the general-in-chief had no superior. he was a writer of no little celebrity, before the war, on military subjects, and is amply competent to pronounce a safe opinion. when a man of his calibre, therefore, steps out of the sphere of the rebellion for a comparison, and pronounces the battle of chattanooga "one of the most remarkable in history," the general public, unlearned in the mysteries of military science, may justifiably deduce from his statement the belief that general grant is one of the most remarkable soldiers the world has ever seen. history is but little more than a record of wars, battles, and sieges. the characters who figure the most extensively in its chronicles are the warriors of all ages. how stands grant among them? he has captured more guns and more prisoners than any general in the whole history of the world! the campaign and siege of vicksburg is without a parallel in the annals of any nation under the sun! until the american rebellion napoleon was the greatest general the world had ever seen. grant has paled even his star; for grant has no waterloo, no disastrous retreat, like that from russia, in his record. not alone in the grandeur of his position as a military genius is grant great. in his sterling goodness, in his modesty, in his magnanimity, in his perception of character, in his quiet winning way, in his sublime confidence in himself, in his christian forbearance, in his absolute self-negation, and in his unselfish love of country, he is a great man, even without the laurel of victory upon his brow. when i see him, crippled in body, weakened and physically broken down by long confinement to his bed, hastening on his crutches to the most desperate scene which the annals of this terrible war present; hurrying with the laurel of vicksburg and donelson on his brow, without a thought that he was imperilling his splendid reputation in an almost hopeless venture; speeding through tempest and desolation, not at the head of his war-worn and victorious veterans, but alone, to a stricken, half-starved, beleaguered position, from whose overlooking environments the cunning foe was gazing down, while they waited for famine and death to do their certain work; when i see him thus staking his all,--for his all, in a worldly sense, was his brilliant fame,--sacrificing ease, comfort, health, exposing his very life, to save the army, to save chattanooga, to save the cause,--i cannot but ask, what other man has done so much? what other man could, or would? one of his biographers has said that grant went to chattanooga with the reënforcements for which rosecrans had vainly pleaded; that he went with two armies to the relief of the town. there was time enough, after grant arrived, to have fought half a dozen battles before even the moral support of either of these forces was available for the relief of the army of the cumberland. sherman was struggling through a hostile country, battling with swollen rivers, broken roads, and the storms and tempests of november, a hundred miles away. hooker was not in a position to lift a finger till the genius of grant opened the way for his movement. bragg might have swooped down from his mountain holds and stormed the intrenchments with an overwhelming force at any hour of the day or the night. we only wondered that he did not do it. but he held lookout valley, held the river, held the railroad above and below the town, and nothing but his perfect assurance that neither hooker nor sherman could get into chattanooga before the garrison would be starved out prevented him from doing so. no! grant fought the rebels alone during those five days--the darkest and most perilous in his career. if he had been beaten in the end, if chattanooga had fallen before either of the two armies arrived, he would still have been entitled to the credit of his most heroic and self-sacrificing conduct. i repeat, it is not alone the brilliant lustre of his military deeds which calls forth our admiration: his patriotism, his unselfish devotion to the cause, entitle him to the highest place in the regards of the american people. occasionally, in the current newspapers of the day, during the rebellion, we read the astounding statement that general fitzfizzle was under fire; that a shell exploded on the side of the river where he was; that his staff besought him not to expose his precious person to the deadly projectiles of the enemy. we are sensationally informed that general fitzfizzle told his officers to retire to a safe place if they were afraid. general fitzfizzle had evidently screwed his courage up to the sticking point, and during the long period of three whole minutes he was exposed to the bullets of the enemy--until, indeed, his presence was elsewhere required. we tender to general fitzfizzle the homage of our grateful admiration. we feel that he was a brave man, for he has exposed his _corpus_ to the bullet of the foe. but what has he done for three minutes more than private mcmullen and corporal mullinstock have done during the entire battle? is it heralded in the newspapers that by an effort he has exhibited the mere brute courage which has distinguished thousands of humble privates whose names will never be printed? it does not appear from any record that grant ever uttered a sensational remark on the field. the terrible earnestness of the man admitted of no side talk, no silly affectation, no ridiculous farce which could point a paragraph in the papers. he was always in the battle, and always a part of the battle. he chose the position best suited to his purpose for observing the movements of the contending armies. it mattered not whether it was exposed to the enemy's fire or not; he never considered that question. i am not aware that he ever recklessly exposed himself without need, and certainly he never sought a place of safety during the battle. it does not appear that he considered the question of personal safety at all. he was where his presence was required, without regard to peril. at belmont he was with the skirmishers in the front line of battle, the first to go on the field, and the last to leave it. at shiloh he led charge after charge, and was in the thickest of the fight. hundreds of men behind him, and all around him, fell. he never required an escort, but rode, with his staff, into the hottest of the fight. so continually exposed was he, that the whole army wondered he was not killed. at ringgold, in the pursuit of bragg's fleeing army, he rode for half a mile, at a moderate trot, through a storm of shot and shell. he was not thinking of danger--only of the enemy's positions. he was studying the battle, in that moment which would have tried the souls of common men. there was no consciousness at any time on his face that he was doing "a big thing." he was simply in earnest, completely absorbed in the progress of the battle. where necessity required him to go, he went; if there was a direct road, by that; if not, over the fields, through the woods, swimming his horse through any stream that lay in his path. he did everything with all his might, as if in literal obedience to the scripture injunction; and though not physically a powerful man, he seemed to be superior to fatigue, hunger, cold, and all the ills to which human flesh is subject. he would ride from breakfast time till two o'clock the next morning without tasting food, and continue this severe exertion until his work was finished--till victory had crowned his operations. he could wear out his staff, who were compelled to attend him, but he did not wear out himself. he was an earnest man, and through the might of his earnestness, he conquered all obstacles, and triumphed over every disadvantage. it was not luck, it was not good fortune, that gave him the battle; it was genius, fortified by hard, persistent labor. if he beat down greater obstacles than any other man, it was because he studied deeper, worked harder, and fought longer than any other. grant's task was not yet finished. burnside was still in peril, a hundred miles away. granger was sent forward to his assistance, but his movements were too laggard to satisfy the impatience of the heroic chief, and sherman was started on the war path to supersede him. the army of the ohio had been hemmed in at knoxville, and its situation was hazardous in the extreme, though burnside was fully equal to the emergency. he had only twelve days' provisions left, but he manfully stood his ground. grant had given him the most effectual relief in driving bragg away from the valley. at the time of sending sherman up the tennessee, grant forwarded a despatch in duplicate to kingston, one copy of which was for burnside, and the other was intended for, and fell into the hands of, the enemy. longstreet received his copy; but, before it fell into his hands, he learned that bragg had fallen back. he therefore determined to attack knoxville without delay. fort sanders, the principal defence of the place, was assaulted, and a fierce struggle ensued, but the rebels were defeated. after the battle, longstreet received the despatch which grant had written for his edification. finding that sherman was in the vicinity, he had not a moment to lose, and started in full retreat for virginia. burnside and sherman conferred together in regard to the situation. longstreet was pursued, but the force was insufficient, and the chase was abandoned. burnside did not fully appreciate the situation, and sent sherman back to chattanooga, retaining only granger's command. longstreet was a very able general, and took prompt advantage of the mistake of his antagonist. finding nothing but a small cavalry force behind him, he turned, defeated it, and marched back into east tennessee, establishing himself at russellville for the winter, where the country afforded abundant supplies. if grant's orders to burnside had been fully apprehended and carried out, this mortifying result could not have transpired. but the winter had set in, and military operations in that mountain region were impracticable. the termination of the event was simply mortifying: it in no way affected the grand result of the chattanooga campaign, which had been victorious in all its details. on the 10th of december, after the enemy had been driven from his strongholds, grant issued his congratulatory order to the three armies under his command, which has such a ring of true steel in it, that i cannot help holding it up to the admiration of my sympathizing reader. "headquarters military division of the } mississippi, in the field, } chattanooga, tenn., dec. 10, 1863. } "the general commanding takes this opportunity of returning his sincere thanks and congratulations to the brave armies of the cumberland, the ohio, the tennessee, and their comrades from the potomac, for the recent splendid and decisive successes achieved over the enemy. in a short time you have recovered from him the control of the tennessee river from bridgeport to knoxville. you dislodged him from his great stronghold upon lookout mountain, drove him from chattanooga valley, wrested from his determined grasp the possession of missionary ridge, repelled, with heavy loss to him, his repeated assaults upon knoxville, forcing him to raise the siege there, driving him at all points, utterly routed and discomfited, beyond the limits of the state. by your noble heroism and determined courage you have most effectually defeated the plans of the enemy for regaining possession of the states of kentucky and tennessee. you have secured positions from which no rebellious power can drive or dislodge you. for all this the general commanding thanks you collectively and individually. the loyal people of the united states thank and bless you. their hopes and prayers for your success against this unholy rebellion are with you daily. their faith in you will not be in vain. their hopes will not be blasted. their prayers to almighty god will be answered. you will yet go to other fields of strife; and, with the invincible bravery and unflinching loyalty to justice and right which have characterized you in the past, you will prove that no enemy can withstand you, and that no defences, however formidable, can check your onward march. by order of major general u.s. grant." this came from the "silent man," who simply never talks without having something to say; but his pen speaks and reveals the man in all the towering grandeur of his lofty patriotism and sublime devotion. in this paper he tells the soldiers what they have done, not what he has done himself. president lincoln promptly congratulated the general, and all under his command, on the decisive victory, and expressed his profoundest gratitude for the skill, courage, and perseverance with which the work had been accomplished. soon after the assembling of congress, while the brilliant events i have written down were still fresh in the minds of the people, both houses passed a resolution to this effect: "that the thanks of congress be, and they are hereby, presented to major general ulysses s. grant, and through him to the officers and soldiers who have fought under his command during this rebellion, for their gallantry and good conduct in the battles in which they have been engaged; and that the president of the united states be requested to cause a gold medal to be struck, with suitable emblems, devices, and inscriptions, to be presented to major general grant." these victories were so important, and had such a decided influence upon the destinies of the nation, that the hearts of the people were filled with gratitude. the president appointed a day of thanksgiving, and grant was renewedly hailed as the savior of the country. he was not dazzled by the elevated position he had achieved. not a vain-glorious remark escaped his lips; not a particle of vanity was apparent in his looks or his manner. neither the victories he had won, nor the spontaneous homage of the people, turned his thought from the cause to himself. early in december, as soon as the campaign was fairly closed, and in the very despatch in which he announced the final results, he renewed his proposition for an expedition against mobile. he does not ask to go home and receive the plaudits of his fellow-citizens; he does not hint at a moment of respite to enjoy the laurels he had won; he does not even require time to rest his weary frame, and recover entirely from his injuries. he is ready to organize immediately an attack upon mobile. he mentions his route, and proposes to take it or invest it before the end of the next month. he was still in earnest, but the government were not prepared to authorize the movement. burnside had been superseded at knoxville by foster, and grant visited his headquarters to prepare for a movement against longstreet as soon as the season would permit. foster was soon relieved at his own request, on account of an old wound, and general schofield, at grant's request, was appointed in his place. sherman was sent to vicksburg, where he organized the celebrated meridian expedition, and early in february it started. the rebels were driven out of mississippi, and its whole railroad system was destroyed or deranged so that it was useless to the confederacy. the army marched four hundred miles in less than a month, fed upon the country, and returned in better condition than when it started. in january grant obtained permission of the war department to visit st. louis, where his son was dangerously sick. he travelled without show or parade, and few, if any, found out who he was. at the hotel, on his arrival, he registered his name as "u.s. grant, chattanooga;" but the news of his coming soon spread, and he was tendered a public reception and dinner. his son being much better, he accepted the invitation. his speech at the dinner was a line and a half in length. in the evening he was serenaded, and his speech was two lines and a half in length. he had never made a speech, and never intended to do so. the multitude shouted for a speech. "tell them you can fight for them, but cannot talk to them--do tell them this," pleaded an earnest friend at his side. "i must get some one else to say that for me," replied the general. of grant's "silence," i shall have the honor to speak in another place. during the winter, grant attended to all the vast details of his large department, and put everything in condition for an early renewal of the contest in the spring, and on the 3d of march he was ordered to washington. chapter xxv. _wherein captain galligasken follows the illustrious soldier to washington, where, after enduring many hardships, he is commissioned lieutenant general in the army of the united states._ grant was not ignorant of the occasion of his summons to washington. while he had been busily engaged with the duties of his department, the people had been heaping honors upon him. associations of all kinds, learned and philanthropic, made him an honorary member of their bodies. ohio and new york voted him thanks in their legislatures. gifts of every description poured in upon him--cigars and cigar cases, revolvers, books, canes, and other articles, sufficient in number to enable him to establish a private museum, if he had had any taste for "the show business." none of these articles gave him so much pleasure as a brier-wood cigar case, cut out with a pocket knife by a poor soldier, and modestly sent to him as a token of the maker's veneration and regard. a great many babies were named after him at this time, though in this respect it is doubtful whether he ever rivalled his immediate associate on the presidential ticket, the hon. schuyler colfax, who has probably had more babies named after him than any other living man. it was not safe to speak ill of grant, so warmly was his name nestled in the hearts of the people; and no one desired to do so except the immediate friends of a few disappointed aspirants for fame on the battle-field. the leather dealer of galena had actually become the most famous man in america. only a short time before he went to washington, he had been honored in the highest degree in st. louis by the very men to whose back doors he had hauled wood only four years before! the city that "respectfully declined" his petition to be appointed an engineer was eager to give him a public reception, and did yield him all the honors within its power. in three years, by the might of his brilliant genius, he had lifted himself from obscurity to a position which challenged the gaze of the whole nation. but his had not been the struggle of ambition--only the promptings of patriotic duty. a score of more ambitious generals, fighting for a name among men, had risen and fallen during this time. while this tempest of applause was sounding through the land, grant was devoting all his energies to the work he had in hand, claiming no honors, asking for no preferments. but a grateful people were not satisfied. grant was no higher in rank than others; he was in no way distinguished on the roll of the army from those whom he had outrivalled in the career of arms. just before he had been called to washington, the bill reviving the grade of lieutenant general in the army had passed both houses of congress, and had been approved by the president. it was then the highest rank known in our country. the office had been created for washington, and had been filled by him for the year preceding his death. it was then discontinued, and only conferred by brevet upon scott in 1855. as grant rose far above any other general in the lustre of his achievements, it was eminently proper that the distinction should be conferred upon him. he did not ask it, he did not even suggest it or hint at it. just before he started for washington, he sent particular instructions to sherman, who was then returning from his meridian expedition, directing him to have his army in readiness for a movement upon atlanta in the spring, which he expected to conduct in person. with these orders he sent a private letter to his devoted friend, which is too perfect an exponent of the man to be omitted:- * * * * * "dear sherman: the bill reviving the grade of lieutenant general in the army has become a law, and my name has been sent to the senate for the place. i now receive orders to report at washington immediately, _in person_, which indicates a confirmation, or a likelihood of confirmation. i start in the morning to comply with the order. "whilst i have been eminently successful in this war, in at least gaining the confidence of the public, no one feels more than i how much of this success is due to the energy, skill, and harmonious putting forth of that energy and skill, of those whom it has been my good fortune to have occupying subordinate positions under me. "there are many officers to whom these remarks are applicable in a greater or less degree, proportionate to their ability as soldiers; but what i want is, to express my thanks to you and mcpherson, as the men to whom, above all others, i feel indebted for whatever i have had of success. "how far your advice and assistance have been of help to me, you know. how far your execution of whatever has been given to you to do entitles you to the reward i am receiving, you cannot know as well as i. "i feel all the gratitude this letter would express, giving it the most flattering construction. "the word _you_ i use in the plural, intending it for mcpherson also. i should write to him, and will some day; but, starting in the morning, i do not know that i shall find time just now. your friend, u.s. grant, _major general_." i doubt whether a brighter illustration of pure magnanimity can be found in the annals of great men throughout all time and all nations than the spirit manifested by grant in this letter. i regard him as more truly great in this exhibition of an excellent tone of mind than in even the glorious victories he won; for the most brilliant conquest in the field, without a noble spirit in the hero, only confers partial greatness. i have before said, in speaking of grant as we saw him at west point, that he was careful of the rights of others--the sublimest interpretation of the golden rule of jesus christ. at the moment when we find the illustrious soldier called to the capital to receive the real laurel he had nobly earned, he seems to pause and ask himself if he is not going to take the reward which in part belongs to others. on the night before he starts, he writes this splendid acknowledgment of his indebtedness to the two veterans who had so devotedly sustained him in his trying campaigns and in the actual shock of battle. sherman's letter in reply contains a tried soldier's estimate of grant. his language is carefully guarded from exaggeration, and i have no hesitation in declaring that he might have made it even stronger, without doing violence to the truth, even in the era of chattanooga. while i feel that my humble office as a chronicler of the events of a sublime life is overshadowed when such a man as sherman speaks, justice to the reader compels me to insert the veteran's letter in my work, for his words carry an influence even beyond the inherent truth he utters. * * * * * "dear general: i have your more than kind and characteristic letter of the 4th instant. i will send a copy to general mcpherson at once. you do yourself injustice in assigning to us too large a share of the merits which have led to your high advancement. i know you approve the friendship i have ever professed to you, and will permit me to continue, as heretofore, to manifest it on all proper occasions. "you are now washington's legitimate successor, and occupy a position of almost dangerous elevation; but if you can continue, as heretofore, to be yourself,--simple, honest, and unpretending,--you will enjoy through life the respect and love of friends, and the homage of millions of human beings, that will award you a large share in securing to them and their descendants a government of law and stability. "i repeat, you do general mcpherson and myself too much honor. at belmont you manifested your traits, neither of us being near. at donelson, also, you illustrated your whole character. i was not near, and general mcpherson in too subordinate a capacity to influence you. "until you had won donelson, i confess i was almost cowed by the terrible array of anarchical elements that presented themselves at every point; but that admitted a ray of light i have followed since. "i believe you are as brave, patriotic, and just, as the great prototype, washington; as unselfish, kind-hearted, and honest as man should be. but the chief characteristic is the simple faith in success you have always manifested, which i can liken to nothing else than the faith a christian has in his savior. "this faith gave you victory at shiloh and vicksburg. also, when you have completed your preparations, you go into battle without hesitation, as at chattanooga--no doubts, no reserves; and i tell you it was this that made us act with confidence. i knew, wherever i was, that you thought of me, and if i got in a tight place, you would help me, if alive. "my only point of doubt was in your knowledge of grand strategy, and of books of science and history; but i confess your common sense seems to have supplied all these. "now as to the future. do not stay in washington; come west; take to yourself the whole mississippi valley. let us make it dead sure, and i tell you the atlantic slopes and the pacific shores will follow its destiny, as sure as the limbs of a tree live and die with the main trunk. we have done much, but still much remains. time and time's influence are with us. we could almost afford to sit still and let these influences work. "here lies the seat of the coming empire; and from the west, when our task is done, we will make short work of charleston and richmond, and the impoverished coast of the atlantic. your sincere friend, w.t. sherman. with no trumpet blast to herald his coming, grant went on his way to washington, travelling in haste, and mostly by special trains. he courted and sought privacy; but when it was discovered at the railroad stations that he was on the train, the people lustily cheered him, and crowded forward to obtain a sight of the great man of whom all had heard, but whom few had seen. he had never made a "progress" after any of his victories. even the president had never seen him. he was well known to the soldiers, hardly at all to the civilians. on his journey he received a telegram from general halleck, so magnanimous in its tone as to leave not a doubt that the general-in-chief had been born into a new life. grant was to displace him, but halleck behaved handsomely; and in his generous appreciation of the illustrious soldier, i shall forever forget that he had ever snubbed and disgraced a greater than himself. the despatch was as follows: "the secretary of war directs me to say that your commission as lieutenant general is signed, and will be delivered to you on your arrival at the war department. i sincerely congratulate you on this recognition of your distinguished and meritorious services." on his arrival at the capital of the nation, where he had never spent more than a single day before, he proceeded quietly to willard's with his son, who accompanied him on the journey. singular as it may seem, he was not discovered. a vainer man than he would have been disgusted; but grant so far sympathized with the rebels that he only wished to be "let alone." without parade or ostentation, he went to the public table to dinner. here, unfortunately for him, but to the great delight of the guests of the hotel, the secret came out. a member of congress who was at the table recognized him, and, rising, he announced, to the dismay of grant, we may well believe, "gentlemen, the hero of vicksburg is among us!" the congressman proposed his health, and this was the signal for the most enthusiastic cheering that ever greeted a laurelled hero coming home from the conquest. grant rose from his chair, and merely bowed his acknowledgments, resuming his seat at the earliest practicable moment; for such a situation was as much worse than the bull-dog guns of vicksburg as anything he could imagine. he was really a modest man; his conduct was not a uriah heep's affectation of humility. he was not insensible to the good opinion of the people, but the extravagant manifestation of it which obtains with our over-demonstrative countrymen was painfully embarrassing to him. at vicksburg grant personally superintended the placing in position of a number of heavy guns. while the soldiers were digging out the embrasure, he stood on the top of the works, smoking his cigar, and coolly whittling a stick--the general inherits the pure tendencies of a new england yankee from his ancestors. in this situation he was a conspicuous mark for rebel sharp-shooters, but he staid there till the guns were placed to his satisfaction, to the intense admiration of the men, who delight in exhibitions of pluck. i am of the opinion, if grant had been whittling a stick when he was discovered and applauded at willard's, he would have cut his fingers; for he is never intimidated except under the fire of a popular demonstration. i declare, upon my honor as a soldier and an historian, that grant is not indifferent to the praise or blame of his fellow-citizens. i know that he is as keenly sensitive as any man living, though his will enables him to control his emotions. i have myself seen him under a fire of compliments, and studied the expression of his face. he is simply modest, even to diffidence. i never saw another man just like him in this respect. there is nothing awkward or repulsive in his manner. for my own part, i do not see how any man, whatever big thing he has done, can stand still and take the most extravagant compliments as a matter of course; and of all the great men i ever knew in public life,--and i have known many,--i have been better satisfied with grant's conduct, in the hour of his triumph, than with that of any other. i cannot describe his mien or manner, because it is indescribable. kind words move him, and i have seen the glow upon his face, hardly perceptible, it is true, but still there, indicating true greatness of soul, in that he was not "puffed up," or, even worse, was not insensible. grant was beset with admirers; but when i consider the quality of a large portion of the crowd which gathers in any public place within the limits of the national capital,--the parasites and sycophants who strive to sun themselves in the smile of a great man,--i cannot wonder that grant did not open his mouth to speak, even to thank the multitude for their kind appreciation. they beset him behind and before; and a man who could not make a speech on such an occasion was a miracle. "silence was golden." with great difficulty could he make his way to his private room, where he sought shelter from the onslaught of admirers. in the evening he went to the white house, to attend president lincoln's levee. the enthusiasm of the people was tremendous. poor grant was never in such a strait in his life. his particular horror seems to have been completely realized on this occasion, and though it was, doubtless, one of the proudest moments of his life, it was at the same time one of the most harassing and discouraging; for the unfortunate general was actually lifted from his feet, and compelled to stand upon a sofa, where all in the room could see him. cheer after cheer shook the walls of the house, in which president lincoln heartily joined, standing by the side of the hero, and magnanimously sustaining him in the hour of his greatest trial, as he had at vicksburg and chattanooga. in the course of the evening, grant escorted mrs. lincoln around the east room, and afterwards remarked that "this was his warmest campaign during the whole war." i heartily sympathize with the sorely-pestered conqueror in what to other men would have been the realization of the acme of human bliss. he blushed and struggled against the awful storm of applause, but he did not do a single ridiculous thing. it was a time when almost any man could have been forgiven for making a fool of himself; but grant had no vanity to triumph over him in the hour of temptation, and he came out of it as clean and bright as he went in. what is true of him on this specific occasion is equally true of him in all his career. he was no more spoiled by prosperity than by adversity; and the former is infinitely more destructive to public men than the latter. as my late friend a. ward said of g. washington, u.s. grant "never slopped over." "i hope to get away from washington soon, for i am tired of the show business already," said the persecuted hero to a friend, as they returned from the levee. the show business! shades of the over-flattered heroes of all time, could it be possible that this man had reached an elevation so sublime as to call the sweet savor of approbation by such a name! others have toiled and struggled for a lifetime to win such a recognition of their greatness, but grant wished to avoid it! the rebellion was not yet conquered. on the morrow he was to receive his commission as lieutenant general, and all the armies of the united states were to be placed under his command. he was an earnest man, and his whole being was filled with a sense of the responsibility he was to assume. the destiny of a nation seemed to be placed upon his shoulders; and what wonder was it that he regarded mere applause as distasteful? i almost tremble as i approach a scene which only the pencil of the artist can fitly describe. in the chamber of the cabinet were gathered, on the 9th of march, the president, the members of the cabinet, and general halleck, representing the government. general grant, attended by two members of his staff and his oldest son, was formally received by the president, who addressed the illustrious soldier as follows:-"general grant: the nation's appreciation of what you have done, and its reliance upon you for what remains in the existing great struggle, are now presented with this commission, constituting you lieutenant general in the army of the united states. with this high honor devolves upon you, also, a corresponding responsibility. as the country herein trusts you, so, under god, it will sustain you. i scarcely need to add, that with what i here speak for the nation goes my own hearty personal concurrence." lieutenant general grant accepted the commission, and then read his written reply:-"mr. president: i accept the commission with gratitude for the honor conferred. with the aid of the noble armies that have fought in so many fields for our common country, it will be my earnest endeavor not to disappoint your expectations. i feel the full weight of the responsibilities now devolving on me; and i know that if they are met, it will be due to those armies, and, above all, to the favor of the providence which leads both nations and men." at last the army of the united states, now numbering eight hundred thousand men, had found its true leader, and grant had found his true position. chapter xxvi. _wherein captain galligasken has something to say about the illustrious soldier's views of strategy, and follows him across the rapidan into the wilderness._ the earnest man, now occupying the highest purely military office in the united states, meant business; and on the day after he received his commission, he paid a brief visit to the army of the potomac, in company with general meade, then commanding it. the next morning he started for the west, and was at nashville when the order of the president appointing him to the command of the armies of the united states reached him. in a very brief, simple, and business-like order he assumed the command, announcing that his headquarters would be in the field, and with the army of the potomac. general halleck, "at his own request," was relieved from command as general-in-chief, and assigned to duty in washington as chief of staff of the army. sherman was appointed to the military division of the mississippi,--the position made vacant by the elevation of grant,--and mcpherson was placed in command of the army and the department of the tennessee, thus stepping into sherman's place. halleck was "let down" as gently as possible, the order that promulgated these changes including the president's approbation and thanks for the zealous manner in which the late general-in-chief had performed his duties. in this programme of appointments, of course, the lieutenant general had been consulted; indeed, so far as the force in the field were concerned, they were his assignments. sherman and mcpherson were placed where they could be felt; they were grant's most intimate friends, made so by their zeal and devotion to the cause which he loved above every other consideration. six days after he had assumed the command of the armies of the nation, grant arrived in washington with his wife and his oldest son. he was the central figure in the gigantic drama of the american rebellion. the eyes of the nation were fixed upon him, not alone of the loyal portion, but the jeers and the taunts of the south indicated that the rebels themselves had an interest in the movements of the hero who had wrested from them the dominion of the western portion of the confederacy. friend and foe on the other side of the broad ocean regarded him with almost breathless attention, for now the name of grant flashed over the wires of another continent. his fame was as broad as the world itself. well might the lieutenant general have shrunk from the stupendous task imposed upon him by the acceptance of his lofty position. he had undertaken a duty which none had assumed but to fail--most miserably to fail. the prospect before him would have been appalling to an ordinary mind. standing on the highest pinnacle of fame as a soldier, as sherman said, "your reputation as a general is now far above that of any man living," he stepped into the most difficult position that ever a man filled. he was exposed to all the perils of political influence, to all the darts of envy and malice behind him, as well as to all the combinations of a skilful and desperate foe before him. it required no little moral courage, after the failure of mcclellan and halleck, after the almost uniform disasters which had beset the eastern armies, to undertake the hazardous task of bringing victory out of the elements around him. grant was solemnly in earnest. he was inspired with one great thought--the putting down of the rebellion. his predecessors had indulged in showy reviews; balls and parties had enlivened the tedium of the waiting hours in the camp; and beauty's flashing eye had gladdened the heart of the soldier. in accordance with the traditions of the army, the ladies waited upon lieutenant general grant, and suggested a ball as a fitting festivity in connection with the grand review of the army of the potomac which was proposed. gently, but firmly, he objected, and declared that "this thing must be stopped." he was not opposed to reasonable pleasures at suitable times, but he pointed out to them the condition of the country in the throes of a death-struggle with treason, and insisted that it was no time for festivities among the army officers. he spoke of the wounded and the dying in the hospitals, and manifested such a simple and genuine sensibility, that the ladies, who were true at heart, promptly abandoned the project. the grand review took place; yet it was not a holiday show, but a means of acquainting the general with the material of the army which was now to do the principal work in suppressing the rebellion. it was a splendid army which marched in column before him, and the heart of the great commander was strengthened by the display, not of gilt and feathers, but of numbers, of muscle, of courage. although in the spring of 1864 the rebellion had been cut in two, the sundered parts, like the fabled reptile, were still vital. the confederacy had been weakened, but by no means overpowered. its supplies of food had been greatly reduced, but still it maintained large armies in the field. the south, nominally struggling for what it was pleased to call liberty, was the most absolute despotism on the face of the earth, and every energy and resource of the people, willing or unwilling, was turned into the channel of its defence. "the cradle and the grave were robbed" to recruit its armies. terrible reverses had befallen the rebel arms, and perhaps impaired the faith of the southern people in ultimate success; but their spirit was not broken, and still they howled about the "last ditch." misfortune, instead of bringing thoughts of submission and peace, brought desperation, a mad and fanatical zeal, like that of a band of pirates who fight tenfold more savagely to escape the halter than to win a prize. ill success, so far from moderating the fury of the rebel soldiers, transformed them into reckless zealots, more dangerous than ever before in the path of an army of civilized men. this is not a theory deduced from the insane protestations of rebel brawlers and newspaper writers, but from the conduct of rebel soldiers on the battle-field; a truth derived from the wilderness, cold harbor, and petersburg, not from jeff. davis and his co-rebel declaimers. the experience of three years of war had demonstrated that, man for man, the north fought as well, at least, as the south. if at one time pluck and persistency seemed to predominate at the south, the table would be turned at another time. for every rebel victory there was always more than one offset in national triumphs. while everything worth holding in the west had fallen, richmond maintained its bold front. the army of the potomac had been tilting at it from the day it was organized; had repeatedly advanced, and as often been driven back. thus far the national arms had failed to reach richmond. while the rebel capital had been the objective point of the north, the national capital had been the objective point of the south. whenever a confederate army, flushed with success in virginia, crossed the potomac, it was driven back. lee in pennsylvania was even more unlucky than mcclellan in virginia. chickahominy and malvern were paralleled by south mountain and antietam; fredericksburg by gettysburg. between richmond and washington, up to the time of grant's appointment as general-in-chief, the contest had been a "drawn game." neither side gained any permanent advantage. when the north rushed down to richmond, it was driven back, shattered and wasted. when the south swept around washington, it recoiled and went back, leaving its dead, wounded, and prisoners behind. up to this time the fighting material of both armies was not only about equal, but in generalship and officers the contending forces were well matched. the loyal nation was tired of this marching back and forth, with nothing but the waste of battle to mark the result, and the coming of grant was hailed as the beginning of a new era. general lee was the ablest soldier in the southern confederacy, and its hope in the coming shock of battle rested on him. all the available troops of the south were sent to him, and though he was outnumbered, he had the advantage of position; he had "the inside track," which was worth more to him, in a military point of view, than the disparity in force was to grant. lee was not only strongly intrenched in his position at the opening of the campaign, but he had been over the ground between the rapidan and the james time and again, till he knew every foot of ground and every strategic point. behind him were the earthworks he had prepared in former campaigns, ready built for use. this was the man, and this the situation, which grant had to encounter; and he sounded with a new significance the old cry, "on to richmond!" he agreed with those who came before him that the rebel capital must be taken, and he intended to take it, not by a series of chess-board movements, retiring when the enemy checkmated him, but by "persistent hammering." he assigned to strategy its real value; but strategy had been tried by the cunningest men in the army, and it had failed. lee was clear-headed, quick, cool, brave, adroit. he made blunders, but so seldom that it was hardly worth while to wait for one. strategy, as i, bernard galligasken, understand it, is simply the taking advantage of the enemy's mistakes and weak points, without exposing yourself in a similar manner. suppose two generals, in command of opposing armies, to be absolutely perfect strategists, and each incapable of making a mistake. with the forces equal in numbers, pluck, and endurance, the first general taking position could hold it, in theory, to the end of time. a reënforcement or a mistake alone can change the conditions, and give the victory to either. if lee would kindly make a bad blunder, it would be easy to whip him; but he profited by his own blunders as well as by those of his enemy. if grant would obligingly leave a weak point, lee could drive him out of virginia. strategy and tactics were splendid qualities in mexico, where the officers of the two armies had been graduated from different military institutions. there strategy overcame all odds, confounding the mexicans with its brilliant results. on the battle-fields of virginia, west point fought on both sides, and the difference in weight and mobility of brain gained victories. grant had solved this problem of strategy out of his own and the experience of the unfortunate generals of the army of the potomac. he believed in strategy as fully and firmly as any general; but the sad spectacle of the splendid army whose movements he was to direct in the closing campaign, marching back, beaten, but undismayed, from fredericksburg, chancellorsville, and chickahominy, assured him that strategy alone could not cut the gordian knot of rebel power. after the fierce battles of chattanooga, where skill and science had done their perfect work, grant was smoking his cigar at his headquarters in nashville, in company with quartermaster general meigs and general w.f. smith, who had greatly distinguished himself in the engineering operations of the campaign just closed. smith was pacing the room, absorbed in his own thoughts, and lost to everything around him. "what are you thinking about, baldy?" asked meigs, breaking the silence which had continued for some time. general smith was so intensely engaged in his meditations, that he did not notice the question, and made no reply. "baldy is studying strategy," added meigs, turning to grant with a laugh. "i don't believe in strategy in the popular understanding of the term," said grant, very seriously, as he removed the cigar from his lips. "i use it to get as close as possible to the enemy with little loss." "and what then?" asked meigs. "then? 'up, guards, and at them!'" answered grant, with more fire than usual. his practice was an exemplification of his rule; but he believed that, after strategy had done its utmost, there was, in this war of the rebellion, a deal of terrible fighting to be done. with this view grant placed himself where he could direct the movements of the army of the potomac. long before he assumed his present office, he had studied the problem, and he was now prepared to act vigorously and in earnest. he purged the army of incompetent men, sternly banished all fancy work from its lines, and gathered himself up for the mighty struggle. sheridan was called from the west, and placed in command of all his cavalry. meade, the hero of gettysburg, was retained in command of the army of the potomac. butler was sent to operate on the south side of the james. sigel commanded the force in the shenandoah valley, which was to protect washington from a rebel force approaching in that direction. more important than all, sherman, at the head of the combined armies which grant himself had commanded at chattanooga, was to move on atlanta. grant had harmonized the various divisions of the army, so that they were no longer to pull "as in a balky team," but all together. richmond was the objective point of the army of the potomac, while atlanta--of vast importance to the rebels as a railroad centre, and for its founderies, machine-shops, military magazines, and storehouses for supplies--was the point to which the army of the mississippi was directed. grant had planned both of these campaigns, and he had thoroughly impressed it upon his subordinates that there was to be no giving up when strategy failed, no turning back, and no conducting war on peace principles. it was the rebel armies which constituted the power of the confederacy, and these were to be destroyed. when they were used up, strategic points would lose their value. through the month of april the busy notes of preparation for the strife were heard; men and material were gathered together, and nothing was left undone which could add even its mite to the prospect of success. though the plan of the campaign was kept a profound secret in the breasts of only a few, so that it might not, as often before, be carried to the rebel leaders, yet the people were not blind to the signs of the times. great bodies of men, and vast supplies of provision and ammunition, were moved to the front, and it was certain that operations on a grand scale were about to be commenced. whatever attention grant had before attracted,--and certainly he had been the "observed of all observers,"--he was now regarded with the most intense interest, which could not but be attended with a certain painful anxiety. all these preparations had been sounded through the land before during the three years of grievous solicitude. that grand army had been ready to move before, with the petted, the trusted, the victorious general at its head. but almost always the tidings of disaster, or, at least, of turning back, came soon after. was the solemn tragedy to be repeated again? were those marshalled hosts once more to be forced back, and another great man to be hurled from his high eminence? the people prayed for grant, prayed for the army, prayed for success. but they believed in their hero. so modest, so gentle, so simple, he was a man to be trusted, and there was more of hope than of fear in their souls. the general-in-chief, unlike his predecessor, had gone into the field, and the people saw how earnest, how confident he was. he made no parade, sounded no trumpet before him, and they felt that god would bless such a man. the army of the potomac was on the north side of the rapidan, while on the south side was the rebel army. grant's headquarters were at culpepper court house. just before the order was given to move across the river, the president and the lieutenant general exchanged letters which illustrate grant's position, while his own exhibits the noble manliness of his nature. i must give both. * * * * * "executive mansion, washington, april 30, 1864. "lieutenant general grant: not expecting to see you before the spring campaign opens, i wish to express in this way my entire satisfaction with what you have done up to this time, so far as i understand it. the particulars of your plan i neither know nor seek to know. you are vigilant and self-reliant, and, pleased with this, i wish not to obtrude any restraints or constraints upon you. while i am very anxious that any great disaster or capture of our own men may be avoided, i know that these points are less likely to escape your attention than they would be mine. if there be anything wanting which is within my power to give, do not fail to let me know it. and now, with a brave army and a just cause, may god sustain you. yours very truly, a. lincoln." "headquarters army of the u.s., } culpepper c.h., va., may 1, 1864.} "mr. president: your very kind letter of yesterday is just received. the confidence you express for the future, and satisfaction for the past, in my military administration, is acknowledged with pride. it shall be my earnest endeavor that you and the country shall not be disappointed. from my first entry into the volunteer service of the country to the present day, i have never had cause of complaint, and have never expressed or implied a complaint against the administration or the secretary of war for throwing any embarrassment in the way of my vigorously prosecuting what appeared to be my duty. indeed, since the promotion which placed me in command of all the armies, and in view of the great responsibility and importance of success, i have been astonished at the readiness with which everything asked for has been yielded, without even an explanation being asked. should my success be less than i desire and expect, the least i can say is, the fault is not with you. very truly your obedient servant, u.s. grant, _lieutenant general_." this reply, so characteristic of the man, is noble in itself, and sublime in contrast with the views of some other generals. "the fault is not with you." not thus spoke others even before they had failed. on the 3d of may, general meade was ordered to cross the rapidan, and on the following day the passage was effected without opposition. the army entered that desolate region called the wilderness, and the soldiers, borrowing speech from the odyssey, might have exclaimed,- "we went, ulysses (such was thy command), through the lone thicket and the desert land." chapter xxvii. _wherein captain galligasken follows the campaign of the army of the potomac, and the illustrious soldier announces that he shall fight it out on that line, if it takes all summer_. the river was safely crossed, and the anxiety which the lieutenant general had felt in regard to this movement was removed. it was an entire success. the army train consisted of four thousand wagons, and it required no little accurate calculation to dispose of it with the available roads, without subjecting any portion of it to the liability of capture. formed in single line, the procession of teams, allowing forty feet to each, would extend about thirty miles, or nearly half way to richmond. it would require a man of great ability to conduct such a train even ten miles, in a time of profound peace, without throwing it into confusion. the nicest system and the closest coöperation were necessary, in order to keep it in a place of safety, and to prevent its movements from being impeded. of course this train could not be extended on a single line. it was a part of the calculation of the commanding general to keep this immense procession in a place of safety, and yet have it when and where it was wanted. but the wagons were only a small part of grant's solicitude. his army was composed of about one hundred and thirty thousand men--equal to the population of a large city. to have marched this vast body on a holiday excursion from the rapidan to the james, with no hostile foe to dispute its passage, would be regarded as a stupendous undertaking even for a skilful person. wellington once observed that there were very few generals in europe who could march an army of a hundred thousand men through hyde park gate without throwing them into confusion. but this vast army on its southern march was to be kept well in hand, and all its movements and positions known to one man. it was to be swung round, marched and countermarched, as a child handles a toy. it required a man of genius to control this cumbrous machine, independently of fighting battles with it. in the hands of an incompetent man, its very numbers would have been its greatest element of weakness. not only was grant directing the movements of this vast army, but he controlled another, hundreds of miles away, nearly as large, and a dozen more of minor magnitude. civilians who have never witnessed the movements of an army on a large scale can have no adequate idea of the skill required to handle its columns; but it is patent to many of the knowing ones that some of our generals failed for the want of this very ability to move in harmony such vast bodies of men. i gaze with wonder and admiration at the ease and facility with which grant carried in his mind the details of such a stupendous organization, and moved its parts as the mainspring moves all the wheels of a watch. a man with this ability alone is a miracle of power. it was the plan of the lieutenant general to flank the army of lee, and place his forces between the rebels and richmond, though the success of the campaign was by no means made to depend upon this movement. it would compel the confederates to abandon their elaborate intrenchments, upon which they had labored for months, either to assault the moving column or to fall back upon the capital. lee did not allow himself to be flanked, but, abandoning his works, attempted to cut through the national line, while it was yet involved in the intricacies of the wilderness. grant had not intended to fight a battle in this unfavorable spot, though he was ready at all times for the assault. the region was a tangled thicket, where the artillery could not be effectually used, and where it was impossible to manoeuvre an army. when he found his subtle foe approaching in force, he made his dispositions for the conflict. the battle commenced at noon, and raged with tremendous fury till night. it was fought with reckless valor on both sides. the rebels were repeatedly massed in heavy columns, and hurled against the union lines. the tide of battle surged to and fro till the darkness interrupted the fierce strife. no decided advantage was gained on either side, and the two armies, exhausted by the struggle, slept upon their arms. at dawn the next morning, may 6, the national line was again formed. it was five miles in length, with sedgwick, commanding the sixth corps, on the right, hancock, with the second corps, on the left, while warren, with the fifth, and burnside, with the ninth corps, were in the centre. by the arrival of longstreet, the rebels were reënforced, and lee began his "hammering" process on the right of the national line, which had been directed to make a general attack. the awful tragedy of the day before was repeated, and both lines at times swayed back and forth. hancock drove the force in front of him a mile and a half to the rear, capturing many prisoners and five stands of colors; but the advantage was soon lost. from morning till night again, with only an occasional lull, the lines surged like the great waves of ocean--now broken and scattered, but then mounting again with new vigor, and rolling on as though death had no terrors, and life had no pains. again the sun went down on a field unwon by either contestant in the savage strife. not a particle of practical advantage was gained by grant or lee. the union army had fought on the defensive, and had repulsed the assault; so far it had been successful. the rebel army had fought on the offensive, intending to drive the national forces back upon the rapidan, and break up the campaign at the onset. in this it had failed. furthermore, grant had succeeded in driving lee out of his intrenchments. the loss on both sides exceeded twenty thousand men. the union loss was much greater than that of the rebels, for the latter were familiar with every foot of the wild region in which the battle was fought, and were thus enabled to take advantage of what were the greatest obstacles in the path of the national troops. the army of the potomac had reached a crisis in its progress when it had been the rule to retreat and recruit. indeed, lee believed he had inflicted injury enough upon his foe to compel him, according to the traditions of the past, to retire and cover washington. but to his amazement, not to say his horror, he ascertained that burnside and sedgwick were in motion, not for the rapidan, but for spottsylvania. throughout the loyal land, and, we may well believe, the homes of treason also, the most intense anxiety for the result prevailed. the faithful, north of the potomac, had been educated by the experience of three years to be prepared for disasters in virginia, and a splendidly-conducted retreat would not greatly have astonished, however much it would have grieved and disappointed them, expecting, as they did, better things of the new general-in-chief. washington was in a state of the most exciting anxiety and suspense, in which the president and the officers of the war department shared. many sat up all night to hear tidings from the bloody battle-field. grant, even more thoroughly in earnest than ever before, had given orders, at the outposts of the city's defences, to arrest every man fleeing from the battle-field, and to put in irons every officer who "straggled." among those who were thus ignominiously shackled were _four colonels_. of course these beggarly cowards brought tidings of defeat and disaster, and it was feared in washington, as it was hoped in richmond, that the grand army of the potomac was again in retreat, was again retracing its steps to a safe position on the potomac. fear and suspense reigned, not only in the capital, but in all the loyal land. grant was the last hope of the people, and if he had failed,--he who had beaten down vicksburg, and scattered the foe at chattanooga,--the cause would be almost hopeless. grant forwarded no sensational despatches, but at the earliest opportunity he sent a truthful statement of the results of his operations. if all that had been hoped of the army was not achieved, the news was satisfactory. the national forces at least held their own; they were not retreating, as general lee believed and had telegraphed to richmond. the nation breathed easier, especially when president lincoln declared by proclamation that "enough was known of the army operations within the last five days to claim our especial gratitude to god." additional troops were sent forward to fill up the fearful gaps which had been made in the lines by the carnage of battle. on saturday, the lieutenant general, so far from being checked or disheartened by his position, felt that he had the advantage of the enemy, and coolly proceeded to carry out his original purpose of flanking the rebel army. he commenced moving his forces to spottsylvania court house, fifteen miles from the wilderness; but the thundering roll of that mighty wagon train was heard by lee. it assured him that a new movement was in progress, and he quickly discovered its nature. then commenced a race for the objective point of both. there was considerable skirmishing during this day, but no heavy battle. both armies were moving in parallel lines for spottsylvania court house, and on several occasions they jostled each other so as to produce smart engagements; but there was no general battle. the advance of the two armies reached their destination at the same time, and the rebels immediately took possession of the strong earthworks which had been previously constructed. warren, in command of the fifth corps, attacked at once; but the enemy was so well protected by his intrenchment that the assault failed. but, reenforced in the afternoon, the attack was repeated, and the foe was driven out of his works, the nationals capturing fifteen hundred prisoners. during the day every corps of the army had been engaged. monday was spent in strengthening the position and in preparation for the fight, though there was much skirmishing going on all day. while general sedgwick was superintending the posting of the guns in front of his corps, a bullet struck him in the face, and he fell, dying immediately. he was a noble man, and a severe loss to the army. on this day also was sent out phil sheridan, on that bold raid in which he inflicted so much injury on the rebels, sweeping around richmond, and menacing its safety. on this expedition he encountered and fought the most celebrated cavalryman of the rebel army,--general stuart,--who was mortally wounded in the action, and his forces routed. on tuesday the general attack upon the rebel line was made. the thunder of five hundred cannons opened the battle, which raged through the long day. each of the opposing generals had almost uniformly divined the purposes of the other, and there were no important mistakes on either side to be taken advantage of. both armies fought with the fury of desperation, the rebels having the tremendous advantage of a line of strong works to cover their operations. the front line of intrenchments was captured, but the enemy had others behind it. though two thousand prisoners were taken, no decided advantage was gained, save that the "hammering" the rebels had received made its due impression. on wednesday there was no general conflict, though so closely were the two armies brought together, that frequent skirmishes could not be avoided. on this day, grant sent a hopeful despatch to washington, announcing the result of his operations thus far. it was the end of the sixth day of continuous heavy fighting. he believed that the enemy's loss had been greater than his own. he had taken five thousand prisoners in battle, and had lost but few except "stragglers." at the end of this communication he appended that thrilling sentence which has so often been repeated as an eloquent interpretation of the character and persistency of the man: "i propose to fight it out on this line, if it takes all summer." my friend pollard becomes particularly unamiable at this critical passage in the history of "the lost cause," and declares that "grant was not shamed. the moloch of the north had not yet been sated." this romancing writer was dissatisfied with poor' grant, because he would not go back to the rapidan. mcclellan was a good fellow, in his estimation, for he did not keep "hammering," and after he had fought a drawn battle, like that at antietam, he did not vex the chivalrous lee by running after him when he "retired." "grant was not shamed," as mcclellan used to be after he had fought a battle. doubtless grant ought to have been "shamed," and gone back like a good boy, and not have been so ridiculous as to propose to fight it out on that line, if it took all summer. that "moloch of the north" was an awful fellow, bound to be "sated" only when the rebellion fell through. my dearly-beloved friend pollard is also vexed at the generalship of grant, and prates about "the fierce and brutal consumption of human life." i am inclined to think he believes in the checker-board theory of carrying on war; but the sum total of grant's sins was, that he did not retreat, and give lee time to recruit and strengthen his position. my friend persistently forgets that these hard knocks in the end used up the rebel army, and introduced him, as a writer, to his subject, "the lost cause." though the end does not always justify the means, it did in this instance, fully and unequivocally. though the national army had in these six days lost thirty-five thousand men, in killed, wounded, and missing, the destruction in the rebel ranks could not have been greatly less, in spite of the advantages under which it was engaged. if grant had retired, and left lee to recuperate the pluck of his army by proclaiming his victory, and to recruit his exhausted forces, the results of these tremendous battles would have been lost to the loyal cause. as it was, they ground in upon the spirits of the rebel army, and produced their proper share of the effect which finally resulted in the overthrow of the rebellion. pollard knows very well if grant had turned back, the confederacy would have obtained a new lease of life; and he frets because the illustrious soldier would not oblige lee in this respect. on thursday, hancock made a sudden attack, surprising the rebels, capturing one entire division, two brigades of another, and thirty guns, the number of prisoners being between three and four thousand. this was a decided success. generals johnson and g.h. stuart were captured. hancock extended his hand to stuart, whom he had known before, exclaiming, "how are you, stuart?" but the rebel was haughty and "airy," and replied, "i am general stuart, of the confederate army, and under present circumstances i decline to take your hand." "under any other circumstances i should not have offered it," added hancock, with coolness and dignity. the enemy made a desperate effort to recover what he had lost, and the battle became general again; but no permanent advantage was secured. lee retired to his inner line of intrenchments, which he had strengthened so that a direct assault was not practicable. for a week, while the roads were rendered unfit for use by heavy rains, the two armies confronted each other. grant watched for an opportunity to turn the enemy's position, but his wily foe as often discovered his purpose. it was manifest that no brilliant results were to be achieved at spottsylvania, and grant made up his mind to "fick it again." a new flank movement was begun, and the lieutenant general safely moved his army "on to richmond," across the north anna river, where its passage was disputed by the rebels; but they were driven back, and the nationals crossed the stream, posting themselves in a strong position. in the mean time, grant had changed his base of supplies from fredericksburg to white house, on the pamunkey. sheridan had returned from his raid, and was rendering efficient service in protecting the supplies with his cavalry, and in reconnoitring the positions of the enemy. lee, who had been over all this ground before, in the memorable campaign with mcclellan, and knew from experience what strong places the region contained, was found to be even more securely placed than before. grant therefore decided not to attack him in his intrenchments, but, under cover of a feint, recrossed the north anna, marched along its banks till he reached the pamunkey, of which the former river is a branch, crossing it near hanover court house, only sixteen miles from richmond. the rebels still kept up with the movement, occupying their intrenchments made to cover richmond. they were posted on the chickahominy, which grant was obliged to cross if he reached the city. he decided to make the attempt to break the enemy's line at cold harbor, where roads were available from white house and to the rebel capital. the attack was made, and one of the severest battles of the campaign followed. sheridan had taken possession of the place, and the enemy attempted to drive him out. the sixth corps went to his assistance, and the spot was held. two days later, four o'clock in the morning, a general assault was made. the first line of the rebel works was carried by hancock, but he was forced back with heavy losses. the conflict raged with unabated fury till half past one in the afternoon, when the weary combatants rested from the strife. grant fortified his line, but it was impossible to carry the rebel strongholds. the battle was fought on the third day of june. the enemy had successfully repulsed the attack, and practically demonstrated that the door of richmond was not open in that direction. grant was not dismayed, nor even "shamed;" nor was the "moloch of the north sated." "on to richmond" was still the beating of his heart, and still he fought it out on this line. if nothing could be done, it would be useless to stay in the swamps, where disease and death lurked for their victims. grant promptly decided to "fick it again," and commenced the difficult movement of transporting his vast army to the south side of the james. chapter xxviii. _wherein captain galligasken describes in brief detail the siege of petersburg and richmond, and attends the illustrious soldier to the end of the campaign at appomattox court house._ in my limited space, it would be impossible for me to do anything more than indicate the principal movements of the army. the details are so cumbrous and complicated that they would require a whole volume, and they are not necessary to my purpose in illustrating the character of general grant. doubtless general lee was aware of the movements of the union army, for a body of troops, numbering over a hundred thousand, could hardly have been spirited through a hostile region without some tidings of its operations reaching him. but the transfer was made so skilfully and expeditiously that it was practically a surprise. probably lee expected to find grant battering away at his intrenchments at some point between the chickahominy and the james; but he must have been astonished when he heard of him fifty-five miles distant, menacing his lines on the south side of richmond. general butler, with the army of the james, was at bermuda hundred, on the river. he had been directed to capture petersburg while it was feebly defended. he had made the attempt, but it had failed. he had strongly fortified his position, and kept a rebel force in front of him, thus in part answering the ends for which he had been sent to the south side. general lee, finding that grant was menacing richmond from a new quarter, hurried his army through the city to confront him in his new position. on the arrival of grant at butler's encampment, he immediately sent out another force for the capture of petersburg, which was an exceedingly important point, covering the railroad connections with the south. the rebels in the intrenchments in front of butler hastened to the defence of the exposed city, and the vacated works were occupied by union troops, but they were eventually driven back. the army was drawn up around petersburg, where the enemy was very strongly intrenched in three lines of works. a vigorous and determined assault was made, but without gaining anything more than a temporary advantage. burnside got near enough with his black brigades to throw a few shells into petersburg, but after a bloody conflict he was forced back. the effort was faithfully made, and continued through three days; but the works were invulnerable. at this point grant fixed his gripe upon the two cities of richmond and petersburg. by his hard fighting he had secured favorable positions to commence his siege operations, which were vigorously followed up till the final event. phil sheridan had been sent off on another raid to destroy the virginia central railroad, and to unite with hunter, by whom sigel had been superseded, after his defeat by breckinridge. he succeeded fully in the first part of his purpose, but could not find hunter, who had been sent down through the shenandoah valley to strike lynchburg. twelve miles from staunton, he encountered jones's command, fought, and defeated it, taking fifteen hundred prisoners. hunter united the expeditions of crook and averill with his own, and marched upon lynchburg; but lee had reënforced its garrison, and he was compelled to retreat, which he did by the way of west virginia, thus placing his troops out of the field at a time when they were very much needed. this army had been relied upon by grant to keep back a rebel approach up the shenandoah valley towards washington, while he had coiled the army of the potomac around lee's forces south of the james, so that there was no danger of the main body again menacing the national capital. it makes me even now groan in spirit to recall the failures of grant's subordinates who were removed from the immediate sphere of his influence; but when i think how charitable the lieutenant general was to them, it is not meet that i should complain. these short comings were galling and vexatious to him, imperilling the mighty plans he had so laboriously built up; but he behaved like a christian in every disappointment and trial. several cavalry raids were organized, which inflicted severe injuries upon the enemy's communications south of petersburg. the celebrated mine was sprung on the 30th of july, which blew up one of the most important of the rebel forts, involving a battery and the greater part of a regiment in its destruction; but the result, which had promised so well, realized nothing but disaster. as soon as lee discovered that hunter was retreating through west virginia, he sent jubal early, with a picked force of twenty-five thousand men, down the shenandoah valley, to threaten washington, and to capture it, if practicable, hoping thus to distract the attention of grant, and cause him to relax the "anaconda" gripe in which he held the rebel army. this army swept fiercely down the valley, and driving the small union force in the vicinity before it, crossed the potomac. strong bodies of cavalry, under mosby, rushed through maryland, plundering hagerstown and frederick city, robbing the stores, and extorting money from the people to save their houses from being burned. they destroyed a portion of the baltimore and ohio railroad, and threatened baltimore and washington. general wallace gathered a force of eight thousand men, and attempted to dispute the passage of early's army; but as the enemy were three to his one, he was compelled to fall back, though he fought a sharp battle before doing so. washington and baltimore were now greatly alarmed, and the citizens were called to arms. the enemy came within five miles of the capital. grant sent the sixth corps, under wright, and a portion of the nineteenth, which had just arrived from new orleans, for its protection. there was some heavy skirmishing near the capital, but the rebels soon retired. wright was ordered to follow them; and, having overtaken early, a smart engagement ensued, in which the enemy was defeated. the shenandoah region gave the lieutenant general a great deal of trouble. he found that early had no intention of returning to richmond, but had established himself in the valley; was gathering the rich harvests there, and sending large supplies to the rebel capital. he visited hunter in person, and gave him particular instructions to follow early, and to destroy all supplies; but finding hunter willing to be relieved, he soon after assigned sheridan to the middle military division, which included all this section, and all the troops in washington and its vicinity. the bold cavalryman was not only the most dashing officer in the army, but one of the best and most skilful generals. he soon brought order and harmony out of the confusion and complications which had so disturbed the general-in-chief. grant cautioned him at first to avoid a general engagement, fearful, in case of defeat, of exposing maryland, pennsylvania, and the capital to new incursions. sheridan was full of fight, and saw his way clearly to a national victory; but he was too good a soldier to disobey his orders. grant was willing to give the desired permission, but, not fully understanding the situation, or the views of his subordinate, he made a second visit to the middle division, and had an interview with sheridan at his headquarters, near harper's ferry. high as his opinion had before been of the dashing soldier, the lieutenant general seems to have received a new revelation of his character and purposes on this occasion, as his enlarged sphere brought out his capacities; and he found it necessary to give him only that brief and singularly expressive order, "go in!" grant adds that he never found it necessary to visit sheridan again before giving him orders. sheridan "went in"! he promptly attacked early, fought him all day, and beat him thoroughly. the enemy lost five guns, fifteen battle flags, and five thousand prisoners. not satisfied with this splendid result, he pursued the defeated foe up the valley, till the latter made a stand at fisher's hill. here sheridan "went in" again, routed early, drove him from his position, scattering portions of his force among the mountains. leisurely returning, he posted himself at cedar creek to rest his troops after their hard marching and fighting. here, while sheridan was absent at winchester, his army was surprised and badly beaten. the guns were captured, portions of the force routed, and the whole compelled to retreat. sheridan was twenty miles from the scene of action; but hearing the distant booming of the guns, he mounted his good horse, and dashed away at a furious speed, and, in the midst of the rout, appeared upon the lost field, his charger reeking with foam. dashing along the broken lines, then in retreat, he swung his hat in air, shouting furiously to the troops, "face the other way, boys! we are going back." the stragglers began to rally at this startling presence on the field; and pushing to the main body, he electrified the army with his glorious spirit. "boys, this would not have happened if i had been here," he called; "we are going back." dashing here and there like a meteor among the troops, he re-formed the lines, and made his dispositions for a renewal of the battle. before the arrangements were quite completed the rebels came down upon the lines again for a fresh and overwhelming assault. this time the onslaught was boldly and successfully resisted; and sheridan, taking advantage of a momentary reeling of the enemy, charged upon them with infantry and cavalry, broke their lines, and thoroughly routed them. all that the rebels had was captured, including the guns and camp equipage which they had taken in the morning. sheridan, by his personal presence, by his magnetic influence, and by his unsurpassed military skill, had wrested victory from defeat. the one man had fought the battle, and had won it. for his brilliant achievement, he was made a major general in the regular army, in the place of general mcclellan, who resigned to go into politics. grant ordered one hundred guns to be fired from each of the armies around petersburg in honor of sheridan's victory. "turning what bade fair to be a disaster into a glorious victory," said the lieutenant general, "stamps sheridan--what i have always thought him--one of the ablest of generals." sheridan's victory also stamps grant as the ablest of generals; for in the selection of his pet he displayed a knowledge of human character and a keen perception of the adaptation of means to ends, the want of which had caused so many other generals to fail. my friend pollard is made especially mad by this episode in the shenandoah valley. he is particularly disgusted with the singular story of "the sudden apparition of general sheridan on a black horse flecked with foam," though in the same chapter in which he alludes to the incident, he tells a story himself which would have made baron munchausen tremble for his reputation. sheridan's exploits in the valley, and his destruction of the rebel supplies, put an end to confederate operations in that quarter. washington was not menaced again, and the sixth corps was sent back to petersburg to resume its place in the line of investment. the army of the potomac was still battering away with its siege works at the rebel fortifications. it had extended its line around petersburg, and destroyed twenty miles of the weldon railroad. there was no rest for the troops in the trenches. every day brought its labors and its battle on a larger or a smaller scale. the sharp-shooters were picking off any man who showed his head above the breastworks. it was ceaseless toil and ceaseless vigilance. grant was everywhere, on the watch for an opportunity to take advantage of any favoring circumstances. the winter came, and the lieutenant general did not desert the army to engage in the festivities or the excitements of the capital. he still kept his gaze firmly fixed on the prize which would end the rebellion. while the general-in-chief had been "hammering" away at the rebel army in virginia, sherman, under his direction, had been striking heavy blows at the south. he had fought and flanked his way down to atlanta, carrying dismay and desolation before his victorious banners. the series of disasters which attended the operations of johnston caused his removal from the command, hood taking his place. the "great flanker" punished him even worse than his predecessor, and hood went into tennessee, with an army of fifty thousand men, to overwhelm thomas; but this veteran almost wiped him out, and drove him to the south, with the loss of half his force and more than half his guns and munitions. farragut thundered into mobile bay with his squadron, and, having defeated or sunk the rebel fleet, captured all the forts which covered mobile. during the winter, fort fisher fell, and wilmington dropped quietly into the hands of the union forces. to crown the disasters of the confederacy, sherman made his grand march to the sea, mowing a wide swath on his passage, and leaving desolation and ruin in his path. the confederacy was on its last legs in the spring of 1865, though lee still held his lines at petersburg and richmond. jeff. davis was still confident, though his general declared that he was no longer able to make a good fight. some attempts to negotiate a peace were made, but they failed because the rebels still wanted terms which a conqueror might have asked. grant had long ago demonstrated that the confederacy was nothing but a "shell," and it had been broken in a hundred places. still the rebels held out wherever they had a foot of ground whereon to stand. still they prated about the "last ditch," and looked confidently, even up to the time of the final disaster, to foreign interference, or to some miraculous interposition of circumstances. sherman continued his march, captured savannah, caused the evacuation of charleston, and occupied columbia. johnston was gathering an army in north carolina for the purpose of overwhelming him. grant feared that lee would desert richmond, and seek to join the forces of johnston. indeed, he had been partly moved by this consideration in the selection of the south side of the james as his field of operations. richmond, without the rebel army which for four long years had been defending it, would be a showy, but not a substantial prize. president lincoln went down to city point, and visited the national army in its several positions, as well to inform himself practically of the situation as to encourage the soldiers who had so long and so valiantly struggled for the salvation of the nation. the preparations for the final campaign were completed, and the army was to move on the 29th of march; but four days before this time arrived, lee made his last struggle to escape the gripe of grant's anaconda, and to realize the indefinite circumstance which was to clear up the horizon of southern prospects. he massed his troops, and made an impetuous assault on fort steadman. the attack was so sudden and violent, that for the moment it was a success, and the rebels were in full possession of the redoubt. but the union guns were immediately pointed at the work, and a terrible fire poured in upon the enemy. the infantry charged upon the rebels in the fort, now cut off from their retreat, and two thousand of them were compelled to surrender. president lincoln had been invited to review the troops; but from a hill he was permitted to behold the recapture of the fort, which suited him better, as a spectacle. a general attack was ordered, and the union line dashed gallantly forward, capturing the enemy's picket line, which they were unable to recover. about this time sherman, whose army was at goldsboro', made a hasty visit to city point, where he had a consultation with the president, grant, meade, and sheridan, and plans were matured to prevent a junction between lee and johnston. the lieutenant general's "hammering" process was now bringing forth its proper fruit in the rebel ranks. deserters and stragglers from them were thicker than snow-flakes at christmas. they had learned what grant was. they had found that he was a fighting general, and they were not willing to be sacrificed to the moloch of the south, battling for what was already a "lost cause." it was confidently believed that lee was more intent upon the problem of retiring with his army than on that of longer protecting richmond. his movement upon fort steadman was doubtless intended to facilitate his escape. grant had no idea of permitting his wily foe to "retire." he was more desirous of capturing the rebel army than of taking richmond. on the 29th of march--the day appointed for the grand movement--sheridan was sent out to dinwiddie court house, south-west of petersburg. the left of the main army had been advanced so that grant's line extended from the appomattox, below petersburg, to dinwiddie. grant himself was at gravelly run, between sheridan and the left of the main body, watching coolly, but with the most intense anxiety, the development of his programme. sheridan, in spite of the heavy rains which had rendered the roads impassable for wagons, floundered through the mud with his cavalry to five forks, where the enemy was in force. warren, with the fifth corps, extended his lines nearly up to the same point. sheridan "went in" with his usual impetuosity, and seized five forks. the enemy made a desperate attack upon warren, and forced him back for a time, though he soon recovered from the shock and held his own. the enemy then turned upon sheridan, occupying an isolated position, and compelled him slowly to fall back; and he retreated upon dinwiddie, instead of upon the main line, thus compelling the rebels in their pursuit to extend their line--a piece of strategy which called forth the warmest commendations of his commander. grant, solicitous for his safety, sent two divisions of the fifth corps to sheridan, who with this aid attacked the rebels on his front, and drove them back to five forks again. at this point the confederates were in heavy force; but sheridan made his dispositions with remarkable skill, hurried up the fifth corps, and with his cavalry executed a brilliant manoeuvre, by which the battle was won, the rebels routed, and six thousand prisoners captured. by this bold and skilful movement, so admirably executed by sheridan, the right of the rebel line was turned. in support of this operation on the left, grant ordered a heavy bombardment to be kept up during the entire night of april 1, the day on which sheridan had fought this decisive action, and at four o'clock the next morning (sunday) a combined assault was made with perfect success, which was followed up till the enemy broke from his lines, and fled from the lost field, following the road along the south bank of the appomattox. richmond and petersburg were lost to the rebels! no tidings of these terrific conflicts had reached richmond. the people still believed, as jeff. davis had taught them, that richmond could hold out for twenty years before any force operating against it. lee sent a message to the obstinate "president" of the confederacy that the battle was lost, and that the army must flee from its strongholds. the despatch was handed to davis while he was at church. he read it, hastily rose, and went out. he was ghastly pale, and his face revealed the disaster to all who saw it. he was alarmed for his personal safety, and perhaps trembled in view of the halter that hung to the allegorical "sour apple tree," which had been celebrated in song all over the loyal land. taking a train to the south, he left richmond, which he was to enter again only as an indicted traitor. that night the city was evacuated in hot haste and set on fire by its late defenders, disappointed and desperate at the grand finale of rebellion. general weitzel entered and took possession the next morning. the flag of the redeemed union waved triumphantly over the capital of virginia. grant was not looking after richmond just now. i do not know that he made any mention of the place in his documents, but in his despatch to sherman, on the 5th of april, he says, "rebel armies are now the only strategic points to strike at." acting on this view, he ordered the most vigorous pursuit of lee. sheridan was sent forward with his cavalry, and the sixth corps, now temporarily under his command. he continued to "hammer" whenever an opportunity offered. at sailor's creek he struck the enemy a heavy blow, which resulted in the capture of sixteen guns, four hundred wagons, and seven thousand prisoners. the pursuit then became a hunt. lee had lost his supplies, or had been cut off from them. on his arrival at amelia court house, he was compelled to halt, to rest his men, and gather up food for their support from the country. this delay afforded the union cavalry time to get ahead of him and destroy the danville railroad, his chosen means of retreat to effect a junction with johnston. the whole army of the potomac was concentrated at jettersville to attack lee at amelia, but he had fled, now bent upon reaching the mountains beyond lynchburg. the pursuit was hurried up, confederate supply trains captured, and the enemy reduced to desperate straits. their sufferings were intensely severe, hundreds of them dropping with sheer exhaustion, for the want of rest and food, while the majority were no longer able to carry their muskets. crossing the river, lee had dragged his weary way to appomattox court house. on the night of april 6, a number of his officers informally met, and agreed that surrender was all that was left to the miserable army, worn out, starved, and thinned by wholesale desertion. one of them informed lee of their conclusion; but whatever he thought, he did not adopt their suggestion. the excellent pollard does not hesitate to hint that grant was a "butcher;" but it is acknowledged that lee had no hope of the campaign in which he had engaged a week before, and had only persisted in fighting to please davis. he waived his own opinion, and fought those bloody battles from petersburg to sailor's creek, when he was satisfied there was no hope. what was he but a "butcher"? is he not responsible for every life sacrificed at his order after he knew that the strife was hopeless? lee was a skilful soldier, and if we could wipe out the fact that he was a traitor, that he fought against the government which had educated him to support it, and which he had sworn to defend; if we could forget that his influence might have removed the stains of andersonville, belle island, and other rebel prisons from the annals of the miserable confederacy; if he had ceased to shed blood when his conscience assured him treason could no longer flourish upon the sacrifice,--we might hold him up as a hero. as it is, he deserves the infamy he has won. it was left for grant to obey the promptings of humanity--for the "butcher" to make the overtures to stay the further useless flow of blood. chapter xxix. _wherein captain galligasken has a few words to say about lee's surrender, and demonstrates, to his own and his reader's entire satisfaction, that the illustrious soldier is not an accidental hero._ if grant had been the "butcher" which the rebels declared him to be, if he had been less magnanimous than he was, he would have compelled rather than "asked" the surrender of lee's broken army. the confederate general knew that he was surrounded, and that he was utterly incapable of fighting another general battle. grant addressed the following letter to him from farmville:- "april 7, 1865. "general: the result of the last week must convince you of the hopelessness of further resistance on the part of the army of northern virginia in this struggle. i feel that it is so, and regard it as my duty to shift from myself the responsibility of any further effusion of blood by asking of you the surrender of that portion of the confederate states army known as the army of northern virginia. u.s. grant, _lieutenant general_." lee replied, in a note of the same date, that, though he did not entertain the opinion expressed by grant of the hopelessness of further resistance, he reciprocated the desire to avoid the useless effusion of blood, and asked what terms would be offered on condition of the surrender of his army. pollard makes lee say that he was not _entirely_ of grant's opinion of the hopelessness of further resistance. pollard admires and glorifies lee, and aims to soften the affectation of his letter, wherein he ignores the fact that his men were utterly demoralized, starved, unarmed, and unable either to fight or to run. that ridiculous virginian pride which had sacrificed thousands of lives after the cause of the south was known to be hopeless, was still in the ascendency. on the 8th sheridan captured twenty-five guns, four trains of cars with supplies, and a hospital train. grant replied to lee's disingenuous note, and, pleading in the interests of peace and humanity, dealing gently with the pride of the fallen virginian, offered the most liberal terms. peace being his chief desire, he insisted only on one condition--that the officers and men of the rebel army should, by the surrender, be disqualified for taking up arms again until properly exchanged. he proposed a meeting, to interchange views and regulate terms, thus magnanimously taking upon himself the initiative in what must be so disagreeable to the rebel general. lee promptly replied that he had not proposed to surrender--only to ask the terms of grant's proposition. "to be frank, i do not think the emergency has arisen to call for the surrender of this army," he writes. how a virginian gentleman, wedded to truth and honor, could make such a statement as this, passes the belief of one who was brought up to be faithful to the homely new england virtues. if the emergency had not arisen, then, in the surrender, lee was a traitor to the south, as from the beginning he had been to the national government. but he condescends to meet grant. the lieutenant general declines to see lee to make a treaty of peace, but he explains that peace will come when the south lays down its arms. on the 9th the rebels made a desperate effort to break through the cavalry which surrounded them, and force a way out of the net into which they had fallen. they were signally defeated, and held in their position. this was the last struggle, and the enemy was in the last corner of the "last ditch." a white flag soon appears in front of the confederate line. lee has come to his senses at last, and asks for an interview to arrange the terms of surrender. the emergency has actually arisen at last. the meeting took place in the house of mr. wilmer mclean. it was a grand occasion, worthy the pen of the historian or the pencil of the artist. the grand army of northern virginia had been "hammered" till there was almost nothing left of it. grant had stuck to it from the rapidan, thirteen months before, until only its shadow was now left, and even that was dissolving before its conqueror. lee appeared dressed "more gayly" than usual, wearing the elegant sword presented to him by his friends, strictly observing all the requirements of courtesy. he was formal, precise, and still dignified, notwithstanding the humiliating task he was called upon to perform. grant wore his ordinary uniform, but carried no sword. the terms of the surrender were agreed upon, and signed by both parties. the rebels were to be paroled, after marching out and stacking their arms. the officers were to retain their side arms, private horses, and baggage. each officer and man was to be allowed to return to his home, not to be disturbed by united states authority so long as he observed his parole, and obeyed the laws in force where he resided. the rebel general acknowledged the magnanimity of his conqueror in giving him and his army such exceedingly favorable terms--terms which finally saved all included in their provisions from the penalty of treason. even my friend pollard begins to see that grant is a noble-minded, magnanimous man, and praises his conduct without stint or measure. on the 12th the army of northern virginia appeared for the last time on the stage as a body. they formed their last parade, stacked their arms, and parked their artillery, to be taken possession of by the union troops. grant was not present at this ceremonial, for he was not a man to indulge in any exultation over his fallen foe, and his delicacy was duly appreciated by the rebels. pollard's testimony, at this point, indicates a just apprehension of the illustrious soldier; a candid recognition of those traits of character which i have tried to exhibit throughout my work; and i cannot do better than quote his words. "indeed, this federal commander had, in the closing scenes of the contest, behaved with a magnanimity and decorum that must ever be remembered to his credit, even by those who disputed his reputation in other respects, and denied his claims to great generalship. he had, with remarkable facility, accorded honorable and liberal terms to the vanquished army. he did nothing to dramatize the surrender; he made no triumphal entry into richmond; he avoided all those displays of triumph so dear to the northern heart; he spared everything that might wound the feelings or imply the humiliation of a vanquished foe. there were no indecent exultations, no 'sensations,' no shows; he received the surrender of his adversary with every courteous recognition due an honorable enemy, and conducted the closing scenes with as much simplicity as possible." seven thousand five hundred rebels only appeared as the wreck of the army of northern virginia, though eighteen thousand "stragglers," hammered out of the line by grant's persistent pounding, came forward and claimed the benefit of the surrender. after my courteous friend, the author of the lost cause, has so kindly furnished me with material for this biography, it pains me to be compelled to raise any further objections to his veracity; but his arithmetic is sadly at fault. he struggles earnestly to convey the impression that grant, from the rapidan to appomattox, was fighting a mere handful of men, which the union army outnumbered in the ratio of three or four to one; and some of grant's northern enemies, or lukewarm friends, have been too willing to use his figures. pollard says lee had thirty-three thousand, at both richmond and petersburg, in the first months of 1865. he mentions twenty-five thousand five hundred at the surrender, acknowledges that five thousand were taken prisoners in the "shameful misfortune" at five forks, and permits us to imply that about the same number were captured at sailor's creek,--thus making up thirty-five thousand five hundred, without counting the killed and wounded, though he says of fort gregg, that only thirty of two hundred and fifty composing the garrison survived the defence. long before the fortunes of the day became desperate in the extreme, pollard groans over heavy losses and numerous stragglers. undoubtedly the national army did outnumber the rebels. either general lee was no general, and was the stupidest fanatic that even the southern confederacy contained, or he had at least fifty thousand men under his command, which was by recognized military rules, a fair proportion, fighting behind elaborate fortifications, to the force of the national army. thirty-three thousand men could not have held his lines twenty-four hours. in my humble opinion, he had from seventy-five to a hundred thousand men. i should cease to respect him as a rebel if he had not, for it would have been inhumanity and butchery for him to stand out with a less number. grant immediately sent the main body of the army to burkville. sherman received the news of lee's surrender, and johnston proposed a meeting to arrange terms for a capitulation. they were drawn up, but sent to the capital for approval. the lieutenant general went immediately to washington. his mission in the field was ended. his name was on every tongue as the greatest of conquerors. he had given the finishing stroke to the greatest rebellion the world had ever seen. all over the nation the people were rejoicing. cannon thundered forth the joy of the country, and the old flag was spread to the breeze, tenfold more dear now that it waved again over a united nation. grant went on his way quietly to the national capital, with no pomp and parade to announce the progress of the conqueror. he did not even go to richmond on his way--the city which had been a stumbling-block in the path of the union armies, now fallen by the might of his genius and his persistency. so quietly did he travel, that it was hardly known he had arrived. he hastened to the war department, where the indefatigable stanton heartily congratulated him. the lieutenant general still meant business, though it was now the details of peace instead of those of war. on the morning of the assassination of president lincoln he attended a cabinet meeting. he suggested to the government that as the war was practically ended, the enormous expenses of the army should be immediately reduced. all drafting and recruiting in the loyal states were suspended, and large reductions were proposed. it was announced that grant would attend the theatre in the evening with the president; but having arrived on the day before, he was anxious to see his family, and started for trenton. probably the dagger which booth flourished was intended for the lieutenant general; but providence had other work for him to do, and he was miraculously spared. on receiving the tidings of the assassination, he returned instantly to washington, and attended the funeral of his steadfast friend and supporter. sherman's arrangement with johnston was promptly disapproved by the government, and grant went to raleigh to smooth the way with his veteran friend to close up this unpleasant business. the surrender was received on the same terms that had been granted to lee, and on this basis all the remaining armies of the rebellion laid down their arms. towards the last of may there was a grand review in washington, which occupied two days. the brave veterans marched before the chief officers of the government and of the army; then doffed their blue uniform, and became private citizens. this was the last act in the drama of the great rebellion, exhibiting the crowning glory of our republic in the facility with which legions of armed men lay aside their military character, and resort to the peaceful occupations of the country. the war was ended! the thought thrilled the people even more than the fact of hostilities had in the beginning. the reflection was all the more thrilling because the strife had ended in victory. it makes us shudder to think of the condition of the country if it had ended in defeat, if the unconquerable spirit of the north would ever have let it end in such a calamity. the nation realized the blessing which was born of the triumph of the national arms. i can conceive of such a thing as the continuance of the war until both north and south were ruined--until the nation crumbled to pieces by the weight of its own miseries. from such a fate i honestly, candidly, and conscientiously believe grant saved his country. there was no other man in all the land to accomplish the work which he performed. there was not another general who had the genius, the moral and mental attributes, for the stupendous task. i earnestly and gratefully recognize the inestimable value of the services even of those who failed to achieve what was expected and required of them. those gallant men who successively commanded the army of the potomac lacked some essential requisite in the sum total of character which the emergency demanded. grant possessed them all, in such singular harmony that he alone could direct the army in the path to victory. all others failed; he alone succeeded. it is hardly necessary to analyze the means by which he succeeded in his gigantic enterprise. others turned back from the goal when their strategy failed, when the rules of warfare failed in their application. grant used his strategy and his tactics to the utmost, and passed them for all they were worth. when they were no longer available, he "hammered" the enemy. when the old rules failed, he made new ones. he was an art and a science unto himself. i say grant was the only man who could conquer the rebellion; the only one who had the elements of success in him. i, bernard galligasken, say this, and i speak advisedly, knowing what i say. during the war, men went from the ranks up to generals of division in a couple of years. if any one had any military talent, he went up like a rocket, and, alas! he often went down like one, when he had soared to the ethereal regions whose air he could not breathe and live. almost all who were heroes in the first year of the war were laid on the shelf before it was half finished. corporals became colonels, and major generals disappeared from the scene of strife. if there was a skilful and patriotic man in the army, he was raised up; if there was an unskilful one, he was pulled down, whatever height he had attained. the need of the nation was desperate, and it could court or flatter no man who was not successful. for three long years the army was hungry for a competent leader, but found him not. the government longed for a mighty man, and was always ready to give him all the honors and all the power it had, without asking his politics, his religion, his antecedents, or even his nationality. there was a chance for any man who had the needed ability; the army, the people, the government, were ready to take him, when he won his laurel, elevate him to the highest position, go down on their knees before him, obey him, trust him, follow him. the path that grant trod was open to every soldier, and, indeed, to every civilian. where are mcclellan, fremont, buell, rosecrans, pope, hooker, burnside? i believe that the country owes them all a debt of gratitude for what they did in the war, and ought to forgive them for what they did not do. all of them were placed in positions to achieve the high eminence which grant reached. it is no discredit to them that they did not succeed in them. i am not willing to believe that it was their fault that they failed, even while each of them may justly be held responsible for his own mistakes. i only wish to show that each of them had, if not a fair chance, at least the same chance that grant had; certainly none of them was more maligned, none of them more savagely treated by politicians and evil advisers in washington. if some of them were not trusted as long as grant, it was only because they did not exhibit abilities which gave the same promise of ultimate success. grant was no accidental hero. i have followed him through the struggles of his brilliant career, and i declare upon my sacred honor as a soldier and an historian, that never a success did he win which he did not work for. behold him at donelson, threading his way, in the cold blasts of that bitter storm, among his weary, freezing soldiers, day after day and night after night, wresting victory from the opposing elements! could it have been an accident that he won that brilliant victory, after the herculean labor he personally performed, after the severe sufferings which he personally endured, after the savage fighting in which he personally engaged? was it an accident, that, in the midst of disaster, he gave the startling order to charge upon the enemy's strong works, and made fighting men out of soldiers demoralized and defeated? behold him in the vicksburg campaign, standing up by the might of his potent will, and against the advice of all his trusted generals, cutting loose from his supplies, and fighting battle after battle, till the foe was driven within his stronghold! was this success an accident? see him sleeping on the ground with his faithful soldiers, with no covering but the stars; see him marching by day and watching by night, attending to the minutest details of the commissary and the quartermaster! every success was wrung from opposing elements, and carried through over the most stupendous obstacle. see him, partially disabled, with his head pillowed upon a stump, in the pelting rain, after the hard-fought day at shiloh, exhausted by his superhuman labors, stealing an hour of rest to keep him alive for the duties of another day--see him, and declare that accidental heroes are not made after this fashion! go with him, crippled in body, and worn out with suffering on a sick bed, to the gloom of defeat and starvation at chattanooga! follow him as he moves about on his crutches through the streets of that beleaguered town, bringing light out of darkness, joy and victory out of misery and disaster. not thus do accidental heroes soar to sublime heights. accidental fortune is not thus constant. to the hero crowned with success, as grant is, only a lofty patriotism, a sublime devotion to his country, and a splendid genius, can be constant. these desert him never. these triumph over all obstacles, bearing their possessor to the loftiest pinnacle of fame, and, better still, to the highest place in the regards of a free and intelligent people, as they have borne grant. no accident, no combination of accidents, could have lifted him up, or sustained him a single year. in the selection of his subordinates grant won half his success. cool, unbiassed judgment did its perfect work for him. his singleness of purpose freed him from bias. he raised men up, or he threw them down, only in the interests of the hallowed cause to which he gave his whole mind and heart. no man ever lived, or ever will live, who more entirely sunk himself in the work he had engaged to do. if any high officer stood in the way of the success of the union arms, he was removed; for grant always knew his man. he was wholly free from personal prejudice and partiality. he elevated no man who was not fit to be elevated. of the prominent officers who stood the test of the war, every one was either raised up by grant, or stood approved by him. sherman and sheridan were his _protégés_; thomas owed his position as an independent commander to him; meade and schofield have to thank him for the high places they hold to-day. he selected them for the great work they did; and while they, in a sense, built him up, he afforded them the opportunity to which their ability entitled them. in building up himself, he built them up; in saving the nation, they saved each other, and won imperishable renown. "the soldiers and sailors are not all for a sham hero, a creature of fortuitous circumstances," said a noted political general at a convention of which wade hampton and forrest, ex-rebel generals, were members, to say nothing of the northern traitors who had stabbed the government in the back during the whole course of the war. he alluded to grant, the nominee of the national party of the union--our standard-bearer in the contest which is to complete the victory won on the southern battle-fields. this same political general was a brave man--as brave as any negro private whom his fellow-member in the convention butchered at fort pillow; but he was the marplot of grant's vicksburg campaign. scores of brave men were slaughtered at champion's hill by his criminal delay to obey his superior's orders. at shiloh, sherman fought his division for him, because he did not know how himself. the key to this sneer about the "creature of fortuitous circumstances" is found in the fact that grant removed from command the author of the phrase at vicksburg, for publishing a stupid, ridiculous, and sensational order, wherein he arrogated to himself the principal glory of the fighting at vicksburg, whereas he was notoriously dilatory, lax, and incompetent in the discharge of his duties. if the lord, in his infinite wisdom, permitted any "sham heroes" to be inflicted upon our war-stricken nation, the author of this sentence was the principal of them. it was grant's chief glory that he conquered in spite of such malignant obstacles in his path. but our glorious standard-bearer needs no defence at my hands, and i humbly apologize for bringing this viper of the new york convention into my story. chapter xxx. _wherein captain galligasken follows the illustrious soldier in his career after the war, relates several anecdotes of him, and respectfully invites the whole world to_ match him. the war was ended, and far above every other man in the country, civilian or soldier, stood general grant. in this sublime attitude he was still the same simple-hearted, plain, and unostentatious man. the people, full of admiration and gratitude, rendered every honor to the illustrious soldier which ingenuity could devise. presents of every description poured in upon him. two valuable houses, richly furnished, a library, and princely sums of money were given to him, and gratefully received, as tokens of the people's regard. he made several tours of pleasure and business, in which he was everywhere received with the most tremendous demonstrations of applause. there could be no mistaking his hold upon the people. they loved, admired, respected him. but in the midst of these splendid ovations, he was still modest, self-possessed, and dignified. in 1865 grant visited the senate chamber at washington. he paid his respects to the senators, and left the room. when he had gone, one of the democratic members declared that a great mistake had been made in appointing grant a lieutenant general, for there wasn't a second lieutenant in the home-guard of his state who did not "cut a bigger swell" than the man who had just left their presence! when he was regarded as an available candidate for the presidency during the war, he was approached on the subject by a zealous partisan. he declared that there was only one political office which he desired. when the war was over, he wanted to be elected mayor of galena! if successful, he intended to see to it that the sidewalk between his house and the depot was put in better order. in one of his excursions in 1865, he visited his former home at galena. a magnificent reception welcomed him. triumphal arches greeted him in the streets, in which were blazoned the victories he had won. in that which contained his house and the sidewalk he condemned was one bearing the inscription, "general, the sidewalk is built." at georgetown, where his childhood had been spent, and in whose streets he had first smelt gunpowder as a baby, the whole town turned out to see and to greet him with the homage due to the great conqueror. here he made one of his longest speeches, amounting to something like ten lines! in philadelphia, new york, and boston, he was received as no man ever had been before. at west point, whither he had gone to pay his grateful respects to his alma mater, lieutenant general scott, his old commander in mexico, presented him a copy of "scott's memoirs," inscribed, "from the oldest to the greatest general." if scott's opinion, as a military man, is worth anything to the sceptic, here was his written indorsement of the preëminence of grant. grant made no speeches. in this respect he has been an enigma to the american people. he was a reticent man, in the fullest sense of the word. for my own part, i should as soon think of condemning abraham lincoln because he could not, or did not, turn back somersets on a tight rope, as to complain of grant because he could not, or did not, make speeches. in this respect he does not differ from hundreds of other great men. washington and jefferson were very indifferent speech-makers. napoleon wrote startling bulletins, but never distinguished himself as an orator. grant's congratulatory orders are full of fire, and, better, full of sound common sense. his reports are replete with wisdom simply expressed, and they are models of compact narration. i wish to go a step further. i fully believe that grant's reticence is one of the elements of his greatness. it is impossible for me to think of him as a successful commander, if he had been a brawler, or even a great talker. most emphatically was his silence, his reticence, "golden." i can point to not less than three generals, high in position, who might have been successful if they had possessed a talent for holding their tongues. but grant has always said enough, and, better still, done enough, to enable the people to ascertain his opinions on great subjects before the country. his position during the rebellion, in regard to slavery, negro soldiers, and the general conduct of the war, was not concealed. the people knew just how he stood. his orders are open, unreserved; and no man's record more thoroughly commits him to the people's policy than that of grant. he was one of the first to give effective aid to the government, in enlisting and organizing negro troops--a subject so trying to the nerves of many of the old army officers, that they were either dumb, or arrayed in virtual opposition to the national policy. during the troubles between the president and congress, grant made no speeches, published no opinions on the disputed questions. the president is the constitutional commander-in-chief of the army, and in his purely military capacity, it would have been improper and indelicate for grant to meddle with the controversy. but who doubted his sentiments? congress practically gave him the execution of its plan of reconstruction. it made laws, and depended upon him to carry them out. it is enough to know that congress confided implicitly in him, and that he drew upon himself the hostility, and even the hatred, of the president, by his manly and straight-forward course. grant's reticence was one of the elements of his success, i repeat. he kept his plans to himself. even his subordinate generals were not often permitted to know them in advance of their execution. one of them visited the lieutenant general, intent upon ascertaining the programme of the chief. "what are your plans, general, for the conduct of the campaign?" asked the inquirer, not doubting that he had a perfect right to know. "general, i have a fine horse out here; i want you to go and look at him," replied grant, leading the way out of the tent. the inquirer was mortally offended at the coolness with which his question was evaded. on another occasion, the editor of a leading political journal, a young man of fine abilities, but having a rather high estimate of his personal consequence, was presented to the lieutenant general. in the course of the conversation, he attempted to draw from the silent hero some political opinion in regard to the south. grant replied that they had some fine horses down south, and made an enemy of the politician. in his reticence there was a purpose; but his silence, so far as speech-making is concerned, is the offspring of constitutional modesty. he is not an off-hand speaker. george francis train can make a speech, but grant cannot. andrew johnson can talk in public, but even his best friends have had abundant reason to wish that he could not. it is a notable fact that the greatest orators have generally failed to reach the highest positions of honor and trust. webster, clay, and everett, besides being great statesmen, were brilliant men in the forum; yet all of them died without occupying the seat of the president. but grant is simply not an impromptu speaker. when the occasion requires, he reads his speech, as greater orators than he are compelled to do. even everett never spoke without careful preparation, and the elaborate orations he delivered were generally in type before he declaimed them. i have no fears that grant will fall short of the expectations even of the american people in this respect, when he has been elected to the presidency; but i am equally confident that he will never become a shame and a scandal to the nation on account of his vicious and unconsidered addresses. when the gold medal, which was voted by resolution of congress to grant, after the campaign of chattanooga, was finished, a committee from the two houses went down to city point in a special steamer to present the elegant testimonial of the nation's gratitude to the illustrious soldier. the members of the committee waited upon the lieutenant general, and arranged with him that the formal ceremony of the presentation should take place on board of the headquarters steamer, where ample accommodations were made for the party who were to witness the impressive scene. at the appointed time, the committee, with a few invited guests, appeared. the lieutenant general was attended by his staff, and a few other officers of the army, on duty at the post. one of the most interesting features of the occasion was the presence of general grant's family, including his wife, his son, and daughter. the youngest of the group was master jesse, a bright, handsome lad of six summers, who attracted no inconsiderable degree of attention, not only from his relation to the mighty man of the nation, but on account of his personal attributes. the guests were gathered together in the cabin of the steamer where the ceremony was to take place. the spokesman of the committee stepped forward, and in a neat and appropriate address presented the medal. general grant's time came then, and, as usual on all similar occasions, he was greatly embarrassed. he could stand undisturbed while five hundred cannons were thundering in his ears, but he seems to have been afraid of the sound of his own voice. all present were curious to know what he would say, and how he would say it, for he had never made an impromptu speech. the general appeared to be slightly agitated as soon as the congressman's speech had been concluded. he began to fumble about his pockets, just as a school-boy does on the rostrum. he was evidently looking for something, and he could not find it. the delay became painful and awkward in the extreme, not only to the general, but to his sympathizing audience; and little jesse, his son, seemed to suffer the most in this prolonged interval. at last his patience was exhausted, and he cried out,-"father, why don't you say something?" [illustration: "father, why don't you say something."--page 343.] a burst of applause from the assembly greeted this speech, and it was plain that jesse had said the right word at the right time. inheriting some of his father's military genius, he had made a demonstration which turned the attention of the company for the time from the embarrassed general, who, taking advantage of the diversion, renewed the onslaught upon his pockets, and brought forth the written paper for which he had been searching. he then read his "impromptu" speech, which was a simple expression of his thanks, set forth in solid phrase, for the distinguished honor which had been conferred upon him. the assembly were then invited to the spacious between-decks of the steamer, where a substantial collation had been prepared for them; and jesse was not the least honored and petted of the party. it is sometimes awkward and unpleasant for a man in public life to be unable to make a speech, but experience has demonstrated that it is often ten times more awkward and unpleasant to be able to make one; and better than any other gift can we spare in an american president that of off-hand-speech making. grant is a thinking man, and his thought is the father of his mighty deeds. his most expressive speech was made to sheridan: "go in!" in the army it was the common remark of the soldiers that grant did not say much, but he kept up a tremendous thinking. in his capacious brain there was room for all the multiplied details of a vast army. his mind contained a map of the theatre of operations, and he knew where everything and everybody was. he understood how the battle was going miles away from his position. at the wilderness he stood under a tree with general meade, whittling, as he was wont to do when brooding in deep thought, smoking, of course, at the same time. an aid dashed furiously up to the spot, and announced that one of the corps holding an important position in the line had broken, and been driven from the field. meade was intensely agitated, for the event indicated nothing but disaster. grant smoked and whittled as coolly as though there had been no hostile armies on the continent. "good god!" exclaimed meade, as the details were enlarged upon by the messenger. still grant whittled and thought. a minute elapsed before he spoke, in which he seemed to be consulting his mental map. "i don't believe it," said he, at last, while the messenger of disaster was still in his presence. the sequel proved that grant was right, and the messenger direct from the scene was wrong. the battle had surged in upon the national line for a moment, but there was no break, no defeat, no disaster. it has been observed that grant whittles two ways--from and towards his body. when he is maturing a plan, solving a problem involved in his operations, he whittles _towards_ himself, as if to concentrate within him some invisible magnetism floating in the air around him. but when his mind grasps the solution of the problem, when the plan is formed, he instantly reverses the stick, and whittles _from_ himself. perhaps to the nation it does not make much difference which way he whittles, while it is patent to the world that he whittled down the rebellion. in 1866 grant was made a full general, the office having been created especially for him. he was not a merely ornamental appendage of the government, but used a laboring oar in his lofty position. he was tender of the people's pockets, heavily drawn upon by the needs of the war. he introduced reforms into the army, largely curtailing the public expense, and exhibiting a spirit of economy which was very hopeful in the people's candidate for the presidency. the war was ended, and with it slavery and the tyranny of one section over the other. the sword had done its work effectually, and the statesman's task of reconstruction was to be completed--a task hardly less difficult than putting down the rebellion itself. then commenced the unfortunate conflict between the president and congress. the people, through their representatives, had adopted the present policy of reconstruction, sustaining it by their voices, their votes, and their influence. grant believed in this system, and, so far as his military position would permit, gave his energies to its support. congress, having full confidence in his integrity and his sound judgment, conferred upon him extraordinary powers. as the commander of all the armies while the south was held in military subjection, he had the power to advance or to thwart the people's policy. he maintained it with all his ability, and thus became the very life and soul of the system. stanton, the tried and true, in the cabinet, was a check upon the president in his insane attempts to usurp the powers of the legislative branch of the government, and to thwart the expressed will of the people. at last the president removed him, subject to the approval of congress, under the tenure of office act, and grant was appointed secretary of war _ad interim_. in the lieutenant general's letter to stanton--his constant friend and tried supporter during the war--he takes the occasion to express his appreciation of the zeal, patriotism, firmness, and ability with which the retiring officer had ever discharged his duty as secretary of war, thus preventing any misunderstanding of his position. in a private letter to the president the general protests smartly and warmly against the removal of stanton and of sheridan, the latter in command of the fifth military district. this letter was an admirable paper, as plucky as it was cogent in its reasoning; but it had no influence upon the stubborn will of the president. as secretary of war, grant signalized his brief term by acts of immense importance in the reduction of expenses. on the reassembling of congress, the senate declined to acquiesce in the removal of stanton, and the general immediately surrendered the office to its legal incumbent. it appeared that the president had no intention of permitting the law of congress to take its course, but designed to disobey and disregard it. he attempted to make grant the cat's-paw of his vicious purposes; but the sterling honesty and simple integrity of the illustrious soldier carried him safely through the ordeal. from beginning to end, grant had resisted all overtures to indorse the president's policy. in the grand "swinging round the circle" of the president, the general had the humiliation of being one of the party, and was heartily ashamed of his company; but in no other respect did he ever go with him or form one of his party. in grant's letters to "his excellency," the writer was fully justified before the country. on the 20th of may, 1868, the national republican convention met at chicago to nominate candidates for the presidency and vice-presidency. it was hardly necessary to nominate grant, for he had already been fixed upon by the people for their suffrages; but the convention, on the first ballot, unanimously nominated him for this high office. the news of this great event was carried to him at once. he was unmoved by it, but asked immediately for the platform. this he carefully read, and heartily indorsed. the honor conferred upon him so unanimously was the most flattering compliment which had been bestowed upon any man since the time of washington; but he only asked to know what principles he was expected to represent. and now my delightful task is ended, though i shall never cease to proclaim the admiration and gratitude with which i regard the illustrious soldier on all proper occasions. as i look upon my poor work, i feel that i have failed to do justice to the sublime subject of my memoir. i cannot express all i feel. from palo alto to appomattox i have followed him in his grand career, and i hold him up as a soldier confidently challenging the whole world,- match him! in the elements of magnanimity, regard for the rights of others, undeviating honor and truth, i say,- match him! as the foremost man in putting down the rebellion, first in war and first in the hearts of his countrymen, i add,- match him! as a man, cool, resolute, and unflinching in the discharge of every duty, proving, by what he has done, what he is able to do in civil as well as in military life, i say,- match him! * * * * * oliver optic's magazine, our boys & girls the only original american juvenile magazine published once a week. edited by oliver optic, who writes for no other juvenile publication--who contributes each year four serial stories, the cost of which in book form would be $5.00--_double the subscription price of the magazine!_ each number (published every saturday) handsomely illustrated by thomas nast, and other talented artists. among the regular contributors, besides oliver optic, are sophie may, author of "little prudy and dotty dimple stories." rosa abbott, author of "jack of all trades," &c. may mannering, author of "the helping-hand series," &c. wirt sikes, author of "on the prairies," &c. olive logan, author of "near views of royalty," &c. rev. elijah kellogg, author of "good old times," &c. each number contains 16 pages of original stories, poetry, articles of history, biography, natural history, dialogues, recitations, facts and figures, puzzles, rebuses, &c. oliver optic's magazine contains more reading matter than any other juvenile publication, and is the _cheapest and the best_ periodical of the kind in the united states. terms, in advance. single subscriptions, one year $2.50 one volume, six months 1.25 single copies 6 cts. three copies $6.50 five copies 10.00 ten copies (an extra copy free) 20.00 canvassers and local agents wanted in every state and town, and liberal arrangements will be made with those who apply to the publishers. a handsome cloth cover, with a beautiful gilt design, will be furnished for binding the numbers for the year for 50 cts. all the numbers for 1867 will be supplied for $2.25. bound volumes, $3.50. any boy or girl who will write to the publishers shall receive a specimen copy by mail free. lee & shepard, publishers, 149 washington street, boston. * * * * * library for young people. by oliver optic. i. the boat club; or, the bunkers of rippleton. ii. all aboard; or, life on the lake. iii. little by little; or, the cruise of the flyaway. iv. try again; or, the trials and triumphs of harry west. v. now or never; or, the adventures of bobby bright. vi. poor and proud; or, the fortunes of katy redburn. six volumes, put up in a neat box. lee & shepard, publishers. * * * * * woodville stories. by oliver optic. i. rich and humble; or, the mission of bertha grant. ii. in school and out; or, the conquest of richard grant. iii. watch and wait; or, the young fugitives. iv. work and win; or, noddy newman on a cruise. v. hope and have; or, fanny grant among the indians. vi. haste and waste! or, the young pilot of lake champlain. lee & shepard, publishers * * * * * the army and navy stories. in six volumes. a library for young and old. by oliver optic. i. the soldier boy; or, tom somers in the army. ii. the sailor boy; or, jack somers in the navy. iii. the young lieutenant; or, the adventures of an army officer. a sequel to "the soldier boy." iv. the yankee middy; or, the adventures of a naval officer. a sequel to "the sailor boy." v. fighting joe; or, the fortunes of a staff officer. a sequel to "the young lieutenant." vi. brave old salt; or, life on the quarter deck. a sequel to "the yankee middy." * * * * * transcriber's notes the punctuation, including accents, has not been changed. the usage of hyphens has been standardised. the oe ligature has been expanded. the following changes have been made: line 2400 the duplicate 'on' has been deleted. line 2464 compaign is now campaign. line 6007 immediaely is now immediately. line 6516 illict is now illicit. line 10544 contined is now continued. line 10784 hoplessness is now hopelessness. line 11585 subblime is now sublime. personal memoirs of u. s. grant volume i. by u. s. grant preface. "man proposes and god disposes." there are but few important events in the affairs of men brought about by their own choice. although frequently urged by friends to write my memoirs i had determined never to do so, nor to write anything for publication. at the age of nearly sixty-two i received an injury from a fall, which confined me closely to the house while it did not apparently affect my general health. this made study a pleasant pastime. shortly after, the rascality of a business partner developed itself by the announcement of a failure. this was followed soon after by universal depression of all securities, which seemed to threaten the extinction of a good part of the income still retained, and for which i am indebted to the kindly act of friends. at this juncture the editor of the century magazine asked me to write a few articles for him. i consented for the money it gave me; for at that moment i was living upon borrowed money. the work i found congenial, and i determined to continue it. the event is an important one for me, for good or evil; i hope for the former. in preparing these volumes for the public, i have entered upon the task with the sincere desire to avoid doing injustice to any one, whether on the national or confederate side, other than the unavoidable injustice of not making mention often where special mention is due. there must be many errors of omission in this work, because the subject is too large to be treated of in two volumes in such way as to do justice to all the officers and men engaged. there were thousands of instances, during the rebellion, of individual, company, regimental and brigade deeds of heroism which deserve special mention and are not here alluded to. the troops engaged in them will have to look to the detailed reports of their individual commanders for the full history of those deeds. the first volume, as well as a portion of the second, was written before i had reason to suppose i was in a critical condition of health. later i was reduced almost to the point of death, and it became impossible for me to attend to anything for weeks. i have, however, somewhat regained my strength, and am able, often, to devote as many hours a day as a person should devote to such work. i would have more hope of satisfying the expectation of the public if i could have allowed myself more time. i have used my best efforts, with the aid of my eldest son, f. d. grant, assisted by his brothers, to verify from the records every statement of fact given. the comments are my own, and show how i saw the matters treated of whether others saw them in the same light or not. with these remarks i present these volumes to the public, asking no favor but hoping they will meet the approval of the reader. u. s. grant. mount macgregor, new york, july 1, 1885. contents volume i. chapter i. ancestry--birth--boyhood. chapter ii. west point--graduation. chapter iii. army life--causes of the mexican war--camp salubrity. chapter iv. corpus christi--mexican smuggling--spanish rule in mexico --supplying transportation. chapter v. trip to austin--promotion to full second-lieutenant--army of occupation. chapter vi. advance of the army--crossing the colorado--the rio grande. chapter vii. the mexican war--the battle of palo alto--the battle of resaca de la palma--army of invasion--general taylor--movement on camargo. chapter viii. advance on monterey--the black fort--the battle of monterey--surrender of the city. chapter ix. political intrigue--buena vista--movement against vera cruz --siege and capture of vera cruz. chapter x. march to jalapa--battle of cerro gordo--perote--puebla--scott and taylor. chapter xi. advance on the city of mexico--battle of contreras--assault at churubusco--negotiations for peace--battle of molino del rey --storming of chapultepec--san cosme--evacuation of the city--halls of the montezumas. chapter xii. promotion to first lieutenant--capture of the city of mexico--the army--mexican soldiers--peace negotiations. chapter xiii. treaty of peace--mexican bull fights--regimental quartermaster--trip to popocatapetl--trip to the caves of mexico. chapter xiv. return of the army--marriage--ordered to the pacific coast --crossing the isthmus--arrival at san francisco. chapter xv. san francisco--early california experiences--life on the pacific coast--promoted captain--flush times in california. chapter xvi. resignation--private life--life at galena--the coming crisis. chapter xvii. outbreak of the rebellion--presiding at a union meeting --mustering officer of state troops--lyon at camp jackson--services tendered to the government. chapter xviii. appointed colonel of the 21st illinois--personnel of the regiment--general logan--march to missouri--movement against harris at florida, mo.--general pope in command--stationed at mexico, mo. chapter xix. commissioned brigadier-general--command at ironton, mo. --jefferson city--cape girardeau--general prentiss--seizure of paducah --headquarters at cairo. chapter xx. general fremont in command--movement against belmont--battle of belmont--a narrow escape--after the battle. chapter xxi. general halleck in command--commanding the district of cairo--movement on fort henry--capture of fort henry. chapter xxii. investment of fort donelson--the naval operations--attack of the enemy--assaulting the works--surrender of the fort. chapter xxiii. promoted major-general of volunteers--unoccupied territory--advance upon nashville--situation of the troops--confederate retreat--relieved of the command--restored to the command--general smith. chapter xxiv. the army at pittsburg landing--injured by a fall--the confederate attack at shiloh--the first day's fight at shiloh--general sherman--condition of the army--close of the first day's fight--the second day's fight--retreat and defeat of the confederates. chapter xxv. struck by a bullet--precipitate retreat of the confederates--intrenchments at shiloh--general buell--general johnston --remarks on shiloh. chapter xxvi. halleck assumes command in the field--the advance upon corinth--occupation of corinth--the army separated. chapter xxvii. headquarters moved to memphis--on the road to memphis --escaping jackson--complaints and requests--halleck appointed commander-in-chief--return to corinth--movements of bragg--surrender of clarksville--the advance upon chattanooga--sheridan colonel of a michigan regiment. chapter xxviii. advance of van dorn and price--price enters iuka--battle of iuka. chapter xxix. van dorn's movements--battle of corinth--command of the department of the tennessee. chapter xxx. the campaign against vicksburg--employing the freedmen --occupation of holly springs--sherman ordered to memphis--sherman's movements down the mississippi--van dorn captures holly springs --collecting forage and food. chapter xxxi. headquarters moved to holly springs--general mcclernand in command--assuming command at young's point--operations above vicksburg --fortifications about vicksburg--the canal--lake providence--operations at yazoo pass. chapter xxxii. the bayous west of the mississippi--criticisms of the northern press--running the batteries--loss of the indianola --disposition of the troops. chapter xxxiii. attack on grand gulf--operations below vicksburg. chapter xxxiv. capture of port gibson--grierson's raid--occupation of grand gulf--movement up the big black--battle of raymond. chapter xxxv. movement against jackson--fall of jackson--intercepting the enemy--battle of champion's hill. chapter xxxvi. battle of black river bridge--crossing the big black --investment of vicksburg--assaulting the works. chapter xxxvii. siege of vicksburg. chapter xxxviii. johnston's movements--fortifications at haines's bluff --explosion of the mine--explosion of the second mine--preparing for the assault--the flag of truce--meeting with pemberton--negotiations for surrender--accepting the terms--surrender of vicksburg. chapter xxxix. retrospect of the campaign--sherman's movements--proposed movement upon mobile--a painful accident--ordered to report at cairo. volume one begins: chapter i. ancestry--birth--boyhood. my family is american, and has been for generations, in all its branches, direct and collateral. mathew grant, the founder of the branch in america, of which i am a descendant, reached dorchester, massachusetts, in may, 1630. in 1635 he moved to what is now windsor, connecticut, and was the surveyor for that colony for more than forty years. he was also, for many years of the time, town clerk. he was a married man when he arrived at dorchester, but his children were all born in this country. his eldest son, samuel, took lands on the east side of the connecticut river, opposite windsor, which have been held and occupied by descendants of his to this day. i am of the eighth generation from mathew grant, and seventh from samuel. mathew grant's first wife died a few years after their settlement in windsor, and he soon after married the widow rockwell, who, with her first husband, had been fellow-passengers with him and his first wife, on the ship mary and john, from dorchester, england, in 1630. mrs. rockwell had several children by her first marriage, and others by her second. by intermarriage, two or three generations later, i am descended from both the wives of mathew grant. in the fifth descending generation my great grandfather, noah grant, and his younger brother, solomon, held commissions in the english army, in 1756, in the war against the french and indians. both were killed that year. my grandfather, also named noah, was then but nine years old. at the breaking out of the war of the revolution, after the battles of concord and lexington, he went with a connecticut company to join the continental army, and was present at the battle of bunker hill. he served until the fall of yorktown, or through the entire revolutionary war. he must, however, have been on furlough part of the time--as i believe most of the soldiers of that period were--for he married in connecticut during the war, had two children, and was a widower at the close. soon after this he emigrated to westmoreland county, pennsylvania, and settled near the town of greensburg in that county. he took with him the younger of his two children, peter grant. the elder, solomon, remained with his relatives in connecticut until old enough to do for himself, when he emigrated to the british west indies. not long after his settlement in pennsylvania, my grandfather, captain noah grant, married a miss kelly, and in 1799 he emigrated again, this time to ohio, and settled where the town of deerfield now stands. he had now five children, including peter, a son by his first marriage. my father, jesse r. grant, was the second child--oldest son, by the second marriage. peter grant went early to maysville, kentucky, where he was very prosperous, married, had a family of nine children, and was drowned at the mouth of the kanawha river, virginia, in 1825, being at the time one of the wealthy men of the west. my grandmother grant died in 1805, leaving seven children. this broke up the family. captain noah grant was not thrifty in the way of "laying up stores on earth," and, after the death of his second wife, he went, with the two youngest children, to live with his son peter, in maysville. the rest of the family found homes in the neighborhood of deerfield, my father in the family of judge tod, the father of the late governor tod, of ohio. his industry and independence of character were such, that i imagine his labor compensated fully for the expense of his maintenance. there must have been a cordiality in his welcome into the tod family, for to the day of his death he looked upon judge tod and his wife, with all the reverence he could have felt if they had been parents instead of benefactors. i have often heard him speak of mrs. tod as the most admirable woman he had ever known. he remained with the tod family only a few years, until old enough to learn a trade. he went first, i believe, with his half-brother, peter grant, who, though not a tanner himself, owned a tannery in maysville, kentucky. here he learned his trade, and in a few years returned to deerfield and worked for, and lived in the family of a mr. brown, the father of john brown--"whose body lies mouldering in the grave, while his soul goes marching on." i have often heard my father speak of john brown, particularly since the events at harper's ferry. brown was a boy when they lived in the same house, but he knew him afterwards, and regarded him as a man of great purity of character, of high moral and physical courage, but a fanatic and extremist in whatever he advocated. it was certainly the act of an insane man to attempt the invasion of the south, and the overthrow of slavery, with less than twenty men. my father set up for himself in business, establishing a tannery at ravenna, the county seat of portage county. in a few years he removed from ravenna, and set up the same business at point pleasant, clermont county, ohio. during the minority of my father, the west afforded but poor facilities for the most opulent of the youth to acquire an education, and the majority were dependent, almost exclusively, upon their own exertions for whatever learning they obtained. i have often heard him say that his time at school was limited to six months, when he was very young, too young, indeed, to learn much, or to appreciate the advantages of an education, and to a "quarter's schooling" afterwards, probably while living with judge tod. but his thirst for education was intense. he learned rapidly, and was a constant reader up to the day of his death in his eightieth year. books were scarce in the western reserve during his youth, but he read every book he could borrow in the neighborhood where he lived. this scarcity gave him the early habit of studying everything he read, so that when he got through with a book, he knew everything in it. the habit continued through life. even after reading the daily papers--which he never neglected--he could give all the important information they contained. he made himself an excellent english scholar, and before he was twenty years of age was a constant contributor to western newspapers, and was also, from that time until he was fifty years old, an able debater in the societies for this purpose, which were common in the west at that time. he always took an active part in politics, but was never a candidate for office, except, i believe, that he was the first mayor of georgetown. he supported jackson for the presidency; but he was a whig, a great admirer of henry clay, and never voted for any other democrat for high office after jackson. my mother's family lived in montgomery county, pennsylvania, for several generations. i have little information about her ancestors. her family took no interest in genealogy, so that my grandfather, who died when i was sixteen years old, knew only back to his grandfather. on the other side, my father took a great interest in the subject, and in his researches, he found that there was an entailed estate in windsor, connecticut, belonging to the family, to which his nephew, lawson grant --still living--was the heir. he was so much interested in the subject that he got his nephew to empower him to act in the matter, and in 1832 or 1833, when i was a boy ten or eleven years old, he went to windsor, proved the title beyond dispute, and perfected the claim of the owners for a consideration--three thousand dollars, i think. i remember the circumstance well, and remember, too, hearing him say on his return that he found some widows living on the property, who had little or nothing beyond their homes. from these he refused to receive any recompense. my mother's father, john simpson, moved from montgomery county, pennsylvania, to clermont county, ohio, about the year 1819, taking with him his four children, three daughters and one son. my mother, hannah simpson, was the third of these children, and was then over twenty years of age. her oldest sister was at that time married, and had several children. she still lives in clermont county at this writing, october 5th, 1884, and is over ninety ears of age. until her memory failed her, a few years ago, she thought the country ruined beyond recovery when the democratic party lost control in 1860. her family, which was large, inherited her views, with the exception of one son who settled in kentucky before the war. he was the only one of the children who entered the volunteer service to suppress the rebellion. her brother, next of age and now past eighty-eight, is also still living in clermont county, within a few miles of the old homestead, and is as active in mind as ever. he was a supporter of the government during the war, and remains a firm believer, that national success by the democratic party means irretrievable ruin. in june, 1821, my father, jesse r. grant, married hannah simpson. i was born on the 27th of april, 1822, at point pleasant, clermont county, ohio. in the fall of 1823 we moved to georgetown, the county seat of brown, the adjoining county east. this place remained my home, until at the age of seventeen, in 1839, i went to west point. the schools, at the time of which i write, were very indifferent. there were no free schools, and none in which the scholars were classified. they were all supported by subscription, and a single teacher--who was often a man or a woman incapable of teaching much, even if they imparted all they knew--would have thirty or forty scholars, male and female, from the infant learning the a b c's up to the young lady of eighteen and the boy of twenty, studying the highest branches taught--the three r's, "reading, 'riting, 'rithmetic." i never saw an algebra, or other mathematical work higher than the arithmetic, in georgetown, until after i was appointed to west point. i then bought a work on algebra in cincinnati; but having no teacher it was greek to me. my life in georgetown was uneventful. from the age of five or six until seventeen, i attended the subscription schools of the village, except during the winters of 1836-7 and 1838-9. the former period was spent in maysville, kentucky, attending the school of richardson and rand; the latter in ripley, ohio, at a private school. i was not studious in habit, and probably did not make progress enough to compensate for the outlay for board and tuition. at all events both winters were spent in going over the same old arithmetic which i knew every word of before, and repeating: "a noun is the name of a thing," which i had also heard my georgetown teachers repeat, until i had come to believe it--but i cast no reflections upon my old teacher, richardson. he turned out bright scholars from his school, many of whom have filled conspicuous places in the service of their states. two of my contemporaries there --who, i believe, never attended any other institution of learning--have held seats in congress, and one, if not both, other high offices; these are wadsworth and brewster. my father was, from my earliest recollection, in comfortable circumstances, considering the times, his place of residence, and the community in which he lived. mindful of his own lack of facilities for acquiring an education, his greatest desire in maturer years was for the education of his children. consequently, as stated before, i never missed a quarter from school from the time i was old enough to attend till the time of leaving home. this did not exempt me from labor. in my early days, every one labored more or less, in the region where my youth was spent, and more in proportion to their private means. it was only the very poor who were exempt. while my father carried on the manufacture of leather and worked at the trade himself, he owned and tilled considerable land. i detested the trade, preferring almost any other labor; but i was fond of agriculture, and of all employment in which horses were used. we had, among other lands, fifty acres of forest within a mile of the village. in the fall of the year choppers were employed to cut enough wood to last a twelve-month. when i was seven or eight years of age, i began hauling all the wood used in the house and shops. i could not load it on the wagons, of course, at that time, but i could drive, and the choppers would load, and some one at the house unload. when about eleven years old, i was strong enough to hold a plough. from that age until seventeen i did all the work done with horses, such as breaking up the land, furrowing, ploughing corn and potatoes, bringing in the crops when harvested, hauling all the wood, besides tending two or three horses, a cow or two, and sawing wood for stoves, etc., while still attending school. for this i was compensated by the fact that there was never any scolding or punishing by my parents; no objection to rational enjoyments, such as fishing, going to the creek a mile away to swim in summer, taking a horse and visiting my grandparents in the adjoining county, fifteen miles off, skating on the ice in winter, or taking a horse and sleigh when there was snow on the ground. while still quite young i had visited cincinnati, forty-five miles away, several times, alone; also maysville, kentucky, often, and once louisville. the journey to louisville was a big one for a boy of that day. i had also gone once with a two-horse carriage to chilicothe, about seventy miles, with a neighbor's family, who were removing to toledo, ohio, and returned alone; and had gone once, in like manner, to flat rock, kentucky, about seventy miles away. on this latter occasion i was fifteen years of age. while at flat rock, at the house of a mr. payne, whom i was visiting with his brother, a neighbor of ours in georgetown, i saw a very fine saddle horse, which i rather coveted, and proposed to mr. payne, the owner, to trade him for one of the two i was driving. payne hesitated to trade with a boy, but asking his brother about it, the latter told him that it would be all right, that i was allowed to do as i pleased with the horses. i was seventy miles from home, with a carriage to take back, and mr. payne said he did not know that his horse had ever had a collar on. i asked to have him hitched to a farm wagon and we would soon see whether he would work. it was soon evident that the horse had never worn harness before; but he showed no viciousness, and i expressed a confidence that i could manage him. a trade was at once struck, i receiving ten dollars difference. the next day mr. payne, of georgetown, and i started on our return. we got along very well for a few miles, when we encountered a ferocious dog that frightened the horses and made them run. the new animal kicked at every jump he made. i got the horses stopped, however, before any damage was done, and without running into anything. after giving them a little rest, to quiet their fears, we started again. that instant the new horse kicked, and started to run once more. the road we were on, struck the turnpike within half a mile of the point where the second runaway commenced, and there there was an embankment twenty or more feet deep on the opposite side of the pike. i got the horses stopped on the very brink of the precipice. my new horse was terribly frightened and trembled like an aspen; but he was not half so badly frightened as my companion, mr. payne, who deserted me after this last experience, and took passage on a freight wagon for maysville. every time i attempted to start, my new horse would commence to kick. i was in quite a dilemma for a time. once in maysville i could borrow a horse from an uncle who lived there; but i was more than a day's travel from that point. finally i took out my bandanna--the style of handkerchief in universal use then--and with this blindfolded my horse. in this way i reached maysville safely the next day, no doubt much to the surprise of my friend. here i borrowed a horse from my uncle, and the following day we proceeded on our journey. about half my school-days in georgetown were spent at the school of john d. white, a north carolinian, and the father of chilton white who represented the district in congress for one term during the rebellion. mr. white was always a democrat in politics, and chilton followed his father. he had two older brothers--all three being school-mates of mine at their father's school--who did not go the same way. the second brother died before the rebellion began; he was a whig, and afterwards a republican. his oldest brother was a republican and brave soldier during the rebellion. chilton is reported as having told of an earlier horse-trade of mine. as he told the story, there was a mr. ralston living within a few miles of the village, who owned a colt which i very much wanted. my father had offered twenty dollars for it, but ralston wanted twenty-five. i was so anxious to have the colt, that after the owner left, i begged to be allowed to take him at the price demanded. my father yielded, but said twenty dollars was all the horse was worth, and told me to offer that price; if it was not accepted i was to offer twenty-two and a half, and if that would not get him, to give the twenty-five. i at once mounted a horse and went for the colt. when i got to mr. ralston's house, i said to him: "papa says i may offer you twenty dollars for the colt, but if you won't take that, i am to offer twenty-two and a half, and if you won't take that, to give you twenty-five." it would not require a connecticut man to guess the price finally agreed upon. this story is nearly true. i certainly showed very plainly that i had come for the colt and meant to have him. i could not have been over eight years old at the time. this transaction caused me great heart-burning. the story got out among the boys of the village, and it was a long time before i heard the last of it. boys enjoy the misery of their companions, at least village boys in that day did, and in later life i have found that all adults are not free from the peculiarity. i kept the horse until he was four years old, when he went blind, and i sold him for twenty dollars. when i went to maysville to school, in 1836, at the age of fourteen, i recognized my colt as one of the blind horses working on the tread-wheel of the ferry-boat. i have describes enough of my early life to give an impression of the whole. i did not like to work; but i did as much of it, while young, as grown men can be hired to do in these days, and attended school at the same time. i had as many privileges as any boy in the village, and probably more than most of them. i have no recollection of ever having been punished at home, either by scolding or by the rod. but at school the case was different. the rod was freely used there, and i was not exempt from its influence. i can see john d. white--the school teacher --now, with his long beech switch always in his hand. it was not always the same one, either. switches were brought in bundles, from a beech wood near the school house, by the boys for whose benefit they were intended. often a whole bundle would be used up in a single day. i never had any hard feelings against my teacher, either while attending the school, or in later years when reflecting upon my experience. mr. white was a kindhearted man, and was much respected by the community in which he lived. he only followed the universal custom of the period, and that under which he had received his own education. chapter ii. west point--graduation. in the winter of 1838-9 i was attending school at ripley, only ten miles distant from georgetown, but spent the christmas holidays at home. during this vacation my father received a letter from the honorable thomas morris, then united states senator from ohio. when he read it he said to me, "ulysses, i believe you are going to receive the appointment." "what appointment?" i inquired. "to west point; i have applied for it." "but i won't go," i said. he said he thought i would, and i thought so too, if he did. i really had no objection to going to west point, except that i had a very exalted idea of the acquirements necessary to get through. i did not believe i possessed them, and could not bear the idea of failing. there had been four boys from our village, or its immediate neighborhood, who had been graduated from west point, and never a failure of any one appointed from georgetown, except in the case of the one whose place i was to take. he was the son of dr. bailey, our nearest and most intimate neighbor. young bailey had been appointed in 1837. finding before the january examination following, that he could not pass, he resigned and went to a private school, and remained there until the following year, when he was reappointed. before the next examination he was dismissed. dr. bailey was a proud and sensitive man, and felt the failure of his son so keenly that he forbade his return home. there were no telegraphs in those days to disseminate news rapidly, no railroads west of the alleghanies, and but few east; and above all, there were no reporters prying into other people's private affairs. consequently it did not become generally known that there was a vacancy at west point from our district until i was appointed. i presume mrs. bailey confided to my mother the fact that bartlett had been dismissed, and that the doctor had forbidden his son's return home. the honorable thomas l. hamer, one of the ablest men ohio ever produced, was our member of congress at the time, and had the right of nomination. he and my father had been members of the same debating society (where they were generally pitted on opposite sides), and intimate personal friends from their early manhood up to a few years before. in politics they differed. hamer was a life-long democrat, while my father was a whig. they had a warm discussion, which finally became angry--over some act of president jackson, the removal of the deposit of public moneys, i think--after which they never spoke until after my appointment. i know both of them felt badly over this estrangement, and would have been glad at any time to come to a reconciliation; but neither would make the advance. under these circumstances my father would not write to hamer for the appointment, but he wrote to thomas morris, united states senator from ohio, informing him that there was a vacancy at west point from our district, and that he would be glad if i could be appointed to fill it. this letter, i presume, was turned over to mr. hamer, and, as there was no other applicant, he cheerfully appointed me. this healed the breach between the two, never after reopened. besides the argument used by my father in favor of my going to west point--that "he thought i would go"--there was another very strong inducement. i had always a great desire to travel. i was already the best travelled boy in georgetown, except the sons of one man, john walker, who had emigrated to texas with his family, and immigrated back as soon as he could get the means to do so. in his short stay in texas he acquired a very different opinion of the country from what one would form going there now. i had been east to wheeling, virginia, and north to the western reserve, in ohio, west to louisville, and south to bourbon county, kentucky, besides having driven or ridden pretty much over the whole country within fifty miles of home. going to west point would give me the opportunity of visiting the two great cities of the continent, philadelphia and new york. this was enough. when these places were visited i would have been glad to have had a steamboat or railroad collision, or any other accident happen, by which i might have received a temporary injury sufficient to make me ineligible, for a time, to enter the academy. nothing of the kind occurred, and i had to face the music. georgetown has a remarkable record for a western village. it is, and has been from its earliest existence, a democratic town. there was probably no time during the rebellion when, if the opportunity could have been afforded, it would not have voted for jefferson davis for president of the united states, over mr. lincoln, or any other representative of his party; unless it was immediately after some of john morgan's men, in his celebrated raid through ohio, spent a few hours in the village. the rebels helped themselves to whatever they could find, horses, boots and shoes, especially horses, and many ordered meals to be prepared for them by the families. this was no doubt a far pleasanter duty for some families than it would have been to render a like service for union soldiers. the line between the rebel and union element in georgetown was so marked that it led to divisions even in the churches. there were churches in that part of ohio where treason was preached regularly, and where, to secure membership, hostility to the government, to the war and to the liberation of the slaves, was far more essential than a belief in the authenticity or credibility of the bible. there were men in georgetown who filled all the requirements for membership in these churches. yet this far-off western village, with a population, including old and young, male and female, of about one thousand--about enough for the organization of a single regiment if all had been men capable of bearing arms--furnished the union army four general officers and one colonel, west point graduates, and nine generals and field officers of volunteers, that i can think of. of the graduates from west point, all had citizenship elsewhere at the breaking out of the rebellion, except possibly general a. v. kautz, who had remained in the army from his graduation. two of the colonels also entered the service from other localities. the other seven, general mcgroierty, colonels white, fyffe, loudon and marshall, majors king and bailey, were all residents of georgetown when the war broke out, and all of them, who were alive at the close, returned there. major bailey was the cadet who had preceded me at west point. he was killed in west virginia, in his first engagement. as far as i know, every boy who has entered west point from that village since my time has been graduated. i took passage on a steamer at ripley, ohio, for pittsburg, about the middle of may, 1839. western boats at that day did not make regular trips at stated times, but would stop anywhere, and for any length of time, for passengers or freight. i have myself been detained two or three days at a place after steam was up, the gang planks, all but one, drawn in, and after the time advertised for starting had expired. on this occasion we had no vexatious delays, and in about three days pittsburg was reached. from pittsburg i chose passage by the canal to harrisburg, rather than by the more expeditious stage. this gave a better opportunity of enjoying the fine scenery of western pennsylvania, and i had rather a dread of reaching my destination at all. at that time the canal was much patronized by travellers, and, with the comfortable packets of the period, no mode of conveyance could be more pleasant, when time was not an object. from harrisburg to philadelphia there was a railroad, the first i had ever seen, except the one on which i had just crossed the summit of the alleghany mountains, and over which canal boats were transported. in travelling by the road from harrisburg, i thought the perfection of rapid transit had been reached. we travelled at least eighteen miles an hour, when at full speed, and made the whole distance averaging probably as much as twelve miles an hour. this seemed like annihilating space. i stopped five days in philadelphia, saw about every street in the city, attended the theatre, visited girard college (which was then in course of construction), and got reprimanded from home afterwards, for dallying by the way so long. my sojourn in new york was shorter, but long enough to enable me to see the city very well. i reported at west point on the 30th or 31st of may, and about two weeks later passed my examination for admission, without difficulty, very much to my surprise. a military life had no charms for me, and i had not the faintest idea of staying in the army even if i should be graduated, which i did not expect. the encampment which preceded the commencement of academic studies was very wearisome and uninteresting. when the 28th of august came--the date for breaking up camp and going into barracks--i felt as though i had been at west point always, and that if i staid to graduation, i would have to remain always. i did not take hold of my studies with avidity, in fact i rarely ever read over a lesson the second time during my entire cadetship. i could not sit in my room doing nothing. there is a fine library connected with the academy from which cadets can get books to read in their quarters. i devoted more time to these, than to books relating to the course of studies. much of the time, i am sorry to say, was devoted to novels, but not those of a trashy sort. i read all of bulwer's then published, cooper's, marryat's, scott's, washington irving's works, lever's, and many others that i do not now remember. mathematics was very easy to me, so that when january came, i passed the examination, taking a good standing in that branch. in french, the only other study at that time in the first year's course, my standing was very low. in fact, if the class had been turned the other end foremost i should have been near head. i never succeeded in getting squarely at either end of my class, in any one study, during the four years. i came near it in french, artillery, infantry and cavalry tactics, and conduct. early in the session of the congress which met in december, 1839, a bill was discussed abolishing the military academy. i saw in this an honorable way to obtain a discharge, and read the debates with much interest, but with impatience at the delay in taking action, for i was selfish enough to favor the bill. it never passed, and a year later, although the time hung drearily with me, i would have been sorry to have seen it succeed. my idea then was to get through the course, secure a detail for a few years as assistant professor of mathematics at the academy, and afterwards obtain a permanent position as professor in some respectable college; but circumstances always did shape my course different from my plans. at the end of two years the class received the usual furlough, extending from the close of the june examination to the 28th of august. this i enjoyed beyond any other period of my life. my father had sold out his business in georgetown--where my youth had been spent, and to which my day-dreams carried me back as my future home, if i should ever be able to retire on a competency. he had moved to bethel, only twelve miles away, in the adjoining county of clermont, and had bought a young horse that had never been in harness, for my special use under the saddle during my furlough. most of my time was spent among my old school-mates--these ten weeks were shorter than one week at west point. persons acquainted with the academy know that the corps of cadets is divided into four companies for the purpose of military exercises. these companies are officered from the cadets, the superintendent and commandant selecting the officers for their military bearing and qualifications. the adjutant, quartermaster, four captains and twelve lieutenants are taken from the first, or senior class; the sergeants from the second, or junior class; and the corporals from the third, or sophomore class. i had not been "called out" as a corporal, but when i returned from furlough i found myself the last but one--about my standing in all the tactics--of eighteen sergeants. the promotion was too much for me. that year my standing in the class--as shown by the number of demerits of the year--was about the same as it was among the sergeants, and i was dropped, and served the fourth year as a private. during my first year's encampment general scott visited west point, and reviewed the cadets. with his commanding figure, his quite colossal size and showy uniform, i thought him the finest specimen of manhood my eyes had ever beheld, and the most to be envied. i could never resemble him in appearance, but i believe i did have a presentiment for a moment that some day i should occupy his place on review--although i had no intention then of remaining in the army. my experience in a horse-trade ten years before, and the ridicule it caused me, were too fresh in my mind for me to communicate this presentiment to even my most intimate chum. the next summer martin van buren, then president of the united states, visited west point and reviewed the cadets; he did not impress me with the awe which scott had inspired. in fact i regarded general scott and captain c. f. smith, the commandant of cadets, as the two men most to be envied in the nation. i retained a high regard for both up to the day of their death. the last two years wore away more rapidly than the first two, but they still seemed about five times as long as ohio years, to me. at last all the examinations were passed, and the members of the class were called upon to record their choice of arms of service and regiments. i was anxious to enter the cavalry, or dragoons as they were then called, but there was only one regiment of dragoons in the army at that time, and attached to that, besides the full complement of officers, there were at least four brevet second lieutenants. i recorded therefore my first choice, dragoons; second, 4th infantry; and got the latter. again there was a furlough--or, more properly speaking, leave of absence for the class were now commissioned officers--this time to the end of september. again i went to ohio to spend my vacation among my old school-mates; and again i found a fine saddle horse purchased for my special use, besides a horse and buggy that i could drive--but i was not in a physical condition to enjoy myself quite as well as on the former occasion. for six months before graduation i had had a desperate cough ("tyler's grip" it was called), and i was very much reduced, weighing but one hundred and seventeen pounds, just my weight at entrance, though i had grown six inches in stature in the mean time. there was consumption in my father's family, two of his brothers having died of that disease, which made my symptoms more alarming. the brother and sister next younger than myself died, during the rebellion, of the same disease, and i seemed the most promising subject for it of the three in 1843. having made alternate choice of two different arms of service with different uniforms, i could not get a uniform suit until notified of my assignment. i left my measurement with a tailor, with directions not to make the uniform until i notified him whether it was to be for infantry or dragoons. notice did not reach me for several weeks, and then it took at least a week to get the letter of instructions to the tailor and two more to make the clothes and have them sent to me. this was a time of great suspense. i was impatient to get on my uniform and see how it looked, and probably wanted my old school-mates, particularly the girls, to see me in it. the conceit was knocked out of me by two little circumstances that happened soon after the arrival of the clothes, which gave me a distaste for military uniform that i never recovered from. soon after the arrival of the suit i donned it, and put off for cincinnati on horseback. while i was riding along a street of that city, imagining that every one was looking at me, with a feeling akin to mine when i first saw general scott, a little urchin, bareheaded, footed, with dirty and ragged pants held up by bare a single gallows--that's what suspenders were called then--and a shirt that had not seen a wash-tub for weeks, turned to me and cried: "soldier! will you work? no, sir--ee; i'll sell my shirt first!!" the horse trade and its dire consequences were recalled to mind. the other circumstance occurred at home. opposite our house in bethel stood the old stage tavern where "man and beast" found accommodation, the stable-man was rather dissipated, but possessed of some humor. on my return i found him parading the streets, and attending in the stable, barefooted, but in a pair of sky-blue nankeen pantaloons--just the color of my uniform trousers--with a strip of white cotton sheeting sewed down the outside seams in imitation of mine. the joke was a huge one in the mind of many of the people, and was much enjoyed by them; but i did not appreciate it so highly. during the remainder of my leave of absence, my time was spent in visiting friends in georgetown and cincinnati, and occasionally other towns in that part of the state. chapter iii. army life--causes of the mexican war--camp salubrity. on the 30th of september i reported for duty at jefferson barracks, st. louis, with the 4th united states infantry. it was the largest military post in the country at that time, being garrisoned by sixteen companies of infantry, eight of the 3d regiment, the remainder of the 4th. colonel steven kearney, one of the ablest officers of the day, commanded the post, and under him discipline was kept at a high standard, but without vexatious rules or regulations. every drill and roll-call had to be attended, but in the intervals officers were permitted to enjoy themselves, leaving the garrison, and going where they pleased, without making written application to state where they were going for how long, etc., so that they were back for their next duty. it did seem to me, in my early army days, that too many of the older officers, when they came to command posts, made it a study to think what orders they could publish to annoy their subordinates and render them uncomfortable. i noticed, however, a few years later, when the mexican war broke out, that most of this class of officers discovered they were possessed of disabilities which entirely incapacitated them for active field service. they had the moral courage to proclaim it, too. they were right; but they did not always give their disease the right name. at west point i had a class-mate--in the last year of our studies he was room-mate also--f. t. dent, whose family resided some five miles west of jefferson barracks. two of his unmarried brothers were living at home at that time, and as i had taken with me from ohio, my horse, saddle and bridle, i soon found my way out to white haven, the name of the dent estate. as i found the family congenial my visits became frequent. there were at home, besides the young men, two daughters, one a school miss of fifteen, the other a girl of eight or nine. there was still an older daughter of seventeen, who had been spending several years at boarding-school in st. louis, but who, though through school, had not yet returned home. she was spending the winter in the city with connections, the family of colonel john o'fallon, well known in st. louis. in february she returned to her country home. after that i do not know but my visits became more frequent; they certainly did become more enjoyable. we would often take walks, or go on horseback to visit the neighbors, until i became quite well acquainted in that vicinity. sometimes one of the brothers would accompany us, sometimes one of the younger sisters. if the 4th infantry had remained at jefferson barracks it is possible, even probable, that this life might have continued for some years without my finding out that there was anything serious the matter with me; but in the following may a circumstance occurred which developed my sentiment so palpably that there was no mistaking it. the annexation of texas was at this time the subject of violent discussion in congress, in the press, and by individuals. the administration of president tyler, then in power, was making the most strenuous efforts to effect the annexation, which was, indeed, the great and absorbing question of the day. during these discussions the greater part of the single rifle regiment in the army--the 2d dragoons, which had been dismounted a year or two before, and designated "dismounted rifles"--was stationed at fort jessup, louisiana, some twenty-five miles east of the texas line, to observe the frontier. about the 1st of may the 3d infantry was ordered from jefferson barracks to louisiana, to go into camp in the neighborhood of fort jessup, and there await further orders. the troops were embarked on steamers and were on their way down the mississippi within a few days after the receipt of this order. about the time they started i obtained a leave of absence for twenty days to go to ohio to visit my parents. i was obliged to go to st. louis to take a steamer for louisville or cincinnati, or the first steamer going up the ohio river to any point. before i left st. louis orders were received at jefferson barracks for the 4th infantry to follow the 3d. a messenger was sent after me to stop my leaving; but before he could reach me i was off, totally ignorant of these events. a day or two after my arrival at bethel i received a letter from a classmate and fellow lieutenant in the 4th, informing me of the circumstances related above, and advising me not to open any letter post marked st. louis or jefferson barracks, until the expiration of my leave, and saying that he would pack up my things and take them along for me. his advice was not necessary, for no other letter was sent to me. i now discovered that i was exceedingly anxious to get back to jefferson barracks, and i understood the reason without explanation from any one. my leave of absence required me to report for duty, at jefferson barracks, at the end of twenty days. i knew my regiment had gone up the red river, but i was not disposed to break the letter of my leave; besides, if i had proceeded to louisiana direct, i could not have reached there until after the expiration of my leave. accordingly, at the end of the twenty days, i reported for duty to lieutenant ewell, commanding at jefferson barracks, handing him at the same time my leave of absence. after noticing the phraseology of the order--leaves of absence were generally worded, "at the end of which time he will report for duty with his proper command"--he said he would give me an order to join my regiment in louisiana. i then asked for a few days' leave before starting, which he readily granted. this was the same ewell who acquired considerable reputation as a confederate general during the rebellion. he was a man much esteemed, and deservedly so, in the old army, and proved himself a gallant and efficient officer in two wars --both in my estimation unholy. i immediately procured a horse and started for the country, taking no baggage with me, of course. there is an insignificant creek--the gravois--between jefferson barracks and the place to which i was going, and at that day there was not a bridge over it from its source to its mouth. there is not water enough in the creek at ordinary stages to run a coffee mill, and at low water there is none running whatever. on this occasion it had been raining heavily, and, when the creek was reached, i found the banks full to overflowing, and the current rapid. i looked at it a moment to consider what to do. one of my superstitions had always been when i started to go any where, or to do anything, not to turn back, or stop until the thing intended was accomplished. i have frequently started to go to places where i had never been and to which i did not know the way, depending upon making inquiries on the road, and if i got past the place without knowing it, instead of turning back, i would go on until a road was found turning in the right direction, take that, and come in by the other side. so i struck into the stream, and in an instant the horse was swimming and i being carried down by the current. i headed the horse towards the other bank and soon reached it, wet through and without other clothes on that side of the stream. i went on, however, to my destination and borrowed a dry suit from my --future--brother-in-law. we were not of the same size, but the clothes answered every purpose until i got more of my own. before i returned i mustered up courage to make known, in the most awkward manner imaginable, the discovery i had made on learning that the 4th infantry had been ordered away from jefferson barracks. the young lady afterwards admitted that she too, although until then she had never looked upon me other than as a visitor whose company was agreeable to her, had experienced a depression of spirits she could not account for when the regiment left. before separating it was definitely understood that at a convenient time we would join our fortunes, and not let the removal of a regiment trouble us. this was in may, 1844. it was the 22d of august, 1848, before the fulfilment of this agreement. my duties kept me on the frontier of louisiana with the army of observation during the pendency of annexation; and afterwards i was absent through the war with mexico, provoked by the action of the army, if not by the annexation itself. during that time there was a constant correspondence between miss dent and myself, but we only met once in the period of four years and three months. in may, 1845, i procured a leave for twenty days, visited st. louis, and obtained the consent of the parents for the union, which had not been asked for before. as already stated, it was never my intention to remain in the army long, but to prepare myself for a professorship in some college. accordingly, soon after i was settled at jefferson barracks, i wrote a letter to professor church--professor of mathematics at west point--requesting him to ask my designation as his assistant, when next a detail had to be made. assistant professors at west point are all officers of the army, supposed to be selected for their special fitness for the particular branch of study they are assigned to teach. the answer from professor church was entirely satisfactory, and no doubt i should have been detailed a year or two later but for the mexican war coming on. accordingly i laid out for myself a course of studies to be pursued in garrison, with regularity, if not persistency. i reviewed my west point course of mathematics during the seven months at jefferson barracks, and read many valuable historical works, besides an occasional novel. to help my memory i kept a book in which i would write up, from time to time, my recollections of all i had read since last posting it. when the regiment was ordered away, i being absent at the time, my effects were packed up by lieutenant haslett, of the 4th infantry, and taken along. i never saw my journal after, nor did i ever keep another, except for a portion of the time while travelling abroad. often since a fear has crossed my mind lest that book might turn up yet, and fall into the hands of some malicious person who would publish it. i know its appearance would cause me as much heart-burning as my youthful horse-trade, or the later rebuke for wearing uniform clothes. the 3d infantry had selected camping grounds on the reservation at fort jessup, about midway between the red river and the sabine. our orders required us to go into camp in the same neighborhood, and await further instructions. those authorized to do so selected a place in the pine woods, between the old town of natchitoches and grand ecore, about three miles from each, and on high ground back from the river. the place was given the name of camp salubrity, and proved entitled to it. the camp was on a high, sandy, pine ridge, with spring branches in the valley, in front and rear. the springs furnished an abundance of cool, pure water, and the ridge was above the flight of mosquitoes, which abound in that region in great multitudes and of great voracity. in the valley they swarmed in myriads, but never came to the summit of the ridge. the regiment occupied this camp six months before the first death occurred, and that was caused by an accident. there was no intimation given that the removal of the 3d and 4th regiments of infantry to the western border of louisiana was occasioned in any way by the prospective annexation of texas, but it was generally understood that such was the case. ostensibly we were intended to prevent filibustering into texas, but really as a menace to mexico in case she appeared to contemplate war. generally the officers of the army were indifferent whether the annexation was consummated or not; but not so all of them. for myself, i was bitterly opposed to the measure, and to this day regard the war, which resulted, as one of the most unjust ever waged by a stronger against a weaker nation. it was an instance of a republic following the bad example of european monarchies, in not considering justice in their desire to acquire additional territory. texas was originally a state belonging to the republic of mexico. it extended from the sabine river on the east to the rio grande on the west, and from the gulf of mexico on the south and east to the territory of the united states and new mexico--another mexican state at that time--on the north and west. an empire in territory, it had but a very sparse population, until settled by americans who had received authority from mexico to colonize. these colonists paid very little attention to the supreme government, and introduced slavery into the state almost from the start, though the constitution of mexico did not, nor does it now, sanction that institution. soon they set up an independent government of their own, and war existed, between texas and mexico, in name from that time until 1836, when active hostilities very nearly ceased upon the capture of santa anna, the mexican president. before long, however, the same people--who with permission of mexico had colonized texas, and afterwards set up slavery there, and then seceded as soon as they felt strong enough to do so--offered themselves and the state to the united states, and in 1845 their offer was accepted. the occupation, separation and annexation were, from the inception of the movement to its final consummation, a conspiracy to acquire territory out of which slave states might be formed for the american union. even if the annexation itself could be justified, the manner in which the subsequent war was forced upon mexico cannot. the fact is, annexationists wanted more territory than they could possibly lay any claim to, as part of the new acquisition. texas, as an independent state, never had exercised jurisdiction over the territory between the nueces river and the rio grande. mexico had never recognized the independence of texas, and maintained that, even if independent, the state had no claim south of the nueces. i am aware that a treaty, made by the texans with santa anna while he was under duress, ceded all the territory between the nueces and the rio grande--, but he was a prisoner of war when the treaty was made, and his life was in jeopardy. he knew, too, that he deserved execution at the hands of the texans, if they should ever capture him. the texans, if they had taken his life, would have only followed the example set by santa anna himself a few years before, when he executed the entire garrison of the alamo and the villagers of goliad. in taking military possession of texas after annexation, the army of occupation, under general taylor, was directed to occupy the disputed territory. the army did not stop at the nueces and offer to negotiate for a settlement of the boundary question, but went beyond, apparently in order to force mexico to initiate war. it is to the credit of the american nation, however, that after conquering mexico, and while practically holding the country in our possession, so that we could have retained the whole of it, or made any terms we chose, we paid a round sum for the additional territory taken; more than it was worth, or was likely to be, to mexico. to us it was an empire and of incalculable value; but it might have been obtained by other means. the southern rebellion was largely the outgrowth of the mexican war. nations, like individuals, are punished for their transgressions. we got our punishment in the most sanguinary and expensive war of modern times. the 4th infantry went into camp at salubrity in the month of may, 1844, with instructions, as i have said, to await further orders. at first, officers and men occupied ordinary tents. as the summer heat increased these were covered by sheds to break the rays of the sun. the summer was whiled away in social enjoyments among the officers, in visiting those stationed at, and near, fort jessup, twenty-five miles away, visiting the planters on the red river, and the citizens of natchitoches and grand ecore. there was much pleasant intercourse between the inhabitants and the officers of the army. i retain very agreeable recollections of my stay at camp salubrity, and of the acquaintances made there, and no doubt my feeling is shared by the few officers living who were there at the time. i can call to mind only two officers of the 4th infantry, besides myself, who were at camp salubrity with the regiment, who are now alive. with a war in prospect, and belonging to a regiment that had an unusual number of officers detailed on special duty away from the regiment, my hopes of being ordered to west point as instructor vanished. at the time of which i now write, officers in the quartermaster's, commissary's and adjutant--general's departments were appointed from the line of the army, and did not vacate their regimental commissions until their regimental and staff commissions were for the same grades. generally lieutenants were appointed to captaincies to fill vacancies in the staff corps. if they should reach a captaincy in the line before they arrived at a majority in the staff, they would elect which commission they would retain. in the 4th infantry, in 1844, at least six line officers were on duty in the staff, and therefore permanently detached from the regiment. under these circumstances i gave up everything like a special course of reading, and only read thereafter for my own amusement, and not very much for that, until the war was over. i kept a horse and rode, and staid out of doors most of the time by day, and entirely recovered from the cough which i had carried from west point, and from all indications of consumption. i have often thought that my life was saved, and my health restored, by exercise and exposure, enforced by an administrative act, and a war, both of which i disapproved. as summer wore away, and cool days and colder nights came upon us, the tents e were occupying ceased to afford comfortable quarters; and "further orders" not reaching us, we began to look about to remedy the hardship. men were put to work getting out timber to build huts, and in a very short time all were comfortably housed--privates as well as officers. the outlay by the government in accomplishing this was nothing, or nearly nothing. the winter was spent more agreeably than the summer had been. there were occasional parties given by the planters along the "coast"--as the bottom lands on the red river were called. the climate was delightful. near the close of the short session of congress of 1844-5, the bill for the annexation of texas to the united states was passed. it reached president tyler on the 1st of march, 1845, and promptly received his approval. when the news reached us we began to look again for "further orders." they did not arrive promptly, and on the 1st of may following i asked and obtained a leave of absence for twenty days, for the purpose of visiting--st. louis. the object of this visit has been before stated. early in july the long expected orders were received, but they only took the regiment to new orleans barracks. we reached there before the middle of the month, and again waited weeks for still further orders. the yellow fever was raging in new orleans during the time we remained there, and the streets of the city had the appearance of a continuous well-observed sunday. i recollect but one occasion when this observance seemed to be broken by the inhabitants. one morning about daylight i happened to be awake, and, hearing the discharge of a rifle not far off, i looked out to ascertain where the sound came from. i observed a couple of clusters of men near by, and learned afterwards that "it was nothing; only a couple of gentlemen deciding a difference of opinion with rifles, at twenty paces." i do not remember if either was killed, or even hurt, but no doubt the question of difference was settled satisfactorily, and "honorably," in the estimation of the parties engaged. i do not believe i ever would have the courage to fight a duel. if any man should wrong me to the extent of my being willing to kill him, i would not be willing to give him the choice of weapons with which it should be done, and of the time, place and distance separating us, when i executed him. if i should do another such a wrong as to justify him in killing me, i would make any reasonable atonement within my power, if convinced of the wrong done. i place my opposition to duelling on higher grounds than here stated. no doubt a majority of the duels fought have been for want of moral courage on the part of those engaged to decline. at camp salubrity, and when we went to new orleans barracks, the 4th infantry was commanded by colonel vose, then an old gentleman who had not commanded on drill for a number of years. he was not a man to discover infirmity in the presence of danger. it now appeared that war was imminent, and he felt that it was his duty to brush up his tactics. accordingly, when we got settled down at our new post, he took command of the regiment at a battalion drill. only two or three evolutions had been gone through when he dismissed the battalion, and, turning to go to his own quarters, dropped dead. he had not been complaining of ill health, but no doubt died of heart disease. he was a most estimable man, of exemplary habits, and by no means the author of his own disease. chapter iv. corpus christi--mexican smuggling--spanish rule in mexico--supplying transportation. early in september the regiment left new orleans for corpus christi, now in texas. ocean steamers were not then common, and the passage was made in sailing vessels. at that time there was not more than three feet of water in the channel at the outlet of corpus christi bay; the debarkation, therefore, had to take place by small steamers, and at an island in the channel called shell island, the ships anchoring some miles out from shore. this made the work slow, and as the army was only supplied with one or two steamers, it took a number of days to effect the landing of a single regiment with its stores, camp and garrison equipage, etc. there happened to be pleasant weather while this was going on, but the land-swell was so great that when the ship and steamer were on opposite sides of the same wave they would be at considerable distance apart. the men and baggage were let down to a point higher than the lower deck of the steamer, and when ship and steamer got into the trough between the waves, and were close together, the load would be drawn over the steamer and rapidly run down until it rested on the deck. after i had gone ashore, and had been on guard several days at shell island, quite six miles from the ship, i had occasion for some reason or other to return on board. while on the suviah--i think that was the name of our vessel--i heard a tremendous racket at the other end of the ship, and much and excited sailor language, such as "damn your eyes," etc. in a moment or two the captain, who was an excitable little man, dying with consumption, and not weighing much over a hundred pounds, came running out, carrying a sabre nearly as large and as heavy as he was, and crying, that his men had mutinied. it was necessary to sustain the captain without question, and in a few minutes all the sailors charged with mutiny were in irons. i rather felt for a time a wish that i had not gone aboard just then. as the men charged with mutiny submitted to being placed in irons without resistance, i always doubted if they knew that they had mutinied until they were told. by the time i was ready to leave the ship again i thought i had learned enough of the working of the double and single pulley, by which passengers were let down from the upper deck of the ship to the steamer below, and determined to let myself down without assistance. without saying anything of my intentions to any one, i mounted the railing, and taking hold of the centre rope, just below the upper block, i put one foot on the hook below the lower block, and stepped off just as i did so some one called out "hold on." it was too late. i tried to "hold on" with all my might, but my heels went up, and my head went down so rapidly that my hold broke, and i plunged head foremost into the water, some twenty-five feet below, with such velocity that it seemed to me i never would stop. when i came to the surface again, being a fair swimmer, and not having lost my presence of mind, i swam around until a bucket was let down for me, and i was drawn up without a scratch or injury. i do not believe there was a man on board who sympathized with me in the least when they found me uninjured. i rather enjoyed the joke myself. the captain of the suviah died of his disease a few months later, and i believe before the mutineers were tried. i hope they got clear, because, as before stated, i always thought the mutiny was all in the brain of a very weak and sick man. after reaching shore, or shell island, the labor of getting to corpus christi was slow and tedious. there was, if my memory serves me, but one small steamer to transport troops and baggage when the 4th infantry arrived. others were procured later. the distance from shell island to corpus christi was some sixteen or eighteen miles. the channel to the bay was so shallow that the steamer, small as it was, had to be dragged over the bottom when loaded. not more than one trip a day could be effected. later this was remedied, by deepening the channel and increasing the number of vessels suitable to its navigation. corpus christi is near the head of the bay of the same name, formed by the entrance of the nueces river into tide-water, and is on the west bank of that bay. at the time of its first occupancy by united states troops there was a small mexican hamlet there, containing probably less than one hundred souls. there was, in addition, a small american trading post, at which goods were sold to mexican smugglers. all goods were put up in compact packages of about one hundred pounds each, suitable for loading on pack mules. two of these packages made a load for an ordinary mexican mule, and three for the larger ones. the bulk of the trade was in leaf tobacco, and domestic cotton-cloths and calicoes. the mexicans had, before the arrival of the army, but little to offer in exchange except silver. the trade in tobacco was enormous, considering the population to be supplied. almost every mexican above the age of ten years, and many much younger, smoked the cigarette. nearly every mexican carried a pouch of leaf tobacco, powdered by rolling in the hands, and a roll of corn husks to make wrappers. the cigarettes were made by the smokers as they used them. up to the time of which i write, and for years afterwards--i think until the administration of president juarez--the cultivation, manufacture and sale of tobacco constituted a government monopoly, and paid the bulk of the revenue collected from internal sources. the price was enormously high, and made successful smuggling very profitable. the difficulty of obtaining tobacco is probably the reason why everybody, male and female, used it at that time. i know from my own experience that when i was at west point, the fact that tobacco, in every form, was prohibited, and the mere possession of the weed severely punished, made the majority of the cadets, myself included, try to acquire the habit of using it. i failed utterly at the time and for many years afterward; but the majority accomplished the object of their youthful ambition. under spanish rule mexico was prohibited from producing anything that the mother-country could supply. this rule excluded the cultivation of the grape, olive and many other articles to which the soil and climate were well adapted. the country was governed for "revenue only;" and tobacco, which cannot be raised in spain, but is indigenous to mexico, offered a fine instrumentality for securing this prime object of government. the native population had been in the habit of using "the weed" from a period, back of any recorded history of this continent. bad habits--if not restrained by law or public opinion--spread more rapidly and universally than good ones, and the spanish colonists adopted the use of tobacco almost as generally as the natives. spain, therefore, in order to secure the largest revenue from this source, prohibited the cultivation, except in specified localities--and in these places farmed out the privilege at a very high price. the tobacco when raised could only be sold to the government, and the price to the consumer was limited only by the avarice of the authorities, and the capacity of the people to pay. all laws for the government of the country were enacted in spain, and the officers for their execution were appointed by the crown, and sent out to the new el dorado. the mexicans had been brought up ignorant of how to legislate or how to rule. when they gained their independence, after many years of war, it was the most natural thing in the world that they should adopt as their own the laws then in existence. the only change was, that mexico became her own executor of the laws and the recipient of the revenues. the tobacco tax, yielding so large a revenue under the law as it stood, was one of the last, if not the very last, of the obnoxious imposts to be repealed. now, the citizens are allowed to cultivate any crops the soil will yield. tobacco is cheap, and every quality can be produced. its use is by no means so general as when i first visited the country. gradually the "army of occupation" assembled at corpus christi. when it was all together it consisted of seven companies of the 2d regiment of dragoons, four companies of light artillery, five regiments of infantry --the 3d, 4th, 5th, 7th and 8th--and one regiment of artillery acting as infantry--not more than three thousand men in all. general zachary taylor commanded the whole. there were troops enough in one body to establish a drill and discipline sufficient to fit men and officers for all they were capable of in case of battle. the rank and file were composed of men who had enlisted in time of peace, to serve for seven dollars a month, and were necessarily inferior as material to the average volunteers enlisted later in the war expressly to fight, and also to the volunteers in the war for the preservation of the union. the men engaged in the mexican war were brave, and the officers of the regular army, from highest to lowest, were educated in their profession. a more efficient army for its number and armament, i do not believe ever fought a battle than the one commanded by general taylor in his first two engagements on mexican--or texan soil. the presence of united states troops on the edge of the disputed territory furthest from the mexican settlements, was not sufficient to provoke hostilities. we were sent to provoke a fight, but it was essential that mexico should commence it. it was very doubtful whether congress would declare war; but if mexico should attack our troops, the executive could announce, "whereas, war exists by the acts of, etc.," and prosecute the contest with vigor. once initiated there were but few public men who would have the courage to oppose it. experience proves that the man who obstructs a war in which his nation is engaged, no matter whether right or wrong, occupies no enviable place in life or history. better for him, individually, to advocate "war, pestilence, and famine," than to act as obstructionist to a war already begun. the history of the defeated rebel will be honorable hereafter, compared with that of the northern man who aided him by conspiring against his government while protected by it. the most favorable posthumous history the stay-at-home traitor can hope for is--oblivion. mexico showing no willingness to come to the nueces to drive the invaders from her soil, it became necessary for the "invaders" to approach to within a convenient distance to be struck. accordingly, preparations were begun for moving the army to the rio grande, to a point near matamoras. it was desirable to occupy a position near the largest centre of population possible to reach, without absolutely invading territory to which we set up no claim whatever. the distance from corpus christi to matamoras is about one hundred and fifty miles. the country does not abound in fresh water, and the length of the marches had to be regulated by the distance between water supplies. besides the streams, there were occasional pools, filled during the rainy season, some probably made by the traders, who travelled constantly between corpus christi and the rio grande, and some by the buffalo. there was not at that time a single habitation, cultivated field, or herd of domestic animals, between corpus christi and matamoras. it was necessary, therefore, to have a wagon train sufficiently large to transport the camp and garrison equipage, officers' baggage, rations for the army, and part rations of grain for the artillery horses and all the animals taken from the north, where they had been accustomed to having their forage furnished them. the army was but indifferently supplied with transportation. wagons and harness could easily be supplied from the north but mules and horses could not so readily be brought. the american traders and mexican smugglers came to the relief. contracts were made for mules at from eight to eleven dollars each. the smugglers furnished the animals, and took their pay in goods of the description before mentioned. i doubt whether the mexicans received in value from the traders five dollars per head for the animals they furnished, and still more, whether they paid anything but their own time in procuring them. such is trade; such is war. the government paid in hard cash to the contractor the stipulated price. between the rio grande and the nueces there was at that time a large band of wild horses feeding; as numerous, probably, as the band of buffalo roaming further north was before its rapid extermination commenced. the mexicans used to capture these in large numbers and bring them into the american settlements and sell them. a picked animal could be purchased at from eight to twelve dollars, but taken at wholesale, they could be bought for thirty-six dollars a dozen. some of these were purchased for the army, and answered a most useful purpose. the horses were generally very strong, formed much like the norman horse, and with very heavy manes and tails. a number of officers supplied themselves with these, and they generally rendered as useful service as the northern animal in fact they were much better when grazing was the only means of supplying forage. there was no need for haste, and some months were consumed in the necessary preparations for a move. in the meantime the army was engaged in all the duties pertaining to the officer and the soldier. twice, that i remember, small trains were sent from corpus christi, with cavalry escorts, to san antonio and austin, with paymasters and funds to pay off small detachments of troops stationed at those places. general taylor encouraged officers to accompany these expeditions. i accompanied one of them in december, 1845. the distance from corpus christi to san antonio was then computed at one hundred and fifty miles. now that roads exist it is probably less. from san antonio to austin we computed the distance at one hundred and ten miles, and from the latter place back to corpus christi at over two hundred miles. i know the distance now from san antonio to austin is but little over eighty miles, so that our computation was probably too high. there was not at the time an individual living between corpus christi and san antonio until within about thirty miles of the latter point, where there were a few scattering mexican settlements along the san antonio river. the people in at least one of these hamlets lived underground for protection against the indians. the country abounded in game, such as deer and antelope, with abundance of wild turkeys along the streams and where there were nut-bearing woods. on the nueces, about twenty-five miles up from corpus christi, were a few log cabins, the remains of a town called san patricio, but the inhabitants had all been massacred by the indians, or driven away. san antonio was about equally divided in population between americans and mexicans. from there to austin there was not a single residence except at new braunfels, on the guadalupe river. at that point was a settlement of germans who had only that year come into the state. at all events they were living in small huts, about such as soldiers would hastily construct for temporary occupation. from austin to corpus christi there was only a small settlement at bastrop, with a few farms along the colorado river; but after leaving that, there were no settlements except the home of one man, with one female slave, at the old town of goliad. some of the houses were still standing. goliad had been quite a village for the period and region, but some years before there had been a mexican massacre, in which every inhabitant had been killed or driven away. this, with the massacre of the prisoners in the alamo, san antonio, about the same time, more than three hundred men in all, furnished the strongest justification the texans had for carrying on the war with so much cruelty. in fact, from that time until the mexican war, the hostilities between texans and mexicans was so great that neither was safe in the neighborhood of the other who might be in superior numbers or possessed of superior arms. the man we found living there seemed like an old friend; he had come from near fort jessup, louisiana, where the officers of the 3d and 4th infantry and the 2d dragoons had known him and his family. he had emigrated in advance of his family to build up a home for them. chapter v. trip to austin--promotion to full second lieutenant--army of occupation. when our party left corpus christi it was quite large, including the cavalry escort, paymaster, major dix, his clerk and the officers who, like myself, were simply on leave; but all the officers on leave, except lieutenant benjamin--afterwards killed in the valley of mexico --lieutenant, now general, augur, and myself, concluded to spend their allotted time at san antonio and return from there. we were all to be back at corpus christi by the end of the month. the paymaster was detained in austin so long that, if we had waited for him, we would have exceeded our leave. we concluded, therefore, to start back at once with the animals we had, and having to rely principally on grass for their food, it was a good six days' journey. we had to sleep on the prairie every night, except at goliad, and possibly one night on the colorado, without shelter and with only such food as we carried with us, and prepared ourselves. the journey was hazardous on account of indians, and there were white men in texas whom i would not have cared to meet in a secluded place. lieutenant augur was taken seriously sick before we reached goliad and at a distance from any habitation. to add to the complication, his horse--a mustang that had probably been captured from the band of wild horses before alluded to, and of undoubted longevity at his capture--gave out. it was absolutely necessary to get for ward to goliad to find a shelter for our sick companion. by dint of patience and exceedingly slow movements, goliad was at last reached, and a shelter and bed secured for our patient. we remained over a day, hoping that augur might recover sufficiently to resume his travels. he did not, however, and knowing that major dix would be along in a few days, with his wagon-train, now empty, and escort, we arranged with our louisiana friend to take the best of care of the sick lieutenant until thus relieved, and went on. i had never been a sportsman in my life; had scarcely ever gone in search of game, and rarely seen any when looking for it. on this trip there was no minute of time while travelling between san patricio and the settlements on the san antonio river, from san antonio to austin, and again from the colorado river back to san patricio, when deer or antelope could not be seen in great numbers. each officer carried a shot-gun, and every evening, after going into camp, some would go out and soon return with venison and wild turkeys enough for the entire camp. i, however, never went out, and had no occasion to fire my gun; except, being detained over a day at goliad, benjamin and i concluded to go down to the creek--which was fringed with timber, much of it the pecan--and bring back a few turkeys. we had scarcely reached the edge of the timber when i heard the flutter of wings overhead, and in an instant i saw two or three turkeys flying away. these were soon followed by more, then more, and more, until a flock of twenty or thirty had left from just over my head. all this time i stood watching the turkeys to see where they flew--with my gun on my shoulder, and never once thought of levelling it at the birds. when i had time to reflect upon the matter, i came to the conclusion that as a sportsman i was a failure, and went back to the house. benjamin remained out, and got as many turkeys as he wanted to carry back. after the second night at goliad, benjamin and i started to make the remainder of the journey alone. we reached corpus christi just in time to avoid "absence without leave." we met no one not even an indian --during the remainder of our journey, except at san patricio. a new settlement had been started there in our absence of three weeks, induced possibly by the fact that there were houses already built, while the proximity of troops gave protection against the indians. on the evening of the first day out from goliad we heard the most unearthly howling of wolves, directly in our front. the prairie grass was tall and we could not see the beasts, but the sound indicated that they were near. to my ear it appeared that there must have been enough of them to devour our party, horses and all, at a single meal. the part of ohio that i hailed from was not thickly settled, but wolves had been driven out long before i left. benjamin was from indiana, still less populated, where the wolf yet roamed over the prairies. he understood the nature of the animal and the capacity of a few to make believe there was an unlimited number of them. he kept on towards the noise, unmoved. i followed in his trail, lacking moral courage to turn back and join our sick companion. i have no doubt that if benjamin had proposed returning to goliad, i would not only have "seconded the motion" but have suggested that it was very hard-hearted in us to leave augur sick there in the first place; but benjamin did not propose turning back. when he did speak it was to ask: "grant, how many wolves do you think there are in that pack?" knowing where he was from, and suspecting that he thought i would over-estimate the number, i determined to show my acquaintance with the animal by putting the estimate below what possibly could be correct, and answered: "oh, about twenty," very indifferently. he smiled and rode on. in a minute we were close upon them, and before they saw us. there were just two of them. seated upon their haunches, with their mouths close together, they had made all the noise we had been hearing for the past ten minutes. i have often thought of this incident since when i have heard the noise of a few disappointed politicians who had deserted their associates. there are always more of them before they are counted. a week or two before leaving corpus christi on this trip, i had been promoted from brevet second-lieutenant, 4th infantry, to full second-lieutenant, 7th infantry. frank gardner,(*1) of the 7th, was promoted to the 4th in the same orders. we immediately made application to be transferred, so as to get back to our old regiments. on my return, i found that our application had been approved at washington. while in the 7th infantry i was in the company of captain holmes, afterwards a lieutenant-general in the confederate army. i never came in contact with him in the war of the rebellion, nor did he render any very conspicuous service in his high rank. my transfer carried me to the company of captain mccall, who resigned from the army after the mexican war and settled in philadelphia. he was prompt, however, to volunteer when the rebellion broke out, and soon rose to the rank of major-general in the union army. i was not fortunate enough to meet him after he resigned. in the old army he was esteemed very highly as a soldier and gentleman. our relations were always most pleasant. the preparations at corpus christi for an advance progressed as rapidly in the absence of some twenty or more lieutenants as if we had been there. the principal business consisted in securing mules, and getting them broken to harness. the process was slow but amusing. the animals sold to the government were all young and unbroken, even to the saddle, and were quite as wild as the wild horses of the prairie. usually a number would be brought in by a company of mexicans, partners in the delivery. the mules were first driven into a stockade, called a corral, inclosing an acre or more of ground. the mexicans,--who were all experienced in throwing the lasso,--would go into the corral on horseback, with their lassos attached to the pommels of their saddles. soldiers detailed as teamsters and black smiths would also enter the corral, the former with ropes to serve as halters, the latter with branding irons and a fire to keep the irons heated. a lasso was then thrown over the neck of a mule, when he would immediately go to the length of his tether, first one end, then the other in the air. while he was thus plunging and gyrating, another lasso would be thrown by another mexican, catching the animal by a fore-foot. this would bring the mule to the ground, when he was seized and held by the teamsters while the blacksmith put upon him, with hot irons, the initials "u. s." ropes were then put about the neck, with a slipnoose which would tighten around the throat if pulled. with a man on each side holding these ropes, the mule was released from his other bindings and allowed to rise. with more or less difficulty he would be conducted to a picket rope outside and fastened there. the delivery of that mule was then complete. this process was gone through with every mule and wild horse with the army of occupation. the method of breaking them was less cruel and much more amusing. it is a well-known fact that where domestic animals are used for specific purposes from generation to generation, the descendants are easily, as a rule, subdued to the same uses. at that time in northern mexico the mule, or his ancestors, the horse and the ass, was seldom used except for the saddle or pack. at all events the corpus christi mule resisted the new use to which he was being put. the treatment he was subjected to in order to overcome his prejudices was summary and effective. the soldiers were principally foreigners who had enlisted in our large cities, and, with the exception of a chance drayman among them, it is not probable that any of the men who reported themselves as competent teamsters had ever driven a mule-team in their lives, or indeed that many had had any previous experience in driving any animal whatever to harness. numbers together can accomplish what twice their number acting individually could not perform. five mules were allotted to each wagon. a teamster would select at the picket rope five animals of nearly the same color and general appearance for his team. with a full corps of assistants, other teamsters, he would then proceed to get his mules together. in two's the men would approach each animal selected, avoiding as far as possible its heels. two ropes would be put about the neck of each animal, with a slip noose, so that he could be choked if too unruly. they were then led out, harnessed by force and hitched to the wagon in the position they had to keep ever after. two men remained on either side of the leader, with the lassos about its neck, and one man retained the same restraining influence over each of the others. all being ready, the hold would be slackened and the team started. the first motion was generally five mules in the air at one time, backs bowed, hind feet extended to the rear. after repeating this movement a few times the leaders would start to run. this would bring the breeching tight against the mules at the wheels, which these last seemed to regard as a most unwarrantable attempt at coercion and would resist by taking a seat, sometimes going so far as to lie down. in time all were broken in to do their duty submissively if not cheerfully, but there never was a time during the war when it was safe to let a mexican mule get entirely loose. their drivers were all teamsters by the time they got through. i recollect one case of a mule that had worked in a team under the saddle, not only for some time at corpus christi, where he was broken, but all the way to the point opposite matamoras, then to camargo, where he got loose from his fastenings during the night. he did not run away at first, but staid in the neighborhood for a day or two, coming up sometimes to the feed trough even; but on the approach of the teamster he always got out of the way. at last, growing tired of the constant effort to catch him, he disappeared altogether. nothing short of a mexican with his lasso could have caught him. regulations would not have warranted the expenditure of a dollar in hiring a man with a lasso to catch that mule; but they did allow the expenditure "of the mule," on a certificate that he had run away without any fault of the quartermaster on whose returns he was borne, and also the purchase of another to take his place. i am a competent witness, for i was regimental quartermaster at the time. while at corpus christi all the officers who had a fancy for riding kept horses. the animals cost but little in the first instance, and when picketed they would get their living without any cost. i had three not long before the army moved, but a sad accident bereft me of them all at one time. a colored boy who gave them all the attention they got --besides looking after my tent and that of a class-mate and fellow-lieutenant and cooking for us, all for about eight dollars per month, was riding one to water and leading the other two. the led horses pulled him from his seat and all three ran away. they never were heard of afterwards. shortly after that some one told captain bliss, general taylor's adjutant-general, of my misfortune. "yes; i heard grant lost five or six dollars' worth of horses the other day," he replied. that was a slander; they were broken to the saddle when i got them and cost nearly twenty dollars. i never suspected the colored boy of malicious intent in letting them get away, because, if they had not escaped, he could have had one of them to ride on the long march then in prospect. chapter vi. advance of the army--crossing the colorado--the rio grande. at last the preparations were complete and orders were issued for the advance to begin on the 8th of march. general taylor had an army of not more than three thousand men. one battery, the siege guns and all the convalescent troops were sent on by water to brazos santiago, at the mouth of the rio grande. a guard was left back at corpus christi to look after public property and to take care of those who were too sick to be removed. the remainder of the army, probably not more than twenty five hundred men, was divided into three brigades, with the cavalry independent. colonel twiggs, with seven companies of dragoons and a battery of light artillery, moved on the 8th. he was followed by the three infantry brigades, with a day's interval between the commands. thus the rear brigade did not move from corpus christi until the 11th of march. in view of the immense bodies of men moved on the same day over narrow roads, through dense forests and across large streams, in our late war, it seems strange now that a body of less than three thousand men should have been broken into four columns, separated by a day's march. general taylor was opposed to anything like plundering by the troops, and in this instance, i doubt not, he looked upon the enemy as the aggrieved party and was not willing to injure them further than his instructions from washington demanded. his orders to the troops enjoined scrupulous regard for the rights of all peaceable persons and the payment of the highest price for all supplies taken for the use of the army. all officers of foot regiments who had horses were permitted to ride them on the march when it did not interfere with their military duties. as already related, having lost my "five or six dollars' worth of horses" but a short time before i determined not to get another, but to make the journey on foot. my company commander, captain mccall, had two good american horses, of considerably more value in that country, where native horses were cheap, than they were in the states. he used one himself and wanted the other for his servant. he was quite anxious to know whether i did not intend to get me another horse before the march began. i told him no; i belonged to a foot regiment. i did not understand the object of his solicitude at the time, but, when we were about to start, he said: "there, grant, is a horse for you." i found that he could not bear the idea of his servant riding on a long march while his lieutenant went a-foot. he had found a mustang, a three-year old colt only recently captured, which had been purchased by one of the colored servants with the regiment for the sum of three dollars. it was probably the only horse at corpus christi that could have been purchased just then for any reasonable price. five dollars, sixty-six and two-thirds per cent. advance, induced the owner to part with the mustang. i was sorry to take him, because i really felt that, belonging to a foot regiment, it was my duty to march with the men. but i saw the captain's earnestness in the matter, and accepted the horse for the trip. the day we started was the first time the horse had ever been under saddle. i had, however, but little difficulty in breaking him, though for the first day there were frequent disagreements between us as to which way we should go, and sometimes whether we should go at all. at no time during the day could i choose exactly the part of the column i would march with; but after that, i had as tractable a horse as any with the army, and there was none that stood the trip better. he never ate a mouthful of food on the journey except the grass he could pick within the length of his picket rope. a few days out from corpus christi, the immense herd of wild horses that ranged at that time between the nueces and the rio grande was seen directly in advance of the head of the column and but a few miles off. it was the very band from which the horse i was riding had been captured but a few weeks before. the column was halted for a rest, and a number of officers, myself among them, rode out two or three miles to the right to see the extent of the herd. the country was a rolling prairie, and, from the higher ground, the vision was obstructed only by the earth's curvature. as far as the eye could reach to our right, the herd extended. to the left, it extended equally. there was no estimating the number of animals in it; i have no idea that they could all have been corralled in the state of rhode island, or delaware, at one time. if they had been, they would have been so thick that the pasturage would have given out the first day. people who saw the southern herd of buffalo, fifteen or twenty years ago, can appreciate the size of the texas band of wild horses in 1846. at the point where the army struck the little colorado river, the stream was quite wide and of sufficient depth for navigation. the water was brackish and the banks were fringed with timber. here the whole army concentrated before attempting to cross. the army was not accompanied by a pontoon train, and at that time the troops were not instructed in bridge building. to add to the embarrassment of the situation, the army was here, for the first time, threatened with opposition. buglers, concealed from our view by the brush on the opposite side, sounded the "assembly," and other military calls. like the wolves before spoken of, they gave the impression that there was a large number of them and that, if the troops were in proportion to the noise, they were sufficient to devour general taylor and his army. there were probably but few troops, and those engaged principally in watching the movements of the "invader." a few of our cavalry dashed in, and forded and swam the stream, and all opposition was soon dispersed. i do not remember that a single shot was fired. the troops waded the stream, which was up to their necks in the deepest part. teams were crossed by attaching a long rope to the end of the wagon tongue passing it between the two swing mules and by the side of the leader, hitching his bridle as well as the bridle of the mules in rear to it, and carrying the end to men on the opposite shore. the bank down to the water was steep on both sides. a rope long enough to cross the river, therefore, was attached to the back axle of the wagon, and men behind would hold the rope to prevent the wagon "beating" the mules into the water. this latter rope also served the purpose of bringing the end of the forward one back, to be used over again. the water was deep enough for a short distance to swim the little mexican mules which the army was then using, but they, and the wagons, were pulled through so fast by the men at the end of the rope ahead, that no time was left them to show their obstinacy. in this manner the artillery and transportation of the "army of occupation" crossed the colorado river. about the middle of the month of march the advance of the army reached the rio grande and went into camp near the banks of the river, opposite the city of matamoras and almost under the guns of a small fort at the lower end of the town. there was not at that time a single habitation from corpus christi until the rio grande was reached. the work of fortifying was commenced at once. the fort was laid out by the engineers, but the work was done by the soldiers under the supervision of their officers, the chief engineer retaining general directions. the mexicans now became so incensed at our near approach that some of their troops crossed the river above us, and made it unsafe for small bodies of men to go far beyond the limits of camp. they captured two companies of dragoons, commanded by captains thornton and hardee. the latter figured as a general in the late war, on the confederate side, and was author of the tactics first used by both armies. lieutenant theodric porter, of the 4th infantry, was killed while out with a small detachment; and major cross, the assistant quartermaster-general, had also been killed not far from camp. there was no base of supplies nearer than point isabel, on the coast, north of the mouth of the rio grande and twenty-five miles away. the enemy, if the mexicans could be called such at this time when no war had been declared, hovered about in such numbers that it was not safe to send a wagon train after supplies with any escort that could be spared. i have already said that general taylor's whole command on the rio grande numbered less than three thousand men. he had, however, a few more troops at point isabel or brazos santiago. the supplies brought from corpus christi in wagons were running short. work was therefore pushed with great vigor on the defences, to enable the minimum number of troops to hold the fort. all the men who could be employed, were kept at work from early dawn until darkness closed the labors of the day. with all this the fort was not completed until the supplies grew so short that further delay in obtaining more could not be thought of. by the latter part of april the work was in a partially defensible condition, and the 7th infantry, major jacob brown commanding, was marched in to garrison it, with some few pieces of artillery. all the supplies on hand, with the exception of enough to carry the rest of the army to point isabel, were left with the garrison, and the march was commenced with the remainder of the command, every wagon being taken with the army. early on the second day after starting the force reached its destination, without opposition from the mexicans. there was some delay in getting supplies ashore from vessels at anchor in the open roadstead. chapter vii. the mexican war--the battle of palo alto--the battle of resaca de la palma--army of invasion--general taylor--movement on camargo. while general taylor was away with the bulk of his army, the little garrison up the river was besieged. as we lay in our tents upon the sea-shore, the artillery at the fort on the rio grande could be distinctly heard. the war had begun. there were no possible means of obtaining news from the garrison, and information from outside could not be otherwise than unfavorable. what general taylor's feelings were during this suspense i do not know; but for myself, a young second-lieutenant who had never heard a hostile gun before, i felt sorry that i had enlisted. a great many men, when they smell battle afar off, chafe to get into the fray. when they say so themselves they generally fail to convince their hearers that they are as anxious as they would like to make believe, and as they approach danger they become more subdued. this rule is not universal, for i have known a few men who were always aching for a fight when there was no enemy near, who were as good as their word when the battle did come. but the number of such men is small. on the 7th of may the wagons were all loaded and general taylor started on his return, with his army reinforced at point isabel, but still less than three thousand strong, to relieve the garrison on the rio grande. the road from point isabel to matamoras is over an open, rolling, treeless prairie, until the timber that borders the bank of the rio grande is reached. this river, like the mississippi, flows through a rich alluvial valley in the most meandering manner, running towards all points of the compass at times within a few miles. formerly the river ran by resaca de la palma, some four or five miles east of the present channel. the old bed of the river at resaca had become filled at places, leaving a succession of little lakes. the timber that had formerly grown upon both banks, and for a considerable distance out, was still standing. this timber was struck six or eight miles out from the besieged garrison, at a point known as palo alto--"tall trees" or "woods." early in the forenoon of the 8th of may as palo alto was approached, an army, certainly outnumbering our little force, was seen, drawn up in line of battle just in front of the timber. their bayonets and spearheads glistened in the sunlight formidably. the force was composed largely of cavalry armed with lances. where we were the grass was tall, reaching nearly to the shoulders of the men, very stiff, and each stock was pointed at the top, and hard and almost as sharp as a darning-needle. general taylor halted his army before the head of column came in range of the artillery of the mexicans. he then formed a line of battle, facing the enemy. his artillery, two batteries and two eighteen-pounder iron guns, drawn by oxen, were placed in position at intervals along the line. a battalion was thrown to the rear, commanded by lieutenant-colonel childs, of the artillery, as reserves. these preparations completed, orders were given for a platoon of each company to stack arms and go to a stream off to the right of the command, to fill their canteens and also those of the rest of their respective companies. when the men were all back in their places in line, the command to advance was given. as i looked down that long line of about three thousand armed men, advancing towards a larger force also armed, i thought what a fearful responsibility general taylor must feel, commanding such a host and so far away from friends. the mexicans immediately opened fire upon us, first with artillery and then with infantry. at first their shots did not reach us, and the advance was continued. as we got nearer, the cannon balls commenced going through the ranks. they hurt no one, however, during this advance, because they would strike the ground long before they reached our line, and ricochetted through the tall grass so slowly that the men would see them and open ranks and let them pass. when we got to a point where the artillery could be used with effect, a halt was called, and the battle opened on both sides. the infantry under general taylor was armed with flint-lock muskets, and paper cartridges charged with powder, buck-shot and ball. at the distance of a few hundred yards a man might fire at you all day without your finding it out. the artillery was generally six-pounder brass guns throwing only solid shot; but general taylor had with him three or four twelve-pounder howitzers throwing shell, besides his eighteen-pounders before spoken of, that had a long range. this made a powerful armament. the mexicans were armed about as we were so far as their infantry was concerned, but their artillery only fired solid shot. we had greatly the advantage in this arm. the artillery was advanced a rod or two in front of the line, and opened fire. the infantry stood at order arms as spectators, watching the effect of our shots upon the enemy, and watching his shots so as to step out of their way. it could be seen that the eighteen-pounders and the howitzers did a great deal of execution. on our side there was little or no loss while we occupied this position. during the battle major ringgold, an accomplished and brave artillery officer, was mortally wounded, and lieutenant luther, also of the artillery, was struck. during the day several advances were made, and just at dusk it became evident that the mexicans were falling back. we again advanced, and occupied at the close of the battle substantially the ground held by the enemy at the beginning. in this last move there was a brisk fire upon our troops, and some execution was done. one cannon-ball passed through our ranks, not far from me. it took off the head of an enlisted man, and the under jaw of captain page of my regiment, while the splinters from the musket of the killed soldier, and his brains and bones, knocked down two or three others, including one officer, lieutenant wallen, --hurting them more or less. our casualties for the day were nine killed and forty-seven wounded. at the break of day on the 9th, the army under taylor was ready to renew the battle; but an advance showed that the enemy had entirely left our front during the night. the chaparral before us was impenetrable except where there were roads or trails, with occasionally clear or bare spots of small dimensions. a body of men penetrating it might easily be ambushed. it was better to have a few men caught in this way than the whole army, yet it was necessary that the garrison at the river should be relieved. to get to them the chaparral had to be passed. thus i assume general taylor reasoned. he halted the army not far in advance of the ground occupied by the mexicans the day before, and selected captain c. f. smith, of the artillery, and captain mccall, of my company, to take one hundred and fifty picked men each and find where the enemy had gone. this left me in command of the company, an honor and responsibility i thought very great. smith and mccall found no obstruction in the way of their advance until they came up to the succession of ponds, before describes, at resaca. the mexicans had passed them and formed their lines on the opposite bank. this position they had strengthened a little by throwing up dead trees and brush in their front, and by placing artillery to cover the approaches and open places. smith and mccall deployed on each side of the road as well as they could, and engaged the enemy at long range. word was sent back, and the advance of the whole army was at once commenced. as we came up we were deployed in like manner. i was with the right wing, and led my company through the thicket wherever a penetrable place could be found, taking advantage of any clear spot that would carry me towards the enemy. at last i got pretty close up without knowing it. the balls commenced to whistle very thick overhead, cutting the limbs of the chaparral right and left. we could not see the enemy, so i ordered my men to lie down, an order that did not have to be enforced. we kept our position until it became evident that the enemy were not firing at us, and then withdrew to find better ground to advance upon. by this time some progress had been made on our left. a section of artillery had been captured by the cavalry, and some prisoners had been taken. the mexicans were giving way all along the line, and many of them had, no doubt, left early. i at last found a clear space separating two ponds. there seemed to be a few men in front and i charged upon them with my company. there was no resistance, and we captured a mexican colonel, who had been wounded, and a few men. just as i was sending them to the rear with a guard of two or three men, a private came from the front bringing back one of our officers, who had been badly wounded in advance of where i was. the ground had been charged over before. my exploit was equal to that of the soldier who boasted that he had cut off the leg of one of the enemy. when asked why he did not cut off his head, he replied: "some one had done that before." this left no doubt in my mind but that the battle of resaca de la palma would have been won, just as it was, if i had not been there. there was no further resistance. the evening of the 9th the army was encamped on its old ground near the fort, and the garrison was relieved. the siege had lasted a number of days, but the casualties were few in number. major jacob brown, of the 7th infantry, the commanding officer, had been killed, and in his honor the fort was named. since then a town of considerable importance has sprung up on the ground occupied by the fort and troops, which has also taken his name. the battles of palo alto and resaca de la palma seemed to us engaged, as pretty important affairs; but we had only a faint conception of their magnitude until they were fought over in the north by the press and the reports came back to us. at the same time, or about the same time, we learned that war existed between the united states and mexico, by the acts of the latter country. on learning this fact general taylor transferred our camps to the south or west bank of the river, and matamoras was occupied. we then became the "army of invasion." up to this time taylor had none but regular troops in his command; but now that invasion had already taken place, volunteers for one year commenced arriving. the army remained at matamoras until sufficiently reinforced to warrant a movement into the interior. general taylor was not an officer to trouble the administration much with his demands, but was inclined to do the best he could with the means given him. he felt his responsibility as going no further. if he had thought that he was sent to perform an impossibility with the means given him, he would probably have informed the authorities of his opinion and left them to determine what should be done. if the judgment was against him he would have gone on and done the best he could with the means at hand without parading his grievance before the public. no soldier could face either danger or responsibility more calmly than he. these are qualities more rarely found than genius or physical courage. general taylor never made any great show or parade, either of uniform or retinue. in dress he was possibly too plain, rarely wearing anything in the field to indicate his rank, or even that he was an officer; but he was known to every soldier in his army, and was respected by all. i can call to mind only one instance when i saw him in uniform, and one other when i heard of his wearing it, on both occasions he was unfortunate. the first was at corpus christi. he had concluded to review his army before starting on the march and gave orders accordingly. colonel twiggs was then second in rank with the army, and to him was given the command of the review. colonel and brevet brigadier-general worth, a far different soldier from taylor in the use of the uniform, was next to twiggs in rank, and claimed superiority by virtue of his brevet rank when the accidents of service threw them where one or the other had to command. worth declined to attend the review as subordinate to twiggs until the question was settled by the highest authority. this broke up the review, and the question was referred to washington for final decision. general taylor was himself only a colonel, in real rank, at that time, and a brigadier-general by brevet. he was assigned to duty, however, by the president, with the rank which his brevet gave him. worth was not so assigned, but by virtue of commanding a division he must, under the army regulations of that day, have drawn the pay of his brevet rank. the question was submitted to washington, and no response was received until after the army had reached the rio grande. it was decided against general worth, who at once tendered his resignation and left the army, going north, no doubt, by the same vessel that carried it. this kept him out of the battles of palo alto and resaca de la palma. either the resignation was not accepted, or general worth withdrew it before action had been taken. at all events he returned to the army in time to command his division in the battle of monterey, and served with it to the end of the war. the second occasion on which general taylor was said to have donned his uniform, was in order to receive a visit from the flag officer of the naval squadron off the mouth of the rio grande. while the army was on that river the flag officer sent word that he would call on the general to pay his respects on a certain day. general taylor, knowing that naval officers habitually wore all the uniform the "law allowed" on all occasions of ceremony, thought it would be only civil to receive his guest in the same style. his uniform was therefore got out, brushed up, and put on, in advance of the visit. the flag officer, knowing general taylor's aversion to the wearing of the uniform, and feeling that it would be regarded as a compliment should he meet him in civilian's dress, left off his uniform for this occasion. the meeting was said to have been embarrassing to both, and the conversation was principally apologetic. the time was whiled away pleasantly enough at matamoras, while we were waiting for volunteers. it is probable that all the most important people of the territory occupied by our army left their homes before we got there, but with those remaining the best of relations apparently existed. it was the policy of the commanding general to allow no pillaging, no taking of private property for public or individual use without satisfactory compensation, so that a better market was afforded than the people had ever known before. among the troops that joined us at matamoras was an ohio regiment, of which thomas l. hamer, the member of congress who had given me my appointment to west point, was major. he told me then that he could have had the colonelcy, but that as he knew he was to be appointed a brigadier-general, he preferred at first to take the lower grade. i have said before that hamer was one of the ablest men ohio ever produced. at that time he was in the prime of life, being less than fifty years of age, and possessed an admirable physique, promising long life. but he was taken sick before monterey, and died within a few days. i have always believed that had his life been spared, he would have been president of the united states during the term filled by president pierce. had hamer filled that office his partiality for me was such, there is but little doubt i should have been appointed to one of the staff corps of the army--the pay department probably--and would therefore now be preparing to retire. neither of these speculations is unreasonable, and they are mentioned to show how little men control their own destiny. reinforcements having arrived, in the month of august the movement commenced from matamoras to camargo, the head of navigation on the rio grande. the line of the rio grande was all that was necessary to hold, unless it was intended to invade mexico from the north. in that case the most natural route to take was the one which general taylor selected. it entered a pass in the sierra madre mountains, at monterey, through which the main road runs to the city of mexico. monterey itself was a good point to hold, even if the line of the rio grande covered all the territory we desired to occupy at that time. it is built on a plain two thousand feet above tide water, where the air is bracing and the situation healthy. on the 19th of august the army started for monterey, leaving a small garrison at matamoras. the troops, with the exception of the artillery, cavalry, and the brigade to which i belonged, were moved up the river to camargo on steamers. as there were but two or three of these, the boats had to make a number of trips before the last of the troops were up. those who marched did so by the south side of the river. lieutenant-colonel garland, of the 4th infantry, was the brigade commander, and on this occasion commanded the entire marching force. one day out convinced him that marching by day in that latitude, in the month of august, was not a beneficial sanitary measure, particularly for northern men. the order of marching was changed and night marches were substituted with the best results. when camargo was reached, we found a city of tents outside the mexican hamlet. i was detailed to act as quartermaster and commissary to the regiment. the teams that had proven abundantly sufficient to transport all supplies from corpus christi to the rio grande over the level prairies of texas, were entirely inadequate to the needs of the reinforced army in a mountainous country. to obviate the deficiency, pack mules were hired, with mexicans to pack and drive them. i had charge of the few wagons allotted to the 4th infantry and of the pack train to supplement them. there were not men enough in the army to manage that train without the help of mexicans who had learned how. as it was the difficulty was great enough. the troops would take up their march at an early hour each day. after they had started, the tents and cooking utensils had to be made into packages, so that they could be lashed to the backs of the mules. sheet-iron kettles, tent-poles and mess chests were inconvenient articles to transport in that way. it took several hours to get ready to start each morning, and by the time we were ready some of the mules first loaded would be tired of standing so long with their loads on their backs. sometimes one would start to run, bowing his back and kicking up until he scattered his load; others would lie down and try to disarrange their loads by attempting to get on the top of them by rolling on them; others with tent-poles for part of their loads would manage to run a tent-pole on one side of a sapling while they would take the other. i am not aware of ever having used a profane expletive in my life; but i would have the charity to excuse those who may have done so, if they were in charge of a train of mexican pack mules at the time. chapter viii. advance on monterey--the black fort--the battle of monterey--surrender of the city. the advance from camargo was commenced on the 5th of september. the army was divided into four columns, separated from each other by one day's march. the advance reached cerralvo in four days and halted for the remainder of the troops to come up. by the 13th the rear-guard had arrived, and the same day the advance resumed its march, followed as before, a day separating the divisions. the forward division halted again at marin, twenty-four miles from monterey. both this place and cerralvo were nearly deserted, and men, women and children were seen running and scattered over the hills as we approached; but when the people returned they found all their abandoned property safe, which must have given them a favorable opinion of los grengos--"the yankees." from marin the movement was in mass. on the 19th general taylor, with is army, was encamped at walnut springs, within three miles of monterey. the town is on a small stream coming out of the mountain-pass, and is backed by a range of hills of moderate elevation. to the north, between the city and walnut springs, stretches an extensive plain. on this plain, and entirely outside of the last houses of the city, stood a strong fort, enclosed on all sides, to which our army gave the name of "black fort." its guns commanded the approaches to the city to the full extent of their range. there were two detached spurs of hills or mountains to the north and northwest of the city, which were also fortified. on one of these stood the bishop's palace. the road to saltillo leaves the upper or western end of the city under the fire of the guns from these heights. the lower or eastern end was defended by two or three small detached works, armed with artillery and infantry. to the south was the mountain stream before mentioned, and back of that the range of foot-hills. the plaza in the centre of the city was the citadel, properly speaking. all the streets leading from it were swept by artillery, cannon being intrenched behind temporary parapets. the house-tops near the plaza were converted into infantry fortifications by the use of sand-bags for parapets. such were the defences of monterey in september, 1847. general ampudia, with a force of certainly ten thousand men, was in command. general taylor's force was about six thousand five hundred strong, in three divisions, under generals butler, twiggs and worth. the troops went into camp at walnut springs, while the engineer officers, under major mansfield--a general in the late war--commenced their reconnoissance. major mansfield found that it would be practicable to get troops around, out of range of the black fort and the works on the detached hills to the north-west of the city, to the saltillo road. with this road in our possession, the enemy would be cut off from receiving further supplies, if not from all communication with the interior. general worth, with his division somewhat reinforced, was given the task of gaining possession of the saltillo road, and of carrying the detached works outside the city, in that quarter. he started on his march early in the afternoon of the 20th. the divisions under generals butler and twiggs were drawn up to threaten the east and north sides of the city and the works on those fronts, in support of the movement under general worth. worth's was regarded as the main attack on monterey, and all other operations were in support of it. his march this day was uninterrupted; but the enemy was seen to reinforce heavily about the bishop's palace and the other outside fortifications on their left. general worth reached a defensible position just out of range of the enemy's guns on the heights north-west of the city, and bivouacked for the night. the engineer officers with him--captain sanders and lieutenant george g. meade, afterwards the commander of the victorious national army at the battle of gettysburg--made a reconnoissance to the saltillo road under cover of night. during the night of the 20th general taylor had established a battery, consisting of two twenty-four-pounder howitzers and a ten inch mortar, at a point from which they could play upon black fort. a natural depression in the plain, sufficiently deep to protect men standing in it from the fire from the fort, was selected and the battery established on the crest nearest the enemy. the 4th infantry, then consisting of but six reduced companies, was ordered to support the artillerists while they were intrenching themselves and their guns. i was regimental quartermaster at the time and was ordered to remain in charge of camp and the public property at walnut springs. it was supposed that the regiment would return to its camp in the morning. the point for establishing the siege battery was reached and the work performed without attracting the attention of the enemy. at daylight the next morning fire was opened on both sides and continued with, what seemed to me at that day, great fury. my curiosity got the better of my judgment, and i mounted a horse and rode to the front to see what was going on. i had been there but a short time when an order to charge was given, and lacking the moral courage to return to camp--where i had been ordered to stay--i charged with the regiment as soon as the troops were out of the depression they came under the fire of black fort. as they advanced they got under fire from batteries guarding the east, or lower, end of the city, and of musketry. about one-third of the men engaged in the charge were killed or wounded in the space of a few minutes. we retreated to get out of fire, not backward, but eastward and perpendicular to the direct road running into the city from walnut springs. i was, i believe, the only person in the 4th infantry in the charge who was on horseback. when we got to a lace of safety the regiment halted and drew itself together--what was left of it. the adjutant of the regiment, lieutenant hoskins, who was not in robust health, found himself very much fatigued from running on foot in the charge and retreat, and, seeing me on horseback, expressed a wish that he could be mounted also. i offered him my horse and he accepted the offer. a few minutes later i saw a soldier, a quartermaster's man, mounted, not far away. i ran to him, took his horse and was back with the regiment in a few minutes. in a short time we were off again; and the next place of safety from the shots of the enemy that i recollect of being in, was a field of cane or corn to the north-east of the lower batteries. the adjutant to whom i had loaned my horse was killed, and i was designated to act in his place. this charge was ill-conceived, or badly executed. we belonged to the brigade commanded by lieutenant-colonel garland, and he had received orders to charge the lower batteries of the city, and carry them if he could without too much loss, for the purpose of creating a diversion in favor of worth, who was conducting the movement which it was intended should be decisive. by a movement by the left flank garland could have led his men beyond the range of the fire from black fort and advanced towards the northeast angle of the city, as well covered from fire as could be expected. there was no undue loss of life in reaching the lower end of monterey, except that sustained by garland's command. meanwhile quitman's brigade, conducted by an officer of engineers, had reached the eastern end of the city, and was placed under cover of the houses without much loss. colonel garland's brigade also arrived at the suburbs, and, by the assistance of some of our troops that had reached house-tops from which they could fire into a little battery covering the approaches to the lower end of the city, the battery was speedily captured and its guns were turned upon another work of the enemy. an entrance into the east end of the city was now secured, and the houses protected our troops so long as they were inactive. on the west general worth had reached the saltillo road after some fighting but without heavy loss. he turned from his new position and captured the forts on both heights in that quarter. this gave him possession of the upper or west end of monterey. troops from both twiggs's and butler's divisions were in possession of the east end of the town, but the black fort to the north of the town and the plaza in the centre were still in the possession of the enemy. our camps at walnut springs, three miles away, were guarded by a company from each regiment. a regiment of kentucky volunteers guarded the mortars and howitzers engaged against black fort. practically monterey was invested. there was nothing done on the 22d by the united states troops; but the enemy kept up a harmless fire upon us from black fort and the batteries still in their possession at the east end of the city. during the night they evacuated these; so that on the morning of the 23d we held undisputed possession of the east end of monterey. twiggs's division was at the lower end of the city, and well covered from the fire of the enemy. but the streets leading to the plaza--all spanish or spanish-american towns have near their centres a square called a plaza--were commanded from all directions by artillery. the houses were flat-roofed and but one or two stories high, and about the plaza the roofs were manned with infantry, the troops being protected from our fire by parapets made of sand-bags. all advances into the city were thus attended with much danger. while moving along streets which did not lead to the plaza, our men were protected from the fire, and from the view, of the enemy except at the crossings; but at these a volley of musketry and a discharge of grape-shot were invariably encountered. the 3d and 4th regiments of infantry made an advance nearly to the plaza in this way and with heavy loss. the loss of the 3d infantry in commissioned officers was especially severe. there were only five companies of the regiment and not over twelve officers present, and five of these officers were killed. when within a square of the plaza this small command, ten companies in all, was brought to a halt. placing themselves under cover from the shots of the enemy, the men would watch to detect a head above the sand-bags on the neighboring houses. the exposure of a single head would bring a volley from our soldiers. we had not occupied this position long when it was discovered that our ammunition was growing low. i volunteered to go back (*2) to the point we had started from, report our position to general twiggs, and ask for ammunition to be forwarded. we were at this time occupying ground off from the street, in rear of the houses. my ride back was an exposed one. before starting i adjusted myself on the side of my horse furthest from the enemy, and with only one foot holding to the cantle of the saddle, and an arm over the neck of the horse exposed, i started at full run. it was only at street crossings that my horse was under fire, but these i crossed at such a flying rate that generally i was past and under cover of the next block of houses before the enemy fired. i got out safely without a scratch. at one place on my ride, i saw a sentry walking in front of a house, and stopped to inquire what he was doing there. finding that the house was full of wounded american officers and soldiers, i dismounted and went in. i found there captain williams, of the engineer corps, wounded in the head, probably fatally, and lieutenant territt, also badly wounded his bowels protruding from his wound. there were quite a number of soldiers also. promising them to report their situation, i left, readjusted myself to my horse, recommenced the run, and was soon with the troops at the east end. before ammunition could be collected, the two regiments i had been with were seen returning, running the same gauntlet in getting out that they had passed in going in, but with comparatively little loss. the movement was countermanded and the troops were withdrawn. the poor wounded officers and men i had found, fell into the hands of the enemy during the night, and died. while this was going on at the east, general worth, with a small division of troops, was advancing towards the plaza from the opposite end of the city. he resorted to a better expedient for getting to the plaza--the citadel--than we did on the east. instead of moving by the open streets, he advanced through the houses, cutting passageways from one to another. without much loss of life, he got so near the plaza during the night that before morning, ampudia, the mexican commander, made overtures for the surrender of the city and garrison. this stopped all further hostilities. the terms of surrender were soon agreed upon. the prisoners were paroled and permitted to take their horses and personal property with them. my pity was aroused by the sight of the mexican garrison of monterey marching out of town as prisoners, and no doubt the same feeling was experienced by most of our army who witnessed it. many of the prisoners were cavalry, armed with lances, and mounted on miserable little half-starved horses that did not look as if they could carry their riders out of town. the men looked in but little better condition. i thought how little interest the men before me had in the results of the war, and how little knowledge they had of "what it was all about." after the surrender of the garrison of monterey a quiet camp life was led until midwinter. as had been the case on the rio grande, the people who remained at their homes fraternized with the "yankees" in the pleasantest manner. in fact, under the humane policy of our commander, i question whether the great majority of the mexican people did not regret our departure as much as they had regretted our coming. property and person were thoroughly protected, and a market was afforded for all the products of the country such as the people had never enjoyed before. the educated and wealthy portion of the population here, as elsewhere, abandoned their homes and remained away from them as long as they were in the possession of the invaders; but this class formed a very small percentage of the whole population. chapter ix. political intrigue--buena vista--movement against vera cruz--siege and capture of vera cruz. the mexican war was a political war, and the administration conducting it desired to make party capital out of it. general scott was at the head of the army, and, being a soldier of acknowledged professional capacity, his claim to the command of the forces in the field was almost indisputable and does not seem to have been denied by president polk, or marcy, his secretary of war. scott was a whig and the administration was democratic. general scott was also known to have political aspirations, and nothing so popularizes a candidate for high civil positions as military victories. it would not do therefore to give him command of the "army of conquest." the plans submitted by scott for a campaign in mexico were disapproved by the administration, and he replied, in a tone possibly a little disrespectful, to the effect that, if a soldier's plans were not to be supported by the administration, success could not be expected. this was on the 27th of may, 1846. four days later general scott was notified that he need not go to mexico. general gaines was next in rank, but he was too old and feeble to take the field. colonel zachary taylor--a brigadier-general by brevet--was therefore left in command. he, too, was a whig, but was not supposed to entertain any political ambitions; nor did he; but after the fall of monterey, his third battle and third complete victory, the whig papers at home began to speak of him as the candidate of their party for the presidency. something had to be done to neutralize his growing popularity. he could not be relieved from duty in the field where all his battles had been victories: the design would have been too transparent. it was finally decided to send general scott to mexico in chief command, and to authorize him to carry out his own original plan: that is, capture vera cruz and march upon the capital of the country. it was no doubt supposed that scott's ambition would lead him to slaughter taylor or destroy his chances for the presidency, and yet it was hoped that he would not make sufficient capital himself to secure the prize. the administration had indeed a most embarrassing problem to solve. it was engaged in a war of conquest which must be carried to a successful issue, or the political object would be unattained. yet all the capable officers of the requisite rank belonged to the opposition, and the man selected for his lack of political ambition had himself become a prominent candidate for the presidency. it was necessary to destroy his chances promptly. the problem was to do this without the loss of conquest and without permitting another general of the same political party to acquire like popularity. the fact is, the administration of mr. polk made every preparation to disgrace scott, or, to speak more correctly, to drive him to such desperation that he would disgrace himself. general scott had opposed conquest by the way of the rio grande, matamoras and saltillo from the first. now that he was in command of all the forces in mexico, he withdrew from taylor most of his regular troops and left him only enough volunteers, as he thought, to hold the line then in possession of the invading army. indeed scott did not deem it important to hold anything beyond the rio grande, and authorized taylor to fall back to that line if he chose. general taylor protested against the depletion of his army, and his subsequent movement upon buena vista would indicate that he did not share the views of his chief in regard to the unimportance of conquest beyond the rio grande. scott had estimated the men and material that would be required to capture vera cruz and to march on the capital of the country, two hundred and sixty miles in the interior. he was promised all he asked and seemed to have not only the confidence of the president, but his sincere good wishes. the promises were all broken. only about half the troops were furnished that had been pledged, other war material was withheld and scott had scarcely started for mexico before the president undertook to supersede him by the appointment of senator thomas h. benton as lieutenant-general. this being refused by congress, the president asked legislative authority to place a junior over a senior of the same grade, with the view of appointing benton to the rank of major-general and then placing him in command of the army, but congress failed to accede to this proposition as well, and scott remained in command: but every general appointed to serve under him was politically opposed to the chief, and several were personally hostile. general scott reached brazos santiago or point isabel, at the mouth of the rio grande, late in december, 1846, and proceeded at once up the river to camargo, where he had written general taylor to meet him. taylor, however, had gone to, or towards tampico, for the purpose of establishing a post there. he had started on this march before he was aware of general scott being in the country. under these circumstances scott had to issue his orders designating the troops to be withdrawn from taylor, without the personal consultation he had expected to hold with his subordinate. general taylor's victory at buena vista, february 22d, 23d, and 24th, 1847, with an army composed almost entirely of volunteers who had not been in battle before, and over a vastly superior force numerically, made his nomination for the presidency by the whigs a foregone conclusion. he was nominated and elected in 1848. i believe that he sincerely regretted this turn in his fortunes, preferring the peace afforded by a quiet life free from abuse to the honor of filling the highest office in the gift of any people, the presidency of the united states. when general scott assumed command of the army of invasion, i was in the division of general david twiggs, in taylor's command; but under the new orders my regiment was transferred to the division of general william worth, in which i served to the close of the war. the troops withdrawn from taylor to form part of the forces to operate against vera cruz, were assembled at the mouth of the rio grande preparatory to embarkation for their destination. i found general worth a different man from any i had before served directly under. he was nervous, impatient and restless on the march, or when important or responsible duty confronted him. there was not the least reason for haste on the march, for it was known that it would take weeks to assemble shipping enough at the point of our embarkation to carry the army, but general worth moved his division with a rapidity that would have been commendable had he been going to the relief of a beleaguered garrison. the length of the marches was regulated by the distances between places affording a supply of water for the troops, and these distances were sometimes long and sometimes short. general worth on one occasion at least, after having made the full distance intended for the day, and after the troops were in camp and preparing their food, ordered tents struck and made the march that night which had been intended for the next day. some commanders can move troops so as to get the maximum distance out of them without fatigue, while others can wear them out in a few days without accomplishing so much. general worth belonged to this latter class. he enjoyed, however, a fine reputation for his fighting qualities, and thus attached his officers and men to him. the army lay in camp upon the sand-beach in the neighborhood of the mouth of the rio grande for several weeks, awaiting the arrival of transports to carry it to its new field of operations. the transports were all sailing vessels. the passage was a tedious one, and many of the troops were on shipboard over thirty days from the embarkation at the mouth of the rio grande to the time of debarkation south of vera cruz. the trip was a comfortless one for officers and men. the transports used were built for carrying freight and possessed but limited accommodations for passengers, and the climate added to the discomfort of all. the transports with troops were assembled in the harbor of anton lizardo, some sixteen miles south of vera cruz, as they arrived, and there awaited the remainder of the fleet, bringing artillery, ammunition and supplies of all kinds from the north. with the fleet there was a little steam propeller dispatch-boat--the first vessel of the kind i had ever seen, and probably the first of its kind ever seen by any one then with the army. at that day ocean steamers were rare, and what there were were sidewheelers. this little vessel, going through the fleet so fast, so noiselessly and with its propeller under water out of view, attracted a great deal of attention. i recollect that lieutenant sidney smith, of the 4th infantry, by whom i happened to be standing on the deck of a vessel when this propeller was passing, exclaimed, "why, the thing looks as if it was propelled by the force of circumstances." finally on the 7th of march, 1847, the little army of ten or twelve thousand men, given scott to invade a country with a population of seven or eight millions, a mountainous country affording the greatest possible natural advantages for defence, was all assembled and ready to commence the perilous task of landing from vessels lying in the open sea. the debarkation took place inside of the little island of sacrificios, some three miles south of vera cruz. the vessels could not get anywhere near shore, so that everything had to be landed in lighters or surf-boats; general scott had provided these before leaving the north. the breakers were sometimes high, so that the landing was tedious. the men were got ashore rapidly, because they could wade when they came to shallow water; but the camp and garrison equipage, provisions, ammunition and all stores had to be protected from the salt water, and therefore their landing took several days. the mexicans were very kind to us, however, and threw no obstacles in the way of our landing except an occasional shot from their nearest fort. during the debarkation one shot took off the head of major albertis. no other, i believe, reached anywhere near the same distance. on the 9th of march the troops were landed and the investment of vera cruz, from the gulf of mexico south of the city to the gulf again on the north, was soon and easily effected. the landing of stores was continued until everything was got ashore. vera cruz, at the time of which i write and up to 1880, was a walled city. the wall extended from the water's edge south of the town to the water again on the north. there were fortifications at intervals along the line and at the angles. in front of the city, and on an island half a mile out in the gulf, stands san juan de ulloa, an enclosed fortification of large dimensions and great strength for that period. against artillery of the present day the land forts and walls would prove elements of weakness rather than strength. after the invading army had established their camps out of range of the fire from the city, batteries were established, under cover of night, far to the front of the line where the troops lay. these batteries were intrenched and the approaches sufficiently protected. if a sortie had been made at any time by the mexicans, the men serving the batteries could have been quickly reinforced without great exposure to the fire from the enemy's main line. no serious attempt was made to capture the batteries or to drive our troops away. the siege continued with brisk firing on our side till the 27th of march, by which time a considerable breach had been made in the wall surrounding the city. upon this general morales, who was governor of both the city and of san juan de ulloa, commenced a correspondence with general scott looking to the surrender of the town, forts and garrison. on the 29th vera cruz and san juan de ulloa were occupied by scott's army. about five thousand prisoners and four hundred pieces of artillery, besides large amounts of small arms and ammunition, fell into the hands of the victorious force. the casualties on our side during the siege amounted to sixty-four officers and men, killed and wounded. chapter x. march to jalapa--battle of cerro gordo--perote--puebla--scott and taylor. general scott had less than twelve thousand men at vera cruz. he had been promised by the administration a very much larger force, or claimed that he had, and he was a man of veracity. twelve thousand was a very small army with which to penetrate two hundred and sixty miles into an enemy's country, and to besiege the capital; a city, at that time, of largely over one hundred thousand inhabitants. then, too, any line of march that could be selected led through mountain passes easily defended. in fact, there were at that time but two roads from vera cruz to the city of mexico that could be taken by an army; one by jalapa and perote, the other by cordova and orizaba, the two coming together on the great plain which extends to the city of mexico after the range of mountains is passed. it was very important to get the army away from vera cruz as soon as possible, in order to avoid the yellow fever, or vomito, which usually visits that city early in the year, and is very fatal to persons not acclimated; but transportation, which was expected from the north, was arriving very slowly. it was absolutely necessary to have enough to supply the army to jalapa, sixty-five miles in the interior and above the fevers of the coast. at that point the country is fertile, and an army of the size of general scott's could subsist there for an indefinite period. not counting the sick, the weak and the garrisons for the captured city and fort, the moving column was now less than ten thousand strong. this force was composed of three divisions, under generals twiggs, patterson, and worth. the importance of escaping the vomito was so great that as soon as transportation enough could be got together to move a division the advance was commenced. on the 8th of april, twiggs's division started for jalapa. he was followed very soon by patterson, with his division. general worth was to bring up the rear with his command as soon as transportation enough was assembled to carry six days' rations for his troops with the necessary ammunition and camp and garrison equipage. it was the 13th of april before this division left vera cruz. the leading division ran against the enemy at cerro gordo, some fifty miles west, on the road to jalapa, and went into camp at plan del rio, about three miles from the fortifications. general patterson reached plan del rio with his division soon after twiggs arrived. the two were then secure against an attack from santa anna, who commanded the mexican forces. at all events they confronted the enemy without reinforcements and without molestation, until the 18th of april. general scott had remained at vera cruz to hasten preparations for the field; but on the 12th, learning the situation at the front, he hastened on to take personal supervision. he at once commenced his preparations for the capture of the position held by santa anna and of the troops holding it. cerro gordo is one of the higher spurs of the mountains some twelve to fifteen miles east of jalapa, and santa anna had selected this point as the easiest to defend against an invading army. the road, said to have been built by cortez, zigzags around the mountain-side and was defended at every turn by artillery. on either side were deep chasms or mountain walls. a direct attack along the road was an impossibility. a flank movement seemed equally impossible. after the arrival of the commanding-general upon the scene, reconnoissances were sent out to find, or to make, a road by which the rear of the enemy's works might be reached without a front attack. these reconnoissances were made under the supervision of captain robert e. lee, assisted by lieutenants p. g. t. beauregard, isaac i. stevens, z. b. tower, g. w. smith, george b. mcclellan, and j. g. foster, of the corps of engineers, all officers who attained rank and fame, on one side or the other, in the great conflict for the preservation of the unity of the nation. the reconnoissance was completed, and the labor of cutting out and making roads by the flank of the enemy was effected by the 17th of the month. this was accomplished without the knowledge of santa anna or his army, and over ground where he supposed it impossible. on the same day general scott issued his order for the attack on the 18th. the attack was made as ordered, and perhaps there was not a battle of the mexican war, or of any other, where orders issued before an engagement were nearer being a correct report of what afterwards took place. under the supervision of the engineers, roadways had been opened over chasms to the right where the walls were so steep that men could barely climb them. animals could not. these had been opened under cover of night, without attracting the notice of the enemy. the engineers, who had directed the opening, led the way and the troops followed. artillery was let down the steep slopes by hand, the men engaged attaching a strong rope to the rear axle and letting the guns down, a piece at a time, while the men at the ropes kept their ground on top, paying out gradually, while a few at the front directed the course of the piece. in like manner the guns were drawn by hand up the opposite slopes. in this way scott's troops reached their assigned position in rear of most of the intrenchments of the enemy, unobserved. the attack was made, the mexican reserves behind the works beat a hasty retreat, and those occupying them surrendered. on the left general pillow's command made a formidable demonstration, which doubtless held a part of the enemy in his front and contributed to the victory. i am not pretending to give full details of all the battles fought, but of the portion that i saw. there were troops engaged on both sides at other points in which both sustained losses; but the battle was won as here narrated. the surprise of the enemy was complete, the victory overwhelming; some three thousand prisoners fell into scott's hands, also a large amount of ordnance and ordnance stores. the prisoners were paroled, the artillery parked and the small arms and ammunition destroyed. the battle of buena vista was probably very important to the success of general scott at cerro gordo and in his entire campaign from vera cruz to the great plains reaching to the city of mexico. the only army santa anna had to protect his capital and the mountain passes west of vera cruz, was the one he had with him confronting general taylor. it is not likely that he would have gone as far north as monterey to attack the united states troops when he knew his country was threatened with invasion further south. when taylor moved to saltillo and then advanced on to buena vista, santa anna crossed the desert confronting the invading army, hoping no doubt to crush it and get back in time to meet general scott in the mountain passes west of vera cruz. his attack on taylor was disastrous to the mexican army, but, notwithstanding this, he marched his army to cerro gordo, a distance not much short of one thousand miles by the line he had to travel, in time to intrench himself well before scott got there. if he had been successful at buena vista his troops would no doubt have made a more stubborn resistance at cerro gordo. had the battle of buena vista not been fought santa anna would have had time to move leisurely to meet the invader further south and with an army not demoralized nor depleted by defeat. after the battle the victorious army moved on to jalapa, where it was in a beautiful, productive and healthy country, far above the fevers of the coast. jalapa, however, is still in the mountains, and between there and the great plain the whole line of the road is easy of defence. it was important, therefore, to get possession of the great highway between the sea-coast and the capital up to the point where it leaves the mountains, before the enemy could have time to re-organize and fortify in our front. worth's division was selected to go forward to secure this result. the division marched to perote on the great plain, not far from where the road debouches from the mountains. there is a low, strong fort on the plain in front of the town, known as the castle of perote. this, however, offered no resistance and fell into our hands, with its armament. general scott having now only nine or ten thousand men west of vera cruz, and the time of some four thousand of them being about to expire, a long delay was the consequence. the troops were in a healthy climate, and where they could subsist for an indefinite period even if their line back to vera cruz should be cut off. it being ascertained that the men whose time would expire before the city of mexico could possibly fall into the hands of the american army, would not remain beyond the term for which they had volunteered, the commanding-general determined to discharge them at once, for a delay until the expiration of their time would have compelled them to pass through vera cruz during the season of the vomito. this reduced scott's force in the field to about five thousand men. early in may, worth, with his division, left perote and marched on to puebla. the roads were wide and the country open except through one pass in a spur of mountains coming up from the south, through which the road runs. notwithstanding this the small column was divided into two bodies, moving a day apart. nothing occurred on the march of special note, except that while lying at the town of amozoque--an easy day's march east of puebla--a body of the enemy's cavalry, two or three thousand strong, was seen to our right, not more than a mile away. a battery or two, with two or three infantry regiments, was sent against them and they soon disappeared. on the 15th of may we entered the city of puebla. general worth was in command at puebla until the latter end of may, when general scott arrived. here, as well as on the march up, his restlessness, particularly under responsibilities, showed itself. during his brief command he had the enemy hovering around near the city, in vastly superior numbers to his own. the brigade to which i was attached changed quarters three different times in about a week, occupying at first quarters near the plaza, in the heart of the city; then at the western entrance; then at the extreme east. on one occasion general worth had the troops in line, under arms, all day, with three days' cooked rations in their haversacks. he galloped from one command to another proclaiming the near proximity of santa anna with an army vastly superior to his own. general scott arrived upon the scene the latter part of the month, and nothing more was heard of santa anna and his myriads. there were, of course, bodies of mounted mexicans hovering around to watch our movements and to pick up stragglers, or small bodies of troops, if they ventured too far out. these always withdrew on the approach of any considerable number of our soldiers. after the arrival of general scott i was sent, as quartermaster, with a large train of wagons, back two days' march at least, to procure forage. we had less than a thousand men as escort, and never thought of danger. we procured full loads for our entire train at two plantations, which could easily have furnished as much more. there had been great delay in obtaining the authority of congress for the raising of the troops asked for by the administration. a bill was before the national legislature from early in the session of 1846-7, authorizing the creation of ten additional regiments for the war to be attached to the regular army, but it was the middle of february before it became a law. appointments of commissioned officers had then to be made; men had to be enlisted, the regiments equipped and the whole transported to mexico. it was august before general scott received reinforcement sufficient to warrant an advance. his moving column, not even now more than ten thousand strong, was in four divisions, commanded by generals twiggs, worth, pillow and quitman. there was also a cavalry corps under general harney, composed of detachments of the 1st, 2d, and 3d dragoons. the advance commenced on the 7th of august with twiggs's division in front. the remaining three divisions followed, with an interval of a day between. the marches were short, to make concentration easier in case of attack. i had now been in battle with the two leading commanders conducting armies in a foreign land. the contrast between the two was very marked. general taylor never wore uniform, but dressed himself entirely for comfort. he moved about the field in which he was operating to see through his own eyes the situation. often he would be without staff officers, and when he was accompanied by them there was no prescribed order in which they followed. he was very much given to sit his horse side-ways--with both feet on one side--particularly on the battlefield. general scott was the reverse in all these particulars. he always wore all the uniform prescribed or allowed by law when he inspected his lines; word would be sent to all division and brigade commanders in advance, notifying them of the hour when the commanding general might be expected. this was done so that all the army might be under arms to salute their chief as he passed. on these occasions he wore his dress uniform, cocked hat, aiguillettes, sabre and spurs. his staff proper, besides all officers constructively on his staff--engineers, inspectors, quartermasters, etc., that could be spared--followed, also in uniform and in prescribed order. orders were prepared with great care and evidently with the view that they should be a history of what followed. in their modes of expressing thought, these two generals contrasted quite as strongly as in their other characteristics. general scott was precise in language, cultivated a style peculiarly his own; was proud of his rhetoric; not averse to speaking of himself, often in the third person, and he could bestow praise upon the person he was talking about without the least embarrassment. taylor was not a conversationalist, but on paper he could put his meaning so plainly that there could be no mistaking it. he knew how to express what he wanted to say in the fewest well-chosen words, but would not sacrifice meaning to the construction of high-sounding sentences. but with their opposite characteristics both were great and successful soldiers; both were true, patriotic and upright in all their dealings. both were pleasant to serve under--taylor was pleasant to serve with. scott saw more through the eyes of his staff officers than through his own. his plans were deliberately prepared, and fully expressed in orders. taylor saw for himself, and gave orders to meet the emergency without reference to how they would read in history. chapter xi. advance on the city of mexico--battle of contreras--assault at churubusco--negotiations for peace--battle of molino del rey--storming of chapultepec--san cosme--evacuation of the city--halls of the montezumas. the route followed by the army from puebla to the city of mexico was over rio frio mountain, the road leading over which, at the highest point, is about eleven thousand feet above tide water. the pass through this mountain might have been easily defended, but it was not; and the advanced division reached the summit in three days after leaving puebla. the city of mexico lies west of rio frio mountain, on a plain backed by another mountain six miles farther west, with others still nearer on the north and south. between the western base of rio frio and the city of mexico there are three lakes, chalco and xochimilco on the left and texcoco on the right, extending to the east end of the city of mexico. chalco and texcoco are divided by a narrow strip of land over which the direct road to the city runs. xochimilco is also to the left of the road, but at a considerable distance south of it, and is connected with lake chalco by a narrow channel. there is a high rocky mound, called el penon, on the right of the road, springing up from the low flat ground dividing the lakes. this mound was strengthened by intrenchments at its base and summit, and rendered a direct attack impracticable. scott's army was rapidly concentrated about ayotla and other points near the eastern end of lake chalco. reconnoissances were made up to within gun-shot of el penon, while engineers were seeking a route by the south side of lake chalco to flank the city, and come upon it from the south and south-west. a way was found around the lake, and by the 18th of august troops were in st. augustin tlalpam, a town about eleven miles due south from the plaza of the capital. between st. augustin tlalpam and the city lie the hacienda of san antonio and the village of churubusco, and south-west of them is contreras. all these points, except st. augustin tlalpam, were intrenched and strongly garrisoned. contreras is situated on the side of a mountain, near its base, where volcanic rocks are piled in great confusion, reaching nearly to san antonio. this made the approach to the city from the south very difficult. the brigade to which i was attached--garland's, of worth's division--was sent to confront san antonio, two or three miles from st. augustin tlalpam, on the road to churubusco and the city of mexico. the ground on which san antonio stands is completely in the valley, and the surface of the land is only a little above the level of the lakes, and, except to the south-west, it was cut up by deep ditches filled with water. to the south-west is the pedregal--the volcanic rock before spoken of--over which cavalry or artillery could not be passed, and infantry would make but poor progress if confronted by an enemy. from the position occupied by garland's brigade, therefore, no movement could be made against the defences of san antonio except to the front, and by a narrow causeway, over perfectly level ground, every inch of which was commanded by the enemy's artillery and infantry. if contreras, some three miles west and south, should fall into our hands, troops from there could move to the right flank of all the positions held by the enemy between us and the city. under these circumstances general scott directed the holding of the front of the enemy without making an attack until further orders. on the 18th of august, the day of reaching san augustin tlalpam, garland's brigade secured a position within easy range of the advanced intrenchments of san antonio, but where his troops were protected by an artificial embankment that had been thrown up for some other purpose than defense. general scott at once set his engineers reconnoitring the works about contreras, and on the 19th movements were commenced to get troops into positions from which an assault could be made upon the force occupying that place. the pedregal on the north and north-east, and the mountain on the south, made the passage by either flank of the enemy's defences difficult, for their work stood exactly between those natural bulwarks; but a road was completed during the day and night of the 19th, and troops were got to the north and west of the enemy. this affair, like that of cerro gordo, was an engagement in which the officers of the engineer corps won special distinction. in fact, in both cases, tasks which seemed difficult at first sight were made easier for the troops that had to execute them than they would have been on an ordinary field. the very strength of each of these positions was, by the skill of the engineers, converted into a defence for the assaulting parties while securing their positions for final attack. all the troops with general scott in the valley of mexico, except a part of the division of general quitman at san augustin tlalpam and the brigade of garland (worth's division) at san antonio, were engaged at the battle of contreras, or were on their way, in obedience to the orders of their chief, to reinforce those who were engaged. the assault was made on the morning of the 20th, and in less than half an hour from the sound of the advance the position was in our hands, with many prisoners and large quantities of ordnance and other stores. the brigade commanded by general riley was from its position the most conspicuous in the final assault, but all did well, volunteers and regulars. from the point occupied by garland's brigade we could see the progress made at contreras and the movement of troops toward the flank and rear of the enemy opposing us. the mexicans all the way back to the city could see the same thing, and their conduct showed plainly that they did not enjoy the sight. we moved out at once, and found them gone from our immediate front. clarke's brigade of worth's division now moved west over the point of the pedregal, and after having passed to the north sufficiently to clear san antonio, turned east and got on the causeway leading to churubusco and the city of mexico. when he approached churubusco his left, under colonel hoffman, attacked a tete-de-pont at that place and brought on an engagement. about an hour after, garland was ordered to advance directly along the causeway, and got up in time to take part in the engagement. san antonio was found evacuated, the evacuation having probably taken place immediately upon the enemy seeing the stars and stripes waving over contreras. the troops that had been engaged at contreras, and even then on their way to that battle-field, were moved by a causeway west of, and parallel to the one by way of san antonio and churubusco. it was expected by the commanding general that these troops would move north sufficiently far to flank the enemy out of his position at churubusco, before turning east to reach the san antonio road, but they did not succeed in this, and churubusco proved to be about the severest battle fought in the valley of mexico. general scott coming upon the battle-field about this juncture, ordered two brigades, under shields, to move north and turn the right of the enemy. this shields did, but not without hard fighting and heavy loss. the enemy finally gave way, leaving in our hands prisoners, artillery and small arms. the balance of the causeway held by the enemy, up to the very gates of the city, fell in like manner. i recollect at this place that some of the gunners who had stood their ground, were deserters from general taylor's army on the rio grande. both the strategy and tactics displayed by general scott in these various engagements of the 20th of august, 1847, were faultless as i look upon them now, after the lapse of so many years. as before stated, the work of the engineer officers who made the reconnoissances and led the different commands to their destinations, was so perfect that the chief was able to give his orders to his various subordinates with all the precision he could use on an ordinary march. i mean, up to the points from which the attack was to commence. after that point is reached the enemy often induces a change of orders not before contemplated. the enemy outside the city outnumbered our soldiery quite three to one, but they had become so demoralized by the succession of defeats this day, that the city of mexico could have been entered without much further bloodshed. in fact, captain philip kearney --afterwards a general in the war of the rebellion--rode with a squadron of cavalry to the very gates of the city, and would no doubt have entered with his little force, only at that point he was badly wounded, as were several of his officers. he had not heard the call for a halt. general franklin pierce had joined the army in mexico, at puebla, a short time before the advance upon the capital commenced. he had consequently not been in any of the engagements of the war up to the battle of contreras. by an unfortunate fall of his horse on the afternoon of the 19th he was painfully injured. the next day, when his brigade, with the other troops engaged on the same field, was ordered against the flank and rear of the enemy guarding the different points of the road from san augustin tlalpam to the city, general pierce attempted to accompany them. he was not sufficiently recovered to do so, and fainted. this circumstance gave rise to exceedingly unfair and unjust criticisms of him when he became a candidate for the presidency. whatever general pierce's qualifications may have been for the presidency, he was a gentleman and a man of courage. i was not a supporter of him politically, but i knew him more intimately than i did any other of the volunteer generals. general scott abstained from entering the city at this time, because mr. nicholas p. trist, the commissioner on the part of the united states to negotiate a treaty of peace with mexico, was with the army, and either he or general scott thought--probably both of them--that a treaty would be more possible while the mexican government was in possession of the capital than if it was scattered and the capital in the hands of an invader. be this as it may, we did not enter at that time. the army took up positions along the slopes of the mountains south of the city, as far west as tacubaya. negotiations were at once entered into with santa anna, who was then practically the government and the immediate commander of all the troops engaged in defence of the country. a truce was signed which denied to either party the right to strengthen its position, or to receive reinforcements during the continuance of the armistices, but authorized general scott to draw supplies for his army from the city in the meantime. negotiations were commenced at once and were kept up vigorously between mr. trist and the commissioners appointed on the part of mexico, until the 2d of september. at that time mr. trist handed in his ultimatum. texas was to be given up absolutely by mexico, and new mexico and california ceded to the united states for a stipulated sum to be afterwards determined. i do not suppose mr. trist had any discretion whatever in regard to boundaries. the war was one of conquest, in the interest of an institution, and the probabilities are that private instructions were for the acquisition of territory out of which new states might be carved. at all events the mexicans felt so outraged at the terms proposed that they commenced preparations for defence, without giving notice of the termination of the armistice. the terms of the truce had been violated before, when teams had been sent into the city to bring out supplies for the army. the first train entering the city was very severely threatened by a mob. this, however, was apologized for by the authorities and all responsibility for it denied; and thereafter, to avoid exciting the mexican people and soldiery, our teams with their escorts were sent in at night, when the troops were in barracks and the citizens in bed. the circumstance was overlooked and negotiations continued. as soon as the news reached general scott of the second violation of the armistice, about the 4th of september, he wrote a vigorous note to president santa anna, calling his attention to it, and, receiving an unsatisfactory reply, declared the armistice at an end. general scott, with worth's division, was now occupying tacubaya, a village some four miles south-west of the city of mexico, and extending from the base up the mountain-side for the distance of half a mile. more than a mile west, and also a little above the plain, stands molino del rey. the mill is a long stone structure, one story high and several hundred feet in length. at the period of which i speak general scott supposed a portion of the mill to be used as a foundry for the casting of guns. this, however, proved to be a mistake. it was valuable to the mexicans because of the quantity of grain it contained. the building is flat roofed, and a line of sand-bags over the outer walls rendered the top quite a formidable defence for infantry. chapultepec is a mound springing up from the plain to the height of probably three hundred feet, and almost in a direct line between molino del rey and the western part of the city. it was fortified both on the top and on the rocky and precipitous sides. the city of mexico is supplied with water by two aqueducts, resting on strong stone arches. one of these aqueducts draws its supply of water from a mountain stream coming into it at or near molino del rey, and runs north close to the west base of chapultepec; thence along the centre of a wide road, until it reaches the road running east into the city by the garita san cosme; from which point the aqueduct and road both run east to the city. the second aqueduct starts from the east base of chapultepec, where it is fed by a spring, and runs north-east to the city. this aqueduct, like the other, runs in the middle of a broad road-way, thus leaving a space on each side. the arches supporting the aqueduct afforded protection for advancing troops as well as to those engaged defensively. at points on the san cosme road parapets were thrown across, with an embrasure for a single piece of artillery in each. at the point where both road and aqueduct turn at right angles from north to east, there was not only one of these parapets supplied by one gun and infantry supports, but the houses to the north of the san cosme road, facing south and commanding a view of the road back to chapultepec, were covered with infantry, protected by parapets made of sandbags. the roads leading to garitas (the gates) san cosme and belen, by which these aqueducts enter the city, were strongly intrenched. deep, wide ditches, filled with water, lined the sides of both roads. such were the defences of the city of mexico in september, 1847, on the routes over which general scott entered. prior to the mexican war general scott had been very partial to general worth--indeed he continued so up to the close of hostilities--but, for some reason, worth had become estranged from his chief. scott evidently took this coldness somewhat to heart. he did not retaliate, however, but on the contrary showed every disposition to appease his subordinate. it was understood at the time that he gave worth authority to plan and execute the battle of molino del rey without dictation or interference from any one, for the very purpose of restoring their former relations. the effort failed, and the two generals remained ever after cold and indifferent towards each other, if not actually hostile. the battle of molino del rey was fought on the 8th of september. the night of the 7th, worth sent for his brigade and regimental commanders, with their staffs, to come to his quarters to receive instructions for the morrow. these orders contemplated a movement up to within striking distance of the mills before daylight. the engineers had reconnoitred the ground as well as possible, and had acquired all the information necessary to base proper orders both for approach and attack. by daylight on the morning of the 8th, the troops to be engaged at molino were all at the places designated. the ground in front of the mills, to the south, was commanded by the artillery from the summit of chapultepec as well as by the lighter batteries at hand; but a charge was made, and soon all was over. worth's troops entered the mills by every door, and the enemy beat a hasty retreat back to chapultepec. had this victory been followed up promptly, no doubt americans and mexicans would have gone over the defences of chapultepec so near together that the place would have fallen into our hands without further loss. the defenders of the works could not have fired upon us without endangering their own men. this was not done, and five days later more valuable lives were sacrificed to carry works which had been so nearly in our possession on the 8th. i do not criticise the failure to capture chapultepec at this time. the result that followed the first assault could not possibly have been foreseen, and to profit by the unexpected advantage, the commanding general must have been on the spot and given the necessary instructions at the moment, or the troops must have kept on without orders. it is always, however, in order to follow a retreating foe, unless stopped or otherwise directed. the loss on our side at molino del rey was severe for the numbers engaged. it was especially so among commissioned officers. i was with the earliest of the troops to enter the mills. in passing through to the north side, looking towards chapultepec, i happened to notice that there were armed mexicans still on top of the building, only a few feet from many of our men. not seeing any stairway or ladder reaching to the top of the building, i took a few soldiers, and had a cart that happened to be standing near brought up, and, placing the shafts against the wall and chocking the wheels so that the cart could not back, used the shafts as a sort of ladder extending to within three or four feet of the top. by this i climbed to the roof of the building, followed by a few men, but found a private soldier had preceded me by some other way. there were still quite a number of mexicans on the roof, among them a major and five or six officers of lower grades, who had not succeeded in getting away before our troops occupied the building. they still had their arms, while the soldier before mentioned was walking as sentry, guarding the prisoners he had surrounded, all by himself. i halted the sentinel, received the swords from the commissioned officers, and proceeded, with the assistance of the soldiers now with me, to disable the muskets by striking them against the edge of the wall, and throw them to the ground below. molino del rey was now captured, and the troops engaged, with the exception of an appropriate guard over the captured position and property, were marched back to their quarters in tacubaya. the engagement did not last many minutes, but the killed and wounded were numerous for the number of troops engaged. during the night of the 11th batteries were established which could play upon the fortifications of chapultepec. the bombardment commenced early on the morning of the 12th, but there was no further engagement during this day than that of the artillery. general scott assigned the capture of chapultepec to general pillow, but did not leave the details to his judgment. two assaulting columns, two hundred and fifty men each, composed of volunteers for the occasion, were formed. they were commanded by captains mckinzie and casey respectively. the assault was successful, but bloody. in later years, if not at the time, the battles of molino del rey and chapultepec have seemed to me to have been wholly unnecessary. when the assaults upon the garitas of san cosme and belen were determined upon, the road running east to the former gate could have been reached easily, without an engagement, by moving along south of the mills until west of them sufficiently far to be out of range, thence north to the road above mentioned; or, if desirable to keep the two attacking columns nearer together, the troops could have been turned east so as to come on the aqueduct road out of range of the guns from chapultepec. in like manner, the troops designated to act against belen could have kept east of chapultepec, out of range, and come on to the aqueduct, also out of range of chapultepec. molino del rey and chapultepec would both have been necessarily evacuated if this course had been pursued, for they would have been turned. general quitman, a volunteer from the state of mississippi, who stood well with the army both as a soldier and as a man, commanded the column acting against belen. general worth commanded the column against san cosme. when chapultepec fell the advance commenced along the two aqueduct roads. i was on the road to san cosme, and witnessed most that took place on that route. when opposition was encountered our troops sheltered themselves by keeping under the arches supporting the aqueduct, advancing an arch at a time. we encountered no serious obstruction until within gun-shot of the point where the road we were on intersects that running east to the city, the point where the aqueduct turns at a right angle. i have described the defences of this position before. there were but three commissioned officers besides myself, that i can now call to mind, with the advance when the above position was reached. one of these officers was a lieutenant semmes, of the marine corps. i think captain gore, and lieutenant judah, of the 4th infantry, were the others. our progress was stopped for the time by the single piece of artillery at the angle of the roads and the infantry occupying the house-tops back from it. west of the road from where we were, stood a house occupying the south-west angle made by the san cosme road and the road we were moving upon. a stone wall ran from the house along each of these roads for a considerable distance and thence back until it joined, enclosing quite a yard about the house. i watched my opportunity and skipped across the road and behind the south wall. proceeding cautiously to the west corner of the enclosure, i peeped around and seeing nobody, continued, still cautiously, until the road running east and west was reached. i then returned to the troops, and called for volunteers. all that were close to me, or that heard me, about a dozen, offered their services. commanding them to carry their arms at a trail, i watched our opportunity and got them across the road and under cover of the wall beyond, before the enemy had a shot at us. our men under cover of the arches kept a close watch on the intrenchments that crossed our path and the house-tops beyond, and whenever a head showed itself above the parapets they would fire at it. our crossing was thus made practicable without loss. when we reached a safe position i instructed my little command again to carry their arms at a trail, not to fire at the enemy until they were ordered, and to move very cautiously following me until the san cosme road was reached; we would then be on the flank of the men serving the gun on the road, and with no obstruction between us and them. when we reached the south-west corner of the enclosure before described, i saw some united states troops pushing north through a shallow ditch near by, who had come up since my reconnaissance. this was the company of captain horace brooks, of the artillery, acting as infantry. i explained to brooks briefly what i had discovered and what i was about to do. he said, as i knew the ground and he did not, i might go on and he would follow. as soon as we got on the road leading to the city the troops serving the gun on the parapet retreated, and those on the house-tops near by followed; our men went after them in such close pursuit--the troops we had left under the arches joining--that a second line across the road, about half-way between the first and the garita, was carried. no reinforcements had yet come up except brooks's company, and the position we had taken was too advanced to be held by so small a force. it was given up, but retaken later in the day, with some loss. worth's command gradually advanced to the front now open to it. later in the day in reconnoitring i found a church off to the south of the road, which looked to me as if the belfry would command the ground back of the garita san cosme. i got an officer of the voltigeurs, with a mountain howitzer and men to work it, to go with me. the road being in possession of the enemy, we had to take the field to the south to reach the church. this took us over several ditches breast deep in water and grown up with water plants. these ditches, however, were not over eight or ten feet in width. the howitzer was taken to pieces and carried by the men to its destination. when i knocked for admission a priest came to the door who, while extremely polite, declined to admit us. with the little spanish then at my command, i explained to him that he might save property by opening the door, and he certainly would save himself from becoming a prisoner, for a time at least; and besides, i intended to go in whether he consented or not. he began to see his duty in the same light that i did, and opened the door, though he did not look as if it gave him special pleasure to do so. the gun was carried to the belfry and put together. we were not more than two or three hundred yards from san cosme. the shots from our little gun dropped in upon the enemy and created great confusion. why they did not send out a small party and capture us, i do not know. we had no infantry or other defences besides our one gun. the effect of this gun upon the troops about the gate of the city was so marked that general worth saw it from his position. (*3) he was so pleased that he sent a staff officer, lieutenant pemberton--later lieutenant-general commanding the defences of vicksburg--to bring me to him. he expressed his gratification at the services the howitzer in the church steeple was doing, saying that every shot was effective, and ordered a captain of voltigeurs to report to me with another howitzer to be placed along with the one already rendering so much service. i could not tell the general that there was not room enough in the steeple for another gun, because he probably would have looked upon such a statement as a contradiction from a second lieutenant. i took the captain with me, but did not use his gun. the night of the 13th of september was spent by the troops under general worth in the houses near san cosme, and in line confronting the general line of the enemy across to belen. the troops that i was with were in the houses north of the road leading into the city, and were engaged during the night in cutting passage-ways from one house to another towards the town. during the night santa anna, with his army--except the deserters--left the city. he liberated all the convicts confined in the town, hoping, no doubt, that they would inflict upon us some injury before daylight; but several hours after santa anna was out of the way, the city authorities sent a delegation to general scott to ask--if not demand--an armistice, respecting church property, the rights of citizens and the supremacy of the city government in the management of municipal affairs. general scott declined to trammel himself with conditions, but gave assurances that those who chose to remain within our lines would be protected so long as they behaved themselves properly. general quitman had advanced along his line very successfully on the 13th, so that at night his command occupied nearly the same position at belen that worth's troops did about san cosme. after the interview above related between general scott and the city council, orders were issued for the cautious entry of both columns in the morning. the troops under worth were to stop at the alameda, a park near the west end of the city. quitman was to go directly to the plaza, and take possession of the palace--a mass of buildings on the east side in which congress has its sessions, the national courts are held, the public offices are all located, the president resides, and much room is left for museums, receptions, etc. this is the building generally designated as the "halls of the montezumas." chapter xii. promotion to first lieutenant--capture of the city of mexico--the army --mexican soldiers--peace negotiations. on entering the city the troops were fired upon by the released convicts, and possibly by deserters and hostile citizens. the streets were deserted, and the place presented the appearance of a "city of the dead," except for this firing by unseen persons from house-tops, windows, and around corners. in this firing the lieutenant-colonel of my regiment, garland, was badly wounded, lieutenant sidney smith, of the 4th infantry, was also wounded mortally. he died a few days after, and by his death i was promoted to the grade of first lieutenant.(*4) i had gone into the battle of palo alto in may, 1846, a second lieutenant, and i entered the city of mexico sixteen months later with the same rank, after having been in all the engagements possible for any one man and in a regiment that lost more officers during the war than it ever had present at any one engagement. my regiment lost four commissioned officers, all senior to me, by steamboat explosions during the mexican war. the mexicans were not so discriminating. they sometimes picked off my juniors. general scott soon followed the troops into the city, in state. i wonder that he was not fired upon, but i believe he was not; at all events he was not hurt. he took quarters at first in the "halls of the montezumas," and from there issued his wise and discreet orders for the government of a conquered city, and for suppressing the hostile acts of liberated convicts already spoken of--orders which challenge the respect of all who study them. lawlessness was soon suppressed, and the city of mexico settled down into a quiet, law-abiding place. the people began to make their appearance upon the streets without fear of the invaders. shortly afterwards the bulk of the troops were sent from the city to the villages at the foot of the mountains, four or five miles to the south and south-west. whether general scott approved of the mexican war and the manner in which it was brought about, i have no means of knowing. his orders to troops indicate only a soldierly spirit, with probably a little regard for the perpetuation of his own fame. on the other hand, general taylor's, i think, indicate that he considered the administration accountable for the war, and felt no responsibility resting on himself further than for the faithful performance of his duties. both generals deserve the commendations of their countrymen and to live in the grateful memory of this people to the latest generation. earlier in this narrative i have stated that the plain, reached after passing the mountains east of perote, extends to the cities of puebla and mexico. the route travelled by the army before reaching puebla, goes over a pass in a spur of mountain coming up from the south. this pass is very susceptible of defence by a smaller against a larger force. again, the highest point of the road-bed between vera cruz and the city of mexico is over rio frio mountain, which also might have been successfully defended by an inferior against a superior force. but by moving north of the mountains, and about thirty miles north of puebla, both of these passes would have been avoided. the road from perote to the city of mexico, by this latter route, is as level as the prairies in our west. arriving due north from puebla, troops could have been detached to take possession of that place, and then proceeding west with the rest of the army no mountain would have been encountered before reaching the city of mexico. it is true this road would have brought troops in by guadalupe--a town, church and detached spur of mountain about two miles north of the capital, all bearing the same general name --and at this point lake texcoco comes near to the mountain, which was fortified both at the base and on the sides: but troops could have passed north of the mountain and come in only a few miles to the north-west, and so flanked the position, as they actually did on the south. it has always seemed to me that this northern route to the city of mexico, would have been the better one to have taken. but my later experience has taught me two lessons: first, that things are seen plainer after the events have occurred; second, that the most confident critics are generally those who know the least about the matter criticised. i know just enough about the mexican war to approve heartily of most of the generalship, but to differ with a little of it. it is natural that an important city like puebla should not have been passed with contempt; it may be natural that the direct road to it should have been taken; but it could have been passed, its evacuation insured and possession acquired without danger of encountering the enemy in intricate mountain defiles. in this same way the city of mexico could have been approached without any danger of opposition, except in the open field. but general scott's successes are an answer to all criticism. he invaded a populous country, penetrating two hundred and sixty miles into the interior, with a force at no time equal to one-half of that opposed to him; he was without a base; the enemy was always intrenched, always on the defensive; yet he won every battle, he captured the capital, and conquered the government. credit is due to the troops engaged, it is true, but the plans and the strategy were the general's. i had now made marches and been in battle under both general scott and general taylor. the former divided his force of 10,500 men into four columns, starting a day apart, in moving from puebla to the capital of the nation, when it was known that an army more than twice as large as his own stood ready to resist his coming. the road was broad and the country open except in crossing the rio frio mountain. general taylor pursued the same course in marching toward an enemy. he moved even in smaller bodies. i never thought at the time to doubt the infallibility of these two generals in all matters pertaining to their profession. i supposed they moved in small bodies because more men could not be passed over a single road on the same day with their artillery and necessary trains. later i found the fallacy of this belief. the rebellion, which followed as a sequence to the mexican war, never could have been suppressed if larger bodies of men could not have been moved at the same time than was the custom under scott and taylor. the victories in mexico were, in every instance, over vastly superior numbers. there were two reasons for this. both general scott and general taylor had such armies as are not often got together. at the battles of palo alto and resaca-de-la-palma, general taylor had a small army, but it was composed exclusively of regular troops, under the best of drill and discipline. every officer, from the highest to the lowest, was educated in his profession, not at west point necessarily, but in the camp, in garrison, and many of them in indian wars. the rank and file were probably inferior, as material out of which to make an army, to the volunteers that participated in all the later battles of the war; but they were brave men, and then drill and discipline brought out all there was in them. a better army, man for man, probably never faced an enemy than the one commanded by general taylor in the earliest two engagements of the mexican war. the volunteers who followed were of better material, but without drill or discipline at the start. they were associated with so many disciplined men and professionally educated officers, that when they went into engagements it was with a confidence they would not have felt otherwise. they became soldiers themselves almost at once. all these conditions we would enjoy again in case of war. the mexican army of that day was hardly an organization. the private soldier was picked up from the lower class of the inhabitants when wanted; his consent was not asked; he was poorly clothed, worse fed, and seldom paid. he was turned adrift when no longer wanted. the officers of the lower grades were but little superior to the men. with all this i have seen as brave stands made by some of these men as i have ever seen made by soldiers. now mexico has a standing army larger than that of the united states. they have a military school modelled after west point. their officers are educated and, no doubt, generally brave. the mexican war of 1846-8 would be an impossibility in this generation. the mexicans have shown a patriotism which it would be well if we would imitate in part, but with more regard to truth. they celebrate the anniversaries of chapultepec and molino del rey as of very great victories. the anniversaries are recognized as national holidays. at these two battles, while the united states troops were victorious, it was at very great sacrifice of life compared with what the mexicans suffered. the mexicans, as on many other occasions, stood up as well as any troops ever did. the trouble seemed to be the lack of experience among the officers, which led them after a certain time to simply quit, without being particularly whipped, but because they had fought enough. their authorities of the present day grow enthusiastic over their theme when telling of these victories, and speak with pride of the large sum of money they forced us to pay in the end. with us, now twenty years after the close of the most stupendous war ever known, we have writers --who profess devotion to the nation--engaged in trying to prove that the union forces were not victorious; practically, they say, we were slashed around from donelson to vicksburg and to chattanooga; and in the east from gettysburg to appomattox, when the physical rebellion gave out from sheer exhaustion. there is no difference in the amount of romance in the two stories. i would not have the anniversaries of our victories celebrated, nor those of our defeats made fast days and spent in humiliation and prayer; but i would like to see truthful history written. such history will do full credit to the courage, endurance and soldierly ability of the american citizen, no matter what section of the country he hailed from, or in what ranks he fought. the justice of the cause which in the end prevailed, will, i doubt not, come to be acknowledged by every citizen of the land, in time. for the present, and so long as there are living witnesses of the great war of sections, there will be people who will not be consoled for the loss of a cause which they believed to be holy. as time passes, people, even of the south, will begin to wonder how it was possible that their ancestors ever fought for or justified institutions which acknowledged the right of property in man. after the fall of the capital and the dispersal of the government of mexico, it looked very much as if military occupation of the country for a long time might be necessary. general scott at once began the preparation of orders, regulations and laws in view of this contingency. he contemplated making the country pay all the expenses of the occupation, without the army becoming a perceptible burden upon the people. his plan was to levy a direct tax upon the separate states, and collect, at the ports left open to trade, a duty on all imports. from the beginning of the war private property had not been taken, either for the use of the army or of individuals, without full compensation. this policy was to be pursued. there were not troops enough in the valley of mexico to occupy many points, but now that there was no organized army of the enemy of any size, reinforcements could be got from the rio grande, and there were also new volunteers arriving from time to time, all by way of vera cruz. military possession was taken of cuernavaca, fifty miles south of the city of mexico; of toluca, nearly as far west, and of pachuca, a mining town of great importance, some sixty miles to the north-east. vera cruz, jalapa, orizaba, and puebla were already in our possession. meanwhile the mexican government had departed in the person of santa anna, and it looked doubtful for a time whether the united states commissioner, mr. trist, would find anybody to negotiate with. a temporary government, however, was soon established at queretaro, and trist began negotiations for a conclusion of the war. before terms were finally agreed upon he was ordered back to washington, but general scott prevailed upon him to remain, as an arrangement had been so nearly reached, and the administration must approve his acts if he succeeded in making such a treaty as had been contemplated in his instructions. the treaty was finally signed the 2d of february, 1848, and accepted by the government at washington. it is that known as the "treaty of guadalupe hidalgo," and secured to the united states the rio grande as the boundary of texas, and the whole territory then included in new mexico and upper california, for the sum of $15,000,000. soon after entering the city of mexico, the opposition of generals pillow, worth and colonel duncan to general scott became very marked. scott claimed that they had demanded of the president his removal. i do not know whether this is so or not, but i do know of their unconcealed hostility to their chief. at last he placed them in arrest, and preferred charges against them of insubordination and disrespect. this act brought on a crisis in the career of the general commanding. he had asserted from the beginning that the administration was hostile to him; that it had failed in its promises of men and war material; that the president himself had shown duplicity if not treachery in the endeavor to procure the appointment of benton: and the administration now gave open evidence of its enmity. about the middle of february orders came convening a court of inquiry, composed of brevet brigadier-general towson, the paymaster-general of the army, brigadier-general cushing and colonel belknap, to inquire into the conduct of the accused and the accuser, and shortly afterwards orders were received from washington, relieving scott of the command of the army in the field and assigning major-general william o. butler of kentucky to the place. this order also released pillow, worth and duncan from arrest. if a change was to be made the selection of general butler was agreeable to every one concerned, so far as i remember to have heard expressions on the subject. there were many who regarded the treatment of general scott as harsh and unjust. it is quite possible that the vanity of the general had led him to say and do things that afforded a plausible pretext to the administration for doing just what it did and what it had wanted to do from the start. the court tried the accuser quite as much as the accused. it was adjourned before completing its labors, to meet in frederick, maryland. general scott left the country, and never after had more than the nominal command of the army until early in 1861. he certainly was not sustained in his efforts to maintain discipline in high places. the efforts to kill off politically the two successful generals, made them both candidates for the presidency. general taylor was nominated in 1848, and was elected. four years later general scott received the nomination but was badly beaten, and the party nominating him died with his defeat.(*5) chapter xiii. treaty of peace--mexican bull fights--regimental quartermaster--trip to popocatapetl--trip to the caves of mexico. the treaty of peace between the two countries was signed by the commissioners of each side early in february, 1848. it took a considerable time for it to reach washington, receive the approval of the administration, and be finally ratified by the senate. it was naturally supposed by the army that there would be no more fighting, and officers and men were of course anxious to get home, but knowing there must be delay they contented themselves as best they could. every sunday there was a bull fight for the amusement of those who would pay their fifty cents. i attended one of them--just one--not wishing to leave the country without having witnessed the national sport. the sight to me was sickening. i could not see how human beings could enjoy the sufferings of beasts, and often of men, as they seemed to do on these occasions. at these sports there are usually from four to six bulls sacrificed. the audience occupies seats around the ring in which the exhibition is given, each seat but the foremost rising higher than the one in front, so that every one can get a full view of the sport. when all is ready a bull is turned into the ring. three or four men come in, mounted on the merest skeletons of horses blind or blind-folded and so weak that they could not make a sudden turn with their riders without danger of falling down. the men are armed with spears having a point as sharp as a needle. other men enter the arena on foot, armed with red flags and explosives about the size of a musket cartridge. to each of these explosives is fastened a barbed needle which serves the purpose of attaching them to the bull by running the needle into the skin. before the animal is turned loose a lot of these explosives are attached to him. the pain from the pricking of the skin by the needles is exasperating; but when the explosions of the cartridges commence the animal becomes frantic. as he makes a lunge towards one horseman, another runs a spear into him. he turns towards his last tormentor when a man on foot holds out a red flag; the bull rushes for this and is allowed to take it on his horns. the flag drops and covers the eyes of the animal so that he is at a loss what to do; it is jerked from him and the torment is renewed. when the animal is worked into an uncontrollable frenzy, the horsemen withdraw, and the matadores --literally murderers--enter, armed with knives having blades twelve or eighteen inches long, and sharp. the trick is to dodge an attack from the animal and stab him to the heart as he passes. if these efforts fail the bull is finally lassoed, held fast and killed by driving a knife blade into the spinal column just back of the horns. he is then dragged out by horses or mules, another is let into the ring, and the same performance is renewed. on the occasion when i was present one of the bulls was not turned aside by the attacks in the rear, the presentations of the red flag, etc., etc., but kept right on, and placing his horns under the flanks of a horse threw him and his rider to the ground with great force. the horse was killed and the rider lay prostrate as if dead. the bull was then lassoed and killed in the manner above described. men came in and carried the dead man off in a litter. when the slaughtered bull and horse were dragged out, a fresh bull was turned into the ring. conspicuous among the spectators was the man who had been carried out on a litter but a few minutes before. he was only dead so far as that performance went; but the corpse was so lively that it could not forego the chance of witnessing the discomfiture of some of his brethren who might not be so fortunate. there was a feeling of disgust manifested by the audience to find that he had come to life again. i confess that i felt sorry to see the cruelty to the bull and the horse. i did not stay for the conclusion of the performance; but while i did stay, there was not a bull killed in the prescribed way. bull fights are now prohibited in the federal district--embracing a territory around the city of mexico, somewhat larger than the district of columbia--and they are not an institution in any part of the country. during one of my recent visits to mexico, bull fights were got up in my honor at puebla and at pachuca. i was not notified in advance so as to be able to decline and thus prevent the performance; but in both cases i civilly declined to attend. another amusement of the people of mexico of that day, and one which nearly all indulged in, male and female, old and young, priest and layman, was monte playing. regular feast weeks were held every year at what was then known as st. augustin tlalpam, eleven miles out of town. there were dealers to suit every class and condition of people. in many of the booths tlackos--the copper coin of the country, four of them making six and a quarter cents of our money--were piled up in great quantities, with some silver, to accommodate the people who could not bet more than a few pennies at a time. in other booths silver formed the bulk of the capital of the bank, with a few doubloons to be changed if there should be a run of luck against the bank. in some there was no coin except gold. here the rich were said to bet away their entire estates in a single day. all this is stopped now. for myself, i was kept somewhat busy during the winter of 1847-8. my regiment was stationed in tacubaya. i was regimental quartermaster and commissary. general scott had been unable to get clothing for the troops from the north. the men were becoming--well, they needed clothing. material had to be purchased, such as could be obtained, and people employed to make it up into "yankee uniforms." a quartermaster in the city was designated to attend to this special duty; but clothing was so much needed that it was seized as fast as made up. a regiment was glad to get a dozen suits at a time. i had to look after this matter for the 4th infantry. then our regimental fund had run down and some of the musicians in the band had been without their extra pay for a number of months. the regimental bands at that day were kept up partly by pay from the government, and partly by pay from the regimental fund. there was authority of law for enlisting a certain number of men as musicians. so many could receive the pay of non-commissioned officers of the various grades, and the remainder the pay of privates. this would not secure a band leader, nor good players on certain instruments. in garrison there are various ways of keeping up a regimental fund sufficient to give extra pay to musicians, establish libraries and ten-pin alleys, subscribe to magazines and furnish many extra comforts to the men. the best device for supplying the fund is to issue bread to the soldiers instead of flour. the ration used to be eighteen ounces per day of either flour or bread; and one hundred pounds of flour will make one hundred and forty pounds of bread. this saving was purchased by the commissary for the benefit of the fund. in the emergency the 4th infantry was laboring under, i rented a bakery in the city, hired bakers--mexicans--bought fuel and whatever was necessary, and i also got a contract from the chief commissary of the army for baking a large amount of hard bread. in two months i made more money for the fund than my pay amounted to during the entire war. while stationed at monterey i had relieved the post fund in the same way. there, however, was no profit except in the saving of flour by converting it into bread. in the spring of 1848 a party of officers obtained leave to visit popocatapetl, the highest volcano in america, and to take an escort. i went with the party, many of whom afterwards occupied conspicuous positions before the country. of those who "went south," and attained high rank, there was lieutenant richard anderson, who commanded a corps at spottsylvania; captain sibley, a major-general, and, after the war, for a number of years in the employ of the khedive of egypt; captain george crittenden, a rebel general; s. b. buckner, who surrendered fort donelson; and mansfield lovell, who commanded at new orleans before that city fell into the hands of the national troops. of those who remained on our side there were captain andrew porter, lieutenant c. p. stone and lieutenant z. b. tower. there were quite a number of other officers, whose names i cannot recollect. at a little village (ozumba) near the base of popocatapetl, where we purposed to commence the ascent, we procured guides and two pack mules with forage for our horses. high up on the mountain there was a deserted house of one room, called the vaqueria, which had been occupied years before by men in charge of cattle ranging on the mountain. the pasturage up there was very fine when we saw it, and there were still some cattle, descendants of the former domestic herd, which had now become wild. it was possible to go on horseback as far as the vaqueria, though the road was somewhat hazardous in places. sometimes it was very narrow with a yawning precipice on one side, hundreds of feet down to a roaring mountain torrent below, and almost perpendicular walls on the other side. at one of these places one of our mules loaded with two sacks of barley, one on each side, the two about as big as he was, struck his load against the mountain-side and was precipitated to the bottom. the descent was steep but not perpendicular. the mule rolled over and over until the bottom was reached, and we supposed of course the poor animal was dashed to pieces. what was our surprise, not long after we had gone into bivouac, to see the lost mule, cargo and owner coming up the ascent. the load had protected the animal from serious injury; and his owner had gone after him and found a way back to the path leading up to the hut where we were to stay. the night at the vaqueria was one of the most unpleasant i ever knew. it was very cold and the rain fell in torrents. a little higher up the rain ceased and snow began. the wind blew with great velocity. the log-cabin we were in had lost the roof entirely on one side, and on the other it was hardly better then a sieve. there was little or no sleep that night. as soon as it was light the next morning, we started to make the ascent to the summit. the wind continued to blow with violence and the weather was still cloudy, but there was neither rain nor snow. the clouds, however, concealed from our view the country below us, except at times a momentary glimpse could be got through a clear space between them. the wind carried the loose snow around the mountain-sides in such volumes as to make it almost impossible to stand up against it. we labored on and on, until it became evident that the top could not be reached before night, if at all in such a storm, and we concluded to return. the descent was easy and rapid, though dangerous, until we got below the snow line. at the cabin we mounted our horses, and by night were at ozumba. the fatigues of the day and the loss of sleep the night before drove us to bed early. our beds consisted of a place on the dirt-floor with a blanket under us. soon all were asleep; but long before morning first one and then another of our party began to cry out with excruciating pain in the eyes. not one escaped it. by morning the eyes of half the party were so swollen that they were entirely closed. the others suffered pain equally. the feeling was about what might be expected from the prick of a sharp needle at a white heat. we remained in quarters until the afternoon bathing our eyes in cold water. this relieved us very much, and before night the pain had entirely left. the swelling, however, continued, and about half the party still had their eyes entirely closed; but we concluded to make a start back, those who could see a little leading the horses of those who could not see at all. we moved back to the village of ameca ameca, some six miles, and stopped again for the night. the next morning all were entirely well and free from pain. the weather was clear and popocatapetl stood out in all its beauty, the top looking as if not a mile away, and inviting us to return. about half the party were anxious to try the ascent again, and concluded to do so. the remainder--i was with the remainder--concluded that we had got all the pleasure there was to be had out of mountain climbing, and that we would visit the great caves of mexico, some ninety miles from where we then were, on the road to acapulco. the party that ascended the mountain the second time succeeded in reaching the crater at the top, with but little of the labor they encountered in their first attempt. three of them--anderson, stone and buckner--wrote accounts of their journey, which were published at the time. i made no notes of this excursion, and have read nothing about it since, but it seems to me that i can see the whole of it as vividly as if it were but yesterday. i have been back at ameca ameca, and the village beyond, twice in the last five years. the scene had not changed materially from my recollection of it. the party which i was with moved south down the valley to the town of cuantla, some forty miles from ameca ameca. the latter stands on the plain at the foot of popocatapetl, at an elevation of about eight thousand feet above tide water. the slope down is gradual as the traveller moves south, but one would not judge that, in going to cuantla, descent enough had been made to occasion a material change in the climate and productions of the soil; but such is the case. in the morning we left a temperate climate where the cereals and fruits are those common to the united states, we halted in the evening in a tropical climate where the orange and banana, the coffee and the sugar-cane were flourishing. we had been travelling, apparently, on a plain all day, but in the direction of the flow of water. soon after the capture of the city of mexico an armistice had been agreed to, designating the limits beyond which troops of the respective armies were not to go during its continuance. our party knew nothing about these limits. as we approached cuantla bugles sounded the assembly, and soldiers rushed from the guard-house in the edge of the town towards us. our party halted, and i tied a white pocket handkerchief to a stick and, using it as a flag of truce, proceeded on to the town. captains sibley and porter followed a few hundred yards behind. i was detained at the guard-house until a messenger could be dispatched to the quarters of the commanding general, who authorized that i should be conducted to him. i had been with the general but a few minutes when the two officers following announced themselves. the mexican general reminded us that it was a violation of the truce for us to be there. however, as we had no special authority from our own commanding general, and as we knew nothing about the terms of the truce, we were permitted to occupy a vacant house outside the guard for the night, with the promise of a guide to put us on the road to cuernavaca the next morning. cuernavaca is a town west of guantla. the country through which we passed, between these two towns, is tropical in climate and productions and rich in scenery. at one point, about half-way between the two places, the road goes over a low pass in the mountains in which there is a very quaint old town, the inhabitants of which at that day were nearly all full-blooded indians. very few of them even spoke spanish. the houses were built of stone and generally only one story high. the streets were narrow, and had probably been paved before cortez visited the country. they had not been graded, but the paving had been done on the natural surface. we had with us one vehicle, a cart, which was probably the first wheeled vehicle that had ever passed through that town. on a hill overlooking this town stands the tomb of an ancient king; and it was understood that the inhabitants venerated this tomb very highly, as well as the memory of the ruler who was supposed to be buried in it. we ascended the mountain and surveyed the tomb; but it showed no particular marks of architectural taste, mechanical skill or advanced civilization. the next day we went into cuernavaca. after a day's rest at cuernavaca our party set out again on the journey to the great caves of mexico. we had proceeded but a few miles when we were stopped, as before, by a guard and notified that the terms of the existing armistice did not permit us to go further in that direction. upon convincing the guard that we were a mere party of pleasure seekers desirous of visiting the great natural curiosities of the country which we expected soon to leave, we were conducted to a large hacienda near by, and directed to remain there until the commanding general of that department could be communicated with and his decision obtained as to whether we should be permitted to pursue our journey. the guard promised to send a messenger at once, and expected a reply by night. at night there was no response from the commanding general, but the captain of the guard was sure he would have a reply by morning. again in the morning there was no reply. the second evening the same thing happened, and finally we learned that the guard had sent no message or messenger to the department commander. we determined therefore to go on unless stopped by a force sufficient to compel obedience. after a few hours' travel we came to a town where a scene similar to the one at cuantia occurred. the commanding officer sent a guide to conduct our party around the village and to put us upon our road again. this was the last interruption: that night we rested at a large coffee plantation, some eight miles from the cave we were on the way to visit. it must have been a saturday night; the peons had been paid off, and spent part of the night in gambling away their scanty week's earnings. their coin was principally copper, and i do not believe there was a man among them who had received as much as twenty-five cents in money. they were as much excited, however, as if they had been staking thousands. i recollect one poor fellow, who had lost his last tlacko, pulled off his shirt and, in the most excited manner, put that up on the turn of a card. monte was the game played, the place out of doors, near the window of the room occupied by the officers of our party. the next morning we were at the mouth of the cave at an early hour, provided with guides, candles and rockets. we explored to a distance of about three miles from the entrance, and found a succession of chambers of great dimensions and of great beauty when lit up with our rockets. stalactites and stalagmites of all sizes were discovered. some of the former were many feet in diameter and extended from ceiling to floor; some of the latter were but a few feet high from the floor; but the formation is going on constantly, and many centuries hence these stalagmites will extend to the ceiling and become complete columns. the stalagmites were all a little concave, and the cavities were filled with water. the water percolates through the roof, a drop at a time--often the drops several minutes apart--and more or less charged with mineral matter. evaporation goes on slowly, leaving the mineral behind. this in time makes the immense columns, many of them thousands of tons in weight, which serve to support the roofs over the vast chambers. i recollect that at one point in the cave one of these columns is of such huge proportions that there is only a narrow passage left on either side of it. some of our party became satisfied with their explorations before we had reached the point to which the guides were accustomed to take explorers, and started back without guides. coming to the large column spoken of, they followed it entirely around, and commenced retracing their steps into the bowels of the mountain, without being aware of the fact. when the rest of us had completed our explorations, we started out with our guides, but had not gone far before we saw the torches of an approaching party. we could not conceive who these could be, for all of us had come in together, and there were none but ourselves at the entrance when we started in. very soon we found it was our friends. it took them some time to conceive how they had got where they were. they were sure they had kept straight on for the mouth of the cave, and had gone about far enough to have reached it. chapter xiv. return of the army--marriage--ordered to the pacific coast--crossing the isthmus--arrival at san francisco. my experience in the mexican war was of great advantage to me afterwards. besides the many practical lessons it taught, the war brought nearly all the officers of the regular army together so as to make them personally acquainted. it also brought them in contact with volunteers, many of whom served in the war of the rebellion afterwards. then, in my particular case, i had been at west point at about the right time to meet most of the graduates who were of a suitable age at the breaking out of the rebellion to be trusted with large commands. graduating in 1843, i was at the military academy from one to four years with all cadets who graduated between 1840 and 1846--seven classes. these classes embraced more than fifty officers who afterwards became generals on one side or the other in the rebellion, many of them holding high commands. all the older officers, who became conspicuous in the rebellion, i had also served with and known in mexico: lee, j. e. johnston, a. s. johnston, holmes, hebert and a number of others on the confederate side; mccall, mansfield, phil. kearney and others on the national side. the acquaintance thus formed was of immense service to me in the war of the rebellion--i mean what i learned of the characters of those to whom i was afterwards opposed. i do not pretend to say that all movements, or even many of them, were made with special reference to the characteristics of the commander against whom they were directed. but my appreciation of my enemies was certainly affected by this knowledge. the natural disposition of most people is to clothe a commander of a large army whom they do not know, with almost superhuman abilities. a large part of the national army, for instance, and most of the press of the country, clothed general lee with just such qualities, but i had known him personally, and knew that he was mortal; and it was just as well that i felt this. the treaty of peace was at last ratified, and the evacuation of mexico by united states troops was ordered. early in june the troops in the city of mexico began to move out. many of them, including the brigade to which i belonged, were assembled at jalapa, above the vomito, to await the arrival of transports at vera cruz: but with all this precaution my regiment and others were in camp on the sand beach in a july sun, for about a week before embarking, while the fever raged with great virulence in vera cruz, not two miles away. i can call to mind only one person, an officer, who died of the disease. my regiment was sent to pascagoula, mississippi, to spend the summer. as soon as it was settled in camp i obtained a leave of absence for four months and proceeded to st. louis. on the 22d of august, 1848, i was married to miss julia dent, the lady of whom i have before spoken. we visited my parents and relations in ohio, and, at the end of my leave, proceeded to my post at sackett's harbor, new york. in april following i was ordered to detroit, michigan, where two years were spent with but few important incidents. the present constitution of the state of michigan was ratified during this time. by the terms of one of its provisions, all citizens of the united states residing within the state at the time of the ratification became citizens of michigan also. during my stay in detroit there was an election for city officers. mr. zachariah chandler was the candidate of the whigs for the office of mayor, and was elected, although the city was then reckoned democratic. all the officers stationed there at the time who offered their votes were permitted to cast them. i did not offer mine, however, as i did not wish to consider myself a citizen of michigan. this was mr. chandler's first entry into politics, a career he followed ever after with great success, and in which he died enjoying the friendship, esteem and love of his countrymen. in the spring of 1851 the garrison at detroit was transferred to sackett's harbor, and in the following spring the entire 4th infantry was ordered to the pacific coast. it was decided that mrs. grant should visit my parents at first for a few months, and then remain with her own family at their st. louis home until an opportunity offered of sending for her. in the month of april the regiment was assembled at governor's island, new york harbor, and on the 5th of july eight companies sailed for aspinwall. we numbered a little over seven hundred persons, including the families of officers and soldiers. passage was secured for us on the old steamer ohio, commanded at the time by captain schenck, of the navy. it had not been determined, until a day or two before starting, that the 4th infantry should go by the ohio; consequently, a complement of passengers had already been secured. the addition of over seven hundred to this list crowded the steamer most uncomfortably, especially for the tropics in july. in eight days aspinwall was reached. at that time the streets of the town were eight or ten inches under water, and foot passengers passed from place to place on raised foot-walks. july is at the height of the wet season, on the isthmus. at intervals the rain would pour down in streams, followed in not many minutes by a blazing, tropical summer's sun. these alternate changes, from rain to sunshine, were continuous in the afternoons. i wondered how any person could live many months in aspinwall, and wondered still more why any one tried. in the summer of 1852 the panama railroad was completed only to the point where it now crosses the chagres river. from there passengers were carried by boats to gorgona, at which place they took mules for panama, some twenty-five miles further. those who travelled over the isthmus in those days will remember that boats on the chagres river were propelled by natives not inconveniently burdened with clothing. these boats carried thirty to forty passengers each. the crews consisted of six men to a boat, armed with long poles. there were planks wide enough for a man to walk on conveniently, running along the sides of each boat from end to end. the men would start from the bow, place one end of their poles against the river bottom, brace their shoulders against the other end, and then walk to the stern as rapidly as they could. in this way from a mile to a mile and a half an hour could be made, against the current of the river. i, as regimental quartermaster, had charge of the public property and had also to look after the transportation. a contract had been entered into with the steamship company in new york for the transportation of the regiment to california, including the isthmus transit. a certain amount of baggage was allowed per man, and saddle animals were to be furnished to commissioned officers and to all disabled persons. the regiment, with the exception of one company left as guards to the public property--camp and garrison equipage principally--and the soldiers with families, took boats, propelled as above described, for gorgona. from this place they marched to panama, and were soon comfortably on the steamer anchored in the bay, some three or four miles from the town. i, with one company of troops and all the soldiers with families, all the tents, mess chests and camp kettles, was sent to cruces, a town a few miles higher up the chagres river than gorgona. there i found an impecunious american who had taken the contract to furnish transportation for the regiment at a stipulated price per hundred pounds for the freight and so much for each saddle animal. but when we reached cruces there was not a mule, either for pack or saddle, in the place. the contractor promised that the animals should be on hand in the morning. in the morning he said that they were on the way from some imaginary place, and would arrive in the course of the day. this went on until i saw that he could not procure the animals at all at the price he had promised to furnish them for. the unusual number of passengers that had come over on the steamer, and the large amount of freight to pack, had created an unprecedented demand for mules. some of the passengers paid as high as forty dollars for the use of a mule to ride twenty-five miles, when the mule would not have sold for ten dollars in that market at other times. meanwhile the cholera had broken out, and men were dying every hour. to diminish the food for the disease, i permitted the company detailed with me to proceed to panama. the captain and the doctors accompanied the men, and i was left alone with the sick and the soldiers who had families. the regiment at panama was also affected with the disease; but there were better accommodations for the well on the steamer, and a hospital, for those taken with the disease, on an old hulk anchored a mile off. there were also hospital tents on shore on the island of flamingo, which stands in the bay. i was about a week at cruces before transportation began to come in. about one-third of the people with me died, either at cruces or on the way to panama. there was no agent of the transportation company at cruces to consult, or to take the responsibility of procuring transportation at a price which would secure it. i therefore myself dismissed the contractor and made a new contract with a native, at more than double the original price. thus we finally reached panama. the steamer, however, could not proceed until the cholera abated, and the regiment was detained still longer. altogether, on the isthmus and on the pacific side, we were delayed six weeks. about one-seventh of those who left new york harbor with the 4th infantry on the 5th of july, now lie buried on the isthmus of panama or on flamingo island in panama bay. one amusing circumstance occurred while we were lying at anchor in panama bay. in the regiment there was a lieutenant slaughter who was very liable to sea-sickness. it almost made him sick to see the wave of a table-cloth when the servants were spreading it. soon after his graduation, slaughter was ordered to california and took passage by a sailing vessel going around cape horn. the vessel was seven months making the voyage, and slaughter was sick every moment of the time, never more so than while lying at anchor after reaching his place of destination. on landing in california he found orders which had come by the isthmus, notifying him of a mistake in his assignment; he should have been ordered to the northern lakes. he started back by the isthmus route and was sick all the way. but when he arrived at the east he was again ordered to california, this time definitely, and at this date was making his third trip. he was as sick as ever, and had been so for more than a month while lying at anchor in the bay. i remember him well, seated with his elbows on the table in front of him, his chin between his hands, and looking the picture of despair. at last he broke out, "i wish i had taken my father's advice; he wanted me to go into the navy; if i had done so, i should not have had to go to sea so much." poor slaughter! it was his last sea voyage. he was killed by indians in oregon. by the last of august the cholera had so abated that it was deemed safe to start. the disease did not break out again on the way to california, and we reached san francisco early in september. chapter xv. san francisco--early california experiences--life on the pacific coast --promoted captain--flush times in california. san francisco at that day was a lively place. gold, or placer digging as it was called, was at its height. steamers plied daily between san francisco and both stockton and sacramento. passengers and gold from the southern mines came by the stockton boat; from the northern mines by sacramento. in the evening when these boats arrived, long wharf--there was but one wharf in san francisco in 1852--was alive with people crowding to meet the miners as they came down to sell their "dust" and to "have a time." of these some were runners for hotels, boarding houses or restaurants; others belonged to a class of impecunious adventurers, of good manners and good presence, who were ever on the alert to make the acquaintance of people with some ready means, in the hope of being asked to take a meal at a restaurant. many were young men of good family, good education and gentlemanly instincts. their parents had been able to support them during their minority, and to give them good educations, but not to maintain them afterwards. from 1849 to 1853 there was a rush of people to the pacific coast, of the class described. all thought that fortunes were to be picked up, without effort, in the gold fields on the pacific. some realized more than their most sanguine expectations; but for one such there were hundreds disappointed, many of whom now fill unknown graves; others died wrecks of their former selves, and many, without a vicious instinct, became criminals and outcasts. many of the real scenes in early california life exceed in strangeness and interest any of the mere products of the brain of the novelist. those early days in california brought out character. it was a long way off then, and the journey was expensive. the fortunate could go by cape horn or by the isthmus of panama; but the mass of pioneers crossed the plains with their ox-teams. this took an entire summer. they were very lucky when they got through with a yoke of worn-out cattle. all other means were exhausted in procuring the outfit on the missouri river. the immigrant, on arriving, found himself a stranger, in a strange land, far from friends. time pressed, for the little means that could be realized from the sale of what was left of the outfit would not support a man long at california prices. many became discouraged. others would take off their coats and look for a job, no matter what it might be. these succeeded as a rule. there were many young men who had studied professions before they went to california, and who had never done a day's manual labor in their lives, who took in the situation at once and went to work to make a start at anything they could get to do. some supplied carpenters and masons with material--carrying plank, brick, or mortar, as the case might be; others drove stages, drays, or baggage wagons, until they could do better. more became discouraged early and spent their time looking up people who would "treat," or lounging about restaurants and gambling houses where free lunches were furnished daily. they were welcomed at these places because they often brought in miners who proved good customers. my regiment spent a few weeks at benicia barracks, and then was ordered to fort vancouver, on the columbia river, then in oregon territory. during the winter of 1852-3 the territory was divided, all north of the columbia river being taken from oregon to make washington territory. prices for all kinds of supplies were so high on the pacific coast from 1849 until at least 1853--that it would have been impossible for officers of the army to exist upon their pay, if it had not been that authority was given them to purchase from the commissary such supplies as he kept, at new orleans wholesale prices. a cook could not be hired for the pay of a captain. the cook could do better. at benicia, in 1852, flour was 25 cents per pound; potatoes were 16 cents; beets, turnips and cabbage, 6 cents; onions, 37 1/2 cents; meat and other articles in proportion. in 1853 at vancouver vegetables were a little lower. i with three other officers concluded that we would raise a crop for ourselves, and by selling the surplus realize something handsome. i bought a pair of horses that had crossed the plains that summer and were very poor. they recuperated rapidly, however, and proved a good team to break up the ground with. i performed all the labor of breaking up the ground while the other officers planted the potatoes. our crop was enormous. luckily for us the columbia river rose to a great height from the melting of the snow in the mountains in june, and overflowed and killed most of our crop. this saved digging it up, for everybody on the pacific coast seemed to have come to the conclusion at the same time that agriculture would be profitable. in 1853 more than three-quarters of the potatoes raised were permitted to rot in the ground, or had to be thrown away. the only potatoes we sold were to our own mess. while i was stationed on the pacific coast we were free from indian wars. there were quite a number of remnants of tribes in the vicinity of portland in oregon, and of fort vancouver in washington territory. they had generally acquired some of the vices of civilization, but none of the virtues, except in individual cases. the hudson's bay company had held the north-west with their trading posts for many years before the united states was represented on the pacific coast. they still retained posts along the columbia river and one at fort vancouver, when i was there. their treatment of the indians had brought out the better qualities of the savages. farming had been undertaken by the company to supply the indians with bread and vegetables; they raised some cattle and horses; and they had now taught the indians to do the labor of the farm and herd. they always compensated them for their labor, and always gave them goods of uniform quality and at uniform price. before the advent of the american, the medium of exchange between the indian and the white man was pelts. afterward it was silver coin. if an indian received in the sale of a horse a fifty dollar gold piece, not an infrequent occurrence, the first thing he did was to exchange it for american half dollars. these he could count. he would then commence his purchases, paying for each article separately, as he got it. he would not trust any one to add up the bill and pay it all at once. at that day fifty dollar gold pieces, not the issue of the government, were common on the pacific coast. they were called slugs. the indians, along the lower columbia as far as the cascades and on the lower willamette, died off very fast during the year i spent in that section; for besides acquiring the vices of the white people they had acquired also their diseases. the measles and the small-pox were both amazingly fatal. in their wild state, before the appearance of the white man among them, the principal complaints they were subject to were those produced by long involuntary fasting, violent exercise in pursuit of game, and over-eating. instinct more than reason had taught them a remedy for these ills. it was the steam bath. something like a bake-oven was built, large enough to admit a man lying down. bushes were stuck in the ground in two rows, about six feet long and some two or three feet apart; other bushes connected the rows at one end. the tops of the bushes were drawn together to interlace, and confined in that position; the whole was then plastered over with wet clay until every opening was filled. just inside the open end of the oven the floor was scooped out so as to make a hole that would hold a bucket or two of water. these ovens were always built on the banks of a stream, a big spring, or pool of water. when a patient required a bath, a fire was built near the oven and a pile of stones put upon it. the cavity at the front was then filled with water. when the stones were sufficiently heated, the patient would draw himself into the oven; a blanket would be thrown over the open end, and hot stones put into the water until the patient could stand it no longer. he was then withdrawn from his steam bath and doused into the cold stream near by. this treatment may have answered with the early ailments of the indians. with the measles or small-pox it would kill every time. during my year on the columbia river, the small-pox exterminated one small remnant of a band of indians entirely, and reduced others materially. i do not think there was a case of recovery among them, until the doctor with the hudson bay company took the matter in hand and established a hospital. nearly every case he treated recovered. i never, myself, saw the treatment described in the preceding paragraph, but have heard it described by persons who have witnessed it. the decimation among the indians i knew of personally, and the hospital, established for their benefit, was a hudson's bay building not a stone's throw from my own quarters. the death of colonel bliss, of the adjutant general's department, which occurred july 5th, 1853, promoted me to the captaincy of a company then stationed at humboldt bay, california. the notice reached me in september of the same year, and i very soon started to join my new command. there was no way of reaching humboldt at that time except to take passage on a san francisco sailing vessel going after lumber. red wood, a species of cedar, which on the pacific coast takes the place filled by white pine in the east, then abounded on the banks of humboldt bay. there were extensive saw-mills engaged in preparing this lumber for the san francisco market, and sailing vessels, used in getting it to market, furnished the only means of communication between humboldt and the balance of the world. i was obliged to remain in san francisco for several days before i found a vessel. this gave me a good opportunity of comparing the san francisco of 1852 with that of 1853. as before stated, there had been but one wharf in front of the city in 1852--long wharf. in 1853 the town had grown out into the bay beyond what was the end of this wharf when i first saw it. streets and houses had been built out on piles where the year before the largest vessels visiting the port lay at anchor or tied to the wharf. there was no filling under the streets or houses. san francisco presented the same general appearance as the year before; that is, eating, drinking and gambling houses were conspicuous for their number and publicity. they were on the first floor, with doors wide open. at all hours of the day and night in walking the streets, the eye was regaled, on every block near the water front, by the sight of players at faro. often broken places were found in the street, large enough to let a man down into the water below. i have but little doubt that many of the people who went to the pacific coast in the early days of the gold excitement, and have never been heard from since, or who were heard from for a time and then ceased to write, found watery graves beneath the houses or streets built over san francisco bay. besides the gambling in cards there was gambling on a larger scale in city lots. these were sold "on change," much as stocks are now sold on wall street. cash, at time of purchase, was always paid by the broker; but the purchaser had only to put up his margin. he was charged at the rate of two or three per cent. a month on the difference, besides commissions. the sand hills, some of them almost inaccessible to foot-passengers, were surveyed off and mapped into fifty vara lots--a vara being a spanish yard. these were sold at first at very low prices, but were sold and resold for higher prices until they went up to many thousands of dollars. the brokers did a fine business, and so did many such purchasers as were sharp enough to quit purchasing before the final crash came. as the city grew, the sand hills back of the town furnished material for filling up the bay under the houses and streets, and still further out. the temporary houses, first built over the water in the harbor, soon gave way to more solid structures. the main business part of the city now is on solid ground, made where vessels of the largest class lay at anchor in the early days. i was in san francisco again in 1854. gambling houses had disappeared from public view. the city had become staid and orderly. chapter xvi. resignation--private life--life at galena--the coming crisis. my family, all this while, was at the east. it consisted now of a wife and two children. i saw no chance of supporting them on the pacific coast out of my pay as an army officer. i concluded, therefore, to resign, and in march applied for a leave of absence until the end of the july following, tendering my resignation to take effect at the end of that time. i left the pacific coast very much attached to it, and with the full expectation of making it my future home. that expectation and that hope remained uppermost in my mind until the lieutenant-generalcy bill was introduced into congress in the winter of 1863-4. the passage of that bill, and my promotion, blasted my last hope of ever becoming a citizen of the further west. in the late summer of 1854 i rejoined my family, to find in it a son whom i had never seen, born while i was on the isthmus of panama. i was now to commence, at the age of thirty-two, a new struggle for our support. my wife had a farm near st. louis, to which we went, but i had no means to stock it. a house had to be built also. i worked very hard, never losing a day because of bad weather, and accomplished the object in a moderate way. if nothing else could be done i would load a cord of wood on a wagon and take it to the city for sale. i managed to keep along very well until 1858, when i was attacked by fever and ague. i had suffered very severely and for a long time from this disease, while a boy in ohio. it lasted now over a year, and, while it did not keep me in the house, it did interfere greatly with the amount of work i was able to perform. in the fall of 1858 i sold out my stock, crops and farming utensils at auction, and gave up farming. in the winter i established a partnership with harry boggs, a cousin of mrs. grant, in the real estate agency business. i spent that winter at st. louis myself, but did not take my family into town until the spring. our business might have become prosperous if i had been able to wait for it to grow. as it was, there was no more than one person could attend to, and not enough to support two families. while a citizen of st. louis and engaged in the real estate agency business, i was a candidate for the office of county engineer, an office of respectability and emolument which would have been very acceptable to me at that time. the incumbent was appointed by the county court, which consisted of five members. my opponent had the advantage of birth over me (he was a citizen by adoption) and carried off the prize. i now withdrew from the co-partnership with boggs, and, in may, 1860, removed to galena, illinois, and took a clerkship in my father's store. while a citizen of missouri, my first opportunity for casting a vote at a presidential election occurred. i had been in the army from before attaining my majority and had thought but little about politics, although i was a whig by education and a great admirer of mr. clay. but the whig party had ceased to exist before i had an opportunity of exercising the privilege of casting a ballot; the know-nothing party had taken its place, but was on the wane; and the republican party was in a chaotic state and had not yet received a name. it had no existence in the slave states except at points on the borders next to free states. in st. louis city and county, what afterwards became the republican party was known as the free-soil democracy, led by the honorable frank p. blair. most of my neighbors had known me as an officer of the army with whig proclivities. they had been on the same side, and, on the death of their party, many had become know-nothings, or members of the american party. there was a lodge near my new home, and i was invited to join it. i accepted the invitation; was initiated; attended a meeting just one week later, and never went to another afterwards. i have no apologies to make for having been one week a member of the american party; for i still think native-born citizens of the united states should have as much protection, as many privileges in their native country, as those who voluntarily select it for a home. but all secret, oath-bound political parties are dangerous to any nation, no matter how pure or how patriotic the motives and principles which first bring them together. no political party can or ought to exist when one of its corner-stones is opposition to freedom of thought and to the right to worship god "according to the dictate of one's own conscience," or according to the creed of any religious denomination whatever. nevertheless, if a sect sets up its laws as binding above the state laws, wherever the two come in conflict this claim must be resisted and suppressed at whatever cost. up to the mexican war there were a few out and out abolitionists, men who carried their hostility to slavery into all elections, from those for a justice of the peace up to the presidency of the united states. they were noisy but not numerous. but the great majority of people at the north, where slavery did not exist, were opposed to the institution, and looked upon its existence in any part of the country as unfortunate. they did not hold the states where slavery existed responsible for it; and believed that protection should be given to the right of property in slaves until some satisfactory way could be reached to be rid of the institution. opposition to slavery was not a creed of either political party. in some sections more anti-slavery men belonged to the democratic party, and in others to the whigs. but with the inauguration of the mexican war, in fact with the annexation of texas, "the inevitable conflict" commenced. as the time for the presidential election of 1856--the first at which i had the opportunity of voting--approached, party feeling began to run high. the republican party was regarded in the south and the border states not only as opposed to the extension of slavery, but as favoring the compulsory abolition of the institution without compensation to the owners. the most horrible visions seemed to present themselves to the minds of people who, one would suppose, ought to have known better. many educated and, otherwise, sensible persons appeared to believe that emancipation meant social equality. treason to the government was openly advocated and was not rebuked. it was evident to my mind that the election of a republican president in 1856 meant the secession of all the slave states, and rebellion. under these circumstances i preferred the success of a candidate whose election would prevent or postpone secession, to seeing the country plunged into a war the end of which no man could foretell. with a democrat elected by the unanimous vote of the slave states, there could be no pretext for secession for four years. i very much hoped that the passions of the people would subside in that time, and the catastrophe be averted altogether; if it was not, i believed the country would be better prepared to receive the shock and to resist it. i therefore voted for james buchanan for president. four years later the republican party was successful in electing its candidate to the presidency. the civilized world has learned the consequence. four millions of human beings held as chattels have been liberated; the ballot has been given to them; the free schools of the country have been opened to their children. the nation still lives, and the people are just as free to avoid social intimacy with the blacks as ever they were, or as they are with white people. while living in galena i was nominally only a clerk supporting myself and family on a stipulated salary. in reality my position was different. my father had never lived in galena himself, but had established my two brothers there, the one next younger than myself in charge of the business, assisted by the youngest. when i went there it was my father's intention to give up all connection with the business himself, and to establish his three sons in it: but the brother who had really built up the business was sinking with consumption, and it was not thought best to make any change while he was in this condition. he lived until september, 1861, when he succumbed to that insidious disease which always flatters its victims into the belief that they are growing better up to the close of life. a more honorable man never transacted business. in september, 1861, i was engaged in an employment which required all my attention elsewhere. during the eleven months that i lived in galena prior to the first call for volunteers, i had been strictly attentive to my business, and had made but few acquaintances other than customers and people engaged in the same line with myself. when the election took place in november, 1860, i had not been a resident of illinois long enough to gain citizenship and could not, therefore, vote. i was really glad of this at the time, for my pledges would have compelled me to vote for stephen a. douglas, who had no possible chance of election. the contest was really between mr. breckinridge and mr. lincoln; between minority rule and rule by the majority. i wanted, as between these candidates, to see mr. lincoln elected. excitement ran high during the canvass, and torch-light processions enlivened the scene in the generally quiet streets of galena many nights during the campaign. i did not parade with either party, but occasionally met with the "wide awakes" --republicans--in their rooms, and superintended their drill. it was evident, from the time of the chicago nomination to the close of the canvass, that the election of the republican candidate would be the signal for some of the southern states to secede. i still had hopes that the four years which had elapsed since the first nomination of a presidential candidate by a party distinctly opposed to slavery extension, had given time for the extreme pro-slavery sentiment to cool down; for the southerners to think well before they took the awful leap which they had so vehemently threatened. but i was mistaken. the republican candidate was elected, and solid substantial people of the north-west, and i presume the same order of people throughout the entire north, felt very serious, but determined, after this event. it was very much discussed whether the south would carry out its threat to secede and set up a separate government, the corner-stone of which should be, protection to the "divine" institution of slavery. for there were people who believed in the "divinity" of human slavery, as there are now people who believe mormonism and polygamy to be ordained by the most high. we forgive them for entertaining such notions, but forbid their practice. it was generally believed that there would be a flurry; that some of the extreme southern states would go so far as to pass ordinances of secession. but the common impression was that this step was so plainly suicidal for the south, that the movement would not spread over much of the territory and would not last long. doubtless the founders of our government, the majority of them at least, regarded the confederation of the colonies as an experiment. each colony considered itself a separate government; that the confederation was for mutual protection against a foreign foe, and the prevention of strife and war among themselves. if there had been a desire on the part of any single state to withdraw from the compact at any time while the number of states was limited to the original thirteen, i do not suppose there would have been any to contest the right, no matter how much the determination might have been regretted. the problem changed on the ratification of the constitution by all the colonies; it changed still more when amendments were added; and if the right of any one state to withdraw continued to exist at all after the ratification of the constitution, it certainly ceased on the formation of new states, at least so far as the new states themselves were concerned. it was never possessed at all by florida or the states west of the mississippi, all of which were purchased by the treasury of the entire nation. texas and the territory brought into the union in consequence of annexation, were purchased with both blood and treasure; and texas, with a domain greater than that of any european state except russia, was permitted to retain as state property all the public lands within its borders. it would have been ingratitude and injustice of the most flagrant sort for this state to withdraw from the union after all that had been spent and done to introduce her; yet, if separation had actually occurred, texas must necessarily have gone with the south, both on account of her institutions and her geographical position. secession was illogical as well as impracticable; it was revolution. now, the right of revolution is an inherent one. when people are oppressed by their government, it is a natural right they enjoy to relieve themselves of the oppression, if they are strong enough, either by withdrawal from it, or by overthrowing it and substituting a government more acceptable. but any people or part of a people who resort to this remedy, stake their lives, their property, and every claim for protection given by citizenship--on the issue. victory, or the conditions imposed by the conqueror--must be the result. in the case of the war between the states it would have been the exact truth if the south had said,--"we do not want to live with you northern people any longer; we know our institution of slavery is obnoxious to you, and, as you are growing numerically stronger than we, it may at some time in the future be endangered. so long as you permitted us to control the government, and with the aid of a few friends at the north to enact laws constituting your section a guard against the escape of our property, we were willing to live with you. you have been submissive to our rule heretofore; but it looks now as if you did not intend to continue so, and we will remain in the union no longer." instead of this the seceding states cried lustily,--"let us alone; you have no constitutional power to interfere with us." newspapers and people at the north reiterated the cry. individuals might ignore the constitution; but the nation itself must not only obey it, but must enforce the strictest construction of that instrument; the construction put upon it by the southerners themselves. the fact is the constitution did not apply to any such contingency as the one existing from 1861 to 1865. its framers never dreamed of such a contingency occurring. if they had foreseen it, the probabilities are they would have sanctioned the right of a state or states to withdraw rather than that there should be war between brothers. the framers were wise in their generation and wanted to do the very best possible to secure their own liberty and independence, and that also of their descendants to the latest days. it is preposterous to suppose that the people of one generation can lay down the best and only rules of government for all who are to come after them, and under unforeseen contingencies. at the time of the framing of our constitution the only physical forces that had been subdued and made to serve man and do his labor, were the currents in the streams and in the air we breathe. rude machinery, propelled by water power, had been invented; sails to propel ships upon the waters had been set to catch the passing breeze--but the application of stream to propel vessels against both wind and current, and machinery to do all manner of work had not been thought of. the instantaneous transmission of messages around the world by means of electricity would probably at that day have been attributed to witchcraft or a league with the devil. immaterial circumstances had changed as greatly as material ones. we could not and ought not to be rigidly bound by the rules laid down under circumstances so different for emergencies so utterly unanticipated. the fathers themselves would have been the first to declare that their prerogatives were not irrevocable. they would surely have resisted secession could they have lived to see the shape it assumed. i travelled through the northwest considerably during the winter of 1860-1. we had customers in all the little towns in south-west wisconsin, south-east minnesota and north-east iowa. these generally knew i had been a captain in the regular army and had served through the mexican war. consequently wherever i stopped at night, some of the people would come to the public-house where i was, and sit till a late hour discussing the probabilities of the future. my own views at that time were like those officially expressed by mr. seward at a later day, that "the war would be over in ninety days." i continued to entertain these views until after the battle of shiloh. i believe now that there would have been no more battles at the west after the capture of fort donelson if all the troops in that region had been under a single commander who would have followed up that victory. there is little doubt in my mind now that the prevailing sentiment of the south would have been opposed to secession in 1860 and 1861, if there had been a fair and calm expression of opinion, unbiased by threats, and if the ballot of one legal voter had counted for as much as that of any other. but there was no calm discussion of the question. demagogues who were too old to enter the army if there should be a war, others who entertained so high an opinion of their own ability that they did not believe they could be spared from the direction of the affairs of state in such an event, declaimed vehemently and unceasingly against the north; against its aggressions upon the south; its interference with southern rights, etc., etc. they denounced the northerners as cowards, poltroons, negro-worshippers; claimed that one southern man was equal to five northern men in battle; that if the south would stand up for its rights the north would back down. mr. jefferson davis said in a speech, delivered at la grange, mississippi, before the secession of that state, that he would agree to drink all the blood spilled south of mason and dixon's line if there should be a war. the young men who would have the fighting to do in case of war, believed all these statements, both in regard to the aggressiveness of the north and its cowardice. they, too, cried out for a separation from such people. the great bulk of the legal voters of the south were men who owned no slaves; their homes were generally in the hills and poor country; their facilities for educating their children, even up to the point of reading and writing, were very limited; their interest in the contest was very meagre--what there was, if they had been capable of seeing it, was with the north; they too needed emancipation. under the old regime they were looked down upon by those who controlled all the affairs in the interest of slave-owners, as poor white trash who were allowed the ballot so long as they cast it according to direction. i am aware that this last statement may be disputed and individual testimony perhaps adduced to show that in ante-bellum days the ballot was as untrammelled in the south as in any section of the country; but in the face of any such contradiction i reassert the statement. the shot-gun was not resorted to. masked men did not ride over the country at night intimidating voters; but there was a firm feeling that a class existed in every state with a sort of divine right to control public affairs. if they could not get this control by one means they must by another. the end justified the means. the coercion, if mild, was complete. there were two political parties, it is true, in all the states, both strong in numbers and respectability, but both equally loyal to the institution which stood paramount in southern eyes to all other institutions in state or nation. the slave-owners were the minority, but governed both parties. had politics ever divided the slave-holders and the non-slave-holders, the majority would have been obliged to yield, or internecine war would have been the consequence. i do not know that the southern people were to blame for this condition of affairs. there was a time when slavery was not profitable, and the discussion of the merits of the institution was confined almost exclusively to the territory where it existed. the states of virginia and kentucky came near abolishing slavery by their own acts, one state defeating the measure by a tie vote and the other only lacking one. but when the institution became profitable, all talk of its abolition ceased where it existed; and naturally, as human nature is constituted, arguments were adduced in its support. the cotton-gin probably had much to do with the justification of slavery. the winter of 1860-1 will be remembered by middle-aged people of to-day as one of great excitement. south carolina promptly seceded after the result of the presidential election was known. other southern states proposed to follow. in some of them the union sentiment was so strong that it had to be suppressed by force. maryland, delaware, kentucky and missouri, all slave states, failed to pass ordinances of secession; but they were all represented in the so-called congress of the so-called confederate states. the governor and lieutenant-governor of missouri, in 1861, jackson and reynolds, were both supporters of the rebellion and took refuge with the enemy. the governor soon died, and the lieutenant-governor assumed his office; issued proclamations as governor of the state; was recognized as such by the confederate government, and continued his pretensions until the collapse of the rebellion. the south claimed the sovereignty of states, but claimed the right to coerce into their confederation such states as they wanted, that is, all the states where slavery existed. they did not seem to think this course inconsistent. the fact is, the southern slave-owners believed that, in some way, the ownership of slaves conferred a sort of patent of nobility--a right to govern independent of the interest or wishes of those who did not hold such property. they convinced themselves, first, of the divine origin of the institution and, next, that that particular institution was not safe in the hands of any body of legislators but themselves. meanwhile the administration of president buchanan looked helplessly on and proclaimed that the general government had no power to interfere; that the nation had no power to save its own life. mr. buchanan had in his cabinet two members at least, who were as earnest--to use a mild term--in the cause of secession as mr. davis or any southern statesman. one of them, floyd, the secretary of war, scattered the army so that much of it could be captured when hostilities should commence, and distributed the cannon and small arms from northern arsenals throughout the south so as to be on hand when treason wanted them. the navy was scattered in like manner. the president did not prevent his cabinet preparing for war upon their government, either by destroying its resources or storing them in the south until a de facto government was established with jefferson davis as its president, and montgomery, alabama, as the capital. the secessionists had then to leave the cabinet. in their own estimation they were aliens in the country which had given them birth. loyal men were put into their places. treason in the executive branch of the government was estopped. but the harm had already been done. the stable door was locked after the horse had been stolen. during all of the trying winter of 1860-1, when the southerners were so defiant that they would not allow within their borders the expression of a sentiment hostile to their views, it was a brave man indeed who could stand up and proclaim his loyalty to the union. on the other hand men at the north--prominent men--proclaimed that the government had no power to coerce the south into submission to the laws of the land; that if the north undertook to raise armies to go south, these armies would have to march over the dead bodies of the speakers. a portion of the press of the north was constantly proclaiming similar views. when the time arrived for the president-elect to go to the capital of the nation to be sworn into office, it was deemed unsafe for him to travel, not only as a president-elect, but as any private citizen should be allowed to do. instead of going in a special car, receiving the good wishes of his constituents at all the stations along the road, he was obliged to stop on the way and to be smuggled into the capital. he disappeared from public view on his journey, and the next the country knew, his arrival was announced at the capital. there is little doubt that he would have been assassinated if he had attempted to travel openly throughout his journey. chapter xvii. outbreak of the rebellion--presiding at a union meeting--mustering officer of state troops--lyon at camp jackson--services tendered to the government. the 4th of march, 1861, came, and abraham lincoln was sworn to maintain the union against all its enemies. the secession of one state after another followed, until eleven had gone out. on the 11th of april fort sumter, a national fort in the harbor of charleston, south carolina, was fired upon by the southerners and a few days after was captured. the confederates proclaimed themselves aliens, and thereby debarred themselves of all right to claim protection under the constitution of the united states. we did not admit the fact that they were aliens, but all the same, they debarred themselves of the right to expect better treatment than people of any other foreign state who make war upon an independent nation. upon the firing on sumter president lincoln issued his first call for troops and soon after a proclamation convening congress in extra session. the call was for 75,000 volunteers for ninety days' service. if the shot fired at fort sumter "was heard around the world," the call of the president for 75,000 men was heard throughout the northern states. there was not a state in the north of a million of inhabitants that would not have furnished the entire number faster than arms could have been supplied to them, if it had been necessary. as soon as the news of the call for volunteers reached galena, posters were stuck up calling for a meeting of the citizens at the court-house in the evening. business ceased entirely; all was excitement; for a time there were no party distinctions; all were union men, determined to avenge the insult to the national flag. in the evening the court-house was packed. although a comparative stranger i was called upon to preside; the sole reason, possibly, was that i had been in the army and had seen service. with much embarrassment and some prompting i made out to announce the object of the meeting. speeches were in order, but it is doubtful whether it would have been safe just then to make other than patriotic ones. there was probably no one in the house, however, who felt like making any other. the two principal speeches were by b. b. howard, the post-master and a breckinridge democrat at the november election the fall before, and john a. rawlins, an elector on the douglas ticket. e. b. washburne, with whom i was not acquainted at that time, came in after the meeting had been organized, and expressed, i understood afterwards, a little surprise that galena could not furnish a presiding officer for such an occasion without taking a stranger. he came forward and was introduced, and made a speech appealing to the patriotism of the meeting. after the speaking was over volunteers were called for to form a company. the quota of illinois had been fixed at six regiments; and it was supposed that one company would be as much as would be accepted from galena. the company was raised and the officers and non-commissioned officers elected before the meeting adjourned. i declined the captaincy before the balloting, but announced that i would aid the company in every way i could and would be found in the service in some position if there should be a war. i never went into our leather store after that meeting, to put up a package or do other business. the ladies of galena were quite as patriotic as the men. they could not enlist, but they conceived the idea of sending their first company to the field uniformed. they came to me to get a description of the united states uniform for infantry; subscribed and bought the material; procured tailors to cut out the garments, and the ladies made them up. in a few days the company was in uniform and ready to report at the state capital for assignment. the men all turned out the morning after their enlistment, and i took charge, divided them into squads and superintended their drill. when they were ready to go to springfield i went with them and remained there until they were assigned to a regiment. there were so many more volunteers than had been called for that the question whom to accept was quite embarrassing to the governor, richard yates. the legislature was in session at the time, however, and came to his relief. a law was enacted authorizing the governor to accept the services of ten additional regiments, one from each congressional district, for one month, to be paid by the state, but pledged to go into the service of the united states if there should be a further call during their term. even with this relief the governor was still very much embarrassed. before the war was over he was like the president when he was taken with the varioloid: "at last he had something he could give to all who wanted it." in time the galena company was mustered into the united states service, forming a part of the 11th illinois volunteer infantry. my duties, i thought, had ended at springfield, and i was prepared to start home by the evening train, leaving at nine o'clock. up to that time i do not think i had been introduced to governor yates, or had ever spoken to him. i knew him by sight, however, because he was living at the same hotel and i often saw him at table. the evening i was to quit the capital i left the supper room before the governor and was standing at the front door when he came out. he spoke to me, calling me by my old army title "captain," and said he understood that i was about leaving the city. i answered that i was. he said he would be glad if i would remain over-night and call at the executive office the next morning. i complied with his request, and was asked to go into the adjutant-general's office and render such assistance as i could, the governor saying that my army experience would be of great service there. i accepted the proposition. my old army experience i found indeed of very great service. i was no clerk, nor had i any capacity to become one. the only place i ever found in my life to put a paper so as to find it again was either a side coat-pocket or the hands of a clerk or secretary more careful than myself. but i had been quartermaster, commissary and adjutant in the field. the army forms were familiar to me and i could direct how they should be made out. there was a clerk in the office of the adjutant-general who supplied my deficiencies. the ease with which the state of illinois settled its accounts with the government at the close of the war is evidence of the efficiency of mr. loomis as an accountant on a large scale. he remained in the office until that time. as i have stated, the legislature authorized the governor to accept the services of ten additional regiments. i had charge of mustering these regiments into the state service. they were assembled at the most convenient railroad centres in their respective congressional districts. i detailed officers to muster in a portion of them, but mustered three in the southern part of the state myself. one of these was to assemble at belleville, some eighteen miles south-east of st. louis. when i got there i found that only one or two companies had arrived. there was no probability of the regiment coming together under five days. this gave me a few idle days which i concluded to spend in st. louis. there was a considerable force of state militia at camp jackson, on the outskirts of st. louis, at the time. there is but little doubt that it was the design of governor claiborn jackson to have these troops ready to seize the united states arsenal and the city of st. louis. why they did not do so i do not know. there was but a small garrison, two companies i think, under captain n. lyon at the arsenal, and but for the timely services of the hon. f. p. blair, i have little doubt that st. louis would have gone into rebel hands, and with it the arsenal with all its arms and ammunition. blair was a leader among the union men of st. louis in 1861. there was no state government in missouri at the time that would sanction the raising of troops or commissioned officers to protect united states property, but blair had probably procured some form of authority from the president to raise troops in missouri and to muster them into the service of the united states. at all events, he did raise a regiment and took command himself as colonel. with this force he reported to captain lyon and placed himself and regiment under his orders. it was whispered that lyon thus reinforced intended to break up camp jackson and capture the militia. i went down to the arsenal in the morning to see the troops start out. i had known lyon for two years at west point and in the old army afterwards. blair i knew very well by sight. i had heard him speak in the canvass of 1858, possibly several times, but i had never spoken to him. as the troops marched out of the enclosure around the arsenal, blair was on his horse outside forming them into line preparatory to their march. i introduced myself to him and had a few moments' conversation and expressed my sympathy with his purpose. this was my first personal acquaintance with the honorable--afterwards major-general f. p. blair. camp jackson surrendered without a fight and the garrison was marched down to the arsenal as prisoners of war. up to this time the enemies of the government in st. louis had been bold and defiant, while union men were quiet but determined. the enemies had their head-quarters in a central and public position on pine street, near fifth--from which the rebel flag was flaunted boldly. the union men had a place of meeting somewhere in the city, i did not know where, and i doubt whether they dared to enrage the enemies of the government by placing the national flag outside their head-quarters. as soon as the news of the capture of camp jackson reached the city the condition of affairs was changed. union men became rampant, aggressive, and, if you will, intolerant. they proclaimed their sentiments boldly, and were impatient at anything like disrespect for the union. the secessionists became quiet but were filled with suppressed rage. they had been playing the bully. the union men ordered the rebel flag taken down from the building on pine street. the command was given in tones of authority and it was taken down, never to be raised again in st. louis. i witnessed the scene. i had heard of the surrender of the camp and that the garrison was on its way to the arsenal. i had seen the troops start out in the morning and had wished them success. i now determined to go to the arsenal and await their arrival and congratulate them. i stepped on a car standing at the corner of 4th and pine streets, and saw a crowd of people standing quietly in front of the head-quarters, who were there for the purpose of hauling down the flag. there were squads of other people at intervals down the street. they too were quiet but filled with suppressed rage, and muttered their resentment at the insult to, what they called, "their" flag. before the car i was in had started, a dapper little fellow--he would be called a dude at this day --stepped in. he was in a great state of excitement and used adjectives freely to express his contempt for the union and for those who had just perpetrated such an outrage upon the rights of a free people. there was only one other passenger in the car besides myself when this young man entered. he evidently expected to find nothing but sympathy when he got away from the "mud sills" engaged in compelling a "free people" to pull down a flag they adored. he turned to me saying: "things have come to a ---pretty pass when a free people can't choose their own flag. where i came from if a man dares to say a word in favor of the union we hang him to a limb of the first tree we come to." i replied that "after all we were not so intolerant in st. louis as we might be; i had not seen a single rebel hung yet, nor heard of one; there were plenty of them who ought to be, however." the young man subsided. he was so crestfallen that i believe if i had ordered him to leave the car he would have gone quietly out, saying to himself: "more yankee oppression." by nightfall the late defenders of camp jackson were all within the walls of the st. louis arsenal, prisoners of war. the next day i left st. louis for mattoon, illinois, where i was to muster in the regiment from that congressional district. this was the 21st illinois infantry, the regiment of which i subsequently became colonel. i mustered one regiment afterwards, when my services for the state were about closed. brigadier-general john pope was stationed at springfield, as united states mustering officer, all the time i was in the state service. he was a native of illinois and well acquainted with most of the prominent men in the state. i was a carpet-bagger and knew but few of them. while i was on duty at springfield the senators, representatives in congress, ax-governors and the state legislators were nearly all at the state capital. the only acquaintance i made among them was with the governor, whom i was serving, and, by chance, with senator s. a. douglas. the only members of congress i knew were washburne and philip foulk. with the former, though he represented my district and we were citizens of the same town, i only became acquainted at the meeting when the first company of galena volunteers was raised. foulk i had known in st. louis when i was a citizen of that city. i had been three years at west point with pope and had served with him a short time during the mexican war, under general taylor. i saw a good deal of him during my service with the state. on one occasion he said to me that i ought to go into the united states service. i told him i intended to do so if there was a war. he spoke of his acquaintance with the public men of the state, and said he could get them to recommend me for a position and that he would do all he could for me. i declined to receive endorsement for permission to fight for my country. going home for a day or two soon after this conversation with general pope, i wrote from galena the following letter to the adjutant-general of the army. galena, illinois, may 24, 1861. col. l. thomas adjt. gen. u. s. a., washington, d. c. sir:--having served for fifteen years in the regular army, including four years at west point, and feeling it the duty of every one who has been educated at the government expense to offer their services for the support of that government, i have the honor, very respectfully, to tender my services, until the close of the war, in such capacity as may be offered. i would say, in view of my present age and length of service, i feel myself competent to command a regiment, if the president, in his judgment, should see fit to intrust one to me. since the first call of the president i have been serving on the staff of the governor of this state, rendering such aid as i could in the organization of our state militia, and am still engaged in that capacity. a letter addressed to me at springfield, illinois, will reach me. i am very respectfully, your obt. svt., u. s. grant. this letter failed to elicit an answer from the adjutant-general of the army. i presume it was hardly read by him, and certainly it could not have been submitted to higher authority. subsequent to the war general badeau having heard of this letter applied to the war department for a copy of it. the letter could not be found and no one recollected ever having seen it. i took no copy when it was written. long after the application of general badeau, general townsend, who had become adjutant-general of the army, while packing up papers preparatory to the removal of his office, found this letter in some out-of-the-way place. it had not been destroyed, but it had not been regularly filed away. i felt some hesitation in suggesting rank as high as the colonelcy of a regiment, feeling somewhat doubtful whether i would be equal to the position. but i had seen nearly every colonel who had been mustered in from the state of illinois, and some from indiana, and felt that if they could command a regiment properly, and with credit, i could also. having but little to do after the muster of the last of the regiments authorized by the state legislature, i asked and obtained of the governor leave of absence for a week to visit my parents in covington, kentucky, immediately opposite cincinnati. general mcclellan had been made a major-general and had his headquarters at cincinnati. in reality i wanted to see him. i had known him slightly at west point, where we served one year together, and in the mexican war. i was in hopes that when he saw me he would offer me a position on his staff. i called on two successive days at his office but failed to see him on either occasion, and returned to springfield. chapter xviii. appointed colonel of the 21st illinois--personnel of the regiment --general logan--march to missouri--movement against harris at florida, mo.--general pope in command--stationed at mexico, mo. while i was absent from the state capital on this occasion the president's second call for troops was issued. this time it was for 300,000 men, for three years or the war. this brought into the united states service all the regiments then in the state service. these had elected their officers from highest to lowest and were accepted with their organizations as they were, except in two instances. a chicago regiment, the 19th infantry, had elected a very young man to the colonelcy. when it came to taking the field the regiment asked to have another appointed colonel and the one they had previously chosen made lieutenant-colonel. the 21st regiment of infantry, mustered in by me at mattoon, refused to go into the service with the colonel of their selection in any position. while i was still absent governor yates appointed me colonel of this latter regiment. a few days after i was in charge of it and in camp on the fair grounds near springfield. my regiment was composed in large part of young men of as good social position as any in their section of the state. it embraced the sons of farmers, lawyers, physicians, politicians, merchants, bankers and ministers, and some men of maturer years who had filled such positions themselves. there were also men in it who could be led astray; and the colonel, elected by the votes of the regiment, had proved to be fully capable of developing all there was in his men of recklessness. it was said that he even went so far at times as to take the guard from their posts and go with them to the village near by and make a night of it. when there came a prospect of battle the regiment wanted to have some one else to lead them. i found it very hard work for a few days to bring all the men into anything like subordination; but the great majority favored discipline, and by the application of a little regular army punishment all were reduced to as good discipline as one could ask. the ten regiments which had volunteered in the state service for thirty days, it will be remembered, had done so with a pledge to go into the national service if called upon within that time. when they volunteered the government had only called for ninety days' enlistments. men were called now for three years or the war. they felt that this change of period released them from the obligation of re-volunteering. when i was appointed colonel, the 21st regiment was still in the state service. about the time they were to be mustered into the united states service, such of them as would go, two members of congress from the state, mcclernand and logan, appeared at the capital and i was introduced to them. i had never seen either of them before, but i had read a great deal about them, and particularly about logan, in the newspapers. both were democratic members of congress, and logan had been elected from the southern district of the state, where he had a majority of eighteen thousand over his republican competitor. his district had been settled originally by people from the southern states, and at the breaking out of secession they sympathized with the south. at the first outbreak of war some of them joined the southern army; many others were preparing to do so; others rode over the country at night denouncing the union, and made it as necessary to guard railroad bridges over which national troops had to pass in southern illinois, as it was in kentucky or any of the border slave states. logan's popularity in this district was unbounded. he knew almost enough of the people in it by their christian names, to form an ordinary congressional district. as he went in politics, so his district was sure to go. the republican papers had been demanding that he should announce where he stood on the questions which at that time engrossed the whole of public thought. some were very bitter in their denunciations of his silence. logan was not a man to be coerced into an utterance by threats. he did, however, come out in a speech before the adjournment of the special session of congress which was convened by the president soon after his inauguration, and announced his undying loyalty and devotion to the union. but i had not happened to see that speech, so that when i first met logan my impressions were those formed from reading denunciations of him. mcclernand, on the other hand, had early taken strong grounds for the maintenance of the union and had been praised accordingly by the republican papers. the gentlemen who presented these two members of congress asked me if i would have any objections to their addressing my regiment. i hesitated a little before answering. it was but a few days before the time set for mustering into the united states service such of the men as were willing to volunteer for three years or the war. i had some doubt as to the effect a speech from logan might have; but as he was with mcclernand, whose sentiments on the all-absorbing questions of the day were well known, i gave my consent. mcclernand spoke first; and logan followed in a speech which he has hardly equalled since for force and eloquence. it breathed a loyalty and devotion to the union which inspired my men to such a point that they would have volunteered to remain in the army as long as an enemy of the country continued to bear arms against it. they entered the united states service almost to a man. general logan went to his part of the state and gave his attention to raising troops. the very men who at first made it necessary to guard the roads in southern illinois became the defenders of the union. logan entered the service himself as colonel of a regiment and rapidly rose to the rank of major-general. his district, which had promised at first to give much trouble to the government, filled every call made upon it for troops, without resorting to the draft. there was no call made when there were not more volunteers than were asked for. that congressional district stands credited at the war department to-day with furnishing more men for the army than it was called on to supply. i remained in springfield with my regiment until the 3d of july, when i was ordered to quincy, illinois. by that time the regiment was in a good state of discipline and the officers and men were well up in the company drill. there was direct railroad communication between springfield and quincy, but i thought it would be good preparation for the troops to march there. we had no transportation for our camp and garrison equipage, so wagons were hired for the occasion and on the 3d of july we started. there was no hurry, but fair marches were made every day until the illinois river was crossed. there i was overtaken by a dispatch saying that the destination of the regiment had been changed to ironton, missouri, and ordering me to halt where i was and await the arrival of a steamer which had been dispatched up the illinois river to take the regiment to st. louis. the boat, when it did come, grounded on a sand-bar a few miles below where we were in camp. we remained there several days waiting to have the boat get off the bar, but before this occurred news came that an illinois regiment was surrounded by rebels at a point on the hannibal and st. joe railroad some miles west of palmyra, in missouri, and i was ordered to proceed with all dispatch to their relief. we took the cars and reached quincy in a few hours. when i left galena for the last time to take command of the 21st regiment i took with me my oldest son, frederick d. grant, then a lad of eleven years of age. on receiving the order to take rail for quincy i wrote to mrs. grant, to relieve what i supposed would be her great anxiety for one so young going into danger, that i would send fred home from quincy by river. i received a prompt letter in reply decidedly disapproving my proposition, and urging that the lad should be allowed to accompany me. it came too late. fred was already on his way up the mississippi bound for dubuque, iowa, from which place there was a railroad to galena. my sensations as we approached what i supposed might be "a field of battle" were anything but agreeable. i had been in all the engagements in mexico that it was possible for one person to be in; but not in command. if some one else had been colonel and i had been lieutenant-colonel i do not think i would have felt any trepidation. before we were prepared to cross the mississippi river at quincy my anxiety was relieved; for the men of the besieged regiment came straggling into town. i am inclined to think both sides got frightened and ran away. i took my regiment to palmyra and remained there for a few days, until relieved by the 19th illinois infantry. from palmyra i proceeded to salt river, the railroad bridge over which had been destroyed by the enemy. colonel john m. palmer at that time commanded the 13th illinois, which was acting as a guard to workmen who were engaged in rebuilding this bridge. palmer was my senior and commanded the two regiments as long as we remained together. the bridge was finished in about two weeks, and i received orders to move against colonel thomas harris, who was said to be encamped at the little town of florida, some twenty-five miles south of where we then were. at the time of which i now write we had no transportation and the country about salt river was sparsely settled, so that it took some days to collect teams and drivers enough to move the camp and garrison equipage of a regiment nearly a thousand strong, together with a week's supply of provision and some ammunition. while preparations for the move were going on i felt quite comfortable; but when we got on the road and found every house deserted i was anything but easy. in the twenty-five miles we had to march we did not see a person, old or young, male or female, except two horsemen who were on a road that crossed ours. as soon as they saw us they decamped as fast as their horses could carry them. i kept my men in the ranks and forbade their entering any of the deserted houses or taking anything from them. we halted at night on the road and proceeded the next morning at an early hour. harris had been encamped in a creek bottom for the sake of being near water. the hills on either side of the creek extend to a considerable height, possibly more than a hundred feet. as we approached the brow of the hill from which it was expected we could see harris' camp, and possibly find his men ready formed to meet us, my heart kept getting higher and higher until it felt to me as though it was in my throat. i would have given anything then to have been back in illinois, but i had not the moral courage to halt and consider what to do; i kept right on. when we reached a point from which the valley below was in full view i halted. the place where harris had been encamped a few days before was still there and the marks of a recent encampment were plainly visible, but the troops were gone. my heart resumed its place. it occurred to me at once that harris had been as much afraid of me as i had been of him. this was a view of the question i had never taken before; but it was one i never forgot afterwards. from that event to the close of the war, i never experienced trepidation upon confronting an enemy, though i always felt more or less anxiety. i never forgot that he had as much reason to fear my forces as i had his. the lesson was valuable. inquiries at the village of florida divulged the fact that colonel harris, learning of my intended movement, while my transportation was being collected took time by the forelock and left florida before i had started from salt river. he had increased the distance between us by forty miles. the next day i started back to my old camp at salt river bridge. the citizens living on the line of our march had returned to their houses after we passed, and finding everything in good order, nothing carried away, they were at their front doors ready to greet us now. they had evidently been led to believe that the national troops carried death and devastation with them wherever they went. in a short time after our return to salt river bridge i was ordered with my regiment to the town of mexico. general pope was then commanding the district embracing all of the state of missouri between the mississippi and missouri rivers, with his headquarters in the village of mexico. i was assigned to the command of a sub-district embracing the troops in the immediate neighborhood, some three regiments of infantry and a section of artillery. there was one regiment encamped by the side of mine. i assumed command of the whole and the first night sent the commander of the other regiment the parole and countersign. not wishing to be outdone in courtesy, he immediately sent me the countersign for his regiment for the night. when he was informed that the countersign sent to him was for use with his regiment as well as mine, it was difficult to make him understand that this was not an unwarranted interference of one colonel over another. no doubt he attributed it for the time to the presumption of a graduate of west point over a volunteer pure and simple. but the question was soon settled and we had no further trouble. my arrival in mexico had been preceded by that of two or three regiments in which proper discipline had not been maintained, and the men had been in the habit of visiting houses without invitation and helping themselves to food and drink, or demanding them from the occupants. they carried their muskets while out of camp and made every man they found take the oath of allegiance to the government. i at once published orders prohibiting the soldiers from going into private houses unless invited by the inhabitants, and from appropriating private property to their own or to government uses. the people were no longer molested or made afraid. i received the most marked courtesy from the citizens of mexico as long as i remained there. up to this time my regiment had not been carried in the school of the soldier beyond the company drill, except that it had received some training on the march from springfield to the illinois river. there was now a good opportunity of exercising it in the battalion drill. while i was at west point the tactics used in the army had been scott's and the musket the flint lock. i had never looked at a copy of tactics from the time of my graduation. my standing in that branch of studies had been near the foot of the class. in the mexican war in the summer of 1846, i had been appointed regimental quartermaster and commissary and had not been at a battalion drill since. the arms had been changed since then and hardee's tactics had been adopted. i got a copy of tactics and studied one lesson, intending to confine the exercise of the first day to the commands i had thus learned. by pursuing this course from day to day i thought i would soon get through the volume. we were encamped just outside of town on the common, among scattering suburban houses with enclosed gardens, and when i got my regiment in line and rode to the front i soon saw that if i attempted to follow the lesson i had studied i would have to clear away some of the houses and garden fences to make room. i perceived at once, however, that hardee's tactics--a mere translation from the french with hardee's name attached --was nothing more than common sense and the progress of the age applied to scott's system. the commands were abbreviated and the movement expedited. under the old tactics almost every change in the order of march was preceded by a "halt," then came the change, and then the "forward march." with the new tactics all these changes could be made while in motion. i found no trouble in giving commands that would take my regiment where i wanted it to go and carry it around all obstacles. i do not believe that the officers of the regiment ever discovered that i had never studied the tactics that i used. chapter xix. commissioned brigadier-general--command at ironton, mo.--jefferson city --cape girardeau--general prentiss--seizure of paducah--headquarters at cairo. i had not been in mexico many weeks when, reading a st. louis paper, i found the president had asked the illinois delegation in congress to recommend some citizens of the state for the position of brigadier-general, and that they had unanimously recommended me as first on a list of seven. i was very much surprised because, as i have said, my acquaintance with the congressmen was very limited and i did not know of anything i had done to inspire such confidence. the papers of the next day announced that my name, with three others, had been sent to the senate, and a few days after our confirmation was announced. when appointed brigadier-general i at once thought it proper that one of my aides should come from the regiment i had been commanding, and so selected lieutenant c. b. lagow. while living in st. louis, i had had a desk in the law office of mcclellan, moody and hillyer. difference in views between the members of the firm on the questions of the day, and general hard times in the border cities, had broken up this firm. hillyer was quite a young man, then in his twenties, and very brilliant. i asked him to accept a place on my staff. i also wanted to take one man from my new home, galena. the canvass in the presidential campaign the fall before had brought out a young lawyer by the name of john a. rawlins, who proved himself one of the ablest speakers in the state. he was also a candidate for elector on the douglas ticket. when sumter was fired upon and the integrity of the union threatened, there was no man more ready to serve his country than he. i wrote at once asking him to accept the position of assistant adjutant-general with the rank of captain, on my staff. he was about entering the service as major of a new regiment then organizing in the north-western part of the state; but he threw this up and accepted my offer. neither hillyer nor lagow proved to have any particular taste or special qualifications for the duties of the soldier, and the former resigned during the vicksburg campaign; the latter i relieved after the battle of chattanooga. rawlins remained with me as long as he lived, and rose to the rank of brigadier general and chief-of-staff to the general of the army--an office created for him--before the war closed. he was an able man, possessed of great firmness, and could say "no" so emphatically to a request which he thought should not be granted that the person he was addressing would understand at once that there was no use of pressing the matter. general rawlins was a very useful officer in other ways than this. i became very much attached to him. shortly after my promotion i was ordered to ironton, missouri, to command a district in that part of the state, and took the 21st illinois, my old regiment, with me. several other regiments were ordered to the same destination about the same time. ironton is on the iron mountain railroad, about seventy miles south of st. louis, and situated among hills rising almost to the dignity of mountains. when i reached there, about the 8th of august, colonel b. gratz brown --afterwards governor of missouri and in 1872 vice-presidential candidate --was in command. some of his troops were ninety days' men and their time had expired some time before. the men had no clothing but what they had volunteered in, and much of this was so worn that it would hardly stay on. general hardee--the author of the tactics i did not study--was at greenville some twenty-five miles further south, it was said, with five thousand confederate troops. under these circumstances colonel brown's command was very much demoralized. a squadron of cavalry could have ridden into the valley and captured the entire force. brown himself was gladder to see me on that occasion than he ever has been since. i relieved him and sent all his men home within a day or two, to be mustered out of service. within ten days after reading ironton i was prepared to take the offensive against the enemy at greenville. i sent a column east out of the valley we were in, with orders to swing around to the south and west and come into the greenville road ten miles south of ironton. another column marched on the direct road and went into camp at the point designated for the two columns to meet. i was to ride out the next morning and take personal command of the movement. my experience against harris, in northern missouri, had inspired me with confidence. but when the evening train came in, it brought general b. m. prentiss with orders to take command of the district. his orders did not relieve me, but i knew that by law i was senior, and at that time even the president did not have the authority to assign a junior to command a senior of the same grade. i therefore gave general prentiss the situation of the troops and the general condition of affairs, and started for st. louis the same day. the movement against the rebels at greenville went no further. from st. louis i was ordered to jefferson city, the capital of the state, to take command. general sterling price, of the confederate army, was thought to be threatening the capital, lexington, chillicothe and other comparatively large towns in the central part of missouri. i found a good many troops in jefferson city, but in the greatest confusion, and no one person knew where they all were. colonel mulligan, a gallant man, was in command, but he had not been educated as yet to his new profession and did not know how to maintain discipline. i found that volunteers had obtained permission from the department commander, or claimed they had, to raise, some of them, regiments; some battalions; some companies--the officers to be commissioned according to the number of men they brought into the service. there were recruiting stations all over town, with notices, rudely lettered on boards over the doors, announcing the arm of service and length of time for which recruits at that station would be received. the law required all volunteers to serve for three years or the war. but in jefferson city in august, 1861, they were recruited for different periods and on different conditions; some were enlisted for six months, some for a year, some without any condition as to where they were to serve, others were not to be sent out of the state. the recruits were principally men from regiments stationed there and already in the service, bound for three years if the war lasted that long. the city was filled with union fugitives who had been driven by guerilla bands to take refuge with the national troops. they were in a deplorable condition and must have starved but for the support the government gave them. they had generally made their escape with a team or two, sometimes a yoke of oxen with a mule or a horse in the lead. a little bedding besides their clothing and some food had been thrown into the wagon. all else of their worldly goods were abandoned and appropriated by their former neighbors; for the union man in missouri who staid at home during the rebellion, if he was not immediately under the protection of the national troops, was at perpetual war with his neighbors. i stopped the recruiting service, and disposed the troops about the outskirts of the city so as to guard all approaches. order was soon restored. i had been at jefferson city but a few days when i was directed from department headquarters to fit out an expedition to lexington, booneville and chillicothe, in order to take from the banks in those cities all the funds they had and send them to st. louis. the western army had not yet been supplied with transportation. it became necessary therefore to press into the service teams belonging to sympathizers with the rebellion or to hire those of union men. this afforded an opportunity of giving employment to such of the refugees within our lines as had teams suitable for our purposes. they accepted the service with alacrity. as fast as troops could be got off they were moved west some twenty miles or more. in seven or eight days from my assuming command at jefferson city, i had all the troops, except a small garrison, at an advanced position and expected to join them myself the next day. but my campaigns had not yet begun, for while seated at my office door, with nothing further to do until it was time to start for the front, i saw an officer of rank approaching, who proved to be colonel jefferson c. davis. i had never met him before, but he introduced himself by handing me an order for him to proceed to jefferson city and relieve me of the command. the orders directed that i should report at department headquarters at st. louis without delay, to receive important special instructions. it was about an hour before the only regular train of the day would start. i therefore turned over to colonel davis my orders, and hurriedly stated to him the progress that had been made to carry out the department instructions already described. i had at that time but one staff officer, doing myself all the detail work usually performed by an adjutant-general. in an hour after being relieved from the command i was on my way to st. louis, leaving my single staff officer(*6) to follow the next day with our horses and baggage. the "important special instructions" which i received the next day, assigned me to the command of the district of south-east missouri, embracing all the territory south of st. louis, in missouri, as well as all southern illinois. at first i was to take personal command of a combined expedition that had been ordered for the capture of colonel jeff. thompson, a sort of independent or partisan commander who was disputing with us the possession of south-east missouri. troops had been ordered to move from ironton to cape girardeau, sixty or seventy miles to the south-east, on the mississippi river; while the forces at cape girardeau had been ordered to move to jacksonville, ten miles out towards ironton; and troops at cairo and bird's point, at the junction of the ohio and mississippi rivers, were to hold themselves in readiness to go down the mississippi to belmont, eighteen miles below, to be moved west from there when an officer should come to command them. i was the officer who had been selected for this purpose. cairo was to become my headquarters when the expedition terminated. in pursuance of my orders i established my temporary headquarters at cape girardeau and sent instructions to the commanding officer at jackson, to inform me of the approach of general prentiss from ironton. hired wagons were kept moving night and day to take additional rations to jackson, to supply the troops when they started from there. neither general prentiss nor colonel marsh, who commanded at jackson, knew their destination. i drew up all the instructions for the contemplated move, and kept them in my pocket until i should hear of the junction of our troops at jackson. two or three days after my arrival at cape girardeau, word came that general prentiss was approaching that place (jackson). i started at once to meet him there and to give him his orders. as i turned the first corner of a street after starting, i saw a column of cavalry passing the next street in front of me. i turned and rode around the block the other way, so as to meet the head of the column. i found there general prentiss himself, with a large escort. he had halted his troops at jackson for the night, and had come on himself to cape girardeau, leaving orders for his command to follow him in the morning. i gave the general his orders--which stopped him at jackson--but he was very much aggrieved at being placed under another brigadier-general, particularly as he believed himself to be the senior. he had been a brigadier, in command at cairo, while i was mustering officer at springfield without any rank. but we were nominated at the same time for the united states service, and both our commissions bore date may 17th, 1861. by virtue of my former army rank i was, by law, the senior. general prentiss failed to get orders to his troops to remain at jackson, and the next morning early they were reported as approaching cape girardeau. i then ordered the general very peremptorily to countermarch his command and take it back to jackson. he obeyed the order, but bade his command adieu when he got them to jackson, and went to st. louis and reported himself. this broke up the expedition. but little harm was done, as jeff. thompson moved light and had no fixed place for even nominal headquarters. he was as much at home in arkansas as he was in missouri and would keep out of the way of a superior force. prentiss was sent to another part of the state. general prentiss made a great mistake on the above occasion, one that he would not have committed later in the war. when i came to know him better, i regretted it much. in consequence of this occurrence he was off duty in the field when the principal campaign at the west was going on, and his juniors received promotion while he was where none could be obtained. he would have been next to myself in rank in the district of south-east missouri, by virtue of his services in the mexican war. he was a brave and very earnest soldier. no man in the service was more sincere in his devotion to the cause for which we were battling; none more ready to make sacrifices or risk life in it. on the 4th of september i removed my headquarters to cairo and found colonel richard oglesby in command of the post. we had never met, at least not to my knowledge. after my promotion i had ordered my brigadier-general's uniform from new york, but it had not yet arrived, so that i was in citizen's dress. the colonel had his office full of people, mostly from the neighboring states of missouri and kentucky, making complaints or asking favors. he evidently did not catch my name when i was presented, for on my taking a piece of paper from the table where he was seated and writing the order assuming command of the district of south-east missouri, colonel richard j. oglesby to command the post at bird's point, and handing it to him, he put on an expression of surprise that looked a little as if he would like to have some one identify me. but he surrendered the office without question. the day after i assumed command at cairo a man came to me who said he was a scout of general fremont. he reported that he had just come from columbus, a point on the mississippi twenty miles below on the kentucky side, and that troops had started from there, or were about to start, to seize paducah, at the mouth of the tennessee. there was no time for delay; i reported by telegraph to the department commander the information i had received, and added that i was taking steps to get off that night to be in advance of the enemy in securing that important point. there was a large number of steamers lying at cairo and a good many boatmen were staying in the town. it was the work of only a few hours to get the boats manned, with coal aboard and steam up. troops were also designated to go aboard. the distance from cairo to paducah is about forty-five miles. i did not wish to get there before daylight of the 6th, and directed therefore that the boats should lie at anchor out in the stream until the time to start. not having received an answer to my first dispatch, i again telegraphed to department headquarters that i should start for paducah that night unless i received further orders. hearing nothing, we started before midnight and arrived early the following morning, anticipating the enemy by probably not over six or eight hours. it proved very fortunate that the expedition against jeff. thompson had been broken up. had it not been, the enemy would have seized paducah and fortified it, to our very great annoyance. when the national troops entered the town the citizens were taken by surprise. i never after saw such consternation depicted on the faces of the people. men, women and children came out of their doors looking pale and frightened at the presence of the invader. they were expecting rebel troops that day. in fact, nearly four thousand men from columbus were at that time within ten or fifteen miles of paducah on their way to occupy the place. i had but two regiments and one battery with me, but the enemy did not know this and returned to columbus. i stationed my troops at the best points to guard the roads leading into the city, left gunboats to guard the river fronts and by noon was ready to start on my return to cairo. before leaving, however, i addressed a short printed proclamation to the citizens of paducah assuring them of our peaceful intentions, that we had come among them to protect them against the enemies of our country, and that all who chose could continue their usual avocations with assurance of the protection of the government. this was evidently a relief to them; but the majority would have much preferred the presence of the other army. i reinforced paducah rapidly from the troops at cape girardeau; and a day or two later general c. f. smith, a most accomplished soldier, reported at cairo and was assigned to the command of the post at the mouth of the tennessee. in a short time it was well fortified and a detachment was sent to occupy smithland, at the mouth of the cumberland. the state government of kentucky at that time was rebel in sentiment, but wanted to preserve an armed neutrality between the north and the south, and the governor really seemed to think the state had a perfect right to maintain a neutral position. the rebels already occupied two towns in the state, columbus and hickman, on the mississippi; and at the very moment the national troops were entering paducah from the ohio front, general lloyd tilghman--a confederate--with his staff and a small detachment of men, were getting out in the other direction, while, as i have already said, nearly four thousand confederate troops were on kentucky soil on their way to take possession of the town. but, in the estimation of the governor and of those who thought with him, this did not justify the national authorities in invading the soil of kentucky. i informed the legislature of the state of what i was doing, and my action was approved by the majority of that body. on my return to cairo i found authority from department headquarters for me to take paducah "if i felt strong enough," but very soon after i was reprimanded from the same quarters for my correspondence with the legislature and warned against a repetition of the offence. soon after i took command at cairo, general fremont entered into arrangements for the exchange of the prisoners captured at camp jackson in the month of may. i received orders to pass them through my lines to columbus as they presented themselves with proper credentials. quite a number of these prisoners i had been personally acquainted with before the war. such of them as i had so known were received at my headquarters as old acquaintances, and ordinary routine business was not disturbed by their presence. on one occasion when several were present in my office my intention to visit cape girardeau the next day, to inspect the troops at that point, was mentioned. something transpired which postponed my trip; but a steamer employed by the government was passing a point some twenty or more miles above cairo, the next day, when a section of rebel artillery with proper escort brought her to. a major, one of those who had been at my headquarters the day before, came at once aboard and after some search made a direct demand for my delivery. it was hard to persuade him that i was not there. this officer was major barrett, of st. louis. i had been acquainted with his family before the war. chapter xx. general fremont in command--movement against belmont--battle of belmont --a narrow escape--after the battle. from the occupation of paducah up to the early part of november nothing important occurred with the troops under my command. i was reinforced from time to time and the men were drilled and disciplined preparatory for the service which was sure to come. by the 1st of november i had not fewer than 20,000 men, most of them under good drill and ready to meet any equal body of men who, like themselves, had not yet been in an engagement. they were growing impatient at lying idle so long, almost in hearing of the guns of the enemy they had volunteered to fight against. i asked on one or two occasions to be allowed to move against columbus. it could have been taken soon after the occupation of paducah; but before november it was so strongly fortified that it would have required a large force and a long siege to capture it. in the latter part of october general fremont took the field in person and moved from jefferson city against general sterling price, who was then in the state of missouri with a considerable command. about the first of november i was directed from department headquarters to make a demonstration on both sides of the mississippi river with the view of detaining the rebels at columbus within their lines. before my troops could be got off, i was notified from the same quarter that there were some 3,000 of the enemy on the st. francis river about fifty miles west, or south-west, from cairo, and was ordered to send another force against them. i dispatched colonel oglesby at once with troops sufficient to compete with the reported number of the enemy. on the 5th word came from the same source that the rebels were about to detach a large force from columbus to be moved by boats down the mississippi and up the white river, in arkansas, in order to reinforce price, and i was directed to prevent this movement if possible. i accordingly sent a regiment from bird's point under colonel w. h. l. wallace to overtake and reinforce oglesby, with orders to march to new madrid, a point some distance below columbus, on the missouri side. at the same time i directed general c. f. smith to move all the troops he could spare from paducah directly against columbus, halting them, however, a few miles from the town to await further orders from me. then i gathered up all the troops at cairo and fort holt, except suitable guards, and moved them down the river on steamers convoyed by two gunboats, accompanying them myself. my force consisted of a little over 3,000 men and embraced five regiments of infantry, two guns and two companies of cavalry. we dropped down the river on the 6th to within about six miles of columbus, debarked a few men on the kentucky side and established pickets to connect with the troops from paducah. i had no orders which contemplated an attack by the national troops, nor did i intend anything of the kind when i started out from cairo; but after we started i saw that the officers and men were elated at the prospect of at last having the opportunity of doing what they had volunteered to do--fight the enemies of their country. i did not see how i could maintain discipline, or retain the confidence of my command, if we should return to cairo without an effort to do something. columbus, besides being strongly fortified, contained a garrison much more numerous than the force i had with me. it would not do, therefore, to attack that point. about two o'clock on the morning of the 7th, i learned that the enemy was crossing troops from columbus to the west bank to be dispatched, presumably, after oglesby. i knew there was a small camp of confederates at belmont, immediately opposite columbus, and i speedily resolved to push down the river, land on the missouri side, capture belmont, break up the camp and return. accordingly, the pickets above columbus were drawn in at once, and about daylight the boats moved out from shore. in an hour we were debarking on the west bank of the mississippi, just out of range of the batteries at columbus. the ground on the west shore of the river, opposite columbus, is low and in places marshy and cut up with sloughs. the soil is rich and the timber large and heavy. there were some small clearings between belmont and the point where we landed, but most of the country was covered with the native forests. we landed in front of a cornfield. when the debarkation commenced, i took a regiment down the river to post it as a guard against surprise. at that time i had no staff officer who could be trusted with that duty. in the woods, at a short distance below the clearing, i found a depression, dry at the time, but which at high water became a slough or bayou. i placed the men in the hollow, gave them their instructions and ordered them to remain there until they were properly relieved. these troops, with the gunboats, were to protect our transports. up to this time the enemy had evidently failed to divine our intentions. from columbus they could, of course, see our gunboats and transports loaded with troops. but the force from paducah was threatening them from the land side, and it was hardly to be expected that if columbus was our object we would separate our troops by a wide river. they doubtless thought we meant to draw a large force from the east bank, then embark ourselves, land on the east bank and make a sudden assault on columbus before their divided command could be united. about eight o'clock we started from the point of debarkation, marching by the flank. after moving in this way for a mile or a mile and a half, i halted where there was marshy ground covered with a heavy growth of timber in our front, and deployed a large part of my force as skirmishers. by this time the enemy discovered that we were moving upon belmont and sent out troops to meet us. soon after we had started in line, his skirmishers were encountered and fighting commenced. this continued, growing fiercer and fiercer, for about four hours, the enemy being forced back gradually until he was driven into his camp. early in this engagement my horse was shot under me, but i got another from one of my staff and kept well up with the advance until the river was reached. the officers and men engaged at belmont were then under fire for the first time. veterans could not have behaved better than they did up to the moment of reaching the rebel camp. at this point they became demoralized from their victory and failed to reap its full reward. the enemy had been followed so closely that when he reached the clear ground on which his camp was pitched he beat a hasty retreat over the river bank, which protected him from our shots and from view. this precipitate retreat at the last moment enabled the national forces to pick their way without hinderance through the abatis--the only artificial defence the enemy had. the moment the camp was reached our men laid down their arms and commenced rummaging the tents to pick up trophies. some of the higher officers were little better than the privates. they galloped about from one cluster of men to another and at every halt delivered a short eulogy upon the union cause and the achievements of the command. all this time the troops we had been engaged with for four hours, lay crouched under cover of the river bank, ready to come up and surrender if summoned to do so; but finding that they were not pursued, they worked their way up the river and came up on the bank between us and our transports. i saw at the same time two steamers coming from the columbus side towards the west shore, above us, black--or gray--with soldiers from boiler-deck to roof. some of my men were engaged in firing from captured guns at empty steamers down the river, out of range, cheering at every shot. i tried to get them to turn their guns upon the loaded steamers above and not so far away. my efforts were in vain. at last i directed my staff officers to set fire to the camps. this drew the fire of the enemy's guns located on the heights of columbus. they had abstained from firing before, probably because they were afraid of hitting their own men; or they may have supposed, until the camp was on fire, that it was still in the possession of their friends. about this time, too, the men we had driven over the bank were seen in line up the river between us and our transports. the alarm "surrounded" was given. the guns of the enemy and the report of being surrounded, brought officers and men completely under control. at first some of the officers seemed to think that to be surrounded was to be placed in a hopeless position, where there was nothing to do but surrender. but when i announced that we had cut our way in and could cut our way out just as well, it seemed a new revelation to officers and soldiers. they formed line rapidly and we started back to our boats, with the men deployed as skirmishers as they had been on entering camp. the enemy was soon encountered, but his resistance this time was feeble. again the confederates sought shelter under the river banks. we could not stop, however, to pick them up, because the troops we had seen crossing the river had debarked by this time and were nearer our transports than we were. it would be prudent to get them behind us; but we were not again molested on our way to the boats. from the beginning of the fighting our wounded had been carried to the houses at the rear, near the place of debarkation. i now set the troops to bringing their wounded to the boats. after this had gone on for some little time i rode down the road, without even a staff officer, to visit the guard i had stationed over the approach to our transports. i knew the enemy had crossed over from columbus in considerable numbers and might be expected to attack us as we were embarking. this guard would be encountered first and, as they were in a natural intrenchment, would be able to hold the enemy for a considerable time. my surprise was great to find there was not a single man in the trench. riding back to the boat i found the officer who had commanded the guard and learned that he had withdrawn his force when the main body fell back. at first i ordered the guard to return, but finding that it would take some time to get the men together and march them back to their position, i countermanded the order. then fearing that the enemy we had seen crossing the river below might be coming upon us unawares, i rode out in the field to our front, still entirely alone, to observe whether the enemy was passing. the field was grown up with corn so tall and thick as to cut off the view of even a person on horseback, except directly along the rows. even in that direction, owing to the overhanging blades of corn, the view was not extensive. i had not gone more than a few hundred yards when i saw a body of troops marching past me not fifty yards away. i looked at them for a moment and then turned my horse towards the river and started back, first in a walk, and when i thought myself concealed from the view of the enemy, as fast as my horse could carry me. when at the river bank i still had to ride a few hundred yards to the point where the nearest transport lay. the cornfield in front of our transports terminated at the edge of a dense forest. before i got back the enemy had entered this forest and had opened a brisk fire upon the boats. our men, with the exception of details that had gone to the front after the wounded, were now either aboard the transports or very near them. those who were not aboard soon got there, and the boats pushed off. i was the only man of the national army between the rebels and our transports. the captain of a boat that had just pushed out but had not started, recognized me and ordered the engineer not to start the engine; he then had a plank run out for me. my horse seemed to take in the situation. there was no path down the bank and every one acquainted with the mississippi river knows that its banks, in a natural state, do not vary at any great angle from the perpendicular. my horse put his fore feet over the bank without hesitation or urging, and with his hind feet well under him, slid down the bank and trotted aboard the boat, twelve or fifteen feet away, over a single gang plank. i dismounted and went at once to the upper deck. the mississippi river was low on the 7th of november, 1861, so that the banks were higher than the heads of men standing on the upper decks of the steamers. the rebels were some distance back from the river, so that their fire was high and did us but little harm. our smoke-stack was riddled with bullets, but there were only three men wounded on the boats, two of whom were soldiers. when i first went on deck i entered the captain's room adjoining the pilot-house, and threw myself on a sofa. i did not keep that position a moment, but rose to go out on the deck to observe what was going on. i had scarcely left when a musket ball entered the room, struck the head of the sofa, passed through it and lodged in the foot. when the enemy opened fire on the transports our gunboats returned it with vigor. they were well out in the stream and some distance down, so that they had to give but very little elevation to their guns to clear the banks of the river. their position very nearly enfiladed the line of the enemy while he was marching through the cornfield. the execution was very great, as we could see at the time and as i afterwards learned more positively. we were very soon out of range and went peacefully on our way to cairo, every man feeling that belmont was a great victory and that he had contributed his share to it. our loss at belmont was 485 in killed, wounded and missing. about 125 of our wounded fell into the hands of the enemy. we returned with 175 prisoners and two guns, and spiked four other pieces. the loss of the enemy, as officially reported, was 642 men, killed, wounded and missing. we had engaged about 2,500 men, exclusive of the guard left with the transports. the enemy had about 7,000; but this includes the troops brought over from columbus who were not engaged in the first defence of belmont. the two objects for which the battle of belmont was fought were fully accomplished. the enemy gave up all idea of detaching troops from columbus. his losses were very heavy for that period of the war. columbus was beset by people looking for their wounded or dead kin, to take them home for medical treatment or burial. i learned later, when i had moved further south, that belmont had caused more mourning than almost any other battle up to that time. the national troops acquired a confidence in themselves at belmont that did not desert them through the war. the day after the battle i met some officers from general polk's command, arranged for permission to bury our dead at belmont and also commenced negotiations for the exchange of prisoners. when our men went to bury their dead, before they were allowed to land they were conducted below the point where the enemy had engaged our transports. some of the officers expressed a desire to see the field; but the request was refused with the statement that we had no dead there. while on the truce-boat i mentioned to an officer, whom i had known both at west point and in the mexican war, that i was in the cornfield near their troops when they passed; that i had been on horseback and had worn a soldier's overcoat at the time. this officer was on general polk's staff. he said both he and the general had seen me and that polk had said to his men, "there is a yankee; you may try your marksmanship on him if you wish," but nobody fired at me. belmont was severely criticised in the north as a wholly unnecessary battle, barren of results, or the possibility of them from the beginning. if it had not been fought, colonel oglesby would probably have been captured or destroyed with his three thousand men. then i should have been culpable indeed. chapter xxi. general halleck in command--commanding the district of cairo--movement on fort henry--capture of fort henry. while at cairo i had frequent opportunities of meeting the rebel officers of the columbus garrison. they seemed to be very fond of coming up on steamers under flags of truce. on two or three occasions i went down in like manner. when one of their boats was seen coming up carrying a white flag, a gun would be fired from the lower battery at fort holt, throwing a shot across the bow as a signal to come no farther. i would then take a steamer and, with my staff and occasionally a few other officers, go down to receive the party. there were several officers among them whom i had known before, both at west point and in mexico. seeing these officers who had been educated for the profession of arms, both at school and in actual war, which is a far more efficient training, impressed me with the great advantage the south possessed over the north at the beginning of the rebellion. they had from thirty to forty per cent. of the educated soldiers of the nation. they had no standing army and, consequently, these trained soldiers had to find employment with the troops from their own states. in this way what there was of military education and training was distributed throughout their whole army. the whole loaf was leavened. the north had a great number of educated and trained soldiers, but the bulk of them were still in the army and were retained, generally with their old commands and rank, until the war had lasted many months. in the army of the potomac there was what was known as the "regular brigade," in which, from the commanding officer down to the youngest second lieutenant, every one was educated to his profession. so, too, with many of the batteries; all the officers, generally four in number to each, were men educated for their profession. some of these went into battle at the beginning under division commanders who were entirely without military training. this state of affairs gave me an idea which i expressed while at cairo; that the government ought to disband the regular army, with the exception of the staff corps, and notify the disbanded officers that they would receive no compensation while the war lasted except as volunteers. the register should be kept up, but the names of all officers who were not in the volunteer service at the close, should be stricken from it. on the 9th of november, two days after the battle of belmont, major-general h. w. halleck superseded general fremont in command of the department of the missouri. the limits of his command took in arkansas and west kentucky east to the cumberland river. from the battle of belmont until early in february, 1862, the troops under my command did little except prepare for the long struggle which proved to be before them. the enemy at this time occupied a line running from the mississippi river at columbus to bowling green and mill springs, kentucky. each of these positions was strongly fortified, as were also points on the tennessee and cumberland rivers near the tennessee state line. the works on the tennessee were called fort heiman and fort henry, and that on the cumberland was fort donelson. at these points the two rivers approached within eleven miles of each other. the lines of rifle pits at each place extended back from the water at least two miles, so that the garrisons were in reality only seven miles apart. these positions were of immense importance to the enemy; and of course correspondingly important for us to possess ourselves of. with fort henry in our hands we had a navigable stream open to us up to muscle shoals, in alabama. the memphis and charleston railroad strikes the tennessee at eastport, mississippi, and follows close to the banks of the river up to the shoals. this road, of vast importance to the enemy, would cease to be of use to them for through traffic the moment fort henry became ours. fort donelson was the gate to nashville--a place of great military and political importance--and to a rich country extending far east in kentucky. these two points in our possession the enemy would necessarily be thrown back to the memphis and charleston road, or to the boundary of the cotton states, and, as before stated, that road would be lost to them for through communication. the designation of my command had been changed after halleck's arrival, from the district of south-east missouri to the district of cairo, and the small district commanded by general c. f. smith, embracing the mouths of the tennessee and cumberland rivers, had been added to my jurisdiction. early in january, 1862, i was directed by general mcclellan, through my department commander, to make a reconnoissance in favor of brigadier-general don carlos buell, who commanded the department of the ohio, with headquarters at louisville, and who was confronting general s. b. buckner with a larger confederate force at bowling green. it was supposed that buell was about to make some move against the enemy, and my demonstration was intended to prevent the sending of troops from columbus, fort henry or donelson to buckner. i at once ordered general smith to send a force up the west bank of the tennessee to threaten forts heiman and henry; mcclernand at the same time with a force of 6,000 men was sent out into west kentucky, threatening columbus with one column and the tennessee river with another. i went with mcclernand's command. the weather was very bad; snow and rain fell; the roads, never good in that section, were intolerable. we were out more than a week splashing through the mud, snow and rain, the men suffering very much. the object of the expedition was accomplished. the enemy did not send reinforcements to bowling green, and general george h. thomas fought and won the battle of mill springs before we returned. as a result of this expedition general smith reported that he thought it practicable to capture fort heiman. this fort stood on high ground, completely commanding fort henry on the opposite side of the river, and its possession by us, with the aid of our gunboats, would insure the capture of fort henry. this report of smith's confirmed views i had previously held, that the true line of operations for us was up the tennessee and cumberland rivers. with us there, the enemy would be compelled to fall back on the east and west entirely out of the state of kentucky. on the 6th of january, before receiving orders for this expedition, i had asked permission of the general commanding the department to go to see him at st. louis. my object was to lay this plan of campaign before him. now that my views had been confirmed by so able a general as smith, i renewed my request to go to st. louis on what i deemed important military business. the leave was granted, but not graciously. i had known general halleck but very slightly in the old army, not having met him either at west point or during the mexican war. i was received with so little cordiality that i perhaps stated the object of my visit with less clearness than i might have done, and i had not uttered many sentences before i was cut short as if my plan was preposterous. i returned to cairo very much crestfallen. flag-officer foote commanded the little fleet of gunboats then in the neighborhood of cairo and, though in another branch of the service, was subject to the command of general halleck. he and i consulted freely upon military matters and he agreed with me perfectly as to the feasibility of the campaign up the tennessee. notwithstanding the rebuff i had received from my immediate chief, i therefore, on the 28th of january, renewed the suggestion by telegraph that "if permitted, i could take and hold fort henry on the tennessee." this time i was backed by flag-officer foote, who sent a similar dispatch. on the 29th i wrote fully in support of the proposition. on the 1st of february i received full instructions from department headquarters to move upon fort henry. on the 2d the expedition started. in february, 1862, there were quite a good many steamers laid up at cairo for want of employment, the mississippi river being closed against navigation below that point. there were also many men in the town whose occupation had been following the river in various capacities, from captain down to deck hand but there were not enough of either boats or men to move at one time the 17,000 men i proposed to take with me up the tennessee. i loaded the boats with more than half the force, however, and sent general mcclernand in command. i followed with one of the later boats and found mcclernand had stopped, very properly, nine miles below fort henry. seven gunboats under flag-officer foote had accompanied the advance. the transports we had with us had to return to paducah to bring up a division from there, with general c. f. smith in command. before sending the boats back i wanted to get the troops as near to the enemy as i could without coming within range of their guns. there was a stream emptying into the tennessee on the east side, apparently at about long range distance below the fort. on account of the narrow water-shed separating the tennessee and cumberland rivers at that point, the stream must be insignificant at ordinary stages, but when we were there, in february, it was a torrent. it would facilitate the investment of fort henry materially if the troops could be landed south of that stream. to test whether this could be done i boarded the gunboat essex and requested captain wm. porter commanding it, to approach the fort to draw its fire. after we had gone some distance past the mouth of the stream we drew the fire of the fort, which fell much short of us. in consequence i had made up my mind to return and bring the troops to the upper side of the creek, when the enemy opened upon us with a rifled gun that sent shot far beyond us and beyond the stream. one shot passed very near where captain porter and i were standing, struck the deck near the stern, penetrated and passed through the cabin and so out into the river. we immediately turned back, and the troops were debarked below the mouth of the creek. when the landing was completed i returned with the transports to paducah to hasten up the balance of the troops. i got back on the 5th with the advance the remainder following as rapidly as the steamers could carry them. at ten o'clock at night, on the 5th, the whole command was not yet up. being anxious to commence operations as soon as possible before the enemy could reinforce heavily, i issued my orders for an advance at 11 a.m. on the 6th. i felt sure that all the troops would be up by that time. fort henry occupies a bend in the river which gave the guns in the water battery a direct fire down the stream. the camp outside the fort was intrenched, with rifle pits and outworks two miles back on the road to donelson and dover. the garrison of the fort and camp was about 2,800, with strong reinforcements from donelson halted some miles out. there were seventeen heavy guns in the fort. the river was very high, the banks being overflowed except where the bluffs come to the water's edge. a portion of the ground on which fort henry stood was two feet deep in water. below, the water extended into the woods several hundred yards back from the bank on the east side. on the west bank fort heiman stood on high ground, completely commanding fort henry. the distance from fort henry to donelson is but eleven miles. the two positions were so important to the enemy, as he saw his interest, that it was natural to suppose that reinforcements would come from every quarter from which they could be got. prompt action on our part was imperative. the plan was for the troops and gunboats to start at the same moment. the troops were to invest the garrison and the gunboats to attack the fort at close quarters. general smith was to land a brigade of his division on the west bank during the night of the 5th and get it in rear of heiman. at the hour designated the troops and gunboats started. general smith found fort heiman had been evacuated before his men arrived. the gunboats soon engaged the water batteries at very close quarters, but the troops which were to invest fort henry were delayed for want of roads, as well as by the dense forest and the high water in what would in dry weather have been unimportant beds of streams. this delay made no difference in the result. on our first appearance tilghman had sent his entire command, with the exception of about one hundred men left to man the guns in the fort, to the outworks on the road to dover and donelson, so as to have them out of range of the guns of our navy; and before any attack on the 6th he had ordered them to retreat on donelson. he stated in his subsequent report that the defence was intended solely to give his troops time to make their escape. tilghman was captured with his staff and ninety men, as well as the armament of the fort, the ammunition and whatever stores were there. our cavalry pursued the retreating column towards donelson and picked up two guns and a few stragglers; but the enemy had so much the start, that the pursuing force did not get in sight of any except the stragglers. all the gunboats engaged were hit many times. the damage, however, beyond what could be repaired by a small expenditure of money, was slight, except to the essex. a shell penetrated the boiler of that vessel and exploded it, killing and wounding forty-eight men, nineteen of whom were soldiers who had been detailed to act with the navy. on several occasions during the war such details were made when the complement of men with the navy was insufficient for the duty before them. after the fall of fort henry captain phelps, commanding the iron-clad carondelet, at my request ascended the tennessee river and thoroughly destroyed the bridge of the memphis and ohio railroad. chapter xxii. investment of fort donelson--the naval operations--attack of the enemy --assaulting the works--surrender of the fort. i informed the department commander of our success at fort henry and that on the 8th i would take fort donelson. but the rain continued to fall so heavily that the roads became impassable for artillery and wagon trains. then, too, it would not have been prudent to proceed without the gunboats. at least it would have been leaving behind a valuable part of our available force. on the 7th, the day after the fall of fort henry, i took my staff and the cavalry--a part of one regiment--and made a reconnoissance to within about a mile of the outer line of works at donelson. i had known general pillow in mexico, and judged that with any force, no matter how small, i could march up to within gunshot of any intrenchments he was given to hold. i said this to the officers of my staff at the time. i knew that floyd was in command, but he was no soldier, and i judged that he would yield to pillow's pretensions. i met, as i expected, no opposition in making the reconnoissance and, besides learning the topography of the country on the way and around fort donelson, found that there were two roads available for marching; one leading to the village of dover, the other to donelson. fort donelson is two miles north, or down the river, from dover. the fort, as it stood in 1861, embraced about one hundred acres of land. on the east it fronted the cumberland; to the north it faced hickman's creek, a small stream which at that time was deep and wide because of the back-water from the river; on the south was another small stream, or rather a ravine, opening into the cumberland. this also was filled with back-water from the river. the fort stood on high ground, some of it as much as a hundred feet above the cumberland. strong protection to the heavy guns in the water batteries had been obtained by cutting away places for them in the bluff. to the west there was a line of rifle pits some two miles back from the river at the farthest point. this line ran generally along the crest of high ground, but in one place crossed a ravine which opens into the river between the village and the fort. the ground inside and outside of this intrenched line was very broken and generally wooded. the trees outside of the rifle-pits had been cut down for a considerable way out, and had been felled so that their tops lay outwards from the intrenchments. the limbs had been trimmed and pointed, and thus formed an abatis in front of the greater part of the line. outside of this intrenched line, and extending about half the entire length of it, is a ravine running north and south and opening into hickman creek at a point north of the fort. the entire side of this ravine next to the works was one long abatis. general halleck commenced his efforts in all quarters to get reinforcements to forward to me immediately on my departure from cairo. general hunter sent men freely from kansas, and a large division under general nelson, from buell's army, was also dispatched. orders went out from the war department to consolidate fragments of companies that were being recruited in the western states so as to make full companies, and to consolidate companies into regiments. general halleck did not approve or disapprove of my going to fort donelson. he said nothing whatever to me on the subject. he informed buell on the 7th that i would march against fort donelson the next day; but on the 10th he directed me to fortify fort henry strongly, particularly to the land side, saying that he forwarded me intrenching tools for that purpose. i received this dispatch in front of fort donelson. i was very impatient to get to fort donelson because i knew the importance of the place to the enemy and supposed he would reinforce it rapidly. i felt that 15,000 men on the 8th would be more effective than 50,000 a month later. i asked flag-officer foote, therefore, to order his gunboats still about cairo to proceed up the cumberland river and not to wait for those gone to eastport and florence; but the others got back in time and we started on the 12th. i had moved mcclernand out a few miles the night before so as to leave the road as free as possible. just as we were about to start the first reinforcement reached me on transports. it was a brigade composed of six full regiments commanded by colonel thayer, of nebraska. as the gunboats were going around to donelson by the tennessee, ohio and cumberland rivers, i directed thayer to turn about and go under their convoy. i started from fort henry with 15,000 men, including eight batteries and part of a regiment of cavalry, and, meeting with no obstruction to detain us, the advance arrived in front of the enemy by noon. that afternoon and the next day were spent in taking up ground to make the investment as complete as possible. general smith had been directed to leave a portion of his division behind to guard forts henry and heiman. he left general lew. wallace with 2,500 men. with the remainder of his division he occupied our left, extending to hickman creek. mcclernand was on the right and covered the roads running south and south-west from dover. his right extended to the back-water up the ravine opening into the cumberland south of the village. the troops were not intrenched, but the nature of the ground was such that they were just as well protected from the fire of the enemy as if rifle-pits had been thrown up. our line was generally along the crest of ridges. the artillery was protected by being sunk in the ground. the men who were not serving the guns were perfectly covered from fire on taking position a little back from the crest. the greatest suffering was from want of shelter. it was midwinter and during the siege we had rain and snow, thawing and freezing alternately. it would not do to allow camp-fires except far down the hill out of sight of the enemy, and it would not do to allow many of the troops to remain there at the same time. in the march over from fort henry numbers of the men had thrown away their blankets and overcoats. there was therefore much discomfort and absolute suffering. during the 12th and 13th, and until the arrival of wallace and thayer on the 14th, the national forces, composed of but 15,000 men, without intrenchments, confronted an intrenched army of 21,000, without conflict further than what was brought on by ourselves. only one gunboat had arrived. there was a little skirmishing each day, brought on by the movement of our troops in securing commanding positions; but there was no actual fighting during this time except once, on the 13th, in front of mcclernand's command. that general had undertaken to capture a battery of the enemy which was annoying his men. without orders or authority he sent three regiments to make the assault. the battery was in the main line of the enemy, which was defended by his whole army present. of course the assault was a failure, and of course the loss on our side was great for the number of men engaged. in this assault colonel william morrison fell badly wounded. up to this time the surgeons with the army had no difficulty in finding room in the houses near our line for all the sick and wounded; but now hospitals were overcrowded. owing, however, to the energy and skill of the surgeons the suffering was not so great as it might have been. the hospital arrangements at fort donelson were as complete as it was possible to make them, considering the inclemency of the weather and the lack of tents, in a sparsely settled country where the houses were generally of but one or two rooms. on the return of captain walke to fort henry on the 10th, i had requested him to take the vessels that had accompanied him on his expedition up the tennessee, and get possession of the cumberland as far up towards donelson as possible. he started without delay, taking, however, only his own gunboat, the carondelet, towed by the steamer alps. captain walke arrived a few miles below donelson on the 12th, a little after noon. about the time the advance of troops reached a point within gunshot of the fort on the land side, he engaged the water batteries at long range. on the 13th i informed him of my arrival the day before and of the establishment of most of our batteries, requesting him at the same time to attack again that day so that i might take advantage of any diversion. the attack was made and many shots fell within the fort, creating some consternation, as we now know. the investment on the land side was made as complete as the number of troops engaged would admit of. during the night of the 13th flag-officer foote arrived with the iron-clads st. louis, louisville and pittsburg and the wooden gunboats tyler and conestoga, convoying thayer's brigade. on the morning of the 14th thayer was landed. wallace, whom i had ordered over from fort henry, also arrived about the same time. up to this time he had been commanding a brigade belonging to the division of general c. f. smith. these troops were now restored to the division they belonged to, and general lew. wallace was assigned to the command of a division composed of the brigade of colonel thayer and other reinforcements that arrived the same day. this new division was assigned to the centre, giving the two flanking divisions an opportunity to close up and form a stronger line. the plan was for the troops to hold the enemy within his lines, while the gunboats should attack the water batteries at close quarters and silence his guns if possible. some of the gunboats were to run the batteries, get above the fort and above the village of dover. i had ordered a reconnoissance made with the view of getting troops to the river above dover in case they should be needed there. that position attained by the gunboats it would have been but a question of time--and a very short time, too--when the garrison would have been compelled to surrender. by three in the afternoon of the 14th flag-officer foote was ready, and advanced upon the water batteries with his entire fleet. after coming in range of the batteries of the enemy the advance was slow, but a constant fire was delivered from every gun that could be brought to bear upon the fort. i occupied a position on shore from which i could see the advancing navy. the leading boat got within a very short distance of the water battery, not further off i think than two hundred yards, and i soon saw one and then another of them dropping down the river, visibly disabled. then the whole fleet followed and the engagement closed for the day. the gunboat which flag-officer foote was on, besides having been hit about sixty times, several of the shots passing through near the waterline, had a shot enter the pilot-house which killed the pilot, carried away the wheel and wounded the flag-officer himself. the tiller-ropes of another vessel were carried away and she, too, dropped helplessly back. two others had their pilot-houses so injured that they scarcely formed a protection to the men at the wheel. the enemy had evidently been much demoralized by the assault, but they were jubilant when they saw the disabled vessels dropping down the river entirely out of the control of the men on board. of course i only witnessed the falling back of our gunboats and felt sad enough at the time over the repulse. subsequent reports, now published, show that the enemy telegraphed a great victory to richmond. the sun went down on the night of the 14th of february, 1862, leaving the army confronting fort donelson anything but comforted over the prospects. the weather had turned intensely cold; the men were without tents and could not keep up fires where most of them had to stay, and, as previously stated, many had thrown away their overcoats and blankets. two of the strongest of our gunboats had been disabled, presumably beyond the possibility of rendering any present assistance. i retired this night not knowing but that i would have to intrench my position, and bring up tents for the men or build huts under the cover of the hills. on the morning of the 15th, before it was yet broad day, a messenger from flag-officer foote handed me a note, expressing a desire to see me on the flag-ship and saying that he had been injured the day before so much that he could not come himself to me. i at once made my preparations for starting. i directed my adjutant-general to notify each of the division commanders of my absence and instruct them to do nothing to bring on an engagement until they received further orders, but to hold their positions. from the heavy rains that had fallen for days and weeks preceding and from the constant use of the roads between the troops and the landing four to seven miles below, these roads had become cut up so as to be hardly passable. the intense cold of the night of the 14th-15th had frozen the ground solid. this made travel on horseback even slower than through the mud; but i went as fast as the roads would allow. when i reached the fleet i found the flag-ship was anchored out in the stream. a small boat, however, awaited my arrival and i was soon on board with the flag-officer. he explained to me in short the condition in which he was left by the engagement of the evening before, and suggested that i should intrench while he returned to mound city with his disabled boats, expressing at the time the belief that he could have the necessary repairs made and be back in ten days. i saw the absolute necessity of his gunboats going into hospital and did not know but i should be forced to the alternative of going through a siege. but the enemy relieved me from this necessity. when i left the national line to visit flag-officer foote i had no idea that there would be any engagement on land unless i brought it on myself. the conditions for battle were much more favorable to us than they had been for the first two days of the investment. from the 12th to the 14th we had but 15,000 men of all arms and no gunboats. now we had been reinforced by a fleet of six naval vessels, a large division of troops under general l. wallace and 2,500 men brought over from fort henry belonging to the division of c. f. smith. the enemy, however, had taken the initiative. just as i landed i met captain hillyer of my staff, white with fear, not for his personal safety, but for the safety of the national troops. he said the enemy had come out of his lines in full force and attacked and scattered mcclernand's division, which was in full retreat. the roads, as i have said, were unfit for making fast time, but i got to my command as soon as possible. the attack had been made on the national right. i was some four or five miles north of our left. the line was about three miles long. in reaching the point where the disaster had occurred i had to pass the divisions of smith and wallace. i saw no sign of excitement on the portion of the line held by smith; wallace was nearer the scene of conflict and had taken part in it. he had, at an opportune time, sent thayer's brigade to the support of mcclernand and thereby contributed to hold the enemy within his lines. i saw everything favorable for us along the line of our left and centre. when i came to the right appearances were different. the enemy had come out in full force to cut his way out and make his escape. mcclernand's division had to bear the brunt of the attack from this combined force. his men had stood up gallantly until the ammunition in their cartridge-boxes gave out. there was abundance of ammunition near by lying on the ground in boxes, but at that stage of the war it was not all of our commanders of regiments, brigades, or even divisions, who had been educated up to the point of seeing that their men were constantly supplied with ammunition during an engagement. when the men found themselves without ammunition they could not stand up against troops who seemed to have plenty of it. the division broke and a portion fled, but most of the men, as they were not pursued, only fell back out of range of the fire of the enemy. it must have been about this time that thayer pushed his brigade in between the enemy and those of our troops that were without ammunition. at all events the enemy fell back within his intrenchments and was there when i got on the field. i saw the men standing in knots talking in the most excited manner. no officer seemed to be giving any directions. the soldiers had their muskets, but no ammunition, while there were tons of it close at hand. i heard some of the men say that the enemy had come out with knapsacks, and haversacks filled with rations. they seemed to think this indicated a determination on his part to stay out and fight just as long as the provisions held out. i turned to colonel j. d. webster, of my staff, who was with me, and said: "some of our men are pretty badly demoralized, but the enemy must be more so, for he has attempted to force his way out, but has fallen back: the one who attacks first now will be victorious and the enemy will have to be in a hurry if he gets ahead of me." i determined to make the assault at once on our left. it was clear to my mind that the enemy had started to march out with his entire force, except a few pickets, and if our attack could be made on the left before the enemy could redistribute his forces along the line, we would find but little opposition except from the intervening abatis. i directed colonel webster to ride with me and call out to the men as we passed: "fill your cartridge-boxes, quick, and get into line; the enemy is trying to escape and he must not be permitted to do so." this acted like a charm. the men only wanted some one to give them a command. we rode rapidly to smith's quarters, when i explained the situation to him and directed him to charge the enemy's works in his front with his whole division, saying at the same time that he would find nothing but a very thin line to contend with. the general was off in an incredibly short time, going in advance himself to keep his men from firing while they were working their way through the abatis intervening between them and the enemy. the outer line of rifle-pits was passed, and the night of the 15th general smith, with much of his division, bivouacked within the lines of the enemy. there was now no doubt but that the confederates must surrender or be captured the next day. there seems from subsequent accounts to have been much consternation, particularly among the officers of high rank, in dover during the night of the 15th. general floyd, the commanding officer, who was a man of talent enough for any civil position, was no soldier and, possibly, did not possess the elements of one. he was further unfitted for command, for the reason that his conscience must have troubled him and made him afraid. as secretary of war he had taken a solemn oath to maintain the constitution of the united states and to uphold the same against all its enemies. he had betrayed that trust. as secretary of war he was reported through the northern press to have scattered the little army the country had so that the most of it could be picked up in detail when secession occurred. about a year before leaving the cabinet he had removed arms from northern to southern arsenals. he continued in the cabinet of president buchanan until about the 1st of january, 1861, while he was working vigilantly for the establishment of a confederacy made out of united states territory. well may he have been afraid to fall into the hands of national troops. he would no doubt have been tried for misappropriating public property, if not for treason, had he been captured. general pillow, next in command, was conceited, and prided himself much on his services in the mexican war. he telegraphed to general johnston, at nashville, after our men were within the rebel rifle-pits, and almost on the eve of his making his escape, that the southern troops had had great success all day. johnston forwarded the dispatch to richmond. while the authorities at the capital were reading it floyd and pillow were fugitives. a council of war was held by the enemy at which all agreed that it would be impossible to hold out longer. general buckner, who was third in rank in the garrison but much the most capable soldier, seems to have regarded it a duty to hold the fort until the general commanding the department, a. s. johnston, should get back to his headquarters at nashville. buckner's report shows, however, that he considered donelson lost and that any attempt to hold the place longer would be at the sacrifice of the command. being assured that johnston was already in nashville, buckner too agreed that surrender was the proper thing. floyd turned over the command to pillow, who declined it. it then devolved upon buckner, who accepted the responsibility of the position. floyd and pillow took possession of all the river transports at dover and before morning both were on their way to nashville, with the brigade formerly commanded by floyd and some other troops, in all about 3,000. some marched up the east bank of the cumberland; others went on the steamers. during the night forrest also, with his cavalry and some other troops about a thousand in all, made their way out, passing between our right and the river. they had to ford or swim over the back-water in the little creek just south of dover. before daylight general smith brought to me the following letter from general buckner: headquarters, fort donelson, february 16, 1862. sir:--in consideration of all the circumstances governing the present situation of affairs at this station, i propose to the commanding officer of the federal forces the appointment of commissioners to agree upon terms of capitulation of the forces and fort under my command, and in that view suggest an armistice until 12 o'clock to-day. i am, sir, very respectfully, your ob't se'v't, s. b. buckner, brig. gen. c. s. a. to brigadier-general u. s. grant, com'ding u. s. forces, near fort donelson. to this i responded as follows: headquarters army in the field, camp near donelson, february 16, 1862. general s. b. buckner, confederate army. sir:--yours of this date, proposing armistice and appointment of commissioners to settle terms of capitulation, is just received. no terms except an unconditional and immediate surrender can be accepted. i propose to move immediately upon your works. i am, sir, very respectfully, your ob't se'v't, u. s. grant, brig. gen. to this i received the following reply: headquarters, dover, tennessee, february 16, 1862. to brig. gen'l u. s. grant, u. s. army. sir:--the distribution of the forces under my command, incident to an unexpected change of commanders, and the overwhelming force under your command, compel me, notwithstanding the brilliant success of the confederate arms yesterday, to accept the ungenerous and unchivalrous terms which you propose. i am, sir, your very ob't se'v't, s. b. buckner, brig. gen. c. s. a. general buckner, as soon as he had dispatched the first of the above letters, sent word to his different commanders on the line of rifle-pits, notifying them that he had made a proposition looking to the surrender of the garrison, and directing them to notify national troops in their front so that all fighting might be prevented. white flags were stuck at intervals along the line of rifle-pits, but none over the fort. as soon as the last letter from buckner was received i mounted my horse and rode to dover. general wallace, i found, had preceded me an hour or more. i presume that, seeing white flags exposed in his front, he rode up to see what they meant and, not being fired upon or halted, he kept on until he found himself at the headquarters of general buckner. i had been at west point three years with buckner and afterwards served with him in the army, so that we were quite well acquainted. in the course of our conversation, which was very friendly, he said to me that if he had been in command i would not have got up to donelson as easily as i did. i told him that if he had been in command i should not have tried in the way i did: i had invested their lines with a smaller force than they had to defend them, and at the same time had sent a brigade full 5,000 strong, around by water; i had relied very much upon their commander to allow me to come safely up to the outside of their works. i asked general buckner about what force he had to surrender. he replied that he could not tell with any degree of accuracy; that all the sick and weak had been sent to nashville while we were about fort henry; that floyd and pillow had left during the night, taking many men with them; and that forrest, and probably others, had also escaped during the preceding night: the number of casualties he could not tell; but he said i would not find fewer than 12,000, nor more than 15,000. he asked permission to send parties outside of the lines to bury his dead, who had fallen on the 15th when they tried to get out. i gave directions that his permit to pass our limits should be recognized. i have no reason to believe that this privilege was abused, but it familiarized our guards so much with the sight of confederates passing to and fro that i have no doubt many got beyond our pickets unobserved and went on. the most of the men who went in that way no doubt thought they had had war enough, and left with the intention of remaining out of the army. some came to me and asked permission to go, saying that they were tired of the war and would not be caught in the ranks again, and i bade them go. the actual number of confederates at fort donelson can never be given with entire accuracy. the largest number admitted by any writer on the southern side, is by colonel preston johnston. he gives the number at 17,000. but this must be an underestimate. the commissary general of prisoners reported having issued rations to 14,623 fort donelson prisoners at cairo, as they passed that point. general pillow reported the killed and wounded at 2,000; but he had less opportunity of knowing the actual numbers than the officers of mcclernand's division, for most of the killed and wounded fell outside their works, in front of that division, and were buried or cared for by buckner after the surrender and when pillow was a fugitive. it is known that floyd and pillow escaped during the night of the 15th, taking with them not less than 3,000 men. forrest escaped with about 1,000 and others were leaving singly and in squads all night. it is probable that the confederate force at donelson, on the 15th of february, 1862, was 21,000 in round numbers. on the day fort donelson fell i had 27,000 men to confront the confederate lines and guard the road four or five miles to the left, over which all our supplies had to be drawn on wagons. during the 16th, after the surrender, additional reinforcements arrived. during the siege general sherman had been sent to smithland, at the mouth of the cumberland river, to forward reinforcements and supplies to me. at that time he was my senior in rank and there was no authority of law to assign a junior to command a senior of the same grade. but every boat that came up with supplies or reinforcements brought a note of encouragement from sherman, asking me to call upon him for any assistance he could render and saying that if he could be of service at the front i might send for him and he would waive rank. chapter xxiii. promoted major-general of volunteers--unoccupied territory--advance upon nashville--situation of the troops--confederate retreat--relieved of the command--restored to the command--general smith. the news of the fall of fort donelson caused great delight all over the north. at the south, particularly in richmond, the effect was correspondingly depressing. i was promptly promoted to the grade of major-general of volunteers, and confirmed by the senate. all three of my division commanders were promoted to the same grade and the colonels who commanded brigades were made brigadier-generals in the volunteer service. my chief, who was in st. louis, telegraphed his congratulations to general hunter in kansas for the services he had rendered in securing the fall of fort donelson by sending reinforcements so rapidly. to washington he telegraphed that the victory was due to general c. f. smith; "promote him," he said, "and the whole country will applaud." on the 19th there was published at st. louis a formal order thanking flag-officer foote and myself, and the forces under our command, for the victories on the tennessee and the cumberland. i received no other recognition whatever from general halleck. but general cullum, his chief of staff, who was at cairo, wrote me a warm congratulatory letter on his own behalf. i approved of general smith's promotion highly, as i did all the promotions that were made. my opinion was and still is that immediately after the fall of fort donelson the way was opened to the national forces all over the south-west without much resistance. if one general who would have taken the responsibility had been in command of all the troops west of the alleghanies, he could have marched to chattanooga, corinth, memphis and vicksburg with the troops we then had, and as volunteering was going on rapidly over the north there would soon have been force enough at all these centres to operate offensively against any body of the enemy that might be found near them. rapid movements and the acquisition of rebellious territory would have promoted volunteering, so that reinforcements could have been had as fast as transportation could have been obtained to carry them to their destination. on the other hand there were tens of thousands of strong able-bodied young men still at their homes in the south-western states, who had not gone into the confederate army in february, 1862, and who had no particular desire to go. if our lines had been extended to protect their homes, many of them never would have gone. providence ruled differently. time was given the enemy to collect armies and fortify his new positions; and twice afterwards he came near forcing his north-western front up to the ohio river. i promptly informed the department commander of our success at fort donelson and that the way was open now to clarksville and nashville; and that unless i received orders to the contrary i should take clarksville on the 21st and nashville about the 1st of march. both these places are on the cumberland river above fort donelson. as i heard nothing from headquarters on the subject, general c. f. smith was sent to clarksville at the time designated and found the place evacuated. the capture of forts henry and donelson had broken the line the enemy had taken from columbus to bowling green, and it was known that he was falling back from the eastern point of this line and that buell was following, or at least advancing. i should have sent troops to nashville at the time i sent to clarksville, but my transportation was limited and there were many prisoners to be forwarded north. none of the reinforcements from buell's army arrived until the 24th of february. then general nelson came up, with orders to report to me with two brigades, he having sent one brigade to cairo. i knew general buell was advancing on nashville from the north, and i was advised by scouts that the rebels were leaving that place, and trying to get out all the supplies they could. nashville was, at that time, one of the best provisioned posts in the south. i had no use for reinforcements now, and thinking buell would like to have his troops again, i ordered nelson to proceed to nashville without debarking at fort donelson. i sent a gunboat also as a convoy. the cumberland river was very high at the time; the railroad bridge at nashville had been burned, and all river craft had been destroyed, or would be before the enemy left. nashville is on the west bank of the cumberland, and buell was approaching from the east. i thought the steamers carrying nelson's division would be useful in ferrying the balance of buell's forces across. i ordered nelson to put himself in communication with buell as soon as possible, and if he found him more than two days off from nashville to return below the city and await orders. buell, however, had already arrived in person at edgefield, opposite nashville, and mitchell's division of his command reached there the same day. nelson immediately took possession of the city. after nelson had gone and before i had learned of buell's arrival, i sent word to department headquarters that i should go to nashville myself on the 28th if i received no orders to the contrary. hearing nothing, i went as i had informed my superior officer i would do. on arriving at clarksville i saw a fleet of steamers at the shore--the same that had taken nelson's division--and troops going aboard. i landed and called on the commanding officer, general c. f. smith. as soon as he saw me he showed an order he had just received from buell in these words: nashville, february 25, 1862. general c. f. smith, commanding u. s. forces, clarksville. general:--the landing of a portion of our troops, contrary to my intentions, on the south side of the river has compelled me to hold this side at every hazard. if the enemy should assume the offensive, and i am assured by reliable persons that in view of my position such is his intention, my force present is altogether inadequate, consisting of only 15,000 men. i have to request you, therefore, to come forward with all the available force under your command. so important do i consider the occasion that i think it necessary to give this communication all the force of orders, and i send four boats, the diana, woodford, john rain, and autocrat, to bring you up. in five or six days my force will probably be sufficient to relieve you. very respectfully, your ob't srv't, d. c. buell, brigadier-general comd'g. p. s.--the steamers will leave here at 12 o'clock to-night. general smith said this order was nonsense. but i told him it was better to obey it. the general replied, "of course i must obey," and said his men were embarking as fast as they could. i went on up to nashville and inspected the position taken by nelson's troops. i did not see buell during the day, and wrote him a note saying that i had been in nashville since early morning and had hoped to meet him. on my return to the boat we met. his troops were still east of the river, and the steamers that had carried nelson's division up were mostly at clarksville to bring smith's division. i said to general buell my information was that the enemy was retreating as fast as possible. general buell said there was fighting going on then only ten or twelve miles away. i said: "quite probably; nashville contained valuable stores of arms, ammunition and provisions, and the enemy is probably trying to carry away all he can. the fighting is doubtless with the rear-guard who are trying to protect the trains they are getting away with." buell spoke very positively of the danger nashville was in of an attack from the enemy. i said, in the absence of positive information, i believed my information was correct. he responded that he "knew." "well," i said, "i do not know; but as i came by clarksville general smith's troops were embarking to join you." smith's troops were returned the same day. the enemy were trying to get away from nashville and not to return to it. at this time general albert sidney johnston commanded all the confederate troops west of the alleghany mountains, with the exception of those in the extreme south. on the national side the forces confronting him were divided into, at first three, then four separate departments. johnston had greatly the advantage in having supreme command over all troops that could possibly be brought to bear upon one point, while the forces similarly situated on the national side, divided into independent commands, could not be brought into harmonious action except by orders from washington. at the beginning of 1862 johnston's troops east of the mississippi occupied a line extending from columbus, on his left, to mill springs, on his right. as we have seen, columbus, both banks of the tennessee river, the west bank of the cumberland and bowling green, all were strongly fortified. mill springs was intrenched. the national troops occupied no territory south of the ohio, except three small garrisons along its bank and a force thrown out from louisville to confront that at bowling green. johnston's strength was no doubt numerically inferior to that of the national troops; but this was compensated for by the advantage of being sole commander of all the confederate forces at the west, and of operating in a country where his friends would take care of his rear without any detail of soldiers. but when general george h. thomas moved upon the enemy at mill springs and totally routed him, inflicting a loss of some 300 killed and wounded, and forts henry and heiman fell into the hands of the national forces, with their armaments and about 100 prisoners, those losses seemed to dishearten the confederate commander so much that he immediately commenced a retreat from bowling green on nashville. he reached this latter place on the 14th of february, while donelson was still besieged. buell followed with a portion of the army of the ohio, but he had to march and did not reach the east bank of the cumberland opposite nashville until the 24th of the month, and then with only one division of his army. the bridge at nashville had been destroyed and all boats removed or disabled, so that a small garrison could have held the place against any national troops that could have been brought against it within ten days after the arrival of the force from bowling green. johnston seemed to lie quietly at nashville to await the result at fort donelson, on which he had staked the possession of most of the territory embraced in the states of kentucky and tennessee. it is true, the two generals senior in rank at fort donelson were sending him encouraging dispatches, even claiming great confederate victories up to the night of the 16th when they must have been preparing for their individual escape. johnston made a fatal mistake in intrusting so important a command to floyd, who he must have known was no soldier even if he possessed the elements of one. pillow's presence as second was also a mistake. if these officers had been forced upon him and designated for that particular command, then he should have left nashville with a small garrison under a trusty officer, and with the remainder of his force gone to donelson himself. if he had been captured the result could not have been worse than it was. johnston's heart failed him upon the first advance of national troops. he wrote to richmond on the 8th of february, "i think the gunboats of the enemy will probably take fort donelson without the necessity of employing their land force in cooperation." after the fall of that place he abandoned nashville and chattanooga without an effort to save either, and fell back into northern mississippi, where, six weeks later, he was destined to end his career. from the time of leaving cairo i was singularly unfortunate in not receiving dispatches from general halleck. the order of the 10th of february directing me to fortify fort henry strongly, particularly to the land side, and saying that intrenching tools had been sent for that purpose, reached me after donelson was invested. i received nothing direct which indicated that the department commander knew we were in possession of donelson. i was reporting regularly to the chief of staff, who had been sent to cairo, soon after the troops left there, to receive all reports from the front and to telegraph the substance to the st. louis headquarters. cairo was at the southern end of the telegraph wire. another line was started at once from cairo to paducah and smithland, at the mouths of the tennessee and cumberland respectively. my dispatches were all sent to cairo by boat, but many of those addressed to me were sent to the operator at the end of the advancing wire and he failed to forward them. this operator afterwards proved to be a rebel; he deserted his post after a short time and went south taking his dispatches with him. a telegram from general mcclellan to me of february 16th, the day of the surrender, directing me to report in full the situation, was not received at my headquarters until the 3d of march. on the 2d of march i received orders dated march 1st to move my command back to fort henry, leaving only a small garrison at donelson. from fort henry expeditions were to be sent against eastport, mississippi, and paris, tennessee. we started from donelson on the 4th, and the same day i was back on the tennessee river. on march 4th i also received the following dispatch from general halleck: maj.-gen. u. s. grant, fort henry: you will place maj.-gen. c. f. smith in command of expedition, and remain yourself at fort henry. why do you not obey my orders to report strength and positions of your command? h. w. halleck, major-general. i was surprised. this was the first intimation i had received that general halleck had called for information as to the strength of my command. on the 6th he wrote to me again. "your going to nashville without authority, and when your presence with your troops was of the utmost importance, was a matter of very serious complaint at washington, so much so that i was advised to arrest you on your return." this was the first i knew of his objecting to my going to nashville. that place was not beyond the limits of my command, which, it had been expressly declared in orders, were "not defined." nashville is west of the cumberland river, and i had sent troops that had reported to me for duty to occupy the place. i turned over the command as directed and then replied to general halleck courteously, but asked to be relieved from further duty under him. later i learned that general halleck had been calling lustily for more troops, promising that he would do something important if he could only be sufficiently reinforced. mcclellan asked him what force he then had. halleck telegraphed me to supply the information so far as my command was concerned, but i received none of his dispatches. at last halleck reported to washington that he had repeatedly ordered me to give the strength of my force, but could get nothing out of me; that i had gone to nashville, beyond the limits of my command, without his authority, and that my army was more demoralized by victory than the army at bull run had been by defeat. general mcclellan, on this information, ordered that i should be relieved from duty and that an investigation should be made into any charges against me. he even authorized my arrest. thus in less than two weeks after the victory at donelson, the two leading generals in the army were in correspondence as to what disposition should be made of me, and in less than three weeks i was virtually in arrest and without a command. on the 13th of march i was restored to command, and on the 17th halleck sent me a copy of an order from the war department which stated that accounts of my misbehavior had reached washington and directed him to investigate and report the facts. he forwarded also a copy of a detailed dispatch from himself to washington entirely exonerating me; but he did not inform me that it was his own reports that had created all the trouble. on the contrary, he wrote to me, "instead of relieving you, i wish you, as soon as your new army is in the field, to assume immediate command, and lead it to new victories." in consequence i felt very grateful to him, and supposed it was his interposition that had set me right with the government. i never knew the truth until general badeau unearthed the facts in his researches for his history of my campaigns. general halleck unquestionably deemed general c. f. smith a much fitter officer for the command of all the forces in the military district than i was, and, to render him available for such command, desired his promotion to antedate mine and those of the other division commanders. it is probable that the general opinion was that smith's long services in the army and distinguished deeds rendered him the more proper person for such command. indeed i was rather inclined to this opinion myself at that time, and would have served as faithfully under smith as he had done under me. but this did not justify the dispatches which general halleck sent to washington, or his subsequent concealment of them from me when pretending to explain the action of my superiors. on receipt of the order restoring me to command i proceeded to savannah on the tennessee, to which point my troops had advanced. general smith was delighted to see me and was unhesitating in his denunciation of the treatment i had received. he was on a sick bed at the time, from which he never came away alive. his death was a severe loss to our western army. his personal courage was unquestioned, his judgment and professional acquirements were unsurpassed, and he had the confidence of those he commanded as well as of those over him. chapter xxiv. the army at pittsburg landing--injured by a fall--the confederate attack at shiloh--the first day's fight at shiloh--general sherman--condition of the army--close of the first day's fight--the second day's fight --retreat and defeat of the confederates. when i reassumed command on the 17th of march i found the army divided, about half being on the east bank of the tennessee at savannah, while one division was at crump's landing on the west bank about four miles higher up, and the remainder at pittsburg landing, five miles above crump's. the enemy was in force at corinth, the junction of the two most important railroads in the mississippi valley--one connecting memphis and the mississippi river with the east, and the other leading south to all the cotton states. still another railroad connects corinth with jackson, in west tennessee. if we obtained possession of corinth the enemy would have no railroad for the transportation of armies or supplies until that running east from vicksburg was reached. it was the great strategic position at the west between the tennessee and the mississippi rivers and between nashville and vicksburg. i at once put all the troops at savannah in motion for pittsburg landing, knowing that the enemy was fortifying at corinth and collecting an army there under johnston. it was my expectation to march against that army as soon as buell, who had been ordered to reinforce me with the army of the ohio, should arrive; and the west bank of the river was the place to start from. pittsburg is only about twenty miles from corinth, and hamburg landing, four miles further up the river, is a mile or two nearer. i had not been in command long before i selected hamburg as the place to put the army of the ohio when it arrived. the roads from pittsburg and hamburg to corinth converge some eight miles out. this disposition of the troops would have given additional roads to march over when the advance commenced, within supporting distance of each other. before i arrived at savannah, sherman, who had joined the army of the tennessee and been placed in command of a division, had made an expedition on steamers convoyed by gunboats to the neighborhood of eastport, thirty miles south, for the purpose of destroying the railroad east of corinth. the rains had been so heavy for some time before that the low-lands had become impassable swamps. sherman debarked his troops and started out to accomplish the object of the expedition; but the river was rising so rapidly that the back-water up the small tributaries threatened to cut off the possibility of getting back to the boats, and the expedition had to return without reaching the railroad. the guns had to be hauled by hand through the water to get back to the boats. on the 17th of march the army on the tennessee river consisted of five divisions, commanded respectively by generals c. f. smith, mcclernand, l. wallace, hurlbut and sherman. general w. h. l. wallace was temporarily in command of smith's division, general smith, as i have said, being confined to his bed. reinforcements were arriving daily and as they came up they were organized, first into brigades, then into a division, and the command given to general prentiss, who had been ordered to report to me. general buell was on his way from nashville with 40,000 veterans. on the 19th of march he was at columbia, tennessee, eighty-five miles from pittsburg. when all reinforcements should have arrived i expected to take the initiative by marching on corinth, and had no expectation of needing fortifications, though this subject was taken into consideration. mcpherson, my only military engineer, was directed to lay out a line to intrench. he did so, but reported that it would have to be made in rear of the line of encampment as it then ran. the new line, while it would be nearer the river, was yet too far away from the tennessee, or even from the creeks, to be easily supplied with water, and in case of attack these creeks would be in the hands of the enemy. the fact is, i regarded the campaign we were engaged in as an offensive one and had no idea that the enemy would leave strong intrenchments to take the initiative when he knew he would be attacked where he was if he remained. this view, however, did not prevent every precaution being taken and every effort made to keep advised of all movements of the enemy. johnston's cavalry meanwhile had been well out towards our front, and occasional encounters occurred between it and our outposts. on the 1st of april this cavalry became bold and approached our lines, showing that an advance of some kind was contemplated. on the 2d johnston left corinth in force to attack my army. on the 4th his cavalry dashed down and captured a small picket guard of six or seven men, stationed some five miles out from pittsburg on the corinth road. colonel buckland sent relief to the guard at once and soon followed in person with an entire regiment, and general sherman followed buckland taking the remainder of a brigade. the pursuit was kept up for some three miles beyond the point where the picket guard had been captured, and after nightfall sherman returned to camp and reported to me by letter what had occurred. at this time a large body of the enemy was hovering to the west of us, along the line of the mobile and ohio railroad. my apprehension was much greater for the safety of crump's landing than it was for pittsburg. i had no apprehension that the enemy could really capture either place. but i feared it was possible that he might make a rapid dash upon crump's and destroy our transports and stores, most of which were kept at that point, and then retreat before wallace could be reinforced. lew. wallace's position i regarded as so well chosen that he was not removed. at this time i generally spent the day at pittsburg and returned to savannah in the evening. i was intending to remove my headquarters to pittsburg, but buell was expected daily and would come in at savannah. i remained at this point, therefore, a few days longer than i otherwise should have done, in order to meet him on his arrival. the skirmishing in our front, however, had been so continuous from about the 3d of april that i did not leave pittsburg each night until an hour when i felt there would be no further danger before the morning. on friday the 4th, the day of buckland's advance, i was very much injured by my horse falling with me, and on me, while i was trying to get to the front where firing had been heard. the night was one of impenetrable darkness, with rain pouring down in torrents; nothing was visible to the eye except as revealed by the frequent flashes of lightning. under these circumstances i had to trust to the horse, without guidance, to keep the road. i had not gone far, however, when i met general w. h. l. wallace and colonel (afterwards general) mcpherson coming from the direction of the front. they said all was quiet so far as the enemy was concerned. on the way back to the boat my horse's feet slipped from under him, and he fell with my leg under his body. the extreme softness of the ground, from the excessive rains of the few preceding days, no doubt saved me from a severe injury and protracted lameness. as it was, my ankle was very much injured, so much so that my boot had to be cut off. for two or three days after i was unable to walk except with crutches. on the 5th general nelson, with a division of buell's army, arrived at savannah and i ordered him to move up the east bank of the river, to be in a position where he could be ferried over to crump's landing or pittsburg as occasion required. i had learned that general buell himself would be at savannah the next day, and desired to meet me on his arrival. affairs at pittsburg landing had been such for several days that i did not want to be away during the day. i determined, therefore, to take a very early breakfast and ride out to meet buell, and thus save time. he had arrived on the evening of the 5th, but had not advised me of the fact and i was not aware of it until some time after. while i was at breakfast, however, heavy firing was heard in the direction of pittsburg landing, and i hastened there, sending a hurried note to buell informing him of the reason why i could not meet him at savannah. on the way up the river i directed the dispatch-boat to run in close to crump's landing, so that i could communicate with general lew. wallace. i found him waiting on a boat apparently expecting to see me, and i directed him to get his troops in line ready to execute any orders he might receive. he replied that his troops were already under arms and prepared to move. up to that time i had felt by no means certain that crump's landing might not be the point of attack. on reaching the front, however, about eight a.m., i found that the attack on pittsburg was unmistakable, and that nothing more than a small guard, to protect our transports and stores, was needed at crump's. captain baxter, a quartermaster on my staff, was accordingly directed to go back and order general wallace to march immediately to pittsburg by the road nearest the river. captain baxter made a memorandum of this order. about one p.m., not hearing from wallace and being much in need of reinforcements, i sent two more of my staff, colonel mcpherson and captain rowley, to bring him up with his division. they reported finding him marching towards purdy, bethel, or some point west from the river, and farther from pittsburg by several miles than when he started. the road from his first position to pittsburg landing was direct and near the river. between the two points a bridge had been built across snake creek by our troops, at which wallace's command had assisted, expressly to enable the troops at the two places to support each other in case of need. wallace did not arrive in time to take part in the first day's fight. general wallace has since claimed that the order delivered to him by captain baxter was simply to join the right of the army, and that the road over which he marched would have taken him to the road from pittsburg to purdy where it crosses owl creek on the right of sherman; but this is not where i had ordered him nor where i wanted him to go. i never could see and do not now see why any order was necessary further than to direct him to come to pittsburg landing, without specifying by what route. his was one of three veteran divisions that had been in battle, and its absence was severely felt. later in the war general wallace would not have made the mistake that he committed on the 6th of april, 1862. i presume his idea was that by taking the route he did he would be able to come around on the flank or rear of the enemy, and thus perform an act of heroism that would redound to the credit of his command, as well as to the benefit of his country. some two or three miles from pittsburg landing was a log meeting-house called shiloh. it stood on the ridge which divides the waters of snake and lick creeks, the former emptying into the tennessee just north of pittsburg landing, and the latter south. this point was the key to our position and was held by sherman. his division was at that time wholly raw, no part of it ever having been in an engagement; but i thought this deficiency was more than made up by the superiority of the commander. mcclernand was on sherman's left, with troops that had been engaged at forts henry and donelson and were therefore veterans so far as western troops had become such at that stage of the war. next to mcclernand came prentiss with a raw division, and on the extreme left, stuart with one brigade of sherman's division. hurlbut was in rear of prentiss, massed, and in reserve at the time of the onset. the division of general c. f. smith was on the right, also in reserve. general smith was still sick in bed at savannah, but within hearing of our guns. his services would no doubt have been of inestimable value had his health permitted his presence. the command of his division devolved upon brigadier-general w. h. l. wallace, a most estimable and able officer; a veteran too, for he had served a year in the mexican war and had been with his command at henry and donelson. wallace was mortally wounded in the first day's engagement, and with the change of commanders thus necessarily effected in the heat of battle the efficiency of his division was much weakened. the position of our troops made a continuous line from lick creek on the left to owl creek, a branch of snake creek, on the right, facing nearly south and possibly a little west. the water in all these streams was very high at the time and contributed to protect our flanks. the enemy was compelled, therefore, to attack directly in front. this he did with great vigor, inflicting heavy losses on the national side, but suffering much heavier on his own. the confederate assaults were made with such a disregard of losses on their own side that our line of tents soon fell into their hands. the ground on which the battle was fought was undulating, heavily timbered with scattered clearings, the woods giving some protection to the troops on both sides. there was also considerable underbrush. a number of attempts were made by the enemy to turn our right flank, where sherman was posted, but every effort was repulsed with heavy loss. but the front attack was kept up so vigorously that, to prevent the success of these attempts to get on our flanks, the national troops were compelled, several times, to take positions to the rear nearer pittsburg landing. when the firing ceased at night the national line was all of a mile in rear of the position it had occupied in the morning. in one of the backward moves, on the 6th, the division commanded by general prentiss did not fall back with the others. this left his flanks exposed and enabled the enemy to capture him with about 2,200 of his officers and men. general badeau gives four o'clock of the 6th as about the time this capture took place. he may be right as to the time, but my recollection is that the hour was later. general prentiss himself gave the hour as half-past five. i was with him, as i was with each of the division commanders that day, several times, and my recollection is that the last time i was with him was about half-past four, when his division was standing up firmly and the general was as cool as if expecting victory. but no matter whether it was four or later, the story that he and his command were surprised and captured in their camps is without any foundation whatever. if it had been true, as currently reported at the time and yet believed by thousands of people, that prentiss and his division had been captured in their beds, there would not have been an all-day struggle, with the loss of thousands killed and wounded on the confederate side. with the single exception of a few minutes after the capture of prentiss, a continuous and unbroken line was maintained all day from snake creek or its tributaries on the right to lick creek or the tennessee on the left above pittsburg. there was no hour during the day when there was not heavy firing and generally hard fighting at some point on the line, but seldom at all points at the same time. it was a case of southern dash against northern pluck and endurance. three of the five divisions engaged on sunday were entirely raw, and many of the men had only received their arms on the way from their states to the field. many of them had arrived but a day or two before and were hardly able to load their muskets according to the manual. their officers were equally ignorant of their duties. under these circumstances it is not astonishing that many of the regiments broke at the first fire. in two cases, as i now remember, colonels led their regiments from the field on first hearing the whistle of the enemy's bullets. in these cases the colonels were constitutional cowards, unfit for any military position; but not so the officers and men led out of danger by them. better troops never went upon a battle-field than many of these, officers and men, afterwards proved themselves to be, who fled panic stricken at the first whistle of bullets and shell at shiloh. during the whole of sunday i was continuously engaged in passing from one part of the field to another, giving directions to division commanders. in thus moving along the line, however, i never deemed it important to stay long with sherman. although his troops were then under fire for the first time, their commander, by his constant presence with them, inspired a confidence in officers and men that enabled them to render services on that bloody battle-field worthy of the best of veterans. mcclernand was next to sherman, and the hardest fighting was in front of these two divisions. mcclernand told me on that day, the 6th, that he profited much by having so able a commander supporting him. a casualty to sherman that would have taken him from the field that day would have been a sad one for the troops engaged at shiloh. and how near we came to this! on the 6th sherman was shot twice, once in the hand, once in the shoulder, the ball cutting his coat and making a slight wound, and a third ball passed through his hat. in addition to this he had several horses shot during the day. the nature of this battle was such that cavalry could not be used in front; i therefore formed ours into line in rear, to stop stragglers--of whom there were many. when there would be enough of them to make a show, and after they had recovered from their fright, they would be sent to reinforce some part of the line which needed support, without regard to their companies, regiments or brigades. on one occasion during the day i rode back as far as the river and met general buell, who had just arrived; i do not remember the hour, but at that time there probably were as many as four or five thousand stragglers lying under cover of the river bluff, panic-stricken, most of whom would have been shot where they lay, without resistance, before they would have taken muskets and marched to the front to protect themselves. this meeting between general buell and myself was on the dispatch-boat used to run between the landing and savannah. it was brief, and related specially to his getting his troops over the river. as we left the boat together, buell's attention was attracted by the men lying under cover of the river bank. i saw him berating them and trying to shame them into joining their regiments. he even threatened them with shells from the gunboats near by. but it was all to no effect. most of these men afterward proved themselves as gallant as any of those who saved the battle from which they had deserted. i have no doubt that this sight impressed general buell with the idea that a line of retreat would be a good thing just then. if he had come in by the front instead of through the stragglers in the rear, he would have thought and felt differently. could he have come through the confederate rear, he would have witnessed there a scene similar to that at our own. the distant rear of an army engaged in battle is not the best place from which to judge correctly what is going on in front. later in the war, while occupying the country between the tennessee and the mississippi, i learned that the panic in the confederate lines had not differed much from that within our own. some of the country people estimated the stragglers from johnston's army as high as 20,000. of course this was an exaggeration. the situation at the close of sunday was as follows: along the top of the bluff just south of the log-house which stood at pittsburg landing, colonel j. d. webster, of my staff, had arranged twenty or more pieces of artillery facing south or up the river. this line of artillery was on the crest of a hill overlooking a deep ravine opening into the tennessee. hurlbut with his division intact was on the right of this artillery, extending west and possibly a little north. mcclernand came next in the general line, looking more to the west. his division was complete in its organization and ready for any duty. sherman came next, his right extending to snake creek. his command, like the other two, was complete in its organization and ready, like its chief, for any service it might be called upon to render. all three divisions were, as a matter of course, more or less shattered and depleted in numbers from the terrible battle of the day. the division of w. h. l. wallace, as much from the disorder arising from changes of division and brigade commanders, under heavy fire, as from any other cause, had lost its organization and did not occupy a place in the line as a division. prentiss' command was gone as a division, many of its members having been killed, wounded or captured, but it had rendered valiant services before its final dispersal, and had contributed a good share to the defence of shiloh. the right of my line rested near the bank of snake creek, a short distance above the bridge which had been built by the troops for the purpose of connecting crump's landing and pittsburg landing. sherman had posted some troops in a log-house and out-buildings which overlooked both the bridge over which wallace was expected and the creek above that point. in this last position sherman was frequently attacked before night, but held the point until he voluntarily abandoned it to advance in order to make room for lew. wallace, who came up after dark. there was, as i have said, a deep ravine in front of our left. the tennessee river was very high and there was water to a considerable depth in the ravine. here the enemy made a last desperate effort to turn our flank, but was repelled. the gunboats tyler and lexington, gwin and shirk commanding, with the artillery under webster, aided the army and effectually checked their further progress. before any of buell's troops had reached the west bank of the tennessee, firing had almost entirely ceased; anything like an attempt on the part of the enemy to advance had absolutely ceased. there was some artillery firing from an unseen enemy, some of his shells passing beyond us; but i do not remember that there was the whistle of a single musket-ball heard. as his troops arrived in the dusk general buell marched several of his regiments part way down the face of the hill where they fired briskly for some minutes, but i do not think a single man engaged in this firing received an injury. the attack had spent its force. general lew. wallace, with 5,000 effective men, arrived after firing had ceased for the day, and was placed on the right. thus night came, wallace came, and the advance of nelson's division came; but none --unless night--in time to be of material service to the gallant men who saved shiloh on that first day against large odds. buell's loss on the 6th of april was two men killed and one wounded, all members of the 36th indiana infantry. the army of the tennessee lost on that day at least 7,000 men. the presence of two or three regiments of buell's army on the west bank before firing ceased had not the slightest effect in preventing the capture of pittsburg landing. so confident was i before firing had ceased on the 6th that the next day would bring victory to our arms if we could only take the initiative, that i visited each division commander in person before any reinforcements had reached the field. i directed them to throw out heavy lines of skirmishers in the morning as soon as they could see, and push them forward until they found the enemy, following with their entire divisions in supporting distance, and to engage the enemy as soon as found. to sherman i told the story of the assault at fort donelson, and said that the same tactics would win at shiloh. victory was assured when wallace arrived, even if there had been no other support. i was glad, however, to see the reinforcements of buell and credit them with doing all there was for them to do. during the night of the 6th the remainder of nelson's division, buell's army crossed the river and were ready to advance in the morning, forming the left wing. two other divisions, crittenden's and mccook's, came up the river from savannah in the transports and were on the west bank early on the 7th. buell commanded them in person. my command was thus nearly doubled in numbers and efficiency. during the night rain fell in torrents and our troops were exposed to the storm without shelter. i made my headquarters under a tree a few hundred yards back from the river bank. my ankle was so much swollen from the fall of my horse the friday night preceding, and the bruise was so painful, that i could get no rest. the drenching rain would have precluded the possibility of sleep without this additional cause. some time after midnight, growing restive under the storm and the continuous pain, i moved back to the log-house under the bank. this had been taken as a hospital, and all night wounded men were being brought in, their wounds dressed, a leg or an arm amputated as the case might require, and everything being done to save life or alleviate suffering. the sight was more unendurable than encountering the enemy's fire, and i returned to my tree in the rain. the advance on the morning of the 7th developed the enemy in the camps occupied by our troops before the battle began, more than a mile back from the most advanced position of the confederates on the day before. it is known now that they had not yet learned of the arrival of buell's command. possibly they fell back so far to get the shelter of our tents during the rain, and also to get away from the shells that were dropped upon them by the gunboats every fifteen minutes during the night. the position of the union troops on the morning of the 7th was as follows: general lew. wallace on the right; sherman on his left; then mcclernand and then hurlbut. nelson, of buell's army, was on our extreme left, next to the river. crittenden was next in line after nelson and on his right, mccook followed and formed the extreme right of buell's command. my old command thus formed the right wing, while the troops directly under buell constituted the left wing of the army. these relative positions were retained during the entire day, or until the enemy was driven from the field. in a very short time the battle became general all along the line. this day everything was favorable to the union side. we had now become the attacking party. the enemy was driven back all day, as we had been the day before, until finally he beat a precipitate retreat. the last point held by him was near the road leading from the landing to corinth, on the left of sherman and right of mcclernand. about three o'clock, being near that point and seeing that the enemy was giving way everywhere else, i gathered up a couple of regiments, or parts of regiments, from troops near by, formed them in line of battle and marched them forward, going in front myself to prevent premature or long-range firing. at this point there was a clearing between us and the enemy favorable for charging, although exposed. i knew the enemy were ready to break and only wanted a little encouragement from us to go quickly and join their friends who had started earlier. after marching to within musket-range i stopped and let the troops pass. the command, charge, was given, and was executed with loud cheers and with a run; when the last of the enemy broke. (*7) chapter xxv. struck by a bullet--precipitate retreat of the confederates --intrenchments at shiloh--general buell--general johnston--remarks on shiloh. during this second day of the battle i had been moving from right to left and back, to see for myself the progress made. in the early part of the afternoon, while riding with colonel mcpherson and major hawkins, then my chief commissary, we got beyond the left of our troops. we were moving along the northern edge of a clearing, very leisurely, toward the river above the landing. there did not appear to be an enemy to our right, until suddenly a battery with musketry opened upon us from the edge of the woods on the other side of the clearing. the shells and balls whistled about our ears very fast for about a minute. i do not think it took us longer than that to get out of range and out of sight. in the sudden start we made, major hawkins lost his hat. he did not stop to pick it up. when we arrived at a perfectly safe position we halted to take an account of damages. mcpherson's horse was panting as if ready to drop. on examination it was found that a ball had struck him forward of the flank just back of the saddle, and had gone entirely through. in a few minutes the poor beast dropped dead; he had given no sign of injury until we came to a stop. a ball had struck the metal scabbard of my sword, just below the hilt, and broken it nearly off; before the battle was over it had broken off entirely. there were three of us: one had lost a horse, killed; one a hat and one a sword-scabbard. all were thankful that it was no worse. after the rain of the night before and the frequent and heavy rains for some days previous, the roads were almost impassable. the enemy carrying his artillery and supply trains over them in his retreat, made them still worse for troops following. i wanted to pursue, but had not the heart to order the men who had fought desperately for two days, lying in the mud and rain whenever not fighting, and i did (*8) not feel disposed to positively order buell, or any part of his command, to pursue. although the senior in rank at the time i had been so only a few weeks. buell was, and had been for some time past, a department commander, while i commanded only a district. i did not meet buell in person until too late to get troops ready and pursue with effect; but had i seen him at the moment of the last charge i should have at least requested him to follow. i rode forward several miles the day after the battle, and found that the enemy had dropped much, if not all, of their provisions, some ammunition and the extra wheels of their caissons, lightening their loads to enable them to get off their guns. about five miles out we found their field hospital abandoned. an immediate pursuit must have resulted in the capture of a considerable number of prisoners and probably some guns. shiloh was the severest battle fought at the west during the war, and but few in the east equalled it for hard, determined fighting. i saw an open field, in our possession on the second day, over which the confederates had made repeated charges the day before, so covered with dead that it would have been possible to walk across the clearing, in any direction, stepping on dead bodies, without a foot touching the ground. on our side national and confederate troops were mingled together in about equal proportions; but on the remainder of the field nearly all were confederates. on one part, which had evidently not been ploughed for several years, probably because the land was poor, bushes had grown up, some to the height of eight or ten feet. there was not one of these left standing unpierced by bullets. the smaller ones were all cut down. contrary to all my experience up to that time, and to the experience of the army i was then commanding, we were on the defensive. we were without intrenchments or defensive advantages of any sort, and more than half the army engaged the first day was without experience or even drill as soldiers. the officers with them, except the division commanders and possibly two or three of the brigade commanders, were equally inexperienced in war. the result was a union victory that gave the men who achieved it great confidence in themselves ever after. the enemy fought bravely, but they had started out to defeat and destroy an army and capture a position. they failed in both, with very heavy loss in killed and wounded, and must have gone back discouraged and convinced that the "yankee" was not an enemy to be despised. after the battle i gave verbal instructions to division commanders to let the regiments send out parties to bury their own dead, and to detail parties, under commissioned officers from each division, to bury the confederate dead in their respective fronts and to report the numbers so buried. the latter part of these instructions was not carried out by all; but they were by those sent from sherman's division, and by some of the parties sent out by mcclernand. the heaviest loss sustained by the enemy was in front of these two divisions. the criticism has often been made that the union troops should have been intrenched at shiloh. up to that time the pick and spade had been but little resorted to at the west. i had, however, taken this subject under consideration soon after re-assuming command in the field, and, as already stated, my only military engineer reported unfavorably. besides this, the troops with me, officers and men, needed discipline and drill more than they did experience with the pick, shovel and axe. reinforcements were arriving almost daily, composed of troops that had been hastily thrown together into companies and regiments--fragments of incomplete organizations, the men and officers strangers to each other. under all these circumstances i concluded that drill and discipline were worth more to our men than fortifications. general buell was a brave, intelligent officer, with as much professional pride and ambition of a commendable sort as i ever knew. i had been two years at west point with him, and had served with him afterwards, in garrison and in the mexican war, several years more. he was not given in early life or in mature years to forming intimate acquaintances. he was studious by habit, and commanded the confidence and respect of all who knew him. he was a strict disciplinarian, and perhaps did not distinguish sufficiently between the volunteer who "enlisted for the war" and the soldier who serves in time of peace. one system embraced men who risked life for a principle, and often men of social standing, competence, or wealth and independence of character. the other includes, as a rule, only men who could not do as well in any other occupation. general buell became an object of harsh criticism later, some going so far as to challenge his loyalty. no one who knew him ever believed him capable of a dishonorable act, and nothing could be more dishonorable than to accept high rank and command in war and then betray the trust. when i came into command of the army in 1864, i requested the secretary of war to restore general buell to duty. after the war, during the summer of 1865, i travelled considerably through the north, and was everywhere met by large numbers of people. every one had his opinion about the manner in which the war had been conducted: who among the generals had failed, how, and why. correspondents of the press were ever on hand to hear every word dropped, and were not always disposed to report correctly what did not confirm their preconceived notions, either about the conduct of the war or the individuals concerned in it. the opportunity frequently occurred for me to defend general buell against what i believed to be most unjust charges. on one occasion a correspondent put in my mouth the very charge i had so often refuted--of disloyalty. this brought from general buell a very severe retort, which i saw in the new york world some time before i received the letter itself. i could very well understand his grievance at seeing untrue and disgraceful charges apparently sustained by an officer who, at the time, was at the head of the army. i replied to him, but not through the press. i kept no copy of my letter, nor did i ever see it in print; neither did i receive an answer. general albert sidney johnston, who commanded the confederate forces at the beginning of the battle, was disabled by a wound on the afternoon of the first day. this wound, as i understood afterwards, was not necessarily fatal, or even dangerous. but he was a man who would not abandon what he deemed an important trust in the face of danger and consequently continued in the saddle, commanding, until so exhausted by the loss of blood that he had to be taken from his horse, and soon after died. the news was not long in reaching our side and i suppose was quite an encouragement to the national soldiers. i had known johnston slightly in the mexican war and later as an officer in the regular army. he was a man of high character and ability. his contemporaries at west point, and officers generally who came to know him personally later and who remained on our side, expected him to prove the most formidable man to meet that the confederacy would produce. i once wrote that nothing occurred in his brief command of an army to prove or disprove the high estimate that had been placed upon his military ability; but after studying the orders and dispatches of johnston i am compelled to materially modify my views of that officer's qualifications as a soldier. my judgment now is that he was vacillating and undecided in his actions. all the disasters in kentucky and tennessee were so discouraging to the authorities in richmond that jefferson davis wrote an unofficial letter to johnston expressing his own anxiety and that of the public, and saying that he had made such defence as was dictated by long friendship, but that in the absence of a report he needed facts. the letter was not a reprimand in direct terms, but it was evidently as much felt as though it had been one. general johnston raised another army as rapidly as he could, and fortified or strongly intrenched at corinth. he knew the national troops were preparing to attack him in his chosen position. but he had evidently become so disturbed at the results of his operations that he resolved to strike out in an offensive campaign which would restore all that was lost, and if successful accomplish still more. we have the authority of his son and biographer for saying that his plan was to attack the forces at shiloh and crush them; then to cross the tennessee and destroy the army of buell, and push the war across the ohio river. the design was a bold one; but we have the same authority for saying that in the execution johnston showed vacillation and indecision. he left corinth on the 2d of april and was not ready to attack until the 6th. the distance his army had to march was less than twenty miles. beauregard, his second in command, was opposed to the attack for two reasons: first, he thought, if let alone the national troops would attack the confederates in their intrenchments; second, we were in ground of our own choosing and would necessarily be intrenched. johnston not only listened to the objection of beauregard to an attack, but held a council of war on the subject on the morning of the 5th. on the evening of the same day he was in consultation with some of his generals on the same subject, and still again on the morning of the 6th. during this last consultation, and before a decision had been reached, the battle began by the national troops opening fire on the enemy. this seemed to settle the question as to whether there was to be any battle of shiloh. it also seems to me to settle the question as to whether there was a surprise. i do not question the personal courage of general johnston, or his ability. but he did not win the distinction predicted for him by many of his friends. he did prove that as a general he was over-estimated. general beauregard was next in rank to johnston and succeeded to the command, which he retained to the close of the battle and during the subsequent retreat on corinth, as well as in the siege of that place. his tactics have been severely criticised by confederate writers, but i do not believe his fallen chief could have done any better under the circumstances. some of these critics claim that shiloh was won when johnston fell, and that if he had not fallen the army under me would have been annihilated or captured. ifs defeated the confederates at shiloh. there is little doubt that we would have been disgracefully beaten if all the shells and bullets fired by us had passed harmlessly over the enemy and if all of theirs had taken effect. commanding generals are liable to be killed during engagements; and the fact that when he was shot johnston was leading a brigade to induce it to make a charge which had been repeatedly ordered, is evidence that there was neither the universal demoralization on our side nor the unbounded confidence on theirs which has been claimed. there was, in fact, no hour during the day when i doubted the eventual defeat of the enemy, although i was disappointed that reinforcements so near at hand did not arrive at an earlier hour. the description of the battle of shiloh given by colonel wm. preston johnston is very graphic and well told. the reader will imagine that he can see each blow struck, a demoralized and broken mob of union soldiers, each blow sending the enemy more demoralized than ever towards the tennessee river, which was a little more than two miles away at the beginning of the onset. if the reader does not stop to inquire why, with such confederate success for more than twelve hours of hard fighting, the national troops were not all killed, captured or driven into the river, he will regard the pen picture as perfect. but i witnessed the fight from the national side from eight o'clock in the morning until night closed the contest. i see but little in the description that i can recognize. the confederate troops fought well and deserve commendation enough for their bravery and endurance on the 6th of april, without detracting from their antagonists or claiming anything more than their just dues. the reports of the enemy show that their condition at the end of the first day was deplorable; their losses in killed and wounded had been very heavy, and their stragglers had been quite as numerous as on the national side, with the difference that those of the enemy left the field entirely and were not brought back to their respective commands for many days. on the union side but few of the stragglers fell back further than the landing on the river, and many of these were in line for duty on the second day. the admissions of the highest confederate officers engaged at shiloh make the claim of a victory for them absurd. the victory was not to either party until the battle was over. it was then a union victory, in which the armies of the tennessee and the ohio both participated. but the army of the tennessee fought the entire rebel army on the 6th and held it at bay until near night; and night alone closed the conflict and not the three regiments of nelson's division. the confederates fought with courage at shiloh, but the particular skill claimed i could not and still cannot see; though there is nothing to criticise except the claims put forward for it since. but the confederate claimants for superiority in strategy, superiority in generalship and superiority in dash and prowess are not so unjust to the union troops engaged at shiloh as are many northern writers. the troops on both sides were american, and united they need not fear any foreign foe. it is possible that the southern man started in with a little more dash than his northern brother; but he was correspondingly less enduring. the endeavor of the enemy on the first day was simply to hurl their men against ours--first at one point, then at another, sometimes at several points at once. this they did with daring and energy, until at night the rebel troops were worn out. our effort during the same time was to be prepared to resist assaults wherever made. the object of the confederates on the second day was to get away with as much of their army and material as possible. ours then was to drive them from our front, and to capture or destroy as great a part as possible of their men and material. we were successful in driving them back, but not so successful in captures as if farther pursuit could have been made. as it was, we captured or recaptured on the second day about as much artillery as we lost on the first; and, leaving out the one great capture of prentiss, we took more prisoners on monday than the enemy gained from us on sunday. on the 6th sherman lost seven pieces of artillery, mcclernand six, prentiss eight, and hurlbut two batteries. on the 7th sherman captured seven guns, mcclernand three and the army of the ohio twenty. at shiloh the effective strength of the union forces on the morning of the 6th was 33,000 men. lew. wallace brought 5,000 more after nightfall. beauregard reported the enemy's strength at 40,955. according to the custom of enumeration in the south, this number probably excluded every man enlisted as musician or detailed as guard or nurse, and all commissioned officers--everybody who did not carry a musket or serve a cannon. with us everybody in the field receiving pay from the government is counted. excluding the troops who fled, panic-stricken, before they had fired a shot, there was not a time during the 6th when we had more than 25,000 men in line. on the 7th buell brought 20,000 more. of his remaining two divisions, thomas's did not reach the field during the engagement; wood's arrived before firing had ceased, but not in time to be of much service. our loss in the two days' fight was 1,754 killed, 8,408 wounded and 2,885 missing. of these, 2,103 were in the army of the ohio. beauregard reported a total loss of 10,699, of whom 1,728 were killed, 8,012 wounded and 957 missing. this estimate must be incorrect. we buried, by actual count, more of the enemy's dead in front of the divisions of mcclernand and sherman alone than here reported, and 4,000 was the estimate of the burial parties of the whole field. beauregard reports the confederate force on the 6th at over 40,000, and their total loss during the two days at 10,699; and at the same time declares that he could put only 20,000 men in battle on the morning of the 7th. the navy gave a hearty support to the army at shiloh, as indeed it always did both before and subsequently when i was in command. the nature of the ground was such, however, that on this occasion it could do nothing in aid of the troops until sundown on the first day. the country was broken and heavily timbered, cutting off all view of the battle from the river, so that friends would be as much in danger from fire from the gunboats as the foe. but about sundown, when the national troops were back in their last position, the right of the enemy was near the river and exposed to the fire of the two gun-boats, which was delivered with vigor and effect. after nightfall, when firing had entirely ceased on land, the commander of the fleet informed himself, approximately, of the position of our troops and suggested the idea of dropping a shell within the lines of the enemy every fifteen minutes during the night. this was done with effect, as is proved by the confederate reports. up to the battle of shiloh i, as well as thousands of other citizens, believed that the rebellion against the government would collapse suddenly and soon, if a decisive victory could be gained over any of its armies. donelson and henry were such victories. an army of more than 21,000 men was captured or destroyed. bowling green, columbus and hickman, kentucky, fell in consequence, and clarksville and nashville, tennessee, the last two with an immense amount of stores, also fell into our hands. the tennessee and cumberland rivers, from their mouths to the head of navigation, were secured. but when confederate armies were collected which not only attempted to hold a line farther south, from memphis to chattanooga, knoxville and on to the atlantic, but assumed the offensive and made such a gallant effort to regain what had been lost, then, indeed, i gave up all idea of saving the union except by complete conquest. up to that time it had been the policy of our army, certainly of that portion commanded by me, to protect the property of the citizens whose territory was invaded, without regard to their sentiments, whether union or secession. after this, however, i regarded it as humane to both sides to protect the persons of those found at their homes, but to consume everything that could be used to support or supply armies. protection was still continued over such supplies as were within lines held by us and which we expected to continue to hold; but such supplies within the reach of confederate armies i regarded as much contraband as arms or ordnance stores. their destruction was accomplished without bloodshed and tended to the same result as the destruction of armies. i continued this policy to the close of the war. promiscuous pillaging, however, was discouraged and punished. instructions were always given to take provisions and forage under the direction of commissioned officers who should give receipts to owners, if at home, and turn the property over to officers of the quartermaster or commissary departments to be issued as if furnished from our northern depots. but much was destroyed without receipts to owners, when it could not be brought within our lines and would otherwise have gone to the support of secession and rebellion. this policy i believe exercised a material influence in hastening the end. the battle of shiloh, or pittsburg landing, has been perhaps less understood, or, to state the case more accurately, more persistently misunderstood, than any other engagement between national and confederate troops during the entire rebellion. correct reports of the battle have been published, notably by sherman, badeau and, in a speech before a meeting of veterans, by general prentiss; but all of these appeared long subsequent to the close of the rebellion and after public opinion had been most erroneously formed. i myself made no report to general halleck, further than was contained in a letter, written immediately after the battle informing him that an engagement had been fought and announcing the result. a few days afterwards general halleck moved his headquarters to pittsburg landing and assumed command of the troops in the field. although next to him in rank, and nominally in command of my old district and army, i was ignored as much as if i had been at the most distant point of territory within my jurisdiction; and although i was in command of all the troops engaged at shiloh i was not permitted to see one of the reports of general buell or his subordinates in that battle, until they were published by the war department long after the event. for this reason i never made a full official report of this engagement. chapter xxvi. halleck assumes command in the field--the advance upon corinth --occupation of corinth--the army separated. general halleck arrived at pittsburg landing on the 11th of april and immediately assumed command in the field. on the 21st general pope arrived with an army 30,000 strong, fresh from the capture of island number ten in the mississippi river. he went into camp at hamburg landing five miles above pittsburg. halleck had now three armies: the army of the ohio, buell commanding; the army of the mississippi, pope commanding; and the army of the tennessee. his orders divided the combined force into the right wing, reserve, centre and left wing. major-general george h. thomas, who had been in buell's army, was transferred with his division to the army of the tennessee and given command of the right wing, composed of all of that army except mcclernand's and lew. wallace's divisions. mcclernand was assigned to the command of the reserve, composed of his own and lew. wallace's divisions. buell commanded the centre, the army of the ohio; and pope the left wing, the army of the mississippi. i was named second in command of the whole, and was also supposed to be in command of the right wing and reserve. orders were given to all the commanders engaged at shiloh to send in their reports without delay to department headquarters. those from officers of the army of the tennessee were sent through me; but from the army of the ohio they were sent by general buell without passing through my hands. general halleck ordered me, verbally, to send in my report, but i positively declined on the ground that he had received the reports of a part of the army engaged at shiloh without their coming through me. he admitted that my refusal was justifiable under the circumstances, but explained that he had wanted to get the reports off before moving the command, and as fast as a report had come to him he had forwarded it to washington. preparations were at once made upon the arrival of the new commander for an advance on corinth. owl creek, on our right, was bridged, and expeditions were sent to the north-west and west to ascertain if our position was being threatened from those quarters; the roads towards corinth were corduroyed and new ones made; lateral roads were also constructed, so that in case of necessity troops marching by different routes could reinforce each other. all commanders were cautioned against bringing on an engagement and informed in so many words that it would be better to retreat than to fight. by the 30th of april all preparations were complete; the country west to the mobile and ohio railroad had been reconnoitred, as well as the road to corinth as far as monterey twelve miles from pittsburg. everywhere small bodies of the enemy had been encountered, but they were observers and not in force to fight battles. corinth, mississippi, lies in a south-westerly direction from pittsburg landing and about nineteen miles away as the bird would fly, but probably twenty-two by the nearest wagon-road. it is about four miles south of the line dividing the states of tennessee and mississippi, and at the junction of the mississippi and chattanooga railroad with the mobile and ohio road which runs from columbus to mobile. from pittsburg to corinth the land is rolling, but at no point reaching an elevation that makes high hills to pass over. in 1862 the greater part of the country was covered with forest with intervening clearings and houses. underbrush was dense in the low grounds along the creeks and ravines, but generally not so thick on the high land as to prevent men passing through with ease. there are two small creeks running from north of the town and connecting some four miles south, where they form bridge creek which empties into the tuscumbia river. corinth is on the ridge between these streams and is a naturally strong defensive position. the creeks are insignificant in volume of water, but the stream to the east widens out in front of the town into a swamp impassable in the presence of an enemy. on the crest of the west bank of this stream the enemy was strongly intrenched. corinth was a valuable strategic point for the enemy to hold, and consequently a valuable one for us to possess ourselves of. we ought to have seized it immediately after the fall of donelson and nashville, when it could have been taken without a battle, but failing then it should have been taken, without delay on the concentration of troops at pittsburg landing after the battle of shiloh. in fact the arrival of pope should not have been awaited. there was no time from the battle of shiloh up to the evacuation of corinth when the enemy would not have left if pushed. the demoralization among the confederates from their defeats at henry and donelson; their long marches from bowling green, columbus, and nashville, and their failure at shiloh; in fact from having been driven out of kentucky and tennessee, was so great that a stand for the time would have been impossible. beauregard made strenuous efforts to reinforce himself and partially succeeded. he appealed to the people of the south-west for new regiments, and received a few. a. s. johnston had made efforts to reinforce in the same quarter, before the battle of shiloh, but in a different way. he had negroes sent out to him to take the place of teamsters, company cooks and laborers in every capacity, so as to put all his white men into the ranks. the people, while willing to send their sons to the field, were not willing to part with their negroes. it is only fair to state that they probably wanted their blacks to raise supplies for the army and for the families left at home. beauregard, however, was reinforced by van dorn immediately after shiloh with 17,000 men. interior points, less exposed, were also depleted to add to the strength at corinth. with these reinforcements and the new regiments, beauregard had, during the month of may, 1862, a large force on paper, but probably not much over 50,000 effective men. we estimated his strength at 70,000. our own was, in round numbers, 120,000. the defensible nature of the ground at corinth, and the fortifications, made 50,000 then enough to maintain their position against double that number for an indefinite time but for the demoralization spoken of. on the 30th of april the grand army commenced its advance from shiloh upon corinth. the movement was a siege from the start to the close. the national troops were always behind intrenchments, except of course the small reconnoitring parties sent to the front to clear the way for an advance. even the commanders of these parties were cautioned, "not to bring on an engagement." "it is better to retreat than to fight." the enemy were constantly watching our advance, but as they were simply observers there were but few engagements that even threatened to become battles. all the engagements fought ought to have served to encourage the enemy. roads were again made in our front, and again corduroyed; a line was intrenched, and the troops were advanced to the new position. cross roads were constructed to these new positions to enable the troops to concentrate in case of attack. the national armies were thoroughly intrenched all the way from the tennessee river to corinth. for myself i was little more than an observer. orders were sent direct to the right wing or reserve, ignoring me, and advances were made from one line of intrenchments to another without notifying me. my position was so embarrassing in fact that i made several applications during the siege to be relieved. general halleck kept his headquarters generally, if not all the time, with the right wing. pope being on the extreme left did not see so much of his chief, and consequently got loose as it were at times. on the 3d of may he was at seven mile creek with the main body of his command, but threw forward a division to farmington, within four miles of corinth. his troops had quite a little engagement at farmington on that day, but carried the place with considerable loss to the enemy. there would then have been no difficulty in advancing the centre and right so as to form a new line well up to the enemy, but pope was ordered back to conform with the general line. on the 8th of may he moved again, taking his whole force to farmington, and pushed out two divisions close to the rebel line. again he was ordered back. by the 4th of may the centre and right wing reached monterey, twelve miles out. their advance was slow from there, for they intrenched with every forward movement. the left wing moved up again on the 25th of may and intrenched itself close to the enemy. the creek with the marsh before described, separated the two lines. skirmishers thirty feet apart could have maintained either line at this point. our centre and right were, at this time, extended so that the right of the right wing was probably five miles from corinth and four from the works in their front. the creek, which was a formidable obstacle for either side to pass on our left, became a very slight obstacle on our right. here the enemy occupied two positions. one of them, as much as two miles out from his main line, was on a commanding elevation and defended by an intrenched battery with infantry supports. a heavy wood intervened between this work and the national forces. in rear to the south there was a clearing extending a mile or more, and south of this clearing a log-house which had been loop-holed and was occupied by infantry. sherman's division carried these two positions with some loss to himself, but with probably greater to the enemy, on the 28th of may, and on that day the investment of corinth was complete, or as complete as it was ever made. thomas' right now rested west of the mobile and ohio railroad. pope's left commanded the memphis and charleston railroad east of corinth. some days before i had suggested to the commanding general that i thought if he would move the army of the mississippi at night, by the rear of the centre and right, ready to advance at daylight, pope would find no natural obstacle in his front and, i believed, no serious artificial one. the ground, or works, occupied by our left could be held by a thin picket line, owing to the stream and swamp in front. to the right the troops would have a dry ridge to march over. i was silenced so quickly that i felt that possibly i had suggested an unmilitary movement. later, probably on the 28th of may, general logan, whose command was then on the mobile and ohio railroad, said to me that the enemy had been evacuating for several days and that if allowed he could go into corinth with his brigade. trains of cars were heard coming in and going out of corinth constantly. some of the men who had been engaged in various capacities on railroads before the war claimed that they could tell, by putting their ears to the rail, not only which way the trains were moving but which trains were loaded and which were empty. they said loaded trains had been going out for several days and empty ones coming in. subsequent events proved the correctness of their judgment. beauregard published his orders for the evacuation of corinth on the 26th of may and fixed the 29th for the departure of his troops, and on the 30th of may general halleck had his whole army drawn up prepared for battle and announced in orders that there was every indication that our left was to be attacked that morning. corinth had already been evacuated and the national troops marched on and took possession without opposition. everything had been destroyed or carried away. the confederate commander had instructed his soldiers to cheer on the arrival of every train to create the impression among the yankees that reinforcements were arriving. there was not a sick or wounded man left by the confederates, nor stores of any kind. some ammunition had been blown up--not removed--but the trophies of war were a few quaker guns, logs of about the diameter of ordinary cannon, mounted on wheels of wagons and pointed in the most threatening manner towards us. the possession of corinth by the national troops was of strategic importance, but the victory was barren in every other particular. it was nearly bloodless. it is a question whether the morale of the confederate troops engaged at corinth was not improved by the immunity with which they were permitted to remove all public property and then withdraw themselves. on our side i know officers and men of the army of the tennessee--and i presume the same is true of those of the other commands--were disappointed at the result. they could not see how the mere occupation of places was to close the war while large and effective rebel armies existed. they believed that a well-directed attack would at least have partially destroyed the army defending corinth. for myself i am satisfied that corinth could have been captured in a two days' campaign commenced promptly on the arrival of reinforcements after the battle of shiloh. general halleck at once commenced erecting fortifications around corinth on a scale to indicate that this one point must be held if it took the whole national army to do it. all commanding points two or three miles to the south, south-east and south-west were strongly fortified. it was expected in case of necessity to connect these forts by rifle-pits. they were laid out on a scale that would have required 100,000 men to fully man them. it was probably thought that a final battle of the war would be fought at that point. these fortifications were never used. immediately after the occupation of corinth by the national troops, general pope was sent in pursuit of the retreating garrison and general buell soon followed. buell was the senior of the two generals and commanded the entire column. the pursuit was kept up for some thirty miles, but did not result in the capture of any material of war or prisoners, unless a few stragglers who had fallen behind and were willing captives. on the 10th of june the pursuing column was all back at corinth. the army of the tennessee was not engaged in any of these movements. the confederates were now driven out of west tennessee, and on the 6th of june, after a well-contested naval battle, the national forces took possession of memphis and held the mississippi river from its source to that point. the railroad from columbus to corinth was at once put in good condition and held by us. we had garrisons at donelson, clarksville and nashville, on the cumberland river, and held the tennessee river from its mouth to eastport. new orleans and baton rouge had fallen into the possession of the national forces, so that now the confederates at the west were narrowed down for all communication with richmond to the single line of road running east from vicksburg. to dispossess them of this, therefore, became a matter of the first importance. the possession of the mississippi by us from memphis to baton rouge was also a most important object. it would be equal to the amputation of a limb in its weakening effects upon the enemy. after the capture of corinth a movable force of 80,000 men, besides enough to hold all the territory acquired, could have been set in motion for the accomplishment of any great campaign for the suppression of the rebellion. in addition to this fresh troops were being raised to swell the effective force. but the work of depletion commenced. buell with the army of the ohio was sent east, following the line of the memphis and charleston railroad. this he was ordered to repair as he advanced --only to have it destroyed by small guerilla bands or other troops as soon as he was out of the way. if he had been sent directly to chattanooga as rapidly as he could march, leaving two or three divisions along the line of the railroad from nashville forward, he could have arrived with but little fighting, and would have saved much of the loss of life which was afterwards incurred in gaining chattanooga. bragg would then not have had time to raise an army to contest the possession of middle and east tennessee and kentucky; the battles of stone river and chickamauga would not necessarily have been fought; burnside would not have been besieged in knoxville without the power of helping himself or escaping; the battle of chattanooga would not have been fought. these are the negative advantages, if the term negative is applicable, which would probably have resulted from prompt movements after corinth fell into the possession of the national forces. the positive results might have been: a bloodless advance to atlanta, to vicksburg, or to any other desired point south of corinth in the interior of mississippi. chapter xxvii. headquarters moved to memphis--on the road to memphis--escaping jackson --complaints and requests--halleck appointed commander-in-chief--return to corinth--movements of bragg--surrender of clarksville--the advance upon chattanooga--sheridan colonel of a michigan regiment. my position at corinth, with a nominal command and yet no command, became so unbearable that i asked permission of halleck to remove my headquarters to memphis. i had repeatedly asked, between the fall of donelson and the evacuation of corinth, to be relieved from duty under halleck; but all my applications were refused until the occupation of the town. i then obtained permission to leave the department, but general sherman happened to call on me as i was about starting and urged me so strongly not to think of going, that i concluded to remain. my application to be permitted to remove my headquarters to memphis was, however, approved, and on the 21st of june i started for that point with my staff and a cavalry escort of only a part of one company. there was a detachment of two or three companies going some twenty-five miles west to be stationed as a guard to the railroad. i went under cover of this escort to the end of their march, and the next morning proceeded to la grange with no convoy but the few cavalry men i had with me. from la grange to memphis the distance is forty-seven miles. there were no troops stationed between these two points, except a small force guarding a working party which was engaged in repairing the railroad. not knowing where this party would be found i halted at la grange. general hurlbut was in command there at the time and had his headquarters tents pitched on the lawn of a very commodious country house. the proprietor was at home and, learning of my arrival, he invited general hurlbut and me to dine with him. i accepted the invitation and spent a very pleasant afternoon with my host, who was a thorough southern gentleman fully convinced of the justice of secession. after dinner, seated in the capacious porch, he entertained me with a recital of the services he was rendering the cause. he was too old to be in the ranks himself--he must have been quite seventy then--but his means enabled him to be useful in other ways. in ordinary times the homestead where he was now living produced the bread and meat to supply the slaves on his main plantation, in the low-lands of mississippi. now he raised food and forage on both places, and thought he would have that year a surplus sufficient to feed three hundred families of poor men who had gone into the war and left their families dependent upon the "patriotism" of those better off. the crops around me looked fine, and i had at the moment an idea that about the time they were ready to be gathered the "yankee" troops would be in the neighborhood and harvest them for the benefit of those engaged in the suppression of the rebellion instead of its support. i felt, however, the greatest respect for the candor of my host and for his zeal in a cause he thoroughly believed in, though our views were as wide apart as it is possible to conceive. the 23d of june, 1862, on the road from la grange to memphis was very warm, even for that latitude and season. with my staff and small escort i started at an early hour, and before noon we arrived within twenty miles of memphis. at this point i saw a very comfortable-looking white-haired gentleman seated at the front of his house, a little distance from the road. i let my staff and escort ride ahead while i halted and, for an excuse, asked for a glass of water. i was invited at once to dismount and come in. i found my host very genial and communicative, and staid longer than i had intended, until the lady of the house announced dinner and asked me to join them. the host, however, was not pressing, so that i declined the invitation and, mounting my horse, rode on. about a mile west from where i had been stopping a road comes up from the southeast, joining that from la grange to memphis. a mile west of this junction i found my staff and escort halted and enjoying the shade of forest trees on the lawn of a house located several hundred feet back from the road, their horses hitched to the fence along the line of the road. i, too, stopped and we remained there until the cool of the afternoon, and then rode into memphis. the gentleman with whom i had stopped twenty miles from memphis was a mr. de loche, a man loyal to the union. he had not pressed me to tarry longer with him because in the early part of my visit a neighbor, a dr. smith, had called and, on being presented to me, backed off the porch as if something had hit him. mr. de loche knew that the rebel general jackson was in that neighborhood with a detachment of cavalry. his neighbor was as earnest in the southern cause as was mr. de loche in that of the union. the exact location of jackson was entirely unknown to mr. de loche; but he was sure that his neighbor would know it and would give information of my presence, and this made my stay unpleasant to him after the call of dr. smith. i have stated that a detachment of troops was engaged in guarding workmen who were repairing the railroad east of memphis. on the day i entered memphis, jackson captured a small herd of beef cattle which had been sent east for the troops so engaged. the drovers were not enlisted men and he released them. a day or two after one of these drovers came to my headquarters and, relating the circumstances of his capture, said jackson was very much disappointed that he had not captured me; that he was six or seven miles south of the memphis and charleston railroad when he learned that i was stopping at the house of mr. de loche, and had ridden with his command to the junction of the road he was on with that from la grange and memphis, where he learned that i had passed three-quarters of an hour before. he thought it would be useless to pursue with jaded horses a well-mounted party with so much of a start. had he gone three-quarters of a mile farther he would have found me with my party quietly resting under the shade of trees and without even arms in our hands with which to defend ourselves. general jackson of course did not communicate his disappointment at not capturing me to a prisoner, a young drover; but from the talk among the soldiers the facts related were learned. a day or two later mr. de loche called on me in memphis to apologize for his apparent incivility in not insisting on my staying for dinner. he said that his wife accused him of marked discourtesy, but that, after the call of his neighbor, he had felt restless until i got away. i never met general jackson before the war, nor during it, but have met him since at his very comfortable summer home at manitou springs, colorado. i reminded him of the above incident, and this drew from him the response that he was thankful now he had not captured me. i certainly was very thankful too. my occupation of memphis as district headquarters did not last long. the period, however, was marked by a few incidents which were novel to me. up to that time i had not occupied any place in the south where the citizens were at home in any great numbers. dover was within the fortifications at fort donelson, and, as far as i remember, every citizen was gone. there were no people living at pittsburg landing, and but very few at corinth. memphis, however, was a populous city, and there were many of the citizens remaining there who were not only thoroughly impressed with the justice of their cause, but who thought that even the "yankee soldiery" must entertain the same views if they could only be induced to make an honest confession. it took hours of my time every day to listen to complaints and requests. the latter were generally reasonable, and if so they were granted; but the complaints were not always, or even often, well founded. two instances will mark the general character. first: the officer who commanded at memphis immediately after the city fell into the hands of the national troops had ordered one of the churches of the city to be opened to the soldiers. army chaplains were authorized to occupy the pulpit. second: at the beginning of the war the confederate congress had passed a law confiscating all property of "alien enemies" at the south, including the debts of southerners to northern men. in consequence of this law, when memphis was occupied the provost-marshal had forcibly collected all the evidences he could obtain of such debts. almost the first complaints made to me were these two outrages. the gentleman who made the complaints informed me first of his own high standing as a lawyer, a citizen and a christian. he was a deacon in the church which had been defiled by the occupation of union troops, and by a union chaplain filling the pulpit. he did not use the word "defile," but he expressed the idea very clearly. he asked that the church be restored to the former congregation. i told him that no order had been issued prohibiting the congregation attending the church. he said of course the congregation could not hear a northern clergyman who differed so radically with them on questions of government. i told him the troops would continue to occupy that church for the present, and that they would not be called upon to hear disloyal sentiments proclaimed from the pulpit. this closed the argument on the first point. then came the second. the complainant said that he wanted the papers restored to him which had been surrendered to the provost-marshal under protest; he was a lawyer, and before the establishment of the "confederate states government" had been the attorney for a number of large business houses at the north; that "his government" had confiscated all debts due "alien enemies," and appointed commissioners, or officers, to collect such debts and pay them over to the "government": but in his case, owing to his high standing, he had been permitted to hold these claims for collection, the responsible officials knowing that he would account to the "government" for every dollar received. he said that his "government," when it came in possession of all its territory, would hold him personally responsible for the claims he had surrendered to the provost-marshal. his impudence was so sublime that i was rather amused than indignant. i told him, however, that if he would remain in memphis i did not believe the confederate government would ever molest him. he left, no doubt, as much amazed at my assurance as i was at the brazenness of his request. on the 11th of july general halleck received telegraphic orders appointing him to the command of all the armies, with headquarters in washington. his instructions pressed him to proceed to his new field of duty with as little delay as was consistent with the safety and interests of his previous command. i was next in rank, and he telegraphed me the same day to report at department headquarters at corinth. i was not informed by the dispatch that my chief had been ordered to a different field and did not know whether to move my headquarters or not. i telegraphed asking if i was to take my staff with me, and received word in reply: "this place will be your headquarters. you can judge for yourself." i left memphis for my new field without delay, and reached corinth on the 15th of the month. general halleck remained until the 17th of july; but he was very uncommunicative, and gave me no information as to what i had been called to corinth for. when general halleck left to assume the duties of general-in-chief i remained in command of the district of west tennessee. practically i became a department commander, because no one was assigned to that position over me and i made my reports direct to the general-in-chief; but i was not assigned to the position of department commander until the 25th of october. general halleck while commanding the department of the mississippi had had control as far east as a line drawn from chattanooga north. my district only embraced west tennessee and kentucky west of the cumberland river. buell, with the army of the ohio, had, as previously stated, been ordered east towards chattanooga, with instructions to repair the memphis and charleston railroad as he advanced. troops had been sent north by halleck along the line of the mobile and ohio railroad to put it in repair as far as columbus. other troops were stationed on the railroad from jackson, tennessee, to grand junction, and still others on the road west to memphis. the remainder of the magnificent army of 120,000 men which entered corinth on the 30th of may had now become so scattered that i was put entirely on the defensive in a territory whose population was hostile to the union. one of the first things i had to do was to construct fortifications at corinth better suited to the garrison that could be spared to man them. the structures that had been built during the months of may and june were left as monuments to the skill of the engineer, and others were constructed in a few days, plainer in design but suited to the command available to defend them. i disposed the troops belonging to the district in conformity with the situation as rapidly as possible. the forces at donelson, clarksville and nashville, with those at corinth and along the railroad eastward, i regarded as sufficient for protection against any attack from the west. the mobile and ohio railroad was guarded from rienzi, south of corinth, to columbus; and the mississippi central railroad from jackson, tennessee, to bolivar. grand junction and la grange on the memphis railroad were abandoned. south of the army of the tennessee, and confronting it, was van dorn, with a sufficient force to organize a movable army of thirty-five to forty thousand men, after being reinforced by price from missouri. this movable force could be thrown against either corinth, bolivar or memphis; and the best that could be done in such event would be to weaken the points not threatened in order to reinforce the one that was. nothing could be gained on the national side by attacking elsewhere, because the territory already occupied was as much as the force present could guard. the most anxious period of the war, to me, was during the time the army of the tennessee was guarding the territory acquired by the fall of corinth and memphis and before i was sufficiently reinforced to take the offensive. the enemy also had cavalry operating in our rear, making it necessary to guard every point of the railroad back to columbus, on the security of which we were dependent for all our supplies. headquarters were connected by telegraph with all points of the command except memphis and the mississippi below columbus. with these points communication was had by the railroad to columbus, then down the river by boat. to reinforce memphis would take three or four days, and to get an order there for troops to move elsewhere would have taken at least two days. memphis therefore was practically isolated from the balance of the command. but it was in sherman's hands. then too the troops were well intrenched and the gunboats made a valuable auxiliary. during the two months after the departure of general halleck there was much fighting between small bodies of the contending armies, but these encounters were dwarfed by the magnitude of the main battles so as to be now almost forgotten except by those engaged in them. some of them, however, estimated by the losses on both sides in killed and wounded, were equal in hard fighting to most of the battles of the mexican war which attracted so much of the attention of the public when they occurred. about the 23d of july colonel ross, commanding at bolivar, was threatened by a large force of the enemy so that he had to be reinforced from jackson and corinth. on the 27th there was skirmishing on the hatchie river, eight miles from bolivar. on the 30th i learned from colonel p. h. sheridan, who had been far to the south, that bragg in person was at rome, georgia, with his troops moving by rail (by way of mobile) to chattanooga and his wagon train marching overland to join him at rome. price was at this time at holly springs, mississippi, with a large force, and occupied grand junction as an outpost. i proposed to the general-in-chief to be permitted to drive him away, but was informed that, while i had to judge for myself, the best use to make of my troops was not to scatter them, but hold them ready to reinforce buell. the movement of bragg himself with his wagon trains to chattanooga across country, while his troops were transported over a long round-about road to the same destination, without need of guards except when in my immediate front, demonstrates the advantage which troops enjoy while acting in a country where the people are friendly. buell was marching through a hostile region and had to have his communications thoroughly guarded back to a base of supplies. more men were required the farther the national troops penetrated into the enemy's country. i, with an army sufficiently powerful to have destroyed bragg, was purely on the defensive and accomplishing no more than to hold a force far inferior to my own. on the 2d of august i was ordered from washington to live upon the country, on the resources of citizens hostile to the government, so far as practicable. i was also directed to "handle rebels within our lines without gloves," to imprison them, or to expel them from their homes and from our lines. i do not recollect having arrested and confined a citizen (not a soldier) during the entire rebellion. i am aware that a great many were sent to northern prisons, particularly to joliet, illinois, by some of my subordinates with the statement that it was my order. i had all such released the moment i learned of their arrest; and finally sent a staff officer north to release every prisoner who was said to be confined by my order. there were many citizens at home who deserved punishment because they were soldiers when an opportunity was afforded to inflict an injury to the national cause. this class was not of the kind that were apt to get arrested, and i deemed it better that a few guilty men should escape than that a great many innocent ones should suffer. on the 14th of august i was ordered to send two more divisions to buell. they were sent the same day by way of decatur. on the 22d colonel rodney mason surrendered clarksville with six companies of his regiment. colonel mason was one of the officers who had led their regiments off the field at almost the first fire of the rebels at shiloh. he was by nature and education a gentleman, and was terribly mortified at his action when the battle was over. he came to me with tears in his eyes and begged to be allowed to have another trial. i felt great sympathy for him and sent him, with his regiment, to garrison clarksville and donelson. he selected clarksville for his headquarters, no doubt because he regarded it as the post of danger, it being nearer the enemy. but when he was summoned to surrender by a band of guerillas, his constitutional weakness overcame him. he inquired the number of men the enemy had, and receiving a response indicating a force greater than his own he said if he could be satisfied of that fact he would surrender. arrangements were made for him to count the guerillas, and having satisfied himself that the enemy had the greater force he surrendered and informed his subordinate at donelson of the fact, advising him to do the same. the guerillas paroled their prisoners and moved upon donelson, but the officer in command at that point marched out to meet them and drove them away. among other embarrassments, at the time of which i now write, was the fact that the government wanted to get out all the cotton possible from the south and directed me to give every facility toward that end. pay in gold was authorized, and stations on the mississippi river and on the railroad in our possession had to be designated where cotton would be received. this opened to the enemy not only the means of converting cotton into money, which had a value all over the world and which they so much needed, but it afforded them means of obtaining accurate and intelligent information in regard to our position and strength. it was also demoralizing to the troops. citizens obtaining permits from the treasury department had to be protected within our lines and given facilities to get out cotton by which they realized enormous profits. men who had enlisted to fight the battles of their country did not like to be engaged in protecting a traffic which went to the support of an enemy they had to fight, and the profits of which went to men who shared none of their dangers. on the 30th of august colonel m. d. leggett, near bolivar, with the 20th and 29th ohio volunteer infantry, was attacked by a force supposed to be about 4,000 strong. the enemy was driven away with a loss of more than one hundred men. on the 1st of september the bridge guard at medon was attacked by guerillas. the guard held the position until reinforced, when the enemy were routed leaving about fifty of their number on the field dead or wounded, our loss being only two killed and fifteen wounded. on the same day colonel dennis, with a force of less than 500 infantry and two pieces of artillery, met the cavalry of the enemy in strong force, a few miles west of medon, and drove them away with great loss. our troops buried 179 of the enemy's dead, left upon the field. afterwards it was found that all the houses in the vicinity of the battlefield were turned into hospitals for the wounded. our loss, as reported at the time, was forty-five killed and wounded. on the 2d of september i was ordered to send more reinforcements to buell. jackson and bolivar were yet threatened, but i sent the reinforcements. on the 4th i received direct orders to send granger's division also to louisville, kentucky. general buell had left corinth about the 10th of june to march upon chattanooga; bragg, who had superseded beauregard in command, sent one division from tupelo on the 27th of june for the same place. this gave buell about seventeen days' start. if he had not been required to repair the railroad as he advanced, the march could have been made in eighteen days at the outside, and chattanooga must have been reached by the national forces before the rebels could have possibly got there. the road between nashville and chattanooga could easily have been put in repair by other troops, so that communication with the north would have been opened in a short time after the occupation of the place by the national troops. if buell had been permitted to move in the first instance, with the whole of the army of the ohio and that portion of the army of the mississippi afterwards sent to him, he could have thrown four divisions from his own command along the line of road to repair and guard it. granger's division was promptly sent on the 4th of september. i was at the station at corinth when the troops reached that point, and found general p. h. sheridan with them. i expressed surprise at seeing him and said that i had not expected him to go. he showed decided disappointment at the prospect of being detained. i felt a little nettled at his desire to get away and did not detain him. sheridan was a first lieutenant in the regiment in which i had served eleven years, the 4th infantry, and stationed on the pacific coast when the war broke out. he was promoted to a captaincy in may, 1861, and before the close of the year managed in some way, i do not know how, to get east. he went to missouri. halleck had known him as a very successful young officer in managing campaigns against the indians on the pacific coast, and appointed him acting-quartermaster in south-west missouri. there was no difficulty in getting supplies forward while sheridan served in that capacity; but he got into difficulty with his immediate superiors because of his stringent rules for preventing the use of public transportation for private purposes. he asked to be relieved from further duty in the capacity in which he was engaged and his request was granted. when general halleck took the field in april, 1862, sheridan was assigned to duty on his staff. during the advance on corinth a vacancy occurred in the colonelcy of the 2d michigan cavalry. governor blair, of michigan, telegraphed general halleck asking him to suggest the name of a professional soldier for the vacancy, saying he would appoint a good man without reference to his state. sheridan was named; and was so conspicuously efficient that when corinth was reached he was assigned to command a cavalry brigade in the army of the mississippi. he was in command at booneville on the 1st of july with two small regiments, when he was attacked by a force full three times as numerous as his own. by very skilful manoeuvres and boldness of attack he completely routed the enemy. for this he was made a brigadier-general and became a conspicuous figure in the army about corinth. on this account i was sorry to see him leaving me. his departure was probably fortunate, for he rendered distinguished services in his new field. granger and sheridan reached louisville before buell got there, and on the night of their arrival sheridan with his command threw up works around the railroad station for the defence of troops as they came from the front. chapter xxviii. advance of van dorn and price--price enters iuka--battle of iuka. at this time, september 4th, i had two divisions of the army of the mississippi stationed at corinth, rienzi, jacinto and danville. there were at corinth also davies' division and two brigades of mcarthur's, besides cavalry and artillery. this force constituted my left wing, of which rosecrans was in command. general ord commanded the centre, from bethel to humboldt on the mobile and ohio railroad and from jackson to bolivar where the mississippi central is crossed by the hatchie river. general sherman commanded on the right at memphis with two of his brigades back at brownsville, at the crossing of the hatchie river by the memphis and ohio railroad. this made the most convenient arrangement i could devise for concentrating all my spare forces upon any threatened point. all the troops of the command were within telegraphic communication of each other, except those under sherman. by bringing a portion of his command to brownsville, from which point there was a railroad and telegraph back to memphis, communication could be had with that part of my command within a few hours by the use of couriers. in case it became necessary to reinforce corinth, by this arrangement all the troops at bolivar, except a small guard, could be sent by rail by the way of jackson in less than twenty-four hours; while the troops from brownsville could march up to bolivar to take their place. on the 7th of september i learned of the advance of van dorn and price, apparently upon corinth. one division was brought from memphis to bolivar to meet any emergency that might arise from this move of the enemy. i was much concerned because my first duty, after holding the territory acquired within my command, was to prevent further reinforcing of bragg in middle tennessee. already the army of northern virginia had defeated the army under general pope and was invading maryland. in the centre general buell was on his way to louisville and bragg marching parallel to him with a large confederate force for the ohio river. i had been constantly called upon to reinforce buell until at this time my entire force numbered less than 50,000 men, of all arms. this included everything from cairo south within my jurisdiction. if i too should be driven back, the ohio river would become the line dividing the belligerents west of the alleghanies, while at the east the line was already farther north than when hostilities commenced at the opening of the war. it is true nashville was never given up after its first capture, but it would have been isolated and the garrison there would have been obliged to beat a hasty retreat if the troops in west tennessee had been compelled to fall back. to say at the end of the second year of the war the line dividing the contestants at the east was pushed north of maryland, a state that had not seceded, and at the west beyond kentucky, another state which had been always loyal, would have been discouraging indeed. as it was, many loyal people despaired in the fall of 1862 of ever saving the union. the administration at washington was much concerned for the safety of the cause it held so dear. but i believe there was never a day when the president did not think that, in some way or other, a cause so just as ours would come out triumphant. up to the 11th of september rosecrans still had troops on the railroad east of corinth, but they had all been ordered in. by the 12th all were in except a small force under colonel murphy of the 8th wisconsin. he had been detained to guard the remainder of the stores which had not yet been brought in to corinth. on the 13th of september general sterling price entered iuka, a town about twenty miles east of corinth on the memphis and charleston railroad. colonel murphy with a few men was guarding the place. he made no resistance, but evacuated the town on the approach of the enemy. i was apprehensive lest the object of the rebels might be to get troops into tennessee to reinforce bragg, as it was afterwards ascertained to be. the authorities at washington, including the general-in-chief of the army, were very anxious, as i have said, about affairs both in east and middle tennessee; and my anxiety was quite as great on their account as for any danger threatening my command. i had not force enough at corinth to attack price even by stripping everything; and there was danger that before troops could be got from other points he might be far on his way across the tennessee. to prevent this all spare forces at bolivar and jackson were ordered to corinth, and cars were concentrated at jackson for their transportation. within twenty-four hours from the transmission of the order the troops were at their destination, although there had been a delay of four hours resulting from the forward train getting off the track and stopping all the others. this gave a reinforcement of near 8,000 men, general ord in command. general rosecrans commanded the district of corinth with a movable force of about 9,000 independent of the garrison deemed necessary to be left behind. it was known that general van dorn was about a four days' march south of us, with a large force. it might have been part of his plan to attack at corinth, price coming from the east while he came up from the south. my desire was to attack price before van dorn could reach corinth or go to his relief. general rosecrans had previously had his headquarters at iuka, where his command was spread out along the memphis and charleston railroad eastward. while there he had a most excellent map prepared showing all the roads and streams in the surrounding country. he was also personally familiar with the ground, so that i deferred very much to him in my plans for the approach. we had cars enough to transport all of general ord's command, which was to go by rail to burnsville, a point on the road about seven miles west of iuka. from there his troops were to march by the north side of the railroad and attack price from the north-west, while rosecrans was to move eastward from his position south of corinth by way of the jacinto road. a small force was to hold the jacinto road where it turns to the north-east, while the main force moved on the fulton road which comes into iuka further east. this plan was suggested by rosecrans. bear creek, a few miles to the east of the fulton road, is a formidable obstacle to the movement of troops in the absence of bridges, all of which, in september, 1862, had been destroyed in that vicinity. the tennessee, to the north-east, not many miles away, was also a formidable obstacle for an army followed by a pursuing force. ord was on the north-west, and even if a rebel movement had been possible in that direction it could have brought only temporary relief, for it would have carried price's army to the rear of the national forces and isolated it from all support. it looked to me that, if price would remain in iuka until we could get there, his annihilation was inevitable. on the morning of the 18th of september general ord moved by rail to burnsville, and there left the cars and moved out to perform his part of the programme. he was to get as near the enemy as possible during the day and intrench himself so as to hold his position until the next morning. rosecrans was to be up by the morning of the 19th on the two roads before described, and the attack was to be from all three quarters simultaneously. troops enough were left at jacinto and rienzi to detain any cavalry that van dorn might send out to make a sudden dash into corinth until i could be notified. there was a telegraph wire along the railroad, so there would be no delay in communication. i detained cars and locomotives enough at burnsville to transport the whole of ord's command at once, and if van dorn had moved against corinth instead of iuka i could have thrown in reinforcements to the number of 7,000 or 8,000 before he could have arrived. i remained at burnsville with a detachment of about 900 men from ord's command and communicated with my two wings by courier. ord met the advance of the enemy soon after leaving burnsville. quite a sharp engagement ensued, but he drove the rebels back with considerable loss, including one general officer killed. he maintained his position and was ready to attack by daylight the next morning. i was very much disappointed at receiving a dispatch from rosecrans after midnight from jacinto, twenty-two miles from iuka, saying that some of his command had been delayed, and that the rear of his column was not yet up as far as jacinto. he said, however, that he would still be at iuka by two o'clock the next day. i did not believe this possible because of the distance and the condition of the roads, which was bad; besides, troops after a forced march of twenty miles are not in a good condition for fighting the moment they get through. it might do in marching to relieve a beleaguered garrison, but not to make an assault. i immediately sent ord a copy of rosecrans' dispatch and ordered him to be in readiness to attack the moment he heard the sound of guns to the south or south-east. he was instructed to notify his officers to be on the alert for any indications of battle. during the 19th the wind blew in the wrong direction to transmit sound either towards the point where ord was, or to burnsville where i had remained. a couple of hours before dark on the 19th rosecrans arrived with the head of his column at garnets, the point where the jacinto road to iuka leaves the road going east. he here turned north without sending any troops to the fulton road. while still moving in column up the jacinto road he met a force of the enemy and had his advance badly beaten and driven back upon the main road. in this short engagement his loss was considerable for the number engaged, and one battery was taken from him. the wind was still blowing hard and in the wrong direction to transmit sounds towards either ord or me. neither he nor i nor any one in either command heard a gun that was fired upon the battle-field. after the engagement rosecrans sent me a dispatch announcing the result. this was brought by a courier. there was no road between burnsville and the position then occupied by rosecrans and the country was impassable for a man on horseback. the courier bearing the message was compelled to move west nearly to jacinto before he found a road leading to burnsville. this made it a late hour of the night before i learned of the battle that had taken place during the afternoon. i at once notified ord of the fact and ordered him to attack early in the morning. the next morning rosecrans himself renewed the attack and went into iuka with but little resistance. ord also went in according to orders, without hearing a gun from the south of town but supposing the troops coming from the south-west must be up by that time. rosecrans, however, had put no troops upon the fulton road, and the enemy had taken advantage of this neglect and retreated by that road during the night. word was soon brought to me that our troops were in iuka. i immediately rode into town and found that the enemy was not being pursued even by the cavalry. i ordered pursuit by the whole of rosecrans' command and went on with him a few miles in person. he followed only a few miles after i left him and then went into camp, and the pursuit was continued no further. i was disappointed at the result of the battle of iuka--but i had so high an opinion of general rosecrans that i found no fault at the time. chapter xxix. van dorn's movements--battle of corinth--command of the department of the tennessee. on the 19th of september general geo. h. thomas was ordered east to reinforce buell. this threw the army at my command still more on the defensive. the memphis and charleston railroad was abandoned, except at corinth, and small forces were left at chewalla and grand junction. soon afterwards the latter of these two places was given up and bolivar became our most advanced position on the mississippi central railroad. our cavalry was kept well to the front and frequent expeditions were sent out to watch the movements of the enemy. we were in a country where nearly all the people, except the negroes, were hostile to us and friendly to the cause we were trying to suppress. it was easy, therefore, for the enemy to get early information of our every move. we, on the contrary, had to go after our information in force, and then often returned without it. on the 22d bolivar was threatened by a large force from south of grand junction, supposed to be twenty regiments of infantry with cavalry and artillery. i reinforced bolivar, and went to jackson in person to superintend the movement of troops to whatever point the attack might be made upon. the troops from corinth were brought up in time to repel the threatened movement without a battle. our cavalry followed the enemy south of davis' mills in mississippi. on the 30th i found that van dorn was apparently endeavoring to strike the mississippi river above memphis. at the same time other points within my command were so threatened that it was impossible to concentrate a force to drive him away. there was at this juncture a large union force at helena, arkansas, which, had it been within my command, i could have ordered across the river to attack and break up the mississippi central railroad far to the south. this would not only have called van dorn back, but would have compelled the retention of a large rebel force far to the south to prevent a repetition of such raids on the enemy's line of supplies. geographical lines between the commands during the rebellion were not always well chosen, or they were too rigidly adhered to. van dorn did not attempt to get upon the line above memphis, as had apparently been his intention. he was simply covering a deeper design; one much more important to his cause. by the 1st of october it was fully apparent that corinth was to be attacked with great force and determination, and that van dorn, lovell, price, villepigue and rust had joined their strength for this purpose. there was some skirmishing outside of corinth with the advance of the enemy on the 3d. the rebels massed in the north-west angle of the memphis and charleston and the mobile and ohio railroads, and were thus between the troops at corinth and all possible reinforcements. any fresh troops for us must come by a circuitous route. on the night of the 3d, accordingly, i ordered general mcpherson, who was at jackson, to join rosecrans at corinth with reinforcements picked up along the line of the railroad equal to a brigade. hurlbut had been ordered from bolivar to march for the same destination; and as van dorn was coming upon corinth from the north-west some of his men fell in with the advance of hurlbut's and some skirmishing ensued on the evening of the 3d. on the 4th van dorn made a dashing attack, hoping, no doubt, to capture rosecrans before his reinforcements could come up. in that case the enemy himself could have occupied the defences of corinth and held at bay all the union troops that arrived. in fact he could have taken the offensive against the reinforcements with three or four times their number and still left a sufficient garrison in the works about corinth to hold them. he came near success, some of his troops penetrating the national lines at least once, but the works that were built after halleck's departure enabled rosecrans to hold his position until the troops of both mcpherson and hurlbut approached towards the rebel front and rear. the enemy was finally driven back with great slaughter: all their charges, made with great gallantry, were repulsed. the loss on our side was heavy, but nothing to compare with van dorn's. mcpherson came up with the train of cars bearing his command as close to the enemy as was prudent, debarked on the rebel flank and got in to the support of rosecrans just after the repulse. his approach, as well as that of hurlbut, was known to the enemy and had a moral effect. general rosecrans, however, failed to follow up the victory, although i had given specific orders in advance of the battle for him to pursue the moment the enemy was repelled. he did not do so, and i repeated the order after the battle. in the first order he was notified that the force of 4,000 men which was going to his assistance would be in great peril if the enemy was not pursued. general ord had joined hurlbut on the 4th and being senior took command of his troops. this force encountered the head of van dorn's retreating column just as it was crossing the hatchie by a bridge some ten miles out from corinth. the bottom land here was swampy and bad for the operations of troops, making a good place to get an enemy into. ord attacked the troops that had crossed the bridge and drove them back in a panic. many were killed, and others were drowned by being pushed off the bridge in their hurried retreat. ord followed and met the main force. he was too weak in numbers to assault, but he held the bridge and compelled the enemy to resume his retreat by another bridge higher up the stream. ord was wounded in this engagement and the command devolved on hurlbut. rosecrans did not start in pursuit till the morning of the 5th and then took the wrong road. moving in the enemy's country he travelled with a wagon train to carry his provisions and munitions of war. his march was therefore slower than that of the enemy, who was moving towards his supplies. two or three hours of pursuit on the day of battle, without anything except what the men carried on their persons, would have been worth more than any pursuit commenced the next day could have possibly been. even when he did start, if rosecrans had followed the route taken by the enemy, he would have come upon van dorn in a swamp with a stream in front and ord holding the only bridge; but he took the road leading north and towards chewalla instead of west, and, after having marched as far as the enemy had moved to get to the hatchie, he was as far from battle as when he started. hurlbut had not the numbers to meet any such force as van dorn's if they had been in any mood for fighting, and he might have been in great peril. i now regarded the time to accomplish anything by pursuit as past and, after rosecrans reached jonesboro, i ordered him to return. he kept on to ripley, however, and was persistent in wanting to go farther. i thereupon ordered him to halt and submitted the matter to the general-in-chief, who allowed me to exercise my judgment in the matter, but inquired "why not pursue?" upon this i ordered rosecrans back. had he gone much farther he would have met a greater force than van dorn had at corinth and behind intrenchments or on chosen ground, and the probabilities are he would have lost his army. the battle of corinth was bloody, our loss being 315 killed, 1,812 wounded and 232 missing. the enemy lost many more. rosecrans reported 1,423 dead and 2,225 prisoners. we fought behind breastworks, which accounts in some degree for the disparity. among the killed on our side was general hackelman. general oglesby was badly, it was for some time supposed mortally, wounded. i received a congratulatory letter from the president, which expressed also his sorrow for the losses. this battle was recognized by me as being a decided victory, though not so complete as i had hoped for, nor nearly so complete as i now think was within the easy grasp of the commanding officer at corinth. since the war it is known that the result, as it was, was a crushing blow to the enemy, and felt by him much more than it was appreciated at the north. the battle relieved me from any further anxiety for the safety of the territory within my jurisdiction, and soon after receiving reinforcements i suggested to the general-in-chief a forward movement against vicksburg. on the 23d of october i learned of pemberton's being in command at holly springs and much reinforced by conscripts and troops from alabama and texas. the same day general rosecrans was relieved from duty with my command, and shortly after he succeeded buell in the command of the army in middle tennessee. i was delighted at the promotion of general rosecrans to a separate command, because i still believed that when independent of an immediate superior the qualities which i, at that time, credited him with possessing, would show themselves. as a subordinate i found that i could not make him do as i wished, and had determined to relieve him from duty that very day. at the close of the operations just described my force, in round numbers, was 48,500. of these 4,800 were in kentucky and illinois, 7,000 in memphis, 19,200 from mound city south, and 17,500 at corinth. general mcclernand had been authorized from washington to go north and organize troops to be used in opening the mississippi. these new levies with other reinforcements now began to come in. on the 25th of october i was placed in command of the department of the tennessee. reinforcements continued to come from the north and by the 2d of november i was prepared to take the initiative. this was a great relief after the two and a half months of continued defence over a large district of country, and where nearly every citizen was an enemy ready to give information of our every move. i have described very imperfectly a few of the battles and skirmishes that took place during this time. to describe all would take more space than i can allot to the purpose; to make special mention of all the officers and troops who distinguished themselves, would take a volume. (*9) chapter xxx. the campaign against vicksburg--employing the freedmen--occupation of holly springs--sherman ordered to memphis--sherman's movements down the mississippi--van dorn captures holly springs--collecting forage and food. vicksburg was important to the enemy because it occupied the first high ground coming close to the river below memphis. from there a railroad runs east, connecting with other roads leading to all points of the southern states. a railroad also starts from the opposite side of the river, extending west as far as shreveport, louisiana. vicksburg was the only channel, at the time of the events of which this chapter treats, connecting the parts of the confederacy divided by the mississippi. so long as it was held by the enemy, the free navigation of the river was prevented. hence its importance. points on the river between vicksburg and port hudson were held as dependencies; but their fall was sure to follow the capture of the former place. the campaign against vicksburg commenced on the 2d of november as indicated in a dispatch to the general-in-chief in the following words: "i have commenced a movement on grand junction, with three divisions from corinth and two from bolivar. will leave here [jackson, tennessee] to-morrow, and take command in person. if found practicable, i will go to holly springs, and, may be, grenada, completing railroad and telegraph as i go." at this time my command was holding the mobile and ohio railroad from about twenty-five miles south of corinth, north to columbus, kentucky; the mississippi central from bolivar north to its junction with the mobile and ohio; the memphis and charleston from corinth east to bear creek, and the mississippi river from cairo to memphis. my entire command was no more than was necessary to hold these lines, and hardly that if kept on the defensive. by moving against the enemy and into his unsubdued, or not yet captured, territory, driving their army before us, these lines would nearly hold themselves; thus affording a large force for field operations. my moving force at that time was about 30,000 men, and i estimated the enemy confronting me, under pemberton, at about the same number. general mcpherson commanded my left wing and general c. s. hamilton the centre, while sherman was at memphis with the right wing. pemberton was fortified at the tallahatchie, but occupied holly springs and grand junction on the mississippi central railroad. on the 8th we occupied grand junction and la grange, throwing a considerable force seven or eight miles south, along the line of the railroad. the road from bolivar forward was repaired and put in running order as the troops advanced. up to this time it had been regarded as an axiom in war that large bodies of troops must operate from a base of supplies which they always covered and guarded in all forward movements. there was delay therefore in repairing the road back, and in gathering and forwarding supplies to the front. by my orders, and in accordance with previous instructions from washington, all the forage within reach was collected under the supervision of the chief quartermaster and the provisions under the chief commissary, receipts being given when there was any one to take them; the supplies in any event to be accounted for as government stores. the stock was bountiful, but still it gave me no idea of the possibility of supplying a moving column in an enemy's country from the country itself. it was at this point, probably, where the first idea of a "freedman's bureau" took its origin. orders of the government prohibited the expulsion of the negroes from the protection of the army, when they came in voluntarily. humanity forbade allowing them to starve. with such an army of them, of all ages and both sexes, as had congregated about grand junction, amounting to many thousands, it was impossible to advance. there was no special authority for feeding them unless they were employed as teamsters, cooks and pioneers with the army; but only able-bodied young men were suitable for such work. this labor would support but a very limited percentage of them. the plantations were all deserted; the cotton and corn were ripe: men, women and children above ten years of age could be employed in saving these crops. to do this work with contrabands, or to have it done, organization under a competent chief was necessary. on inquiring for such a man chaplain eaton, now and for many years the very able united states commissioner of education, was suggested. he proved as efficient in that field as he has since done in his present one. i gave him all the assistants and guards he called for. we together fixed the prices to be paid for the negro labor, whether rendered to the government or to individuals. the cotton was to be picked from abandoned plantations, the laborers to receive the stipulated price (my recollection is twelve and a half cents per pound for picking and ginning) from the quartermaster, he shipping the cotton north to be sold for the benefit of the government. citizens remaining on their plantations were allowed the privilege of having their crops saved by freedmen on the same terms. at once the freedmen became self-sustaining. the money was not paid to them directly, but was expended judiciously and for their benefit. they gave me no trouble afterwards. later the freedmen were engaged in cutting wood along the mississippi river to supply the large number of steamers on that stream. a good price was paid for chopping wood used for the supply of government steamers (steamers chartered and which the government had to supply with fuel). those supplying their own fuel paid a much higher price. in this way a fund was created not only sufficient to feed and clothe all, old and young, male and female, but to build them comfortable cabins, hospitals for the sick, and to supply them with many comforts they had never known before. at this stage of the campaign against vicksburg i was very much disturbed by newspaper rumors that general mcclernand was to have a separate and independent command within mine, to operate against vicksburg by way of the mississippi river. two commanders on the same field are always one too many, and in this case i did not think the general selected had either the experience or the qualifications to fit him for so important a position. i feared for the safety of the troops intrusted to him, especially as he was to raise new levies, raw troops, to execute so important a trust. but on the 12th i received a dispatch from general halleck saying that i had command of all the troops sent to my department and authorizing me to fight the enemy where i pleased. the next day my cavalry was in holly springs, and the enemy fell back south of the tallahatchie. holly springs i selected for my depot of supplies and munitions of war, all of which at that time came by rail from columbus, kentucky, except the few stores collected about la grange and grand junction. this was a long line (increasing in length as we moved south) to maintain in an enemy's country. on the 15th of november, while i was still at holly springs, i sent word to sherman to meet me at columbus. we were but forty-seven miles apart, yet the most expeditious way for us to meet was for me to take the rail to columbus and sherman a steamer for the same place. at that meeting, besides talking over my general plans i gave him his orders to join me with two divisions and to march them down the mississippi central railroad if he could. sherman, who was always prompt, was up by the 29th to cottage hill, ten miles north of oxford. he brought three divisions with him, leaving a garrison of only four regiments of infantry, a couple of pieces of artillery and a small detachment of cavalry. further reinforcements he knew were on their way from the north to memphis. about this time general halleck ordered troops from helena, arkansas (territory west of the mississippi was not under my command then) to cut the road in pemberton's rear. the expedition was under generals hovey and c. c. washburn and was successful so far as reaching the railroad was concerned, but the damage done was very slight and was soon repaired. the tallahatchie, which confronted me, was very high, the railroad bridge destroyed and pemberton strongly fortified on the south side. a crossing would have been impossible in the presence of an enemy. i sent the cavalry higher up the stream and they secured a crossing. this caused the enemy to evacuate their position, which was possibly accelerated by the expedition of hovey and washburn. the enemy was followed as far south as oxford by the main body of troops, and some seventeen miles farther by mcpherson's command. here the pursuit was halted to repair the railroad from the tallahatchie northward, in order to bring up supplies. the piles on which the railroad bridge rested had been left standing. the work of constructing a roadway for the troops was but a short matter, and, later, rails were laid for cars. during the delay at oxford in repairing railroads i learned that an expedition down the mississippi now was inevitable and, desiring to have a competent commander in charge, i ordered sherman on the 8th of december back to memphis to take charge. the following were his orders: headquarters 13th army corps, department of the tennessee. oxford, mississippi, december 8,1862. major-general w. t. sherman, commanding right wing: you will proceed, with as little delay as possible, to memphis, tennessee, taking with you one division of your present command. on your arrival at memphis you will assume command of all the troops there, and that portion of general curtis's forces at present east of the mississippi river, and organize them into brigades and divisions in your own army. as soon as possible move with them down the river to the vicinity of vicksburg, and with the co-operation of the gunboat fleet under command of flag-officer porter proceed to the reduction of that place in such a manner as circumstances, and your own judgment, may dictate. the amount of rations, forage, land transportation, etc., necessary to take, will be left entirely with yourself. the quartermaster at st. louis will be instructed to send you transportation for 30,000 men; should you still find yourself deficient, your quartermaster will be authorized to make up the deficiency from such transports as may come into the port of memphis. on arriving in memphis, put yourself in communication with admiral porter, and arrange with him for his co-operation. inform me at the earliest practicable day of the time when you will embark, and such plans as may then be matured. i will hold the forces here in readiness to co-operate with you in such manner as the movements of the enemy may make necessary. leave the district of memphis in the command of an efficient officer, and with a garrison of four regiments of infantry, the siege guns, and whatever cavalry may be there. u. s. grant, major-general. this idea had presented itself to my mind earlier, for on the 3d of december i asked halleck if it would not be well to hold the enemy south of the yallabusha and move a force from helena and memphis on vicksburg. on the 5th again i suggested, from oxford, to halleck that if the helena troops were at my command i though it would be possible to take them and the memphis forces south of the mouth of the yazoo river, and thus secure vicksburg and the state of mississippi. halleck on the same day, the 5th of december, directed me not to attempt to hold the country south of the tallahatchie, but to collect 25,000 troops at memphis by the 20th for the vicksburg expedition. i sent sherman with two divisions at once, informed the general-in-chief of the fact, and asked whether i should command the expedition down the river myself or send sherman. i was authorized to do as i though best for the accomplishment of the great object in view. i sent sherman and so informed general halleck. as stated, my action in sending sherman back was expedited by a desire to get him in command of the forces separated from my direct supervision. i feared that delay might bring mcclernand, who was his senior and who had authority from the president and secretary of war to exercise that particular command,--and independently. i doubted mcclernand's fitness; and i had good reason to believe that in forestalling him i was by no means giving offence to those whose authority to command was above both him and me. neither my orders to general sherman, nor the correspondence between us or between general halleck and myself, contemplated at the time my going further south than the yallabusha. pemberton's force in my front was the main part of the garrison of vicksburg, as the force with me was the defence of the territory held by us in west tennessee and kentucky. i hoped to hold pemberton in my front while sherman should get in his rear and into vicksburg. the further north the enemy could be held the better. it was understood, however, between general sherman and myself that our movements were to be co-operative; if pemberton could not be held away from vicksburg i was to follow him; but at that time it was not expected to abandon the railroad north of the yallabusha. with that point as a secondary base of supplies, the possibility of moving down the yazoo until communications could be opened with the mississippi was contemplated. it was my intention, and so understood by sherman and his command, that if the enemy should fall back i would follow him even to the gates of vicksburg. i intended in such an event to hold the road to grenada on the yallabusha and cut loose from there, expecting to establish a new base of supplies on the yazoo, or at vicksburg itself, with grenada to fall back upon in case of failure. it should be remembered that at the time i speak of it had not been demonstrated that an army could operate in an enemy's territory depending upon the country for supplies. a halt was called at oxford with the advance seventeen miles south of there, to bring up the road to the latter point and to bring supplies of food, forage and munitions to the front. on the 18th of december i received orders from washington to divide my command into four army corps, with general mcclernand to command one of them and to be assigned to that part of the army which was to operate down the mississippi. this interfered with my plans, but probably resulted in my ultimately taking the command in person. mcclernand was at that time in springfield, illinois. the order was obeyed without any delay. dispatches were sent to him the same day in conformity. on the 20th general van dorn appeared at holly springs, my secondary base of supplies, captured the garrison of 1,500 men commanded by colonel murphy, of the 8th wisconsin regiment, and destroyed all our munitions of war, food and forage. the capture was a disgraceful one to the officer commanding but not to the troops under him. at the same time forrest got on our line of railroad between jackson, tennessee, and columbus, kentucky, doing much damage to it. this cut me off from all communication with the north for more than a week, and it was more than two weeks before rations or forage could be issued from stores obtained in the regular way. this demonstrated the impossibility of maintaining so long a line of road over which to draw supplies for an army moving in an enemy's country. i determined, therefore, to abandon my campaign into the interior with columbus as a base, and returned to la grange and grand junction destroying the road to my front and repairing the road to memphis, making the mississippi river the line over which to draw supplies. pemberton was falling back at the same time. the moment i received the news of van dorn's success i sent the cavalry at the front back to drive him from the country. he had start enough to move north destroying the railroad in many places, and to attack several small garrisons intrenched as guards to the railroad. all these he found warned of his coming and prepared to receive him. van dorn did not succeed in capturing a single garrison except the one at holly springs, which was larger than all the others attacked by him put together. murphy was also warned of van dorn's approach, but made no preparations to meet him. he did not even notify his command. colonel murphy was the officer who, two months before, had evacuated iuka on the approach of the enemy. general rosecrans denounced him for the act and desired to have him tried and punished. i sustained the colonel at the time because his command was a small one compared with that of the enemy--not one-tenth as large--and i thought he had done well to get away without falling into their hands. his leaving large stores to fall into price's possession i looked upon as an oversight and excused it on the ground of inexperience in military matters. he should, however, have destroyed them. this last surrender demonstrated to my mind that rosecrans' judgment of murphy's conduct at iuka was correct. the surrender of holly springs was most reprehensible and showed either the disloyalty of colonel murphy to the cause which he professed to serve, or gross cowardice. after the war was over i read from the diary of a lady who accompanied general pemberton in his retreat from the tallahatchie, that the retreat was almost a panic. the roads were bad and it was difficult to move the artillery and trains. why there should have been a panic i do not see. no expedition had yet started down the mississippi river. had i known the demoralized condition of the enemy, or the fact that central mississippi abounded so in all army supplies, i would have been in pursuit of pemberton while his cavalry was destroying the roads in my rear. after sending cavalry to drive van dorn away, my next order was to dispatch all the wagons we had, under proper escort, to collect and bring in all supplies of forage and food from a region of fifteen miles east and west of the road from our front back to grand junction, leaving two months' supplies for the families of those whose stores were taken. i was amazed at the quantity of supplies the country afforded. it showed that we could have subsisted off the country for two months instead of two weeks without going beyond the limits designated. this taught me a lesson which was taken advantage of later in the campaign when our army lived twenty days with the issue of only five days' rations by the commissary. our loss of supplies was great at holly springs, but it was more than compensated for by those taken from the country and by the lesson taught. the news of the capture of holly springs and the destruction of our supplies caused much rejoicing among the people remaining in oxford. they came with broad smiles on their faces, indicating intense joy, to ask what i was going to do now without anything for my soldiers to eat. i told them that i was not disturbed; that i had already sent troops and wagons to collect all the food and forage they could find for fifteen miles on each side of the road. countenances soon changed, and so did the inquiry. the next was, "what are we to do?" my response was that we had endeavored to feed ourselves from our own northern resources while visiting them; but their friends in gray had been uncivil enough to destroy what we had brought along, and it could not be expected that men, with arms in their hands, would starve in the midst of plenty. i advised them to emigrate east, or west, fifteen miles and assist in eating up what we left. chapter xxxi. headquarters moved to holly springs--general m'clernand in command --assuming command at young's point--operations above vicksburg --fortifications about vicksburg--the canal--lake providence --operations at yazoo pass. this interruption in my communications north--i was really cut off from communication with a great part of my own command during this time --resulted in sherman's moving from memphis before mcclernand could arrive, for my dispatch of the 18th did not reach mcclernand. pemberton got back to vicksburg before sherman got there. the rebel positions were on a bluff on the yazoo river, some miles above its mouth. the waters were high so that the bottoms were generally overflowed, leaving only narrow causeways of dry land between points of debarkation and the high bluffs. these were fortified and defended at all points. the rebel position was impregnable against any force that could be brought against its front. sherman could not use one-fourth of his force. his efforts to capture the city, or the high ground north of it, were necessarily unavailing. sherman's attack was very unfortunate, but i had no opportunity of communicating with him after the destruction of the road and telegraph to my rear on the 20th. he did not know but what i was in the rear of the enemy and depending on him to open a new base of supplies for the troops with me. i had, before he started from memphis, directed him to take with him a few small steamers suitable for the navigation of the yazoo, not knowing but that i might want them to supply me after cutting loose from my base at grenada. on the 23d i removed my headquarters back to holly springs. the troops were drawn back gradually, but without haste or confusion, finding supplies abundant and no enemy following. the road was not damaged south of holly springs by van dorn, at least not to an extent to cause any delay. as i had resolved to move headquarters to memphis, and to repair the road to that point, i remained at holly springs until this work was completed. on the 10th of january, the work on the road from holly springs to grand junction and thence to memphis being completed, i moved my headquarters to the latter place. during the campaign here described, the losses (mostly captures) were about equal, crediting the rebels with their holly springs capture, which they could not hold. when sherman started on his expedition down the river he had 20,000 men, taken from memphis, and was reinforced by 12,000 more at helena, arkansas. the troops on the west bank of the river had previously been assigned to my command. mcclernand having received the orders for his assignment reached the mouth of the yazoo on the 2d of january, and immediately assumed command of all the troops with sherman, being a part of his own corps, the 13th, and all of sherman's, the 15th. sherman, and admiral porter with the fleet, had withdrawn from the yazoo. after consultation they decided that neither the army nor navy could render service to the cause where they were, and learning that i had withdrawn from the interior of mississippi, they determined to return to the arkansas river and to attack arkansas post, about fifty miles up that stream and garrisoned by about five or six thousand men. sherman had learned of the existence of this force through a man who had been captured by the enemy with a steamer loaded with ammunition and other supplies intended for his command. the man had made his escape. mcclernand approved this move reluctantly, as sherman says. no obstacle was encountered until the gunboats and transports were within range of the fort. after three days' bombardment by the navy an assault was made by the troops and marines, resulting in the capture of the place, and in taking 5,000 prisoners and 17 guns. i was at first disposed to disapprove of this move as an unnecessary side movement having no especial bearing upon the work before us; but when the result was understood i regarded it as very important. five thousand confederate troops left in the rear might have caused us much trouble and loss of property while navigating the mississippi. immediately after the reduction of arkansas post and the capture of the garrison, mcclernand returned with his entire force to napoleon, at the mouth of the arkansas river. from here i received messages from both sherman and admiral porter, urging me to come and take command in person, and expressing their distrust of mcclernand's ability and fitness for so important and intricate an expedition. on the 17th i visited mcclernand and his command at napoleon. it was here made evident to me that both the army and navy were so distrustful of mcclernand's fitness to command that, while they would do all they could to insure success, this distrust was an element of weakness. it would have been criminal to send troops under these circumstances into such danger. by this time i had received authority to relieve mcclernand, or to assign any person else to the command of the river expedition, or to assume command in person. i felt great embarrassment about mcclernand. he was the senior major-general after myself within the department. it would not do, with his rank and ambition, to assign a junior over him. nothing was left, therefore, but to assume the command myself. i would have been glad to put sherman in command, to give him an opportunity to accomplish what he had failed in the december before; but there seemed no other way out of the difficulty, for he was junior to mcclernand. sherman's failure needs no apology. on the 20th i ordered general mcclernand with the entire command, to young's point and milliken's bend, while i returned to memphis to make all the necessary preparation for leaving the territory behind me secure. general hurlbut with the 16th corps was left in command. the memphis and charleston railroad was held, while the mississippi central was given up. columbus was the only point between cairo and memphis, on the river, left with a garrison. all the troops and guns from the posts on the abandoned railroad and river were sent to the front. on the 29th of january i arrived at young's point and assumed command the following day. general mcclernand took exception in a most characteristic way--for him. his correspondence with me on the subject was more in the nature of a reprimand than a protest. it was highly insubordinate, but i overlooked it, as i believed, for the good of the service. general mcclernand was a politician of very considerable prominence in his state; he was a member of congress when the secession war broke out; he belonged to that political party which furnished all the opposition there was to a vigorous prosecution of the war for saving the union; there was no delay in his declaring himself for the union at all hazards, and there was no uncertain sound in his declaration of where he stood in the contest before the country. he also gave up his seat in congress to take the field in defence of the principles he had proclaimed. the real work of the campaign and siege of vicksburg now began. the problem was to secure a footing upon dry ground on the east side of the river from which the troops could operate against vicksburg. the mississippi river, from cairo south, runs through a rich alluvial valley of many miles in width, bound on the east by land running from eighty up to two or more hundred feet above the river. on the west side the highest land, except in a few places, is but little above the highest water. through this valley the river meanders in the most tortuous way, varying in direction to all points of the compass. at places it runs to the very foot of the bluffs. after leaving memphis, there are no such highlands coming to the water's edge on the east shore until vicksburg is reached. the intervening land is cut up by bayous filled from the river in high water--many of them navigable for steamers. all of them would be, except for overhanging trees, narrowness and tortuous course, making it impossible to turn the bends with vessels of any considerable length. marching across this country in the face of an enemy was impossible; navigating it proved equally impracticable. the strategical way according to the rule, therefore, would have been to go back to memphis; establish that as a base of supplies; fortify it so that the storehouses could be held by a small garrison, and move from there along the line of railroad, repairing as we advanced, to the yallabusha, or to jackson, mississippi. at this time the north had become very much discouraged. many strong union men believed that the war must prove a failure. the elections of 1862 had gone against the party which was for the prosecution of the war to save the union if it took the last man and the last dollar. voluntary enlistments had ceased throughout the greater part of the north, and the draft had been resorted to to fill up our ranks. it was my judgment at the time that to make a backward movement as long as that from vicksburg to memphis, would be interpreted, by many of those yet full of hope for the preservation of the union, as a defeat, and that the draft would be resisted, desertions ensue and the power to capture and punish deserters lost. there was nothing left to be done but to go forward to a decisive victory. this was in my mind from the moment i took command in person at young's point. the winter of 1862-3 was a noted one for continuous high water in the mississippi and for heavy rains along the lower river. to get dry land, or rather land above the water, to encamp the troops upon, took many miles of river front. we had to occupy the levees and the ground immediately behind. this was so limited that one corps, the 17th, under general mcpherson, was at lake providence, seventy miles above vicksburg. it was in january the troops took their position opposite vicksburg. the water was very high and the rains were incessant. there seemed no possibility of a land movement before the end of march or later, and it would not do to lie idle all this time. the effect would be demoralizing to the troops and injurious to their health. friends in the north would have grown more and more discouraged, and enemies in the same section more and more insolent in their gibes and denunciation of the cause and those engaged in it. i always admired the south, as bad as i thought their cause, for the boldness with which they silenced all opposition and all croaking, by press or by individuals, within their control. war at all times, whether a civil war between sections of a common country or between nations, ought to be avoided, if possible with honor. but, once entered into, it is too much for human nature to tolerate an enemy within their ranks to give aid and comfort to the armies of the opposing section or nation. vicksburg, as stated before, is on the first high land coming to the river's edge, below that on which memphis stands. the bluff, or high land, follows the left bank of the yazoo for some distance and continues in a southerly direction to the mississippi river, thence it runs along the mississippi to warrenton, six miles below. the yazoo river leaves the high land a short distance below haines' bluff and empties into the mississippi nine miles above vicksburg. vicksburg is built on this high land where the mississippi washes the base of the hill. haines' bluff, eleven miles from vicksburg, on the yazoo river, was strongly fortified. the whole distance from there to vicksburg and thence to warrenton was also intrenched, with batteries at suitable distances and rifle-pits connecting them. from young's point the mississippi turns in a north-easterly direction to a point just above the city, when it again turns and runs south-westerly, leaving vessels, which might attempt to run the blockade, exposed to the fire of batteries six miles below the city before they were in range of the upper batteries. since then the river has made a cut-off, leaving what was the peninsula in front of the city, an island. north of the yazoo was all a marsh, heavily timbered, cut up with bayous, and much overflowed. a front attack was therefore impossible, and was never contemplated; certainly not by me. the problem then became, how to secure a landing on high ground east of the mississippi without an apparent retreat. then commenced a series of experiments to consume time, and to divert the attention of the enemy, of my troops and of the public generally. i, myself, never felt great confidence that any of the experiments resorted to would prove successful. nevertheless i was always prepared to take advantage of them in case they did. in 1862 general thomas williams had come up from new orleans and cut a ditch ten or twelve feet wide and about as deep, straight across from young's point to the river below. the distance across was a little over a mile. it was williams' expectation that when the river rose it would cut a navigable channel through; but the canal started in an eddy from both ends, and, of course, it only filled up with water on the rise without doing any execution in the way of cutting. mr. lincoln had navigated the mississippi in his younger days and understood well its tendency to change its channel, in places, from time to time. he set much store accordingly by this canal. general mcclernand had been, therefore, directed before i went to young's point to push the work of widening and deepening this canal. after my arrival the work was diligently pushed with about 4,000 men--as many as could be used to advantage--until interrupted by a sudden rise in the river that broke a dam at the upper end, which had been put there to keep the water out until the excavation was completed. this was on the 8th of march. even if the canal had proven a success, so far as to be navigable for steamers, it could not have been of much advantage to us. it runs in a direction almost perpendicular to the line of bluffs on the opposite side, or east bank, of the river. as soon as the enemy discovered what we were doing he established a battery commanding the canal throughout its length. this battery soon drove out our dredges, two in number, which were doing the work of thousands of men. had the canal been completed it might have proven of some use in running transports through, under the cover of night, to use below; but they would yet have to run batteries, though for a much shorter distance. while this work was progressing we were busy in other directions, trying to find an available landing on high ground on the east bank of the river, or to make water-ways to get below the city, avoiding the batteries. on the 30th of january, the day after my arrival at the front, i ordered general mcpherson, stationed with his corps at lake providence, to cut the levee at that point. if successful in opening a channel for navigation by this route, it would carry us to the mississippi river through the mouth of the red river, just above port hudson and four hundred miles below vicksburg by the river. lake providence is a part of the old bed of the mississippi, about a mile from the present channel. it is six miles long and has its outlet through bayou baxter, bayou macon, and the tensas, washita and red rivers. the last three are navigable streams at all seasons. bayous baxter and macon are narrow and tortuous, and the banks are covered with dense forests overhanging the channel. they were also filled with fallen timber, the accumulation of years. the land along the mississippi river, from memphis down, is in all instances highest next to the river, except where the river washes the bluffs which form the boundary of the valley through which it winds. bayou baxter, as it reaches lower land, begins to spread out and disappears entirely in a cypress swamp before it reaches the macon. there was about two feet of water in this swamp at the time. to get through it, even with vessels of the lightest draft, it was necessary to clear off a belt of heavy timber wide enough to make a passage way. as the trees would have to be cut close to the bottom--under water--it was an undertaking of great magnitude. on the 4th of february i visited general mcpherson, and remained with him several days. the work had not progressed so far as to admit the water from the river into the lake, but the troops had succeeded in drawing a small steamer, of probably not over thirty tons' capacity, from the river into the lake. with this we were able to explore the lake and bayou as far as cleared. i saw then that there was scarcely a chance of this ever becoming a practicable route for moving troops through an enemy's country. the distance from lake providence to the point where vessels going by that route would enter the mississippi again, is about four hundred and seventy miles by the main river. the distance would probably be greater by the tortuous bayous through which this new route would carry us. the enemy held port hudson, below where the red river debouches, and all the mississippi above to vicksburg. the red river, washita and tensas were, as has been said, all navigable streams, on which the enemy could throw small bodies of men to obstruct our passage and pick off our troops with their sharpshooters. i let the work go on, believing employment was better than idleness for the men. then, too, it served as a cover for other efforts which gave a better prospect of success. this work was abandoned after the canal proved a failure. lieutenant-colonel wilson of my staff was sent to helena, arkansas, to examine and open a way through moon lake and the yazoo pass if possible. formerly there was a route by way of an inlet from the mississippi river into moon lake, a mile east of the river, thence east through yazoo pass to coldwater, along the latter to the tallahatchie, which joins the yallabusha about two hundred and fifty miles below moon lake and forms the yazoo river. these were formerly navigated by steamers trading with the rich plantations along their banks; but the state of mississippi had built a strong levee across the inlet some years before, leaving the only entrance for vessels into this rich region the one by way of the mouth of the yazoo several hundreds of miles below. on the 2d of february this dam, or levee, was cut. the river being high the rush of water through the cut was so great that in a very short time the entire obstruction was washed away. the bayous were soon filled and much of the country was overflowed. this pass leaves the mississippi river but a few miles below helena. on the 24th general ross, with his brigade of about 4,500 men on transports, moved into this new water-way. the rebels had obstructed the navigation of yazoo pass and the coldwater by felling trees into them. much of the timber in this region being of greater specific gravity than water, and being of great size, their removal was a matter of great labor; but it was finally accomplished, and on the 11th of march ross found himself, accompanied by two gunboats under the command of lieutenant-commander watson smith, confronting a fortification at greenwood, where the tallahatchie and yallabusha unite and the yazoo begins. the bends of the rivers are such at this point as to almost form an island, scarcely above water at that stage of the river. this island was fortified and manned. it was named fort pemberton after the commander at vicksburg. no land approach was accessible. the troops, therefore, could render no assistance towards an assault further than to establish a battery on a little piece of ground which was discovered above water. the gunboats, however, attacked on the 11th and again on the 13th of march. both efforts were failures and were not renewed. one gunboat was disabled and we lost six men killed and twenty-five wounded. the loss of the enemy was less. fort pemberton was so little above the water that it was thought that a rise of two feet would drive the enemy out. in hope of enlisting the elements on our side, which had been so much against us up to this time, a second cut was made in the mississippi levee, this time directly opposite helena, or six miles above the former cut. it did not accomplish the desired result, and ross, with his fleet, started back. on the 22d he met quinby with a brigade at yazoo pass. quinby was the senior of ross, and assumed command. he was not satisfied with returning to his former position without seeing for himself whether anything could be accomplished. accordingly fort pemberton was revisited by our troops; but an inspection was sufficient this time without an attack. quinby, with his command, returned with but little delay. in the meantime i was much exercised for the safety of ross, not knowing that quinby had been able to join him. reinforcements were of no use in a country covered with water, as they would have to remain on board of their transports. relief had to come from another quarter. so i determined to get into the yazoo below fort pemberton. steel's bayou empties into the yazoo river between haines' bluff and its mouth. it is narrow, very tortuous, and fringed with a very heavy growth of timber, but it is deep. it approaches to within one mile of the mississippi at eagle bend, thirty miles above young's point. steel's bayou connects with black bayou, black bayou with deer creek, deer creek with rolling fork, rolling fork with the big sunflower river, and the big sunflower with the yazoo river about ten miles above haines' bluff in a right line but probably twenty or twenty-five miles by the winding of the river. all these waterways are of about the same nature so far as navigation is concerned, until the sunflower is reached; this affords free navigation. admiral porter explored this waterway as far as deer creek on the 14th of march, and reported it navigable. on the next day he started with five gunboats and four mortar-boats. i went with him for some distance. the heavy overhanging timber retarded progress very much, as did also the short turns in so narrow a stream. the gunboats, however, ploughed their way through without other damage than to their appearance. the transports did not fare so well although they followed behind. the road was somewhat cleared for them by the gunboats. in the evening i returned to headquarters to hurry up reinforcements. sherman went in person on the 16th, taking with him stuart's division of the 15th corps. they took large river transports to eagle bend on the mississippi, where they debarked and marched across to steel's bayou, where they re-embarked on the transports. the river steamers, with their tall smokestacks and light guards extending out, were so much impeded that the gunboats got far ahead. porter, with his fleet, got within a few hundred yards of where the sailing would have been clear and free from the obstructions caused by felling trees into the water, when he encountered rebel sharp-shooters, and his progress was delayed by obstructions in his front. he could do nothing with gunboats against sharpshooters. the rebels, learning his route, had sent in about 4,000 men--many more than there were sailors in the fleet. sherman went back, at the request of the admiral, to clear out black bayou and to hurry up reinforcements, which were far behind. on the night of the 19th he received notice from the admiral that he had been attacked by sharp-shooters and was in imminent peril. sherman at once returned through black bayou in a canoe, and passed on until he met a steamer, with the last of the reinforcements he had, coming up. they tried to force their way through black bayou with their steamer, but, finding it slow and tedious work, debarked and pushed forward on foot. it was night when they landed, and intensely dark. there was but a narrow strip of land above water, and that was grown up with underbrush or cane. the troops lighted their way through this with candles carried in their hands for a mile and a half, when they came to an open plantation. here the troops rested until morning. they made twenty-one miles from this resting-place by noon the next day, and were in time to rescue the fleet. porter had fully made up his mind to blow up the gunboats rather than have them fall into the hands of the enemy. more welcome visitors he probably never met than the "boys in blue" on this occasion. the vessels were backed out and returned to their rendezvous on the mississippi; and thus ended in failure the fourth attempt to get in rear of vicksburg. chapter xxxii. the bayous west of the mississippi--criticisms of the northern press --running the batteries--loss of the indianola--disposition of the troops. the original canal scheme was also abandoned on the 27th of march. the effort to make a waterway through lake providence and the connecting bayous was abandoned as wholly impracticable about the same time. at milliken's bend, and also at young's point, bayous or channels start, which connecting with other bayous passing richmond, louisiana, enter the mississippi at carthage twenty-five or thirty miles above grand gulf. the mississippi levee cuts the supply of water off from these bayous or channels, but all the rainfall behind the levee, at these points, is carried through these same channels to the river below. in case of a crevasse in this vicinity, the water escaping would find its outlet through the same channels. the dredges and laborers from the canal having been driven out by overflow and the enemy's batteries, i determined to open these other channels, if possible. if successful the effort would afford a route, away from the enemy's batteries, for our transports. there was a good road back of the levees, along these bayous, to carry the troops, artillery and wagon trains over whenever the water receded a little, and after a few days of dry weather. accordingly, with the abandonment of all the other plans for reaching a base heretofore described, this new one was undertaken. as early as the 4th of february i had written to halleck about this route, stating that i thought it much more practicable than the other undertaking (the lake providence route), and that it would have been accomplished with much less labor if commenced before the water had got all over the country. the upper end of these bayous being cut off from a water supply, further than the rainfall back of the levees, was grown up with dense timber for a distance of several miles from their source. it was necessary, therefore, to clear this out before letting in the water from the river. this work was continued until the waters of the river began to recede and the road to richmond, louisiana, emerged from the water. one small steamer and some barges were got through this channel, but no further use could be made of it because of the fall in the river. beyond this it was no more successful than the other experiments with which the winter was whiled away. all these failures would have been very discouraging if i had expected much from the efforts; but i had not. from the first the most i hoped to accomplish was the passage of transports, to be used below vicksburg, without exposure to the long line of batteries defending that city. this long, dreary and, for heavy and continuous rains and high water, unprecedented winter was one of great hardship to all engaged about vicksburg. the river was higher than its natural banks from december, 1862, to the following april. the war had suspended peaceful pursuits in the south, further than the production of army supplies, and in consequence the levees were neglected and broken in many places and the whole country was covered with water. troops could scarcely find dry ground on which to pitch their tents. malarial fevers broke out among the men. measles and small-pox also attacked them. the hospital arrangements and medical attendance were so perfect, however, that the loss of life was much less than might have been expected. visitors to the camps went home with dismal stories to relate; northern papers came back to the soldiers with these stories exaggerated. because i would not divulge my ultimate plans to visitors, they pronounced me idle, incompetent and unfit to command men in an emergency, and clamored for my removal. they were not to be satisfied, many of them, with my simple removal, but named who my successor should be. mcclernand, fremont, hunter and mcclellan were all mentioned in this connection. i took no steps to answer these complaints, but continued to do my duty, as i understood it, to the best of my ability. every one has his superstitions. one of mine is that in positions of great responsibility every one should do his duty to the best of his ability where assigned by competent authority, without application or the use of influence to change his position. while at cairo i had watched with very great interest the operations of the army of the potomac, looking upon that as the main field of the war. i had no idea, myself, of ever having any large command, nor did i suppose that i was equal to one; but i had the vanity to think that as a cavalry officer i might succeed very well in the command of a brigade. on one occasion, in talking about this to my staff officers, all of whom were civilians without any military education whatever, i said that i would give anything if i were commanding a brigade of cavalry in the army of the potomac and i believed i could do some good. captain hillyer spoke up and suggested that i make application to be transferred there to command the cavalry. i then told him that i would cut my right arm off first, and mentioned this superstition. in time of war the president, being by the constitution commander-in-chief of the army and navy, is responsible for the selection of commanders. he should not be embarrassed in making his selections. i having been selected, my responsibility ended with my doing the best i knew how. if i had sought the place, or obtained it through personal or political influence, my belief is that i would have feared to undertake any plan of my own conception, and would probably have awaited direct orders from my distant superiors. persons obtaining important commands by application or political influence are apt to keep a written record of complaints and predictions of defeat, which are shown in case of disaster. somebody must be responsible for their failures. with all the pressure brought to bear upon them, both president lincoln and general halleck stood by me to the end of the campaign. i had never met mr. lincoln, but his support was constant. at last the waters began to recede; the roads crossing the peninsula behind the levees of the bayous, were emerging from the waters; the troops were all concentrated from distant points at milliken's bend preparatory to a final move which was to crown the long, tedious and discouraging labors with success. i had had in contemplation the whole winter the movement by land to a point below vicksburg from which to operate, subject only to the possible but not expected success of some one of the expedients resorted to for the purpose of giving us a different base. this could not be undertaken until the waters receded. i did not therefore communicate this plan, even to an officer of my staff, until it was necessary to make preparations for the start. my recollection is that admiral porter was the first one to whom i mentioned it. the co-operation of the navy was absolutely essential to the success (even to the contemplation) of such an enterprise. i had no more authority to command porter than he had to command me. it was necessary to have part of his fleet below vicksburg if the troops went there. steamers to use as ferries were also essential. the navy was the only escort and protection for these steamers, all of which in getting below had to run about fourteen miles of batteries. porter fell into the plan at once, and suggested that he had better superintend the preparation of the steamers selected to run the batteries, as sailors would probably understand the work better than soldiers. i was glad to accept his proposition, not only because i admitted his argument, but because it would enable me to keep from the enemy a little longer our designs. porter's fleet was on the east side of the river above the mouth of the yazoo, entirely concealed from the enemy by the dense forests that intervened. even spies could not get near him, on account of the undergrowth and overflowed lands. suspicions of some mysterious movements were aroused. our river guards discovered one day a small skiff moving quietly and mysteriously up the river near the east shore, from the direction of vicksburg, towards the fleet. on overhauling the boat they found a small white flag, not much larger than a handkerchief, set up in the stern, no doubt intended as a flag of truce in case of discovery. the boat, crew and passengers were brought ashore to me. the chief personage aboard proved to be jacob thompson, secretary of the interior under the administration of president buchanan. after a pleasant conversation of half an hour or more i allowed the boat and crew, passengers and all, to return to vicksburg, without creating a suspicion that there was a doubt in my mind as to the good faith of mr. thompson and his flag. admiral porter proceeded with the preparation of the steamers for their hazardous passage of the enemy's batteries. the great essential was to protect the boilers from the enemy's shot, and to conceal the fires under the boilers from view. this he accomplished by loading the steamers, between the guards and boilers on the boiler deck up to the deck above, with bales of hay and cotton, and the deck in front of the boilers in the same way, adding sacks of grain. the hay and grain would be wanted below, and could not be transported in sufficient quantity by the muddy roads over which we expected to march. before this i had been collecting, from st. louis and chicago, yawls and barges to be used as ferries when we got below. by the 16th of april porter was ready to start on his perilous trip. the advance, flagship benton, porter commanding, started at ten o'clock at night, followed at intervals of a few minutes by the lafayette with a captured steamer, the price, lashed to her side, the louisville, mound city, pittsburgh and carondelet--all of these being naval vessels. next came the transports --forest queen, silver wave and henry clay, each towing barges loaded with coal to be used as fuel by the naval and transport steamers when below the batteries. the gunboat tuscumbia brought up the rear. soon after the start a battery between vicksburg and warrenton opened fire across the intervening peninsula, followed by the upper batteries, and then by batteries all along the line. the gunboats ran up close under the bluffs, delivering their fire in return at short distances, probably without much effect. they were under fire for more than two hours and every vessel was struck many times, but with little damage to the gunboats. the transports did not fare so well. the henry clay was disabled and deserted by her crew. soon after a shell burst in the cotton packed about the boilers, set the vessel on fire and burned her to the water's edge. the burning mass, however, floated down to carthage before grounding, as did also one of the barges in tow. the enemy were evidently expecting our fleet, for they were ready to light up the river by means of bonfires on the east side and by firing houses on the point of land opposite the city on the louisiana side. the sight was magnificent, but terrible. i witnessed it from the deck of a river transport, run out into the middle of the river and as low down as it was prudent to go. my mind was much relieved when i learned that no one on the transports had been killed and but few, if any, wounded. during the running of the batteries men were stationed in the holds of the transports to partially stop with cotton shot-holes that might be made in the hulls. all damage was afterwards soon repaired under the direction of admiral porter. the experiment of passing batteries had been tried before this, however, during the war. admiral farragut had run the batteries at port hudson with the flagship hartford and one iron-clad and visited me from below vicksburg. the 13th of february admiral porter had sent the gunboat indianola, lieutenant-commander george brown commanding, below. she met colonel ellet of the marine brigade below natchez on a captured steamer. two of the colonel's fleet had previously run the batteries, producing the greatest consternation among the people along the mississippi from vicksburg (*10) to the red river. the indianola remained about the mouth of the red river some days, and then started up the mississippi. the confederates soon raised the queen of the west, (*11) and repaired her. with this vessel and the ram webb, which they had had for some time in the red river, and two other steamers, they followed the indianola. the latter was encumbered with barges of coal in tow, and consequently could make but little speed against the rapid current of the mississippi. the confederate fleet overtook her just above grand gulf, and attacked her after dark on the 24th of february. the indianola was superior to all the others in armament, and probably would have destroyed them or driven them away, but for her encumbrance. as it was she fought them for an hour and a half, but, in the dark, was struck seven or eight times by the ram and other vessels, and was finally disabled and reduced to a sinking condition. the armament was thrown overboard and the vessel run ashore. officers and crew then surrendered. i had started mcclernand with his corps of four divisions on the 29th of march, by way of richmond, louisiana, to new carthage, hoping that he might capture grand gulf before the balance of the troops could get there; but the roads were very bad, scarcely above water yet. some miles from new carthage the levee to bayou vidal was broken in several places, overflowing the roads for the distance of two miles. boats were collected from the surrounding bayous, and some constructed on the spot from such material as could be collected, to transport the troops across the overflowed interval. by the 6th of april mcclernand had reached new carthage with one division and its artillery, the latter ferried through the woods by these boats. on the 17th i visited new carthage in person, and saw that the process of getting troops through in the way we were doing was so tedious that a better method must be devised. the water was falling, and in a few days there would not be depth enough to use boats; nor would the land be dry enough to march over. mcclernand had already found a new route from smith's plantation where the crevasse occurred, to perkins' plantation, eight to twelve miles below new carthage. this increased the march from milliken's bend from twenty-seven to nearly forty miles. four bridges had to be built across bayous, two of them each over six hundred feet long, making about two thousand feet of bridging in all. the river falling made the current in these bayous very rapid, increasing the difficulty of building and permanently fastening these bridges; but the ingenuity of the "yankee soldier" was equal to any emergency. the bridges were soon built of such material as could be found near by, and so substantial were they that not a single mishap occurred in crossing all the army with artillery, cavalry and wagon trains, except the loss of one siege gun (a thirty-two pounder). this, if my memory serves me correctly, broke through the only pontoon bridge we had in all our march across the peninsula. these bridges were all built by mcclernand's command, under the supervision of lieutenant hains of the engineer corps. i returned to milliken's bend on the 18th or 19th, and on the 20th issued the following final order for the movement of troops: headquarters department of the tennessee, milliken's bend, louisiana, april 20, 1863. special orders, no. 110. * * * * * * * viii. the following orders are published for the information and guidance of the "army in the field," in its present movement to obtain a foothold on the east bank of the mississippi river, from which vicksburg can be approached by practicable roads. first.--the thirteenth army corps, major-general john a. mcclernand commanding, will constitute the right wing. second.--the fifteenth army corps, major-general w. t. sherman commanding, will constitute the left wing. third.--the seventeenth army corps, major-general james b. mcpherson commanding, will constitute the centre. fourth.--the order of march to new carthage will be from right to left. fifth.--reserves will be formed by divisions from each army corps; or, an entire army corps will be held as a reserve, as necessity may require. when the reserve is formed by divisions, each division will remain under the immediate command of its respective corps commander, unless otherwise specially ordered for a particular emergency. sixth.--troops will be required to bivouac, until proper facilities can be afforded for the transportation of camp equipage. seventh.--in the present movement, one tent will be allowed to each company for the protection of rations from rain; one wall tent for each regimental headquarters; one wall tent for each brigade headquarters; and one wall tent for each division headquarters; corps commanders having the books and blanks of their respective commands to provide for, are authorized to take such tents as are absolutely necessary, but not to exceed the number allowed by general orders no. 160, a. g. o., series of 1862. eighth.--all the teams of the three army corps, under the immediate charge of the quartermasters bearing them on their returns, will constitute a train for carrying supplies and ordnance and the authorized camp equipage of the army. ninth.--as fast as the thirteenth army corps advances, the seventeenth army corps will take its place; and it, in turn, will be followed in like manner by the fifteenth army corps. tenth.--two regiments from each army corps will be detailed by corps commanders, to guard the lines from richmond to new carthage. eleventh.--general hospitals will be established by the medical director between duckport and milliken's bend. all sick and disabled soldiers will be left in these hospitals. surgeons in charge of hospitals will report convalescents as fast as they become fit for duty. each corps commander will detail an intelligent and good drill officer, to remain behind and take charge of the convalescents of their respective corps; officers so detailed will organize the men under their charge into squads and companies, without regard to the regiments they belong to; and in the absence of convalescent commissioned officers to command them, will appoint non-commissioned officers or privates. the force so organized will constitute the guard of the line from duckport to milliken's bend. they will furnish all the guards and details required for general hospitals, and with the contrabands that may be about the camps, will furnish all the details for loading and unloading boats. twelfth.--the movement of troops from milliken's bend to new carthage will be so conducted as to allow the transportation of ten days' supply of rations, and one-half the allowance of ordnance, required by previous orders. thirteenth.--commanders are authorized and enjoined to collect all the beef cattle, corn and other necessary supplies on the line of march; but wanton destruction of property, taking of articles useless for military purposes, insulting citizens, going into and searching houses without proper orders from division commanders, are positively prohibited. all such irregularities must be summarily punished. fourteenth.--brigadier-general j. c. sullivan is appointed to the command of all the forces detailed for the protection of the line from here to new carthage. his particular attention is called to general orders, no. 69, from adjutant-general's office, washington, of date march 20, 1863. by order of major-general u. s. grant. mcclernand was already below on the mississippi. two of mcpherson's divisions were put upon the march immediately. the third had not yet arrived from lake providence; it was on its way to milliken's bend and was to follow on arrival. sherman was to follow mcpherson. two of his divisions were at duckport and young's point, and the third under steele was under orders to return from greenville, mississippi, where it had been sent to expel a rebel battery that had been annoying our transports. it had now become evident that the army could not be rationed by a wagon train over the single narrow and almost impassable road between milliken's bend and perkins' plantation. accordingly six more steamers were protected as before, to run the batteries, and were loaded with supplies. they took twelve barges in tow, loaded also with rations. on the night of the 22d of april they ran the batteries, five getting through more or less disabled while one was sunk. about half the barges got through with their needed freight. when it was first proposed to run the blockade at vicksburg with river steamers there were but two captains or masters who were willing to accompany their vessels, and but one crew. volunteers were called for from the army, men who had had experience in any capacity in navigating the western rivers. captains, pilots, mates, engineers and deck-hands enough presented themselves to take five times the number of vessels we were moving through this dangerous ordeal. most of them were from logan's division, composed generally of men from the southern part of illinois and from missouri. all but two of the steamers were commanded by volunteers from the army, and all but one so manned. in this instance, as in all others during the war, i found that volunteers could be found in the ranks and among the commissioned officers to meet every call for aid whether mechanical or professional. colonel w. s. oliver was master of transportation on this occasion by special detail. chapter xxxiii. attack on grand gulf--operations below vicksburg. on the 24th my headquarters were with the advance at perkins' plantation. reconnoissances were made in boats to ascertain whether there was high land on the east shore of the river where we might land above grand gulf. there was none practicable. accordingly the troops were set in motion for hard times, twenty-two miles farther down the river and nearly opposite grand gulf. the loss of two steamers and six barges reduced our transportation so that only 10,000 men could be moved by water. some of the steamers that had got below were injured in their machinery, so that they were only useful as barges towed by those less severely injured. all the troops, therefore, except what could be transported in one trip, had to march. the road lay west of lake st. joseph. three large bayous had to be crossed. they were rapidly bridged in the same manner as those previously encountered. (*12) on the 27th mcclernand's corps was all at hard times, and mcpherson's was following closely. i had determined to make the attempt to effect a landing on the east side of the river as soon as possible. accordingly, on the morning of the 29th, mcclernand was directed to embark all the troops from his corps that our transports and barges could carry. about 10,000 men were so embarked. the plan was to have the navy silence the guns at grand gulf, and to have as many men as possible ready to debark in the shortest possible time under cover of the fire of the navy and carry the works by storm. the following order was issued: perkins plantation, la., april 27,1863. major-general j. a. mcclernand, commanding 13th a. c. commence immediately the embarkation of your corps, or so much of it as there is transportation for. have put aboard the artillery and every article authorized in orders limiting baggage, except the men, and hold them in readiness, with their places assigned, to be moved at a moment's warning. all the troops you may have, except those ordered to remain behind, send to a point nearly opposite grand gulf, where you see, by special orders of this date, general mcpherson is ordered to send one division. the plan of the attack will be for the navy to attack and silence all the batteries commanding the river. your corps will be on the river, ready to run to and debark on the nearest eligible land below the promontory first brought to view passing down the river. once on shore, have each commander instructed beforehand to form his men the best the ground will admit of, and take possession of the most commanding points, but avoid separating your command so that it cannot support itself. the first object is to get a foothold where our troops can maintain themselves until such time as preparations can be made and troops collected for a forward movement. admiral porter has proposed to place his boats in the position indicated to you a few days ago, and to bring over with them such troops as may be below the city after the guns of the enemy are silenced. it may be that the enemy will occupy positions back from the city, out of range of the gunboats, so as to make it desirable to run past grand gulf and land at rodney. in case this should prove the plan, a signal will be arranged and you duly informed, when the transports are to start with this view. or, it may be expedient for the boats to run past, but not the men. in this case, then, the transports would have to be brought back to where the men could land and move by forced marches to below grand gulf, re-embark rapidly and proceed to the latter place. there will be required, then, three signals; one, to indicate that the transports can run down and debark the troops at grand gulf; one, that the transports can run by without the troops; and the last, that the transports can run by with the troops on board. should the men have to march, all baggage and artillery will be left to run the blockade. if not already directed, require your men to keep three days' rations in their haversacks, not to be touched until a movement commences. u. s. grant, major-general. at 8 o'clock a.m., 29th, porter made the attack with his entire strength present, eight gunboats. for nearly five and a half hours the attack was kept up without silencing a single gun of the enemy. all this time mcclernand's 10,000 men were huddled together on the transports in the stream ready to attempt a landing if signalled. i occupied a tug from which i could see the effect of the battle on both sides, within range of the enemy's guns; but a small tug, without armament, was not calculated to attract the fire of batteries while they were being assailed themselves. about half-past one the fleet withdrew, seeing their efforts were entirely unavailing. the enemy ceased firing as soon as we withdrew. i immediately signalled the admiral and went aboard his ship. the navy lost in this engagement eighteen killed and fifty-six wounded. a large proportion of these were of the crew of the flagship, and most of those from a single shell which penetrated the ship's side and exploded between decks where the men were working their guns. the sight of the mangled and dying men which met my eye as i boarded the ship was sickening. grand gulf is on a high bluff where the river runs at the very foot of it. it is as defensible upon its front as vicksburg and, at that time, would have been just as impossible to capture by a front attack. i therefore requested porter to run the batteries with his fleet that night, and to take charge of the transports, all of which would be wanted below. there is a long tongue of land from the louisiana side extending towards grand gulf, made by the river running nearly east from about three miles above and nearly in the opposite direction from that point for about the same distance below. the land was so low and wet that it would not have been practicable to march an army across but for a levee. i had had this explored before, as well as the east bank below to ascertain if there was a possible point of debarkation north of rodney. it was found that the top of the levee afforded a good road to march upon. porter, as was always the case with him, not only acquiesced in the plan, but volunteered to use his entire fleet as transports. i had intended to make this request, but he anticipated me. at dusk, when concealed from the view of the enemy at grand gulf, mcclernand landed his command on the west bank. the navy and transports ran the batteries successfully. the troops marched across the point of land under cover of night, unobserved. by the time it was light the enemy saw our whole fleet, ironclads, gunboats, river steamers and barges, quietly moving down the river three miles below them, black, or rather blue, with national troops. when the troops debarked, the evening of the 29th, it was expected that we would have to go to rodney, about nine miles below, to find a landing; but that night a colored man came in who informed me that a good landing would be found at bruinsburg, a few miles above rodney, from which point there was a good road leading to port gibson some twelve miles in the interior. the information was found correct, and our landing was effected without opposition. sherman had not left his position above vicksburg yet. on the morning of the 27th i ordered him to create a diversion by moving his corps up the yazoo and threatening an attack on haines' bluff. my object was to compel pemberton to keep as much force about vicksburg as i could, until i could secure a good footing on high land east of the river. the move was eminently successful and, as we afterwards learned, created great confusion about vicksburg and doubts about our real design. sherman moved the day of our attack on grand gulf, the 29th, with ten regiments of his command and eight gunboats which porter had left above vicksburg. he debarked his troops and apparently made every preparation to attack the enemy while the navy bombarded the main forts at haines' bluff. this move was made without a single casualty in either branch of the service. on the first of may sherman received orders from me (sent from hard times the evening of the 29th of april) to withdraw from the front of haines' bluff and follow mcpherson with two divisions as fast as he could. i had established a depot of supplies at perkins' plantation. now that all our gunboats were below grand gulf it was possible that the enemy might fit out boats in the big black with improvised armament and attempt to destroy these supplies. mcpherson was at hard times with a portion of his corps, and the depot was protected by a part of his command. the night of the 29th i directed him to arm one of the transports with artillery and send it up to perkins' plantation as a guard; and also to have the siege guns we had brought along moved there and put in position. the embarkation below grand gulf took place at de shroon's, louisiana, six miles above bruinsburg, mississippi. early on the morning of 30th of april mcclernand's corps and one division of mcpherson's corps were speedily landed. when this was effected i felt a degree of relief scarcely ever equalled since. vicksburg was not yet taken it is true, nor were its defenders demoralized by any of our previous moves. i was now in the enemy's country, with a vast river and the stronghold of vicksburg between me and my base of supplies. but i was on dry ground on the same side of the river with the enemy. all the campaigns, labors, hardships and exposures from the month of december previous to this time that had been made and endured, were for the accomplishment of this one object. i had with me the 13th corps, general mcclernand commanding, and two brigades of logan's division of the 17th corps, general mcpherson commanding--in all not more than twenty thousand men to commence the campaign with. these were soon reinforced by the remaining brigade of logan's division and crocker's division of the 17th corps. on the 7th of may i was further reinforced by sherman with two divisions of his, the 15th corps. my total force was then about thirty-three thousand men. the enemy occupied grand gulf, haines' bluff and jackson with a force of nearly sixty thousand men. jackson is fifty miles east of vicksburg and is connected with it by a railroad. my first problem was to capture grand gulf to use as a base. bruinsburg is two miles from high ground. the bottom at that point is higher than most of the low land in the valley of the mississippi, and a good road leads to the bluff. it was natural to expect the garrison from grand gulf to come out to meet us and prevent, if they could, our reaching this solid base. bayou pierre enters the mississippi just above bruinsburg and, as it is a navigable stream and was high at the time, in order to intercept us they had to go by port gibson, the nearest point where there was a bridge to cross upon. this more than doubled the distance from grand gulf to the high land back of bruinsburg. no time was to be lost in securing this foothold. our transportation was not sufficient to move all the army across the river at one trip, or even two; but the landing of the 13th corps and one division of the 17th was effected during the day, april 30th, and early evening. mcclernand was advanced as soon as ammunition and two days' rations (to last five) could be issued to his men. the bluffs were reached an hour before sunset and mcclernand was pushed on, hoping to reach port gibson and save the bridge spanning the bayou pierre before the enemy could get there; for crossing a stream in the presence of an enemy is always difficult. port gibson, too, is the starting point of roads to grand gulf, vicksburg and jackson. mcclernand's advance met the enemy about five miles west of port gibson at thompson's plantation. there was some firing during the night, but nothing rising to the dignity of a battle until daylight. the enemy had taken a strong natural position with most of the grand gulf garrison, numbering about seven or eight thousand men, under general bowen. his hope was to hold me in check until reinforcements under loring could reach him from vicksburg; but loring did not come in time to render much assistance south of port gibson. two brigades of mcpherson's corps followed mcclernand as fast as rations and ammunition could be issued, and were ready to take position upon the battlefield whenever the 13th corps could be got out of the way. the country in this part of mississippi stands on edge, as it were, the roads running along the ridges except when they occasionally pass from one ridge to another. where there are no clearings the sides of the hills are covered with a very heavy growth of timber and with undergrowth, and the ravines are filled with vines and canebrakes, almost impenetrable. this makes it easy for an inferior force to delay, if not defeat, a far superior one. near the point selected by bowen to defend, the road to port gibson divides, taking two ridges which do not diverge more than a mile or two at the widest point. these roads unite just outside the town. this made it necessary for mcclernand to divide his force. it was not only divided, but it was separated by a deep ravine of the character above described. one flank could not reinforce the other except by marching back to the junction of the roads. mcclernand put the divisions of hovey, carr and a. j. smith upon the right-hand branch and osterhaus on the left. i was on the field by ten a.m., and inspected both flanks in person. on the right the enemy, if not being pressed back, was at least not repulsing our advance. on the left, however, osterhaus was not faring so well. he had been repulsed with some loss. as soon as the road could be cleared of mcclernand's troops i ordered up mcpherson, who was close upon the rear of the 13th corps, with two brigades of logan's division. this was about noon. i ordered him to send one brigade (general john e. smith's was selected) to support osterhaus, and to move to the left and flank the enemy out of his position. this movement carried the brigade over a deep ravine to a third ridge and, when smith's troops were seen well through the ravine, osterhaus was directed to renew his front attack. it was successful and unattended by heavy loss. the enemy was sent in full retreat on their right, and their left followed before sunset. while the movement to our left was going on, mcclernand, who was with his right flank, sent me frequent requests for reinforcements, although the force with him was not being pressed. i had been upon the ground and knew it did not admit of his engaging all the men he had. we followed up our victory until night overtook us about two miles from port gibson; then the troops went into bivouac for the night. chapter xxxiv. capture of port gibson--grierson's raid--occupation of grand gulf --movement up the big black--battle of raymond. we started next morning for port gibson as soon as it was light enough to see the road. we were soon in the town, and i was delighted to find that the enemy had not stopped to contest our crossing further at the bridge, which he had burned. the troops were set to work at once to construct a bridge across the south fork of the bayou pierre. at this time the water was high and the current rapid. what might be called a raft-bridge was soon constructed from material obtained from wooden buildings, stables, fences, etc., which sufficed for carrying the whole army over safely. colonel j. h. wilson, a member of my staff, planned and superintended the construction of this bridge, going into the water and working as hard as any one engaged. officers and men generally joined in this work. when it was finished the army crossed and marched eight miles beyond to the north fork that day. one brigade of logan's division was sent down the stream to occupy the attention of a rebel battery, which had been left behind with infantry supports to prevent our repairing the burnt railroad bridge. two of his brigades were sent up the bayou to find a crossing and reach the north fork to repair the bridge there. the enemy soon left when he found we were building a bridge elsewhere. before leaving port gibson we were reinforced by crocker's division, mcpherson's corps, which had crossed the mississippi at bruinsburg and come up without stopping except to get two days' rations. mcpherson still had one division west of the mississippi river, guarding the road from milliken's bend to the river below until sherman's command should relieve it. on leaving bruinsburg for the front i left my son frederick, who had joined me a few weeks before, on board one of the gunboats asleep, and hoped to get away without him until after grand gulf should fall into our hands; but on waking up he learned that i had gone, and being guided by the sound of the battle raging at thompson's hill--called the battle of port gibson--found his way to where i was. he had no horse to ride at the time, and i had no facilities for even preparing a meal. he, therefore, foraged around the best he could until we reached grand gulf. mr. c. a. dana, then an officer of the war department, accompanied me on the vicksburg campaign and through a portion of the siege. he was in the same situation as fred so far as transportation and mess arrangements were concerned. the first time i call to mind seeing either of them, after the battle, they were mounted on two enormous horses, grown white from age, each equipped with dilapidated saddles and bridles. our trains arrived a few days later, after which we were all perfectly equipped. my son accompanied me throughout the campaign and siege, and caused no anxiety either to me or to his mother, who was at home. he looked out for himself and was in every battle of the campaign. his age, then not quite thirteen, enabled him to take in all he saw, and to retain a recollection of it that would not be possible in more mature years. when the movement from bruinsburg commenced we were without a wagon train. the train still west of the mississippi was carried around with proper escort, by a circuitous route from milliken's bend to hard times seventy or more miles below, and did not get up for some days after the battle of port gibson. my own horses, headquarters' transportation, servants, mess chest, and everything except what i had on, was with this train. general a. j. smith happened to have an extra horse at bruinsburg which i borrowed, with a saddle-tree without upholstering further than stirrups. i had no other for nearly a week. it was necessary to have transportation for ammunition. provisions could be taken from the country; but all the ammunition that can be carried on the person is soon exhausted when there is much fighting. i directed, therefore, immediately on landing that all the vehicles and draft animals, whether horses, mules, or oxen, in the vicinity should be collected and loaded to their capacity with ammunition. quite a train was collected during the 30th, and a motley train it was. in it could be found fine carriages, loaded nearly to the top with boxes of cartridges that had been pitched in promiscuously, drawn by mules with plough, harness, straw collars, rope-lines, etc.; long-coupled wagons, with racks for carrying cotton bales, drawn by oxen, and everything that could be found in the way of transportation on a plantation, either for use or pleasure. the making out of provision returns was stopped for the time. no formalities were to retard our progress until a position was secured when the time could be spared to observe them. it was at port gibson i first heard through a southern paper of the complete success of colonel grierson, who was making a raid through central mississippi. he had started from la grange april 17th with three regiments of about 1,700 men. on the 21st he had detached colonel hatch with one regiment to destroy the railroad between columbus and macon and then return to la grange. hatch had a sharp fight with the enemy at columbus and retreated along the railroad, destroying it at okalona and tupelo, and arriving in la grange april 26. grierson continued his movement with about 1,000 men, breaking the vicksburg and meridian railroad and the new orleans and jackson railroad, arriving at baton rouge may 2d. this raid was of great importance, for grierson had attracted the attention of the enemy from the main movement against vicksburg. during the night of the 2d of may the bridge over the north fork was repaired, and the troops commenced crossing at five the next morning. before the leading brigade was over it was fired upon by the enemy from a commanding position; but they were soon driven off. it was evident that the enemy was covering a retreat from grand gulf to vicksburg. every commanding position from this (grindstone) crossing to hankinson's ferry over the big black was occupied by the retreating foe to delay our progress. mcpherson, however, reached hankinson's ferry before night, seized the ferry boat, and sent a detachment of his command across and several miles north on the road to vicksburg. when the junction of the road going to vicksburg with the road from grand gulf to raymond and jackson was reached, logan with his division was turned to the left towards grand gulf. i went with him a short distance from this junction. mcpherson had encountered the largest force yet met since the battle of port gibson and had a skirmish nearly approaching a battle; but the road logan had taken enabled him to come up on the enemy's right flank, and they soon gave way. mcpherson was ordered to hold hankinson's ferry and the road back to willow springs with one division; mcclernand, who was now in the rear, was to join in this as well as to guard the line back down the bayou. i did not want to take the chances of having an enemy lurking in our rear. on the way from the junction to grand gulf, where the road comes into the one from vicksburg to the same place six or seven miles out, i learned that the last of the enemy had retreated past that place on their way to vicksburg. i left logan to make the proper disposition of his troops for the night, while i rode into the town with an escort of about twenty cavalry. admiral porter had already arrived with his fleet. the enemy had abandoned his heavy guns and evacuated the place. when i reached grand gulf may 3d i had not been with my baggage since the 27th of april and consequently had had no change of underclothing, no meal except such as i could pick up sometimes at other headquarters, and no tent to cover me. the first thing i did was to get a bath, borrow some fresh underclothing from one of the naval officers and get a good meal on the flag-ship. then i wrote letters to the general-in-chief informing him of our present position, dispatches to be telegraphed from cairo, orders to general sullivan commanding above vicksburg, and gave orders to all my corps commanders. about twelve o'clock at night i was through my work and started for hankinson's ferry, arriving there before daylight. while at grand gulf i heard from banks, who was on the red river, and who said that he could not be at port hudson before the 10th of may and then with only 15,000 men. up to this time my intention had been to secure grand gulf, as a base of supplies, detach mcclernand's corps to banks and co-operate with him in the reduction of port hudson. the news from banks forced upon me a different plan of campaign from the one intended. to wait for his co-operation would have detained me at least a month. the reinforcements would not have reached ten thousand men after deducting casualties and necessary river guards at all high points close to the river for over three hundred miles. the enemy would have strengthened his position and been reinforced by more men than banks could have brought. i therefore determined to move independently of banks, cut loose from my base, destroy the rebel force in rear of vicksburg and invest or capture the city. grand gulf was accordingly given up as a base and the authorities at washington were notified. i knew well that halleck's caution would lead him to disapprove of this course; but it was the only one that gave any chance of success. the time it would take to communicate with washington and get a reply would be so great that i could not be interfered with until it was demonstrated whether my plan was practicable. even sherman, who afterwards ignored bases of supplies other than what were afforded by the country while marching through four states of the confederacy with an army more than twice as large as mine at this time, wrote me from hankinson's ferry, advising me of the impossibility of supplying our army over a single road. he urged me to "stop all troops till your army is partially supplied with wagons, and then act as quick as possible; for this road will be jammed, as sure as life." to this i replied: "i do not calculate upon the possibility of supplying the army with full rations from grand gulf. i know it will be impossible without constructing additional roads. what i do expect is to get up what rations of hard bread, coffee and salt we can, and make the country furnish the balance." we started from bruinsburg with an average of about two days' rations, and received no more from our own supplies for some days; abundance was found in the mean time. a delay would give the enemy time to reinforce and fortify. mcclernand's and mcpherson's commands were kept substantially as they were on the night of the 2d, awaiting supplies sufficient to give them three days' rations in haversacks. beef, mutton, poultry and forage were found in abundance. quite a quantity of bacon and molasses was also secured from the country, but bread and coffee could not be obtained in quantity sufficient for all the men. every plantation, however, had a run of stone, propelled by mule power, to grind corn for the owners and their slaves. all these were kept running while we were stopping, day and night, and when we were marching, during the night, at all plantations covered by the troops. but the product was taken by the troops nearest by, so that the majority of the command was destined to go without bread until a new base was established on the yazoo above vicksburg. while the troops were awaiting the arrival of rations i ordered reconnoissances made by mcclernand and mcpherson, with the view of leading the enemy to believe that we intended to cross the big black and attack the city at once. on the 6th sherman arrived at grand gulf and crossed his command that night and the next day. three days' rations had been brought up from grand gulf for the advanced troops and were issued. orders were given for a forward movement the next day. sherman was directed to order up blair, who had been left behind to guard the road from milliken's bend to hard times with two brigades. the quartermaster at young's point was ordered to send two hundred wagons with blair, and the commissary was to load them with hard bread, coffee, sugar, salt and one hundred thousand pounds of salt meat. on the 3d hurlbut, who had been left at memphis, was ordered to send four regiments from his command to milliken's bend to relieve blair's division, and on the 5th he was ordered to send lauman's division in addition, the latter to join the army in the field. the four regiments were to be taken from troops near the river so that there would be no delay. during the night of the 6th mcpherson drew in his troops north of the big black and was off at an early hour on the road to jackson, via rocky springs, utica and raymond. that night he and mcclernand were both at rocky springs ten miles from hankinson's ferry. mcpherson remained there during the 8th, while mcclernand moved to big sandy and sherman marched from grand gulf to hankinson's ferry. the 9th, mcpherson moved to a point within a few miles west of utica; mcclernand and sherman remained where they were. on the 10th mcpherson moved to utica, sherman to big sandy; mcclernand was still at big sandy. the 11th, mcclernand was at five mile creek; sherman at auburn; mcpherson five miles advanced from utica. may 12th, mcclernand was at fourteen mile creek; sherman at fourteen mile creek; mcpherson at raymond after a battle. after mcpherson crossed the big black at hankinson's ferry vicksburg could have been approached and besieged by the south side. it is not probable, however, that pemberton would have permitted a close besiegement. the broken nature of the ground would have enabled him to hold a strong defensible line from the river south of the city to the big black, retaining possession of the railroad back to that point. it was my plan, therefore, to get to the railroad east of vicksburg, and approach from that direction. accordingly, mcpherson's troops that had crossed the big black were withdrawn and the movement east to jackson commenced. as has been stated before, the country is very much broken and the roads generally confined to the tops of the hills. the troops were moved one (sometimes two) corps at a time to reach designated points out parallel to the railroad and only from six to ten miles from it. mcclernand's corps was kept with its left flank on the big black guarding all the crossings. fourteen mile creek, a stream substantially parallel with the railroad, was reached and crossings effected by mcclernand and sherman with slight loss. mcpherson was to the right of sherman, extending to raymond. the cavalry was used in this advance in reconnoitring to find the roads: to cover our advances and to find the most practicable routes from one command to another so they could support each other in case of an attack. in making this move i estimated pemberton's movable force at vicksburg at about eighteen thousand men, with smaller forces at haines' bluff and jackson. it would not be possible for pemberton to attack me with all his troops at one place, and i determined to throw my army between his and fight him in detail. this was done with success, but i found afterwards that i had entirely under-estimated pemberton's strength. up to this point our movements had been made without serious opposition. my line was now nearly parallel with the jackson and vicksburg railroad and about seven miles south of it. the right was at raymond eighteen miles from jackson, mcpherson commanding; sherman in the centre on fourteen mile creek, his advance thrown across; mcclernand to the left, also on fourteen mile creek, advance across, and his pickets within two miles of edward's station, where the enemy had concentrated a considerable force and where they undoubtedly expected us to attack. mcclernand's left was on the big black. in all our moves, up to this time, the left had hugged the big black closely, and all the ferries had been guarded to prevent the enemy throwing a force on our rear. mcpherson encountered the enemy, five thousand strong with two batteries under general gregg, about two miles out of raymond. this was about two p.m. logan was in advance with one of his brigades. he deployed and moved up to engage the enemy. mcpherson ordered the road in rear to be cleared of wagons, and the balance of logan's division, and crocker's, which was still farther in rear, to come forward with all dispatch. the order was obeyed with alacrity. logan got his division in position for assault before crocker could get up, and attacked with vigor, carrying the enemy's position easily, sending gregg flying from the field not to appear against our front again until we met at jackson. in this battle mcpherson lost 66 killed, 339 wounded, and 37 missing --nearly or quite all from logan's division. the enemy's loss was 100 killed, 305 wounded, besides 415 taken prisoners. i regarded logan and crocker as being as competent division commanders as could be found in or out of the army and both equal to a much higher command. crocker, however, was dying of consumption when he volunteered. his weak condition never put him on the sick report when there was a battle in prospect, as long as he could keep on his feet. he died not long after the close of the rebellion. chapter xxxv. movement against jackson--fall of jackson--intercepting the enemy --battle of champion's hill. when the news reached me of mcpherson's victory at raymond about sundown my position was with sherman. i decided at once to turn the whole column towards jackson and capture that place without delay. pemberton was now on my left, with, as i supposed, about 18,000 men; in fact, as i learned afterwards, with nearly 50,000. a force was also collecting on my right, at jackson, the point where all the railroads communicating with vicksburg connect. all the enemy's supplies of men and stores would come by that point. as i hoped in the end to besiege vicksburg i must first destroy all possibility of aid. i therefore determined to move swiftly towards jackson, destroy or drive any force in that direction and then turn upon pemberton. but by moving against jackson, i uncovered my own communication. so i finally decided to have none--to cut loose altogether from my base and move my whole force eastward. i then had no fears for my communications, and if i moved quickly enough could turn upon pemberton before he could attack me in the rear. accordingly, all previous orders given during the day for movements on the 13th were annulled by new ones. mcpherson was ordered at daylight to move on clinton, ten miles from jackson; sherman was notified of my determination to capture jackson and work from there westward. he was ordered to start at four in the morning and march to raymond. mcclernand was ordered to march with three divisions by dillon's to raymond. one was left to guard the crossing of the big black. on the 10th i had received a letter from banks, on the red river, asking reinforcements. porter had gone to his assistance with a part of his fleet on the 3d, and i now wrote to him describing my position and declining to send any troops. i looked upon side movements as long as the enemy held port hudson and vicksburg as a waste of time and material. general joseph e. johnston arrived at jackson in the night of the 13th from tennessee, and immediately assumed command of all the confederate troops in mississippi. i knew he was expecting reinforcements from the south and east. on the 6th i had written to general halleck: "information from the other side leaves me to believe the enemy are bringing forces from tullahoma." up to this time my troops had been kept in supporting distances of each other, as far as the nature of the country would admit. reconnoissances were constantly made from each corps to enable them to acquaint themselves with the most practicable routes from one to another in case a union became necessary. mcpherson reached clinton with the advance early on the 13th and immediately set to work destroying the railroad. sherman's advance reached raymond before the last of mcpherson's command had got out of the town. mcclernand withdrew from the front of the enemy, at edward's station, with much skill and without loss, and reached his position for the night in good order. on the night of the 13th, mcpherson was ordered to march at early dawn upon jackson, only fifteen miles away. sherman was given the same order; but he was to move by the direct road from raymond to jackson, which is south of the road mcpherson was on and does not approach within two miles of it at the point where it crossed the line of intrenchments which, at that time, defended the city. mcclernand was ordered to move one division of his command to clinton, one division a few miles beyond mississippi springs following sherman's line, and a third to raymond. he was also directed to send his siege guns, four in number with the troops going by mississippi springs. mcclernand's position was an advantageous one in any event. with one division at clinton he was in position to reinforce mcpherson, at jackson, rapidly if it became necessary; the division beyond mississippi springs was equally available to reinforce sherman; the one at raymond could take either road. he still had two other divisions farther back now that blair had come up, available within a day at jackson. if this last command should not be wanted at jackson, they were already one day's march from there on their way to vicksburg and on three different roads leading to the latter city. but the most important consideration in my mind was to have a force confronting pemberton if he should come out to attack my rear. this i expected him to do; as shown further on, he was directed by johnston to make this very move. i notified general halleck that i should attack the state capital on the 14th. a courier carried the dispatch to grand gulf through an unprotected country. sherman and mcpherson communicated with each other during the night and arranged to reach jackson at about the same hour. it rained in torrents during the night of the 13th and the fore part of the day of the 14th. the roads were intolerable, and in some places on sherman's line, where the land was low, they were covered more than a foot deep with water. but the troops never murmured. by nine o'clock crocker, of mcpherson's corps, who was now in advance, came upon the enemy's pickets and speedily drove them in upon the main body. they were outside of the intrenchments in a strong position, and proved to be the troops that had been driven out of raymond. johnston had been reinforced; during the night by georgia and south carolina regiments, so that his force amounted to eleven thousand men, and he was expecting still more. sherman also came upon the rebel pickets some distance out from the town, but speedily drove them in. he was now on the south and south-west of jackson confronting the confederates behind their breastworks, while mcpherson's right was nearly two miles north, occupying a line running north and south across the vicksburg railroad. artillery was brought up and reconnoissances made preparatory to an assault. mcpherson brought up logan's division while he deployed crocker's for the assault. sherman made similar dispositions on the right. by eleven a.m. both were ready to attack. crocker moved his division forward, preceded by a strong skirmish line. these troops at once encountered the enemy's advance and drove it back on the main body, when they returned to their proper regiment and the whole division charged, routing the enemy completely and driving him into this main line. this stand by the enemy was made more than two miles outside of his main fortifications. mcpherson followed up with his command until within range of the guns of the enemy from their intrenchments, when he halted to bring his troops into line and reconnoitre to determine the next move. it was now about noon. while this was going on sherman was confronting a rebel battery which enfiladed the road on which he was marching--the mississippi springs road--and commanded a bridge spanning a stream over which he had to pass. by detaching right and left the stream was forced and the enemy flanked and speedily driven within the main line. this brought our whole line in front of the enemy's line of works, which was continuous on the north, west and south sides from the pearl river north of the city to the same river south. i was with sherman. he was confronted by a force sufficient to hold us back. appearances did not justify an assault where we were. i had directed sherman to send a force to the right, and to reconnoitre as far as to the pearl river. this force, tuttle's division, not returning i rode to the right with my staff, and soon found that the enemy had left that part of the line. tuttle's movement or mcpherson's pressure had no doubt led johnston to order a retreat, leaving only the men at the guns to retard us while he was getting away. tuttle had seen this and, passing through the lines without resistance, came up in the rear of the artillerists confronting sherman and captured them with ten pieces of artillery. i rode immediately to the state house, where i was soon followed by sherman. about the same time mcpherson discovered that the enemy was leaving his front, and advanced crocker, who was so close upon the enemy that they could not move their guns or destroy them. he captured seven guns and, moving on, hoisted the national flag over the rebel capital of mississippi. stevenson's brigade was sent to cut off the rebel retreat, but was too late or not expeditious enough. our loss in this engagement was: mcpherson, 37 killed, 228 wounded; sherman, 4 killed and 21 wounded and missing. the enemy lost 845 killed, wounded and captured. seventeen guns fell into our hands, and the enemy destroyed by fire their store-houses, containing a large amount of commissary stores. on this day blair reached new auburn and joined mcclernand's 4th division. he had with him two hundred wagons loaded with rations, the only commissary supplies received during the entire campaign. i slept that night in the room that johnston was said to have occupied the night before. about four in the afternoon i sent for the corps commanders and directed the dispositions to be made of their troops. sherman was to remain in jackson until he destroyed that place as a railroad centre, and manufacturing city of military supplies. he did the work most effectually. sherman and i went together into a manufactory which had not ceased work on account of the battle nor for the entrance of yankee troops. our presence did not seem to attract the attention of either the manager or the operatives, most of whom were girls. we looked on for a while to see the tent cloth which they were making roll out of the looms, with "c. s. a." woven in each bolt. there was an immense amount of cotton, in bales, stacked outside. finally i told sherman i thought they had done work enough. the operatives were told they could leave and take with them what cloth they could carry. in a few minutes cotton and factory were in a blaze. the proprietor visited washington while i was president to get his pay for this property, claiming that it was private. he asked me to give him a statement of the fact that his property had been destroyed by national troops, so that he might use it with congress where he was pressing, or proposed to press, his claim. i declined. on the night of the 13th johnston sent the following dispatch to pemberton at edward's station: "i have lately arrived, and learn that major-general sherman is between us with four divisions at clinton. it is important to establish communication, that you may be reinforced. if practicable, come up in his rear at once. to beat such a detachment would be of immense value. all the troops you can quickly assemble should be brought. time is all-important." this dispatch was sent in triplicate, by different messengers. one of the messengers happened to be a loyal man who had been expelled from memphis some months before by hurlbut for uttering disloyal and threatening sentiments. there was a good deal of parade about his expulsion, ostensibly as a warning to those who entertained the sentiments he expressed; but hurlbut and the expelled man understood each other. he delivered his copy of johnston's dispatch to mcpherson who forwarded it to me. receiving this dispatch on the 14th i ordered mcpherson to move promptly in the morning back to bolton, the nearest point where johnston could reach the road. bolton is about twenty miles west of jackson. i also informed mcclernand of the capture of jackson and sent him the following order: "it is evidently the design of the enemy to get north of us and cross the big black, and beat us into vicksburg. we must not allow them to do this. turn all your forces towards bolton station, and make all dispatch in getting there. move troops by the most direct road from wherever they may be on the receipt of this order." and to blair i wrote: "their design is evidently to cross the big black and pass down the peninsula between the big black and yazoo rivers. we must beat them. turn your troops immediately to bolton; take all the trains with you. smith's division, and any other troops now with you, will go to the same place. if practicable, take parallel roads, so as to divide your troops and train." johnston stopped on the canton road only six miles north of jackson, the night of the 14th. he sent from there to pemberton dispatches announcing the loss of jackson, and the following order: "as soon as the reinforcements are all up, they must be united to the rest of the army. i am anxious to see a force assembled that may be able to inflict a heavy blow upon the enemy. can grant supply himself from the mississippi? can you not cut him off from it, and above all, should he be compelled to fall back for want of supplies, beat him." the concentration of my troops was easy, considering the character of the country. mcpherson moved along the road parallel with and near the railroad. mcclernand's command was, one division (hovey's) on the road mcpherson had to take, but with a start of four miles. one (osterhaus) was at raymond, on a converging road that intersected the other near champion's hill; one (carr's) had to pass over the same road with osterhaus, but being back at mississippi springs, would not be detained by it; the fourth (smith's) with blair's division, was near auburn with a different road to pass over. mcclernand faced about and moved promptly. his cavalry from raymond seized bolton by half-past nine in the morning, driving out the enemy's pickets and capturing several men. the night of the 15th hovey was at bolton; carr and osterhaus were about three miles south, but abreast, facing west; smith was north of raymond with blair in his rear. mcpherson's command, with logan in front, had marched at seven o'clock, and by four reached hovey and went into camp; crocker bivouacked just in hovey's rear on the clinton road. sherman with two divisions, was in jackson, completing the destruction of roads, bridges and military factories. i rode in person out to clinton. on my arrival i ordered mcclernand to move early in the morning on edward's station, cautioning him to watch for the enemy and not bring on an engagement unless he felt very certain of success. i naturally expected that pemberton would endeavor to obey the orders of his superior, which i have shown were to attack us at clinton. this, indeed, i knew he could not do; but i felt sure he would make the attempt to reach that point. it turned out, however, that he had decided his superior's plans were impracticable, and consequently determined to move south from edward's station and get between me and my base. i, however, had no base, having abandoned it more than a week before. on the 15th pemberton had actually marched south from edward's station, but the rains had swollen baker's creek, which he had to cross so much that he could not ford it, and the bridges were washed away. this brought him back to the jackson road, on which there was a good bridge over baker's creek. some of his troops were marching until midnight to get there. receiving here early on the 16th a repetition of his order to join johnston at clinton, he concluded to obey, and sent a dispatch to his chief, informing him of the route by which he might be expected. about five o'clock in the morning (16th) two men, who had been employed on the jackson and vicksburg railroad, were brought to me. they reported that they had passed through pemberton's army in the night, and that it was still marching east. they reported him to have eighty regiments of infantry and ten batteries; in all, about twenty-five thousand men. i had expected to leave sherman at jackson another day in order to complete his work; but getting the above information i sent him orders to move with all dispatch to bolton, and to put one division with an ammunition train on the road at once, with directions to its commander to march with all possible speed until he came up to our rear. within an hour after receiving this order steele's division was on the road. at the same time i dispatched to blair, who was near auburn, to move with all speed to edward's station. mcclernand was directed to embrace blair in his command for the present. blair's division was a part of the 15th army corps (sherman's); but as it was on its way to join its corps, it naturally struck our left first, now that we had faced about and were moving west. the 15th corps, when it got up, would be on our extreme right. mcpherson was directed to get his trains out of the way of the troops, and to follow hovey's division as closely as possible. mcclernand had two roads about three miles apart, converging at edward's station, over which to march his troops. hovey's division of his corps had the advance on a third road (the clinton) still farther north. mcclernand was directed to move blair's and a. j. smith's divisions by the southernmost of these roads, and osterhaus and carr by the middle road. orders were to move cautiously with skirmishers to the front to feel for the enemy. smith's division on the most southern road was the first to encounter the enemy's pickets, who were speedily driven in. osterhaus, on the middle road, hearing the firing, pushed his skirmishers forward, found the enemy's pickets and forced them back to the main line. about the same time hovey encountered the enemy on the northern or direct wagon road from jackson to vicksburg. mcpherson was hastening up to join hovey, but was embarrassed by hovey's trains occupying the roads. i was still back at clinton. mcpherson sent me word of the situation, and expressed the wish that i was up. by half-past seven i was on the road and proceeded rapidly to the front, ordering all trains that were in front of troops off the road. when i arrived hovey's skirmishing amounted almost to a battle. mcclernand was in person on the middle road and had a shorter distance to march to reach the enemy's position than mcpherson. i sent him word by a staff officer to push forward and attack. these orders were repeated several times without apparently expediting mcclernand's advance. champion's hill, where pemberton had chosen his position to receive us, whether taken by accident or design, was well selected. it is one of the highest points in that section, and commanded all the ground in range. on the east side of the ridge, which is quite precipitous, is a ravine running first north, then westerly, terminating at baker's creek. it was grown up thickly with large trees and undergrowth, making it difficult to penetrate with troops, even when not defended. the ridge occupied by the enemy terminated abruptly where the ravine turns westerly. the left of the enemy occupied the north end of this ridge. the bolton and edward's station wagon-road turns almost due south at this point and ascends the ridge, which it follows for about a mile; then turning west, descends by a gentle declivity to baker's creek, nearly a mile away. on the west side the slope of the ridge is gradual and is cultivated from near the summit to the creek. there was, when we were there, a narrow belt of timber near the summit west of the road. from raymond there is a direct road to edward's station, some three miles west of champion's hill. there is one also to bolton. from this latter road there is still another, leaving it about three and a half miles before reaching bolton and leads direct to the same station. it was along these two roads that three divisions of mcclernand's corps, and blair of sherman's, temporarily under mcclernand, were moving. hovey of mcclernand's command was with mcpherson, farther north on the road from bolton direct to edward's station. the middle road comes into the northern road at the point where the latter turns to the west and descends to baker's creek; the southern road is still several miles south and does not intersect the others until it reaches edward's station. pemberton's lines covered all these roads, and faced east. hovey's line, when it first drove in the enemy's pickets, was formed parallel to that of the enemy and confronted his left. by eleven o'clock the skirmishing had grown into a hard-contested battle. hovey alone, before other troops could be got to assist him, had captured a battery of the enemy. but he was not able to hold his position and had to abandon the artillery. mcpherson brought up his troops as fast as possible, logan in front, and posted them on the right of hovey and across the flank of the enemy. logan reinforced hovey with one brigade from his division; with his other two he moved farther west to make room for crocker, who was coming up as rapidly as the roads would admit. hovey was still being heavily pressed, and was calling on me for more reinforcements. i ordered crocker, who was now coming up, to send one brigade from his division. mcpherson ordered two batteries to be stationed where they nearly enfiladed the enemy's line, and they did good execution. from logan's position now a direct forward movement carried him over open fields, in rear of the enemy and in a line parallel with them. he did make exactly this move, attacking, however, the enemy through the belt of woods covering the west slope of the hill for a short distance. up to this time i had kept my position near hovey where we were the most heavily pressed; but about noon i moved with a part of my staff by our right around, until i came up with logan himself. i found him near the road leading down to baker's creek. he was actually in command of the only road over which the enemy could retreat; hovey, reinforced by two brigades from mcpherson's command, confronted the enemy's left; crocker, with two brigades, covered their left flank; mcclernand two hours before, had been within two miles and a half of their centre with two divisions, and the two divisions, blair's and a. j. smith's, were confronting the rebel right; ransom, with a brigade of mcarthur's division of the 17th corps (mcpherson's), had crossed the river at grand gulf a few days before, and was coming up on their right flank. neither logan nor i knew that we had cut off the retreat of the enemy. just at this juncture a messenger came from hovey, asking for more reinforcements. there were none to spare. i then gave an order to move mcpherson's command by the left flank around to hovey. this uncovered the rebel line of retreat, which was soon taken advantage of by the enemy. during all this time, hovey, reinforced as he was by a brigade from logan and another from crocker, and by crocker gallantly coming up with two other brigades on his right, had made several assaults, the last one about the time the road was opened to the rear. the enemy fled precipitately. this was between three and four o'clock. i rode forward, or rather back, to where the middle road intersects the north road, and found the skirmishers of carr's division just coming in. osterhaus was farther south and soon after came up with skirmishers advanced in like manner. hovey's division, and mcpherson's two divisions with him, had marched and fought from early dawn, and were not in the best condition to follow the retreating foe. i sent orders to osterhaus to pursue the enemy, and to carr, whom i saw personally, i explained the situation and directed him to pursue vigorously as far as the big black, and to cross it if he could; osterhaus to follow him. the pursuit was continued until after dark. the battle of champion's hill lasted about four hours, hard fighting, preceded by two or three hours of skirmishing, some of which almost rose to the dignity of battle. every man of hovey's division and of mcpherson's two divisions was engaged during the battle. no other part of my command was engaged at all, except that as described before. osterhaus's and a. j. smith's divisions had encountered the rebel advanced pickets as early as half-past seven. their positions were admirable for advancing upon the enemy's line. mcclernand, with two divisions, was within a few miles of the battle-field long before noon and in easy hearing. i sent him repeated orders by staff officers fully competent to explain to him the situation. these traversed the wood separating us, without escort, and directed him to push forward; but he did not come. it is true, in front of mcclernand there was a small force of the enemy and posted in a good position behind a ravine obstructing his advance; but if he had moved to the right by the road my staff officers had followed the enemy must either have fallen back or been cut off. instead of this he sent orders to hovey, who belonged to his corps, to join on to his right flank. hovey was bearing the brunt of the battle at the time. to obey the order he would have had to pull out from the front of the enemy and march back as far as mcclernand had to advance to get into battle and substantially over the same ground. of course i did not permit hovey to obey the order of his intermediate superior. we had in this battle about 15,000 men absolutely engaged. this excludes those that did not get up, all of mcclernand's command except hovey. our loss was 410 killed, 1,844 wounded and 187 missing. hovey alone lost 1,200 killed, wounded and missing--more than one-third of his division. had mcclernand come up with reasonable promptness, or had i known the ground as i did afterwards, i cannot see how pemberton could have escaped with any organized force. as it was he lost over three thousand killed and wounded and about three thousand captured in battle and in pursuit. loring's division, which was the right of pemberton's line, was cut off from the retreating army and never got back into vicksburg. pemberton himself fell back that night to the big black river. his troops did not stop before midnight and many of them left before the general retreat commenced, and no doubt a good part of them returned to their homes. logan alone captured 1,300 prisoners and eleven guns. hovey captured 300 under fire and about 700 in all, exclusive of 500 sick and wounded whom he paroled, thus making 1,200. mcpherson joined in the advance as soon as his men could fill their cartridge-boxes, leaving one brigade to guard our wounded. the pursuit was continued as long as it was light enough to see the road. the night of the 16th of may found mcpherson's command bivouacked from two to six miles west of the battlefield, along the line of the road to vicksburg. carr and osterhaus were at edward's station, and blair was about three miles south-east; hovey remained on the field where his troops had fought so bravely and bled so freely. much war material abandoned by the enemy was picked up on the battle-field, among it thirty pieces of artillery. i pushed through the advancing column with my staff and kept in advance until after night. finding ourselves alone we stopped and took possession of a vacant house. as no troops came up we moved back a mile or more until we met the head of the column just going into bivouac on the road. we had no tents, so we occupied the porch of a house which had been taken for a rebel hospital and which was filled with wounded and dying who had been brought from the battle-field we had just left. while a battle is raging one can see his enemy mowed down by the thousand, or the ten thousand, with great composure; but after the battle these scenes are distressing, and one is naturally disposed to do as much to alleviate the suffering of an enemy as a friend. chapter xxxvi. battle of black river bridge--crossing the big black--investment of vicksburg--assaulting the works. we were now assured of our position between johnston and pemberton, without a possibility of a junction of their forces. pemberton might have made a night march to the big black, crossed the bridge there and, by moving north on the west side, have eluded us and finally returned to johnston. but this would have given us vicksburg. it would have been his proper move, however, and the one johnston would have made had he been in pemberton's place. in fact it would have been in conformity with johnston's orders to pemberton. sherman left jackson with the last of his troops about noon on the 16th and reached bolton, twenty miles west, before halting. his rear guard did not get in until two a.m. the 17th, but renewed their march by daylight. he paroled his prisoners at jackson, and was forced to leave his own wounded in care of surgeons and attendants. at bolton he was informed of our victory. he was directed to commence the march early next day, and to diverge from the road he was on to bridgeport on the big black river, some eleven miles above the point where we expected to find the enemy. blair was ordered to join him there with the pontoon train as early as possible. this movement brought sherman's corps together, and at a point where i hoped a crossing of the big black might be effected and sherman's corps used to flank the enemy out of his position in our front, thus opening a crossing for the remainder of the army. i informed him that i would endeavor to hold the enemy in my front while he crossed the river. the advance division, carr's (mcclernand's corps), resumed the pursuit at half-past three a.m. on the 17th, followed closely by osterhaus, mcpherson bringing up the rear with his corps. as i expected, the enemy was found in position on the big black. the point was only six miles from that where my advance had rested for the night, and was reached at an early hour. here the river makes a turn to the west, and has washed close up to the high land; the east side is a low bottom, sometimes overflowed at very high water, but was cleared and in cultivation. a bayou runs irregularly across this low land, the bottom of which, however, is above the surface of the big black at ordinary stages. when the river is full water runs through it, converting the point of land into an island. the bayou was grown up with timber, which the enemy had felled into the ditch. at this time there was a foot or two of water in it. the rebels had constructed a parapet along the inner bank of this bayou by using cotton bales from the plantation close by and throwing dirt over them. the whole was thoroughly commanded from the height west of the river. at the upper end of the bayou there was a strip of uncleared land which afforded a cover for a portion of our men. carr's division was deployed on our right, lawler's brigade forming his extreme right and reaching through these woods to the river above. osterhaus' division was deployed to the left of carr and covered the enemy's entire front. mcpherson was in column on the road, the head close by, ready to come in wherever he could be of assistance. while the troops were standing as here described an officer from banks' staff came up and presented me with a letter from general halleck, dated the 11th of may. it had been sent by the way of new orleans to banks to be forwarded to me. it ordered me to return to grand gulf and to co-operate from there with banks against port hudson, and then to return with our combined forces to besiege vicksburg. i told the officer that the order came too late, and that halleck would not give it now if he knew our position. the bearer of the dispatch insisted that i ought to obey the order, and was giving arguments to support his position when i heard great cheering to the right of our line and, looking in that direction, saw lawler in his shirt sleeves leading a charge upon the enemy. i immediately mounted my horse and rode in the direction of the charge, and saw no more of the officer who delivered the dispatch; i think not even to this day. the assault was successful. but little resistance was made. the enemy fled from the west bank of the river, burning the bridge behind him and leaving the men and guns on the east side to fall into our hands. many tried to escape by swimming the river. some succeeded and some were drowned in the attempt. eighteen guns were captured and 1,751 prisoners. our loss was 39 killed, 237 wounded and 3 missing. the enemy probably lost but few men except those captured and drowned. but for the successful and complete destruction of the bridge, i have but little doubt that we should have followed the enemy so closely as to prevent his occupying his defences around vicksburg. as the bridge was destroyed and the river was high, new bridges had to be built. it was but little after nine o'clock a.m. when the capture took place. as soon as work could be commenced, orders were given for the construction of three bridges. one was taken charge of by lieutenant hains, of the engineer corps, one by general mcpherson himself and one by general ransom, a most gallant and intelligent volunteer officer. my recollection is that hains built a raft bridge; mcpherson a pontoon, using cotton bales in large numbers, for pontoons; and that ransom felled trees on opposite banks of the river, cutting only on one side of the tree, so that they would fall with their tops interlacing in the river, without the trees being entirely severed from their stumps. a bridge was then made with these trees to support the roadway. lumber was taken from buildings, cotton gins and wherever found, for this purpose. by eight o'clock in the morning of the 18th all three bridges were complete and the troops were crossing. sherman reached bridgeport about noon of the 17th and found blair with the pontoon train already there. a few of the enemy were intrenched on the west bank, but they made little resistance and soon surrendered. two divisions were crossed that night and the third the following morning. on the 18th i moved along the vicksburg road in advance of the troops and as soon as possible joined sherman. my first anxiety was to secure a base of supplies on the yazoo river above vicksburg. sherman's line of march led him to the very point on walnut hills occupied by the enemy the december before when he was repulsed. sherman was equally anxious with myself. our impatience led us to move in advance of the column and well up with the advanced skirmishers. there were some detached works along the crest of the hill. these were still occupied by the enemy, or else the garrison from haines' bluff had not all got past on their way to vicksburg. at all events the bullets of the enemy whistled by thick and fast for a short time. in a few minutes sherman had the pleasure of looking down from the spot coveted so much by him the december before on the ground where his command had lain so helpless for offensive action. he turned to me, saying that up to this minute he had felt no positive assurance of success. this, however, he said was the end of one of the greatest campaigns in history and i ought to make a report of it at once. vicksburg was not yet captured, and there was no telling what might happen before it was taken; but whether captured or not, this was a complete and successful campaign. i do not claim to quote sherman's language; but the substance only. my reason for mentioning this incident will appear further on. mcpherson, after crossing the big black, came into the jackson and vicksburg road which sherman was on, but to his rear. he arrived at night near the lines of the enemy, and went into camp. mcclernand moved by the direct road near the railroad to mount albans, and then turned to the left and put his troops on the road from baldwin's ferry to vicksburg. this brought him south of mcpherson. i now had my three corps up the works built for the defence of vicksburg, on three roads --one to the north, one to the east and one to the south-east of the city. by the morning of the 19th the investment was as complete as my limited number of troops would allow. sherman was on the right, and covered the high ground from where it overlooked the yazoo as far south-east as his troops would extend. mcpherson joined on to his left, and occupied ground on both sides of the jackson road. mcclernand took up the ground to his left and extended as far towards warrenton as he could, keeping a continuous line. on the 19th there was constant skirmishing with the enemy while we were getting into better position. the enemy had been much demoralized by his defeats at champion's hill and the big black, and i believed he would not make much effort to hold vicksburg. accordingly, at two o'clock i ordered an assault. it resulted in securing more advanced positions for all our troops where they were fully covered from the fire of the enemy. the 20th and 21st were spent in strengthening our position and in making roads in rear of the army, from yazoo river or chickasaw bayou. most of the army had now been for three weeks with only five days' rations issued by the commissary. they had an abundance of food, however, but began to feel the want of bread. i remember that in passing around to the left of the line on the 21st, a soldier, recognizing me, said in rather a low voice, but yet so that i heard him, "hard tack." in a moment the cry was taken up all along the line, "hard tack! hard tack!" i told the men nearest to me that we had been engaged ever since the arrival of the troops in building a road over which to supply them with everything they needed. the cry was instantly changed to cheers. by the night of the 21st all the troops had full rations issued to them. the bread and coffee were highly appreciated. i now determined on a second assault. johnston was in my rear, only fifty miles away, with an army not much inferior in numbers to the one i had with me, and i knew he was being reinforced. there was danger of his coming to the assistance of pemberton, and after all he might defeat my anticipations of capturing the garrison if, indeed, he did not prevent the capture of the city. the immediate capture of vicksburg would save sending me the reinforcements which were so much wanted elsewhere, and would set free the army under me to drive johnston from the state. but the first consideration of all was--the troops believed they could carry the works in their front, and would not have worked so patiently in the trenches if they had not been allowed to try. the attack was ordered to commence on all parts of the line at ten o'clock a.m. on the 22d with a furious cannonade from every battery in position. all the corps commanders set their time by mine so that all might open the engagement at the same minute. the attack was gallant, and portions of each of the three corps succeeded in getting up to the very parapets of the enemy and in planting their battle flags upon them; but at no place were we able to enter. general mcclernand reported that he had gained the enemy's intrenchments at several points, and wanted reinforcements. i occupied a position from which i believed i could see as well as he what took place in his front, and i did not see the success he reported. but his request for reinforcements being repeated i could not ignore it, and sent him quinby's division of the 17th corps. sherman and mcpherson were both ordered to renew their assaults as a diversion in favor of mcclernand. this last attack only served to increase our casualties without giving any benefit whatever. as soon as it was dark our troops that had reached the enemy's line and been obliged to remain there for security all day, were withdrawn; and thus ended the last assault upon vicksburg. chapter xxxvii siege of vicksburg. i now determined upon a regular siege--to "out-camp the enemy," as it were, and to incur no more losses. the experience of the 22d convinced officers and men that this was best, and they went to work on the defences and approaches with a will. with the navy holding the river, the investment of vicksburg was complete. as long as we could hold our position the enemy was limited in supplies of food, men and munitions of war to what they had on hand. these could not last always. the crossing of troops at bruinsburg commenced april 30th. on the 18th of may the army was in rear of vicksburg. on the 19th, just twenty days after the crossing, the city was completely invested and an assault had been made: five distinct battles (besides continuous skirmishing) had been fought and won by the union forces; the capital of the state had fallen and its arsenals, military manufactories and everything useful for military purposes had been destroyed; an average of about one hundred and eighty miles had been marched by the troops engaged; but five days' rations had been issued, and no forage; over six thousand prisoners had been captured, and as many more of the enemy had been killed or wounded; twenty-seven heavy cannon and sixty-one field-pieces had fallen into our hands; and four hundred miles of the river, from vicksburg to port hudson, had become ours. the union force that had crossed the mississippi river up to this time was less than forty-three thousand men. one division of these, blair's, only arrived in time to take part in the battle of champion's hill, but was not engaged there; and one brigade, ransom's of mcpherson's corps, reached the field after the battle. the enemy had at vicksburg, grand gulf, jackson, and on the roads between these places, over sixty thousand men. they were in their own country, where no rear guards were necessary. the country is admirable for defence, but difficult for the conduct of an offensive campaign. all their troops had to be met. we were fortunate, to say the least, in meeting them in detail: at port gibson seven or eight thousand; at raymond, five thousand; at jackson, from eight to eleven thousand; at champion's hill, twenty-five thousand; at the big black, four thousand. a part of those met at jackson were all that was left of those encountered at raymond. they were beaten in detail by a force smaller than their own, upon their own ground. our loss up to this time was: killed wounded missing port gibson..... 131 719 25 south fork bayou pierre..... .. 1 .. skirmishes, may 3 ..... 1 9 .. fourteen mile creek..... 6 24 .. raymond............... 66 339 39 jackson..... 42 251 7 champion's hill..... 410 1,844 187 big black..... 39 237 3 bridgeport..... .. 1 .. total..... 695 3,425 259 of the wounded many were but slightly so, and continued on duty. not half of them were disabled for any length of time. after the unsuccessful assault of the 22d the work of the regular siege began. sherman occupied the right starting from the river above vicksburg, mcpherson the centre (mcarthur's division now with him) and mcclernand the left, holding the road south to warrenton. lauman's division arrived at this time and was placed on the extreme left of the line. in the interval between the assaults of the 19th and 22d, roads had been completed from the yazoo river and chickasaw bayou, around the rear of the army, to enable us to bring up supplies of food and ammunition; ground had been selected and cleared on which the troops were to be encamped, and tents and cooking utensils were brought up. the troops had been without these from the time of crossing the mississippi up to this time. all was now ready for the pick and spade. prentiss and hurlbut were ordered to send forward every man that could be spared. cavalry especially was wanted to watch the fords along the big black, and to observe johnston. i knew that johnston was receiving reinforcements from bragg, who was confronting rosecrans in tennessee. vicksburg was so important to the enemy that i believed he would make the most strenuous efforts to raise the siege, even at the risk of losing ground elsewhere. my line was more than fifteen miles long, extending from haines' bluff to vicksburg, thence to warrenton. the line of the enemy was about seven. in addition to this, having an enemy at canton and jackson, in our rear, who was being constantly reinforced, we required a second line of defence facing the other way. i had not troops enough under my command to man these. general halleck appreciated the situation and, without being asked, forwarded reinforcements with all possible dispatch. the ground about vicksburg is admirable for defence. on the north it is about two hundred feet above the mississippi river at the highest point and very much cut up by the washing rains; the ravines were grown up with cane and underbrush, while the sides and tops were covered with a dense forest. farther south the ground flattens out somewhat, and was in cultivation. but here, too, it was cut up by ravines and small streams. the enemy's line of defence followed the crest of a ridge from the river north of the city eastward, then southerly around to the jackson road, full three miles back of the city; thence in a southwesterly direction to the river. deep ravines of the description given lay in front of these defences. as there is a succession of gullies, cut out by rains along the side of the ridge, the line was necessarily very irregular. to follow each of these spurs with intrenchments, so as to command the slopes on either side, would have lengthened their line very much. generally therefore, or in many places, their line would run from near the head of one gully nearly straight to the head of another, and an outer work triangular in shape, generally open in the rear, was thrown up on the point; with a few men in this outer work they commanded the approaches to the main line completely. the work to be done, to make our position as strong against the enemy as his was against us, was very great. the problem was also complicated by our wanting our line as near that of the enemy as possible. we had but four engineer officers with us. captain prime, of the engineer corps, was the chief, and the work at the beginning was mainly directed by him. his health soon gave out, when he was succeeded by captain comstock, also of the engineer corps. to provide assistants on such a long line i directed that all officers who had graduated at west point, where they had necessarily to study military engineering, should in addition to their other duties assist in the work. the chief quartermaster and the chief commissary were graduates. the chief commissary, now the commissary-general of the army, begged off, however, saying that there was nothing in engineering that he was good for unless he would do for a sap-roller. as soldiers require rations while working in the ditches as well as when marching and fighting, and as we would be sure to lose him if he was used as a sap-roller, i let him off. the general is a large man; weighs two hundred and twenty pounds, and is not tall. we had no siege guns except six thirty-two pounders, and there were none at the west to draw from. admiral porter, however, supplied us with a battery of navy-guns of large calibre, and with these, and the field artillery used in the campaign, the siege began. the first thing to do was to get the artillery in batteries where they would occupy commanding positions; then establish the camps, under cover from the fire of the enemy but as near up as possible; and then construct rifle-pits and covered ways, to connect the entire command by the shortest route. the enemy did not harass us much while we were constructing our batteries. probably their artillery ammunition was short; and their infantry was kept down by our sharpshooters, who were always on the alert and ready to fire at a head whenever it showed itself above the rebel works. in no place were our lines more than six hundred yards from the enemy. it was necessary, therefore, to cover our men by something more than the ordinary parapet. to give additional protection sand bags, bullet-proof, were placed along the tops of the parapets far enough apart to make loop-holes for musketry. on top of these, logs were put. by these means the men were enabled to walk about erect when off duty, without fear of annoyance from sharpshooters. the enemy used in their defence explosive musket-balls, no doubt thinking that, bursting over our men in the trenches, they would do some execution; but i do not remember a single case where a man was injured by a piece of one of these shells. when they were hit and the ball exploded, the wound was terrible. in these cases a solid ball would have hit as well. their use is barbarous, because they produce increased suffering without any corresponding advantage to those using them. the enemy could not resort to our method to protect their men, because we had an inexhaustible supply of ammunition to draw upon and used it freely. splinters from the timber would have made havoc among the men behind. there were no mortars with the besiegers, except what the navy had in front of the city; but wooden ones were made by taking logs of the toughest wood that could be found, boring them out for six or twelve pound shells and binding them with strong iron bands. these answered as cochorns, and shells were successfully thrown from them into the trenches of the enemy. the labor of building the batteries and intrenching was largely done by the pioneers, assisted by negroes who came within our lines and who were paid for their work; but details from the troops had often to be made. the work was pushed forward as rapidly as possible, and when an advanced position was secured and covered from the fire of the enemy the batteries were advanced. by the 30th of june there were two hundred and twenty guns in position, mostly light field-pieces, besides a battery of heavy guns belonging to, manned and commanded by the navy. we were now as strong for defence against the garrison of vicksburg as they were against us; but i knew that johnston was in our rear, and was receiving constant reinforcements from the east. he had at this time a larger force than i had had at any time prior to the battle of champion's hill. as soon as the news of the arrival of the union army behind vicksburg reached the north, floods of visitors began to pour in. some came to gratify curiosity; some to see sons or brothers who had passed through the terrible ordeal; members of the christian and sanitary associations came to minister to the wants of the sick and the wounded. often those coming to see a son or brother would bring a dozen or two of poultry. they did not know how little the gift would be appreciated. many of the soldiers had lived so much on chickens, ducks and turkeys without bread during the march, that the sight of poultry, if they could get bacon, almost took away their appetite. but the intention was good. among the earliest arrivals was the governor of illinois, with most of the state officers. i naturally wanted to show them what there was of most interest. in sherman's front the ground was the most broken and most wooded, and more was to be seen without exposure. i therefore took them to sherman's headquarters and presented them. before starting out to look at the lines--possibly while sherman's horse was being saddled --there were many questions asked about the late campaign, about which the north had been so imperfectly informed. there was a little knot around sherman and another around me, and i heard sherman repeating, in the most animated manner, what he had said to me when we first looked down from walnut hills upon the land below on the 18th of may, adding: "grant is entitled to every bit of the credit for the campaign; i opposed it. i wrote him a letter about it." but for this speech it is not likely that sherman's opposition would have ever been heard of. his untiring energy and great efficiency during the campaign entitle him to a full share of all the credit due for its success. he could not have done more if the plan had been his own. (*13) on the 26th of may i sent blair's division up the yazoo to drive out a force of the enemy supposed to be between the big black and the yazoo. the country was rich and full of supplies of both food and forage. blair was instructed to take all of it. the cattle were to be driven in for the use of our army, and the food and forage to be consumed by our troops or destroyed by fire; all bridges were to be destroyed, and the roads rendered as nearly impassable as possible. blair went forty-five miles and was gone almost a week. his work was effectually done. i requested porter at this time to send the marine brigade, a floating nondescript force which had been assigned to his command and which proved very useful, up to haines' bluff to hold it until reinforcements could be sent. on the 26th i also received a letter from banks, asking me to reinforce him with ten thousand men at port hudson. of course i could not comply with his request, nor did i think he needed them. he was in no danger of an attack by the garrison in his front, and there was no army organizing in his rear to raise the siege. on the 3d of june a brigade from hurlbut's command arrived, general kimball commanding. it was sent to mechanicsburg, some miles north-east of haines' bluff and about midway between the big black and the yazoo. a brigade of blair's division and twelve hundred cavalry had already, on blair's return from the yazoo, been sent to the same place with instructions to watch the crossings of the big black river, to destroy the roads in his (blair's) front, and to gather or destroy all supplies. on the 7th of june our little force of colored and white troops across the mississippi, at milliken's bend, were attacked by about 3,000 men from richard taylor's trans-mississippi command. with the aid of the gunboats they were speedily repelled. i sent mower's brigade over with instructions to drive the enemy beyond the tensas bayou; and we had no further trouble in that quarter during the siege. this was the first important engagement of the war in which colored troops were under fire. these men were very raw, having all been enlisted since the beginning of the siege, but they behaved well. on the 8th of june a full division arrived from hurlbut's command, under general sooy smith. it was sent immediately to haines' bluff, and general c. c. washburn was assigned to the general command at that point. on the 11th a strong division arrived from the department of the missouri under general herron, which was placed on our left. this cut off the last possible chance of communication between pemberton and johnston, as it enabled lauman to close up on mcclernand's left while herron intrenched from lauman to the water's edge. at this point the water recedes a few hundred yards from the high land. through this opening no doubt the confederate commanders had been able to get messengers under cover of night. on the 14th general parke arrived with two divisions of burnside's corps, and was immediately dispatched to haines' bluff. these latter troops--herron's and parke's--were the reinforcements already spoken of sent by halleck in anticipation of their being needed. they arrived none too soon. i now had about seventy-one thousand men. more than half were disposed across the peninsula, between the yazoo at haines' bluff and the big black, with the division of osterhaus watching the crossings of the latter river farther south and west from the crossing of the jackson road to baldwin's ferry and below. there were eight roads leading into vicksburg, along which and their immediate sides, our work was specially pushed and batteries advanced; but no commanding point within range of the enemy was neglected. on the 17th i received a letter from general sherman and one on the 18th from general mcpherson, saying that their respective commands had complained to them of a fulsome, congratulatory order published by general mcclernand to the 13th corps, which did great injustice to the other troops engaged in the campaign. this order had been sent north and published, and now papers containing it had reached our camps. the order had not been heard of by me, and certainly not by troops outside of mcclernand's command until brought in this way. i at once wrote to mcclernand, directing him to send me a copy of this order. he did so, and i at once relieved him from the command of the 13th army corps and ordered him back to springfield, illinois. the publication of his order in the press was in violation of war department orders and also of mine. chapter xxxviii. johnston's movements--fortifications at haines' bluff--explosion of the mine--explosion of the second mine--preparing for the assault--the flag of truce--meeting with pemberton--negotiations for surrender--accepting the terms--surrender of vicksburg. on the 22d of june positive information was received that johnston had crossed the big black river for the purpose of attacking our rear, to raise the siege and release pemberton. the correspondence between johnston and pemberton shows that all expectation of holding vicksburg had by this time passed from johnston's mind. i immediately ordered sherman to the command of all the forces from haines' bluff to the big black river. this amounted now to quite half the troops about vicksburg. besides these, herron and a. j. smith's divisions were ordered to hold themselves in readiness to reinforce sherman. haines' bluff had been strongly fortified on the land side, and on all commanding points from there to the big black at the railroad crossing batteries had been constructed. the work of connecting by rifle-pits where this was not already done, was an easy task for the troops that were to defend them. we were now looking west, besieging pemberton, while we were also looking east to defend ourselves against an expected siege by johnston. but as against the garrison of vicksburg we were as substantially protected as they were against us. where we were looking east and north we were strongly fortified, and on the defensive. johnston evidently took in the situation and wisely, i think, abstained from making an assault on us because it would simply have inflicted loss on both sides without accomplishing any result. we were strong enough to have taken the offensive against him; but i did not feel disposed to take any risk of losing our hold upon pemberton's army, while i would have rejoiced at the opportunity of defending ourselves against an attack by johnston. from the 23d of may the work of fortifying and pushing forward our position nearer to the enemy had been steadily progressing. at three points on the jackson road, in front of leggett's brigade, a sap was run up to the enemy's parapet, and by the 25th of june we had it undermined and the mine charged. the enemy had countermined, but did not succeed in reaching our mine. at this particular point the hill on which the rebel work stands rises abruptly. our sap ran close up to the outside of the enemy's parapet. in fact this parapet was also our protection. the soldiers of the two sides occasionally conversed pleasantly across this barrier; sometimes they exchanged the hard bread of the union soldiers for the tobacco of the confederates; at other times the enemy threw over hand-grenades, and often our men, catching them in their hands, returned them. our mine had been started some distance back down the hill; consequently when it had extended as far as the parapet it was many feet below it. this caused the failure of the enemy in his search to find and destroy it. on the 25th of june at three o'clock, all being ready, the mine was exploded. a heavy artillery fire all along the line had been ordered to open with the explosion. the effect was to blow the top of the hill off and make a crater where it stood. the breach was not sufficient to enable us to pass a column of attack through. in fact, the enemy having failed to reach our mine had thrown up a line farther back, where most of the men guarding that point were placed. there were a few men, however, left at the advance line, and others working in the countermine, which was still being pushed to find ours. all that were there were thrown into the air, some of them coming down on our side, still alive. i remember one colored man, who had been under ground at work when the explosion took place, who was thrown to our side. he was not much hurt, but terribly frightened. some one asked him how high he had gone up. "dun no, massa, but t'ink 'bout t'ree mile," was his reply. general logan commanded at this point and took this colored man to his quarters, where he did service to the end of the siege. as soon as the explosion took place the crater was seized by two regiments of our troops who were near by, under cover, where they had been placed for the express purpose. the enemy made a desperate effort to expel them, but failed, and soon retired behind the new line. from here, however, they threw hand-grenades, which did some execution. the compliment was returned by our men, but not with so much effect. the enemy could lay their grenades on the parapet, which alone divided the contestants, and roll them down upon us; while from our side they had to be thrown over the parapet, which was at considerable elevation. during the night we made efforts to secure our position in the crater against the missiles of the enemy, so as to run trenches along the outer base of their parapet, right and left; but the enemy continued throwing their grenades, and brought boxes of field ammunition (shells), the fuses of which they would light with portfires, and throw them by hand into our ranks. we found it impossible to continue this work. another mine was consequently started which was exploded on the 1st of july, destroying an entire rebel redan, killing and wounding a considerable number of its occupants and leaving an immense chasm where it stood. no attempt to charge was made this time, the experience of the 25th admonishing us. our loss in the first affair was about thirty killed and wounded. the enemy must have lost more in the two explosions than we did in the first. we lost none in the second. from this time forward the work of mining and pushing our position nearer to the enemy was prosecuted with vigor, and i determined to explode no more mines until we were ready to explode a number at different points and assault immediately after. we were up now at three different points, one in front of each corps, to where only the parapet of the enemy divided us. at this time an intercepted dispatch from johnston to pemberton informed me that johnston intended to make a determined attack upon us in order to relieve the garrison at vicksburg. i knew the garrison would make no formidable effort to relieve itself. the picket lines were so close to each other--where there was space enough between the lines to post pickets--that the men could converse. on the 21st of june i was informed, through this means, that pemberton was preparing to escape, by crossing to the louisiana side under cover of night; that he had employed workmen in making boats for that purpose; that the men had been canvassed to ascertain if they would make an assault on the "yankees" to cut their way out; that they had refused, and almost mutinied, because their commander would not surrender and relieve their sufferings, and had only been pacified by the assurance that boats enough would be finished in a week to carry them all over. the rebel pickets also said that houses in the city had been pulled down to get material to build these boats with. afterwards this story was verified: on entering the city we found a large number of very rudely constructed boats. all necessary steps were at once taken to render such an attempt abortive. our pickets were doubled; admiral porter was notified, so that the river might be more closely watched; material was collected on the west bank of the river to be set on fire and light up the river if the attempt was made; and batteries were established along the levee crossing the peninsula on the louisiana side. had the attempt been made the garrison of vicksburg would have been drowned, or made prisoners on the louisiana side. general richard taylor was expected on the west bank to co-operate in this movement, i believe, but he did not come, nor could he have done so with a force sufficient to be of service. the mississippi was now in our possession from its source to its mouth, except in the immediate front of vicksburg and of port hudson. we had nearly exhausted the country, along a line drawn from lake providence to opposite bruinsburg. the roads west were not of a character to draw supplies over for any considerable force. by the 1st of july our approaches had reached the enemy's ditch at a number of places. at ten points we could move under cover to within from five to one hundred yards of the enemy. orders were given to make all preparations for assault on the 6th of july. the debouches were ordered widened to afford easy egress, while the approaches were also to be widened to admit the troops to pass through four abreast. plank, and bags filled with cotton packed in tightly, were ordered prepared, to enable the troops to cross the ditches. on the night of the 1st of july johnston was between brownsville and the big black, and wrote pemberton from there that about the 7th of the month an attempt would be made to create a diversion to enable him to cut his way out. pemberton was a prisoner before this message reached him. on july 1st pemberton, seeing no hope of outside relief, addressed the following letter to each of his four division commanders: "unless the siege of vicksburg is raised, or supplies are thrown in, it will become necessary very shortly to evacuate the place. i see no prospect of the former, and there are many great, if not insuperable obstacles in the way of the latter. you are, therefore, requested to inform me with as little delay as possible, as to the condition of your troops and their ability to make the marches and undergo the fatigues necessary to accomplish a successful evacuation." two of his generals suggested surrender, and the other two practically did the same. they expressed the opinion that an attempt to evacuate would fail. pemberton had previously got a message to johnston suggesting that he should try to negotiate with me for a release of the garrison with their arms. johnston replied that it would be a confession of weakness for him to do so; but he authorized pemberton to use his name in making such an arrangement. on the 3d about ten o'clock a.m. white flags appeared on a portion of the rebel works. hostilities along that part of the line ceased at once. soon two persons were seen coming towards our lines bearing a white flag. they proved to be general bowen, a division commander, and colonel montgomery, aide-de-camp to pemberton, bearing the following letter to me: "i have the honor to propose an armistice for--hours, with the view to arranging terms for the capitulation of vicksburg. to this end, if agreeable to you, i will appoint three commissioners, to meet a like number to be named by yourself at such place and hour to-day as you may find convenient. i make this proposition to save the further effusion of blood, which must otherwise be shed to a frightful extent, feeling myself fully able to maintain my position for a yet indefinite period. this communication will be handed you under a flag of truce, by major-general john s. bowen." it was a glorious sight to officers and soldiers on the line where these white flags were visible, and the news soon spread to all parts of the command. the troops felt that their long and weary marches, hard fighting, ceaseless watching by night and day, in a hot climate, exposure to all sorts of weather, to diseases and, worst of all, to the gibes of many northern papers that came to them saying all their suffering was in vain, that vicksburg would never be taken, were at last at an end and the union sure to be saved. bowen was received by general a. j. smith, and asked to see me. i had been a neighbor of bowen's in missouri, and knew him well and favorably before the war; but his request was refused. he then suggested that i should meet pemberton. to this i sent a verbal message saying that, if pemberton desired it, i would meet him in front of mcpherson's corps at three o'clock that afternoon. i also sent the following written reply to pemberton's letter: "your note of this date is just received, proposing an armistice for several hours, for the purpose of arranging terms of capitulation through commissioners, to be appointed, etc. the useless effusion of blood you propose stopping by this course can be ended at any time you may choose, by the unconditional surrender of the city and garrison. men who have shown so much endurance and courage as those now in vicksburg, will always challenge the respect of an adversary, and i can assure you will be treated with all the respect due to prisoners of war. i do not favor the proposition of appointing commissioners to arrange the terms of capitulation, because i have no terms other than those indicated above." at three o'clock pemberton appeared at the point suggested in my verbal message, accompanied by the same officers who had borne his letter of the morning. generals ord, mcpherson, logan and a. j. smith, and several officers of my staff, accompanied me. our place of meeting was on a hillside within a few hundred feet of the rebel lines. near by stood a stunted oak-tree, which was made historical by the event. it was but a short time before the last vestige of its body, root and limb had disappeared, the fragments taken as trophies. since then the same tree has furnished as many cords of wood, in the shape of trophies, as "the true cross." pemberton and i had served in the same division during part of the mexican war. i knew him very well therefore, and greeted him as an old acquaintance. he soon asked what terms i proposed to give his army if it surrendered. my answer was the same as proposed in my reply to his letter. pemberton then said, rather snappishly, "the conference might as well end," and turned abruptly as if to leave. i said, "very well." general bowen, i saw, was very anxious that the surrender should be consummated. his manner and remarks while pemberton and i were talking, showed this. he now proposed that he and one of our generals should have a conference. i had no objection to this, as nothing could be made binding upon me that they might propose. smith and bowen accordingly had a conference, during which pemberton and i, moving a short distance away towards the enemy's lines were in conversation. after a while bowen suggested that the confederate army should be allowed to march out with the honors of war, carrying their small arms and field artillery. this was promptly and unceremoniously rejected. the interview here ended, i agreeing, however, to send a letter giving final terms by ten o'clock that night. word was sent to admiral porter soon after the correspondence with pemberton commenced, so that hostilities might be stopped on the part of both army and navy. it was agreed on my paging with pemberton that they should not be renewed until our correspondence ceased. when i returned to my headquarters i sent for all the corps and division commanders with the army immediately confronting vicksburg. half the army was from eight to twelve miles off, waiting for johnston. i informed them of the contents of pemberton's letters, of my reply and the substance of the interview, and that i was ready to hear any suggestion; but would hold the power of deciding entirely in my own hands. this was the nearest approach to a "council of war" i ever held. against the general, and almost unanimous judgment of the council i sent the following letter: "in conformity with agreement of this afternoon, i will submit the following proposition for the surrender of the city of vicksburg, public stores, etc. on your accepting the terms proposed, i will march in one division as a guard, and take possession at eight a.m. to-morrow. as soon as rolls can be made out, and paroles be signed by officers and men, you will be allowed to march out of our lines, the officers taking with them their side-arms and clothing, and the field, staff and cavalry officers one horse each. the rank and file will be allowed all their clothing, but no other property. if these conditions are accepted, any amount of rations you may deem necessary can be taken from the stores you now have, and also the necessary cooking utensils for preparing them. thirty wagons also, counting two two-horse or mule teams as one, will be allowed to transport such articles as cannot be carried along. the same conditions will be allowed to all sick and wounded officers and soldiers as fast as they become able to travel. the paroles for these latter must be signed, however, whilst officers present are authorized to sign the roll of prisoners." by the terms of the cartel then in force, prisoners captured by either army were required to be forwarded as soon as possible to either aiken's landing below dutch gap on the james river, or to vicksburg, there to be exchanged, or paroled until they could be exchanged. there was a confederate commissioner at vicksburg, authorized to make the exchange. i did not propose to take him a prisoner, but to leave him free to perform the functions of his office. had i insisted upon an unconditional surrender there would have been over thirty thousand men to transport to cairo, very much to the inconvenience of the army on the mississippi. thence the prisoners would have had to be transported by rail to washington or baltimore; thence again by steamer to aiken's--all at very great expense. at aiken's they would have had to be paroled, because the confederates did not have union prisoners to give in exchange. then again pemberton's army was largely composed of men whose homes were in the south-west; i knew many of them were tired of the war and would get home just as soon as they could. a large number of them had voluntarily come into our lines during the siege, and requested to be sent north where they could get employment until the war was over and they could go to their homes. late at night i received the following reply to my last letter: "i have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of this date, proposing terms of capitulation for this garrison and post. in the main your terms are accepted; but, in justice both to the honor and spirit of my troops manifested in the defence of vicksburg, i have to submit the following amendments, which, if acceded to by you, will perfect the agreement between us. at ten o'clock a.m. to-morrow, i propose to evacuate the works in and around vicksburg, and to surrender the city and garrison under my command, by marching out with my colors and arms, stacking them in front of my present lines. after which you will take possession. officers to retain their side-arms and personal property, and the rights and property of citizens to be respected." this was received after midnight. my reply was as follows: "i have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of 3d july. the amendment proposed by you cannot be acceded to in full. it will be necessary to furnish every officer and man with a parole signed by himself, which, with the completion of the roll of prisoners, will necessarily take some time. again, i can make no stipulations with regard to the treatment of citizens and their private property. while i do not propose to cause them any undue annoyance or loss, i cannot consent to leave myself under any restraint by stipulations. the property which officers will be allowed to take with them will be as stated in my proposition of last evening; that is, officers will be allowed their private baggage and side-arms, and mounted officers one horse each. if you mean by your proposition for each brigade to march to the front of the lines now occupied by it, and stack arms at ten o'clock a.m., and then return to the inside and there remain as prisoners until properly paroled, i will make no objection to it. should no notification be received of your acceptance of my terms by nine o'clock a.m. i shall regard them as having been rejected, and shall act accordingly. should these terms be accepted, white flags should be displayed along your lines to prevent such of my troops as may not have been notified, from firing upon your men." pemberton promptly accepted these terms. during the siege there had been a good deal of friendly sparring between the soldiers of the two armies, on picket and where the lines were close together. all rebels were known as "johnnies," all union troops as "yanks." often "johnny" would call: "well, yank, when are you coming into town?" the reply was sometimes: "we propose to celebrate the 4th of july there." sometimes it would be: "we always treat our prisoners with kindness and do not want to hurt them;" or, "we are holding you as prisoners of war while you are feeding yourselves." the garrison, from the commanding general down, undoubtedly expected an assault on the fourth. they knew from the temper of their men it would be successful when made; and that would be a greater humiliation than to surrender. besides it would be attended with severe loss to them. the vicksburg paper, which we received regularly through the courtesy of the rebel pickets, said prior to the fourth, in speaking of the "yankee" boast that they would take dinner in vicksburg that day, that the best receipt for cooking a rabbit was "first ketch your rabbit." the paper at this time and for some time previous was printed on the plain side of wall paper. the last number was issued on the fourth and announced that we had "caught our rabbit." i have no doubt that pemberton commenced his correspondence on the third with a two-fold purpose: first, to avoid an assault, which he knew would be successful, and second, to prevent the capture taking place on the great national holiday, the anniversary of the declaration of american independence. holding out for better terms as he did he defeated his aim in the latter particular. at the appointed hour the garrison of vicksburg marched out of their works and formed line in front, stacked arms and marched back in good order. our whole army present witnessed this scene without cheering. logan's division, which had approached nearest the rebel works, was the first to march in; and the flag of one of the regiments of his division was soon floating over the court-house. our soldiers were no sooner inside the lines than the two armies began to fraternize. our men had had full rations from the time the siege commenced, to the close. the enemy had been suffering, particularly towards the last. i myself saw our men taking bread from their haversacks and giving it to the enemy they had so recently been engaged in starving out. it was accepted with avidity and with thanks. pemberton says in his report: "if it should be asked why the 4th of july was selected as the day for surrender, the answer is obvious. i believed that upon that day i should obtain better terms. well aware of the vanity of our foe, i knew they would attach vast importance to the entrance on the 4th of july into the stronghold of the great river, and that, to gratify their national vanity, they would yield then what could not be extorted from them at any other time." this does not support my view of his reasons for selecting the day he did for surrendering. but it must be recollected that his first letter asking terms was received about 10 o'clock a.m., july 3d. it then could hardly be expected that it would take twenty-four hours to effect a surrender. he knew that johnston was in our rear for the purpose of raising the siege, and he naturally would want to hold out as long as he could. he knew his men would not resist an assault, and one was expected on the fourth. in our interview he told me he had rations enough to hold out for some time--my recollection is two weeks. it was this statement that induced me to insert in the terms that he was to draw rations for his men from his own supplies. on the 4th of july general holmes, with an army of eight or nine thousand men belonging to the trans-mississippi department, made an attack upon helena, arkansas. he was totally defeated by general prentiss, who was holding helena with less than forty-two hundred soldiers. holmes reported his loss at 1,636, of which 173 were killed; but as prentiss buried 400, holmes evidently understated his losses. the union loss was 57 killed, 127 wounded, and between 30 and 40 missing. this was the last effort on the part of the confederacy to raise the siege of vicksburg. on the third, as soon as negotiations were commenced, i notified sherman and directed him to be ready to take the offensive against johnston, drive him out of the state and destroy his army if he could. steele and ord were directed at the same time to be in readiness to join sherman as soon as the surrender took place. of this sherman was notified. i rode into vicksburg with the troops, and went to the river to exchange congratulations with the navy upon our joint victory. at that time i found that many of the citizens had been living under ground. the ridges upon which vicksburg is built, and those back to the big black, are composed of a deep yellow clay of great tenacity. where roads and streets are cut through, perpendicular banks are left and stand as well as if composed of stone. the magazines of the enemy were made by running passage-ways into this clay at places where there were deep cuts. many citizens secured places of safety for their families by carving out rooms in these embankments. a door-way in these cases would be cut in a high bank, starting from the level of the road or street, and after running in a few feet a room of the size required was carved out of the clay, the dirt being removed by the door-way. in some instances i saw where two rooms were cut out, for a single family, with a door-way in the clay wall separating them. some of these were carpeted and furnished with considerable elaboration. in these the occupants were fully secure from the shells of the navy, which were dropped into the city night and dav without intermission. i returned to my old headquarters outside in the afternoon, and did not move into the town until the sixth. on the afternoon of the fourth i sent captain wm. m. dunn of my staff to cairo, the nearest point where the telegraph could be reached, with a dispatch to the general-in-chief. it was as follows: "the enemy surrendered this morning. the only terms allowed is their parole as prisoners of war. this i regard as a great advantage to us at this moment. it saves, probably, several days in the capture, and leaves troops and transports ready for immediate service. sherman, with a large force, moves immediately on johnston, to drive him from the state. i will send troops to the relief of banks, and return the 9th army corps to burnside." this news, with the victory at gettysburg won the same day, lifted a great load of anxiety from the minds of the president, his cabinet and the loyal people all over the north. the fate of the confederacy was sealed when vicksburg fell. much hard fighting was to be done afterwards and many precious lives were to be sacrificed; but the morale was with the supporters of the union ever after. i at the same time wrote to general banks informing him of the fall and sending him a copy of the terms; also saying i would send him all the troops he wanted to insure the capture of the only foothold the enemy now had on the mississippi river. general banks had a number of copies of this letter printed, or at least a synopsis of it, and very soon a copy fell into the hands of general gardner, who was then in command of port hudson. gardner at once sent a letter to the commander of the national forces saying that he had been informed of the surrender of vicksburg and telling how the information reached him. he added that if this was true, it was useless for him to hold out longer. general banks gave him assurances that vicksburg had been surrendered, and general gardner surrendered unconditionally on the 9th of july. port hudson with nearly 6,000 prisoners, 51 guns, 5,000 small-arms and other stores fell into the hands of the union forces: from that day to the close of the rebellion the mississippi river, from its source to its mouth, remained in the control of the national troops. pemberton and his army were kept in vicksburg until the whole could be paroled. the paroles were in duplicate, by organization (one copy for each, federals and confederates), and signed by the commanding officers of the companies or regiments. duplicates were also made for each soldier and signed by each individually, one to be retained by the soldier signing and one to be retained by us. several hundred refused to sign their paroles, preferring to be sent to the north as prisoners to being sent back to fight again. others again kept out of the way, hoping to escape either alternative. pemberton appealed to me in person to compel these men to sign their paroles, but i declined. it also leaked out that many of the men who had signed their paroles, intended to desert and go to their homes as soon as they got out of our lines. pemberton hearing this, again appealed to me to assist him. he wanted arms for a battalion, to act as guards in keeping his men together while being marched to a camp of instruction, where he expected to keep them until exchanged. this request was also declined. it was precisely what i expected and hoped that they would do. i told him, however, that i would see that they marched beyond our lines in good order. by the eleventh, just one week after the surrender, the paroles were completed and the confederate garrison marched out. many deserted, and fewer of them were ever returned to the ranks to fight again than would have been the case had the surrender been unconditional and the prisoners sent to the james river to be paroled. as soon as our troops took possession of the city guards were established along the whole line of parapet, from the river above to the river below. the prisoners were allowed to occupy their old camps behind the intrenchments. no restraint was put upon them, except by their own commanders. they were rationed about as our own men, and from our supplies. the men of the two armies fraternized as if they had been fighting for the same cause. when they passed out of the works they had so long and so gallantly defended, between lines of their late antagonists, not a cheer went up, not a remark was made that would give pain. really, i believe there was a feeling of sadness just then in the breasts of most of the union soldiers at seeing the dejection of their late antagonists. the day before the departure the following order was issued: "paroled prisoners will be sent out of here to-morrow. they will be authorized to cross at the railroad bridge, and move from there to edward's ferry, (*14) and on by way of raymond. instruct the commands to be orderly and quiet as these prisoners pass, to make no offensive remarks, and not to harbor any who fall out of ranks after they have passed." chapter xxxix. retrospect of the campaign--sherman's movements--proposed movement upon mobile--a painful accident--ordered to report at cairo. the capture of vicksburg, with its garrison, ordnance and ordnance stores, and the successful battles fought in reaching them, gave new spirit to the loyal people of the north. new hopes for the final success of the cause of the union were inspired. the victory gained at gettysburg, upon the same day, added to their hopes. now the mississippi river was entirely in the possession of the national troops; for the fall of vicksburg gave us port hudson at once. the army of northern virginia was driven out of pennsylvania and forced back to about the same ground it occupied in 1861. the army of the tennessee united with the army of the gulf, dividing the confederate states completely. the first dispatch i received from the government after the fall of vicksburg was in these words: "i fear your paroling the prisoners at vicksburg, without actual delivery to a proper agent as required by the seventh article of the cartel, may be construed into an absolute release, and that the men will immediately be placed in the ranks of the enemy. such has been the case elsewhere. if these prisoners have not been allowed to depart, you will detain them until further orders." halleck did not know that they had already been delivered into the hands of major watts, confederate commissioner for the exchange of prisoners. at vicksburg 31,600 prisoners were surrendered, together with 172 cannon about 60,000 muskets and a large amount of ammunition. the small-arms of the enemy were far superior to the bulk of ours. up to this time our troops at the west had been limited to the old united states flint-lock muskets changed into percussion, or the belgian musket imported early in the war--almost as dangerous to the person firing it as to the one aimed at--and a few new and improved arms. these were of many different calibers, a fact that caused much trouble in distributing ammunition during an engagement. the enemy had generally new arms which had run the blockade and were of uniform caliber. after the surrender i authorized all colonels whose regiments were armed with inferior muskets, to place them in the stack of captured arms and replace them with the latter. a large number of arms turned in to the ordnance department as captured, were thus arms that had really been used by the union army in the capture of vicksburg. in this narrative i have not made the mention i should like of officers, dead and alive, whose services entitle them to special mention. neither have i made that mention of the navy which its services deserve. suffice it to say, the close of the siege of vicksburg found us with an army unsurpassed, in proportion to its numbers, taken as a whole of officers and men. a military education was acquired which no other school could have given. men who thought a company was quite enough for them to command properly at the beginning, would have made good regimental or brigade commanders; most of the brigade commanders were equal to the command of a division, and one, ransom, would have been equal to the command of a corps at least. logan and crocker ended the campaign fitted to command independent armies. general f. p. blair joined me at milliken's bend a full-fledged general, without having served in a lower grade. he commanded a division in the campaign. i had known blair in missouri, where i had voted against him in 1858 when he ran for congress. i knew him as a frank, positive and generous man, true to his friends even to a fault, but always a leader. i dreaded his coming; i knew from experience that it was more difficult to command two generals desiring to be leaders than it was to command one army officered intelligently and with subordination. it affords me the greatest pleasure to record now my agreeable disappointment in respect to his character. there was no man braver than he, nor was there any who obeyed all orders of his superior in rank with more unquestioning alacrity. he was one man as a soldier, another as a politician. the navy under porter was all it could be, during the entire campaign. without its assistance the campaign could not have been successfully made with twice the number of men engaged. it could not have been made at all, in the way it was, with any number of men without such assistance. the most perfect harmony reigned between the two arms of the service. there never was a request made, that i am aware of, either of the flag-officer or any of his subordinates, that was not promptly complied with. the campaign of vicksburg was suggested and developed by circumstances. the elections of 1862 had gone against the prosecution of the war. voluntary enlistments had nearly ceased and the draft had been resorted to; this was resisted, and a defeat or backward movement would have made its execution impossible. a forward movement to a decisive victory was necessary. accordingly i resolved to get below vicksburg, unite with banks against port hudson, make new orleans a base and, with that base and grand gulf as a starting point, move our combined forces against vicksburg. upon reaching grand gulf, after running its batteries and fighting a battle, i received a letter from banks informing me that he could not be at port hudson under ten days, and then with only fifteen thousand men. the time was worth more than the reinforcements; i therefore determined to push into the interior of the enemy's country. with a large river behind us, held above and below by the enemy, rapid movements were essential to success. jackson was captured the day after a new commander had arrived, and only a few days before large reinforcements were expected. a rapid movement west was made; the garrison of vicksburg was met in two engagements and badly defeated, and driven back into its stronghold and there successfully besieged. it looks now as though providence had directed the course of the campaign while the army of the tennessee executed the decree. upon the surrender of the garrison of vicksburg there were three things that required immediate attention. the first was to send a force to drive the enemy from our rear, and out of the state. the second was to send reinforcements to banks near port hudson, if necessary, to complete the triumph of opening the mississippi from its source to its mouth to the free navigation of vessels bearing the stars and stripes. the third was to inform the authorities at washington and the north of the good news, to relieve their long suspense and strengthen their confidence in the ultimate success of the cause they had so much at heart. soon after negotiations were opened with general pemberton for the surrender of the city, i notified sherman, whose troops extended from haines' bluff on the left to the crossing of the vicksburg and jackson road over the big black on the right, and directed him to hold his command in readiness to advance and drive the enemy from the state as soon as vicksburg surrendered. steele and ord were directed to be in readiness to join sherman in his move against general johnston, and sherman was advised of this also. sherman moved promptly, crossing the big black at three different points with as many columns, all concentrating at bolton, twenty miles west of jackson. johnston heard of the surrender of vicksburg almost as soon as it occurred, and immediately fell back on jackson. on the 8th of july sherman was within ten miles of jackson and on the 11th was close up to the defences of the city and shelling the town. the siege was kept up until the morning of the 17th, when it was found that the enemy had evacuated during the night. the weather was very hot, the roads dusty and the water bad. johnston destroyed the roads as he passed and had so much the start that pursuit was useless; but sherman sent one division, steele's, to brandon, fourteen miles east of jackson. the national loss in the second capture of jackson was less than one thousand men, killed, wounded and missing. the confederate loss was probably less, except in captured. more than this number fell into our hands as prisoners. medicines and food were left for the confederate wounded and sick who had to be left behind. a large amount of rations was issued to the families that remained in jackson. medicine and food were also sent to raymond for the destitute families as well as the sick and wounded, as i thought it only fair that we should return to these people some of the articles we had taken while marching through the country. i wrote to sherman: "impress upon the men the importance of going through the state in an orderly manner, abstaining from taking anything not absolutely necessary for their subsistence while travelling. they should try to create as favorable an impression as possible upon the people." provisions and forage, when called for by them, were issued to all the people, from bruinsburg to jackson and back to vicksburg, whose resources had been taken for the supply of our army. very large quantities of groceries and provisions were so issued. sherman was ordered back to vicksburg, and his troops took much the same position they had occupied before--from the big black to haines' bluff. having cleaned up about vicksburg and captured or routed all regular confederate forces for more than a hundred miles in all directions, i felt that the troops that had done so much should be allowed to do more before the enemy could recover from the blow he had received, and while important points might be captured without bloodshed. i suggested to the general-in-chief the idea of a campaign against mobile, starting from lake pontchartrain. halleck preferred another course. the possession of the trans-mississippi by the union forces seemed to possess more importance in his mind than almost any campaign east of the mississippi. i am well aware that the president was very anxious to have a foothold in texas, to stop the clamor of some of the foreign governments which seemed to be seeking a pretext to interfere in the war, at least so far as to recognize belligerent rights to the confederate states. this, however, could have been easily done without wasting troops in western louisiana and eastern texas, by sending a garrison at once to brownsville on the rio grande. halleck disapproved of my proposition to go against mobile, so that i was obliged to settle down and see myself put again on the defensive as i had been a year before in west tennessee. it would have been an easy thing to capture mobile at the time i proposed to go there. having that as a base of operations, troops could have been thrown into the interior to operate against general bragg's army. this would necessarily have compelled bragg to detach in order to meet this fire in his rear. if he had not done this the troops from mobile could have inflicted inestimable damage upon much of the country from which his army and lee's were yet receiving their supplies. i was so much impressed with this idea that i renewed my request later in july and again about the 1st of august, and proposed sending all the troops necessary, asking only the assistance of the navy to protect the debarkation of troops at or near mobile. i also asked for a leave of absence to visit new orleans, particularly if my suggestion to move against mobile should be approved. both requests were refused. so far as my experience with general halleck went it was very much easier for him to refuse a favor than to grant one. but i did not regard this as a favor. it was simply in line of duty, though out of my department. the general-in-chief having decided against me, the depletion of an army, which had won a succession of great victories, commenced, as had been the case the year before after the fall of corinth when the army was sent where it would do the least good. by orders, i sent to banks a force of 4,000 men; returned the 9th corps to kentucky and, when transportation had been collected, started a division of 5,000 men to schofield in missouri where price was raiding the state. i also detached a brigade under ransom to natchez, to garrison that place permanently. this latter move was quite fortunate as to the time when ransom arrived there. the enemy happened to have a large number, about 5,000 head, of beef cattle there on the way from texas to feed the eastern armies, and also a large amount of munitions of war which had probably come through texas from the rio grande and which were on the way to lee's and other armies in the east. the troops that were left with me around vicksburg were very busily and unpleasantly employed in making expeditions against guerilla bands and small detachments of cavalry which infested the interior, and in destroying mills, bridges and rolling stock on the railroads. the guerillas and cavalry were not there to fight but to annoy, and therefore disappeared on the first approach of our troops. the country back of vicksburg was filled with deserters from pemberton's army and, it was reported, many from johnston's also. the men determined not to fight again while the war lasted. those who lived beyond the reach of the confederate army wanted to get to their homes. those who did not, wanted to get north where they could work for their support till the war was over. besides all this there was quite a peace feeling, for the time being, among the citizens of that part of mississippi, but this feeling soon subsided. it is not probable that pemberton got off with over 4,000 of his army to the camp where he proposed taking them, and these were in a demoralized condition. on the 7th of august i further depleted my army by sending the 13th corps, general ord commanding, to banks. besides this i received orders to co-operate with the latter general in movements west of the mississippi. having received this order i went to new orleans to confer with banks about the proposed movement. all these movements came to naught. during this visit i reviewed banks' army a short distance above carrollton. the horse i rode was vicious and but little used, and on my return to new orleans ran away and, shying at a locomotive in the street, fell, probably on me. i was rendered insensible, and when i regained consciousness i found myself in a hotel near by with several doctors attending me. my leg was swollen from the knee to the thigh, and the swelling, almost to the point of bursting, extended along the body up to the arm-pit. the pain was almost beyond endurance. i lay at the hotel something over a week without being able to turn myself in bed. i had a steamer stop at the nearest point possible, and was carried to it on a litter. i was then taken to vicksburg, where i remained unable to move for some time afterwards. while i was absent general sherman declined to assume command because, he said, it would confuse the records; but he let all the orders be made in my name, and was glad to render any assistance he could. no orders were issued by my staff, certainly no important orders, except upon consultation with and approval of sherman. on the 13th of september, while i was still in new orleans, halleck telegraphed to me to send all available forces to memphis and thence to tuscumbia, to co-operate with rosecrans for the relief of chattanooga. on the 15th he telegraphed again for all available forces to go to rosecrans. this was received on the 27th. i was still confined to my bed, unable to rise from it without assistance; but i at once ordered sherman to send one division to memphis as fast as transports could be provided. the division of mcpherson's corps, which had got off and was on the way to join steele in arkansas, was recalled and sent, likewise, to report to hurlbut at memphis. hurlbut was directed to forward these two divisions with two others from his own corps at once, and also to send any other troops that might be returning there. halleck suggested that some good man, like sherman or mcpherson, should be sent to memphis to take charge of the troops going east. on this i sent sherman, as being, i thought, the most suitable person for an independent command, and besides he was entitled to it if it had to be given to any one. he was directed to take with him another division of his corps. this left one back, but having one of mcpherson's divisions he had still the equivalent. before the receipt by me of these orders the battle of chickamauga had been fought and rosecrans forced back into chattanooga. the administration as well as the general-in-chief was nearly frantic at the situation of affairs there. mr. charles a. dana, an officer of the war department, was sent to rosecrans' headquarters. i do not know what his instructions were, but he was still in chattanooga when i arrived there at a later period. it seems that halleck suggested that i should go to nashville as soon as able to move and take general direction of the troops moving from the west. i received the following dispatch dated october 3d: "it is the wish of the secretary of war that as soon as general grant is able he will come to cairo and report by telegraph." i was still very lame, but started without delay. arriving at columbus on the 16th i reported by telegraph: "your dispatch from cairo of the 3d directing me to report from cairo was received at 11.30 on the 10th. left the same day with staff and headquarters and am here en route for cairo." end of volume i. personal memoirs of u. s. grant volume ii. contents. chapter xl. first meeting with secretary stanton--general rosecrans --commanding military division of mississippi--andrew johnson's address --arrival at chattanooga. chapter xli. assuming the command at chattanooga--opening a line of supplies--battle of wauhatchie--on the picket line. chapter xlii. condition of the army--rebuilding the railroad--general burnside's situation--orders for battle--plans for the attack--hooker's position--sherman's movements. chapter xliii. preparations for battle--thomas carries the first line of the enemy--sherman carries missionary ridge--battle of lookout mountain --general hooker's fight. chapter xliv. battle of chattanooga--a gallant charge--complete rout of the enemy--pursuit of the confederates--general bragg--remarks on chattanooga. chapter xlv. the relief of knoxville--headquarters moved to nashville --visiting knoxville--cipher dispatches--withholding orders. chapter xlvi. operations in mississippi--longstreet in east tennessee --commissioned lieutenant-general--commanding the armies of the united states--first interview with president lincoln. chapter xlvii. the military situation--plans for the campaign--sheridan assigned to command of the cavalry--flank movements--forrest at fort pillow--general banks's expedition--colonel mosby--an incident of the wilderness campaign. chapter xlviii. commencement of the grand campaign--general butler's position--sheridan's first raid. chapter xlix. sherman s campaign in georgia--siege of atlanta--death of general mcpherson--attempt to capture andersonville--capture of atlanta. chapter l. grand movement of the army of the potomac--crossing the rapidan--entering the wilderness--battle of the wilderness. chapter li. after the battle--telegraph and signal service--movement by the left flank. chapter lii. battle of spottsylvania--hancock's position--assault of warren's and wright's corps--upton promoted on the field--good news from butler and sheridan. chapter liii. hancock's assault--losses of the confederates--promotions recommended--discomfiture of the enemy--ewell's attack--reducing the artillery. chapter liv. movement by the left flank--battle of north anna--an incident of the march--moving on richmond--south of the pamunkey --position of the national army. chapter lv. advance on cold harbor--an anecdote of the war--battle of cold harbor--correspondence with lee retrospective. chapter lvi. left flank movement across the chickahominy and james --general lee--visit to butler--the movement on petersburg --the investment of petersburg. chapter lvii. raid on the virginia central railroad--raid on the weldon railroad--early's movement upon washington--mining the works before petersburg--explosion of the mine before petersburg--campaign in the shenandoah valley--capture of the weldon railroad. chapter lviii. sheridan's advance--visit to sheridan--sheridan's victory in the shenandoah--sheridan's ride to winchester--close of the campaign for the winter. chapter lix. the campaign in georgia--sherman's march to the sea--war anecdotes--the march on savannah--investment of savannah--capture of savannah. chapter lx. the battle of franklin--the battle of nashville chapter lxi. expedition against fort fisher--attack on the fort--failure of the expedition--second expedition against the fort--capture of fort fisher. chapter lxii. sherman's march north--sheridan ordered to lynchburg --canby ordered to move against mobile--movements of schofield and thomas --capture of columbia, south carolina--sherman in the carolinas. chapter lxiii. arrival of the peace commissioners--lincoln and the peace commissioners--an anecdote of lincoln--the winter before petersburg --sheridan destroys the railroad--gordon carries the picket line--parke recaptures the line--the battle of white oak road. chapter lxiv. interview with sheridan--grand movement of the army of the potomac--sheridan's advance on five forks--battle of five forks--parke and wright storm the enemy's line--battles before petersburg. chapter lxv. the capture of petersburg--meeting president lincoln in petersburg--the capture of richmond--pursuing the enemy--visit to sheridan and meade. chapter lxvi. battle of sailor's creek--engagement at farmville --correspondence with general lee--sheridan intercepts the enemy. chapter lxvii. negotiations at appomattox--interview with lee at mclean's house--the terms of surrender--lee's surrender--interview with lee after the surrender. chapter lxviii. morale of the two armies--relative conditions of the north and south--president lincoln visits richmond--arrival at washington--president lincoln's assassination--president johnson's policy. chapter lxix. sherman and johnston--johnston's surrender to sherman --capture of mobile--wilson's expedition--capture of jefferson davis --general thomas's qualities--estimate of general canby. chapter lxx. the end of the war--the march to washington--one of lincoln's anecdotes--grand review at washington--characteristics of lincoln and stanton--estimate of the different corps commanders. conclusion appendix chapter xl. first meeting with secretary stanton--general rosecrans--commanding military division of mississippi--andrew johnson's address--arrival at chattanooga. the reply (to my telegram of october 16, 1863, from cairo, announcing my arrival at that point) came on the morning of the 17th, directing me to proceed immediately to the galt house, louisville, where i would meet an officer of the war department with my instructions. i left cairo within an hour or two after the receipt of this dispatch, going by rail via indianapolis. just as the train i was on was starting out of the depot at indianapolis a messenger came running up to stop it, saying the secretary of war was coming into the station and wanted to see me. i had never met mr. stanton up to that time, though we had held frequent conversations over the wires the year before, when i was in tennessee. occasionally at night he would order the wires between the war department and my headquarters to be connected, and we would hold a conversation for an hour or two. on this occasion the secretary was accompanied by governor brough of ohio, whom i had never met, though he and my father had been old acquaintances. mr. stanton dismissed the special train that had brought him to indianapolis, and accompanied me to louisville. up to this time no hint had been given me of what was wanted after i left vicksburg, except the suggestion in one of halleck's dispatches that i had better go to nashville and superintend the operation of troops sent to relieve rosecrans. soon after we started the secretary handed me two orders, saying that i might take my choice of them. the two were identical in all but one particular. both created the "military division of mississippi," (giving me the command) composed of the departments of the ohio, the cumberland, and the tennessee, and all the territory from the alleghanies to the mississippi river north of banks's command in the south-west. one order left the department commanders as they were, while the other relieved rosecrans and assigned thomas to his place. i accepted the latter. we reached louisville after night and, if i remember rightly, in a cold, drizzling rain. the secretary of war told me afterwards that he caught a cold on that occasion from which he never expected to recover. he never did. a day was spent in louisville, the secretary giving me the military news at the capital and talking about the disappointment at the results of some of the campaigns. by the evening of the day after our arrival all matters of discussion seemed exhausted, and i left the hotel to spend the evening away, both mrs. grant (who was with me) and myself having relatives living in louisville. in the course of the evening mr. stanton received a dispatch from mr. c. a. dana, then in chattanooga, informing him that unless prevented rosecrans would retreat, and advising peremptory orders against his doing so. as stated before, after the fall of vicksburg i urged strongly upon the government the propriety of a movement against mobile. general rosecrans had been at murfreesboro', tennessee, with a large and well-equipped army from early in the year 1863, with bragg confronting him with a force quite equal to his own at first, considering it was on the defensive. but after the investment of vicksburg bragg's army was largely depleted to strengthen johnston, in mississippi, who was being reinforced to raise the siege. i frequently wrote general halleck suggesting that rosecrans should move against bragg. by so doing he would either detain the latter's troops where they were or lay chattanooga open to capture. general halleck strongly approved the suggestion, and finally wrote me that he had repeatedly ordered rosecrans to advance, but that the latter had constantly failed to comply with the order, and at last, after having held a council of war, had replied in effect that it was a military maxim "not to fight two decisive battles at the same time." if true, the maxim was not applicable in this case. it would be bad to be defeated in two decisive battles fought the same day, but it would not be bad to win them. i, however, was fighting no battle, and the siege of vicksburg had drawn from rosecrans' front so many of the enemy that his chances of victory were much greater than they would be if he waited until the siege was over, when these troops could be returned. rosecrans was ordered to move against the army that was detaching troops to raise the siege. finally he did move, on the 24th of june, but ten days afterwards vicksburg surrendered, and the troops sent from bragg were free to return. it was at this time that i recommended to the general-in-chief the movement against mobile. i knew the peril the army of the cumberland was in, being depleted continually, not only by ordinary casualties, but also by having to detach troops to hold its constantly extending line over which to draw supplies, while the enemy in front was as constantly being strengthened. mobile was important to the enemy, and in the absence of a threatening force was guarded by little else than artillery. if threatened by land and from the water at the same time the prize would fall easily, or troops would have to be sent to its defence. those troops would necessarily come from bragg. my judgment was overruled, and the troops under my command were dissipated over other parts of the country where it was thought they could render the most service. soon it was discovered in washington that rosecrans was in trouble and required assistance. the emergency was now too immediate to allow us to give this assistance by making an attack in rear of bragg upon mobile. it was therefore necessary to reinforce directly, and troops were sent from every available point. rosecrans had very skilfully manoeuvred bragg south of the tennessee river, and through and beyond chattanooga. if he had stopped and intrenched, and made himself strong there, all would have been right and the mistake of not moving earlier partially compensated. but he pushed on, with his forces very much scattered, until bragg's troops from mississippi began to join him. then bragg took the initiative. rosecrans had to fall back in turn, and was able to get his army together at chickamauga, some miles south-east of chattanooga, before the main battle was brought on. the battle was fought on the 19th and 20th of september, and rosecrans was badly defeated, with a heavy loss in artillery and some sixteen thousand men killed, wounded and captured. the corps under major-general george h. thomas stood its ground, while rosecrans, with crittenden and mccook, returned to chattanooga. thomas returned also, but later, and with his troops in good order. bragg followed and took possession of missionary ridge, overlooking chattanooga. he also occupied lookout mountain, west of the town, which rosecrans had abandoned, and with it his control of the river and the river road as far back as bridgeport. the national troops were now strongly intrenched in chattanooga valley, with the tennessee river behind them and the enemy occupying commanding heights to the east and west, with a strong line across the valley from mountain to mountain, and with chattanooga creek, for a large part of the way, in front of their line. on the 29th halleck telegraphed me the above results, and directed all the forces that could be spared from my department to be sent to rosecrans. long before this dispatch was received sherman was on his way, and mcpherson was moving east with most of the garrison of vicksburg. a retreat at that time would have been a terrible disaster. it would not only have been the loss of a most important strategic position to us, but it would have been attended with the loss of all the artillery still left with the army of the cumberland and the annihilation of that army itself, either by capture or demoralization. all supplies for rosecrans had to be brought from nashville. the railroad between this base and the army was in possession of the government up to bridgeport, the point at which the road crosses to the south side of the tennessee river; but bragg, holding lookout and raccoon mountains west of chattanooga, commanded the railroad, the river and the shortest and best wagon-roads, both south and north of the tennessee, between chattanooga and bridgeport. the distance between these two places is but twenty-six miles by rail, but owing to the position of bragg, all supplies for rosecrans had to be hauled by a circuitous route north of the river and over a mountainous country, increasing the distance to over sixty miles. this country afforded but little food for his animals, nearly ten thousand of which had already starved, and not enough were left to draw a single piece of artillery or even the ambulances to convey the sick. the men had been on half rations of hard bread for a considerable time, with but few other supplies except beef driven from nashville across the country. the region along the road became so exhausted of food for the cattle that by the time they reached chattanooga they were much in the condition of the few animals left alive there--"on the lift." indeed, the beef was so poor that the soldiers were in the habit of saying, with a faint facetiousness, that they were living on "half rations of hard bread and beef dried on the hoof." nothing could be transported but food, and the troops were without sufficient shoes or other clothing suitable for the advancing season. what they had was well worn. the fuel within the federal lines was exhausted, even to the stumps of trees. there were no teams to draw it from the opposite bank, where it was abundant. the only way of supplying fuel, for some time before my arrival, had been to cut trees on the north bank of the river at a considerable distance up the stream, form rafts of it and float it down with the current, effecting a landing on the south side within our lines by the use of paddles or poles. it would then be carried on the shoulders of the men to their camps. if a retreat had occurred at this time it is not probable that any of the army would have reached the railroad as an organized body, if followed by the enemy. on the receipt of mr. dana's dispatch mr. stanton sent for me. finding that i was out he became nervous and excited, inquiring of every person he met, including guests of the house, whether they knew where i was, and bidding them find me and send me to him at once. about eleven o'clock i returned to the hotel, and on my way, when near the house, every person met was a messenger from the secretary, apparently partaking of his impatience to see me. i hastened to the room of the secretary and found him pacing the floor rapidly in his dressing-gown. saying that the retreat must be prevented, he showed me the dispatch. i immediately wrote an order assuming command of the military division of the mississippi, and telegraphed it to general rosecrans. i then telegraphed to him the order from washington assigning thomas to the command of the army of the cumberland; and to thomas that he must hold chattanooga at all hazards, informing him at the same time that i would be at the front as soon as possible. a prompt reply was received from thomas, saying, "we will hold the town till we starve." i appreciated the force of this dispatch later when i witnessed the condition of affairs which prompted it. it looked, indeed, as if but two courses were open: one to starve, the other to surrender or be captured. on the morning of the 20th of october i started, with my staff, and proceeded as far as nashville. at that time it was not prudent to travel beyond that point by night, so i remained in nashville until the next morning. here i met for the first time andrew johnson, military governor of tennessee. he delivered a speech of welcome. his composure showed that it was by no means his maiden effort. it was long, and i was in torture while he was delivering it, fearing something would be expected from me in response. i was relieved, however, the people assembled having apparently heard enough. at all events they commenced a general hand-shaking, which, although trying where there is so much of it, was a great relief to me in this emergency. from nashville i telegraphed to burnside, who was then at knoxville, that important points in his department ought to be fortified, so that they could be held with the least number of men; to admiral porter at cairo, that sherman's advance had passed eastport, mississippi, that rations were probably on their way from st. louis by boat for supplying his army, and requesting him to send a gunboat to convoy them; and to thomas, suggesting that large parties should be put at work on the wagon-road then in use back to bridgeport. on the morning of the 21st we took the train for the front, reaching stevenson alabama, after dark. rosecrans was there on his way north. he came into my car and we held a brief interview, in which he described very clearly the situation at chattanooga, and made some excellent suggestions as to what should be done. my only wonder was that he had not carried them out. we then proceeded to bridgeport, where we stopped for the night. from here we took horses and made our way by jasper and over waldron's ridge to chattanooga. there had been much rain, and the roads were almost impassable from mud, knee-deep in places, and from wash-outs on the mountain sides. i had been on crutches since the time of my fall in new orleans, and had to be carried over places where it was not safe to cross on horseback. the roads were strewn with the debris of broken wagons and the carcasses of thousands of starved mules and horses. at jasper, some ten or twelve miles from bridgeport, there was a halt. general o. o. howard had his headquarters there. from this point i telegraphed burnside to make every effort to secure five hundred rounds of ammunition for his artillery and small-arms. we stopped for the night at a little hamlet some ten or twelve miles farther on. the next day we reached chattanooga a little before dark. i went directly to general thomas's headquarters, and remaining there a few days, until i could establish my own. during the evening most of the general officers called in to pay their respects and to talk about the condition of affairs. they pointed out on the map the line, marked with a red or blue pencil, which rosecrans had contemplated falling back upon. if any of them had approved the move they did not say so to me. i found general w. f. smith occupying the position of chief engineer of the army of the cumberland. i had known smith as a cadet at west point, but had no recollection of having met him after my graduation, in 1843, up to this time. he explained the situation of the two armies and the topography of the country so plainly that i could see it without an inspection. i found that he had established a saw-mill on the banks of the river, by utilizing an old engine found in the neighborhood; and, by rafting logs from the north side of the river above, had got out the lumber and completed pontoons and roadway plank for a second bridge, one flying bridge being there already. he was also rapidly getting out the materials and constructing the boats for a third bridge. in addition to this he had far under way a steamer for plying between chattanooga and bridgeport whenever we might get possession of the river. this boat consisted of a scow, made of the plank sawed out at the mill, housed in, and a stern wheel attached which was propelled by a second engine taken from some shop or factory. i telegraphed to washington this night, notifying general halleck of my arrival, and asking to have general sherman assigned to the command of the army of the tennessee, headquarters in the field. the request was at once complied with. chapter xli. assuming the command at chattanooga--opening a line of supplies--battle of wauhatchie--on the picket line. the next day, the 24th, i started out to make a personal inspection, taking thomas and smith with me, besides most of the members of my personal staff. we crossed to the north side of the river, and, moving to the north of detached spurs of hills, reached the tennessee at brown's ferry, some three miles below lookout mountain, unobserved by the enemy. here we left our horses back from the river and approached the water on foot. there was a picket station of the enemy on the opposite side, of about twenty men, in full view, and we were within easy range. they did not fire upon us nor seem to be disturbed by our presence. they must have seen that we were all commissioned officers. but, i suppose, they looked upon the garrison of chattanooga as prisoners of war, feeding or starving themselves, and thought it would be inhuman to kill any of them except in self-defence. that night i issued orders for opening the route to bridgeport--a cracker line, as the soldiers appropriately termed it. they had been so long on short rations that my first thought was the establishment of a line over which food might reach them. chattanooga is on the south bank of the tennessee, where that river runs nearly due west. it is at the northern end of a valley five or six miles in width, through which chattanooga creek runs. to the east of the valley is missionary ridge, rising from five to eight hundred feet above the creek and terminating somewhat abruptly a half mile or more before reaching the tennessee. on the west of the valley is lookout mountain, twenty-two hundred feet above-tide water. just below the town the tennessee makes a turn to the south and runs to the base of lookout mountain, leaving no level ground between the mountain and river. the memphis and charleston railroad passes this point, where the mountain stands nearly perpendicular. east of missionary ridge flows the south chickamauga river; west of lookout mountain is lookout creek; and west of that, raccoon mountains. lookout mountain, at its northern end, rises almost perpendicularly for some distance, then breaks off in a gentle slope of cultivated fields to near the summit, where it ends in a palisade thirty or more feet in height. on the gently sloping ground, between the upper and lower palisades, there is a single farmhouse, which is reached by a wagon-road from the valley east. the intrenched line of the enemy commenced on the north end of missionary ridge and extended along the crest for some distance south, thence across chattanooga valley to lookout mountain. lookout mountain was also fortified and held by the enemy, who also kept troops in lookout valley west, and on raccoon mountain, with pickets extending down the river so as to command the road on the north bank and render it useless to us. in addition to this there was an intrenched line in chattanooga valley extending from the river east of the town to lookout mountain, to make the investment complete. besides the fortifications on mission ridge, there was a line at the base of the hill, with occasional spurs of rifle-pits half-way up the front. the enemy's pickets extended out into the valley towards the town, so far that the pickets of the two armies could converse. at one point they were separated only by the narrow creek which gives its name to the valley and town, and from which both sides drew water. the union lines were shorter than those of the enemy. thus the enemy, with a vastly superior force, was strongly fortified to the east, south, and west, and commanded the river below. practically, the army of the cumberland was besieged. the enemy had stopped with his cavalry north of the river the passing of a train loaded with ammunition and medical supplies. the union army was short of both, not having ammunition enough for a day's fighting. general halleck had, long before my coming into this new field, ordered parts of the 11th and 12th corps, commanded respectively by generals howard and slocum, hooker in command of the whole, from the army of the potomac to reinforce rosecrans. it would have been folly to send them to chattanooga to help eat up the few rations left there. they were consequently left on the railroad, where supplies could be brought to them. before my arrival, thomas ordered their concentration at bridgeport. general w. f. smith had been so instrumental in preparing for the move which i was now about to make, and so clear in his judgment about the manner of making it, that i deemed it but just to him that he should have command of the troops detailed to execute the design, although he was then acting as a staff officer and was not in command of troops. on the 24th of october, after my return to chattanooga, the following details were made: general hooker, who was now at bridgeport, was ordered to cross to the south side of the tennessee and march up by whitesides and wauhatchie to brown's ferry. general palmer, with a division of the 14th corps, army of the cumberland, was ordered to move down the river on the north side, by a back road, until opposite whitesides, then cross and hold the road in hooker's rear after he had passed. four thousand men were at the same time detailed to act under general smith directly from chattanooga. eighteen hundred of them, under general hazen, were to take sixty pontoon boats, and under cover of night float by the pickets of the enemy at the north base of lookout, down to brown's ferry, then land on the south side and capture or drive away the pickets at that point. smith was to march with the remainder of the detail, also under cover of night, by the north bank of the river to brown's ferry, taking with him all the material for laying the bridge as soon as the crossing was secured. on the 26th, hooker crossed the river at bridgeport and commenced his eastward march. at three o'clock on the morning of the 27th, hazen moved into the stream with his sixty pontoons and eighteen hundred brave and well-equipped men. smith started enough in advance to be near the river when hazen should arrive. there are a number of detached spurs of hills north of the river at chattanooga, back of which is a good road parallel to the stream, sheltered from the view from the top of lookout. it was over this road smith marched. at five o'clock hazen landed at brown's ferry, surprised the picket guard, and captured most of it. by seven o'clock the whole of smith's force was ferried over and in possession of a height commanding the ferry. this was speedily fortified, while a detail was laying the pontoon bridge. by ten o'clock the bridge was laid, and our extreme right, now in lookout valley, was fortified and connected with the rest of the army. the two bridges over the tennessee river--a flying one at chattanooga and the new one at brown's ferry--with the road north of the river, covered from both the fire and the view of the enemy, made the connection complete. hooker found but slight obstacles in his way, and on the afternoon of the 28th emerged into lookout valley at wauhatchie. howard marched on to brown's ferry, while geary, who commanded a division in the 12th corps, stopped three miles south. the pickets of the enemy on the river below were now cut off, and soon came in and surrendered. the river was now opened to us from lookout valley to bridgeport. between brown's ferry and kelly's ferry the tennessee runs through a narrow gorge in the mountains, which contracts the stream so much as to increase the current beyond the capacity of an ordinary steamer to stem it. to get up these rapids, steamers must be cordelled; that is, pulled up by ropes from the shore. but there is no difficulty in navigating the stream from bridgeport to kelly's ferry. the latter point is only eight miles from chattanooga and connected with it by a good wagon-road, which runs through a low pass in the raccoon mountains on the south side of the river to brown's ferry, thence on the north side to the river opposite chattanooga. there were several steamers at bridgeport, and abundance of forage, clothing and provisions. on the way to chattanooga i had telegraphed back to nashville for a good supply of vegetables and small rations, which the troops had been so long deprived of. hooker had brought with him from the east a full supply of land transportation. his animals had not been subjected to hard work on bad roads without forage, but were in good condition. in five days from my arrival in chattanooga the way was open to bridgeport and, with the aid of steamers and hooker's teams, in a week the troops were receiving full rations. it is hard for any one not an eye-witness to realize the relief this brought. the men were soon reclothed and also well fed, an abundance of ammunition was brought up, and a cheerfulness prevailed not before enjoyed in many weeks. neither officers nor men looked upon themselves any longer as doomed. the weak and languid appearance of the troops, so visible before, disappeared at once. i do not know what the effect was on the other side, but assume it must have been correspondingly depressing. mr. davis had visited bragg but a short time before, and must have perceived our condition to be about as bragg described it in his subsequent report. "these dispositions," he said, "faithfully sustained, insured the enemy's speedy evacuation of chattanooga for want of food and forage. possessed of the shortest route to his depot, and the one by which reinforcements must reach him, we held him at our mercy, and his destruction was only a question of time." but the dispositions were not "faithfully sustained," and i doubt not but thousands of men engaged in trying to "sustain" them now rejoice that they were not. there was no time during the rebellion when i did not think, and often say, that the south was more to be benefited by its defeat than the north. the latter had the people, the institutions, and the territory to make a great and prosperous nation. the former was burdened with an institution abhorrent to all civilized people not brought up under it, and one which degraded labor, kept it in ignorance, and enervated the governing class. with the outside world at war with this institution, they could not have extended their territory. the labor of the country was not skilled, nor allowed to become so. the whites could not toil without becoming degraded, and those who did were denominated "poor white trash." the system of labor would have soon exhausted the soil and left the people poor. the non-slaveholders would have left the country, and the small slaveholder must have sold out to his more fortunate neighbor. soon the slaves would have outnumbered the masters, and, not being in sympathy with them, would have risen in their might and exterminated them. the war was expensive to the south as well as to the north, both in blood and treasure, but it was worth all it cost. the enemy was surprised by the movements which secured to us a line of supplies. he appreciated its importance, and hastened to try to recover the line from us. his strength on lookout mountain was not equal to hooker's command in the valley below. from missionary ridge he had to march twice the distance we had from chattanooga, in order to reach lookout valley; but on the night of the 28th and 29th an attack was made on geary at wauhatchie by longstreet's corps. when the battle commenced, hooker ordered howard up from brown's ferry. he had three miles to march to reach geary. on his way he was fired upon by rebel troops from a foot-hill to the left of the road and from which the road was commanded. howard turned to the left, charged up the hill and captured it before the enemy had time to intrench, taking many prisoners. leaving sufficient men to hold this height, he pushed on to reinforce geary. before he got up, geary had been engaged for about three hours against a vastly superior force. the night was so dark that the men could not distinguish one from another except by the light of the flashes of their muskets. in the darkness and uproar hooker's teamsters became frightened and deserted their teams. the mules also became frightened, and breaking loose from their fastenings stampeded directly towards the enemy. the latter, no doubt, took this for a charge, and stampeded in turn. by four o'clock in the morning the battle had entirely ceased, and our "cracker line" was never afterward disturbed. in securing possession of lookout valley, smith lost one man killed and four or five wounded. the enemy lost most of his pickets at the ferry, captured. in the night engagement of the 28th-9th hooker lost 416 killed and wounded. i never knew the loss of the enemy, but our troops buried over one hundred and fifty of his dead and captured more than a hundred. after we had secured the opening of a line over which to bring our supplies to the army, i made a personal inspection to see the situation of the pickets of the two armies. as i have stated, chattanooga creek comes down the centre of the valley to within a mile or such a matter of the town of chattanooga, then bears off westerly, then north-westerly, and enters the tennessee river at the foot of lookout mountain. this creek, from its mouth up to where it bears off west, lay between the two lines of pickets, and the guards of both armies drew their water from the same stream. as i would be under short-range fire and in an open country, i took nobody with me, except, i believe, a bugler, who stayed some distance to the rear. i rode from our right around to our left. when i came to the camp of the picket guard of our side, i heard the call, "turn out the guard for the commanding general." i replied, "never mind the guard," and they were dismissed and went back to their tents. just back of these, and about equally distant from the creek, were the guards of the confederate pickets. the sentinel on their post called out in like manner, "turn out the guard for the commanding general," and, i believe, added, "general grant." their line in a moment front-faced to the north, facing me, and gave a salute, which i returned. the most friendly relations seemed to exist between the pickets of the two armies. at one place there was a tree which had fallen across the stream, and which was used by the soldiers of both armies in drawing water for their camps. general longstreet's corps was stationed there at the time, and wore blue of a little different shade from our uniform. seeing a soldier in blue on this log, i rode up to him, commenced conversing with him, and asked whose corps he belonged to. he was very polite, and, touching his hat to me, said he belonged to general longstreet's corps. i asked him a few questions--but not with a view of gaining any particular information--all of which he answered, and i rode off. chapter xlii. condition of the army--rebuilding the railroad--general burnside's situation--orders for battle--plans for the attack--hooker's position --sherman's movements. having got the army of the cumberland in a comfortable position, i now began to look after the remainder of my new command. burnside was in about as desperate a condition as the army of the cumberland had been, only he was not yet besieged. he was a hundred miles from the nearest possible base, big south fork of the cumberland river, and much farther from any railroad we had possession of. the roads back were over mountains, and all supplies along the line had long since been exhausted. his animals, too, had been starved, and their carcasses lined the road from cumberland gap, and far back towards lexington, ky. east tennessee still furnished supplies of beef, bread and forage, but it did not supply ammunition, clothing, medical supplies, or small rations, such as coffee, sugar, salt and rice. sherman had started from memphis for corinth on the 11th of october. his instructions required him to repair the road in his rear in order to bring up supplies. the distance was about three hundred and thirty miles through a hostile country. his entire command could not have maintained the road if it had been completed. the bridges had all been destroyed by the enemy, and much other damage done. a hostile community lived along the road; guerilla bands infested the country, and more or less of the cavalry of the enemy was still in the west. often sherman's work was destroyed as soon as completed, and he only a short distance away. the memphis and charleston railroad strikes the tennessee river at eastport, mississippi. knowing the difficulty sherman would have to supply himself from memphis, i had previously ordered supplies sent from st. louis on small steamers, to be convoyed by the navy, to meet him at eastport. these he got. i now ordered him to discontinue his work of repairing roads and to move on with his whole force to stevenson, alabama, without delay. this order was borne to sherman by a messenger, who paddled down the tennessee in a canoe and floated over muscle shoals; it was delivered at iuka on the 27th. in this sherman was notified that the rebels were moving a force towards cleveland, east tennessee, and might be going to nashville, in which event his troops were in the best position to beat them there. sherman, with his characteristic promptness, abandoned the work he was engaged upon and pushed on at once. on the 1st of november he crossed the tennessee at eastport, and that day was in florence, alabama, with the head of column, while his troops were still crossing at eastport, with blair bringing up the rear. sherman's force made an additional army, with cavalry, artillery, and trains, all to be supplied by the single track road from nashville. all indications pointed also to the probable necessity of supplying burnside's command in east tennessee, twenty-five thousand more, by the same route. a single track could not do this. i gave, therefore, an order to sherman to halt general g. m. dodge's command, of about eight thousand men, at athens, and subsequently directed the latter to arrange his troops along the railroad from decatur north towards nashville, and to rebuild that road. the road from nashville to decatur passes over a broken country, cut up with innumerable streams, many of them of considerable width, and with valleys far below the road-bed. all the bridges over these had been destroyed, and the rails taken up and twisted by the enemy. all the cars and locomotives not carried off had been destroyed as effectually as they knew how to destroy them. all bridges and culverts had been destroyed between nashville and decatur, and thence to stevenson, where the memphis and charleston and the nashville and chattanooga roads unite. the rebuilding of this road would give us two roads as far as stevenson over which to supply the army. from bridgeport, a short distance farther east, the river supplements the road. general dodge, besides being a most capable soldier, was an experienced railroad builder. he had no tools to work with except those of the pioneers--axes, picks, and spades. with these he was able to intrench his men and protect them against surprises by small parties of the enemy. as he had no base of supplies until the road could be completed back to nashville, the first matter to consider after protecting his men was the getting in of food and forage from the surrounding country. he had his men and teams bring in all the grain they could find, or all they needed, and all the cattle for beef, and such other food as could be found. millers were detailed from the ranks to run the mills along the line of the army. when these were not near enough to the troops for protection they were taken down and moved up to the line of the road. blacksmith shops, with all the iron and steel found in them, were moved up in like manner. blacksmiths were detailed and set to work making the tools necessary in railroad and bridge building. axemen were put to work getting out timber for bridges and cutting fuel for locomotives when the road should be completed. car-builders were set to work repairing the locomotives and cars. thus every branch of railroad building, making tools to work with, and supplying the workmen with food, was all going on at once, and without the aid of a mechanic or laborer except what the command itself furnished. but rails and cars the men could not make without material, and there was not enough rolling stock to keep the road we already had worked to its full capacity. there were no rails except those in use. to supply these deficiencies i ordered eight of the ten engines general mcpherson had at vicksburg to be sent to nashville, and all the cars he had except ten. i also ordered the troops in west tennessee to points on the river and on the memphis and charleston road, and ordered the cars, locomotives and rails from all the railroads except the memphis and charleston to nashville. the military manager of railroads also was directed to furnish more rolling stock and, as far as he could, bridge material. general dodge had the work assigned him finished within forty days after receiving his orders. the number of bridges to rebuild was one hundred and eighty-two, many of them over deep and wide chasms; the length of road repaired was one hundred and two miles. the enemy's troops, which it was thought were either moving against burnside or were going to nashville, went no farther than cleveland. their presence there, however, alarmed the authorities at washington, and, on account of our helpless condition at chattanooga, caused me much uneasiness. dispatches were constantly coming, urging me to do something for burnside's relief; calling attention to the importance of holding east tennessee; saying the president was much concerned for the protection of the loyal people in that section, etc. we had not at chattanooga animals to pull a single piece of artillery, much less a supply train. reinforcements could not help burnside, because he had neither supplies nor ammunition sufficient for them; hardly, indeed, bread and meat for the men he had. there was no relief possible for him except by expelling the enemy from missionary ridge and about chattanooga. on the 4th of november longstreet left our front with about fifteen thousand troops, besides wheeler's cavalry, five thousand more, to go against burnside. the situation seemed desperate, and was more aggravating because nothing could be done until sherman should get up. the authorities at washington were now more than ever anxious for the safety of burnside's army, and plied me with dispatches faster than ever, urging that something should be done for his relief. on the 7th, before longstreet could possibly have reached knoxville, i ordered thomas peremptorily to attack the enemy's right, so as to force the return of the troops that had gone up the valley. i directed him to take mules, officers' horses, or animals wherever he could get them to move the necessary artillery. but he persisted in the declaration that he could not move a single piece of artillery, and could not see how he could possibly comply with the order. nothing was left to be done but to answer washington dispatches as best i could; urge sherman forward, although he was making every effort to get forward, and encourage burnside to hold on, assuring him that in a short time he should be relieved. all of burnside's dispatches showed the greatest confidence in his ability to hold his position as long as his ammunition held out. he even suggested the propriety of abandoning the territory he held south and west of knoxville, so as to draw the enemy farther from his base and make it more difficult for him to get back to chattanooga when the battle should begin. longstreet had a railroad as far as loudon; but from there to knoxville he had to rely on wagon trains. burnside's suggestion, therefore, was a good one, and it was adopted. on the 14th i telegraphed him: "sherman's advance has reached bridgeport. his whole force will be ready to move from there by tuesday at farthest. if you can hold longstreet in check until he gets up, or by skirmishing and falling back can avoid serious loss to yourself and gain time, i will be able to force the enemy back from here and place a force between longstreet and bragg that must inevitably make the former take to the mountain-passes by every available road, to get to his supplies. sherman would have been here before this but for high water in elk river driving him some thirty miles up that river to cross." and again later in the day, indicating my plans for his relief, as follows: "your dispatch and dana's just received. being there, you can tell better how to resist longstreet's attack than i can direct. with your showing you had better give up kingston at the last moment and save the most productive part of your possessions. every arrangement is now made to throw sherman's force across the river, just at and below the mouth of chickamauga creek, as soon as it arrives. thomas will attack on his left at the same time, and together it is expected to carry missionary ridge, and from there push a force on to the railroad between cleveland and dalton. hooker will at the same time attack, and, if he can, carry lookout mountain. the enemy now seems to be looking for an attack on his left flank. this favors us. to further confirm this, sherman's advance division will march direct from whiteside to trenton. the remainder of his force will pass over a new road just made from whiteside to kelly's ferry, thus being concealed from the enemy, and leave him to suppose the whole force is going up lookout valley. sherman's advance has only just reached bridgeport. the rear will only reach there on the 16th. this will bring it to the 19th as the earliest day for making the combined movement as desired. inform me if you think you can sustain yourself until this time. i can hardly conceive of the enemy breaking through at kingston and pushing for kentucky. if they should, however, a new problem would be left for solution. thomas has ordered a division of cavalry to the vicinity of sparta. i will ascertain if they have started, and inform you. it will be entirely out of the question to send you ten thousand men, not because they cannot be spared, but how would they be fed after they got even one day east from here?" longstreet, for some reason or other, stopped at loudon until the 13th. that being the terminus of his railroad communications, it is probable he was directed to remain there awaiting orders. he was in a position threatening knoxville, and at the same time where he could be brought back speedily to chattanooga. the day after longstreet left loudon, sherman reached bridgeport in person and proceeded on to see me that evening, the 14th, and reached chattanooga the next day. my orders for battle were all prepared in advance of sherman's arrival (*15), except the dates, which could not be fixed while troops to be engaged were so far away. the possession of lookout mountain was of no special advantage to us now. hooker was instructed to send howard's corps to the north side of the tennessee, thence up behind the hills on the north side, and to go into camp opposite chattanooga; with the remainder of the command, hooker was, at a time to be afterwards appointed, to ascend the western slope between the upper and lower palisades, and so get into chattanooga valley. the plan of battle was for sherman to attack the enemy's right flank, form a line across it, extend our left over south chickamauga river so as to threaten or hold the railroad in bragg's rear, and thus force him either to weaken his lines elsewhere or lose his connection with his base at chickamauga station. hooker was to perform like service on our right. his problem was to get from lookout valley to chattanooga valley in the most expeditious way possible; cross the latter valley rapidly to rossville, south of bragg's line on missionary ridge, form line there across the ridge facing north, with his right flank extended to chickamauga valley east of the ridge, thus threatening the enemy's rear on that flank and compelling him to reinforce this also. thomas, with the army of the cumberland, occupied the centre, and was to assault while the enemy was engaged with most of his forces on his two flanks. to carry out this plan, sherman was to cross the tennessee at brown's ferry and move east of chattanooga to a point opposite the north end of mission ridge, and to place his command back of the foot-hills out of sight of the enemy on the ridge. there are two streams called chickamauga emptying into the tennessee river east of chattanooga--north chickamauga, taking its rise in tennessee, flowing south, and emptying into the river some seven or eight miles east; while the south chickamauga, which takes its rise in georgia, flows northward, and empties into the tennessee some three or four miles above the town. there were now one hundred and sixteen pontoons in the north chickamauga river, their presence there being unknown to the enemy. at night a division was to be marched up to that point, and at two o'clock in the morning moved down with the current, thirty men in each boat. a few were to land east of the mouth of the south chickamauga, capture the pickets there, and then lay a bridge connecting the two banks of the river. the rest were to land on the south side of the tennessee, where missionary ridge would strike it if prolonged, and a sufficient number of men to man the boats were to push to the north side to ferry over the main body of sherman's command while those left on the south side intrenched themselves. thomas was to move out from his lines facing the ridge, leaving enough of palmer's corps to guard against an attack down the valley. lookout valley being of no present value to us, and being untenable by the enemy if we should secure missionary ridge, hooker's orders were changed. his revised orders brought him to chattanooga by the established route north of the tennessee. he was then to move out to the right to rossville. hooker's position in lookout valley was absolutely essential to us so long as chattanooga was besieged. it was the key to our line for supplying the army. but it was not essential after the enemy was dispersed from our front, or even after the battle for this purpose was begun. hooker's orders, therefore, were designed to get his force past lookout mountain and chattanooga valley, and up to missionary ridge. by crossing the north face of lookout the troops would come into chattanooga valley in rear of the line held by the enemy across the valley, and would necessarily force its evacuation. orders were accordingly given to march by this route. but days before the battle began the advantages as well as the disadvantages of this plan of action were all considered. the passage over the mountain was a difficult one to make in the face of an enemy. it might consume so much time as to lose us the use of the troops engaged in it at other points where they were more wanted. after reaching chattanooga valley, the creek of the same name, quite a formidable stream to get an army over, had to be crossed. i was perfectly willing that the enemy should keep lookout mountain until we got through with the troops on missionary ridge. by marching hooker to the north side of the river, thence up the stream, and recrossing at the town, he could be got in position at any named time; when in this new position, he would have chattanooga creek behind him, and the attack on missionary ridge would unquestionably cause the evacuation by the enemy of his line across the valley and on lookout mountain. hooker's order was changed accordingly. as explained elsewhere, the original order had to be reverted to, because of a flood in the river rendering the bridge at brown's ferry unsafe for the passage of troops at the exact juncture when it was wanted to bring all the troops together against missionary ridge. the next day after sherman's arrival i took him, with generals thomas and smith and other officers, to the north side of the river, and showed them the ground over which sherman had to march, and pointed out generally what he was expected to do. i, as well as the authorities in washington, was still in a great state of anxiety for burnside's safety. burnside himself, i believe, was the only one who did not share in this anxiety. nothing could be done for him, however, until sherman's troops were up. as soon, therefore, as the inspection was over, sherman started for bridgeport to hasten matters, rowing a boat himself, i believe, from kelly's ferry. sherman had left bridgeport the night of the 14th, reached chattanooga the evening of the 15th, made the above-described inspection on the morning of the 16th, and started back the same evening to hurry up his command, fully appreciating the importance of time. his march was conducted with as much expedition as the roads and season would admit of. by the 20th he was himself at brown's ferry with the head of column, but many of his troops were far behind, and one division (ewing's) was at trenton, sent that way to create the impression that lookout was to be taken from the south. sherman received his orders at the ferry, and was asked if he could not be ready for the assault the following morning. news had been received that the battle had been commenced at knoxville. burnside had been cut off from telegraphic communications. the president, the secretary of war, and general halleck, were in an agony of suspense. my suspense was also great, but more endurable, because i was where i could soon do something to relieve the situation. it was impossible to get sherman's troops up for the next day. i then asked him if they could not be got up to make the assault on the morning of the 22d, and ordered thomas to move on that date. but the elements were against us. it rained all the 20th and 21st. the river rose so rapidly that it was difficult to keep the pontoons in place. general orlando b. willcox, a division commander under burnside, was at this time occupying a position farther up the valley than knoxville --about maynardville--and was still in telegraphic communication with the north. a dispatch was received from him saying that he was threatened from the east. the following was sent in reply: "if you can communicate with general burnside, say to him that our attack on bragg will commence in the morning. if successful, such a move will be made as i think will relieve east tennessee, if he can hold out. longstreet passing through our lines to kentucky need not cause alarm. he would find the country so bare that he would lose his transportation and artillery before reaching kentucky, and would meet such a force before he got through, that he could not return." meantime, sherman continued his crossing without intermission as fast as his troops could be got up. the crossing had to be effected in full view of the enemy on the top of lookout mountain. once over, however, the troops soon disappeared behind the detached hill on the north side, and would not come to view again, either to watchmen on lookout mountain or missionary ridge, until they emerged between the hills to strike the bank of the river. but when sherman's advance reached a point opposite the town of chattanooga, howard, who, it will be remembered, had been concealed behind the hills on the north side, took up his line of march to join the troops on the south side. his crossing was in full view both from missionary ridge and the top of lookout, and the enemy of course supposed these troops to be sherman's. this enabled sherman to get to his assigned position without discovery. chapter xliii. preparations for battle--thomas carries the first line of the enemy --sherman carries missionary ridge--battle of lookout mountain --general hooker's fight. on the 20th, when so much was occurring to discourage--rains falling so heavily as to delay the passage of troops over the river at brown's ferry and threatening the entire breaking of the bridge; news coming of a battle raging at knoxville; of willcox being threatened by a force from the east--a letter was received from bragg which contained these words: "as there may still be some non-combatants in chattanooga, i deem it proper to notify you that prudence would dictate their early withdrawal." of course, i understood that this was a device intended to deceive; but i did not know what the intended deception was. on the 22d, however, a deserter came in who informed me that bragg was leaving our front, and on that day buckner's division was sent to reinforce longstreet at knoxville, and another division started to follow but was recalled. the object of bragg's letter, no doubt, was in some way to detain me until knoxville could be captured, and his troops there be returned to chattanooga. during the night of the 21st the rest of the pontoon boats, completed, one hundred and sixteen in all, were carried up to and placed in north chickamauga. the material for the roadway over these was deposited out of view of the enemy within a few hundred yards of the bank of the tennessee, where the north end of the bridge was to rest. hearing nothing from burnside, and hearing much of the distress in washington on his account, i could no longer defer operations for his relief. i determined, therefore, to do on the 23d, with the army of the cumberland, what had been intended to be done on the 24th. the position occupied by the army of the cumberland had been made very strong for defence during the months it had been besieged. the line was about a mile from the town, and extended from citico creek, a small stream running near the base of missionary ridge and emptying into the tennessee about two miles below the mouth of the south chickamauga, on the left, to chattanooga creek on the right. all commanding points on the line were well fortified and well equipped with artillery. the important elevations within the line had all been carefully fortified and supplied with a proper armament. among the elevations so fortified was one to the east of the town, named fort wood. it owed its importance chiefly to the fact that it lay between the town and missionary ridge, where most of the strength of the enemy was. fort wood had in it twenty-two pieces of artillery, most of which would reach the nearer points of the enemy's line. on the morning of the 23d thomas, according to instructions, moved granger's corps of two divisions, sheridan and t. j. wood commanding, to the foot of fort wood, and formed them into line as if going on parade, sheridan on the right, wood to the left, extending to or near citico creek. palmer, commanding the 14th corps, held that part of our line facing south and southwest. he supported sheridan with one division (baird's), while his other division under johnson remained in the trenches, under arms, ready to be moved to any point. howard's corps was moved in rear of the centre. the picket lines were within a few hundred yards of each other. at two o'clock in the afternoon all were ready to advance. by this time the clouds had lifted so that the enemy could see from his elevated position all that was going on. the signal for advance was given by a booming of cannon from fort wood and other points on the line. the rebel pickets were soon driven back upon the main guards, which occupied minor and detached heights between the main ridge and our lines. these too were carried before halting, and before the enemy had time to reinforce their advance guards. but it was not without loss on both sides. this movement secured to us a line fully a mile in advance of the one we occupied in the morning, and the one which the enemy had occupied up to this time. the fortifications were rapidly turned to face the other way. during the following night they were made strong. we lost in this preliminary action about eleven hundred killed and wounded, while the enemy probably lost quite as heavily, including the prisoners that were captured. with the exception of the firing of artillery, kept up from missionary ridge and fort wood until night closed in, this ended the fighting for the first day. the advantage was greatly on our side now, and if i could only have been assured that burnside could hold out ten days longer i should have rested more easily. but we were doing the best we could for him and the cause. by the night of the 23d sherman's command was in a position to move, though one division (osterhaus's) had not yet crossed the river at brown's ferry. the continuous rise in the tennessee had rendered it impossible to keep the bridge at that point in condition for troops to cross; but i was determined to move that night even without this division. orders were sent to osterhaus accordingly to report to hooker, if he could not cross by eight o'clock on the morning of the 24th. because of the break in the bridge, hooker's orders were again changed, but this time only back to those first given to him. general w. f. smith had been assigned to duty as chief engineer of the military division. to him were given the general direction of moving troops by the boats from north chickamauga, laying the bridge after they reached their position, and generally all the duties pertaining to his office of chief engineer. during the night general morgan l. smith's division was marched to the point where the pontoons were, and the brigade of giles a. smith was selected for the delicate duty of manning the boats and surprising the enemy's pickets on the south bank of the river. during this night also general j. m. brannan, chief of artillery, moved forty pieces of artillery, belonging to the army of the cumberland, and placed them on the north side of the river so as to command the ground opposite, to aid in protecting the approach to the point where the south end of the bridge was to rest. he had to use sherman's artillery horses for this purpose, thomas having none. at two o'clock in the morning, november 24th, giles a. smith pushed out from the north chickamauga with his one hundred and sixteen boats, each loaded with thirty brave and well-armed men. the boats with their precious freight dropped down quietly with the current to avoid attracting the attention of any one who could convey information to the enemy, until arriving near the mouth of south chickamauga. here a few boats were landed, the troops debarked, and a rush was made upon the picket guard known to be at that point. the guard were surprised, and twenty of their number captured. the remainder of the troops effected a landing at the point where the bridge was to start, with equally good results. the work of ferrying over sherman's command from the north side of the tennessee was at once commenced, using the pontoons for the purpose. a steamer was also brought up from the town to assist. the rest of m. l. smith's division came first, then the division of john e. smith. the troops as they landed were put to work intrenching their position. by daylight the two entire divisions were over, and well covered by the works they had built. the work of laying the bridge, on which to cross the artillery and cavalry, was now begun. the ferrying over the infantry was continued with the steamer and the pontoons, taking the pontoons, however, as fast as they were wanted to put in their place in the bridge. by a little past noon the bridge was completed, as well as one over the south chickamauga connecting the troops left on that side with their comrades below, and all the infantry and artillery were on the south bank of the tennessee. sherman at once formed his troops for assault on missionary ridge. by one o'clock he started with m. l. smith on his left, keeping nearly the course of chickamauga river; j. e. smith next to the right and a little to the rear; and ewing still farther to the right and also a little to the rear of j. e. smith's command, in column, ready to deploy to the right if an enemy should come from that direction. a good skirmish line preceded each of these columns. soon the foot of the hill was reached; the skirmishers pushed directly up, followed closely by their supports. by half-past three sherman was in possession of the height without having sustained much loss. a brigade from each division was now brought up, and artillery was dragged to the top of the hill by hand. the enemy did not seem to be aware of this movement until the top of the hill was gained. there had been a drizzling rain during the day, and the clouds were so low that lookout mountain and the top of missionary ridge were obscured from the view of persons in the valley. but now the enemy opened fire upon their assailants, and made several attempts with their skirmishers to drive them away, but without avail. later in the day a more determined attack was made, but this, too, failed, and sherman was left to fortify what he had gained. sherman's cavalry took up its line of march soon after the bridge was completed, and by half-past three the whole of it was over both bridges and on its way to strike the enemy's communications at chickamauga station. all of sherman's command was now south of the tennessee. during the afternoon general giles a. smith was severely wounded and carried from the field. thomas having done on the 23d what was expected of him on the 24th, there was nothing for him to do this day except to strengthen his position. howard, however, effected a crossing of citico creek and a junction with sherman, and was directed to report to him. with two or three regiments of his command he moved in the morning along the banks of the tennessee, and reached the point where the bridge was being laid. he went out on the bridge as far as it was completed from the south end, and saw sherman superintending the work from the north side and moving himself south as fast as an additional boat was put in and the roadway put upon it. howard reported to his new chief across the chasm between them, which was now narrow and in a few minutes closed. while these operations were going on to the east of chattanooga, hooker was engaged on the west. he had three divisions: osterhaus's, of the 15th corps, army of the tennessee; geary's, 12th corps, army of the potomac; and cruft's, 14th corps, army of the cumberland. geary was on the right at wauhatchie, cruft at the centre, and osterhaus near brown's ferry. these troops were all west of lookout creek. the enemy had the east bank of the creek strongly picketed and intrenched, and three brigades of troops in the rear to reinforce them if attacked. these brigades occupied the summit of the mountain. general carter l. stevenson was in command of the whole. why any troops, except artillery with a small infantry guard, were kept on the mountain-top, i do not see. a hundred men could have held the summit--which is a palisade for more than thirty feet down--against the assault of any number of men from the position hooker occupied. the side of lookout mountain confronting hooker's command was rugged, heavily timbered, and full of chasms, making it difficult to advance with troops, even in the absence of an opposing force. farther up, the ground becomes more even and level, and was in cultivation. on the east side the slope is much more gradual, and a good wagon road, zigzagging up it, connects the town of chattanooga with the summit. early on the morning of the 24th hooker moved geary's division, supported by a brigade of cruft's, up lookout creek, to effect a crossing. the remainder of cruft's division was to seize the bridge over the creek, near the crossing of the railroad. osterhaus was to move up to the bridge and cross it. the bridge was seized by gross's brigade after a slight skirmish with the pickets guarding it. this attracted the enemy so that geary's movement farther up was not observed. a heavy mist obscured him from the view of the troops on the top of the mountain. he crossed the creek almost unobserved, and captured the picket of over forty men on guard near by. he then commenced ascending the mountain directly in his front. by this time the enemy was seen coming down from their camps on the mountain slope, and filing into their rifle-pits to contest the crossing of the bridge. by eleven o'clock the bridge was complete. osterhaus was up, and after some sharp skirmishing the enemy was driven away with considerable loss in killed and captured. while the operations at the bridge were progressing, geary was pushing up the hill over great obstacles, resisted by the enemy directly in his front, and in face of the guns on top of the mountain. the enemy, seeing their left flank and rear menaced, gave way, and were followed by cruft and osterhaus. soon these were up abreast of geary, and the whole command pushed up the hill, driving the enemy in advance. by noon geary had gained the open ground on the north slope of the mountain, with his right close up to the base of the upper palisade, but there were strong fortifications in his front. the rest of the command coming up, a line was formed from the base of the upper palisade to the mouth of chattanooga creek. thomas and i were on the top of orchard knob. hooker's advance now made our line a continuous one. it was in full view, extending from the tennessee river, where sherman had crossed, up chickamauga river to the base of mission ridge, over the top of the north end of the ridge to chattanooga valley, then along parallel to the ridge a mile or more, across the valley to the mouth of chattanooga creek, thence up the slope of lookout mountain to the foot of the upper palisade. the day was hazy, so that hooker's operations were not visible to us except at moments when the clouds would rise. but the sound of his artillery and musketry was heard incessantly. the enemy on his front was partially fortified, but was soon driven out of his works. during the afternoon the clouds, which had so obscured the top of lookout all day as to hide whatever was going on from the view of those below, settled down and made it so dark where hooker was as to stop operations for the time. at four o'clock hooker reported his position as impregnable. by a little after five direct communication was established, and a brigade of troops was sent from chattanooga to reinforce him. these troops had to cross chattanooga creek and met with some opposition, but soon overcame it, and by night the commander, general carlin, reported to hooker and was assigned to his left. i now telegraphed to washington: "the fight to-day progressed favorably. sherman carried the end of missionary ridge, and his right is now at the tunnel, and his left at chickamauga creek. troops from lookout valley carried the point of the mountain, and now hold the eastern slope and a point high up. hooker reports two thousand prisoners taken, besides which a small number have fallen into our hands from missionary ridge." the next day the president replied: "your dispatches as to fighting on monday and tuesday are here. well done. many thanks to all. remember burnside." and halleck also telegraphed: "i congratulate you on the success thus far of your plans. i fear that burnside is hard pushed, and that any further delay may prove fatal. i know you will do all in your power to relieve him." the division of jefferson c. davis, army of the cumberland, had been sent to the north chickamauga to guard the pontoons as they were deposited in the river, and to prevent all ingress or egress of citizens. on the night of the 24th his division, having crossed with sherman, occupied our extreme left from the upper bridge over the plain to the north base of missionary ridge. firing continued to a late hour in the night, but it was not connected with an assault at any point. chapter xliv. battle of chattanooga--a gallant charge--complete rout of the enemy --pursuit of the confederates--general bragg--remarks on chattanooga. at twelve o'clock at night, when all was quiet, i began to give orders for the next day, and sent a dispatch to willcox to encourage burnside. sherman was directed to attack at daylight. hooker was ordered to move at the same hour, and endeavor to intercept the enemy's retreat if he still remained; if he had gone, then to move directly to rossville and operate against the left and rear of the force on missionary ridge. thomas was not to move until hooker had reached missionary ridge. as i was with him on orchard knob, he would not move without further orders from me. the morning of the 25th opened clear and bright, and the whole field was in full view from the top of orchard knob. it remained so all day. bragg's headquarters were in full view, and officers--presumably staff officers--could be seen coming and going constantly. the point of ground which sherman had carried on the 24th was almost disconnected from the main ridge occupied by the enemy. a low pass, over which there is a wagon road crossing the hill, and near which there is a railroad tunnel, intervenes between the two hills. the problem now was to get to the main ridge. the enemy was fortified on the point; and back farther, where the ground was still higher, was a second fortification commanding the first. sherman was out as soon as it was light enough to see, and by sunrise his command was in motion. three brigades held the hill already gained. morgan l. smith moved along the east base of missionary ridge; loomis along the west base, supported by two brigades of john e. smith's division; and corse with his brigade was between the two, moving directly towards the hill to be captured. the ridge is steep and heavily wooded on the east side, where m. l. smith's troops were advancing, but cleared and with a more gentle slope on the west side. the troops advanced rapidly and carried the extreme end of the rebel works. morgan l. smith advanced to a point which cut the enemy off from the railroad bridge and the means of bringing up supplies by rail from chickamauga station, where the main depot was located. the enemy made brave and strenuous efforts to drive our troops from the position we had gained, but without success. the contest lasted for two hours. corse, a brave and efficient commander, was badly wounded in this assault. sherman now threatened both bragg's flank and his stores, and made it necessary for him to weaken other points of his line to strengthen his right. from the position i occupied i could see column after column of bragg's forces moving against sherman. every confederate gun that could be brought to bear upon the union forces was concentrated upon him. j. e. smith, with two brigades, charged up the west side of the ridge to the support of corse's command, over open ground and in the face of a heavy fire of both artillery and musketry, and reached the very parapet of the enemy. he lay here for a time, but the enemy coming with a heavy force upon his right flank, he was compelled to fall back, followed by the foe. a few hundred yards brought smith's troops into a wood, where they were speedily reformed, when they charged and drove the attacking party back to his intrenchments. seeing the advance, repulse, and second advance of j. e. smith from the position i occupied, i directed thomas to send a division to reinforce him. baird's division was accordingly sent from the right of orchard knob. it had to march a considerable distance directly under the eye of the enemy to reach its position. bragg at once commenced massing in the same direction. this was what i wanted. but it had now got to be late in the afternoon, and i had expected before this to see hooker crossing the ridge in the neighborhood of rossville and compelling bragg to mass in that direction also. the enemy had evacuated lookout mountain during the night, as i expected he would. in crossing the valley he burned the bridge over chattanooga creek, and did all he could to obstruct the roads behind him. hooker was off bright and early, with no obstructions in his front but distance and the destruction above named. he was detained four hours crossing chattanooga creek, and thus was lost the immediate advantage i expected from his forces. his reaching bragg's flank and extending across it was to be the signal for thomas's assault of the ridge. but sherman's condition was getting so critical that the assault for his relief could not be delayed any longer. sheridan's and wood's divisions had been lying under arms from early morning, ready to move the instant the signal was given. i now directed thomas to order the charge at once (*16). i watched eagerly to see the effect, and became impatient at last that there was no indication of any charge being made. the centre of the line which was to make the charge was near where thomas and i stood, but concealed from view by an intervening forest. turning to thomas to inquire what caused the delay, i was surprised to see thomas j. wood, one of the division commanders who was to make the charge, standing talking to him. i spoke to general wood, asking him why he did not charge as ordered an hour before. he replied very promptly that this was the first he had heard of it, but that he had been ready all day to move at a moment's notice. i told him to make the charge at once. he was off in a moment, and in an incredibly short time loud cheering was heard, and he and sheridan were driving the enemy's advance before them towards missionary ridge. the confederates were strongly intrenched on the crest of the ridge in front of us, and had a second line half-way down and another at the base. our men drove the troops in front of the lower line of rifle-pits so rapidly, and followed them so closely, that rebel and union troops went over the first line of works almost at the same time. many rebels were captured and sent to the rear under the fire of their own friends higher up the hill. those that were not captured retreated, and were pursued. the retreating hordes being between friends and pursuers caused the enemy to fire high to avoid killing their own men. in fact, on that occasion the union soldier nearest the enemy was in the safest position. without awaiting further orders or stopping to reform, on our troops went to the second line of works; over that and on for the crest--thus effectually carrying out my orders of the 18th for the battle and of the 24th (*17) for this charge. i watched their progress with intense interest. the fire along the rebel line was terrific. cannon and musket balls filled the air: but the damage done was in small proportion to the ammunition expended. the pursuit continued until the crest was reached, and soon our men were seen climbing over the confederate barriers at different points in front of both sheridan's and wood's divisions. the retreat of the enemy along most of his line was precipitate and the panic so great that bragg and his officers lost all control over their men. many were captured, and thousands threw away their arms in their flight. sheridan pushed forward until he reached the chickamauga river at a point above where the enemy crossed. he met some resistance from troops occupying a second hill in rear of missionary ridge, probably to cover the retreat of the main body and of the artillery and trains. it was now getting dark, but sheridan, without halting on that account pushed his men forward up this second hill slowly and without attracting the attention of the men placed to defend it, while he detached to the right and left to surround the position. the enemy discovered the movement before these dispositions were complete, and beat a hasty retreat, leaving artillery, wagon trains, and many prisoners in our hands. to sheridan's prompt movement the army of the cumberland, and the nation, are indebted for the bulk of the capture of prisoners, artillery, and small-arms that day. except for his prompt pursuit, so much in this way would not have been accomplished. while the advance up mission ridge was going forward, general thomas with staff, general gordon granger, commander of the corps making the assault, and myself and staff occupied orchard knob, from which the entire field could be observed. the moment the troops were seen going over the last line of rebel defences, i ordered granger to join his command, and mounting my horse i rode to the front. general thomas left about the same time. sheridan on the extreme right was already in pursuit of the enemy east of the ridge. wood, who commanded the division to the left of sheridan, accompanied his men on horseback in the charge, but did not join sheridan in the pursuit. to the left, in baird's front where bragg's troops had massed against sherman, the resistance was more stubborn and the contest lasted longer. i ordered granger to follow the enemy with wood's division, but he was so much excited, and kept up such a roar of musketry in the direction the enemy had taken, that by the time i could stop the firing the enemy had got well out of the way. the enemy confronting sherman, now seeing everything to their left giving way, fled also. sherman, however, was not aware of the extent of our success until after nightfall, when he received orders to pursue at daylight in the morning. as soon as sherman discovered that the enemy had left his front he directed his reserves, davis's division of the army of the cumberland, to push over the pontoon-bridge at the mouth of the chickamauga, and to move forward to chickamauga station. he ordered howard to move up the stream some two miles to where there was an old bridge, repair it during the night, and follow davis at four o'clock in the morning. morgan l. smith was ordered to reconnoitre the tunnel to see if that was still held. nothing was found there but dead bodies of men of both armies. the rest of sherman's command was directed to follow howard at daylight in the morning to get on to the railroad towards graysville. hooker, as stated, was detained at chattanooga creek by the destruction of the bridge at that point. he got his troops over, with the exception of the artillery, by fording the stream at a little after three o'clock. leaving his artillery to follow when the bridge should be reconstructed, he pushed on with the remainder of his command. at rossville he came upon the flank of a division of the enemy, which soon commenced a retreat along the ridge. this threw them on palmer. they could make but little resistance in the position they were caught in, and as many of them as could do so escaped. many, however, were captured. hooker's position during the night of the 25th was near rossville, extending east of the ridge. palmer was on his left, on the road to graysville. during the night i telegraphed to willcox that bragg had been defeated, and that immediate relief would be sent to burnside if he could hold out; to halleck i sent an announcement of our victory, and informed him that forces would be sent up the valley to relieve burnside. before the battle of chattanooga opened i had taken measures for the relief of burnside the moment the way should be clear. thomas was directed to have the little steamer that had been built at chattanooga loaded to its capacity with rations and ammunition. granger's corps was to move by the south bank of the tennessee river to the mouth of the holston, and up that to knoxville accompanied by the boat. in addition to the supplies transported by boat, the men were to carry forty rounds of ammunition in their cartridge-boxes, and four days' rations in haversacks. in the battle of chattanooga, troops from the army of the potomac, from the army of the tennessee, and from the army of the cumberland participated. in fact, the accidents growing out of the heavy rains and the sudden rise in the tennessee river so mingled the troops that the organizations were not kept together, under their respective commanders, during the battle. hooker, on the right, had geary's division of the 12th corps, army of the potomac; osterhaus's division of the 15th corps, army of the tennessee; and cruft's division of the army of the cumberland. sherman had three divisions of his own army, howard's corps from the army of the potomac, and jefferson c. davis's division of the army of the cumberland. there was no jealousy--hardly rivalry. indeed, i doubt whether officers or men took any note at the time of the fact of this intermingling of commands. all saw a defiant foe surrounding them, and took it for granted that every move was intended to dislodge him, and it made no difference where the troops came from so that the end was accomplished. the victory at chattanooga was won against great odds, considering the advantage the enemy had of position, and was accomplished more easily than was expected by reason of bragg's making several grave mistakes: first, in sending away his ablest corps commander with over twenty thousand troops; second, in sending away a division of troops on the eve of battle; third, in placing so much of a force on the plain in front of his impregnable position. it was known that mr. jefferson davis had visited bragg on missionary ridge a short time before my reaching chattanooga. it was reported and believed that he had come out to reconcile a serious difference between bragg and longstreet, and finding this difficult to do, planned the campaign against knoxville, to be conducted by the latter general. i had known both bragg and longstreet before the war, the latter very well. we had been three years at west point together, and, after my graduation, for a time in the same regiment. then we served together in the mexican war. i had known bragg in mexico, and met him occasionally subsequently. i could well understand how there might be an irreconcilable difference between them. bragg was a remarkably intelligent and well-informed man, professionally and otherwise. he was also thoroughly upright. but he was possessed of an irascible temper, and was naturally disputatious. a man of the highest moral character and the most correct habits, yet in the old army he was in frequent trouble. as a subordinate he was always on the lookout to catch his commanding officer infringing his prerogatives; as a post commander he was equally vigilant to detect the slightest neglect, even of the most trivial order. i have heard in the old army an anecdote very characteristic of bragg. on one occasion, when stationed at a post of several companies commanded by a field officer, he was himself commanding one of the companies and at the same time acting as post quartermaster and commissary. he was first lieutenant at the time, but his captain was detached on other duty. as commander of the company he made a requisition upon the quartermaster--himself--for something he wanted. as quartermaster he declined to fill the requisition, and endorsed on the back of it his reasons for so doing. as company commander he responded to this, urging that his requisition called for nothing but what he was entitled to, and that it was the duty of the quartermaster to fill it. as quartermaster he still persisted that he was right. in this condition of affairs bragg referred the whole matter to the commanding officer of the post. the latter, when he saw the nature of the matter referred, exclaimed: "my god, mr. bragg, you have quarrelled with every officer in the army, and now you are quarrelling with yourself!" longstreet was an entirely different man. he was brave, honest, intelligent, a very capable soldier, subordinate to his superiors, just and kind to his subordinates, but jealous of his own rights, which he had the courage to maintain. he was never on the lookout to detect a slight, but saw one as soon as anybody when intentionally given. it may be that longstreet was not sent to knoxville for the reason stated, but because mr. davis had an exalted opinion of his own military genius, and thought he saw a chance of "killing two birds with one stone." on several occasions during the war he came to the relief of the union army by means of his superior military genius. i speak advisedly when i saw mr. davis prided himself on his military capacity. he says so himself, virtually, in his answer to the notice of his nomination to the confederate presidency. some of his generals have said so in their writings since the downfall of the confederacy. my recollection is that my first orders for the battle of chattanooga were as fought. sherman was to get on missionary ridge, as he did; hooker to cross the north end of lookout mountain, as he did, sweep across chattanooga valley and get across the south end of the ridge near rossville. when hooker had secured that position the army of the cumberland was to assault in the centre. before sherman arrived, however, the order was so changed as that hooker was directed to come to chattanooga by the north bank of the tennessee river. the waters in the river, owing to heavy rains, rose so fast that the bridge at brown's ferry could not be maintained in a condition to be used in crossing troops upon it. for this reason hooker's orders were changed by telegraph back to what they were originally.-----note.--from this point on this volume was written (with the exception of the campaign in the wilderness, which had been previously written) by general grant, after his great illness in april, and the present arrangement of the subject-matter was made by him between the 10th and 18th of july, 1885. chapter xlv. the relief of knoxville--headquarters moved to nashville--visiting knoxville-cipher cipher dispatches--withholding orders. chattanooga now being secure to the national troops beyond any doubt, i immediately turned my attention to relieving knoxville, about the situation of which the president, in particular, was very anxious. prior to the battles, i had made preparations for sending troops to the relief of burnside at the very earliest moment after securing chattanooga. we had there two little steamers which had been built and fitted up from the remains of old boats and put in condition to run. general thomas was directed to have one of these boats loaded with rations and ammunition and move up the tennessee river to the mouth of the holston, keeping the boat all the time abreast of the troops. general granger, with the 4th corps reinforced to make twenty thousand men, was to start the moment missionary ridge was carried, and under no circumstances were the troops to return to their old camps. with the provisions carried, and the little that could be got in the country, it was supposed he could hold out until longstreet was driven away, after which event east tennessee would furnish abundance of food for burnside's army and his own also. while following the enemy on the 26th, and again on the morning of the 27th, part of the time by the road to ringgold, i directed thomas, verbally, not to start granger until he received further orders from me; advising him that i was going to the front to more fully see the situation. i was not right sure but that bragg's troops might be over their stampede by the time they reached dalton. in that case bragg might think it well to take the road back to cleveland, move thence towards knoxville, and, uniting with longstreet, make a sudden dash upon burnside. when i arrived at ringgold, however, on the 27th, i saw that the retreat was most earnest. the enemy had been throwing away guns, caissons and small-arms, abandoning provisions, and, altogether, seemed to be moving like a disorganized mob, with the exception of cleburne's division, which was acting as rear-guard to cover the retreat. when hooker moved from rossville toward ringgold palmer's division took the road to graysville, and sherman moved by the way of chickamauga station toward the same point. as soon as i saw the situation at ringgold i sent a staff officer back to chattanooga to advise thomas of the condition of affairs, and direct him by my orders to start granger at once. feeling now that the troops were already on the march for the relief of burnside i was in no hurry to get back, but stayed at ringgold through the day to prepare for the return of our troops. ringgold is in a valley in the mountains, situated between east chickamauga creek and taylor's ridge, and about twenty miles south-east from chattanooga. i arrived just as the artillery that hooker had left behind at chattanooga creek got up. his men were attacking cleburne's division, which had taken a strong position in the adjacent hills so as to cover the retreat of the confederate army through a narrow gorge which presents itself at that point. just beyond the gorge the valley is narrow, and the creek so tortuous that it has to be crossed a great many times in the course of the first mile. this attack was unfortunate, and cost us some men unnecessarily. hooker captured, however, 3 pieces of artillery and 230 prisoners, and 130 rebel dead were left upon the field. i directed general hooker to collect the flour and wheat in the neighboring mills for the use of the troops, and then to destroy the mills and all other property that could be of use to the enemy, but not to make any wanton destruction. at this point sherman came up, having reached graysville with his troops, where he found palmer had preceded him. palmer had picked up many prisoners and much abandoned property on the route. i went back in the evening to graysville with sherman, remained there over night and did not return to chattanooga until the following night, the 29th. i then found that thomas had not yet started granger, thus having lost a full day which i deemed of so much importance in determining the fate of knoxville. thomas and granger were aware that on the 23d of the month burnside had telegraphed that his supplies would last for ten or twelve days and during that time he could hold out against longstreet, but if not relieved within the time indicated he would be obliged to surrender or attempt to retreat. to effect a retreat would have been an impossibility. he was already very low in ammunition, and with an army pursuing he would not have been able to gather supplies. finding that granger had not only not started but was very reluctant to go, he having decided for himself that it was a very bad move to make, i sent word to general sherman of the situation and directed him to march to the relief of knoxville. i also gave him the problem that we had to solve--that burnside had now but four to six days supplies left, and that he must be relieved within that time. sherman, fortunately, had not started on his return from graysville, having sent out detachments on the railroad which runs from dalton to cleveland and knoxville to thoroughly destroy that road, and these troops had not yet returned to camp. i was very loath to send sherman, because his men needed rest after their long march from memphis and hard fighting at chattanooga. but i had become satisfied that burnside would not be rescued if his relief depended upon general granger's movements. sherman had left his camp on the north side of the tennessee river, near chattanooga, on the night of the 23d, the men having two days' cooked rations in their haversacks. expecting to be back in their tents by that time and to be engaged in battle while out, they took with them neither overcoats nor blankets. the weather was already cold, and at night they must have suffered more or less. the two days' rations had already lasted them five days; and they were now to go through a country which had been run over so much by confederate troops that there was but little probability of finding much food. they did, however, succeed in capturing some flour. they also found a good deal of bran in some of the mills, which the men made up into bread; and in this and other ways they eked out an existence until they could reach knoxville. i was so very anxious that burnside should get news of the steps being taken for his relief, and thus induce him to hold out a little longer if it became necessary, that i determined to send a message to him. i therefore sent a member of my staff, colonel j. h. wilson, to get into knoxville if he could report to burnside the situation fully, and give him all the encouragement possible. mr. charles a. dana was at chattanooga during the battle, and had been there even before i assumed command. mr. dana volunteered to accompany colonel wilson, and did accompany him. i put the information of what was being done for the relief of knoxville into writing, and directed that in some way or other it must be secretly managed so as to have a copy of this fall into the hands of general longstreet. they made the trip safely; general longstreet did learn of sherman's coming in advance of his reaching there, and burnside was prepared to hold out even for a longer time if it had been necessary. burnside had stretched a boom across the holston river to catch scows and flats as they floated down. on these, by previous arrangements with the loyal people of east tennessee, were placed flour and corn, with forage and provisions generally, and were thus secured for the use of the union troops. they also drove cattle into knoxville by the east side, which was not covered by the enemy; so that when relief arrived burnside had more provisions on hand than when he had last reported. our total loss (not including burnside's) in all these engagements amounted to 757 killed, 4,529 wounded and 330 missing. we captured 6,142 prisoners--about 50 per cent. more than the enemy reported for their total loss--40 pieces of artillery, 69 artillery carriages and caissons and over 7,000 stands of small-arms. the enemy's loss in arms was probably much greater than here reported, because we picked up a great many that were found abandoned. i had at chattanooga, in round numbers, about 60,000 men. bragg had about half this number, but his position was supposed to be impregnable. it was his own fault that he did not have more men present. he had sent longstreet away with his corps swelled by reinforcements up to over twenty thousand men, thus reducing his own force more than one-third and depriving himself of the presence of the ablest general of his command. he did this, too, after our troops had opened a line of communication by way of brown's and kelly's ferries with bridgeport, thus securing full rations and supplies of every kind; and also when he knew reinforcements were coming to me. knoxville was of no earthly use to him while chattanooga was in our hands. if he should capture chattanooga, knoxville with its garrison would have fallen into his hands without a struggle. i have never been able to see the wisdom of this move. then, too, after sherman had arrived, and when bragg knew that he was on the north side of the tennessee river, he sent buckner's division to reinforce longstreet. he also started another division a day later, but our attack having commenced before it reached knoxville bragg ordered it back. it had got so far, however, that it could not return to chattanooga in time to be of service there. it is possible this latter blunder may have been made by bragg having become confused as to what was going on on our side. sherman had, as already stated, crossed to the north side of the tennessee river at brown's ferry, in full view of bragg's troops from lookout mountain, a few days before the attack. they then disappeared behind foot hills, and did not come to the view of the troops on missionary ridge until they met their assault. bragg knew it was sherman's troops that had crossed, and, they being so long out of view, may have supposed that they had gone up the north bank of the tennessee river to the relief of knoxville and that longstreet was therefore in danger. but the first great blunder, detaching longstreet, cannot be accounted for in any way i know of. if he had captured chattanooga, east tennessee would have fallen without a struggle. it would have been a victory for us to have got our army away from chattanooga safely. it was a manifold greater victory to drive away the besieging army; a still greater one to defeat that army in his chosen ground and nearly annihilate it. the probabilities are that our loss in killed was the heavier, as we were the attacking party. the enemy reported his loss in killed at 361: but as he reported his missing at 4,146, while we held over 6,000 of them as prisoners, and there must have been hundreds if not thousands who deserted, but little reliance can be placed on this report. there was certainly great dissatisfaction with bragg on the part of the soldiers for his harsh treatment of them, and a disposition to get away if they could. then, too, chattanooga, following in the same half year with gettysburg in the east and vicksburg in the west, there was much the same feeling in the south at this time that there had been in the north the fall and winter before. if the same license had been allowed the people and press in the south that was allowed in the north, chattanooga would probably have been the last battle fought for the preservation of the union. general william f. smith's services in these battles had been such that i thought him eminently entitled to promotion. i was aware that he had previously been named by the president for promotion to the grade of major-general, but that the senate had rejected the nomination. i was not aware of the reasons for this course, and therefore strongly recommended him for a major-generalcy. my recommendation was heeded and the appointment made. upon the raising of the siege of knoxville i, of course, informed the authorities at washington--the president and secretary of war--of the fact, which caused great rejoicing there. the president especially was rejoiced that knoxville had been relieved (*18) without further bloodshed. the safety of burnside's army and the loyal people of east tennessee had been the subject of much anxiety to the president for several months, during which time he was doing all he could to relieve the situation; sending a new commander (*19) with a few thousand troops by the way of cumberland gap, and telegraphing me daily, almost hourly, to "remember burnside," "do something for burnside," and other appeals of like tenor. he saw no escape for east tennessee until after our victory at chattanooga. even then he was afraid that burnside might be out of ammunition, in a starving condition, or overpowered: and his anxiety was still intense until he heard that longstreet had been driven from the field. burnside followed longstreet only to strawberry plains, some twenty miles or more east, and then stopped, believing that longstreet would leave the state. the latter did not do so, however, but stopped only a short distance farther on and subsisted his army for the entire winter off east tennessee. foster now relieved burnside. sherman made disposition of his troops along the tennessee river in accordance with instructions. i left thomas in command at chattanooga, and, about the 20th of december, moved my headquarters to nashville, tennessee. nashville was the most central point from which to communicate with my entire military division, and also with the authorities at washington. while remaining at chattanooga i was liable to have my telegraphic communications cut so as to throw me out of communication with both my command and washington. nothing occurred at nashville worthy of mention during the winter, (*20) so i set myself to the task of having troops in positions from which they could move to advantage, and in collecting all necessary supplies so as to be ready to claim a due share of the enemy's attention upon the appearance of the first good weather in the spring. i expected to retain the command i then had, and prepared myself for the campaign against atlanta. i also had great hopes of having a campaign made against mobile from the gulf. i expected after atlanta fell to occupy that place permanently, and to cut off lee's army from the west by way of the road running through augusta to atlanta and thence south-west. i was preparing to hold atlanta with a small garrison, and it was my expectation to push through to mobile if that city was in our possession: if not, to savannah; and in this manner to get possession of the only east and west railroad that would then be left to the enemy. but the spring campaign against mobile was not made. the army of the ohio had been getting supplies over cumberland gap until their animals had nearly all starved. i now determined to go myself to see if there was any possible chance of using that route in the spring, and if not to abandon it. accordingly i left nashville in the latter part of december by rail for chattanooga. from chattanooga i took one of the little steamers previously spoken of as having been built there, and, putting my horses aboard, went up to the junction of the clinch with the tennessee. from that point the railroad had been repaired up to knoxville and out east to strawberry plains. i went by rail therefore to knoxville, where i remained for several days. general john g. foster was then commanding the department of the ohio. it was an intensely cold winter, the thermometer being down as low as zero every morning for more than a week while i was at knoxville and on my way from there on horseback to lexington, kentucky, the first point where i could reach rail to carry me back to my headquarters at nashville. the road over cumberland gap, and back of it, was strewn with debris of broken wagons and dead animals, much as i had found it on my first trip to chattanooga over waldron's ridge. the road had been cut up to as great a depth as clay could be by mules and wagons, and in that condition frozen; so that the ride of six days from strawberry plains to lexington over these holes and knobs in the road was a very cheerless one, and very disagreeable. i found a great many people at home along that route, both in tennessee and kentucky, and, almost universally, intensely loyal. they would collect in little places where we would stop of evenings, to see me, generally hearing of my approach before we arrived. the people naturally expected to see the commanding general the oldest person in the party. i was then forty-one years of age, while my medical director was gray-haired and probably twelve or more years my senior. the crowds would generally swarm around him, and thus give me an opportunity of quietly dismounting and getting into the house. it also gave me an opportunity of hearing passing remarks from one spectator to another about their general. those remarks were apt to be more complimentary to the cause than to the appearance of the supposed general, owing to his being muffled up, and also owing to the travel-worn condition we were all in after a hard day's ride. i was back in nashville by the 13th of january, 1864. when i started on this trip it was necessary for me to have some person along who could turn dispatches into cipher, and who could also read the cipher dispatches which i was liable to receive daily and almost hourly. under the rules of the war department at that time, mr. stanton had taken entire control of the matter of regulating the telegraph and determining how it should be used, and of saying who, and who alone, should have the ciphers. the operators possessed of the ciphers, as well as the ciphers used, were practically independent of the commanders whom they were serving immediately under, and had to report to the war department through general stager all the dispatches which they received or forwarded. i was obliged to leave the telegraphic operator back at nashville, because that was the point at which all dispatches to me would come, to be forwarded from there. as i have said, it was necessary for me also to have an operator during this inspection who had possession of this cipher to enable me to telegraph to my division and to the war department without my dispatches being read by all the operators along the line of wires over which they were transmitted. accordingly i ordered the cipher operator to turn over the key to captain cyrus b. comstock, of the corps of engineers, whom i had selected as a wise and discreet man who certainly could be trusted with the cipher if the operator at my headquarters could. the operator refused point blank to turn over the key to captain comstock as directed by me, stating that his orders from the war department were not to give it to anybody--the commanding general or any one else. i told him i would see whether he would or not. he said that if he did he would be punished. i told him if he did not he most certainly would be punished. finally, seeing that punishment was certain if he refused longer to obey my order, and being somewhat remote (even if he was not protected altogether from the consequences of his disobedience to his orders) from the war department, he yielded. when i returned from knoxville i found quite a commotion. the operator had been reprimanded very severely and ordered to be relieved. i informed the secretary of war, or his assistant secretary in charge of the telegraph, stager, that the man could not be relieved, for he had only obeyed my orders. it was absolutely necessary for me to have the cipher, and the man would most certainly have been punished if he had not delivered it; that they would have to punish me if they punished anybody, or words to that effect. this was about the only thing approaching a disagreeable difference between the secretary of war and myself that occurred until the war was over, when we had another little spat. owing to his natural disposition to assume all power and control in all matters that he had anything whatever to do with, he boldly took command of the armies, and, while issuing no orders on the subject, prohibited any order from me going out of the adjutant-general's office until he had approved it. this was done by directing the adjutant-general to hold any orders that came from me to be issued from the adjutant-general's office until he had examined them and given his approval. he never disturbed himself, either, in examining my orders until it was entirely convenient for him; so that orders which i had prepared would often lie there three or four days before he would sanction them. i remonstrated against this in writing, and the secretary apologetically restored me to my rightful position of general-in-chief of the army. but he soon lapsed again and took control much as before. after the relief of knoxville sherman had proposed to burnside that he should go with him to drive longstreet out of tennessee; but burnside assured him that with the troops which had been brought by granger, and which were to be left, he would be amply prepared to dispose of longstreet without availing himself of this offer. as before stated sherman's command had left their camps north of the tennessee, near chattanooga, with two days' rations in their haversacks, without coats or blankets, and without many wagons, expecting to return to their camps by the end of that time. the weather was now cold and they were suffering, but still they were ready to make the further sacrifice, had it been required, for the good of the cause which had brought them into service. sherman, having accomplished the object for which he was sent, marched back leisurely to his old camp on the tennessee river. chapter xlvi. operations in mississippi--longstreet in east tennessee--commissioned lieutenant-general--commanding the armies of the united states--first interview with president lincoln. soon after his return from knoxville i ordered sherman to distribute his forces from stevenson to decatur and thence north to nashville; sherman suggested that he be permitted to go back to mississippi, to the limits of his own department and where most of his army still remained, for the purpose of clearing out what confederates might still be left on the east bank of the mississippi river to impede its navigation by our boats. he expected also to have the co-operation of banks to do the same thing on the west shore. of course i approved heartily. about the 10th of january sherman was back in memphis, where hurlbut commanded, and got together his memphis men, or ordered them collected and sent to vicksburg. he then went to vicksburg and out to where mcpherson was in command, and had him organize his surplus troops so as to give him about 20,000 men in all. sherman knew that general (bishop) polk was occupying meridian with his headquarters, and had two divisions of infantry with a considerable force of cavalry scattered west of him. he determined, therefore, to move directly upon meridian. i had sent some 2,500 cavalry under general sooy smith to sherman's department, and they had mostly arrived before sherman got to memphis. hurlbut had 7,000 cavalry, and sherman ordered him to reinforce smith so as to give the latter a force of about 7,000 with which to go against forrest, who was then known to be south-east from memphis. smith was ordered to move about the 1st of february. while sherman was waiting at vicksburg for the arrival of hurlbut with his surplus men, he sent out scouts to ascertain the position and strength of the enemy and to bring back all the information they could gather. when these scouts returned it was through them that he got the information of general polk's being at meridian, and of the strength and disposition of his command. forrest had about 4,000 cavalry with him, composed of thoroughly well-disciplined men, who under so able a leader were very effective. smith's command was nearly double that of forrest, but not equal, man to man, for the lack of a successful experience such as forrest's men had had. the fact is, troops who have fought a few battles and won, and followed up their victories, improve upon what they were before to an extent that can hardly be counted by percentage. the difference in result is often decisive victory instead of inglorious defeat. this same difference, too, is often due to the way troops are officered, and for the particular kind of warfare which forrest had carried on neither army could present a more effective officer than he was. sherman got off on the 3d of february and moved out on his expedition, meeting with no opposition whatever until he crossed the big black, and with no great deal of opposition after that until he reached jackson, mississippi. this latter place he reached on the 6th or 7th, brandon on the 8th, and morton on the 9th. up to this time he moved in two columns to enable him to get a good supply of forage, etc., and expedite the march. here, however, there were indications of the concentration of confederate infantry, and he was obliged to keep his army close together. he had no serious engagement; but he met some of the enemy who destroyed a few of his wagons about decatur, mississippi, where, by the way, sherman himself came near being picked up. he entered meridian on the 14th of the month, the enemy having retreated toward demopolis, alabama. he spent several days in meridian in thoroughly destroying the railroad to the north and south, and also for the purpose of hearing from sooy smith, who he supposed had met forrest before this time and he hoped had gained a decisive victory because of a superiority of numbers. hearing nothing of him, however, he started on his return trip to vicksburg. there he learned that smith, while waiting for a few of his men who had been ice-bound in the ohio river, instead of getting off on the 1st as expected, had not left until the 11th. smith did meet forrest, but the result was decidedly in forrest's favor. sherman had written a letter to banks, proposing a co-operative movement with him against shreveport, subject to my approval. i disapproved of sherman's going himself, because i had other important work for him to do, but consented that he might send a few troops to the aid of banks, though their time to remain absent must be limited. we must have them for the spring campaign. the trans-mississippi movement proved abortive. my eldest son, who had accompanied me on the vicksburg campaign and siege, had while there contracted disease, which grew worse, until he had grown so dangerously ill that on the 24th of january i obtained permission to go to st. louis, where he was staying at the time, to see him, hardly expecting to find him alive on my arrival. while i was permitted to go, i was not permitted to turn over my command to any one else, but was directed to keep the headquarters with me and to communicate regularly with all parts of my division and with washington, just as though i had remained at nashville. when i obtained this leave i was at chattanooga, having gone there again to make preparations to have the troops of thomas in the southern part of tennessee co-operate with sherman's movement in mississippi. i directed thomas, and logan who was at scottsboro, alabama, to keep up a threatening movement to the south against j. e. johnston, who had again relieved bragg, for the purpose of making him keep as many troops as possible there. i learned through confederate sources that johnston had already sent two divisions in the direction of mobile, presumably to operate against sherman, and two more divisions to longstreet in east tennessee. seeing that johnston had depleted in this way, i directed thomas to send at least ten thousand men, besides stanley's division which was already to the east, into east tennessee, and notified schofield, who was now in command in east tennessee, of this movement of troops into his department and also of the reinforcements longstreet had received. my object was to drive longstreet out of east tennessee as a part of the preparations for my spring campaign. about this time general foster, who had been in command of the department of the ohio after burnside until schofield relieved him (*21), advised me that he thought it would be a good thing to keep longstreet just where he was; that he was perfectly quiet in east tennessee, and if he was forced to leave there, his whole well-equipped army would be free to go to any place where it could effect the most for their cause. i thought the advice was good, and, adopting that view, countermanded the orders for pursuit of longstreet. on the 12th of february i ordered thomas to take dalton and hold it, if possible; and i directed him to move without delay. finding that he had not moved, on the 17th i urged him again to start, telling him how important it was, that the object of the movement was to co-operate with sherman, who was moving eastward and might be in danger. then again on the 21st, he not yet having started, i asked him if he could not start the next day. he finally got off on the 22d or 23d. the enemy fell back from his front without a battle, but took a new position quite as strong and farther to the rear. thomas reported that he could not go any farther, because it was impossible with his poor teams, nearly starved, to keep up supplies until the railroads were repaired. he soon fell back. schofield also had to return for the same reason. he could not carry supplies with him, and longstreet was between him and the supplies still left in the country. longstreet, in his retreat, would be moving towards his supplies, while our forces, following, would be receding from theirs. on the 2d of march, however, i learned of sherman's success, which eased my mind very much. the next day, the 3d, i was ordered to washington. the bill restoring the grade of lieutenant-general of the army had passed through congress and became a law on the 26th of february. my nomination had been sent to the senate on the 1st of march and confirmed the next day (the 2d). i was ordered to washington on the 3d to receive my commission, and started the day following that. the commission was handed to me on the 9th. it was delivered to me at the executive mansion by president lincoln in the presence of his cabinet, my eldest son, those of my staff who were with me and and a few other visitors. the president in presenting my commission read from a paper--stating, however, as a preliminary, and prior to the delivery of it, that he had drawn that up on paper, knowing my disinclination to speak in public, and handed me a copy in advance so that i might prepare a few lines of reply. the president said: "general grant, the nation's appreciation of what you have done, and its reliance upon you for what remains to be done in the existing great struggle, are now presented, with this commission constituting you lieutenant-general in the army of the united states. with this high honor, devolves upon you, also, a corresponding responsibility. as the country herein trusts you, so, under god, it will sustain you. i scarcely need to add, that, with what i here speak for the nation, goes my own hearty personal concurrence." to this i replied: "mr. president, i accept the commission, with gratitude for the high honor conferred. with the aid of the noble armies that have fought in so many fields for our common country, it will be my earnest endeavor not to disappoint your expectations. i feel the full weight of the responsibilities now devolving on me; and i know that if they are met, it will be due to those armies, and above all, to the favor of that providence which leads both nations and men." on the 10th i visited the headquarters of the army of the potomac at brandy station; then returned to washington, and pushed west at once to make my arrangements for turning over the commands there and giving general directions for the preparations to be made for the spring campaign. it had been my intention before this to remain in the west, even if i was made lieutenant-general; but when i got to washington and saw the situation it was plain that here was the point for the commanding general to be. no one else could, probably, resist the pressure that would be brought to bear upon him to desist from his own plans and pursue others. i determined, therefore, before i started back to have sherman advanced to my late position, mcpherson to sherman's in command of the department, and logan to the command of mcpherson's corps. these changes were all made on my recommendation and without hesitation. my commission as lieutenant-general was given to me on the 9th of march, 1864. on the following day, as already stated, i visited general meade, commanding the army of the potomac, at his headquarters at brandy station, north of the rapidan. i had known general meade slightly in the mexican war, but had not met him since until this visit. i was a stranger to most of the army of the potomac, i might say to all except the officers of the regular army who had served in the mexican war. there had been some changes ordered in the organization of that army before my promotion. one was the consolidation of five corps into three, thus throwing some officers of rank out of important commands. meade evidently thought that i might want to make still one more change not yet ordered. he said to me that i might want an officer who had served with me in the west, mentioning sherman specially, to take his place. if so, he begged me not to hesitate about making the change. he urged that the work before us was of such vast importance to the whole nation that the feeling or wishes of no one person should stand in the way of selecting the right men for all positions. for himself, he would serve to the best of his ability wherever placed. i assured him that i had no thought of substituting any one for him. as to sherman, he could not be spared from the west. this incident gave me even a more favorable opinion of meade than did his great victory at gettysburg the july before. it is men who wait to be selected, and not those who seek, from whom we may always expect the most efficient service. meade's position afterwards proved embarrassing to me if not to him. he was commanding an army and, for nearly a year previous to my taking command of all the armies, was in supreme command of the army of the potomac--except from the authorities at washington. all other general officers occupying similar positions were independent in their commands so far as any one present with them was concerned. i tried to make general meade's position as nearly as possible what it would have been if i had been in washington or any other place away from his command. i therefore gave all orders for the movements of the army of the potomac to meade to have them executed. to avoid the necessity of having to give orders direct, i established my headquarters near his, unless there were reasons for locating them elsewhere. this sometimes happened, and i had on occasions to give orders direct to the troops affected. on the 11th i returned to washington and, on the day after, orders were published by the war department placing me in command of all the armies. i had left washington the night before to return to my old command in the west and to meet sherman whom i had telegraphed to join me in nashville. sherman assumed command of the military division of the mississippi on the 18th of march, and we left nashville together for cincinnati. i had sherman accompany me that far on my way back to washington so that we could talk over the matters about which i wanted to see him, without losing any more time from my new command than was necessary. the first point which i wished to discuss was particularly about the co-operation of his command with mine when the spring campaign should commence. there were also other and minor points, minor as compared with the great importance of the question to be decided by sanguinary war--the restoration to duty of officers who had been relieved from important commands, namely mcclellan, burnside and fremont in the east, and buell, mccook, negley and crittenden in the west. some time in the winter of 1863-64 i had been invited by the general-in-chief to give my views of the campaign i thought advisable for the command under me--now sherman's. general j. e. johnston was defending atlanta and the interior of georgia with an army, the largest part of which was stationed at dalton, about 38 miles south of chattanooga. dalton is at the junction of the railroad from cleveland with the one from chattanooga to atlanta. there could have been no difference of opinion as to the first duty of the armies of the military division of the mississippi. johnston's army was the first objective, and that important railroad centre, atlanta, the second. at the time i wrote general halleck giving my views of the approaching campaign, and at the time i met general sherman, it was expected that general banks would be through with the campaign which he had been ordered upon before my appointment to the command of all the armies, and would be ready to co-operate with the armies east of the mississippi, his part in the programme being to move upon mobile by land while the navy would close the harbor and assist to the best of its ability. (*22) the plan therefore was for sherman to attack johnston and destroy his army if possible, to capture atlanta and hold it, and with his troops and those of banks to hold a line through to mobile, or at least to hold atlanta and command the railroad running east and west, and the troops from one or other of the armies to hold important points on the southern road, the only east and west road that would be left in the possession of the enemy. this would cut the confederacy in two again, as our gaining possession of the mississippi river had done before. banks was not ready in time for the part assigned to him, and circumstances that could not be foreseen determined the campaign which was afterwards made, the success and grandeur of which has resounded throughout all lands. in regard to restoring officers who had been relieved from important commands to duty again, i left sherman to look after those who had been removed in the west while i looked out for the rest. i directed, however, that he should make no assignment until i could speak to the secretary of war about the matter. i shortly after recommended to the secretary the assignment of general buell to duty. i received the assurance that duty would be offered to him; and afterwards the secretary told me that he had offered buell an assignment and that the latter had declined it, saying that it would be degradation to accept the assignment offered. i understood afterwards that he refused to serve under either sherman or canby because he had ranked them both. both graduated before him and ranked him in the old army. sherman ranked him as a brigadier-general. all of them ranked me in the old army, and sherman and buell did as brigadiers. the worst excuse a soldier can make for declining service is that he once ranked the commander he is ordered to report to. on the 23d of march i was back in washington, and on the 26th took up my headquarters at culpeper court-house, a few miles south of the headquarters of the army of the potomac. although hailing from illinois myself, the state of the president, i never met mr. lincoln until called to the capital to receive my commission as lieutenant-general. i knew him, however, very well and favorably from the accounts given by officers under me at the west who had known him all their lives. i had also read the remarkable series of debates between lincoln and douglas a few years before, when they were rival candidates for the united states senate. i was then a resident of missouri, and by no means a "lincoln man" in that contest; but i recognized then his great ability. in my first interview with mr. lincoln alone he stated to me that he had never professed to be a military man or to know how campaigns should be conducted, and never wanted to interfere in them: but that procrastination on the part of commanders, and the pressure from the people at the north and congress, which was always with him, forced him into issuing his series of "military orders"--one, two, three, etc. he did not know but they were all wrong, and did know that some of them were. all he wanted or had ever wanted was some one who would take the responsibility and act, and call on him for all the assistance needed, pledging himself to use all the power of the government in rendering such assistance. assuring him that i would do the best i could with the means at hand, and avoid as far as possible annoying him or the war department, our first interview ended. the secretary of war i had met once before only, but felt that i knew him better. while commanding in west tennessee we had occasionally held conversations over the wires, at night, when they were not being otherwise used. he and general halleck both cautioned me against giving the president my plans of campaign, saying that he was so kind-hearted, so averse to refusing anything asked of him, that some friend would be sure to get from him all he knew. i should have said that in our interview the president told me he did not want to know what i proposed to do. but he submitted a plan of campaign of his own which he wanted me to hear and then do as i pleased about. he brought out a map of virginia on which he had evidently marked every position occupied by the federal and confederate armies up to that time. he pointed out on the map two streams which empty into the potomac, and suggested that the army might be moved on boats and landed between the mouths of these streams. we would then have the potomac to bring our supplies, and the tributaries would protect our flanks while we moved out. i listened respectfully, but did not suggest that the same streams would protect lee's flanks while he was shutting us up. i did not communicate my plans to the president, nor did i to the secretary of war or to general halleck. march the 26th my headquarters were, as stated, at culpeper, and the work of preparing for an early campaign commenced. chapter xlvii. the military situation--plans for the campaign--sheridan assigned to command of the cavalry--flank movements--forrest at fort pillow--general banks's expedition--colonel mosby--an incident of the wilderness campaign. when i assumed command of all the armies the situation was about this: the mississippi river was guarded from st. louis to its mouth; the line of the arkansas was held, thus giving us all the north-west north of that river. a few points in louisiana not remote from the river were held by the federal troops, as was also the mouth of the rio grande. east of the mississippi we held substantially all north of the memphis and charleston railroad as far east as chattanooga, thence along the line of the tennessee and holston rivers, taking in nearly all of the state of tennessee. west virginia was in our hands; and that part of old virginia north of the rapidan and east of the blue ridge we also held. on the sea-coast we had fortress monroe and norfolk in virginia; plymouth, washington and new berne in north carolina; beaufort, folly and morris islands, hilton head, port royal and fort pulaski in south carolina and georgia; fernandina, st. augustine, key west and pensacola in florida. the balance of the southern territory, an empire in extent, was still in the hands of the enemy. sherman, who had succeeded me in the command of the military division of the mississippi, commanded all the troops in the territory west of the alleghanies and north of natchez, with a large movable force about chattanooga. his command was subdivided into four departments, but the commanders all reported to sherman and were subject to his orders. this arrangement, however, insured the better protection of all lines of communication through the acquired territory, for the reason that these different department commanders could act promptly in case of a sudden or unexpected raid within their respective jurisdictions without awaiting the orders of the division commander. in the east the opposing forces stood in substantially the same relations towards each other as three years before, or when the war began; they were both between the federal and confederate capitals. it is true, footholds had been secured by us on the sea-coast, in virginia and north carolina, but, beyond that, no substantial advantage had been gained by either side. battles had been fought of as great severity as had ever been known in war, over ground from the james river and chickahominy, near richmond, to gettysburg and chambersburg, in pennsylvania, with indecisive results, sometimes favorable to the national army, sometimes to the confederate army; but in every instance, i believe, claimed as victories for the south by the southern press if not by the southern generals. the northern press, as a whole, did not discourage these claims; a portion of it always magnified rebel success and belittled ours, while another portion, most sincerely earnest in their desire for the preservation of the union and the overwhelming success of the federal armies, would nevertheless generally express dissatisfaction with whatever victories were gained because they were not more complete. that portion of the army of the potomac not engaged in guarding lines of communication was on the northern bank of the rapidan. the army of northern virginia confronting it on the opposite bank of the same river, was strongly intrenched and commanded by the acknowledged ablest general in the confederate army. the country back to the james river is cut up with many streams, generally narrow, deep, and difficult to cross except where bridged. the region is heavily timbered, and the roads narrow, and very bad after the least rain. such an enemy was not, of course, unprepared with adequate fortifications at convenient intervals all the way back to richmond, so that when driven from one fortified position they would always have another farther to the rear to fall back into. to provision an army, campaigning against so formidable a foe through such a country, from wagons alone seemed almost impossible. system and discipline were both essential to its accomplishment. the union armies were now divided into nineteen departments, though four of them in the west had been concentrated into a single military division. the army of the potomac was a separate command and had no territorial limits. there were thus seventeen distinct commanders. before this time these various armies had acted separately and independently of each other, giving the enemy an opportunity often of depleting one command, not pressed, to reinforce another more actively engaged. i determined to stop this. to this end i regarded the army of the potomac as the centre, and all west to memphis along the line described as our position at the time, and north of it, the right wing; the army of the james, under general butler, as the left wing, and all the troops south, as a force in rear of the enemy. some of these latter were occupying positions from which they could not render service proportionate to their numerical strength. all such were depleted to the minimum necessary to hold their positions as a guard against blockade runners; where they could not do this their positions were abandoned altogether. in this way ten thousand men were added to the army of the james from south carolina alone, with general gillmore in command. it was not contemplated that general gillmore should leave his department; but as most of his troops were taken, presumably for active service, he asked to accompany them and was permitted to do so. officers and soldiers on furlough, of whom there were many thousands, were ordered to their proper commands; concentration was the order of the day, and to have it accomplished in time to advance at the earliest moment the roads would permit was the problem. as a reinforcement to the army of the potomac, or to act in support of it, the 9th army corps, over twenty thousand strong, under general burnside, had been rendezvoused at annapolis, maryland. this was an admirable position for such a reinforcement. the corps could be brought at the last moment as a reinforcement to the army of the potomac, or it could be thrown on the sea-coast, south of norfolk, in virginia or north carolina, to operate against richmond from that direction. in fact burnside and the war department both thought the 9th corps was intended for such an expedition up to the last moment. my general plan now was to concentrate all the force possible against the confederate armies in the field. there were but two such, as we have seen, east of the mississippi river and facing north. the army of northern virginia, general robert e. lee commanding, was on the south bank of the rapidan, confronting the army of the potomac; the second, under general joseph e. johnston, was at dalton, georgia, opposed to sherman who was still at chattanooga. beside these main armies the confederates had to guard the shenandoah valley, a great storehouse to feed their armies from, and their line of communications from richmond to tennessee. forrest, a brave and intrepid cavalry general, was in the west with a large force; making a larger command necessary to hold what we had gained in middle and west tennessee. we could not abandon any territory north of the line held by the enemy because it would lay the northern states open to invasion. but as the army of the potomac was the principal garrison for the protection of washington even while it was moving on lee, so all the forces to the west, and the army of the james, guarded their special trusts when advancing from them as well as when remaining at them. better indeed, for they forced the enemy to guard his own lines and resources at a greater distance from ours, and with a greater force. little expeditions could not so well be sent out to destroy a bridge or tear up a few miles of railroad track, burn a storehouse, or inflict other little annoyances. accordingly i arranged for a simultaneous movement all along the line. sherman was to move from chattanooga, johnston's army and atlanta being his objective points. (*23) crook, commanding in west virginia, was to move from the mouth of the gauley river with a cavalry force and some artillery, the virginia and tennessee railroad to be his objective. either the enemy would have to keep a large force to protect their communications, or see them destroyed and a large amount of forage and provision, which they so much needed, fall into our hands. sigel was in command in the valley of virginia. he was to advance up the valley, covering the north from an invasion through that channel as well while advancing as by remaining near harper's ferry. every mile he advanced also gave us possession of stores on which lee relied. butler was to advance by the james river, having richmond and petersburg as his objective. before the advance commenced i visited butler at fort monroe. this was the first time i had ever met him. before giving him any order as to the part he was to play in the approaching campaign i invited his views. they were very much such as i intended to direct, and as i did direct (*24), in writing, before leaving. general w. f. smith, who had been promoted to the rank of major-general shortly after the battle of chattanooga on my recommendation, had not yet been confirmed. i found a decided prejudice against his confirmation by a majority of the senate, but i insisted that his services had been such that he should be rewarded. my wishes were now reluctantly complied with, and i assigned him to the command of one of the corps under general butler. i was not long in finding out that the objections to smith's promotion were well founded. in one of my early interviews with the president i expressed my dissatisfaction with the little that had been accomplished by the cavalry so far in the war, and the belief that it was capable of accomplishing much more than it had done if under a thorough leader. i said i wanted the very best man in the army for that command. halleck was present and spoke up, saying: "how would sheridan do?" i replied: "the very man i want." the president said i could have anybody i wanted. sheridan was telegraphed for that day, and on his arrival was assigned to the command of the cavalry corps with the army of the potomac. this relieved general alfred pleasonton. it was not a reflection on that officer, however, for i did not know but that he had been as efficient as any other cavalry commander. banks in the department of the gulf was ordered to assemble all the troops he had at new orleans in time to join in the general move, mobile to be his objective. at this time i was not entirely decided as to whether i should move the army of the potomac by the right flank of the enemy, or by his left. each plan presented advantages. (*25) if by his right--my left--the potomac, chesapeake bay and tributaries would furnish us an easy hauling distance of every position the army could occupy from the rapidan to the james river. but lee could, if he chose, detach or move his whole army north on a line rather interior to the one i would have to take in following. a movement by his left--our right--would obviate this; but all that was done would have to be done with the supplies and ammunition we started with. all idea of adopting this latter plan was abandoned when the limited quantity of supplies possible to take with us was considered. the country over which we would have to pass was so exhausted of all food or forage that we would be obliged to carry everything with us. while these preparations were going on the enemy was not entirely idle. in the west forrest made a raid in west tennessee up to the northern border, capturing the garrison of four or five hundred men at union city, and followed it up by an attack on paducah, kentucky, on the banks of the ohio. while he was able to enter the city he failed to capture the forts or any part of the garrison. on the first intelligence of forrest's raid i telegraphed sherman to send all his cavalry against him, and not to let him get out of the trap he had put himself into. sherman had anticipated me by sending troops against him before he got my order. forrest, however, fell back rapidly, and attacked the troops at fort pillow, a station for the protection of the navigation of the mississippi river. the garrison consisted of a regiment of colored troops, infantry, and a detachment of tennessee cavalry. these troops fought bravely, but were overpowered. i will leave forrest in his dispatches to tell what he did with them. "the river was dyed," he says, "with the blood of the slaughtered for two hundred yards. the approximate loss was upward of five hundred killed, but few of the officers escaping. my loss was about twenty killed. it is hoped that these facts will demonstrate to the northern people that negro soldiers cannot cope with southerners." subsequently forrest made a report in which he left out the part which shocks humanity to read. at the east, also, the rebels were busy. i had said to halleck that plymouth and washington, north carolina, were unnecessary to hold. it would be better to have the garrisons engaged there added to butler's command. if success attended our arms both places, and others too, would fall into our hands naturally. these places had been occupied by federal troops before i took command of the armies, and i knew that the executive would be reluctant to abandon them, and therefore explained my views; but before my views were carried out the rebels captured the garrison at plymouth. i then ordered the abandonment of washington, but directed the holding of new berne at all hazards. this was essential because new berne was a port into which blockade runners could enter. general banks had gone on an expedition up the red river long before my promotion to general command. i had opposed the movement strenuously, but acquiesced because it was the order of my superior at the time. by direction of halleck i had reinforced banks with a corps of about ten thousand men from sherman's command. this reinforcement was wanted back badly before the forward movement commenced. but banks had got so far that it seemed best that he should take shreveport on the red river, and turn over the line of that river to steele, who commanded in arkansas, to hold instead of the line of the arkansas. orders were given accordingly, and with the expectation that the campaign would be ended in time for banks to return a. j. smith's command to where it belonged and get back to new orleans himself in time to execute his part in the general plan. but the expedition was a failure. banks did not get back in time to take part in the programme as laid down. nor was smith returned until long after the movements of may, 1864, had been begun. the services of forty thousand veteran troops, over and above the number required to hold all that was necessary in the department of the gulf, were thus paralyzed. it is but just to banks, however, to say that his expedition was ordered from washington and he was in no way responsible except for the conduct of it. i make no criticism on this point. he opposed the expedition. by the 27th of april spring had so far advanced as to justify me in fixing a day for the great move. on that day burnside left annapolis to occupy meade's position between bull run and the rappahannock. meade was notified and directed to bring his troops forward to his advance. on the following day butler was notified of my intended advance on the 4th of may, and he was directed to move the night of the same day and get as far up the james river as possible by daylight, and push on from there to accomplish the task given him. he was also notified that reinforcements were being collected in washington city, which would be forwarded to him should the enemy fall back into the trenches at richmond. the same day sherman was directed to get his forces up ready to advance on the 5th. sigel was in winchester and was notified to move in conjunction with the others. the criticism has been made by writers on the campaign from the rapidan to the james river that all the loss of life could have been obviated by moving the army there on transports. richmond was fortified and intrenched so perfectly that one man inside to defend was more than equal to five outside besieging or assaulting. to get possession of lee's army was the first great object. with the capture of his army richmond would necessarily follow. it was better to fight him outside of his stronghold than in it. if the army of the potomac had been moved bodily to the james river by water lee could have moved a part of his forces back to richmond, called beauregard from the south to reinforce it, and with the balance moved on to washington. then, too, i ordered a move, simultaneous with that of the army of the potomac, up the james river by a formidable army already collected at the mouth of the river. while my headquarters were at culpeper, from the 26th of march to the 4th of may, i generally visited washington once a week to confer with the secretary of war and president. on the last occasion, a few days before moving, a circumstance occurred which came near postponing my part in the campaign altogether. colonel john s. mosby had for a long time been commanding a partisan corps, or regiment, which operated in the rear of the army of the potomac. on my return to the field on this occasion, as the train approached warrenton junction, a heavy cloud of dust was seen to the east of the road as if made by a body of cavalry on a charge. arriving at the junction the train was stopped and inquiries made as to the cause of the dust. there was but one man at the station, and he informed us that mosby had crossed a few minutes before at full speed in pursuit of federal cavalry. had he seen our train coming, no doubt he would have let his prisoners escape to capture the train. i was on a special train, if i remember correctly, without any guard. since the close of the war i have come to know colonel mosby personally, and somewhat intimately. he is a different man entirely from what i had supposed. he is slender, not tall, wiry, and looks as if he could endure any amount of physical exercise. he is able, and thoroughly honest and truthful. there were probably but few men in the south who could have commanded successfully a separate detachment in the rear of an opposing army, and so near the border of hostilities, as long as he did without losing his entire command. on this same visit to washington i had my last interview with the president before reaching the james river. he had of course become acquainted with the fact that a general movement had been ordered all along the line, and seemed to think it a new feature in war. i explained to him that it was necessary to have a great number of troops to guard and hold the territory we had captured, and to prevent incursions into the northern states. these troops could perform this service just as well by advancing as by remaining still; and by advancing they would compel the enemy to keep detachments to hold them back, or else lay his own territory open to invasion. his answer was: "oh, yes! i see that. as we say out west, if a man can't skin he must hold a leg while somebody else does." there was a certain incident connected with the wilderness campaign of which it may not be out of place to speak; and to avoid a digression further on i will mention it here. a few days before my departure from culpeper the honorable e. b. washburne visited me there, and remained with my headquarters for some distance south, through the battle in the wilderness and, i think, to spottsylvania. he was accompanied by a mr. swinton, whom he presented as a literary gentleman who wished to accompany the army with a view of writing a history of the war when it was over. he assured me--and i have no doubt swinton gave him the assurance--that he was not present as a correspondent of the press. i expressed an entire willingness to have him (swinton) accompany the army, and would have allowed him to do so as a correspondent, restricted, however, in the character of the information he could give. we received richmond papers with about as much regularity as if there had been no war, and knew that our papers were received with equal regularity by the confederates. it was desirable, therefore, that correspondents should not be privileged spies of the enemy within our lines. probably mr. swinton expected to be an invited guest at my headquarters, and was disappointed that he was not asked to become so. at all events he was not invited, and soon i found that he was corresponding with some paper (i have now forgotten which one), thus violating his word either expressed or implied. he knew of the assurance washburne had given as to the character of his mission. i never saw the man from the day of our introduction to the present that i recollect. he accompanied us, however, for a time at least. the second night after crossing the rapidan (the night of the 5th of may) colonel w. r. rowley, of my staff, was acting as night officer at my headquarters. a short time before midnight i gave him verbal instructions for the night. three days later i read in a richmond paper a verbatim report of these instructions. a few nights still later (after the first, and possibly after the second, day's fighting in the wilderness) general meade came to my tent for consultation, bringing with him some of his staff officers. both his staff and mine retired to the camp-fire some yards in front of the tent, thinking our conversation should be private. there was a stump a little to one side, and between the front of the tent and camp-fire. one of my staff, colonel t. s. bowers, saw what he took to be a man seated on the ground and leaning against the stump, listening to the conversation between meade and myself. he called the attention of colonel rowley to it. the latter immediately took the man by the shoulder and asked him, in language more forcible than polite, what he was doing there. the man proved to be swinton, the "historian," and his replies to the question were evasive and unsatisfactory, and he was warned against further eaves-dropping. the next i heard of mr. swinton was at cold harbor. general meade came to my headquarters saying that general burnside had arrested swinton, who at some previous time had given great offence, and had ordered him to be shot that afternoon. i promptly ordered the prisoner to be released, but that he must be expelled from the lines of the army not to return again on pain of punishment. chapter xlviii. commencement of the grand campaign--general butler's position --sheridan's first raid. the armies were now all ready to move for the accomplishment of a single object. they were acting as a unit so far as such a thing was possible over such a vast field. lee, with the capital of the confederacy, was the main end to which all were working. johnston, with atlanta, was an important obstacle in the way of our accomplishing the result aimed at, and was therefore almost an independent objective. it was of less importance only because the capture of johnston and his army would not produce so immediate and decisive a result in closing the rebellion as would the possession of richmond, lee and his army. all other troops were employed exclusively in support of these two movements. this was the plan; and i will now endeavor to give, as concisely as i can, the method of its execution, outlining first the operations of minor detached but co-operative columns. as stated before, banks failed to accomplish what he had been sent to do on the red river, and eliminated the use of forty thousand veterans whose cooperation in the grand campaign had been expected--ten thousand with sherman and thirty thousand against mobile. sigel's record is almost equally brief. he moved out, it is true, according to programme; but just when i was hoping to hear of good work being done in the valley i received instead the following announcement from halleck: "sigel is in full retreat on strasburg. he will do nothing but run; never did anything else." the enemy had intercepted him about new market and handled him roughly, leaving him short six guns, and some nine hundred men out of his six thousand. the plan had been for an advance of sigel's forces in two columns. though the one under his immediate command failed ingloriously the other proved more fortunate. under crook and averell his western column advanced from the gauley in west virginia at the appointed time, and with more happy results. they reached the virginia and tennessee railroad at dublin and destroyed a depot of supplies, besides tearing up several miles of road and burning the bridge over new river. having accomplished this they recrossed the alleghanies to meadow bluffs and there awaited further orders. butler embarked at fort monroe with all his command, except the cavalry and some artillery which moved up the south bank of the james river. his steamers moved first up chesapeake bay and york river as if threatening the rear of lee's army. at midnight they turned back, and butler by daylight was far up the james river. he seized city point and bermuda hundred early in the day, without loss and, no doubt, very much to the surprise of the enemy. this was the accomplishment of the first step contemplated in my instructions to butler. he was to act from here, looking to richmond as his objective point. i had given him to understand that i should aim to fight lee between the rapidan and richmond if he would stand; but should lee fall back into richmond i would follow up and make a junction of the armies of the potomac and the james on the james river. he was directed to secure a footing as far up the south side of the river as he could at as early a date as possible. butler was in position by the 6th of may and had begun intrenching, and on the 7th he sent out his cavalry from suffolk to cut the weldon railroad. he also sent out detachments to destroy the railroad between petersburg and richmond, but no great success attended these latter efforts. he made no great effort to establish himself on that road and neglected to attack petersburg, which was almost defenceless. about the 11th he advanced slowly until he reached the works at drury's bluff, about half way between bermuda hundred and richmond. in the mean time beauregard had been gathering reinforcements. on the 16th he attacked butler with great vigor, and with such success as to limit very materially the further usefulness of the army of the james as a distinct factor in the campaign. i afterward ordered a portion of it to join the army of the potomac, leaving a sufficient force with butler to man his works, hold securely the footing he had already gained and maintain a threatening front toward the rear of the confederate capital. the position which general butler had chosen between the two rivers, the james and appomattox, was one of great natural strength, one where a large area of ground might be thoroughly inclosed by means of a single intrenched line, and that a very short one in comparison with the extent of territory which it thoroughly protected. his right was protected by the james river, his left by the appomattox, and his rear by their junction--the two streams uniting near by. the bends of the two streams shortened the line that had been chosen for intrenchments, while it increased the area which the line inclosed. previous to ordering any troops from butler i sent my chief engineer, general barnard, from the army of the potomac to that of the james to inspect butler's position and ascertain whether i could again safely make an order for general butler's movement in co-operation with mine, now that i was getting so near richmond; or, if i could not, whether his position was strong enough to justify me in withdrawing some of his troops and having them brought round by water to white house to join me and reinforce the army of the potomac. general barnard reported the position very strong for defensive purposes, and that i could do the latter with great security; but that general butler could not move from where he was, in co-operation, to produce any effect. he said that the general occupied a place between the james and appomattox rivers which was of great strength, and where with an inferior force he could hold it for an indefinite length of time against a superior; but that he could do nothing offensively. i then asked him why butler could not move out from his lines and push across the richmond and petersburg railroad to the rear and on the south side of richmond. he replied that it was impracticable, because the enemy had substantially the same line across the neck of land that general butler had. he then took out his pencil and drew a sketch of the locality, remarking that the position was like a bottle and that butler's line of intrenchments across the neck represented the cork; that the enemy had built an equally strong line immediately in front of him across the neck; and it was therefore as if butler was in a bottle. he was perfectly safe against an attack; but, as barnard expressed it, the enemy had corked the bottle and with a small force could hold the cork in its place. this struck me as being very expressive of his position, particularly when i saw the hasty sketch which general barnard had drawn; and in making my subsequent report i used that expression without adding quotation marks, never thinking that anything had been said that would attract attention--as this did, very much to the annoyance, no doubt, of general butler and, i know, very much to my own. i found afterwards that this was mentioned in the notes of general badeau's book, which, when they were shown to me, i asked to have stricken out; yet it was retained there, though against my wishes. i make this statement here because, although i have often made it before, it has never been in my power until now to place it where it will correct history; and i desire to rectify all injustice that i may have done to individuals, particularly to officers who were gallantly serving their country during the trying period of the war for the preservation of the union. general butler certainly gave his very earnest support to the war; and he gave his own best efforts personally to the suppression of the rebellion. the further operations of the army of the james can best be treated of in connection with those of the army of the potomac, the two being so intimately associated and connected as to be substantially one body in which the individuality of the supporting wing is merged. before giving the reader a summary of sherman's great atlanta campaign, which must conclude my description of the various co-operative movements preparatory to proceeding with that of the operations of the centre, i will briefly mention sheridan's first raid upon lee's communications which, though an incident of the operations on the main line and not specifically marked out in the original plan, attained in its brilliant execution and results all the proportions of an independent campaign. by thus anticipating, in point of time, i will be able to more perfectly observe the continuity of events occurring in my immediate front when i shall have undertaken to describe our advance from the rapidan. on the 8th of may, just after the battle of the wilderness and when we were moving on spottsylvania i directed sheridan verbally to cut loose from the army of the potomac, pass around the left of lee's army and attack his cavalry: to cut the two roads--one running west through gordonsville, charlottesville and lynchburg, the other to richmond, and, when compelled to do so for want of forage and rations, to move on to the james river and draw these from butler's supplies. this move took him past the entire rear of lee's army. these orders were also given in writing through meade. the object of this move was three-fold. first, if successfully executed, and it was, he would annoy the enemy by cutting his line of supplies and telegraphic communications, and destroy or get for his own use supplies in store in the rear and coming up. second, he would draw the enemy's cavalry after him, and thus better protect our flanks, rear and trains than by remaining with the army. third, his absence would save the trains drawing his forage and other supplies from fredericksburg, which had now become our base. he started at daylight the next morning, and accomplished more than was expected. it was sixteen days before he got back to the army of the potomac. the course sheridan took was directly to richmond. before night stuart, commanding the confederate cavalry, came on to the rear of his command. but the advance kept on, crossed the north anna, and at beaver dam, a station on the virginia central railroad, recaptured four hundred union prisoners on their way to richmond, destroyed the road and used and destroyed a large amount of subsistence and medical stores. stuart, seeing that our cavalry was pushing towards richmond, abandoned the pursuit on the morning of the 10th and, by a detour and an exhausting march, interposed between sheridan and richmond at yellow tavern, only about six miles north of the city. sheridan destroyed the railroad and more supplies at ashland, and on the 11th arrived in stuart's front. a severe engagement ensued in which the losses were heavy on both sides, but the rebels were beaten, their leader mortally wounded, and some guns and many prisoners were captured. sheridan passed through the outer defences of richmond, and could, no doubt, have passed through the inner ones. but having no supports near he could not have remained. after caring for his wounded he struck for the james river below the city, to communicate with butler and to rest his men and horses as well as to get food and forage for them. he moved first between the chickahominy and the james, but in the morning (the 12th) he was stopped by batteries at mechanicsville. he then turned to cross to the north side of the chickahominy by meadow bridge. he found this barred, and the defeated confederate cavalry, reorganized, occupying the opposite side. the panic created by his first entrance within the outer works of richmond having subsided troops were sent out to attack his rear. he was now in a perilous position, one from which but few generals could have extricated themselves. the defences of richmond, manned, were to the right, the chickahominy was to the left with no bridge remaining and the opposite bank guarded, to the rear was a force from richmond. this force was attacked and beaten by wilson's and gregg's divisions, while sheridan turned to the left with the remaining division and hastily built a bridge over the chickahominy under the fire of the enemy, forced a crossing and soon dispersed the confederates he found there. the enemy was held back from the stream by the fire of the troops not engaged in bridge building. on the 13th sheridan was at bottom's bridge, over the chickahominy. on the 14th he crossed this stream and on that day went into camp on the james river at haxall's landing. he at once put himself into communication with general butler, who directed all the supplies he wanted to be furnished. sheridan had left the army of the potomac at spottsylvania, but did not know where either this or lee's army was now. great caution therefore had to be exercised in getting back. on the 17th, after resting his command for three days, he started on his return. he moved by the way of white house. the bridge over the pamunkey had been burned by the enemy, but a new one was speedily improvised and the cavalry crossed over it. on the 22d he was at aylett's on the matapony, where he learned the position of the two armies. on the 24th he joined us on the march from north anna to cold harbor, in the vicinity of chesterfield. sheridan in this memorable raid passed entirely around lee's army: encountered his cavalry in four engagements, and defeated them in all; recaptured four hundred union prisoners and killed and captured many of the enemy; destroyed and used many supplies and munitions of war; destroyed miles of railroad and telegraph, and freed us from annoyance by the cavalry of the enemy for more than two weeks. chapter xlix. sherman's campaign in georgia--siege of atlanta--death of general mcpherson--attempt to capture andersonville--capture of atlanta. after separating from sherman in cincinnati i went on to washington, as already stated, while he returned to nashville to assume the duties of his new command. his military division was now composed of four departments and embraced all the territory west of the alleghany mountains and east of the mississippi river, together with the state of arkansas in the trans-mississippi. the most easterly of these was the department of the ohio, general schofield commanding; the next was the department of the cumberland, general thomas commanding; the third the department of the tennessee, general mcpherson commanding; and general steele still commanded the trans-mississippi, or department of arkansas. the last-named department was so far away that sherman could not communicate with it very readily after starting on his spring campaign, and it was therefore soon transferred from his military division to that of the gulf, where general canby, who had relieved general banks, was in command. the movements of the armies, as i have stated in a former chapter, were to be simultaneous, i fixing the day to start when the season should be far enough advanced, it was hoped, for the roads to be in a condition for the troops to march. general sherman at once set himself to work preparing for the task which was assigned him to accomplish in the spring campaign. mcpherson lay at huntsville with about twenty-four thousand men, guarding those points of tennessee which were regarded as most worth holding; thomas, with over sixty thousand men of the army of the cumberland, was at chattanooga; and schofield, with about fourteen thousand men, was at knoxville. with these three armies, numbering about one hundred thousand men in all, sherman was to move on the day fixed for the general advance, with a view of destroying johnston's army and capturing atlanta. he visited each of these commands to inform himself as to their condition, and it was found to be, speaking generally, good. one of the first matters to turn his attention to was that of getting, before the time arrived for starting, an accumulation of supplies forward to chattanooga, sufficiently large to warrant a movement. he found, when he got to that place, that the trains over the single-track railroad, which was frequently interrupted for a day or two at a time, were only sufficient to meet the daily wants of the troops without bringing forward any surplus of any kind. he found, however, that trains were being used to transport all the beef cattle, horses for the cavalry, and even teams that were being brought to the front. he at once changed all this, and required beef cattle, teams, cavalry horses, and everything that could travel, even the troops, to be marched, and used the road exclusively for transporting supplies. in this way he was able to accumulate an abundance before the time finally fixed upon for the move, the 4th of may. as i have said already, johnston was at dalton, which was nearly one-fourth of the way between chattanooga and atlanta. the country is mountainous all the way to atlanta, abounding in mountain streams, some of them of considerable volume. dalton is on ground where water drains towards atlanta and into one of the main streams rising north-east from there and flowing south-west--this being the general direction which all the main streams of that section take, with smaller tributaries entering into them. johnston had been preparing himself for this campaign during the entire winter. the best positions for defence had been selected all the way from dalton back to atlanta, and very strongly intrenched; so that, as he might be forced to fall back from one position, he would have another to fall into in his rear. his position at dalton was so very strongly intrenched that no doubt he expected, or at least hoped, to hold sherman there and prevent him from getting any further. with a less skilful general, and one disposed to take no risks, i have no doubt that he would have succeeded. sherman's plan was to start schofield, who was farthest back, a few days in advance from knoxville, having him move on the direct road to dalton. thomas was to move out to ringgold. it had been sherman's intention to cross mcpherson over the tennessee river at huntsville or decatur, and move him south from there so as to have him come into the road running from chattanooga to atlanta a good distance to the rear of the point johnston was occupying; but when that was contemplated it was hoped that mcpherson alone would have troops enough to cope with johnston, if the latter should move against him while unsupported by the balance of the army. in this he was disappointed. two of mcpherson's veteran divisions had re-enlisted on the express provision that they were to have a furlough. this furlough had not yet expired, and they were not back. then, again, sherman had lent banks two divisions under a. j. smith, the winter before, to co-operate with the trans-mississippi forces, and this with the express pledge that they should be back by a time specified, so as to be prepared for this very campaign. it is hardly necessary to say they were not returned. that department continued to absorb troops to no purpose to the end of the war. this left mcpherson so weak that the part of the plan above indicated had to be changed. he was therefore brought up to chattanooga and moved from there on a road to the right of thomas--the two coming together about dalton. the three armies were abreast, all ready to start promptly on time. sherman soon found that dalton was so strongly fortified that it was useless to make any attempt to carry it by assault; and even to carry it by regular approaches was impracticable. there was a narrowing up in the mountain, between the national and confederate armies, through which a stream, a wagon road and a railroad ran. besides, the stream had been dammed so that the valley was a lake. through this gorge the troops would have to pass. mcpherson was therefore sent around by the right, to come out by the way of snake creek gap into the rear of the enemy. this was a surprise to johnston, and about the 13th he decided to abandon his position at dalton. on the 15th there was very hard fighting about resaca; but our cavalry having been sent around to the right got near the road in the enemy's rear. again johnston fell back, our army pursuing. the pursuit was continued to kingston, which was reached on the 19th with very little fighting, except that newton's division overtook the rear of johnston's army and engaged it. sherman was now obliged to halt for the purpose of bringing up his railroad trains. he was depending upon the railroad for all of his supplies, and as of course the railroad was wholly destroyed as johnston fell back, it had to be rebuilt. this work was pushed forward night and day, and caused much less delay than most persons would naturally expect in a mountainous country where there were so many bridges to be rebuilt. the campaign to atlanta was managed with the most consummate skill, the enemy being flanked out of one position after another all the way there. it is true this was not accomplished without a good deal of fighting --some of it very hard fighting, rising to the dignity of very important battles--neither were single positions gained in a day. on the contrary, weeks were spent at some; and about atlanta more than a month was consumed. it was the 23d of may before the road was finished up to the rear of sherman's army and the pursuit renewed. this pursuit brought him up to the vicinity of allatoona. this place was very strongly intrenched, and naturally a very defensible position. an assault upon it was not thought of, but preparations were made to flank the enemy out of it. this was done by sending a large force around our right, by the way of dallas, to reach the rear of the enemy. before reaching there, however, they found the enemy fortified in their way, and there resulted hard fighting for about a week at a place called new hope church. on the left our troops also were fortified, and as close up to the enemy as they could get. they kept working still farther around to the left toward the railroad. this was the case more particularly with the cavalry. by the 4th of june johnston found that he was being hemmed in so rapidly that he drew off and allatoona was left in our possession. allatoona, being an important place, was strongly intrenched for occupation by our troops before advancing farther, and made a secondary base of supplies. the railroad was finished up to that point, the intrenchments completed, storehouses provided for food, and the army got in readiness for a further advance. the rains, however, were falling in such torrents that it was impossible to move the army by the side roads which they would have to move upon in order to turn johnston out of his new position. while sherman's army lay here, general f. p. blair returned to it, bringing with him the two divisions of veterans who had been on furlough. johnston had fallen back to marietta and kenesaw mountain, where strong intrenchments awaited him. at this latter place our troops made an assault upon the enemy's lines after having got their own lines up close to him, and failed, sustaining considerable loss. but during the progress of the battle schofield was gaining ground to the left; and the cavalry on his left were gaining still more toward the enemy's rear. these operations were completed by the 3d of july, when it was found that johnston had evacuated the place. he was pursued at once. sherman had made every preparation to abandon the railroad, leaving a strong guard in his intrenchments. he had intended, moving out with twenty days' rations and plenty of ammunition, to come in on the railroad again at the chattahoochee river. johnston frustrated this plan by himself starting back as above stated. this time he fell back to the chattahoochee. about the 5th of july he was besieged again, sherman getting easy possession of the chattahoochee river both above and below him. the enemy was again flanked out of his position, or so frightened by flanking movements that on the night of the 9th he fell back across the river. here johnston made a stand until the 17th, when sherman's old tactics prevailed again and the final movement toward atlanta began. johnston was now relieved of the command, and hood superseded him. johnston's tactics in this campaign do not seem to have met with much favor, either in the eyes of the administration at richmond, or of the people of that section of the south in which he was commanding. the very fact of a change of commanders being ordered under such circumstances was an indication of a change of policy, and that now they would become the aggressors--the very thing our troops wanted. for my own part, i think that johnston's tactics were right. anything that could have prolonged the war a year beyond the time that it did finally close, would probably have exhausted the north to such an extent that they might then have abandoned the contest and agreed to a separation. atlanta was very strongly intrenched all the way around in a circle about a mile and a half outside of the city. in addition to this, there were advanced intrenchments which had to be taken before a close siege could be commenced. sure enough, as indicated by the change of commanders, the enemy was about to assume the offensive. on the 20th he came out and attacked the army of the cumberland most furiously. hooker's corps, and newton's and johnson's divisions were the principal ones engaged in this contest, which lasted more than an hour; but the confederates were then forced to fall back inside their main lines. the losses were quite heavy on both sides. on this day general gresham, since our postmaster-general, was very badly wounded. during the night hood abandoned his outer lines, and our troops were advanced. the investment had not been relinquished for a moment during the day. during the night of the 21st hood moved out again, passing by our left flank, which was then in motion to get a position farther in rear of him, and a desperate battle ensued, which lasted most of the day of the 22d. at first the battle went very much in favor of the confederates, our troops being somewhat surprised. while our troops were advancing they were struck in flank, and their flank was enveloped. but they had become too thorough veterans to be thrown into irreparable confusion by an unexpected attack when off their guard, and soon they were in order and engaging the enemy, with the advantage now of knowing where their antagonist was. the field of battle continued to expand until it embraced about seven miles of ground. finally, however, and before night, the enemy was driven back into the city (*26). it was during this battle that mcpherson, while passing from one column to another, was instantly killed. in his death the army lost one of its ablest, purest and best generals. garrard had been sent out with his cavalry to get upon the railroad east of atlanta and to cut it in the direction of augusta. he was successful in this, and returned about the time of the battle. rousseau had also come up from tennessee with a small division of cavalry, having crossed the tennessee river about decatur and made a raid into alabama. finally, when hard pressed, he had come in, striking the railroad in rear of sherman, and reported to him about this time. the battle of the 22d is usually known as the battle of atlanta, although the city did not fall into our hands until the 2d of september. preparations went on, as before, to flank the enemy out of his position. the work was tedious, and the lines that had to be maintained were very long. our troops were gradually worked around to the east until they struck the road between decatur and atlanta. these lines were strongly fortified, as were those to the north and west of the city--all as close up to the enemy's lines as practicable--in order to hold them with the smallest possible number of men, the design being to detach an army to move by our right and try to get upon the railroad down south of atlanta. on the 27th the movement by the right flank commenced. on the 28th the enemy struck our right flank, general logan commanding, with great vigor. logan intrenched himself hastily, and by that means was enabled to resist all assaults and inflict a great deal of damage upon the enemy. these assaults were continued to the middle of the afternoon, and resumed once or twice still later in the day. the enemy's losses in these unsuccessful assaults were fearful. during that evening the enemy in logan's front withdrew into the town. this now left sherman's army close up to the confederate lines, extending from a point directly east of the city around by the north and west of it for a distance of fully ten miles; the whole of this line being intrenched, and made stronger every day they remained there. in the latter part of july sherman sent stoneman to destroy the railroads to the south, about macon. he was then to go east and, if possible, release our prisoners about andersonville. there were painful stories current at the time about the great hardships these prisoners had to endure in the way of general bad treatment, in the way in which they were housed, and in the way in which they were fed. great sympathy was felt for them; and it was thought that even if they could be turned loose upon the country it would be a great relief to them. but the attempt proved a failure. mccook, who commanded a small brigade, was first reported to have been captured; but he got back, having inflicted a good deal of damage upon the enemy. he had also taken some prisoners; but encountering afterwards a largely superior force of the enemy he was obliged to drop his prisoners and get back as best he could with what men he had left. he had lost several hundred men out of his small command. on the 4th of august colonel adams, commanding a little brigade of about a thousand men, returned reporting stoneman and all but himself as lost. i myself had heard around richmond of the capture of stoneman, and had sent sherman word, which he received. the rumor was confirmed there, also, from other sources. a few days after colonel adams's return colonel capron also got in with a small detachment and confirmed the report of the capture of stoneman with something less than a thousand men. it seems that stoneman, finding the escape of all his force was impossible, had made arrangements for the escape of two divisions. he covered the movement of these divisions to the rear with a force of about seven hundred men, and at length surrendered himself and this detachment to the commanding confederate. in this raid, however, much damage was inflicted upon the enemy by the destruction of cars, locomotives, army wagons, manufactories of military supplies, etc. on the 4th and 5th sherman endeavored to get upon the railroad to our right, where schofield was in command, but these attempts failed utterly. general palmer was charged with being the cause of this failure, to a great extent, by both general sherman and general schofield; but i am not prepared to say this, although a question seems to have arisen with palmer as to whether schofield had any right to command him. if he did raise this question while an action was going on, that act alone was exceedingly reprehensible. about the same time wheeler got upon our railroad north of resaca and destroyed it nearly up to dalton. this cut sherman off from communication with the north for several days. sherman responded to this attack on his lines of communication by directing one upon theirs. kilpatrick started on the night of the 18th of august to reach the macon road about jonesboro. he succeeded in doing so, passed entirely around the confederate lines of atlanta, and was back again in his former position on our left by the 22d. these little affairs, however, contributed but very little to the grand result. they annoyed, it is true, but any damage thus done to a railroad by any cavalry expedition is soon repaired. sherman made preparations for a repetition of his tactics; that is, for a flank movement with as large a force as could be got together to some point in the enemy's rear. sherman commenced this last movement on the 25th of august, and on the 1st of september was well up towards the railroad twenty miles south of atlanta. here he found hardee intrenched, ready to meet him. a battle ensued, but he was unable to drive hardee away before night set in. under cover of the night, however, hardee left of his own accord. that night hood blew up his military works, such as he thought would be valuable in our hands, and decamped. the next morning at daylight general h. w. slocum, who was commanding north of the city, moved in and took possession of atlanta, and notified sherman. sherman then moved deliberately back, taking three days to reach the city, and occupied a line extending from decatur on the left to atlanta in the centre, with his troops extending out of the city for some distance to the right. the campaign had lasted about four months, and was one of the most memorable in history. there was but little if anything in the whole campaign, now that it is over, to criticise at all, and nothing to criticise severely. it was creditable alike to the general who commanded and the army which had executed it. sherman had on this campaign some bright, wide-awake division and brigade commanders whose alertness added a host to the efficiency of his command. the troops now went to work to make themselves comfortable, and to enjoy a little rest after their arduous campaign. the city of atlanta was turned into a military base. the citizens were all compelled to leave. sherman also very wisely prohibited the assembling of the army of sutlers and traders who always follow in the wake of an army in the field, if permitted to do so, from trading with the citizens and getting the money of the soldiers for articles of but little use to them, and for which they are made to pay most exorbitant prices. he limited the number of these traders to one for each of his three armies. the news of sherman's success reached the north instantaneously, and set the country all aglow. this was the first great political campaign for the republicans in their canvass of 1864. it was followed later by sheridan's campaign in the shenandoah valley; and these two campaigns probably had more effect in settling the election of the following november than all the speeches, all the bonfires, and all the parading with banners and bands of music in the north. chapter l. grand movement of the army of the potomac--crossing the rapidan --entering the wilderness--battle of the wilderness. soon after midnight, may 3d-4th, the army of the potomac moved out from its position north rapidan, to start upon that memorable campaign, destined to result in the capture of the confederate capital and the army defending it. this was not to be accomplished, however, without as desperate fighting as the world has ever witnessed; not to be consummated in a day, a week, a month, single season. the losses inflicted, and endured, were destined to be severe; but the armies now confronting each other had already been in deadly conflict for a period of three years, with immense losses in killed, by death from sickness, captured and wounded; and neither had made any real progress accomplishing the final end. it is true the confederates had, so far, held their capital, and they claimed this to be their sole object. but previously they had boldly proclaimed their intention to capture philadelphia, new york, and the national capital, and had made several attempts to do so, and once or twice had come fearfully near making their boast good--too near for complacent contemplation by the loyal north. they had also come near losing their own capital on at least one occasion. so here was a stand-off. the campaign now begun was destined to result in heavier losses, to both armies, in a given time, than any previously suffered; but the carnage was to be limited to a single year, and to accomplish all that had been anticipated or desired at the beginning in that time. we had to have hard fighting to achieve this. the two armies had been confronting each other so long, without any decisive result, that they hardly knew which could whip. ten days' rations, with a supply of forage and ammunition were taken in wagons. beef cattle were driven with the trains, and butchered as wanted. three days rations in addition, in haversacks, and fifty rounds of cartridges, were carried on the person of each soldier. the country over which the army had to operate, from the rapidan to the crossing of the james river, is rather flat, and is cut by numerous streams which make their way to the chesapeake bay. the crossings of these streams by the army were generally made not far above tide-water, and where they formed a considerable obstacle to the rapid advance of troops even when the enemy did not appear in opposition. the country roads were narrow and poor. most of the country is covered with a dense forest, in places, like the wilderness and along the chickahominy, almost impenetrable even for infantry except along the roads. all bridges were naturally destroyed before the national troops came to them. the army of the potomac was composed of three infantry and one cavalry corps, commanded respectively by generals w. s. hancock, g. k. warren, (*27) john sedgwick and p. h. sheridan. the artillery was commanded by general henry j. hunt. this arm was in such abundance that the fourth of it could not be used to advantage in such a country as we were destined to pass through. the surplus was much in the way, taking up as it did so much of the narrow and bad roads, and consuming so much of the forage and other stores brought up by the trains. the 5th corps, general warren commanding, was in advance on the right, and marched directly for germania ford, preceded by one division of cavalry, under general j. h. wilson. general sedgwick followed warren with the 6th corps. germania ford was nine or ten miles below the right of lee's line. hancock, with the 2d corps, moved by another road, farther east, directly upon ely's ford, six miles below germania, preceded by gregg's division of cavalry, and followed by the artillery. torbert's division of cavalry was left north of the rapidan, for the time, to picket the river and prevent the enemy from crossing and getting into our rear. the cavalry seized the two crossings before daylight, drove the enemy's pickets guarding them away, and by six o'clock a.m. had the pontoons laid ready for the crossing of the infantry and artillery. this was undoubtedly a surprise to lee. the fact that the movement was unopposed proves this. burnside, with the 9th corps, was left back at warrenton, guarding the railroad from bull run forward to preserve control of it in case our crossing the rapidan should be long delayed. he was instructed, however, to advance at once on receiving notice that the army had crossed; and a dispatch was sent to him a little after one p.m. giving the information that our crossing had been successful. the country was heavily wooded at all the points of crossing, particularly on the south side of the river. the battle-field from the crossing of the rapidan until the final movement from the wilderness toward spottsylvania was of the same character. there were some clearings and small farms within what might be termed the battle-field; but generally the country was covered with a dense forest. the roads were narrow and bad. all the conditions were favorable for defensive operations. there are two roads, good for that part of virginia, running from orange court house to the battle-field. the most southerly of these roads is known as the orange court house plank road, the northern one as the orange turnpike. there are also roads from east of the battle-field running to spottsylvania court house, one from chancellorsville, branching at aldrich's; the western branch going by piney branch church, alsop's, thence by the brock road to spottsylvania; the east branch goes by gates's, thence to spottsylvania. the brock road runs from germania ford through the battle-field and on to the court house. as spottsylvania is approached the country is cut up with numerous roads, some going to the town direct, and others crossing so as to connect the farms with roads going there. lee's headquarters were at orange court house. from there to fredericksburg he had the use of the two roads above described running nearly parallel to the wilderness. this gave him unusual facilities, for that country, for concentrating his forces to his right. these roads strike the road from germania ford in the wilderness. as soon as the crossing of the infantry was assured, the cavalry pushed forward, wilson's division by wilderness tavern to parker's store, on the orange plank road; gregg to the left towards chancellorsville. warren followed wilson and reached the wilderness tavern by noon, took position there and intrenched. sedgwick followed warren. he was across the river and in camp on the south bank, on the right of warren, by sundown. hancock, with the 2d corps, moved parallel with warren and camped about six miles east of him. before night all the troops, and by the evening of the 5th the trains of more than four thousand wagons, were safely on the south side of the river. there never was a corps better organized than was the quartermaster's corps with the army of the potomac in 1864. with a wagon-train that would have extended from the rapidan to richmond, stretched along in single file and separated as the teams necessarily would be when moving, we could still carry only three days' forage and about ten to twelve days' rations, besides a supply of ammunition. to overcome all difficulties, the chief quartermaster, general rufus ingalls, had marked on each wagon the corps badge with the division color and the number of the brigade. at a glance, the particular brigade to which any wagon belonged could be told. the wagons were also marked to note the contents: if ammunition, whether for artillery or infantry; if forage, whether grain or hay; if rations, whether, bread, pork, beans, rice, sugar, coffee or whatever it might be. empty wagons were never allowed to follow the army or stay in camp. as soon as a wagon was empty it would return to the base of supply for a load of precisely the same article that had been taken from it. empty trains were obliged to leave the road free for loaded ones. arriving near the army they would be parked in fields nearest to the brigades they belonged to. issues, except of ammunition, were made at night in all cases. by this system the hauling of forage for the supply train was almost wholly dispensed with. they consumed theirs at the depots. i left culpeper court house after all the troops had been put in motion, and passing rapidly to the front, crossed the rapidan in advance of sedgwick's corps; and established headquarters for the afternoon and night in a deserted house near the river. orders had been given, long before this movement began, to cut down the baggage of officers and men to the lowest point possible. notwithstanding this i saw scattered along the road from culpeper to germania ford wagon-loads of new blankets and overcoats, thrown away by the troops to lighten their knapsacks; an improvidence i had never witnessed before. lee, while his pickets and signal corps must have discovered at a very early hour on the morning of the 4th of may, that the army of the potomac was moving, evidently did not learn until about one o'clock in the afternoon by what route we would confront his army. this i judge from the fact that at 1.15 p.m., an hour and a quarter after warren had reached old wilderness tavern, our officers took off rebel signals which, when translated, were seen to be an order to his troops to occupy their intrenchments at mine run. here at night dispatches were received announcing that sherman, butler and crook had moved according to programme. on discovering the advance of the army of the potomac, lee ordered hill, ewell and longstreet, each commanding corps, to move to the right to attack us, hill on the orange plank road, longstreet to follow on the same road. longstreet was at this time--middle of the afternoon--at gordonsville, twenty or more miles away. ewell was ordered by the orange pike. he was near by and arrived some four miles east of mine run before bivouacking for the night. my orders were given through general meade for an early advance on the morning of the 5th. warren was to move to parker's store, and wilson's cavalry--then at parker's store--to move on to craig's meeting-house. sedgwick followed warren, closing in on his right. the army of the potomac was facing to the west, though our advance was made to the south, except when facing the enemy. hancock was to move south-westward to join on the left of warren, his left to reach to shady grove church. at six o'clock, before reaching parker's store, warren discovered the enemy. he sent word back to this effect, and was ordered to halt and prepare to meet and attack him. wright, with his division of sedgwick's corps, was ordered, by any road he could find, to join on to warren's right, and getty with his division, also of sedgwick's corps, was ordered to move rapidly by warren's rear and get on his left. this was the speediest way to reinforce warren who was confronting the enemy on both the orange plank and turnpike roads. burnside had moved promptly on the 4th, on receiving word that the army of the potomac had safely crossed the rapidan. by making a night march, although some of his troops had to march forty miles to reach the river, he was crossing with the head of his column early on the morning of the 5th. meade moved his headquarters on to old wilderness tavern, four miles south of the river, as soon as it was light enough to see the road. i remained to hasten burnside's crossing and to put him in position. burnside at this time was not under meade's command, and was his senior in rank. getting information of the proximity of the enemy, i informed meade, and without waiting to see burnside, at once moved forward my headquarters to where meade was. it was my plan then, as it was on all other occasions, to take the initiative whenever the enemy could be drawn from his intrenchments if we were not intrenched ourselves. warren had not yet reached the point where he was to halt, when he discovered the enemy near by. neither party had any advantage of position. warren was, therefore, ordered to attack as soon as he could prepare for it. at nine o'clock hancock was ordered to come up to the support of getty. he himself arrived at getty's front about noon, but his troops were yet far in the rear. getty was directed to hold his position at all hazards until relieved. about this hour warren was ready, and attacked with favorable though not decisive results. getty was somewhat isolated from warren and was in a precarious condition for a time. wilson, with his division of cavalry, was farther south, and was cut off from the rest of the army. at two o'clock hancock's troops began to arrive, and immediately he was ordered to join getty and attack the enemy. but the heavy timber and narrow roads prevented him from getting into position for attack as promptly as he generally did when receiving such orders. at four o'clock he again received his orders to attack, and general getty received orders from meade a few minutes later to attack whether hancock was ready or not. he met the enemy under heth within a few hundred yards. hancock immediately sent two divisions, commanded by birney and mott, and later two brigades, carroll's and owen's, to the support of getty. this was timely and saved getty. during the battle getty and carroll were wounded, but remained on the field. one of birney's most gallant brigade commanders--alexander hays--was killed. i had been at west point with hays for three years, and had served with him through the mexican war, a portion of the time in the same regiment. he was a most gallant officer, ready to lead his command wherever ordered. with him it was "come, boys," not "go." wadsworth's division and baxter's brigade of the 2d division were sent to reinforce hancock and getty; but the density of the intervening forest was such that, there being no road to march upon, they did not get up with the head of column until night, and bivouacked where they were without getting into position. during the afternoon sheridan sent gregg's division of cavalry to todd's tavern in search of wilson. this was fortunate. he found wilson engaged with a superior force under general rosser, supported by infantry, and falling back before it. together they were strong enough to turn the tables upon the enemy and themselves become aggressive. they soon drove the rebel cavalry back beyond corbin's bridge. fighting between hancock and hill continued until night put a close to it. neither side made any special progress. after the close of the battle of the 5th of may my orders were given for the following morning. we knew longstreet with 12,000 men was on his way to join hill's right, near the brock road, and might arrive during the night. i was anxious that the rebels should not take the initiative in the morning, and therefore ordered hancock to make an assault at 4.30 o'clock. meade asked to have the hour changed to six. deferring to his wishes as far as i was willing, the order was modified and five was fixed as the hour to move. hancock had now fully one-half of the army of the potomac. wadsworth with his division, which had arrived the night before, lay in a line perpendicular to that held by hill, and to the right of hancock. he was directed to move at the same time, and to attack hill's left. burnside, who was coming up with two divisions, was directed to get in between warren and wadsworth, and attack as soon as he could get in position to do so. sedgwick and warren were to make attacks in their front, to detain as many of the enemy as they could and to take advantage of any attempt to reinforce hill from that quarter. burnside was ordered if he should succeed in breaking the enemy's centre, to swing around to the left and envelop the right of lee's army. hancock was informed of all the movements ordered. burnside had three divisions, but one of them--a colored division--was sent to guard the wagon train, and he did not see it again until july. lee was evidently very anxious that there should be no battle on his right until longstreet got up. this is evident from the fact that notwithstanding the early hour at which i had ordered the assault, both for the purpose of being the attacking party and to strike before longstreet got up, lee was ahead in his assault on our right. his purpose was evident, but he failed. hancock was ready to advance by the hour named, but learning in time that longstreet was moving a part of his corps by the catharpin road, thus threatening his left flank, sent a division of infantry, commanded by general barlow, with all his artillery, to cover the approaches by which longstreet was expected. this disposition was made in time to attack as ordered. hancock moved by the left of the orange plank road, and wadsworth by the right of it. the fighting was desperate for about an hour, when the enemy began to break up in great confusion. i believed then, and see no reason to change that opinion now, that if the country had been such that hancock and his command could have seen the confusion and panic in the lines of the enemy, it would have been taken advantage of so effectually that lee would not have made another stand outside of his richmond defences. gibbon commanded hancock's left, and was ordered to attack, but was not able to accomplish much. on the morning of the 6th sheridan was sent to connect with hancock's left and attack the enemy's cavalry who were trying to get on our left and rear. he met them at the intersection of the furnace and brock roads and at todd's tavern, and defeated them at both places. later he was attacked, and again the enemy was repulsed. hancock heard the firing between sheridan and stuart, and thinking the enemy coming by that road, still further reinforced his position guarding the entrance to the brock road. another incident happened during the day to further induce hancock to weaken his attacking column. word reached him that troops were seen moving towards him from the direction of todd's tavern, and brooke's brigade was detached to meet this new enemy; but the troops approaching proved to be several hundred convalescents coming from chancellorsville, by the road hancock had advanced upon, to join their respective commands. at 6.50 o'clock a.m., burnside, who had passed wilderness tavern at six o'clock, was ordered to send a division to the support of hancock, but to continue with the remainder of his command in the execution of his previous order. the difficulty of making a way through the dense forests prevented burnside from getting up in time to be of any service on the forenoon of the sixth. hancock followed hill's retreating forces, in the morning, a mile or more. he maintained this position until, along in the afternoon, longstreet came upon him. the retreating column of hill meeting reinforcements that had not yet been engaged, became encouraged and returned with them. they were enabled, from the density of the forest, to approach within a few hundred yards of our advance before being discovered. falling upon a brigade of hancock's corps thrown to the advance, they swept it away almost instantly. the enemy followed up his advantage and soon came upon mott's division, which fell back in great confusion. hancock made dispositions to hold his advanced position, but after holding it for a time, fell back into the position that he had held in the morning, which was strongly intrenched. in this engagement the intrepid wadsworth while trying to rally his men was mortally wounded and fell into the hands of the enemy. the enemy followed up, but made no immediate attack. the confederate general jenkins was killed and longstreet seriously wounded in this engagement. longstreet had to leave the field, not to resume command for many weeks. his loss was a severe one to lee, and compensated in a great measure for the mishap, or misapprehensions, which had fallen to our lot during the day. after longstreet's removal from the field lee took command of his right in person. he was not able, however, to rally his men to attack hancock's position, and withdrew from our front for the purpose of reforming. hancock sent a brigade to clear his front of all remnants that might be left of longstreet's or hill's commands. this brigade having been formed at right angles to the intrenchments held by hancock's command, swept down the whole length of them from left to right. a brigade of the enemy was encountered in this move; but it broke and disappeared without a contest. firing was continued after this, but with less fury. burnside had not yet been able to get up to render any assistance. but it was now only about nine in the morning, and he was getting into position on hancock's right. at 4.15 in the afternoon lee attacked our left. his line moved up to within a hundred yards of ours and opened a heavy fire. this status was maintained for about half an hour. then a part of mott's division and ward's brigade of birney's division gave way and retired in disorder. the enemy under r. h. anderson took advantage of this and pushed through our line, planting their flags on a part of the intrenchments not on fire. but owing to the efforts of hancock, their success was but temporary. carroll, of gibbon's division, moved at a double quick with his brigade and drove back the enemy, inflicting great loss. fighting had continued from five in the morning sometimes along the whole line, at other times only in places. the ground fought over had varied in width, but averaged three-quarters of a mile. the killed, and many of the severely wounded, of both armies, lay within this belt where it was impossible to reach them. the woods were set on fire by the bursting shells, and the conflagration raged. the wounded who had not strength to move themselves were either suffocated or burned to death. finally the fire communicated with our breastworks, in places. being constructed of wood, they burned with great fury. but the battle still raged, our men firing through the flames until it became too hot to remain longer. lee was now in distress. his men were in confusion, and his personal efforts failed to restore order. these facts, however, were learned subsequently, or we would have taken advantage of his condition and no doubt gained a decisive success. his troops were withdrawn now, but i revoked the order, which i had given previously to this assault, for hancock to attack, because his troops had exhausted their ammunition and did not have time to replenish from the train, which was at some distance. burnside, sedgwick, and warren had all kept up an assault during all this time; but their efforts had no other effect than to prevent the enemy from reinforcing his right from the troops in their front. i had, on the 5th, ordered all the bridges over the rapidan to be taken up except one at germania ford. the troops on sedgwick's right had been sent to enforce our left. this left our right in danger of being turned, and us of being cut off from all present base of supplies. sedgwick had refused his right and intrenched it for protection against attack. but late in the afternoon of the 6th early came out from his lines in considerable force and got in upon sedgwick's right, notwithstanding the precautions taken, and created considerable confusion. early captured several hundred prisoners, among them two general officers. the defence, however, was vigorous; and night coming on, the enemy was thrown into as much confusion as our troops, engaged, were. early says in his memoirs that if we had discovered the confusion in his lines we might have brought fresh troops to his great discomfort. many officers, who had not been attacked by early, continued coming to my headquarters even after sedgwick had rectified his lines a little farther to the rear, with news of the disaster, fully impressed with the idea that the enemy was pushing on and would soon be upon me. during the night all of lee's army withdrew within their intrenchments. on the morning of the 7th general custer drove the enemy's cavalry from catharpin furnace to todd's tavern. pickets and skirmishers were sent along our entire front to find the position of the enemy. some went as far as a mile and a half before finding him. but lee showed no disposition to come out of his works. there was no battle during the day, and but little firing except in warren's front; he being directed about noon to make a reconnoissance in force. this drew some sharp firing, but there was no attempt on the part of lee to drive him back. this ended the battle of the wilderness. chapter li. after the battle--telegraph and signal service--movement by the left flank. more desperate fighting has not been witnessed on this continent than that of the 5th and 6th of may. our victory consisted in having successfully crossed a formidable stream, almost in the face of an enemy, and in getting the army together as a unit. we gained an advantage on the morning of the 6th, which, if it had been followed up, must have proven very decisive. in the evening the enemy gained an advantage; but was speedily repulsed. as we stood at the close, the two armies were relatively in about the same condition to meet each other as when the river divided them. but the fact of having safely crossed was a victory. our losses in the wilderness were very severe. those of the confederates must have been even more so; but i have no means of speaking with accuracy upon this point. the germania ford bridge was transferred to ely's ford to facilitate the transportation of the wounded to washington. it may be as well here as elsewhere to state two things connected with all movements of the army of the potomac: first, in every change of position or halt for the night, whether confronting the enemy or not, the moment arms were stacked the men intrenched themselves. for this purpose they would build up piles of logs or rails if they could be found in their front, and dig a ditch, throwing the dirt forward on the timber. thus the digging they did counted in making a depression to stand in, and increased the elevation in front of them. it was wonderful how quickly they could in this way construct defences of considerable strength. when a halt was made with the view of assaulting the enemy, or in his presence, these would be strengthened or their positions changed under the direction of engineer officers. the second was, the use made of the telegraph and signal corps. nothing could be more complete than the organization and discipline of this body of brave and intelligent men. insulated wires--insulated so that they would transmit messages in a storm, on the ground or under water--were wound upon reels, making about two hundred pounds weight of wire to each reel. two men and one mule were detailed to each reel. the pack-saddle on which this was carried was provided with a rack like a sawbuck placed crosswise of the saddle, and raised above it so that the reel, with its wire, would revolve freely. there was a wagon, supplied with a telegraph operator, battery and telegraph instruments for each division, each corps, each army, and one for my headquarters. there were wagons also loaded with light poles, about the size and length of a wall tent pole, supplied with an iron spike in one end, used to hold the wires up when laid, so that wagons and artillery would not run over them. the mules thus loaded were assigned to brigades, and always kept with the command they were assigned to. the operators were also assigned to particular headquarters, and never changed except by special orders. the moment the troops were put in position to go into camp all the men connected with this branch of service would proceed to put up their wires. a mule loaded with a coil of wire would be led to the rear of the nearest flank of the brigade he belonged to, and would be led in a line parallel thereto, while one man would hold an end of the wire and uncoil it as the mule was led off. when he had walked the length of the wire the whole of it would be on the ground. this would be done in rear of every brigade at the same time. the ends of all the wires would then be joined, making a continuous wire in the rear of the whole army. the men, attached to brigades or divisions, would all commence at once raising the wires with their telegraph poles. this was done by making a loop in the wire and putting it over the spike and raising the pole to a perpendicular position. at intervals the wire would be attached to trees, or some other permanent object, so that one pole was sufficient at a place. in the absence of such a support two poles would have to be used, at intervals, placed at an angle so as to hold the wire firm in its place. while this was being done the telegraph wagons would take their positions near where the headquarters they belonged to were to be established, and would connect with the wire. thus, in a few minutes longer time than it took a mule to walk the length of its coil, telegraphic communication would be effected between all the headquarters of the army. no orders ever had to be given to establish the telegraph. the signal service was used on the march. the men composing this corps were assigned to specified commands. when movements were made, they would go in advance, or on the flanks, and seize upon high points of ground giving a commanding view of the country, if cleared, or would climb tall trees on the highest points if not cleared, and would denote, by signals, the positions of different parts of our own army, and often the movements of the enemy. they would also take off the signals of the enemy and transmit them. it would sometimes take too long a time to make translations of intercepted dispatches for us to receive any benefit from them. but sometimes they gave useful information. on the afternoon of the 7th i received news from washington announcing that sherman had probably attacked johnston that day, and that butler had reached city point safely and taken it by surprise on the 5th. i had given orders for a movement by the left flank, fearing that lee might move rapidly to richmond to crush butler before i could get there. my order for this movement was as follows: headquarters armies of the u. s., may 7, 1864, 6.30 a.m. major-general meade, commanding a. p. make all preparations during the day for a night march to take position at spottsylvania c. h. with one army corps, at todd's tavern with one, and another near the intersection of the piney branch and spottsylvania road with the road from alsop's to old court house. if this move is made the trains should be thrown forward early in the morning to the ny river. i think it would be advisable in making the change to leave hancock where he is until warren passes him. he could then follow and become the right of the new line. burnside will move to piney branch church. sedgwick can move along the pike to chancellorsville and on to his destination. burnside will move on the plank road to the intersection of it with the orange and fredericksburg plank road, then follow sedgwick to his place of destination. all vehicles should be got out of hearing of the enemy before the troops move, and then move off quietly. it is more than probable that the enemy concentrate for a heavy attack on hancock this afternoon. in case they do we must be prepared to resist them, and follow up any success we may gain, with our whole force. such a result would necessarily modify these instructions. all the hospitals should be moved to-day to chancellorsville. u. s. grant, lieut.-general. during the 7th sheridan had a fight with the rebel cavalry at todd's tavern, but routed them, thus opening the way for the troops that were to go by that route at night. soon after dark warren withdrew from the front of the enemy, and was soon followed by sedgwick. warren's march carried him immediately behind the works where hancock's command lay on the brock road. with my staff and a small escort of cavalry i preceded the troops. meade with his staff accompanied me. the greatest enthusiasm was manifested by hancock's men as we passed by. no doubt it was inspired by the fact that the movement was south. it indicated to them that they had passed through the "beginning of the end" in the battle just fought. the cheering was so lusty that the enemy must have taken it for a night attack. at all events it drew from him a furious fusillade of artillery and musketry, plainly heard but not felt by us. meade and i rode in advance. we had passed but a little way beyond our left when the road forked. we looked to see, if we could, which road sheridan had taken with his cavalry during the day. it seemed to be the right-hand one, and accordingly we took it. we had not gone far, however, when colonel c. b. comstock, of my staff, with the instinct of the engineer, suspecting that we were on a road that would lead us into the lines of the enemy, if he, too, should be moving, dashed by at a rapid gallop and all alone. in a few minutes he returned and reported that lee was moving, and that the road we were on would bring us into his lines in a short distance. we returned to the forks of the road, left a man to indicate the right road to the head of warren's column when it should come up, and continued our journey to todd's tavern, where we arrived after midnight. my object in moving to spottsylvania was two-fold: first, i did not want lee to get back to richmond in time to attempt to crush butler before i could get there; second, i wanted to get between his army and richmond if possible; and, if not, to draw him into the open field. but lee, by accident, beat us to spottsylvania. our wagon trains had been ordered easterly of the roads the troops were to march upon before the movement commenced. lee interpreted this as a semi-retreat of the army of the potomac to fredericksburg, and so informed his government. accordingly he ordered longstreet's corps--now commanded by anderson--to move in the morning (the 8th) to spottsylvania. but the woods being still on fire, anderson could not go into bivouac, and marched directly on to his destination that night. by this accident lee got possession of spottsylvania. it is impossible to say now what would have been the result if lee's orders had been obeyed as given; but it is certain that we would have been in spottsylvania, and between him and his capital. my belief is that there would have been a race between the two armies to see which could reach richmond first, and the army of the potomac would have had the shorter line. thus, twice since crossing the rapidan we came near closing the campaign, so far as battles were concerned, from the rapidan to the james river or richmond. the first failure was caused by our not following up the success gained over hill's corps on the morning of the 6th, as before described: the second, when fires caused by that battle drove anderson to make a march during the night of the 7th-8th which he was ordered to commence on the morning of the 8th. but accident often decides the fate of battle. sheridan's cavalry had had considerable fighting during the afternoon of the 7th, lasting at todd's tavern until after night, with the field his at the close. he issued the necessary orders for seizing spottsylvania and holding the bridge over the po river, which lee's troops would have to cross to get to spottsylvania. but meade changed sheridan's orders to merritt--who was holding the bridge--on his arrival at todd's tavern, and thereby left the road free for anderson when he came up. wilson, who was ordered to seize the town, did so, with his division of cavalry; but he could not hold it against the confederate corps which had not been detained at the crossing of the po, as it would have been but for the unfortunate change in merritt's orders. had he been permitted to execute the orders sheridan gave him, he would have been guarding with two brigades of cavalry the bridge over the po river which anderson had to cross, and must have detained him long enough to enable warren to reinforce wilson and hold the town. anderson soon intrenched himself--if indeed the intrenchments were not already made--immediately across warren's front. warren was not aware of his presence, but probably supposed it was the cavalry which merritt had engaged earlier in the day. he assaulted at once, but was repulsed. he soon organized his men, as they were not pursued by the enemy, and made a second attack, this time with his whole corps. this time he succeeded in gaining a position immediately in the enemy's front, where he intrenched. his right and left divisions--the former crawford's, the latter wadsworth's, now commanded by cutler--drove the enemy back some distance. at this time my headquarters had been advanced to piney branch church. i was anxious to crush anderson before lee could get a force to his support. to this end sedgwick who was at piney branch church, was ordered to warren's support. hancock, who was at todd's tavern, was notified of warren's engagement, and was directed to be in readiness to come up. burnside, who was with the wagon trains at aldrich's on our extreme left, received the same instructions. sedgwick was slow in getting up for some reason--probably unavoidable, because he was never at fault when serious work was to be done--so that it was near night before the combined forces were ready to attack. even then all of sedgwick's command did not get into the engagement. warren led the last assault, one division at a time, and of course it failed. warren's difficulty was twofold: when he received an order to do anything, it would at once occur to his mind how all the balance of the army should be engaged so as properly to co-operate with him. his ideas were generally good, but he would forget that the person giving him orders had thought of others at the time he had of him. in like manner, when he did get ready to execute an order, after giving most intelligent instructions to division commanders, he would go in with one division, holding the others in reserve until he could superintend their movements in person also, forgetting that division commanders could execute an order without his presence. his difficulty was constitutional and beyond his control. he was an officer of superior ability, quick perceptions, and personal courage to accomplish anything that could be done with a small command. lee had ordered hill's corps--now commanded by early--to move by the very road we had marched upon. this shows that even early in the morning of the 8th lee had not yet become acquainted with my move, but still thought that the army of the potomac had gone to fredericksburg. indeed, he informed the authorities at richmond he had possession of spottsylvania and was on my flank. anderson was in possession of spottsylvania, through no foresight of lee, however. early only found that he had been following us when he ran against hancock at todd's tavern. his coming detained hancock from the battle-field of spottsylvania for that day; but he, in like manner, kept early back and forced him to move by another route. had i ordered the movement for the night of the 7th by my left flank, it would have put hancock in the lead. it would also have given us an hour or earlier start. it took all that time for warren to get the head of his column to the left of hancock after he had got his troops out of their line confronting the enemy. this hour, and hancock's capacity to use his whole force when necessary, would, no doubt, have enabled him to crush anderson before he could be reinforced. but the movement made was tactical. it kept the troops in mass against a possible assault by the enemy. our left occupied its intrenchments while the two corps to the right passed. if an attack had been made by the enemy he would have found the 2d corps in position, fortified, and, practically, the 5th and 6th corps in position as reserves, until his entire front was passed. by a left flank movement the army would have been scattered while still passing the front of the enemy, and before the extreme right had got by it would have been very much exposed. then, too, i had not yet learned the special qualifications of the different corps commanders. at that time my judgment was that warren was the man i would suggest to succeed meade should anything happen to that gallant soldier to take him from the field. as i have before said, warren was a gallant soldier, an able man; and he was beside thoroughly imbued with the solemnity and importance of the duty he had to perform. chapter lii. battle of spottsylvania--hancock's position--assault of warren's and wright's corps--upton promoted on the field--good news from butler and sheridan. the mattapony river is formed by the junction of the mat, the ta, the po and the ny rivers, the last being the northernmost of the four. it takes its rise about a mile south and a little east of the wilderness tavern. the po rises south-west of the place, but farther away. spottsylvania is on the ridge dividing these two streams, and where they are but a few miles apart. the brock road reaches spottsylvania without crossing either of these streams. lee's army coming up by the catharpin road, had to cross the po at wooden bridge. warren and hancock came by the brock road. sedgwick crossed the ny at catharpin furnace. burnside coming by aldrich's to gates's house, had to cross the ny near the enemy. he found pickets at the bridge, but they were soon driven off by a brigade of willcox's division, and the stream was crossed. this brigade was furiously attacked; but the remainder of the division coming up, they were enabled to hold their position, and soon fortified it. about the time i received the news of this attack, word came from hancock that early had left his front. he had been forced over to the catharpin road, crossing the po at corbin's and again at wooden bridge. these are the bridges sheridan had given orders to his cavalry to occupy on the 8th, while one division should occupy spottsylvania. these movements of the enemy gave me the idea that lee was about to make the attempt to get to, or towards, fredericksburg to cut off my supplies. i made arrangements to attack his right and get between him and richmond if he should try to execute this design. if he had any such intention it was abandoned as soon as burnside was established south of the ny. the po and the ny are narrow little streams, but deep, with abrupt banks, and bordered by heavily wooded and marshy bottoms--at the time we were there--and difficult to cross except where bridged. the country about was generally heavily timbered, but with occasional clearings. it was a much better country to conduct a defensive campaign in than an offensive one. by noon of the 9th the position of the two armies was as follows: lee occupied a semicircle facing north, north-west and north-east, inclosing the town. anderson was on his left extending to the po, ewell came next, then early. warren occupied our right, covering the brock and other roads converging at spottsylvania; sedgwick was to his left and burnside on our extreme left. hancock was yet back at todd's tavern, but as soon as it was known that early had left hancock's front the latter was ordered up to warren's right. he formed a line with three divisions on the hill overlooking the po early in the afternoon, and was ordered to cross the po and get on the enemy's flank. the fourth division of hancock's corps, mott commanding, was left at todd's when the corps first came up; but in the afternoon it was brought up and placed to the left of sedgwick's--now wright's--6th corps. in the morning general sedgwick had been killed near the right of his intrenchments by rebel sharpshooters. his loss was a severe one to the army of the potomac and to the nation. general h. g. wright succeeded him in the command of his corps. hancock was now, nine p.m. of the 9th of may, across the left flank of lee's army, but separated from it, and also from the remainder of meade's army, by the po river. but for the lateness of the hour and the darkness of the night he would have attempted to cross the river again at wooden bridge, thus bringing himself on the same side with both friend and foe. the po at the points where hancock's corps crossed runs nearly due east. just below his lower crossing--the troops crossed at three points--it turns due south, and after passing under wooden bridge soon resumes a more easterly direction. during the night this corps built three bridges over the po; but these were in rear. the position assumed by hancock's corps forced lee to reinforce his left during the night. accordingly on the morning of the 10th, when hancock renewed his effort to get over the po to his front, he found himself confronted by some of early's command, which had been brought from the extreme right of the enemy during the night. he succeeded in effecting a crossing with one brigade, however, but finding the enemy intrenched in his front, no more were crossed. hancock reconnoitred his front on the morning of the 10th, with the view of forcing a crossing, if it was found that an advantage could be gained. the enemy was found strongly intrenched on the high ground overlooking the river, and commanding the wooden bridge with artillery. anderson's left rested on the po, where it turns south; therefore, for hancock to cross over--although it would bring him to the same side of the stream with the rest of the army--would still farther isolate him from it. the stream would have to be crossed twice in the face of the enemy to unite with the main body. the idea of crossing was therefore abandoned. lee had weakened the other parts of his line to meet this movement of hancock's, and i determined to take advantage of it. accordingly in the morning, orders were issued for an attack in the afternoon on the centre by warren's and wright's corps, hancock to command all the attacking force. two of his divisions were brought to the north side of the po. gibbon was placed to the right of warren, and birney in his rear as a reserve. barlow's division was left south of the stream, and mott of the same corps was still to the left of wright's corps. burnside was ordered to reconnoitre his front in force, and, if an opportunity presented, to attack with vigor. the enemy seeing barlow's division isolated from the rest of the army, came out and attacked with fury. barlow repulsed the assault with great slaughter, and with considerable loss to himself. but the enemy reorganized and renewed the assault. birney was now moved to the high ground overlooking the river crossings built by our troops, and covered the crossings. the second assault was repulsed, again with severe loss to the enemy, and barlow was withdrawn without further molestation. general t. g. stevenson was killed in this move. between the lines, where warren's assault was to take place, there was a ravine grown up with large trees and underbrush, making it almost impenetrable by man. the slopes on both sides were also covered with a heavy growth of timber. warren, before noon, reconnoitred his front twice, the first time with one and the second with two divisions. he was repulsed on both occasions, but gained such information of the ground as to induce him to report recommending the assault. wright also reconnoitred his front and gained a considerably advanced position from the one he started from. he then organized a storming party, consisting of twelve regiments, and assigned colonel emory upton, of the 121st new york volunteers, to the command of it. about four o'clock in the afternoon the assault was ordered, warren's and wright's corps, with mott's division of hancock's corps, to move simultaneously. the movement was prompt, and in a few minutes the fiercest of struggles began. the battle-field was so densely covered with forest that but little could be seen, by any one person, as to the progress made. meade and i occupied the best position we could get, in rear of warren. warren was repulsed with heavy loss, general j. c. rice being among the killed. he was not followed, however, by the enemy, and was thereby enabled to reorganize his command as soon as covered from the guns of the enemy. to the left our success was decided, but the advantage was lost by the feeble action of mott. upton with his assaulting party pushed forward and crossed the enemy's intrenchments. turning to the right and left he captured several guns and some hundreds of prisoners. mott was ordered to his assistance but failed utterly. so much time was lost in trying to get up the troops which were in the right position to reinforce, that i ordered upton to withdraw; but the officers and men of his command were so averse to giving up the advantage they had gained that i withdrew the order. to relieve them, i ordered a renewal of the assault. by this time hancock, who had gone with birney's division to relieve barlow, had returned, bringing the division with him. his corps was now joined with warren's and wright's in this last assault. it was gallantly made, many men getting up to, and over, the works of the enemy; but they were not able to hold them. at night they were withdrawn. upton brought his prisoners with him, but the guns he had captured he was obliged to abandon. upton had gained an important advantage, but a lack in others of the spirit and dash possessed by him lost it to us. before leaving washington i had been authorized to promote officers on the field for special acts of gallantry. by this authority i conferred the rank of brigadier-general upon upton on the spot, and this act was confirmed by the president. upton had been badly wounded in this fight. burnside on the left had got up to within a few hundred yards of spottsylvania court house, completely turning lee's right. he was not aware of the importance of the advantage he had gained, and i, being with the troops where the heavy fighting was, did not know of it at the time. he had gained his position with but little fighting, and almost without loss. burnside's position now separated him widely from wright's corps, the corps nearest to him. at night he was ordered to join on to this. this brought him back about a mile, and lost to us an important advantage. i attach no blame to burnside for this, but i do to myself for not having had a staff officer with him to report to me his position. the enemy had not dared to come out of his line at any point to follow up his advantage, except in the single instance of his attack on barlow. then he was twice repulsed with heavy loss, though he had an entire corps against two brigades. barlow took up his bridges in the presence of this force. on the 11th there was no battle and but little firing; none except by mott who made a reconnoissance to ascertain if there was a weak point in the enemy's line. i wrote the following letter to general halleck: near spottsylvania c. h., may 11, 1864--8.30 a.m. major-general halleck, chief of staff of the army, washington, d. c. we have now ended the 6th day of very hard fighting. the result up to this time is much in our favor. but our losses have been heavy as well as those of the enemy. we have lost to this time eleven general officers killed, wounded and missing, and probably twenty thousand men. i think the loss of the enemy must be greater--we having taken over four thousand prisoners in battle, whilst he has taken from us but few except a few stragglers. i am now sending back to belle plain all my wagons for a fresh supply of provisions and ammunition, and purpose to fight it out on this line if it takes all summer. the arrival of reinforcements here will be very encouraging to the men, and i hope they will be sent as fast as possible, and in as great numbers. my object in having them sent to belle plain was to use them as an escort to our supply trains. if it is more convenient to send them out by train to march from the railroad to belle plain or fredericksburg, send them so. i am satisfied the enemy are very shaky, and are only kept up to the mark by the greatest exertions on the part of their officers, and by keeping them intrenched in every position they take. up to this time there is no indication of any portion of lee's army being detached for the defence of richmond. u. s. grant, lieut.-general. and also, i received information, through the war department, from general butler that his cavalry under kautz had cut the railroad south of petersburg, separating beauregard from richmond, and had whipped hill, killing, wounding and capturing many. also that he was intrenched, and could maintain himself. on this same day came news from sheridan to the effect that he had destroyed ten miles of the railroad and telegraph between lee and richmond, one and a half million rations, and most of the medical stores for his army. on the 8th i had directed sheridan verbally to cut loose from the army of the potomac and pass around the left of lee's army and attack his cavalry and communications, which was successfully executed in the manner i have already described. chapter liii. hancock's assault-losses of the confederates--promotions recommended --discomfiture of the enemy--ewell's attack-reducing the artillery. in the reconnoissance made by mott on the 11th, a salient was discovered at the right centre. i determined that an assault should be made at that point. (*28) accordingly in the afternoon hancock was ordered to move his command by the rear of warren and wright, under cover of night, to wright's left, and there form it for an assault at four o'clock the next morning. the night was dark, it rained heavily, and the road was difficult, so that it was midnight when he reached the point where he was to halt. it took most of the night to get the men in position for their advance in the morning. the men got but little rest. burnside was ordered to attack (*29) on the left of the salient at the same hour. i sent two of my staff officers to impress upon him the importance of pushing forward vigorously. hancock was notified of this. warren and wright were ordered to hold themselves in readiness to join in the assault if circumstances made it advisable. i occupied a central position most convenient for receiving information from all points. hancock put barlow on his left, in double column, and birney to his right. mott followed birney, and gibbon was held in reserve. the morning of the 12th opened foggy, delaying the start more than half an hour. the ground over which hancock had to pass to reach the enemy, was ascending and heavily wooded to within two or three hundred yards of the enemy's intrenchments. in front of birney there was also a marsh to cross. but, notwithstanding all these difficulties, the troops pushed on in quick time without firing a gun, and when within four or five hundred yards of the enemy's line broke out in loud cheers, and with a rush went up to and over the breastworks. barlow and birney entered almost simultaneously. here a desperate hand-to-hand conflict took place. the men of the two sides were too close together to fire, but used their guns as clubs. the hand conflict was soon over. hancock's corps captured some four thousand prisoners among them a division and a brigade commander twenty or more guns with their horses, caissons, and ammunition, several thousand stand of arms, and many colors. hancock, as soon as the hand-to-hand conflict was over, turned the guns of the enemy against him and advanced inside the rebel lines. about six o'clock i ordered warren's corps to the support of hancock's. burnside, on the left, had advanced up east of the salient to the very parapet of the enemy. potter, commanding one of his divisions, got over but was not able to remain there. however, he inflicted a heavy loss upon the enemy; but not without loss in return. this victory was important, and one that lee could not afford to leave us in full possession of. he made the most strenuous efforts to regain the position he had lost. troops were brought up from his left and attacked hancock furiously. hancock was forced to fall back: but he did so slowly, with his face to the enemy, inflicting on him heavy loss, until behind the breastworks he had captured. these he turned, facing them the other way, and continued to hold. wright was ordered up to reinforce hancock, and arrived by six o'clock. he was wounded soon after coming up but did not relinquish the command of his corps, although the fighting lasted until one o'clock the next morning. at eight o'clock warren was ordered up again, but was so slow in making his dispositions that his orders were frequently repeated, and with emphasis. at eleven o'clock i gave meade written orders to relieve warren from his command if he failed to move promptly. hancock placed batteries on high ground in his rear, which he used against the enemy, firing over the heads of his own troops. burnside accomplished but little on our left of a positive nature, but negatively a great deal. he kept lee from reinforcing his centre from that quarter. if the 5th corps, or rather if warren, had been as prompt as wright was with the 6th corps, better results might have been obtained. lee massed heavily from his left flank on the broken point of his line. five times during the day he assaulted furiously, but without dislodging our troops from their new position. his losses must have been fearful. sometimes the belligerents would be separated by but a few feet. in one place a tree, eighteen inches in diameter, was cut entirely down by musket balls. all the trees between the lines were very much cut to pieces by artillery and musketry. it was three o'clock next morning before the fighting ceased. some of our troops had then been twenty hours under fire. in this engagement we did not lose a single organization, not even a company. the enemy lost one division with its commander, one brigade and one regiment, with heavy losses elsewhere.(*30) our losses were heavy, but, as stated, no whole company was captured. at night lee took a position in rear of his former one, and by the following morning he was strongly intrenched in it. warren's corps was now temporarily broken up, cutler's division sent to wright, and griffin's to hancock. meade ordered his chief of staff, general humphreys, to remain with warren and the remaining division, and authorized him to give it orders in his name. during the day i was passing along the line from wing to wing continuously. about the centre stood a house which proved to be occupied by an old lady and her daughter. she showed such unmistakable signs of being strongly union that i stopped. she said she had not seen a union flag for so long a time that it did her heart good to look upon it again. she said her husband and son, being, union men, had had to leave early in the war, and were now somewhere in the union army, if alive. she was without food or nearly so, so i ordered rations issued to her, and promised to find out if i could where the husband and son were. there was no fighting on the 13th, further than a little skirmishing between mott's division and the enemy. i was afraid that lee might be moving out, and i did not want him to go without my knowing it. the indications were that he was moving, but it was found that he was only taking his new position back from the salient that had been captured. our dead were buried this day. mott's division was reduced to a brigade, and assigned to birney's division. during this day i wrote to washington recommending sherman and meade (*31) for promotion to the grade of major-general in the regular army; hancock for brigadier-general; wright, gibbon and humphreys to be major-generals of volunteers; and upton and carroll to be brigadiers. upton had already been named as such, but the appointment had to be confirmed by the senate on the nomination of the president. the night of the 13th warren and wright were moved by the rear to the left of burnside. the night was very dark and it rained heavily, the roads were so bad that the troops had to cut trees and corduroy the road a part of the way, to get through. it was midnight before they got to the point where they were to halt, and daylight before the troops could be organized to advance to their position in line. they gained their position in line, however, without any fighting, except a little in wright's front. here upton had to contend for an elevation which we wanted and which the enemy was not disposed to yield. upton first drove the enemy, and was then repulsed in turn. ayres coming to his support with his brigade (of griffin's division, warren's corps), the position was secured and fortified. there was no more battle during the 14th. this brought our line east of the court house and running north and south and facing west. during the night of the 14th-15th lee moved to cover this new front. this left hancock without an enemy confronting him. he was brought to the rear of our new centre, ready to be moved in any direction he might be wanted. on the 15th news came from butler and averill. the former reported the capture of the outer works at drury's bluff, on the james river, and that his cavalry had cut the railroad and telegraph south of richmond on the danville road: and the latter, the destruction of a depot of supplies at dublin, west virginia, and the breaking of new river bridge on the virginia and tennessee railroad. the next day news came from sherman and sheridan. sherman had forced johnston out of dalton, georgia, and was following him south. the report from sheridan embraced his operations up to his passing the outer defences of richmond. the prospect must now have been dismal in richmond. the road and telegraph were cut between the capital and lee. the roads and wires were cut in every direction from the rebel capital. temporarily that city was cut off from all communication with the outside except by courier. this condition of affairs, however, was of but short duration. i wrote halleck: near spottsylvania c. h., may 16, 1864, 8 a.m. major-general halleck, washington, d. c.: we have had five days almost constant rain without any prospect yet of it clearing up. the roads have now become so impassable that ambulances with wounded men can no longer run between here and fredericksburg. all offensive operations necessarily cease until we can have twenty-four hours of dry weather. the army is in the best of spirits, and feel the greatest confidence of ultimate success. * * * * * * you can assure the president and secretary of war that the elements alone have suspended hostilities, and that it is in no manner due to weakness or exhaustion on our part. u. s. grant, lieut.-general. the condition of the roads was such that nothing was done on the 17th. but that night hancock and wright were to make a night march back to their old positions, and to make an assault at four o'clock in the morning. lee got troops back in time to protect his old line, so the assault was unsuccessful. on this day (18th) the news was almost as discouraging to us as it had been two days before in the rebel capital. as stated above, hancock's and wright's corps had made an unsuccessful assault. news came that sigel had been defeated at new market, badly, and was retreating down the valley. not two hours before, i had sent the inquiry to halleck whether sigel could not get to staunton to stop supplies coming from there to lee. i asked at once that sigel might be relieved, and some one else put in his place. hunter's name was suggested, and i heartily approved. further news from butler reported him driven from drury's bluff, but still in possession of the petersburg road. banks had been defeated in louisiana, relieved, and canby put in his place. this change of commander was not on my suggestion. all this news was very discouraging. all of it must have been known by the enemy before it was by me. in fact, the good news (for the enemy) must have been known to him at the moment i thought he was in despair, and his anguish had been already relieved when we were enjoying his supposed discomfiture, but this was no time for repining. i immediately gave orders for a movement by the left flank, on towards richmond, to commence on the night of the 19th. i also asked halleck to secure the cooperation of the navy in changing our base of supplies from fredericksburg to port royal, on the rappahannock. up to this time i had received no reinforcements, except six thousand raw troops under brigadier general robert o. tyler, just arrived. they had not yet joined their command, hancock's corps, but were on our right. this corps had been brought to the rear of the centre, ready to move in any direction. lee, probably suspecting some move on my part, and seeing our right entirely abandoned, moved ewell's corps about five o'clock in the afternoon, with early's as a reserve, to attack us in that quarter. tyler had come up from fredericksburg, and had been halted on the road to the right of our line, near kitching's brigade of warren's corps. tyler received the attack with his raw troops, and they maintained their position, until reinforced, in a manner worthy of veterans. hancock was in a position to reinforce speedily, and was the soldier to do it without waiting to make dispositions. birney was thrown to tyler's right and crawford to his left, with gibbon as a reserve; and ewell was whirled back speedily and with heavy loss. warren had been ordered to get on ewell's flank and in his rear, to cut him off from his intrenchments. but his efforts were so feeble that under the cover of night ewell got back with only the loss of a few hundred prisoners, besides his killed and wounded. the army being engaged until after dark, i rescinded the order for the march by our left flank that night. as soon as it was discovered that the enemy were coming out to attack, i naturally supposed they would detach a force to destroy our trains. the withdrawal of hancock from the right uncovered one road from spottsylvania to fredericksburg over which trains drew our supplies. this was guarded by a division of colored troops, commanded by general ferrero, belonging to burnside's corps. ferrero was therefore promptly notified, and ordered to throw his cavalry pickets out to the south and be prepared to meet the enemy if he should come; if he had to retreat to do so towards fredericksburg. the enemy did detach as expected, and captured twenty-five or thirty wagons which, however, were soon retaken. in consequence of the disasters that had befallen us in the past few days, lee could be reinforced largely, and i had no doubt he would be. beauregard had come up from the south with troops to guard the confederate capital when it was in danger. butler being driven back, most of the troops could be sent to lee. hoke was no longer needed in north carolina; and sigel's troops having gone back to cedar creek, whipped, many troops could be spared from the valley. the wilderness and spottsylvania battles convinced me that we had more artillery than could ever be brought into action at any one time. it occupied much of the road in marching, and taxed the trains in bringing up forage. artillery is very useful when it can be brought into action, but it is a very burdensome luxury where it cannot be used. before leaving spottsylvania, therefore, i sent back to the defences of washington over one hundred pieces of artillery, with the horses and caissons. this relieved the roads over which we were to march of more than two hundred six-horse teams, and still left us more artillery than could be advantageously used. in fact, before reaching the james river i again reduced the artillery with the army largely. i believed that, if one corps of the army was exposed on the road to richmond, and at a distance from the main army, lee would endeavor to attack the exposed corps before reinforcements could come up; in which case the main army could follow lee up and attack him before he had time to intrench. so i issued the following orders: near spottsylvania c. h., va., may 18, 1864. major-general meade, commanding army of the potomac. before daylight to-morrow morning i propose to draw hancock and burnside from the position they now hold, and put burnside to the left of wright. wright and burnside should then force their way up as close to the enemy as they can get without a general engagement, or with a general engagement if the enemy will come out of their works to fight, and intrench. hancock should march and take up a position as if in support of the two left corps. to-morrow night, at twelve or one o'clock, he will be moved south-east with all his force and as much cavalry as can be given to him, to get as far towards richmond on the line of the fredericksburg railroad as he can make, fighting the enemy in whatever force he can find him. if the enemy make a general move to meet this, they will be followed by the other three corps of the army, and attacked, if possible, before time is given to intrench. suitable directions will at once be given for all trains and surplus artillery to conform to this movement. u. s. grant. on the 20th, lee showing no signs of coming out of his lines, orders were renewed for a left-flank movement, to commence after night. chapter liv. movement by the left flank--battle of north anna--an incident of the march--moving on richmond--south of the pamunkey--position of the national army. we were now to operate in a different country from any we had before seen in virginia. the roads were wide and good, and the country well cultivated. no men were seen except those bearing arms, even the black man having been sent away. the country, however, was new to us, and we had neither guides nor maps to tell us where the roads were, or where they led to. engineer and staff officers were put to the dangerous duty of supplying the place of both maps and guides. by reconnoitring they were enabled to locate the roads in the vicinity of each army corps. our course was south, and we took all roads leading in that direction which would not separate the army too widely. hancock who had the lead had marched easterly to guiney's station, on the fredericksburg railroad, thence southerly to bowling green and milford. he was at milford by the night of the 21st. here he met a detachment of pickett's division coming from richmond to reinforce lee. they were speedily driven away, and several hundred captured. warren followed on the morning of the 21st, and reached guiney's station that night without molestation. burnside and wright were retained at spottsylvania to keep up the appearance of an intended assault, and to hold lee, if possible, while hancock and warren should get start enough to interpose between him and richmond. lee had now a superb opportunity to take the initiative either by attacking wright and burnside alone, or by following by the telegraph road and striking hancock's and warren's corps, or even hancock's alone, before reinforcements could come up. but he did not avail himself of either opportunity. he seemed really to be misled as to my designs; but moved by his interior line--the telegraph road--to make sure of keeping between his capital and the army of the potomac. he never again had such an opportunity of dealing a heavy blow. the evening of the 21st burnside, 9th corps, moved out followed by wright, 6th corps. burnside was to take the telegraph road; but finding stanard's ford, over the po, fortified and guarded, he turned east to the road taken by hancock and warren without an attempt to dislodge the enemy. the night of the 21st i had my headquarters near the 6th corps, at guiney's station, and the enemy's cavalry was between us and hancock. there was a slight attack on burnside's and wright's corps as they moved out of their lines; but it was easily repulsed. the object probably was only to make sure that we were not leaving a force to follow upon the rear of the confederates. by the morning of the 22d burnside and wright were at guiney's station. hancock's corps had now been marching and fighting continuously for several days, not having had rest even at night much of the time. they were, therefore, permitted to rest during the 22d. but warren was pushed to harris's store, directly west of milford, and connected with it by a good road, and burnside was sent to new bethel church. wright's corps was still back at guiney's station. i issued the following order for the movement of the troops the next day: new bethel, va., may 22, 1864 major-general meade, commanding army of the potomac. direct corps commanders to hold their troops in readiness to march at five a.m. to-morrow. at that hour each command will send out cavalry and infantry on all roads to their front leading south, and ascertain, if possible, where the enemy is. if beyond the south anna, the 5th and 6th corps will march to the forks of the road, where one branch leads to beaver dam station, the other to jericho bridge, then south by roads reaching the anna, as near to and east of hawkins creek as they can be found. the 2d corps will move to chesterfield ford. the 9th corps will be directed to move at the same time to jericho bridge. the map only shows two roads for the four corps to march upon, but, no doubt, by the use of plantation roads, and pressing in guides, others can be found, to give one for each corps. the troops will follow their respective reconnoitring parties. the trains will be moved at the same time to milford station. headquarters will follow the 9th corps. u. s. grant, lieut.-general. warren's corps was moved from harris's store to jericho ford, wright's following. warren arrived at the ford early in the afternoon, and by five o'clock effected a crossing under the protection of sharpshooters. the men had to wade in water up to their waists. as soon as enough troops were over to guard the ford, pontoons were laid and the artillery and the rest of the troops crossed. the line formed was almost perpendicular to the course of the river--crawford on the left, next to the river, griffin in the centre, and cutler on the right. lee was found intrenched along the front of their line. the whole of hill's corps was sent against warren's right before it had got in position. a brigade of cutler's division was driven back, the enemy following, but assistance coming up the enemy was in turn driven back into his trenches with heavy loss in killed and wounded, with about five hundred prisoners left in our hands. by night wright's corps was up ready to reinforce warren. on the 23d hancock's corps was moved to the wooden bridge which spans the north anna river just west of where the fredericksburg railroad crosses. it was near night when the troops arrived. they found the bridge guarded, with troops intrenched, on the north side. hancock sent two brigades, egan's and pierce's, to the right and left, and when properly disposed they charged simultaneously. the bridge was carried quickly, the enemy retreating over it so hastily that many were shoved into the river, and some of them were drowned. several hundred prisoners were captured. the hour was so late that hancock did not cross until next morning. burnside's corps was moved by a middle road running between those described above, and which strikes the north anna at ox ford, midway between telegraph road and jericho ford. the hour of its arrival was too late to cross that night. on the 24th hancock's corps crossed to the south side of the river without opposition, and formed line facing nearly west. the railroad in rear was taken possession of and destroyed as far as possible. wright's corps crossed at jericho early the same day, and took position to the right of warren's corps, extending south of the virginia central railroad. this road was torn up for a considerable distance to the rear (west), the ties burned, and the rails bent and twisted by heating them over the burning ties. it was found, however, that burnside's corps could not cross at ox ford. lee had taken a position with his centre on the river at this point, with the two wings thrown back, his line making an acute angle where it overlooked the river. before the exact position of the whole of lee's line was accurately known, i directed hancock and warren each to send a brigade to ox ford by the south side of the river. they found the enemy too strong to justify a serious attack. a third ford was found between ox ford and jericho. burnside was directed to cross a division over this ford, and to send one division to hancock. crittenden was crossed by this newly-discovered ford, and formed up the river to connect with crawford's left. potter joined hancock by way of the wooden bridge. crittenden had a severe engagement with some of hill's corps on his crossing the river, and lost heavily. when joined to warren's corps he was no further molested. burnside still guarded ox ford from the north side. lee now had his entire army south of the north anna. our lines covered his front, with the six miles separating the two wings guarded by but a single division. to get from one wing to the other the river would have to be crossed twice. lee could reinforce any part of his line from all points of it in a very short march; or could concentrate the whole of it wherever he might choose to assault. we were, for the time, practically two armies besieging. lee had been reinforced, and was being reinforced, largely. about this time the very troops whose coming i had predicted, had arrived or were coming in. pickett with a full division from richmond was up; hoke from north carolina had come with a brigade; and breckinridge was there: in all probably not less than fifteen thousand men. but he did not attempt to drive us from the field. on the 22d or 23d i received dispatches from washington saying that sherman had taken kingston, crossed the etowah river and was advancing into georgia. i was seated at the time on the porch of a fine plantation house waiting for burnside's corps to pass. meade and his staff, besides my own staff, were with me. the lady of the house, a mrs. tyler, and an elderly lady, were present. burnside seeing us, came up on the porch, his big spurs and saber rattling as he walked. he touched his hat politely to the ladies, and remarked that he supposed they had never seen so many "live yankees" before in their lives. the elderly lady spoke up promptly saying, "oh yes, i have; many more." "where?" said burnside. "in richmond." prisoners, of course, was understood. i read my dispatch aloud, when it was received. this threw the younger lady into tears. i found the information she had received (and i suppose it was the information generally in circulation through the south) was that lee was driving us from the state in the most demoralized condition and that in the south-west our troops were but little better than prisoners of war. seeing our troops moving south was ocular proof that a part of her information was incorrect, and she asked me if my news from sherman was true. i assured her that there was no doubt about it. i left a guard to protect the house from intrusion until the troops should have all passed, and assured her that if her husband was in hiding she could bring him in and he should be protected also. but i presume he was in the confederate army. on the 25th i gave orders, through halleck, to hunter, who had relieved sigel, to move up the valley of virginia, cross over the blue ridge to charlottesville and go as far as lynchburg if possible, living upon the country and cutting the railroads and canal as he went. after doing this he could find his way back to his base, or join me. on the same day news was received that lee was falling back on richmond. this proved not to be true. but we could do nothing where we were unless lee would assume the offensive. i determined, therefore, to draw out of our present position and make one more effort to get between him and richmond. i had no expectation now, however, of succeeding in this; but i did expect to hold him far enough west to enable me to reach the james river high up. sheridan was now again with the army of the potomac. on the 26th i informed the government at washington of the position of the two armies; of the reinforcements the enemy had received; of the move i proposed to make (*32); and directed that our base of supplies should be shifted to white house, on the pamunkey. the wagon train and guards moved directly from port royal to white house. supplies moved around by water, guarded by the navy. orders had previously been sent, through halleck, for butler to send smith's corps to white house. this order was repeated on the 25th, with directions that they should be landed on the north side of the pamunkey, and marched until they joined the army of the potomac. it was a delicate move to get the right wing of the army of the potomac from its position south of the north anna in the presence of the enemy. to accomplish it, i issued the following order: quarles' mills, va., may 25, 1864. major general meade, commanding a. p. direct generals warren and wright to withdraw all their teams and artillery, not in position, to the north side of the river to-morrow. send that belonging to general wright's corps as far on the road to hanover town as it can go, without attracting attention to the fact. send with it wright's best division or division under his ablest commander. have their places filled up in the line so if possible the enemy will not notice their withdrawal. send the cavalry to-morrow afternoon, or as much of it as you may deem necessary, to watch and seize, if they can, littlepage's bridge and taylor's ford, and to remain on one or other side of the river at these points until the infantry and artillery all pass. as soon as it is dark to-morrow night start the division which you withdraw first from wright's corps to make a forced march to hanover town, taking with them no teams to impede their march. at the same time this division starts commence withdrawing all of the 5th and 6th corps from the south side of the river, and march them for the same place. the two divisions of the 9th corps not now with hancock, may be moved down the north bank of the river where they will be handy to support hancock if necessary, or will be that much on their road to follow the 5th and 6th corps. hancock should hold his command in readiness to follow as soon as the way is clear for him. to-morrow it will leave nothing for him to do, but as soon as he can he should get all his teams and spare artillery on the road or roads which he will have to take. as soon as the troops reach hanover town they should get possession of all the crossings they can in that neighborhood. i think it would be well to make a heavy cavalry demonstration on the enemy's left, to-morrow afternoon, also. u. s. grant, lieut.-general. wilson's division of cavalry was brought up from the left and moved by our right south to little river. here he manoeuvred to give the impression that we were going to attack the left flank of lee's army. under cover of night our right wing was withdrawn to the north side of the river, lee being completely deceived by wilson's feint. on the afternoon of the 26th sheridan moved, sending gregg's and torbert's cavalry to taylor's and littlepage's fords towards hanover. as soon as it was dark both divisions moved quietly to hanover ferry, leaving small guards behind to keep up the impression that crossings were to be attempted in the morning. sheridan was followed by a division of infantry under general russell. on the morning of the 27th the crossing was effected with but little loss, the enemy losing thirty or forty, taken prisoners. thus a position was secured south of the pamunkey. russell stopped at the crossing while the cavalry pushed on to hanover town. here barringer's, formerly gordon's, brigade of rebel cavalry was encountered, but it was speedily driven away. warren's and wright's corps were moved by the rear of burnside's and hancock's corps. when out of the way these latter corps followed, leaving pickets confronting the enemy. wilson's cavalry followed last, watching all the fords until everything had recrossed; then taking up the pontoons and destroying other bridges, became the rear-guard. two roads were traversed by the troops in this move. the one nearest to and north of the north anna and pamunkey was taken by wright, followed by hancock. warren, followed by burnside, moved by a road farther north, and longer. the trains moved by a road still farther north, and had to travel a still greater distance. all the troops that had crossed the pamunkey on the morning of the 27th remained quiet during the rest of the day, while the troops north of that stream marched to reach the crossing that had been secured for them. lee had evidently been deceived by our movement from north anna; for on the morning of the 27th he telegraphed to richmond: "enemy crossed to north side, and cavalry and infantry crossed at hanover town." the troops that had then crossed left his front the night of the 25th. the country we were now in was a difficult one to move troops over. the streams were numerous, deep and sluggish, sometimes spreading out into swamps grown up with impenetrable growths of trees and underbrush. the banks were generally low and marshy, making the streams difficult to approach except where there were roads and bridges. hanover town is about twenty miles from richmond. there are two roads leading there; the most direct and shortest one crossing the chickahominy at meadow bridge, near the virginia central railroad, the second going by new and old cold harbor. a few miles out from hanover town there is a third road by way of mechanicsville to richmond. new cold harbor was important to us because while there we both covered the roads back to white house (where our supplies came from), and the roads south-east over which we would have to pass to get to the james river below the richmond defences. on the morning of the 28th the army made an early start, and by noon all had crossed except burnside's corps. this was left on the north side temporarily to guard the large wagon train. a line was at once formed extending south from the river, wright's corps on the right, hancock's in the centre, and warren's on the left, ready to meet the enemy if he should come. at the same time sheridan was directed to reconnoitre towards mechanicsville to find lee's position. at hawes' shop, just where the middle road leaves the direct road to richmond, he encountered the confederate cavalry dismounted and partially intrenched. gregg attacked with his division, but was unable to move the enemy. in the evening custer came up with a brigade. the attack was now renewed, the cavalry dismounting and charging as infantry. this time the assault was successful, both sides losing a considerable number of men. but our troops had to bury the dead, and found that more confederate than union soldiers had been killed. the position was easily held, because our infantry was near. on the 29th a reconnoissance was made in force, to find the position of lee. wright's corps pushed to hanover court house. hancock's corps pushed toward totopotomoy creek; warren's corps to the left on the shady grove church road, while burnside was held in reserve. our advance was pushed forward three miles on the left with but little fighting. there was now an appearance of a movement past our left flank, and sheridan was sent to meet it. on the 30th hancock moved to the totopotomoy, where he found the enemy strongly fortified. wright was moved to the right of hancock's corps, and burnside was brought forward and crossed, taking position to the left of hancock. warren moved up near huntley corners on the shady grove church road. there was some skirmishing along the centre, and in the evening early attacked warren with some vigor, driving him back at first, and threatening to turn our left flank. as the best means of reinforcing the left, hancock was ordered to attack in his front. he carried and held the rifle-pits. while this was going on warren got his men up, repulsed early, and drove him more than a mile. on this day i wrote to halleck ordering all the pontoons in washington to be sent to city point. in the evening news was received of the arrival of smith with his corps at white house. i notified meade, in writing, as follows: near hawes' shop, va., 6.40 p.m., may 30, 1864. major-general meade, commanding a. p. general smith will debark his force at the white house tonight and start up the south bank of the pamunkey at an early hour, probably at 3 a.m. in the morning. it is not improbable that the enemy, being aware of smith's movement, will be feeling to get on our left flank for the purpose of cutting him off, or by a dash to crush him and get back before we are aware of it. sheridan ought to be notified to watch the enemy's movements well out towards cold harbor, and also on the mechanicsville road. wright should be got well massed on hancock's right, so that, if it becomes necessary, he can take the place of the latter readily whilst troops are being thrown east of the totopotomoy if necessary. i want sheridan to send a cavalry force of at least half a brigade, if not a whole brigade, at 5 a.m. in the morning, to communicate with smith and to return with him. i will send orders for smith by the messenger you send to sheridan with his orders. u. s. grant. i also notified smith of his danger, and the precautions that would be taken to protect him. the night of the 30th lee's position was substantially from atlee's station on the virginia central railroad south and east to the vicinity of cold harbor. ours was: the left of warren's corps was on the shady grove road, extending to the mechanicsville road and about three miles south of the totopotomoy. burnside to his right, then hancock, and wright on the extreme right, extending towards hanover court house, six miles south-east of it. sheridan with two divisions of cavalry was watching our left front towards cold harbor. wilson with his division on our right was sent to get on the virginia central railroad and destroy it as far back as possible. he got possession of hanover court house the next day after a skirmish with young's cavalry brigade. the enemy attacked sheridan's pickets, but reinforcements were sent up and the attack was speedily repulsed and the enemy followed some distance towards cold harbor. chapter lv. advance on cold harbor--an anecdote of the war--battle of cold harbor --correspondence with lee--retrospective. on the 31st sheridan advanced to near old cold harbor. he found it intrenched and occupied by cavalry and infantry. a hard fight ensued but the place was carried. the enemy well knew the importance of cold harbor to us, and seemed determined that we should not hold it. he returned with such a large force that sheridan was about withdrawing without making any effort to hold it against such odds; but about the time he commenced the evacuation he received orders to hold the place at all hazards, until reinforcements could be sent to him. he speedily turned the rebel works to face against them and placed his men in position for defence. night came on before the enemy was ready for assault. wright's corps was ordered early in the evening to march directly to cold harbor passing by the rear of the army. it was expected to arrive by daylight or before; but the night was dark and the distance great, so that it was nine o'clock the 1st of june before it reached its destination. before the arrival of wright the enemy had made two assaults on sheridan, both of which were repulsed with heavy loss to the enemy. wright's corps coming up, there was no further assault on cold harbor. smith, who was coming up from white house, was also directed to march directly to cold harbor, and was expected early on the morning of the 1st of june; but by some blunder the order which reached smith directed him to newcastle instead of cold harbor. through this blunder smith did not reach his destination until three o'clock in the afternoon, and then with tired and worn-out men from their long and dusty march. he landed twelve thousand five hundred men from butler's command, but a division was left at white house temporarily and many men had fallen out of ranks in their long march. before the removal of wright's corps from our right, after dark on the 31st, the two lines, federal and confederate, were so close together at that point that either side could detect directly any movement made by the other. finding at daylight that wright had left his front, lee evidently divined that he had gone to our left. at all events, soon after light on the 1st of june anderson, who commanded the corps on lee's left, was seen moving along warren's front. warren was ordered to attack him vigorously in flank, while wright was directed to move out and get on his front. warren fired his artillery at the enemy; but lost so much time in making ready that the enemy got by, and at three o'clock he reported the enemy was strongly intrenched in his front, and besides his lines were so long that he had no mass of troops to move with. he seemed to have forgotten that lines in rear of an army hold themselves while their defenders are fighting in their front. wright reconnoitred some distance to his front: but the enemy finding old cold harbor already taken had halted and fortified some distance west. by six o'clock in the afternoon wright and smith were ready to make an assault. in front of both the ground was clear for several hundred yards and then became wooded. both charged across this open space and into the wood, capturing and holding the first line of rifle-pits of the enemy, and also capturing seven or eight hundred prisoners. while this was going on, the enemy charged warren three separate times with vigor, but were repulsed each time with loss. there was no officer more capable, nor one more prompt in acting, than warren when the enemy forced him to it. there was also an attack upon hancock's and burnside's corps at the same time; but it was feeble and probably only intended to relieve anderson who was being pressed by wright and smith. during the night the enemy made frequent attacks with the view of dispossessing us of the important position we had gained, but without effecting their object. hancock was moved from his place in line during the night and ordered to the left of wright. i expected to take the offensive on the morning of the 2d, but the night was so dark, the heat and dust so excessive and the roads so intricate and hard to keep, that the head of column only reached old cold harbor at six o'clock, but was in position at 7.30 a.m. preparations were made for an attack in the afternoon, but did not take place until the next morning. warren's corps was moved to the left to connect with smith: hancock's corps was got into position to the left of wright's, and burnside was moved to bethesda church in reserve. while warren and burnside were making these changes the enemy came out several times and attacked them, capturing several hundred prisoners. the attacks were repulsed, but not followed up as they should have been. i was so annoyed at this that i directed meade to instruct his corps commanders that they should seize all such opportunities when they occurred, and not wait for orders, all of our manoeuvres being made for the very purpose of getting the enemy out of his cover. on this day wilson returned from his raid upon the virginia central railroad, having damaged it considerably. but, like ourselves, the rebels had become experts in repairing such damage. sherman, in his memoirs, relates an anecdote of his campaign to atlanta that well illustrates this point. the rebel cavalry lurking in his rear to burn bridges and obstruct his communications had become so disgusted at hearing trains go whistling by within a few hours after a bridge had been burned, that they proposed to try blowing up some of the tunnels. one of them said, "no use, boys, old sherman carries duplicate tunnels with him, and will replace them as fast as you can blow them up; better save your powder." sheridan was engaged reconnoitring the banks of the chickahominy, to find crossings and the condition of the roads. he reported favorably. during the night lee moved his left up to make his line correspond to ours. his lines extended now from the totopotomoy to new cold harbor. mine from bethesda church by old cold harbor to the chickahominy, with a division of cavalry guarding our right. an assault was ordered for the 3d, to be made mainly by the corps of hancock, wright and smith; but warren and burnside were to support it by threatening lee's left, and to attack with great earnestness if he should either reinforce more threatened points by drawing from that quarter or if a favorable opportunity should present itself. the corps commanders were to select the points in their respective fronts where they would make their assaults. the move was to commence at half-past four in the morning. hancock sent barlow and gibbon forward at the appointed hour, with birney as a reserve. barlow pushed forward with great vigor, under a heavy fire of both artillery and musketry, through thickets and swamps. notwithstanding all the resistance of the enemy and the natural obstructions to overcome, he carried a position occupied by the enemy outside their main line where the road makes a deep cut through a bank affording as good a shelter for troops as if it had been made for that purpose. three pieces of artillery had been captured here, and several hundred prisoners. the guns were immediately turned against the men who had just been using them. no (*33) assistance coming to him, he (barlow) intrenched under fire and continued to hold his place. gibbon was not so fortunate in his front. he found the ground over which he had to pass cut up with deep ravines, and a morass difficult to cross. but his men struggled on until some of them got up to the very parapet covering the enemy. gibbon gained ground much nearer the enemy than that which he left, and here he intrenched and held fast. wright's corps moving in two lines captured the outer rifle-pits in their front, but accomplished nothing more. smith's corps also gained the outer rifle-pits in its front. the ground over which this corps (18th) had to move was the most exposed of any over which charges were made. an open plain intervened between the contending forces at this point, which was exposed both to a direct and a cross fire. smith, however, finding a ravine running towards his front, sufficiently deep to protect men in it from cross fire, and somewhat from a direct fire, put martindale's division in it, and with brooks supporting him on the left and devens on the right succeeded in gaining the outer--probably picket--rifle-pits. warren and burnside also advanced and gained ground--which brought the whole army on one line. this assault cost us heavily and probably without benefit to compensate: but the enemy was not cheered by the occurrence sufficiently to induce him to take the offensive. in fact, nowhere after the battle of the wilderness did lee show any disposition to leave his defences far behind him. fighting was substantially over by half-past seven in the morning. at eleven o'clock i started to visit all the corps commanders to see for myself the different positions gained and to get their opinion of the practicability of doing anything more in their respective fronts. hancock gave the opinion that in his front the enemy was too strong to make any further assault promise success. wright thought he could gain the lines of the enemy, but it would require the cooperation of hancock's and smith's corps. smith thought a lodgment possible, but was not sanguine: burnside thought something could be done in his front, but warren differed. i concluded, therefore to make no more assaults, and a little after twelve directed in the following letter that all offensive action should cease. cold harbor, june 3, 1864.-12.30 p.m. major-general meade, commanding a. p. the opinion of corps commanders not being sanguine of success in case an assault is ordered, you may direct a suspension of farther advance for the present. hold our most advanced positions and strengthen them. whilst on the defensive our line may be contracted from the right if practicable. reconnoissances should be made in front of every corps and advances made to advantageous positions by regular approaches. to aid the expedition under general hunter it is necessary that we should detain all the army now with lee until the former gets well on his way to lynchburg. to do this effectually it will be better to keep the enemy out of the intrenchments of richmond than to have them go back there. wright and hancock should be ready to assault in case the enemy should break through general smith's lines, and all should be ready to resist an assault. u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. the remainder of the day was spent in strengthening the line we now held. by night we were as strong against lee as he was against us. during the night the enemy quitted our right front, abandoning some of their wounded, and without burying their dead. these we were able to care for. but there were many dead and wounded men between the lines of the contending forces, which were now close together, who could not be cared for without a cessation of hostilities. so i wrote the following: cold harbor, va., june 5, 1864. general r. e. lee, commanding confederate army. it is reported to me that there are wounded men, probably of both armies, now lying exposed and suffering between the lines occupied respectively by the two armies. humanity would dictate that some provision should be made to provide against such hardships. i would propose, therefore, that hereafter, when no battle is raging, either party be authorized to send to any point between the pickets or skirmish lines, unarmed men bearing litters to pick up their dead or wounded, without being fired upon by the other party. any other method, equally fair to both parties, you may propose for meeting the end desired will be accepted by me. u. s. grant, lieut.-general. lee replied that he feared such an arrangement would lead to misunderstanding, and proposed that in future, when either party wished to remove their dead and wounded, a flag of truce be sent. i answered this immediately by saying: cold harbor, va., june 6, 1864. general r. e. lee, commanding army of n. va. your communication of yesterday's date is received. i will send immediately, as you propose, to collect the dead and wounded between the lines of the two armies, and will also instruct that you be allowed to do the same. i propose that the time for doing this be between the hours of 12 m. and 3 p.m. to-day. i will direct all parties going out to bear a white flag, and not to attempt to go beyond where we have dead or wounded, and not beyond or on ground occupied by your troops. u. s. grant, lieut.-general. lee's response was that he could not consent to the burial of the dead and removal of the wounded in the way i proposed, but when either party desired such permission it should be asked for by flag of truce and he had directed that any parties i may have sent out, as mentioned in my letter, to be turned back. i answered: cold harbor, va, june 6, 1864. general r. e. lee. commanding army, n. va. the knowledge that wounded men are now suffering from want of attention, between the two armies, compels me to ask a suspension of hostilities for sufficient time to collect them in, say two hours. permit me to say that the hours you may fix upon for this will be agreeable to me, and the same privilege will be extended to such parties as you may wish to send out on the same duty without further application. u. s. grant, lieut.-general. lee acceded to this; but delays in transmitting the correspondence brought it to the 7th of june--forty-eight hours after it commenced --before parties were got out to collect the men left upon the field. in the meantime all but two of the wounded had died. and i wrote to lee: cold harbor, va., june 7, 1864. 10.30 a.m. gen. r. e. lee, commanding army of n. va. i regret that your note of seven p.m. yesterday should have been received at the nearest corps headquarters, to where it was delivered, after the hour which had been given for the removal of the dead and wounded had expired; 10.45 p.m. was the hour at which it was received at corps headquarters, and between eleven and twelve it reached my headquarters. as a consequence, it was not understood by the troops of this army that there was a cessation of hostilities for the purpose of collecting the dead and wounded, and none were collected. two officers and six men of the 8th and 25th north carolina regts., who were out in search of the bodies of officers of their respective regiments, were captured and brought into our lines, owing to this want of understanding. i regret this, but will state that as soon as i learned the fact, i directed that they should not be held as prisoners, but must be returned to their commands. these officers and men having been carelessly brought through our lines to the rear have not determined whether they will be sent back the way they came, or whether they will be sent by some other route. regretting that all my efforts for alleviating the sufferings of wounded men left upon the battle-field have been rendered nugatory, i remain, &c., u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. i have always regretted that the last assault at cold harbor was ever made. i might say the same thing of the assault of the 22d of may, 1863, at vicksburg. at cold harbor no advantage whatever was gained to compensate for the heavy loss we sustained. indeed, the advantages other than those of relative losses, were on the confederate side. before that, the army of northern virginia seemed to have acquired a wholesome regard for the courage, endurance, and soldierly qualities generally of the army of the potomac. they no longer wanted to fight them "one confederate to five yanks." indeed, they seemed to have given up any idea of gaining any advantage of their antagonist in the open field. they had come to much prefer breastworks in their front to the army of the potomac. this charge seemed to revive their hopes temporarily; but it was of short duration. the effect upon the army of the potomac was the reverse. when we reached the james river, however, all effects of the battle of cold harbor seemed to have disappeared. there was more justification for the assault at vicksburg. we were in a southern climate, at the beginning of the hot season. the army of the tennessee had won five successive victories over the garrison of vicksburg in the three preceding weeks. they had driven a portion of that army from port gibson with considerable loss, after having flanked them out of their stronghold at grand gulf. they had attacked another portion of the same army at raymond, more than fifty miles farther in the interior of the state, and driven them back into jackson with great loss in killed, wounded, captured and missing, besides loss of large and small arms: they had captured the capital of the state of mississippi, with a large amount of materials of war and manufactures. only a few days before, they had beaten the enemy then penned up in the town first at champion's hill, next at big black river bridge, inflicting upon him a loss of fifteen thousand or more men (including those cut off from returning) besides large losses in arms and ammunition. the army of the tennessee had come to believe that they could beat their antagonist under any circumstances. there was no telling how long a regular siege might last. as i have stated, it was the beginning of the hot season in a southern climate. there was no telling what the casualties might be among northern troops working and living in trenches, drinking surface water filtered through rich vegetation, under a tropical sun. if vicksburg could have been carried in may, it would not only have saved the army the risk it ran of a greater danger than from the bullets of the enemy, but it would have given us a splendid army, well equipped and officered, to operate elsewhere with. these are reasons justifying the assault. the only benefit we gained--and it was a slight one for so great a sacrifice--was that the men worked cheerfully in the trenches after that, being satisfied with digging the enemy out. had the assault not been made, i have no doubt that the majority of those engaged in the siege of vicksburg would have believed that had we assaulted it would have proven successful, and would have saved life, health and comfort. chapter lvi. left flank movement across the chickahominy and james--general lee --visit to butler--the movement on petersburg--the investment of petersburg. lee's position was now so near richmond, and the intervening swamps of the chickahominy so great an obstacle to the movement of troops in the face of an enemy, that i determined to make my next left flank move carry the army of the potomac south of the james river. (*34) preparations for this were promptly commenced. the move was a hazardous one to make: the chickahominy river, with its marshy and heavily timbered approaches, had to be crossed; all the bridges over it east of lee were destroyed; the enemy had a shorter line and better roads to travel on to confront me in crossing; more than fifty miles intervened between me and butler, by the roads i should have to travel, with both the james and the chickahominy unbridged to cross; and last, the army of the potomac had to be got out of a position but a few hundred yards from the enemy at the widest place. lee, if he did not choose to follow me, might, with his shorter distance to travel and his bridges over the chickahominy and the james, move rapidly on butler and crush him before the army with me could come to his relief. then too he might spare troops enough to send against hunter who was approaching lynchburg, living upon the country he passed through, and without ammunition further than what he carried with him. but the move had to be made, and i relied upon lee's not seeing my danger as i saw it. besides we had armies on both sides of the james river and not far from the confederate capital. i knew that its safety would be a matter of the first consideration with the executive, legislative and judicial branches of the so-called confederate government, if it was not with the military commanders. but i took all the precaution i knew of to guard against all dangers. sheridan was sent with two divisions, to communicate with hunter and to break up the virginia central railroad and the james river canal, on the 7th of june, taking instructions to hunter to come back with him (*35). hunter was also informed by way of washington and the valley that sheridan was on the way to meet him. the canal and central road, and the regions penetrated by them, were of vast importance to the enemy, furnishing and carrying a large per cent. of all the supplies for the army of northern virginia and the people of richmond. before sheridan got off on the 7th news was received from hunter reporting his advance to staunton and successful engagement with the enemy near that place on the 5th, in which the confederate commander, w. s. jones, was killed. on the 4th of june the enemy having withdrawn his left corps, burnside on our right was moved up between warren and smith. on the 5th birney returned to hancock, which extended his left now to the chickahominy, and warren was withdrawn to cold harbor. wright was directed to send two divisions to the left to extend down the banks of that stream to bottom's bridge. the cavalry extended still farther east to jones's bridge. on the 7th abercrombie--who was in command at white house, and who had been in command at our base of supplies in all the changes made from the start--was ordered to take up the iron from the york river railroad and put it on boats, and to be in readiness to move by water to city point. on the 8th meade was directed to fortify a line down the bank overlooking the chickahominy, under cover of which the army could move. on the 9th abercrombie was directed to send all organized troops arriving at white house, without debarking from their transports, to report to butler. halleck was at this time instructed to send all reinforcements to city point. on the 11th i wrote: cold harbor, va., june 11, 1864. major-gen. b. f. butler, commanding department of va. and n. c. the movement to transfer this army to the south side of the james river will commence after dark to-morrow night. col. comstock, of my staff, was sent specially to ascertain what was necessary to make your position secure in the interval during which the enemy might use most of his force against you, and also, to ascertain what point on the river we should reach to effect a crossing if it should not be practicable to reach this side of the river at bermuda hundred. colonel comstock has not yet returned, so that i cannot make instructions as definite as i would wish, but the time between this and sunday night being so short in which to get word to you, i must do the best i can. colonel dent goes to the chickahominy to take to you the 18th corps. the corps will leave its position in the trenches as early in the evening, tomorrow, as possible, and make a forced march to cole's landing or ferry, where it should reach by ten a.m. the following morning. this corps numbers now 15,300 men. they take with them neither wagons nor artillery; these latter marching with the balance of the army to the james river. the remainder of the army will cross the chickahominy at long bridge and at jones's, and strike the river at the most practicable crossing below city point. i directed several days ago that all reinforcements for the army should be sent to you. i am not advised of the number that may have gone, but suppose you have received from six to ten thousand. general smith will also reach you as soon as the enemy could, going by the way of richmond. the balance of the force will not be more than one day behind, unless detained by the whole of lee's army, in which case you will be strong enough. i wish you would direct the proper staff officers, your chief-engineer and your chief-quartermaster, to commence at once the collection of all the means in their reach for crossing the army on its arrival. if there is a point below city point where a pontoon bridge can be thrown, have it laid. expecting the arrival of the 18th corps by monday night, if you deem it practicable from the force you have to seize and hold petersburg, you may prepare to start, on the arrival of troops to hold your present lines. i do not want petersburg visited, however, unless it is held, nor an attempt to take it, unless you feel a reasonable degree of confidence of success. if you should go there, i think troops should take nothing with them except what they can carry, depending upon supplies being sent after the place is secured. if colonel dent should not succeed in securing the requisite amount of transportation for the 18th corps before reaching you, please have the balance supplied. u. s. grant, lieut.-general. p. s.--on reflection i will send the 18th corps by way of white house. the distance which they will have to march will be enough shorter to enable them to reach you about the same time, and the uncertainty of navigation on the chickahominy will be avoided. u. s. grant. cold harbor, va., june 11,1864. major-general g. g. meade, commanding army of the potomac. colonel comstock, who visited the james river for the purpose of ascertaining the best point below bermuda hundred to which to march the army has not yet returned. it is now getting so late, however, that all preparations may be made for the move to-morrow night without waiting longer. the movement will be made as heretofore agreed upon, that is, the 18th corps make a rapid march with the infantry alone, their wagons and artillery accompanying the balance of the army to cole's landing or ferry, and there embark for city point, losing no time for rest until they reach the latter point. the 5th corps will seize long bridge and move out on the long bridge road to its junction with quaker road, or until stopped by the enemy. the other three corps will follow in such order as you may direct, one of them crossing at long bridge, and two at jones's bridge. after the crossing is effected, the most practicable roads will be taken to reach about fort powhattan. of course, this is supposing the enemy makes no opposition to our advance. the 5th corps, after securing the passage of the balance of the army, will join or follow in rear of the corps which crosses the same bridge with themselves. the wagon trains should be kept well east of the troops, and if a crossing can be found, or made lower down than jones's they should take it. u. s. grant, lieut.-general. p. s.--in view of the long march to reach cole's landing, and the uncertainty of being able to embark a large number of men there, the direction of the 18th corps may be changed to white house. they should be directed to load up transports, and start them as fast as loaded without waiting for the whole corps or even whole divisions to go together. u. s. grant. about this time word was received (through the richmond papers of the 11th) that crook and averell had united and were moving east. this, with the news of hunter's successful engagement near staunton, was no doubt known to lee before it was to me. then sheridan leaving with two divisions of cavalry, looked indeed threatening, both to lee's communications and supplies. much of his cavalry was sent after sheridan, and early with ewell's entire corps was sent to the valley. supplies were growing scarce in richmond, and the sources from which to draw them were in our hands. people from outside began to pour into richmond to help eat up the little on hand. consternation reigned there. on the 12th smith was ordered to move at night to white house, not to stop until he reached there, and to take boats at once for city point, leaving his trains and artillery to move by land. soon after dark some of the cavalry at long bridge effected a crossing by wading and floundering through the water and mud, leaving their horses behind, and drove away the cavalry pickets. a pontoon bridge was speedily thrown across, over which the remainder of the army soon passed and pushed out for a mile or two to watch and detain any advance that might be made from the other side. warren followed the cavalry, and by the morning of the 13th had his whole corps over. hancock followed warren. burnside took the road to jones's bridge, followed by wright. ferrero's division, with the wagon train, moved farther east, by window shades and cole's ferry, our rear being covered by cavalry. it was known that the enemy had some gunboats at richmond. these might run down at night and inflict great damage upon us before they could be sunk or captured by our navy. general butler had, in advance, loaded some vessels with stone ready to be sunk so as to obstruct the channel in an emergency. on the 13th i sent orders to have these sunk as high up the river as we could guard them, and prevent their removal by the enemy. as soon as warren's corps was over the chickahominy it marched out and joined the cavalry in holding the roads from richmond while the army passed. no attempt was made by the enemy to impede our march, however, but warren and wilson reported the enemy strongly fortified in their front. by the evening of the 13th hancock's corps was at charles city court house on the james river. burnside's and wright's corps were on the chickahominy, and crossed during the night, warren's corps and the cavalry still covering the army. the material for a pontoon bridge was already at hand and the work of laying it was commenced immediately, under the superintendence of brigadier-general benham, commanding the engineer brigade. on the evening of the 14th the crossing commenced, hancock in advance, using both the bridge and boats. when the wilderness campaign commenced the army of the potomac, including burnside's--which was a separate command until the 24th of may when it was incorporated with the main army--numbered about 116,000 men. during the progress of the campaign about 40,000 reinforcements were received. at the crossing of the james river june 14th-15th the army numbered about 115,000. besides the ordinary losses incident to a campaign of six weeks' nearly constant fighting or skirmishing, about one-half of the artillery was sent back to washington, and many men were discharged by reason of the expiration of their term of service.* in estimating our strength every enlisted man and every commissioned officer present is included, no matter how employed; in bands, sick in field hospitals, hospital attendants, company cooks and all. operating in an enemy's country, and being supplied always from a distant base, large detachments had at all times to be sent from the front, not only to guard the base of supplies and the roads to it, but all the roads leading to our flanks and rear. we were also operating in a country unknown to us, and without competent guides or maps showing the roads accurately. the manner of estimating numbers in the two armies differs materially. in the confederate army often only bayonets are taken into account, never, i believe, do they estimate more than are handling the guns of the artillery and armed with muskets (*36) or carbines. generally the latter are far enough away to be excluded from the count in any one field. officers and details of enlisted men are not included. in the northern armies the estimate is most liberal, taking in all connected with the army and drawing pay. estimated in the same manner as ours, lee had not less than 80,000 men at the start. his reinforcements were about equal to ours during the campaign, deducting the discharged men and those sent back. he was on the defensive, and in a country in which every stream, every road, every obstacle to the movement of troops and every natural defence was familiar to him and his army. the citizens were all friendly to him and his cause, and could and did furnish him with accurate reports of our every move. rear guards were not necessary for him, and having always a railroad at his back, large wagon trains were not required. all circumstances considered we did not have any advantage in numbers. general lee, who had led the army of northern virginia in all these contests, was a very highly estimated man in the confederate army and states, and filled also a very high place in the estimation of the people and press of the northern states. his praise was sounded throughout the entire north after every action he was engaged in: the number of his forces was always lowered and that of the national forces exaggerated. he was a large, austere man, and i judge difficult of approach to his subordinates. to be extolled by the entire press of the south after every engagement, and by a portion of the press north with equal vehemence, was calculated to give him the entire confidence of his troops and to make him feared by his antagonists. it was not an uncommon thing for my staff-officers to hear from eastern officers, "well, grant has never met bobby lee yet." there were good and true officers who believe now that the army of northern virginia was superior to the army of the potomac man to man. i do not believe so, except as the advantages spoken of above made them so. before the end i believe the difference was the other way. the army of northern virginia became despondent and saw the end. it did not please them. the national army saw the same thing, and were encouraged by it. the advance of the army of the potomac reached the james on the 14th of june. preparations were at once commenced for laying the pontoon bridges and crossing the river. as already stated, i had previously ordered general butler to have two vessels loaded with stone and carried up the river to a point above that occupied by our gunboats, where the channel was narrow, and sunk there so as to obstruct the passage and prevent confederate gunboats from coming down the river. butler had had these boats filled and put in position, but had not had them sunk before my arrival. i ordered this done, and also directed that he should turn over all material and boats not then in use in the river to be used in ferrying the troops across. i then, on the 14th, took a steamer and ran up to bermuda hundred to see general butler for the purpose of directing a movement against petersburg, while our troops of the army of the potomac were crossing. i had sent general w. f. smith back from cold harbor by the way of white house, thence on steamers to city point for the purpose of giving general butler more troops with which to accomplish this result. general butler was ordered to send smith with his troops reinforced, as far as that could be conveniently done, from other parts of the army of the james. he gave smith about six thousand reinforcements, including some twenty-five hundred cavalry under kautz, and about thirty-five hundred colored infantry under hinks. the distance which smith had to move to reach the enemy's lines was about six miles, and the confederate advance line of works was but two miles outside of petersburg. smith was to move under cover of night, up close to the enemy's works, and assault as soon as he could after daylight. i believed then, and still believe, that petersburg could have been easily captured at that time. it only had about 2,500 men in the defences besides some irregular troops, consisting of citizens and employees in the city who took up arms in case of emergency. smith started as proposed, but his advance encountered a rebel force intrenched between city point and their lines outside of petersburg. this position he carried, with some loss to the enemy; but there was so much delay that it was daylight before his troops really got off from there. while there i informed general butler that hancock's corps would cross the river and move to petersburg to support smith in case the latter was successful, and that i could reinforce there more rapidly than lee could reinforce from his position. i returned down the river to where the troops of the army of the potomac now were, communicated to general meade, in writing, the directions i had given to general butler and directed him (meade) to cross hancock's corps over under cover of night, and push them forward in the morning to petersburg; halting them, however, at a designated point until they could hear from smith. i also informed general meade that i had ordered rations from bermuda hundred for hancock's corps, and desired him to issue them speedily, and to lose no more time than was absolutely necessary. the rations did not reach him, however, and hancock, while he got all his corps over during the night, remained until half-past ten in the hope of receiving them. he then moved without them, and on the road received a note from general w. f. smith, asking him to come on. this seems to be the first information that general hancock had received of the fact that he was to go to petersburg, or that anything particular was expected of him. otherwise he would have been there by four o'clock in the afternoon. smith arrived in front of the enemy's lines early in the forenoon of the 15th, and spent the day until after seven o'clock in the evening in reconnoitering what appeared to be empty works. the enemy's line consisted of redans occupying commanding positions, with rifle-pits connecting them. to the east side of petersburg, from the appomattox back, there were thirteen of these redans extending a distance of several miles, probably three. if they had been properly manned they could have held out against any force that could have attacked them, at least until reinforcements could have got up from the north of richmond. smith assaulted with the colored troops, and with success. by nine o'clock at night he was in possession of five of these redans and, of course, of the connecting lines of rifle-pits. all of them contained artillery, which fell into our hands. hancock came up and proposed to take any part assigned to him; and smith asked him to relieve his men who were in the trenches. next morning, the 16th, hancock himself was in command, and captured another redan. meade came up in the afternoon and succeeded hancock, who had to be relieved, temporarily, from the command of his corps on account of the breaking out afresh of the wound he had received at gettysburg. during the day meade assaulted and carried one more redan to his right and two to his left. in all this we lost very heavily. the works were not strongly manned, but they all had guns in them which fell into our hands, together with the men who were handling them in the effort to repel these assaults. up to this time beauregard, who had commanded south of richmond, had received no reinforcements, except hoke's division from drury's bluff,(*37) which had arrived on the morning of the 16th; though he had urged the authorities very strongly to send them, believing, as he did, that petersburg would be a valuable prize which we might seek. during the 17th the fighting was very severe and the losses heavy; and at night our troops occupied about the same position they had occupied in the morning, except that they held a redan which had been captured by potter during the day. during the night, however, beauregard fell back to the line which had been already selected, and commenced fortifying it. our troops advanced on the 18th to the line which he had abandoned, and found that the confederate loss had been very severe, many of the enemy's dead still remaining in the ditches and in front of them. colonel j. l. chamberlain, of the 20th maine, was wounded on the 18th. he was gallantly leading his brigade at the time, as he had been in the habit of doing in all the engagements in which he had previously been engaged. he had several times been recommended for a brigadier-generalcy for gallant and meritorious conduct. on this occasion, however, i promoted him on the spot, and forwarded a copy of my order to the war department, asking that my act might be confirmed and chamberlain's name sent to the senate for confirmation without any delay. this was done, and at last a gallant and meritorious officer received partial justice at the hands of his government, which he had served so faithfully and so well. if general hancock's orders of the 15th had been communicated to him, that officer, with his usual promptness, would undoubtedly have been upon the ground around petersburg as early as four o'clock in the afternoon of the 15th. the days were long and it would have given him considerable time before night. i do not think there is any doubt that petersburg itself could have been carried without much loss; or, at least, if protected by inner detached works, that a line could have been established very much in rear of the one then occupied by the enemy. this would have given us control of both the weldon and south side railroads. this would also have saved an immense amount of hard fighting which had to be done from the 15th to the 18th, and would have given us greatly the advantage in the long siege which ensued. i now ordered the troops to be put under cover and allowed some of the rest which they had so long needed. they remained quiet, except that there was more or less firing every day, until the 22d, when general meade ordered an advance towards the weldon railroad. we were very anxious to get to that road, and even round to the south side railroad if possible. meade moved hancock's corps, now commanded by birney, to the left, with a view to at least force the enemy to stay within the limits of his own line. general wright, with the 6th corps, was ordered by a road farther south, to march directly for the weldon road. the enemy passed in between these two corps and attacked vigorously, and with very serious results to the national troops, who were then withdrawn from their advanced position. the army of the potomac was given the investment of petersburg, while the army of the james held bermuda hundred and all the ground we possessed north of the james river. the 9th corps, burnside's, was placed upon the right at petersburg; the 5th, warren's, next; the 2d, birney's, next; then the 6th, wright's, broken off to the left and south. thus began the siege of petersburg. chapter lvii. raid on the virginia central railroad--raid on the weldon railroad --early 's movement upon washington--mining the works before petersburg --explosion of the mine before petersburg--campaign in the shenandoah valley--capture of the weldon railroad. on the 7th of june, while at cold harbor, i had as already indicated sent sheridan with two divisions of cavalry to destroy as much as he could of the virginia central railroad. general hunter had been operating up the shenandoah valley with some success, having fought a battle near staunton where he captured a great many prisoners, besides killing and wounding a good many men. after the battle he formed a junction at staunton with averell and crook, who had come up from the kanawha, or gauley river. it was supposed, therefore, that general hunter would be about charlottesville, virginia, by the time sheridan could get there, doing on the way the damage that he was sent to do. i gave sheridan instructions to have hunter, in case he should meet him about charlottesville, join and return with him to the army of the potomac. lee, hearing of hunter's success in the valley, started breckinridge out for its defence at once. learning later of sheridan's going with two divisions, he also sent hampton with two divisions of cavalry, his own and fitz-hugh lee's. sheridan moved to the north side of the north anna to get out west, and learned of the movement of these troops to the south side of the same stream almost as soon as they had started. he pushed on to get to trevilian station to commence his destruction at that point. on the night of the 10th he bivouacked some six or seven miles east of trevilian, while fitz-hugh lee was the same night at trevilian station and hampton but a few miles away. during the night hampton ordered an advance on sheridan, hoping, no doubt, to surprise and very badly cripple him. sheridan, however, by a counter move sent custer on a rapid march to get between the two divisions of the enemy and into their rear. this he did successfully, so that at daylight, when the assault was made, the enemy found himself at the same time resisted in front and attacked in rear, and broke in some confusion. the losses were probably very light on both sides in killed and wounded, but sheridan got away with some five hundred prisoners and sent them to city point. during that day, the 11th, sheridan moved into trevilian station, and the following day proceeded to tear up the road east and west. there was considerable fighting during the whole of the day, but the work of destruction went on. in the meantime, at night, the enemy had taken possession of the crossing which sheridan had proposed to take to go north when he left trevilian. sheridan learned, however, from some of the prisoners he had captured here, that general hunter was about lynchburg, and therefore that there was no use of his going on to charlottesville with a view to meet him. sheridan started back during the night of the 12th, and made his way north and farther east, coming around by the north side of white house, and arriving there on the 21st. here he found an abundance of forage for his animals, food for his men, and security while resting. he had been obliged to leave about ninety of his own men in the field-hospital which he had established near trevilian, and these necessarily fell into the hands of the enemy. white house up to this time had been a depot; but now that our troops were all on the james river, it was no longer wanted as a store of supplies. sheridan was, therefore, directed to break it up; which he did on the 22d of june, bringing the garrison and an immense wagon train with him. all these were over the james river by the 26th of the month, and sheridan ready to follow. in the meantime meade had sent wilson's division on a raid to destroy the weldon and south side roads. now that sheridan was safe and hampton free to return to richmond with his cavalry, wilson's position became precarious. meade therefore, on the 27th, ordered sheridan over the river to make a demonstration in favor of wilson. wilson got back, though not without severe loss, having struck both roads, but the damage done was soon repaired. after these events comparative quiet reigned about petersburg until late in july. the time, however, was spent in strengthening the intrenchments and making our position generally more secure against a sudden attack. in the meantime i had to look after other portions of my command, where things had not been going on so favorably, always, as i could have wished. general hunter who had been appointed to succeed sigel in the shenandoah valley immediately took up the offensive. he met the enemy on the 5th of june at piedmont, and defeated him. on the 8th he formed a junction with crook and averell at staunton, from which place he moved direct on lynchburg, via lexington, which he reached and invested on the 16th. up to this time he was very successful; and but for the difficulty of taking with him sufficient ordnance stores over so long a march, through a hostile country, he would, no doubt, have captured lynchburg. the destruction of the enemy's supplies and manufactories had been very great. to meet this movement under general hunter, general lee sent early with his corps, a part of which reached lynchburg before hunter. after some skirmishing on the 17th and 18th, general hunter, owing to a want of ammunition to give battle, retired from before the place. unfortunately, this want of ammunition left him no choice of route for his return but by the way of the gauley and kanawha rivers, thence up the ohio river, returning to harper's ferry by way of the baltimore and ohio railroad. a long time was consumed in making this movement. meantime the valley was left open to early's troops, and others in that quarter; and washington also was uncovered. early took advantage of this condition of affairs and moved on washington. in the absence of hunter, general lew wallace, with headquarters at baltimore, commanded the department in which the shenandoah lay. his surplus of troops with which to move against the enemy was small in number. most of these were raw and, consequently, very much inferior to our veterans and to the veterans which early had with him; but the situation of washington was precarious, and wallace moved with commendable promptitude to meet the enemy at the monocacy. he could hardly have expected to defeat him badly, but he hoped to cripple and delay him until washington could be put into a state of preparation for his reception. i had previously ordered general meade to send a division to baltimore for the purpose of adding to the defences of washington, and he had sent ricketts's division of the 6th corps (wright's), which arrived in baltimore on the 8th of july. finding that wallace had gone to the front with his command, ricketts immediately took the cars and followed him to the monocacy with his entire division. they met the enemy and, as might have been expected, were defeated; but they succeeded in stopping him for the day on which the battle took place. the next morning early started on his march to the capital of the nation, arriving before it on the 11th. learning of the gravity of the situation i had directed general meade to also order wright with the rest of his corps directly to washington for the relief of that place, and the latter reached there the very day that early arrived before it. the 19th corps, which had been stationed in louisiana, having been ordered up to reinforce the armies about richmond, had about this time arrived at fortress monroe, on their way to join us. i diverted them from that point to washington, which place they reached, almost simultaneously with wright, on the 11th. the 19th corps was commanded by major-general emory. early made his reconnoissance with a view of attacking on the following morning, the 12th; but the next morning he found our intrenchments, which were very strong, fully manned. he at once commenced to retreat, wright following. there is no telling how much this result was contributed to by general lew wallace's leading what might well be considered almost a forlorn hope. if early had been but one day earlier he might have entered the capital before the arrival of the reinforcements i had sent. whether the delay caused by the battle amounted to a day or not, general wallace contributed on this occasion, by the defeat of the troops under him a greater benefit to the cause than often falls to the lot of a commander of an equal force to render by means of a victory. farther west also the troubles were threatening. some time before, forrest had met sturgis in command of some of our cavalry in mississippi and handled him very roughly, gaining a very great victory over him. this left forrest free to go almost where he pleased, and to cut the roads in rear of sherman who was then advancing. sherman was abundantly able to look after the army that he was immediately with, and all of his military division so long as he could communicate with it; but it was my place to see that he had the means with which to hold his rear. two divisions under a. j. smith had been sent to banks in louisiana some months before. sherman ordered these back, with directions to attack forrest. smith met and defeated him very badly. i then directed that smith should hang to forrest and not let him go; and to prevent by all means his getting upon the memphis and nashville railroad. sherman had anticipated me in this matter, and given the same orders in substance; but receiving my directions for this order to smith, he repeated it. on the 25th of june general burnside had commenced running a mine from about the centre of his front under the confederate works confronting him. he was induced to do this by colonel pleasants, of the pennsylvania volunteers, whose regiment was mostly composed of miners, and who was himself a practical miner. burnside had submitted the scheme to meade and myself, and we both approved of it, as a means of keeping the men occupied. his position was very favorable for carrying on this work, but not so favorable for the operations to follow its completion. the position of the two lines at that point were only about a hundred yards apart with a comparatively deep ravine intervening. in the bottom of this ravine the work commenced. the position was unfavorable in this particular: that the enemy's line at that point was re-entering, so that its front was commanded by their own lines both to the right and left. then, too, the ground was sloping upward back of the confederate line for a considerable distance, and it was presumable that the enemy had, at least, a detached work on this highest point. the work progressed, and on the 23d of july the mine was finished ready for charging; but i had this work of charging deferred until we were ready for it. on the 17th of july several deserters came in and said that there was great consternation in richmond, and that lee was coming out to make an attack upon us the object being to put us on the defensive so that he might detach troops to go to georgia where the army sherman was operating against was said to be in great trouble. i put the army commanders, meade and butler, on the lookout, but the attack was not made. i concluded, then, a few days later, to do something in the way of offensive movement myself, having in view something of the same object that lee had had. wright's and emory's corps were in washington, and with this reduction of my force lee might very readily have spared some troops from the defences to send west. i had other objects in view, however, besides keeping lee where he was. the mine was constructed and ready to be exploded, and i wanted to take that occasion to carry petersburg if i could. it was the object, therefore, to get as many of lee's troops away from the south side of the james river as possible. accordingly, on the 26th, we commenced a movement with hancock's corps and sheridan's cavalry to the north side by the way of deep bottom, where butler had a pontoon bridge laid. the plan, in the main, was to let the cavalry cut loose and, joining with kautz's cavalry of the army of the james, get by lee's lines and destroy as much as they could of the virginia central railroad, while, in the mean time, the infantry was to move out so as to protect their rear and cover their retreat back when they should have got through with their work. we were successful in drawing the enemy's troops to the north side of the james as i expected. the mine was ordered to be charged, and the morning of the 30th of july was the time fixed for its explosion. i gave meade minute orders (*38) on the 24th directing how i wanted the assault conducted, which orders he amplified into general instructions for the guidance of the troops that were to be engaged. meade's instructions, which i, of course, approved most heartily, were all that i can see now was necessary. the only further precaution which he could have taken, and which he could not foresee, would have been to have different men to execute them. the gallery to the mine was over five hundred feet long from where it entered the ground to the point where it was under the enemy's works, and with a cross gallery of something over eighty feet running under their lines. eight chambers had been left, requiring a ton of powder each to charge them. all was ready by the time i had prescribed; and on the 29th hancock and sheridan were brought back near the james river with their troops. under cover of night they started to recross the bridge at deep bottom, and to march directly for that part of our lines in front of the mine. warren was to hold his line of intrenchments with a sufficient number of men and concentrate the balance on the right next to burnside's corps, while ord, now commanding the 18th corps, temporarily under meade, was to form in the rear of burnside to support him when he went in. all were to clear off the parapets and the _abatis_ in their front so as to leave the space as open as possible, and be able to charge the moment the mine had been sprung and burnside had taken possession. burnside's corps was not to stop in the crater at all but push on to the top of the hill, supported on the right and left by ord's and warren's corps. warren and ord fulfilled their instructions perfectly so far as making ready was concerned. burnside seemed to have paid no attention whatever to the instructions, and left all the obstruction in his own front for his troops to get over in the best way they could. the four divisions of his corps were commanded by generals potter, willcox, ledlie and ferrero. the last was a colored division; and burnside selected it to make the assault. meade interfered with this. burnside then took ledlie's division--a worse selection than the first could have been. in fact, potter and willcox were the only division commanders burnside had who were equal to the occasion. ledlie besides being otherwise inefficient, proved also to possess disqualification less common among soldiers. there was some delay about the explosion of the mine so that it did not go off until about five o'clock in the morning. when it did explode it was very successful, making a crater twenty feet deep and something like a hundred feet in length. instantly one hundred and ten cannon and fifty mortars, which had been placed in the most commanding positions covering the ground to the right and left of where the troops were to enter the enemy's lines, commenced playing. ledlie's division marched into the crater immediately on the explosion, but most of the men stopped there in the absence of any one to give directions; their commander having found some safe retreat to get into before they started. there was some delay on the left and right in advancing, but some of the troops did get in and turn to the right and left, carrying the rifle-pits as i expected they would do. there had been great consternation in petersburg, as we were well aware, about a rumored mine that we were going to explode. they knew we were mining, and they had failed to cut our mine off by countermining, though beauregard had taken the precaution to run up a line of intrenchments to the rear of that part of their line fronting where they could see that our men were at work. we had learned through deserters who had come in that the people had very wild rumors about what was going on on our side. they said that we had undermined the whole of petersburg; that they were resting upon a slumbering volcano and did not know at what moment they might expect an eruption. i somewhat based my calculations upon this state of feeling, and expected that when the mine was exploded the troops to the right and left would flee in all directions, and that our troops, if they moved promptly, could get in and strengthen themselves before the enemy had come to a realization of the true situation. it was just as i expected it would be. we could see the men running without any apparent object except to get away. it was half an hour before musketry firing, to amount to anything, was opened upon our men in the crater. it was an hour before the enemy got artillery up to play upon them; and it was nine o'clock before lee got up reinforcements from his right to join in expelling our troops. the effort was a stupendous failure. it cost us about four thousand men, mostly, however, captured; and all due to inefficiency on the part of the corps commander and the incompetency of the division commander who was sent to lead the assault. after being fully assured of the failure of the mine, and finding that most of that part of lee's army which had been drawn north of the james river were still there, i gave meade directions to send a corps of infantry and the cavalry next morning, before lee could get his forces back, to destroy fifteen or twenty miles of the weldon railroad. but misfortunes never come singly. i learned during that same afternoon that wright's pursuit of early was feeble because of the constant and contrary orders he had been receiving from washington, while i was cut off from immediate communication by reason of our cable across chesapeake bay being broken. early, however, was not aware of the fact that wright was not pursuing until he had reached strasburg. finding that he was not pursued he turned back to winchester, where crook was stationed with a small force, and drove him out. he then pushed north until he had reached the potomac, then he sent mccausland across to chambersburg, pa., to destroy that town. chambersburg was a purely defenceless town with no garrison whatever, and no fortifications; yet mccausland, under early's orders, burned the place and left about three hundred families houseless. this occurred on the 30th of july. i rescinded my orders for the troops to go out to destroy the weldon railroad, and directed them to embark for washington city. after burning chambersburg mccausland retreated, pursued by our cavalry, towards cumberland. they were met and defeated by general kelley and driven into virginia. the shenandoah valley was very important to the confederates, because it was the principal storehouse they now had for feeding their armies about richmond. it was well known that they would make a desperate struggle to maintain it. it had been the source of a great deal of trouble to us heretofore to guard that outlet to the north, partly because of the incompetency of some of the commanders, but chiefly because of interference from washington. it seemed to be the policy of general halleck and secretary stanton to keep any force sent there, in pursuit of the invading army, moving right and left so as to keep between the enemy and our capital; and, generally speaking, they pursued this policy until all knowledge of the whereabouts of the enemy was lost. they were left, therefore, free to supply themselves with horses, beef cattle, and such provisions as they could carry away from western maryland and pennsylvania. i determined to put a stop to this. i started sheridan at once for that field of operation, and on the following day sent another division of his cavalry. i had previously asked to have sheridan assigned to that command, but mr. stanton objected, on the ground that he was too young for so important a command. on the 1st of august when i sent reinforcements for the protection of washington, i sent the following orders: city point, va., august 1, 1864, 11.30 a.m. major-general halleck, washington d. c. i am sending general sheridan for temporary duty whilst the enemy is being expelled from the border. unless general hunter is in the field in person, i want sheridan put in command of all the troops in the field, with instructions to put himself south of the enemy and follow him to the death. wherever the enemy goes let our troops go also. once started up the valley they ought to be followed until we get possession of the virginia central railroad. if general hunter is in the field, give sheridan direct command of the 6th corps and cavalry division. all the cavalry, i presume, will reach washington in the course of to-morrow. u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. the president in some way or other got to see this dispatch of mine directing certain instructions to be given to the commanders in the field, operating against early, and sent me the following very characteristic dispatch: office u. s. military telegraph, war department, washington, d. c., august 3, 1864. cypher. 6 p.m., lt. general grant, city point, va. i have seen your despatch in which you say, "i want sheridan put in command of all the troops in the field, with instructions to put himself south of the enemy, and follow him to the death. wherever the enemy goes, let our troops go also." this, i think, is exactly right, as to how our forces should move. but please look over the despatches you may have received from here, even since you made that order, and discover, if you can, that there is any idea in the head of any one here, of "putting our army south of the enemy," or of "following him to the death" in any direction. i repeat to you it will neither be done nor attempted unless you watch it every day, and hour, and force it. a. lincoln. i replied to this that "i would start in two hours for washington," and soon got off, going directly to the monocacy without stopping at washington on my way. i found general hunter's army encamped there, scattered over the fields along the banks of the monocacy, with many hundreds of cars and locomotives, belonging to the baltimore and ohio railroad, which he had taken the precaution to bring back and collect at that point. i asked the general where the enemy was. he replied that he did not know. he said the fact was, that he was so embarrassed with orders from washington moving him first to the right and then to the left that he had lost all trace of the enemy. i then told the general that i would find out where the enemy was, and at once ordered steam got up and trains made up, giving directions to push for halltown, some four miles above harper's ferry, in the shenandoah valley. the cavalry and the wagon trains were to march, but all the troops that could be transported by the cars were to go in that way. i knew that the valley was of such importance to the enemy that, no matter how much he was scattered at that time, he would in a very short time be found in front of our troops moving south. i then wrote out general hunter's instructions. (*39) i told him that sheridan was in washington, and still another division was on its way; and suggested that he establish the headquarters of the department at any point that would suit him best, cumberland, baltimore, or elsewhere, and give sheridan command of the troops in the field. the general replied to this, that he thought he had better be relieved entirely. he said that general halleck seemed so much to distrust his fitness for the position he was in that he thought somebody else ought to be there. he did not want, in any way, to embarrass the cause; thus showing a patriotism that was none too common in the army. there were not many major-generals who would voluntarily have asked to have the command of a department taken from them on the supposition that for some particular reason, or for any reason, the service would be better performed. i told him, "very well then," and telegraphed at once for sheridan to come to the monocacy, and suggested that i would wait and meet him there. sheridan came at once by special train, but reached there after the troops were all off. i went to the station and remained there until he arrived. myself and one or two of my staff were about all the union people, except general hunter and his staff, who were left at the monocacy when sheridan arrived. i hastily told sheridan what had been done and what i wanted him to do, giving him, at the same time, the written instructions which had been prepared for general hunter and directed to that officer. sheridan now had about 30,000 men to move with, 8,000 of them being cavalry. early had about the same number, but the superior ability of the national commander over the confederate commander was so great that all the latter's advantage of being on the defensive was more than counterbalanced by this circumstance. as i had predicted, early was soon found in front of sheridan in the valley, and pennsylvania and maryland were speedily freed from the invaders. the importance of the valley was so great to the confederates that lee reinforced early, but not to the extent that we thought and feared he would. to prevent as much as possible these reinforcements from being sent out from richmond, i had to do something to compel lee to retain his forces about his capital. i therefore gave orders for another move to the north side of the james river, to threaten richmond. hancock's corps, part of the 10th corps under birney, and gregg's division of cavalry were crossed to the north side of the james during the night of the 13th-14th of august. a threatening position was maintained for a number of days, with more or less skirmishing, and some tolerably hard fighting; although it was my object and my instructions that anything like a battle should be avoided, unless opportunities should present themselves which would insure great success. general meade was left in command of the few troops around petersburg, strongly intrenched; and was instructed to keep a close watch upon the enemy in that quarter, and himself to take advantage of any weakening that might occur through an effort on the part of the enemy to reinforce the north side. there was no particular victory gained on either side; but during that time no more reinforcements were sent to the valley. i informed sheridan of what had been done to prevent reinforcements being sent from richmond against him, and also that the efforts we had made had proven that one of the divisions which we supposed had gone to the valley was still at richmond, because we had captured six or seven hundred prisoners from that division, each of its four brigades having contributed to our list of captures. i also informed him that but one division had gone, and it was possible that i should be able to prevent the going of any more. to add to my embarrassment at this time sherman, who was now near atlanta, wanted reinforcements. he was perfectly willing to take the raw troops then being raised in the north-west, saying that he could teach them more soldiering in one day among his troops than they would learn in a week in a camp of instruction. i therefore asked that all troops in camps of instruction in the north-west be sent to him. sherman also wanted to be assured that no eastern troops were moving out against him. i informed him of what i had done and assured him that i would hold all the troops there that it was possible for me to hold, and that up to that time none had gone. i also informed him that his real danger was from kirby smith, who commanded the trans-mississippi department. if smith should escape steele, and get across the mississippi river, he might move against him. i had, therefore, asked to have an expedition ready to move from new orleans against mobile in case kirby smith should get across. this would have a tendency to draw him to the defence of that place, instead of going against sherman. right in the midst of all these embarrassments halleck informed me that there was an organized scheme on foot in the north to resist the draft, and suggested that it might become necessary to draw troops from the field to put it down. he also advised taking in sail, and not going too fast. the troops were withdrawn from the north side of the james river on the night of the 20th. before they were withdrawn, however, and while most of lee's force was on that side of the river, warren had been sent with most of the 5th corps to capture the weldon railroad. he took up his line of march well back to the rear, south of the enemy, while the troops remaining in the trenches extended so as to cover that part of the line which he had vacated by moving out. from our left, near the old line, it was about three miles to the weldon railroad. a division was ordered from the right of the petersburg line to reinforce warren, while a division was brought back from the north side of the james river to take its place. this road was very important to the enemy. the limits from which his supplies had been drawn were already very much contracted, and i knew that he must fight desperately to protect it. warren carried the road, though with heavy loss on both sides. he fortified his new position, and our trenches were then extended from the left of our main line to connect with his new one. lee made repeated attempts to dislodge warren's corps, but without success, and with heavy loss. as soon as warren was fortified and reinforcements reached him, troops were sent south to destroy the bridges on the weldon railroad; and with such success that the enemy had to draw in wagons, for a distance of about thirty miles, all the supplies they got thereafter from that source. it was on the 21st that lee seemed to have given up the weldon railroad as having been lost to him; but along about the 24th or 25th he made renewed attempts to recapture it; again he failed and with very heavy losses to him as compared with ours. on the night of the 20th our troops on the north side of the james were withdrawn, and hancock and gregg were sent south to destroy the weldon railroad. they were attacked on the 25th at reams's station, and after desperate fighting a part of our line gave way, losing five pieces of artillery. but the weldon railroad never went out of our possession from the 18th of august to the close of the war. chapter lviii. sheridan's advance--visit to sheridan--sheridan's victory in the shenandoah--sheridan's ride to winchester--close of the campaign for the winter. we had our troops on the weldon railroad contending against a large force that regarded this road of so much importance that they could afford to expend many lives in retaking it; sherman just getting through to atlanta with great losses of men from casualties, discharges and detachments left along as guards to occupy and hold the road in rear of him; washington threatened but a short time before, and now early being strengthened in the valley so as, probably, to renew that attempt. it kept me pretty active in looking after all these points. on the 10th of august sheridan had advanced on early up the shenandoah valley, early falling back to strasburg. on the 12th i learned that lee had sent twenty pieces of artillery, two divisions of infantry and a considerable cavalry force to strengthen early. it was important that sheridan should be informed of this, so i sent the information to washington by telegraph, and directed a courier to be sent from there to get the message to sheridan at all hazards, giving him the information. the messenger, an officer of the army, pushed through with great energy and reached sheridan just in time. the officer went through by way of snicker's gap, escorted by some cavalry. he found sheridan just making his preparations to attack early in his chosen position. now, however, he was thrown back on the defensive. on the 15th of september i started to visit general sheridan in the shenandoah valley. my purpose was to have him attack early, or drive him out of the valley and destroy that source of supplies for lee's army. i knew it was impossible for me to get orders through washington to sheridan to make a move, because they would be stopped there and such orders as halleck's caution (and that of the secretary of war) would suggest would be given instead, and would, no doubt, be contradictory to mine. i therefore, without stopping at washington, went directly through to charlestown, some ten miles above harper's ferry, and waited there to see general sheridan, having sent a courier in advance to inform him where to meet me. when sheridan arrived i asked him if he had a map showing the positions of his army and that of the enemy. he at once drew one out of his side pocket, showing all roads and streams, and the camps of the two armies. he said that if he had permission he would move so and so (pointing out how) against the confederates, and that he could "whip them." before starting i had drawn up a plan of campaign for sheridan, which i had brought with me; but, seeing that he was so clear and so positive in his views and so confident of success, i said nothing about this and did not take it out of my pocket. sheridan's wagon trains were kept at harper's ferry, where all of his stores were. by keeping the teams at that place, their forage did not have to be hauled to them. as supplies of ammunition, provisions and rations for the men were wanted, trains would be made up to deliver the stores to the commissaries and quartermasters encamped at winchester. knowing that he, in making preparations to move at a given day, would have to bring up wagons trains from harper's ferry, i asked him if he could be ready to get off by the following tuesday. this was on friday. "o yes," he said, he "could be off before daylight on monday." i told him then to make the attack at that time and according to his own plan; and i immediately started to return to the army about richmond. after visiting baltimore and burlington, new jersey, i arrived at city point on the 19th. on the way out to harper's ferry i had met mr. robert garrett, president of the baltimore and ohio railroad. he seemed very anxious to know when workmen might be put upon the road again so as to make repairs and put it in shape for running. it was a large piece of property to have standing idle. i told him i could not answer then positively but would try and inform him before a great while. on my return mr. garrett met me again with the same and i told him i thought that by the wednesday he might send his workmen out on his road. i gave him no further information however, and he had no suspicion of how i expected to have the road cleared for his workmen. sheridan moved at the time he had fixed upon. he met early at the crossing of opequon creek, a most decisive victory--one which the country. early had invited this attack himself by his bad generalship and made the victory easy. he had sent g. t. anderson's division east of the blue ridge before i went to harper's ferry; and about the time i arrived there he started other divisions (leaving but two in their camps) to march to martinsburg for the purpose destroying the baltimore and ohio railroad at that point. early here learned that i had been with sheridan and, supposing there was some movement on foot, started back as soon as he got the information. but his forces were separated and, as i have said, he was very badly defeated. he fell back to fisher's hill, sheridan following. the valley is narrow at that point, and early made another stand there, behind works which extended across. but sheridan turned both his flanks and again sent him speeding up the valley, following in hot pursuit. the pursuit was continued up the valley to mount jackson and new market. sheridan captured about eleven hundred prisoners and sixteen guns. the houses which he passed all along the route were found to be filled with early's wounded, and the country swarmed with his deserters. finally, on the 25th, early turned from the valley eastward, leaving sheridan at harrisonburg in undisputed possession. now one of the main objects of the expedition began to be accomplished. sheridan went to work with his command, gathering in the crops, cattle, and everything in the upper part of the valley required by our troops; and especially taking what might be of use to the enemy. what he could not take away he destroyed, so that the enemy would not be invited to come back there. i congratulated sheridan upon his recent great victory and had a salute of a hundred guns fired in honor of it, the guns being aimed at the enemy around petersburg. i also notified the other commanders throughout the country, who also fired salutes in honor of his victory. i had reason to believe that the administration was a little afraid to have a decisive battle at that time, for fear it might go against us and have a bad effect on the november elections. the convention which had met and made its nomination of the democratic candidate for the presidency had declared the war a failure. treason was talked as boldly in chicago at that convention as ever been in charleston. it was a question whether the government would then have had the power to make arrests and punish those who talked treason. but this decisive victory was the most effective campaign argument made in the canvass. sheridan, in his pursuit, got beyond where they could hear from him in washington, and the president became very much frightened about him. he was afraid that the hot pursuit had been a little like that of general cass was said to have been, in one of our indian wars, when he was an officer of army. cass was pursuing the indians so closely that the first thing he knew he found himself in front, and the indians pursuing him. the president was afraid that sheridan had got on the other side of early and that early was in behind him. he was afraid that sheridan was getting so far away that reinforcements would be sent out from richmond to enable early to beat him. i replied to the president that i had taken steps to prevent lee from sending reinforcements to early, by attacking the former where he was. on the 28th of september, to retain lee in his position, i sent ord with the 18th corps and birney with the 10th corps to make an advance on richmond, to threaten it. ord moved with the left wing up to chaffin's bluff; birney with the 10th corps took a road farther north; while kautz with the cavalry took the darby road, still farther to the north. they got across the river by the next morning, and made an effort to surprise the enemy. in that, however, they were unsuccessful. the enemy's lines were very strong and very intricate. stannard's division of the 18th corps with general burnham's brigade leading, tried an assault against fort harrison and captured it with sixteen guns and a good many prisoners. burnham was killed in the assault. colonel stevens who succeeded him was badly wounded; and his successor also fell in the same way. some works to the right and left were also carried with the guns in them--six in number--and a few more prisoners. birney's troops to the right captured the enemy's intrenched picket-lines, but were unsuccessful in their efforts upon the main line. our troops fortified their new position, bringing fort harrison into the new line and extending it to the river. this brought us pretty close to the enemy on the north side of the james, and the two opposing lines maintained their relative positions to the close of the siege. in the afternoon a further attempt was made to advance, but it failed. ord fell badly wounded, and had to be relieved; the command devolved upon general heckman, and later general weitzel was assigned to the command of the 18th corps. during the night lee reinforced his troops about fort gilmer, which was at the right of fort harrison, by eight additional brigades from petersburg, and attempted to retake the works which we had captured by concentrating ten brigades against them. all their efforts failed, their attacks being all repulsed with very heavy loss. in one of these assaults upon us general stannard, a gallant officer who was defending fort harrison, lost an arm. our casualties during these operations amounted to 394 killed, i,554 wounded and 324 missing. whilst this was going on general meade was instructed to keep up an appearance of moving troops to our extreme left. parke and warren were kept with two divisions, each under arms, ready to move leaving their enclosed batteries manned, with a scattering line on the other intrenchments. the object of this was to prevent reinforcements from going to the north side of the river. meade was instructed to watch the enemy closely and, if lee weakened his lines, to make an attack. on the 30th these troops moved out, under warren, and captured an advanced intrenched camp at peeble's farm, driving the enemy back to the main line. our troops followed and made an attack in the hope of carrying the enemy's main line; but in this they were unsuccessful and lost a large number of men, mostly captured. the number of killed and wounded was not large. the next day our troops advanced again and established themselves, intrenching a new line about a mile in front of the enemy. this advanced warren's position on the weldon railroad very considerably. sheridan having driven the enemy out of the valley, and taken the productions of the valley so that instead of going there for supplies the enemy would have to bring his provisions with him if he again entered it, recommended a reduction of his own force, the surplus to be sent where it could be of more use. i approved of his suggestion, and ordered him to send wright's corps back to the james river. i further directed him to repair the railroad up the shenandoah valley towards the advanced position which we would hold with a small force. the troops were to be sent to washington by the way of culpeper, in order to watch the east side of the blue ridge, and prevent the enemy from getting into the rear of sheridan while he was still doing his work of destruction. the valley was so very important, however, to the confederate army that, contrary to our expectations, they determined to make one more strike, and save it if possible before the supplies should be all destroyed. reinforcements were sent therefore to early, and this before any of our troops had been withdrawn. early prepared to strike sheridan at harrisonburg; but the latter had not remained there. on the 6th of october sheridan commenced retiring down the valley, taking or destroying all the food and forage and driving the cattle before him, early following. at fisher's hill sheridan turned his cavalry back on that of early, which, under the lead of rosser, was pursuing closely, and routed it most completely, capturing eleven guns and a large number of prisoners. sheridan lost only about sixty men. his cavalry pursued the enemy back some twenty-five miles. on the 10th of october the march down the valley was again resumed, early again following. i now ordered sheridan to halt, and to improve the opportunity if afforded by the enemy's having been sufficiently weakened, to move back again and cut the james river canal and virginia central railroad. but this order had to go through washington where it was intercepted; and when sheridan received what purported to be a statement of what i wanted him to do it was something entirely different. halleck informed sheridan that it was my wish for him to hold a forward position as a base from which to act against charlottesville and gordonsville; that he should fortify this position and provision it. sheridan objected to this most decidedly; and i was impelled to telegraph him, on the 14th, as follows: city point, va., october 14, 1864.--12.30 p.m. major-general sheridan, cedar creek, va. what i want is for you to threaten the virginia central railroad and canal in the manner your judgment tells you is best, holding yourself ready to advance, if the enemy draw off their forces. if you make the enemy hold a force equal to your own for the protection of those thoroughfares, it will accomplish nearly as much as their destruction. if you cannot do this, then the next best thing to do is to send here all the force you can. i deem a good cavalry force necessary for your offensive, as well as defensive operations. you need not therefore send here more than one division of cavalry. u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. sheridan having been summoned to washington city, started on the 15th leaving wright in command. his army was then at cedar creek, some twenty miles south of winchester. the next morning while at front royal, sheridan received a dispatch from wright, saying that a dispatch from longstreet to early had been intercepted. it directed the latter to be ready to move and to crush sheridan as soon as he, longstreet, arrived. on the receipt of this news sheridan ordered the cavalry up the valley to join wright. on the 18th of october early was ready to move, and during the night succeeded in getting his troops in the rear of our left flank, which fled precipitately and in great confusion down the valley, losing eighteen pieces of artillery and a thousand or more prisoners. the right under general getty maintained a firm and steady front, falling back to middletown where it took a position and made a stand. the cavalry went to the rear, seized the roads leading to winchester and held them for the use of our troops in falling back, general wright having ordered a retreat back to that place. sheridan having left washington on the 18th, reached winchester that night. the following morning he started to join his command. he had scarcely got out of town, when he met his men returning in panic from the front and also heard heavy firing to the south. he immediately ordered the cavalry at winchester to be deployed across the valley to stop the stragglers. leaving members of his staff to take care of winchester and the public property there, he set out with a small escort directly for the scene of battle. as he met the fugitives he ordered them to turn back, reminding them that they were going the wrong way. his presence soon restored confidence. finding themselves worse frightened than hurt the men did halt and turn back. many of those who had run ten miles got back in time to redeem their reputation as gallant soldiers before night. when sheridan got to the front he found getty and custer still holding their ground firmly between the confederates and our retreating troops. everything in the rear was now ordered up. sheridan at once proceeded to intrench his position; and he awaited an assault from the enemy. this was made with vigor, and was directed principally against emory's corps, which had sustained the principal loss in the first attack. by one o'clock the attack was repulsed. early was so badly damaged that he seemed disinclined to make another attack, but went to work to intrench himself with a view to holding the position he had already gained. he thought, no doubt, that sheridan would be glad enough to leave him unmolested; but in this he was mistaken. about the middle of the afternoon sheridan advanced. he sent his cavalry by both flanks, and they penetrated to the enemy's rear. the contest was close for a time, but at length the left of the enemy broke, and disintegration along the whole line soon followed. early tried to rally his men, but they were followed so closely that they had to give way very quickly every time they attempted to make a stand. our cavalry, having pushed on and got in the rear of the confederates, captured twenty-four pieces of artillery, besides retaking what had been lost in the morning. this victory pretty much closed the campaigning in the valley of virginia. all the confederate troops were sent back to richmond with the exception of one division of infantry and a little cavalry. wright's corps was ordered back to the army of the potomac, and two other divisions were withdrawn from the valley. early had lost more men in killed, wounded and captured in the valley than sheridan had commanded from first to last. on more than one occasion in these engagements general r. b. hayes, who succeeded me as president of the united states, bore a very honorable part. his conduct on the field was marked by conspicuous gallantry as well as the display of qualities of a higher order than that of mere personal daring. this might well have been expected of one who could write at the time he is said to have done so: "any officer fit for duty who at this crisis would abandon his post to electioneer for a seat in congress, ought to be scalped." having entered the army as a major of volunteers at the beginning of the war, general hayes attained by meritorious service the rank of brevet major-general before its close. on the north side of the james river the enemy attacked kautz's cavalry on the 7th of october, and drove it back with heavy loss in killed, wounded and prisoners, and the loss of all the artillery. this was followed up by an attack on our intrenched infantry line, but was repulsed with severe slaughter. on the 13th a reconnoissance was sent out by general butler, with a view to drive the enemy from some new works he was constructing, which resulted in heavy loss to us. on the 24th i ordered general meade to attempt to get possession of the south side railroad, and for that purpose to advance on the 27th. the attempt proved a failure, however, the most advanced of our troops not getting nearer than within six miles of the point aimed for. seeing the impossibility of its accomplishment i ordered the troops to withdraw, and they were all back in their former positions the next day. butler, by my directions, also made a demonstration on the north side of the james river in order to support this move, by detaining there the confederate troops who were on that side. he succeeded in this, but failed of further results by not marching past the enemy's left before turning in on the darby road and by reason of simply coming up against their lines in place. this closed active operations around richmond for the winter. of course there was frequent skirmishing between pickets, but no serious battle was fought near either petersburg or richmond. it would prolong this work to give a detailed account of all that took place from day to day around petersburg and at other parts of my command, and it would not interest the general reader if given. all these details can be found by the military student in a series of books published by the scribners, badeau's history of my campaigns, and also in the publications of the war department, including both the national and confederate reports. in the latter part of november general hancock was relieved from the command of the 2d corps by the secretary of war and ordered to washington, to organize and command a corps of veteran troops to be designated the 1st corps. it was expected that this would give him a large command to co-operate with in the spring. it was my expectation, at the time, that in the final operations hancock should move either up the valley, or else east of the blue ridge to lynchburg; the idea being to make the spring campaign the close of the war. i expected, with sherman coming up from the south, meade south of petersburg and around richmond, and thomas's command in tennessee with depots of supplies established in the eastern part of that state, to move from the direction of washington or the valley towards lynchburg. we would then have lee so surrounded that his supplies would be cut off entirely, making it impossible for him to support his army. general humphreys, chief-of-staff of the army of the potomac, was assigned to the command of the 2d corps, to succeed hancock. chapter lix. the campaign in georgia--sherman's march to the sea--war anecdotes--the march on savannah--investment of savannah--capture of savannah. let us now return to the operations in the military division of the mississippi, and accompany sherman in his march to the sea. the possession of atlanta by us narrowed the territory of the enemy very materially and cut off one of his two remaining lines of roads from east to west. a short time after the fall of atlanta mr. davis visited palmetto and macon and made speeches at each place. he spoke at palmetto on the 20th of september, and at macon on the 22d. inasmuch as he had relieved johnston and appointed hood, and hood had immediately taken the initiative, it is natural to suppose that mr. davis was disappointed with general johnston's policy. my own judgment is that johnston acted very wisely: he husbanded his men and saved as much of his territory as he could, without fighting decisive battles in which all might be lost. as sherman advanced, as i have show, his army became spread out, until, if this had been continued, it would have been easy to destroy it in detail. i know that both sherman and i were rejoiced when we heard of the change. hood was unquestionably a brave, gallant soldier and not destitute of ability; but unfortunately his policy was to fight the enemy wherever he saw him, without thinking much of the consequences of defeat. in his speeches mr. davis denounced governor brown, of georgia, and general johnston in unmeasured terms, even insinuating that their loyalty to the southern cause was doubtful. so far as general johnston is concerned, i think davis did him a great injustice in this particular. i had know the general before the war and strongly believed it would be impossible for him to accept a high commission for the purpose of betraying the cause he had espoused. there, as i have said, i think that his policy was the best one that could have been pursued by the whole south--protract the war, which was all that was necessary to enable them to gain recognition in the end. the north was already growing weary, as the south evidently was also, but with this difference. in the north the people governed, and could stop hostilities whenever they chose to stop supplies. the south was a military camp, controlled absolutely by the government with soldiers to back it, and the war could have been protracted, no matter to what extent the discontent reached, up to the point of open mutiny of the soldiers themselves. mr. davis's speeches were frank appeals to the people of georgia and that portion of the south to come to their relief. he tried to assure his frightened hearers that the yankees were rapidly digging their own graves; that measures were already being taken to cut them off from supplies from the north; and that with a force in front, and cut off from the rear, they must soon starve in the midst of a hostile people. papers containing reports of these speeches immediately reached the northern states, and they were republished. of course, that caused no alarm so long as telegraphic communication was kept up with sherman. when hood was forced to retreat from atlanta he moved to the south-west and was followed by a portion of sherman's army. he soon appeared upon the railroad in sherman's rear, and with his whole army began destroying the road. at the same time also the work was begun in tennessee and kentucky which mr. davis had assured his hearers at palmetto and macon would take place. he ordered forrest (about the ablest cavalry general in the south) north for this purpose; and forrest and wheeler carried out their orders with more or less destruction, occasionally picking up a garrison. forrest indeed performed the very remarkable feat of capturing, with cavalry, two gunboats and a number of transports, something the accomplishment of which is very hard to account for. hood's army had been weakened by governor brown's withdrawing the georgia state troops for the purpose of gathering in the season's crops for the use of the people and for the use of the army. this not only depleted hood's forces but it served a most excellent purpose in gathering in supplies of food and forage for the use of our army in its subsequent march. sherman was obliged to push on with his force and go himself with portions of it hither and thither, until it was clearly demonstrated to him that with the army he then had it would be impossible to hold the line from atlanta back and leave him any force whatever with which to take the offensive. had that plan been adhered to, very large reinforcements would have been necessary; and mr. davis's prediction of the destruction of the army would have been realized, or else sherman would have been obliged to make a successful retreat, which mr. davis said in his speeches would prove more disastrous than napoleon's retreat from moscow. these speeches of mr. davis were not long in reaching sherman. he took advantage of the information they gave, and made all the preparation possible for him to make to meet what now became expected, attempts to break his communications. something else had to be done: and to sherman's sensible and soldierly mind the idea was not long in dawning upon him, not only that something else had to be done, but what that something else should be. on september 10th i telegraphed sherman as follows: city point, va., sept. 10, 1864. major-general sherman, atlanta, georgia. so soon as your men are sufficiently rested, and preparations can be made, it is desirable that another campaign should be commenced. we want to keep the enemy constantly pressed to the end of the war. if we give him no peace whilst the war lasts, the end cannot be distant. now that we have all of mobile bay that is valuable, i do not know but it will be the best move to transfer canby's troops to act upon savannah, whilst you move on augusta. i should like to hear from you, however, in this matter. u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. sherman replied promptly: "if i could be sure of finding provisions and ammunition at augusta, or columbus, georgia, i can march to milledgeville, and compel hood to give up augusta or macon, and then turn on the other. * * * if you can manage to take the savannah river as high up as augusta, or the chattahoochee as far up as columbus, i can sweep the whole state of georgia." on the 12th i sent a special messenger, one of my own staff, with a letter inviting sherman's views about the next campaign. city point, va., sept. 12, 1864. major-general w. t. sherman, commanding mill division of the mississippi. i send lieutenant-colonel porter, of my staff, with this. colonel porter will explain to you the exact condition of affairs here better than i can do in the limits of a letter. although i feel myself strong enough for offensive operations, i am holding on quietly to get advantage of recruits and convalescents, who are coming forward very rapidly. my lines are necessarily very long, extending from deep bottom north of the james across the peninsula formed by the appomattox and the james, and south of the appomattox to the weldon road. this line is very strongly fortified, and can be held with comparatively few men, but from its great length takes many in the aggregate. i propose, when i do move, to extend my left so as to control what is known as the south side, or lynchburg and petersburg road, then if possible to keep the danville road cut. at the same time this move is made, i want to send a force of from six to ten thousand men against wilmington. the way i propose to do this is to land the men north of fort fisher, and hold that point. at the same time a large naval fleet will be assembled there, and the iron-clads will run the batteries as they did at mobile. this will give us the same control of the harbor of wilmington that we now have of the harbor of mobile. what you are to do with the forces at your command, i do not see. the difficulties of supplying your army, except when you are constantly moving, beyond where you are, i plainly see. if it had not been for price's movements canby would have sent twelve thousand more men to mobile. from your command on the mississippi an equal number could have been taken. with these forces my idea would have been to divide them, sending one half to mobile and the other half to savannah. you could then move as proposed in your telegram, so as to threaten macon and augusta equally. whichever was abandoned by the enemy you could take and open up a new base of supplies. my object now in sending a staff officer is not so much to suggest operations for you, as to get your views and have plans matured by the time everything can be got ready. it will probably be the 5th of october before any of the plans herein indicated will be executed. if you have any promotions to recommend, send the names forward and i will approve them. * * * u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. this reached sherman on september 20th. on the 25th of september sherman reported to washington that hood's troops were in his rear. he had provided against this by sending a division to chattanooga and a division to rome, georgia, which was in the rear of hood, supposing that hood would fall back in the direction from which he had come to reach the railroad. at the same time sherman and hood kept up a correspondence relative to the exchange of prisoners, the treatment of citizens, and other matters suitable to be arranged between hostile commanders in the field. on the 27th of september i telegraphed sherman as follows: city point, va., september 27, 1864--10.30 a.m. major-general sherman: i have directed all recruits and new troops from the western states to be sent to nashville, to receive their further orders from you. * * * u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. on the 29th sherman sent thomas back to chattanooga, and afterwards to nashville, with another division (morgan's) of the advanced army. sherman then suggested that, when he was prepared, his movements should take place against milledgeville and then to savannah. his expectation at that time was, to make this movement as soon as he could get up his supplies. hood was moving in his own country, and was moving light so that he could make two miles to sherman's one. he depended upon the country to gather his supplies, and so was not affected by delays. as i have said, until this unexpected state of affairs happened, mobile had been looked upon as the objective point of sherman's army. it had been a favorite move of mine from 1862, when i first suggested to the then commander-in-chief that the troops in louisiana, instead of frittering away their time in the trans-mississippi, should move against mobile. i recommended this from time to time until i came into command of the army, the last of march 1864. having the power in my own hands, i now ordered the concentration of supplies, stores and troops, in the department of the gulf about new orleans, with a view to a move against mobile, in support of, and in conjunction with, the other armies operating in the field. before i came into command, these troops had been scattered over the trans-mississippi department in such a way that they could not be, or were not, gotten back in time to take any part in the original movement; hence the consideration, which had caused mobile to be selected as the objective point for sherman's army to find his next base of supplies after having cut loose from atlanta, no longer existed. general g. m. dodge, an exceedingly efficient officer, having been badly wounded, had to leave the army about the first of october. he was in command of two divisions of the 16th corps, consolidated into one. sherman then divided his army into the right and left wings the right commanded by general o. o. howard and the left by general slocum. general dodge's two divisions were assigned, one to each of these wings. howard's command embraced the 15th and 17th corps, and slocum's the 14th and 20th corps, commanded by generals jeff. c. davis and a. s. williams. generals logan and blair commanded the two corps composing the right wing. about this time they left to take part in the presidential election, which took place that year, leaving their corps to osterhaus and ransom. i have no doubt that their leaving was at the earnest solicitation of the war department. general blair got back in time to resume his command and to proceed with it throughout the march to the sea and back to the grand review at washington. general logan did not return to his command until after it reached savannah. logan felt very much aggrieved at the transfer of general howard from that portion of the army of the potomac which was then with the western army, to the command of the army of the tennessee, with which army general logan had served from the battle of belmont to the fall of atlanta--having passed successively through all grades from colonel commanding a regiment to general commanding a brigade, division and army corps, until upon the death of mcpherson the command of the entire army of the tennessee devolved upon him in the midst of a hotly contested battle. he conceived that he had done his full duty as commander in that engagement; and i can bear testimony, from personal observation, that he had proved himself fully equal to all the lower positions which he had occupied as a soldier. i will not pretend to question the motive which actuated sherman in taking an officer from another army to supersede general logan. i have no doubt, whatever, that he did this for what he considered would be to the good of the service, which was more important than that the personal feelings of any individual should not be aggrieved; though i doubt whether he had an officer with him who could have filled the place as logan would have done. differences of opinion must exist between the best of friends as to policies in war, and of judgment as to men's fitness. the officer who has the command, however, should be allowed to judge of the fitness of the officers under him, unless he is very manifestly wrong. sherman's army, after all the depletions, numbered about sixty thousand effective men. all weak men had been left to hold the rear, and those remaining were not only well men, but strong and hardy, so that he had sixty thousand as good soldiers as ever trod the earth; better than any european soldiers, because they not only worked like a machine but the machine thought. european armies know very little what they are fighting for, and care less. included in these sixty thousand troops, there were two small divisions of cavalry, numbering altogether about four thousand men. hood had about thirty-five to forty thousand men, independent of forrest, whose forces were operating in tennessee and kentucky, as mr. davis had promised they should. this part of mr. davis's military plan was admirable, and promised the best results of anything he could have done, according to my judgment. i say this because i have criticised his military judgment in the removal of johnston, and also in the appointment of hood. i am aware, however, that there was high feeling existing at that time between davis and his subordinate, whom i regarded as one of his ablest lieutenants. on the 5th of october the railroad back from atlanta was again very badly broken, hood having got on the track with his army. sherman saw after night, from a high point, the road burning for miles. the defence of the railroad by our troops was very gallant, but they could not hold points between their intrenched positions against hood's whole army; in fact they made no attempt to do so; but generally the intrenched positions were held, as well as important bridges, and store located at them. allatoona, for instance, was defended by a small force of men under the command of general corse, one of the very able and efficient volunteer officers produced by the war. he, with a small force, was cut off from the remainder of the national army and was attacked with great vigor by many times his own number. sherman from his high position could see the battle raging, with the confederate troops between him and his subordinate. he sent men, of course, to raise the temporary siege, but the time that would be necessarily consumed in reaching corse, would be so great that all occupying the intrenchments might be dead. corse was a man who would never surrender. from a high position some of sherman's signal corps discovered a signal flag waving from a hole in the block house at allatoona. it was from corse. he had been shot through the face, but he signalled to his chief a message which left no doubt of his determination to hold his post at all hazards. it was at this point probably, that sherman first realized that with the forces at his disposal, the keeping open of his line of communication with the north would be impossible if he expected to retain any force with which to operate offensively beyond atlanta. he proposed, therefore, to destroy the roads back to chattanooga, when all ready to move, and leave the latter place garrisoned. yet, before abandoning the railroad, it was necessary that he should repair damages already done, and hold the road until he could get forward such supplies, ordnance stores and small rations, as he wanted to carry with him on his proposed march, and to return to the north his surplus artillery; his object being to move light and to have no more artillery than could be used to advantage on the field. sherman thought hood would follow him, though he proposed to prepare for the contingency of the latter moving the other way while he was moving south, by making thomas strong enough to hold tennessee and kentucky. i, myself, was thoroughly satisfied that hood would go north, as he did. on the 2d of november i telegraphed sherman authorizing him definitely to move according to the plan he had proposed: that is, cutting loose from his base, giving up atlanta and the railroad back to chattanooga. to strengthen thomas he sent stanley (4th corps) back, and also ordered schofield, commanding the army of the ohio, twelve thousand strong, to report to him. in addition to this, a. j. smith, who, with two divisions of sherman's army, was in missouri aiding rosecrans in driving the enemy from that state, was under orders to return to thomas and, under the most unfavorable circumstances, might be expected to arrive there long before hood could reach nashville. in addition to this, the new levies of troops that were being raised in the north-west went to thomas as rapidly as enrolled and equipped. thomas, without any of these additions spoken of, had a garrison at chattanooga which had been strengthened by one division and garrisons at bridgeport, stevenson, decatur, murfreesboro, and florence. there were already with him in nashville ten thousand soldiers in round numbers, and many thousands of employees in the quartermaster's and other departments who could be put in the intrenchments in front of nashville, for its defence. also, wilson was there with ten thousand dismounted cavalrymen, who were being equipped for the field. thomas had at this time about forty-five thousand men without any of the reinforcements here above enumerated. these reinforcements gave him altogether about seventy thousand men, without counting what might be added by the new levies already spoken of. about this time beauregard arrived upon the field, not to supersede hood in command, but to take general charge over the entire district in which hood and sherman were, or might be, operating. he made the most frantic appeals to the citizens for assistance to be rendered in every way: by sending reinforcements, by destroying supplies on the line of march of the invaders, by destroying the bridges over which they would have to cross, and by, in every way, obstructing the roads to their front. but it was hard to convince the people of the propriety of destroying supplies which were so much needed by themselves, and each one hoped that his own possessions might escape. hood soon started north, and went into camp near decatur, alabama, where he remained until the 29th of october, but without making an attack on the garrison of that place. the tennessee river was patrolled by gunboats, from muscle shoals east; and, also, below the second shoals out to the ohio river. these, with the troops that might be concentrated from the garrisons along the river at any point where hood might choose to attempt to cross, made it impossible for him to cross the tennessee at any place where it was navigable. but muscle shoals is not navigable, and below them again is another shoal which also obstructs navigation. hood therefore moved down to a point nearly opposite florence, alabama, crossed over and remained there for some time, collecting supplies of food, forage and ammunition. all of these had to come from a considerable distance south, because the region in which he was then situated was mountainous, with small valleys which produced but little, and what they had produced had long since been exhausted. on the 1st of november i suggested to sherman, and also asked his views thereon, the propriety of destroying hood before he started on his campaign. on the 2d of november, as stated, i approved definitely his making his proposed campaign through georgia, leaving hood behind to the tender mercy of thomas and the troops in his command. sherman fixed the 10th of november as the day of starting. sherman started on that day to get back to atlanta, and on the 15th the real march to the sea commenced. the right wing, under howard, and the cavalry went to jonesboro, milledgeville, then the capital of georgia, being sherman's objective or stopping place on the way to savannah. the left wing moved to stone mountain, along roads much farther east than those taken by the right wing. slocum was in command, and threatened augusta as the point to which he was moving, but he was to turn off and meet the right wing at milledgeville. atlanta was destroyed so far as to render it worthless for military purposes before starting, sherman himself remaining over a day to superintend the work, and see that it was well done. sherman's orders for this campaign were perfect. before starting, he had sent back all sick, disabled and weak men, retaining nothing but the hardy, well-inured soldiers to accompany him on his long march in prospect. his artillery was reduced to sixty-five guns. the ammunition carried with them was two hundred rounds for musket and gun. small rations were taken in a small wagon train, which was loaded to its capacity for rapid movement. the army was expected to live on the country, and to always keep the wagons full of forage and provisions against a possible delay of a few days. the troops, both of the right and left wings, made most of their advance along the line of railroads, which they destroyed. the method adopted to perform this work, was to burn and destroy all the bridges and culverts, and for a long distance, at places, to tear up the track and bend the rails. soldiers to do this rapidly would form a line along one side of the road with crowbars and poles, place these under the rails and, hoisting all at once, turn over many rods of road at one time. the ties would then be placed in piles, and the rails, as they were loosened, would be carried and put across these log heaps. when a sufficient number of rails were placed upon a pile of ties it would be set on fire. this would heat the rails very much more in the middle, that being over the main part of the fire, than at the ends, so that they would naturally bend of their own weight; but the soldiers, to increase the damage, would take tongs and, one or two men at each end of the rail, carry it with force against the nearest tree and twist it around, thus leaving rails forming bands to ornament the forest trees of georgia. all this work was going on at the same time, there being a sufficient number of men detailed for that purpose. some piled the logs and built the fire; some put the rails upon the fire; while others would bend those that were sufficiently heated: so that, by the time the last bit of road was torn up, that it was designed to destroy at a certain place, the rails previously taken up were already destroyed. the organization for supplying the army was very complete. each brigade furnished a company to gather supplies of forage and provisions for the command to which they belonged. strict injunctions were issued against pillaging, or otherwise unnecessarily annoying the people; but everything in shape of food for man and forage for beast was taken. the supplies were turned over to the brigade commissary and quartermaster, and were issued by them to their respective commands precisely the same as if they had been purchased. the captures consisted largely of cattle, sheep, poultry, some bacon, cornmeal, often molasses, and occasionally coffee or other small rations. the skill of these men, called by themselves and the army "bummers," in collecting their loads and getting back to their respective commands, was marvellous. when they started out in the morning, they were always on foot; but scarcely one of them returned in the evening without being mounted on a horse or mule. these would be turned in for the general use of the army, and the next day these men would start out afoot and return again in the evening mounted. many of the exploits of these men would fall under the head of romance; indeed, i am afraid that in telling some of their experiences, the romance got the better of the truth upon which the story was founded, and that, in the way many of these anecdotes are told, very little of the foundation is left. i suspect that most of them consist chiefly of the fiction added to make the stories better. in one instance it was reported that a few men of sherman's army passed a house where they discovered some chickens under the dwelling. they immediately proceeded to capture them, to add to the army's supplies. the lady of the house, who happened to be at home, made piteous appeals to have these spared, saying they were a few she had put away to save by permission of other parties who had preceded and who had taken all the others that she had. the soldiers seemed moved at her appeal; but looking at the chickens again they were tempted and one of them replied: "the rebellion must be suppressed if it takes the last chicken in the confederacy," and proceeded to appropriate the last one. another anecdote characteristic of these times has been told. the south, prior to the rebellion, kept bloodhounds to pursue runaway slaves who took refuge in the neighboring swamps, and also to hunt convicts. orders were issued to kill all these animals as they were met with. on one occasion a soldier picked up a poodle, the favorite pet of its mistress, and was carrying it off to execution when the lady made a strong appeal to him to spare it. the soldier replied, "madam, our orders are to kill every bloodhound." "but this is not a bloodhound," said the lady. "well, madam, we cannot tell what it will grow into if we leave it behind," said the soldier as he went off with it. notwithstanding these anecdotes, and the necessary hardship they would seem to imply, i do not believe there was much unwarrantable pillaging considering that we were in the enemy's territory and without any supplies except such as the country afforded. on the 23d sherman, with the left wing, reached milledgeville. the right wing was not far off: but proceeded on its way towards savannah destroying the road as it went. the troops at milledgeville remained over a day to destroy factories, buildings used for military purposes, etc., before resuming its march. the governor, who had been almost defying mr. davis before this, now fled precipitately, as did the legislature of the state and all the state officers. the governor, sherman says, was careful to carry away even his garden vegetables, while he left the archives of the state to fall into our hands. the only military force that was opposed to sherman's forward march was the georgia militia, a division under the command of general g. w. smith, and a battalion under harry wayne. neither the quality of the forces nor their numbers was sufficient to even retard the progress of sherman's army. the people at the south became so frantic at this time at the successful invasion of georgia that they took the cadets from the military college and added them to the ranks of the militia. they even liberated the state convicts under promise from them that they would serve in the army. i have but little doubt that the worst acts that were attributed to sherman's army were committed by these convicts, and by other southern people who ought to have been under sentence--such people as could be found in every community, north and south--who took advantage of their country being invaded to commit crime. they were in but little danger of detection, or of arrest even if detected. the southern papers in commenting upon sherman's movements pictured him as in the most deplorable condition: stating that his men were starving, that they were demoralized and wandering about almost without object, aiming only to reach the sea coast and get under the protection of our navy. these papers got to the north and had more or less effect upon the minds of the people, causing much distress to all loyal persons particularly to those who had husbands, sons or brothers with sherman. mr. lincoln seeing these accounts, had a letter written asking me if i could give him anything that he could say to the loyal people that would comfort them. i told him there was not the slightest occasion for alarm; that with 60,000 such men as sherman had with him, such a commanding officer as he was could not be cut off in the open country. he might possibly be prevented from reaching the point he had started out to reach, but he would get through somewhere and would finally get to his chosen destination: and even if worst came to worst he could return north. i heard afterwards of mr. lincoln's saying, to those who would inquire of him as to what he thought about the safety of sherman's army, that sherman was all right: "grant says they are safe with such a general, and that if they cannot get out where they want to, they can crawl back by the hole they went in at." while at milledgeville the soldiers met at the state house, organized a legislature, and proceeded to business precisely as if they were the legislative body belonging to the state of georgia. the debates were exciting, and were upon the subject of the situation the south was in at that time, particularly the state of georgia. they went so far as to repeal, after a spirited and acrimonious debate, the ordinance of secession. the next day (24th) sherman continued his march, going by the way of waynesboro and louisville, millen being the next objective and where the two columns (the right and left wings) were to meet. the left wing moved to the left of the direct road, and the cavalry still farther off so as to make it look as though augusta was the point they were aiming for. they moved on all the roads they could find leading in that direction. the cavalry was sent to make a rapid march in hope of surprising millen before the union prisoners could be carried away; but they failed in this. the distance from milledgeville to millen was about one hundred miles. at this point wheeler, who had been ordered from tennessee, arrived and swelled the numbers and efficiency of the troops confronting sherman. hardee, a native of georgia, also came, but brought no troops with him. it was intended that he should raise as large an army as possible with which to intercept sherman's march. he did succeed in raising some troops, and with these and those under the command of wheeler and wayne, had an army sufficient to cause some annoyance but no great detention. our cavalry and wheeler's had a pretty severe engagement, in which wheeler was driven towards augusta, thus giving the idea that sherman was probably making for that point. millen was reached on the 3d of december, and the march was resumed the following day for savannah, the final objective. bragg had now been sent to augusta with some troops. wade hampton was there also trying to raise cavalry sufficient to destroy sherman's army. if he ever raised a force it was too late to do the work expected of it. hardee's whole force probably numbered less than ten thousand men. from millen to savannah the country is sandy and poor, and affords but very little forage other than rice straw, which was then growing. this answered a very good purpose as forage, and the rice grain was an addition to the soldier's rations. no further resistance worthy of note was met with, until within a few miles of savannah. this place was found to be intrenched and garrisoned. sherman proceeded at once on his arrival to invest the place, and found that the enemy had placed torpedoes in the ground, which were to explode when stepped on by man or beast. one of these exploded under an officer's horse, blowing the animal to pieces and tearing one of the legs of the officer so badly that it had to be amputated. sherman at once ordered his prisoners to the front, moving them in a compact body in advance, to either explode the torpedoes or dig them up. no further explosion took place. on the 10th of december the siege of savannah commenced. sherman then, before proceeding any further with operations for the capture of the place, started with some troops to open communication with our fleet, which he expected to find in the lower harbor or as near by as the forts of the enemy would permit. in marching to the coast he encountered fort mcallister, which it was necessary to reduce before the supplies he might find on shipboard could be made available. fort mcallister was soon captured by an assault made by general hazen's division. communication was then established with the fleet. the capture of savannah then only occupied a few days, and involved no great loss of life. the garrison, however, as we shall see, was enabled to escape by crossing the river and moving eastward. when sherman had opened communication with the fleet he found there a steamer, which i had forwarded to him, carrying the accumulated mails for his army, also supplies which i supposed he would be in need of. general j. g. foster, who commanded all the troops south of north carolina on the atlantic sea-board, visited general sherman before he had opened communication with the fleet, with the view of ascertaining what assistance he could be to him. foster returned immediately to his own headquarters at hilton head, for the purpose of sending sherman siege guns, and also if he should find he had them to spare, supplies of clothing, hard bread, etc., thinking that these articles might not be found outside. the mail on the steamer which i sent down, had been collected by colonel a. h. markland of the post office department, who went in charge of it. on this same vessel i sent an officer of my staff (lieutenant dunn) with the following letter to general sherman: city point, va., dec. 3, 1864. major-general w. t. sherman, commanding armies near savannah, ga. the little information gleaned from the southern press, indicating no great obstacle to your progress, i have directed your mails (which had been previously collected at baltimore by colonel markland, special agent of the post office department) to be sent as far as the blockading squadron off savannah, to be forwarded to you as soon as heard from on the coast. not liking to rejoice before the victory is assured, i abstain from congratulating you and those under your command, until bottom has been struck. i have never had a fear, however, for the result. since you left atlanta, no very great progress has been made here. the enemy has been closely watched though, and prevented from detaching against you. i think not one man has gone from here, except some twelve or fifteen hundred dismounted cavalry. bragg has gone from wilmington. i am trying to take advantage of his absence to get possession of that place. owing to some preparations admiral porter and general butler are making to blow up fort fisher (which, while hoping for the best, i do not believe a particle in), there is a delay in getting this expedition off. i hope they will be ready to start by the 7th, and that bragg will not have started back by that time. in this letter i do not intend to give you anything like directions for future action, but will state a general idea i have, and will get your views after you have established yourself on the sea-coast. with your veteran army i hope to get control of the only two through routes from east to west possessed by the enemy before the fall of atlanta. the condition will be filled by holding savannah and augusta, or by holding any other port to the east of savannah and branchville. if wilmington falls, a force from there can co-operate with you. thomas has got back into the defences of nashville, with hood close upon him. decatur has been abandoned, and so have all the roads except the main one leading to chattanooga. part of this falling back was undoubtedly necessary and all of it may have been. it did not look so, however, to me. in my opinion, thomas far outnumbers hood in infantry. in cavalry, hood has the advantage in morale and numbers. i hope yet that hood will be badly crippled if not destroyed. the general news you will learn from the papers better than i could give it. after all becomes quiet, and roads become so bad up here that there is likely to be a week or two when nothing can be done, i will run down the coast to see you. if you desire it, i will ask mrs. sherman to go with me. yours truly, u. s. grant, lieutenant-general i quote this letter because it gives the reader a full knowledge of the events of that period. sherman now (the 15th) returned to savannah to complete its investment and insure the surrender of the garrison. the country about savannah is low and marshy, and the city was well intrenched from the river above to the river below; and assaults could not be made except along a comparatively narrow causeway. for this reason assaults must have resulted in serious destruction of life to the union troops, with the chance of failing altogether. sherman therefore decided upon a complete investment of the place. when he believed this investment completed, he summoned the garrison to surrender. general hardee, who was in command, replied in substance that the condition of affairs was not such as sherman had described. he said he was in full communication with his department and was receiving supplies constantly. hardee, however, was cut off entirely from all communication with the west side of the river, and by the river itself to the north and south. on the south carolina side the country was all rice fields, through which it would have been impossible to bring supplies so that hardee had no possible communication with the outside world except by a dilapidated plank road starting from the west bank of the river. sherman, receiving this reply, proceeded in person to a point on the coast, where general foster had troops stationed under general hatch, for the purpose of making arrangements with the latter officer to go through by one of the numerous channels running inland along that part of the coast of south carolina, to the plank road which general hardee still possessed, and thus to cut him off from the last means he had of getting supplies, if not of communication. while arranging for this movement, and before the attempt to execute the plan had been commenced, sherman received information through one of his staff officers that the enemy had evacuated savannah the night before. this was the night of the 21st of december. before evacuating the place hardee had blown up the navy yard. some iron-clads had been destroyed, as well as other property that might have been valuable to us; but he left an immense amount of stores untouched, consisting of cotton, railroad cars, workshops, numerous pieces of artillery, and several thousand stands of small arms. a little incident occurred, soon after the fall of savannah, which sherman relates in his memoirs, and which is worthy of repetition. savannah was one of the points where blockade runners entered. shortly after the city fell into our possession, a blockade runner came sailing up serenely, not doubting but the confederates were still in possession. it was not molested, and the captain did not find out his mistake until he had tied up and gone to the custom house, where he found a new occupant of the building, and made a less profitable disposition of his vessel and cargo than he had expected. as there was some discussion as to the authorship of sherman's march to the sea, by critics of his book when it appeared before the public, i want to state here that no question upon that subject was ever raised between general sherman and myself. circumstances made the plan on which sherman expected to act impracticable, as as commander of the forces he necessarily had to devise a new on which would give more promise of success: consequently he recommended the destruction of the railroad back to chattanooga, and that he should be authorized then to move, as he did, from atlanta forward. his suggestions were finally approved, although they did not immediately find favor in washington. even when it came to the time of starting, the greatest apprehension, as to the propriety of the campaign he was about commence, filled the mind of the president, induced no doubt by his advisers. this went so far as to move the president to ask me to suspend sherman's march for a day or two until i could think the matter over. my recollection is, though i find no record to show it, that out of deference to the president's wish i did send a dispatch to sherman asking him to wait a day or two, or else the connections between us were already cut so that i could not do so. however this may be, the question of who devised the plan of march from atlanta to savannah is easily answered: it was clearly sherman, and to him also belongs the credit of its brilliant execution. it was hardly possible that any one else than those on the spot could have devised a new plan of campaign to supersede one that did not promise success. (*40) i was in favor of sherman's plan from the time it was first submitted to me. my chief of staff, however, was very bitterly opposed to it and, as i learned subsequently, finding that he could not move me, he appealed to the authorities at washington to stop it. chapter lx. the battle of franklin--the battle of nashville. as we have seen, hood succeeded in crossing the tennessee river between muscle shoals and the lower shoals at the end of october, 1864. thomas sent schofield with the 4th and 23d corps, together with three brigades of wilson's cavalry to pulaski to watch him. on the 17th of november hood started and moved in such a manner as to avoid schofield, thereby turning his position. hood had with him three infantry corps, commanded respectively by stephen d. lee, stewart and cheatham. these, with his cavalry, numbered about forty-five thousand men. schofield had, of all arms, about thirty thousand. thomas's orders were, therefore, for schofield to watch the movements of the enemy, but not to fight a battle if he could avoid it; but to fall back in case of an advance on nashville, and to fight the enemy, as he fell back, so as to retard the enemy's movements until he could be reinforced by thomas himself. as soon as schofield saw this movement of hood's, he sent his trains to the rear, but did not fall back himself until the 21st, and then only to columbia. at columbia there was a slight skirmish but no battle. from this place schofield then retreated to franklin. he had sent his wagons in advance, and stanley had gone with them with two divisions to protect them. cheatham's corps of hood's army pursued the wagon train and went into camp at spring hill, for the night of the 29th. schofield retreating from columbia on the 29th, passed spring hill, where cheatham was bivouacked, during the night without molestation, though within half a mile of where the confederates were encamped. on the morning of the 30th he had arrived at franklin. hood followed closely and reached franklin in time to make an attack the same day. the fight was very desperate and sanguinary. the confederate generals led their men in the repeated charges, and the loss among them was of unusual proportions. this fighting continued with great severity until long after the night closed in, when the confederates drew off. general stanley, who commanded two divisions of the union troops, and whose troops bore the brunt of the battle, was wounded in the fight, but maintained his position. the enemy's loss at franklin, according to thomas's report, was 1,750 buried upon the field by our troops, 3,800 in the hospital, and 702 prisoners besides. schofield's loss, as officially reported, was 189 killed, 1,033 wounded, and 1,104 captured and missing. thomas made no effort to reinforce schofield at franklin, as it seemed to me at the time he should have done, and fight out the battle there. he simply ordered schofield to continue his retreat to nashville, which the latter did during that night and the next day. thomas, in the meantime, was making his preparations to receive hood. the road to chattanooga was still well guarded with strong garrisons at murfreesboro, stevenson, bridgeport and chattanooga. thomas had previously given up decatur and had been reinforced by a. j. smith's two divisions just returned from missouri. he also had steedman's division and r. s. granger's, which he had drawn from the front. his quartermaster's men, about ten thousand in number, had been organized and armed under the command of the chief quartermaster, general j. l. donaldson, and placed in the fortifications under the general supervision of general z. b. tower, of the united states engineers. hood was allowed to move upon nashville, and to invest that place almost without interference. thomas was strongly fortified in his position, so that he would have been safe against the attack of hood. he had troops enough even to annihilate him in the open field. to me his delay was unaccountable--sitting there and permitting himself to be invested, so that, in the end, to raise the siege he would have to fight the enemy strongly posted behind fortifications. it is true the weather was very bad. the rain was falling and freezing as it fell, so that the ground was covered with a sheet of ice, that made it very difficult to move. but i was afraid that the enemy would find means of moving, elude thomas and manage to get north of the cumberland river. if he did this, i apprehended most serious results from the campaign in the north, and was afraid we might even have to send troops from the east to head him off if he got there, general thomas's movements being always so deliberate and so slow, though effective in defence. i consequently urged thomas in frequent dispatches sent from city point(*41) to make the attack at once. the country was alarmed, the administration was alarmed, and i was alarmed lest the very thing would take place which i have just described that is, hood would get north. it was all without avail further than to elicit dispatches from thomas saying that he was getting ready to move as soon as he could, that he was making preparations, etc. at last i had to say to general thomas that i should be obliged to remove him unless he acted promptly. he replied that he was very sorry, but he would move as soon as he could. general logan happening to visit city point about that time, and knowing him as a prompt, gallant and efficient officer, i gave him an order to proceed to nashville to relieve thomas. i directed him, however, not to deliver the order or publish it until he reached there, and if thomas had moved, then not to deliver it at all, but communicate with me by telegraph. after logan started, in thinking over the situation, i became restless, and concluded to go myself. i went as far as washington city, when a dispatch was received from general thomas announcing his readiness at last to move, and designating the time of his movement. i concluded to wait until that time. he did move, and was successful from the start. this was on the 15th of december. general logan was at louisville at the time this movement was made, and telegraphed the fact to washington, and proceeded no farther himself. the battle during the 15th was severe, but favorable to the union troops, and continued until night closed in upon the combat. the next day the battle was renewed. after a successful assault upon hood's men in their intrenchments the enemy fled in disorder, routed and broken, leaving their dead, their artillery and small arms in great numbers on the field, besides the wounded that were captured. our cavalry had fought on foot as infantry, and had not their horses with them; so that they were not ready to join in the pursuit the moment the enemy retreated. they sent back, however, for their horses, and endeavored to get to franklin ahead of hood's broken army by the granny white road, but too much time was consumed in getting started. they had got but a few miles beyond the scene of the battle when they found the enemy's cavalry dismounted and behind intrenchments covering the road on which they were advancing. here another battle ensued, our men dismounting and fighting on foot, in which the confederates were again routed and driven in great disorder. our cavalry then went into bivouac, and renewed the pursuit on the following morning. they were too late. the enemy already had possession of franklin, and was beyond them. it now became a chase in which the confederates had the lead. our troops continued the pursuit to within a few miles of columbia, where they found the rebels had destroyed the railroad bridge as well as all other bridges over duck river. the heavy rains of a few days before had swelled the stream into a mad torrent, impassable except on bridges. unfortunately, either through a mistake in the wording of the order or otherwise, the pontoon bridge which was to have been sent by rail out to franklin, to be taken thence with the pursuing column, had gone toward chattanooga. there was, consequently, a delay of some four days in building bridges out of the remains of the old railroad bridge. of course hood got such a start in this time that farther pursuit was useless, although it was continued for some distance, but without coming upon him again. chapter lxi. expedition against fort fisher--attack on the fort--failure of the expedition--second expedition against the fort--capture of fort fisher. up to january, 1865, the enemy occupied fort fisher, at the mouth of cape fear river and below the city of wilmington. this port was of immense importance to the confederates, because it formed their principal inlet for blockade runners by means of which they brought in from abroad such supplies and munitions of war as they could not produce at home. it was equally important to us to get possession of it, not only because it was desirable to cut off their supplies so as to insure a speedy termination of the war, but also because foreign governments, particularly the british government, were constantly threatening that unless ours could maintain the blockade of that coast they should cease to recognize any blockade. for these reasons i determined, with the concurrence of the navy department, in december, to send an expedition against fort fisher for the purpose of capturing it. to show the difficulty experienced in maintaining the blockade, i will mention a circumstance that took place at fort fisher after its fall. two english blockade runners came in at night. their commanders, not supposing the fort had fallen, worked their way through all our fleet and got into the river unobserved. they then signalled the fort, announcing their arrival. there was a colored man in the fort who had been there before and who understood these signals. he informed general terry what reply he should make to have them come in, and terry did as he advised. the vessels came in, their officers entirely unconscious that they were falling into the hands of the union forces. even after they were brought in to the fort they were entertained in conversation for some little time before suspecting that the union troops were occupying the fort. they were finally informed that their vessels and cargoes were prizes. i selected general weitzel, of the army of the james, to go with the expedition, but gave instructions through general butler. he commanded the department within whose geographical limits fort fisher was situated, as well as beaufort and other points on that coast held by our troops; he was, therefore, entitled to the right of fitting out the expedition against fort fisher. general butler conceived the idea that if a steamer loaded heavily with powder could be run up to near the shore under the fort and exploded, it would create great havoc and make the capture an easy matter. admiral porter, who was to command the naval squadron, seemed to fall in with the idea, and it was not disapproved of in washington; the navy was therefore given the task of preparing the steamer for this purpose. i had no confidence in the success of the scheme, and so expressed myself; but as no serious harm could come of the experiment, and the authorities at washington seemed desirous to have it tried, i permitted it. the steamer was sent to beaufort, north carolina, and was there loaded with powder and prepared for the part she was to play in the reduction of fort fisher. general butler chose to go in command of the expedition himself, and was all ready to sail by the 9th of december (1864). very heavy storms prevailed, however, at that time along that part of the sea-coast, and prevented him from getting off until the 13th or 14th. his advance arrived off fort fisher on the 15th. the naval force had been already assembled, or was assembling, but they were obliged to run into beaufort for munitions, coal, etc.; then, too, the powder-boat was not yet fully prepared. the fleet was ready to proceed on the 18th; but butler, who had remained outside from the 15th up to that time, now found himself out of coal, fresh water, etc., and had to put into beaufort to replenish. another storm overtook him, and several days more were lost before the army and navy were both ready at the same time to co-operate. on the night of the 23d the powder-boat was towed in by a gunboat as near to the fort as it was safe to run. she was then propelled by her own machinery to within about five hundred yards of the shore. there the clockwork, which was to explode her within a certain length of time, was set and she was abandoned. everybody left, and even the vessels put out to sea to prevent the effect of the explosion upon them. at two o'clock in the morning the explosion took place--and produced no more effect on the fort, or anything else on land, than the bursting of a boiler anywhere on the atlantic ocean would have done. indeed when the troops in fort fisher heard the explosion they supposed it was the bursting of a boiler in one of the yankee gunboats. fort fisher was situated upon a low, flat peninsula north of cape fear river. the soil is sandy. back a little the peninsula is very heavily wooded, and covered with fresh-water swamps. the fort ran across this peninsula, about five hundred yards in width, and extended along the sea coast about thirteen hundred yards. the fort had an armament of 21 guns and 3 mortars on the land side, and 24 guns on the sea front. at that time it was only garrisoned by four companies of infantry, one light battery and the gunners at the heavy guns less than seven hundred men with a reserve of less than a thousand men five miles up the peninsula. general whiting of the confederate army was in command, and general bragg was in command of the force at wilmington. both commenced calling for reinforcements the moment they saw our troops landing. the governor of north carolina called for everybody who could stand behind a parapet and shoot a gun, to join them. in this way they got two or three hundred additional men into fort fisher; and hoke's division, five or six thousand strong, was sent down from richmond. a few of these troops arrived the very day that butler was ready to advance. on the 24th the fleet formed for an attack in arcs of concentric circles, their heavy iron-clads going in very close range, being nearest the shore, and leaving intervals or spaces so that the outer vessels could fire between them. porter was thus enabled to throw one hundred and fifteen shells per minute. the damage done to the fort by these shells was very slight, only two or three cannon being disabled in the fort. but the firing silenced all the guns by making it too hot for the men to maintain their positions about them and compelling them to seek shelter in the bomb-proofs. on the next day part of butler's troops under general adelbert ames effected a landing out of range of the fort without difficulty. this was accomplished under the protection of gunboats sent for the purpose, and under cover of a renewed attack upon the fort by the fleet. they formed a line across the peninsula and advanced, part going north and part toward the fort, covering themselves as they did so. curtis pushed forward and came near to fort fisher, capturing the small garrison at what was called the flag pond battery. weitzel accompanied him to within a half a mile of the works. here he saw that the fort had not been injured, and so reported to butler, advising against an assault. ames, who had gone north in his advance, captured 228 of the reserves. these prisoners reported to butler that sixteen hundred of hoke's division of six thousand from richmond had already arrived and the rest would soon be in his rear. upon these reports butler determined to withdraw his troops from the peninsula and return to the fleet. at that time there had not been a man on our side injured except by one of the shells from the fleet. curtis had got within a few yards of the works. some of his men had snatched a flag from the parapet of the fort, and others had taken a horse from the inside of the stockade. at night butler informed porter of his withdrawal, giving the reasons above stated, and announced his purpose as soon as his men could embark to start for hampton roads. porter represented to him that he had sent to beaufort for more ammunition. he could fire much faster than he had been doing, and would keep the enemy from showing himself until our men were within twenty yards of the fort, and he begged that butler would leave some brave fellows like those who had snatched the flag from the parapet and taken the horse from the fort. butler was unchangeable. he got all his troops aboard, except curtis's brigade, and started back. in doing this, butler made a fearful mistake. my instructions to him, or to the officer who went in command of the expedition, were explicit in the statement that to effect a landing would be of itself a great victory, and if one should be effected, the foothold must not be relinquished; on the contrary, a regular siege of the fort must be commenced and, to guard against interference by reason of storms, supplies of provisions must be laid in as soon as they could be got on shore. but general butler seems to have lost sight of this part of his instructions, and was back at fort monroe on the 28th. i telegraphed to the president as follows: city point, va., dec. 28, 1864.--8.30 p.m. the wilmington expedition has proven a gross and culpable failure. many of the troops are back here. delays and free talk of the object of the expedition enabled the enemy to move troops to wilmington to defeat it. after the expedition sailed from fort monroe, three days of fine weather were squandered, during which the enemy was without a force to protect himself. who is to blame will, i hope, be known. u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. porter sent dispatches to the navy department in which he complained bitterly of having been abandoned by the army just when the fort was nearly in our possession, and begged that our troops might be sent back again to cooperate, but with a different commander. as soon as i heard this i sent a messenger to porter with a letter asking him to hold on. i assured him that i fully sympathized with him in his disappointment, and that i would send the same troops back with a different commander, with some reinforcements to offset those which the enemy had received. i told him it would take some little time to get transportation for the additional troops; but as soon as it could be had the men should be on their way to him, and there would be no delay on my part. i selected a. h. terry to command. it was the 6th of january before the transports could be got ready and the troops aboard. they sailed from fortress monroe on that day. the object and destination of the second expedition were at the time kept a secret to all except a few in the navy department and in the army to whom it was necessary to impart the information. general terry had not the slightest idea of where he was going or what he was to do. he simply knew that he was going to sea and that he had his orders with him, which were to be opened when out at sea. he was instructed to communicate freely with porter and have entire harmony between army and navy, because the work before them would require the best efforts of both arms of service. they arrived off beaufort on the 8th. a heavy storm, however, prevented a landing at forth fisher until the 13th. the navy prepared itself for attack about as before, and the same time assisted the army in landing, this time five miles away. only iron-clads fired at first; the object being to draw the fire of the enemy's guns so as to ascertain their positions. this object being accomplished, they then let in their shots thick and fast. very soon the guns were all silenced, and the fort showed evident signs of being much injured. terry deployed his men across the peninsula as had been done before, and at two o'clock on the following morning was up within two miles of the fort with a respectable abatis in front of his line. his artillery was all landed on that day, the 14th. again curtis's brigade of ame's division had the lead. by noon they had carried an unfinished work less than a half mile from the fort, and turned it so as to face the other way. terry now saw porter and arranged for an assault on the following day. the two commanders arranged their signals so that they could communicate with each other from time to time as they might have occasion. at day light the fleet commenced its firing. the time agreed upon for the assault was the middle of the afternoon, and ames who commanded the assaulting column moved at 3.30. porter landed a force of sailors and marines to move against the sea-front in co-operation with ames's assault. they were under commander breese of the navy. these sailors and marines had worked their way up to within a couple of hundred yards of the fort before the assault. the signal was given and the assault was made; but the poor sailors and marines were repulsed and very badly handled by the enemy, losing 280 killed and wounded out of their number. curtis's brigade charged successfully though met by a heavy fire, some of the men having to wade through the swamp up to their waists to reach the fort. many were wounded, of course, and some killed; but they soon reached the palisades. these they cut away, and pushed on through. the other troops then came up, pennypacker's following curtis, and bell, who commanded the 3d brigade of ames's division, following pennypacker. but the fort was not yet captured though the parapet was gained. the works were very extensive. the large parapet around the work would have been but very little protection to those inside except when they were close up under it. traverses had, therefore, been run until really the work was a succession of small forts enclosed by a large one. the rebels made a desperate effort to hold the fort, and had to be driven from these traverses one by one. the fight continued till long after night. our troops gained first one traverse and then another, and by 10 o'clock at night the place was carried. during this engagement the sailors, who had been repulsed in their assault on the bastion, rendered the best service they could by reinforcing terry's northern line--thus enabling him to send a detachment to the assistance of ames. the fleet kept up a continuous fire upon that part of the fort which was still occupied by the enemy. by means of signals they could be informed where to direct their shots. during the succeeding nights the enemy blew up fort caswell on the opposite side of cape fear river, and abandoned two extensive works on smith's island in the river. our captures in all amounted to 169 guns, besides small-arms, with full supplies of ammunition, and 2,083 prisoners. in addition to these, there were about 700 dead and wounded left there. we had lost 110 killed and 536 wounded. in this assault on fort fisher, bell, one of the brigade commanders, was killed, and two, curtis and pennypacker, were badly wounded. secretary stanton, who was on his way back from savannah, arrived off fort fisher soon after it fell. when he heard the good news he promoted all the officers of any considerable rank for their conspicuous gallantry. terry had been nominated for major-general, but had not been confirmed. this confirmed him; and soon after i recommended him for a brigadier-generalcy in the regular army, and it was given to him for this victory. chapter lxii. sherman's march north--sheridan ordered to lynchburg--canby ordered to move against mobile--movements of schofield and thomas--capture of columbia, south carolina--sherman in the carolinas. when news of sherman being in possession of savannah reached the north, distinguished statesmen and visitors began to pour in to see him. among others who went was the secretary of war, who seemed much pleased at the result of his campaign. mr. draper, the collector of customs of new york, who was with mr. stanton's party, was put in charge of the public property that had been abandoned and captured. savannah was then turned over to general foster's command to hold, so that sherman might have his own entire army free to operate as might be decided upon in the future. i sent the chief engineer of the army of the potomac (general barnard) with letters to general sherman. he remained some time with the general, and when he returned brought back letters, one of which contained suggestions from sherman as to what ought to be done in co-operation with him, when he should have started upon his march northward. i must not neglect to state here the fact that i had no idea originally of having sherman march from savannah to richmond, or even to north carolina. the season was bad, the roads impassable for anything except such an army as he had, and i should not have thought of ordering such a move. i had, therefore, made preparations to collect transports to carry sherman and his army around to the james river by water, and so informed him. on receiving this letter he went to work immediately to prepare for the move, but seeing that it would require a long time to collect the transports, he suggested the idea then of marching up north through the carolinas. i was only too happy to approve this; for if successful, it promised every advantage. his march through georgia had thoroughly destroyed all lines of transportation in that state, and had completely cut the enemy off from all sources of supply to the west of it. if north and south carolina were rendered helpless so far as capacity for feeding lee's army was concerned, the confederate garrison at richmond would be reduced in territory, from which to draw supplies, to very narrow limits in the state of virginia; and, although that section of the country was fertile, it was already well exhausted of both forage and food. i approved sherman's suggestion therefore at once. the work of preparation was tedious, because supplies, to load the wagons for the march, had to be brought from a long distance. sherman would now have to march through a country furnishing fewer provisions than that he had previously been operating in during his march to the sea. besides, he was confronting, or marching toward, a force of the enemy vastly superior to any his troops had encountered on their previous march; and the territory through which he had to pass had now become of such vast importance to the very existence of the confederate army, that the most desperate efforts were to be expected in order to save it. sherman, therefore, while collecting the necessary supplies to start with, made arrangements with admiral dahlgren, who commanded that part of the navy on the south carolina and georgia coast, and general foster, commanding the troops, to take positions, and hold a few points on the sea coast, which he (sherman) designated, in the neighborhood of charleston. this provision was made to enable him to fall back upon the sea coast, in case he should encounter a force sufficient to stop his onward progress. he also wrote me a letter, making suggestions as to what he would like to have done in support of his movement farther north. this letter was brought to city point by general barnard at a time when i happened to be going to washington city, where i arrived on the 21st of january. i cannot tell the provision i had already made to co-operate with sherman, in anticipation of his expected movement, better than by giving my reply to this letter. headquarters armies of the united states, washington, d. c., jan. 21, 1865. major-general w. t. sherman, commanding mill div. of the mississippi. general:--your letters brought by general barnard were received at city point, and read with interest. not having them with me, however, i cannot say that in this i will be able to satisfy you on all points of recommendation. as i arrived here at one p.m., and must leave at six p.m., having in the meantime spent over three hours with the secretary and general halleck, i must be brief. before your last request to have thomas make a campaign into the heart of alabama, i had ordered schofield to annapolis, md., with his corps. the advance (six thousand) will reach the seaboard by the 23d, the remainder following as rapidly as railroad transportation can be procured from cincinnati. the corps numbers over twenty-one thousand men. i was induced to do this because i did not believe thomas could possibly be got off before spring. his pursuit of hood indicated a sluggishness that satisfied me that he would never do to conduct one of your campaigns. the command of the advance of the pursuit was left to subordinates, whilst thomas followed far behind. when hood had crossed the tennessee, and those in pursuit had reached it, thomas had not much more than half crossed the state, from whence he returned to nashville to take steamer for eastport. he is possessed of excellent judgment, great coolness and honesty, but he is not good on a pursuit. he also reported his troops fagged, and that it was necessary to equip up. this report and a determination to give the enemy no rest determined me to use his surplus troops elsewhere. thomas is still left with a sufficient force surplus to go to selma under an energetic leader. he has been telegraphed to, to know whether he could go, and, if so, which of the several routes he would select. no reply is yet received. canby has been ordered to act offensively from the sea-coast to the interior, towards montgomery and selma. thomas's forces will move from the north at an early day, or some of his troops will be sent to canby. without further reinforcements canby will have a moving column of twenty thousand men. fort fisher, you are aware, has been captured. we have a force there of eight thousand effective. at new bern about half the number. it is rumored, through deserters, that wilmington also has fallen. i am inclined to believe the rumor, because on the 17th we knew the enemy were blowing up their works about fort caswell, and that on the 18th terry moved on wilmington. if wilmington is captured, schofield will go there. if not, he will be sent to new bern. in either event, all the surplus forces at the two points will move to the interior toward goldsboro' in co-operation with your movements. from either point, railroad communications can be run out, there being here abundance of rolling-stock suited to the gauge of those roads. there have been about sixteen thousand men sent from lee's army south. of these, you will have fourteen thousand against you, if wilmington is not held by the enemy, casualties at fort fisher having overtaken about two thousand. all these troops are subject to your orders as you come in communication with them. they will be so instructed. from about richmond i will watch lee closely, and if he detaches much more, or attempts to evacuate, will pitch in. in the meantime, should you be brought to a halt anywhere, i can send two corps of thirty thousand effective men to your support, from the troops about richmond. to resume: canby is ordered to operate to the interior from the gulf. a. j. smith may go from the north, but i think it doubtful. a force of twenty-eight or thirty thousand will co-operate with you from new bern or wilmington, or both. you can call for reinforcements. this will be handed you by captain hudson, of my staff, who will return with any message you may have for me. if there is anything i can do for you in the way of having supplies on ship-board, at any point on the sea-coast, ready for you, let me know it. yours truly, u. s. grant, lieut.-general. i had written on the 18th of january to general sherman, giving him the news of the battle of nashville. he was much pleased at the result, although, like myself, he had been very much disappointed at thomas for permitting hood to cross the tennessee river and nearly the whole state of tennessee, and come to nashville to be attacked there. he, however, as i had done, sent thomas a warm congratulatory letter. on the 10th of january, 1865, the resolutions of thanks to sherman and his army passed by congress were approved. sherman, after the capture, at once had the debris cleared up, commencing the work by removing the piling and torpedoes from the river, and taking up all obstructions. he had then intrenched the city, so that it could be held by a small garrison. by the middle of january all his work was done, except the accumulation of supplies to commence his movement with. he proposed to move in two columns, one from savannah, going along by the river of the same name, and the other by roads farther east, threatening charleston. he commenced the advance by moving his right wing to beaufort, south carolina, then to pocotaligo by water. this column, in moving north, threatened charleston, and, indeed, it was not determined at first that they would have a force visit charleston. south carolina had done so much to prepare the public mind of the south for secession, and had been so active in precipitating the decision of the question before the south was fully prepared to meet it, that there was, at that time, a feeling throughout the north and also largely entertained by people of the south, that the state of south carolina, and charleston, the hot-bed of secession in particular, ought to have a heavy hand laid upon them. in fact, nothing but the decisive results that followed, deterred the radical portion of the people from condemning the movement, because charleston had been left out. to pass into the interior would, however, be to insure the evacuation of the city, and its possession by the navy and foster's troops. it is so situated between two formidable rivers that a small garrison could have held it against all odds as long as their supplies would hold out. sherman therefore passed it by. by the first of february all preparations were completed for the final march, columbia, south carolina, being the first objective; fayetteville, north carolina, the second; and goldsboro, or neighborhood, the final one, unless something further should be determined upon. the right wing went from pocotaligo, and the left from about hardeeville on the savannah river, both columns taking a pretty direct route for columbia. the cavalry, however, were to threaten charleston on the right, and augusta on the left. on the 15th of january fort fisher had fallen, news of which sherman had received before starting out on his march. we already had new bern and had soon wilmington, whose fall followed that of fort fisher; as did other points on the sea coast, where the national troops were now in readiness to co-operate with sherman's advance when he had passed fayetteville. on the 18th of january i ordered canby, in command at new orleans, to move against mobile, montgomery and selma, alabama, for the purpose of destroying roads, machine shops, etc. on the 8th of february i ordered sheridan, who was in the valley of virginia, to push forward as soon as the weather would permit and strike the canal west of richmond at or about lynchburg; and on the 20th i made the order to go to lynchburg as soon as the roads would permit, saying: "as soon as it is possible to travel, i think you will have no difficulty about reaching lynchburg with a cavalry force alone. from there you could destroy the railroad and canal in every direction, so as to be of no further use to the rebellion. * * * this additional raid, with one starting from east tennessee under stoneman, numbering about four or five thousand cavalry; one from eastport, mississippi, ten thousand cavalry; canby, from mobile bay, with about eighteen thousand mixed troops--these three latter pushing for tuscaloosa, selma and montgomery; and sherman with a large army eating out the vitals of south carolina--is all that will be wanted to leave nothing for the rebellion to stand upon. i would advise you to overcome great obstacles to accomplish this. charleston was evacuated on tuesday last." on the 27th of february, more than a month after canby had received his orders, i again wrote to him, saying that i was extremely anxious to hear of his being in alabama. i notified him, also, that i had sent grierson to take command of his cavalry, he being a very efficient officer. i further suggested that forrest was probably in mississippi, and if he was there, he would find him an officer of great courage and capacity whom it would be difficult to get by. i still further informed him that thomas had been ordered to start a cavalry force into mississippi on the 20th of february, or as soon as possible thereafter. this force did not get off however. all these movements were designed to be in support of sherman's march, the object being to keep the confederate troops in the west from leaving there. but neither canby nor thomas could be got off in time. i had some time before depleted thomas's army to reinforce canby, for the reason that thomas had failed to start an expedition which he had been ordered to send out, and to have the troops where they might do something. canby seemed to be equally deliberate in all of his movements. i ordered him to go in person; but he prepared to send a detachment under another officer. general granger had got down to new orleans, in some way or other, and i wrote canby that he must not put him in command of troops. in spite of this he asked the war department to assign granger to the command of a corps. almost in despair of having adequate service rendered to the cause in that quarter, i said to canby: "i am in receipt of a dispatch * * * informing me that you have made requisitions for a construction corps and material to build seventy miles of railroad. i have directed that none be sent. thomas's army has been depleted to send a force to you that they might be where they could act in winter, and at least detain the force the enemy had in the west. if there had been any idea of repairing railroads, it could have been done much better from the north, where we already had the troops. i expected your movements to be co-operative with sherman's last. this has now entirely failed. i wrote to you long ago, urging you to push promptly and to live upon the country, and destroy railroads, machine shops, etc., not to build them. take mobile and hold it, and push your forces to the interior--to montgomery and to selma. destroy railroads, rolling stock, and everything useful for carrying on war, and, when you have done this, take such positions as can be supplied by water. by this means alone you can occupy positions from which the enemy's roads in the interior can be kept broken." most of these expeditions got off finally, but too late to render any service in the direction for which they were designed. the enemy, ready to intercept his advance, consisted of hardee's troops and wheeler's cavalry, perhaps less than fifteen thousand men in all; but frantic efforts were being made in richmond, as i was sure would be the case, to retard sherman's movements. everything possible was being done to raise troops in the south. lee dispatched against sherman the troops which had been sent to relieve fort fisher, which, including those of the other defences of the harbor and its neighborhood, amounted, after deducting the two thousand killed, wounded and captured, to fourteen thousand men. after thomas's victory at nashville what remained, of hood's army were gathered together and forwarded as rapidly as possible to the east to co-operate with these forces; and, finally, general joseph e. johnston, one of the ablest commanders of the south though not in favor with the administration (or at least with mr. davis), was put in command of all the troops in north and south carolina. schofield arrived at annapolis in the latter part of january, but before sending his troops to north carolina i went with him down the coast to see the situation of affairs, as i could give fuller directions after being on the ground than i could very well have given without. we soon returned, and the troops were sent by sea to cape fear river. both new bern and wilmington are connected with raleigh by railroads which unite at goldsboro. schofield was to land troops at smithville, near the mouth of the cape fear river on the west side, and move up to secure the wilmington and charlotteville railroad. this column took their pontoon bridges with them, to enable them to cross over to the island south of the city of wilmington. a large body was sent by the north side to co-operate with them. they succeeded in taking the city on the 22d of february. i took the precaution to provide for sherman's army, in case he should be forced to turn in toward the sea coast before reaching north carolina, by forwarding supplies to every place where he was liable to have to make such a deflection from his projected march. i also sent railroad rolling stock, of which we had a great abundance, now that we were not operating the roads in virginia. the gauge of the north carolina railroads being the same as the virginia railroads had been altered too; these cars and locomotives were ready for use there without any change. on the 31st of january i countermanded the orders given to thomas to move south to alabama and georgia. (i had previously reduced his force by sending a portion of it to terry.) i directed in lieu of this movement, that he should send stoneman through east tennessee, and push him well down toward columbia, south carolina, in support of sherman. thomas did not get stoneman off in time, but, on the contrary, when i had supposed he was on his march in support of sherman i heard of his being in louisville, kentucky. i immediately changed the order, and directed thomas to send him toward lynchburg. finally, however, on the 12th of march, he did push down through the north-western end of south carolina, creating some consternation. i also ordered thomas to send the 4th corps (stanley's) to bull gap and to destroy no more roads east of that. i also directed him to concentrate supplies at knoxville, with a view to a probable movement of his army through that way toward lynchburg. goldsboro is four hundred and twenty-five miles from savannah. sherman's march was without much incident until he entered columbia, on the 17th of february. he was detained in his progress by having to repair and corduroy the roads, and rebuild the bridges. there was constant skirmishing and fighting between the cavalry of the two armies, but this did not retard the advance of the infantry. four days, also, were lost in making complete the destruction of the most important railroads south of columbia; there was also some delay caused by the high water, and the destruction of the bridges on the line of the road. a formidable river had to be crossed near columbia, and that in the face of a small garrison under general wade hampton. there was but little delay, however, further than that caused by high water in the stream. hampton left as sherman approached, and the city was found to be on fire. there has since been a great deal of acrimony displayed in discussions of the question as to who set columbia on fire. sherman denies it on the part of his troops, and hampton denies it on the part of the confederates. one thing is certain: as soon as our troops took possession, they at once proceeded to extinguish the flames to the best of their ability with the limited means at hand. in any case, the example set by the confederates in burning the village of chambersburg, pa., a town which was not garrisoned, would seem to make a defence of the act of firing the seat of government of the state most responsible for the conflict then raging, not imperative. the confederate troops having vacated the city, the mayor took possession, and sallied forth to meet the commander of the national forces for the purpose of surrendering the town, making terms for the protection of property, etc. sherman paid no attention at all to the overture, but pushed forward and took the town without making any conditions whatever with its citizens. he then, however, co-operated with the mayor in extinguishing the flames and providing for the people who were rendered destitute by this destruction of their homes. when he left there he even gave the mayor five hundred head of cattle to be distributed among the citizens, to tide them over until some arrangement could be made for their future supplies. he remained in columbia until the roads, public buildings, workshops and everything that could be useful to the enemy were destroyed. while at columbia, sherman learned for the first time that what remained of hood's army was confronting him, under the command of general beauregard. charleston was evacuated on the 18th of february, and foster garrisoned the place. wilmington was captured on the 22d. columbia and cheraw farther north, were regarded as so secure from invasion that the wealthy people of charleston and augusta had sent much of their valuable property to these two points to be stored. among the goods sent there were valuable carpets, tons of old madeira, silverware, and furniture. i am afraid much of these goods fell into the hands of our troops. there was found at columbia a large amount of powder, some artillery, small-arms and fixed ammunition. these, of course were among the articles destroyed. while here, sherman also learned of johnston's restoration to command. the latter was given, as already stated, all troops in north and south carolina. after the completion of the destruction of public property about columbia, sherman proceeded on his march and reached cheraw without any special opposition and without incident to relate. the railroads, of course, were thoroughly destroyed on the way. sherman remained a day or two at cheraw; and, finally, on the 6th of march crossed his troops over the pedee and advanced straight for fayetteville. hardee and hampton were there, and barely escaped. sherman reached fayetteville on the 11th of march. he had dispatched scouts from cheraw with letters to general terry, at wilmington, asking him to send a steamer with some supplies of bread, clothing and other articles which he enumerated. the scouts got through successfully, and a boat was sent with the mail and such articles for which sherman had asked as were in store at wilmington; unfortunately, however, those stores did not contain clothing. four days later, on the 15th, sherman left fayetteville for goldsboro. the march, now, had to be made with great caution, for he was approaching lee's army and nearing the country that still remained open to the enemy. besides, he was confronting all that he had had to confront in his previous march up to that point, reinforced by the garrisons along the road and by what remained of hood's army. frantic appeals were made to the people to come in voluntarily and swell the ranks of our foe. i presume, however, that johnston did not have in all over 35,000 or 40,000 men. the people had grown tired of the war, and desertions from the confederate army were much more numerous than the voluntary accessions. there was some fighting at averysboro on the 16th between johnston's troops and sherman's, with some loss; and at bentonville on the 19th and 21st of march, but johnston withdrew from the contest before the morning of the 22d. sherman's loss in these last engagements in killed, wounded, and missing, was about sixteen hundred. sherman's troops at last reached goldsboro on the 23d of the month and went into bivouac; and there his men were destined to have a long rest. schofield was there to meet him with the troops which had been sent to wilmington. sherman was no longer in danger. he had johnston confronting him; but with an army much inferior to his own, both in numbers and morale. he had lee to the north of him with a force largely superior; but i was holding lee with a still greater force, and had he made his escape and gotten down to reinforce johnston, sherman, with the reinforcements he now had from schofield and terry, would have been able to hold the confederates at bay for an indefinite period. he was near the sea-shore with his back to it, and our navy occupied the harbors. he had a railroad to both wilmington and new bern, and his flanks were thoroughly protected by streams, which intersect that part of the country and deepen as they approach the sea. then, too, sherman knew that if lee should escape me i would be on his heels, and he and johnson together would be crushed in one blow if they attempted to make a stand. with the loss of their capital, it is doubtful whether lee's army would have amounted to much as an army when it reached north carolina. johnston's army was demoralized by constant defeat and would hardly have made an offensive movement, even if they could have been induced to remain on duty. the men of both lee's and johnston's armies were, like their brethren of the north, as brave as men can be; but no man is so brave that he may not meet such defeats and disasters as to discourage him and dampen his ardor for any cause, no matter how just he deems it. chapter lxiii. arrival of the peace commissioners--lincoln and the peace commissioners --an anecdote of lincoln--the winter before petersburg--sheridan destroys the railroad--gordon carries the picket line--parke recaptures the line --the line of battle of white oak road. on the last of january, 1865, peace commissioners from the so-called confederate states presented themselves on our lines around petersburg, and were immediately conducted to my headquarters at city point. they proved to be alexander h. stephens, vice-president of the confederacy, judge campbell, assistant-secretary of war, and r. m. t. hunt, formerly united states senator and then a member of the confederate senate. it was about dark when they reached my headquarters, and i at once conducted them to the steam mary martin, a hudson river boat which was very comfortably fitted up for the use of passengers. i at once communicated by telegraph with washington and informed the secretary of war and the president of the arrival of these commissioners and that their object was to negotiate terms of peace between he united states and, as they termed it, the confederate government. i was instructed to retain them at city point, until the president, or some one whom he would designate, should come to meet them. they remained several days as guests on board the boat. i saw them quite frequently, though i have no recollection of having had any conversation whatever with them on the subject of their mission. it was something i had nothing to do with, and i therefore did not wish to express any views on the subject. for my own part i never had admitted, and never was ready to admit, that they were the representatives of a government. there had been too great a waste of blood and treasure to concede anything of the kind. as long as they remained there, however, our relations were pleasant and i found them all very agreeable gentlemen. i directed the captain to furnish them with the best the boat afforded, and to administer to their comfort in every way possible. no guard was placed over them and no restriction was put upon their movements; nor was there any pledge asked that they would not abuse the privileges extended to them. they were permitted to leave the boat when they felt like it, and did so, coming up on the bank and visiting me at my headquarters. i had never met either of these gentlemen before the war, but knew them well by reputation and through their public services, and i had been a particular admirer of mr. stephens. i had always supposed that he was a very small man, but when i saw him in the dusk of the evening i was very much surprised to find so large a man as he seemed to be. when he got down on to the boat i found that he was wearing a coarse gray woollen overcoat, a manufacture that had been introduced into the south during the rebellion. the cloth was thicker than anything of the kind i had ever seen, even in canada. the overcoat extended nearly to his feet, and was so large that it gave him the appearance of being an average-sized man. he took this off when he reached the cabin of the boat, and i was struck with the apparent change in size, in the coat and out of it. after a few days, about the 2d of february, i received a dispatch from washington, directing me to send the commissioners to hampton roads to meet the president and a member of the cabinet. mr. lincoln met them there and had an interview of short duration. it was not a great while after they met that the president visited me at city point. he spoke of his having met the commissioners, and said he had told them that there would be no use in entering into any negotiations unless they would recognize, first: that the union as a whole must be forever preserved, and second: that slavery must be abolished. if they were willing to concede these two points, then he was ready to enter into negotiations and was almost willing to hand them a blank sheet of paper with his signature attached for them to fill in the terms upon which they were willing to live with us in the union and be one people. he always showed a generous and kindly spirit toward the southern people, and i never heard him abuse an enemy. some of the cruel things said about president lincoln, particularly in the north, used to pierce him to the heart; but never in my presence did he evince a revengeful disposition and i saw a great deal of him at city point, for he seemed glad to get away from the cares and anxieties of the capital. right here i might relate an anecdote of mr. lincoln. it was on the occasion of his visit to me just after he had talked with the peace commissioners at hampton roads. after a little conversation, he asked me if i had seen that overcoat of stephens's. i replied that i had. "well," said he, "did you see him take it off?" i said yes. "well," said he, "didn't you think it was the biggest shuck and the littlest ear that ever you did see?" long afterwards i told this story to the confederate general j. b. gordon, at the time a member of the senate. he repeated it to stephens, and, as i heard afterwards, stephens laughed immoderately at the simile of mr. lincoln. the rest of the winter, after the departure of the peace commissioners, passed off quietly and uneventfully, except for two or three little incidents. on one occasion during this period, while i was visiting washington city for the purpose of conferring with the administration, the enemy's cavalry under general wade hampton, passing our extreme left and then going to the south, got in east of us. before their presence was known, they had driven off a large number of beef cattle that were grazing in that section. it was a fair capture, and they were sufficiently needed by the confederates. it was only retaliating for what we had done, sometimes for many weeks at a time, when out of supplies taking what the confederate army otherwise would have gotten. as appears in this book, on one single occasion we captured five thousand head of cattle which were crossing the mississippi river near port hudson on their way from texas to supply the confederate army in the east. one of the most anxious periods of my experience during the rebellion was the last few weeks before petersburg. i felt that the situation of the confederate army was such that they would try to make an escape at the earliest practicable moment, and i was afraid, every morning, that i would awake from my sleep to hear that lee had gone, and that nothing was left but a picket line. he had his railroad by the way of danville south, and i was afraid that he was running off his men and all stores and ordnance except such as it would be necessary to carry with him for his immediate defence. i knew he could move much more lightly and more rapidly than i, and that, if he got the start, he would leave me behind so that we would have the same army to fight again farther south and the war might be prolonged another year. i was led to this fear by the fact that i could not see how it was possible for the confederates to hold out much longer where they were. there is no doubt that richmond would have been evacuated much sooner than it was, if it had not been that it was the capital of the so-called confederacy, and the fact of evacuating the capital would, of course, have had a very demoralizing effect upon the confederate army. when it was evacuated (as we shall see further on), the confederacy at once began to crumble and fade away. then, too, desertions were taking place, not only among those who were with general lee in the neighborhood of their capital, but throughout the whole confederacy. i remember that in a conversation with me on one occasion long prior to this, general butler remarked that the confederates would find great difficulty in getting more men for their army; possibly adding, though i am not certain as to this, "unless they should arm the slave." the south, as we all knew, were conscripting every able-bodied man between the ages of eighteen and forty-five; and now they had passed a law for the further conscription of boys from fourteen to eighteen, calling them the junior reserves, and men from forty-five to sixty to be called the senior reserves. the latter were to hold the necessary points not in immediate danger, and especially those in the rear. general butler, in alluding to this conscription, remarked that they were thus "robbing both the cradle and the grave," an expression which i afterwards used in writing a letter to mr. washburn. it was my belief that while the enemy could get no more recruits they were losing at least a regiment a day, taking it throughout the entire army, by desertions alone. then by casualties of war, sickness, and other natural causes, their losses were much heavier. it was a mere question of arithmetic to calculate how long they could hold out while that rate of depletion was going on. of course long before their army would be thus reduced to nothing the army which we had in the field would have been able to capture theirs. then too i knew from the great number of desertions, that the men who had fought so bravely, so gallantly and so long for the cause which they believed in--and as earnestly, i take it, as our men believed in the cause for which they were fighting--had lost hope and become despondent. many of them were making application to be sent north where they might get employment until the war was over, when they could return to their southern homes. for these and other reasons i was naturally very impatient for the time to come when i could commence the spring campaign, which i thoroughly believed would close the war. there were two considerations i had to observe, however, and which detained me. one was the fact that the winter had been one of heavy rains, and the roads were impassable for artillery and teams. it was necessary to wait until they had dried sufficiently to enable us to move the wagon trains and artillery necessary to the efficiency of an army operating in the enemy's country. the other consideration was that general sheridan with the cavalry of the army of the potomac was operating on the north side of the james river, having come down from the shenandoah. it was necessary that i should have his cavalry with me, and i was therefore obliged to wait until he could join me south of the james river. let us now take account of what he was doing. on the 5th of march i had heard from sheridan. he had met early between staunton and charlottesville and defeated him, capturing nearly his entire command. early and some of his officers escaped by finding refuge in the neighboring houses or in the woods. on the 12th i heard from him again. he had turned east, to come to white house. he could not go to lynchburg as ordered, because the rains had been so very heavy and the streams were so very much swollen. he had a pontoon train with him, but it would not reach half way across some of the streams, at their then stage of water, which he would have to get over in going south as first ordered. i had supplies sent around to white house for him, and kept the depot there open until he arrived. we had intended to abandon it because the james river had now become our base of supplies. sheridan had about ten thousand cavalry with him, divided into two divisions commanded respectively by custer and devin. general merritt was acting as chief of cavalry. sheridan moved very light, carrying only four days' provisions with him, with a larger supply of coffee, salt and other small rations, and a very little else besides ammunition. they stopped at charlottesville and commenced tearing up the railroad back toward lynchburg. he also sent a division along the james river canal to destroy locks, culverts etc. all mills and factories along the lines of march of his troops were destroyed also. sheridan had in this way consumed so much time that his making a march to white house was now somewhat hazardous. he determined therefore to fight his way along the railroad and canal till he was as near to richmond as it was possible to get, or until attacked. he did this, destroying the canal as far as goochland, and the railroad to a point as near richmond as he could get. on the 10th he was at columbia. negroes had joined his column to the number of two thousand or more, and they assisted considerably in the work of destroying the railroads and the canal. his cavalry was in as fine a condition as when he started, because he had been able to find plenty of forage. he had captured most of early's horses and picked up a good many others on the road. when he reached ashland he was assailed by the enemy in force. he resisted their assault with part of his command, moved quickly across the south and north anna, going north, and reached white house safely on the 19th. the time for sherman to move had to be fixed with reference to the time he could get away from goldsboro where he then was. supplies had to be got up to him which would last him through a long march, as there would probably not be much to be obtained in the country through which he would pass. i had to arrange, therefore, that he should start from where he was, in the neighborhood of goldsboro on the 18th of april, the earliest day at which he supposed he could be ready. sherman was anxious that i should wait where i was until he could come up, and make a sure thing of it; but i had determined to move as soon as the roads and weather would admit of my doing so. i had been tied down somewhat in the matter of fixing any time at my pleasure for starting, until sheridan, who was on his way from the shenandoah valley to join me, should arrive, as both his presence and that of his cavalry were necessary to the execution of the plans which i had in mind. however, having arrived at white house on the 19th of march, i was enabled to make my plans. prompted by my anxiety lest lee should get away some night before i was aware of it, and having the lead of me, push into north carolina to join with johnston in attempting to crush out sherman, i had, as early as the 1st of the month of march, given instructions to the troops around petersburg to keep a sharp lookout to see that such a movement should not escape their notice, and to be ready strike at once if it was undertaken. it is now known that early in the month of march mr. davis and general lee had a consultation about the situation of affairs in and about and petersburg, and they both agreed places were no longer tenable for them, and that they must get away as soon as possible. they, too, were waiting for dry roads, or a condition of the roads which would make it possible to move. general lee, in aid of his plan of escape, and to secure a wider opening to enable them to reach the danville road with greater security than he would have in the way the two armies were situated, determined upon an assault upon the right of our lines around petersburg. the night of the 24th of march was fixed upon for this assault, and general gordon was assigned to the execution of the plan. the point between fort stedman and battery no. 10, where our lines were closest together, was selected as the point of his attack. the attack was to be made at night, and the troops were to get possession of the higher ground in the rear where they supposed we had intrenchments, then sweep to the right and left, create a panic in the lines of our army, and force me to contract my lines. lee hoped this would detain me a few days longer and give him an opportunity of escape. the plan was well conceived and the execution of it very well done indeed, up to the point of carrying a portion of our line. gordon assembled his troops under the cover of night, at the point at which they were to make their charge, and got possession of our picket-line, entirely without the knowledge of the troops inside of our main line of intrenchments; this reduced the distance he would have to charge over to not much more than fifty yards. for some time before the deserters had been coming in with great frequency, often bringing their arms with them, and this the confederate general knew. taking advantage of this knowledge he sent his pickets, with their arms, creeping through to ours as if to desert. when they got to our lines they at once took possession and sent our pickets to the rear as prisoners. in the main line our men were sleeping serenely, as if in great security. this plan was to have been executed and much damage done before daylight; but the troops that were to reinforce gordon had to be brought from the north side of the james river and, by some accident on the railroad on their way over, they were detained for a considerable time; so that it got to be nearly daylight before they were ready to make the charge. the charge, however, was successful and almost without loss, the enemy passing through our lines between fort stedman and battery no. 10. then turning to the right and left they captured the fort and the battery, with all the arms and troops in them. continuing the charge, they also carried batteries eleven and twelve to our left, which they turned toward city point. meade happened to be at city point that night, and this break in his line cut him off from all communication with his headquarters. parke, however, commanding the 9th corps when this breach took place, telegraphed the facts to meade's headquarters, and learning that the general was away, assumed command himself and with commendable promptitude made all preparations to drive the enemy back. general tidball gathered a large number of pieces of artillery and planted them in rear of the captured works so as to sweep the narrow space of ground between the lines very thoroughly. hartranft was soon out with his division, as also was willcox. hartranft to the right of the breach headed the rebels off in that direction and rapidly drove them back into fort stedman. on the other side they were driven back into the intrenchments which they had captured, and batteries eleven and twelve were retaken by willcox early in the morning. parke then threw a line around outside of the captured fort and batteries, and communication was once more established. the artillery fire was kept up so continuously that it was impossible for the confederates to retreat, and equally impossible for reinforcements to join them. they all, therefore, fell captives into our hands. this effort of lee's cost him about four thousand men, and resulted in their killing, wounding and capturing about two thousand of ours. after the recapture of the batteries taken by the confederates, our troops made a charge and carried the enemy's intrenched picket line, which they strengthened and held. this, in turn, gave us but a short distance to charge over when our attack came to be made a few days later. the day that gordon was making dispositions for this attack (24th of march) i issued my orders for the movement to commence on the 29th. ord, with three divisions of infantry and mackenzie's cavalry, was to move in advance on the night of the 27th, from the north side of the james river and take his place on our extreme left, thirty miles away. he left weitzel with the rest of the army of the james to hold bermuda hundred and the north of the james river. the engineer brigade was to be left at city point, and parke's corps in the lines about petersburg. (*42) ord was at his place promptly. humphreys and warren were then on our extreme left with the 2d and 5th corps. they were directed on the arrival of ord, and on his getting into position in their places, to cross hatcher's run and extend out west toward five forks, the object being to get into a position from which we could strike the south side railroad and ultimately the danville railroad. there was considerable fighting in taking up these new positions for the 2d and 5th corps, in which the army of the james had also to participate somewhat, and the losses were quite severe. this was what was known as the battle of white oak road. chapter lxiv. interview with sheridan--grand movement of the army of the potomac --sheridan's advance on five forks--battle of five forks--parke and wright storm the enemy's line--battles before petersburg. sheridan reached city point on the 26th day of march. his horses, of course, were jaded and many of them had lost their shoes. a few days of rest were necessary to recuperate the animals and also to have them shod and put in condition for moving. immediately on general sheridan's arrival at city point i prepared his instructions for the move which i had decided upon. the movement was to commence on the 29th of the month. after reading the instructions i had given him, sheridan walked out of my tent, and i followed to have some conversation with him by himself --not in the presence of anybody else, even of a member of my staff. in preparing his instructions i contemplated just what took place; that is to say, capturing five forks, driving the enemy from petersburg and richmond and terminating the contest before separating from the enemy. but the nation had already become restless and discouraged at the prolongation of the war, and many believed that it would never terminate except by compromise. knowing that unless my plan proved an entire success it would be interpreted as a disastrous defeat, i provided in these instructions that in a certain event he was to cut loose from the army of the potomac and his base of supplies, and living upon the country proceed south by the way of the danville railroad, or near it, across the roanoke, get in the rear of johnston, who was guarding that road, and cooperate with sherman in destroying johnston; then with these combined forces to help carry out the instructions which sherman already had received, to act in cooperation with the armies around petersburg and richmond. i saw that after sheridan had read his instructions he seemed somewhat disappointed at the idea, possibly, of having to cut loose again from the army of the potomac, and place himself between the two main armies of the enemy. i said to him: "general, this portion of your instructions i have put in merely as a blind;" and gave him the reason for doing so, heretofore described. i told him that, as a matter of fact, i intended to close the war right here, with this movement, and that he should go no farther. his face at once brightened up, and slapping his hand on his leg he said: "i am glad to hear it, and we can do it." sheridan was not however to make his movement against five forks until he got further instructions from me. one day, after the movement i am about to describe had commenced, and when his cavalry was on our extreme left and far to the rear, south, sheridan rode up to where my headquarters were then established, at dabney's mills. he met some of my staff officers outside, and was highly jubilant over the prospects of success, giving reasons why he believed this would prove the final and successful effort. although my chief-of-staff had urged very strongly that we return to our position about city point and in the lines around petersburg, he asked sheridan to come in to see me and say to me what he had been saying to them. sheridan felt a little modest about giving his advice where it had not been asked; so one of my staff came in and told me that sheridan had what they considered important news, and suggested that i send for him. i did so, and was glad to see the spirit of confidence with which he was imbued. knowing as i did from experience, of what great value that feeling of confidence by a commander was, i determined to make a movement at once, although on account of the rains which had fallen after i had started out the roads were still very heavy. orders were given accordingly. finally the 29th of march came, and fortunately there having been a few days free from rain, the surface of the ground was dry, giving indications that the time had come when we could move. on that date i moved out with all the army available after leaving sufficient force to hold the line about petersburg. it soon set in raining again however, and in a very short time the roads became practically impassable for teams, and almost so for cavalry. sometimes a horse or mule would be standing apparently on firm ground, when all at once one foot would sink, and as he commenced scrambling to catch himself all his feet would sink and he would have to be drawn by hand out of the quicksands so common in that part of virginia and other southern states. it became necessary therefore to build corduroy roads every foot of the way as we advanced, to move our artillery upon. the army had become so accustomed to this kind of work, and were so well prepared for it, that it was done very rapidly. the next day, march 30th, we had made sufficient progress to the south-west to warrant me in starting sheridan with his cavalry over by dinwiddie with instructions to then come up by the road leading north-west to five forks, thus menacing the right of lee's line. this movement was made for the purpose of extending our lines to the west as far as practicable towards the enemy's extreme right, or five forks. the column moving detached from the army still in the trenches was, excluding the cavalry, very small. the forces in the trenches were themselves extending to the left flank. warren was on the extreme left when the extension began, but humphreys was marched around later and thrown into line between him and five forks. my hope was that sheridan would be able to carry five forks, get on the enemy's right flank and rear, and force them to weaken their centre to protect their right so that an assault in the centre might be successfully made. general wright's corps had been designated to make this assault, which i intended to order as soon as information reached me of sheridan's success. he was to move under cover as close to the enemy as he could get. it is natural to suppose that lee would understand my design to be to get up to the south side and ultimately to the danville railroad, as soon as he had heard of the movement commenced on the 29th. these roads were so important to his very existence while he remained in richmond and petersburg, and of such vital importance to him even in case of retreat, that naturally he would make most strenuous efforts to defend them. he did on the 30th send pickett with five brigades to reinforce five forks. he also sent around to the right of his army some two or three other divisions, besides directing that other troops be held in readiness on the north side of the james river to come over on call. he came over himself to superintend in person the defence of his right flank. sheridan moved back to dinwiddie court-house on the night of the 30th, and then took a road leading north-west to five forks. he had only his cavalry with him. soon encountering the rebel cavalry he met with a very stout resistance. he gradually drove them back however until in the neighborhood of five forks. here he had to encounter other troops besides those he had been contending with, and was forced to give way. in this condition of affairs he notified me of what had taken place and stated that he was falling back toward dinwiddie gradually and slowly, and asked me to send wright's corps to his assistance. i replied to him that it was impossible to send wright's corps because that corps was already in line close up to the enemy, where we should want to assault when the proper time came, and was besides a long distance from him; but the 2d (humphreys's) and 5th (warren's) corps were on our extreme left and a little to the rear of it in a position to threaten the left flank of the enemy at five forks, and that i would send warren. accordingly orders were sent to warren to move at once that night (the 31st) to dinwiddie court house and put himself in communication with sheridan as soon as possible, and report to him. he was very slow in moving, some of his troops not starting until after 5 o'clock next morning. when he did move it was done very deliberately, and on arriving at gravelly run he found the stream swollen from the recent rains so that he regarded it as not fordable. sheridan of course knew of his coming, and being impatient to get the troops up as soon as possible, sent orders to him to hasten. he was also hastened or at least ordered to move up rapidly by general meade. he now felt that he could not cross that creek without bridges, and his orders were changed to move so as to strike the pursuing enemy in flank or get in their rear; but he was so late in getting up that sheridan determined to move forward without him. however, ayres's division of warren's corps reached him in time to be in the fight all day, most of the time separated from the remainder of the 5th corps and fighting directly under sheridan. warren reported to sheridan about 11 o'clock on the 1st, but the whole of his troops were not up so as to be much engaged until late in the afternoon. griffin's division in backing to get out of the way of a severe cross fire of the enemy was found marching away from the fighting. this did not continue long, however; the division was brought back and with ayres's division did most excellent service during the day. crawford's division of the same corps had backed still farther off, and although orders were sent repeatedly to bring it up, it was late before it finally got to where it could be of material assistance. once there it did very excellent service. sheridan succeeded by the middle of the afternoon or a little later, in advancing up to the point from which to make his designed assault upon five forks itself. he was very impatient to make the assault and have it all over before night, because the ground he occupied would be untenable for him in bivouac during the night. unless the assault was made and was successful, he would be obliged to return to dinwiddie court-house, or even further than that for the night. it was at this junction of affairs that sheridan wanted to get crawford's division in hand, and he also wanted warren. he sent staff officer after staff officer in search of warren, directing that general to report to him, but they were unable to find him. at all events sheridan was unable to get that officer to him. finally he went himself. he issued an order relieving warren and assigning griffin to the command of the 5th corps. the troops were then brought up and the assault successfully made. i was so much dissatisfied with warren's dilatory movements in the battle of white oak road and in his failure to reach sheridan in time, that i was very much afraid that at the last moment he would fail sheridan. he was a man of fine intelligence, great earnestness, quick perception, and could make his dispositions as quickly as any officer, under difficulties where he was forced to act. but i had before discovered a defect which was beyond his control, that was very prejudicial to his usefulness in emergencies like the one just before us. he could see every danger at a glance before he had encountered it. he would not only make preparations to meet the danger which might occur, but he would inform his commanding officer what others should do while he was executing his move. i had sent a staff officer to general sheridan to call his attention to these defects, and to say that as much as i liked general warren, now was not a time when we could let our personal feelings for any one stand in the way of success; and if his removal was necessary to success, not to hesitate. it was upon that authorization that sheridan removed warren. i was very sorry that it had been done, and regretted still more that i had not long before taken occasion to assign him to another field of duty. it was dusk when our troops under sheridan went over the parapets of the enemy. the two armies were mingled together there for a time in such manner that it was almost a question which one was going to demand the surrender of the other. soon, however, the enemy broke and ran in every direction; some six thousand prisoners, besides artillery and small-arms in large quantities, falling into our hands. the flying troops were pursued in different directions, the cavalry and 5th corps under sheridan pursuing the larger body which moved north-west. this pursuit continued until about nine o'clock at night, when sheridan halted his troops, and knowing the importance to him of the part of the enemy's line which had been captured, returned, sending the 5th corps across hatcher's run to just south-west of petersburg, and facing them toward it. merritt, with the cavalry, stopped and bivouacked west of five forks. this was the condition which affairs were in on the night of the 1st of april. i then issued orders for an assault by wright and parke at four o'clock on the morning of the 2d. i also ordered the 2d corps, general humphreys, and general ord with the army of the james, on the left, to hold themselves in readiness to take any advantage that could be taken from weakening in their front. i notified mr. lincoln at city point of the success of the day; in fact i had reported to him during the day and evening as i got news, because he was so much interested in the movements taking place that i wanted to relieve his mind as much as i could. i notified weitzel on the north side of the james river, directing him, also, to keep close up to the enemy, and take advantage of the withdrawal of troops from there to promptly enter the city of richmond. i was afraid that lee would regard the possession of five forks as of so much importance that he would make a last desperate effort to retake it, risking everything upon the cast of a single die. it was for this reason that i had ordered the assault to take place at once, as soon as i had received the news of the capture of five forks. the corps commanders, however, reported that it was so dark that the men could not see to move, and it would be impossible to make the assault then. but we kept up a continuous artillery fire upon the enemy around the whole line including that north of the james river, until it was light enough to move, which was about a quarter to five in the morning. at that hour parke's and wright's corps moved out as directed, brushed the abatis from their front as they advanced under a heavy fire of musketry and artillery, and went without flinching directly on till they mounted the parapets and threw themselves inside of the enemy's line. parke, who was on the right, swept down to the right and captured a very considerable length of line in that direction, but at that point the outer was so near the inner line which closely enveloped the city of petersburg that he could make no advance forward and, in fact, had a very serious task to turn the lines which he had captured to the defence of his own troops and to hold them; but he succeeded in this. wright swung around to his left and moved to hatcher's run, sweeping everything before him. the enemy had traverses in rear of his captured line, under cover of which he made something of a stand, from one to another, as wright moved on; but the latter met no serious obstacle. as you proceed to the left the outer line becomes gradually much farther from the inner one, and along about hatcher's run they must be nearly two miles apart. both parke and wright captured a considerable amount of artillery and some prisoners--wright about three thousand of them. in the meantime ord and humphreys, in obedience to the instructions they had received, had succeeded by daylight, or very early in the morning, in capturing the intrenched picket-lines in their front; and before wright got up to that point, ord had also succeeded in getting inside of the enemy's intrenchments. the second corps soon followed; and the outer works of petersburg were in the hands of the national troops, never to be wrenched from them again. when wright reached hatcher's run, he sent a regiment to destroy the south side railroad just outside of the city. my headquarters were still at dabney's saw-mills. as soon as i received the news of wright's success, i sent dispatches announcing the fact to all points around the line, including the troops at bermuda hundred and those on the north side of the james, and to the president at city point. further dispatches kept coming in, and as they did i sent the additional news to these points. finding at length that they were all in, i mounted my horse to join the troops who were inside the works. when i arrived there i rode my horse over the parapet just as wright's three thousand prisoners were coming out. i was soon joined inside by general meade and his staff. lee made frantic efforts to recover at least part of the lost ground. parke on our right was repeatedly assaulted, but repulsed every effort. before noon longstreet was ordered up from the north side of the james river thus bringing the bulk of lee's army around to the support of his extreme right. as soon as i learned this i notified weitzel and directed him to keep up close to the enemy and to have hartsuff, commanding the bermuda hundred front, to do the same thing, and if they found any break to go in; hartsuff especially should do so, for this would separate richmond and petersburg. sheridan, after he had returned to five forks, swept down to petersburg, coming in on our left. this gave us a continuous line from the appomattox river below the city to the same river above. at eleven o'clock, not having heard from sheridan, i reinforced parke with two brigades from city point. with this additional force he completed his captured works for better defence, and built back from his right, so as to protect his flank. he also carried in and made an abatis between himself and the enemy. lee brought additional troops and artillery against parke even after this was done, and made several assaults with very heavy losses. the enemy had in addition to their intrenched line close up to petersburg, two enclosed works outside of it, fort gregg and fort whitworth. we thought it had now become necessary to carry them by assault. about one o'clock in the day, fort gregg was assaulted by foster's division of the 24th corps (gibbon's), supported by two brigades from ord's command. the battle was desperate and the national troops were repulsed several times; but it was finally carried, and immediately the troops in fort whitworth evacuated the place. the guns of fort gregg were turned upon the retreating enemy, and the commanding officer with some sixty of the men of fort whitworth surrendered. i had ordered miles in the morning to report to sheridan. in moving to execute this order he came upon the enemy at the intersection of the white oak road and the claiborne road. the enemy fell back to sutherland station on the south side road and were followed by miles. this position, naturally a strong and defensible one, was also strongly intrenched. sheridan now came up and miles asked permission from him to make the assault, which sheridan gave. by this time humphreys had got through the outer works in his front, and came up also and assumed command over miles, who commanded a division in his corps. i had sent an order to humphreys to turn to his right and move towards petersburg. this order he now got, and started off, thus leaving miles alone. the latter made two assaults, both of which failed, and he had to fall back a few hundred yards. hearing that miles had been left in this position, i directed humphreys to send a division back to his relief. he went himself. sheridan before starting to sweep down to petersburg had sent merritt with his cavalry to the west to attack some confederate cavalry that had assembled there. merritt drove them north to the appomattox river. sheridan then took the enemy at sutherland station on the reverse side from where miles was, and the two together captured the place, with a large number of prisoners and some pieces of artillery, and put the remainder, portions of three confederate corps, to flight. sheridan followed, and drove them until night, when further pursuit was stopped. miles bivouacked for the night on the ground which he with sheridan had carried so handsomely by assault. i cannot explain the situation here better than by giving my dispatch to city point that evening: boydton road, near petersburg, april 2, 1865.--4.40 p.m. colonel t. s. bowers, city point. we are now up and have a continuous line of troops, and in a few hours will be intrenched from the appomattox below petersburg to the river above. heth's and wilcox's divisions, such part of them as were not captured, were cut off from town, either designedly on their part or because they could not help it. sheridan with the cavalry and 5th corps is above them. miles's division, 2d corps, was sent from the white oak road to sutherland station on the south side railroad, where he met them, and at last accounts was engaged with them. not knowing whether sheridan would get up in time, general humphreys was sent with another division from here. the whole captures since the army started out gunning will amount to not less than twelve thousand men, and probably fifty pieces of artillery. i do not know the number of men and guns accurately however. * * * i think the president might come out and pay us a visit tomorrow. u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. during the night of april 2d our line was intrenched from the river above to the river below. i ordered a bombardment to be commenced the next morning at five a.m., to be followed by an assault at six o'clock; but the enemy evacuated petersburg early in the morning. chapter lxv. the capture of petersburg--meeting president lincoln in petersburg--the capture of richmond--pursuing the enemy--visit to sheridan and meade. general meade and i entered petersburg on the morning of the 3d and took a position under cover of a house which protected us from the enemy's musketry which was flying thick and fast there. as we would occasionally look around the corner we could see the streets and the appomattox bottom, presumably near the bridge, packed with the confederate army. i did not have artillery brought up, because i was sure lee was trying to make his escape, and i wanted to push immediately in pursuit. at all events i had not the heart to turn the artillery upon such a mass of defeated and fleeing men, and i hoped to capture them soon. soon after the enemy had entirely evacuated petersburg, a man came in who represented himself to be an engineer of the army of northern virginia. he said that lee had for some time been at work preparing a strong enclosed intrenchment, into which he would throw himself when forced out of petersburg, and fight his final battle there; that he was actually at that time drawing his troops from richmond, and falling back into this prepared work. this statement was made to general meade and myself when we were together. i had already given orders for the movement up the south side of the appomattox for the purpose of heading off lee; but meade was so much impressed by this man's story that he thought we ought to cross the appomattox there at once and move against lee in his new position. i knew that lee was no fool, as he would have been to have put himself and his army between two formidable streams like the james and appomattox rivers, and between two such armies as those of the potomac and the james. then these streams coming together as they did to the east of him, it would be only necessary to close up in the west to have him thoroughly cut off from all supplies or possibility of reinforcement. it would only have been a question of days, and not many of them, if he had taken the position assigned to him by the so-called engineer, when he would have been obliged to surrender his army. such is one of the ruses resorted to in war to deceive your antagonist. my judgment was that lee would necessarily have to evacuate richmond, and that the only course for him to pursue would be to follow the danville road. accordingly my object was to secure a point on that road south of lee, and i told meade this. he suggested that if lee was going that way we would follow him. my reply was that we did not want to follow him; we wanted to get ahead of him and cut him off, and if he would only stay in the position he (meade) believed him to be in at that time, i wanted nothing better; that when we got in possession of the danville railroad, at its crossing of the appomattox river, if we still found him between the two rivers, all we had to do was to move eastward and close him up. that we would then have all the advantage we could possibly have by moving directly against him from petersburg, even if he remained in the position assigned him by the engineer officer. i had held most of the command aloof from the intrenchments, so as to start them out on the danville road early in the morning, supposing that lee would be gone during the night. during the night i strengthened sheridan by sending him humphreys's corps. lee, as we now know, had advised the authorities at richmond, during the day, of the condition of affairs, and told them it would be impossible for him to hold out longer than night, if he could hold out that long. davis was at church when he received lee's dispatch. the congregation was dismissed with the notice that there would be no evening service. the rebel government left richmond about two o'clock in the afternoon of the 2d. at night lee ordered his troops to assemble at amelia court house, his object being to get away, join johnston if possible, and to try to crush sherman before i could get there. as soon as i was sure of this i notified sheridan and directed him to move out on the danville railroad to the south side of the appomattox river as speedily as possible. he replied that he already had some of his command nine miles out. i then ordered the rest of the army of the potomac under meade to follow the same road in the morning. parke's corps followed by the same road, and the army of the james was directed to follow the road which ran alongside of the south side railroad to burke's station, and to repair the railroad and telegraph as they proceeded. that road was a 5 feet gauge, while our rolling stock was all of the 4 feet 8 1/2 inches gauge; consequently the rail on one side of the track had to be taken up throughout the whole length and relaid so as to conform to the gauge of our cars and locomotives. mr. lincoln was at city point at the time, and had been for some days. i would have let him know what i contemplated doing, only while i felt a strong conviction that the move was going to be successful, yet it might not prove so; and then i would have only added another to the many disappointments he had been suffering for the past three years. but when we started out he saw that we were moving for a purpose, and bidding us godspeed, remained there to hear the result. the next morning after the capture of petersburg, i telegraphed mr. lincoln asking him to ride out there and see me, while i would await his arrival. i had started all the troops out early in the morning, so that after the national army left petersburg there was not a soul to be seen, not even an animal in the streets. there was absolutely no one there, except my staff officers and, possibly, a small escort of cavalry. we had selected the piazza of a deserted house, and occupied it until the president arrived. about the first thing that mr. lincoln said to me, after warm congratulations for the victory, and thanks both to myself and to the army which had accomplished it, was: "do you know, general, that i have had a sort of a sneaking idea for some days that you intended to do something like this." our movements having been successful up to this point, i no longer had any object in concealing from the president all my movements, and the objects i had in view. he remained for some days near city point, and i communicated with him frequently and fully by telegraph. mr. lincoln knew that it had been arranged for sherman to join me at a fixed time, to co-operate in the destruction of lee's army. i told him that i had been very anxious to have the eastern armies vanquish their old enemy who had so long resisted all their repeated and gallant attempts to subdue them or drive them from their capital. the western armies had been in the main successful until they had conquered all the territory from the mississippi river to the state of north carolina, and were now almost ready to knock at the back door of richmond, asking admittance. i said to him that if the western armies should be even upon the field, operating against richmond and lee, the credit would be given to them for the capture, by politicians and non-combatants from the section of country which those troops hailed from. it might lead to disagreeable bickerings between members of congress of the east and those of the west in some of their debates. western members might be throwing it up to the members of the east that in the suppression of the rebellion they were not able to capture an army, or to accomplish much in the way of contributing toward that end, but had to wait until the western armies had conquered all the territory south and west of them, and then come on to help them capture the only army they had been engaged with. mr. lincoln said he saw that now, but had never thought of it before, because his anxiety was so great that he did not care where the aid came from so the work was done. the army of the potomac has every reason to be proud of its four years' record in the suppression of the rebellion. the army it had to fight was the protection to the capital of a people which was attempting to found a nation upon the territory of the united states. its loss would be the loss of the cause. every energy, therefore, was put forth by the confederacy to protect and maintain their capital. everything else would go if it went. lee's army had to be strengthened to enable it to maintain its position, no matter what territory was wrested from the south in another quarter. i never expected any such bickering as i have indicated, between the soldiers of the two sections; and, fortunately, there has been none between the politicians. possibly i am the only one who thought of the liability of such a state of things in advance. when our conversation was at an end mr. lincoln mounted his horse and started on his return to city point, while i and my staff started to join the army, now a good many miles in advance. up to this time i had not received the report of the capture of richmond. soon after i left president lincoln i received a dispatch from general weitzel which notified me that he had taken possession of richmond at about 8.15 o'clock in the morning of that day, the 3d, and that he had found the city on fire in two places. the city was in the most utter confusion. the authorities had taken the precaution to empty all the liquor into the gutter, and to throw out the provisions which the confederate government had left, for the people to gather up. the city had been deserted by the authorities, civil and military, without any notice whatever that they were about to leave. in fact, up to the very hour of the evacuation the people had been led to believe that lee had gained an important victory somewhere around petersburg. weitzel's command found evidence of great demoralization in lee's army, there being still a great many men and even officers in the town. the city was on fire. our troops were directed to extinguish the flames, which they finally succeeded in doing. the fire had been started by some one connected with the retreating army. all authorities deny that it was authorized, and i presume it was the work of excited men who were leaving what they regarded as their capital and may have felt that it was better to destroy it than have it fall into the hands of their enemy. be that as it may, the national troops found the city in flames, and used every effort to extinguish them. the troops that had formed lee's right, a great many of them, were cut off from getting back into petersburg, and were pursued by our cavalry so hotly and closely that they threw away caissons, ammunition, clothing, and almost everything to lighten their loads, and pushed along up the appomattox river until finally they took water and crossed over. i left mr. lincoln and started, as i have already said, to join the command, which halted at sutherland station, about nine miles out. we had still time to march as much farther, and time was an object; but the roads were bad and the trains belonging to the advance corps had blocked up the road so that it was impossible to get on. then, again, our cavalry had struck some of the enemy and were pursuing them; and the orders were that the roads should be given up to the cavalry whenever they appeared. this caused further delay. general wright, who was in command of one of the corps which were left back, thought to gain time by letting his men go into bivouac and trying to get up some rations for them, and clearing out the road, so that when they did start they would be uninterrupted. humphreys, who was far ahead, was also out of rations. they did not succeed in getting them up through the night; but the army of the potomac, officers and men, were so elated by the reflection that at last they were following up a victory to its end, that they preferred marching without rations to running a possible risk of letting the enemy elude them. so the march was resumed at three o'clock in the morning. merritt's cavalry had struck the enemy at deep creek, and driven them north to the appomattox, where, i presume, most of them were forced to cross. on the morning of the 4th i learned that lee had ordered rations up from danville for his famishing army, and that they were to meet him at farmville. this showed that lee had already abandoned the idea of following the railroad down to danville, but had determined to go farther west, by the way of farmville. i notified sheridan of this and directed him to get possession of the road before the supplies could reach lee. he responded that he had already sent crook's division to get upon the road between burkesville and jetersville, then to face north and march along the road upon the latter place; and he thought crook must be there now. the bulk of the army moved directly for jetersville by two roads. after i had received the dispatch from sheridan saying that crook was on the danville road, i immediately ordered meade to make a forced march with the army of the potomac, and to send parke's corps across from the road they were on to the south side railroad, to fall in the rear of the army of the james and to protect the railroad which that army was repairing as it went along. our troops took possession of jetersville and in the telegraph office, they found a dispatch from lee, ordering two hundred thousand rations from danville. the dispatch had not been sent, but sheridan sent a special messenger with it to burkesville and had it forwarded from there. in the meantime, however, dispatches from other sources had reached danville, and they knew there that our army was on the line of the road; so that they sent no further supplies from that quarter. at this time merritt and mackenzie, with the cavalry, were off between the road which the army of the potomac was marching on and the appomattox river, and were attacking the enemy in flank. they picked up a great many prisoners and forced the abandonment of some property. lee intrenched himself at amelia court house, and also his advance north of jetersville, and sent his troops out to collect forage. the country was very poor and afforded but very little. his foragers scattered a great deal; many of them were picked up by our men, and many others never returned to the army of northern virginia. griffin's corps was intrenched across the railroad south of jetersville, and sheridan notified me of the situation. i again ordered meade up with all dispatch, sheridan having but the one corps of infantry with a little cavalry confronting lee's entire army. meade, always prompt in obeying orders, now pushed forward with great energy, although he was himself sick and hardly able to be out of bed. humphreys moved at two, and wright at three o'clock in the morning, without rations, as i have said, the wagons being far in the rear. i stayed that night at wilson's station on the south side railroad. on the morning of the 5th i sent word to sheridan of the progress meade was making, and suggested that he might now attack lee. we had now no other objective than the confederate armies, and i was anxious to close the thing up at once. on the 5th i marched again with ord's command until within about ten miles of burkesville, where i stopped to let his army pass. i then received from sheridan the following dispatch: "the whole of lee's army is at or near amelia court house, and on this side of it. general davies, whom i sent out to painesville on their right flank, has just captured six pieces of artillery and some wagons. we can capture the army of northern virginia if force enough can be thrown to this point, and then advance upon it. my cavalry was at burkesville yesterday, and six miles beyond, on the danville road, last night. general lee is at amelia court house in person. they are out of rations, or nearly so. they were advancing up the railroad towards burkesville yesterday, when we intercepted them at this point." it now became a life and death struggle with lee to get south to his provisions. sheridan, thinking the enemy might turn off immediately towards farmville, moved davies's brigade of cavalry out to watch him. davies found the movement had already commenced. he attacked and drove away their cavalry which was escorting wagons to the west, capturing and burning 180 wagons. he also captured five pieces of artillery. the confederate infantry then moved against him and probably would have handled him very roughly, but sheridan had sent two more brigades of cavalry to follow davies, and they came to his relief in time. a sharp engagement took place between these three brigades of cavalry and the enemy's infantry, but the latter was repulsed. meade himself reached jetersville about two o'clock in the afternoon, but in advance of all his troops. the head of humphreys's corps followed in about an hour afterwards. sheridan stationed the troops as they came up, at meade's request, the latter still being very sick. he extended two divisions of this corps off to the west of the road to the left of griffin's corps, and one division to the right. the cavalry by this time had also come up, and they were put still farther off to the left, sheridan feeling certain that there lay the route by which the enemy intended to escape. he wanted to attack, feeling that if time was given, the enemy would get away; but meade prevented this, preferring to wait till his troops were all up. at this juncture sheridan sent me a letter which had been handed to him by a colored man, with a note from himself saying that he wished i was there myself. the letter was dated amelia court house, april 5th, and signed by colonel taylor. it was to his mother, and showed the demoralization of the confederate army. sheridan's note also gave me the information as here related of the movements of that day. i received a second message from sheridan on the 5th, in which he urged more emphatically the importance of my presence. this was brought to me by a scout in gray uniform. it was written on tissue paper, and wrapped up in tin-foil such as chewing tobacco is folded in. this was a precaution taken so that if the scout should be captured he could take this tin-foil out of his pocket and putting it into his mouth, chew it. it would cause no surprise at all to see a confederate soldier chewing tobacco. it was nearly night when this letter was received. i gave ord directions to continue his march to burkesville and there intrench himself for the night, and in the morning to move west to cut off all the roads between there and farmville. i then started with a few of my staff and a very small escort of cavalry, going directly through the woods, to join meade's army. the distance was about sixteen miles; but the night being dark our progress was slow through the woods in the absence of direct roads. however, we got to the outposts about ten o'clock in the evening, and after some little parley convinced the sentinels of our identity and were conducted in to where sheridan was bivouacked. we talked over the situation for some little time, sheridan explaining to me what he thought lee was trying to do, and that meade's orders, if carried out, moving to the right flank, would give him the coveted opportunity of escaping us and putting us in rear of him. we then together visited meade, reaching his headquarters about midnight. i explained to meade that we did not want to follow the enemy; we wanted to get ahead of him, and that his orders would allow the enemy to escape, and besides that, i had no doubt that lee was moving right then. meade changed his orders at once. they were now given for an advance on amelia court house, at an early hour in the morning, as the army then lay; that is, the infantry being across the railroad, most of it to the west of the road, with the cavalry swung out still farther to the left. chapter lxvi. battle of sailor's creek--engagement at farmville--correspondence with general lee--sheridan intercepts the enemy. the appomattox, going westward, takes a long sweep to the south-west from the neighborhood of the richmond and danville railroad bridge, and then trends north-westerly. sailor's creek, an insignificant stream, running northward, empties into the appomattox between the high bridge and jetersville. near the high bridge the stage road from petersburg to lynchburg crosses the appomattox river, also on a bridge. the railroad runs on the north side of the river to farmville, a few miles west, and from there, recrossing, continues on the south side of it. the roads coming up from the south-east to farmville cross the appomattox river there on a bridge and run on the north side, leaving the lynchburg and petersburg railroad well to the left. lee, in pushing out from amelia court house, availed himself of all the roads between the danville road and appomattox river to move upon, and never permitted the head of his columns to stop because of any fighting that might be going on in his rear. in this way he came very near succeeding in getting to his provision trains and eluding us with at least part of his army. as expected, lee's troops had moved during the night before, and our army in moving upon amelia court house soon encountered them. there was a good deal of fighting before sailor's creek was reached. our cavalry charged in upon a body of theirs which was escorting a wagon train in order to get it past our left. a severe engagement ensued, in which we captured many prisoners, and many men also were killed and wounded. there was as much gallantry displayed by some of the confederates in these little engagements as was displayed at any time during the war, notwithstanding the sad defeats of the past week. the armies finally met on sailor's creek, when a heavy engagement took place, in which infantry, artillery and cavalry were all brought into action. our men on the right, as they were brought in against the enemy, came in on higher ground, and upon his flank, giving us every advantage to be derived from the lay of the country. our firing was also very much more rapid, because the enemy commenced his retreat westward and in firing as he retreated had to turn around every time he fired. the enemy's loss was very heavy, as well in killed and wounded as in captures. some six general officers fell into our hands in this engagement, and seven thousand men were made prisoners. this engagement was commenced in the middle of the afternoon of the 6th, and the retreat and pursuit were continued until nightfall, when the armies bivouacked upon the ground where the night had overtaken them. when the move towards amelia court house had commenced that morning, i ordered wright's corps, which was on the extreme right, to be moved to the left past the whole army, to take the place of griffin's, and ordered the latter at the same time to move by and place itself on the right. the object of this movement was to get the 6th corps, wright's, next to the cavalry, with which they had formerly served so harmoniously and so efficiently in the valley of virginia. the 6th corps now remained with the cavalry and under sheridan's direct command until after the surrender. ord had been directed to take possession of all the roads southward between burkesville and the high bridge. on the morning of the 6th he sent colonel washburn with two infantry regiments with instructions to destroy high bridge and to return rapidly to burkesville station; and he prepared himself to resist the enemy there. soon after washburn had started ord became a little alarmed as to his safety and sent colonel read, of his staff, with about eighty cavalrymen, to overtake him and bring him back. very shortly after this he heard that the head of lee's column had got up to the road between him and where washburn now was, and attempted to send reinforcements, but the reinforcements could not get through. read, however, had got through ahead of the enemy. he rode on to farmville and was on his way back again when he found his return cut off, and washburn confronting apparently the advance of lee's army. read drew his men up into line of battle, his force now consisting of less than six hundred men, infantry and cavalry, and rode along their front, making a speech to his men to inspire them with the same enthusiasm that he himself felt. he then gave the order to charge. this little band made several charges, of course unsuccessful ones, but inflicted a loss upon the enemy more than equal to their own entire number. colonel read fell mortally wounded, and then washburn; and at the close of the conflict nearly every officer of the command and most of the rank and file had been either killed or wounded. the remainder then surrendered. the confederates took this to be only the advance of a larger column which had headed them off, and so stopped to intrench; so that this gallant band of six hundred had checked the progress of a strong detachment of the confederate army. this stoppage of lee's column no doubt saved to us the trains following. lee himself pushed on and crossed the wagon road bridge near the high bridge, and attempted to destroy it. he did set fire to it, but the flames had made but little headway when humphreys came up with his corps and drove away the rear-guard which had been left to protect it while it was being burned up. humphreys forced his way across with some loss, and followed lee to the intersection of the road crossing at farmville with the one from petersburg. here lee held a position which was very strong, naturally, besides being intrenched. humphreys was alone, confronting him all through the day, and in a very hazardous position. he put on a bold face, however, and assaulted with some loss, but was not assaulted in return. our cavalry had gone farther south by the way of prince edward's court house, along with the 5th corps (griffin's), ord falling in between griffin and the appomattox. crook's division of cavalry and wright's corps pushed on west of farmville. when the cavalry reached farmville they found that some of the confederates were in ahead of them, and had already got their trains of provisions back to that point; but our troops were in time to prevent them from securing anything to eat, although they succeeded in again running the trains off, so that we did not get them for some time. these troops retreated to the north side of the appomattox to join lee, and succeeded in destroying the bridge after them. considerable fighting ensued there between wright's corps and a portion of our cavalry and the confederates, but finally the cavalry forded the stream and drove them away. wright built a foot-bridge for his men to march over on and then marched out to the junction of the roads to relieve humphreys, arriving there that night. i had stopped the night before at burkesville junction. our troops were then pretty much all out of the place, but we had a field hospital there, and ord's command was extended from that point towards farmville. here i met dr. smith, a virginian and an officer of the regular army, who told me that in a conversation with general ewell, one of the prisoners and a relative of his, ewell had said that when we had got across the james river he knew their cause was lost, and it was the duty of their authorities to make the best terms they could while they still had a right to claim concessions. the authorities thought differently, however. now the cause was lost and they had no right to claim anything. he said further, that for every man that was killed after this in the war somebody is responsible, and it would be but very little better than murder. he was not sure that lee would consent to surrender his army without being able to consult with the president, but he hoped he would. i rode in to farmville on the 7th, arriving there early in the day. sheridan and ord were pushing through, away to the south. meade was back towards the high bridge, and humphreys confronting lee as before stated. after having gone into bivouac at prince edward's court house, sheridan learned that seven trains of provisions and forage were at appomattox, and determined to start at once and capture them; and a forced march was necessary in order to get there before lee's army could secure them. he wrote me a note telling me this. this fact, together with the incident related the night before by dr. smith, gave me the idea of opening correspondence with general lee on the subject of the surrender of his army. i therefore wrote to him on this day, as follows: headquarters armies of the u. s., 5 p.m., april 7, 1865. general r. e. lee commanding c. s. a. the result of the last week must convince you of the hopelessness of further resistance on the part of the army of northern virginia in this struggle. i feel that it is so, and regard it as my duty to shift from myself the responsibility of any further effusion of blood, by asking of you the surrender of that portion of the confederate states army known as the army of northern virginia. u. s. grant, lieut.-general. lee replied on the evening of the same day as follows: april 7, 1865. general: i have received your note of this day. though not entertaining the opinion you express on the hopelessness of further resistance on the part of the army of northern virginia, i reciprocate your desire to avoid useless effusion of blood, and therefore before considering your proposition, ask the terms you will offer on condition of its surrender. r. e. lee, general. lieut.-general u. s. grant, commanding armies of the u. s. this was not satisfactory, but i regarded it as deserving another letter and wrote him as follows: april 8, 1865. general r. e. lee, commanding c. s. a. your note of last evening in reply to mine of same date, asking the condition on which i will accept the surrender of the army of northern virginia is just received. in reply i would say that, peace being my great desire, there is but one condition i would insist upon, namely: that the men and officers surrendered shall be disqualified for taking up arms again against the government of the united states until properly exchanged. i will meet you, or will designate officers to meet any officers you may name for the same purpose, at any point agreeable to you, for the purpose of arranging definitely the terms upon which the surrender of the army of northern virginia will be received. u. s. grant, lieut.-general. lee's army was rapidly crumbling. many of his soldiers had enlisted from that part of the state where they now were, and were continually dropping out of the ranks and going to their homes. i know that i occupied a hotel almost destitute of furniture at farmville, which had probably been used as a confederate hospital. the next morning when i came out i found a confederate colonel there, who reported to me and said that he was the proprietor of that house, and that he was a colonel of a regiment that had been raised in that neighborhood. he said that when he came along past home, he found that he was the only man of the regiment remaining with lee's army, so he just dropped out, and now wanted to surrender himself. i told him to stay there and he would not be molested. that was one regiment which had been eliminated from lee's force by this crumbling process. although sheridan had been marching all day, his troops moved with alacrity and without any straggling. they began to see the end of what they had been fighting four years for. nothing seemed to fatigue them. they were ready to move without rations and travel without rest until the end. straggling had entirely ceased, and every man was now a rival for the front. the infantry marched about as rapidly as the cavalry could. sheridan sent custer with his division to move south of appomattox station, which is about five miles south-west of the court house, to get west of the trains and destroy the roads to the rear. they got there the night of the 8th, and succeeded partially; but some of the train men had just discovered the movement of our troops and succeeded in running off three of the trains. the other four were held by custer. the head of lee's column came marching up there on the morning of the 9th, not dreaming, i suppose, that there were any union soldiers near. the confederates were surprised to find our cavalry had possession of the trains. however, they were desperate and at once assaulted, hoping to recover them. in the melee that ensued they succeeded in burning one of the trains, but not in getting anything from it. custer then ordered the other trains run back on the road towards farmville, and the fight continued. so far, only our cavalry and the advance of lee's army were engaged. soon, however, lee's men were brought up from the rear, no doubt expecting they had nothing to meet but our cavalry. but our infantry had pushed forward so rapidly that by the time the enemy got up they found griffin's corps and the army of the james confronting them. a sharp engagement ensued, but lee quickly set up a white flag. chapter lxvii. negotiations at appomattox--interview with lee at mclean's house--the terms of surrender--lee's surrender--interview with lee after the surrender. on the 8th i had followed the army of the potomac in rear of lee. i was suffering very severely with a sick headache, and stopped at a farmhouse on the road some distance in rear of the main body of the army. i spent the night in bathing my feet in hot water and mustard, and putting mustard plasters on my wrists and the back part of my neck, hoping to be cured by morning. during the night i received lee's answer to my letter of the 8th, inviting an interview between the lines on the following morning. (*43) but it was for a different purpose from that of surrendering his army, and i answered him as follows: headquarters armies of the u. s., april 9, 1865. general r. e. lee, commanding c. s. a. your note of yesterday is received. as i have no authority to treat on the subject of peace, the meeting proposed for ten a.m. to-day could lead to no good. i will state, however, general, that i am equally anxious for peace with yourself, and the whole north entertains the same feeling. the terms upon which peace can be had are well understood. by the south laying down their arms they will hasten that most desirable event, save thousands of human lives and hundreds of millions of property not yet destroyed. sincerely hoping that all our difficulties may be settled without the loss of another life, i subscribe myself, etc., u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. i proceeded at an early hour in the morning, still suffering with the headache, to get to the head of the column. i was not more than two or three miles from appomattox court house at the time, but to go direct i would have to pass through lee's army, or a portion of it. i had therefore to move south in order to get upon a road coming up from another direction. when the white flag was put out by lee, as already described, i was in this way moving towards appomattox court house, and consequently could not be communicated with immediately, and be informed of what lee had done. lee, therefore, sent a flag to the rear to advise meade and one to the front to sheridan, saying that he had sent a message to me for the purpose of having a meeting to consult about the surrender of his army, and asked for a suspension of hostilities until i could be communicated with. as they had heard nothing of this until the fighting had got to be severe and all going against lee, both of these commanders hesitated very considerably about suspending hostilities at all. they were afraid it was not in good faith, and we had the army of northern virginia where it could not escape except by some deception. they, however, finally consented to a suspension of hostilities for two hours to give an opportunity of communicating with me in that time, if possible. it was found that, from the route i had taken, they would probably not be able to communicate with me and get an answer back within the time fixed unless the messenger should pass through the rebel lines. lee, therefore, sent an escort with the officer bearing this message through his lines to me. april 9, 1865. general: i received your note of this morning on the picket-line whither i had come to meet you and ascertain definitely what terms were embraced in your proposal of yesterday with reference to the surrender of this army. i now request an interview in accordance with the offer contained in your letter of yesterday for that purpose. r. e. lee, general. lieutenant-general u. s. grant commanding u. s. armies. when the officer reached me i was still suffering with the sick headache, but the instant i saw the contents of the note i was cured. i wrote the following note in reply and hastened on: april 9, 1865. general r. e. lee, commanding c. s. armies. your note of this date is but this moment (11.50 a.m.) received, in consequence of my having passed from the richmond and lynchburg road to the farmville and lynchburg road. i am at this writing about four miles west of walker's church and will push forward to the front for the purpose of meeting you. notice sent to me on this road where you wish the interview to take place will meet me. u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. i was conducted at once to where sheridan was located with his troops drawn up in line of battle facing the confederate army near by. they were very much excited, and expressed their view that this was all a ruse employed to enable the confederates to get away. they said they believed that johnston was marching up from north carolina now, and lee was moving to join him; and they would whip the rebels where they now were in five minutes if i would only let them go in. but i had no doubt about the good faith of lee, and pretty soon was conducted to where he was. i found him at the house of a mr. mclean, at appomattox court house, with colonel marshall, one of his staff officers, awaiting my arrival. the head of his column was occupying a hill, on a portion of which was an apple orchard, beyond a little valley which separated it from that on the crest of which sheridan's forces were drawn up in line of battle to the south. before stating what took place between general lee and myself, i will give all there is of the story of the famous apple tree. wars produce many stories of fiction, some of which are told until they are believed to be true. the war of the rebellion was no exception to this rule, and the story of the apple tree is one of those fictions based on a slight foundation of fact. as i have said, there was an apple orchard on the side of the hill occupied by the confederate forces. running diagonally up the hill was a wagon road, which, at one point, ran very near one of the trees, so that the wheels of vehicles had, on that side, cut off the roots of this tree, leaving a little embankment. general babcock, of my staff, reported to me that when he first met general lee he was sitting upon this embankment with his feet in the road below and his back resting against the tree. the story had no other foundation than that. like many other stories, it would be very good if it was only true. i had known general lee in the old army, and had served with him in the mexican war; but did not suppose, owing to the difference in our age and rank, that he would remember me, while i would more naturally remember him distinctly, because he was the chief of staff of general scott in the mexican war. when i had left camp that morning i had not expected so soon the result that was then taking place, and consequently was in rough garb. i was without a sword, as i usually was when on horseback on the field, and wore a soldier's blouse for a coat, with the shoulder straps of my rank to indicate to the army who i was. when i went into the house i found general lee. we greeted each other, and after shaking hands took our seats. i had my staff with me, a good portion of whom were in the room during the whole of the interview. what general lee's feelings were i do not know. as he was a man of much dignity, with an impassible face, it was impossible to say whether he felt inwardly glad that the end had finally come, or felt sad over the result, and was too manly to show it. whatever his feelings, they were entirely concealed from my observation; but my own feelings, which had been quite jubilant on the receipt of his letter, were sad and depressed. i felt like anything rather than rejoicing at the downfall of a foe who had fought so long and valiantly, and had suffered so much for a cause, though that cause was, i believe, one of the worst for which a people ever fought, and one for which there was the least excuse. i do not question, however, the sincerity of the great mass of those who were opposed to us. general lee was dressed in a full uniform which was entirely new, and was wearing a sword of considerable value, very likely the sword which had been presented by the state of virginia; at all events, it was an entirely different sword from the one that would ordinarily be worn in the field. in my rough traveling suit, the uniform of a private with the straps of a lieutenant-general, i must have contrasted very strangely with a man so handsomely dressed, six feet high and of faultless form. but this was not a matter that i thought of until afterwards. we soon fell into a conversation about old army times. he remarked that he remembered me very well in the old army; and i told him that as a matter of course i remembered him perfectly, but from the difference in our rank and years (there being about sixteen years' difference in our ages), i had thought it very likely that i had not attracted his attention sufficiently to be remembered by him after such a long interval. our conversation grew so pleasant that i almost forgot the object of our meeting. after the conversation had run on in this style for some time, general lee called my attention to the object of our meeting, and said that he had asked for this interview for the purpose of getting from me the terms i proposed to give his army. i said that i meant merely that his army should lay down their arms, not to take them up again during the continuance of the war unless duly and properly exchanged. he said that he had so understood my letter. then we gradually fell off again into conversation about matters foreign to the subject which had brought us together. this continued for some little time, when general lee again interrupted the course of the conversation by suggesting that the terms i proposed to give his army ought to be written out. i called to general parker, secretary on my staff, for writing materials, and commenced writing out the following terms: appomattox c. h., va., ap 19th, 1865. gen. r. e. lee, comd'g c. s. a. gen: in accordance with the substance of my letter to you of the 8th inst., i propose to receive the surrender of the army of n. va. on the following terms, to wit: rolls of all the officers and men to be made in duplicate. one copy to be given to an officer designated by me, the other to be retained by such officer or officers as you may designate. the officers to give their individual paroles not to take up arms against the government of the united states until properly exchanged, and each company or regimental commander sign a like parole for the men of their commands. the arms, artillery and public property to be parked and stacked, and turned over to the officer appointed by me to receive them. this will not embrace the side-arms of the officers, nor their private horses or baggage. this done, each officer and man will be allowed to return to their homes, not to be disturbed by united states authority so long as they observe their paroles and the laws in force where they may reside. very respectfully, u. s. grant, lt. gen. when i put my pen to the paper i did not know the first word that i should make use of in writing the terms. i only knew what was in my mind, and i wished to express it clearly, so that there could be no mistaking it. as i wrote on, the thought occurred to me that the officers had their own private horses and effects, which were important to them, but of no value to us; also that it would be an unnecessary humiliation to call upon them to deliver their side arms. no conversation, not one word, passed between general lee and myself, either about private property, side arms, or kindred subjects. he appeared to have no objections to the terms first proposed; or if he had a point to make against them he wished to wait until they were in writing to make it. when he read over that part of the terms about side arms, horses and private property of the officers, he remarked, with some feeling, i thought, that this would have a happy effect upon his army. then, after a little further conversation, general lee remarked to me again that their army was organized a little differently from the army of the united states (still maintaining by implication that we were two countries); that in their army the cavalrymen and artillerists owned their own horses; and he asked if he was to understand that the men who so owned their horses were to be permitted to retain them. i told him that as the terms were written they would not; that only the officers were permitted to take their private property. he then, after reading over the terms a second time, remarked that that was clear. i then said to him that i thought this would be about the last battle of the war--i sincerely hoped so; and i said further i took it that most of the men in the ranks were small farmers. the whole country had been so raided by the two armies that it was doubtful whether they would be able to put in a crop to carry themselves and their families through the next winter without the aid of the horses they were then riding. the united states did not want them and i would, therefore, instruct the officers i left behind to receive the paroles of his troops to let every man of the confederate army who claimed to own a horse or mule take the animal to his home. lee remarked again that this would have a happy effect. he then sat down and wrote out the following letter: headquarters army of northern virginia, april 9, 1865. general:--i received your letter of this date containing the terms of the surrender of the army of northern virginia as proposed by you. as they are substantially the same as those expressed in your letter of the 8th inst., they are accepted. i will proceed to designate the proper officers to carry the stipulations into effect. r. e. lee, general. lieut.-general u. s. grant. while duplicates of the two letters were being made, the union generals present were severally presented to general lee. the much talked of surrendering of lee's sword and my handing it back, this and much more that has been said about it is the purest romance. the word sword or side arms was not mentioned by either of us until i wrote it in the terms. there was no premeditation, and it did not occur to me until the moment i wrote it down. if i had happened to omit it, and general lee had called my attention to it, i should have put it in the terms precisely as i acceded to the provision about the soldiers retaining their horses. general lee, after all was completed and before taking his leave, remarked that his army was in a very bad condition for want of food, and that they were without forage; that his men had been living for some days on parched corn exclusively, and that he would have to ask me for rations and forage. i told him "certainly," and asked for how many men he wanted rations. his answer was "about twenty-five thousand;" and i authorized him to send his own commissary and quartermaster to appomattox station, two or three miles away, where he could have, out of the trains we had stopped, all the provisions wanted. as for forage, we had ourselves depended almost entirely upon the country for that. generals gibbon, griffin and merritt were designated by me to carry into effect the paroling of lee's troops before they should start for their homes--general lee leaving generals longstreet, gordon and pendleton for them to confer with in order to facilitate this work. lee and i then separated as cordially as we had met, he returning to his own lines, and all went into bivouac for the night at appomattox. soon after lee's departure i telegraphed to washington as follows: headquarters appomattox c. h., va., april 9th, 1865, 4.30 p.m. hon. e. m. stanton, secretary of war, washington. general lee surrendered the army of northern virginia this afternoon on terms proposed by myself. the accompanying additional correspondence will show the conditions fully. u. s. grant, lieut.-general. when news of the surrender first reached our lines our men commenced firing a salute of a hundred guns in honor of the victory. i at once sent word, however, to have it stopped. the confederates were now our prisoners, and we did not want to exult over their downfall. i determined to return to washington at once, with a view to putting a stop to the purchase of supplies, and what i now deemed other useless outlay of money. before leaving, however, i thought i (*44) would like to see general lee again; so next morning i rode out beyond our lines towards his headquarters, preceded by a bugler and a staff-officer carrying a white flag. lee soon mounted his horse, seeing who it was, and met me. we had there between the lines, sitting on horseback, a very pleasant conversation of over half an hour, in the course of which lee said to me that the south was a big country and that we might have to march over it three or four times before the war entirely ended, but that we would now be able to do it as they could no longer resist us. he expressed it as his earnest hope, however, that we would not be called upon to cause more loss and sacrifice of life; but he could not foretell the result. i then suggested to general lee that there was not a man in the confederacy whose influence with the soldiery and the whole people was as great as his, and that if he would now advise the surrender of all the armies i had no doubt his advice would be followed with alacrity. but lee said, that he could not do that without consulting the president first. i knew there was no use to urge him to do anything against his ideas of what was right. i was accompanied by my staff and other officers, some of whom seemed to have a great desire to go inside the confederate lines. they finally asked permission of lee to do so for the purpose of seeing some of their old army friends, and the permission was granted. they went over, had a very pleasant time with their old friends, and brought some of them back with them when they returned. when lee and i separated he went back to his lines and i returned to the house of mr. mclean. here the officers of both armies came in great numbers, and seemed to enjoy the meeting as much as though they had been friends separated for a long time while fighting battles under the same flag. for the time being it looked very much as if all thought of the war had escaped their minds. after an hour pleasantly passed in this way i set out on horseback, accompanied by my staff and a small escort, for burkesville junction, up to which point the railroad had by this time been repaired. chapter lxviii. morale of the two armies--relative conditions of the north and south --president lincoln visits richmond--arrival at washington--president lincoln's assassination--president johnson's policy. after the fall of petersburg, and when the armies of the potomac and the james were in motion to head off lee's army, the morale of the national troops had greatly improved. there was no more straggling, no more rear guards. the men who in former times had been falling back, were now, as i have already stated, striving to get to the front. for the first time in four weary years they felt that they were now nearing the time when they could return to their homes with their country saved. on the other hand, the confederates were more than correspondingly depressed. their despondency increased with each returning day, and especially after the battle of sailor's creek. they threw away their arms in constantly increasing numbers, dropping out of the ranks and betaking themselves to the woods in the hope of reaching their homes. i have already instanced the case of the entire disintegration of a regiment whose colonel i met at farmville. as a result of these and other influences, when lee finally surrendered at appomattox, there were only 28,356 officers and men left to be paroled, and many of these were without arms. it was probably this latter fact which gave rise to the statement sometimes made, north and south, that lee surrendered a smaller number of men than what the official figures show. as a matter of official record, and in addition to the number paroled as given above, we captured between march 29th and the date of surrender 19,132 confederates, to say nothing of lee's other losses, killed, wounded and missing, during the series of desperate conflicts which marked his headlong and determined flight. the same record shows the number of cannon, including those at appomattox, to have been 689 between the dates named. there has always been a great conflict of opinion as to the number of troops engaged in every battle, or all important battles, fought between the sections, the south magnifying the number of union troops engaged and belittling their own. northern writers have fallen, in many instances, into the same error. i have often heard gentlemen, who were thoroughly loyal to the union, speak of what a splendid fight the south had made and successfully continued for four years before yielding, with their twelve million of people against our twenty, and of the twelve four being colored slaves, non-combatants. i will add to their argument. we had many regiments of brave and loyal men who volunteered under great difficulty from the twelve million belonging to the south. but the south had rebelled against the national government. it was not bound by any constitutional restrictions. the whole south was a military camp. the occupation of the colored people was to furnish supplies for the army. conscription was resorted to early, and embraced every male from the age of eighteen to forty-five, excluding only those physically unfit to serve in the field, and the necessary number of civil officers of state and intended national government. the old and physically disabled furnished a good portion of these. the slaves, the non-combatants, one-third of the whole, were required to work in the field without regard to sex, and almost without regard to age. children from the age of eight years could and did handle the hoe; they were not much older when they began to hold the plough. the four million of colored non-combatants were equal to more than three times their number in the north, age for age and sex for sex, in supplying food from the soil to support armies. women did not work in the fields in the north, and children attended school. the arts of peace were carried on in the north. towns and cities grew during the war. inventions were made in all kinds of machinery to increase the products of a day's labor in the shop, and in the field. in the south no opposition was allowed to the government which had been set up and which would have become real and respected if the rebellion had been successful. no rear had to be protected. all the troops in service could be brought to the front to contest every inch of ground threatened with invasion. the press of the south, like the people who remained at home, were loyal to the southern cause. in the north, the country, the towns and the cities presented about the same appearance they do in time of peace. the furnace was in blast, the shops were filled with workmen, the fields were cultivated, not only to supply the population of the north and the troops invading the south, but to ship abroad to pay a part of the expense of the war. in the north the press was free up to the point of open treason. the citizen could entertain his views and express them. troops were necessary in the northern states to prevent prisoners from the southern army being released by outside force, armed and set at large to destroy by fire our northern cities. plans were formed by northern and southern citizens to burn our cities, to poison the water supplying them, to spread infection by importing clothing from infected regions, to blow up our river and lake steamers--regardless of the destruction of innocent lives. the copperhead disreputable portion of the press magnified rebel successes, and belittled those of the union army. it was, with a large following, an auxiliary to the confederate army. the north would have been much stronger with a hundred thousand of these men in the confederate ranks and the rest of their kind thoroughly subdued, as the union sentiment was in the south, than we were as the battle was fought. as i have said, the whole south was a military camp. the colored people, four million in number, were submissive, and worked in the field and took care of the families while the able-bodied white men were at the front fighting for a cause destined to defeat. the cause was popular, and was enthusiastically supported by the young men. the conscription took all of them. before the war was over, further conscriptions took those between fourteen and eighteen years of age as junior reserves, and those between forty-five and sixty as senior reserves. it would have been an offence, directly after the war, and perhaps it would be now, to ask any able-bodied man in the south, who was between the ages of fourteen and sixty at any time during the war, whether he had been in the confederate army. he would assert that he had, or account for his absence from the ranks. under such circumstances it is hard to conceive how the north showed such a superiority of force in every battle fought. i know they did not. during 1862 and '3, john h. morgan, a partisan officer, of no military education, but possessed of courage and endurance, operated in the rear of the army of the ohio in kentucky and tennessee. he had no base of supplies to protect, but was at home wherever he went. the army operating against the south, on the contrary, had to protect its lines of communication with the north, from which all supplies had to come to the front. every foot of road had to be guarded by troops stationed at convenient distances apart. these guards could not render assistance beyond the points where stationed. morgan was foot-loose and could operate where, his information--always correct--led him to believe he could do the greatest damage. during the time he was operating in this way he killed, wounded and captured several times the number he ever had under his command at any one time. he destroyed many millions of property in addition. places he did not attack had to be guarded as if threatened by him. forrest, an abler soldier, operated farther west, and held from the national front quite as many men as could be spared for offensive operations. it is safe to say that more than half the national army was engaged in guarding lines of supplies, or were on leave, sick in hospital or on detail which prevented their bearing arms. then, again, large forces were employed where no confederate army confronted them. i deem it safe to say that there were no large engagements where the national numbers compensated for the advantage of position and intrenchment occupied by the enemy. while i was in pursuit of general lee, the president went to richmond in company with admiral porter, and on board his flagship. he found the people of that city in great consternation. the leading citizens among the people who had remained at home surrounded him, anxious that something should be done to relieve them from suspense. general weitzel was not then in the city, having taken offices in one of the neighboring villages after his troops had succeeded in subduing the conflagration which they had found in progress on entering the confederate capital. the president sent for him, and, on his arrival, a short interview was had on board the vessel, admiral porter and a leading citizen of virginia being also present. after this interview the president wrote an order in about these words, which i quote from memory: "general weitzel is authorized to permit the body calling itself the legislature of virginia to meet for the purpose of recalling the virginia troops from the confederate armies." immediately some of the gentlemen composing that body wrote out a call for a meeting and had it published in their papers. this call, however, went very much further than mr. lincoln had contemplated, as he did not say the "legislature of virginia" but "the body which called itself the legislature of virginia." mr. stanton saw the call as published in the northern papers the very next issue and took the liberty of countermanding the order authorizing any meeting of the legislature, or any other body, and this notwithstanding the fact that the president was nearer the spot than he was. this was characteristic of mr. stanton. he was a man who never questioned his own authority, and who always did in war time what he wanted to do. he was an able constitutional lawyer and jurist; but the constitution was not an impediment to him while the war lasted. in this latter particular i entirely agree with the view he evidently held. the constitution was not framed with a view to any such rebellion as that of 1861-5. while it did not authorize rebellion it made no provision against it. yet the right to resist or suppress rebellion is as inherent as the right of self-defence, and as natural as the right of an individual to preserve his life when in jeopardy. the constitution was therefore in abeyance for the time being, so far as it in any way affected the progress and termination of the war. those in rebellion against the government of the united states were not restricted by constitutional provisions, or any other, except the acts of their congress, which was loyal and devoted to the cause for which the south was then fighting. it would be a hard case when one-third of a nation, united in rebellion against the national authority, is entirely untrammeled, that the other two-thirds, in their efforts to maintain the union intact, should be restrained by a constitution prepared by our ancestors for the express purpose of insuring the permanency of the confederation of the states. after i left general lee at appomattox station, i went with my staff and a few others directly to burkesville station on my way to washington. the road from burkesville back having been newly repaired and the ground being soft, the train got off the track frequently, and, as a result, it was after midnight of the second day when i reached city point. as soon as possible i took a dispatch-boat thence to washington city. while in washington i was very busy for a time in preparing the necessary orders for the new state of affairs; communicating with my different commanders of separate departments, bodies of troops, etc. but by the 14th i was pretty well through with this work, so as to be able to visit my children, who were then in burlington, new jersey, attending school. mrs. grant was with me in washington at the time, and we were invited by president and mrs. lincoln to accompany them to the theatre on the evening of that day. i replied to the president's verbal invitation to the effect, that if we were in the city we would take great pleasure in accompanying them; but that i was very anxious to get away and visit my children, and if i could get through my work during the day i should do so. i did get through and started by the evening train on the 14th, sending mr. lincoln word, of course, that i would not be at the theatre. at that time the railroad to new york entered philadelphia on broad street; passengers were conveyed in ambulances to the delaware river, and then ferried to camden, at which point they took the cars again. when i reached the ferry, on the east side of the city of philadelphia, i found people awaiting my arrival there; and also dispatches informing me of the assassination of the president and mr. seward, and of the probable assassination of the vice president, mr. johnson, and requesting my immediate return. it would be impossible for me to describe the feeling that overcame me at the news of these assassinations, more especially the assassination of the president. i knew his goodness of heart, his generosity, his yielding disposition, his desire to have everybody happy, and above all his desire to see all the people of the united states enter again upon the full privileges of citizenship with equality among all. i knew also the feeling that mr. johnson had expressed in speeches and conversation against the southern people, and i feared that his course towards them would be such as to repel, and make them unwilling citizens; and if they became such they would remain so for a long while. i felt that reconstruction had been set back, no telling how far. i immediately arranged for getting a train to take me back to washington city; but mrs. grant was with me; it was after midnight and burlington was but an hour away. finding that i could accompany her to our house and return about as soon as they would be ready to take me from the philadelphia station, i went up with her and returned immediately by the same special train. the joy that i had witnessed among the people in the street and in public places in washington when i left there, had been turned to grief; the city was in reality a city of mourning. i have stated what i believed then the effect of this would be, and my judgment now is that i was right. i believe the south would have been saved from very much of the hardness of feeling that was engendered by mr. johnson's course towards them during the first few months of his administration. be this as it may, mr. lincoln's assassination was particularly unfortunate for the entire nation. mr. johnson's course towards the south did engender bitterness of feeling. his denunciations of treason and his ever-ready remark, "treason is a crime and must be made odious," was repeated to all those men of the south who came to him to get some assurances of safety so that they might go to work at something with the feeling that what they obtained would be secure to them. he uttered his denunciations with great vehemence, and as they were accompanied with no assurances of safety, many southerners were driven to a point almost beyond endurance. the president of the united states is, in a large degree, or ought to be, a representative of the feeling, wishes and judgment of those over whom he presides; and the southerners who read the denunciations of themselves and their people must have come to the conclusion that he uttered the sentiments of the northern people; whereas, as a matter of fact, but for the assassination of mr. lincoln, i believe the great majority of the northern people, and the soldiers unanimously, would have been in favor of a speedy reconstruction on terms that would be the least humiliating to the people who had rebelled against their government. they believed, i have no doubt, as i did, that besides being the mildest, it was also the wisest, policy. the people who had been in rebellion must necessarily come back into the union, and be incorporated as an integral part of the nation. naturally the nearer they were placed to an equality with the people who had not rebelled, the more reconciled they would feel with their old antagonists, and the better citizens they would be from the beginning. they surely would not make good citizens if they felt that they had a yoke around their necks. i do not believe that the majority of the northern people at that time were in favor of negro suffrage. they supposed that it would naturally follow the freedom of the negro, but that there would be a time of probation, in which the ex-slaves could prepare themselves for the privileges of citizenship before the full right would be conferred; but mr. johnson, after a complete revolution of sentiment, seemed to regard the south not only as an oppressed people, but as the people best entitled to consideration of any of our citizens. this was more than the people who had secured to us the perpetuation of the union were prepared for, and they became more radical in their views. the southerners had the most power in the executive branch, mr. johnson having gone to their side; and with a compact south, and such sympathy and support as they could get from the north, they felt that they would be able to control the nation at once, and already many of them acted as if they thought they were entitled to do so. thus mr. johnson, fighting congress on the one hand, and receiving the support of the south on the other, drove congress, which was overwhelmingly republican, to the passing of first one measure and then another to restrict his power. there being a solid south on one side that was in accord with the political party in the north which had sympathized with the rebellion, it finally, in the judgment of congress and of the majority of the legislatures of the states, became necessary to enfranchise the negro, in all his ignorance. in this work, i shall not discuss the question of how far the policy of congress in this particular proved a wise one. it became an absolute necessity, however, because of the foolhardiness of the president and the blindness of the southern people to their own interest. as to myself, while strongly favoring the course that would be the least humiliating to the people who had been in rebellion, i gradually worked up to the point where, with the majority of the people, i favored immediate enfranchisement. chapter lxix. sherman and johnston--johnston's surrender to sherman--capture of mobile--wilson's expedition--capture of jefferson davis--general thomas's qualities--estimate of general canby. when i left appomattox i ordered general meade to proceed leisurely back to burkesville station with the army of the potomac and the army of the james, and to go into camp there until further orders from me. general johnston, as has been stated before, was in north carolina confronting general sherman. it could not be known positively, of course, whether johnston would surrender on the news of lee's surrender, though i supposed he would; and if he did not, burkesville station was the natural point from which to move to attack him. the army which i could have sent against him was superior to his, and that with which sherman confronted him was also superior; and between the two he would necessarily have been crushed, or driven away. with the loss of their capital and the army of northern virginia it was doubtful whether johnston's men would have the spirit to stand. my belief was that he would make no such attempt; but i adopted this course as a precaution against what might happen, however improbable. simultaneously with my starting from city point, i sent a messenger to north carolina by boat with dispatches to general sherman, informing him of the surrender of lee and his army; also of the terms which i had given him; and i authorized sherman to give the same terms to johnston if the latter chose to accept them. the country is familiar with the terms that sherman agreed to conditionally, because they embraced a political question as well as a military one and he would therefore have to confer with the government before agreeing to them definitely. general sherman had met mr. lincoln at city point while visiting there to confer with me about our final movement, and knew what mr. lincoln had said to the peace commissioners when he met them at hampton roads, viz.: that before he could enter into negotiations with them they would have to agree to two points: one being that the union should be preserved, and the other that slavery should be abolished; and if they were ready to concede these two points he was almost ready to sign his name to a blank piece of paper and permit them to fill out the balance of the terms upon which we would live together. he had also seen notices in the newspapers of mr. lincoln's visit to richmond, and had read in the same papers that while there he had authorized the convening of the legislature of virginia. sherman thought, no doubt, in adding to the terms that i had made with general lee, that he was but carrying out the wishes of the president of the united states. but seeing that he was going beyond his authority, he made it a point that the terms were only conditional. they signed them with this understanding, and agreed to a truce until the terms could be sent to washington for approval; if approved by the proper authorities there, they would then be final; if not approved, then he would give due notice, before resuming hostilities. as the world knows, sherman, from being one of the most popular generals of the land (congress having even gone so far as to propose a bill providing for a second lieutenant-general for the purpose of advancing him to that grade), was denounced by the president and secretary of war in very bitter terms. some people went so far as to denounce him as a traitor --a most preposterous term to apply to a man who had rendered so much service as he had, even supposing he had made a mistake in granting such terms as he did to johnston and his army. if sherman had taken authority to send johnston with his army home, with their arms to be put in the arsenals of their own states, without submitting the question to the authorities at washington, the suspicions against him might have some foundation. but the feeling against sherman died out very rapidly, and it was not many weeks before he was restored to the fullest confidence of the american people. when, some days after my return to washington, president johnson and the secretary of war received the terms which general sherman had forwarded for approval, a cabinet meeting was immediately called and i was sent for. there seemed to be the greatest consternation, lest sherman would commit the government to terms which they were not willing to accede to and which he had no right to grant. a message went out directing the troops in the south not to obey general sherman. i was ordered to proceed at once to north carolina and take charge of matter there myself. of course i started without delay, and reached there as soon as possible. i repaired to raleigh, where sherman was, as quietly as possible, hoping to see him without even his army learning of my presence. when i arrived i went to sherman's headquarters, and we were at once closeted together. i showed him the instruction and orders under which i visited him. i told him that i wanted him to notify general johnston that the terms which they had conditionally agreed upon had not been approved in washington, and that he was authorized to offer the same terms i had given general lee. i sent sherman to do this himself. i did not wish the knowledge of my presence to be known to the army generally; so i left it to sherman to negotiate the terms of the surrender solely by himself, and without the enemy knowing that i was anywhere near the field. as soon as possible i started to get away, to leave sherman quite free and untrammelled. at goldsboro', on my way back, i met a mail, containing the last newspapers, and i found in them indications of great excitement in the north over the terms sherman had given johnston; and harsh orders that had been promulgated by the president and secretary of war. i knew that sherman must see these papers, and i fully realized what great indignation they would cause him, though i do not think his feelings could have been more excited than were my own. but like the true and loyal soldier that he was, he carried out the instructions i had given him, obtained the surrender of johnston's army, and settled down in his camp about raleigh, to await final orders. there were still a few expeditions out in the south that could not be communicated with, and had to be left to act according to the judgment of their respective commanders. with these it was impossible to tell how the news of the surrender of lee and johnston, of which they must have heard, might affect their judgment as to what was best to do. the three expeditions which i had tried so hard to get off from the commands of thomas and canby did finally get off: one under canby himself, against mobile, late in march; that under stoneman from east tennessee on the 20th; and the one under wilson, starting from eastport, mississippi, on the 22d of march. they were all eminently successful, but without any good result. indeed much valuable property was destroyed and many lives lost at a time when we would have liked to spare them. the war was practically over before their victories were gained. they were so late in commencing operations, that they did not hold any troops away that otherwise would have been operating against the armies which were gradually forcing the confederate armies to a surrender. the only possible good that we may have experienced from these raids was by stoneman's getting near lynchburg about the time the armies of the potomac and the james were closing in on lee at appomattox. stoneman entered north carolina and then pushed north to strike the virginia and tennessee railroad. he got upon that road, destroyed its bridges at different places and rendered the road useless to the enemy up to within a few miles of lynchburg. his approach caused the evacuation of that city about the time we were at appomattox, and was the cause of a commotion we heard of there. he then pushed south, and was operating in the rear of johnston's army about the time the negotiations were going on between sherman and johnston for the latter's surrender. in this raid stoneman captured and destroyed a large amount of stores, while fourteen guns and nearly two thousand prisoners were the trophies of his success. canby appeared before mobile on the 27th of march. the city of mobile was protected by two forts, besides other intrenchments--spanish fort, on the east side of the bay, and fort blakely, north of the city. these forts were invested. on the night of the 8th of april, the national troops having carried the enemy's works at one point, spanish fort was evacuated; and on the 9th, the very day of lee's surrender, blakely was carried by assault, with a considerable loss to us. on the 11th the city was evacuated. i had tried for more than two years to have an expedition sent against mobile when its possession by us would have been of great advantage. it finally cost lives to take it when its possession was of no importance, and when, if left alone, it would within a few days have fallen into our hands without any bloodshed whatever. wilson moved out with full 12,000 men, well equipped and well armed. he was an energetic officer and accomplished his work rapidly. forrest was in his front, but with neither his old-time army nor his old-time prestige. he now had principally conscripts. his conscripts were generally old men and boys. he had a few thousand regular cavalry left, but not enough to even retard materially the progress of wilson's cavalry. selma fell on the 2d of april, with a large number of prisoners and a large quantity of war material, machine shops, etc., to be disposed of by the victors. tuscaloosa, montgomery and west point fell in quick succession. these were all important points to the enemy by reason of their railroad connections, as depots of supplies, and because of their manufactories of war material. they were fortified or intrenched, and there was considerable fighting before they were captured. macon surrendered on the 21st of april. here news was received of the negotiations for the surrender of johnston's army. wilson belonged to the military division commanded by sherman, and of course was bound by his terms. this stopped all fighting. general richard taylor had now become the senior confederate officer still at liberty east of the mississippi river, and on the 4th of may he surrendered everything within the limits of this extensive command. general e. kirby smith surrendered the trans-mississippi department on the 26th of may, leaving no other confederate army at liberty to continue the war. wilson's raid resulted in the capture of the fugitive president of the defunct confederacy before he got out of the country. this occurred at irwinsville, georgia, on the 11th of may. for myself, and i believe mr. lincoln shared the feeling, i would have been very glad to have seen mr. davis succeed in escaping, but for one reason: i feared that if not captured, he might get into the trans-mississippi region and there set up a more contracted confederacy. the young men now out of homes and out of employment might have rallied under his standard and protracted the war yet another year. the northern people were tired of the war, they were tired of piling up a debt which would be a further mortgage upon their homes. mr. lincoln, i believe, wanted mr. davis to escape, because he did not wish to deal with the matter of his punishment. he knew there would be people clamoring for the punishment of the ex-confederate president, for high treason. he thought blood enough had already been spilled to atone for our wickedness as a nation. at all events he did not wish to be the judge to decide whether more should be shed or not. but his own life was sacrificed at the hands of an assassin before the ex-president of the confederacy was a prisoner in the hands of the government which he had lent all his talent and all his energies to destroy. all things are said to be wisely directed, and for the best interest of all concerned. this reflection does not, however, abate in the slightest our sense of bereavement in the untimely loss of so good and great a man as abraham lincoln. he would have proven the best friend the south could have had, and saved much of the wrangling and bitterness of feeling brought out by reconstruction under a president who at first wished to revenge himself upon southern men of better social standing than himself, but who still sought their recognition, and in a short time conceived the idea and advanced the proposition to become their moses to lead them triumphantly out of all their difficulties. the story of the legislation enacted during the reconstruction period to stay the hands of the president is too fresh in the minds of the people to be told now. much of it, no doubt, was unconstitutional; but it was hoped that the laws enacted would serve their purpose before the question of constitutionality could be submitted to the judiciary and a decision obtained. these laws did serve their purpose, and now remain "a dead letter" upon the statute books of the united states, no one taking interest enough in them to give them a passing thought. much was said at the time about the garb mr. davis was wearing when he was captured. i cannot settle this question from personal knowledge of the facts; but i have been under the belief, from information given to me by general wilson shortly after the event, that when mr. davis learned that he was surrounded by our cavalry he was in his tent dressed in a gentleman's dressing gown. naturally enough, mr. davis wanted to escape, and would not reflect much how this should be accomplished provided it might be done successfully. if captured, he would be no ordinary prisoner. he represented all there was of that hostility to the government which had caused four years of the bloodiest war--and the most costly in other respects of which history makes any record. every one supposed he would be tried for treason if captured, and that he would be executed. had he succeeded in making his escape in any disguise it would have been adjudged a good thing afterwards by his admirers. as my official letters on file in the war department, as well as my remarks in this book, reflect upon general thomas by dwelling somewhat upon his tardiness, it is due to myself, as well as to him, that i give my estimate of him as a soldier. the same remark will apply also in the case of general canby. i had been at west point with thomas one year, and had known him later in the old army. he was a man of commanding appearance, slow and deliberate in speech and action; sensible, honest and brave. he possessed valuable soldierly qualities in an eminent degree. he gained the confidence of all who served under him, and almost their love. this implies a very valuable quality. it is a quality which calls out the most efficient services of the troops serving under the commander possessing it. thomas's dispositions were deliberately made, and always good. he could not be driven from a point he was given to hold. he was not as good, however, in pursuit as he was in action. i do not believe that he could ever have conducted sherman's army from chattanooga to atlanta against the defences and the commander guarding that line in 1864. on the other hand, if it had been given him to hold the line which johnston tried to hold, neither that general nor sherman, nor any other officer could have done it better. thomas was a valuable officer, who richly deserved, as he has received, the plaudits of his countrymen for the part he played in the great tragedy of 1861-5. general canby was an officer of great merit. he was naturally studious, and inclined to the law. there have been in the army but very few, if any, officers who took as much interest in reading and digesting every act of congress and every regulation for the government of the army as he. his knowledge gained in this way made him a most valuable staff officer, a capacity in which almost all his army services were rendered up to the time of his being assigned to the military division of the gulf. he was an exceedingly modest officer, though of great talent and learning. i presume his feelings when first called upon to command a large army against a fortified city, were somewhat like my own when marching a regiment against general thomas harris in missouri in 1861. neither of us would have felt the slightest trepidation in going into battle with some one else commanding. had canby been in other engagements afterwards, he would, i have no doubt, have advanced without any fear arising from a sense of the responsibility. he was afterwards killed in the lava beds of southern oregon, while in pursuit of the hostile modoc indians. his character was as pure as his talent and learning were great. his services were valuable during the war, but principally as a bureau officer. i have no idea that it was from choice that his services were rendered in an office, but because of his superior efficiency there. chapter lxx. the end of the war--the march to washington--one of lincoln's anecdotes --grand review at washington--characteristics of lincoln and stanton --estimate of the different corps commanders. things began to quiet down, and as the certainty that there would be no more armed resistance became clearer, the troops in north carolina and virginia were ordered to march immediately to the capital, and go into camp there until mustered out. suitable garrisons were left at the prominent places throughout the south to insure obedience to the laws that might be enacted for the government of the several states, and to insure security to the lives and property of all classes. i do not know how far this was necessary, but i deemed it necessary, at that time, that such a course should be pursued. i think now that these garrisons were continued after they ceased to be absolutely required; but it is not to be expected that such a rebellion as was fought between the sections from 1861 to 1865 could terminate without leaving many serious apprehensions in the mind of the people as to what should be done. sherman marched his troops from goldsboro, up to manchester, on the south side of the james river, opposite richmond, and there put them in camp, while he went back to savannah to see what the situation was there. it was during this trip that the last outrage was committed upon him. halleck had been sent to richmond to command virginia, and had issued orders prohibiting even sherman's own troops from obeying his, sherman's, orders. sherman met the papers on his return, containing this order of halleck, and very justly felt indignant at the outrage. on his arrival at fortress monroe returning from savannah, sherman received an invitation from halleck to come to richmond and be his guest. this he indignantly refused, and informed halleck, furthermore, that he had seen his order. he also stated that he was coming up to take command of his troops, and as he marched through it would probably be as well for halleck not to show himself, because he (sherman) would not be responsible for what some rash person might do through indignation for the treatment he had received. very soon after that, sherman received orders from me to proceed to washington city, and to go into camp on the south side of the city pending the mustering-out of the troops. there was no incident worth noting in the march northward from goldsboro, to richmond, or in that from richmond to washington city. the army, however, commanded by sherman, which had been engaged in all the battles of the west and had marched from the mississippi through the southern states to the sea, from there to goldsboro, and thence to washington city, had passed over many of the battle-fields of the army of the potomac, thus having seen, to a greater extent than any other body of troops, the entire theatre of the four years' war for the preservation of the union. the march of sherman's army from atlanta to the sea and north to goldsboro, while it was not accompanied with the danger that was anticipated, yet was magnificent in its results, and equally magnificent in the way it was conducted. it had an important bearing, in various ways, upon the great object we had in view, that of closing the war. all the states east of the mississippi river up to the state of georgia, had felt the hardships of the war. georgia, and south carolina, and almost all of north carolina, up to this time, had been exempt from invasion by the northern armies, except upon their immediate sea coasts. their newspapers had given such an account of confederate success, that the people who remained at home had been convinced that the yankees had been whipped from first to last, and driven from pillar to post, and that now they could hardly be holding out for any other purpose than to find a way out of the war with honor to themselves. even during this march of sherman's the newspapers in his front were proclaiming daily that his army was nothing better than a mob of men who were frightened out of their wits and hastening, panic-stricken, to try to get under the cover of our navy for protection against the southern people. as the army was seen marching on triumphantly, however, the minds of the people became disabused and they saw the true state of affairs. in turn they became disheartened, and would have been glad to submit without compromise. another great advantage resulting from this march, and which was calculated to hasten the end, was the fact that the great storehouse of georgia was entirely cut off from the confederate armies. as the troops advanced north from savannah, the destruction of the railroads in south carolina and the southern part of north carolina, further cut off their resources and left the armies still in virginia and north carolina dependent for supplies upon a very small area of country, already very much exhausted of food and forage. in due time the two armies, one from burkesville junction and the other from the neighborhood of raleigh, north carolina, arrived and went into camp near the capital, as directed. the troops were hardy, being inured to fatigue, and they appeared in their respective camps as ready and fit for duty as they had ever been in their lives. i doubt whether an equal body of men of any nation, take them man for man, officer for officer, was ever gotten together that would have proved their equal in a great battle. the armies of europe are machines; the men are brave and the officers capable; but the majority of the soldiers in most of the nations of europe are taken from a class of people who are not very intelligent and who have very little interest in the contest in which they are called upon to take part. our armies were composed of men who were able to read, men who knew what they were fighting for, and could not be induced to serve as soldiers, except in an emergency when the safety of the nation was involved, and so necessarily must have been more than equal to men who fought merely because they were brave and because they were thoroughly drilled and inured to hardships. there was nothing of particular importance occurred during the time these troops were in camp before starting north. i remember one little incident which i will relate as an anecdote characteristic of mr. lincoln. it occurred a day after i reached washington, and about the time general meade reached burkesville with the army. governor smith of virginia had left richmond with the confederate states government, and had gone to danville. supposing i was necessarily with the army at burkesville, he addressed a letter to me there informing me that, as governor of the commonwealth of the state of virginia, he had temporarily removed the state capital from richmond to danville, and asking if he would be permitted to perform the functions of his office there without molestation by the federal authorities. i give this letter only in substance. he also inquired of me whether in case he was not allowed to perform the duties of his office, he with a few others might not be permitted to leave the country and go abroad without interference. general meade being informed that a flag of truce was outside his pickets with a letter to me, at once sent out and had the letter brought in without informing the officer who brought it that i was not present. he read the letter and telegraphed me its contents. meeting mr. lincoln shortly after receiving this dispatch, i repeated its contents to him. mr. lincoln, supposing i was asking for instructions, said, in reply to that part of governor smith's letter which inquired whether he with a few friends would be permitted to leave the country unmolested, that his position was like that of a certain irishman (giving the name) he knew in springfield who was very popular with the people, a man of considerable promise, and very much liked. unfortunately he had acquired the habit of drinking, and his friends could see that the habit was growing on him. these friends determined to make an effort to save him, and to do this they drew up a pledge to abstain from all alcoholic drinks. they asked pat to join them in signing the pledge, and he consented. he had been so long out of the habit of using plain water as a beverage that he resorted to soda-water as a substitute. after a few days this began to grow distasteful to him. so holding the glass behind him, he said: "doctor, couldn't you drop a bit of brandy in that unbeknownst to myself." i do not remember what the instructions were the president gave me, but i know that governor smith was not permitted to perform the duties of his office. i also know that if mr. lincoln had been spared, there would have been no efforts made to prevent any one from leaving the country who desired to do so. he would have been equally willing to permit the return of the same expatriated citizens after they had time to repent of their choice. on the 18th of may orders were issued by the adjutant-general for a grand review by the president and his cabinet of sherman's and meade's armies. the review commenced on the 23d and lasted two days. meade's army occupied over six hours of the first day in passing the grand stand which had been erected in front of the president's house. sherman witnessed this review from the grand stand which was occupied by the president and his cabinet. here he showed his resentment for the cruel and harsh treatment that had unnecessarily been inflicted upon him by the secretary of war, by refusing to take his extended hand. sherman's troops had been in camp on the south side of the potomac. during the night of the 23d he crossed over and bivouacked not far from the capitol. promptly at ten o'clock on the morning of the 24th, his troops commenced to pass in review. sherman's army made a different appearance from that of the army of the potomac. the latter had been operating where they received directly from the north full supplies of food and clothing regularly: the review of this army therefore was the review of a body of 65,000 well-drilled, well-disciplined and orderly soldiers inured to hardship and fit for any duty, but without the experience of gathering their own food and supplies in an enemy's country, and of being ever on the watch. sherman's army was not so well-dressed as the army of the potomac, but their marching could not be excelled; they gave the appearance of men who had been thoroughly drilled to endure hardships, either by long and continuous marches or through exposure to any climate, without the ordinary shelter of a camp. they exhibited also some of the order of march through georgia where the "sweet potatoes sprung up from the ground" as sherman's army went marching through. in the rear of a company there would be a captured horse or mule loaded with small cooking utensils, captured chickens and other food picked up for the use of the men. negro families who had followed the army would sometimes come along in the rear of a company, with three or four children packed upon a single mule, and the mother leading it. the sight was varied and grand: nearly all day for two successive days, from the capitol to the treasury building, could be seen a mass of orderly soldiers marching in columns of companies. the national flag was flying from almost every house and store; the windows were filled with spectators; the door-steps and side-walks were crowded with colored people and poor whites who did not succeed in securing better quarters from which to get a view of the grand armies. the city was about as full of strangers who had come to see the sights as it usually is on inauguration day when a new president takes his seat. it may not be out of place to again allude to president lincoln and the secretary of war, mr. stanton, who were the great conspicuous figures in the executive branch of the government. there is no great difference of opinion now, in the public mind, as to the characteristics of the president. with mr. stanton the case is different. they were the very opposite of each other in almost every particular, except that each possessed great ability. mr. lincoln gained influence over men by making them feel that it was a pleasure to serve him. he preferred yielding his own wish to gratify others, rather than to insist upon having his own way. it distressed him to disappoint others. in matters of public duty, however, he had what he wished, but in the least offensive way. mr. stanton never questioned his own authority to command, unless resisted. he cared nothing for the feeling of others. in fact it seemed to be pleasanter to him to disappoint than to gratify. he felt no hesitation in assuming the functions of the executive, or in acting without advising with him. if his act was not sustained, he would change it--if he saw the matter would be followed up until he did so. it was generally supposed that these two officials formed the complement of each other. the secretary was required to prevent the president's being imposed upon. the president was required in the more responsible place of seeing that injustice was not done to others. i do not know that this view of these two men is still entertained by the majority of the people. it is not a correct view, however, in my estimation. mr. lincoln did not require a guardian to aid him in the fulfilment of a public trust. mr. lincoln was not timid, and he was willing to trust his generals in making and executing their plans. the secretary was very timid, and it was impossible for him to avoid interfering with the armies covering the capital when it was sought to defend it by an offensive movement against the army guarding the confederate capital. he could see our weakness, but he could not see that the enemy was in danger. the enemy would not have been in danger if mr. stanton had been in the field. these characteristics of the two officials were clearly shown shortly after early came so near getting into the capital. among the army and corps commanders who served with me during the war between the states, and who attracted much public attention, but of whose ability as soldiers i have not yet given any estimate, are meade, hancock, sedgwick, burnside, terry and hooker. there were others of great merit, such as griffin, humphreys, wright and mackenzie. of those first named, burnside at one time had command of the army of the potomac, and later of the army of the ohio. hooker also commanded the army of the potomac for a short time. general meade was an officer of great merit, with drawbacks to his usefulness that were beyond his control. he had been an officer of the engineer corps before the war, and consequently had never served with troops until he was over forty-six years of age. he never had, i believe, a command of less than a brigade. he saw clearly and distinctly the position of the enemy, and the topography of the country in front of his own position. his first idea was to take advantage of the lay of the ground, sometimes without reference to the direction we wanted to move afterwards. he was subordinate to his superiors in rank to the extent that he could execute an order which changed his own plans with the same zeal he would have displayed if the plan had been his own. he was brave and conscientious, and commanded the respect of all who knew him. he was unfortunately of a temper that would get beyond his control, at times, and make him speak to officers of high rank in the most offensive manner. no one saw this fault more plainly than he himself, and no one regretted it more. this made it unpleasant at times, even in battle, for those around him to approach him even with information. in spite of this defect he was a most valuable officer and deserves a high place in the annals of his country. general burnside was an officer who was generally liked and respected. he was not, however, fitted to command an army. no one knew this better than himself. he always admitted his blunders, and extenuated those of officers under him beyond what they were entitled to. it was hardly his fault that he was ever assigned to a separate command. of hooker i saw but little during the war. i had known him very well before, however. where i did see him, at chattanooga, his achievement in bringing his command around the point of lookout mountain and into chattanooga valley was brilliant. i nevertheless regarded him as a dangerous man. he was not subordinate to his superiors. he was ambitious to the extent of caring nothing for the rights of others. his disposition was, when engaged in battle, to get detached from the main body of the army and exercise a separate command, gathering to his standard all he could of his juniors. hancock stands the most conspicuous figure of all the general officers who did not exercise a separate command. he commanded a corps longer than any other one, and his name was never mentioned as having committed in battle a blunder for which he was responsible. he was a man of very conspicuous personal appearance. tall, well-formed and, at the time of which i now write, young and fresh-looking, he presented an appearance that would attract the attention of an army as he passed. his genial disposition made him friends, and his personal courage and his presence with his command in the thickest of the fight won for him the confidence of troops serving under him. no matter how hard the fight, the 2d corps always felt that their commander was looking after them. sedgwick was killed at spottsylvania before i had an opportunity of forming an estimate of his qualifications as a soldier from personal observation. i had known him in mexico when both of us were lieutenants, and when our service gave no indication that either of us would ever be equal to the command of a brigade. he stood very high in the army, however, as an officer and a man. he was brave and conscientious. his ambition was not great, and he seemed to dread responsibility. he was willing to do any amount of battling, but always wanted some one else to direct. he declined the command of the army of the potomac once, if not oftener. general alfred h. terry came into the army as a volunteer without a military education. his way was won without political influence up to an important separate command--the expedition against fort fisher, in january, 1865. his success there was most brilliant, and won for him the rank of brigadier-general in the regular army and of major-general of volunteers. he is a man who makes friends of those under him by his consideration of their wants and their dues. as a commander, he won their confidence by his coolness in action and by his clearness of perception in taking in the situation under which he was placed at any given time. griffin, humphreys, and mackenzie were good corps commanders, but came into that position so near to the close of the war as not to attract public attention. all three served as such, in the last campaign of the armies of the potomac and the james, which culminated at appomattox court house, on the 9th of april, 1865. the sudden collapse of the rebellion monopolized attention to the exclusion of almost everything else. i regarded mackenzie as the most promising young officer in the army. graduating at west point, as he did, during the second year of the war, he had won his way up to the command of a corps before its close. this he did upon his own merit and without influence. conclusion. the cause of the great war of the rebellion against the united status will have to be attributed to slavery. for some years before the war began it was a trite saying among some politicians that "a state half slave and half free cannot exist." all must become slave or all free, or the state will go down. i took no part myself in any such view of the case at the time, but since the war is over, reviewing the whole question, i have come to the conclusion that the saying is quite true. slavery was an institution that required unusual guarantees for its security wherever it existed; and in a country like ours where the larger portion of it was free territory inhabited by an intelligent and well-to-do population, the people would naturally have but little sympathy with demands upon them for its protection. hence the people of the south were dependent upon keeping control of the general government to secure the perpetuation of their favorite institution. they were enabled to maintain this control long after the states where slavery existed had ceased to have the controlling power, through the assistance they received from odd men here and there throughout the northern states. they saw their power waning, and this led them to encroach upon the prerogatives and independence of the northern states by enacting such laws as the fugitive slave law. by this law every northern man was obliged, when properly summoned, to turn out and help apprehend the runaway slave of a southern man. northern marshals became slave-catchers, and northern courts had to contribute to the support and protection of the institution. this was a degradation which the north would not permit any longer than until they could get the power to expunge such laws from the statute books. prior to the time of these encroachments the great majority of the people of the north had no particular quarrel with slavery, so long as they were not forced to have it themselves. but they were not willing to play the role of police for the south in the protection of this particular institution. in the early days of the country, before we had railroads, telegraphs and steamboats--in a word, rapid transit of any sort--the states were each almost a separate nationality. at that time the subject of slavery caused but little or no disturbance to the public mind. but the country grew, rapid transit was established, and trade and commerce between the states got to be so much greater than before, that the power of the national government became more felt and recognized and, therefore, had to be enlisted in the cause of this institution. it is probably well that we had the war when we did. we are better off now than we would have been without it, and have made more rapid progress than we otherwise should have made. the civilized nations of europe have been stimulated into unusual activity, so that commerce, trade, travel, and thorough acquaintance among people of different nationalities, has become common; whereas, before, it was but the few who had ever had the privilege of going beyond the limits of their own country or who knew anything about other people. then, too, our republican institutions were regarded as experiments up to the breaking out of the rebellion, and monarchical europe generally believed that our republic was a rope of sand that would part the moment the slightest strain was brought upon it. now it has shown itself capable of dealing with one of the greatest wars that was ever made, and our people have proven themselves to be the most formidable in war of any nationality. but this war was a fearful lesson, and should teach us the necessity of avoiding wars in the future. the conduct of some of the european states during our troubles shows the lack of conscience of communities where the responsibility does not come upon a single individual. seeing a nation that extended from ocean to ocean, embracing the better part of a continent, growing as we were growing in population, wealth and intelligence, the european nations thought it would be well to give us a check. we might, possibly, after a while threaten their peace, or, at least, the perpetuity of their institutions. hence, england was constantly finding fault with the administration at washington because we were not able to keep up an effective blockade. she also joined, at first, with france and spain in setting up an austrian prince upon the throne in mexico, totally disregarding any rights or claims that mexico had of being treated as an independent power. it is true they trumped up grievances as a pretext, but they were only pretexts which can always be found when wanted. mexico, in her various revolutions, had been unable to give that protection to the subjects of foreign nations which she would have liked to give, and some of her revolutionary leaders had forced loans from them. under pretence of protecting their citizens, these nations seized upon mexico as a foothold for establishing a european monarchy upon our continent, thus threatening our peace at home. i, myself, regarded this as a direct act of war against the united states by the powers engaged, and supposed as a matter of course that the united states would treat it as such when their hands were free to strike. i often spoke of the matter to mr. lincoln and the secretary of war, but never heard any special views from them to enable me to judge what they thought or felt about it. i inferred that they felt a good deal as i did, but were unwilling to commit themselves while we had our own troubles upon our hands. all of the powers except france very soon withdrew from the armed intervention for the establishment of an austrian prince upon the throne of mexico; but the governing people of these countries continued to the close of the war to throw obstacles in our way. after the surrender of lee, therefore, entertaining the opinion here expressed, i sent sheridan with a corps to the rio grande to have him where he might aid juarez in expelling the french from mexico. these troops got off before they could be stopped; and went to the rio grande, where sheridan distributed them up and down the river, much to the consternation of the troops in the quarter of mexico bordering on that stream. this soon led to a request from france that we should withdraw our troops from the rio grande and to negotiations for the withdrawal of theirs. finally bazaine was withdrawn from mexico by order of the french government. from that day the empire began to totter. mexico was then able to maintain her independence without aid from us. france is the traditional ally and friend of the united states. i did not blame france for her part in the scheme to erect a monarchy upon the ruins of the mexican republic. that was the scheme of one man, an imitator without genius or merit. he had succeeded in stealing the government of his country, and made a change in its form against the wishes and instincts of his people. he tried to play the part of the first napoleon, without the ability to sustain that role. he sought by new conquests to add to his empire and his glory; but the signal failure of his scheme of conquest was the precursor of his own overthrow. like our own war between the states, the franco-prussian war was an expensive one; but it was worth to france all it cost her people. it was the completion of the downfall of napoleon iii. the beginning was when he landed troops on this continent. failing here, the prestige of his name--all the prestige he ever had--was gone. he must achieve a success or fall. he tried to strike down his neighbor, prussia--and fell. i never admired the character of the first napoleon; but i recognize his great genius. his work, too, has left its impress for good on the face of europe. the third napoleon could have no claim to having done a good or just act. to maintain peace in the future it is necessary to be prepared for war. there can scarcely be a possible chance of a conflict, such as the last one, occurring among our own people again; but, growing as we are, in population, wealth and military power, we may become the envy of nations which led us in all these particulars only a few years ago; and unless we are prepared for it we may be in danger of a combined movement being some day made to crush us out. now, scarcely twenty years after the war, we seem to have forgotten the lessons it taught, and are going on as if in the greatest security, without the power to resist an invasion by the fleets of fourth-rate european powers for a time until we could prepare for them. we should have a good navy, and our sea-coast defences should be put in the finest possible condition. neither of these cost much when it is considered where the money goes, and what we get in return. money expended in a fine navy, not only adds to our security and tends to prevent war in the future, but is very material aid to our commerce with foreign nations in the meantime. money spent upon sea-coast defences is spent among our own people, and all goes back again among the people. the work accomplished, too, like that of the navy, gives us a feeling of security. england's course towards the united states during the rebellion exasperated the people of this country very much against the mother country. i regretted it. england and the united states are natural allies, and should be the best of friends. they speak one language, and are related by blood and other ties. we together, or even either separately, are better qualified than any other people to establish commerce between all the nationalities of the world. england governs her own colonies, and particularly those embracing the people of different races from her own, better than any other nation. she is just to the conquered, but rigid. she makes them self-supporting, but gives the benefit of labor to the laborer. she does not seem to look upon the colonies as outside possessions which she is at liberty to work for the support and aggrandizement of the home government. the hostility of england to the united states during our rebellion was not so much real as it was apparent. it was the hostility of the leaders of one political party. i am told that there was no time during the civil war when they were able to get up in england a demonstration in favor of secession, while these were constantly being gotten up in favor of the union, or, as they called it, in favor of the north. even in manchester, which suffered so fearfully by having the cotton cut off from her mills, they had a monster demonstration in favor of the north at the very time when their workmen were almost famishing. it is possible that the question of a conflict between races may come up in the future, as did that between freedom and slavery before. the condition of the colored man within our borders may become a source of anxiety, to say the least. but he was brought to our shores by compulsion, and he now should be considered as having as good a right to remain here as any other class of our citizens. it was looking to a settlement of this question that led me to urge the annexation of santo domingo during the time i was president of the united states. santo domingo was freely offered to us, not only by the administration, but by all the people, almost without price. the island is upon our shores, is very fertile, and is capable of supporting fifteen millions of people. the products of the soil are so valuable that labor in her fields would be so compensated as to enable those who wished to go there to quickly repay the cost of their passage. i took it that the colored people would go there in great numbers, so as to have independent states governed by their own race. they would still be states of the union, and under the protection of the general government; but the citizens would be almost wholly colored. by the war with mexico, we had acquired, as we have seen, territory almost equal in extent to that we already possessed. it was seen that the volunteers of the mexican war largely composed the pioneers to settle up the pacific coast country. their numbers, however, were scarcely sufficient to be a nucleus for the population of the important points of the territory acquired by that war. after our rebellion, when so many young men were at liberty to return to their homes, they found they were not satisfied with the farm, the store, or the work-shop of the villages, but wanted larger fields. the mines of the mountains first attracted them; but afterwards they found that rich valleys and productive grazing and farming lands were there. this territory, the geography of which was not known to us at the close of the rebellion, is now as well mapped as any portion of our country. railroads traverse it in every direction, north, south, east, and west. the mines are worked. the high lands are used for grazing purposes, and rich agricultural lands are found in many of the valleys. this is the work of the volunteer. it is probable that the indians would have had control of these lands for a century yet but for the war. we must conclude, therefore, that wars are not always evils unmixed with some good. prior to the rebellion the great mass of the people were satisfied to remain near the scenes of their birth. in fact an immense majority of the whole people did not feel secure against coming to want should they move among entire strangers. so much was the country divided into small communities that localized idioms had grown up, so that you could almost tell what section a person was from by hearing him speak. before, new territories were settled by a "class"; people who shunned contact with others; people who, when the country began to settle up around them, would push out farther from civilization. their guns furnished meat, and the cultivation of a very limited amount of the soil, their bread and vegetables. all the streams abounded with fish. trapping would furnish pelts to be brought into the states once a year, to pay for necessary articles which they could not raise--powder, lead, whiskey, tobacco and some store goods. occasionally some little articles of luxury would enter into these purchases--a quarter of a pound of tea, two or three pounds of coffee, more of sugar, some playing cards, and if anything was left over of the proceeds of the sale, more whiskey. little was known of the topography of the country beyond the settlements of these frontiersmen. this is all changed now. the war begot a spirit of independence and enterprise. the feeling now is, that a youth must cut loose from his old surroundings to enable him to get up in the world. there is now such a commingling of the people that particular idioms and pronunciation are no longer localized to any great extent; the country has filled up "from the centre all around to the sea"; railroads connect the two oceans and all parts of the interior; maps, nearly perfect, of every part of the country are now furnished the student of geography. the war has made us a nation of great power and intelligence. we have but little to do to preserve peace, happiness and prosperity at home, and the respect of other nations. our experience ought to teach us the necessity of the first; our power secures the latter. i feel that we are on the eve of a new era, when there is to be great harmony between the federal and confederate. i cannot stay to be a living witness to the correctness of this prophecy; but i feel it within me that it is to be so. the universally kind feeling expressed for me at a time when it was supposed that each day would prove my last, seemed to me the beginning of the answer to "let us have peace." the expression of these kindly feelings were not restricted to a section of the country, nor to a division of the people. they came from individual citizens of all nationalities; from all denominations--the protestant, the catholic, and the jew; and from the various societies of the land--scientific, educational, religious or otherwise. politics did not enter into the matter at all. i am not egotist enough to suppose all this significance should be given because i was the object of it. but the war between the states was a very bloody and a very costly war. one side or the other had to yield principles they deemed dearer than life before it could be brought to an end. i commanded the whole of the mighty host engaged on the victorious side. i was, no matter whether deservedly so or not, a representative of that side of the controversy. it is a significant and gratifying fact that confederates should have joined heartily in this spontaneous move. i hope the good feeling inaugurated may continue to the end. appendix. report of lieutenant-general u. s. grant, of the united states armies 1864-65. headquarters armies of the united states, washington, d. c., july 22, 1865. hon. e. m. stanton, secretary of war. sir: i have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of the armies of the united states from the date of my appointment to command the same. from an early period in the rebellion i had been impressed with the idea that active and continuous operations of all the troops that could be brought into the field, regardless of season and weather, were necessary to a speedy termination of the war. the resources of the enemy and his numerical strength were far inferior to ours; but as an offset to this, we had a vast territory, with a population hostile to the government, to garrison, and long lines of river and railroad communications to protect, to enable us to supply the operating armies. the armies in the east and west acted independently and without concert, like a balky team, no two ever pulling together, enabling the enemy to use to great advantage his interior lines of communication for transporting troops from east to west, reinforcing the army most vigorously pressed, and to furlough large numbers, during seasons of inactivity on our part, to go to their homes and do the work of producing, for the support of their armies. it was a question whether our numerical strength and resources were not more than balanced by these disadvantages and the enemy's superior position. from the first, i was firm in the conviction that no peace could be had that would be stable and conducive to the happiness of the people, both north and south, until the military power of the rebellion was entirely broken. i therefore determined, first, to use the greatest number of troops practicable against the armed force of the enemy; preventing him from using the same force at different seasons against first one and then another of our armies, and the possibility of repose for refitting and producing necessary supplies for carrying on resistance. second, to hammer continuously against the armed force of the enemy and his resources, until by mere attrition, if in no other way, there should be nothing left to him but an equal submission with the loyal section of our common country to the constitution and laws of the land. these views have been kept constantly in mind, and orders given and campaigns made to carry them out. whether they might have been better in conception and execution is for the people, who mourn the loss of friends fallen, and who have to pay the pecuniary cost, to say. all i can say is, that what i have done has been done conscientiously, to the best of my ability, and in what i conceived to be for the best interests of the whole country. at the date when this report begins, the situation of the contending forces was about as follows: the mississippi river was strongly garrisoned by federal troops, from st. louis, missouri, to its mouth. the line of the arkansas was also held, thus giving us armed possession of all west of the mississippi, north of that stream. a few points in southern louisiana, not remote from the river, were held by us, together with a small garrison at and near the mouth of the rio grande. all the balance of the vast territory of arkansas, louisiana, and texas was in the almost undisputed possession of the enemy, with an army of probably not less than eighty thousand effective men, that could have been brought into the field had there been sufficient opposition to have brought them out. the let-alone policy had demoralized this force so that probably but little more than one-half of it was ever present in garrison at any one time. but the one-half, or forty thousand men, with the bands of guerillas scattered through missouri, arkansas, and along the mississippi river, and the disloyal character of much of the population, compelled the use of a large number of troops to keep navigation open on the river, and to protect the loyal people to the west of it. to the east of the mississippi we held substantially with the line of the tennessee and holston rivers, running eastward to include nearly all of the state of tennessee. south of chattanooga, a small foothold had been obtained in georgia, sufficient to protect east tennessee from incursions from the enemy's force at dalton, georgia. west virginia was substantially within our lines. virginia, with the exception of the northern border, the potomac river, a small area about the mouth of james river, covered by the troops at norfolk and fort monroe, and the territory covered by the army of the potomac lying along the rapidan, was in the possession of the enemy. along the sea-coast footholds had been obtained at plymouth, washington, and new bern, in north carolina; beaufort, folly and morris islands, hilton head, fort pulaski, and port royal, in south carolina; fernandina and st. augustine, in florida. key west and pensacola were also in our possession, while all the important ports were blockaded by the navy. the accompanying map, a copy of which was sent to general sherman and other commanders in march, 1864, shows by red lines the territory occupied by us at the beginning of the rebellion, and at the opening of the campaign of 1864, while those in blue are the lines which it was proposed to occupy. behind the union lines there were many bands of guerillas and a large population disloyal to the government, making it necessary to guard every foot of road or river used in supplying our armies. in the south, a reign of military despotism prevailed, which made every man and boy capable of bearing arms a soldier; and those who could not bear arms in the field acted as provosts for collecting deserters and returning them. this enabled the enemy to bring almost his entire strength into the field. the enemy had concentrated the bulk of his forces east of the mississippi into two armies, commanded by generals r. e. lee and j. e. johnston, his ablest and best generals. the army commanded by lee occupied the south bank of the rapidan, extending from mine run westward, strongly intrenched, covering and defending richmond, the rebel capital, against the army of the potomac. the army under johnston occupied a strongly intrenched position at dalton, georgia, covering and defending atlanta, georgia, a place of great importance as a railroad centre, against the armies under major-general w. t. sherman. in addition to these armies he had a large cavalry force under forrest, in north-east mississippi; a considerable force, of all arms, in the shenandoah valley, and in the western part of virginia and extreme eastern part of tennessee; and also confronting our sea-coast garrisons, and holding blockaded ports where we had no foothold upon land. these two armies, and the cities covered and defended by them, were the main objective points of the campaign. major-general w. t. sherman, who was appointed to the command of the military division of the mississippi, embracing all the armies and territory east of the mississippi river to the alleghanies and the department of arkansas, west of the mississippi, had the immediate command of the armies operating against johnston. major-general george g. meade had the immediate command of the army of the potomac, from where i exercised general supervision of the movements of all our armies. general sherman was instructed to move against johnston's army, to break it up, and to go into the interior of the enemy's country as far as he could, inflicting all the damage he could upon their war resources. if the enemy in his front showed signs of joining lee, to follow him up to the full extent of his ability, while i would prevent the concentration of lee upon him, if it was in the power of the army of the potomac to do so. more specific written instructions were not given, for the reason that i had talked over with him the plans of the campaign, and was satisfied that he understood them and would execute them to the fullest extent possible. major-general n. p. banks, then on an expedition up red river against shreveport, louisiana (which had been organized previous to my appointment to command), was notified by me on the 15th of march, of the importance it was that shreveport should be taken at the earliest possible day, and that if he found that the taking of it would occupy from ten to fifteen days' more time than general sherman had given his troops to be absent from their command, he would send them back at the time specified by general sherman, even if it led to the abandonment of the main object of the red river expedition, for this force was necessary to movements east of the mississippi; that should his expedition prove successful, he would hold shreveport and the red river with such force as he might deem necessary, and return the balance of his troops to the neighborhood of new orleans, commencing no move for the further acquisition of territory, unless it was to make that then held by him more easily held; that it might be a part of the spring campaign to move against mobile; that it certainly would be, if troops enough could be obtained to make it without embarrassing other movements; that new orleans would be the point of departure for such an expedition; also, that i had directed general steele to make a real move from arkansas, as suggested by him (general banks), instead of a demonstration, as steele thought advisable. on the 31st of march, in addition to the foregoing notification and directions, he was instructed as follows: "1st. if successful in your expedition against shreveport, that you turn over the defence of the red river to general steele and the navy. "2d. that you abandon texas entirely, with the exception of your hold upon the rio grande. this can be held with four thousand men, if they will turn their attention immediately to fortifying their positions. at least one-half of the force required for this service might be taken from the colored troops. "3d. by properly fortifying on the mississippi river, the force to guard it from port hudson to new orleans can be reduced to ten thousand men, if not to a less number. six thousand more would then hold all the rest of the territory necessary to hold until active operations can again be resumed west of the river. according to your last return, this would give you a force of over thirty thousand effective men with which to move against mobile. to this i expect to add five thousand men from missouri. if however, you think the force here stated too small to hold the territory regarded as necessary to hold possession of, i would say concentrate at least twenty-five thousand men of your present command for operations against mobile. with these and such additions as i can give you from elsewhere, lose no time in making a demonstration, to be followed by an attack upon mobile. two or more iron-clads will be ordered to report to admiral farragut. this gives him a strong naval fleet with which to co-operate. you can make your own arrangements with the admiral for his co-operation, and select your own line of approach. my own idea of the matter is that pascagoula should be your base; but, from your long service in the gulf department, you will know best about the matter. it is intended that your movements shall be co-operative with movements elsewhere, and you cannot now start too soon. all i would now add is, that you commence the concentration of your forces at once. preserve a profound secrecy of what you intend doing, and start at the earliest possible moment. "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "major-general n. p. banks." major-general meade was instructed that lee's army would be his objective point; that wherever lee went he would go also. for his movement two plans presented themselves: one to cross the rapidan below lee, moving by his right flank; the other above, moving by his left. each presented advantages over the other, with corresponding objections. by crossing above, lee would be cut off from all chance of ignoring richmond or going north on a raid. but if we took this route, all we did would have to be done whilst the rations we started with held out; besides, it separated us from butler, so that he could not be directed how to cooperate. if we took the other route, brandy station could be used as a base of supplies until another was secured on the york or james rivers. of these, however, it was decided to take the lower route. the following letter of instruction was addressed to major-general b. f. butler: "fort monroe, virginia, april 2, 1864. "general:-in the spring campaign, which it is desirable shall commence at as early a day as practicable, it is proposed to have cooperative action of all the armies in the field, as far as this object can be accomplished. "it will not be possible to unite our armies into two or three large ones to act as so many units, owing to the absolute necessity of holding on to the territory already taken from the enemy. but, generally speaking, concentration can be practically effected by armies moving to the interior of the enemy's country from the territory they have to guard. by such movement, they interpose themselves between the enemy and the country to be guarded, thereby reducing the number necessary to guard important points, or at least occupy the attention of a part of the enemy's force, if no greater object is gained. lee's army and richmond being the greater objects towards which our attention must be directed in the next campaign, it is desirable to unite all the force we can against them. the necessity of covering washington with the army of the potomac, and of covering your department with your army, makes it impossible to unite these forces at the beginning of any move. i propose, therefore, what comes nearest this of anything that seems practicable: the army of the potomac will act from its present base, lee's army being the objective point. you will collect all the forces from your command that can be spared from garrison duty--i should say not less than twenty thousand effective men--to operate on the south side of james river, richmond being your objective point. to the force you already have will be added about ten thousand men from south carolina, under major-general gillmore, who will command them in person. major-general w. f. smith is ordered to report to you, to command the troops sent into the field from your own department. "general gillmore will be ordered to report to you at fortress monroe, with all the troops on transports, by the 18th instant, or as soon thereafter as practicable. should you not receive notice by that time to move, you will make such disposition of them and your other forces as you may deem best calculated to deceive the enemy as to the real move to be made. "when you are notified to move, take city point with as much force as possible. fortify, or rather intrench, at once, and concentrate all your troops for the field there as rapidly as you can. from city point directions cannot be given at this time for your further movements. "the fact that has already been stated--that is, that richmond is to be your objective point, and that there is to be co-operation between your force and the army of the potomac--must be your guide. this indicates the necessity of your holding close to the south bank of the james river as you advance. then, should the enemy be forced into his intrenchments in richmond, the army of the potomac would follow, and by means of transports the two armies would become a unit. "all the minor details of your advance are left entirely to your direction. if, however, you think it practicable to use your cavalry south of you, so as to cut the railroad about hicksford, about the time of the general advance, it would be of immense advantage. "you will please forward for my information, at the earliest practicable day, all orders, details, and instructions you may give for the execution of this order. "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "major-general b. f. butler." on the 16th these instructions were substantially reiterated. on the 19th, in order to secure full co-operation between his army and that of general meade, he was informed that i expected him to move from fort monroe the same day that general meade moved from culpeper. the exact time i was to telegraph him as soon as it was fixed, and that it would not be earlier than the 27th of april; that it was my intention to fight lee between culpeper and richmond, if he would stand. should he, however, fall back into richmond, i would follow up and make a junction with his (general butler's) army on the james river; that, could i be certain he would be able to invest richmond on the south side, so as to have his left resting on the james, above the city, i would form the junction there; that circumstances might make this course advisable anyhow; that he should use every exertion to secure footing as far up the south side of the river as he could, and as soon as possible after the receipt of orders to move; that if he could not carry the city, he should at least detain as large a force there as possible. in co-operation with the main movements against lee and johnston, i was desirous of using all other troops necessarily kept in departments remote from the fields of immediate operations, and also those kept in the background for the protection of our extended lines between the loyal states and the armies operating against them. a very considerable force, under command of major-general sigel, was so held for the protection of west virginia, and the frontiers of maryland and pennsylvania. whilst these troops could not be withdrawn to distant fields without exposing the north to invasion by comparatively small bodies of the enemy, they could act directly to their front, and give better protection than if lying idle in garrison. by such a movement they would either compel the enemy to detach largely for the protection of his supplies and lines of communication, or he would lose them. general sigel was therefore directed to organize all his available force into two expeditions, to move from beverly and charleston, under command of generals ord and crook, against the east tennessee and virginia railroad. subsequently, general ord having been relieved at his own request, general sigel was instructed at his own suggestion, to give up the expedition by beverly, and to form two columns, one under general crook, on the kanawha, numbering about ten thousand men, and one on the shenandoah, numbering about seven thousand men. the one on the shenandoah to assemble between cumberland and the shenandoah, and the infantry and artillery advanced to cedar creek with such cavalry as could be made available at the moment, to threaten the enemy in the shenandoah valley, and advance as far as possible; while general crook would take possession of lewisburg with part of his force and move down the tennessee railroad, doing as much damage as he could, destroying the new river bridge and the salt-works, at saltville, va. owing to the weather and bad condition of the roads, operations were delayed until the 1st of may, when, everything being in readiness and the roads favorable, orders were given for a general movement of all the armies not later than the 4th of may. my first object being to break the military power of the rebellion, and capture the enemy's important strongholds, made me desirous that general butler should succeed in his movement against richmond, as that would tend more than anything else, unless it were the capture of lee's army, to accomplish this desired result in the east. if he failed, it was my determination, by hard fighting, either to compel lee to retreat, or to so cripple him that he could not detach a large force to go north, and still retain enough for the defence of richmond. it was well understood, by both generals butler and meade, before starting on the campaign, that it was my intention to put both their armies south of the james river, in case of failure to destroy lee without it. before giving general butler his instructions, i visited him at fort monroe, and in conversation pointed out the apparent importance of getting possession of petersburg, and destroying railroad communication as far south as possible. believing, however, in the practicability of capturing richmond unless it was reinforced, i made that the objective point of his operations. as the army of the potomac was to move simultaneously with him, lee could not detach from his army with safety, and the enemy did not have troops elsewhere to bring to the defence of the city in time to meet a rapid movement from the north of james river. i may here state that, commanding all the armies as i did, i tried, as far as possible, to leave general meade in independent command of the army of the potomac. my instructions for that army were all through him, and were general in their nature, leaving all the details and the execution to him. the campaigns that followed proved him to be the right man in the right place. his commanding always in the presence of an officer superior to him in rank, has drawn from him much of that public attention that his zeal and ability entitle him to, and which he would otherwise have received. the movement of the army of the potomac commenced early on the morning of the 4th of may, under the immediate direction and orders of major-general meade, pursuant to instructions. before night, the whole army was across the rapidan (the fifth and sixth corps crossing at germania ford, and the second corps at ely's ford, the cavalry, under major-general sheridan, moving in advance,) with the greater part of its trains, numbering about four thousand wagons, meeting with but slight opposition. the average distance travelled by the troops that day was about twelve miles. this i regarded as a great success, and it removed from my mind the most serious apprehensions i had entertained, that of crossing the river in the face of an active, large, well-appointed, and ably commanded army, and how so large a train was to be carried through a hostile country, and protected. early on the 5th, the advance corps (the fifth, major-general g. k. warren commanding) met and engaged the enemy outside his intrenchments near mine run. the battle raged furiously all day, the whole army being brought into the fight as fast as the corps could be got upon the field, which, considering the density of the forest and narrowness of the roads, was done with commendable promptness. general burnside, with the ninth corps, was, at the time the army of the potomac moved, left with the bulk of his corps at the crossing of the rappahannock river and alexandria railroad, holding the road back to bull run, with instructions not to move until he received notice that a crossing of the rapidan was secured, but to move promptly as soon as such notice was received. this crossing he was apprised of on the afternoon of the 4th. by six o'clock of the morning of the 6th he was leading his corps into action near the wilderness tavern, some of his troops having marched a distance of over thirty miles, crossing both the rappahannock and rapidan rivers. considering that a large proportion, probably two-thirds of his command, was composed of new troops, unaccustomed to marches, and carrying the accoutrements of a soldier, this was a remarkable march. the battle of the wilderness was renewed by us at five o'clock on the morning of the 6th, and continued with unabated fury until darkness set in, each army holding substantially the same position that they had on the evening of the 5th. after dark, the enemy made a feeble attempt to turn our right flank, capturing several hundred prisoners and creating considerable confusion. but the promptness of general sedgwick, who was personally present and commanded that part of our line, soon reformed it and restored order. on the morning of the 7th, reconnoissances showed that the enemy had fallen behind his intrenched lines, with pickets to the front, covering a part of the battle-field. from this it was evident to my mind that the two days' fighting had satisfied him of his inability to further maintain the contest in the open field, notwithstanding his advantage of position, and that he would wait an attack behind his works. i therefore determined to push on and put my whole force between him and richmond; and orders were at once issued for a movement by his right flank. on the night of the 7th, the march was commenced towards spottsylvania court house, the fifth corps moving on the most direct road. but the enemy having become apprised of our movement, and having the shorter line, was enabled to reach there first. on the 8th, general warren met a force of the enemy, which had been sent out to oppose and delay his advance, to gain time to fortify the line taken up at spottsylvania. this force was steadily driven back on the main force, within the recently constructed works, after considerable fighting, resulting in severe loss to both sides. on the morning of the 9th, general sheridan started on a raid against the enemy's lines of communication with richmond. the 9th, 10th, and 11th were spent in manoeuvring and fighting, without decisive results. among the killed on the 9th was that able and distinguished soldier major-general john sedgwick, commanding the sixth army corps. major-general h. g. wright succeeded him in command. early on the morning of the 12th a general attack was made on the enemy in position. the second corps, major-general hancock commanding, carried a salient of his line, capturing most of johnson's division of ewell's corps and twenty pieces of artillery. but the resistance was so obstinate that the advantage gained did not prove decisive. the 13th, 14th, 15th, 16th, 17th, and 18th, were consumed in manoeuvring and awaiting the arrival of reinforcements from washington. deeming it impracticable to make any further attack upon the enemy at spottsylvania court house, orders were issued on the 15th with a view to a movement to the north anna, to commence at twelve o'clock on the night of the 19th. late in the afternoon of the 19th, ewell's corps came out of its works on our extreme right flank; but the attack was promptly repulsed, with heavy loss. this delayed the movement to the north anna until the night of the 21st, when it was commenced. but the enemy again, having the shorter line, and being in possession of the main roads, was enabled to reach the north anna in advance of us, and took position behind it. the fifth corps reached the north anna on the afternoon of the 23d, closely followed by the sixth corps. the second and ninth corps got up about the same time, the second holding the railroad bridge, and the ninth lying between that and jericho ford. general warren effected a crossing the same afternoon, and got a position without much opposition. soon after getting into position he was violently attacked, but repulsed the enemy with great slaughter. on the 25th, general sheridan rejoined the army of the potomac from the raid on which he started from spottsylvania, having destroyed the depots at beaver dam and ashland stations, four trains of cars, large supplies of rations, and many miles of railroad-track; recaptured about four hundred of our men on their way to richmond as prisoners of war; met and defeated the enemy's cavalry at yellow tavern; carried the first line of works around richmond (but finding the second line too strong to be carried by assault), recrossed to the north bank of the chickahominy at meadow bridge under heavy fire, and moved by a detour to haxall's landing, on the james river, where he communicated with general butler. this raid had the effect of drawing off the whole of the enemy's cavalry force, making it comparatively easy to guard our trains. general butler moved his main force up the james river, in pursuance of instructions, on the 4th of may, general gillmore having joined him with the tenth corps. at the same time he sent a force of one thousand eight hundred cavalry, by way of west point, to form a junction with him wherever he might get a foothold, and a force of three thousand cavalry, under general kautz, from suffolk, to operate against the road south of petersburg and richmond. on the 5th, he occupied, without opposition, both city point and bermuda hundred, his movement being a complete surprise. on the 6th, he was in position with his main army, and commenced intrenching. on the 7th he made a reconnoissance against the petersburg and richmond railroad, destroying a portion of it after some fighting. on the 9th he telegraphed as follows: "headquarters, near bermuda landing, may 9, 1864. "hon. e. m. stanton, secretary of war. "our operations may be summed up in a few words. with one thousand seven hundred cavalry we have advanced up the peninsula, forced the chickahominy, and have safely, brought them to their present position. these were colored cavalry, and are now holding our advance pickets towards richmond. "general kautz, with three thousand cavalry from suffolk, on the same day with our movement up james river, forced the black water, burned the railroad bridge at stony creek, below petersburg, cutting into beauregard's force at that point. "we have landed here, intrenched ourselves, destroyed many miles of railroad, and got a position which, with proper supplies, we can hold out against the whole of lee's army. i have ordered up the supplies. "beauregard, with a large portion of his force, was left south by the cutting of the railroads by kautz. that portion which reached petersburg under hill i have whipped to-day, killing and wounding many, and taking many prisoners, after a severe and well-contested fight. "general grant will not be troubled with any further reinforcements to lee from beauregard's force. "benj. f. butler, major-general." on the evening of the 13th and morning of the 14th he carried a portion of the enemy's first line of defences at drury's bluff, or fort darling, with small loss. the time thus consumed from the 6th lost to us the benefit of the surprise and capture of richmond and petersburg, enabling, as it did, beauregard to collect his loose forces in north and south carolina, and bring them to the defence of those places. on the 16th, the enemy attacked general butler in his position in front of drury's bluff. he was forced back, or drew back, into his intrenchments between the forks of the james and appomattox rivers, the enemy intrenching strongly in his front, thus covering his railroads, the city, and all that was valuable to him. his army, therefore, though in a position of great security, was as completely shut off from further operations directly against richmond as if it had been in a bottle strongly corked. it required but a comparatively small force of the enemy to hold it there. on the 12th, general kautz, with his cavalry, was started on a raid against the danville railroad, which he struck at coalfield, powhatan, and chula stations, destroying them, the railroad-track, two freight trains, and one locomotive, together with large quantities of commissary and other stores; thence, crossing to the south side road, struck it at wilson's, wellsville, and black's and white's stations, destroying the road and station-houses; thence he proceeded to city point, which he reached on the 18th. on the 19th of april, and prior to the movement of general butler, the enemy, with a land force under general hoke and an iron-clad ram, attacked plymouth, n. c., commanded by general h. w. wessells, and our gunboats there, and, after severe fighting, the place was carried by assault, and the entire garrison and armament captured. the gunboat smithfield was sunk, and the miami disabled. the army sent to operate against richmond having hermetically sealed itself up at bermuda hundred, the enemy was enabled to bring the most, if not all, the reinforcements brought from the south by beauregard against the army of the potomac. in addition to this reinforcement, a very considerable one, probably not less than fifteen thousand men, was obtained by calling in the scattered troops under breckinridge from the western part of virginia. the position of bermuda hundred was as easy to defend as it was difficult to operate from against the enemy. i determined, therefore, to bring from it all available forces, leaving enough only to secure what had been gained; and accordingly, on the 22d, i directed that they be sent forward, under command of major-general w. f. smith, to join the army of the potomac. on the 24th of may, the 9th army corps, commanded by major-general a. e. burnside, was assigned to the army of the potomac, and from this time forward constituted a portion of major-general meade's command. finding the enemy's position on the north anna stronger than either of his previous ones, i withdrew on the night of the 26th to the north bank of the north anna, and moved via hanover town to turn the enemy's position by his right. generals torbert's and merritt's divisions of cavalry, under sheridan, and the 6th corps, led the advance, crossed the pamunkey river at hanover town, after considerable fighting, and on the 28th the two divisions of cavalry had a severe, but successful engagement with the enemy at hawes's shop. on the 29th and 30th we advanced, with heavy skirmishing, to the hanover court house and cold harbor road, and developed the enemy's position north of the chickahominy. late on the evening of the last day the enemy came out and attacked our left, but was repulsed with very considerable loss. an attack was immediately ordered by general meade, along his whole line, which resulted in driving the enemy from a part of his intrenched skirmish line. on the 31st, general wilson's division of cavalry destroyed the railroad bridges over the south anna river, after defeating the enemy's cavalry. general sheridan, on the same day, reached cold harbor, and held it until relieved by the 6th corps and general smith's command, which had just arrived, via white house, from general butler's army. on the 1st day of june an attack was made at five p.m. by the 6th corps and the troops under general smith, the other corps being held in readiness to advance on the receipt of orders. this resulted in our carrying and holding the enemy's first line of works in front of the right of the 6th corps, and in front of general smith. during the attack the enemy made repeated assaults on each of the corps not engaged in the main attack, but was repulsed with heavy loss in every instance. that night he made several assaults to regain what he had lost in the day, but failed. the 2d was spent in getting troops into position for an attack on the 3d. on the 3d of june we again assaulted the enemy's works, in the hope of driving him from his position. in this attempt our loss was heavy, while that of the enemy, i have reason to believe, was comparatively light. it was the only general attack made from the rapidan to the james which did not inflict upon the enemy losses to compensate for our own losses. i would not be understood as saying that all previous attacks resulted in victories to our arms, or accomplished as much as i had hoped from them; but they inflicted upon the enemy severe losses, which tended, in the end, to the complete overthrow of the rebellion. from the proximity of the enemy to his defences around richmond, it was impossible, by any flank movement, to interpose between him and the city. i was still in a condition to either move by his left flank, and invest richmond from the north side, or continue my move by his right flank to the south side of the james. while the former might have been better as a covering for washington, yet a full survey of all the ground satisfied me that it would be impracticable to hold a line north and east of richmond that would protect the fredericksburg railroad, a long, vulnerable line, which would exhaust much of our strength to guard, and that would have to be protected to supply the army, and would leave open to the enemy all his lines of communication on the south side of the james. my idea, from the start, had been to beat lee's army north of richmond, if possible. then, after destroying his lines of communication north of the james river, to transfer the army to the south side, and besiege lee in richmond, or follow him south if he should retreat. after the battle of the wilderness, it was evident that the enemy deemed it of the first importance to run no risks with the army he then had. he acted purely on the defensive, behind breastworks, or feebly on the offensive immediately in front of them, and where, in case of repulse, he could easily retire behind them. without a greater sacrifice of life than i was willing to make, all could not be accomplished that i had designed north of richmond. i therefore determined to continue to hold substantially the ground we then occupied, taking advantage of any favorable circumstances that might present themselves, until the cavalry could be sent to charlottesville and gordonsville to effectually break up the railroad connection between richmond and the shenandoah valley and lynchburg; and when the cavalry got well off, to move the army to the south side of the james river, by the enemy's right flank, where i felt i could cut off all his sources of supply, except by the canal. on the 7th, two divisions of cavalry, under general sheridan, got off on the expedition against the virginia central railroad, with instructions to hunter, whom i hoped he would meet near charlottesville, to join his forces to sheridan's, and after the work laid out for them was thoroughly done, to join the army of the potomac by the route laid down in sheridan's instructions. on the 10th of june, general butler sent a force of infantry, under general gillmore, and of cavalry under general kautz, to capture petersburg, if possible, and destroy the railroad and common bridges across the appomattox. the cavalry carried the works on the south side, and penetrated well in towards the town, but were forced to retire. general gillmore, finding the works which he approached very strong, and deeming an assault impracticable, returned to bermuda hundred without attempting one. attaching great importance to the possession of petersburg, i sent back to bermuda hundred and city point, general smith's command by water, via the white house, to reach there in advance of the army of the potomac. this was for the express purpose of securing petersburg before the enemy, becoming aware of our intention, could reinforce the place. the movement from cold harbor commenced after dark on the evening of the 12th. one division of cavalry, under general wilson, and the 5th corps, crossed the chickahominy at long bridge, and moved out to white oak swamp, to cover the crossings of the other corps. the advance corps reached james river, at wilcox's landing and charles city court house, on the night of the 13th. during three long years the armies of the potomac and northern virginia had been confronting each other. in that time they had fought more desperate battles than it probably ever before fell to the lot of two armies to fight, without materially changing the vantage ground of either. the southern press and people, with more shrewdness than was displayed in the north, finding that they had failed to capture washington and march on to new york, as they had boasted they would do, assumed that they only defended their capital and southern territory. hence, antietam, gettysburg, and all the other battles that had been fought, were by them set down as failures on our part, and victories for them. their army believed this. it produced a morale which could only be overcome by desperate and continuous hard fighting. the battles of the wilderness, spottsylvania, north anna and cold harbor, bloody and terrible as they were on our side, were even more damaging to the enemy, and so crippled him as to make him wary ever after of taking the offensive. his losses in men were probably not so great, owing to the fact that we were, save in the wilderness, almost invariably the attacking party; and when he did attack, it was in the open field. the details of these battles, which for endurance and bravery on the part of the soldiery, have rarely been surpassed, are given in the report of major-general meade, and the subordinate reports accompanying it. during the campaign of forty-three days, from the rapidan to the james river, the army had to be supplied from an ever-shifting base, by wagons, over narrow roads, through a densely wooded country, with a lack of wharves at each new base from which to conveniently discharge vessels. too much credit cannot, therefore, be awarded to the quartermaster and commissary departments for the zeal and efficiency displayed by them. under the general supervision of the chief quartermaster, brigadier-general r. ingalls, the trains were made to occupy all the available roads between the army and our water-base, and but little difficulty was experienced in protecting them. the movement in the kanawha and shenandoah valleys, under general sigel, commenced on the 1st of may. general crook, who had the immediate command of the kanawha expedition, divided his forces into two columns, giving one, composed of cavalry, to general averell. they crossed the mountains by separate routes. averell struck the tennessee and virginia railroad, near wytheville, on the 10th, and proceeding to new river and christiansburg, destroyed the road, several important bridges and depots, including new river bridge, forming a junction with crook at union on the 15th. general sigel moved up the shenandoah valley, met the enemy at new market on the 15th, and, after a severe engagement, was defeated with heavy loss, and retired behind cedar creek. not regarding the operations of general sigel as satisfactory, i asked his removal from command, and major-general hunter appointed to supersede him. his instructions were embraced in the following dispatches to major-general h. w. halleck, chief of staff of the army: "near spottsylvania court house, va. "may 20, 1864. * * * * * * * "the enemy are evidently relying for supplies greatly on such as are brought over the branch road running through staunton. on the whole, therefore, i think it would be better for general hunter to move in that direction; reach staunton and gordonsville or charlottesville, if he does not meet too much opposition. if he can hold at bay a force equal to his own, he will be doing good service. * * * "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "major-general h. w. halleck." "jericho ford, va., may 25, 1864. "if hunter can possibly get to charlottesville and lynchburg, he should do so, living on the country. the railroads and canal should be destroyed beyond possibility of repairs for weeks. completing this, he could find his way back to his original base, or from about gordonsville join this army. "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "major-general h. w. halleck." general hunter immediately took up the offensive, and, moving up the shenandoah valley, met the enemy on the 5th of june at piedmont, and, after a battle of ten hours, routed and defeated him, capturing on the field of battle one thousand five hundred men, three pieces of artillery, and three hundred stand of small arms. on the 8th of the same month he formed a junction with crook and averell at staunton, from which place he moved direct on lynchburg, via lexington, which place he reached and invested on the 16th day of june. up to this time he was very successful; and but for the difficulty of taking with him sufficient ordnance stores over so long a march, through a hostile country, he would, no doubt, have captured that, to the enemy important, point. the destruction of the enemy's supplies and manufactories was very great. to meet this movement under general hunter, general lee sent a force, perhaps equal to a corps, a part of which reached lynchburg a short time before hunter. after some skirmishing on the 17th and 18th, general hunter, owing to a want of ammunition to give battle, retired from before the place. unfortunately, this want of ammunition left him no choice of route for his return but by way of kanawha. this lost to us the use of his troops for several weeks from the defence of the north. had general hunter moved by way of charlottesville, instead of lexington, as his instructions contemplated, he would have been in a position to have covered the shenandoah valley against the enemy, should the force he met have seemed to endanger it. if it did not, he would have been within easy distance of the james river canal, on the main line of communication between lynchburg and the force sent for its defence. i have never taken exception to the operations of general hunter, and am not now disposed to find fault with him, for i have no doubt he acted within what he conceived to be the spirit of his instructions and the interests of the service. the promptitude of his movements and his gallantry should entitle him to the commendation of his country. to return to the army of the potomac: the 2d corps commenced crossing the james river on the morning of the 14th by ferry-boats at wilcox's landing. the laying of the pontoon-bridge was completed about midnight of the 14th, and the crossing of the balance of the army was rapidly pushed forward by both bridge and ferry. after the crossing had commenced, i proceeded by steamer to bermuda hundred to give the necessary orders for the immediate capture of petersburg. the instructions to general butler were verbal, and were for him to send general smith immediately, that night, with all the troops he could give him without sacrificing the position he then held. i told him that i would return at once to the army of the potomac, hasten its crossing and throw it forward to petersburg by divisions as rapidly as it could be done, that we could reinforce our armies more rapidly there than the enemy could bring troops against us. general smith got off as directed, and confronted the enemy's pickets near petersburg before daylight next morning, but for some reason that i have never been able to satisfactorily understand, did not get ready to assault his main lines until near sundown. then, with a part of his command only, he made the assault, and carried the lines north-east of petersburg from the appomattox river, for a distance of over two and a half miles, capturing fifteen pieces of artillery and three hundred prisoners. this was about seven p.m. between the line thus captured and petersburg there were no other works, and there was no evidence that the enemy had reinforced petersburg with a single brigade from any source. the night was clear the moon shining brightly and favorable to further operations. general hancock, with two divisions of the 2d corps, reached general smith just after dark, and offered the service of these troops as he (smith) might wish, waiving rank to the named commander, who he naturally supposed knew best the position of affairs, and what to do with the troops. but instead of taking these troops and pushing at once into petersburg, he requested general hancock to relieve a part of his line in the captured works, which was done before midnight. by the time i arrived the next morning the enemy was in force. an attack was ordered to be made at six o'clock that evening by the troops under smith and the 2d and 9th corps. it required until that time for the 9th corps to get up and into position. the attack was made as ordered, and the fighting continued with but little intermission until six o'clock the next morning, and resulted in our carrying the advance and some of the main works of the enemy to the right (our left) of those previously captured by general smith, several pieces of artillery, and over four hundred prisoners. the 5th corps having got up, the attacks were renewed and persisted in with great vigor on the 17th and 18th, but only resulted in forcing the enemy into an interior line, from which he could not be dislodged. the advantages of position gained by us were very great. the army then proceeded to envelop petersburg towards the south side railroad as far as possible without attacking fortifications. on the 16th the enemy, to reinforce petersburg, withdrew from a part of his intrenchment in front of bermuda hundred, expecting, no doubt, to get troops from north of the james to take the place of those withdrawn before we could discover it. general butler, taking advantage of this, at once moved a force on the railroad between petersburg and richmond. as soon as i was apprised of the advantage thus gained, to retain it i ordered two divisions of the 6th corps, general wright commanding, that were embarking at wilcox's landing, under orders for city point, to report to general butler at bermuda hundred, of which general butler was notified, and the importance of holding a position in advance of his present line urged upon him. about two o'clock in the afternoon general butler was forced back to the line the enemy had withdrawn from in the morning. general wright, with his two divisions, joined general butler on the forenoon of the 17th, the latter still holding with a strong picket-line the enemy's works. but instead of putting these divisions into the enemy's works to hold them, he permitted them to halt and rest some distance in the rear of his own line. between four and five o'clock in the afternoon the enemy attacked and drove in his pickets and re-occupied his old line. on the night of the 20th and morning of the 21st a lodgment was effected by general butler, with one brigade of infantry, on the north bank of the james, at deep bottom, and connected by pontoon-bridge with bermuda hundred. on the 19th, general sheridan, on his return from his expedition against the virginia central railroad, arrived at the white house just as the enemy's cavalry was about to attack it, and compelled it to retire. the result of this expedition was, that general sheridan met the enemy's cavalry near trevilian station, on the morning of the 11th of june, whom he attacked, and after an obstinate contest drove from the field in complete rout. he left his dead and nearly all his wounded in our hands, and about four hundred prisoners and several hundred horses. on the 12th he destroyed the railroad from trevilian station to louisa court house. this occupied until three o'clock p.m., when he advanced in the direction of gordonsville. he found the enemy reinforced by infantry, behind well-constructed rifle-pits, about five miles from the latter place and too strong to successfully assault. on the extreme right, however, his reserve brigade carried the enemy's works twice, and was twice driven therefrom by infantry. night closed the contest. not having sufficient ammunition to continue the engagement, and his animals being without forage (the country furnishing but inferior grazing), and hearing nothing from general hunter, he withdrew his command to the north side of the north anna, and commenced his return march, reaching white house at the time before stated. after breaking up the depot at that place, he moved to the james river, which he reached safely after heavy fighting. he commenced crossing on the 25th, near fort powhatan, without further molestation, and rejoined the army of the potomac. on the 22d, general wilson, with his own division of cavalry of the army of the potomac, and general kautz's division of cavalry of the army of the james moved against the enemy's railroads south of richmond. striking the weldon railroad at reams's station, destroying the depot and several miles of the road, and the south side road about fifteen miles from petersburg, to near nottoway station, where he met and defeated a force of the enemy's cavalry. he reached burkesville station on the afternoon of the 23d, and from there destroyed the danville railroad to roanoke bridge, a distance of twenty-five miles, where he found the enemy in force, and in a position from which he could not dislodge him. he then commenced his return march, and on the 28th met the enemy's cavalry in force at the weldon railroad crossing of stony creek, where he had a severe but not decisive engagement. thence he made a detour from his left with a view of reaching reams's station (supposing it to be in our possession). at this place he was met by the enemy's cavalry, supported by infantry, and forced to retire, with the loss of his artillery and trains. in this last encounter, general kautz, with a part of his command, became separated, and made his way into our lines. general wilson, with the remainder of his force, succeeded in crossing the nottoway river and coming in safely on our left and rear. the damage to the enemy in this expedition more than compensated for the losses we sustained. it severed all connection by railroad with richmond for several weeks. with a view of cutting the enemy's railroad from near richmond to the anna rivers, and making him wary of the situation of his army in the shenandoah, and, in the event of failure in this, to take advantage of his necessary withdrawal of troops from petersburg, to explode a mine that had been prepared in front of the 9th corps and assault the enemy's lines at that place, on the night of the 26th of july the 2d corps and two divisions of the cavalry corps and kautz's cavalry were crossed to the north bank of the james river and joined the force general butler had there. on the 27th the enemy was driven from his intrenched position, with the loss of four pieces of artillery. on the 28th our lines were extended from deep bottom to new market road, but in getting this position were attacked by the enemy in heavy force. the fighting lasted for several hours, resulting in considerable loss to both sides. the first object of this move having failed, by reason of the very large force thrown there by the enemy, i determined to take advantage of the diversion made, by assaulting petersburg before he could get his force back there. one division of the 2d corps was withdrawn on the night of the 28th, and moved during the night to the rear of the 18th corps, to relieve that corps in the line, that it might be foot-loose in the assault to be made. the other two divisions of the 2d corps and sheridan's cavalry were crossed over on the night of the 29th and moved in front of petersburg. on the morning of the 30th, between four and five o'clock, the mine was sprung, blowing up a battery and most of a regiment, and the advance of the assaulting column, formed of the 9th corps, immediately took possession of the crater made by the explosion, and the line for some distance to the right and left of it, and a detached line in front of it, but for some cause failed to advance promptly to the ridge beyond. had they done this, i have every reason to believe that petersburg would have fallen. other troops were immediately pushed forward, but the time consumed in getting them up enabled the enemy to rally from his surprise (which had been complete), and get forces to this point for its defence. the captured line thus held being untenable, and of no advantage to us, the troops were withdrawn, but not without heavy loss. thus terminated in disaster what promised to be the most successful assault of the campaign. immediately upon the enemy's ascertaining that general hunter was retreating from lynchburg by way of the kanawha river, thus laying the shenandoah valley open for raid into maryland and pennsylvania, he returned northward and moved down that valley. as soon as this movement of the enemy was ascertained, general hunter, who had reached the kanawha river, was directed to move his troops without delay, by river and railroad, to harper's ferry; but owing to the difficulty of navigation by reason of low water and breaks in the railroad, great delay was experienced in getting there. it became necessary, therefore, to find other troops to check this movement of the enemy. for this purpose the 6th corps was taken from the armies operating against richmond, to which was added the 19th corps, then fortunately beginning to arrive in hampton roads from the gulf department, under orders issued immediately after the ascertainment of the result of the red river expedition. the garrisons of baltimore and washington were at this time made up of heavy-artillery regiments, hundred days' men, and detachments from the invalid corps. one division under command of general ricketts, of the 6th corps, was sent to baltimore, and the remaining two divisions of the 6th corps, under general wright, were subsequently sent to washington. on the 3d of july the enemy approached martinsburg. general sigel, who was in command of our forces there, retreated across the potomac at shepherdtown; and general weber, commanding at harper's ferry, crossed the occupied hagerstown, moving a strong column towards frederick city. general wallace, with rickett's division and his own command, the latter mostly new and undisciplined troops, pushed out from baltimore with great promptness, and met the enemy in force on the monocacy, near the crossing of the railroad bridge. his force was not sufficient to insure success, but he fought the enemy nevertheless, and although it resulted in a defeat to our arms, yet it detained the enemy, and thereby served to enable general wright to reach washington with two division of the 6th corps, and the advance of the 19th corps, before him. from monocacy the enemy moved on washington, his cavalry advance reaching rockville on the evening of the 10th. on the 12th a reconnoissance was thrown out in front of fort stevens, to ascertain the enemy's position and force. a severe skirmish ensued, in which we lost about two hundred and eighty in killed and wounded. the enemy's loss was probably greater. he commenced retreating during the night. learning the exact condition of affairs at washington, i requested by telegraph, at forty-five minutes past eleven p.m., on the 12th, the assignment of major-general h. g. wright to the command of all the troops that could be made available to operate in the field against the enemy, and directed that he should get outside of the trenches with all the force he could, and push early to the last moment. general wright commenced the pursuit on the 13th; on the 18th the enemy was overtaken at snicker's ferry, on the shenandoah, when a sharp skirmish occurred; and on the 20th, general averell encountered and defeated a portion of the rebel army at winchester, capturing four pieces of artillery and several hundred prisoners. learning that early was retreating south towards lynchburg or richmond, i directed that the 6th and 19th corps be got back to the armies operating against richmond, so that they might be used in a movement against lee before the return of the troops sent by him into the valley; and that hunter should remain in the shenandoah valley, keeping between any force of the enemy and washington, acting on the defensive as much as possible. i felt that if the enemy had any notion of returning, the fact would be developed before the 6th and 19th corps could leave washington. subsequently, the 19th corps was excepted form the order to return to the james. about the 25th it became evident that the enemy was again advancing upon maryland and pennsylvania, and the 6th corps, then at washington, was ordered back to the vicinity of harper's ferry. the rebel force moved down the valley, and sent a raiding party into pennsylvania which on the 30th burned chambersburg, and then retreated, pursued by our cavalry, towards cumberland. they were met and defeated by general kelley, and with diminished numbers escaped into the mountains of west virginia. from the time of the first raid the telegraph wires were frequently down between washington and city point, making it necessary to transmit messages a part of the way by boat. it took from twenty-four to thirty-six hours to get dispatches through and return answers would be received showing a different state of facts from those on which they were based, causing confusion and apparent contradiction of orders that must have considerably embarrassed those who had to execute them, and rendered operations against the enemy less effective than they otherwise would have been. to remedy this evil, it was evident to my mind that some person should have the supreme command of all the forces in the department of west virginia, washington, susquehanna, and the middle department, and i so recommended. on the 2d of august, i ordered general sheridan to report in person to major-general halleck, chief of staff, at washington, with a view to his assignment to the command of all the forces against early. at this time the enemy was concentrated in the neighborhood of winchester, while our forces, under general hunter, were concentrated on the monocacy, at the crossing of the baltimore and ohio railroad, leaving open to the enemy western maryland and southern pennsylvania. from where i was, i hesitated to give positive orders for the movement of our forces at monocacy, lest by so doing i should expose washington. therefore, on the 4th, i left city point to visit hunter's command, and determine for myself what was best to be done. on arrival there, and after consultation with general hunter, i issued to him the following instructions: "monocacy bridge, maryland, august 5, 1864--8 p.m. "general:--concentrate all your available force without delay in the vicinity of harper's ferry, leaving only such railroad guards and garrisons for public property as may be necessary. use, in this concentrating, the railroad, if by so doing time can be saved. from harper's ferry, if it is found that the enemy has moved north of the potomac in large force, push north, following him and attacking him wherever found; follow him, if driven south of the potomac, as long as it is safe to do so. if it is ascertained that the enemy has but a small force north of the potomac, then push south with the main force, detaching under a competent commander, a sufficient force to look after the raiders, and drive them to their homes. in detaching such a force, the brigade of the cavalry now en route from washington via rockville may be taken into account. "there are now on their way to join you three other brigades of the best cavalry, numbering at least five thousand men and horses. these will be instructed, in the absence of further orders, to join you by the south side of the potomac. one brigade will probably start to-morrow. in pushing up the shenandoah valley, where it is expected you will have to go first or last, it is desirable that nothing should be left to invite the enemy to return. take all provisions, forage, and stock wanted for the use of your command; such as cannot be consumed, destroy. it is not desirable that the buildings should be destroyed--they should rather be protected; but the people should be informed that, so long as an army can subsist among them, recurrence of theses raids must be expected, and we are determined to stop them at all hazards. "bear in mind, the object is to drive the enemy south; and to do this you want to keep him always in sight. be guided in your course by the course he takes. "make your own arrangements for supplies of all kinds, giving regular vouchers for such as may be taken from loyal citizens in the country through which you march. "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "major-general d. hunter." the troops were immediately put in motion, and the advance reached halltown that night. general hunter having, in our conversation, expressed a willingness to be relieved from command, i telegraphed to have general sheridan, then at washington, sent to harper's ferry by the morning train, with orders to take general command of all the troops in the field, and to call on general hunter at monocacy, who would turn over to him my letter of instructions. i remained at monocacy until general sheridan arrived, on the morning of the 6th, and, after a conference with him in relation to military affairs in that vicinity, i returned to city point by way of washington. on the 7th of august, the middle department, and the departments of west virginia, washington, and susquehanna, were constituted into the "middle military division," and major-general sheridan was assigned to temporary command of the same. two divisions of cavalry, commanded by generals torbert and wilson, were sent to sheridan from the army of the potomac. the first reached him at harper's ferry about the 11th of august. his operations during the month of august and the fore part of september were both of an offensive and defensive character, resulting in many severe skirmishes, principally by the cavalry, in which we were generally successful, but no general engagement took place. the two armies lay in such a position--the enemy on the west bank of the opequon creek covering winchester, and our forces in front of berryville--that either could bring on a battle at any time. defeat to us would lay open to the enemy the states of maryland and pennsylvania for long distances before another army could be interposed to check him. under these circumstances i hesitated about allowing the initiative to be taken. finally, the use of the baltimore and ohio railroad, and the chesapeake and ohio canal, which were both obstructed by the enemy, became so indispensably necessary to us, and the importance of relieving pennsylvania and maryland from continuously threatened invasion so great, that i determined the risk should be taken. but fearing to telegraph the order for an attack without knowing more than i did of general sheridan's feelings as to what would be the probable result, i left city point on the 15th of september to visit him at his headquarters, to decide, after conference with him, what should be done. i met him at charlestown, and he pointed out so distinctly how each army lay; what he could do the moment he was authorized, and expressed such confidence of success, that i saw there were but two words of instructions necessary--go in! for the conveniences of forage, the teams for supplying the army were kept at harper's ferry. i asked him if he could get out his teams and supplies in time to make an attack on the ensuing tuesday morning. his reply was, that he could before daylight on monday. he was off promptly to time, and i may here add, that the result was such that i have never since deemed it necessary to visit general sheridan before giving him orders. early on the morning of the 19th, general sheridan attacked general early at the crossing on the opequon creek, and after a most sanguinary and bloody battle, lasting until five o'clock in the evening, defeated him with heavy loss, carrying his entire position from opequon creek to winchester, capturing several thousand prisoners and five pieces of artillery. the enemy rallied, and made a stand in a strong position at fisher's hill, where he was attacked, and again defeated with heavy loss on the 20th [22d]. sheridan pursued him with great energy through harrisonburg, staunton, and the gaps of the blue ridge. after stripping the upper valley of most of the supplies and provisions for the rebel army, he returned to strasburg, and took position on the north side of cedar creek. having received considerable reinforcements, general early again returned to the valley, and, on the 9th of october, his cavalry encountered ours near strasburg, where the rebels were defeated, with the loss of eleven pieces of artillery and three hundred and fifty prisoners. on the night of the 18th, the enemy crossed the mountains which separate the branches of the shenandoah, forded the north fork, and early on the morning of the 19th, under cover of the darkness and the fog, surprised and turned our left flank, and captured the batteries which enfiladed our whole line. our troops fell back with heavy loss and in much confusion, but were finally rallied between middletown and newtown. at this juncture, general sheridan, who was at winchester when the battle commenced arrived on the field, arranged his lines just in time to repulse a heavy attack of the enemy, and immediately assuming the offensive, he attacked in turn with great vigor. the enemy was defeated with great slaughter, and the loss of most of his artillery and trains, and the trophies he had captured in the morning. the wreck of his army escaped during the night, and fled in the direction of staunton and lynchburg. pursuit was made to mount jackson. thus ended this, the enemy's last attempt to invade the north via the shenandoah valley. i was now enabled to return the 6th corps to the army of the potomac, and to send one division from sheridan's army to the army of the james, and another to savannah, georgia, to hold sherman's new acquisitions on the sea-coast, and thus enable him to move without detaching from his force for that purpose. reports from various sources led me to believe that the enemy had detached three divisions from petersburg to reinforce early in the shenandoah valley. i therefore sent the 2d corps and gregg's division of cavalry, of the army of the potomac, and a force of general butler's army, on the night of the 13th of august, to threaten richmond from the north side of the james, to prevent him from sending troops away, and, if possible, to draw back those sent. in this move we captured six pieces of artillery and several hundred prisoners, detained troops that were under marching orders, and ascertained that but one division (kershaw's), of the three reputed detached, had gone. the enemy having withdrawn heavily from petersburg to resist this movement, the 5th corps, general warren commanding, was moved out on the 18th, and took possession of the weldon railroad. during the day he had considerable fighting. to regain possession of the road, the enemy made repeated and desperate assaults, but was each time repulsed with great loss. on the night of the 20th, the troops on the north side of the james were withdrawn, and hancock and gregg returned to the front at petersburg. on the 25th, the 2d corps and gregg's division of cavalry, while at reams's station destroying the railroad, were attacked, and after desperate fighting, a part of our line gave way, and five pieces of artillery fell into the hands of the enemy. by the 12th of september, a branch railroad was completed from the city point and petersburg railroad to the weldon railroad, enabling us to supply, without difficulty, in all weather, the army in front of petersburg. the extension of our lines across the weldon railroad compelled the enemy to so extend his, that it seemed he could have but few troops north of the james for the defence of richmond. on the night of the 28th, the 10th corps, major-general birney, and the 18th corps, major-general ord commanding, of general butler's army, were crossed to the north side of the james, and advanced on the morning of the 29th, carrying the very strong fortifications and intrenchments below chaffin's farm, known as fort harrison, capturing fifteen pieces of artillery, and the new market road and intrenchments. this success was followed up by a gallant assault upon fort gilmer, immediately in front of the chaffin farm fortifications, in which we were repulsed with heavy loss. kautz's cavalry was pushed forward on the road to the right of this, supported by infantry, and reached the enemy's inner line, but was unable to get further. the position captured from the enemy was so threatening to richmond, that i determined to hold it. the enemy made several desperate attempts to dislodge us, all of which were unsuccessful, and for which he paid dearly. on the morning of the 30th, general meade sent out a reconnoissance with a view to attacking the enemy's line, if it was found sufficiently weakened by withdrawal of troops to the north side. in this reconnoissance we captured and held the enemy's works near poplar spring church. in the afternoon, troops moving to get to the left of the point gained were attacked by the enemy in heavy force, and compelled to fall back until supported by the forces holding the captured works. our cavalry under gregg was also attacked, but repulsed the enemy with great loss. on the 7th of october, the enemy attacked kautz's cavalry north of the james, and drove it back with heavy loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners, and the loss of all the artillery eight or nine pieces. this he followed up by an attack on our intrenched infantry line, but was repulsed with severe slaughter. on the 13th, a reconnoissance was sent out by general butler, with a view to drive the enemy from some new works he was constructing, which resulted in very heavy loss to us. on the 27th, the army of the potomac, leaving only sufficient men to hold its fortified line, moved by the enemy's right flank. the 2d corps, followed by two divisions of the 5th corps, with the cavalry in advance and covering our left flank, forced a passage of hatcher's run, and moved up the south side of it towards the south side railroad, until the 2d corps and part of the cavalry reached the boydton plank road where it crosses hatcher's run. at this point we were six miles distant from the south side railroad, which i had hoped by this movement to reach and hold. but finding that we had not reached the end of the enemy's fortifications, and no place presenting itself for a successful assault by which he might be doubled up and shortened, i determined to withdraw to within our fortified line. orders were given accordingly. immediately upon receiving a report that general warren had connected with general hancock, i returned to my headquarters. soon after i left the enemy moved out across hatcher's run, in the gap between generals hancock and warren, which was not closed as reported, and made a desperate attack on general hancock's right and rear. general hancock immediately faced his corps to meet it, and after a bloody combat drove the enemy within his works, and withdrew that night to his old position. in support of this movement, general butler made a demonstration on the north side of the james, and attacked the enemy on the williamsburg road, and also on the york river railroad. in the former he was unsuccessful; in the latter he succeeded in carrying a work which was afterwards abandoned, and his forces withdrawn to their former positions. from this time forward the operations in front of petersburg and richmond, until the spring campaign of 1865, were confined to the defence and extension of our lines, and to offensive movements for crippling the enemy's lines of communication, and to prevent his detaching any considerable force to send south. by the 7th of february, our lines were extended to hatcher's run, and the weldon railroad had been destroyed to hicksford. general sherman moved from chattanooga on the 6th of may, with the armies of the cumberland, tennessee, and ohio, commanded, respectively, by generals thomas mcpherson, and schofield, upon johnston's army at dalton; but finding the enemy's position at buzzard's roost, covering dalton, too strong to be assaulted, general mcpherson was sent through snake gap to turn it, while generals thomas and schofield threatened it in front and on the north. this movement was successful. johnston, finding his retreat likely to be cut off, fell back to his fortified position at resaca, where he was attacked on the afternoon of may 15th. a heavy battle ensued. during the night the enemy retreated south. late on the 17th, his rear-guard was overtaken near adairsville, and heavy skirmishing followed. the next morning, however, he had again disappeared. he was vigorously pursued, and was overtaken at cassville on the 19th, but during the ensuing night retreated across the etowah. while these operations were going on, general jefferson c. davis's division of thomas's army was sent to rome, capturing it with its forts and artillery, and its valuable mills and foundries. general sherman, having give his army a few days' rest at this point, again put it in motion on the 23d, for dallas, with a view of turning the difficult pass at allatoona. on the afternoon of the 25th, the advance, under general hooker, had a severe battle with the enemy, driving him back to new hope church, near dallas. several sharp encounters occurred at this point. the most important was on the 28th, when the enemy assaulted general mcpherson at dallas, but received a terrible and bloody repulse. on the 4th of june, johnston abandoned his intrenched position at new hope church, and retreated to the strong positions of kenesaw, pine, and lost mountains. he was forced to yield the two last-named places, and concentrate his army on kenesaw, where, on the 27th, generals thomas and mcpherson made a determined but unsuccessful assault. on the night of the 2d of july, sherman commenced moving his army by the right flank, and on the morning of the 3d, found that the enemy, in consequence of this movement, had abandoned kenesaw and retreated across the chattahoochee. general sherman remained on the chattahoochee to give his men rest and get up stores until the 17th of july, when he resumed his operations, crossed the chattahoochee, destroyed a large portion of the railroad to augusta, and drove the enemy back to atlanta. at this place general hood succeeded general johnston in command of the rebel army, and assuming the offensive-defensive policy, made several severe attacks upon sherman in the vicinity of atlanta, the most desperate and determined of which was on the 22d of july. about one p.m. of this day the brave, accomplished, and noble-hearted mcpherson was killed. general logan succeeded him, and commanded the army of the tennessee through this desperate battle, and until he was superseded by major-general howard, on the 26th, with the same success and ability that had characterized him in the command of a corps or division. in all these attacks the enemy was repulsed with great loss. finding it impossible to entirely invest the place, general sherman, after securing his line of communications across the chattahoochee, moved his main force round by the enemy's left flank upon the montgomery and macon roads, to draw the enemy from his fortifications. in this he succeeded, and after defeating the enemy near rough-and-ready, jonesboro, and lovejoy's, forcing him to retreat to the south, on the 2d of september occupied atlanta, the objective point of his campaign. about the time of this move, the rebel cavalry, under wheeler, attempted to cut his communications in the rear, but was repulsed at dalton, and driven into east tennessee, whence it proceeded west to mcminnville, murfreesboro, and franklin, and was finally driven south of the tennessee. the damage done by this raid was repaired in a few days. during the partial investment of atlanta, general rousseau joined general sherman with a force of cavalry from decatur, having made a successful raid upon the atlanta and montgomery railroad, and its branches near opelika. cavalry raids were also made by generals mccook, garrard, and stoneman, to cut the remaining railroad communication with atlanta. the first two were successful the latter, disastrous. general sherman's movement from chattanooga to atlanta was prompt, skilful, and brilliant. the history of his flank movements and battles during that memorable campaign will ever be read with an interest unsurpassed by anything in history. his own report, and those of his subordinate commanders, accompanying it, give the details of that most successful campaign. he was dependent for the supply of his armies upon a single-track railroad from nashville to the point where he was operating. this passed the entire distance through a hostile country, and every foot of it had to be protected by troops. the cavalry force of the enemy under forrest, in northern mississippi, was evidently waiting for sherman to advance far enough into the mountains of georgia, to make a retreat disastrous, to get upon this line and destroy it beyond the possibility of further use. to guard against this danger, sherman left what he supposed to be a sufficient force to operate against forrest in west tennessee. he directed general washburn, who commanded there, to send brigadier-general s. d. sturgis in command of this force to attack him. on the morning of the 10th of june, general sturgis met the enemy near guntown, mississippi, was badly beaten, and driven back in utter rout and confusion to memphis, a distance of about one hundred miles, hotly pursued by the enemy. by this, however, the enemy was defeated in his designs upon sherman's line of communications. the persistency with which he followed up this success exhausted him, and made a season for rest and repairs necessary. in the meantime, major-general a. j. smith, with the troops of the army of the tennessee that had been sent by general sherman to general banks, arrived at memphis on their return from red river, where they had done most excellent service. he was directed by general sherman to immediately take the offensive against forrest. this he did with the promptness and effect which has characterized his whole military career. on the 14th of july, he met the enemy at tupelo, mississippi, and whipped him badly. the fighting continued through three days. our loss was small compared with that of the enemy. having accomplished the object of his expedition, general smith returned to memphis. during the months of march and april this same force under forrest annoyed us considerably. on the 24th of march it captured union city, kentucky, and its garrison, and on the 24th attacked paducah, commanded by colonel s. g. hicks, 40th illinois volunteers. colonel h., having but a small force, withdrew to the forts near the river, from where he repulsed the enemy and drove him from the place. on the 13th of april, part of this force, under the rebel general buford, summoned the garrison of columbus, kentucky, to surrender, but received for reply from colonel lawrence, 34th new jersey volunteers, that being placed there by his government with adequate force to hold his post and repel all enemies from it, surrender was out of the question. on the morning of the same day forrest attacked fort pillow, tennessee, garrisoned by a detachment of tennessee cavalry and the 1st regiment alabama colored troops, commanded by major booth. the garrison fought bravely until about three o'clock in the afternoon, when the enemy carried the works by assault; and, after our men threw down their arms, proceeded to an inhuman and merciless massacre of the garrison. on the 14th, general buford, having failed at columbus, appeared before paducah, but was again driven off. guerillas and raiders, seemingly emboldened by forrest's operations, were also very active in kentucky. the most noted of these was morgan. with a force of from two to three thousand cavalry, he entered the state through pound gap in the latter part of may. on the 11th of june they attacked and captured cynthiana, with its entire garrison. on the 12th he was overtaken by general burbridge, and completely routed with heavy loss, and was finally driven out of the state. this notorious guerilla was afterwards surprised and killed near greenville, tennessee, and his command captured and dispersed by general gillem. in the absence of official reports of the commencement of the red river expedition, except so far as relates to the movements of the troops sent by general sherman under general a. j. smith, i am unable to give the date of its starting. the troops under general smith, comprising two divisions of the 16th and a detachment of the 17th army corps, left vicksburg on the 10th of march, and reached the designated point on red river one day earlier than that appointed by general banks. the rebel forces at fort de russy, thinking to defeat him, left the fort on the 14th to give him battle in the open field; but, while occupying the enemy with skirmishing and demonstrations, smith pushed forward to fort de russy, which had been left with a weak garrison, and captured it with its garrison about three hundred and fifty men, eleven pieces of artillery, and many small-arms. our loss was but slight. on the 15th he pushed forward to alexandria, which place he reached on the 18th. on the 21st he had an engagement with the enemy at henderson's hill, in which he defeated him, capturing two hundred and ten prisoners and four pieces of artillery. on the 28th, he again attacked and defeated the enemy under the rebel general taylor, at cane river. by the 26th, general banks had assembled his whole army at alexandria, and pushed forward to grand ecore. on the morning of april 6th he moved from grand ecore. on the afternoon of the 7th, he advanced and met the enemy near pleasant hill, and drove him from the field. on the same afternoon the enemy made a stand eight miles beyond pleasant hill, but was again compelled to retreat. on the 8th, at sabine cross roads and peach hill, the enemy attacked and defeated his advance, capturing nineteen pieces of artillery and an immense amount of transportation and stores. during the night, general banks fell back to pleasant hill, where another battle was fought on the 9th, and the enemy repulsed with great loss. during the night, general banks continued his retrograde movement to grand ecore, and thence to alexandria, which he reached on the 27th of april. here a serious difficulty arose in getting admiral porter's fleet which accompanied the expedition, over the rapids, the water having fallen so much since they passed up as to prevent their return. at the suggestion of colonel (now brigadier-general) bailey, and under his superintendence, wing-dams were constructed, by which the channel was contracted so that the fleet passed down the rapids in safety. the army evacuated alexandria on the 14th of may, after considerable skirmishing with the enemy's advance, and reached morganzia and point coupee near the end of the month. the disastrous termination of this expedition, and the lateness of the season, rendered impracticable the carrying out of my plans of a movement in force sufficient to insure the capture of mobile. on the 23d of march, major-general steele left little rock with the 7th army corps, to cooperate with general banks's expedition on the red river, and reached arkadelphia on the 28th. on the 16th of april, after driving the enemy before him, he was joined, near elkin's ferry, in washita county, by general thayer, who had marched from fort smith. after several severe skirmishes, in which the enemy was defeated, general steele reached camden, which he occupied about the middle of april. on learning the defeat and consequent retreat of general banks on red river, and the loss of one of his own trains at mark's mill, in dallas county, general steele determined to fall back to the arkansas river. he left camden on the 26th of april, and reached little rock on the 2d of may. on the 30th of april, the enemy attacked him while crossing saline river at jenkins's ferry, but was repulsed with considerable loss. our loss was about six hundred in killed, wounded and prisoners. major-general canby, who had been assigned to the command of the "military division of the west mississippi," was therefore directed to send the 19th army corps to join the armies operating against richmond, and to limit the remainder of his command to such operations as might be necessary to hold the positions and lines of communications he then occupied. before starting general a. j. smith's troops back to sherman, general canby sent a part of it to disperse a force of the enemy that was collecting near the mississippi river. general smith met and defeated this force near lake chicot on the 5th of june. our loss was about forty killed and seventy wounded. in the latter part of july, general canby sent major-general gordon granger, with such forces as he could collect, to co-operate with admiral farragut against the defences of mobile bay. on the 8th of august, fort gaines surrendered to the combined naval and land forces. fort powell was blown up and abandoned. on the 9th, fort morgan was invested, and, after a severe bombardment, surrendered on the 23d. the total captures amounted to one thousand four hundred and sixty-four prisoners, and one hundred and four pieces of artillery. about the last of august, it being reported that the rebel general price, with a force of about ten thousand men, had reached jacksonport, on his way to invade missouri, general a. j. smith's command, then en route from memphis to join sherman, was ordered to missouri. a cavalry force was also, at the same time, sent from memphis, under command of colonel winslow. this made general rosecrans's forces superior to those of price, and no doubt was entertained he would be able to check price and drive him back; while the forces under general steele, in arkansas, would cut off his retreat. on the 26th day of september, price attacked pilot knob and forced the garrison to retreat, and thence moved north to the missouri river, and continued up that river towards kansas. general curtis, commanding department of kansas, immediately collected such forces as he could to repel the invasion of kansas, while general rosecrans's cavalry was operating in his rear. the enemy was brought to battle on the big blue and defeated, with the loss of nearly all his artillery and trains and a large number of prisoners. he made a precipitate retreat to northern arkansas. the impunity with which price was enabled to roam over the state of missouri for a long time, and the incalculable mischief done by him, show to how little purpose a superior force may be used. there is no reason why general rosecrans should not have concentrated his forces, and beaten and driven price before the latter reached pilot knob. september 20th, the enemy's cavalry, under forrest, crossed the tennessee near waterloo, alabama, and on the 23d attacked the garrison at athens, consisting of six hundred men, which capitulated on the 24th. soon after the surrender two regiments of reinforcements arrived, and after a severe fight were compelled to surrender. forrest destroyed the railroad westward, captured the garrison at sulphur branch trestle, skirmished with the garrison at pulaski on the 27th, and on the same day cut the nashville and chattanooga railroad near tullahoma and dechard. on the morning of the 30th, one column of forrest's command, under buford, appeared before huntsville, and summoned the surrender of the garrison. receiving an answer in the negative, he remained in the vicinity of the place until next morning, when he again summoned its surrender, and received the same reply as on the night before. he withdrew in the direction of athens which place had been regarrisoned, and attacked it on the afternoon of the 1st of october, but without success. on the morning of the 2d he renewed his attack, but was handsomely repulsed. another column under forrest appeared before columbia on the morning of the 1st, but did not make an attack. on the morning of the 3d he moved towards mount pleasant. while these operations were going on, every exertion was made by general thomas to destroy the forces under forrest before he could recross the tennessee, but was unable to prevent his escape to corinth, mississippi. in september, an expedition under general burbridge was sent to destroy the saltworks at saltville, virginia. he met the enemy on the 2d of october, about three miles and a half from saltville, and drove him into his strongly intrenched position around the salt-works, from which he was unable to dislodge him. during the night he withdrew his command and returned to kentucky. general sherman, immediately after the fall of atlanta, put his armies in camp in and about the place, and made all preparations for refitting and supplying them for future service. the great length of road from atlanta to the cumberland river, however, which had to be guarded, allowed the troops but little rest. during this time jefferson davis made a speech in macon, georgia, which was reported in the papers of the south, and soon became known to the whole country, disclosing the plans of the enemy, thus enabling general sherman to fully meet them. he exhibited the weakness of supposing that an army that had been beaten and fearfully decimated in a vain attempt at the defensive, could successfully undertake the offensive against the army that had so often defeated it. in execution of this plan, hood, with this army, was soon reported to the south-west of atlanta. moving far to sherman's right, he succeeded in reaching the railroad about big shanty, and moved north on it. general sherman, leaving a force to hold atlanta, with the remainder of his army fell upon him and drove him to gadsden, alabama. seeing the constant annoyance he would have with the roads to his rear if he attempted to hold atlanta, general sherman proposed the abandonment and destruction of that place, with all the railroads leading to it, and telegraphed me as follows: "centreville, georgia", october 10--noon. "dispatch about wilson just received. hood is now crossing coosa river, twelve miles below rome, bound west. if he passes over the mobile and ohio road, had i not better execute the plan of my letter sent by colonel porter, and leave general thomas with the troops now in tennessee to defend the state? he will have an ample force when the reinforcements ordered reach nashville. "w. t. sherman, major-general. "lieutenant-general grant." for a full understanding of the plan referred to in this dispatch, i quote from the letter sent by colonel porter: "i will therefore give my opinion, that your army and canby's should be reinforced to the maximum; that after you get wilmington, you strike for savannah and the river; that canby be instructed to hold the mississippi river, and send a force to get columbus, georgia, either by the way of the alabama or the appalachicola, and that i keep hood employed and put my army in final order for a march on augusta, columbia, and charleston, to be ready as soon as wilmington is sealed as to commerce and the city of savannah is in our possession." this was in reply to a letter of mine of date september 12th, in answer to a dispatch of his containing substantially the same proposition, and in which i informed him of a proposed movement against wilmington, and of the situation in virginia, etc. "city point, virginia, "october 11, 1864--11 a.m. "your dispatch of october 10th received. does it not look as if hood was going to attempt the invasion of middle tennessee, using the mobile and ohio and memphis and charleston roads to supply his base on the tennessee river, about florence or decatur? if he does this, he ought to be met and prevented from getting north of the tennessee river. if you were to cut loose, i do not believe you would meet hood's army, but would be bushwhacked by all the old men and little boys, and such railroad guards as are still left at home. hood would probably strike for nashville, thinking that by going north he could inflict greater damage upon us than we could upon the rebels by going south. if there is any way of getting at hood's army, i would prefer that, but i must trust to your own judgment. i find i shall not be able to send a force from here to act with you on savannah. your movements, therefore, will be independent of mine; at least until the fall of richmond takes place. i am afraid thomas, with such lines of road as he has to protect, could not prevent hood from going north. with wilson turned loose, with all your cavalry, you will find the rebels put much more on the defensive than heretofore. "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "major-general w. t. sherman." "kingston, georgia, "october 11--11 a.m. "hood moved his army from palmetto station across by dallas and cedartown, and is now on the coosa river, south of rome. he threw one corps on my road at acworth, and i was forced to follow. i hold atlanta with the 20th corps, and have strong detachments along my line. this reduces my active force to a comparatively small army. we cannot remain here on the defensive. with the twenty-five thousand men, and the bold cavalry he has, he can constantly break my roads. i would infinitely prefer to make a wreck of the road, and of the country from chattanooga to atlanta including the latter city send back all my wounded and worthless, and with my effective army, move through georgia, smashing things, to the sea. hood may turn into tennessee and kentucky, but i believe he will be forced to follow me. instead of my being on the defensive, i would be on the offensive; instead of guessing at what he means to do, he would have to guess at my plans. the difference in war is full twenty-five per cent. i can make savannah, charleston, or the mouth of the chattahoochee. "answer quick, as i know we will not have the telegraph long. "w. t. sherman, major-general. "lieutenant-general grant." "city point, virginia, "october 11,1864--11.30 p.m. "your dispatch of to-day received. if you are satisfied the trip to the sea-coast can be made, holding the line of the tennessee river firmly, you may make it, destroying all the railroad south of dalton or chattanooga, as you think best. "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "major-general w. t. sherman." it was the original design to hold atlanta, and by getting through to the coast, with a garrison left on the southern railroads, leading east and west, through georgia, to effectually sever the east from the west. in other words, cut the would-be confederacy in two again, as it had been cut once by our gaining possession of the mississippi river. general sherman's plan virtually effected this object. general sherman commenced at once his preparations for his proposed movement, keeping his army in position in the meantime to watch hood. becoming satisfied that hood had moved westward from gadsden across sand mountain, general sherman sent the 4th corps, major-general stanley commanding, and the 23d corps, major-general schofield commanding, back to chattanooga to report to major-general thomas, at nashville, whom he had placed in command of all the troops of his military division, save the four army corps and cavalry division he designed to move with through georgia. with the troops thus left at his disposal, there was little doubt that general thomas could hold the line of the tennessee, or, in the event hood should force it, would be able to concentrate and beat him in battle. it was therefore readily consented to that sherman should start for the sea-coast. having concentrated his troops at atlanta by the 14th of november, he commenced his march, threatening both augusta and macon. his coming-out point could not be definitely fixed. having to gather his subsistence as he marched through the country, it was not impossible that a force inferior to his own might compel him to head for such point as he could reach, instead of such as he might prefer. the blindness of the enemy, however, in ignoring his movement, and sending hood's army, the only considerable force he had west of richmond and east of the mississippi river, northward on an offensive campaign, left the whole country open, and sherman's route to his own choice. how that campaign was conducted, how little opposition was met with, the condition of the country through which the armies passed, the capture of fort mcallister, on the savannah river, and the occupation of savannah on the 21st of december, are all clearly set forth in general sherman's admirable report. soon after general sherman commenced his march from atlanta, two expeditions, one from baton rouge, louisiana, and one from vicksburg, mississippi, were started by general canby to cut the enemy's lines of communication with mobile and detain troops in that field. general foster, commanding department of the south, also sent an expedition, via broad river, to destroy the railroad between charleston and savannah. the expedition from vicksburg, under command of brevet brigadier-general e. d. osband (colonel 3d united states colored cavalry), captured, on the 27th of november, and destroyed the mississippi central railroad bridge and trestle-work over big black river, near canton, thirty miles of the road, and two locomotives, besides large amounts of stores. the expedition from baton rouge was without favorable results. the expedition from the department of the south, under the immediate command of brigadier-general john p. hatch, consisting of about five thousand men of all arms, including a brigade from the navy, proceeded up broad river and debarked at boyd's neck on the 29th of november, from where it moved to strike the railroad at grahamsville. at honey hill, about three miles from grahamsville, the enemy was found and attacked in a strongly fortified position, which resulted, after severe fighting, in our repulse with a loss of seven hundred and forty-six in killed, wounded, and missing. during the night general hatch withdrew. on the 6th of december general foster obtained a position covering the charleston and savannah railroad, between the coosawhatchie and tulifinny rivers. hood, instead of following sherman, continued his move northward, which seemed to me to be leading to his certain doom. at all events, had i had the power to command both armies, i should not have changed the orders under which he seemed to be acting. on the 26th of october, the advance of hood's army attacked the garrison at decatur, alabama, but failing to carry the place, withdrew towards courtland, and succeeded, in the face of our cavalry, in effecting a lodgment on the north side of the tennessee river, near florence. on the 28th, forrest reached the tennessee, at fort heiman, and captured a gunboat and three transports. on the 2d of november he planted batteries above and below johnsonville, on the opposite side of the river, isolating three gunboats and eight transports. on the 4th the enemy opened his batteries upon the place, and was replied to from the gunboats and the garrison. the gunboats becoming disabled were set on fire, as also were the transports, to prevent their falling into the hands of the enemy. about a million and a half dollars' worth of store and property on the levee and in storehouses was consumed by fire. on the 5th the enemy disappeared and crossed to the north side of the tennessee river, above johnsonville, moving towards clifton, and subsequently joined hood. on the night of the 5th, general schofield, with the advance of the 23d corps, reached johnsonville, but finding the enemy gone, was ordered to pulaski, and was put in command of all the troopers there, with instruction to watch the movements of hood and retard his advance, but not to risk a general engagement until the arrival of general a. j. smith's command from missouri, and until general wilson could get his cavalry remounted. on the 19th, general hood continued his advance. general thomas, retarding him as much as possible, fell back towards nashville for the purpose of concentrating his command and gaining time for the arrival of reinforcements. the enemy coming up with our main force, commanded by general schofield, at franklin, on the 30th, assaulted our works repeatedly during the afternoon until late at night, but were in every instance repulsed. his loss in this battle was one thousand seven hundred and fifty killed, seven hundred and two prisoners, and three thousand eight hundred wounded. among his losses were six general officers killed, six wounded, and one captured. our entire loss was two thousand three hundred. this was the first serious opposition the enemy met with, and i am satisfied was the fatal blow to all his expectations. during the night, general schofield fell back towards nashville. this left the field to the enemy--not lost by battle, but voluntarily abandoned--so that general thomas's whole force might be brought together. the enemy followed up and commenced the establishment of his line in front of nashville on the 2d of december. as soon as it was ascertained that hood was crossing the tennessee river, and that price was going out of missouri, general rosecrans was ordered to send to general thomas the troops of general a. j. smith's command, and such other troops as he could spare. the advance of this reinforcement reached nashville on the 30th of november. on the morning of the 15th december, general thomas attacked hood in position, and, in a battle lasting two days, defeated and drove him from the field in the utmost confusion, leaving in our hand most of his artillery and many thousand prisoners, including four general officers. before the battle of nashville i grew very impatient over, as it appeared to me, the unnecessary delay. this impatience was increased upon learning that the enemy had sent a force of cavalry across the cumberland into kentucky. i feared hood would cross his whole army and give us great trouble there. after urging upon general thomas the necessity of immediately assuming the offensive, i started west to superintend matters there in person. reaching washington city, i received general thomas's dispatch announcing his attack upon the enemy, and the result as far as the battle had progressed. i was delighted. all fears and apprehensions were dispelled. i am not yet satisfied but that general thomas, immediately upon the appearance of hood before nashville, and before he had time to fortify, should have moved out with his whole force and given him battle, instead of waiting to remount his cavalry, which delayed him until the inclemency of the weather made it impracticable to attack earlier than he did. but his final defeat of hood was so complete, that it will be accepted as a vindication of that distinguished officer's judgment. after hood's defeat at nashville he retreated, closely pursued by cavalry and infantry, to the tennessee river, being forced to abandon many pieces of artillery and most of his transportation. on the 28th of december our advanced forces ascertained that he had made good his escape to the south side of the river. about this time, the rains having set in heavily in tennessee and north alabama, making it difficult to move army transportation and artillery, general thomas stopped the pursuit by his main force at the tennessee river. a small force of cavalry, under colonel w. j. palmer, 15th pennsylvania volunteers, continued to follow hood for some distance, capturing considerable transportation and all the enemy's pontoon-bridge. the details of these operations will be found clearly set forth in general thomas's report. a cavalry expedition, under brevet major-general grierson, started from memphis on the 21st of december. on the 25th he surprised and captured forrest's dismounted camp at verona, mississippi, on the mobile and ohio railroad, destroyed the railroad, sixteen cars loaded with wagons and pontoons for hood's army, four thousand new english carbines, and large amounts of public stores. on the morning of the 28th he attacked and captured a force of the enemy at egypt, and destroyed a train of fourteen cars; thence turning to the south-west, he struck the mississippi central railroad at winona, destroyed the factories and large amounts of stores at bankston, and the machine-shops and public property at grenada, arriving at vicksburg january 5th. during the operations in middle tennessee, the enemy, with a force under general breckinridge, entered east tennessee. on the 13th of november he attacked general gillem, near morristown, capturing his artillery and several hundred prisoners. gillem, with what was left of his command, retreated to knoxville. following up his success, breckinridge moved to near knoxville, but withdrew on the 18th, followed by general ammen. under the directions of general thomas, general stoneman concentrated the commands of generals burbridge and gillem near bean's station to operate against breckinridge, and destroy or drive him into virginia --destroy the salt-works at saltville, and the railroad into virginia as far as he could go without endangering his command. on the 12th of december he commenced his movement, capturing and dispersing the enemy's forces wherever he met them. on the 16th he struck the enemy, under vaughn, at marion, completely routing and pursuing him to wytheville, capturing all his artillery, trains, and one hundred and ninety-eight prisoners; and destroyed wytheville, with its stores and supplies, and the extensive lead-works near there. returning to marion, he met a force under breckinridge, consisting, among other troops, of the garrison of saltville, that had started in pursuit. he at once made arrangements to attack it the next morning; but morning found breckinridge gone. he then moved directly to saltville, and destroyed the extensive salt-works at that place, a large amount of stores, and captured eight pieces of artillery. having thus successfully executed his instructions, he returned general burbridge to lexington and general gillem to knoxville. wilmington, north carolina, was the most important sea-coast port left to the enemy through which to get supplies from abroad, and send cotton and other products out by blockade-runners, besides being a place of great strategic value. the navy had been making strenuous exertions to seal the harbor of wilmington, but with only partial effect. the nature of the outlet of cape fear river was such, that it required watching for so great a distance that, without possession of the land north of new inlet, or fort fisher, it was impossible for the navy to entirely close the harbor against the entrance of blockade-runners. to secure the possession of this land required the co-operation of a land force, which i agreed to furnish. immediately commenced the assemblage in hampton roads, under admiral d. d. porter, of the most formidable armada ever collected for concentration upon one given point. this necessarily attracted the attention of the enemy, as well as that of the loyal north; and through the imprudence of the public press, and very likely of officers of both branches of service, the exact object of the expedition became a subject of common discussion in the newspapers both north and south. the enemy, thus warned, prepared to meet it. this caused a postponement of the expedition until the later part of november, when, being again called upon by hon. g. v. fox, assistant secretary of the navy, i agreed to furnish the men required at once, and went myself, in company with major-general butler, to hampton roads, where we had a conference with admiral porter as to the force required and the time of starting. a force of six thousand five hundred men was regarded as sufficient. the time of starting was not definitely arranged, but it was thought all would be ready by the 6th of december, if not before. learning, on the 30th of november, that bragg had gone to georgia, taking with him most of the forces about wilmington, i deemed it of the utmost importance that the expedition should reach its destination before the return of bragg, and directed general butler to make all arrangements for the departure of major-general weitzel, who had been designated to command the land forces, so that the navy might not be detained one moment. on the 6th of december, the following instructions were given: "city point, virginia, december 6, 1864. "general: the first object of the expedition under general weitzel is to close to the enemy the port of wilmington. if successful in this, the second will be to capture wilmington itself. there are reasonable grounds to hope for success, if advantage can be taken of the absence of the greater part of the enemy's forces now looking after sherman in georgia. the directions you have given for the numbers and equipment of the expedition are all right, except in the unimportant matter of where they embark and the amount of intrenching tools to be taken. the object of the expedition will be gained by effecting a landing on the main land between cape fear river and the atlantic, north of the north entrance to the river. should such landing be effected while the enemy still holds fort fisher and the batteries guarding the entrance to the river, then the troops should intrench themselves, and, by co-operating with the navy, effect the reduction and capture of those places. these in our hands, the navy could enter the harbor, and the port of wilmington would be sealed. should fort fisher and the point of land on which it is built fall into the hands of our troops immediately on landing, then it will be worth the attempt to capture wilmington by a forced march and surprise. if time is consumed in gaining the first object of the expedition, the second will become a matter of after consideration. "the details for execution are intrusted to you and the officer immediately in command of the troops. "should the troops under general weitzel fail to effect a landing at or near fort fisher, they will be returned to the armies operating against richmond without delay. "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "major-general b. f. butler." general butler commanding the army from which the troops were taken for this enterprise, and the territory within which they were to operate, military courtesy required that all orders and instructions should go through him. they were so sent, but general weitzel has since officially informed me that he never received the foregoing instructions, nor was he aware of their existence, until he read general butler's published official report of the fort fisher failure, with my indorsement and papers accompanying it. i had no idea of general butler's accompanying the expedition until the evening before it got off from bermuda hundred, and then did not dream but that general weitzel had received all the instructions, and would be in command. i rather formed the idea that general butler was actuated by a desire to witness the effect of the explosion of the powder-boat. the expedition was detained several days at hampton roads, awaiting the loading of the powder-boat. the importance of getting the wilmington expedition off without any delay, with or without the powder-boat, had been urged upon general butler, and he advised to so notify admiral porter. the expedition finally got off on the 13th of december, and arrived at the place of rendezvous, off new inlet, near fort fisher, on the evening of the 15th. admiral porter arrived on the evening of the 18th, having put in at beaufort to get ammunition for the monitors. the sea becoming rough, making it difficult to land troops, and the supply of water and coal being about exhausted, the transport fleet put back to beaufort to replenish; this, with the state of the weather, delayed the return to the place of rendezvous until the 24th. the powder-boat was exploded on the morning of the 24th, before the return of general butler from beaufort; but it would seem, from the notice taken of it in the southern newspapers, that the enemy were never enlightened as to the object of the explosion until they were informed by the northern press. on the 25th a landing was effected without opposition, and a reconnoissance, under brevet brigadier-general curtis, pushed up towards the fort. but before receiving a full report of the result of this reconnoissance, general butler, in direct violation of the instructions given, ordered the re-embarkation of the troops and the return of the expedition. the re-embarkation was accomplished by the morning of the 27th. on the return of the expedition officers and men among them brevet major-general (then brevet brigadier-general) n. m. curtis, first-lieutenant g. w. ross, 117th regiment new york volunteers, first-lieutenant william h. walling, and second-lieutenant george simpson, 142d new york volunteers voluntarily reported to me that when recalled they were nearly into the fort, and, in their opinion, it could have been taken without much loss. soon after the return of the expedition, i received a dispatch from the secretary of the navy, and a letter from admiral porter, informing me that the fleet was still off fort fisher, and expressing the conviction that, under a proper leader, the place could be taken. the natural supposition with me was, that when the troops abandoned the expedition, the navy would do so also. finding it had not, however, i answered on the 30th of december, advising admiral porter to hold on, and that i would send a force and make another attempt to take the place. this time i selected brevet major-general (now major-general) a. h. terry to command the expedition. the troops composing it consisted of the same that composed the former, with the addition of a small brigade, numbering about one thousand five hundred, and a small siege train. the latter it was never found necessary to land. i communicated direct to the commander of the expedition the following instructions: "city point, virginia, january 3, 1865. "general: the expedition intrusted to your command has been fitted out to renew the attempt to capture fort fisher, n. c., and wilmington ultimately, if the fort falls. you will then proceed with as little delay as possible to the naval fleet lying off cape fear river, and report the arrival of yourself and command to admiral d. d. porter, commanding north atlantic blockading squadron. "it is exceedingly desirable that the most complete understanding should exist between yourself and the naval commander. i suggest, therefore, that you consult with admiral porter freely, and get from him the part to be performed by each branch of the public service, so that there may be unity of action. it would be well to have the whole programme laid down in writing. i have served with admiral porter, and know that you can rely on his judgment and his nerve to undertake what he proposes. i would, therefore, defer to him as much as is consistent with your own responsibilities. the first object to be attained is to get a firm position on the spit of land on which fort fisher is built, from which you can operate against that fort. you want to look to the practicability of receiving your supplies, and to defending yourself against superior forces sent against you by any of the avenues left open to the enemy. if such a position can be obtained, the siege of fort fisher will not be abandoned until its reduction is accomplished, or another plan of campaign is ordered from these headquarters. "my own views are, that if you effect a landing, the navy ought to run a portion of their fleet into cape fear river, while the balance of it operates on the outside. land forces cannot invest fort fisher, or cut it off from supplies or reinforcements, while the river is in possession of the enemy. "a siege-train will be loaded on vessels and sent to fort monroe, in readiness to be sent to you if required. all other supplies can be drawn from beaufort as you need them. "keep the fleet of vessels with you until your position is assured. when you find they can be spared, order them back, or such of them as you can spare, to fort monroe, to report for orders. "in case of failure to effect a landing, bring your command back to beaufort, and report to these headquarters for further instructions. you will not debark at beaufort until so directed. "general sheridan has been ordered to send a division of troops to baltimore and place them on sea-going vessels. these troops will be brought to fort monroe and kept there on the vessels until you are heard from. should you require them, they will be sent to you. "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "brevet major-general a. h. terry." lieutenant-colonel c. b. comstock, aide-de-camp (now brevet brigadier-general), who accompanied the former expedition, was assigned, in orders, as chief-engineer to this. it will be seen that these instructions did not differ materially from those given for the first expedition, and that in neither instance was there an order to assault fort fisher. this was a matter left entirely to the discretion of the commanding officer. the expedition sailed from fort monroe on the morning of the 6th, arriving at the rendezvous, off beaufort, on the 8th, where, owing to the difficulties of the weather, it lay until the morning of the 12th, when it got under way and reached its destination that evening. under cover of the fleet, the disembarkation of the troops commenced on the morning of the 13th, and by three o'clock p.m. was completed without loss. on the 14th a reconnoissance was pushed to within five hundred yards of fort fisher, and a small advance work taken possession of and turned into a defensive line against any attempt that might be made from the fort. this reconnoissance disclosed the fact that the front of the work had been seriously injured by the navy fire. in the afternoon of the 15th the fort was assaulted, and after most desperate fighting was captured, with its entire garrison and armament. thus was secured, by the combined efforts of the navy and army, one of the most important successes of the war. our loss was: killed, one hundred and ten; wounded, five hundred and thirty-six. on the 16th and the 17th the enemy abandoned and blew up fort caswell and the works on smith's island, which were immediately occupied by us. this gave us entire control of the mouth of the cape fear river. at my request, mayor-general b. f. butler was relieved, and major-general e. o. c. ord assigned to the department of virginia and north carolina. the defence of the line of the tennessee no longer requiring the force which had beaten and nearly destroyed the only army now threatening it, i determined to find other fields of operation for general thomas's surplus troops--fields from which they would co-operate with other movements. general thomas was therefore directed to collect all troops, not essential to hold his communications at eastport, in readiness for orders. on the 7th of january, general thomas was directed, if he was assured of the departure of hood south from corinth, to send general schofield with his corps east with as little delay as possible. this direction was promptly complied with, and the advance of the corps reached washington on the 23d of the same month, whence it was sent to fort fisher and new bern. on the 26th he was directed to send general a. j. smith's command and a division of cavalry to report to general canby. by the 7th of february the whole force was en route for its destination. the state of north carolina was constituted into a military department, and general schofield assigned to command, and placed under the orders of major-general sherman. the following instructions were given him: "city point, va., january 31, 1865. "general:-* * * your movements are intended as co-operative with sherman's through the states of south and north carolina. the first point to be attained is to secure wilmington. goldsboro' will then be your objective point, moving either from wilmington or new bern, or both, as you deem best. should you not be able to reach goldsboro', you will advance on the line or lines of railway connecting that place with the sea-coast--as near to it as you can, building the road behind you. the enterprise under you has two objects: the first is to give general sherman material aid, if needed, in his march north; the second, to open a base of supplies for him on his line of march. as soon, therefore, as you can determine which of the two points, wilmington or new bern, you can best use for throwing supplies from, to the interior, you will commence the accumulation of twenty days' rations and forage for sixty thousand men and twenty thousand animals. you will get of these as many as you can house and protect to such point in the interior as you may be able to occupy. i believe general palmer has received some instructions direct from general sherman on the subject of securing supplies for his army. you will learn what steps he has taken, and be governed in your requisitions accordingly. a supply of ordnance stores will also be necessary. "make all requisitions upon the chiefs of their respective departments in the field with me at city point. communicate with me by every opportunity, and should you deem it necessary at any time, send a special boat to fortress monroe, from which point you can communicate by telegraph. "the supplies referred to in these instructions are exclusive of those required for your own command. "the movements of the enemy may justify, or even make it your imperative duty, to cut loose from your base, and strike for the interior to aid sherman. in such case you will act on your own judgment without waiting for instructions. you will report, however, what you purpose doing. the details for carrying out these instructions are necessarily left to you. i would urge, however, if i did not know that you are already fully alive to the importance of it, prompt action. sherman may be looked for in the neighborhood of goldsboro' any time from the 22d to the 28th of february; this limits your time very materially. "if rolling-stock is not secured in the capture of wilmington, it can be supplied from washington. a large force of railroad men have already been sent to beaufort, and other mechanics will go to fort fisher in a day or two. on this point i have informed you by telegraph. "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "major-general j. m. schofield." previous to giving these instructions i had visited fort fisher, accompanied by general schofield, for the purpose of seeing for myself the condition of things, and personally conferring with general terry and admiral porter as to what was best to be done. anticipating the arrival of general sherman at savannah his army entirely foot-loose, hood being then before nashville, tennessee, the southern railroads destroyed, so that it would take several months to re-establish a through line from west to east, and regarding the capture of lee's army as the most important operation towards closing the rebellion--i sent orders to general sherman on the 6th of december, that after establishing a base on the sea-coast, with necessary garrison, to include all his artillery and cavalry, to come by water to city point with the balance of his command. on the 18th of december, having received information of the defeat and utter rout of hood's army by general thomas, and that, owing to the great difficulty of procuring ocean transportation, it would take over two months to transport sherman's army, and doubting whether he might not contribute as much towards the desired result by operating from where he was, i wrote to him to that effect, and asked him for his views as to what would be best to do. a few days after this i received a communication from general sherman, of date 16th december, acknowledging the receipt of my order of the 6th, and informing me of his preparations to carry it into effect as soon as he could get transportation. also that he had expected, upon reducing savannah, instantly to march to columbia, south carolina, thence to raleigh, and thence to report to me; but that this would consume about six weeks' time after the fall of savannah, whereas by sea he could probably reach me by the middle of january. the confidence he manifested in this letter of being able to march up and join me pleased me, and, without waiting for a reply to my letter of the 18th, i directed him, on the 28th of december, to make preparations to start as he proposed, without delay, to break up the railroads in north and south carolina, and join the armies operating against richmond as soon as he could. on the 21st of january i informed general sherman that i had ordered the 23d corps, major-general schofield commanding, east; that it numbered about twenty-one thousand men; that we had at fort fisher, about eight thousand men; at new bern, about four thousand; that if wilmington was captured, general schofield would go there; if not, he would be sent to new bern; that, in either event, all the surplus force at both points would move to the interior towards goldsboro', in co-operation with his movement; that from either point railroad communication could be run out; and that all these troops would be subject to his orders as he came into communication with them. in obedience to his instructions, general schofield proceeded to reduce wilmington, north carolina, in co-operation with the navy under admiral porter, moving his forces up both sides of the cape fear river. fort anderson, the enemy's main defence on the west bank of the river, was occupied on the morning of the 19th, the enemy having evacuated it after our appearance before it. after fighting on 20th and 21st, our troops entered wilmington on the morning of the 22d, the enemy having retreated towards goldsboro' during the night. preparations were at once made for a movement on goldsboro' in two columns--one from wilmington, and the other from new bern--and to repair the railroad leading there from each place, as well as to supply general sherman by cape fear river, towards fayetteville, if it became necessary. the column from new bern was attacked on the 8th of march, at wise's forks, and driven back with the loss of several hundred prisoners. on the 11th the enemy renewed his attack upon our intrenched position, but was repulsed with severe loss, and fell back during the night. on the 14th the neuse river was crossed and kinston occupied, and on the 21st goldsboro' was entered. the column from wilmington reached cox's bridge, on the neuse river, ten miles above goldsboro', on the 22d. by the 1st of february, general sherman's whole army was in motion from savannah. he captured columbia, south carolina, on the 17th; thence moved on goldsboro', north carolina, via fayetteville, reaching the latter place on the 12th of march, opening up communication with general schofield by way of cape fear river. on the 15th he resumed his march on goldsboro'. he met a force of the enemy at averysboro', and after a severe fight defeated and compelled it to retreat. our loss in this engagement was about six hundred. the enemy's loss was much greater. on the 18th the combined forces of the enemy, under joe johnston, attacked his advance at bentonville, capturing three guns and driving it back upon the main body. general slocum, who was in the advance ascertaining that the whole of johnston's army was in the front, arranged his troops on the defensive, intrenched himself and awaited reinforcements, which were pushed forward. on the night of the 21st the enemy retreated to smithfield, leaving his dead and wounded in our hands. from there sherman continued to goldsboro', which place had been occupied by general schofield on the 21st (crossing the neuse river ten miles above there, at cox's bridge, where general terry had got possession and thrown a pontoon-bridge on the 22d), thus forming a junction with the columns from new bern and wilmington. among the important fruits of this campaign was the fall of charleston, south carolina. it was evacuated by the enemy on the night of the 17th of february, and occupied by our forces on the 18th. on the morning of the 31st of january, general thomas was directed to send a cavalry expedition, under general stoneman, from east tennessee, to penetrate south carolina well down towards columbia, to destroy the railroads and military resources of the country, and return, if he was able, to east tennessee by way of salisbury, north carolina, releasing our prisoners there, if possible. of the feasibility of this latter, however, general stoneman was to judge. sherman's movements, i had no doubt, would attract the attention of all the force the enemy could collect, and facilitate the execution of this. general stoneman was so late in making his start on this expedition (and sherman having passed out of the state of south carolina), on the 27th of february i directed general thomas to change his course, and order him to repeat his raid of last fall, destroying the railroad towards lynchburg as far as he could. this would keep him between our garrisons in east tennessee and the enemy. i regarded it not impossible that in the event of the enemy being driven from richmond, he might fall back to lynchburg and attempt a raid north through east tennessee. on the 14th of february the following communication was sent to general thomas: "city point, va., february 14, 1865. "general canby is preparing a movement from mobile bay against mobile and the interior of alabama. his force will consist of about twenty thousand men, besides a. j. smith's command. the cavalry you have sent to canby will be debarked at vicksburg. it, with the available cavalry already in that section, will move from there eastward, in co-operation. hood's army has been terribly reduced by the severe punishment you gave it in tennessee, by desertion consequent upon their defeat, and now by the withdrawal of many of them to oppose sherman. (i take it a large portion of the infantry has been so withdrawn. it is so asserted in the richmond papers, and a member of the rebel congress said a few days since in a speech, that one-half of it had been brought to south carolina to oppose sherman.) this being true, or even if it is not true, canby's movement will attract all the attention of the enemy, and leave the advance from your standpoint easy. i think it advisable, therefore, that you prepare as much of a cavalry force as you can spare, and hold it in readiness to go south. the object would be threefold: first, to attract as much of the enemy's force as possible, to insure success to canby; second, to destroy the enemy's line of communications and military resources; third, to destroy or capture their forces brought into the field. tuscaloosa and selma would probably be the points to direct the expedition against. this, however, would not be so important as the mere fact of penetrating deep into alabama. discretion should be left to the officer commanding the expedition to go where, according to the information he may receive, he will best secure the objects named above. "now that your force has been so much depleted, i do not know what number of men you can put into the field. if not more than five thousand men, however, all cavalry, i think it will be sufficient. it is not desirable that you should start this expedition until the one leaving vicksburg has been three or four days out, or even a week. i do not know when it will start, but will inform you by telegraph as soon as i learn. if you should hear through other sources before hearing from me, you can act on the information received. "to insure success your cavalry should go with as little wagon-train as possible, relying upon the country for supplies. i would also reduce the number of guns to a battery, or the number of batteries, and put the extra teams to the guns taken. no guns or caissons should be taken with less than eight horses. "please inform me by telegraph, on receipt of this, what force you think you will be able to send under these directions. "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "major-general g. h. thomas." on the 15th, he was directed to start the expedition as soon after the 20th as he could get it off. i deemed it of the utmost importance, before a general movement of the armies operating against richmond, that all communications with the city, north of james river, should be cut off. the enemy having withdrawn the bulk of his force from the shenandoah valley and sent it south, or replaced troops sent from richmond, and desiring to reinforce sherman, if practicable, whose cavalry was greatly inferior in numbers to that of the enemy, i determined to make a move from the shenandoah, which, if successful, would accomplish the first at least, and possibly the latter of the objects. i therefore telegraphed general sheridan as follows: "city point, va., february 20, 1865--1 p.m. "general:--as soon as it is possible to travel, i think you will have no difficulty about reaching lynchburg with a cavalry force alone. from there you could destroy the railroad and canal in every direction, so as to be of no further use to the rebellion. sufficient cavalry should be left behind to look after mosby's gang. from lynchburg, if information you might get there would justify it, you will strike south, heading the streams in virgina to the westward of danville, and push on and join general sherman. this additional raid, with one now about starting from east tennessee under stoneman, numbering four or give thousand cavalry, one from vicksburg, numbering seven or eight thousand cavalry, one from eastport, mississippi, then thousand cavalry, canby from mobile bay, with about thirty-eight thousand mixed troops, these three latter pushing for tuscaloosa, selma, and montgomery, and sherman with a large army eating out the vitals of south carolina, is all that will be wanted to leave nothing for the rebellion to stand upon. i would advise you to overcome great obstacles to accomplish this. charleston was evacuated on tuesday 1st. "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "major-general p. h. sheridan." on the 25th i received a dispatch from general sheridan, inquiring where sherman was aiming for, and if i could give him definite information as to the points he might be expected to move on, this side of charlotte, north carolina. in answer, the following telegram was sent him: "city point, va., february 25, 1865. "general:--sherman's movements will depend on the amount of opposition he meets with from the enemy. if strongly opposed, he may possibly have to fall back to georgetown, s. c., and fit out for a new start. i think, however, all danger for the necessity of going to that point has passed. i believe he has passed charlotte. he may take fayetteville on his way to goldsboro'. if you reach lynchburg, you will have to be guided in your after movements by the information you obtain. before you could possibly reach sherman, i think you would find him moving from goldsboro' towards raleigh, or engaging the enemy strongly posted at one or the other of these places, with railroad communications opened from his army to wilmington or new bern. "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "major-general p. h. sheridan." general sheridan moved from winchester on the 27th of february, with two divisions of cavalry, numbering about five thousand each. on the 1st of march he secured the bridge, which the enemy attempted to destroy, across the middle fork of the shenandoah, at mount crawford, and entered staunton on the 2d, the enemy having retreated to waynesboro'. thence he pushed on to waynesboro', where he found the enemy in force in an intrenched position, under general early. without stopping to make a reconnoissance, an immediate attack was made, the position was carried, and sixteen hundred prisoners, eleven pieces of artillery, with horses and caissons complete, two hundred wagons and teams loaded with subsistence, and seventeen battle-flags, were captured. the prisoners, under an escort of fifteen hundred men, were sent back to winchester. thence he marched on charlottesville, destroying effectually the railroad and bridges as he went, which place he reached on the 3d. here he remained two days, destroying the railroad towards richmond and lynchburg, including the large iron bridges over the north and south forks of the rivanna river and awaited the arrival of his trains. this necessary delay caused him to abandon the idea of capturing lynchburg. on the morning of the 6th, dividing his force into two columns, he sent one to scottsville, whence it marched up the james river canal to new market, destroying every lock, and in many places the bank of the canal. from here a force was pushed out from this column to duiguidsville, to obtain possession of the bridge across the james river at that place, but failed. the enemy burned it on our approach. the enemy also burned the bridge across the river at hardwicksville. the other column moved down the railroad towards lynchburg, destroying it as far as amherst court house, sixteen miles from lynchburg; thence across the country, uniting with the column at new market. the river being very high, his pontoons would not reach across it; and the enemy having destroyed the bridges by which he had hoped to cross the river and get on the south side railroad about farmville, and destroy it to appomattox court house, the only thing left for him was to return to winchester or strike a base at the white house. fortunately, he chose the latter. from new market he took up his line of march, following the canal towards richmond, destroying every lock upon it and cutting the banks wherever practicable, to a point eight miles east of goochland, concentrating the whole force at columbia on the 10th. here he rested one day, and sent through by scouts information of his whereabouts and purposes, and a request for supplies to meet him at white house, which reached me on the night of the 12th. an infantry force was immediately sent to get possession of white house, and supplies were forwarded. moving from columbia in a direction to threaten richmond, to near ashland station, he crossed the annas, and after having destroyed all the bridges and many miles of the railroad, proceeded down the north bank of the pamunkey to white house, which place he reached on the 19th. previous to this the following communication was sent to general thomas: "city point, virginia, march 7, 1865--9.30 a.m. "general:--i think it will be advisable now for you to repair the railroad in east tennessee, and throw a good force up to bull's gap and fortify there. supplies at knoxville could always be got forward as required. with bull's gap fortified, you can occupy as outposts about all of east tennessee, and be prepared, if it should be required of you in the spring, to make a campaign towards lynchburg, or into north carolina. i do not think stoneman should break the road until he gets into virginia, unless it should be to cut off rolling-stock that may be caught west of that. "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "major-general g. h. thomas." thus it will be seen that in march, 1865, general canby was moving an adequate force against mobile and the army defending it under general dick taylor; thomas was pushing out two large and well-appointed cavalry expeditions--one from middle tennessee under brevet major-general wilson against the enemy's vital points in alabama, the other from east tennessee, under major-general stoneman, towards lynchburg--and assembling the remainder of his available forces, preparatory to commence offensive operations from east tennessee; general sheridan's cavalry was at white house; the armies of the potomac and james were confronting the enemy, under lee, in his defences of richmond and petersburg; general sherman with his armies, reinforced by that of general schofield, was at goldsboro'; general pope was making preparations for a spring campaign against the enemy under kirby smith and price, west of the mississippi; and general hancock was concentrating a force in the vicinity of winchester, virginia, to guard against invasion or to operate offensively, as might prove necessary. after the long march by general sheridan's cavalry over winter roads, it was necessary to rest and refit at white house. at this time the greatest source of uneasiness to me was the fear that the enemy would leave his strong lines about petersburg and richmond for the purpose of uniting with johnston, and before he was driven from them by battle, or i was prepared to make an effectual pursuit. on the 24th of march, general sheridan moved from white house, crossed the james river at jones's landing, and formed a junction with the army of the potomac in front of petersburg on the 27th. during this move, general ord sent forces to cover the crossings of the chickahominy. on the 24th of march the following instructions for a general movement of the armies operating against richmond were issued: "city point, virginia, march 24, 1865. "general: on the 29th instant the armies operating against richmond will be moved by our left, for the double purpose of turning the enemy out of his present position around petersburg, and to insure the success of the cavalry under general sheridan, which will start at the same time, in its efforts to reach and destroy the south side and danville railroads. two corps of the army of the potomac will be moved at first in two columns, taking the two roads crossing hatcher's run, nearest where the present line held by us strikes that stream, both moving towards dinwiddie court house. "the cavalry under general sheridan, joined by the division now under general davies, will move at the same time by the weldon road and the jerusalem plank road, turning west from the latter before crossing the nottoway, and west with the whole column before reaching stony creek. general sheridan will then move independently, under other instructions which will be given him. all dismounted cavalry belonging to the army of the potomac, and the dismounted cavalry from the middle military division not required for guarding property belonging to their arm of service, will report to brigadier-general benham, to be added to the defences of city point. major-general parke will be left in command of all the army left for holding the lines about petersburg and city point, subject of course to orders from the commander of the army of the potomac. the 9th army corps will be left intact, to hold the present line of works so long as the whole line now occupied by us is held. if, however, the troops to the left of the 9th corps are withdrawn, then the left of the corps may be thrown back so as to occupy the position held by the army prior to the capture of the weldon road. all troops to the left of the 9th corps will be held in readiness to move at the shortest notice by such route as may be designated when the order is given. "general ord will detach three divisions, two white and one colored, or so much of them as he can, and hold his present lines, and march for the present left of the army of the potomac. in the absence of further orders, or until further orders are given, the white divisions will follow the left column of the army of the potomac, and the colored division the right column. during the movement major-general weitzel will be left in command of all the forces remaining behind from the army of the james. "the movement of troops from the army of the james will commence on the night of the 27th instant. general ord will leave behind the minimum number of cavalry necessary for picket duty, in the absence of the main army. a cavalry expedition, from general ord's command, will also be started from suffolk, to leave there on saturday, the 1st of april, under colonel sumner, for the purpose of cutting the railroad about hicksford. this, if accomplished, will have to be a surprise, and therefore from three to five hundred men will be sufficient. they should, however, be supported by all the infantry that can be spared from norfolk and portsmouth, as far out as to where the cavalry crosses the blackwater. the crossing should probably be at uniten. should colonel sumner succeed in reaching the weldon road, he will be instructed to do all the damage possible to the triangle of roads between hicksford, weldon, and gaston. the railroad bridge at weldon being fitted up for the passage of carriages, it might be practicable to destroy any accumulation of supplies the enemy may have collected south of the roanoke. all the troops will move with four days' rations in haversacks and eight days' in wagons. to avoid as much hauling as possible, and to give the army of the james the same number of days' supplies with the army of the potomac, general ord will direct his commissary and quartermaster to have sufficient supplies delivered at the terminus of the road to fill up in passing. sixty rounds of ammunition per man will be taken in wagons, and as much grain as the transportation on hand will carry, after taking the specified amount of other supplies. the densely wooded country in which the army has to operate making the use of much artillery impracticable, the amount taken with the army will be reduced to six or eight guns to each division, at the option of the army commanders. "all necessary preparations for carrying these directions into operation may be commenced at once. the reserves of the 9th corps should be massed as much as possible. while i would not now order an unconditional attack on the enemy's line by them, they should be ready and should make the attack if the enemy weakens his line in their front, without waiting for orders. in case they carry the line, then the whole of the 9th corps could follow up so as to join or co-operate with the balance of the army. to prepare for this, the 9th corps will have rations issued to them, same as the balance of the army. general weitzel will keep vigilant watch upon his front, and if found at all practicable to break through at any point, he will do so. a success north of the james should be followed up with great promptness. an attack will not be feasible unless it is found that the enemy has detached largely. in that case it may be regarded as evident that the enemy are relying upon their local reserves principally for the defence of richmond. preparations may be made for abandoning all the line north of the james, except inclosed works only to be abandoned, however, after a break is made in the lines of the enemy. "by these instructions a large part of the armies operating against richmond is left behind. the enemy, knowing this, may, as an only chance, strip their lines to the merest skeleton, in the hope of advantage not being taken of it, while they hurl everything against the moving column, and return. it cannot be impressed too strongly upon commanders of troops left in the trenches not to allow this to occur without taking advantage of it. the very fact of the enemy coming out to attack, if he does so, might be regarded as almost conclusive evidence of such a weakening of his lines. i would have it particularly enjoined upon corps commanders that, in case of an attack from the enemy, those not attacked are not to wait for orders from the commanding officer of the army to which they belong, but that they will move promptly, and notify the commander of their action. i would also enjoin the same action on the part of division commanders when other parts of their corps are engaged. in like manner, i would urge the importance of following up a repulse of the enemy. "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "major-generals meade, ord, and sheridan." early on the morning of the 25th the enemy assaulted our lines in front of the 9th corps (which held from the appomattox river towards our left), and carried fort stedman, and a part of the line to the right and left of it, established themselves and turned the guns of the fort against us, but our troops on either flank held their ground until the reserves were brought up, when the enemy was driven back with a heavy loss in killed and wounded, and one thousand nine hundred prisoners. our loss was sixty-eight killed, three hundred and thirty-seven wounded, and five hundred and six missing. general meade at once ordered the other corps to advance and feel the enemy in their respective fronts. pushing forward, they captured and held the enemy's strongly intrenched picket-line in front of the 2d and 6th corps, and eight hundred and thirty-four prisoners. the enemy made desperate attempts to retake this line, but without success. our loss in front of these was fifty-two killed, eight hundred and sixty-four wounded, and two hundred and seven missing. the enemy's loss in killed and wounded was far greater. general sherman having got his troops all quietly in camp about goldsboro', and his preparations for furnishing supplies to them perfected, visited me at city point on the 27th of march, and stated that he would be ready to move, as he had previously written me, by the 10th of april, fully equipped and rationed for twenty days, if it should become necessary to bring his command to bear against lee's army, in co-operation with our forces in front of richmond and petersburg. general sherman proposed in this movement to threaten raleigh, and then, by turning suddenly to the right, reach the roanoke at gaston or thereabouts, whence he could move on to the richmond and danville railroad, striking it in the vicinity of burkesville, or join the armies operating against richmond, as might be deemed best. this plan he was directed to carry into execution, if he received no further directions in the meantime. i explained to him the movement i had ordered to commence on the 29th of march. that if it should not prove as entirely successful as i hoped, i would cut the cavalry loose to destroy the danville and south side railroads, and thus deprive the enemy of further supplies, and also to prevent the rapid concentration of lee's and johnston's armies. i had spent days of anxiety lest each morning should bring the report that the enemy had retreated the night before. i was firmly convinced that sherman's crossing the roanoke would be the signal for lee to leave. with johnston and him combined, a long, tedious, and expensive campaign, consuming most of the summer, might become necessary. by moving out i would put the army in better condition for pursuit, and would at least, by the destruction of the danville road, retard the concentration of the two armies of lee and johnston, and cause the enemy to abandon much material that he might otherwise save. i therefore determined not to delay the movement ordered. on the night of the 27th, major-general ord, with two divisions of the 24th corps, major-general gibbon commanding, and one division of the 25th corps, brigadier-general birney commanding, and mackenzie's cavalry, took up his line of march in pursuance of the foregoing instructions, and reached the position assigned him near hatcher's run on the morning of the 29th. on the 28th the following instructions were given to general sheridan: "city point, va., march 28, 1865. "general:--the 5th army corps will move by the vaughn road at three a.m. to-morrow morning. the 2d moves at about nine a.m., having but about three miles to march to reach the point designated for it to take on the right of the 5th corps, after the latter reaching dinwiddie court house. move your cavalry at as early an hour as you can, and without being confined to any particular road or roads. you may go out by the nearest roads in rear of the 5th corps, pass by its left, and passing near to or through dinwiddie, reach the right and rear of the enemy as soon as you can. it is not the intention to attack the enemy in his intrenched position, but to force him out, if possible. should he come out and attack us, or get himself where he can be attacked, move in with your entire force in your own way, and with the full reliance that the army will engage or follow, as circumstances will dictate. i shall be on the field, and will probably be able to communicate with you. should i not do so, and you find that the enemy keeps within his main intrenched line, you may cut loose and push for the danville road. if you find it practicable, i would like you to cross the south side road, between petersburg and burkesville, and destroy it to some extent. i would not advise much detention, however, until you reach the danville road, which i would like you to strike as near to the appomattox as possible. make your destruction on that road as complete as possible. you can then pass on to the south side road, west of burkesville, and destroy that in like manner. "after having accomplished the destruction of the two railroads, which are now the only avenues of supply to lee's army, you may return to this army, selecting your road further south, or you may go on into north carolina and join general sherman. should you select the latter course, get the information to me as early as possible, so that i may send orders to meet you at goldsboro'. "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "major-general p. h. sheridan." on the morning of the 29th the movement commenced. at night the cavalry was at dinwiddie court house, and the left of our infantry line extended to the quaker road, near its intersection with the boydton plank road. the position of the troops from left to right was as follows: sheridan, warren, humphreys, ord, wright, parke. everything looked favorable to the defeat of the enemy and the capture of petersburg and richmond, if the proper effort was made. i therefore addressed the following communication to general sheridan, having previously informed him verbally not to cut loose for the raid contemplated in his orders until he received notice from me to do so: "gravelly creek, march 29, 1865. "general:--our line is now unbroken from the appomattox to dinwiddie. we are all ready, however, to give up all, from the jerusalem plank road to hatcher's run, whenever the forces can be used advantageously. after getting into line south of hatcher's, we pushed forward to find the enemy's position. general griffin was attacked near where the quaker road intersects the boydton road, but repulsed it easily, capturing about one hundred men. humphreys reached dabney's mill, and was pushing on when last heard from. "i now feel like ending the matter, if it is possible to do so, before going back. i do not want you, therefore, to cut loose and go after the enemy's roads at present. in the morning push around the enemy, if you can, and get on to his right rear. the movements of the enemy's cavalry may, of course, modify your action. we will act all together as one army here, until it is seen what can be done with the enemy. the signal-officer at cobb's hill reported, at half-past eleven a.m., that a cavalry column had passed that point from richmond towards petersburg, taking forty minutes to pass. "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "major-general p. h. sheridan." from the night of the 29th to the morning of the 31st the rain fell in such torrents as to make it impossible to move a wheeled vehicle, except as corduroy roads were laid in front of them. during the 30th, sheridan advanced from dinwiddie court house towards five forks, where he found the enemy in full force. general warren advanced and extended his line across the boydton plank road to near the white oak road, with a view of getting across the latter; but, finding the enemy strong in his front and extending beyond his left, was directed to hold on where he was, and fortify. general humphreys drove the enemy from his front into his main line on the hatcher, near burgess's mills. generals ord, wright, and parke made examinations in their fronts to determine the feasibility of an assault on the enemy's lines. the two latter reported favorably. the enemy confronting us as he did, at every point from richmond to our extreme left, i conceived his lines must be weakly held, and could be penetrated if my estimate of his forces was correct. i determined, therefore, to extend our line no farther, but to reinforce general sheridan with a corps of infantry, and thus enable him to cut loose and turn the enemy's right flank, and with the other corps assault the enemy's lines. the result of the offensive effort of the enemy the week before, when he assaulted fort stedman, particularly favored this. the enemy's intrenched picket-line captured by us at that time threw the lines occupied by the belligerents so close together at some points that it was but a moment's run from one to the other. preparations were at once made to relieve general humphreys's corps, to report to general sheridan; but the condition of the roads prevented immediate movement. on the morning of the 31st, general warren reported favorably to getting possession of the white oak road, and was directed to do so. to accomplish this, he moved with one division, instead of his whole corps, which was attacked by the enemy in superior force and driven back on the 2d division before it had time to form, and it, in turn, forced back upon the 3d division, when the enemy was checked. a division of the 2d corps was immediately sent to his support, the enemy driven back with heavy loss, and possession of the white oak road gained. sheridan advanced, and with a portion of his cavalry got possession of the five forks; but the enemy, after the affair with the 5th corps, reinforced the rebel cavalry, defending that point with infantry, and forced him back towards dinwiddie court house. here general sheridan displayed great generalship. instead of retreating with his whole command on the main army, to tell the story of superior forces encountered, he deployed his cavalry on foot, leaving only mounted men enough to take charge of the horses. this compelled the enemy to deploy over a vast extent of wooded and broken country, and made his progress slow. at this juncture he dispatched to me what had taken place, and that he was dropping back slowly on dinwiddie court house. general mackenzie's cavalry and one division of the 5th corps were immediately ordered to his assistance. soon after receiving a report from general meade that humphreys could hold our position on the boydton road, and that the other two divisions of the 5th corps could go to sheridan, they were so ordered at once. thus the operations of the day necessitated the sending of warren, because of his accessibility, instead of humphreys, as was intended, and precipitated intended movements. on the morning of the 1st of april, general sheridan, reinforced by general warren, drove the enemy back on five forks, where, late in the evening, he assaulted and carried his strongly fortified position, capturing all his artillery and between five and six thousand prisoners. about the close of this battle, brevet major-general charles griffin relieved major-general warren in command of the 5th corps. the report of this reached me after nightfall. some apprehensions filled my mind lest the enemy might desert his lines during the night, and by falling upon general sheridan before assistance could reach him, drive him from his position and open the way for retreat. to guard against this, general miles's division of humphreys's corps was sent to reinforce him, and a bombardment was commenced and kept up until four o'clock in the morning (april 2), when an assault was ordered on the enemy's lines. general wright penetrated the lines with his whole corps, sweeping everything before him, and to his left towards hatcher's run, capturing many guns and several thousand prisoners. he was closely followed by two divisions of general ord's command, until he met the other division of general ord's that had succeeded in forcing the enemy's lines near hatcher's run. generals wright and ord immediately swung to the right, and closed all of the enemy on that side of them in petersburg, while general humphreys pushed forward with two divisions and joined general wright on the left. general parke succeeded in carrying the enemy's main line, capturing guns and prisoners, but was unable to carry his inner line. general sheridan being advised of the condition of affairs, returned general miles to his proper command. on reaching the enemy's lines immediately surrounding petersburg, a portion of general gibbon's corps, by a most gallant charge, captured two strong inclosed works--the most salient and commanding south of petersburg--thus materially shortening the line of investment necessary for taking in the city. the enemy south of hatcher's run retreated westward to sutherland's station, where they were overtaken by miles's division. a severe engagement ensued, and lasted until both his right and left flanks were threatened by the approach of general sheridan, who was moving from ford's station towards petersburg, and a division sent by general meade from the front of petersburg, when he broke in the utmost confusion, leaving in our hands his guns and many prisoners. this force retreated by the main road along the appomattox river. during the night of the 2d the enemy evacuated petersburg and richmond, and retreated towards danville. on the morning of the 3d pursuit was commenced. general sheridan pushed for the danville road, keeping near the appomattox, followed by general meade with the 2d and 6th corps, while general ord moved for burkesville, along the south side road; the 9th corps stretched along that road behind him. on the 4th, general sheridan struck the danville road near jetersville, where he learned that lee was at amelia court house. he immediately intrenched himself and awaited the arrival of general meade, who reached there the next day. general ord reached burkesville on the evening of the 5th. on the morning of the 5th, i addressed major-general sherman the following communication: "wilson's station, april 5, 1865. "general: all indications now are that lee will attempt to reach danville with the remnant of his force. sheridan, who was up with him last night, reports all that is left, horse, foot, and dragoons, at twenty thousand, much demoralized. we hope to reduce this number one-half. i shall push on to burkesville, and if a stand is made at danville, will in a very few days go there. if you can possibly do so, push on from where you are, and let us see if we cannot finish the job with lee's and johnston's armies. whether it will be better for you to strike for greensboro', or nearer to danville, you will be better able to judge when you receive this. rebel armies now are the only strategic points to strike at. "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "major-general w. t. sherman." on the morning of the 6th, it was found that general lee was moving west of jetersville, towards danville. general sheridan moved with his cavalry (the 5th corps having been returned to general meade on his reaching jetersville) to strike his flank, followed by the 6th corps, while the 2d and 5th corps pressed hard after, forcing him to abandon several hundred wagons and several pieces of artillery. general ord advanced from burkesville towards farmville, sending two regiments of infantry and a squadron of cavalry, under brevet brigadier-general theodore read, to reach and destroy the bridges. this advance met the head of lee's column near farmville, which it heroically attacked and detained until general read was killed and his small force overpowered. this caused a delay in the enemy's movements, and enabled general ord to get well up with the remainder of his force, on meeting which, the enemy immediately intrenched himself. in the afternoon, general sheridan struck the enemy south of sailors' creek, captured sixteen pieces of artillery and about four hundred wagons, and detained him until the 6th corps got up, when a general attack of infantry and cavalry was made, which resulted in the capture of six or seven thousand prisoners, among whom were many general officers. the movements of the 2d corps and general ord's command contributed greatly to the day's success. on the morning of the 7th the pursuit was renewed, the cavalry, except one division, and the 5th corps moving by prince edward's court house; the 6th corps, general ord's command, and one division of cavalry, on farmville; and the 2d corps by the high bridge road. it was soon found that the enemy had crossed to the north side of the appomattox; but so close was the pursuit, that the 2d corps got possession of the common bridge at high bridge before the enemy could destroy it, and immediately crossed over. the 6th corps and a division of cavalry crossed at farmville to its support. feeling now that general lee's chance of escape was utterly hopeless, i addressed him the following communication from farmville: "april 7, 1865. "general--the result of the last week must convince you of the hopelessness of further resistance on the part of the army of northern virginia in this struggle. i feel that it is so, and regard it as my duty to shift from myself the responsibility of any further effusion of blood, by asking of you the surrender of that portion of the confederate states army known as the army of northern virginia. "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "general r. e. lee." early on the morning of the 8th, before leaving, i received at farmville the following: "april 7, 1865. "general: i have received your note of this date. though not entertaining the opinion you express on the hopelessness of further resistance on the part of the army of northern virginia, i reciprocate your desire to avoid useless effusion of blood, and therefore, before considering your proposition, ask the terms you will offer on condition of its surrender. "r. e. lee, general. "lieutenant-general u. s. grant." to this i immediately replied: "april 8, 1865. "general:--your note of last evening, in reply to mine of same date, asking the condition on which i will accept the surrender of the army of northern virginia, is just received. in reply, i would say, that peace being my great desire, there is but one condition i would insist upon --namely, that the men and officers surrendered shall be disqualified for taking up arms again against the government of the united states until properly exchanged. i will meet you, or will designate officers to meet any officers you may name for the same purpose, at any point agreeable to you, for the purpose of arranging definitely the terms upon which the surrender of the army of the northern virginia will be received. "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "general r. e. lee." early on the morning of the 8th the pursuit was resumed. general meade followed north of the appomattox, and general sheridan, with all the cavalry, pushed straight ahead for appomattox station, followed by general ord's command and the 5th corps. during the day general meade's advance had considerable fighting with the enemy's rear-guard, but was unable to bring on a general engagement. late in the evening general sheridan struck the railroad at appomattox station, drove the enemy from there, and captured twenty-five pieces of artillery, a hospital train, and four trains of cars loaded with supplies for lee's army. during this day i accompanied general meade's column, and about midnight received the following communication from general lee: april 8, 1865. "general:--i received, at a late hour, your note of to-day. in mine of yesterday i did not intend to propose the surrender of the army of northern virginia, but to ask the terms of your proposition. to be frank, i do not think the emergency has arisen to call for the surrender of this army; but as the restoration of peace should be the sole object of all, i desired to know whether your proposals would lead to that end. i cannot, therefore, meet you with a view to the surrender of the army of northern virginia; but as far as your proposal may affect the confederate states forces under my command, and tend to the restoration of peace, i should be pleased to meet you at ten a.m. to-morrow on the old stage-road to richmond, between the picket-lines of the two armies. "r. e. lee, general. "lieutenant-general u. s. grant." early on the morning of the 9th i returned him an answer as follows, and immediately started to join the column south of the appomattox: "april 9, 1865. "general:--your note of yesterday is received. i have no authority to treat on the subject of peace; the meeting proposed for ten a.m. to-day could lead to no good. i will state, however, general, that i am equally anxious for peace with yourself, and the whole north entertains the same feeling. the terms upon which peace can be had are well understood. by the south laying down their arms they will hasten that most desirable event, save thousands of human lives, and hundreds of millions of property not yet destroyed. seriously hoping that all our difficulties may be settled without the loss of another life, i subscribe myself, etc. "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "general r. e. lee." on this morning of the 9th, general ord's command and the 5th corps reached appomattox station just as the enemy was making a desperate effort to break through our cavalry. the infantry was at once thrown in. soon after a white flag was received, requesting a suspension of hostilities pending negotiations for a surrender. before reaching general sheridan's headquarters, i received the following from general lee: "april 9, 1865. "general:--i received your note of this morning on the picket-line, whither i had come to meet you, and ascertain definitely what terms were embraced in your proposal of yesterday with reference to the surrender of this army. i now ask an interview, in accordance with the offer contained in your letter of yesterday, for that purpose. "r. e. lee, general. "lieutenant-general u. s. grant." the interview was held at appomattox court-house, the result of which is set forth in the following correspondence: appomattox court-house, virginia, april 9, 1865. "general: in accordance with the substance of my letter to you of the 8th instant, i propose to receive the surrender of the army of northern virginia on the following terms, to wit: rolls of all the officers and men to be made in duplicate, one copy to be given to an officer to be designated by me, the other to be retained by such officer or officers as you may designate. the officers to give their individual paroles not to take up arms against the government of the united states until properly exchanged; and each company or regimental commander sign a like parole for the men of their commands. the arms, artillery, and public property to be parked and stacked, and turned over to the officers appointed by me to receive them. this will not embrace the side-arms of the officers, nor their private horses or baggage. this done, each officer and man will be allowed to return to his home, not to be disturbed by united states authority so long as they observe their paroles and the laws in force where they may reside. "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "general r. e. lee." "headquarters army of northern virginia, april 9, 1865. "general: i have received your letter of this date containing the terms of surrender of the army of northern virginia as proposed by you. as they are substantially the same as those expressed in your letter of the 8th instant, they are accepted. i will proceed to designate the proper officers to carry the stipulations into effect. "r. e. lee, general. "lieutenant-general u. s. grant." the command of major-general gibbon, the 5th army corps under griffin, and mackenzie's cavalry, were designated to remain at appomattox court-house until the paroling of the surrendered army was completed, and to take charge of the public property. the remainder of the army immediately returned to the vicinity of burkesville. general lee's great influence throughout the whole south caused his example to be followed, and to-day the result is that the armies lately under his leadership are at their homes, desiring peace and quiet, and their arms are in the hands of our ordnance officers. on the receipt of my letter of the 5th, general sherman moved directly against joe johnston, who retreated rapidly on and through raleigh, which place general sherman occupied on the morning of the 13th. the day preceding, news of the surrender of general lee reached him at smithfield. on the 14th a correspondence was opened between general sherman and general johnston, which resulted on the 18th in an agreement for a suspension of hostilities, and a memorandum or basis for peace, subject to the approval of the president. this agreement was disapproved by the president on the 21st, which disapproval, together with your instructions, was communicated to general sherman by me in person on the morning of the 24th, at raleigh, north carolina, in obedience to your orders. notice was at once given by him to general johnston for the termination of the truce that had been entered into. on the 25th another meeting between them was agreed upon, to take place on the 26th, which terminated in the surrender and disbandment of johnston's army upon substantially the same terms as were given to general lee. the expedition under general stoneman from east tennessee got off on the 20th of march, moving by way of boone, north carolina, and struck the railroad at wytheville, chambersburg, and big lick. the force striking it at big lick pushed on to within a few miles of lynchburg, destroying the important bridges, while with the main force he effectually destroyed it between new river and big lick, and then turned for greensboro', on the north carolina railroad; struck that road and destroyed the bridges between danville and greensboro', and between greensboro' and the yadkin, together with the depots of supplies along it, and captured four hundred prisoners. at salisbury he attacked and defeated a force of the enemy under general gardiner, capturing fourteen pieces of artillery and one thousand three hundred and sixty-four prisoners, and destroyed large amounts of army stores. at this place he destroyed fifteen miles of railroad and the bridges towards charlotte. thence he moved to slatersville. general canby, who had been directed in january to make preparations for a movement from mobile bay against mobile and the interior of alabama, commenced his movement on the 20th of march. the 16th corps, major-general a. j. smith commanding, moved from fort gaines by water to fish river; the 13th corps, under major-general gordon granger, moved from fort morgan and joined the 16th corps on fish river, both moving thence on spanish fort and investing it on the 27th; while major-general steele's command moved from pensacola, cut the railroad leading from tensas to montgomery, effected a junction with them, and partially invested fort blakely. after a severe bombardment of spanish fort, a part of its line was carried on the 8th of april. during the night the enemy evacuated the fort. fort blakely was carried by assault on the 9th, and many prisoners captured; our loss was considerable. these successes practically opened to us the alabama river, and enabled us to approach mobile from the north. on the night of the 11th the city was evacuated, and was taken possession of by our forces on the morning of the 12th. the expedition under command of brevet major-general wilson, consisting of twelve thousand five hundred mounted men, was delayed by rains until march 22d, when it moved from chickasaw, alabama. on the 1st of april, general wilson encountered the enemy in force under forrest near ebenezer church, drove him in confusion, captured three hundred prisoners and three guns, and destroyed the central bridge over the cahawba river. on the 2d he attacked and captured the fortified city of selma, defended by forrest, with seven thousand men and thirty-two guns, destroyed the arsenal, armory, naval foundry, machine-shops, vast quantities of stores, and captured three thousand prisoners. on the 4th he captured and destroyed tuscaloosa. on the 10th he crossed the alabama river, and after sending information of his operations to general canby, marched on montgomery, which place he occupied on the 14th, the enemy having abandoned it. at this place many stores and five steamboats fell into our hands. thence a force marched direct on columbus, and another on west point, both of which places were assaulted and captured on the 16th. at the former place we got one thousand five hundred prisoners and fifty-two field-guns, destroyed two gunboats, the navy yard, foundries, arsenal, many factories, and much other public property. at the latter place we got three hundred prisoners, four guns, and destroyed nineteen locomotives and three hundred cars. on the 20th he took possession of macon, georgia, with sixty field-guns, one thousand two hundred militia, and five generals, surrendered by general howell cobb. general wilson, hearing that jeff. davis was trying to make his escape, sent forces in pursuit and succeeded in capturing him on the morning of may 11th. on the 4th day of may, general dick taylor surrendered to general canby all the remaining rebel forces east of the mississippi. a force sufficient to insure an easy triumph over the enemy under kirby smith, west of the mississippi, was immediately put in motion for texas, and major-general sheridan designated for its immediate command; but on the 26th day of may, and before they reached their destination, general kirby smith surrendered his entire command to major-general canby. this surrender did not take place, however, until after the capture of the rebel president and vice-president; and the bad faith was exhibited of first disbanding most of his army and permitting an indiscriminate plunder of public property. owing to the report that many of those lately in arms against the government had taken refuge upon the soil of mexico, carrying with them arms rightfully belonging to the united states, which had been surrendered to us by agreement among them some of the leaders who had surrendered in person and the disturbed condition of affairs on the rio grande, the orders for troops to proceed to texas were not changed. there have been severe combats, raids, expeditions, and movements to defeat the designs and purposes of the enemy, most of them reflecting great credit on our arms, and which contributed greatly to our final triumph, that i have not mentioned. many of these will be found clearly set forth in the reports herewith submitted; some in the telegrams and brief dispatches announcing them, and others, i regret to say, have not as yet been officially reported. for information touching our indian difficulties, i would respectfully refer to the reports of the commanders of departments in which they have occurred. it has been my fortune to see the armies of both the west and the east fight battles, and from what i have seen i know there is no difference in their fighting qualities. all that it was possible for men to do in battle they have done. the western armies commenced their battles in the mississippi valley, and received the final surrender of the remnant of the principal army opposed to them in north carolina. the armies of the east commenced their battles on the river from which the army of the potomac derived its name, and received the final surrender of their old antagonists at appomattox court house, virginia. the splendid achievements of each have nationalized our victories removed all sectional jealousies (of which we have unfortunately experienced too much), and the cause of crimination and recrimination that might have followed had either section failed in its duty. all have a proud record, and all sections can well congratulate themselves and each other for having done their full share in restoring the supremacy of law over every foot of territory belonging to the united states. let them hope for perpetual peace and harmony with that enemy, whose manhood, however mistaken the cause, drew forth such herculean deeds of valor. i have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant, u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. the end __________ footnotes (*1) afterwards general gardner, c.s.a. (*2) general garland expressed a wish to get a message back to general twiggs, his division commander, or general taylor, to the effect that he was nearly out of ammunition and must have more sent to him, or otherwise be reinforced. deeming the return dangerous he did not like to order any one to carry it, so he called for a volunteer. lieutenant grant offered his services, which were accepted.--publishers. (*3) mentioned in the reports of major lee, colonel garland and general worth.--publishers. (*4) note.--it had been a favorite idea with general scott for a great many years before the mexican war to have established in the united states a soldiers' home, patterned after something of the kind abroad, particularly, i believe, in france. he recommended this uniformly, or at least frequently, in his annual reports to the secretary of war, but never got any hearing. now, as he had conquered the state, he made assessments upon the different large towns and cities occupied by our troops, in proportion to their capacity to pay, and appointed officers to receive the money. in addition to the sum thus realized he had derived, through capture at cerro gordo, sales of captured government tobacco, etc., sums which swelled the fund to a total of about $220,000. portions of this fund were distributed among the rank and file, given to the wounded in hospital, or applied in other ways, leaving a balance of some $118,000 remaining unapplied at the close of the war. after the war was over and the troops all home, general scott applied to have this money, which had never been turned into the treasury of the united states, expended in establishing such homes as he had previously recommended. this fund was the foundation of the soldiers' home at washington city, and also one at harrodsburgh, kentucky. the latter went into disuse many years ago. in fact it never had many soldiers in it, and was, i believe, finally sold. (*5) the mexican war made three presidential candidates, scott, taylor and pierce--and any number of aspirants for that high office. it made also governors of states, members of the cabinet, foreign ministers and other officers of high rank both in state and nation. the rebellion, which contained more war in a single day, at some critical periods, than the whole mexican war in two years, has not been so fruitful of political results to those engaged on the union side. on the other side, the side of the south, nearly every man who holds office of any sort whatever, either in the state or in the nation, was a confederate soldier, but this is easily accounted for from the fact that the south was a military camp, and there were very few people of a suitable age to be in the army who were not in it. (*6) c. b. lagow, the others not yet having joined me. (*7) note.--since writing this chapter i have received from mrs. w. h. l. wallace, widow of the gallant general who was killed in the first day's fight on the field of shiloh, a letter from general lew. wallace to him dated the morning of the 5th. at the date of this letter it was well known that the confederates had troops out along the mobile & ohio railroad west of crump's landing and pittsburg landing, and were also collecting near shiloh. this letter shows that at that time general lew. wallace was making preparations for the emergency that might happen for the passing of reinforcements between shiloh and his position, extending from crump's landing westward, and he sends it over the road running from adamsville to the pittsburg landing and purdy road. these two roads intersect nearly a mile west of the crossing of the latter over owl creek, where our right rested. in this letter general lew. wallace advises general w. h. l. wallace that he will send "to-morrow" (and his letter also says "april 5th," which is the same day the letter was dated and which, therefore, must have been written on the 4th) some cavalry to report to him at his headquarters, and suggesting the propriety of general w. h. l. wallace's sending a company back with them for the purpose of having the cavalry at the two landings familiarize themselves with the road so that they could "act promptly in case of emergency as guides to and from the different camps." this modifies very materially what i have said, and what has been said by others, of the conduct of general lew. wallace at the battle of shiloh. it shows that he naturally, with no more experience than he had at the time in the profession of arms, would take the particular road that he did start upon in the absence of orders to move by a different road. the mistake he made, and which probably caused his apparent dilatoriness, was that of advancing some distance after he found that the firing, which would be at first directly to his front and then off to the left, had fallen back until it had got very much in rear of the position of his advance. this falling back had taken place before i sent general wallace orders to move up to pittsburg landing and, naturally, my order was to follow the road nearest the river. but my order was verbal, and to a staff officer who was to deliver it to general wallace, so that i am not competent to say just what order the general actually received. general wallace's division was stationed, the first brigade at crump's landing, the second out two miles, and the third two and a half miles out. hearing the sounds of battle general wallace early ordered his first and third brigades to concentrate on the second. if the position of our front had not changed, the road which wallace took would have been somewhat shorter to our right than the river road. u. s. grant. mount macgregor, new york, june 21, 1885. (*8) note: in an article on the battle of shiloh which i wrote for the century magazine, i stated that general a. mcd. mccook, who commanded a division of buell's army, expressed some unwillingness to pursue the enemy on monday, april 7th, because of the condition of his troops. general badeau, in his history, also makes the same statement, on my authority. out of justice to general mccook and his command, i must say that they left a point twenty-two miles east of savannah on the morning of the 6th. from the heavy rains of a few days previous and the passage of trains and artillery, the roads were necessarily deep in mud, which made marching slow. the division had not only marched through this mud the day before, but it had been in the rain all night without rest. it was engaged in the battle of the second day and did as good service as its position allowed. in fact an opportunity occurred for it to perform a conspicuous act of gallantry which elicited the highest commendation from division commanders in the army of the tennessee. general sherman both in his memoirs and report makes mention of this fact. general mccook himself belongs to a family which furnished many volunteers to the army. i refer to these circumstances with minuteness because i did general mccook injustice in my article in the century, though not to the extent one would suppose from the public press. i am not willing to do any one an injustice, and if convinced that i have done one, i am always willing to make the fullest admission. (*9) note.--for gallantry in the various engagements, from the time i was left in command down to 26th of october and on my recommendation, generals mcpherson and c. s. hamilton were promoted to be major-generals, and colonels c. c. marsh, 20th illinois, m. m. crocker, 13th iowa j. a. mower, 11th missouri, m. d. leggett, 78th ohio, j. d. stevenson, 7th missouri, and john e. smith, 45th illinois, to be brigadiers. (*10) colonel ellet reported having attacked a confederate battery on the red river two days before with one of his boats, the de soto. running aground, he was obliged to abandon his vessel. however, he reported that he set fire to her and blew her up. twenty of his men fell into the hands of the enemy. with the balance he escaped on the small captured steamer, the new era, and succeeded in passing the batteries at grand gulf and reaching the vicinity of vicksburg. (*11) one of colonel ellet's vessels which had run the blockade on february the 2d and been sunk in the red river. (*12) note.--on this occasion governor richard yates, of illinois, happened to be on a visit to the army and accompanied me to carthage. i furnished an ambulance for his use and that of some of the state officers who accompanied him. (*13) note.--when general sherman first learned of the move i proposed to make, he called to see me about it. i recollect that i had transferred my headquarters from a boat in the river to a house a short distance back from the levee. i was seated on the piazza engaged in conversation with my staff when sherman came up. after a few moments' conversation he said that he would like to see me alone. we passed into the house together and shut the door after us. sherman then expressed his alarm at the move i had ordered, saying that i was putting myself in a position voluntarily which an enemy would be glad to manoeuvre a year--or a long time--to get me in. i was going into the enemy's country, with a large river behind me and the enemy holding points strongly fortified above and below. he said that it was an axiom in war that when any great body of troops moved against an enemy they should do so from a base of supplies, which they would guard as they would the apple of the eye, etc. he pointed out all the difficulties that might be encountered in the campaign proposed, and stated in turn what would be the true campaign to make. this was, in substance, to go back until high ground could be reached on the east bank of the river; fortify there and establish a depot of supplies, and move from there, being always prepared to fall back upon it in case of disaster. i said this would take us back to memphis. sherman then said that was the very place he would go to, and would move by railroad from memphis to grenada, repairing the road as we advanced. to this i replied, the country is already disheartened over the lack of success on the part of our armies; the last election went against the vigorous prosecution of the war, voluntary enlistments had ceased throughout most of the north and conscription was already resorted to, and if we went back so far as memphis it would discourage the people so much that bases of supplies would be of no use: neither men to hold them nor supplies to put in them would be furnished. the problem for us was to move forward to a decisive victory, or our cause was lost. no progress was being made in any other field, and we had to go on. sherman wrote to my adjutant general, colonel j. a. rawlins, embodying his views of the campaign that should be made, and asking him to advise me to at least get the views of my generals upon the subject. colonel rawlins showed me the letter, but i did not see any reason for changing my plans. the letter was not answered and the subject was not subsequently mentioned between sherman and myself to the end of the war, that i remember of. i did not regard the letter as official, and consequently did not preserve it. general sherman furnished a copy himself to general badeau, who printed it in his history of my campaigns. i did not regard either the conversation between us or the letter to my adjutant-general as protests, but simply friendly advice which the relations between us fully justified. sherman gave the same energy to make the campaign a success that he would or could have done if it had been ordered by himself. i make this statement here to correct an impression which was circulated at the close of the war to sherman's prejudice, and for which there was no fair foundation. (*14) meant edward's station. (*15) chattanooga, november 18, 1863. major-general w. t. sherman: enclosed herewith i send you copy of instructions to major-general thomas. you having been over the ground in person, and having heard the whole matter discussed, further instructions will not be necessary for you. it is particularly desirable that a force should be got through to the railroad between cleveland and dalton, and longstreet thus cut off from communication with the south, but being confronted by a large force here, strongly located, it is not easy to tell how this is to be effected until the result of our first effort is known. i will add, however, what is not shown in my instructions to thomas, that a brigade of cavalry has been ordered here which, if it arrives in time, will be thrown across the tennessee above chickamauga, and may be able to make the trip to cleveland or thereabouts. u. s. grant maj.-gen'l. chattanooga, november 18, 1863. major-general geo. h. thomas, chattanooga: all preparations should be made for attacking the enemy's position on missionary ridge by saturday at daylight. not being provided with a map giving names of roads, spurs of the mountains, and other places, such definite instructions cannot be given as might be desirable. however, the general plan, you understand, is for sherman, with the force brought with him strengthened by a division from your command, to effect a crossing of the tennessee river just below the mouth of chickamauga; his crossing to be protected by artillery from the heights on the north bank of the river (to be located by your chief of artillery), and to secure the heights on the northern extremity to about the railroad tunnel before the enemy can concentrate against him. you will co-operate with sherman. the troops in chattanooga valley should be well concentrated on your left flank, leaving only the necessary force to defend fortifications on the right and centre, and a movable column of one division in readiness to move wherever ordered. this division should show itself as threateningly as possible on the most practicable line for making an attack up the valley. your effort then will be to form a junction with sherman, making your advance well towards the northern end of missionary ridge, and moving as near simultaneously with him as possible. the junction once formed and the ridge carried, communications will be at once established between the two armies by roads on the south bank of the river. further movements will then depend on those of the enemy. lookout valley, i think, will be easily held by geary's division and what troops you may still have there belonging to the old army of the cumberland. howard's corps can then be held in readiness to act either with you at chattanooga or with sherman. it should be marched on friday night to a position on the north side of the river, not lower down than the first pontoon-bridge, and there held in readiness for such orders as may become necessary. all these troops will be provided with two days' cooked rations in haversacks, and one hundred rounds of ammunition on the person of each infantry soldier. special care should be taken by all officers to see that ammunition is not wasted or unnecessarily fired away. you will call on the engineer department for such preparations as you may deem necessary for carrying your infantry and artillery over the creek. u. s. grant, major-general. (*16) in this order authority was given for the troops to reform after taking the first line of rifle-pits preparatory to carrying the ridge. (*17) chattanooga, november 24,1863. major-general. ceo. h. thomas, chattanooga general sherman carried missionary ridge as far as the tunnel with only slight skirmishing. his right now rests at the tunnel and on top of the hill, his left at chickamauga creek. i have instructed general sherman to advance as soon as it is light in the morning, and your attack, which will be simultaneous, will be in cooperation. your command will either carry the rifle-pits and ridge directly in front of them, or move to the left, as the presence of the enemy may require. if hooker's position on the mountain [cannot be maintained] with a small force, and it is found impracticable to carry the top from where he is, it would be advisable for him to move up the valley with all the force he can spare, and ascend by the first practicable road. u. s. grant, major-general. (*18) washington, d. c., december 8, 1863, 10.2 a.m. maj.-general u. s. grant: understanding that your lodgment at knoxville and at chattanooga is now secure, i wish to tender you, and all under your command, my more than thanks, my profoundest gratitude for the skill, courage, and perseverance with which you and they, over so great difficulties, have effected that important object. god bless you all, a. lincoln, president u. s. (*19) general john g. foster. (*20) during this winter the citizens of jo davies county, ill., subscribed for and had a diamond-hilled sword made for general grant, which was always known as the chattanooga sword. the scabbard was of gold, and was ornamented with a scroll running nearly its entire length, displaying in engraved letters the names of the battles in which general grant had participated. congress also gave him a vote of thanks for the victories at chattanooga, and voted him a gold medal for vicksburg and chattanooga. all such things are now in the possession of the government at washington. (*21) washington, d. c. december 29, 1863. maj.-general u. s. grant: general foster has asked to be relieved from his command on account of disability from old wounds. should his request be granted, who would you like as his successor? it is possible that schofield will be sent to your command. h. w. halleck general-in-chief. (official.) (*22) see letter to banks, in general grant's report, appendix. (*23) [private and confidential.] headquarters armies of the united states, washington, d. c., april 4, 1864. major-general w. t. sherman, commanding military division of the mississippi. general:--it is my design, if the enemy keep quiet and allow me to take the initiative in the spring campaign, to work all parts of the army together, and somewhat towards a common centre. for your information i now write you my programme, as at present determined upon. i have sent orders to banks, by private messenger, to finish up his present expedition against shreveport with all dispatch; to turn over the defence of red river to general steele and the navy and to return your troops to you and his own to new orleans; to abandon all of texas, except the rio grande, and to hold that with not to exceed four thousand men; to reduce the number of troops on the mississippi to the lowest number necessary to hold it, and to collect from his command not less than twenty-five thousand men. to this i will add five thousand men from missouri. with this force he is to commence operations against mobile as soon as he can. it will be impossible for him to commence too early. gillmore joins butler with ten thousand men, and the two operate against richmond from the south side of the james river. this will give butler thirty-three thousand men to operate with, w. f. smith commanding the right wing of his forces and gillmore the left wing. i will stay with the army of the potomac, increased by burnside's corps of not less than twenty-five thousand effective men, and operate directly against lee's army, wherever it may be found. sigel collects all his available force in two columns, one, under ord and averell, to start from beverly, virginia, and the other, under crook, to start from charleston on the kanawha, to move against the virginia and tennessee railroad. crook will have all cavalry, and will endeavor to get in about saltville, and move east from there to join ord. his force will be all cavalry, while ord will have from ten to twelve thousand men of all arms. you i propose to move against johnston's army, to break it up and to get into the interior of the enemy's country as far as you can, inflicting all the damage you can against their war resources. i do not propose to lay down for you a plan of campaign, but simply lay down the work it is desirable to have done and leave you free to execute it in your own way. submit to me, however, as early as you can, your plan of operations. as stated, banks is ordered to commence operations as soon as he can. gillmore is ordered to report at fortress monroe by the 18th inst., or as soon thereafter as practicable. sigel is concentrating now. none will move from their places of rendezvous until i direct, except banks. i want to be ready to move by the 25th inst., if possible. but all i can now direct is that you get ready as soon as possible. i know you will have difficulties to encounter in getting through the mountains to where supplies are abundant, but i believe you will accomplish it. from the expedition from the department of west virginia i do not calculate on very great results; but it is the only way i can take troops from there. with the long line of railroad sigel has to protect, he can spare no troops except to move directly to his front. in this way he must get through to inflict great damage on the enemy, or the enemy must detach from one of his armies a large force to prevent it. in other words, if sigel can't skin himself he can hold a leg while some one else skins. i am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant, u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. (*24) see instructions to butler, in general grant's report, appendix. (*25) in field, culpeper c. h., va., april 9, 1864. maj.-general geo. g. meade com'd'g army of the potomac. for information and as instruction to govern your preparations for the coming campaign, the following is communicated confidentially for your own perusal alone. so far as practicable all the armies are to move together, and towards one common centre. banks has been instructed to turn over the guarding of the red river to general steele and the navy, to abandon texas with the exception of the rio grande, and to concentrate all the force he can, not less than 25,000 men, to move on mobile. this he is to do without reference to other movements. from the scattered condition of his command, however, he cannot possibly get it together to leave new orleans before the 1st of may, if so soon. sherman will move at the same time you do, or two or three days in advance, jo. johnston's army being his objective point, and the heart of georgia his ultimate aim. if successful he will secure the line from chattanooga to mobile with the aid of banks. sigel cannot spare troops from his army to reinforce either of the great armies, but he can aid them by moving directly to his front. this he has been directed to do, and is now making preparations for it. two columns of his command will make south at the same time with the general move; one from beverly, from ten to twelve thousand strong, under major-general ord; the other from charleston, va., principally cavalry, under brig.-general crook. the former of these will endeavor to reach the tennessee and virginia railroad, about south of covington, and if found practicable will work eastward to lynchburg and return to its base by way of the shenandoah valley, or join you. the other will strike at saltville, va., and come eastward to join ord. the cavalry from ord's command will try tributaries would furnish us an easy line over which to bring all supplies to within easy hauling distance of every position the army could occupy from the rapidan to the james river. but lee could, if he chose, detach or move his whole army north on a line rather interior to the one i would have to take in following. a movement by his left--our right--would obviate this; but all that was done would have to be done with the supplies and ammunition we started with. all idea of adopting this latter plan was abandoned when the limited quantity of supplies possible to take with us was considered. the country over which we would have to pass was so exhausted of all food or forage that we would be obliged to carry everything with us. while these preparations were going on the enemy was not entirely idle. in the west forrest made a raid in west tennessee up to the northern border, capturing the garrison of four or five hundred men at union city, and followed it up by an attack on paducah, kentucky, on the banks of the ohio. while he was able to enter the city he failed to capture the forts or any part of the garrison. on the first intelligence of forrest's raid i telegraphed sherman to send all his cavalry against him, and not to let him get out of the trap he had put himself into. sherman had anticipated me by sending troops against him before he got my order. forrest, however, fell back rapidly, and attacked the troops at fort pillow, a station for the protection of the navigation of the mississippi river. the garrison to force a passage southward, if they are successful in reaching the virginia and tennessee railroad, to cut the main lines of the road connecting richmond with all the south and south-west. gillmore will join butler with about 10,000 men from south carolina. butler can reduce his garrison so as to take 23,000 men into the field directly to his front. the force will be commanded by maj.-general w. f. smith. with smith and gillmore, butler will seize city point, and operate against richmond from the south side of the river. his movement will be simultaneous with yours. lee's army will be your objective point. wherever lee goes, there you will go also. the only point upon which i am now in doubt is, whether it will be better to cross the rapidan above or below him. each plan presents great advantages over the other with corresponding objections. by crossing above, lee is cut off from all chance of ignoring richmond and going north on a raid. but if we take this route, all we do must be done whilst the rations we start with hold out. we separate from butler so that he cannot be directed how to co-operate. by the other route brandy station can be used as a base of supplies until another is secured on the york or james rivers. these advantages and objections i will talk over with you more fully than i can write them. burnside with a force of probably 25,000 men will reinforce you. immediately upon his arrival, which will be shortly after the 20th inst., i will give him the defence of the road from bull run as far south as we wish to hold it. this will enable you to collect all your strength about brandy station and to the front. there will be naval co-operation on the james river, and transports and ferries will be provided so that should lee fall back into his intrenchments at richmond, butler's force and yours will be a unit, or at least can be made to act as such. what i would direct then, is that you commence at once reducing baggage to the very lowest possible standard. two wagons to a regiment of five hundred men is the greatest number that should be allowed, for all baggage, exclusive of subsistence stores and ordnance stores. one wagon to brigade and one to division headquarters is sufficient and about two to corps headquarters. should by lee's right flank be our route, you will want to make arrangements for having supplies of all sorts promptly forwarded to white house on the pamunkey. your estimates for this contingency should be made at once. if not wanted there, there is every probability they will be wanted on the james river or elsewhere. if lee's left is turned, large provision will have to be made for ordnance stores. i would say not much short of five hundred rounds of infantry ammunition would do. by the other, half the amount would be sufficient. u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. (*26) general john a. logan, upon whom devolved the command of the army of the tennessee during this battle, in his report gave our total loss in killed, wounded and missing at 3,521; and estimated that of the enemy to be not less than 10,000: and general g. m. dodge, graphically describing to general sherman the enemy's attack, the full weight of which fell first upon and was broken by his depleted command, remarks: "the disparity of forces can be seen from the fact that in the charge made by my two brigades under fuller and mersy they took 351 prisoners, representing forty-nine different regiments, eight brigades and three divisions; and brought back eight battle flags from the enemy." (*27) union army on the rapidan, may 5, 1864. [compiled.] lieutenant-general u. s. grant, commander-in-chief. major-general george g. meade, commanding army of the potomac. maj.-gen. w. s. hancock, commanding second army corps. first division, brig.-gen. francis c. barlow. first brigade, col. nelson a. miles. second brigade, col. thomas a. smyth. third brigade, col. paul frank. fourth brigade, col. john r. brooke. second division, brig.-gen. john gibbon. first brigade, brig.-gen. alex. s. webb. second brigade, brig.-gen. joshua t. owen. third brigade, col. samuel s. carroll. third division, maj.-gen. david b. birney. first brigade, brig.-gen. j. h. h. ward. second brigade, brig.-gen. alexander hays. fourth divisin, brig.-gen. gershom mott. first brigade, col. robert mcallister. second brigade, col. wm. r. brewster. artillery brigade, col. john c. tidball. maj.-gen. g. k. warren, commanding fifth army corps. first division, brig.-gen. charles griffin. first brigade, brig.-gen. romeyn b. ayres. second brigade, col. jacob b. sweitzer. third brigade, brig.-gen. j. j. bartlett. second division, brig.-gen. john c. robinson. first brigade, col. samuel h. leonard. second brigade, brig.-gen. henry baxter. third brigade, col. andrew w. denison. third division, brig.-gen. samuel w. crawford. first brigade, col. wm mccandless. third brigade, col. joseph w. fisher. fourth division, brig.-gen. james s. wadsworth. first brigade, brig.-gen. lysander cutler. second brigade brig.-gen. james c. rice. third brigade, col. roy stone artillery brigade, col. s. s. wainwright. maj.-gen. john sedgwick, commanding sixth army corps. first division, brig.-gen. h. g. wright. first brigade, col. henry w. brown. second brigade, col. emory upton. third brigade, brig.-gen. d. a. russell. fourth brigade, brig.-gen. alexander shaler. second division, brig.-gen. george w. getty. first brigade, brig.-gen. frank wheaton. second brigade, col. lewis a. grant. third brigade, brig.-gen. thos. h. neill. fourth brigade, brig.-gen. henry l. eustis. third division, brig.-gen. james ricketts. first brigade, brig.-gen. wm. h. morris. second brigade, brig.-gen. t. seymour. artillery brigade, col. c. h. tompkins maj.-gen. p. h. sheridan, commanding cavalry corps. first division, brig.-gen. a. t. a. torbert. first brigade, brig.-gen. g. a. custer. second brigade, col. thos. c. devin. reserve brigade, brig.-gen. wesley merritt second division, brig.-gen. d. mcm. gregg. first brigade, brig.-gen. henry e. davies, jr. second brigade, col. j. irvin gregg. third division, brig.-gen. j. h. wilson. first brigade, col. t. m. bryan, jr. second brigade, col. geo. h. chapman. maj.-gen. a. e. burnside, commanding ninth army corps. first division, brig.-gen. t. g. stevenson. first brigade, col. sumner carruth. second brigade, col. daniel leasure. second division, brig.-gen. robert b. potter. first brigade, col. zenas r. bliss. second brigade, col. simon g. griffin. third division, brig.-gen. orlando willcox. first brigade, col. john f. hartranft. second brigade, col. benj. c. christ. fourth division, brig.-gen. edward ferrero. first brigade, col. joshua k. sigfried. second brigade, col. henry g. thomas. provisional brigade, col. elisha g. marshall. brig.-gen. henry j. hunt, commanding artillery. reserve, col. h. s. burton. first brigade, col. j. h. kitching. second brigade, maj. j. a. tompkins. first brig. horse art., capt. j. m. robertson. second brigade, horse art., capt. d. r. ransom. third brigade, maj. r. h. fitzhugh. general headquarters....... provost guard, brig.-gen. m. r. patrick. volunteer engineers, brig.-gen. h. w. benham. confederate army. organization of the army of northern virginia, commanded by general robert e. lee, august 31st, 1834. first army corps: lieut.-gen. r. h. anderson, commanding. maj.-gen. geo. e. pickett's division. brig.-gen. seth m. barton's brigade. (a) brig.-gen. m. d. corse's " " eppa hunton's " " wm. r. terry's " maj.-gen. c. w. field's division. (b) brig.-gen. g. t. anderson's brigade " e. m. law's (c) " " john bratton's " maj.-gen. j. b. kershaw's division. (d) brig.-gen. w. t. wofford's brigade " b. g. humphreys' " " goode bryan's " " kershaw's (old) " second army corps: major-general jubal a. early, commanding maj.-gen. john b. gordon's division. brig.-gen. h. t. hays' brigade. (e) " john pegram 's " (f) " gordon's " (g) brig.-gen. r. f. hoke's " maj.-gen. edward johnson's division. stonewall brig. (brig.-gen. j. a. walker). (h) brig.-gen. j m jones' brigade. (h) " geo h. stewart's " (h) " l. a. stafford's " (e) maj.-gen. r. e. rodes' division. brig.-gen. j. daniel's brigade. (i) " geo. dole's " (k) " s. d. ramseur's brigade. " c. a. battle's " " r. d. johnston's " (f) third army corps: lieut.-gen. a. p. hill, commanding. maj.-gen. wm. mahone's division. (l) brig.-gen. j. c. c. sanders' brigade. mahone's " brig.-gen. n. h. harris's " (m) " a. r. wright's " " joseph finegan's " maj.-gen. c. m. wilcox's division. brig.-gen. e. l. thomas's brigade (n) " james h. lane's " " sam'l mccowan's " " alfred m. scale's " maj.-gen. h. heth's division. (o) brig.-gen. j. r. davis's brigade. " john r. cooke's " " d. mcrae's " " j. j. archer's " " h. h. walker's " _unattached_: 5th alabama battalion. cavalry corps: lieutenant-general wade hampton, commanding.(p) maj.-gen. fitzhugh lee's division brig.-gen. w. c. wickham's brigade " l. l. lomax's " maj.-gen. m. c. butler's division. brig.-gen. john dunovant's brigade. " p. m. b. young's " " thomas l. rosser's " maj.-gen. w. h. f. lee's division. brig.-gen. rufus barringer's brigade. " j. r. chambliss's " artillery reserve: brig.-gen. w. n. pendleton, commanding. brig.-gen. e. p. alexander's division.* cabell's battalion. manly's battery. 1st co. richmond howitzers. carleton's battery. calloway's battery. haskell's battalion. branch's battery. nelson's " garden's " rowan " huger's battalion. smith's battery. moody " woolfolk " parker's " taylor's " fickling's " martin's " gibb's battalion. davidson's battery. dickenson's " otey's " brig.-gen. a. l. long's division. braxton's battalion. lee battery. 1st md. artillery. stafford " alleghany " cutshaw's battalion. charlotteville artillery. staunton " courtney " carter's battalion. morris artillery. orange " king william artillery. jeff davis " nelson's battalion. amherst artillery. milledge " fluvauna " brown's battalion. powhatan artillery. 2d richmond howitzers. 3d " " rockbridge artillery. salem flying artillery. col r. l.walker's division. cutt's battalion. ross's battery. patterson's battery. irwin artillery. richardson's battalion. lewis artillery. donaldsonville artillery. norfolk light " huger " mclntosh 's battalion. johnson's battery. hardaway artillery. danville " 2d rockbridge artillery. pegram's battalion. peedee artillery. fredericksburg artillery. letcher " purcell battery. crenshaw's battery. poague's battalion. madison artillery. albemarle " brooke " charlotte " note. (a) col. w. r. aylett was in command aug. 29th, and probably at above date. (b) inspection report of this division shows that it also contained benning's and gregg's brigades. (c) commanded by colonel p. d. bowles. (d) only two brigadier-generals reported for duty; names not indicated. organization of the army of the valley district. (e) constituting york's brigade. (f) in ramseur's division. (g) evan's brigade, colonel e. n. atkinson commanding, and containing 12th georgia battalion. (h) the virginia regiments constituted terry's brigade, gordon's division. (i) grimes' brigade. (k) cook's " (l) returns report but one general officer present for duty; name not indicated. (m) colonel joseph m. jayne, commanding. (n) colonel thomas j. simmons, commanding. (o) four brigadier-generals reported present for duty; names not indicated. (p) on face of returns appears to have consisted of hampton's, fitz-lee's, and w. h. f. lee's division, and dearing's brigade. *but one general officer reported present for duty in the artillery, and alexander's name not on the original. (*28) headquarters armies u. s., may ii, 1864.--3 p.m. major-general meade, commanding army of the potomac. move three divisions of the 2d corps by the rear of the 5th and 6th corps, under cover of night, so as to join the 9th corps in a vigorous assault on the enemy at four o'clock a.m. to-morrow. will send one or two staff officers over to-night to stay with burnside, and impress him with the importance of a prompt and vigorous attack. warren and wright should hold their corps as close to the enemy as possible, to take advantage of any diversion caused by this attack, and to push in if any opportunity presents itself. there is but little doubt in my mind that the assault last evening would have proved entirely successful if it had commenced one hour earlier and had been heartily entered into by mott's division and the 9th corps. u. s. grant, lieut.-general. (*29) headquarters, armies u. s., may 11, 1864.-4 p.m. major-general a. e. burnside, commanding 9th army corps. major-general hancock has been ordered to move his corps under cover of night to join you in a vigorous attack against the enemy at 4 o'clock a.m. to-morrow. you will move against the enemy with your entire force promptly and with all possible vigor at precisely 4 o'clock a.m. to-morrow the 12th inst. let your preparations for this attack be conducted with the utmost secrecy and veiled entirely from the enemy. i send two of my staff officers, colonels comstock and babcock, in whom i have great confidence and who are acquainted with the direction the attack is to be made from here, to remain with you and general hancock with instructions to render you every assistance in their power. generals warren and wright will hold their corps as close to the enemy as possible, to take advantage of any diversion caused by yours and hancock's attack, and will push in their whole force if any opportunity presents itself. u. s. grant, lieut.-general. (*30) headquarters armies u. s., may 12, 1864, 6.30 p.m. major-general halleck, washington, d. c. the eighth day of the battle closes, leaving between three and four thousand prisoners in our hands for the day's work, including two general officers, and over thirty pieces of artillery. the enemy are obstinate, and seem to have found the last ditch. we have lost no organizations, not even that of a company, whilst we have destroyed and captured one division (johnson's), one brigade (doles'), and one regiment entire from the enemy. u. s. grant, lieut.-general. (*31) spottsylvania c. h., may 13, 1864. hon e. m. stanton, secretary of war, washington, d. c. i beg leave to recommend the following promotions be made for gallant and distinguished services in the last eight days' battles, to wit: brigadier-general h. g. wright and brigadier-general john gibbon to be major-generals; colonel s. s. carroll, 8th ohio volunteers colonel e. upton, 121st new york volunteers; colonel william mccandless, 2d pennsylvania reserves, to be brigadier-generals. i would also recommend major-general w. s. hancock for brigadier-general in the regular army. his services and qualifications are eminently deserving of this recognition. in making these recommendations i do not wish the claims of general g. m. dodge for promotion forgotten, but recommend his name to be sent in at the same time. i would also ask to have general wright assigned to the command of the sixth army corps. i would further ask the confirmation of general humphreys to the rank of major-general. general meade has more than met my most sanguine expectations. he and sherman are the fittest officers for large commands i have come in contact with. if their services can be rewarded by promotion to the rank of major-generals in the regular army the honor would be worthily bestowed, and i would feel personally gratified. i would not like to see one of these promotions at this time without seeing both. u. s. grant, lieut.-general. (*32) quarles' mills, va., may 26, 1864. major-general halleck, washington, d. c. the relative position of the two armies is now as follows: lee's right rests on a swamp east of the richmond and fredericksburg road and south of the north anna, his centre on the river at ox ford, and his left at little river with the crossings of little river guarded as far up as we have gone. hancock with his corps and one division of the 9th corps crossed at chesterfield ford and covers the right wing of lee's army. one division of the 9th corps is on the north bank of the anna at ox ford, with bridges above and below at points nearest to it where both banks are held by us, so that it could reinforce either wing of our army with equal facility. the 5th and 6th corps with one division of the 9th corps run from the south bank of the anna from a short distance above ox ford to little river, and parallel with and near to the enemy. to make a direct attack from either wing would cause a slaughter of our men that even success would not justify. to turn the enemy by his right, between the two annas is impossible on account of the swamp upon which his right rests. to turn him by the left leaves little river, new found river and south anna river, all of them streams presenting considerable obstacles to the movement of our army, to be crossed. i have determined therefore to turn the enemy's right by crossing at or near hanover town. this crosses all three streams at once, and leaves us still where we can draw supplies. during the last night the teams and artillery not in position, belonging to the right wing of our army, and one division of that wing were quietly withdrawn to the north bank of the river and moved down to the rear of the left. as soon as it is dark this division with most of the cavalry will commence a forced march for hanover town to seize and hold the crossings. the balance of the right wing will withdraw at the same hour, and follow as rapidly as possible. the left wing will also withdraw from the south bank of the river to-night and follow in rear of the right wing. lee's army is really whipped. the prisoners we now take show it, and the action of his army shows it unmistakably. a battle with them outside of intrenchments cannot be had. our men feel that they have gained the morale over the enemy, and attack him with confidence. i may be mistaken, but i feel that our success over lee's army is already assured. the promptness and rapidity with which you have forwarded reinforcements has contributed largely to the feeling of confidence inspired in our men, and to break down that of the enemy. we are destroying all the rails we can on the central and fredericksburg roads. i want to leave a gap on the roads north of richmond so big that to get a single track they will have to import rail from elsewhere. even if a crossing is not effected at hanover town it will probably be necessary for us to move on down the pamunkey until a crossing is effected. i think it advisable therefore to change our base of supplies from port royal to the white house. i wish you would direct this change at once, and also direct smith to put the railroad bridge there in condition for crossing troops and artillery and leave men to hold it. u. s. grant, lieut.-general. (*33) near cold harbor, june 3, 1864, 7 a.m. major-general meade, commanding a. p. the moment it becomes certain that an assault cannot succeed, suspend the offensive; but when one does succeed, push it vigorously and if necessary pile in troops at the successful point from wherever they can be taken. i shall go to where you are in the course of an hour. u. s. grant, lieut.-general. (*34) cold harbor, june 5,1864. major-general halleck, chief of staff of the army, washington, d. c. a full survey of all the ground satisfies me that it would be impracticable to hold a line north-east of richmond that would protect the fredericksburg railroad to enable us to use that road for supplying the army. to do so would give us a long vulnerable line of road to protect, exhausting much of our strength to guard it, and would leave open to the enemy all of his lines of communication on the south side of the james. my idea from the start has been to beat lee's army if possible north of richmond; then after destroying his lines of communication on the north side of the james river to transfer the army to the south side and besiege lee in richmond, or follow him south if he should retreat. i now find, after over thirty days of trial, the enemy deems it of the first importance to run no risks with the armies they now have. they act purely on the defensive behind breastworks, or feebly on the offensive immediately in front of them, and where in case of repulse they can instantly retire behind them. without a greater sacrifice of human life than i am willing to make all cannot be accomplished that i had designed outside of the city. i have therefore resolved upon the following plan: i will continue to hold substantially the ground now occupied by the army of the potomac, taking advantage of any favorable circumstance that may present itself until the cavalry can be sent west to destroy the virginia central railroad from about beaver dam for some twenty-five or thirty miles west. when this is effected i will move the army to the south side of the james river, either by crossing the chickahominy and marching near to city point, or by going to the mouth of the chickahominy on north side and crossing there. to provide for this last and most possible contingency, several ferry-boats of the largest class ought to be immediately provided. once on the south side of the james river, i can cut off all sources of supply to the enemy except what is furnished by the canal. if hunter succeeds in reaching lynchburg, that will be lost to him also. should hunter not succeed, i will still make the effort to destroy the canal by sending cavalry up the south side of the river with a pontoon train to cross wherever they can. the feeling of the two armies now seems to be that the rebels can protect themselves only by strong intrenchments, whilst our army is not only confident of protecting itself without intrenchments, but that it can beat and drive the enemy wherever and whenever he can be found without this protection. u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. (*35) cold harbor, va., june 6, 1864. major-general d. hunter commanding dept. w. va. general sheridan leaves here to-morrow morning, with instructions to proceed to charlottesville, va., and to commence there the destruction of the va. cen. r. r., destroying this way as much as possible. the complete destruction of this road and of the canal on james river is of great importance to us. according to the instructions i sent to general halleck for your guidance, you were to proceed to lynchburg and commence there. it would be of great value to us to get possession of lynchburg for a single day. but that point is of so much importance to the enemy, that in attempting to get it such resistance may be met as to defeat your getting onto the road or canal at all. i see, in looking over the letter to general halleck on the subject of your instructions, that it rather indicates that your route should be from staunton via charlottesville. if you have so understood it, you will be doing just what i want. the direction i would now give is, that if this letter reaches you in the valley between staunton and lynchburg, you immediately turn east by the most practicable road. from thence move eastward along the line of the road, destroying it completely and thoroughly, until you join general sheridan. after the work laid out for general sheridan and yourself is thoroughly done, proceed to join the army of the potomac by the route laid out in general sheridan's instructions. if any portion of your force, especially your cavalry, is needed back in your department, you are authorized to send it back. if on receipt of this you should be near to lynchburg and deem it practicable to detach a cavalry force to destroy the canal. lose no opportunity to destroy the canal. u. s. grant, lieut.-general. (*36) from a statement of losses compiled in the adjutant-general's office. field of action and date. | killed. | wounded. | missing. | aggregate. | wilderness, may 5th to 7th | 2,261 | 8,785 | 2,902 |13,948 | spottsylvania, may 8th to 21st | 2,271 | 9,360 | 1,970 | 13,601| north anna, may 23d to 27th | 186 | 792 | 165 | 1,143 | totopotomoy, may 27th to 31st | 99 | 358 | 52 | 509 | cold harbor, may 31st to june 12th | 1,769 | 6,752 | 1,537 |10,058 | total ................ | 6,586 | 26,047 | 6,626 | 39,259 | (*37) city point, va., june 17, 1864. 11 a.m. major-gen. halleck, washington, d. c. * * * * * * * the enemy in their endeavor to reinforce petersburg abandoned their intrenchments in front of bermuda hundred. they no doubt expected troops from north of the james river to take their place before we discovered it. general butler took advantage of this and moved a force at once upon the railroad and plank road between richmond and petersburg, which i hope to retain possession of. too much credit cannot be given to the troops and their commanders for the energy and fortitude displayed during the last five days. day and night has been all the same, no delays being allowed on any account. u. s. grant, lieut.-general. (*38) city point, va., july 24, 1864. major-general meade, commanding, etc. the engineer officers who made a survey of the front from bermuda hundred report against the probability of success from an attack there. the chances they think will be better on burnside's front. if this is attempted it will be necessary to concentrate all the force possible at the point in the enemy's line we expect to penetrate. all officers should be fully impressed with the absolute necessity of pushing entirely beyond the enemy's present line, if they should succeed in penetrating it, and of getting back to their present line promptly if they should not succeed in breaking through. to the right and left of the point of assault all the artillery possible should be brought to play upon the enemy in front during the assault. their lines would be sufficient for the support of the artillery, and all the reserves could be brought on the flanks of their commands nearest to the point of assault, ready to follow in if successful. the field artillery and infantry held in the lines during the first assault should be in readiness to move at a moment's notice either to their front or to follow the main assault, as they should receive orders. one thing, however, should be impressed on corps commanders. if they see the enemy giving away on their front or moving from it to reinforce a heavily assaulted portion of their line, they should take advantage of such knowledge and act promptly without waiting for orders from army commanders. general ord can co-operate with his corps in this movement, and about five thousand troops from bermuda hundred can be sent to reinforce you or can be used to threaten an assault between the appomattox and james rivers, as may be deemed best. this should be done by tuesday morning, if done at all. if not attempted, we will then start at the date indicated to destroy the railroad as far as hicksford at least, and to weldon if possible. * * * * * * * whether we send an expedition on the road or assault at petersburg, burnside's mine will be blown up.... u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. (*39) see letter, august 5th, appendix. (*40) see appendix, letters of oct. 11th. (*41) city point, va., december 2,1864. major-general thomas, nashville tenn. if hood is permitted to remain quietly about nashville, you will lose all the road back to chattanooga and possibly have to abandon the line of the tennessee. should he attack you it is all well, but if he does not you should attack him before he fortifies. arm and put in the trenches your quartermaster employees, citizens, etc. u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. city point, va., december 2, 1864.--1.30 p.m. major-general thomas, nashville, tenn. with your citizen employees armed, you can move out of nashville with all your army and force the enemy to retire or fight upon ground of your own choosing. after the repulse of hood at franklin, it looks to me that instead of falling back to nashville we should have taken the offensive against the enemy where he was. at this distance, however, i may err as to the best method of dealing with the enemy. you will now suffer incalculable injury upon your railroads if hood is not speedily disposed of. put forth therefore every possible exertion to attain this end. should you get him to retreating give him no peace. u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. city point, va., december 5, 1864. major-general thomas, nashville, tenn. is there not danger of forrest moving down the cumberland to where he can cross it? it seems to me whilst you should be getting up your cavalry as rapidly as possible to look after forrest, hood should be attacked where he is. time strengthens him in all possibility as much as it does you. u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. city point, va., december 6, 1864--4 p.m. major-general thomas, nashville, tenn. attack hood at once and wait no longer for a remnant of your cavalry. there is great danger of delay resulting in a campaign back to the ohio river. u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. city point, va., december 8, 1864.--8.30 p.m. major-general thomas, nashville, tenn. your dispatch of yesterday received. it looks to me evident the enemy are trying to cross the cumberland river, and are scattered. why not attack at once? by all means avoid the contingency of a foot race to see which, you or hood, can beat to the ohio. if you think necessary call on the governors of states to send a force into louisville to meet the enemy if he should cross the river. you clearly never should cross except in rear of the enemy. now is one of the finest opportunities ever presented of destroying one of the three armies of the enemy. if destroyed he never can replace it. use the means at your command, and you can do this and cause a rejoicing that will resound from one end of the land to the other. u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. city point, va., december 11, 1864.--4 p.m. major-general thomas, nashville, tenn. if you delay attack longer the mortifying spectacle will be witnessed of a rebel army moving for the ohio river, and you will be forced to act, accepting such weather as you find. let there be no further delay. hood cannot even stand a drawn battle so far from his supplies of ordnance stores. if he retreats and you follow, he must lose his material and much of his army. i am in hopes of receiving a dispatch from you to-day announcing that you have moved. delay no longer for weather or reinforcements. u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. washington, d. c., december 15, 1864. major-general thomas, nashville, tenn. i was just on my way to nashville, but receiving a dispatch from van duzer detailing your splendid success of to-day, i shall go no further. push the enemy now and give him no rest until he is entirely destroyed. your army will cheerfully suffer many privations to break up hood's army and render it useless for future operations. do not stop for trains or supplies, but take them from the country as the enemy have done. much is now expected. u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. (*42) see orders to major-general meade, ord, and sheridan, march 24th, appendix. (*43) see appendix. (*44) note.--the fac-simile of the terms of lee's surrender inserted at this place, was copied from the original document furnished the publishers through the courtesy of general ely s. parker, military secretary on general grant's staff at the time of the surrender. three pages of paper were prepared in general grant's manifold order book on which he wrote the terms, and the interlineations and erasures were added by general parker at the suggestion of general grant. after such alteration it was handed to general lee, who put on his glasses, read it, and handed it back to general grant. the original was then transcribed by general parker upon official headed paper and a copy furnished general lee. the fac-simile herewith shows the color of the paper of the original document and all interlineations and erasures. there is a popular error to the effect that generals grant and lee each signed the articles of surrender. the document in the form of a letter was signed only by general grant, in the parlor of mclean's house while general lee was sitting in the room, and general lee immediately wrote a letter accepting the terms and handed it to general grant. proofreading team. a compilation of the messages and papers of the presidents by james d. richardson a representative from the state of tennessee volume vii ulysses s. grant prefatory note the election of general grant to the presidency by the people of the united states was another instance illustrating the gratitude of a republic to a successful soldier. but for the great civil war no one supposes he would ever have been elevated to this exalted post. his services in that heroic struggle were such as to win the highest encomiums from his countrymen, and naturally at the first opportunity after the closing of the war when a chief executive was to be chosen they turned their eyes to the most conspicuous figure in that war and made him president of the united states. this volume, the seventh of the series, comprises his eight years and the four years of his successor, mr. hayes. during this period of twelve years--that is, from march 4, 1869, to march 4, 1881--the legislation for the restoration of the southern states to their original positions in the union was enacted, the reunion of the states was perfected, and all sections of the land again given full and free representation in congress. much of the bitterness engendered by the war, and which had been left alive at its closing, and which was not diminished to any appreciable extent during president johnson's term, was largely assuaged during president grant's administration, and under that of president hayes was further softened and almost entirely dissipated. it will be seen that president grant in his papers dwelt especially upon the duty of paying the national debt in gold and returning to specie payments; that he urged upon congress a proposition to annex santo domingo; that during his administration the "quaker peace commission" was appointed to deal with the indians, the fifteenth amendment to the constitution of the united states was proclaimed, the treaty of washington was negotiated, and, with a subsequent arbitration at geneva, a settlement was provided of the difficulties relating to the alabama claims and the fisheries; that in 1870 and frequently afterwards he urged upon congress the need of reform in the civil service. his appeals secured the passage of the law of march 3, 1871, under which he appointed a civil service commission. this commission framed rules, which were approved by the president. they provided for open competitive examination, and went into effect january 1, 1872; and out of these grew the present civil-service rules. one of his most important papers was the message vetoing the "inflation bill." the closing months of his public life covered the stormy and exciting period following the presidential election of 1876, when the result as between mr. tilden and mr. hayes was so long in doubt. there is very little, however, in any presidential paper of that period to indicate the great peril to the country and the severe strain to which our institutions were subjected in that memorable contest. the administration of mr. hayes, though it began amid exciting scenes and an unprecedented situation which threatened disasters, was rather marked by moderation and a sympathy with what he considered true reform. some of his vetoes are highly interesting, and indicate independence of character and that he was not always controlled by mere party politics. one of the most famous and best remembered of his messages is that vetoing the bland-allison act, which restored the legal-tender quality to the silver dollar and provided for its limited coinage. other papers of interest are his message recommending the resumption of specie payments; vetoes of a bill to restrict chinese immigration, of an army appropriation bill, of a legislative, executive, and judicial appropriation bill, and of the act known as the "funding act of 1881." it was during mr. hayes's administration, when the forty-fifth congress met in extraordinary session on march 18, 1879, that for the first time since the congress that was chosen with mr. buchanan in 1856 the democratic party was in control of both houses. james d. richardson, february 22, 1898. ulysses s. grant march 4, 1869, to march 4, 1877 ulysses s. grant ulysses s. grant was born at point pleasant, clermont county, ohio, april 27, 1822. he was of scotch ancestry, but his family had been american in all its branches for several generations. was a descendant of mathew grant, who arrived at dorchester, mass., in may, 1630. his father was jesse r. grant and his mother hannah simpson; they were married in clermont county, ohio, in june, 1821. in the fall of 1823 his parents removed to georgetown, the county seat of brown county, ohio. ulysses, the eldest of six children, spent his boyhood in assisting his father on the farm, which was more congenial than working in the tannery of which his father was proprietor. from an early age until 17 years old attended the subscription schools of georgetown, except during the winters of 1836-37 and 1838-39, which were spent at schools in maysville, ky., and ripley, ohio. in the spring of 1839, at the age of 17, was appointed to a cadetship in the military academy at west point by thomas l. hamer, a member of congress, and entered the academy july 1, 1839. the name given him at birth was hiram ulysses, but he was always called by his middle name. mr. hamer, thinking ulysses his first name, and that his middle name was probably that of his mother's family, inserted in the official appointment the name of ulysses s. grant. the officials of the academy were notified by cadet grant of the error, but they did not feel authorized to correct it, and it was acquiesced in and became the name by which he was always known. graduated from the academy in 1843, twenty-first in a class of thirty-nine members. was attached to the fourth united states infantry as brevet second lieutenant july 1, 1843; was appointed second lieutenant, seventh infantry, september 30, 1845, and transferred to the fourth infantry november 15, 1845. during the mexican war (1846-1848) took part with his regiment in active service, and was in all the battles fought by generals scott and taylor except that of buena vista. was brevetted for gallant conduct at the battles of palo alto and resaca de la palma, but declined the honor. at the battle of monterey distinguished himself by volunteering to run the gantlet and bring ammunition for the troops into the city. september 8, 1847, was appointed brevet first lieutenant for gallant conduct at molino del rey. acted as regimental quartermaster april 1, 1847, to july 23, 1848, and from november 17, 1848, to august 5, 1853. september 13, 1847, was brevetted captain for gallant conduct at the battle of chapultepec, and on september 16 was appointed first lieutenant. at san cosme was mentioned in special orders by his commanders--regimental, brigade, and division. after the mexican war his regiment was sent to pascagoula, miss., and afterwards to sacketts harbor, n.y., and detroit, mich. august 22, 1848, married miss julia dent, of st. louis, mo. in 1852 his regiment was sent to the pacific coast. august 5, 1853, was appointed captain. resigned july 31, 1854, and went to live on a farm near st. louis, but in 1858 gave up farming on account of his health, and entered into the real-estate business in st. louis. in may, 1860, removed to galena, ill., and became a clerk in his father's store. in april, 1861, after president lincoln's call for troops, presided at a public meeting in galena, which resulted in the organization of a company of volunteers, which he drilled and accompanied to springfield, ill. was employed by governor yates in the adjutant-general's office, and appointed mustering officer. offered his services to the national government in a letter written may 24, 1861, but no answer was ever made to it. june 17, 1861, was appointed colonel of the twenty-first illinois volunteers, and served until august 7, when he was appointed brigadier-general of volunteers by the president, his commission to date from may 17, 1861. was assigned september 1 to command the district of southeastern missouri. september 4 established his headquarters at cairo, and on the 6th captured paducah, ky. february 2, 1862, advanced from cairo; on the 6th captured fort henry, and on the 16th fort donelson. soon afterwards was made a major-general of volunteers, his commission dating from february 16. march 4 was relieved from his command and ordered to remain at fort henry, but on the 13th was restored. commanded at the battle of shiloh, april 6 and 7, 1862. general halleck on april 11 assumed command of the combined armies, and general grant became second in command during the advance upon and the siege of corinth. in july halleck became general in chief of all the armies, and general grant was placed in command of the district of west tennessee. in september fought the battle of iuka, miss., and in october the battle of corinth. january 29, 1863, moved down the mississippi river and took command of the troops opposite vicksburg. on march 29 sent one corps of his army across the peninsula opposite vicksburg, and on april 16 ran the batteries with seven gunboats and three transports. april 22 six other transports ran the batteries. his army was now below vicksburg, and on the 29th bombarded grand gulf. may 1 fought the battle at port gibson, and on may 3 captured grand gulf. may 12 defeated the confederates at raymond; and on the 14th captured jackson, miss. after several engagements the confederates were driven by him into vicksburg, when he began the siege of that city, which was surrendered july 4, 1863. on the same day was commissioned a major-general in the united states army. in august went to new orleans to confer with general banks, and while reviewing the troops there was injured by his horse falling on him. about the middle of october was assigned to the command of the military division of the mississippi, which included rosecran's army at chattanooga, tenn. arrived at chattanooga october 23, and the next day issued orders which resulted in the battle of wauhatchie on the 29th. attacked the confederates under general bragg on november 23, and after three days' fighting captured missionary ridge, whereupon the confederates retreated to dalton, ga. for his successes congress, in december, 1863, passed a resolution of thanks to him and the officers and soldiers of his command, and presented him with a gold medal. the bill restoring the grade of lieutenant-general became a law in february, 1864, and on march 1 he was nominated for the position and was confirmed the succeeding day. on march 12 assumed command of all the armies of the united states, and immediately began the plan of campaign that kept all of the armies in motion until the war ended. about may 4, 1864, this campaign, the greatest of the war, began, and lasted until the surrender of the confederates in april, 1865. during this period there were fought some of the bloodiest battles of the world. on april 9, 1865, general lee surrendered his army at appomattox, va., to general grant, who then displayed the greatest magnanimity to the confederates, and won for himself from his late enemies their warmest gratitude. his magnanimity will always be remembered by the confederate soldiers, and will stand in history as long as nobility of character shall be appreciated by mankind. on the closing of the war directed his attention to mustering out of service the great army under his command and the disposal of the enormous quantity of stores of the government. in the discharge of his duties visited different sections of the country and was received everywhere with enthusiasm. the citizens of philadelphia presented him with a handsome residence in that city; his old neighbors in galena gave him a pretty home in their town; the people of new york presented to him a check for $105,000. in november and december, 1865, traveled through the southern states, and made a report to the president upon the conditions there. in may, 1866, submitted a plan to the government for the reorganization of the regular army of the united states, which became the basis of its reorganization. july 25 congress passed an act creating the grade of general of the armies of the united states, and on the same day he was appointed to this rank. august 12, 1867, was appointed by president johnson secretary of war _ad interim_, which position he held until january 14, 1868. at the national convention of the republican party which met in chicago on may 20, 1868, was unanimously nominated for president on the first call of states. his letter of acceptance of that nomination was brief, and contained the famous sentence, "let us have peace." at the election in november was chosen to be president, receiving 214 electoral votes, while horatio seymour received 80. was renominated by his party in national convention in philadelphia june 6, 1872, and at the election in november received 286 electoral votes, against 66 which would have been cast for horace greeley if he had lived. retired from office march 4, 1877. after his retirement made a journey into foreign countries, and was received with great distinction and pomp by all the governments and peoples he visited. an earnest effort was made to nominate him for a third term, but it failed. by special act of congress passed march 3, 1885, was placed as general on the retired list of the army. he died july 23, 1885, at mount mcgregor, n.y., and was buried at riverside park, new york city, on the hudson river. first inaugural address. _citizens of the united states_: your suffrages having elected me to the office of president of the united states, i have, in conformity to the constitution of our country, taken the oath of office prescribed therein. i have taken this oath without mental reservation and with the determination to do to the best of my ability all that is required of me. the responsibilities of the position i feel, but accept them without fear. the office has come to me unsought; i commence its duties untrammeled. i bring to it a conscious desire and determination to fill it to the best of my ability to the satisfaction of the people. on all leading questions agitating the public mind i will always express my views to congress and urge them according to my judgment, and when i think it advisable will exercise the constitutional privilege of interposing a veto to defeat measures which i oppose; but all laws will be faithfully executed, whether they meet my approval or not. i shall on all subjects have a policy to recommend, but none to enforce against the will of the people. laws are to govern all alike--those opposed as well as those who favor them. i know no method to secure the repeal of bad or obnoxious laws so effective as their stringent execution. the country having just emerged from a great rebellion, many questions will come before it for settlement in the next four years which preceding administrations have never had to deal with. in meeting these it is desirable that they should be approached calmly, without prejudice, hate, or sectional pride, remembering that the greatest good to the greatest number is the object to be attained. this requires security of person, property, and free religious and political opinion in every part of our common country, without regard to local prejudice. all laws to secure these ends will receive my best efforts for their enforcement. a great debt has been contracted in securing to us and our posterity the union. the payment of this, principal and interest, as well as the return to a specie basis as soon as it can be accomplished without material detriment to the debtor class or to the country at large, must be provided for. to protect the national honor, every dollar of government indebtedness should be paid in gold, unless otherwise expressly stipulated in the contract. let it be understood that no repudiator of one farthing of our public debt will be trusted in public place, and it will go far toward strengthening a credit which ought to be the best in the world, and will ultimately enable us to replace the debt with bonds bearing less interest than we now pay. to this should be added a faithful collection of the revenue, a strict accountability to the treasury for every dollar collected, and the greatest practicable retrenchment in expenditure in every department of government. when we compare the paying capacity of the country now, with the ten states in poverty from the effects of war, but soon to emerge, i trust, into greater prosperity than ever before, with its paying capacity twenty-five years ago, and calculate what it probably will be twenty-five years hence, who can doubt the feasibility of paying every dollar then with more ease than we now pay for useless luxuries? why, it looks as though providence had bestowed upon us a strong box in the precious metals locked up in the sterile mountains of the far west, and which we are now forging the key to unlock, to meet the very contingency that is now upon us. ultimately it may be necessary to insure the facilities to reach these riches, and it may be necessary also that the general government should give its aid to secure this access; but that should only be when a dollar of obligation to pay secures precisely the same sort of dollar to use now, and hot before. whilst the question of specie payments is in abeyance the prudent business man is careful about contracting debts payable in the distant future. the nation should follow the same rule. a prostrate commerce is to be rebuilt and all industries encouraged. the young men of the country--those who from their age must be its rulers twenty-five years hence--have a peculiar interest in maintaining the national honor. a moment's reflection as to what will be our commanding influence among the nations of the earth in their day, if they are only true to themselves, should inspire them with national pride. all divisions--geographical, political, and religious--can join in this common sentiment. how the public debt is to be paid or specie payments resumed is not so important as that a plan should be adopted and acquiesced in. a united determination to do is worth more than divided counsels upon the method of doing. legislation upon this subject may not be necessary now, nor even advisable, but it will be when the civil law is more fully restored in all parts of the country and trade resumes its wonted channels. it will be my endeavor to execute all laws in good faith, to collect all revenues assessed, and to have them properly accounted for and economically disbursed. i will to the best of my ability appoint to office those only who will carry out this design. in regard to foreign policy, i would deal with nations as equitable law requires individuals to deal with each other, and i would protect the law-abiding citizen, whether of native or foreign birth, wherever his rights are jeopardized or the flag of our country floats. i would respect the rights of all nations, demanding equal respect for our own. if others depart from this rule in their dealings with us, we may be compelled to follow their precedent. the proper treatment of the original occupants of this land--the indians--is one deserving of careful study. i will favor any course toward them which tends to their civilization and ultimate citizenship. the question of suffrage is one which is likely to agitate the public so long as a portion of the citizens of the nation are excluded from its privileges in any state. it seems to me very desirable that this question should be settled now, and i entertain the hope and express the desire that it may be by the ratification of the fifteenth article of amendment to the constitution. in conclusion i ask patient forbearance one toward another throughout the land, and a determined effort on the part of every citizen to do his share toward cementing a happy union; and i ask the prayers of the nation to almighty god in behalf of this consummation. march 4, 1869. [note.--the forty-first congress, first session, met march 4, 1869, in accordance with the act of january 22, 1867.] special messages. washington, d.c., _march 6, 1869_. _to the senate of the united states:_ since the nomination and confirmation of alexander t. stewart to the office of secretary of the treasury i find that by the eighth section of the act of congress approved september 2, 1789, it is provided as follows, to wit: _and be it further enacted_, that no person appointed to any office instituted by this act shall, directly or indirectly, be concerned or interested in carrying on the business of trade or commerce; or be owner, in whole or in part, of any sea vessel; or purchase, by himself or another in trust for him, any public lands or other public property; or be concerned in the purchase or disposal of any public securities of any state or of the united states; or take or apply to his own use any emolument or gain for negotiating or transacting any business in the said department other than what shall be allowed by law; and if any person shall offend against any of the prohibitions of this act he shall be deemed guilty of a high misdemeanor and forfeit to the united states the penalty of $3,000, and shall upon conviction be removed from office and forever thereafter incapable of holding any office under the united states: _provided_, that if any other person than a public prosecutor shall give information of any such offense, upon which a prosecution and conviction shall be had, one-half the aforesaid penalty of $3,000, when recovered, shall be for the use of the person giving such information. in view of these provisions and the fact that mr. stewart has been unanimously confirmed by the senate, i would ask that he be exempted by joint resolution of the two houses of congress from the operations of the same. u.s. grant. washington, _march 9, 1869_. _to the senate of the united states:_ i transmit to the senate, in compliance with its resolution of the 5th instant, a report from the secretary of state, communicating a list of the public and private acts and resolutions passed at the third session of the fortieth congress which have become laws, either by approval or otherwise. u.s. grant. washington, _march 9, 1869_. _to the senate of the united states:_ i have the honor to request to be permitted to withdraw from the senate of the united states my message of the 6th instant, requesting the passage of a joint resolution of the two houses of congress to relieve the secretary of the treasury from the disabilities imposed by section 8 of the act of congress approved september 2, 1789. u.s. grant. washington, _march 15, 1869_. _to the senate and house of representatives:_ i invite the attention of congress to the accompanying communication[1] of this date, which i have received from the secretary of the interior. u.s. grant. [footnote 1: report of the government directors of the union pacific railroad relative to an injunction issued by judge barnard, of the supreme court of the city of new york, restraining and prohibiting an election of officers or directors on the day directed by the law of december 20, 1867.] washington, _march 16, 1869_. _to the senate of the united states:_ in compliance with the resolution of the senate of the 11th instant, asking if the first installment due from the government of venezuela pursuant to the convention of april 25, 1866, has been paid, i transmit a report from the secretary of state, to whom the resolution was referred. u.s. grant. washington, _march 24, 1869_. _to the senate of the united states:_ i transmit to the senate, in answer to their resolution of the 1st instant, a report from the secretary of state, together with accompanying papers.[2] u.s. grant. [footnote 2: correspondence with the united states minister and the secretary of legation at madrid.] washington, _march 29, 1869_. _to the senate of the united states:_ in compliance with the request contained in the resolution of the senate of the 17th instant, in regard to certain correspondence[3] between james buchanan, then president of the united states, and lewis cass, secretary of state, i transmit a report from the department of state, which is accompanied by a copy of the correspondence referred to. u.s. grant. [footnote 3: regarding the policy to be pursued to avert civil war, then threatening, which correspondence led to the resignation of mr. cass.] washington, _march 31, 1869_. _to the house of representatives:_ in compliance with a resolution of the house of representatives of the 30th of january last, calling for the papers relative to the claim of owen thorn and others against the british government, i transmit a report from the secretary of state, together with copies of the papers referred to in said resolution. u.s. grant. washington, _april 3, 1869_. _to the house of representatives:_ in answer to the resolution of the house of representatives of the 28th of january last, requesting information concerning the destruction during the late war by rebel vessels of certain merchant vessels of the united states, and concerning the damages and claims resulting therefrom, i transmit a report from the secretary of state and the tabular statement which accompanied it. u.s. grant. washington, d.c., _april 5, 1869_. _to the senate of the united states:_ i transmit herewith, for the constitutional action of the senate, certain articles of agreement made and concluded at the kaw indian agency, kans., on the 13th ultimo, between the commissioners on the part of the united states and certain chiefs or headmen of the kansas or kaw tribe of indians on behalf of said tribe, together with a letter from the secretary of the interior, to which attention is invited. u.s. grant. washington, _april 7, 1869_. _to the senate of the united states:_ in answer to the resolution of the senate of the 27th of may last, in relation to the subject of claims against great britain, i transmit a report from the secretary of state and the papers which accompanied it. u.s. grant. washington, d.c., _april 7, 1869_. _to the senate and house of representatives:_ while i am aware that the time in which congress proposes now to remain in session is very brief, and that it is its desire, as far as is consistent with the public interest, to avoid entering upon the general business of legislation, there is one subject which concerns so deeply the welfare of the country that i deem it my duty to bring it before you. i have no doubt that you will concur with me in the opinion that it is desirable to restore the states which were engaged in the rebellion to their proper relations to the government and the country at as early a period as the people of those states shall be found willing to become peaceful and orderly communities and to adopt and maintain such constitutions and laws as will effectually secure the civil and political rights of all persons within their borders. the authority of the united states, which has been vindicated and established by its military power, must undoubtedly be asserted for the absolute protection of all its citizens in the full enjoyment of the freedom and security which is the object of a republican government; but whenever the people of a rebellious state are ready to enter in good faith upon the accomplishment of this object, in entire conformity with the constitutional authority of congress, it is certainly desirable that all causes of irritation should be removed as promptly as possible, that a more perfect union may be established and the country be restored to peace and prosperity. the convention of the people of virginia which met in richmond on tuesday, december 3, 1867, framed a constitution for that state, which was adopted by the convention on the 17th of april, 1868, and i desire respectfully to call the attention of congress to the propriety of providing by law for the holding of an election in that state at some time during the months of may and june next, under the direction of the military commander of that district, at which the question of the adoption of that constitution shall be submitted to the citizens of the state; and if this should seem desirable, i would recommend that a separate vote be taken upon such parts as may be thought expedient, and that at the same time and under the same authority there shall be an election for the officers provided under such constitution, and that the constitution, or such parts thereof as shall have been adopted by the people, be submitted to congress on the first monday of december next for its consideration, so that if the same is then approved the necessary steps will have been taken for the restoration of the state of virginia to its proper relations to the union. i am led to make this recommendation from the confident hope and belief that the people of that state are now ready to cooperate with the national government in bringing it again into such relations to the union as it ought as soon as possible to establish and maintain, and to give to all its people those equal rights under the law which were asserted in the declaration of independence in the words of one of the most illustrious of its sons. i desire also to ask the consideration of congress to the question whether there is not just ground for believing that the constitution framed by a convention of the people of mississippi for that state, and once rejected, might not be again submitted to the people of that state in like manner, and with the probability of the same result. u.s. grant. proclamation. by the president of the united states of america. a proclamation. whereas objects of interest to the united states require that the senate should be convened at 12 o'clock on the 12th day of april, 1869, to receive and act upon such communications as may be made to it on the part of the executive: now, therefore, i, u.s. grant, president of the united states, have considered it to be my duty to issue this my proclamation, declaring that an extraordinary occasion requires the senate of the united states to convene for the transaction of business at the capitol, in the city of washington, on the 12th day of april, 1869, at 12 o'clock noon on that day, of which all who shall at that time be entitled to act as members of that body are hereby required to take notice. given under my hand and the seal of the united states, at washington, the 8th day of april, a.d. 1869, and of the independence of the united states of america the ninety-third. [seal.] u.s. grant. by the president: hamilton fish, _secretary of state_. special messages. washington, _april 16, 1869_. _to the senate of the united states_: i transmit to the senate, for consideration with a view to ratification, a convention between the united states and the emperor of the french, signed this day by the plenipotentiaries of the parties, for the mutual protection of trade-marks of their respective citizens and subjects. u.s. grant. washington, _april 21, 1869_. _to the senate of the united states_: i transmit to the senate, in answer to their resolution adopted in executive session on the 16th of february last, requesting copy of the official correspondence of mr. buchanan during his residence at st. petersburg as minister of the united states, a report from the secretary of state, with the accompanying papers. u.s. grant. proclamations. by the president of the united states of america. a proclamation. in pursuance of the provisions of the act of congress approved april 10, 1869, i hereby designate the 6th day of july, 1869, as the time for submitting the constitution passed by the convention which met in richmond, va., on tuesday, the 3d day of december, 1867, to the voters of said state registered at the date of such submission, viz, july 6, 1869, for ratification or rejection. and i submit to a separate vote the fourth clause of section i of article 3 of said constitution, which is in the following words: every person who has been a senator or representative in congress, or elector of president or vice-president, or who held any office, civil or military, under the united states, or under any state, who, having previously taken an oath as a member of congress, or as an officer of the united states, or as a member of any state legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any state, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. this clause shall include the following officers: governor, lieutenant-governor, secretary of state, auditor of public accounts, second auditor, register of the land office, state treasurer, attorney-general, sheriffs, sergeant of a city or town, commissioner of the revenue, county surveyors, constables, overseers of the poor, commissioner of the board of public works, judges of the supreme court, judges of the circuit court, judges of the court of hustings, justices of the county courts, mayor, recorder, alderman, councilmen of a city or town, coroners, escheators, inspectors of tobacco, flour, etc., clerks of the supreme, district, circuit, and county courts and of the court of hustings, and attorneys for the commonwealth: _provided_, that the legislature may, by a vote of three-fifths of both houses, remove the disabilities incurred by this clause from any person included therein, by a separate vote in each case. and i also submit to a separate vote the seventh section of article 3 of the said constitution, which is in the words following: in addition to the foregoing oath of office, the governor, lieutenant-governor, members of the general assembly, secretary of state, auditor of public accounts, state treasurer, attorney-general, and all persons elected to any convention to frame a constitution for this state or to amend or revise this constitution in any manner, and mayor and council of any city or town, shall, before they enter on the duties of their respective offices, take and subscribe the following oath or affirmation: _provided_, the disabilities therein contained may be individually removed by a three-fifths vote of the general assembly: "i do solemnly swear (or affirm) that i have never voluntarily borne arms against the united states since i have been a citizen thereof; that i have voluntarily given no aid, countenance, counsel, or encouragement to persons engaged in armed hostility thereto; that i have never sought nor accepted nor attempted to exercise the functions of any office whatever under any authority or pretended authority in hostility to the united states; that i have not yielded a voluntary support to any pretended government, authority, power, or constitution within the united states hostile or inimical thereto. and i do further swear (or affirm) that, to the best of my knowledge and ability, i will support and defend the constitution of the united states against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that i will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that i take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion, and that i will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which i am about to enter. so help me god." the above oath shall also be taken by all the city and county officers before entering upon their duties, and by all other state officers not included in the above provision. i direct the vote to be taken upon each of the above-cited provisions alone, and upon the other portions of the said constitution in the following manner, viz: each voter favoring the ratification of the constitution (excluding the provisions above quoted) as framed by the convention of december 3, 1867, shall express his judgment by voting for the constitution. each voter favoring the rejection of the constitution (excluding the provisions above quoted) shall express his judgment by voting against the constitution. each voter will be allowed to cast a separate ballot for or against either or both of the provisions above quoted. in testimony whereof i have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the united states to be affixed. done at the city of washington, this 14th day of may, a.d. 1869, and of the independence of the united states of america the ninety-third. u.s. grant. by the president: hamilton fish, _secretary of state_. by the president of the united states of america. a proclamation. whereas the act of congress approved june 25, 1868, constituted, on and after that date, eight hours a day's work for all laborers, workmen, and mechanics employed by or on behalf of the government of the united states, and repealed all acts and parts of acts inconsistent therewith: now, therefore, i, ulysses s. grant, president of the united states, do hereby direct that from and after this date no reduction shall be made in the wages paid by the government by the day to such laborers, workmen, and mechanics on account of such reduction of the hours of labor. in testimony whereof i have hereto set my hand and caused the seal of the united states to be affixed. done at the city of washington, this 19th day of may, a.d. 1869, and of the independence of the united states the ninety-third. u.s. grant. by the president: hamilton fish, _secretary of state_. by the president of the united states of america. a proclamation. whereas satisfactory evidence has been received by me from his majesty the emperor of france, through the count faverney, his chargã© d'affaires, that on and after this date the discriminating duties heretofore levied in french ports upon merchandise imported from the countries of its origin in vessels of the united states are to be discontinued and abolished: now, therefore, i, u.s. grant, president of the united states of america, by virtue of the authority vested in me by an act of congress of the 7th day of january, 1824, and by an act in addition thereto of the 24th day of may, 1828, do hereby declare and proclaim that on and after this date, so long as merchandise imported from the countries of its origin into french ports in vessels belonging to citizens of the united states is admitted into french ports on the terms aforesaid, the discriminating duties heretofore levied upon merchandise imported from the countries of its origin into ports of the united states in french vessels shall be, and are hereby, discontinued and abolished. in testimony whereof i have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the united states to be affixed. done at the city of washington, this 12th day of june, a.d. 1869, and of the independence of the united states of america the ninety-third. u.s. grant. by the president: hamilton fish, _secretary of state_. by the president of the united states of america. a proclamation. in pursuance of the provisions of the act of congress approved april 10, 1869, i hereby designate tuesday, the 30th day of november, 1869, as the time for submitting the constitution adopted on the 15th day of may, 1868, by the convention which met in jackson, miss., to the voters of said state registered at the date of such submission, viz, november 30, 1869. and i submit to a separate vote that part of section 3 of article vii of said constitution which is in the following words: that i am not disfranchised in any of the provisions of the acts known as the reconstruction acts of the thirty-ninth and fortieth congress, and that i admit the political and civil equality of all men. so help me god: _provided_, if congress shall at any time remove the disabilities of any person disfranchised in said reconstruction acts of the said thirty-ninth and fortieth congress (and the legislature of this state shall concur therein), then so much of this oath, and so much only, as refers to the said reconstruction acts shall not be required of such person so pardoned to entitle him to be registered. and i further submit to a separate vote section 5 of the same article of said constitution, which is in the following words: no person shall be eligible to any office of profit or trust, civil or military, in this state who, as a member of the legislature, voted for the call of the convention that passed the ordinance of secession, or who, as a delegate to any convention, voted for or signed any ordinance of secession, or who gave voluntary aid, countenance, counsel, or encouragement to persons engaged in armed hostility to the united states, or who accepted or attempted to exercise the functions of any office, civil or military, under any authority or pretended government, authority, power, or constitution within the united states hostile or inimical thereto, except all persons who aided reconstruction by voting for this convention or who have continuously advocated the assembling of this convention and shall continuously and in good faith advocate the acts of the same; but the legislature may remove such disability: _provided_, that nothing in this section, except voting for or signing the ordinance of secession, shall be so construed as to exclude from office the private soldier of the late so-called confederate states army. and i further submit to a separate vote section 5 of article xii of the said constitution, which is in the following words: the credit of the state shall not be pledged or loaned in aid of any person, association, or corporation; nor shall the state hereafter become a stockholder in any corporation or association. and i further submit to a separate vote part of the oath of office prescribed in section 26 of article xii of the said constitution, which is in the following words: that i have never, as a member of any convention, voted for or signed any ordinance of secession; that i have never, as a member of any state legislature, voted for the call of any convention that passed any such ordinance. the above oath shall also be taken by all the city and county officers before entering upon their duties, and by all other state officials not included in the above provision. i direct the vote to be taken upon each of the above-cited provisions alone, and upon the other portions of the said constitution in the following manner, viz: each voter favoring the ratification of the constitution (excluding the provisions above quoted), as adopted by the convention of may 15, 1868, shall express his judgment by voting for the constitution. each voter favoring the rejection of the constitution (excluding the provisions above quoted) shall express his judgment by voting against the constitution. each voter will be allowed to cast a separate ballot for or against either or both of the provisions above quoted. it is understood that sections 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, and 15 of article xiii, under the head of "ordinance," are considered as forming no part of the said constitution. in testimony whereof i have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the united states to be affixed. [seal.] done at the city of washington, this 13th day of july, a.d. 1869, and of the independence of the united states of america the ninety-fourth. u.s. grant. by the president: hamilton fish, _secretary of state_. by the president of the united states of america. a proclamation. in pursuance of the provisions of the act of congress approved april 10, 1869, i hereby designate tuesday, the 30th day of november, 1869, as the time for submitting the constitution adopted by the convention which met in austin, tex., on the 15th day of june, 1868, to the voters of said state registered at the date of such submission, viz: i direct the vote to be taken upon the said constitution in the following manner, viz: each voter favoring the ratification of the constitution as adopted by the convention of the 15th of june, 1868, shall express his judgment by voting for the constitution. each voter favoring the rejection of the constitution shall express his judgment by voting against the constitution. in testimony whereof i have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the united states to be affixed. [seal.] done at the city of washington, this 15th day of july, a.d. 1869, and of the independence of the united states of america the ninety-fourth. u.s. grant. by the president: hamilton fish, _secretary of state_. by the president of the united states of america. a proclamation. the year which is drawing to a close has been free from pestilence; health has prevailed throughout the land; abundant crops reward the labors of the husbandman; commerce and manufactures have successfully prosecuted their peaceful paths; the mines and forests have yielded liberally; the nation has increased in wealth and in strength; peace has prevailed, and its blessings have advanced every interest of the people in every part of the union; harmony and fraternal intercourse restored are obliterating the marks of past conflict and estrangement; burdens have been lightened; means have been increased; civil and religious liberty are secured to every inhabitant of the land, whose soil is trod by none but freemen. it becomes a people thus favored to make acknowledgment to the supreme author from whom such blessings flow of their gratitude and their dependence, to render praise and thanksgiving for the same, and devoutly to implore a continuance of god's mercies. therefore i, ulysses s. grant, president of the united states, do recommend that thursday, the 18th day of november next, be observed as a day of thanksgiving and of praise and of prayer to almighty god, the creator and the ruler of the universe; and i do further recommend to all the people of the united states to assemble on that day in their accustomed places of public worship and to unite in the homage and praise due to the bountiful father of all mercies and in fervent prayer for the continuance of the manifold blessings he has vouchsafed to us as a people. [seal.] in testimony whereof i have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the united states to be affixed, this 5th day of october, a.d. 1869, and of the independence of the united states of america the ninety-fourth. u.s. grant. by the president: hamilton fish, _secretary of state_. by the president of the united states of america. a proclamation. whereas by the proclamation of the president of the united states of the 12th day of june last the levying of discriminating duties on merchandise imported into the united states in french vessels from the countries of its origin was discontinued; and whereas satisfactory information has since been received by me that the levying of such duties on all merchandise imported into france in vessels of the united states, whether from the countries of its origin or from other countries, has been discontinued: now, therefore, i, u.s. grant, president of the united states of america, by virtue of the authority vested in me by an act of congress of the 7th day of january, 1824, and by an act in addition thereto of the 24th day of may, 1828, do hereby declare and proclaim that on and after this date, so long as merchandise imported into france in vessels of the united states, whether from the countries of its origin or from other countries, shall be admitted into the ports of france on the terms aforesaid, the discriminating duties heretofore levied upon merchandise imported into the united states in french vessels, either from the countries of its origin or from any other country, shall be, and are, discontinued and abolished. in testimony whereof i have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the united states to be affixed. [seal.] done at the city of washington, this 20th day of november, a.d. 1869, and of the independence of the united states of america the ninety-fourth. u.s. grant. by the president: hamilton fish, _secretary of state_. executive orders. general orders, no. 10. headquarters of the army, adjutant-general's office, _washington, march 5, 1869_. the president of the united states directs that the following orders be carried into execution as soon as practicable: 1. the department of the south will be commanded by brigadier and brevet major general a.h. terry. 2. major-general g.g. meade is assigned to command the military division of the atlantic, and will transfer his headquarters to philadelphia, pa. he will turn over his present command temporarily to brevet major-general t.h. ruger, colonel thirty-third infantry, who is assigned to duty according to his brevet of major-general while in the exercise of this command. 3. major-general p.h. sheridan is assigned to command the department of louisiana, and will turn over the command of the department of the missouri temporarily to the next senior officer. 4. major-general w.s. hancock is assigned to command the department of dakota. 5. brigadier and brevet major general e.r.s. canby is assigned to command the first military district, and will proceed to his post as soon as relieved by brevet major-general reynolds. 6. brevet major-general a.c. gillem, colonel twenty-fourth infantry, will turn over the command of the fourth military district to the next senior officer and join his regiment. 7. brevet major-general j.j. reynolds, colonel twenty-sixth infantry, is assigned to command the fifth military district, according to his brevet of major-general. 8. brevet major-general w.h. emory, colonel fifth cavalry, is assigned to command the department of washington, according to his brevet of major-general. by command of the general of the army: e.d. townsend, _assistant adjutant-general_. general orders, no. 11. headquarters of the army, adjutant general's office, _washington, march 8, 1869_. the following orders of the president of the united states are published for the information and government of all concerned: war department, _washington city, march 5, 1869_. by direction of the president, general william t. sherman will assume command of the army of the united states. the chiefs of staff corps, departments, and bureaus will report to and act under the immediate orders of the general commanding the army. all official business which by law or regulations requires the action of the president or secretary of war will be submitted by the general of the army to the secretary of war, and in general all orders from the president or secretary of war to any portion of the army, line or staff, will be transmitted through the general of the army. j.m. schofield, _secretary of war_. by command of the general of the army: e.d. townsend, _assistant adjutant-general_. special orders, no. 55. headquarters of the army, adjutant-general's office, _washington, march 9, 1869_. * * * * * 6. by direction of the president, brevet major-general adelbert ames, lieutenant-colonel twenty-fourth united states infantry, is hereby assigned to command the fourth military district, according to his brevet rank. * * * * * by command of general sherman: e.d. townsend, _assistant adjutant-general_. general orders, no. 18. headquarters of the army, adjutant-general's office, _washington, march 16, 1869_. by direction of the president of the united states, the following changes are made in military divisions and department commands: i. lieutenant-general p.h. sheridan is assigned to command the military division of the missouri. ii. major-general h.w. halleck is assigned to the command of the military division of the south, to be composed of the departments of the south and louisiana, of the fourth military district, and of the states composing the present department of the cumberland; headquarters, louisville, ky. major-general halleck will proceed to his new command as soon as relieved by major-general thomas. iii. major-general g.h. thomas is assigned to command the military division of the pacific. iv. major-general j.m. schofield is assigned to command the department of the missouri. the state of illinois and post of fort smith, ark., are transferred to this department. v. brigadier and brevet major general o.o. howard is assigned to command the department of louisiana. until his arrival the senior officer, brevet major-general j.a. mower, will command, according to his brevet of major-general. vi. the department of washington will be discontinued and merged in the department of the east. the records will be sent to the adjutant-general of the army. vii. the first military district will be added to the military division of the atlantic. viii. as soon as major-general thomas is ready to relinquish command of the department of the cumberland, the department will be discontinued, and the states composing it will be added to other departments, to be hereafter designated. the records will be forwarded to the adjutant-general of the army. by command of general sherman: e.d. townsend, _assistant adjutant-general_. war department, _washington city, march 26, 1869_. by direction of the president, the order of the secretary of war dated war department, march 5, 1869, and published in general orders, no. 11, headquarters of the army, adjutant-general's office, dated march 8, 1869, except so much as directs general w.t. sherman to "assume command of the army of the united states," is hereby rescinded. all official business which by law or regulations requires the action of the president or secretary of war will be submitted by the chiefs of staff corps, departments, and bureaus to the secretary of war. all orders and instructions relating to military operations issued by the president or secretary of war will be issued through the general of the army. jno. a. rawlins, _secretary of war_. special orders, no. 75. headquarters of the army, adjutant-general's office, _washington, march 31, 1869_. * * * * * 16. by direction of the president of the united states, brevet major-general a.s. webb, united states army, is assigned to command the first military district, according to his brevet of major-general, until the arrival of brevet major-general canby to relieve him. he will accordingly repair to richmond, va., without delay. 17. by direction of the president, brevet major-general george stoneman, colonel twenty-first united states infantry, is hereby relieved from the temporary command of the first military district, and will accompany his regiment to the military division of the pacific. * * * * * * by command of general sherman: e.d. townsend, _assistant adjutant-general_. executive mansion, _washington, d.c., june 3, 1869_. a commission of citizens having been appointed under the authority of law to cooperate with the administrative departments in the management of indian affairs, consisting of william welsh, of philadelphia; john v. farwell, of chicago; george h. stuart, of philadelphia; robert campbell, st. louis; w.e. dodge, new york; e.s. tobey, boston; felix r. brunot, pittsburg; nathan bishop, new york, and henry s. lane, of indiana, the following regulations will till further directions control the action of said commission and of the bureau of indian affairs in matters coming under their joint supervision: 1. the commission will make its own organization and employ its own clerical assistants, keeping its "necessary expenses of transportation, subsistence, and clerk hire when actually engaged in said service" within the amount appropriated therefor by congress. 2. the commission shall be furnished with full opportunity to inspect the records of the indian office and to obtain full information as to the conduct of all parts of the affairs thereof. 3. they shall have full power to inspect, in person or by subcommittee, the various indian superintendencies and agencies in the indian country, to be present at payment of annuities, at consultations or councils with the indians, and when on the ground to advise superintendents and agents in the performance of their duties. 4. they are authorized to be present, in person or by subcommittee, at purchases of goods for indian purposes, and inspect said purchases, advising the commissioner of indian affairs in regard thereto. 5. whenever they shall deem it necessary or advisable that instructions of superintendents or agents be changed or modified, they will communicate such advice through the office of commissioner of indian affairs to the secretary of the interior, and in like manner their advice as to changes in modes of purchasing goods or conducting the affairs of the indian bureau proper. complaints against superintendents or agents or other officers will in the same manner be forwarded to the indian bureau or department of the interior for action. 6. the commission will at their board meetings determine upon the recommendations to be made as to the plans of civilizing or dealing with the indians, and submit the same for action in the manner above indicated, and all plans involving the expenditure of public money will be acted upon by the executive or the secretary of the interior before expenditure is made under the same. 7. the usual modes of accounting with the treasury can not be changed, and all expenditures, therefore, must be subject to the approvals now required by law and the regulations of the treasury department, and all vouchers must conform to the same laws and requirements and pass through the ordinary channels. 8. all the officers of the government connected with the indian service are enjoined to afford every facility and opportunity to said commission and their subcommittees in the performance of their duties, and to give the most respectful heed to their advice within the limits of such officers' positive instructions from their superiors; to allow such commissioners full access to their records and accounts, and to cooperate with them in the most earnest manner to the extent of their proper powers in the general work of civilizing the indians, protecting them in their legal rights, and stimulating them to become industrious citizens in permanent homes, instead of following a roving and savage life. 9. the commission will keep such records or minutes of their proceedings as may be necessary to afford evidence of their action, and will provide for the manner in which their communications with and advice to the government shall be made and authenticated. u.s. grant. [from the daily morning chronicle, washington, september 8, 1869.] department of state, _washington, september 7, 1869_. [4] it is my melancholy duty to inform you that the hon. john a. rawlins, secretary of war, departed this life at twelve minutes past 4 o'clock on yesterday afternoon. in consequence of this afflicting event the president directs that the executive departments of the government will be careful to manifest every observance of honor which custom has established as appropriate to the memory of one so eminent as a public functionary and so distinguished as a citizen. i am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant, hamilton fish. [footnote 4: addressed to the heads of the executive departments.] [from the daily morning chronicle, washington, september 8, 1869.] department of state, _washington, september 7, 1869_. sir:[5] i have the honor to inform you that the president directs me to communicate to you his order that in honor of the memory of the hon. john a. rawlins, late secretary of war, who died yesterday at twelve minutes past 4 o'clock p.m., the executive departments shall be draped in mourning for a period of thirty days, and that they be closed from the morning of the 8th instant until after the obsequies of the deceased shall have been solemnized. i have the honor to be, your obedient servant, hamilton fish. [footnote 5: addressed to the heads of the executive departments.] department of state, _washington, september 7, 1869_. the remains of the hon. john a. rawlins, late secretary of war, will be interred with military honors, under the direction of the general of the army, on thursday, the 9th instant, at 10 o'clock a.m. the following persons will officiate as pallbearers on the occasion: brevet major-general edward d. townsend, adjutant-general; brevet major-general randolph b. marcy, inspect or-general; brevet major-general joseph holt, judge-advocate-general; brevet major-general montgomery c. meigs, quartermaster-general; brevet major-general amos b. eaton, commissary-general; brevet major-general joseph k. barnes, surgeon-general; brevet major-general b.w. brice, paymaster-general; brevet major-general a.a. humphreys, chief of engineers; brevet major-general alexander b. dyer, chief of ordnance; brevet brigadier-general albert j. myer, chief signal officer; brevet major-general o.o. howard; brevet major-general john e. smith; commodore melancton smith, chief bureau equipment; brigadier-general jacob zeilin, marine corps; brigadier-general giles a. smith, second assistant postmaster-general; hon. sayles j. bowen, mayor of washington. on the day of the funeral the customary number of guns will be fired from all arsenals, forts, and navy-yards in the united states and from the military and naval academies. flags will be kept at half-mast, custom-houses closed, and all public work suspended during the day. the general of the army and heads of the several executive departments will issue the orders necessary for carrying these directions into effect. by order of the president: hamilton fish, _secretary of state_. general orders, no. 69. headquarters of the army, adjutant-general's office, _washington, october 9, 1869_. i. the following order of the president has been received from the war department: executive mansion, _washington, october 8, 1869_. the painful duty devolves upon the president of announcing to the people of the united states the death of one of his honored predecessors, franklin pierce, which occurred at concord early this morning. eminent in the public councils and universally beloved in private life, his death will be mourned with a sorrow befitting the loss which his country sustains in his decease. as a mark of respect to his memory, it is ordered that the executive mansion and the several departments at washington be draped in mourning, and all business suspended on the day of the funeral. it is further ordered that the war and navy departments cause suitable military and naval honors to be paid on the occasion to the memory of this illustrious citizen who has passed from us. u.s. grant. ii. in compliance with the instructions of the president and of the secretary of war, on the day after the receipt of this order at each military post the troops will be paraded at 10 o'clock a.m. and the order read to them, after which all labors for the day will cease. the national flag will be displayed at half-staff. at dawn of day thirteen guns will be fired, and afterwards at intervals of thirty minutes between the rising and setting sun a single gun, and at the close of the day a national salute of thirty-seven guns. the officers of the army will wear crape on the left arm and on their swords and the colors of the several regiments will be put in mourning for the period of thirty days. by command of general sherman: j.c. kelton, _assistant adjutant-general_. general order. navy department, _washington, october 9, 1869_. the death of ex-president franklin pierce is announced in the following order of the president of the united states: [for order see preceding page.] in pursuance of the foregoing order, it is hereby directed that twenty-one guns be fired, at intervals of one minute each, at the several navy-yards and stations, on the day of the funeral where this order may be received in time, otherwise on the day after its receipt, commencing at noon, and also on board the flagships in each fleet. the flags at the several navy-yards, naval stations, marine barracks, and vessels in commission will be placed at half-mast from sunrise to sunset on the day when the minute guns are fired. all officers of the navy and marine corps will wear the usual badge of mourning attached to the sword hilt and on the left arm for thirty days. geo. m. robeson, _secretary of the navy_. by the president of the united states. executive order. washington, _october 19, 1869_. all communications in writing intended for the executive department of this government and relating to public business of whatever kind, including suggestions for legislation, claims, contracts, employment, appointments, and removals from office, and pardons, must be transmitted through the department to which the care of the subject-matter of the communication properly belongs. communications otherwise transmitted will not receive attention. by order of the president: hamilton fish, _secretary of state_. first annual message. executive mansion, _washington, d.c., december 6, 1869_. _to the senate and house of representatives_: in coming before you for the first time as chief magistrate of this great nation, it is with gratitude to the giver of all good for the many benefits we enjoy. we are blessed with peace at home, and are without entangling alliances abroad to forebode trouble; with a territory unsurpassed in fertility, of an area equal to the abundant support of 500,000,000 people, and abounding in every variety of useful mineral in quantity sufficient to supply the world for generations; with exuberant crops; with a variety of climate adapted to the production of every species of earth's riches and suited to the habits, tastes, and requirements of every living thing; with a population of 40,000,000 free people, all speaking one language; with facilities for every mortal to acquire an education; with institutions closing to none the avenues to fame or any blessing of fortune that may be coveted; with freedom of the pulpit, the press, and the school; with a revenue flowing into the national treasury beyond the requirements of the government. happily, harmony is being rapidly restored within our own borders. manufactures hitherto unknown in our country are springing up in all sections, producing a degree of national independence unequaled by that of any other power. these blessings and countless others are intrusted to your care and mine for safe-keeping for the brief period of our tenure of office. in a short time we must, each of us, return to the ranks of the people, who have conferred upon us our honors, and account to them for our stewardship. i earnestly desire that neither you nor i may be condemned by a free and enlightened constituency nor by our own consciences. emerging from a rebellion of gigantic magnitude, aided, as it was, by the sympathies and assistance of nations with which we were at peace, eleven states of the union were, four years ago, left without legal state governments. a national debt had been contracted; american commerce was almost driven from the seas; the industry of one-half of the country had been taken from the control of the capitalist and placed where all labor rightfully belongs--in the keeping of the laborer. the work of restoring state governments loyal to the union, of protecting and fostering free labor, and providing means for paying the interest on the public debt has received ample attention from congress. although your efforts have not met with the success in all particulars that might have been desired, yet on the whole they have been more successful than could have been reasonably anticipated. seven states which passed ordinances of secession have been fully restored to their places in the union. the eighth (georgia) held an election at which she ratified her constitution, republican in form, elected a governor, members of congress, a state legislature, and all other officers required. the governor was duly installed, and the legislature met and performed all the acts then required of them by the reconstruction acts of congress. subsequently, however, in violation of the constitution which they had just ratified (as since decided by the supreme court of the state), they unseated the colored members of the legislature and admitted to seats some members who are disqualified by the third clause of the fourteenth amendment to the constitution--an article which they themselves had contributed to ratify. under these circumstances i would submit to you whether it would not be wise, without delay, to enact a law authorizing the governor of georgia to convene the members originally elected to the legislature, requiring each member to take the oath prescribed by the reconstruction acts, and none to be admitted who are ineligible under the third clause of the fourteenth amendment. the freedmen, under the protection which they have received, are making rapid progress in learning, and no complaints are heard of lack of industry on their part where they receive fair remuneration for their labor. the means provided for paying the interest on the public debt, with all other expenses of government, are more than ample. the loss of our commerce is the only result of the late rebellion which has not received sufficient attention from you. to this subject i call your earnest attention. i will not now suggest plans by which this object may be effected, but will, if necessary, make it the subject of a special message during the session of congress. at the march term congress by joint resolution authorized the executive to order elections in the states of virginia, mississippi, and texas, to submit to them the constitutions which each had previously, in convention, framed, and submit the constitutions, either entire or in separate parts, to be voted upon, at the discretion of the executive. under this authority elections were called. in virginia the election took place on the 6th of july, 1869. the governor and lieutenant-governor elected have been installed. the legislature met and did all required by this resolution and by all the reconstruction acts of congress, and abstained from all doubtful authority. i recommend that her senators and representatives be promptly admitted to their seats, and that the state be fully restored to its place in the family of states. elections were called in mississippi and texas, to commence on the 30th of november, 1869, and to last two days in mississippi and four days in texas. the elections have taken place, but the result is not known. it is to be hoped that the acts of the legislatures of these states, when they meet, will be such as to receive your approval, and thus close the work of reconstruction. among the evils growing out of the rebellion, and not yet referred to, is that of an irredeemable currency. it is an evil which i hope will receive your most earnest attention. it is a duty, and one of the highest duties, of government to secure to the citizen a medium of exchange of fixed, unvarying value. this implies a return to a specie basis, and no substitute for it can be devised. it should be commenced now and reached at the earliest practicable moment consistent with a fair regard to the interests of the debtor class. immediate resumption, if practicable, would not be desirable. it would compel the debtor class to pay, beyond their contracts, the premium on gold at the date of their purchase, and would bring bankruptcy and ruin to thousands. fluctuation, however, in the paper value of the measure of all values (gold) is detrimental to the interests of trade. it makes the man of business an involuntary gambler, for in all sales where future payment is to be made both parties speculate as to what will be the value of the currency to be paid and received. i earnestly recommend to you, then, such legislation as will insure a gradual return to specie payments and put an immediate stop to fluctuations in the value of currency. the methods to secure the former of these results are as numerous as are the speculators on political economy. to secure the latter i see but one way, and that is to authorize the treasury to redeem its own paper, at a fixed price, whenever presented, and to withhold from circulation all currency so redeemed until sold again for gold. the vast resources of the nation, both developed and undeveloped, ought to make our credit the best on earth. with a less burden of taxation than the citizen has endured for six years past, the entire public debt could be paid in ten years. but it is not desirable that the people should be taxed to pay it in that time. year by year the ability to pay increases in a rapid ratio. but the burden of interest ought to be reduced as rapidly as can be done without the violation of contract. the public debt is represented in great part by bonds having from five to twenty and from ten to forty years to run, bearing interest at the rate of 6 per cent and 5 per cent, respectively. it is optional with the government to pay these bonds at any period after the expiration of the least time mentioned upon their face. the time has already expired when a great part of them may be taken up, and is rapidly approaching when all may be. it is believed that all which are now due may be replaced by bonds bearing a rate of interest not exceeding 4-1/2 per cent, and as rapidly as the remainder become due that they may be replaced in the same way. to accomplish this it may be necessary to authorize the interest to be paid at either of three or four of the money centers of europe, or by any assistant treasurer of the united states, at the option of the holder of the bond. i suggest this subject for the consideration of congress, and also, simultaneously with this, the propriety of redeeming our currency, as before suggested, at its market value at the time the law goes into effect, increasing the rate at which currency shall be bought and sold from day to day or week to week, at the same rate of interest as government pays upon its bonds. the subjects of tariff and internal taxation will necessarily receive your attention. the revenues of the country are greater than the requirements, and may with safety be reduced. but as the funding of the debt in a 4 or a 4-1/2 per cent loan would reduce annual current expenses largely, thus, after funding, justifying a greater reduction of taxation than would be now expedient, i suggest postponement of this question until the next meeting of congress. it may be advisable to modify taxation and tariff in instances where unjust or burdensome discriminations are made by the present laws, but a general revision of the laws regulating this subject i recommend the postponement of for the present. i also suggest the renewal of the tax on incomes, but at a reduced rate, say of 3 per cent, and this tax to expire in three years. with the funding of the national debt, as here suggested, i feel safe in saying that taxes and the revenue from imports may be reduced safely from sixty to eighty millions per annum at once, and may be still further reduced from year to year, as the resources of the country are developed. the report of the secretary of the treasury shows the receipts of the government for the fiscal year ending june 30, 1869, to be $370,943,747, and the expenditures, including interest, bounties, etc., to be $321,490,597. the estimates for the ensuing year are more favorable to the government, and will no doubt show a much larger decrease of the public debt. the receipts in the treasury beyond expenditures have exceeded the amount necessary to place to the credit of the sinking fund, as provided by law. to lock up the surplus in the treasury and withhold it from circulation would lead to such a contraction of the currency as to cripple trade and seriously affect the prosperity of the country. under these circumstances the secretary of the treasury and myself heartily concurred in the propriety of using all the surplus currency in the treasury in the purchase of government bonds, thus reducing the interest-bearing indebtedness of the country, and of submitting to congress the question of the disposition to be made of the bonds so purchased. the bonds now held by the treasury amount to about seventy-five millions, including those belonging to the sinking fund. i recommend that the whole be placed to the credit of the sinking fund. your attention is respectfully invited to the recommendations of the secretary of the treasury for the creation of the office of commissioner of customs revenue; for the increase of salaries to certain classes of officials; the substitution of increased national-bank circulation to replace the outstanding 3 per cent certificates; and most especially to his recommendation for the repeal of laws allowing shares of fines, penalties, forfeitures, etc., to officers of the government or to informers. the office of commissioner of internal revenue is one of the most arduous and responsible under the government. it falls but little, if any, short of a cabinet position in its importance and responsibilities. i would ask for it, therefore, such legislation as in your judgment will place the office upon a footing of dignity commensurate with its importance and with the character and qualifications of the class of men required to fill it properly. as the united states is the freest of all nations, so, too, its people sympathize with all people struggling for liberty and self-government; but while so sympathizing it is due to our honor that we should abstain from enforcing our views upon unwilling nations and from taking an interested part, _without invitation_, in the quarrels between different nations or between governments and their subjects. our course should always be in conformity with strict justice and law, international and local. such has been the policy of the administration in dealing with these questions. for more than a year a valuable province of spain, and a near neighbor of ours, in whom all our people can not but feel a deep interest, has been struggling for independence and freedom. the people and government of the united states entertain the same warm feelings and sympathies for the people of cuba in their pending struggle that they manifested throughout the previous struggles between spain and her former colonies in behalf of the latter. but the contest has at no time assumed the conditions which amount to a war in the sense of international law, or which would show the existence of a _de facto_ political organization of the insurgents sufficient to justify a recognition of belligerency. the principle is maintained, however, that this nation is its own judge when to accord the rights of belligerency, either to a people struggling to free themselves from a government they believe to be oppressive or to independent nations at war with each other. the united states have no disposition to interfere with the existing relations of spain to her colonial possessions on this continent. they believe that in due time spain and other european powers will find their interest in terminating those relations and establishing their present dependencies as independent powers--members of the family of nations. these dependencies are no longer regarded as subject to transfer from one european power to another. when the present relation of colonies ceases, they are to become independent powers, exercising the right of choice and of self-control in the determination of their future condition and relations with other powers. the united states, in order to put a stop to bloodshed in cuba, and in the interest of a neighboring people, proposed their good offices to bring the existing contest to a termination. the offer, not being accepted by spain on a basis which we believed could be received by cuba, was withdrawn. it is hoped that the good offices of the united states may yet prove advantageous for the settlement of this unhappy strife. meanwhile a number of illegal expeditions against cuba have been broken up. it has been the endeavor of the administration to execute the neutrality laws in good faith, no matter how unpleasant the task, made so by the sufferings we have endured from lack of like good faith toward us by other nations. on the 26th of march last the united states schooner _lizzie major_ was arrested on the high seas by a spanish frigate, and two passengers taken from it and carried as prisoners to cuba. representations of these facts were made to the spanish government as soon as official information of them reached washington. the two passengers were set at liberty, and the spanish government assured the united states that the captain of the frigate in making the capture had acted without law, that he had been reprimanded for the irregularity of his conduct, and that the spanish authorities in cuba would not sanction any act that could violate the rights or treat with disrespect the sovereignty of this nation. the question of the seizure of the brig _mary lowell_ at one of the bahama islands by spanish authorities is now the subject of correspondence between this government and those of spain and great britain. the captain-general of cuba about may last issued a proclamation authorizing search to be made of vessels on the high seas. immediate remonstrance was made against this, whereupon the captain-general issued a new proclamation limiting the right of search to vessels of the united states so far as authorized under the treaty of 1795. this proclamation, however, was immediately withdrawn. i have always felt that the most intimate relations should be cultivated between the republic of the united states and all independent nations on this continent. it may be well worth considering whether new treaties between us and them may not be profitably entered into, to secure more intimate relations--friendly, commercial, and otherwise. the subject of an interoceanic canal to connect the atlantic and pacific oceans through the isthmus of darien is one in which commerce is greatly interested. instructions have been given to our minister to the republic of the united states of colombia to endeavor to obtain authority for a survey by this government, in order to determine the practicability of such an undertaking, and a charter for the right of way to build, by private enterprise, such a work, if the survey proves it to be practicable. in order to comply with the agreement of the united states as to a mixed commission at lima for the adjustment of claims, it became necessary to send a commissioner and secretary to lima in august last. no appropriation having been made by congress for this purpose, it is now asked that one be made covering the past and future expenses of the commission. the good offices of the united states to bring about a peace between spain and the south american republics with which she is at war having been accepted by spain, peru, and chile, a congress has been invited to be held in washington during the present winter. a grant has been given to europeans of an exclusive right of transit over the territory of nicaragua, to which costa rica has given its assent, which, it is alleged, conflicts with vested rights of citizens of the united states. the department of state has now this subject under consideration. the minister of peru having made representations that there was a state of war between peru and spain, and that spain was constructing, in and near new york, thirty gunboats, which might be used by spain in such a way as to relieve the naval force at cuba, so as to operate against peru, orders were given to prevent their departure. no further steps having been taken by the representative of the peruvian government to prevent the departure of these vessels, and i not feeling authorized to detain the property of a nation with which we are at peace on a mere executive order, the matter has been referred to the courts to decide. the conduct of the war between the allies and the republic of paraguay has made the intercourse with that country so difficult that it has been deemed advisable to withdraw our representative from there. toward the close of the last administration a convention was signed at london for the settlement of all outstanding claims between great britain and the united states, which failed to receive the advice and consent of the senate to its ratification. the time and the circumstances attending the negotiation of that treaty were unfavorable to its acceptance by the people of the united states, and its provisions were wholly inadequate for the settlement of the grave wrongs that had been sustained by this government, as well as by its citizens. the injuries resulting to the united states by reason of the course adopted by great britain during our late civil war--in the increased rates of insurance; in the diminution of exports and imports, and other obstructions to domestic industry and production; in its effect upon the foreign commerce of the country; in the decrease and transfer to great britain of our commercial marine; in the prolongation of the war and the increased cost (both in treasure and in lives) of its suppression--could not be adjusted and satisfied as ordinary commercial claims, which continually arise between commercial nations; and yet the convention treated them simply as such ordinary claims, from which they differ more widely in the gravity of their character than in the magnitude of their amount, great even as is that difference. not a word was found in the treaty, and not an inference could be drawn from it, to remove the sense of the unfriendliness of the course of great britain in our struggle for existence, which had so deeply and universally impressed itself upon the people of this country. believing that a convention thus misconceived in its scope and inadequate in its provisions would not have produced the hearty, cordial settlement of pending questions, which alone is consistent with the relations which i desire to have firmly established between the united states and great britain, i regarded the action of the senate in rejecting the treaty to have been wisely taken in the interest of peace and as a necessary step in the direction of a perfect and cordial friendship between the two countries. a sensitive people, conscious of their power, are more at ease under a great wrong wholly unatoned than under the restraint of a settlement which satisfies neither their ideas of justice nor their grave sense of the grievance they have sustained. the rejection of the treaty was followed by a state of public feeling on both sides which i thought not favorable to an immediate attempt at renewed negotiations. i accordingly so instructed the minister of the united states to great britain, and found that my views in this regard were shared by her majesty's ministers. i hope that the time may soon arrive when the two governments can approach the solution of this momentous question with an appreciation of what is due to the rights, dignity, and honor of each, and with the determination not only to remove the causes of complaint in the past, but to lay the foundation of a broad principle of public law which will prevent future differences and tend to firm and continued peace and friendship. this is now the only grave question which the united states has with any foreign nation. the question of renewing a treaty for reciprocal trade between the united states and the british provinces on this continent has not been favorably considered by the administration. the advantages of such a treaty would be wholly in favor of the british producer. except, possibly, a few engaged in the trade between the two sections, no citizen of the united states would be benefited by reciprocity. our internal taxation would prove a protection to the british producer almost equal to the protection which our manufacturers now receive from the tariff. some arrangement, however, for the regulation of commercial intercourse between the united states and the dominion of canada may be desirable. the commission for adjusting the claims of the "hudsons bay and puget sound agricultural company" upon the united states has terminated its labors. the award of $650,000 has been made and all rights and titles of the company on the territory of the united states have been extinguished. deeds for the property of the company have been delivered. an appropriation by congress to meet this sum is asked. the commissioners for determining the northwestern land boundary between the united states and the british possessions under the treaty of 1856 have completed their labors, and the commission has been dissolved. in conformity with the recommendation of congress, a proposition was early made to the british government to abolish the mixed courts created under the treaty of april 7, 1862, for the suppression of the slave trade. the subject is still under negotiation. it having come to my knowledge that a corporate company, organized under british laws, proposed to land upon the shores of the united states and to operate there a submarine cable, under a concession from his majesty the emperor of the french of an exclusive right for twenty years of telegraphic communication between the shores of france and the united states, with the very objectionable feature of subjecting all messages conveyed thereby to the scrutiny and control of the french government, i caused the french and british legations at washington to be made acquainted with the probable policy of congress on this subject, as foreshadowed by the bill which passed the senate in march last. this drew from the representatives of the company an agreement to accept as the basis of their operations the provisions of that bill, or of such other enactment on the subject as might be passed during the approaching session of congress; also, to use their influence to secure from the french government a modification of their concession, so as to permit the landing upon french soil of any cable belonging to any company incorporated by the authority of the united states or of any state in the union, and, on their part, not to oppose the establishment of any such cable. in consideration of this agreement i directed the withdrawal of all opposition by the united states authorities to the landing of the cable and to the working of it until the meeting of congress. i regret to say that there has been no modification made in the company's concession, nor, so far as i can learn, have they attempted to secure one. their concession excludes the capital and the citizens of the united states from competition upon the shores of france. i recommend legislation to protect the rights of citizens of the united states, as well as the dignity and sovereignty of the nation, against such an assumption. i shall also endeavor to secure, by negotiation, an abandonment of the principle of monopolies in ocean telegraphic cables. copies of this correspondence are herewith furnished. the unsettled political condition of other countries, less fortunate than our own, sometimes induces their citizens to come to the united states for the sole purpose of becoming naturalized. having secured this, they return to their native country and reside there, without disclosing their change of allegiance. they accept official positions of trust or honor, which can only be held by citizens of their native land; they journey under passports describing them as such citizens; and it is only when civil discord, after perhaps years of quiet, threatens their persons or their property, or when their native state drafts them into its military service, that the fact of their change of allegiance is made known. they reside permanently away from the united states, they contribute nothing to its revenues, they avoid the duties of its citizenship, and they only make themselves known by a claim of protection. i have directed the diplomatic and consular officers of the united states to scrutinize carefully all such claims for protection. the citizen of the united states, whether native or adopted, who discharges his duty to his country, is entitled to its complete protection. while i have a voice in the direction of affairs i shall not consent to imperil this sacred right by conferring it upon fictitious or fraudulent claimants. on the accession of the present administration it was found that the minister for north germany had made propositions for the negotiation of a convention for the protection of emigrant passengers, to which no response had been given. it was concluded that to be effectual all the maritime powers engaged in the trade should join in such a measure. invitations have been extended to the cabinets of london, paris, florence, berlin, brussels, the hague, copenhagen, and stockholm to empower their representatives at washington to simultaneously enter into negotiations and to conclude with the united states conventions identical in form, making uniform regulations as to the construction of the parts of vessels to be devoted to the use of emigrant passengers, as to the quality and quantity of food, as to the medical treatment of the sick, and as to the rules to be observed during the voyage, in order to secure ventilation, to promote health, to prevent intrusion, and to protect the females; and providing for the establishment of tribunals in the several countries for enforcing such regulations by summary process. your attention is respectfully called to the law regulating the tariff on russian hemp, and to the question whether to fix the charges on russian hemp higher than they are fixed upon manila is not a violation of our treaty with russia placing her products upon the same footing with those of the most favored nations. our manufactures are increasing with wonderful rapidity under the encouragement which they now receive. with the improvements in machinery already effected, and still increasing, causing machinery to take the place of skilled labor to a large extent, our imports of many articles must fall off largely within a very few years. fortunately, too, manufactures are not confined to a few localities, as formerly, and it is to be hoped will become more and more diffused, making the interest in them equal in all sections. they give employment and support to hundreds of thousands of people at home, and retain with us the means which otherwise would be shipped abroad. the extension of railroads in europe and the east is bringing into competition with our agricultural products like products of other countries. self-interest, if not self-preservation, therefore dictates caution against disturbing any industrial interest of the country. it teaches us also the necessity of looking to other markets for the sale of our surplus. our neighbors south of us, and china and japan, should receive our special attention. it will be the endeavor of the administration to cultivate such relations with all these nations as to entitle us to their confidence and make it their interest, as well as ours, to establish better commercial relations. through the agency of a more enlightened policy than that heretofore pursued toward china, largely due to the sagacity and efforts of one of our own distinguished citizens, the world is about to commence largely increased relations with that populous and hitherto exclusive nation. as the united states have been the initiators in this new policy, so they should be the most earnest in showing their good faith in making it a success. in this connection i advise such legislation as will forever preclude the enslavement of the chinese upon our soil under the name of coolies, and also prevent american vessels from engaging in the transportation of coolies to any country tolerating the system. i also recommend that the mission to china be raised to one of the first class. on my assuming the responsible duties of chief magistrate of the united states it was with the conviction that three things were essential to its peace, prosperity, and fullest development. first among these is strict integrity in fulfilling all our obligations; second, to secure protection to the person and property of the citizen of the united states in each and every portion of our common country, wherever he may choose to move, without reference to original nationality, religion, color, or politics, demanding of him only obedience to the laws and proper respect for the rights of others; third, union of all the states, with equal rights, indestructible by any constitutional means. to secure the first of these, congress has taken two essential steps: first, in declaring by joint resolution that the public debt shall be paid, principal and interest, in coin; and, second, by providing the means for paying. providing the means, however, could not secure the object desired without a proper administration of the laws for the collection of the revenues and an economical disbursement of them. to this subject the administration has most earnestly addressed itself, with results, i hope, satisfactory to the country. there has been no hesitation in changing officials in order to secure an efficient execution of the laws, sometimes, too, when, in a mere party view, undesirable political results were likely to follow; nor any hesitation in sustaining efficient officials against remonstrances wholly political. it may be well to mention here the embarrassment possible to arise from leaving on the statute books the so-called "tenure-of-office acts," and to earnestly recommend their total repeal. it could not have been the intention of the framers of the constitution, when providing that appointments made by the president should receive the consent of the senate, that the latter should have the power to retain in office persons placed there by federal appointment against the will of the president. the law is inconsistent with a faithful and efficient administration of the government. what faith can an executive put in officials forced upon him, and those, too, whom he has suspended for reason? how will such officials be likely to serve an administration which they know does not trust them? for the second requisite to our growth and prosperity time and a firm but humane administration of existing laws (amended from time to time as they may prove ineffective or prove harsh and unnecessary) are probably all that are required. the third can not be attained by special legislation, but must be regarded as fixed by the constitution itself and gradually acquiesced in by force of public opinion. from the foundation of the government to the present the management of the original inhabitants of this continent--the indians--has been a subject of embarrassment and expense, and has been attended with continuous robberies, murders, and wars. from my own experience upon the frontiers and in indian countries, i do not hold either legislation or the conduct of the whites who come most in contact with the indian blameless for these hostilities. the past, however, can not be undone, and the question must be met as we now find it. i have attempted a new policy toward these wards of the nation (they can not be regarded in any other light than as wards), with fair results so far as tried, and which i hope will be attended ultimately with great success. the society of friends is well known as having succeeded in living in peace with the indians in the early settlement of pennsylvania, while their white neighbors of other sects in other sections were constantly embroiled. they are also known for their opposition to all strife, violence, and war, and are generally noted for their strict integrity and fair dealings. these considerations induced me to give the management of a few reservations of indians to them and to throw the burden of the selection of agents upon the society itself. the result has proven most satisfactory. it will de found more fully set forth in the report of the commissioner of indian affairs. for superintendents and indian agents not on the reservations, officers of the army were selected. the reasons for this are numerous. where indian agents are sent, there, or near there, troops must be sent also. the agent and the commander of troops are independent of each other, and are subject to orders from different departments of the government. the army officer holds a position for life; the agent, one at the will of the president. the former is personally interested in living in harmony with the indian and in establishing a permanent peace, to the end that some portion of his life may be spent within the limits of civilized society; the latter has no such personal interest. another reason is an economic one; and still another, the hold which the government has upon a life officer to secure a faithful discharge of duties in carrying out a given policy. the building of railroads, and the access thereby given to all the agricultural and mineral regions of the country, is rapidly bringing civilized settlements into contact with all the tribes of indians. no matter what ought to be the relations between such settlements and the aborigines, the fact is they do not harmonize well, and one or the other has to give way in the end. a system which looks to the extinction of a race is too horrible for a nation to adopt without entailing upon itself the wrath of all christendom and engendering in the citizen a disregard for human life and the rights of others, dangerous to society. i see no substitute for such a system, except in placing all the indians on large reservations, as rapidly as it can be done, and giving them absolute protection there. as soon as they are fitted for it they should be induced to take their lands in severalty and to set up territorial governments for their own protection. for full details on this subject i call your special attention to the reports of the secretary of the interior and the commissioner of indian affairs. the report of the secretary of war shows the expenditures of the war department for the year ending june 30, 1869, to be $80,644,042, of which $23,882,310 was disbursed in the payment of debts contracted during the war, and is not chargeable to current army expenses. his estimate of $34,531,031 for the expenses of the army for the next fiscal year is as low as it is believed can be relied on. the estimates of bureau officers have been carefully scrutinized, and reduced wherever it has been deemed practicable. if, however, the condition of the country should be such by the beginning of the next fiscal year as to admit of a greater concentration of troops, the appropriation asked for will not be expended. the appropriations estimated for river and harbor improvements and for fortifications are submitted separately. whatever amount congress may deem proper to appropriate for these purposes will be expended. the recommendation of the general of the army that appropriations be made for the forts at boston, portland, new york, philadelphia, new orleans, and san francisco, if for no other, is concurred in. i also ask your special attention to the recommendation of the general commanding the military division of the pacific for the sale of the seal islands of st. paul and st. george, alaska territory, and suggest that it either be complied with or that legislation be had for the protection of the seal fisheries from which a revenue should be derived. the report of the secretary of war contains a synopsis of the reports of the heads of bureaus, of the commanders of military divisions, and of the districts of virginia, mississippi, and texas, and the report of the general of the army in full. the recommendations therein contained have been well considered, and are submitted for your action. i, however, call special attention to the recommendation of the chief of ordnance for the sale of arsenals and lands no longer of use to the government; also, to the recommendation of the secretary of war that the act of 3d march, 1869, prohibiting promotions and appointments in the staff corps of the army, be repealed. the extent of country to be garrisoned and the number of military posts to be occupied is the same with a reduced army as with a large one. the number of staff officers required is more dependent upon the latter than the former condition. the report of the secretary of the navy accompanying this shows the condition of the navy when this administration came into office and the changes made since. strenuous efforts have been made to place as many vessels "in commission," or render them fit for service if required, as possible, and to substitute the sail for steam while cruising, thus materially reducing the expenses of the navy and adding greatly to its efficiency. looking to our future, i recommend a liberal, though not extravagant, policy toward this branch of the public service. the report of the postmaster-general furnishes a clear and comprehensive exhibit of the operations of the postal service and of the financial condition of the post office department. the ordinary postal revenues for the year ending the 30th of june, 1869, amounted to $18,344,510, and the expenditures to $23,698,131, showing an excess of expenditures over receipts of $5,353,620. the excess of expenditures over receipts for the previous year amounted to $6,437,992. the increase of revenues for 1869 over those of 1868 was $2,051,909, and the increase of expenditures was $967,538. the increased revenue in 1869 exceeded the increased revenue in 1868 by $996,336, and the increased expenditure in 1869 was $2,527,570 less than the increased expenditure in 1868, showing by comparison this gratifying feature of improvement, that while the increase of expenditures over the increase of receipts in 1868 was $2,439,535, the increase of receipts over the increase of expenditures in 1869 was $1,084,371. your attention is respectfully called to the recommendations made by the postmaster-general for authority to change the rate of compensation to the main trunk railroad lines for their services in carrying the mails; for having post-route maps executed; for reorganizing and increasing the efficiency of the special-agency service; for increase of the mail service on the pacific, and for establishing mail service, under the flag of the union, on the atlantic; and most especially do i call your attention to his recommendation for the total abolition of the franking privilege. this is an abuse from which no one receives a commensurate advantage; it reduces the receipts for postal service from 25 to 30 per cent and largely increases the service to be performed. the method by which postage should be paid upon public matter is set forth fully in the report of the postmaster-general. the report of the secretary of the interior shows that the quantity of public lands disposed of during the year ending the 30th of june, 1869, was 7,666,152 acres, exceeding that of the preceding year by 1,010,409 acres. of this amount 2,899,544 acres were sold for cash and 2,737,365 acres entered under the homestead laws. the remainder was granted to aid in the construction of works of internal improvement, approved to the states as swamp land, and located with warrants and scrip. the cash receipts from all sources were $4,472,886, exceeding those of the preceding year $2,840,140. during the last fiscal year 23,196 names were added to the pension rolls and 4,876 dropped therefrom, leaving at its close 187,963. the amount paid to pensioners, including the compensation of disbursing agents, was $28,422,884, an increase of $4,411,902 on that of the previous year. the munificence of congress has been conspicuously manifested in its legislation for the soldiers and sailors who suffered in the recent struggle to maintain "that unity of government which makes us one people." the additions to the pension rolls of each successive year since the conclusion of hostilities result in a great degree from the repeated amendments of the act of the 14th of july, 1862, which extended its provisions to cases not falling within its original scope. the large outlay which is thus occasioned is further increased by the more liberal allowance bestowed since that date upon those who in the line of duty were wholly or permanently disabled. public opinion has given an emphatic sanction to these measures of congress, and it will be conceded that no part of our public burden is more cheerfully borne than that which is imposed by this branch of the service. it necessitates for the next fiscal year, in addition to the amount justly chargeable to the naval pension fund, an appropriation of $30,000,000. during the year ending the 30th of september, 1869, the patent office issued 13,762 patents, and its receipts were $686,389, being $213,926 more than the expenditures. i would respectfully call your attention to the recommendation of the secretary of the interior for uniting the duties of supervising the education of freedmen with the other duties devolving upon the commissioner of education. if it is the desire of congress to make the census which must be taken during the year 1870 more complete and perfect than heretofore, i would suggest early action upon any plan that may be agreed upon. as congress at the last session appointed a committee to take into consideration such measures as might be deemed proper in reference to the census and report a plan, i desist from saying more. i recommend to your favorable consideration the claims of the agricultural bureau for liberal appropriations. in a country so diversified in climate and soil as ours, and with a population so largely dependent upon agriculture, the benefits that can be conferred by properly fostering this bureau are incalculable. i desire respectfully to call the attention of congress to the inadequate salaries of a number of the most important offices of the government. in this message i will not enumerate them, but will specify only the justices of the supreme court. no change has been made in their salaries for fifteen years. within that time the labors of the court have largely increased and the expenses of living have at least doubled. during the same time congress has twice found it necessary to increase largely the compensation of its own members, and the duty which it owes to another department of the government deserves, and will undoubtedly receive, its due consideration. there are many subjects not alluded to in this message which might with propriety be introduced, but i abstain, believing that your patriotism and statesmanship will suggest the topics and the legislation most conducive to the interests of the whole people. on my part i promise a rigid adherence to the laws and their strict enforcement. u.s. grant. special messages. washington, _december 6, 1869_. _to the senate of the united states_: i submit to the senate, for its consideration with a view to ratification, an additional article to the convention of the 24th of october, 1867, between the united states of america and his majesty the king of denmark. u.s. grant. washington, _december 6, 1869_ _to the senate of the united states_: i submit to the senate, for its consideration with a view to ratification, a convention between the united states and his hawaiian majesty, signed in this city on the 8th day of may last, providing for the extension of the term for the exchange of the ratifications of the convention for commercial reciprocity between the same parties, signed on the 21st day of may, 1867. u.s. grant. washington, _december 6, 1869_. _to the senate of the united states_: i submit to the senate, for its consideration with a view to ratification, a protocol, signed in this city on the 23d of october last, to the convention upon the subject of claims between the united states and the mexican republic, signed the 4th of july, 1868. u.s. grant. washington, _december 7, 1869_. _to the senate of the united states_: i transmit, for the consideration of the senate, the accompanying copy of a correspondence between the secretary of state and the minister of the united states at berlin, in relation to the exchange of the ratifications of the naturalization convention dated july 27, 1868, between the united states and the government of wurtemberg, which was not effected within the time named in the convention. u.s. grant. washington, _december 7, 1869_. _to the senate of the united states_: i transmit, for the consideration of the senate, the accompanying copy of a correspondence between the secretary of state and the legation of the united states at brussels, in relation to the exchange of the ratifications of the consular convention with belgium signed on the 5th of december, 1868, which was not effected within the time named in the convention. u.s. grant. washington, _december 7, 1869_. _to the senate of the united states_: i transmit to the senate a copy of a correspondence, a list of which is hereto annexed, between the secretary of state and the minister resident of the united states at constantinople, and invite its consideration of the question as to the correct meaning of the fourth article of the treaty of 1830 between the united states and turkey. u.s. grant. washington, d.c., _december 9, 1869_. _to the senate of the united states:_ in compliance with the resolution of the senate of the 6th instant, requesting reports of the military commander of the district of which georgia is a part in regard to the political and civil condition of that state, the accompanying papers are submitted. u.s. grant. washington, _december 9, 1869_. _to the house of representatives:_ i transmit a report from the secretary of state, in answer to a resolution of the house of representatives of yesterday, asking to be informed what legislatures have ratified the proposed fifteenth amendment of the constitution of the united states. u.s. grant. washington, _december 15, 1869_. _to the house of representatives:_ i transmit a further report from the secretary of state in answer to the resolution of the house of representatives of the 9th instant, making known that official notice has been received at the department of state of the ratification by the legislature of the state of alabama of the amendment to the constitution recently proposed by congress as article xv. u.s. grant. washington, _december 15, 1869_. _to the house of representatives:_ in answer to the resolution of the house of representatives of the 13th instant, requesting a copy of official correspondence on the subject of cuba, i transmit a report from the secretary of state, to whom the resolution was referred. u.s. grant. executive mansion, _washington, d.c., december 15, 1869_. _to the house of representatives:_ in answer to the resolution of december 9, 1869, requesting a copy of the charges, testimony, findings, and sentence in the trial by court-martial of passed assistant surgeon charles l. green, united states navy, i transmit herewith a report from the secretary of the navy, to whom the resolution was referred. u.s. grant. executive mansion, _washington, d.c., december 20, 1869_. _to the senate of the united states:_ i hereby request the return of such part of my message of december 9, in response to senate resolution of december 6, requesting the reports of the military commander of the district of which georgia is a part, to wit, an anonymous letter purporting to be from "a georgia woman." by accident the paper got with those called for by the resolution, instead of in the wastebasket, where it was intended it should go. u.s. grant. washington, _december 20, 1869_. _to the senate of the united states:_ i transmit to the senate, in relation to their resolution of the 8th instant, a report from the secretary of state, with accompanying documents.[6] u.s. grant. [footnote 6: relating to the revolution in cuba and the political and civil condition of that island.] washington, _december 22, 1869_. _to the senate:_ in answer to the resolution of the senate of the 20th instant, in relation to correspondence between the united states and great britain concerning questions pending between the two countries since the rejection of the claims convention by the senate, i transmit a report from the secretary of state upon the subject and the papers by which it was accompanied. u.s. grant. washington, _december 22, 1869_. _to the senate of the united states:_ i transmit to the senate, in answer to their resolution of the 8th instant, a report[7] from the secretary of state. u.s. grant. [footnote 7: stating that neither correspondence nor negotiation upon the subject of trade and commerce between the united states and canada had been entered into.] washington, _january 10, 1870_. _to the senate of the united states_: i transmit to the senate, for consideration with a view to its ratification, a convention between the united states and the dominican republic for a lease to the former of the bay and peninsula of samana. u.s. grant. washington, _january 10, 1870_. _to the senate of the united states:_ i transmit to the senate, for consideration with a view to its ratification, a treaty for the annexation of the dominican republic to the united states, signed by the plenipotentiaries of the parties on the 29th of november last. u.s. grant. executive mansion, _washington, d.c., january 10, 1870_. _to the senate of the united states:_ in response to the resolution of the senate of december 9, 1869, requesting the information in possession of the president or any of the departments relating to the action which has been had in the district of virginia under the act "authorizing the submission of the constitutions of virginia, mississippi, and texas to a vote of the people, and authorizing the election of state officers provided by the said constitutions, and members of congress," approved april 10, 1869, i have the honor to transmit herewith the reports of the secretary of state, the secretary of war, and the attorney-general, to whom, severally, the resolution was referred. u.s. grant. executive mansion, _washington, d.c., january 21, 1870_. _to the house of representatives:_ in answer to the resolution passed by the house of representatives on the 17th instant, requesting to be informed "under what act of congress or by other authority appropriations for the navy are diverted to the survey of the isthmus of darien," i transmit a report by the secretary of the navy, to whom the resolution was referred. u.s. grant. executive mansion, _washington, d.c., january 29, 1870_. _to the senate and house of representatives:_ i herewith transmit to congress a report, dated 29th instant, with the accompanying papers,[8] received from the secretary of state, in compliance with the requirements of the eighteenth section of the act entitled "an act to regulate the diplomatic and consular systems of the united states," approved august 18, 1856. u.s. grant. [footnote 8: report of fees collected, etc., by consular officers of the united states for 1868, and tariff of consular fees.] washington, _february 1, 1870_. _to the senate of the united states:_ i transmit to the senate, in compliance with its resolution of the 31st ultimo, a report from the secretary of state, communicating information in relation to the action of the legislature of the state of mississippi on the proposed fifteenth amendment to the constitution of the united states. u.s. grant. washington, _february 2, 1870_. _to the senate of the united states:_ in answer to the resolution of the senate of the 8th ultimo, i transmit a report[9] from the secretary of state and the papers which accompanied it. u.s. grant. [footnote 9: relating to the insurrection in the red river settlement, in british north america.] executive mansion, _february 4, 1870_. _to the senate of the united states:_ i herewith lay before the senate, for the consideration and action of that body in connection with a treaty of december 4, 1868, with the seneca nation of indians, now pending, amendments to said treaty proposed at a council of said indians held at their council house on the catteraugus reservation, in new york, on the 26th ultimo. a letter of the secretary of the interior, of the 3d instant, accompanies the papers. u.s. grant. executive mansion, _february 4, 1870_. _to the senate of the united states:_ for the reasons stated in the accompanying communication from the secretary of the interior, i respectfully request to withdraw the treaties hereinafter mentioned, which are now pending before the senate: first. treaty concluded with the great and little osages may 27, 1868. second. treaty concluded with the sacs and foxes of the missouri and iowa tribes of indians february 11, 1869. third. treaty concluded with the otoc and missouria indians february 13, 1869. fourth. treaty concluded with the kansas or kaw indians march 13, 1869. u.s. grant. washington, _february 8, 1870_. _to the house of representatives:_ in answer to the resolution of the house of representatives of the 3d instant, calling for the number of copies of the tributes of the nations to abraham lincoln now in possession of the department of state, i transmit a report from the secretary of state and the paper which accompanied it. u.s. grant. washington, _february 11, 1870_. _to the house of representatives:_ in compliance with the resolution of the house of representatives requesting me to furnish any information which may have been received by the government in relation to the recent assault upon and reported murder of one or more american citizens in cuba, i communicate a report from the secretary of state, with the papers accompanying it. u.s. grant. washington city, _february 11, 1870_. _to the senate of the united states:_ the papers in the case of commander jonathan young, of the united states navy, show-that when the naval promotions were made in 1866 the name of commander jonathan young was not included among them, and he was passed over, while commander george w. young was not passed over; that among other testimonials is one from vice-admiral d.d. porter stating that "commander jonathan young was passed over by mistake; that he was recommended for promotion, while commander george w. young was not recommended for promotion, and by some singular mistake the latter was promoted, while the former was passed over." that eminent officers, formerly _junior_ to commander young, but promoted over his head, desire his restoration to his former position, because they consider such restoration due to his character, ability, and services. in view, therefore, of these facts, and of the general good standing of commander jonathan young, and of his gallant and efficient services during the war, and to remedy so far as is now possible what is believed to have been a clerical error of the department, which has worked to his injury, the department now recommends that he be restored to his original standing upon the navy list. for these reasons i nominate commander jonathan young to be restored to his original position, to take rank from the 25th july, 1866, and next after commander william t. truxtun. u.s. grant. washington, d.c., _february 11, 1870_. _to the senate of the united states:_ in reply to the resolution of the senate of the 4th instant, requesting information in regard to the proceedings had in the state of georgia in pursuance of the recent act of congress entitled "an act to promote the reconstruction of the state of georgia," and in relation to the organization of the legislature of that state since the passage of that act, i herewith transmit the report of the secretary of war, to whom the resolution was referred. u.s. grant. washington, _february 15, 1870_. _to the senate of the united states:_ in reply to a resolution of the senate of the 9th instant, in relation to the central branch, union pacific railroad company, i transmit a copy of a letter addressed to me on the 27th ultimo by the secretary of the interior. it contains all the information in my possession touching the action of any of the departments on the claim of that company to continue and extend its road and to receive in aid of the construction thereof lands and bonds from the united states. u.s. grant. washington, _february 16, 1870_. _to the senate of the united states:_ in response to the resolution of the senate of the 8th instant, asking "how much of the appropriations heretofore made, amounting to $100,000, to provide for the defense of certain suits now pending in the court of claims, known as the cotton cases, has been expended, and to whom the same has been paid; for what services rendered, and the amount paid to each of said persons; and also the number of clerks in the treasury department, and other persons, with their names, engaged or occupied in the defense of said suits," i herewith transmit the report of the secretary of the treasury, to whom the resolution was referred. u.s. grant. washington, _february 16, 1870_. _to the house of representatives:_ in answer to the resolution of the house of representatives of the 10th instant, i transmit a report[10] from the secretary of state, with accompanying documents. u.s. grant. [footnote 10: relating to the payment in currency, instead of coin, of the semiannual installments of interest due to the united states under the convention with spain concluded february 17, 1834, and opinion of the attorney-general relative thereto.] washington, _february 17, 1870_. _to the senate of the united states:_ i transmit to the senate, in answer to their resolution of the 24th ultimo, the report from the secretary of state, with accompaniments.[11] u.s. grant. [footnote 11: lists of officers commissioned by the department of state, their compensation, etc.] washington, _february 18, 1870_. _to the house of representatives:_ i transmit to the house of representatives, in further answer to their resolution requesting information in relation to the recent assault upon and reported murder of one or more american citizens in cuba, a report from the secretary of state, with accompanying papers. u.s. grant. washington, _february 19, 1870_. _to the senate of the united states:_ in reply to the resolution of the senate of the 11th instant, requesting "any information which may have been received by the government of the recently reported engagement of colonel baker with the indians,[86] with copies of all orders which led to the same," i transmit a report from the secretary of war, to whom the resolution was referred. u.s. grant. [footnote 12: piegan in montana.] executive mansion, _washington, d.c., february 21, 1870_. _to the house of representatives:_ i transmit to the house of representatives, in answer to their resolution of the 7th instant, a report from the secretary of state, with accompanying documents.[13] u.s. grant. [footnote 13: correspondence relative to affairs connected with cuba and to the struggle for independence in that island.] washington, _february 23, 1870_. _to the senate of the united states:_ i transmit to the senate, in answer to their resolution of the 14th instant, a report from the secretary of state, with accompanying documents.[14] u.s. grant. [footnote 14: correspondence of the united states minister to japan relative to american interests in that country.] washington, _february 24, 1870_. _to the senate of the united states:_ in answer to the resolution of the senate of the 21st instant, directing the secretary of state to furnish the senate with copies of all correspondence relating to the imprisonment of mr. davis hatch by the dominican government, i transmit a report of the secretary of state upon the subject. u.s. grant. washington, _february 28, 1870_. _to the senate of the united states:_ in answer to the resolution of the senate of the 19th instant, requesting to be informed "if any officer of the government has, contrary to the treaty of july 19, 1866, with the cherokee nation, enforced or sought to enforce the payment of taxes by cherokees on products manufactured in the cherokee nation and sold within the indian territory," i transmit a report from the secretary of the treasury, to whom the resolution was referred. u.s. grant. washington, _february 28, 1870_. _to the house of representatives:_ in answer to the resolution of the house of representatives of the 15th instant, i transmit a report from the secretary of state upon the subject,[15] and the papers by which it was accompanied. u.s. grant. [footnote 15: imprisonment of american citizens in great britain for political offenses.] washington, _march 1, 1870_. _to the senate and house of representatives:_ i transmit to congress a communication from the secretary of state, with the accompanying documents, relative to the claims of citizens of the united states on the government of venezuela which were adjusted by the commission provided for by the convention with that republic of april 25, 1866. u.s. grant. executive mansion, _washington, d.c., march 3, 1870_. _to the house of representatives:_ i transmit herewith, in response to the resolution of the house asking for information in relation to the repairs of spanish war vessels at the docks of the united states, the report of the secretary of the navy, to whom the resolution was referred. u.s. grant. executive mansion, _washington, d.c., march 8, 1870_. _to the senate and house of representatives:_ herewith i have the honor to transmit a communication from the secretary of the interior, relative to the obligation of congress to make the necessary appropriations to carry out the indian treaties made by what is known as the peace commission of 1867. the history of those treaties and the consequences of noncompliance with them by the government are so clearly set forth in this statement that i deem it better to communicate it in full than to ask the necessary appropriation in a shorter statement of the reasons for it. i earnestly desire that if an indian war becomes inevitable the government of the united states at least should not be responsible for it. pains will be taken, and force used if necessary, to prevent the departure of the expeditions referred to by the secretary of the interior. u.s. grant. washington, _march 10, 1870_. _to the senate of the united states:_ in answer to the resolution of the senate of the 4th instant, in relation to the "transcontinental, memphis, el paso and pacific railroad company," i transmit reports from the secretary of state and the secretary of the interior, with accompanying papers. u.s. grant. washington, _march 10, 1870_. _to the senate of the united states:_ i transmit to the senate, in answer to their resolution of the 28th ultimo, a report[90] from the secretary of state, with accompanying documents. u.s. grant. [footnote 16: relating to legislation necessary to insure the administration of justice and the protection of american interests in china and japan.] executive mansion, _washington, d.c., march 14, 1870_. _to the senate of the united states:_ in reply to your resolution of the 14th of february, requesting to be informed whether i desire that any of the indian treaties now pending before you be considered confidentially, i have to inform you that there are none of them which i object to having discussed in open session. u.s. grant. executive mansion, _washington, d.c., march 14, 1870_. _to the senate of the united states:_ i would respectfully call your attention to a treaty now before you for the acquisition of the republic of st. domingo, entered into between the agents of the two governments on the 29th of november, 1869, and by its terms to be finally acted upon by the people of st. domingo and the senate of the united states within four months from the date of signing the treaty. the time for action expires on the 29th instant, a fact to which i desire expressly to call your attention. i would also direct your notice to the fact that the government of st. domingo has no agent in the united states who is authorized to extend the time for further deliberation upon its merits. the people of st. domingo have already, so far as their action can go, ratified the treaty, and i express the earnest wish that you will not permit it to expire by limitation. i also entertain the sincere hope that your action may be favorable to the ratification of the treaty. u.s. grant. washington, _march 15, 1870_. _to the senate of the united states:_ i transmit a report from the secretary of state, in answer to a resolution of the senate of the 3d instant, asking to be informed what states have ratified the amendment known as the fifteenth amendment to the constitution of the united states, so far as official notice thereof has been transmitted to the department of state, and that information from time to time may be communicated to that body, as soon as practicable, of such ratification hereafter by any state. u.s. grant. executive mansion, _washington, d.c., march 23, 1870_. _to the senate and house of representatives:_ in the executive message of december 6, 1869, to congress the importance of taking steps to revive our drooping merchant marine was urged, and a special message promised at a future day during the present session, recommending more specifically plans to accomplish this result. now that the committee of the house of representatives intrusted with the labor of ascertaining "the cause of the decline of american commerce" has completed its work and submitted its report to the legislative branch of the government, i deem this a fitting time to execute that promise. the very able, calm, and exhaustive report of the committee points out the grave wrongs which have produced the decline in our commerce. it is a national humiliation that we are now compelled to pay from twenty to thirty million dollars annually (exclusive of passage money, which we should share with vessels of other nations) to foreigners for doing the work which should be done by american vessels, american built, american owned, and american manned. this is a direct drain upon the resources of the country of just so much money, equal to casting it into the sea, so far as this nation is concerned. a nation of the vast and ever-increasing interior resources of the united states, extending, as it does, from one to the other of the great oceans of the world, with an industrious, intelligent, energetic population, must one day possess its full share of the commerce of these oceans, no matter what the cost. delay will only increase this cost and enhance the difficulty of attaining the result. i therefore put in an earnest plea for early action in this matter, in a way to secure the desired increase of american commerce. the advanced period of the year and the fact that no contracts for shipbuilding will probably be entered into until this question is settled by congress, and the further fact that if there should be much delay all large vessels contracted for this year will fail of completion before winter sets in, and will therefore be carried over for another year, induces me to request your early consideration of this subject. i regard it of such grave importance, affecting every interest of the country to so great an extent, that any method which will gain the end will secure a rich national blessing. building ships and navigating them utilizes vast capital at home; it employs thousands of workmen in their construction and manning; it creates a home market for the products of the farm and the shop; it diminishes the balance of trade against us precisely to the extent of freights and passage money paid to american vessels, and gives us a supremacy upon the seas of inestimable value in case of foreign war. our navy at the commencement of the late war consisted of less than 100 vessels, of about 150,000 tons and a force of about 8,000 men. we drew from the merchant marine, which had cost the government nothing, but which had been a source of national wealth, 600 vessels, exceeding 1,000,000 tons, and about 70,000 men, to aid in the suppression of the rebellion. this statement demonstrates the value of the merchant marine as a means of national defense in time of need. the committee on the causes of the reduction of american tonnage, after tracing the causes of its decline, submit two bills, which, if adopted, they believe will restore to the nation its maritime power. their report shows with great minuteness the actual and comparative american tonnage at the time of its greatest prosperity; the actual and comparative decline since, together with the causes; and exhibits all other statistics of material interest in reference to the subject. as the report is before congress, i will not recapitulate any of its statistics, but refer only to the methods recommended by the committee to give back to us our lost commerce. as a general rule, when it can be adopted, i believe a direct money subsidy is less liable to abuse than an indirect aid given to the same enterprise. in this case, however, my opinion is that subsidies, while they may be given to specified lines of steamers or other vessels, should not be exclusively adopted, but, in addition to subsidizing very desirable lines of ocean traffic, a general assistance should be given in an effective way. i therefore commend to your favorable consideration the two bills proposed by the committee and referred to in this message. u.s. grant. executive mansion, _march 25, 1870_. _to the senate of the united states_: in reply to a senate resolution of the 24th instant, requesting to be furnished with a report, written by captain selfridge, upon the resources and condition of things in the dominican republic, i have to state that no such report has been received. u.s. grant. washington, _march 25, 1870_. _to the senate of the united states_: in answer to the resolution of the senate of the 15th ultimo, i transmit a report, with accompanying paper,[17] from the secretary of the navy, to whom the resolution was referred. u.s. grant. [footnote 17: statement of the number and character of the ironclad vessels of the navy, their cost, by whom designed, who recommended their construction, and their condition.] executive mansion, _march 29, 1870_. _to the house of representatives_: in reply to your resolution of december 20, 1869, asking "whether any citizens of the united states are imprisoned or detained in military custody by officers of the army of the united states, and, if any, to furnish their names, date of arrest, the offenses charged, together with a statement of what measures have been taken for the trial and punishment of the offenders," i transmit herewith the report of the secretary of war, to whom the resolution was referred. u.s. grant. executive mansion, _march 30, 1870_. _to the senate and house of representatives_: it is unusual to notify the two houses of congress by message of the promulgation, by proclamation of the secretary of state, of the ratification of a constitutional amendment. in view, however, of the vast importance of the fifteenth amendment to the constitution, this day declared a part of that revered instrument, i deem a departure from the usual custom justifiable. a measure which makes at once 4,000,000 people voters who were heretofore declared by the highest tribunal in the land not citizens of the united states, nor eligible to become so (with the assertion that "at the time of the declaration of independence the opinion was fixed and universal in the civilized portion of the white race, regarded as an axiom in morals as well as in politics, that black men had no rights which the white man was bound to respect"), is indeed a measure of grander importance than any other one act of the kind from the foundation of our free government to the present day. institutions like ours, in which all power is derived directly from the people, must depend mainly upon their intelligence, patriotism, and industry. i call the attention, therefore, of the newly enfranchised race to the importance of their striving in every honorable manner to make themselves worthy of their new privilege. to the race more favored heretofore by our laws i would say, withhold no legal privilege of advancement to the new citizen. the framers of our constitution firmly believed that a republican government could not endure without intelligence and education generally diffused among the people. the father of his country, in his farewell address, uses this language: promote, then, as an object of primary importance, institutions for the general diffusion of knowledge. in proportion as the structure of a government gives force to public opinion, it is essential that public opinion should be enlightened. in his first annual message to congress the same views are forcibly presented, and are again urged in his eighth message. i repeat that the adoption of the fifteenth amendment to the constitution completes the greatest civil change and constitutes the most important event that has occurred since the nation came into life. the change will be beneficial in proportion to the heed that is given to the urgent recommendations of washington. if these recommendations were important then, with a population of but a few millions, how much more important now, with a population of 40,000,000, and increasing in a rapid ratio. i would therefore call upon congress to take all the means within their constitutional powers to promote and encourage popular education throughout the country, and upon the people everywhere to see to it that all who possess and exercise political rights shall have the opportunity to acquire the knowledge which will make their share in the government a blessing and not a danger. by such means only can the benefits contemplated by this amendment to the constitution be secured. u.s. grant. hamilton fish, secretary of state of the united states. _to all to whom these presents may come, greeting:_ know ye that the congress of the united states, on or about the 27th day of february, in the year 1869, passed a resolution in the words and figures following, to wit: a resolution proposing an amendment to the constitution of the united states. _resolved by the senate and house of representatives of the united states of america in congress assembled_ (_two-thirds of both houses concurring_), that the following article be proposed to the legislatures of the several states as an amendment to the constitution of the united states, which, when ratified by three-fourths of said legislatures, shall be valid as a part of the constitution, viz; article xv. section 1. the right of citizens of the united states to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the united states, or by any state, on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. sec. 2. the congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation. and further, that it appears from official documents on file in this department that the amendment to the constitution of the united states, proposed as aforesaid, has been ratified by the legislatures of the states of north carolina, west virginia, massachusetts, wisconsin, maine, louisiana, michigan, south carolina, pennsylvania, arkansas, connecticut, florida, illinois, indiana, new york, new hampshire, nevada, vermont, virginia, alabama, missouri, mississippi, ohio, iowa, kansas, minnesota, rhode island, nebraska, and texas; in all, twenty-nine states; and further, that the states whose legislatures have so ratified the said proposed amendment constitute three-fourths of the whole number of states in the united states; and further, that it appears from an official document on file in this department that the legislature of the state of new york has since passed resolutions claiming to withdraw the said ratification of the said amendment, which had been made by the legislature of that state, and of which official notice had been filed in this department; and further, that it appears from an official document on file in this department that the legislature of georgia has by resolution ratified the said proposed amendment: now, therefore, be it known that i, hamilton fish, secretary of state of the united states, by virtue and in pursuance of the second section of the act of congress approved the 20th day of april, in the year 1818, entitled "an act to provide for the publication of the laws of the united states, and for other purposes," do hereby certify that the amendment aforesaid has become valid to all intents and purposes as part of the constitution of the united states. in testimony whereof i have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the department of state to be affixed. [seal.] done at the city of washington this 30th day of march, a.d. 1870, and of the independence of the united states the ninety-fourth. hamilton fish. washington, _march 31, 1870_. _to the senate of the united states_: i transmit, for consideration with a view to its ratification, a treaty between the united states and the united states of colombia for the construction of an interoceanic canal across the isthmus of panama or darien, signed at bogota on the 26th of january last. a copy of a dispatch of the 1st ultimo to the secretary of state from general hurlbut, the united states minister at bogota, relative to the treaty, is also transmitted for the information of the senate. u.s. grant. washington, _march 31, 1870_. _to the senate and house of representatives:_ i transmit to congress a further communication from the secretary of state, with the accompanying documents, relative to the claims of citizens of the united states on the government of venezuela which were adjusted by the commission provided for by the convention with that republic of april 25, 1866. u.s. grant. washington, _march 31, 1870_. _to the house of representatives:_ in answer to the resolution of the house of representatives of the 7th instant, relating to fisheries in british waters, i transmit a report from the secretary of state and the papers which accompanied it, and i have to state that the commanding officer of the naval steamer ordered to the fishing grounds will be instructed to give his attention, should circumstances require it, to cases which may arise under any change which may be made in the british laws affecting fisheries within british jurisdiction, with a view to preventing, so far as it may be in his power, infractions by citizens of the united states of the first article of the treaty between the united states and great britain of 1818, the laws in force relating to fisheries within british jurisdiction, or any illegal interference with the pursuits of the fishermen of the united states. u.s. grant. washington, _april 5, 1870_. _to the house of representatives:_ in answer to the resolution of the house of representatives of the 28th ultimo, i transmit a report[18] from the secretary of state, to whom the resolution was referred. u.s. grant. [footnote 18: declining to communicate a copy of the list of privileges accompanying or relating to the san domingo treaty while the subject is pending before the senate in executive session.] executive mansion, _april 6, 1870_. _to the house of representatives:_ in answer to your resolution of the 7th ultimo, requesting to be furnished with a copy of orders, correspondence, reports of councils with indians by military and civil officers of the government, in possession of the interior and war departments, relating to difficulties with the cheyenne, comanche, arapahoe, apache, and kiowa tribes of indians during the year 1867, etc., i herewith transmit the reports received from those departments. u.s. grant. washington, _april 14, 1870_. _to the senate and house of representatives:_ i transmit to congress a report from the secretary of state, relative to results of the proceedings of the joint commission at lima under the convention between the united states and peru of 4th of december, 1868, and recommend that an appropriation be made to discharge the obligation of the united states in the case of the claim of esteban g. montano, to which the report refers. u.s. grant. executive mansion, _april 20, 1870_. _to the house of representatives:_ in answer to your resolution of the 21st ultimo, requesting to be informed "whether any portion of the military forces of the united states has been sent into the counties of bourbon, crawford, and cherokee, in the state of kansas, and, if so, when, what number, for what purpose, and on whose procurement; and also whether they have been required to erect there any winter quarters, forts, fortifications, or earth-works, and, if so, what, for what purpose, and at whose expense, and at what probable expense to the government have all said acts been done," i transmit herewith a report, dated 18th instant, from the secretary of war, to whom the resolution was referred. u.s. grant. washington, _april 26, 1870_. _to the house of representatives:_ in answer to the resolution of the house of representatives of the 9th instant, i transmit a report from the secretary of state and the paper[19] which accompanied it. u.s. grant. [footnote 19: supplemental report to the department of state by samuel b. ruggles, united states delegate to the international monetary conference at paris, 1867.] washington, _may 6, 1870_. _to the senate of the united states:_ in answer to the resolution of the senate of the 26th ultimo, i transmit a report from the secretary of state and the papers[20] by which it was accompanied. u.s. grant. [footnote 20: dispatches of j. somers smith, commercial agent of the united states at san domingo, relative to the imprisonment of davis hatch by the dominican government.] washington, _may 21, 1870_. _to the senate of the united states:_ i transmit to the senate, in answer to their resolution of the 18th instant, calling for information relative to the passage of any english or canadian steamer through the canal of sault ste. marie, a report from the secretary of state, with accompanying papers. u.s. grant. washington, _may 23, 1870_. _to the senate of the united states:_ in response to your resolution of the 12th instant, requesting information "in relation to an organized band of persons at cheyenne, in the territory of wyoming, or vicinity, the number and designs of such persons," i transmit herewith the reports of the secretary of war and the secretary of the interior, to whom the resolution was referred. u.s. grant. washington, _may 23, 1870_. _to the house of representatives:_ i transmit to the house of representatives, in answer to their resolution of the 5th instant, a report from the secretary of state and its accompanying papers.[21] u.s. grant. [footnote 21: relating to the claims of united states citizens against venezuela.] washington, _may 26, 1870_. _to the senate of the united states:_ i have the satisfaction of transmitting to the senate, for consideration with a view to its ratification, a convention between the united states and her britannic majesty, relative to naturalization, signed in london on the 13th instant. the convention is substantially the same as the protocol on the subject signed by mr. reverdy johnson and lord stanley on the 9th of october, 1868, and approved by the senate on the 13th april, 1869. if the instrument should go into effect, it will relieve the parties from a grievance which has hitherto been a cause of frequent annoyance and sometimes of dangerous irritation. a copy of mr. motley's dispatch on the subject and of the act of parliament of may 12, 1870, are also transmitted. u.s. grant. washington, _may 28, 1870_. _to the senate of the united states:_ in answer to the resolution of the senate of the 24th instant, i transmit a report from the secretary of state and the document[22] by which it was accompanied. u.s. grant. [footnote 22: dispatch from henry t. blow, united states minister to brazil, relative to the commercial interests of the united states with south america.] executive mansion, _may 31, 1870_. _to the senate of the united states:_ i transmit to the senate, for consideration with a view to its ratification, an additional article to the treaty of the 29th of november last, for the annexation of the dominican republic to the united states, stipulating for an extension of the time for exchanging the ratifications thereof, signed in this city on the 14th instant by the plenipotentiaries of the parties. it was my intention to have also negotiated with the plenipotentiary of san domingo amendments to the treaty of annexation to obviate objections which may be urged against the treaty as it is now worded; but on reflection i deem it better to submit to the senate the propriety of their amending the treaty as follows: first, to specify that the obligations of this government shall not exceed the $1,500,000 stipulated in the treaty; secondly, to determine the manner of appointing the agents to receive and disburse the same; thirdly, to determine the class of creditors who shall take precedence in the settlement of their claims; and, finally, to insert such amendments as may suggest themselves to the minds of senators to carry out in good faith the conditions of the treaty submitted to the senate of the united states in january last, according to the spirit and intent of that treaty. from the most reliable information i can obtain, the sum specified in the treaty will pay every just claim against the republic of san domingo and leave a balance sufficient to carry on a territorial government until such time as new laws for providing a territorial revenue can be enacted and put in force. i feel an unusual anxiety for the ratification of this treaty, because i believe it will redound greatly to the glory of the two countries interested, to civilization, and to the extirpation of the institution of slavery. the doctrine promulgated by president monroe has been adhered to by all political parties, and i now deem it proper to assert the equally important principle that hereafter no territory on this continent shall be regarded as subject of transfer to a european power. the government of san domingo has voluntarily sought this annexation. it is a weak power, numbering probably less than 120,000 souls, and yet possessing one of the richest territories under the sun, capable of supporting a population of 10,000,000 people in luxury. the people of san domingo are not capable of maintaining themselves in their present condition, and must look for outside support. they yearn for the protection of our free institutions and laws, our progress and civilization. shall we refuse them? i have information which i believe reliable that a european power stands ready now to offer $2,000,000 for the possession of samana bay alone. if refused by us, with what grace can we prevent a foreign power from attempting to secure the prize? the acquisition of san domingo is desirable because of its geographical position. it commands the entrance to the caribbean sea and the isthmus transit of commerce. it possesses the richest soil, best and most capacious harbors, most salubrious climate, and the most valuable products of the forests, mine, and soil of any of the west india islands. its possession by us will in a few years build up a coastwise commerce of immense magnitude, which will go far toward restoring to us our lost merchant marine. it will give to us those articles which we consume so largely and do not produce, thus equalizing our exports and imports. in case of foreign war it will give us command of all the islands referred to, and thus prevent an enemy from ever again possessing himself of rendezvous upon our very coast. at present our coast trade between the states bordering on the atlantic and those bordering on the gulf of mexico is cut into by the bahamas and the antilles. twice we must, as it were, pass through foreign countries to get by sea from georgia to the west coast of florida. san domingo, with a stable government, under which her immense resources can be developed, will give remunerative wages to tens of thousands of laborers not now on the island. this labor will take advantage of every available means of transportation to abandon the adjacent islands and seek the blessings of freedom and its sequence--each inhabitant receiving the reward of his own labor. porto rico and cuba will have to abolish slavery, as a measure of self-preservation to retain their laborers. san domingo will become a large consumer of the products of northern farms and manufactories. the cheap rate at which her citizens can be furnished with food, tools, and machinery will make it necessary that the contiguous islands should have the same advantages in order to compete in the production of sugar, coffee, tobacco, tropical fruits, etc. this will open to us a still wider market for our products. the production of our own supply of these articles will cut off more than one hundred millions of our annual imports, besides largely increasing our exports. with such a picture it is easy to see how our large debt abroad is ultimately to be extinguished. with a balance of trade against us (including interest on bonds held by foreigners and money spent by our citizens traveling in foreign lands) equal to the entire yield of the precious metals in this country, it is not so easy to see how this result is to be otherwise accomplished. the acquisition of san domingo is an adherence to the "monroe doctrine;" it is a measure of national protection; it is asserting our just claim to a controlling influence over the great commercial traffic soon to flow from east to west by the way of the isthmus of darien; it is to build up our merchant marine; it is to furnish new markets for the products of our farms, shops, and manufactories; it is to make slavery insupportable in cuba and porto rico at once and ultimately so in brazil; it is to settle the unhappy condition of cuba, and end an exterminating conflict; it is to provide honest means of paying our honest debts, without overtaxing the people; it is to furnish our citizens with the necessaries of everyday life at cheaper rates than ever before; and it is, in fine, a rapid stride toward that greatness which the intelligence, industry, and enterprise of the citizens of the united states entitle this country to assume among nations. u.s. grant. executive mansion, _washington, d.c. june 2, 1870_. _to the senate of the united states:_ in reply to your resolution of the 1st instant, requesting, "in confidence," any information in possession of the president "touching any proposition, offer, or design of any foreign power to purchase or obtain any part of the territory of san domingo or any right to the bay of samana," i transmit herewith a copy of a letter, dated 27th of april, 1870. addressed to "colonel j.w. fabens, dominican minister, washington," by "e. herzberg hartmount, dominican consul-general in london." u.s. grant. washington, _june 3, 1870_. _to the senate of the united states:_ i transmit to the senate, in answer to their resolution of the 18th ultimo, a report from the secretary of state, with an accompanying paper.[23] u.s. grant. [footnote 23: communication from george bancroft, united states minister at berlin, relative to political questions in germany.] washington, _june 3, 1870_. _to the senate of the united states:_ i transmit to the senate, for consideration with a view to its ratification, an additional convention to the treaty of the 7th of april, 1862, for the suppression of the african slave trade, which additional convention was signed on this day in the city of washington by the plenipotentiaries of the high contracting parties. u.s. grant. washington, _june 6, 1870_. _to the senate of the united states:_ i transmit to the senate, in answer to their resolution of the 3d instant, the accompanying report[24] from the secretary of state. u.s. grant. [footnote 24: stating that he has received no official information relative to a reported persecution and massacre of israelites in roumania.] executive mansion, _june 13, 1870_. _to the senate and house of representatives:_ in my annual message to congress at the beginning of its present session i referred to the contest which had then for more than a year existed in the island of cuba between a portion of its inhabitants and the government of spain, and the feelings and sympathies of the people and government of the united states for the people of cuba, as for all peoples struggling for liberty and self-government, and said that "the contest has at no time assumed the conditions which amount to war in the sense of international law, or which would show the existence of a _de facto_ political organization of the insurgents sufficient to justify a recognition of belligerency." during the six months which have passed since the date of that message the condition of the insurgents has not improved, and the insurrection itself, although not subdued, exhibits no signs of advance, but seems to be confined to an irregular system of hostilities, carried on by small and illy armed bands of men, roaming without concentration through the woods and the sparsely populated regions of the island, attacking from ambush convoys and small bands of troops, burning plantations and the estates of those not sympathizing with their cause. but if the insurrection has not gained ground, it is equally true that spain has not suppressed it. climate, disease, and the occasional bullet have worked destruction among the soldiers of spain; and although the spanish authorities have possession of every seaport and every town on the island, they have not been able to subdue the hostile feeling which has driven a considerable number of the native inhabitants of the island to armed resistance against spain, and still leads them to endure the dangers and the privations of a roaming life of guerrilla warfare. on either side the contest has been conducted, and is still carried on, with a lamentable disregard of human life and of the rules and practices which modern civilization has prescribed in mitigation of the necessary horrors of war. the torch of spaniard and of cuban is alike busy in carrying devastation over fertile regions; murderous and revengeful decrees are issued and executed by both parties. count valmaseda and colonel boet, on the part of spain, have each startled humanity and aroused the indignation of the civilized world by the execution, each, of a score of prisoners at a time, while general quesada, the cuban chief, coolly and with apparent unconsciousness of aught else than a proper act, has admitted the slaughter, by his own deliberate order, in one day, of upward of 650 prisoners of war. a summary trial, with few, if any, escapes from conviction, followed by immediate execution, is the fate of those arrested on either side on suspicion of infidelity to the cause of the party making the arrest. whatever may be the sympathies of the people or of the government of the united states for the cause or objects for which a part of the people of cuba are understood to have put themselves in armed resistance to the government of spain, there can be no just sympathy in a conflict carried on by both parties alike in such barbarous violation of the rules of civilized nations and with such continued outrage upon the plainest principles of humanity. we can not discriminate in our censure of their mode of conducting their contest between the spaniards and the cubans. each commit the same atrocities and outrage alike the established rules of war. the properties of many of our citizens have been destroyed or embargoed, the lives of several have been sacrificed, and the liberty of others has been restrained. in every case that has come to the knowledge of the government an early and earnest demand for reparation and indemnity has been made, and most emphatic remonstrance has been presented against the manner in which the strife is conducted and against the reckless disregard of human life, the wanton destruction of material wealth, and the cruel disregard of the established rules of civilized warfare. i have, since the beginning of the present session of congress, communicated to the house of representatives, upon their request, an account of the steps which i had taken in the hope of bringing this sad conflict to an end and of securing to the people of cuba the blessings and the right of independent self-government. the efforts thus made failed, but not without an assurance from spain that the good offices of this government might still avail for the objects to which they had been addressed. during the whole contest the remarkable exhibition has been made of large numbers of cubans escaping from the island and avoiding the risks of war; congregating in this country, at a safe distance from the scene of danger, and endeavoring to make war from our shores, to urge our people into the fight which they avoid, and to embroil this government in complications and possible hostilities with spain. it can scarce be doubted that this last result is the real object of these parties, although carefully covered under the deceptive and apparently plausible demand for a mere recognition of belligerency. it is stated on what i have reason to regard as good authority that cuban bonds have been prepared to a large amount, whose payment is made dependent upon the recognition by the united states of either cuban belligerency or independence. the object of making their value thus contingent upon the action of this government is a subject for serious reflection. in determining the course to be adopted on the demand thus made for a recognition of belligerency the liberal and peaceful principles adopted by the father of his country and the eminent statesmen of his day, and followed by succeeding chief magistrates and the men of their day, may furnish a safe guide to those of us now charged with the direction and control of the public safety. from 1789 to 1815 the dominant thought of our statesmen was to keep the united states out of the wars which were devastating europe. the discussion of measures of neutrality begins with the state papers of mr. jefferson when secretary of state. he shows that they are measures of national right as well as of national duty; that misguided individual citizens can not be tolerated in making war according to their own caprice, passions, interests, or foreign sympathies; that the agents of foreign governments, recognized or unrecognized, can not be permitted to abuse our hospitality by usurping the functions of enlisting or equipping military or naval forces within our territory. washington inaugurated the policy of neutrality and of absolute abstinence from all foreign entangling alliances, which resulted, in 1794, in the first municipal enactment for the observance of neutrality. the duty of opposition to filibustering has been admitted by every president. washington encountered the efforts of genã¨t and of the french revolutionists; john adams, the projects of miranda; jefferson, the schemes of aaron burr. madison and subsequent presidents had to deal with the question of foreign enlistment or equipment in the united states, and since the days of john quincy adams it has been one of the constant cares of government in the united states to prevent piratical expeditions against the feeble spanish american republics from leaving our shores. in no country are men wanting for any enterprise that holds out promise of adventure or of gain. in the early days of our national existence the whole continent of america (outside of the limits of the united states) and all its islands were in colonial dependence upon european powers. the revolutions which from 1810 spread almost simultaneously through all the spanish american continental colonies resulted in the establishment of new states, like ourselves, of european origin, and interested in excluding european politics and the questions of dynasty and of balances of power from further influence in the new world. the american policy of neutrality, important before, became doubly so from the fact that it became applicable to the new republics as well as to the mother country. it then devolved upon us to determine the great international question at what time and under what circumstances to recognize a new power as entitled to a place among the family of nations, as well as the preliminary question of the attitude to be observed by this government toward the insurrectionary party pending the contest. mr. monroe concisely expressed the rule which has controlled the action of this government with reference to revolting colonies pending their struggle by saying: as soon as the movement assumed such a steady and consistent form as to make the success of the provinces probable, the rights to which they were entitled by the laws of nations as equal parties to a civil war were extended to them. the strict adherence to this rule of public policy has been one of the highest honors of american statesmanship, and has secured to this government the confidence of the feeble powers on this continent, which induces them to rely upon its friendship and absence of designs of conquest and to look to the united states for example and moral protection. it has given to this government a position of prominence and of influence which it should not abdicate, but which imposes upon it the most delicate duties of right and of honor regarding american questions, whether those questions affect emancipated colonies or colonies still subject to european dominion. the question of belligerency is one of fact, not to be decided by sympathies for or prejudices against either party. the relations between the parent state and the insurgents must amount in fact to war in the sense of international law. fighting, though fierce and protracted, does not alone constitute war. there must be military forces acting in accordance with the rules and customs of war, flags of truce, cartels, exchange of prisoners, etc.; and to justify a recognition of belligerency there must be, above all, a _de facto_ political organization of the insurgents sufficient in character and resources to constitute it, if left to itself, a state among nations capable of discharging the duties of a state and of meeting the just responsibilities it may incur as such toward other powers in the discharge of its national duties. applying the best information which i have been enabled to gather, whether from official or unofficial sources, including the very exaggerated statements which each party gives to all that may prejudice the opposite or give credit to its own side of the question, i am unable to see in the present condition of the contest in cuba those elements which are requisite to constitute war in the sense of international law. the insurgents hold no town or city; have no established seat of government; they have no prize courts; no organization for the receiving and collecting of revenue; no seaport to which a prize may be carried or through which access can be had by a foreign power to the limited interior territory and mountain fastnesses which they occupy. the existence of a legislature representing any popular constituency is more than doubtful. in the uncertainty that hangs around the entire insurrection there is no palpable evidence of an election, of any delegated authority, or of any government outside the limits of the camps occupied from day to day by the roving companies of insurgent troops; there is no commerce, no trade, either internal or foreign, no manufactures. the late commander in chief of the insurgents, having recently come to the united states, publicly declared that "all commercial intercourse or trade with the exterior world has been utterly cut off;" and he further added: "to-day we have not 10,000 arms in cuba." it is a well-established principle of public law that a recognition by a foreign state of belligerent rights to insurgents under circumstances such as now exist in cuba, if not justified by necessity, is a gratuitous demonstration of moral support to the rebellion. such necessity may yet hereafter arrive, but it has not yet arrived, nor is its probability clearly to be seen. if it be war between spain and cuba, and be so recognized, it is our duty to provide for the consequences which may ensue in the embarrassment to our commerce and the interference with our revenue. if belligerency be recognized, the commercial marine of the united states becomes liable to search and to seizure by the commissioned cruisers of both parties; they become subject to the adjudication of prize courts. our large coastwise trade between the atlantic and the gulf states and between both and the isthmus of panama and the states of south america (engaging the larger part of our commercial marine) passes of necessity almost in sight of the island of cuba. under the treaty with spain of 1795, as well as by the law of nations, our vessels will be liable to visit on the high seas. in case of belligerency the carrying of contraband, which now is lawful, becomes liable to the risks of seizure and condemnation. the parent government becomes relieved from responsibility for acts done in the insurgent territory, and acquires the right to exercise against neutral commerce all the powers of a party to a maritime war. to what consequences the exercise of those powers may lead is a question which i desire to commend to the serious consideration of congress. in view of the gravity of this question, i have deemed it my duty to invite the attention of the war-making power of the country to all the relations and bearings of the question in connection with the declaration of neutrality and granting of belligerent rights. there is not a _de facto_ government in the island of cuba sufficient to execute law and maintain just relations with other nations. spain has not been able to suppress the opposition to spanish rule on the island, nor to award speedy justice to other nations, or citizens of other nations, when their rights have been invaded. there are serious complications growing out of the seizure of american vessels upon the high seas, executing american citizens without proper trial, and confiscating or embargoing the property of american citizens. solemn protests have been made against every infraction of the rights either of individual citizens of the united states or the rights of our flag upon the high seas, and all proper steps have been taken and are being pressed for the proper reparation of every indignity complained of. the question of belligerency, however, which is to be decided upon definite principles and according to ascertained facts, is entirely different from and unconnected with the other questions of the manner in which the strife is carried on on both sides and the treatment of our citizens entitled to our protection. the questions concern our own dignity and responsibility, and they have been made, as i have said, the subjects of repeated communications with spain and of protests and demands for redress on our part. it is hoped that these will not be disregarded, but should they be these questions will be made the subject of a further communication to congress. u.s. grant. executive mansion, _june 17, 1870_. _to the senate of the united states:_ in answer to the resolution of the senate of the 8th instant, requesting the president "to communicate, in confidence, the instructions of the navy department to the navy officers in command on the coast of dominica and hayti, and the reports of such officers to the navy department, from the commencement of the negotiation of the treaty with dominica," i herewith transmit the papers received from the secretary of the navy, to whom the resolution was referred. u.s. grant. executive mansion, _june 25, 1870_. _to the senate of the united states:_ in answer to the resolution of the 22d instant, requesting to be furnished with "proposals received from any company or citizens of the united states for constructing and placing iron steamships in transatlantic service," i transmit herewith the only proposal of that nature received by me. u.s. grant. washington, _july 9, 1870_. _to the senate of the united states:_ in answer to the resolutions of the senate of the 26th of may and of the 14th of june last, i transmit a report from the secretary of state thereupon, and the papers[25] by which it was accompanied. u.s. grant. [footnote 25: lists of american vessels seized by spanish authorities in cuba; of american citizens executed and imprisoned in cuba; of american citizens whose property was confiscated or embargoed in cuba, and of decrees under which the spanish authorities acted, and correspondence showing steps taken by the united states government in reference thereto.] washington, _july 12, 1870_. _to the senate of the united states:_ i transmit to the senate, for consideration with a view to ratification, a convention between the united states and austria, concerning the rights, privileges, and immunities of consuls in the two countries, signed at washington on the 11th instant. u.s. grant. washington, _july 13, 1870_. _to the senate of the united states:_ i transmit to the senate, in answer to their resolution of the 8th instant, a report from the secretary of state and the papers[26] which accompanied it. u.s. grant. [footnote 26: instructions to the minister to spain stating the basis on which the united states offered its good offices for the purpose of terminating the war in cuba, correspondence relative thereto, etc.] washington, _july 13, 1870_. _to the senate of the united states:_ in answer to their resolution of the 8th instant, i transmit to the senate a report from the secretary of state and the papers[27] which accompanied it. u.s. grant. [footnote 27: correspondence between the united states and great britain concerning questions pending between the two countries.] washington, _july 14, 1870_. _to the senate of the united states:_ i transmit to the senate, in answer to their resolution of the 7th instant, a report from the secretary of state, with accompanying documents. u.s. grant. department of state, _washington, july 14, 1870_. the secretary of state, to whom was referred the resolution of the senate requesting the president "to institute an inquiry, by such means as in his judgment shall be deemed proper, into the present condition of the commercial relations between the united states and the spanish american states on this continent, and between those countries and other nations, and to communicate to the senate full and complete statements regarding the same, together with such recommendations as he may think necessary to promote the development and increase of our commerce with those regions and to secure to the united states that proportionate share of the trade of this continent to which their close relations of geographical contiguity and political friendship with all the states of america justly entitle them," has the honor to report: the resolution justly regards the commercial and the political relations of the united states with the american states of spanish origin as necessarily dependent upon each other. if the commerce of those countries has been diverted from its natural connection with the united states, the fact may probably be partly traced to political causes, which have been swept away by the great civil convulsion in this country. for the just comprehension of the position of this government in the american political system, and for the causes which have failed to give it hitherto the influence to which it is properly entitled by reason of its democratic system and of the moderation and sense of justice which have distinguished its foreign policy through successive administrations from the birth of the nation until now, it is necessary to make a brief notice of such measures as affect our present relations to the other parts of this continent. the united states were the first of the european colonies in america to arrive at maturity as a people and assume the position of an independent republic. since then important changes have taken place in various nations and in every part of the world. our own growth in power has been not the least remarkable of all the great events of modern history. when, at the conclusion of the revolutionary war, having conquered by arms our right to exist as a sovereign state, that right was at length recognized by treaties, we occupied only a narrow belt of land along the atlantic coast, hemmed in at the north, the west, and the south by the possessions of european governments, or by uncultivated wastes beyond the alleghanies, inhabited only by the aborigines. but in the very infancy of the united states far-sighted statesmen saw and predicted that, weak in population and apparently restricted in available territory as the new republic then was, it had within it the germs of colossal grandeur, and would at no remote day occupy the continent of america with its institutions, its authority, and its peaceful influence. that expectation has been thus far signally verified. the united states entered at once into the occupation of their rightful possessions westward to the banks of the mississippi. next, by the spontaneous proffer of france, they acquired louisiana and its territorial extension, or right of extension, north to the line of the treaty demarcation between france and great britain, and west to the pacific ocean. next, by amicable arrangement with spain, they acquired the floridas, and complete southern maritime frontiers upon the gulf of mexico. then came the union with the independent state of texas, followed by the acquisitions of california and new mexico, and then of arizona. finally, russia has ceded to us alaska, and the continent of north america has become independent of europe, except so much of it as continues to maintain political relations with great britain. meanwhile, partly by natural increase and partly by voluntary immigration from europe, our population has risen from 3,000,000 to nearly 40,000,000; the number of states and territories united under the constitution has been augmented from thirteen to forty-seven; the development of internal wealth and power has kept pace with political expansion; we have occupied in part and peopled the vast interior of the continent; we have bound the pacific to the atlantic by a chain of intervening states and organized territories; we have delivered the republic from the anomaly and the ignominy of domestic servitude; we have constitutionally fixed the equality of all races and of all men before the law; and we have established, at the cost of a great civil war--a cost, however, not beyond the value of such a result--the indissoluble national unity of the united states. in all these marked stages of national progress, from the declaration of independence to the recent amendments of the constitution, it is impossible not to perceive a providential series and succession of events, intimately attached one to the other, and possessed of definite character as a whole, whatever incidental departures from such uniformity may have marked, or seemed to mark, our foreign policy under the influence of temporary causes or of the conflicting opinions of statesmen. in the time of washington, of the first adams, of jefferson, and of madison the condition of europe, engaged in the gigantic wars of the french revolution and of the empire, produced its series of public questions and gave tone and color to our foreign policy. in the time of monroe, of the second adams, and of jackson, and subsequently thereto, the independence of the spanish and portuguese colonies of america produced its series of questions and its apparent modification of our public policy. domestic questions of territorial organization, of social emancipation, and of national unity have also largely occupied the minds and the attention of the later administrations. the treaties of alliance and guaranty with france, which contributed so much to our independence, were one source of solicitude to the early administrations, which were endeavoring to protect our commerce from the depredations and wrongs to which the maritime policy of england and the reaction of that policy on france subjected it. for twenty years we struggled in vain to accomplish this, and at last drifted into war. the avoidance of entangling alliances, the characteristic feature of the foreign policy of washington, sprang from this condition of things. but the entangling alliances which then existed were engagements made with france as a part of the general contract under which aid was furnished to us for the achievement of our independence. france was willing to waive the letter of the obligation as to her west india possessions, but demanded in its stead privileges in our ports which the administration was unwilling to concede. to make its refusal acceptable to a public which sympathized with france, the cabinet of general washington exaggerated the principle into a theory tending to national isolation. the public measures designed to maintain unimpaired the domestic sovereignty and the international neutrality of the united states were independent of this policy, though apparently incidental to it. the municipal laws enacted by congress then and since have been but declarations of the law of nations. they are essential to the preservation of our national dignity and honor; they have for their object to repress and punish all enterprises of private war, one of the last relics of mediaeval barbarism; and they have descended to us from the fathers of the republic, supported and enforced by every succeeding president of the united states. the foreign policy of these early days was not a narrow one. during this period we secured the evacuation by great britain of the country wrongfully occupied by her on the lakes; we acquired louisiana; we measured forces on the sea with france, and on the land and sea with england; we set the example of resisting and chastising the piracies of the barbary states; we initiated in negotiations with prussia the long line of treaties for the liberalization of war and the promotion of international intercourse; and we steadily demanded, and at length obtained, indemnification from various governments for the losses we had suffered by foreign spoliations in the wars of europe. to this point in our foreign policy we had arrived when the revolutionary movements in spanish and portuguese america compelled a modification of our relations with europe, in consequence of the rise of new and independent states in america. the revolution which commenced in 1810, and extended through all the spanish american continental colonies, after vain efforts of repression on the part of spain, protracted through twenty years, terminated in the establishment of the independent states of mexico, guatemala, san salvador, honduras, nicaragua, costa rica, venezuela, colombia, ecuador, peru, chile, bolivia, the argentine republic, uruguay, and paraguay, to which the empire of brazil came in time to be added. these events necessarily enlarged the sphere of action of the united states, and essentially modified our relations with europe and our attitude to the rest of this continent. the new states were, like ourselves, revolted colonies. they continued the precedent we had set, of separating from europe. their assumption of independence was stimulated by our example. they professedly imitated us, and copied our national constitution, sometimes even to their inconvenience. the spanish american colonies had not the same preparation for independence that we had. each of the british colonies possessed complete local autonomy. its formal transition from dependence to independence consisted chiefly in expelling the british governor of the colony and electing a governor of the state, from which to the organized union was but a step. all these conditions of success were wanting in spanish america, and hence many of the difficulties in their career as independent states; and, further, while the revolution in british america was the exclusive result of the march of opinion in the british colonies, the simultaneous action of the separate spanish colonies, though showing a desire for independence, was principally produced by the accident of the invasion of spain by france. the formation of these new sovereignties in america was important to us, not only because of the cessation of colonial monopolies to that extent, but because of the geographical relations to us held by so many new nations, all, like ourselves, created from european stock and interested in excluding european politics, dynastic questions, and balances of power from further influence in the new world. thus the united states were forced into new lines of action, which, though apparently in some respects conflicting, were really in harmony with the line marked out by washington. the avoidance of entangling political alliances and the maintenance of our own independent neutrality became doubly important from the fact that they became applicable to the new republics as well as to the mother country. the duty of noninterference had been admitted by every president. the question came up in the time of the first adams, on the occasion of the enlistment projects of miranda. it appeared again under jefferson (anterior to the revolt of the spanish colonies) in the schemes of aaron burr. it was an ever-present question in the administrations of madison, monroe, and the younger adams, in reference to the questions of foreign enlistment or equipment in the united states, and when these new republics entered the family of nations, many of them very feeble, and all too much subject to internal revolution and civil war, a strict adherence to our previous policy and a strict enforcement of our laws became essential to the preservation of friendly relations with them; for since that time it has been one of the principal cares of those intrusted with the administration of the government to prevent piratical expeditions against these sister republics from leaving our ports. and thus the changed condition of the new world made no change in the traditional and peaceful policy of the united states in this respect. in one respect, however, the advent of these new states in america did compel an apparent change of foreign policy on our part. it devolved upon us the determination of the great international question at what time and under what circumstances to recognize a new power as entitled to a place among the family of nations. there was but little of precedent to guide us, except our own case. something, indeed, could be inferred from the historical origin of the netherlands and switzerland. but our own case, carefully and conscientiously considered, was sufficient to guide us to right conclusions. we maintained our position of international friendship and of treaty obligations toward spain, but we did not consider that we were bound to wait for its recognition of the new republics before admitting them into treaty relations with us as sovereign states. we held that it was for us to judge whether or not they had attained to the condition of actual independence, and the consequent right of recognition by us. we considered this question of fact deliberately and coolly. we sent commissioners to spanish america to ascertain and report for our information concerning their actual circumstances, and in the fullness of time we acknowledged their independence; we exchanged diplomatic ministers, and made treaties of amity with them, the earliest of which, negotiated by mr. john quincy adams, served as the model for the subsequent treaties with the spanish american republics. we also, simultaneously therewith, exerted our good offices with spain to induce her to submit to the inevitable result and herself to accept and acknowledge the independence of her late colonies. we endeavored to induce russia to join us in these representations. in all this our action was positive, in the direction of promoting the complete political separation of america from europe. a vast field was thus opened to the statesmen of the united states for the peaceful introduction, the spread, and the permanent establishment of the american ideas of republican government, of modification of the laws of war, of liberalization of commerce, of religious freedom and toleration, and of the emancipation of the new world from the dynastic and balance of power controversies of europe. mr. john quincy adams, beyond any other statesman of the time in this country, had the knowledge and experience, both european and american, the comprehension of thought and purpose, and the moral convictions which peculiarly fitted him to introduce our country into this new field and to lay the foundation of an american policy. the declaration known as the monroe doctrine, and the objects and purposes of the congress of panama, both supposed to have been largely inspired by mr. adams, have influenced public events from that day to this as a principle of government for this continent and its adjacent islands. it was at the period of the congress of aix-la-chapelle and of laybach, when the "holy alliance" was combined to arrest all political changes in europe in the sense of liberty, when they were intervening in southern europe for the reestablishment of absolutism, and when they were meditating interference to check the progress of free government in america, that mr. monroe, in his annual message of december, 1823, declared that the united states would consider any attempt to extend the european system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. "with the existing colonies or dependencies of any european power," he said, "we have not interfered and shall not interfere; but with the governments who have declared their independence and maintained it, and whose independence we have, on great consideration and on just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any european power in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the united states." this declaration resolved the solution of the immediate question of the independence of the spanish american colonies, and is supposed to have exercised some influence upon the course of the british cabinet in regard to the absolutist schemes in europe as well as in america. it has also exercised a permanent influence on this continent. it was at once invoked in consequence of the supposed peril of cuba on the side of europe; it was applied to a similar danger threatening yucatan; it was embodied in the treaty of the united states and great britain as to central america; it produced the successful opposition of the united states to the attempt of great britain to exercise dominion in nicaragua under the cover of the mosquito indians; and it operated in like manner to prevent the establishment of a european dynasty in mexico. the united states stand solemnly committed by repeated declarations and repeated acts to this doctrine, and its application to the affairs of this continent. in his message to the two houses of congress at the commencement of the present session the president, following the teachings of all our history, said that the existing "dependencies are no longer regarded as subject to transfer from one european power to another. when the present relation of colonies ceases, they are to become independent powers, exercising the right of choice and of self-control in the determination of their future condition and relations with other powers." this policy is not a policy of aggression; but it opposes the creation of european dominion on american soil, or its transfer to other european powers, and it looks hopefully to the time when, by the voluntary departure of european governments from this continent and the adjacent islands, america shall be wholly american. it does not contemplate forcible intervention in any legitimate contest, but it protests against permitting such a contest to result in the increase of european power or influence; and it ever impels this government, as in the late contest between the south american republics and spain, to interpose its good offices to secure an honorable peace. the congress of panama was planned by bolivar to secure the union of spanish america against spain. it had originally military as well as political purposes. in the military objects the united states could take no part; and, indeed, the necessity for such objects ceased when the full effects of mr. monroe's declarations were felt. but the pacific objects of the congress--the establishment of close and cordial relations of amity, the creation of commercial intercourse, of interchange of political thought, and of habits of good understanding between the new republics and the united states and their respective citizens--might perhaps have been attained had the administration of that day received the united support of the country. unhappily, they were lost; the new states were removed from the sympathetic and protecting influence of our example, and their commerce, which we might then have secured, passed into other hands, unfriendly to the united states. in looking back upon the panama congress from this length of time it is easy to understand why the earnest and patriotic men who endeavored to crystallize an american system for this continent failed. mr. clay and mr. adams were far-sighted statesmen, but, unfortunately, they struck against the rock of african slavery. one of the questions proposed for discussion in the conference was "the consideration of the means to be adopted for the entire abolition of the african slave trade," to which proposition the committee of the united states senate of that day replied: "the united states have not certainly the right, and ought never to feel the inclination, to dictate to others who may differ with them upon this subject; nor do the committee see the expediency of insulting other states with whom we are maintaining relations of perfect amity by ascending the moral chair and proclaiming from thence mere abstract principles, of the rectitude of which each nation enjoys the perfect right of deciding for itself." the same committee also alluded to the possibility that the condition of the islands of cuba and porto rico, still the possessions of spain and still slaveholding, might be made the subject of discussion and of contemplated action by the panama congress. "if ever the united states," they said, "permit themselves to be associated with these nations in any general congress assembled for the discussion of common plans in any way affecting european interests, they will by such act not only deprive themselves of the ability they now possess of rendering useful assistance to the other american states, but also produce other effects prejudicial to their own interests." thus the necessity at that day of preserving the great interest of the southern states in african slavery, and of preventing a change in the character of labor in the islands of cuba and porto rico, lost to the united states the opportunity of giving a permanent direction to the political and commercial connections of the newly enfranchised spanish american states, and their trade passed into hands unfriendly to the united states, and has remained there ever since. events subsequent to that date have tended to place us in a position to retrieve our mistakes, among which events may be particularly named the suppression of the rebellion, the manifestation of our undeveloped and unexpected military power, the retirement of the french from mexico, and the abolition of slavery in the united states. there is good reason to believe that the latter fact has had an important influence in our favor in spanish america. it has caused us to be regarded there with more sympathetic as well as more respectful consideration. it has relieved those republics from the fear of filibusterism which had been formerly incited against central america and mexico in the interest of slave extension, and it has produced an impression of the stability of our institutions and of our public strength sufficient to dissipate the fears of our friends or the hopes of those who wish us ill. thus there exists in the spanish american republics confidence toward the united states. on our side they find a feeling of cordial amity and friendship, and a desire to cultivate and develop our common interests on this continent. with some of these states our relations are more intimate than with others, either by reason of closer similarity of constitutional forms, of greater commercial intercourse, of proximity in fact, or of the construction or contemplated construction of lines of transit for our trade and commerce between the atlantic and the pacific. with several of them we have peculiar treaty relations. the treaty of 1846 between the united states and new granada contains stipulations of guaranty for the neutrality of that part of the isthmus within the present territory of colombia, and for the protection of the rights of sovereignty and property therein belonging to colombia. similar stipulations appear in the treaty of 1867 with nicaragua, and of july, 1864, with honduras. those treaties (like the treaty of alliance made with france in 1778 by dr. franklin, silas deane, and arthur lee) constitute _pro tanto_ a true protective alliance between the united states and each of those republics. provisions of like effect appear in the treaty of april 19, 1850, between great britain and the united states. brazil, with her imperial semblance and constitutional reality, has always held relations of amity with us, which have been fortified by the opening of her great rivers to commerce. it needs only that, in emulation of russia and the united states, she should emancipate her slaves to place her in more complete sympathy with the rest of america. it will not be presumptuous, after the foregoing sketch, to say, with entire consideration for the sovereignty and national pride of the spanish american republics, that the united states, by the priority of their independence, by the stability of their institutions, by the regard of their people for the forms of law, by their resources as a government, by their naval power, by their commercial enterprise, by the attractions which they offer to european immigration, by the prodigious internal development of their resources and wealth, and by the intellectual life of their population, occupy of necessity a prominent position on this continent, which they neither can nor should abdicate, which entitles them to a leading voice, and which imposes upon them duties of right and of honor regarding american questions, whether those questions affect emancipated colonies or colonies still subject to european dominion. the public questions which existed as to all european colonies prior to and during the revolutions in the continental colonies of spain and portugal still exist with reference to the european colonies which remain; and they now return upon us in full force, as we watch events in cuba and porto rico. whatever may be the result of the pending contest in cuba, it appears to be the belief of some of the leading statesmen of spain that the relations which now exist between the island and the mother country can not be long continued. it is understood that the resources for carrying on the struggle have been supplied mainly from cuba, by the aid of that portion of the population which does not desire to see its political destinies intrusted to the persons who direct the movements of the insurgents; but it does not follow that its political relations with spain are to remain unchanged, or that even the party which is now dominant in the island will wish to forever continue colonists. these facts give reason to think that when the contest shall close, cuba, with her resources strained, but unexhausted (whatever may be her political relations), will resume and continue her old commercial relations with the united states; and it is not impossible that at some day, not far distant when measured by the course of history, she will be called upon to elect her position in the family of nations. although the resolution of the senate does not in terms apply to the islands of the antilles, it is impossible to answer it without speaking of them. they outlie the southern coast of the united states and guard the approaches to the ports of mexico, venezuela, and the isthmus, by which we reach from the east the western coasts of mexico and of the spanish states. the people of the spanish islands speak the language and share the traditions, customs, ideas, and religion of the spanish american states of the continent, and will probably, like them, become at some time independent of the mother country. it would, therefore, be unwise, while shaping a commercial policy for the continent, to disregard the islands which lie so much nearer to our seaports. with the spanish islands of cuba and porto rico we maintain, in spite of their adverse legislation, a large commerce by reason of our necessities and of their proximity. in the year ending june 30, 1869, we imported from them merchandise valued at $65,609,274. during the same time we sent them goods to the value only of $15,313,919. the prohibitory duties forced upon them by the policy of spain shut out much that we might supply. their tropical productions, for instance, are too valuable to allow their lands to be given up to the growth of breadstuffs; yet, instead of taking these articles from the superabundant fields of their nearest neighbors, they are forced to go to the distant plains of spain. it will be for the interest of the united states to shape its general policy so that this relation of imports and exports shall be altered in cuba when peace is restored and its political condition is satisfactorily established. with none of the other spanish american states in north and south america are our commercial relations what they should be. our total imports in the year ending june 30, 1869, from these countries were less than $25,000,000 (or not one-half the amount from cuba alone), and our exports for the same time to them were only $17,850,313; and yet these countries have an aggregate population nearly or quite as great as that of the united states; they have republican forms of government, and they profess to be, and probably really are, in political sympathy with us. this department is not able to give with entire accuracy the imports and exports of great britain with the same countries during the corresponding period. it is believed, however, the following figures will be found to be not far from correct: imports to great britain, $42,820,942; exports from great britain, $40,682,102. it thus appears that notwithstanding the greater distance which the commerce has to travel in coming to and from great britain, notwithstanding the political sympathy which ought naturally to exist between republics, notwithstanding the american idea which has been so prominently and so constantly put forward by the government of the united states, notwithstanding the acknowledged skill of american manufacturers, notwithstanding the ready markets which the great cities of the united states afford for the consumption of tropical productions, the inhabitants of the spanish american continent consume of the products of great britain more than twice the quantity they take of the products of the united states, and that they sell to us only three-fifths of the amount they sell to great britain. the secretary of state appends to this report the tables on which these statements are founded. that their commerce with the united states is not large may be partially explained by the fact that these states have been subject to many successive revolutions since the failure of the congress of panama. these revolutions not only exhaust their resources and burden them with debt, but they check emigration, prevent the flow of foreign capital into the country, and stop the enterprise which needs a stable government for its development. these suggestions are, however, applicable to the british commerce as well as to our own, and they do not explain why we, with the natural advantages in our favor, fall so far behind. the isthmus of panama is the common point where the commerce of the western coasts of mexico and south america meets. when it arrives there, why should it seek liverpool and london rather than new york? the political causes which have operated to divert this commerce from us the secretary of state has endeavored to explain. a favorable time has now come for removing them--for laying the foundation of an american policy which shall bind in closer union the american republics. let them understand that the united states do not covet their territories; that our only desire is to see them peaceful, with free and stable governments, increasing in wealth and population, and developing in the lines in which their own traditions, customs, habits, laws, and modes of thought will naturally take them. let them feel that, as in 1826, so now, this government is ready to aid them to the full extent of its constitutional power in any steps which they may take for their better protection against anarchy. let them be convinced that the united states is prepared, in good faith and without ulterior purposes, to join them in the development of a peaceful american commercial policy that may in time include this continent and the west indian islands. let this be comprehended, and there will be no political reason why we may not "secure to the united states that proportionate share of the trade of this continent to which their close relations of geographical contiguity and political friendship with all the states of america justly entitle them." it may not be enough to remove the political obstacles only. the financial policy which the war made necessary may have operated injuriously upon our commerce with these states. the resolution of the senate calls, on these points, for detailed information which is not within the control of the secretary of state, and for recommendations for the future which he is not prepared to give without that information. to fully answer the senate's call, it would probably be necessary to employ some competent agent, familiar with the spanish american states, to collate and arrange the information asked for. for this there is no appropriation by congress. respectfully submitted. hamilton fish. _commerce of the united states with the countries on this continent and adjacent islands for the year ended june 30, 1860_. [compiled from the annual report on commerce and navigation.] countries. imports. exports. reexports. total total exports. commerce. _______________________________________________________________________ dominion of canada $3,353,010 $18,188,613 $2,858,782 $21,047,395 $51,400,405 all other british possessions in north america 1,737,304 2,703,173 446,664 3,149,837 4,887,141 british west indies 6,682,391 9,142,344 101,760 9,244,104 15,926,495 ========================================================== total 38,772,705 30,034,130 3,407,206 33,441,336 72,214,041 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- cuba 58,201,374 12,643,955 7,064,787 19,708,742 77,910,116 porto rico 7,407,900 2,669,964 114,037 2,784,001 10,191,901 ========================================================== total 65,609,274 15,313,919 7,178,824 22,492,743 88,102,017 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- french possessions in america 696,952 1,174,056 45,514 1,219,570 1,916,522 danish west indies 638,550 1,500,000 39,121 1,539,121 2,177,671 dutch west indies and guiana 999,099 926,051 29,595 955,646 1,954,745 hayti and san domingo 729,632 1,349,438 129,462 1,478,900 2,208,532 sandwich islands 1,298,065 700,962 86,665 787,627 2,085,712 ========================================================== total 4,362,318 5,650,507 330,357 5,980,864 10,343,182 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- mexico 7,232,006 3,836,699 1,047,408 4,884,107 12,116,113 central american states 733,296 1,324,336 52,146 1,376,482 2,109,778 colombia 5,291,706 4,900,075 180,267 5,080,342 10,372,048 peru 1,386,310 1,556,434 116,911 1,673,445 3,059,755 chile 1,186,982 1,969,580 115,905 2,085,485 3,272,467 argentine republic 5,162,966 2,235,089 272,425 2,507,514 7,670,480 uruguay 1,472,608 835,112 58,270 894,382 2,366,990 brazil 24,912,450 5,910,565 158,514 6,069,079 30,981,529 venezuela 2,431,760 1,191,888 29,176 1,221,064 3,652,824 ========================================================== total 49,810,084 23,760,878 2,031,022 25,791,900 75,601,984 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- grand total 158,554,381 74,759,434 12,947,409 87,706,843 246,261,224 ========================================================== total commerce of united states 437,314,255 413,954,615 25,173,414 439,128,029 876,442,284 _______________________________________________________________________ _imports and exports of great britain with spanish america and some of the west india islands for parts of the years 1868 and 1869_. year. imports. exports. ================================================================== cuba and porto rico 1869 â£3,228,292 â£1,374,242 french possessions in america 1868 4,252 3,002 danish west indies 1868 295,102 9,211 dutch west indies and guiana 1868 148,882 4,444 hayti and san domingo 1868 220,806 6,043 sandwich islands 1868 33,336 917 mexico 1868 350,664 92,077 central american states 1868 939,827 173,611 colombia 1869 971,396 2,500,039 peru 1869 2,734,784 1,180,931 chile 1869 3,211,174 1,596,905 argentine republic 1869 1,034,445 1,841,953 uruguay 1869 535,015 1,009,425 brazil 1869 7,754,526 5,477,439 venezuela 1868 69,997 10,452 ================================================================== washington, _july 14, 1870_. _to the senate of the united states:_ i transmit, for the consideration of the senate with a view to ratification, a convention between the united states and his majesty the king of sweden and norway, relative to the citizenship of natives of the one country who may emigrate to the other. a protocol on the subject is also herewith transmitted. u.s. grant. washington, _july 14, 1870_. _to the senate of the united states:_ i transmit, for consideration with a view to its ratification, a convention between the united states and the republic of salvador for the surrender of fugitive criminals, signed at san salvador on the 23d day of may last. u.s. grant. washington, d.c., _july 15, 1870_. _to the senate and house of representatives:_ your attention is respectfully called to the necessity of passing an indian appropriation bill before the members of congress separate. without such appropriation indian hostilities are sure to ensue, and with them suffering, loss of life, and expenditures vast as compared with the amount asked for. the latest intelligence from europe indicates the imminence of a war between france and north germany. in view of this a sound policy indicates the importance of some legislation tending to enlarge the commercial marine of this country. the vessels of this country at the present time are insufficient to meet the demand which the existence of a war in europe will impose upon the commerce of the united states, and i submit to the consideration of congress that the interests of the country will be advanced by the opportunity afforded to our citizens to purchase vessels of foreign construction for the foreign trade of the country. an act to this effect may be limited in its duration to meet the immediate exigency. the foreign-mail service of the united states is in a large degree dependent upon the bremen and hamburg lines of steamers. the post-office department has entered into contracts in writing with the two companies above named, and with the williams and guion lines, respectively, for a regular and continuous service of two years. the only arrangement that could be made with the inman and cunard lines is temporary, and may be broken off at any time. the north german lines are first class in point of speed and equipment, their steamers usually making the trip across the atlantic in from twenty-four to thirty-six hours in advance of the williams and guion lines. should the north german steamers be blockaded or impeded by france, our postal intercourse with foreign nations will be greatly embarrassed unless congress shall interpose for its relief. i suggest to congress the propriety of further postponing the time for adjournment, with the view of considering the questions herein communicated. u.s. grant. washington, _july 15, 1870_. _to the senate of the united states:_ in answer to their resolution of the 9th instant, i transmit a report[28] from the secretary of state and the papers which accompanied it. u.s. grant. [footnote 28: relating to the importation of chinese coolies into the united states.] veto messages. executive mansion, _washington, d.c., january 11, 1870_. _to the senate of the united states:_ i return herewith without my approval senate bill no. 273, entitled "an act for the relief of rollin white," for the reasons set forth in the accompanying communication, dated december n, 1869, from the chief of ordnance. u.s. grant. ordnance office, war department, _washington, december 11, 1869_. hon. w.w. belknap, _secretary of war_. sir: in the year 1855 rollin white obtained letters patent for improvements in repeating pistols, in (among other things) extending the chambers of the rotating cylinder through to the rear, so as to enable the chambers to be charged at the rear by hand or by a self-acting charger. some time afterwards, and prior to the breaking out of the rebellion, he assigned this patent to smith & wesson, of springfield, mass., for the sum of $500 in cash and their obligation to pay him 25 cents royalty on each pistol manufactured under the patent, binding himself to apply for and to use his influence to procure a renewal of the patent. he afterwards surrendered this original patent and obtained a reissue in three divisions. two years before the expiration of the latter he applied to the commissioner of patents for an extension, upon the ground of insufficiency of compensation. the commissioner rejected the application for an extension, without assigning any reason, and the patents expired by limitation on the 3d of april, 1869, and the invention became public property. on the 9th of april, 1869, a bill authorizing the commissioner of patents to reconsider the application of rollin white for extension of his patents was introduced in the senate and passed without debate. it passed the house without debate on the 10th of april, but failed to receive the signature of the vice-president before congress adjourned. it is understood that it has now been signed by that officer, and only awaits the approval of the president to become a law. unless the ends of justice require the extension of this patent, it should not be renewed. so far as i have been able to ascertain, justice to the government and to the public forbids this patent from being renewed. the validity of the patent has been questioned for many years, and it is understood that it was only affirmed by the supreme court by a tie vote, four of the justices voting affirmatively and an equal number negatively. its renewal is urged by rollin white upon the ground that he has not been sufficiently compensated for his invention. rollin white has received nearly $71,000 as royalty. smith & wesson, for the years 1862, 1863, 1864, 1865, 1866, 1867, and 1868, returned incomes amounting in the aggregate to about $1,000,000. this was derived chiefly from the manufacture of firearms under rollin white's patent, that firm holding the exclusive right to manufacture under it and being engaged almost exclusively in their manufacture. it is believed that the government suffered inconvenience and embarrassment enough during the war in consequence of the inability of manufacturers to use this patent, and that its further extension will operate prejudicially to its interest by compelling it to pay to parties already well paid a large royalty for altering its revolvers to use metallic cartridges. for these reasons i respectfully request that you will call the attention of the president of the united states to this subject before he acts upon the bill which is now before him. respectfully, your obedient servant, a.b. dyer, _brevet major-general, chief of ordnance_. executive mansion, _july 14, 1870_. _to the senate of the united states:_ i herewith return without my approval senate bill no. 476, "an act to fix the status of certain federal soldiers enlisting in the union army from the states of alabama and florida," for the reasons embodied in the following facts, which have been obtained from the office of the second comptroller: the first regiment of florida cavalry, composed of six companies, was organized from december, 1862, to august, 1864, to serve three years. it was mustered out of service november 17, 1865, by reason of general order from the war department discharging all cavalry organizations east of the mississippi. the men of this regiment enlisting prior to july 18, 1864, received $25 advance bounty at muster-in, and the discharged soldiers and heirs of those deceased have been paid the same bounty under act of july 22, 1861, joint resolution of january 13, 1864, an act of july 28, 1866, as men enlisted at the same time in other volunteer organizations. the second regiment of florida cavalry, composed of seven companies, was organized from december, 1863, to june, 1864, to serve three years. it was mustered out november 29, 1865, by reason of the order discharging cavalry organizations east of the mississippi. most of the men received the $25 advance bounty at muster-in, and the discharged men and heirs of deceased men have received bounty under the several acts of congress cited above, subject to the same conditions which apply to men who enlisted at the same time in other volunteer organizations. the first alabama cavalry was originally organized as a one-year regiment from december, 1862, to september, 1863, and two companies of three-years men (companies i and k) were added to complete its organization. these companies were formerly companies d and e of the first middle tennessee cavalry. prior to the expiration of the term of the one-year men, the adjutant-general of the army, of date may 15, 1863, authorized general dodge to fill up this command, and in accordance therewith the places of the companies discharged by reason of expiration of term were filled by companies of men enlisted for three years. the original companies, a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, and l, were organized from december, 1862, to september 25, 1863, and were discharged by companies from december 22, 1863, to september 28, 1864, in order as the term (one year) of each company expired. companies i and k, mustered in august, 1862, to serve three years, were discharged in july, 1865, by reason of expiration of term of service. as reorganized under the order above mentioned, the regiment consisted of companies a, b, c, d, e, and g, organized from february 5, 1864, to october, 1864, to serve three years; companies f, l, and m, organized from december 28, 1863, to october 31, 1864, to serve one and three years; company h, organized in march and april, 1865, to serve three years, and companies i and k, of the old organization described above. the men of the first alabama cavalry who enlisted for three years have been paid bounty under the several acts of congress upon the same principles which apply to other three-years volunteers. the one-year men enlisted prior to july 18, 1864, received no bounty, but $100 bounty has been paid the proper heirs of the one-year men of this organization who died in the service, in accordance with the act of july 22, 1861, under which the regiment was originally organized. some of the men of these organizations were erroneously paid by the pay department at the time of their muster out of service, they having been paid but $100, when they should have been allowed $300 under the joint resolution of january 13, 1864. the balance of bounty due these men is being paid by the proper accounting officers. it will be seen by comparing the above statement with the act under consideration that the effect of the act will be to give the one-year men of the first alabama cavalry, nearly all of whom enlisted in 1862 and 1863, a bounty of $100 each, or a proportionate part, according to the time served. it would give each man of companies i and k of the first alabama cavalry $100 more bounty. the bounty of the other three-years men of the first alabama cavalry, first florida cavalry, and second florida cavalry, who enlisted prior to december 25, 1863, and from april 1, 1864, to july 17, 1864, inclusive, and who were discharged by reason of orders from the war department, will not be affected. the men enlisting in these organizations under joint resolution of january 13, 1864, receive under existing laws $100 more bounty than they would be entitled to receive if the act under consideration becomes a law. in case of deceased men the working of the act is still more perplexing, as the prescribed order of inheritance under the act of july 4, 1864, is entirely different from that under all other acts. a large proportion of the claims in case of the deceased men have been settled, and the bounties have been paid fathers, mothers, brothers, and sisters, the proper heirs under existing laws, which under this act would go only to the widow, children, and widowed mother. bounty has also been paid to parents under act of july 28, 1866, which this act would require to be paid to the widow, although she may have remarried. under the act of july 28, 1866, children of age are not entitled, but this act makes them joint heirs with the minor children. in case of the deceased one-year men, and the three-years men enlisted under joint resolution of january 13, 1864, the effect of this act would only be to change the prescribed order of inheritance. in case of the three-years men enlisted under act of july 22, 1861, the order of inheritance is changed by this act, and the heirs entitled (widow, children, and widowed mother) will receive $100 more bounty than they are now entitled to receive. it may be well to state that november 14, 1864, the war department gave authority to enlist men who had deserted from the rebel army as recruits for the first alabama cavalry, with the distinct understanding that they were to receive no bounty. such recruits have not been paid bounty, and it may be a question whether the act under consideration would entitle them to any. u.s. grant. proclamations. by the president of the united states of america. a proclamation. whereas, pursuant to the first section of the act of congress approved the 11th day of june, 1864, entitled "an act to provide for the execution of treaties between the united states and foreign nations respecting consular jurisdiction over the crews of vessels of such foreign nations in the waters and ports of the united states," it is provided that before that act shall take effect as to the ships and vessels of any particular nation having such treaty with the united states the president of the united states shall have been satisfied that similar provisions have been made for the execution of such treaty by the other contracting party, and shall have issued his proclamation to that effect, declaring that act to be in force as to such nation; and whereas due inquiry having been made and satisfactory answers having been received that similar provisions are in force in france, prussia and the other states of the north german union, and italy: now, therefore, be it known that i, ulysses s. grant, president of the united states of america, do hereby proclaim the same accordingly. done at the city of washington, this 10th day of february, a.d. 1870, and of the independence of the united states of america the ninety-fourth. [seal.] u.s. grant. by the president: hamilton fish, _secretary of state_. ulysses s. grant, president of the united states of america. _to all whom it may concern:_ an exequatur, bearing date the 17th day of june, 1865, having been issued to joaquin de palma, recognizing him as vice-consul of portugal at savannah, ga., and declaring him free to exercise and enjoy such functions, powers, and privileges as are allowed to vice-consuls by the law of nations or by the laws of the united states and existing treaty stipulations between the government of portugal and the united states; but for satisfactory reasons it is deemed advisable that the said joaquin de palma should no longer be permitted to continue in the exercise of said functions, powers, and privileges: these are therefore to declare that i no longer recognize the said joaquin de palma as vice-consul of portugal at savannah, ga., and will not permit him to exercise or enjoy any of the functions, powers, or privileges allowed to a consular officer of that nation; and that i do hereby wholly revoke and annul the said exequatur heretofore given, and do declare the same to be absolutely null and void from this day forward. in testimony whereof i have caused these letters to be made patent and the seal of the united states of america to be hereunto affixed. [seal.] given under my hand, at washington, this 12th day of may, a.d. 1870, and of the independence of the united states of america the ninety-fourth. u.s. grant. by the president: hamilton fish, _secretary of state_. by the president of the united states of america. a proclamation. whereas it has come to my knowledge that sundry illegal military enterprises and expeditions are being set on foot within the territory and jurisdiction of the united states with a view to carry on the same from such territory and jurisdiction against the people and district of the dominion of canada, within the dominions of her majesty the queen of the united kingdom of great britain and ireland, with whom the united states are at peace: now, therefore, i, ulysses s. grant, president of the united states, do hereby admonish all good citizens of the united states and all persons within the territory and jurisdiction of the united states against aiding, countenancing, abetting, or taking part in such unlawful proceedings; and i do hereby warn all persons that by committing such illegal acts they will forfeit all right to the protection of the government or to its interference in their behalf to rescue them from the consequences of their own acts; and i do hereby enjoin all officers in the service of the united states to employ all their lawful authority and power to prevent and defeat the aforesaid unlawful proceedings and to arrest and bring to justice all persons who may be engaged therein. in testimony whereof i have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the united states to be affixed. [seal.] done at the city of washington, this 24th day of may, a.d. 1870, and of the independence of the united states the ninety-fourth. u.s. grant. by the president: hamilton fish, _secretary of state_. by the president of the united states of america. a proclamation. whereas a state of war unhappily exists between france on the one side and the north german confederation and its allies on the other side; and whereas the united states are on terms of friendship and amity with all the contending powers and with the persons inhabiting their several dominions; and whereas great numbers of the citizens of the united states reside within the territories or dominions of each of the said belligerents and carry on commerce, trade, or other business or pursuits therein, protected by the faith of treaties; and whereas great numbers of the subjects or citizens of each of the said belligerents reside within the territory or jurisdiction of the united states and carry on commerce, trade, or other business or pursuits therein; and whereas the laws of the united states, without interfering with the free expression of opinion and sympathy, or with the open manufacture or sale of arms or munitions of war, nevertheless impose upon all persons who may be within their territory and jurisdiction the duty of an impartial neutrality during the existence of the contest: now, therefore, i, ulysses s. grant, president of the united states, in order to preserve the neutrality of the united states and of their citizens and of persons within their territory and jurisdiction, and to enforce their laws, and in order that all persons, being warned of the general tenor of the laws and treaties of the united states in this behalf and of the law of nations, may thus be prevented from an unintentional violation of the same, do hereby declare and proclaim that by the act passed on the 20th day of april, a.d. 1818, commonly known as the "neutrality law," the following acts are forbidden to be done, under severe penalties, within the territory and jurisdiction of the united states, to wit: 1. accepting and exercising a commission to serve either of the said belligerents, by land or by sea, against the other belligerent. 2. enlisting or entering into the service of either of the said belligerents as a soldier or as a marine or seaman on board of any vessel of war, letter of marque, or privateer. 3. hiring or retaining another person to enlist or enter himself in the service of either of the said belligerents as a soldier or as a marine or seaman on board of any vessel of war, letter of marque, or privateer. 4. hiring another person to go beyond the limits or jurisdiction of the united states with intent to be enlisted as aforesaid. 5. hiring another person to go beyond the limits of the united states with intent to be entered into service as aforesaid. 6. retaining another person to go beyond the limits of the united states with intent to be enlisted as aforesaid. 7. retaining another person to go beyond the limits of the united states with intent to be entered into service as aforesaid. (but the said act is not to be construed to extend to a citizen or subject of either belligerent who, being transiently within the united states, shall, on board of any vessel of war which at the time of its arrival within the united states was fitted and equipped as such vessel of war, enlist or enter himself, or hire or retain another subject or citizen of the same belligerent who is transiently within the united states to enlist or enter himself, to serve such belligerent on board such vessel of war, if the united states shall then be at peace with such belligerent.) 8. fitting out and arming, or attempting to fit out and arm, or procuring to be fitted out and armed, or knowingly being concerned in the furnishing, fitting out, or arming of any ship or vessel with intent that such ship or vessel shall be employed in the service of either of the said belligerents. 9. issuing or delivering a commission within the territory or jurisdiction of the united states for any ship or vessel to the intent that she may be employed as aforesaid. 10. increasing or augmenting, or procuring to be increased or augmented, or knowingly being concerned in increasing or augmenting, the force of any ship of war, cruiser, or other armed vessel which at the time of her arrival within the united states was a ship of war, cruiser, or armed vessel in the service of either of the said belligerents, or belonging to the subjects or citizens of either, by adding to the number of guns of such vessel, or by changing those on board of her for guns of a larger caliber, or by the addition thereto of any equipment solely applicable to war. 11. beginning or setting on foot or providing or preparing the means for any military expedition or enterprise to be carried on from the territory or jurisdiction of the united states against the territories or dominions of either of the said belligerents. and i do further declare and proclaim that by the nineteenth article of the treaty of amity and commerce which was concluded between his majesty the king of prussia and the united states of america on the 11th day of july, a.d. 1799, which article was revived by the treaty of may 1, a.d. 1828, between the same parties, and is still in force, it was agreed that "the vessels of war, public and private, of both parties shall carry freely, wheresoever they please, the vessels and effects taken from their enemies, without being obliged to pay any duties, charges, or fees to officers of admiralty, of the customs, or any others; nor shall such prizes be arrested, searched, or put under legal process when they come to and enter the ports of the other party, but may freely be carried out again at any time by their captors to the places expressed in their commissions, which the commanding officer of such vessel shall be obliged to show." and i do further declare and proclaim that it has been officially communicated to the government of the united states by the envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of the north german confederation at washington that private property on the high seas will be exempted from seizure by the ships of his majesty the king of prussia, without regard to reciprocity. and i do further declare and proclaim that it has been officially communicated to the government of the united states by the envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of his majesty the emperor of the french at washington that orders have been given that in the conduct of the war the commanders of the french forces on land and on the seas shall scrupulously observe toward neutral powers the rules of international law and that they shall strictly adhere to the principles set forth in the declaration of the congress of paris of the 16th of april, 1856; that is to say: first. that privateering is and remains abolished. second. that the neutral flag covers enemy's goods, with the exception of contraband of war. third. that neutral goods, with the exception of contraband of war, are not liable to capture under the enemy's flag. fourth. that blockades, in order to be binding, must be effective--that is to say, maintained by a force sufficient really to prevent access to the coast of the enemy; and that, although the united states have not adhered to the declaration of 1856, the vessels of his majesty will not seize enemy's property found on board of a vessel of the united states, provided that property is not contraband of war. and i do further declare and proclaim that the statutes of the united states and the law of nations alike require that no person within the territory and jurisdiction of the united states shall take part, directly or indirectly, in the said war, but shall remain at peace with each of the said belligerents and shall maintain a strict and impartial neutrality, and that whatever privileges shall be accorded to one belligerent within the ports of the united states shall be in like manner accorded to the other. and i do hereby enjoin all the good citizens of the united states and all persons residing or being within the territory or jurisdiction of the united states to observe the laws thereof and to commit no act contrary to the provisions of the said statutes or in violation of the law of nations in that behalf. and i do hereby warn all citizens of the united states and all persons residing or being within their territory or jurisdiction that while the free and full expression of sympathies in public and private is not restricted by the laws of the united states, military forces in aid of either belligerent can not lawfully be originated or organized within their jurisdiction; and that while all persons may lawfully and without restriction, by reason of the aforesaid state of war, manufacture and sell within the united states arms and munitions of war and other articles ordinarily known as "contraband of war," yet they can not carry such articles upon the high seas for the use or service of either belligerent, nor can they transport soldiers and officers of either, or attempt to break any blockade which may be lawfully established and maintained during the war, without incurring the risk of hostile capture and the penalties denounced by the law of nations in that behalf. and i do hereby give notice that all citizens of the united states and others who may claim the protection of this government who may misconduct themselves in the premises will do so at their peril, and that they can in no wise obtain any protection from the government of the united states against the consequences of their misconduct. in witness whereof i have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the united states to be affixed. [seal.] done at the city of washington, this 22d day of august, a.d. 1870, and of the independence of the united states of america the ninety-fifth. u.s. grant. by the president: hamilton fish, _secretary of state_. by the president of the united states of america. a proclamation. whereas on the 22d day of august, 1870, my proclamation was issued enjoining neutrality in the present war between france and the north german confederation and its allies, and declaring, so far as then seemed to be necessary, the respective rights and obligations of the belligerent parties and of the citizens of the united states; and whereas subsequent information gives reason to apprehend that armed cruisers of the belligerents may be tempted to abuse the hospitality accorded to them in the ports, harbors, roadsteads, and other waters of the united states, by making such waters subservient to the purposes of war: now, therefore, i, ulysses s. grant, president of the united states of america, do hereby proclaim and declare that any frequenting and use of the waters within the territorial jurisdiction of the united states by the armed vessels of either belligerent, whether public ships or privateers, for the purpose of preparing for hostile operations or as posts of observation upon the ships of war or privateers or merchant vessels of the other belligerent lying within or being about to enter the jurisdiction of the united states, must be regarded as unfriendly and offensive and in violation of that neutrality which it is the determination of this government to observe; and to the end that the hazard and inconvenience of such apprehended practices may be avoided, i further proclaim and declare that from and after the 12th day of october instant, and during the continuance of the present hostilities between france and the north german confederation and its allies, no ship of war or privateer of either belligerent shall be permitted to make use of any port, harbor, roadstead, or other waters within the jurisdiction of the united states as a station or place of resort for any warlike purpose or for the purpose of obtaining any facilities of warlike equipment; and no ship of war or privateer of either belligerent shall be permitted to sail out of or leave any port, harbor, roadstead, or waters subject to the jurisdiction of the united states from which a vessel of the other belligerent (whether the same shall be a ship of war, a privateer, or a merchant ship) shall have previously departed until after the expiration of at least twenty-four hours from the departure of such last-mentioned vessel beyond the jurisdiction of the united states. if any ship of war or privateer of either belligerent shall, after the time this notification takes effect, enter any port, harbor, roadstead, or waters of the united states, such vessel shall be required to depart and to put to sea within twenty-four hours after her entrance into such port, harbor, roadstead, or waters, except in case of stress of weather or of her requiring provisions or things necessary for the subsistence of her crew or for repairs, in either of which cases the authorities of the port or of the nearest port (as the case may be) shall require her to put to sea as soon as possible after the expiration of such period of twenty-four hours, without permitting her to take in supplies beyond what may be necessary for her immediate use; and no such vessel which may have been permitted to remain within the waters of the united states for the purpose of repair shall continue within such port, harbor, roadstead, or waters for a longer period than twenty-four hours after her necessary repairs shall have been completed, unless within such twenty-four hours a vessel, whether ship of war, privateer, or merchant ship, of the other belligerent shall have departed therefrom, in which case the time limited for the departure of such ship of war or privateer shall be extended so far as may be necessary to secure an interval of not less than twenty-four hours between such departure and that of any ship of war, privateer, or merchant ship of the other belligerent which may have previously quit the same port, harbor, roadstead, or waters. no ship of war or privateer of either belligerent shall be detained in any port, harbor, roadstead, or waters of the united states more than twenty-four hours by reason of the successive departures from such port, harbor, roadstead, or waters of more than one vessel of the other belligerent. but if there be several vessels of each or either of the two belligerents in the same port, harbor, roadstead, or waters, the order of their departure therefrom shall be so arranged as to afford the opportunity of leaving alternately to the vessels of the respective belligerents and to cause the least detention consistent with the objects of this proclamation. no ship of war or privateer of either belligerent shall be permitted, while in any port, harbor, roadstead, or waters within the jurisdiction of the united states, to take in any supplies except provisions and such other things as may be requisite for the subsistence of her crew, and except so much coal only as may be sufficient to carry such vessel, if without sail power, to the nearest european port of her own country, or, in case the vessel is rigged to go under sail and may also be propelled by steam power, then with half the quantity of coal which she would be entitled to receive if dependent upon steam alone; and no coal shall be again supplied to any such ship of war or privateer in the same or any other port, harbor, roadstead, or waters of the united states, without special permission, until after the expiration of three months from the time when such coal may have been last supplied to her within the waters of the united states, unless such ship of war or privateer shall, since last thus supplied, have entered a european port of the government to which she belongs. in testimony whereof i have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the united states to be affixed. [seal.] done at the city of washington, this 8th day of october, a.d. 1870, and of the independence of the united states of america the ninety-fifth. u.s. grant. by the president: hamilton fish, _secretary of state_. by the president of the united states of america. a proclamation. whereas divers evil-disposed persons have at sundry times within the territory or jurisdiction of the united states begun or set on foot, or provided or prepared the means for, military expeditions or enterprises to be carried on thence against the territories or dominions of powers with whom the united states are at peace, by organizing bodies pretending to have powers of government over portions of the territories or dominions of powers with whom the united states are at peace, or, by being or assuming to be members of such bodies, by levying or collecting money for the purpose or for the alleged purpose of using the same in carrying on military enterprises against such territories or dominions by enlisting and organizing armed forces to be used against such powers, and by fitting out, equipping, and arming vessels to transport such organized armed forces to be employed in hostilities against such powers; and whereas it is alleged and there is reason to apprehend that such evil-disposed persons have also at sundry times within the territory and jurisdiction of the united states violated the laws thereof by accepting and exercising commissions to serve by land or by sea against powers with whom the united states are at peace by enlisting themselves or other persons to carry on war against such powers by fitting out and arming vessels with intent that the same shall be employed to cruise or commit hostilities against such powers, or by delivering commissions within the territory or jurisdiction of the united states for such vessels to the intent that they might be employed as aforesaid; and whereas such acts are in violation of the laws of the united states in such case made and provided, and are done in disregard of the duties and obligations which all persons residing or being within the territory or jurisdiction of the united states owe thereto, and are condemned by all right-minded and law-abiding citizens: now, therefore, i, ulysses s. grant, president of the united states of america, do hereby declare and proclaim that all persons hereafter found within the territory or jurisdiction of the united states committing any of the aforerecited violations of law or any similar violations of the sovereignty of the united states for which punishment is provided by law will be rigorously prosecuted therefor, and, upon conviction and sentence to punishment, will not be entitled to expect or receive the clemency of the executive to save them from the consequences of their guilt; and i enjoin upon every officer of this government, civil or military or naval, to use all efforts in his power to arrest for trial and punishment every such offender against the laws providing for the performance of our sacred obligations to friendly powers. in testimony whereof i have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the united states to be affixed. [seal.] done at the city of washington, this 12th day of october, a.d. 1870, and of the independence of the united states of america the ninety-fifth. u.s. grant. by the president: hamilton fish, _secretary of state_. by the president of the united states of america. a proclamation. whereas it behooves a people sensible of their dependence on the almighty publicly and collectively to acknowledge their gratitude for his favors and mercies and humbly to beseech for their continuance; and whereas the people of the united states during the year now about to end have special cause to be thankful for general prosperity, abundant harvests, exemption from pestilence, foreign war, and civil strife: now, therefore, be it known that i, ulysses s. grant, president of the united states, concurring in any similar recommendations from chief magistrates of states, do hereby recommend to all citizens to meet in their respective places of worship on thursday, the 24th day of november next, there to give thanks for the bounty of god during the year about to close and to supplicate for its continuance hereafter. in witness whereof i have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the united states to be affixed. [seal.] done at the city of washington, this 21st day of october, a.d. 1870, and of the independence of the united states the ninety-fifth. u.s. grant. by the president: hamilton fish, _secretary of state_. executive orders. general orders, no. 83. headquarters of the army adjutant-general's office, _washington, december 24, 1869_. brevet major-general a.h. terry, in addition to his duties as commander of the department of the south, is, by order of the president of the united states, appointed to exercise the duties of commanding general of the district of georgia, as defined by the act of congress approved december 22, 1869. by command of general sherman: e.d. townsend, _adjutant-general_. executive mansion, _washington, d.c., december 24, 1869_. the painful duty devolves upon the president of announcing to the people of the united states the death of one of her most distinguished citizens and faithful public servants, the hon. edwin m. stanton, which occurred in this city at an early hour this morning. he was distinguished in the councils of the nation during the entire period of its recent struggle for national existence--first as attorney-general, then as secretary of war: he was unceasing in his labors, earnest and fearless in the assumption of responsibilities necessary to his country's success, respected by all good men, and feared by wrongdoers. in his death the bar, the bench, and the nation sustain a great loss, which will be mourned by all. as a mark of respect to his memory it is ordered that the executive mansion and the several departments at washington be draped in mourning, and that all business be suspended on the day of the funeral. u.s. grant. general orders, no. 1. headquarters of the army, adjutant-general's office, _washington, january 4, 1870_. by direction of the president of the united states, so much of general orders, no. 103, dated headquarters third military district (department of georgia, florida, and alabama), atlanta, ga., july 22, 1868, and so much of general orders, no. 55, dated headquarters of the army, adjutant-general's office, washington, july 28, 1868, as refers to the state of georgia is hereby countermanded. brevet major-general terry will until further orders exercise within that state the powers of the commander of a military district, as provided by the act of march 2, 1867, and the acts supplementary thereto, under his assignment by general orders, no. 83, dated headquarters of the army, adjutant-general's office, washington, december 24, 1869. by command of general sherman: e.d. townsend, _adjutant-general_. general orders, no. 11. headquarters of the army, adjutant-general's office, _washington, january 29, 1870_. i. the senators and representatives from the state of virginia having been admitted to their respective houses of congress, the command known as the first military district has ceased to exist. ii. by direction of the president, the states of maryland, virginia, west virginia, and north carolina will compose the department of virginia, under the command of brevet major-general e.r.s. canby, headquarters at richmond, va., and will form a part of the military division of the atlantic. iii. commanding officers of all posts and detachments now serving in the limits of the new department will report to general canby for instructions. the companies of the eighth infantry now serving in the state of north carolina will be relieved as early as possible, and report to brevet major-general a.h. terry, commanding department of the south, for orders. by command of general sherman: e.d. townsend, _adjutant-general_. general orders, no. 25. headquarters of the army, adjutant-general's office, _washington, february 26, 1870_. i. the senators and representatives from the state of mississippi having been admitted to their respective houses of congress, the command known as the fourth military district has ceased to exist. ii. by direction of the president, the state of mississippi is attached to the department of the cumberland, and the officers and troops within the late fourth military district will accordingly report to brevet major-general cooke, commanding the department. iii. the general commanding the late fourth military district will complete the records of that district as soon as practicable and send them to the adjutant-general of the army, except such military records as should properly be retained at the headquarters of the department, which he will send there. by command of general sherman: e.d. townsend, _adjutant-general_. general orders, no. 35. headquarters of the army, adjutant-general's office, _washington, march 31, 1870_. i. by order of the president of the united states, the state of texas having been admitted to representation in congress, the command heretofore known as the fifth military district will cease to exist, and will hereafter constitute a separate military department, headquarters austin, tex., brevet major-general j.j. reynolds commanding. ii. the department known as the department of louisiana will be broken up; the state of louisiana is hereby added to the department of texas, and the state of arkansas to the department of the missouri. the commanding general department of the missouri will, as soon as convenient, relieve the garrison at little rock by a detachment from the sixth infantry, and the commanding officer of the troops now in arkansas will report to general j.j. reynolds for orders, to take effect as soon as replaced. iii. the new department of texas will form a part of the military division of the south. by command of general sherman: e.d. townsend, _adjutant-general_. second annual message. executive mansion, _december 5, 1870_. _to the senate and house of representatives:_ a year of peace and general prosperity to this nation has passed since the last assembling of congress. we have, through a kind providence, been blessed with abundant crops, and have been spared from complications and war with foreign nations. in our midst comparative harmony has been restored. it is to be regretted, however, that a free exercise of the elective franchise has by violence and intimidation been denied to citizens in exceptional cases in several of the states lately in rebellion, and the verdict of the people has thereby been reversed. the states of virginia, mississippi, and texas have been restored to representation in our national councils. georgia, the only state now without representation, may confidently be expected to take her place there also at the beginning of the new year, and then, let us hope, will be completed the work of reconstruction. with an acquiescence on the part of the whole people in the national obligation to pay the public debt created as the price of our union, the pensions to our disabled soldiers and sailors and their widows and orphans, and in the changes to the constitution which have been made necessary by a great rebellion, there is no reason why we should not advance in material prosperity and happiness as no other nation ever did after so protracted and devastating a war. soon after the existing war broke out in europe the protection of the united states minister in paris was invoked in favor of north germans domiciled in french territory. instructions were issued to grant the protection. this has been followed by an extension of american protection to citizens of saxony, hesse and saxe-coburg, gotha, colombia, portugal, uruguay, the dominican republic, ecuador, chile, paraguay, and venezuela in paris. the charge was an onerous one, requiring constant and severe labor, as well as the exercise of patience, prudence, and good judgment. it has been performed to the entire satisfaction of this government, and, as i am officially informed, equally so to the satisfaction of the government of north germany. as soon as i learned that a republic had been proclaimed at paris and that the people of france had acquiesced in the change, the minister of the united states was directed by telegraph to recognize it and to tender my congratulations and those of the people of the united states. the reestablishment in france of a system of government disconnected with the dynastic traditions of europe appeared to be a proper subject for the felicitations of americans. should the present struggle result in attaching the hearts of the french to our simpler forms of representative government, it will be a subject of still further satisfaction to our people. while we make no effort to impose our institutions upon the inhabitants of other countries, and while we adhere to our traditional neutrality in civil contests elsewhere, we can not be indifferent to the spread of american political ideas in a great and highly civilized country like france. we were asked by the new government to use our good offices, jointly with those of european powers, in the interests of peace. answer was made that the established policy and the true interests of the united states forbade them to interfere in european questions jointly with european powers. i ascertained, informally and unofficially, that the government of north germany was not then disposed to listen to such representations from any power, and though earnestly wishing to see the blessings of peace restored to the belligerents, with all of whom the united states are on terms of friendship, i declined on the part of this government to take a step which could only result in injury to our true interests, without advancing the object for which our intervention was invoked. should the time come when the action of the united states can hasten the return of peace by a single hour, that action will be heartily taken. i deemed it prudent, in view of the number of persons of german and french birth living in the united states, to issue, soon after official notice of a state of war had been received from both belligerents, a proclamation[29] defining the duties of the united states as a neutral and the obligations of persons residing within their territory to observe their laws and the laws of nations. this proclamation was followed by others,[30] as circumstances seemed to call for them. the people, thus acquainted in advance of their duties and obligations, have assisted in preventing violations of the neutrality of the united states. it is not understood that the condition of the insurrection in cuba has materially changed since the close of the last session of congress. in an early stage of the contest the authorities of spain inaugurated a system of arbitrary arrests, of close confinement, and of military trial and execution of persons suspected of complicity with the insurgents, and of summary embargo of their properties, and sequestration of their revenues by executive warrant. such proceedings, so far as they affected the persons or property of citizens of the united states, were in violation of the provisions of the treaty of 1795 between the united states and spain. representations of injuries resulting to several persons claiming to be citizens of the united states by reason of such violations were made to the spanish government. from april, 1869, to june last the spanish minister at washington had been clothed with a limited power to aid in redressing such wrongs. that power was found to be withdrawn, "in view," as it was said, "of the favorable situation in which the island of cuba" then "was," which, however, did not lead to a revocation or suspension of the extraordinary and arbitrary functions exercised by the executive power in cuba, and we were obliged to make our complaints at madrid. in the negotiations thus opened, and still pending there, the united states only claimed that for the future the rights secured to their citizens by treaty should be respected in cuba, and that as to the past a joint tribunal should be established in the united states with full jurisdiction over all such claims. before such an impartial tribunal each claimant would be required to prove his case. on the other hand, spain would be at liberty to traverse every material fact, and thus complete equity would be done. a case which at one time threatened seriously to affect the relations between the united states and spain has already been disposed of in this way. the claim of the owners of the _colonel lloyd aspinwall_ for the illegal seizure and detention of that vessel was referred to arbitration by mutual consent, and has resulted in an award to the united states, for the owners, of the sum of $19,702.50 in gold. another and long-pending claim of like nature, that of the whaleship _canada_, has been disposed of by friendly arbitrament during the present year. it was referred, by the joint consent of brazil and the united states, to the decision of sir edward thornton, her britannic majesty's minister at washington, who kindly undertook the laborious task of examining the voluminous mass of correspondence and testimony submitted by the two governments, and awarded to the united states the sum of $100,740.09 in gold, which has since been paid by the imperial government. these recent examples show that the mode which the united states have proposed to spain for adjusting the pending claims is just and feasible, and that it may be agreed to by either nation without dishonor. it is to be hoped that this moderate demand may be acceded to by spain without further delay. should the pending negotiations, unfortunately and unexpectedly, be without result, it will then become my duty to communicate that fact to congress and invite its action on the subject. the long-deferred peace conference between spain and the allied south american republics has been inaugurated in washington under the auspices of the united states. pursuant to the recommendation contained in the resolution of the house of representatives of the 17th of december, 1866, the executive department of the government offered its friendly offices for the promotion of peace and harmony between spain and the allied republics. hesitations and obstacles occurred to the acceptance of the offer. ultimately, however, a conference was arranged, and was opened in this city on the 29th of october last, at which i authorized the secretary of state to preside. it was attended by the ministers of spain, peru, chile, and ecuador. in consequence of the absence of a representative from bolivia, the conference was adjourned until the attendance of a plenipotentiary from that republic could be secured or other measures could be adopted toward compassing its objects. the allied and other republics of spanish origin on this continent may see in this fact a new proof of our sincere interest in their welfare, of our desire to see them blessed with good governments, capable of maintaining order and of preserving their respective territorial integrity, and of our sincere wish to extend our own commercial and social relations with them. the time is not probably far distant when, in the natural course of events, the european political connection with this continent will cease. our policy should be shaped, in view of this probability, so as to ally the commercial interests of the spanish american states more closely to our own, and thus give the united states all the preeminence and all the advantage which mr. monroe, mr. adams, and mr. clay contemplated when they proposed to join in the congress of panama. during the last session of congress a treaty for the annexation of the republic of san domingo to the united states failed to receive the requisite two-thirds vote of the senate. i was thoroughly convinced then that the best interests of this country, commercially and materially, demanded its ratification. time has only confirmed me in this view. i now firmly believe that the moment it is known that the united states have entirely abandoned the project of accepting as a part of its territory the island of san domingo a free port will be negotiated for by european nations in the bay of samana. a large commercial city will spring up, to which we will be tributary without receiving corresponding benefits, and then will be seen the folly of our rejecting so great a prize. the government of san domingo has voluntarily sought this annexation. it is a weak power, numbering probably less than 120,000 souls, and yet possessing one of the richest territories under the sun, capable of supporting a population of 10,000,000 people in luxury. the people of san domingo are not capable of maintaining themselves in their present condition, and must look for outside support. they yearn for the protection of our free institutions and laws, our progress and civilization. shall we refuse them? the acquisition of san domingo is desirable because of its geographical position. it commands the entrance to the caribbean sea and the isthmus transit of commerce. it possesses the richest soil, best and most capacious harbors, most salubrious climate, and the most valuable products of the forests, mine, and soil of any of the west india islands. its possession by us will in a few years build up a coastwise commerce of immense magnitude, which will go far toward restoring to us our lost merchant marine. it will give to us those articles which we consume so largely and do not produce, thus equalizing our exports and imports. in case of foreign war it will give us command of all the islands referred to, and thus prevent an enemy from ever again possessing himself of rendezvous upon our very coast. at present our coast trade between the states bordering on the atlantic and those bordering on the gulf of mexico is cut into by the bahamas and the antilles, twice we must, as it were, pass through foreign countries to get by sea from georgia to the west coast of florida. san domingo, with a stable government, under which her immense resources can be developed, will give remunerative wages to tens of thousands of laborers not now upon the island. this labor will take advantage of every available means of transportation to abandon the adjacent islands and seek the blessings of freedom and its sequence--each inhabitant receiving the reward of his own labor. porto rico and cuba will have to abolish slavery, as a measure of self-preservation, to retain their laborers. san domingo will become a large consumer of the products of northern farms and manufactories. the cheap rate at which her citizens can be furnished with food, tools, and machinery will make it necessary that contiguous islands should have the same advantages in order to compete in the production of sugar, coffee, tobacco, tropical fruits, etc. this will open to us a still wider market for our products. the production of our own supply of these articles will cut off more than one hundred millions of our annual imports, besides largely increasing our exports. with such a picture it is easy to see how our large debt abroad is ultimately to be extinguished. with a balance of trade against us (including interest on bonds held by foreigners and money spent by our citizens traveling in foreign lands) equal to the entire yield of the precious metals in this country, it is not so easy to see how this result is to be otherwise accomplished. the acquisition of san domingo is an adherence to the "monroe doctrine;" it is a measure of national protection; it is asserting our just claim to a controlling influence over the great commercial traffic soon to flow from west to east by way of the isthmus of darien; it is to build up our merchant marine; it is to furnish new markets for the products of our farms, shops, and manufactories; it is to make slavery insupportable in cuba and porto rico at once, and ultimately so in brazil; it is to settle the unhappy condition of cuba and end an exterminating conflict; it is to provide honest means of paying our honest debts without overtaxing the people; it is to furnish our citizens with the necessaries of everyday life at cheaper rates than ever before; and it is, in fine, a rapid stride toward that greatness which the intelligence, industry, and enterprise of the citizens of the united states entitle this country to assume among nations. in view of the importance of this question, i earnestly urge upon congress early action expressive of its views as to the best means of acquiring san domingo. my suggestion is that by joint resolution of the two houses of congress the executive be authorized to appoint a commission to negotiate a treaty with the authorities of san domingo for the acquisition of that island, and that an appropriation be made to defray the expenses of such a commission. the question may then be determined, either by the action of the senate upon the treaty or the joint action of the two houses of congress upon a resolution of annexation, as in the case of the acquisition of texas. so convinced am i of the advantages to flow from the acquisition of san domingo, and of the great disadvantages--i might almost say calamities--to flow from nonacquisition, that i believe the subject has only to be investigated to be approved. it is to be regretted that our representations in regard to the injurious effects, especially upon the revenue of the united states, of the policy of the mexican government in exempting from impost duties a large tract of its territory on our borders have not only been fruitless, but that it is even proposed in that country to extend the limits within which the privilege adverted to has hitherto been enjoyed. the expediency of taking into your serious consideration proper measures for countervailing the policy referred to will, it is presumed, engage your earnest attention. it is the obvious interest, especially of neighboring nations, to provide against impunity to those who may have committed high crimes within their borders and who may have sought refuge abroad. for this purpose extradition treaties have been concluded with several of the central american republics, and others are in progress. the sense of congress is desired, as early as may be convenient, upon the proceedings of the commission on claims against venezuela, as communicated in my messages of march 16, 1869, march 1, 1870, and march 31, 1870. it has not been deemed advisable to distribute any of the money which has been received from that government until congress shall have acted on the subject. the massacres of french and russian residents at tien-tsin, under circumstances of great barbarity, was supposed by some to have been premeditated, and to indicate a purpose among the populace to exterminate foreigners in the chinese empire. the evidence fails to establish such a supposition, but shows a complicity between the local authorities and the mob. the government at peking, however, seems to have been disposed to fulfill its treaty obligations so far as it was able to do so. unfortunately, the news of the war between the german states and france reached china soon after the massacre. it would appear that the popular mind became possessed with the idea that this contest, extending to chinese waters, would neutralize the christian influence and power, and that the time was coming when the superstitious masses might expel all foreigners and restore mandarin influence. anticipating trouble from this cause, i invited france and north germany to make an authorized suspension of hostilities in the east (where they were temporarily suspended by act of the commanders), and to act together for the future protection in china of the lives and properties of americans and europeans. since the adjournment of congress the ratifications of the treaty with great britain for abolishing the mixed courts for the suppression of the slave trade have been exchanged. it is believed that the slave trade is now confined to the eastern coast of africa, whence the slaves are taken to arabian markets. the ratifications of the naturalization convention between great britain and the united states have also been exchanged during the recess, and thus a long-standing dispute between the two governments has been settled in accordance with the principles always contended for by the united states. in april last, while engaged in locating a military reservation near pembina, a corps of engineers discovered that the commonly received boundary line between the united states and the british possessions at that place is about 4,700 feet south of the true position of the forty-ninth parallel, and that the line, when run on what is now supposed to be the true position of that parallel, would leave the fort of the hudsons bay company at pembina within the territory of the united states. this information being communicated to the british government, i was requested to consent, and did consent, that the british occupation of the fort of the hudsons bay company should continue for the present. i deem it important, however, that this part of the boundary line should be definitely fixed by a joint commission of the two governments, and i submit herewith estimates of the expense of such a commission on the part of the united states and recommend that an appropriation be made for that purpose. the land boundary has already been fixed and marked from the summit of the rocky mountains to the georgian bay. it should now be in like manner marked from the lake of the woods to the summit of the rocky mountains. i regret to say that no conclusion has been reached for the adjustment of the claims against great britain growing out of the course adopted by that government during the rebellion. the cabinet of london, so far as its views have been expressed, does not appear to be willing to concede that her majesty's government was guilty of any negligence, or did or permitted any act during the war by which the united states has just cause of complaint. our firm and unalterable convictions are directly the reverse. i therefore recommend to congress to authorize the appointment of a commission to take proof of the amount and the ownership of these several claims, on notice to the representative of her majesty at washington, and that authority be given for the settlement of these claims by the united states, so that the government shall have the ownership of the private claims, as well as the responsible control of all the demands against great britain. it can not be necessary to add that whenever her majesty's government shall entertain a desire for a full and friendly adjustment of these claims the united states will enter upon their consideration with an earnest desire for a conclusion consistent with the honor and dignity of both nations. the course pursued by the canadian authorities toward the fishermen of the united states during the past season has not been marked by a friendly feeling. by the first article of the convention of 1818 between great britain and the united states it was agreed that the inhabitants of the united states should have forever, in common with british subjects, the right of taking fish in certain waters therein defined. in the waters not included in the limits named in the convention (within 3 miles of parts of the british coast) it has been the custom for many years to give to intruding fishermen of the united states a reasonable warning of their violation of the technical rights of great britain. the imperial government is understood to have delegated the whole or a share of its jurisdiction or control of these inshore fishing grounds to the colonial authority known as the dominion of canada, and this semi-independent but irresponsible agent has exercised its delegated powers in an unfriendly way. vessels have been seized without notice or warning, in violation of the custom previously prevailing, and have been taken into the colonial ports, their voyages broken up, and the vessels condemned. there is reason to believe that this unfriendly and vexatious treatment was designed to bear harshly upon the hardy fishermen of the united states, with a view to political effect upon this government. the statutes of the dominion of canada assume a still broader and more untenable jurisdiction over the vessels of the united states. they authorize officers or persons to bring vessels hovering within 3 marine miles of any of the coasts, bays, creeks, or harbors of canada into port, to search the cargo, to examine the master on oath touching the cargo and voyage, and to inflict upon him a heavy pecuniary penalty if true answers are not given; and if such a vessel is found "preparing to fish" within 3 marine miles of any of such coasts, bays, creeks, or harbors without a license, or after the expiration of the period named in the last license granted to it, they provide that the vessel, with her tackle, etc., shall be forfeited. it is not known that any condemnations have been made under this statute. should the authorities of canada attempt to enforce it, it will become my duty to take such steps as may be necessary to protect the rights of the citizens of the united states. it has been claimed by her majesty's officers that the fishing vessels of the united states have no right to enter the open ports of the british possessions in north america, except for the purposes of shelter and repairing damages, of purchasing wood and obtaining water; that they have no right to enter at the british custom-houses or to trade there except in the purchase of wood and water, and that they must depart within twenty-four hours after notice to leave. it is not known that any seizure of a fishing vessel carrying the flag of the united states has been made under this claim. so far as the claim is founded on an alleged construction of the convention of 1818, it can not be acquiesced in by the united states. it is hoped that it will not be insisted on by her majesty's government. during the conferences which preceded the negotiation of the convention of 1818 the british commissioners proposed to expressly exclude the fishermen of the united states from "the privilege of carrying on trade with any of his britannic majesty's subjects residing within the limits assigned for their use;" and also that it should not be "lawful for the vessels of the united states engaged in said fishery to have on board any goods, wares, or merchandise whatever, except such as may be necessary for the prosecution of their voyages to and from the said fishing grounds; and any vessel of the united states which shall contravene this regulation may be seized, condemned, and confiscated, with her cargo." this proposition, which is identical with the construction now put upon the language of the convention, was emphatically rejected by the american commissioners, and thereupon was abandoned by the british plenipotentiaries, and article i, as it stands in the convention, was substituted. if, however, it be said that this claim is founded on provincial or colonial statutes, and not upon the convention, this government can not but regard them as unfriendly, and in contravention of the spirit, if not of the letter, of the treaty, for the faithful execution of which the imperial government is alone responsible. anticipating that an attempt may possibly be made by the canadian authorities in the coming season to repeat their unneighborly acts toward our fishermen, i recommend you to confer upon the executive the power to suspend by proclamation the operation of the laws authorizing the transit of goods, wares, and merchandise in bond across the territory of the united states to canada, and, further, should such an extreme measure become necessary, to suspend the operation of any laws whereby the vessels of the dominion of canada are permitted to enter the waters of the united states. a like unfriendly disposition has been manifested on the part of canada in the maintenance of a claim of right to exclude the citizens of the united states from the navigation of the st. lawrence. this river constitutes a natural outlet to the ocean for eight states, with an aggregate population of about 17,600,000 inhabitants, and with an aggregate tonnage of 661,367 tons upon the waters which discharge into it. the foreign commerce of our ports on these waters is open to british competition, and the major part of it is done in british bottoms. if the american seamen be excluded from this natural avenue to the ocean, the monopoly of the direct commerce of the lake ports with the atlantic would be in foreign hands, their vessels on transatlantic voyages having an access to our lake ports which would be denied to american vessels on similar voyages. to state such a proposition is to refute its justice. during the administration of mr. john quincy adams mr. clay unanswerably demonstrated the natural right of the citizens of the united states to the navigation of this river, claiming that the act of the congress of vienna in opening the rhine and other rivers to all nations showed the judgment of european jurists and statesmen that the inhabitants of a country through which a navigable river passes have a natural right to enjoy the navigation of that river to and into the sea, even though passing through the territories of another power. this right does not exclude the coequal right of the sovereign possessing the territory through which the river debouches into the sea to make such regulations relative to the police of the navigation as may be reasonably necessary; but those regulations should be framed in a liberal spirit of comity, and should not impose needless burdens upon the commerce which has the right of transit. it has been found in practice more advantageous to arrange these regulations by mutual agreement. the united states are ready to make any reasonable arrangement as to the police of the st. lawrence which may be suggested by great britain. if the claim made by mr. clay was just when the population of states bordering on the shores of the lakes was only 3,400,000, it now derives greater force and equity from the increased population, wealth, production, and tonnage of the states on the canadian frontier. since mr. clay advanced his argument in behalf of our right the principle for which he contended has been frequently, and by various nations, recognized by law or by treaty, and has been extended to several other great rivers. by the treaty concluded at mayence in 1831 the rhine was declared free from the point where it is first navigable into the sea. by the convention between spain and portugal concluded in 1835 the navigation of the douro throughout its whole extent was made free for the subjects of both crowns. in 1853 the argentine confederation by treaty threw open the free navigation of the parana and the uruguay to the merchant vessels of all nations. in 1856 the crimean war was closed by a treaty which provided for the free navigation of the danube. in 1858 bolivia by treaty declared that it regarded the rivers amazon and la plata, in accordance with fixed principles of national law, as highways or channels opened by nature for the commerce of all nations. in 1859 the paraguay was made free by treaty, and in december, 1866, the emperor of brazil by imperial decree declared the amazon to be open to the frontier of brazil to the merchant ships of all nations. the greatest living british authority on this subject, while asserting the abstract right of the british claim, says: it seems difficult to deny that great britain may ground her refusal upon strict _law_, but it is equally difficult to deny, first, that in so doing she exercises harshly an extreme and hard law; secondly, that her conduct with respect to the navigation of the st. lawrence is in glaring and discreditable inconsistency with her conduct with respect to the navigation of the mississippi. on the ground that she possessed a small domain in which the mississippi took its rise, she insisted on the right to navigate the entire volume of its waters. on the ground that she possesses both banks of the st. lawrence, where it disembogues itself into the sea, she denies to the united states the right of navigation, though about one-half of the waters of lakes ontario, erie, huron, and superior, and the whole of lake michigan, through which the river flows, are the property of the united states. the whole nation is interested in securing cheap transportation from the agricultural states of the west to the atlantic seaboard. to the citizens of those states it secures a greater return for their labor; to the inhabitants of the seaboard it affords cheaper food; to the nation, an increase in the annual surplus of wealth. it is hoped that the government of great britain will see the justice of abandoning the narrow and inconsistent claim to which her canadian provinces have urged her adherence. our depressed commerce is a subject to which i called your special attention at the last session, and suggested that we will in the future have to look more to the countries south of us, and to china and japan, for its revival. our representatives to all these governments have exerted their influence to encourage trade between the united states and the countries to which they are accredited. but the fact exists that the carrying is done almost entirely in foreign bottoms, and while this state of affairs exists we can not control our due share of the commerce of the world; that between the pacific states and china and japan is about all the carrying trade now conducted in american vessels. i would recommend a liberal policy toward that line of american steamers--one that will insure its success, and even increased usefulness. the cost of building iron vessels, the only ones that can compete with foreign ships in the carrying trade, is so much greater in the united states than in foreign countries that without some assistance from the government they can not be successfully built here. there will be several propositions laid before congress in the course of the present session looking to a remedy for this evil. even if it should be at some cost to the national treasury, i hope such encouragement will be given as will secure american shipping on the high seas and american shipbuilding at home. the condition of the archives at the department of state calls for the early action of congress. the building now rented by that department is a frail structure, at an inconvenient distance from the executive mansion and from the other departments, is ill adapted to the purpose for which it is used, has not capacity to accommodate the archives, and is not fireproof. its remote situation, its slender construction, and the absence of a supply of water in the neighborhood leave but little hope of safety for either the building or its contents in case of the accident of a fire. its destruction would involve the loss of the rolls containing the original acts and resolutions of congress, of the historic records of the revolution and of the confederation, of the whole series of diplomatic and consular archives since the adoption of the constitution, and of the many other valuable records and papers left with that department when it was the principal depository of the governmental archives. i recommend an appropriation for the construction of a building for the department of state. i recommend to your consideration the propriety of transferring to the department of the interior, to which they seem more appropriately to belong, all powers and duties in relation to the territories with which the department of state is now charged by law or usage; and from the interior department to the war department the pension bureau, so far as it regulates the payment of soldiers' pensions. i would further recommend that the payment of naval pensions be transferred to one of the bureaus of the navy department. the estimates for the expenses of the government for the next fiscal year are $18,244,346.01 less than for the current one, but exceed the appropriations for the present year for the same items $8,972,127.56. in this estimate, however, is included $22,338,278.37 for public works heretofore begun under congressional provision, and of which only so much is asked as congress may choose to give. the appropriation for the same works for the present fiscal year was $11,984,518.08. the average value of gold, as compared with national currency, for the whole of the year 1869 was about 134, and for eleven months of 1870 the same relative value has been about 115. the approach to a specie basis is very gratifying, but the fact can not be denied that the instability of the value of our currency is prejudicial to our prosperity, and tends to keep up prices, to the detriment of trade. the evils of a depreciated and fluctuating currency are so great that now, when the premium on gold has fallen so much, it would seem that the time has arrived when by wise and prudent legislation congress should look to a policy which would place our currency at par with gold at no distant day. the tax collected from the people has been reduced more than $80,000,000 per annum. by steadiness in our present course there is no reason why in a few short years the national taxgatherer may not disappear from the door of the citizen almost entirely. with the revenue stamp dispensed by postmasters in every community, a tax upon liquors of all sorts and tobacco in all its forms, and by a wise adjustment of the tariff, which will put a duty only upon those articles which we could dispense with, known as luxuries, and on those which we use more of than we produce, revenue enough may be raised after a few years of peace and consequent reduction of indebtedness to fulfill all our obligations. a further reduction of expenses, in addition to a reduction of interest account, may be relied on to make this practicable. revenue reform, if it means this, has my hearty support. if it implies a collection of all the revenue for the support of the government, for the payment of principal and interest of the public debt, pensions, etc., by directly taxing the people, then i am against revenue reform, and confidently believe the people are with me. if it means failure to provide the necessary means to defray all the expenses of government, and thereby repudiation of the public debt and pensions, then i am still more opposed to such kind of revenue reform. revenue reform has not been defined by any of its advocates to my knowledge, but seems to be accepted as something which is to supply every man's wants without any cost or effort on his part. a true revenue reform can not be made in a day, but must be the work of national legislation and of time. as soon as the revenue can be dispensed with, all duty should be removed from coffee, tea, and other articles of universal use not produced by ourselves. the necessities of the country compel us to collect revenue from our imports. an army of assessors and collectors is not a pleasant sight to the citizen, but that or a tariff for revenue is necessary. such a tariff, so far as it acts as an encouragement to home production, affords employment to labor at living wages, in contrast to the pauper labor of the old world, and also in the development of home resources. under the act of congress of the 15th day of july, 1870, the army has gradually been reduced, so that on the 1st day of january, 1871, the number of commissioned officers and men will not exceed the number contemplated by that law. the war department building is an old structure, not fireproof, and entirely inadequate in dimensions to our present wants. many thousands of dollars are now paid annually for rent of private buildings to accommodate the various bureaus of the department. i recommend an appropriation for a new war department building, suited to the present and growing wants of the nation. the report of the secretary of war shows a very satisfactory reduction in the expenses of the army for the last fiscal year. for details you are referred to his accompanying report. the expenses of the navy for the whole of the last year--i.e., from december 1, 1869, the date of the last report--are less than $19,000,000, or about $1,000,000 less than they were the previous year. the expenses since the commencement of this fiscal year--i.e., since july 1--show for the five months a decrease of over $2,400,000 from those of the corresponding months last year. the estimates for the current year were $28,205,671.37. those for next year are $20,683,317, with $955,100 additional for necessary permanent improvements. these estimates are made closely for the mere maintenance of the naval establishment as it now is, without much in the nature of permanent improvement. the appropriations made for the last and current years were evidently intended by congress, and are sufficient only, to keep the navy on its present footing by the repairing and refitting of our old ships. this policy must, of course, gradually but surely destroy the navy, and it is in itself far from economical, as each year that it is pursued the necessity for mere repairs in ships and navy-yards becomes more imperative and more costly, and our current expenses are annually increased for the mere repair of ships, many of which must soon become unsafe and useless. i hope during the present session of congress to be able to submit to it a plan by which naval vessels can be built and repairs made with great saving upon the present cost. it can hardly be wise statesmanship in a government which represents a country with over 5,000 miles of coast line on both oceans, exclusive of alaska, and containing 40,000,000 progressive people, with relations of every nature with almost every foreign country, to rest with such inadequate means of enforcing any foreign policy, either of protection or redress. separated by the ocean from the nations of the eastern continent, our navy is our only means of direct protection to our citizens abroad or for the enforcement of any foreign policy. the accompanying report of the postmaster-general shows a most satisfactory working of that department. with the adoption of the recommendations contained therein, particularly those relating to a reform in the franking privilege and the adoption of the "correspondence cards," a self-sustaining postal system may speedily be looked for, and at no distant day a further reduction of the rate of postage be attained. i recommend authorization by congress to the postmaster-general and attorney-general to issue all commissions to officials appointed through their respective departments. at present these commissions, where appointments are presidential, are issued by the state department. the law in all the departments of government, except those of the post-office and of justice, authorizes each to issue its own commissions. always favoring practical reforms, i respectfully call your attention to one abuse of long standing which i would like to see remedied by this congress. it is a reform in the civil service of the country. i would have it go beyond the mere fixing of the tenure of office of clerks and employees who do not require "the advice and consent of the senate" to make their appointments complete. i would have it govern, not the tenure, but the manner of making all appointments. there is no duty which so much embarrasses the executive and heads of departments as that of appointments, nor is there any such arduous and thankless labor imposed on senators and representatives as that of finding places for constituents. the present system does not secure the best men, and often not even fit men, for public place. the elevation and purification of the civil service of the government will be hailed with approval by the whole people of the united states. reform in the management of indian affairs has received the special attention of the administration from its inauguration to the present day. the experiment of making it a missionary work was tried with a few agencies given to the denomination of friends, and has been found to work most advantageously. all agencies and superintendencies not so disposed of were given to officers of the army. the act of congress reducing the army renders army officers ineligible for civil positions. indian agencies being civil offices, i determined to give all the agencies to such religious denominations as had heretofore established missionaries among the indians, and perhaps to some other denominations who would undertake the work on the same terms--i.e. as a missionary work. the societies selected are allowed to name their own agents, subject to the approval of the executive, and are expected to watch over them and aid them as missionaries, to christianize and civilize the indian, and to train him in the arts of peace. the government watches over the official acts of these agents, and requires of them as strict an accountability as if they were appointed in any other manner. i entertain the confident hope that the policy now pursued will in a few years bring all the indians upon reservations, where they will live in houses, and have schoolhouses and churches, and will be pursuing peaceful and self-sustaining avocations, and where they may be visited by the law-abiding white man with the same impunity that he now visits the civilized white settlements. i call your special attention to the report of the commissioner of indian affairs for full information on this subject. during the last fiscal year 8,095,413 acres of public land were disposed of. of this quantity 3,698,910.05 acres were taken under the homestead law and 2,159,515.81 acres sold for cash. the remainder was located with military warrants, college or indian scrip, or applied in satisfaction of grants to railroads or for other public uses. the entries under the homestead law during the last year covered 961,545 acres more than those during the preceding year. surveys have been vigorously prosecuted to the full extent of the means applicable to the purpose. the quantity of land in market will amply supply the present demand. the claim of the settler under the homestead or the preemption laws is not, however, limited to lands subject to sale at private entry. any unappropriated surveyed public land may, to a limited amount, be acquired under the former laws if the party entitled to enter under them will comply with the requirements they prescribe in regard to the residence and cultivation. the actual settler's preference right of purchase is even broader, and extends to lands which were unsurveyed at the time of his settlement. his right was formerly confined within much narrower limits, and at one period of our history was conferred only by special statutes. they were enacted from time to time to legalize what was then regarded as an unauthorized intrusion upon the national domain. the opinion that the public lands should be regarded chiefly as a source of revenue is no longer maintained. the rapid settlement and successful cultivation of them are now justly considered of more importance to our well-being than is the fund which the sale of them would produce. the remarkable growth and prosperity of our new states and territories attest the wisdom of the legislation which invites the tiller of the soil to secure a permanent home on terms within the reach of all. the pioneer who incurs the dangers and privations of a frontier life, and thus aids in laying the foundation of new commonwealths, renders a signal service to his country, and is entitled to its special favor and protection. these laws secure that object and largely promote the general welfare. they should therefore be cherished as a permanent feature of our land system. good faith requires us to give full effect to existing grants. the time-honored and beneficent policy of setting apart certain sections of public land for educational purposes in the new states should be continued. when ample provision shall have been made for these objects, i submit as a question worthy of serious consideration whether the residue of our national domain should not be wholly disposed of under the provisions of the homestead and preemption laws. in addition to the swamp and overflowed lands granted to the states in which they are situated, the lands taken under the agricultural-college acts and for internal-improvement purposes under the act of september, 1841, and the acts supplemental thereto, there had been conveyed up to the close of the last fiscal year, by patent or other equivalent title, to states and corporations 27,836,257.63 acres for railways, canals, and wagon roads. it is estimated that an additional quantity of 174,735,523 acres is still due under grants for like uses. the policy of thus aiding the states in building works of internal improvement was inaugurated more than forty years since in the grants to indiana and illinois, to aid those states in opening canals to connect the waters of the wabash with those of lake erie and the waters of the illinois with those of lake michigan. it was followed, with some modifications, in the grant to illinois of alternate sections of public land within certain limits of the illinois central railway. fourteen states and sundry corporations have received similar subsidies in connection with railways completed or in process of construction. as the reserved sections are rated at the double minimum, the sale of them at the enhanced price has thus in many instances indemnified the treasury for the granted lands. the construction of some of these thoroughfares has undoubtedly given a vigorous impulse to the development of our resources and the settlement of the more distant portions of the country. it may, however, be well insisted that much of our legislation in this regard has been characterized by indiscriminate and profuse liberality. the united states should not loan their credit in aid of any enterprise undertaken by states or corporations, nor grant lands in any instance, unless the projected work is of acknowledged national importance. i am strongly inclined to the opinion that it is inexpedient and unnecessary to bestow subsidies of either description; but should congress determine otherwise i earnestly recommend that the right of settlers and of the public be more effectually secured and protected by appropriate legislation. during the year ending september 30, 1870, there were filed in the patent office 19,411 applications for patents, 3,374 caveats, and 160 applications for the extension of patents. thirteen thousand six hundred and twenty-two patents, including reissues and designs, were issued, 1,010 extended, and 1,089 allowed, but not issued by reason of the non-payment of the final fees. the receipts of the office during the fiscal year were $136,304.29 in excess of its expenditures. the work of the census bureau has been energetically prosecuted. the preliminary report, containing much information of special value and interest, will be ready for delivery during the present session. the remaining volumes will be completed with all the dispatch consistent with perfect accuracy in arranging and classifying the returns. we shall thus at no distant day be furnished with an authentic record of our condition and resources. it will, i doubt not, attest the growing prosperity of the country, although during the decade which has just closed it was so severely tried by the great war waged to maintain its integrity and to secure and perpetuate our free institutions. during the last fiscal year the sum paid to pensioners, including the cost of disbursement, was $27,780,811.11, and 1,758 bounty-land warrants were issued. at its close 198,686 names were on the pension rolls. the labors of the pension office have been directed to the severe scrutiny of the evidence submitted in favor of new claims and to the discovery of fictitious claims which have been heretofore allowed. the appropriation for the employment of special agents for the investigation of frauds has been judiciously used, and the results obtained have been of unquestionable benefit to the service. the subjects of education and agriculture are of great interest to the success of our republican institutions, happiness, and grandeur as a nation. in the interest of one a bureau has been established in the interior department--the bureau of education; and in the interest of the other, a separate department, that of agriculture. i believe great general good is to flow from the operations of both these bureaus if properly fostered. i can not commend to your careful consideration too highly the reports of the commissioners of education and of agriculture, nor urge too strongly such liberal legislation as to secure their efficiency. in conclusion i would sum up the policy of the administration to be a thorough enforcement of every law; a faithful collection of every tax provided for; economy in the disbursement of the same; a prompt payment of every debt of the nation; a reduction of taxes as rapidly as the requirements of the country will admit; reductions of taxation and tariff, to be so arranged as to afford the greatest relief to the greatest number; honest and fair dealings with all other peoples, to the end that war, with all its blighting consequences, may be avoided, but without surrendering any right or obligation due to us; a reform in the treatment of indians and in the whole civil service of the country; and finally, in securing a pure, untrammeled ballot, where every man entitled to cast a vote may do so, just once at each election, without fear of molestation or proscription on account of his political faith, nativity, or color. u.s. grant. [footnote 29: see pp. 86-89.] [footnote 30: see pp. 89-92.] special messages. december 6, 1870. _to the senate and house of representatives:_ in pursuance of the provisions of the second section of an act approved june 20, 1864, entitled "an act making appropriations for the consular and diplomatic expenses of the government for the year ending june 30, 1865, and for other purposes," i inform congress that louis w. viollier, a consular clerk, was, on the 26th day of september last, removed from office for the following causes, namely: for disobedience of orders and continued absence from duty after orders to proceed to his post. u.s. grant. washington, _december 6, 1870_. _to the senate and house of representatives:_ i herewith transmit to congress a report, dated the 5th instant, with the accompanying papers,[31] received from the secretary of state, in compliance with the requirements of the eighteenth section of the act entitled "an act to regulate the diplomatic and consular systems of the united states," approved august 18, 1856. u.s. grant. [footnote 31: report of fees collected, etc., by consular officers of the united states for 1868, and tariff of consular fees prescribed by the president october 1, 1870.] washington, _december 6, 1870_. _to the senate of the united states:_ i transmit to the senate, for its consideration with a view to ratification, a convention for the surrender of criminals between the united states of america and the republic of guatemala, signed on the 11th day of october last, together with correspondence on the subject, a list of which is given. u.s. grant. washington, _december 6, 1870_. _to the senate of the united states:_ i transmit to the senate, for its consideration with a view to ratification, a convention for the extradition of criminals fugitives from justice between the united states of america and the republic of nicaragua, signed at the city of nicaragua on the 5th day of june last, together with correspondence upon the subject, of which a list is annexed. u.s. grant. washington, _december 6, 1870_. _to the senate of the united states:_ i transmit to the senate, for its consideration with a view to ratification, a treaty for the extradition of criminals fugitives from justice between the united states and the republic of peru, signed at lima on the 12th day of september last. as this treaty contains some stipulations of an unusual character, the special attention of the senate is called to them. u.s. grant. washington, _december 6, 1870_. _to the senate of the united states:_ i transmit to the senate, for its consideration with a view to ratification, a treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation between the united states of america and the republic of peru, signed at the city of lima on the 6th day of september last, together with the correspondence in relation thereto, a list of which is annexed. u.s. grant. washington, _december 6, 1870_. _to the senate of the united states:_ referring to my message of the 1st of february last, transmitting to the senate, for its consideration with a view to ratification, a treaty between the united states and the united states of colombia for the construction of an interoceanic canal across the isthmus of panama or darien, signed at bogota on the 26th of january last, i herewith submit correspondence upon the subject between the secretary of state and the minister of the united states at bogota, a list of which is hereto appended. u.s. grant. washington, _december 8, 1870_. _to the house of representatives of the united states:_ in answer to its resolution of the 1st of july, 1870, i transmit to the house of representatives a report[32] from the secretary of state. u.s. grant. [footnote 32: stating that the correspondence relative to the arrest and detention of american fishing vessels in the straits of canso by armed vessels flying the british flag had been communicated to congress with the president's annual message on the 5th instant.] washington, _december 8, 1870_. _to the senate of the united states:_ in answer to a resolution of the 5th instant, i transmit to the senate a report[33] from the secretary of state. u.s. grant. [footnote 33: stating that the correspondence with the united states minister at paris relative to the franco-prussian war had been communicated with the president's annual message on the 5th instant.] washington, _december 12, 1870_. _to the senate of the united states:_ i submit to the senate, for their consideration with a view to ratification, a convention relating to naturalization between the united states and the austro-hungarian empire, signed at vienna on the 20th of september, 1870, which is accompanied by the papers mentioned in the subjoined list. u.s. grant. washington, _december 13, 1870_. _to the senate of the united states:_ i transmit, in answer to the resolution of the senate of june 14, 1870, a report from the secretary of state and the papers[34] by which it was accompanied. u.s. grant. [footnote 34: relating to charges for messages made by the international ocean telegraph company.] washington, _december 15, 1870_. _to the house of representatives:_ in answer to the resolution of the house of representatives of the 9th of april, 1869, i herewith transmit a report[35] from the secretary of state. u.s. grant. [footnote 35: stating that all the correspondence relative to the condition of affairs in paraguay believed to be required by the public interest had been made public.] washington, _december 15, 1870_. _to the house of representatives:_ in answer to the resolution of the house of representatives of the 20th of january last, i herewith transmit a report[36] from the secretary of state, with accompanying documents. u.s. grant. [footnote 36: stating that the claim for indemnity in the case of the ship _canada_, wrecked on the coast of brazil in 1865, had been referred to the british minister as arbiter, and submitting a summary of the case, correspondence connected with it, and a copy of the award of the arbiter.] executive mansion, _december 19, 1870_. _to the senate and house of representatives of the united states:_ i transmit herewith a report[37] of the secretary of the treasury, made in compliance with section 2 of the act approved july n, 1870, "making appropriations for the consular and diplomatic expenses of the government for the year ending june 30, 1871, and for other purposes." u.s. grant. [footnote 37: transmitting reports of consular agents.] washington, _december 19, 1870_. _to the house of representatives:_ i transmit to the house of representatives a report of the secretary of state and the papers[38] by which it was accompanied, in answer to its resolution of the 7th instant. u.s. grant. [footnote 38: relating to the seizure at port hood, nova scotia, by a canadian revenue cutter, of the schooner _granada_, of provincetown, mass.] executive mansion, _january 4, 1871_. _to the house of representatives:_ i transmit to the house of representatives, in answer to their resolution of the 12th of december, 1870, a report from the secretary of state, with accompanying documents.[39] u.s. grant. [footnote 39: correspondence relative to public documents or libraries in the care of legations of the united states.] washington, _january 9, 1871_. _to the senate of the united states:_ i transmit to the senate, in answer to their resolution of the 5th instant, a report from the secretary of state, with accompanying documents.[40] u.s. grant. [footnote 40: the last correspondence with mr. motley, including telegraphic dispatches, etc., relative to his recall as minister to the court of st. james.] washington, _january 9, 1871_. _to the house of representatives:_ i transmit to the house of representatives, in answer to their resolution of the 5th instant, a report from the secretary of state, with the accompanying documents.[41] u.s. grant. [footnote 41: correspondence, etc., in 1844 and 1845 relative to the resources and condition of the dominican republic.] washington, d.c., _january 9, 1871_. _to the senate of the united states:_ i transmit, for consideration with a view to its ratification, a treaty of amity, commerce, and consular privileges between the united states and the republic of salvador, signed at the city of san salvador on the 6th of december last. a copy of the official correspondence relating to the instrument is also herewith transmitted. u.s. grant. executive mansion, _january 11, 1871_. _to the senate of the united states:_ in view of a proclamation having been published in newspapers of the united states purporting to emanate from cabral, a chieftain who opposed the constitutional authorities of the republic of san domingo, i deem it but just to communicate to the senate of the united states the views of that chieftain and his followers, as voluntarily communicated by him through the united states minister to the republic of hayti in june last. it will be observed by the letter of minister bassett that cabral did not wish his views to be made public before the question of annexation was disposed of, in a way to work prejudice to his interest. but as the object which cabral had already in view was to declare to the treaty-making power of the united states his views and those of his followers upon the subject of annexation of the republic of san domingo, and as the senate is a branch of that power, i deem it no breach of confidence to communicate this letter to the senate. i ask, however, that it may be read in executive session and that the request of cabral be observed, so that in no case they shall be made public or used against him until the question of annexation is disposed of. u.s. grant. executive mansion, _january 11, 1871_. _to the house of representatives:_ i transmit herewith, in reply to the resolution of the house of representatives of the 5th instant, copies of the reports of captain george b. mcclellan upon the dominican republic, made in the year 1854. u.s. grant. executive mansion, _january 13, 1871_. _to the senate of the united states:_ in reply to the resolution of the senate of the 16th of december, 1870, requesting to be furnished with information relative to the organization of disloyal persons in north carolina having in view resistance of the united states laws, denial of protection, and the enjoyment of the rights and liberties secured under the united states, etc., i transmit herewith abstracts of reports and other papers on file in the war department relative to outrages in north carolina, and also, for the information of the senate, those relative to outrages in the other southern states. the original reports and papers are too voluminous to be copied in season to be used by the present congress, but are easily accessible for reference, and copies of such papers can be furnished as the senate may deem necessary. u.s. grant. washington, _january 16, 1871_. _to the senate of the united states:_ i transmit to the senate, in answer to their resolution of 4th instant, a report from the secretary of state, with accompanying documents, relating to the proposed annexation of the dominican portion of the island of san domingo. u.s. grant. executive mansion, _january 17, 1871_. _to the senate of the united states:_ in answer to their resolution of the 16th of december, 1870, i herewith transmit copies of certain reports received at the war department relative to disloyal organizations in the state of north carolina, intended to resist the laws or to deprive the citizens of the united states of the protection of law or the enjoyment of their rights under the constitution of the united states. these reports are in addition to the abstracts of those sent to the senate on the 13th instant. u.s. grant. executive mansion, _january 24, 1871_. _to the senate of the united states:_ in answer to your resolution of the 21st december, 1870, requesting the president "to furnish the senate with the amount of money expended by the united states for freight and passage to the pacific coast by the way of the isthmus and cape horn during the twelve months now last past," i herewith transmit reports from the secretary of the treasury, of war, and of the navy, to whom, respectively, the resolution was referred. u.s. grant. washington, _january 27, 1871_. _to the senate and house of representatives:_ i transmit herewith, for the consideration of congress, a report of the secretary of state and the papers which accompanied it, concerning regulations for the consular courts of the united states in japan. u.s. grant. washington, _january 27, 1871_. _to the senate of the united states:_ i transmit, for consideration with a view to its ratification, a treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation between the united states and the oriental republic of uruguay, which was signed at montevideo, it is presumed, in the course of last month, though the precise date has inadvertently been omitted. a copy of the correspondence relating to the instrument is also herewith transmitted. from this it will be seen that the treaty is substantially the same as one between the same parties which has already been approved by the senate and ratified by the president of the united states, but the ratifications of which have never been exchanged. if the senate should approve the new treaty, it is suggested that their resolution to that effect should include authority to insert the precise date when that shall have been ascertained. u.s. grant. executive mansion, _january 30, 1871_. _to the senate and house of representatives:_ i transmit herewith an official copy of the proceedings of the council of indian tribes held at ocmulgee in december last, which resulted in the adoption of a declaration of rights and a constitution for their government, together with a copy of the report of the commissioner of indian affairs and the views of the secretary of the interior thereon. it would seem highly desirable that the civilized indians of the country should be encouraged in establishing for themselves forms of territorial government compatible with the constitution of the united states and with the previous customs toward communities lying outside of state limits. i concur in the views expressed by the secretary of the interior, that it would not be advisable to receive the new territory with the constitution precisely as it is now framed. as long as a territorial form of government is preserved, congress should hold the power of approving or disapproving of all legislative action of the territory, and the executive should, with "the advice and consent of the senate," have the power to appoint the governor and judicial officers (and possibly some others) of the territory. this is the first indication of the aborigines desiring to adopt our form of government, and it is highly desirable that they become self-sustaining, self-relying, christianized, and civilized. if successful in this their first attempt at territorial government, we may hope for a gradual concentration of other indians in the new territory. i therefore recommend as close an adherence to their wishes as is consistent with safety. it might be well to limit the appointment of all territorial officials appointed by the executive to native citizens of the territory. if any exception is made to this rule, i would recommend that it should be limited to the judiciary. it is confidently hoped that the policy now being pursued toward the indian will fit him for self-government and make him desire to settle among people of his own race where he can enjoy the full privileges of civil and enlightened government. u.s. grant. executive mansion, _february 7, 1871_. _to the senate and house of representatives:_ the union of the states of germany into a form of government similar in many respects to that of the american union is an event that can not fail to touch deeply the sympathies of the people of the united states. this union has been brought about by the long-continued, persistent efforts of the people, with the deliberate approval of the governments and people of twenty-four of the german states, through their regularly constituted representatives. in it the american people see an attempt to reproduce in europe some of the best features of our own constitution, with such modifications as the history and condition of germany seem to require. the local governments of the several members of the union are preserved, while the power conferred upon the chief imparts strength for the purposes of self-defense, without authority to enter upon wars of conquest and ambition. the cherished aspiration for national unity which for ages has inspired the many millions of people speaking the same language, inhabiting a contiguous and compact territory, but unnaturally separated and divided by dynastic jealousies and the ambition of short-sighted rulers, has been attained, and germany now contains a population of about 34,000,000, united, like our own, under one government for its relations with other powers, but retaining in its several members the right and power of control of their local interests, habits, and institutions. the bringing of great masses of thoughtful and free people under a single government must tend to make governments what alone they should be--the representatives of the will and the organization of the power of the people. the adoption in europe of the american system of union under the control and direction of a free people, educated to self-restraint, can not fail to extend popular institutions and to enlarge the peaceful influence of american ideas. the relations of the united states with germany are intimate and cordial. the commercial intercourse between the two countries is extensive and is increasing from year to year; and the large number of citizens and residents in the united states of german extraction and the continued flow of emigration thence to this country have produced an intimacy of personal and political intercourse approaching, if not equal to, that with the country from which the founders of our government derived their origin. the extent of these interests and the greatness of the german union seem to require that in the classification of the representatives of this government to foreign powers there should no longer be an apparent undervaluation of the importance of the german mission, such as is made in the difference between the compensation allowed by law to the minister to germany and those to great britain and france. there would seem to be a great propriety in placing the representative of this government at berlin on the same footing with that of its representatives at london and paris. the union of the several states of germany under one government and the increasing commercial and personal intercourse between the two countries will also add to the labors and the responsibilities of the legation. i therefore recommend that the salaries of the minister and of the secretary of legation at berlin be respectively increased to the same amounts as are allowed to those at london and paris. u.s. grant. executive mansion, _february 7, 1871_. _to the senate of the united states:_ in answer to that part of your resolution of the 4th of january last requesting copies of "instructions to the commander of our naval squadron in the waters of the island [of san domingo] since the commencement of the late negotiations, with the reports and correspondence of such commander," i herewith transmit a report, with accompanying papers, received from the secretary of the navy. u.s. grant. executive mansion, _february 8, 1871_. _to the senate and house of representatives:_ i transmit herewith an extract of a paper addressed to the president, the secretary of the interior, and the commissioner of indian affairs by the committee of friends on indian affairs having charge of the northern superintendency, in relation to a desire of certain indian tribes to sell a portion of the lands owned by them, with a view of locating on other lands that they may be able to purchase, together with the report of the commissioner of indian affairs thereon and a letter of the secretary of the interior department approving the report of the commissioner. i submit the draft of a bill which has been prepared, and which it is believed will effect the object desired by the committee, and request the consideration thereof by congress. u.s. grant. washington, _february 9, 1871_. _to the senate:_ the british minister accredited to this government recently, in compliance with instructions from his government, submitted a proposal for the appointment of a "joint high commission," to be composed of members to be named by each government, to hold its session at washington, and to treat and discuss the mode of settling the different questions which have arisen out of the fisheries, as well as those which affect the relations of the united states toward the british possessions in north america. i did not deem it expedient to agree to the proposal unless the consideration of the questions growing out of the acts committed by the vessels which have given rise to the claims known as the "alabama claims" were to be within the subject of discussion and settlement by the commission. the british government having assented to this, the commission is expected shortly to meet. i therefore nominate as such commissioners, jointly and separately, on the part of the united states: hamilton fish, secretary of state. robert c. schenck, envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to great britain. samuel nelson, an associate justice of the supreme court of the united states. ebenezer r. hoar, of massachusetts. george h. williams, of oregon. i communicate herewith the correspondence which has passed on this subject between the secretary of state and the british minister. u.s. grant. executive mansion, _february 10, 1871_. _to the senate and house of representatives:_ i submit herewith, for the information of congress, the second annual report of the board of indian commissioners to the secretary of the interior. u.s. grant. executive mansion, _february 13, 1871_. _to the house of representatives:_ i transmit herewith, in answer to the resolution of the house of the 6th instant, copies of the correspondence between the governor of the state of california and the president of the united states in the month of october, 1868, relative to the use of the military forces of the national government in preserving the peace at the approaching state election. u.s. grant. executive mansion, _february 15, 1871_. _to the senate and house of representatives:_ i have this day transmitted to the senate the announcement that senate bill no. 218, "an act prescribing an oath of office to be taken by persons who participated in the late rebellion, but who are not disqualified from holding office by the fourteenth amendment to the constitution of the united states," has become a law in the manner prescribed by the constitution, without the signature of the president. if this were a bill for the repeal of the "test oath" required of persons "elected or appointed to offices of honor or trust," it would meet my approval. the effect of the law, however, is to relieve from taking a prescribed oath all those persons whom it was intended to exclude from such offices and to require it from all others. by this law the soldier who fought and bled for his country is to swear to his loyalty before assuming official functions, while the general who commanded hosts for the overthrow of his government is admitted to place without it. i can not affix my name to a law which discriminates against the upholder of his government. i believe, however, that it is not wise policy to keep from office by an oath those who are not disqualified by the constitution, and who are the choice of legal voters; but while relieving them from an oath which they can not take, i recommend the release also of those to whom the oath has no application. u.s. grant. executive mansion, _february 17, 1871_. _to the senate of the united states:_ in answer to your resolution of the 19th of december last, requesting the president "to furnish the senate with the entire cost of transportation of mails and freights of every description to the pacific coast, also to all intermediate points west of the missouri river, from the annexation of california to july 1, 1864; and also the expenses of the war department and indian bureau during the same period in guarding the overland route from the missouri river to california against indians and mormons, and the cost of the indian service on the same line, including in all cases freights and all other expenditures," i transmit herewith reports received from the secretary of the interior, the secretary of war, and the postmaster-general. u.s. grant. washington, _february 27, 1871_. _to the senate of the united states:_ i transmit to the senate, for its consideration with a view to ratification, a convention between the united states and great britain, concluded at washington on the 23d instant, supplemental to the convention between the two countries concluded may 13, 1870, concerning the citizenship of citizens or subjects of either country emigrating to the other. the conclusion of the supplemental convention now submitted was found to be expedient in view of the stipulation contained in article ii of the before-named convention of may 13, 1870, that the two governments should agree upon the manner in which the renunciation within the periods specified, by naturalized citizens and subjects of either country, of their naturalization should be effected. u.s. grant. washington, _march 3, 1871_. _to the senate of the united states:_ i transmit to the senate, in answer to their resolution of the 2d instant, a report of the secretary of state, with accompanying documents.[42] u.s. grant. [footnote 42: correspondence from the united states legation at constantinople relative to restrictions on the passage of the straits of the dardanelles and the bosphorus by the ships of other nations.] washington, _march 3, 1871_. _to the senate of the united states:_ i transmit to the senate, in answer to their resolution of february 1, 1871, a report from the secretary of state, with accompanying documents.[43] u.s. grant. [footnote 43: dispatches, etc., from the united states minister to the court of brazil relative to the paraguayan war, the culture of cotton in brazil, trade with brazil, etc.] veto messages. executive mansion, _january 4, 1871_. _to the house of representatives:_ i herewith return without my approval house bill no. 1395, entitled "an act for the relief of charles cooper, goshorn a. jones, jerome rowley, william hannegan, and john hannegan," for the following reasons: the act directs the discontinuance of an action at law said to be now pending in the united states district court for the northern district of ohio for the enforcement of the bond executed by said parties to the united states, whereas in fact no such suit is pending in the district court, but such a suit is now pending in the circuit court of the united states for the sixth circuit and northern district of ohio. neither the body of said act nor the proviso requires the obligors in said bond, who are released from all liability to the united states on account thereof, to abandon or release their pretended claim against the government. since these parties have gone to congress to ask relief from liability for a large sum of money on account of the failure of the principals in the bond to execute their contract, it is but just and proper that they at the same time should abandon the claim heretofore asserted by them against the government growing out of the same transaction. u.s. grant. executive mansion, _february 7, 1871_. _to the senate of the united states:_ i hereby return without my approval senate resolution no. 92, entitled "a resolution for the relief of certain contractors for the construction of vessels of war and steam machinery," for the following reasons: the act of march 2, 1867 (14 u.s. statutes at large, p. 424), directs the secretary of the navy- to investigate the claims of all contractors for building vessels of war and steam machinery for the same under contracts made after the 1st day of may, 1861, and prior to the 1st day of january, 1864; and said investigation to be made upon the following basis: he shall ascertain the additional cost which was necessarily incurred by each contractor in the completion of his work by reason of any changes or alterations in the plans and specifications required, and delays in the prosecution of the work occasioned by the government, which were not provided for in the original contract; but no allowance for any advance in the price of labor or material shall be considered unless such advance occurred during the prolonged time for completing the work rendered necessary by the delay resulting from the action of the government aforesaid, and then only when such advance could not have been avoided by the exercise of ordinary prudence and diligence on the part of the contractor. * * * the present joint resolution transfers the investigation to the court of claims, and repeals "so much of said act as provides against considering any allowance in favor of any such parties for any advance in the price of labor or material, unless such advance could have been avoided by the exercise of ordinary diligence and prudence on the part of the contractor." it seems to me that the provision thus repealed is a very reasonable one. it prevents the contractor from receiving any allowance for an advance in the price of labor and material when he could have avoided that advance by the exercise of ordinary prudence and diligence. the effect of the repeal will be to relieve contractors from the consequences of their own imprudence and negligence. i see no good reason for thus relieving contractors who have not exercised ordinary prudence and diligence in their business transactions. u.s. grant. executive mansion, _february 28, 1871_. _to the house of representatives:_ i herewith return without my approval house bill no. 2566, entitled "an act for the relief of henry willman, late a private in the third regiment of indiana cavalry," for the following reasons: the records of the war department show that henry willman was mustered into the military service april 4, 1862, and that he was mounted on a private horse. it appears from evidence presented by himself that his horse died may 18, 1862; that he remounted himself on june 8, 1862, and so continued mounted till october 1, 1862, when his horse was killed by the enemy, and that he was not afterwards mounted upon a private horse. upon presenting a claim against the united states for the legal value of the two horses lost by him in the public service, the claim, after investigation, was allowed; but it being discovered that he had erroneously been paid for the use and risk of a private horse from may 18 to june 8, 1862, and from october 1, 1862, to april 30, 1864, during which periods he had no horse in the public service, the amount so overpaid was offset against his claim, leaving the latter fully liquidated and the claimant indebted to the united states in an amount not yet refunded. the person named in the act is not, in law or equity, entitled to the relief therein provided, and has no unsatisfied demands against the united states. u.s. grant. proclamation. by the president of the united states of america. a proclamation. whereas satisfactory evidence was given to me on the 17th day of this month by the government of portugal that the discriminating duties heretofore levied in the ports of portugal on merchandise imported in vessels of the united states into said ports from other countries than those of which said merchandise was the growth, production, or manufacture have been abolished: now, therefore, i, ulysses s. grant, president of the united states of america, by virtue of the authority vested in me by an act of congress of january 7, 1824, and by an act in addition thereto of may 24, 1828, do hereby declare and proclaim that the discriminating duties heretofore levied in ports of the united states upon merchandise imported in portuguese vessels from countries other than those of which such merchandise is the growth, produce, or manufacture shall be, and are hereby, suspended and discontinued, this suspension or discontinuance to take effect on and after the said 17th day of this month and to continue so long as the reciprocal exemption of merchandise belonging to citizens of the united states from such discriminating duties shall be granted in the ports of portugal. in testimony whereof i have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the united states to be affixed. [seal.] done at the city of washington, this 25th day of february, a.d. 1871, and of the independence of the united states of america the ninety-fifth. u.s. grant. by the president: hamilton fish, _secretary of state_. [note.--the forty-second congress, first session, met march 4, 1871, in accordance with the act of january 22, 1867.] special messages. washington, _march 17, 1871_. _to the senate of the united states:_ i transmit to the senate, in compliance with its resolution of the 14th instant, a report from the secretary of state, making known that official notice has been received at the department of state of the ratification by the legislature of one, and only one, additional state--to wit, that of new jersey--of the fifteenth amendment to the constitution of the united states since the 30th of march, 1870, the date of his certificate that three-fourths of the whole number of states in the united states had ratified that amendment and that it had become valid to all intents and purposes as part of the constitution of the united states. u.s. grant. washington, d.c., _march 23, 1871_. _to the senate and house of representatives:_ a condition of affairs now exists in some of the states of the union rendering life and property insecure and the carrying of the mails and the collection of the revenue dangerous. the proof that such a condition of affairs exists in some localities is now before the senate. that the power to correct these evils is beyond the control of the state authorities i do not doubt; that the power of the executive of the united states, acting within the limits of existing laws, is sufficient for present emergencies is not clear. therefore i urgently recommend such legislation as in the judgment of congress shall effectually secure life, liberty, and property and the enforcement of law in all parts of the united states. it may be expedient to provide that such law as shall be passed in pursuance of this recommendation shall expire at the end of the next session of congress. there is no other subject upon which i would recommend legislation during the present session. u.s. grant. washington, _march 28, 1871_. _to the senate of the united states:_ in answer to the resolution of the senate of the 16th instant, i transmit a report from the secretary of state and the papers[44] which accompanied it. u.s. grant. [footnote 44: reports, communications, etc., relative to the international statistical congress held at the hague in 1869.] washington, _march 30, 1871_. _to the senate of the united states:_ i transmit, for consideration with a view to its ratification, a treaty of commerce and navigation between the united states and the kingdom of italy, signed at florence on the 26th of last month. u.s. grant. executive mansion, _march 31, 1871_. _to the senate of the united states:_ in answer to your resolution of the 17th instant, requesting, "if not incompatible with the public service, the report recently made by a board of officers of the engineer department on the condition of the mississippi river near vicksburg, miss., with such remarks, suggestions, or recommendations as may be made by the chief engineer of the army," i herewith transmit a report, dated 28th instant, with accompanying papers, received from the secretary of war. u.s. grant. executive mansion, _april 5, 1871_. _to the senate and house of representatives:_ i have the honor to submit herewith to the two houses of congress the report of the commissioners appointed in pursuance of joint resolution approved january 12, 1871. it will be observed that this report more than sustains all that i have heretofore said in regard to the productiveness and healthfulness of the republic of san domingo, of the unanimity of the people for annexation to the united states, and of their peaceable character. it is due to the public, as it certainly is to myself, that i should here give all the circumstances which first led to the negotiation of a treaty for the annexation of the republic of san domingo to the united states. when i accepted the arduous and responsible position which i now hold, i did not dream of instituting any steps for the acquisition of insular possessions. i believed, however, that our institutions were broad enough to extend over the entire continent as rapidly as other peoples might desire to bring themselves under our protection. i believed further that we should not permit any independent government within the limits of north america to pass from a condition of independence to one of ownership or protection under a european power. soon after my inauguration as president i was waited upon by an agent of president baez with a proposition to annex the republic of san domingo to the united states. this gentleman represented the capacity of the island, the desire of the people, and their character and habits about as they have been described by the commissioners whose report accompanies this message. he stated further that, being weak in numbers and poor in purse, they were not capable of developing their great resources; that the people had no incentive to industry on account of lack of protection for their accumulations, and that if not accepted by the united states--with institutions which they loved above those of any other nation--they would be compelled to seek protection elsewhere. to these statements i made no reply and gave no indication of what i thought of the proposition. in the course of time i was waited upon by a second gentleman from san domingo, who made the same representations, and who was received in like manner. in view of the facts which had been laid before me, and with an earnest desire to maintain the "monroe doctrine," i believed that i would be derelict in my duty if i did not take measures to ascertain the exact wish of the government and inhabitants of the republic of san domingo in regard to annexation and communicate the information to the people of the united states. under the attending circumstances i felt that if i turned a deaf ear to this appeal i might in the future be justly charged with a flagrant neglect of the public interests and an utter disregard of the welfare of a downtrodden race praying for the blessings of a free and strong government and for protection in the enjoyment of the fruits of their own industry. those opponents of annexation who have heretofore professed to be preeminently the friends of the rights of man i believed would be my most violent assailants if i neglected so clear a duty. accordingly, after having appointed a commissioner to visit the island, who declined on account of sickness, i selected a second gentleman, in whose capacity, judgment, and integrity i had, and have yet, the most unbounded confidence. he visited san domingo, not to secure or hasten annexation, but, unprejudiced and unbiased, to learn all the facts about the government, the people, and the resources of that republic. he went certainly as well prepared to make an unfavorable report as a favorable one, if the facts warranted it. his report fully corroborated the views of previous commissioners, and upon its receipt i felt that a sense of duty and a due regard for our great national interests required me to negotiate a treaty for the acquisition of the republic of san domingo. as soon as it became publicly known that such a treaty had been negotiated, the attention of the country was occupied with allegations calculated to prejudice the merits of the case and with aspersions upon those whose duty had connected them with it. amid the public excitement thus created the treaty failed to receive the requisite two-thirds vote of the senate, and was rejected; but whether the action of that body was based wholly upon the merits of the treaty, or might not have been in some degree influenced by such unfounded allegations, could not be known by the people, because the debates of the senate in secret session are not published. under these circumstances i deemed it due to the office which i hold and due to the character of the agents who had been charged with the investigation that such proceedings should be had as would enable the people to know the truth. a commission was therefore constituted, under authority of congress, consisting of gentlemen selected with special reference to their high character and capacity for the laborious work intrusted to them, who were instructed to visit the spot and report upon the facts. other eminent citizens were requested to accompany the commission, in order that the people might have the benefit of their views. students of science and correspondents of the press, without regard to political opinions, were invited to join the expedition, and their numbers were limited only by the capacity of the vessel. the mere rejection by the senate of a treaty negotiated by the president only indicates a difference of opinion between two coordinate departments of the government, without touching the character or wounding the pride of either. but when such rejection takes place simultaneously with charges openly made of corruption on the part of the president or those employed by him the case is different. indeed, in such case the honor of the nation demands investigation. this has been accomplished by the report of the commissioners herewith transmitted, and which fully vindicates the purity of the motives and action of those who represented the united states in the negotiation. and now my task is finished, and with it ends all personal solicitude upon the subject. my duty being done, yours begins; and i gladly hand over the whole matter to the judgment of the american people and of their representatives in congress assembled. the facts will now be spread before the country, and a decision rendered by that tribunal whose convictions so seldom err, and against whose will i have no policy to enforce. my opinion remains unchanged; indeed, it is confirmed by the report that the interests of our country and of san domingo alike invite the annexation of that republic. in view of the difference of opinion upon this subject, i suggest that no action be taken at the present session beyond the printing and general dissemination of the report. before the next session of congress the people will have considered the subject and formed an intelligent opinion concerning it, to which opinion, deliberately made up, it will be the duty of every department of the government to give heed; and no one will more cheerfully conform to it than myself. it is not only the theory of our constitution that the will of the people, constitutionally expressed, is the supreme law, but i have ever believed that "all men are wiser than any one man;" and if the people, upon a full presentation of the facts, shall decide that the annexation of the republic is not desirable, every department of the government ought to acquiesce in that decision. in again submitting to congress a subject upon which public sentiment has been divided, and which has been made the occasion of acrimonious debates in congress, as well as of unjust aspersions elsewhere, i may, i trust, be indulged in a single remark. no man could hope to perform duties so delicate and responsible as pertain to the presidential office without sometimes incurring the hostility of those who deem their opinions and wishes treated with insufficient consideration; and he who undertakes to conduct the affairs of a great government as a faithful public servant, if sustained by the approval of his own conscience, may rely with confidence upon the candor and intelligence of a free people whose best interests he has striven to subserve, and can bear with patience the censure of disappointed men. u.s. grant. washington, _april 5, 1871_. _to the senate of the united states:_ i transmit confidentially, for the information and consideration of the senate, a copy of a dispatch of the 25th of february last relative to the annexation of the hawaiian islands, addressed to the department of state by henry a. pierce, minister resident of the united states at honolulu. although i do not deem it advisable to express any opinion or to make any recommendation in regard to the subject at this juncture, the views of the senate, if it should be deemed proper to express them, would be very acceptable with reference to any future course which there might be a disposition to adopt. u.s. grant. washington, _april 11, 1871_. _to the house of representatives:_ i transmit to the house of representatives, in answer to their resolution of march 31, 1871, a report from the secretary of state, with accompanying documents.[45] u.s. grant. [footnote 45: dispatches from the united states minister at florence relative to the occupation of rome by the king of italy.] [the following messages were sent to the special session of the senate convened by proclamation (see pp. 133-134) of april 20, 1871.] washington, _may 10, 1871_. _to the senate of the united states:_ i transmit to the senate, for consideration with a view to ratification, a treaty between the united states and great britain for the settlement of pending questions between the two countries, signed at washington on the 8th instant by the commissioners of the united states and great britain, respectively. copies of the powers and instructions to the commissioners on the part of the united states and the protocols of the conferences are also transmitted. u.s. grant. washington, _may 15, 1871_. _to the senate of the united states:_ i transmit to the senate, in answer to their resolution of the 10th instant, a report[46] from the secretary of state and the papers which accompanied it. u.s. grant. [footnote 46: relating to claims of the subjects of foreign nations growing out of the war of the rebellion.] washington, _may 17, 1871_. _to the senate of the united states:_ in answer to a resolution of the senate of the 15th instant, i transmit herewith a report [47] from the secretary of state. u.s. grant. [footnote 47: relating to claims under the treaty of washington of may 8 1871.] proclamations. by the president of the united states of america. a proclamation. whereas it is provided in the constitution of the united states that the united states shall protect every state in this union, on application of the legislature, or of the executive (when the legislature can not be convened), against domestic violence; and whereas it is provided in the laws of the united states that in all cases of insurrection in any state or of obstruction to the laws thereof it shall be lawful for the president of the united states, on application of the legislature of such state, or of the executive (when the legislature can not be convened), to call forth the militia of any other state or states, or to employ such part of the land and naval force as shall be judged necessary for the purpose of suppressing such insurrection or of causing the laws to be duly executed; and whereas i have received information that combinations of armed men, unauthorized by law, are now disturbing the peace and safety of the citizens of the state of south carolina and committing acts of violence in said state of a character and to an extent which render the power of the state and its officers unequal to the task of protecting life and property and securing public order therein; and whereas the legislature of said state is not now in session and can not be convened in time to meet the present emergency, and the executive of said state has therefore made application to me for such part of the military force of the united states as may be necessary and adequate to protect said state and the citizens thereof against the domestic violence hereinbefore mentioned and to enforce the due execution of the laws; and whereas the laws of the united states require that whenever it may be necessary, in the judgment of the president, to use the military force for the purpose aforesaid, he shall forthwith, by proclamation, command such insurgents to disperse and retire peaceably to their respective abodes within a limited time: now, therefore, i, ulysses s. grant, president of the united states, do hereby command the persons composing the unlawful combinations aforesaid to disperse and retire peaceably to their respective abodes within twenty days from this date. in witness whereof i have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the united states to be affixed. [seal.] done at the city of washington, this 24th day of march, a.d. 1871, and of the independence of the united states the ninety-fifth. u.s. grant. by the president: hamilton fish, _secretary of state_. by the president of the united states of america. a proclamation. whereas objects of interest to the united states require that the senate should be convened at 12 o'clock on wednesday, the 10th day of may next, to receive and act upon such communications as may be made to it on the part of the executive: now, therefore, i, ulysses s. grant, president of the united states, have considered it to be my duty to issue this my proclamation, declaring that an extraordinary occasion requires the senate of the united states to convene for the transaction of business at the capitol, in the city of washington, on wednesday, the 10th day of may next, at 12 o'clock on that day, of which all who shall at that time be entitled to act as members of that body are hereby required to take notice. [seal.] given under my hand and the seal of the united states, at washington, the 20th day of april, a.d. 1871, and of the independence of the united states of america the ninety-fifth. u.s. grant. by the president: hamilton fish, _secretary of state_. by the president of the united states of america. a proclamation the act of congress entitled "an act to enforce the provisions of the fourteenth amendment to the constitution of the united states, and for other purposes," approved april 20, a.d. 1871, being a law of extraordinary public importance, i consider it my duty to issue this my proclamation, calling the attention of the people of the united states thereto enjoining upon all good citizens, and especially upon all public officers, to be zealous in the enforcement thereof, and warning all persons to abstain from committing any of the acts thereby prohibited. this law of congress applies to all parts of the united states and will be enforced everywhere to the extent of the powers vested in the executive. but inasmuch as the necessity therefor is well known to have been caused chiefly by persistent violations of the rights of citizens of the united states by combinations of lawless and disaffected persons in certain localities lately the theater of insurrection and military conflict, i do particularly exhort the people of those parts of the country to suppress all such combinations by their own voluntary efforts through the agency of local laws and to maintain the rights of all citizens of the united states and to secure to all such citizens the equal protection of the laws. fully sensible of the responsibility imposed upon the executive by the act of congress to which public attention is now called, and reluctant to call into exercise any of the extraordinary powers thereby conferred upon me except in cases of imperative necessity, i do, nevertheless, deem it my duty to make known that i will not hesitate to exhaust the powers thus vested in the executive whenever and wherever it shall become necessary to do so for the purpose of securing to all citizens of the united states the peaceful enjoyment of the rights guaranteed to them by the constitution and laws. it is my earnest wish that peace and cheerful obedience to law may prevail throughout the land and that all traces of our late unhappy civil strife may be speedily removed. these ends can be easily reached by acquiescence in the results of the conflict, now written in our constitution, and by the due and proper enforcement of equal, just, and impartial laws in every part of our country. the failure of local communities to furnish such means for the attainment of results so earnestly desired imposes upon the national government the duty of putting forth all its energies for the protection of its citizens of every race and color and for the restoration of peace and order throughout the entire country. in testimony whereof i have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the united states to be affixed. done at the city of washington, this 3d day of may, a.d. 1871, and of the independence of the united states the ninety-fifth. [seal.] u.s. grant. by the president: hamilton fish, _secretary of state_. by the president of the united states of america. a proclamation. whereas unlawful combinations and conspiracies have long existed and do still exist in the state of south carolina for the purpose of depriving certain portions and classes of the people of that state of the rights, privileges, immunities, and protection named in the constitution of the united states and secured by the act of congress approved april 20, 1871, entitled "an act to enforce the provisions of the fourteenth amendment to the constitution of the united states;" and whereas in certain parts of said state, to wit, in the counties of spartanburg, york, marion, chester, laurens, newberry, fairfield, lancaster, and chesterfield, such combinations and conspiracies do so obstruct and hinder the execution of the laws of said state and of the united states as to deprive the people aforesaid of the rights, privileges, immunities, and protection aforesaid and do oppose and obstruct the laws of the united states and their due execution and impede and obstruct the due course of justice under the same; and whereas the constituted authorities of said state are unable to protect the people aforesaid in such rights within the said counties; and whereas the combinations and conspiracies aforesaid, within the counties aforesaid, are organized and armed and are so numerous and powerful as to be able to defy the constituted authorities of said state and of the united states within the said state, and by reason of said causes the conviction of such offenders and the preservation of the public peace and safety have become impracticable in said counties: now, therefore, i, ulysses s. grant, president of the united states of america, do hereby command all persons composing the unlawful combinations and conspiracies aforesaid to disperse and to retire peaceably to their homes within five days of the date hereof, and to deliver either to the marshal of the united states for the district of south carolina, or to any of his deputies, or to any military officer of the united states within said counties, all arms, ammunition, uniforms, disguises, and other means and implements used, kept, possessed, or controlled by them for carrying out the unlawful purposes for which the combinations and conspiracies are organized. in witness whereof i have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the united states to be affixed. done at the city of washington, this 12th day of october, a.d. 1871, and of the independence of the united states of america the ninety-sixth. [seal.] u.s. grant. by the president: hamilton fish, _secretary of state_. by the president of the united states of america. a proclamation. whereas by an act of congress entitled "an act to enforce the provisions of the fourteenth amendment to the constitution of the united states, and for other purposes," approved the 20th day of april, a.d. 1871, power is given to the president of the united states, when in his judgment the public safety shall require it, to suspend the privileges of the writ of _habeas corpus_ in any state or part of a state whenever combinations and conspiracies exist in such state or part of a state for the purpose of depriving any portion or class of the people of such state of the rights, privileges, immunities, and protection named in the constitution of the united states and secured by the act of congress aforesaid; and whenever such combinations and conspiracies do so obstruct and hinder the execution of the laws of any such state and of the united states as to deprive the people aforesaid of the rights, privileges, immunities, and protection aforesaid, and do oppose and obstruct the laws of the united states and their due execution, and impede and obstruct the due course of justice under the same; and whenever such combinations shall be organized and armed, and so numerous and powerful as to be able by violence either to overthrow or to set at defiance the constituted authorities of said state and of the united states within such state; and whenever by reason of said causes the conviction of such offenders and the preservation of the public peace shall become in such state or part of a state impracticable; and whereas such unlawful combinations and conspiracies for the purposes aforesaid are declared by the act of congress aforesaid to be rebellion against the government of the united states; and whereas by said act of congress it is provided that before the president shall suspend the privileges of the writ of _habeas corpus_ he shall first have made proclamation commanding such insurgents to disperse; and whereas on the 12th day of the present month of october the president of the united states did issue his proclamation, reciting therein, among other things, that such combinations and conspiracies did then exist in the counties of spartanburg, york, marion, chester, laurens, newberry, fairfield, lancaster, and chesterfield, in the state of south carolina, and commanding thereby all persons composing such unlawful combinations and conspiracies to disperse and retire peaceably to their homes within five days from the date thereof, and to deliver either to the marshal of the united states for the district of south carolina, or to any of his deputies, or to any military officer of the united states within said counties, all arms, ammunition, uniforms, disguises, and other means and implements used, kept, possessed, or controlled by them for carrying out the unlawful purposes for which the said combinations and conspiracies are organized; and whereas the insurgents engaged in such unlawful combinations and conspiracies within the counties aforesaid have not dispersed and retired peaceably to their respective homes, and have not delivered to the marshal of the united states, or to any of his deputies, or to any military officer of the united states within said counties, all arms, ammunition, uniforms, disguises, and other means and implements used, kept, possessed, or controlled by them for carrying out the unlawful purposes for which the combinations and conspiracies are organized, as commanded by said proclamation, but do still persist in the unlawful combinations and conspiracies aforesaid: now, therefore, i, ulysses s. grant, president of the united states of america, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the constitution of the united states and the act of congress aforesaid, do hereby declare that in my judgment the public safety especially requires that the privileges of the writ of _habeas corpus_ be suspended, to the end that such rebellion may be overthrown, and do hereby suspend the privileges of the writ of _habeas corpus_ within the counties of spartanburg, york, marion, chester, laurens, newberry, fairfield, lancaster, and chesterfield, in said state of south carolina, in respect to all persons arrested by the marshal of the united states for the said district of south carolina, or by any of his deputies, or by any military officer of the united states, or by any soldier or citizen acting under the orders of said marshal, deputy, or such military officer within any one of said counties, charged with any violation of the act of congress aforesaid, during the continuance of such rebellion. in witness whereof i have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the united states to be affixed. done at the city of washington, this 17th day of october, a.d. 1871, and of the independence of the united states of america the ninety-sixth. [seal.] u.s. grant. by the president: j.c. bancroft davis, _acting secretary of state_. by the president of the united states of america. a proclamation. the process of the seasons has again enabled the husbandman to garner the fruits of successful toil. industry has been generally well rewarded. we are at peace with all nations, and tranquillity, with few exceptions, prevails at home. within the past year we have in the main been free from ills which elsewhere have afflicted our kind. if some of us have had calamities, these should be an occasion for sympathy with the sufferers, of resignation on their part to the will of the most high, and of rejoicing to the many who have been more favored. i therefore recommend that on thursday, the 30th day of november next, the people meet in their respective places of worship and there make the usual annual acknowledgments to almighty god for the blessings he has conferred upon them, for their merciful exemption from evils, and invoke his protection and kindness for their less fortunate brethren, whom in his wisdom he has deemed it best to chastise. in witness whereof i have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the united states to be affixed. done at the city of washington, this 28th day of october, a.d. 1871, and of the independence of the united states the ninety-sixth. [seal.] u.s. grant. by the president: hamilton fish, _secretary of state_. by the president of the united states of america. a proclamation. whereas in my proclamation of the 12th day of october, in the year 1871, it was recited that certain unlawful combinations and conspiracies existed in certain counties in the state of south carolina for the purpose of depriving certain portions and classes of the people of that state of the rights, privileges, and immunities and protection named in the constitution of the united states and secured by the act of congress approved april 20, 1871, entitled "an act to enforce the provisions of the fourteenth amendment to the constitution of the united states," and the persons composing such combinations and conspiracies were commanded to disperse and to retire peaceably to their homes within five days from said date; and whereas by my proclamation of the 17th day of october, in the year 1871, the privileges of the writ of _habeas corpus_ were suspended in the counties named in said proclamation; and whereas the county of marion was named in said proclamations as one of the counties in which said unlawful combinations and conspiracies for the purposes aforesaid existed, and in which the privileges of the writ of _habeas corpus_ were suspended; and whereas it has been ascertained that in said county of marion said combinations and conspiracies do not exist to the extent recited in said proclamations; and whereas it has been ascertained that unlawful combinations and conspiracies of the character and to the extent and for the purposes described in said proclamations do exist in the county of union in said state: now, therefore, i, ulysses s. grant, president of the united states of america, do hereby revoke, as to the said county of marion, the suspension of the privileges of the writ of _habeas corpus_ directed in my said proclamation of the 17th day of october, 1871. and i do hereby command all persons in the said county of union composing the unlawful combinations and conspiracies aforesaid to disperse and to retire peaceably to their homes within five days of the date hereof, and to deliver either to the marshal of the united states for the district of south carolina, or to any of his deputies, or to any military officer of the united states within said county, all arms, ammunition, uniforms, disguises, and other means and implements used, kept, possessed, or controlled by them for carrying out the unlawful purposes for which the combinations and conspiracies are organized. in witness whereof i have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the united states to be affixed. done at the city of washington, this 3d day of november, a.d. 1871, and of the independence of the united states of america the ninety-sixth. [seal.] u.s. grant. by the president: hamilton fish, _secretary of state_. by the president of the united states of america. a proclamation. whereas by an act of congress entitled "an act to enforce the provisions of the fourteenth amendment to the constitution of the united states, and for other purposes," approved the 20th day of april, a.d. 1871, power is given to the president of the united states, when in his judgment the public safety shall require it, to suspend the privileges of the writ of _habeas corpus_ in any state or part of a state whenever combinations and conspiracies exist in such state or part of a state for the purpose of depriving any portion or class of the people of such state of the rights, privileges, immunities, and protection named in the constitution of the united states and secured by the act of congress aforesaid; and whenever such combinations and conspiracies do so obstruct and hinder the execution of the laws of any such state and of the united states as to deprive the people aforesaid of the rights, privileges, immunities, and protection aforesaid, and do oppose and obstruct the laws of the united states and their due execution, and impede and obstruct the due course of justice under the same; and whenever such combinations shall be organized and armed and so numerous and powerful as to be able by violence either to overthrow or to set at defiance the constituted authorities of said state and of the united states within such state; and whenever by reason of said causes the conviction of such offenders and the preservation of the public peace shall become in such state or part of a state impracticable; and whereas such unlawful combinations and conspiracies for the purposes aforesaid are declared by the act of congress aforesaid to be rebellion against the government of the united states; and whereas by said act of congress it is provided that before the president shall suspend the privileges of the writ of _habeas corpus_ he shall first have made proclamation commanding such insurgents to disperse; and whereas on the 3d day of the present month of november the president of the united states did issue his proclamation, reciting therein, among other things, that such combinations and conspiracies did then exist in the county of union, in the state of south carolina, and commanding thereby all persons composing such unlawful combinations and conspiracies to disperse and retire peaceably to their homes within five days from the date thereof, and to deliver either to the marshal of the united states for the district of south carolina, or to any of his deputies, or to any military officer of the united states within said county, all arms, ammunition, uniforms, disguises, and other means and implements used, kept, possessed, or controlled by them for carrying out the unlawful purposes for which the said combinations and conspiracies are organized; and whereas the insurgents engaged in such unlawful combinations and conspiracies within the county aforesaid have not dispersed and retired peaceably to their respective homes, and have not delivered to the marshal of the united states, or to any of his deputies, or to any military officer of the united states within said county, all arms, ammunition, uniforms, disguises, and other means and implements used, kept, possessed, or controlled by them for carrying out the unlawful purposes for which the combinations and conspiracies are organized, as commanded by said proclamation, but do still persist in the unlawful combinations and conspiracies aforesaid: now, therefore, i, ulysses s. grant, president of the united states of america, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the constitution of the united states and the act of congress aforesaid, do hereby declare that in my judgment the public safety especially requires that the privileges of the writ of _habeas corpus_ be suspended, to the end that such rebellion may be overthrown, and do hereby suspend the privileges of the writ of _habeas corpus_ within the county of union, in said state of south carolina, in respect to all persons arrested by the marshal of the united states for the said district of south carolina, or by any of his deputies, or by any military officer of the united states, or by any soldier or citizen acting under the orders of said marshal, deputy, or such military officer within said county, charged with any violation of the act of congress aforesaid, during the continuance of such rebellion. in witness whereof i have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the united states to be affixed. done at the city of washington, this 10th day of november, a.d. 1871, and of the independence of the united states of america the ninety-sixth. [seal.] u.s. grant. by the president: hamilton fish, _secretary of state_. executive order. by the president of the united states. executive order. washington, _march 31, 1871_. the act of june 15, 1852, section 1 (10 u.s. statutes at large, p. 10), provides: that whenever any officer of either of the territories of the united states shall be absent therefrom and from the duties of his office no salary shall be paid him during the year in which such absence shall occur, unless good cause therefor shall be shown to the president of the united states, who shall officially certify his opinion of such cause to the proper accounting officer of the treasury, to be filed in his office. it has been the practice under this law for the territorial officers who have desired to be absent from their respective territories to apply for leaves to the head of the proper department at washington, and when such leave has been given the required certificate of the president has been granted as a matter of course. the unusual number of applications for leave of absence which have been lately made by territorial officers has induced the president to announce that he expects the gentlemen who hold those offices to stay in their respective territories and to attend strictly to their official duties. they have been appointed for service in the territory and for the benefit and convenience of the territorial population. he expects them by their personal presence to identify themselves with the people and acquire local information, without which their duties can not be well performed. frequent or long absence makes them in some degree strangers, and therefore less acceptable to the people. their absence, no matter with what substitution, must often put the people to inconvenience. executive officers may be required for emergencies which could not be foreseen. judges should be at hand, not only when the courts are in session, but for matters of bail, _habeas corpus_, orders in equity, examination of persons charged with crime, and other similar business, which often arises in vacation. these and similar considerations no doubt induced congress to pass the law above quoted. it is therefore directed that in future the heads of departments shall grant leaves of absence to territorial officers only for reasons of the most urgent character, and then only for the shortest possible time. by order of the president: hamilton fish, _secretary of state_. third annual message. executive mansion, _december 4, 1871_. _to the senate and house of representatives:_ in addressing my third annual message to the law-making branch of the government it is gratifying to be able to state that during the past year success has generally attended the effort to execute all laws found upon the statute books. the policy has been not to inquire into the wisdom of laws already enacted, but to learn their spirit and intent and to enforce them accordingly. the past year has, under a wise providence, been one of general prosperity to the nation. it has, however, been attended with more than usual chastisements in the loss of life and property by storm and fire. these disasters have served to call forth the best elements of human nature in our country and to develop a friendship for us on the part of foreign nations which goes far toward alleviating the distresses occasioned by these calamities. the benevolent, who have so generously shared their means with the victims of these misfortunes, will reap their reward in the consciousness of having performed a noble act and in receiving the grateful thanks of men, women, and children whose sufferings they have relieved. the relations of the united states with foreign powers continue to be friendly. the year has been an eventful one in witnessing two great nations, speaking one language and having one lineage, settling by peaceful arbitration disputes of long standing and liable at any time to bring those nations into bloody and costly conflict. an example has thus been set which, if successful in its final issue, may be followed by other civilized nations, and finally be the means of returning to productive industry millions of men now maintained to settle the disputes of nations by the bayonet and the broadside. i transmit herewith a copy of the treaty alluded to, which has been concluded since the adjournment of congress with her britannic majesty, and a copy of the protocols of the conferences of the commissioners by whom it was negotiated. this treaty provides methods for adjusting the questions pending between the two nations. various questions are to be adjusted by arbitration. i recommend congress at an early day to make the necessary provision for the tribunal at geneva and for the several commissioners on the part of the united states called for by the treaty. his majesty the king of italy, the president of the swiss confederation, and his majesty the emperor of brazil have each consented, on the joint request of the two powers, to name an arbiter for the tribunal at geneva. i have caused my thanks to be suitably expressed for the readiness with which the joint request has been complied with, by the appointment of gentlemen of eminence and learning to these important positions. his majesty the emperor of germany has been pleased to comply with the joint request of the two governments, and has consented to act as the arbitrator of the disputed water boundary between the united states and great britain. the contracting parties in the treaty have undertaken to regard as between themselves certain principles of public law, for which the united states have contended from the commencement of their history. they have also agreed to bring those principles to the knowledge of the other maritime powers and to invite them to accede to them. negotiations are going on as to the form of the note by which the invitation is to be extended to the other powers. i recommend the legislation necessary on the part of the united states to bring into operation the articles of the treaty relating to the fisheries and to the other matters touching the relations of the united states toward the british north american possessions, to become operative so soon as the proper legislation shall be had on the part of great britain and its possessions. it is much to be desired that this legislation may become operative before the fishermen of the united states begin to make their arrangements for the coming season. i have addressed a communication, of which a copy is transmitted herewith, to the governors of new york, pennsylvania, ohio, indiana, michigan, illinois, and wisconsin, urging upon the governments of those states, respectively, the necessary action on their part to carry into effect the object of the article of the treaty which contemplates the use of the canals, on either side, connected with the navigation of the lakes and rivers forming the boundary, on terms of equality, by the inhabitants of both countries. it is hoped that the importance of the object and the benefits to flow therefrom will secure the speedy approval and legislative sanction of the states concerned. i renew the recommendation for an appropriation for determining the true position of the forty-ninth parallel of latitude where it forms the boundary between the united states and the british north american possessions, between the lake of the woods and the summit of the rocky mountains. the early action of congress on this recommendation would put it in the power of the war department to place a force in the field during the next summer. the resumption of diplomatic relations between france and germany has enabled me to give directions for the withdrawal of the protection extended to germans in france by the diplomatic and consular representatives of the united states in that country. it is just to add that the delicate duty of this protection has been performed by the minister and the consul-general at paris, and the various consuls in france under the supervision of the latter, with great kindness as well as with prudence and tact. their course has received the commendation of the german government, and has wounded no susceptibility of the french. the government of the emperor of germany continues to manifest a friendly feeling toward the united states, and a desire to harmonize with the moderate and just policy which this government maintains in its relations with asiatic powers, as well as with the south american republics. i have given assurances that the friendly feelings of that government are fully shared by the united states. the ratifications of the consular and naturalization conventions with the austro-hungarian empire have been exchanged. i have been officially informed of the annexation of the states of the church to the kingdom of italy, and the removal of the capital of that kingdom to rome. in conformity with the established policy of the united states, i have recognized this change. the ratifications of the new treaty of commerce between the united states and italy have been exchanged. the two powers have agreed in this treaty that private property at sea shall be exempt from capture in case of war between the two powers. the united states have spared no opportunity of incorporating this rule into the obligation of nations. the forty-first congress, at its third session, made an appropriation for the organization of a mixed commission for adjudicating upon the claims of citizens of the united states against spain growing out of the insurrection in cuba. that commission has since been organized. i transmit herewith the correspondence relating to its formation and its jurisdiction. it is to be hoped that this commission will afford the claimants a complete remedy for their injuries. it has been made the agreeable duty of the united states to preside over a conference at washington between the plenipotentiaries of spain and the allied south american republics, which has resulted in an armistice, with the reasonable assurance of a permanent peace. the intimate friendly relations which have so long existed between the united states and russia continue undisturbed. the visit of the third son of the emperor is a proof that there is no desire on the part of his government to diminish the cordiality of those relations. the hospitable reception which has been given to the grand duke is a proof that on our side we share the wishes of that government. the inexcusable course of the russian minister at washington rendered it necessary to ask his recall and to decline to longer receive that functionary as a diplomatic representative. it was impossible, with self-respect or with a just regard to the dignity of the country, to permit mr. catacazy to continue to hold intercourse with this government after his personal abuse of government officials, and during his persistent interferences, through various means, with the relations between the united states and other powers. in accordance with my wishes, this government has been relieved of further intercourse with mr. catacazy, and the management of the affairs of the imperial legation has passed into the hands of a gentleman entirely unobjectionable. with japan we continue to maintain intimate relations. the cabinet of the mikado has since the close of the last session of congress selected citizens of the united states to serve in offices of importance in several departments of government. i have reason to think that this selection is due to an appreciation of the disinterestedness of the policy which the united states have pursued toward japan. it is our desire to continue to maintain this disinterested and just policy with china as well as japan. the correspondence transmitted herewith shows that there is no disposition on the part of this government to swerve from its established course. prompted by a desire to put an end to the barbarous treatment of our shipwrecked sailors on the korean coast, i instructed our minister at peking to endeavor to conclude a convention with korea for securing the safety and humane treatment of such mariners. admiral rodgers was instructed to accompany him with a sufficient force to protect him in case of need. a small surveying party sent out, on reaching the coast was treacherously attacked at a disadvantage. ample opportunity was given for explanation and apology for the insult. neither came. a force was then landed. after an arduous march over a rugged and difficult country, the forts from which the outrages had been committed were reduced by a gallant assault and were destroyed. having thus punished the criminals, and having vindicated the honor of the flag, the expedition returned, finding it impracticable under the circumstances to conclude the desired convention. i respectfully refer to the correspondence relating thereto, herewith submitted, and leave the subject for such action as congress may see fit to take. the republic of mexico has not yet repealed the very objectionable laws establishing what is known as the "free zone" on the frontier of the united states. it is hoped that this may yet be done, and also that more stringent measures may be taken by that republic for restraining lawless persons on its frontiers. i hope that mexico by its own action will soon relieve this government of the difficulties experienced from these causes. our relations with the various republics of central and south america continue, with one exception, to be cordial and friendly. i recommend some action by congress regarding the overdue installments under the award of the venezuelan claims commission of 1866. the internal dissensions of this government present no justification for the absence of effort to meet their solemn treaty obligations. the ratification of an extradition treaty with nicaragua has been exchanged. it is a subject for congratulation that the great empire of brazil has taken the initiatory step toward the abolition of slavery. our relations with that empire, always cordial, will naturally be made more so by this act. it is not too much to hope that the government of brazil may hereafter find it for its interest, as well as intrinsically right, to advance toward entire emancipation more rapidly than the present act contemplates. the true prosperity and greatness of a nation is to be found in the elevation and education of its laborers. it is a subject for regret that the reforms in this direction which were voluntarily promised by the statesmen of spain have not been carried out in its west india colonies. the laws and regulations for the apparent abolition of slavery in cuba and porto rico leave most of the laborers in bondage, with no hope of release until their lives become a burden to their employers. i desire to direct your attention to the fact that citizens of the united states, or persons claiming to be citizens of the united states, are large holders in foreign lands of this species of property, forbidden by the fundamental law of their alleged country. i recommend to congress to provide by stringent legislation a suitable remedy against the holding, owning, or dealing in slaves, or being interested in slave property, in foreign lands, either as owners, hirers, or mortgagors, by citizens of the united states. it is to be regretted that the disturbed condition of the island of cuba continues to be a source of annoyance and of anxiety. the existence of a protracted struggle in such close proximity to our own territory, without apparent prospect of an early termination, can not be other than an object of concern to a people who, while abstaining from interference in the affairs of other powers, naturally desire to see every country in the undisturbed enjoyment of peace, liberty, and the blessings of free institutions. our naval commanders in cuban waters have been instructed, in case it should become necessary, to spare no effort to protect the lives and property of _bona fide_ american citizens and to maintain the dignity of the flag. it is hoped that all pending questions with spain growing out of the affairs in cuba may be adjusted in the spirit of peace and conciliation which has hitherto guided the two powers in their treatment of such questions. to give importance to and to add to the efficiency of our diplomatic relations with japan and china, and to further aid in retaining the good opinion of those peoples, and to secure to the united states its share of the commerce destined to flow between those nations and the balance of the commercial world, i earnestly recommend that an appropriation be made to support at least four american youths in each of those countries, to serve as a part of the official family of our ministers there. our representatives would not even then be placed upon an equality with the representatives of great britain and of some other powers. as now situated, our representatives in japan and china have to depend for interpreters and translators upon natives of those countries who know our language imperfectly, or procure for the occasion the services of employees in foreign business houses or the interpreters to other foreign ministers. i would also recommend liberal measures for the purpose of supporting the american lines of steamers now plying between san francisco and japan and china, and the australian line--almost our only remaining lines of ocean steamers--and of increasing their services. the national debt has been reduced to the extent of $86,057,126.80 during the year, and by the negotiation of national bonds at a lower rate of interest the interest on the public debt has been so far diminished that now the sum to be raised for the interest account is nearly $17,000,000 less than on the 1st of march, 1869. it was highly desirable that this rapid diminution should take place, both to strengthen the credit of the country and to convince its citizens of their entire ability to meet every dollar of liability without bankrupting them. but in view of the accomplishment of these desirable ends; of the rapid development of the resources of the country; its increasing ability to meet large demands, and the amount already paid, it is not desirable that the present resources of the country should continue to be taxed in order to continue this rapid payment. i therefore recommend a modification of both the tariff and internal-tax law. i recommend that all taxes from internal sources be abolished, except those collected from spirituous, vinous, and malt liquors, tobacco in its various forms, and from stamps. in readjusting the tariff i suggest that a careful estimate be made of the amount of surplus revenue collected under the present laws, after providing for the current expenses of the government, the interest account, and a sinking fund, and that this surplus be reduced in such a manner as to afford the greatest relief to the greatest number. there are many articles not produced at home, but which enter largely into general consumption through articles which are manufactured at home, such as medicines compounded, etc., etc., from which very little revenue is derived, but which enter into general use. all such articles i recommend to be placed on the "free list." should a further reduction prove advisable, i would then recommend that it be made upon those articles which can best bear it without disturbing home production or reducing the wages of american labor. i have not entered into figures, because to do so would be to repeat what will be laid before you in the report of the secretary of the treasury. the present laws for collecting revenue pay collectors of customs small salaries, but provide for moieties (shares in all seizures), which, at principal ports of entry particularly, raise the compensation of those officials to a large sum. it has always seemed to me as if this system must at times work perniciously. it holds out an inducement to dishonest men, should such get possession of those offices, to be lax in their scrutiny of goods entered, to enable them finally to make large seizures. your attention is respectfully invited to this subject. continued fluctuations in the value of gold, as compared with the national currency, has a most damaging effect upon the increase and development of the country, in keeping up prices of all articles necessary in everyday life. it fosters a spirit of gambling, prejudicial alike to national morals and the national finances. if the question can be met as to how to get a fixed value to our currency, that value constantly and uniformly approaching par with specie, a very desirable object will be gained. for the operations of the army in the past year, the expense of maintaining it, the estimate for the ensuing year, and for continuing seacoast and other improvements conducted under the supervision of the war department, i refer you to the accompanying report of the secretary of war. i call your attention to the provisions of the act of congress approved march 3, 1869, which discontinues promotions in the staff corps of the army until provided for by law. i recommend that the number of officers in each grade in the staff corps be fixed, and that whenever the number in any one grade falls below the number so fixed, that the vacancy may be filled by promotion from the grade below. i also recommend that when the office of chief of a corps becomes vacant the place may be filled by selection from the corps in which the vacancy exists. the report of the secretary of the navy shows an improvement in the number and efficiency of the naval force, without material increase in the expense of supporting it. this is due to the policy which has been adopted, and is being extended as fast as our material will admit, of using smaller vessels as cruisers on the several stations. by this means we have been enabled to occupy at once a larger extent of cruising grounds, to visit more frequently the ports where the presence of our flag is desirable, and generally to discharge more efficiently the appropriate duties of the navy in time of peace, without exceeding the number of men or the expenditure authorized by law. during the past year the navy has, in addition to its regular service, supplied the men and officers for the vessels of the coast survey, and has completed the surveys authorized by congress of the isthmuses of darien and tehuantepec, and, under like authority, has sent out an expedition, completely furnished and equipped, to explore the unknown ocean of the north. the suggestions of the report as to the necessity for increasing and improving the _matã©riel_ of the navy, and the plan recommended for reducing the _personnel_ of the service to a peace standard, by the gradual abolition of certain grades of officers, the reduction of others, and the employment of some in the service of the commercial marine, are well considered and deserve the thoughtful attention of congress. i also recommend that all promotions in the navy above the rank of captain be by selection instead of by seniority. this course will secure in the higher grades greater efficiency and hold out an incentive to young officers to improve themselves in the knowledge of their profession. the present cost of maintaining the navy, its cost compared with that of the preceding year, and the estimates for the ensuing year are contained in the accompanying report of the secretary of the navy. the enlarged receipts of the post-office department, as shown by the accompanying report of the postmaster-general, exhibit a gratifying increase in that branch of the public service. it is the index of the growth of education and of the prosperity of the people, two elements highly conducive to the vigor and stability of republics. with a vast territory like ours, much of it sparsely populated, but all requiring the services of the mail, it is not at present to be expected that this department can be made self-sustaining. but a gradual approach to this end from year to year is confidently relied on, and the day is not far distant when the post-office department of the government will prove a much greater blessing to the whole people than it is now. the suggestions of the postmaster-general for improvements in the department presided over by him are earnestly recommended to your special attention. especially do i recommend favorable consideration of the plan for uniting the telegraphic system of the united states with the postal system. it is believed that by such a course the cost of telegraphing could be much reduced, and the service as well, if not better, rendered. it would secure the further advantage of extending the telegraph through portions of the country where private enterprise will not construct it. commerce, trade, and, above all, the efforts to bring a people widely separated into a community of interest are always benefited by a rapid intercommunication. education, the groundwork of republican institutions, is encouraged by increasing the facilities to gather speedy news from all parts of the country. the desire to reap the benefit of such improvements will stimulate education. i refer you to the report of the postmaster-general for full details of the operations of last year and for comparative statements of results with former years. there has been imposed upon the executive branch of the government the execution of the act of congress approved april 20, 1871, and commonly known as the kuklux law, in a portion of the state of south carolina. the necessity of the course pursued will be demonstrated by the report of the committee to investigate southern outrages. under the provisions of the above act i issued a proclamation[48] calling the attention of the people of the united states to the same, and declaring my reluctance to exercise any of the extraordinary powers thereby conferred upon me, except in case of imperative necessity, but making known my purpose to exercise such powers whenever it should become necessary to do so for the purpose of securing to all citizens of the united states the peaceful enjoyment of the rights guaranteed to them by the constitution and the laws. after the passage of this law information was received from time to time that combinations of the character referred to in this law existed and were powerful in many parts of the southern states, particularly in certain counties in the state of south carolina. careful investigation was made, and it was ascertained that in nine counties of that state such combinations were active and powerful, embracing a sufficient portion of the citizens to control the local authority, and having, among other things, the object of depriving the emancipated class of the substantial benefits of freedom and of preventing the free political action of those citizens who did not sympathize with their own views. among their operations were frequent scourgings and occasional assassinations, generally perpetrated at night by disguised persons, the victims in almost all cases being citizens of different political sentiments from their own or freed persons who had shown a disposition to claim equal rights with other citizens. thousands of inoffensive and well-disposed citizens were the sufferers by this lawless violence. thereupon, on the 12th of october, 1871, a proclamation[49] was issued, in terms of the law, calling upon the members of those combinations to disperse within five days and to deliver to the marshal or military officers of the united states all arms, ammunition, uniforms, disguises, and other means and implements used by them for carrying out their unlawful purposes. this warning not having been heeded, on the 17th of october another proclamation[50] was issued, suspending the privileges of the writ of _habeas corpus_ in nine counties in that state. direction was given that within the counties so designated persons supposed, upon creditable information, to be members of such unlawful combinations should be arrested by the military forces of the united states and delivered to the marshal, to be dealt with according to law. in two of said counties, york and spartanburg, many arrests have been made. at the last account the number of persons thus arrested was 168. several hundred, whose criminality was ascertained to be of an inferior degree, were released for the present. these have generally made confessions of their guilt. great caution has been exercised in making these arrests, and, notwithstanding the large number, it is believed that no innocent person is now in custody. the prisoners will be held for regular trial in the judicial tribunals of the united states. as soon as it appeared that the authorities of the united states were about to take vigorous measures to enforce the law, many persons absconded, and there is good ground for supposing that all of such persons have violated the law. a full report of what has been done under this law will be submitted to congress by the attorney-general. in utah there still remains a remnant of barbarism, repugnant to civilization, to decency, and to the laws of the united states. territorial officers, however, have been found who are willing to perform their duty in a spirit of equity and with a due sense of the necessity of sustaining the majesty of the law. neither polygamy nor any other violation of existing statutes will be permitted within the territory of the united states. it is not with the religion of the self-styled saints that we are now dealing, but with their practices. they will be protected in the worship of god according to the dictates of their consciences, but they will not be permitted to violate the laws under the cloak of religion. it may be advisable for congress to consider what, in the execution of the laws against polygamy, is to be the status of plural wives and their offspring. the propriety of congress passing an enabling act authorizing the territorial legislature of utah to legitimize all children born prior to a time fixed in the act might be justified by its humanity to these innocent children. this is a suggestion only, and not a recommendation. the policy pursued toward the indians has resulted favorably, so far as can be judged from the limited time during which it has been in operation. through the exertions of the various societies of christians to whom has been intrusted the execution of the policy, and the board of commissioners authorized by the law of april 10, 1869, many tribes of indians have been induced to settle upon reservations, to cultivate the soil, to perform productive labor of various kinds, and to partially accept civilization. they are being cared for in such a way, it is hoped, as to induce those still pursuing their old habits of life to embrace the only opportunity which is left them to avoid extermination. i recommend liberal appropriations to carry out the indian peace policy, not only because it is humane, christianlike, and economical, but because it is right. i recommend to your favorable consideration also the policy of granting a territorial government to the indians in the indian territory west of arkansas and missouri and south of kansas. in doing so every right guaranteed to the indian by treaty should be secured. such a course might in time be the means of collecting most of the indians now between the missouri and the pacific and south of the british possessions into one territory or one state. the secretary of the interior has treated upon this subject at length, and i commend to you his suggestions. i renew my recommendation that the public lands be regarded as a heritage to our children, to be disposed of only as required for occupation and to actual settlers. those already granted have been in great part disposed of in such a way as to secure access to the balance by the hardy settler who may wish to avail himself of them, but caution should be exercised even in attaining so desirable an object. educational interest may well be served by the grant of the proceeds of the sale of public lands to settlers. i do not wish to be understood as recommending in the least degree a curtailment of what is being done by the general government for the encouragement of education. the report of the secretary of the interior submitted with this will give you all the information collected and prepared for publication in regard to the census taken during the year 1870; the operations of the bureau of education for the year; the patent office; the pension office; the land office, and the indian bureau. the report of the commissioner of agriculture gives the operations of his department for the year. as agriculture is the groundwork of our prosperity, too much importance can not be attached to the labors of this department. it is in the hands of an able head, with able assistants, all zealously devoted to introducing into the agricultural productions of the nation all useful products adapted to any of the various climates and soils of our vast territory, and to giving all useful information as to the method of cultivation, the plants, cereals, and other products adapted to particular localities. quietly but surely the agricultural bureau is working a great national good, and if liberally supported the more widely its influence will be extended and the less dependent we shall be upon the products of foreign countries. the subject of compensation to the heads of bureaus and officials holding positions of responsibility, and requiring ability and character to fill properly, is one to which your attention is invited. but few of the officials receive a compensation equal to the respectable support of a family, while their duties are such as to involve millions of interest. in private life services demand compensation equal to the services rendered; a wise economy would dictate the same rule in the government service. i have not given the estimates for the support of government for the ensuing year, nor the comparative statement between the expenditures for the year just passed and the one just preceding, because all these figures are contained in the accompanying reports or in those presented directly to congress. these estimates have my approval. more than six years having elapsed since the last hostile gun was fired between the armies then arrayed against each other--one for the perpetuation, the other for the destruction, of the union--it may well be considered whether it is not now time that the disabilities imposed by the fourteenth amendment should be removed. that amendment does not exclude the ballot, but only imposes the disability to hold offices upon certain classes. when the purity of the ballot is secure, majorities are sure to elect officers reflecting the views of the majority. i do not see the advantage or propriety of excluding men from office merely because they were before the rebellion of standing and character sufficient to be elected to positions requiring them to take oaths to support the constitution, and admitting to eligibility those entertaining precisely the same views, but of less standing in their communities. it may be said that the former violated an oath, while the latter did not; the latter did not have it in their power to do so. if they had taken this oath, it can not be doubted they would have broken it as did the former class. if there are any great criminals, distinguished above all others for the part they took in opposition to the government, they might, in the judgment of congress, be excluded from such an amnesty. this subject is submitted for your careful consideration. the condition of the southern states is, unhappily, not such as all true patriotic citizens would like to see. social ostracism for opinion's sake, personal violence or threats toward persons entertaining political views opposed to those entertained by the majority of the old citizens, prevents immigration and the flow of much-needed capital into the states lately in rebellion. it will be a happy condition of the country when the old citizens of these states will take an interest in public affairs, promulgate ideas honestly entertained, vote for men representing their views, and tolerate the same freedom of expression and ballot in those entertaining different political convictions. under the provisions of the act of congress approved february 21, 1871, a territorial government was organized in the district of columbia. its results have thus far fully realized the expectations of its advocates. under the direction of the territorial officers, a system of improvements has been inaugurated by means of which washington is rapidly becoming a city worthy of the nation's capital. the citizens of the district having voluntarily taxed themselves to a large amount for the purpose of contributing to the adornment of the seat of government, i recommend liberal appropriations on the part of congress, in order that the government may bear its just share of the expense of carrying out a judicious system of improvements. by the great fire in chicago the most important of the government buildings in that city were consumed. those burned had already become inadequate to the wants of the government in that growing city, and, looking to the near future, were totally inadequate. i recommend, therefore, that an appropriation be made immediately to purchase the remainder of the square on which the burned buildings stood, provided it can be purchased at a fair valuation, or provided that the legislature of illinois will pass a law authorizing its condemnation for government purposes; and also an appropriation of as much money as can properly be expended toward the erection of new buildings during this fiscal year. the number of immigrants ignorant of our laws, habits, etc., coming into our country annually has become so great and the impositions practiced upon them so numerous and flagrant that i suggest congressional action for their protection. it seems to me a fair subject of legislation by congress. i can not now state as fully as i desire the nature of the complaints made by immigrants of the treatment they receive, but will endeavor to do so during the session of congress, particularly if the subject should receive your attention. it has been the aim of the administration to enforce honesty and efficiency in all public offices. every public servant who has violated the trust placed in him has been proceeded against with all the rigor of the law. if bad men have secured places, it has been the fault of the system established by law and custom for making appointments, or the fault of those who recommend for government positions persons not sufficiently well known to them personally, or who give letters indorsing the characters of office seekers without a proper sense of the grave responsibility which such a course devolves upon them. a civil-service reform which can correct this abuse is much desired. in mercantile pursuits the business man who gives a letter of recommendation to a friend to enable him to obtain credit from a stranger is regarded as morally responsible for the integrity of his friend and his ability to meet his obligations. a reformatory law which would enforce this principle against all indorsers of persons for public place would insure great caution in making recommendations. a salutary lesson has been taught the careless and the dishonest public servant in the great number of prosecutions and convictions of the last two years. it is gratifying to notice the favorable change which is taking place throughout the country in bringing to punishment those who have proven recreant to the trusts confided to them and in elevating to public office none but those who possess the confidence of the honest and the virtuous, who, it will always be found, comprise the majority of the community in which they live. in my message to congress one year ago i urgently recommended a reform in the civil service of the country. in conformity with that recommendation congress, in the ninth section of "an act making appropriations for sundry civil expenses of the government, and for other purposes," approved march 3, 1871, gave the necessary authority to the executive to inaugurate a civil-service reform, and placed upon him the responsibility of doing so. under the authority of said act i convened a board of gentlemen eminently qualified for the work to devise rules and regulations to effect the needed reform. their labors are not yet complete, but it is believed that they will succeed in devising a plan that can be adopted to the great relief of the executive, the heads of departments, and members of congress, and which will redound to the true interest of the public service. at all events, the experiment shall have a fair trial. i have thus hastily summed up the operations of the government during the last year, and made such suggestions as occur to me to be proper for your consideration. i submit them with a confidence that your combined action will be wise, statesmanlike, and in the best interests of the whole country. u.s. grant. [footnote 48: see pp. 134-135.] [footnote 49: see pp. 135-136.] [footnote 50: see pp. 136-138.] special messages. executive mansion, _december 4, 1871_. _to the house of representatives:_ in compliance with section 2 of the act making appropriations for the consular and diplomatic expenses of the government for the year ending june 30, 1871, approved july 11, 1870, i herewith transmit the names and reports of and the amounts paid to consular agents of the united states. u.s. grant. washington, _december 4, 1871_. _to the senate and house of representatives:_ i transmit herewith to congress a report, dated november 8, 1871, received from the secretary of state, in compliance with the requirement of the act of march 3, 1871, making appropriations, among other things, for the increase of expenses and compensation of certain diplomatic and consular officers of the united states on account of the late war between france and prussia. the expenditures therein mentioned have been made on my approval. u.s. grant. washington, _december 4, 1871_. _to the senate and house of representatives:_ i herewith transmit to congress a report, dated the 4th instant, with the accompanying papers,[51] received from the secretary of state, in compliance with the requirements of the eighteenth section of the act entitled "an act to regulate the diplomatic and consular systems of the united states," approved august 18, 1856. u.s. grant. [footnote 51: report of fees collected, etc., by consular officers of the united states for 1870, and tariff of consular fees prescribed by the president october 1, 1870.] washington, _december 5, 1871_. _to the senate and house of representatives:_ in pursuance of the provisions of the second section of the act approved june 20, 1864, entitled "an act making appropriations for the consular and diplomatic expenses of the government for the year ending the 30th of june, 1865, and for other purposes," i inform congress that william heine, a consular clerk, was on the 30th of august last removed from office for the following cause, viz: insubordination, disobedience of orders, and disrespectful conduct toward his superiors. u.s. grant. washington, _december 6, 1871_. _to the senate of the united states:_ i transmit to the senate, in answer to their resolution of the 5th instant, a report from the secretary of state, with accompanying papers.[52] u.s. grant. [footnote 52: correspondence relative to the retirement of constantin de catacazy, minister from russia to the united states.] executive mansion, _december 19, 1871_. _to the senate and house of representatives:_ in accordance with the act of congress approved march 3, 1871, i convened a commission of eminent gentlemen to devise rules and regulations for the purpose of reforming the civil service. their labors are now completed, and i transmit herewith their report,[53] together with the rules which they recommend for my action. these rules have been adopted and will go into effect on the 1st day of january, 1872. under the law referred to, as i interpret it, the authority is already invested in the executive to enforce these regulations, with full power to abridge, alter, or amend them, at his option, when changes may be deemed advisable. these views, together with the report of the commissioners, are submitted for your careful consideration as to whether further legislation may be necessary in order to carry out an effective and beneficial civil-service reform. if left to me, without further congressional action, the rules prescribed by the commission, under the reservation already mentioned, will be faithfully executed; but they are not binding, without further legislation, upon my successors. being desirous of bringing this subject to the attention of congress before the approaching recess, i have not time to sufficiently examine the accompanying report to enable me to suggest definite legislative action to insure the support which may be necessary in order to give a thorough trial to a policy long needed. i ask for all the strength which congress can give me to enable me to carry out the reforms in the civil service recommended by the commission, and adopted to take effect, as before stated, on january 1, 1872. the law which provides for the convening of a commission to devise rules and regulations for reforming the civil service authorizes, i think, the permanent organization of a primary board under whose general direction all examinations of applicants for public office shall be conducted. there is no appropriation to continue such a board beyond the termination of its present labors. i therefore recommend that a proper appropriation be made to continue the services of the present board for another year, and in view of the fact that three members of the board held positions in the public service, which precludes them from receiving extra compensation, under existing laws, that they be authorized to receive a fair compensation for extra services rendered by them in the performance of this duty. u.s. grant. [footnote 53: omitted.] rules for the civil service. 1. no person shall be admitted to any position in the civil service within the appointment of the president or the heads of departments who is not a citizen of the united states; who shall not have furnished satisfactory evidence in regard to character, health, and age, and who shall not have passed a satisfactory examination in speaking, reading, and writing the english language. 2. an advisory board of suitable persons, to be employed by the president under the ninth section of the act of march 3, 1871, entitled "an act making appropriations for sundry civil expenses of the government for the fiscal year ending june 30, 1872, and for other purposes," shall, so far as practicable, group the positions in each branch of the civil service according to the character of the duties to be performed, and shall grade each group from lowest to highest for the purpose of promotion within the group. admission to the civil service shall always be to the lowest grade of any group; and to such positions as can not be grouped or graded admission shall be determined as provided for the lowest grade. 3. a vacancy occurring in the lowest grade of any group of offices shall be filled, after due public notice, from all applicants who shall present themselves, and who shall have furnished the evidence and satisfied the preliminary examination already mentioned, and who shall have passed a public competitive examination to test knowledge, ability, and special qualifications for the performance of the duties of the office. the board conducting such competitive examination shall prepare, under the supervision of the advisory board, a list of the names of the applicants in the order of their excellence as proved by such examination, beginning with the highest, and shall then certify to the nominating or appointing power, as the case may be, the names standing at the head of such list, not exceeding three, and from the names thus certified the appointment shall be made. 4. a vacancy occurring in any grade of a group of offices above the lowest shall be filled by a competitive examination of applicants from the other grades of that group, and the list of names from which the appointment is to be made shall be prepared and certified as provided in the preceding rule; but if no such applicants are found competent the appointment shall be made upon an examination of all applicants, conducted in accordance with the provisions for admission to the lowest grade. 5. applicants certified as otherwise qualified for appointment as cashiers of collectors of customs, cashiers of assistant treasurers, cashiers of postmasters, superintendents of money-order divisions in post-offices, and such other custodians of large sums of money as may hereafter be designated by the advisory board, and for whose pecuniary fidelity another officer is responsible, shall, nevertheless, not be appointed except with the approval of such other officer. 6. postmasters whose annual salary is less than $200 may be appointed upon the written request of applicants, with such evidence of character and fitness as shall be satisfactory to the head of the department. 7. the appointment of all persons entering the civil service in accordance with these regulations, excepting persons appointed by the president by and with the advice and consent of the senate, postmasters, and persons appointed to any position in a foreign country, shall be made for a probationary term of six months, during which the conduct and capacity of such persons shall be tested; and if at the end of said probationary term satisfactory proofs of their fitness shall have been furnished by the board of examiners to the head of the department in which they shall have been employed during said term, they shall be reappointed. 8. the president will designate three persons in each department of the public service to serve as a board of examiners, which, under the supervision of the advisory board and under regulations to be prescribed by it, and at such times and places as it may determine, shall conduct, personally or by persons approved by the advisory board, all investigations and examinations for admission into said departments or for promotion therein. 9. any person who, after long and faithful service in a department, shall be incapacitated by mental or bodily infirmity for the efficient discharge of the duties of his position may be appointed by the head of the department, at his discretion, to a position of less responsibility in the same department. 10. nothing in these rules shall prevent the appointment of aliens to positions in the consular service which by reason of small compensation or of other sufficient cause are, in the judgment of the appointing power, necessarily so filled, nor the appointment of such persons within the united states as are indispensable to a proper discharge of the duties of certain positions, but who may not be familiar with the english language or legally capable of naturalization. 11. no head of a department nor any subordinate officer of the government shall, as such officer, authorize or permit or assist in levying any assessment of money for political purposes, under the form of voluntary contributions or otherwise, upon any person employed under his control, nor shall any such person pay any money so assessed. 12. the advisory board shall at any time recommend to the president such changes in these rules as it may consider necessary to secure the greater efficiency of the civil service. 13. from these rules are excepted the heads of departments, assistant secretaries of departments, assistant attorneys-general, and first assistant postmaster-general, solicitor-general, solicitor of the treasury, naval solicitor, solicitor of internal revenue, examiner of claims in the state department, treasurer of the united states, register of the treasury, first and second comptrollers of the treasury, judges of the united states courts, district attorneys, private secretary of the president, ambassadors and other public ministers, superintendent of the coast survey, director of the mint, governors of territories, special commissioners, special counsel, visiting and examining boards, persons appointed to positions without compensation for services, dispatch agents, and bearers of dispatches. executive mansion, _december 20, 1871_. _to the house of representatives:_ in answer to the resolution of the house of representatives of the 6th instant, requesting information in regard to certain measures with reference to the spanish west indies, i transmit reports from the secretary of state and of the navy, with the documents by which they were accompanied. u.s. grant. washington, _january 8, 1872_. _to the house of representatives:_ in answer to a resolution of the house of representatives of the 6th of december, requesting to be informed if any further action is necessary by congress to secure the immediate temporary preservation of the archives or public records now in the state department, i transmit a report and accompanying papers from the secretary of state. u.s. grant. washington, _january 9, 1872_. _to the senate:_ in answer to the resolution of the senate of the 19th of december last, calling for certain correspondence relating to the subject of international coinage not heretofore furnished, i transmit herewith a report from the secretary of state, with the papers which accompanied it. u.s. grant. washington, _january 15, 1872_. _to the senate of the united states:_ i transmit, for the consideration of the senate with a view to ratification, a convention between the united states and his majesty the emperor of austria-hungary, relative to the protection of trade-marks. u.s. grant. washington, _january 15, 1872_. _to the senate of the united states:_ i transmit, for the consideration of the senate with a view to ratification, a convention between the united states and his majesty the emperor of germany, relative to the rights, privileges, and duties of consuls and to the protection of trade-marks, signed at berlin on the 11th ultimo. a copy of the dispatch of the 11th ultimo from mr. bancroft, which accompanied the convention, is also transmitted for the information of the senate. u.s. grant. washington, _january 16, 1872_. _to the senate of the united states:_ in answer to the resolution of the senate of the 16th of may last, calling for papers, correspondence, and information relating to the case of the ship _hudson_ and schooner _washington_[54] i transmit reports from the secretaries of state and of the navy and the papers by which they were accompanied. u.s. grant. [footnote 54: seized by british authorities at the falkland islands in 1854.] washington, _january 30, 1872_. _to the house of representatives:_ in answer to a resolution of the house of representatives of the 15th instant, calling for certain correspondence relating to the release of the fenian prisoner william g. halpine, i transmit herewith a report of the secretary of state. u.s. grant. washington, _february 2, 1872_. _to the senate of the united states:_ i transmit to the senate, in answer to their resolution of the 16th ultimo, a report from the secretary of state, with accompanying papers.[55] u.s. grant. [footnote 55: correspondence relative to the seizure and detention of the american steamers _hero, dudley buck, nutrias_, and _san fernando_, property of the venezuela steam transportation company, and the virtual imprisonment of the officers of those vessels.] washington, _february 13, 1872_. _to the senate of the united states:_ in answer to the resolution adopted by the senate on the 19th of december last, relative to questions with spain growing out of affairs in cuba and to instructions to our naval commanders in cuban waters, i transmit reports from the secretaries of state and of the navy. u.s. grant. washington, _february 13, 1872_. _to the senate of the united states:_ in answer to the resolution of the senate of the 8th instant, i transmit a report from the secretary of state and the copy of the case of the united states presented to the tribunal of arbitration at geneva, which accompanied it. u.s. grant. washington, _february 23, 1872_. _to the senate of the united states:_ i transmit herewith, for the consideration of the senate, a preliminary report of dr. e.c. wines, appointed under a joint resolution of congress of the 7th of march, 1871, as commissioner of the united states to the international congress on the prevention and repression of crime, including penal and reformatory treatment. u.s. grant. washington, _march 11, 1872_. _to the house of representatives:_ i transmit herewith a report,[56] dated the 5th instant, received from the secretary of state, in compliance with the resolution of the house of representatives of the 28th of february ultimo. u.s. grant. [footnote 56: relative to the number of consular and commercial agents of the united states abroad who speak or write the language of the country in which their districts are situated.] executive mansion, _march 15, 1872_. _to the senate and house of representatives:_ i have the honor herewith to transmit to congress a recommendation from hon. m.d. leggett, commissioner of patents, for the reorganization of his office, and also the letter of the secretary of the interior accompanying it. i concur with the secretary of the interior in the views expressed in his letter, and recommend the careful consideration of congress to the subject of this communication, and action which will secure a more efficient performance of the duties of the patent office than is practicable under present legislation. u.s. grant. washington, _march 16, 1872_. _to the house of representatives:_ i transmit herewith a report,[57] dated the 16th instant, received from the secretary of state, in compliance with the resolution of the house of representatives of the 7th instant. u.s. grant. [footnote 57: stating that there are no papers in the department of state to show that the inhabitants of the navigators islands, in the pacific ocean, have made application to have the protection of the united states extended over said islands.] washington, _march 19, 1872_. _to the senate of the united states:_ i transmit to the senate, for consideration with a view to its ratification, a "general convention of friendship, commerce, and extradition" between the united states and the orange free state, signed at bloemfontein on the 22d of december last by w.w. edgcomb, consul of the united states at cape town, acting on behalf of this government, and by mr. f.k. hã¶hne on behalf of the orange free state. u.s. grant. washington, _march 20, 1872_. _to the house of representatives:_ i transmit herewith a report,[58] dated the 20th instant, received from the secretary of state, to whom was referred the resolution of the house of representatives of the 28th ultimo. u.s. grant. [footnote 58: transmitting a translation of the spanish royal decree of july 6, 1860, prescribing regulations for the introduction of chinese laborers into cuba, and translation of a decree of count valmaseda, captain-general of cuba, of december 13, 1871, relative to the decree of july 6, 1860.] washington, _march 23, 1872_. _to the house of representatives of the united states:_ in answer to a resolution of the house of representatives of the 20th instant, i transmit a report from the secretary of state, with a list of the newspapers[59] which accompanied it. u.s. grant. [footnote 59: selected to publish the laws of the united states for the second session of the forty-second congress.] washington, _march 28, 1872_. _to the house of representatives:_ i transmit to the house of representatives, in answer to their resolution of the 19th instant, a report of the secretary of state and the papers[60] which accompany the same. u.s. grant. [footnote 60: correspondence relative to the imprisonment by spanish authorities of dr. j.r. houard, a citizen of the united states, charged with complicity in the insurrection in cuba.] washington, _april 2, 1872_. _to the senate of the united states:_ in answer to the resolution of the senate of the 18th of january last, relating to british light-house dues, i transmit herewith a report from the secretary of state and the documents which accompanied it. u.s. grant. washington, _april 4, 1872_. _to the house of representatives:_ in answer to the resolution of the house of representatives of the 14th of january last, i transmit herewith a report[61] of the secretary of state. u.s. grant. [footnote 61: stating that the report of richard d. cutts on the marketable products of the sea was transmitted with the message of president johnson of february 17, 1869.] executive mansion, _april 19, 1872_. _to the house of representatives:_ in answer to the resolution of the house of representatives of the 25th of january last, i have the honor to submit the following, accompanied by the report of the attorney-general, to whom the resolution was referred: representations having been made to me that in certain portions of south carolina a condition of lawlessness and terror existed, i requested the then attorney-general (akerman) to visit that state, and after personal examination to report to me the facts in relation to the subject. on the 16th of october last he addressed me a communication from south carolina, in which he stated that in the counties of spartanburg, york, chester, union, laurens, newberry, fairfield, lancaster, and chesterfield there were combinations for the purpose of preventing the free political action of citizens who were friendly to the constitution and the government of the united states, and of depriving emancipated classes of the equal protection of the laws. "these combinations embrace at least two-thirds of the active white men of those counties, and have the sympathy and countenance of a majority of the one-third. they are connected with similar combinations in other counties and states, and no doubt are part of a grand system of criminal associations pervading most of the southern states. the members are bound to obedience and secrecy by oaths which they are taught to regard as of higher obligation than the lawful oaths taken before civil magistrates. "they are organized and armed. they effect their objects by personal violence, often extending to murder. they terrify witnesses; they control juries in the state courts, and sometimes in the courts of the united states. systematic perjury is one of the means by which prosecutions of the members are defeated. from information given by officers of the state and of the united states and by credible private citizens i am justified in affirming that the instances of criminal violence perpetrated by these combinations within the last twelve months in the above-named counties could be reckoned by thousands." i received information of a similar import from various other sources, among which were the joint select committee of congress upon southern outrages, the officers of the state, the military officers of the united states on duty in south carolina, the united states attorney and marshal, and other civil officers of the government, repentant and abjuring members of those unlawful organizations, persons specially employed by the department of justice to detect crimes against the united states, and from other credible persons. most, if not all, of this information, except what i derived from the attorney-general, came to me orally, and was to the effect that said counties were under the sway of powerful combinations, properly known as "kuklux klans," the objects of which were by force and terror to prevent all political action not in accord with the views of the members; to deprive colored citizens of the right to bear arms and of the right to a free ballot; to suppress schools in which colored children were taught, and to reduce the colored people to a condition closely akin to that of slavery; that these combinations were organized and armed, and had rendered the local laws ineffectual to protect the classes whom they desired to oppress; that they had perpetrated many murders and hundreds of crimes of minor degree, all of which were unpunished; and that witnesses could not safely testify against them unless the more active members were placed under restraint. u.s. grant. washington, _april 20, 1872_. _to the house of representatives:_ i transmit, for the information of the house of representatives, a report from the secretary of state and the copy of the counter case of the united states in the matter of the claims against great britain, as presented to the board of arbitration at geneva, which accompanies it. u.s. grant. [the same message was sent to the senate.] washington, _april 24, 1872_. _to the house of representatives of the united states:_ in answer to a resolution of the 22d instant, i transmit to the house of representatives a report from the secretary of state, with the british case[62] and papers which accompanied it. u.s. grant. [footnote 62: presented to the board of arbitration at geneva.] _to the house of representatives:_ in answer to a resolution of the house of representatives of yesterday, i transmit a report of the secretary of state and copies of the british counter case,[63] and the volumes of appendixes to the british case which accompany it. u.s. grant. april 29, 1872. [footnote 63: presented to the board of arbitration at geneva.] executive mansion, _april 30, 1872_. _to the senate and house of representatives:_ i have the honor to transmit herewith the annual report of the board of public works of the district of columbia, submitted to me for that purpose by the governor of the territory in accordance with section 37 of "an act to provide a government for the district of columbia," approved february 21, 1871. u.s. grant. washington, d.c., _may 7, 1872_. _to the house of representatives:_ in answer to a resolution of the house of representatives of the 15th of march last, i transmit herewith a report of the secretary of state and the papers[64] which accompanied it. u.s. grant. [footnote 64: correspondence relative to the claim of the owners of the steamer _aroostook_ for compensation for the use of that vessel in searching for bodies and property lost in the united states steamer _oneida_, wrecked in the bay of yedo in 1870.] washington, _may 7, 1872_. _to the senate of the united states:_ i transmit, for the consideration of the senate with a view to its ratification, a convention between the united states and the republic of ecuador for the purpose of regulating the citizenship of persons who emigrate from the one country to the other, which instrument was signed in this city on the 6th instant. u.s. grant. washington, _may 7, 1872_. _to the senate of the united states:_ i herewith communicate to the senate a report from the acting secretary of the interior of this date, in answer to the resolution of that body adopted on the 23d ultimo, calling for information relative to the recent affray at the court-house in going snake district, indian territory. in view of the feeling of hostility which exists between the cherokees and the united states authorities of the western district of arkansas, it seems to be necessary that congress should adopt such measures as will tend to allay that feeling and at the same time secure the enforcement of the laws in that territory. i therefore concur with the acting secretary of the interior in suggesting the adoption of a pending bill for the erection of a judicial district within the indian territory, as a measure which will afford the most immediate remedy for the existing troubles. u.s. grant. [a similar message, dated may 10, was sent to the house of representatives, in answer to a resolution of that body of april 29.] washington, _may 13, 1872_. _to the senate of the united states:_ i transmit herewith the correspondence which has recently taken place respecting the differences of opinion which have arisen between this government and that of great britain with regard to the powers of the tribunal of arbitration created under the treaty signed at washington may 8, 1871. i respectfully invite the attention of the senate to the proposed article submitted by the british government with the object of removing the differences which seem to threaten the prosecution of the arbitration, and request an expression by the senate of their disposition in regard to advising and consenting to the formal adoption of an article such as is proposed by the british government. the senate is aware that the consultation with that body in advance of entering into agreements with foreign states has many precedents. in the early days of the republic general washington repeatedly asked their advice upon pending questions with such powers. the most important recent precedent is that of the oregon boundary treaty, in 1846. the importance of the results hanging upon the present state of the treaty with great britain leads me to follow these former precedents and to desire the counsel of the senate in advance of agreeing to the proposal of great britain. u.s. grant. executive mansion, _may 14, 1872_. _to the senate and house of representatives of the united states:_ in my message to congress at the beginning of its present session allusion was made to the hardships and privations inflicted upon poor immigrants on shipboard and upon arrival on our shores, and a suggestion was made favoring national legislation for the purpose of effecting a radical cure of the evil. promise was made that a special message on this subject would be presented during the present session should information be received which would warrant it. i now transmit to the two houses of congress all that has been officially received since that time bearing upon the subject, and recommend that such legislation be had as will secure, first, such room and accommodation on shipboard as is necessary for health and comfort, and such privacy and protection as not to compel immigrants to be the unwilling witnesses to so much vice and misery; and, second, legislation to protect them upon their arrival at our seaports from the knaves who are ever ready to despoil them of the little all which they are able to bring with them. such legislation will be in the interests of humanity, and seems to be fully justifiable. the immigrant is not a citizen of any state or territory upon his arrival, but comes here to become a citizen of a great republic, free to change his residence at will, to enjoy the blessings of a protecting government, where all are equal before the law, and to add to the national wealth by his industry. on his arrival he does not know states or corporations, but confides implicitly in the protecting arm of the great, free country of which he has heard so much before leaving his native land. it is a source of serious disappointment and discouragement to those who start with means sufficient to support them comfortably until they can choose a residence and begin employment for a comfortable support to find themselves subject to ill treatment and every discomfort on their passage here, and at the end of their journey seized upon by professed friends, claiming legal right to take charge of them for their protection, who do not leave them until all their resources are exhausted, when they are abandoned in a strange land, surrounded by strangers, without employment and ignorant of the means of securing it. under the present system this is the fate of thousands annually, the exposures on shipboard and the treatment on landing driving thousands to lives of vice and shame who, with proper humane treatment, might become useful and respectable members of society. i do not advise national legislation in affairs that should be regulated by the states; but i see no subject more national in its character than provision for the safety and welfare of the thousands who leave foreign lands to become citizens of this republic. when their residence is chosen, they may then look to the laws of their locality for protection and guidance. the mass of immigrants arriving upon our shores, coming, as they do, on vessels under foreign flags, makes treaties with the nations furnishing these immigrants necessary for their complete protection. for more than two years efforts have been made on our part to secure such treaties, and there is now reasonable ground to hope for success. u.s. grant. washington, _may 14, 1872_. _to the senate of the united states:_ in answer to a resolution of the senate of the 28th of march last, i transmit herewith copies of the correspondence between the department of state and the consul of the united states at bucharest relative to the persecution and oppression of the israelites in the principality of roumania. u.s. grant. washington, _may 15, 1872_. _to the house of representatives:_ i transmit herewith, for the information of the house of representatives, the correspondence which has recently taken place respecting the differences of opinion which have arisen between this government and that of great britain with regard to the powers of the tribunal of arbitration created under the treaty signed at washington may 8, 1871, and which has led to certain negotiations, still pending, between the two governments. u.s. grant. washington, _may 17, 1872_. _to the senate of the united states:_ i herewith transmit to the senate a communication of this date from the acting secretary of the interior, and the papers therein described, containing information[65] called for in the senate resolution of the 23d ultimo, which was answered in part on the 8th [7th] instant. u.s. grant. [footnote 65: relating to acts of united states marshals and deputy marshals in that portion of the western district of arkansas comprising the indian country.] washington, _may 21, 1872_. _to the house of representatives:_ in answer to the resolution of the house of representatives of the 14th instant, requesting information in regard to the commerce between the united states and certain british colonial possessions, i transmit a report from the secretary of state and the documents by which it was accompanied. u.s. grant. washington, _may 22, 1872_. _to the house of representatives:_ in answer to a resolution of the house of representatives of the 20th instant, requesting me to join the italian government in a protest against the intolerant and cruel treatment of the jews in roumania, i transmit a report from the secretary of state relative to the subject. u.s. grant. washington, _may 22, 1872_. _to the senate of the united states:_ i transmit to the senate, for its consideration, an agreement between the great chief of the island of tutuila, one of the samoan group, in the south pacific, and commander r.w. meade, commanding the united states steamer _narragansett_, bearing date the 17th of february last. this instrument proposes to confer upon this government the exclusive privilege of establishing a naval station in the dominions of that chief for the equivalent of protecting those dominions. a copy of a letter of the 15th instant, and of its accompaniment, addressed by the secretary of the navy to the secretary of state, descriptive of tutuila and of other islands of the group, and of a letter in the nature of a protest from a person claiming to be consul of the north german confederation in that quarter, are also herewith transmitted. no report has yet been received from commander meade on the subject. although he was without special instructions or authority to enter into such agreement, the advantages of the concession which it proposes to make are so great, in view of the advantageous position of tutuila, especially as a coaling station for steamers between san francisco and australia, that i should not hesitate to recommend its approval but for the protection on the part of the united states which it seems to imply. with some modification of the obligation of protection which the agreement imports, it is recommended to the favorable consideration of the senate. u.s. grant. executive mansion, _may 23, 1872_. _to the senate of the united states:_ i have the honor to transmit herewith, in answer to the resolution of the senate of march 12, requesting to be informed of "the amount of money expended by the government of the united states during the last three years for telegraphing by ocean cables," reports from the different departments of the government, to which the resolution was referred. u.s. grant. executive mansion, _may 24, 1872_. _to the senate and house of representatives:_ in compliance with section 2 of the act approved july 11, 1870, entitled "an act making appropriations for the consular and diplomatic expenses of the government for the year ending june 30, 1871, and for other purposes," i have the honor to transmit herewith the report of d.b.r. keim, agent to examine consular affairs. u.s. grant. executive mansion, _may 28, 1872_. _to the house of representatives:_ in further answer to the resolution of the 14th instant of the house of representatives, wherein information in regard to commerce between the united states and certain british colonial possessions is requested, i transmit a report from the postmaster-general and the document by which it was accompanied. u.s. grant. washington, _may 28, 1872_. _to the house of representatives:_ in answer to the resolution of the house of representatives of the 7th instant, requesting copies of correspondence in regard to an extradition treaty with belgium, i transmit a report from the secretary of state and the documents by which it was accompanied. u.s. grant. executive mansion, _may 31, 1872_. _to the senate and house of representatives:_ i have the honor to respectfully call the attention of congress to an act approved july 14, 1870, directing the secretary of war to place at the disposal of the president certain bronze ordnance, to aid in the erection of an equestrian statue of the late general john a. rawlins, and to the facts that no appropriation of money to pay for the statue is made by the resolution and no artist is named or party designated to whom the ordnance is to be delivered. in view of the ambiguity of the statute, i would recommend that congress signify what action is desired as to the selection of the artist, and that the necessary sum required for the erection of the monument be appropriated. a board of officers should also be named to designate the location of the monument. u.s. grant. veto messages. executive mansion, _march 28, 1872_. _to the house of representatives:_ i herewith return, for the further consideration of congress, without my approval, house bill no. 1550, "an act for the relief of the estate of dr. john f. hanks," for the reason that the records of the treasury department show that the current moneys taken by colonel s.b. holabird from the louisiana state bank of new orleans in the month of august, 1862, were accounted for by that officer to the treasury department, and the names of the depositors given, and that the name of dr. john f. hanks does not appear among them. it also appears from the records of the treasury department that among the effects taken from the louisiana state bank of new orleans was the sum of $1,729 of confederate money, and that the said sum stood upon the books of said bank to the credit of j.f. hanks. it is but justice, however, to the executors of the estate of dr. hanks to state that there is every reason to believe that the money deposited by dr. hanks in the louisiana state bank was in current funds, and that when application was made to congress for the recovery of the same they believed, and had evidence to satisfy them, that such funds had found their way into the treasury of the united states. there has unquestionably been a mistake made, either by the officers of the louisiana state bank or the persons engaged in removing the funds of that bank, by which the estate of dr. hanks is loser to the amount of relief afforded by house bill no. 1550. accompanying this i send the statement furnished by the secretary of the treasury of the funds covered into his department, and accounted for through it, arising from the seizure of funds of the louisiana state bank of new orleans in the month of august, 1862. u.s. grant. executive mansion, _april 1, 1872_. _to the house of representatives:_ i return herewith, for the further consideration of congress, house bill no. 1867, "an act for the relief of james t. johnston," without my approval, for the reason that the records of the treasury department show that the lot sold in the name of j.t. johnston, situate on prince street, alexandria, va., for taxes due the united states, is numbered 162, instead of 163, as represented in this bill. with the exception of this discrepancy in the number of the lot there is no reason why the bill should not receive my approval. u.s. grant. washington, _april 10, 1872_. _to the house of representatives:_ i have received and taken into consideration the bill entitled "an act for the relief of the children of john m. baker, deceased," and, pursuant to the duty required of me by the constitution, i return the same with my objections to the house of representatives, in which it originated. the bill proposes to pay a sum of money to the children of john m. baker, deceased, late united states consul at rio janeiro, for services of that person as acting chargã© d'affaires of the united states in the year 1834. so far as it can be ascertained it is apprehended that the bill may have received the sanction of congress through some inadvertence, for upon inquiry at the proper department it appears that mr. baker never did act as chargã© d'affaires of the united states at rio janeiro, and that he was not authorized so to act, but, on the contrary, was expressly forbidden to enter into diplomatic correspondence with the government of brazil. the letter of the 8th of february, 1854, a copy of which is annexed, addressed by william l. marcy, then secretary of state, to james m. mason, chairman of the committee on foreign relations of the senate, specifies objections to the claim, which it is believed have not since diminished, and in which i fully concur. u.s. grant. executive mansion, _april 15, 1872_. _to the senate of the united states:_ i return without my approval an act entitled "an act granting a pension to abigail ryan, widow of thomas a. ryan." the name of mrs. ryan is now borne upon the pension rolls, pursuant to an act of congress entitled "an act for the relief of mrs. abigail ryan," approved june 15, 1866 (14 u.s. statutes at large, p. 590). u.s. grant. executive mansion, _april 22, 1872_. _to the house of representatives:_ i return herewith house resolution no. 622, entitled "an act granting a pension to richard b. crawford," without my approval, for the reason that said crawford is now drawing a pension as a private soldier, the wound on account of which he was pensioned having been received before his promotion to a lieutenancy. u.s. grant. executive mansion, _may 14, 1872_. _to the senate of the united states:_ i have the honor to return herewith the bill (s. 955) entitled "an act granting a pension to mary ann montgomery, widow of william w. montgomery, late captain in texas volunteers," without my approval, inasmuch as the concluding phrase, "and in respect to her minor children under 16 years of age," has obviously no meaning whatsoever. if it were the intention of the framer of the bill that the pension thereby granted should revert to said minor children upon the remarriage or death of the widow, the phrase referred to should read as follows: "and in the event of her remarriage or death, to her minor children under 16 years of age." i therefore return the bill for proper action. u.s. grant. washington, _june 1, 1872_. _to the senate of the united states:_ i have examined the bill entitled "an act for the relief of j. milton best," and, being unable to give it my approval, return the same to the senate, the house in which it originated, without my signature. the bill appropriates the sum of $25,000 to compensate dr. j. milton best for the destruction of his dwelling house and its contents by order of the commanding officer of the united states military forces at paducah, ky., on the 26th day of march, 1864. it appears that this house was one of a considerable number destroyed for the purpose of giving open range to the guns of a united states fort. on the day preceding the destruction the houses had been used as a cover for rebel troops attacking the fort, and, apprehending a renewal of the attack, the commanding officer caused the destruction of the houses. this, then, is a claim for compensation on account of the ravages of war. it can not be denied that the payment of this claim would invite the presentation of demands for very large sums of money; and such is the supposed magnitude of the claims that may be made against the government for necessary and unavoidable destruction of property by the army that i deem it proper to return this bill for reconsideration. it is a general principle of both international and municipal law that all property is held subject not only to be taken by the government for public uses, in which case, under the constitution of the united states, the owner is entitled to just compensation, but also subject to be temporarily occupied, or even actually destroyed, in times of great public danger, and when the public safety demands it; and in this latter case governments do not admit a legal obligation on their part to compensate the owner. the temporary occupation of, injuries to, and destruction of property caused by actual and necessary military operations are generally considered to fall within the last-mentioned principle. if a government makes compensation under such circumstances, it is a matter of bounty rather than of strict legal right. if it be deemed proper to make compensation for such losses, i suggest for the consideration of congress whether it would not be better, by general legislation, to provide some means for the ascertainment of the damage in all similar cases, and thus save to claimants the expense, inconvenience, and delay of attendance upon congress, and at the same time save the government from the danger of having imposed upon it fictitious or exaggerated claims supported wholly by _ex parte_ proof. if the claimant in this case ought to be paid, so ought all others similarly situated; and that there are many such can not be doubted. besides, there are strong reasons for believing that the amount of damage in this case has been greatly overestimated. if this be true, it furnishes an illustration of the danger of trusting entirely to _ex parte_ testimony in such matters. u.s. grant. executive mansion, _june 7, 1872_. _to the senate of the united states:_ i have the honor to return herewith senate bill no. 569, an act entitled "an act for the relief of thomas b. wallace, of lexington, in the state of missouri," without my approval. this claim, for which $11,250 are appropriated by this bill, is of the same nature and character as the claim of dr. j. milton best, which was returned to the senate on the 1st instant without my signature. the same reasons which prompted the return of that bill for reconsideration apply in this case, which also is a claim for compensation on account of the ravages of war, and comes under the same general principle of both international and municipal law, that all property is held subject not only to be taken by the government for public uses, in which case, under the constitution of the united states, the owner is entitled to just compensation, but also subject to be temporarily occupied, or even actually destroyed, in times of great public danger, and when the public safety demands it; and in the latter case governments do not admit a legal obligation on their part to compensate the owner. the temporary occupation of, injuries to, and destruction of property caused by actual and necessary military operations are generally considered to fall within the last-mentioned principle, and if a government makes compensation under such circumstances it is a matter of bounty rather than of strict legal right. if it be deemed proper to make compensation for such losses, i renew my recommendation that provision be made by general legislation for all similar cases. u.s. grant. proclamations. by the president of the united states of america. a proclamation. whereas satisfactory information has been received by me, through don mauricio lopez roberts, envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of his majesty the king of spain, that the government of that country has abolished discriminating duties heretofore imposed on merchandise imported from all other countries, excepting the islands of cuba and porto rico, into spain and the adjacent islands in vessels of the united states, said abolition to take effect from and after the 1st day of january next: now, therefore, i, ulysses s. grant, president of the united states of america, by virtue of the authority vested in me by an act of congress of the 7th day of january, 1824, and by an act in addition thereto of the 24th day of may, 1828, do hereby declare and proclaim that on and after the said 1st day of january next, so long as merchandise imported from any other country, excepting the islands of cuba and porto rico, into the ports of spain and the islands adjacent thereto in vessels belonging to citizens of the united states shall be exempt from discriminating duties, any such duties on merchandise imported into the united states in spanish vessels, excepting from the islands of cuba and porto rico, shall be discontinued and abolished. in testimony whereof i have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the united states to be affixed. [seal.] done at the city of washington, this 19th day of december, a.d. 1871, and of the independence of the united states of america the ninety-sixth. u.s. grant. by the president: hamilton fish, _secretary of state_. by the president of the united states of america. a proclamation. whereas, pursuant to the first section of the act of congress approved the 11th day of june, 1864, entitled "an act to provide for the execution of treaties between the united states and foreign nations respecting consular jurisdiction over the crews of vessels of such foreign nations in the waters and ports of the united states," it is provided that before that act shall take effect as to the ships and vessels of any particular nation having such treaty with the united states the president of the united states shall have been satisfied that similar provisions have been made for the execution of such treaty by the other contracting party and shall have issued his proclamation to that effect, declaring that act to be in force as to such nation; and whereas due inquiry having been made and a satisfactory answer having been received that similar provisions are in force in the united kingdoms of sweden and norway: now, therefore, be it known that i, ulysses s. grant, president of the united states of america, do hereby proclaim the same accordingly. [seal.] done at the city of washington, this 11th day of may, a.d. 1872, and of the independence of the united states of america the ninety-sixth. u.s. grant. by the president: hamilton fish, _secretary of state_. by the president of the united states of america. a proclamation. whereas the act of congress approved june 25, 1868, constituted, on and after that date, eight hours a day's work for all laborers, workmen, and mechanics employed by or on behalf of the government of the united states; and whereas on the 19th day of may, a.d. 1869, by executive proclamation it was directed that from and after that date no reduction should be made in the wages paid by the government by the day to such laborers, workmen, and mechanics on account of such reduction of the hours of labor; and whereas it is now represented to me that the act of congress and the proclamation aforesaid have not been strictly observed by all officers of the government having charge of such laborers, workmen, and mechanics: now, therefore, i, ulysses s. grant, president of the united states, do hereby again call attention to the act of congress aforesaid, and direct all officers of the executive department of the government having charge of the employment and payment of laborers, workmen, or mechanics employed by or on behalf of the government of the united states to make no reduction in the wages paid by the government by the day to such laborers, workmen, and mechanics on account of the reduction of the hours of labor. in testimony whereof i have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the united states to be affixed. [seal.] done at the city of washington, this 11th day of may, a.d. 1872, and of the independence of the united states the ninety-sixth. u.s. grant. by the president: hamilton fish, _secretary of state_. by the president of the united states of america. a proclamation. whereas the act of congress approved may 22, 1872, removes all political disabilities imposed by the third section of the fourteenth article of amendments to the constitution of the united states from all persons whomsoever except senators and representatives of the thirty-sixth and thirty-seventh congresses and officers in the judicial, military, and naval service of the united states, heads of departments, and foreign ministers of the united states; and whereas it is represented to me that there are now pending in the several circuit and district courts of the united states proceedings by _quo warranto_ under the fourteenth section of the act of congress approved may 31, 1870, to remove from office certain persons who are alleged to hold said offices in violation of the provisions of said article of amendment to the constitution of the united states, and also penal prosecutions against such persons under the fifteenth section of the act of congress aforesaid: now, therefore, i, ulysses s. grant, president of the united states, do hereby direct all district attorneys having charge of such proceedings and prosecutions to dismiss and discontinue the same, except as to persons who may be embraced in the exceptions named in the act of congress first above cited. in testimony whereof i have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the united states to be affixed. [seal.] done at the city of washington, this 1st day of june, a.d. 1872, and of the independence of the united states of america the ninety-sixth. u.s. grant. by the president: hamilton fish, _secretary of state_. by the president of the united states of america. a proclamation. whereas satisfactory information has been received by me from his majesty the emperor of japan, through an official communication of mr. arinori mori, his majesty's chargã© d'affaires, under date of the 2d instant, that no other or higher duties of tonnage or impost are imposed or levied in the ports of the empire of japan upon vessels wholly belonging to citizens of the united states or upon the produce, manufactures, or merchandise imported in the same from the united states or from any foreign country than are levied on japanese ships and their cargoes in the same ports under like circumstances: now, therefore, i, ulysses s. grant, president of the united states of america, by virtue of the authority vested in me by an act of congress of the 24th day of may, 1828, do hereby declare and proclaim that from and after the said 2d instant, so long as vessels of the united states and their cargoes shall be exempt from discriminating duties as aforesaid, any such duties on japanese vessels entering the ports of the united states, or on the produce, manufactures, or merchandise imported in such vessels, shall be discontinued and abolished. in testimony whereof i have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the united states to be affixed. [seal.] done at the city of washington, the 4th day of september, a.d. 1872, and of the independence of the united states the ninety-seventh. u.s. grant. by the president: charles hale, _acting secretary of state_. by the president of the united states of america. a proclamation. whereas the revolution of another year has again brought the time when it is usual to look back upon the past and publicly to thank the almighty for his mercies and his blessings; and whereas if any one people has more occasion than another for such thankfulness it is the citizens of the united states, whose government is their creature, subject to their behests; who have reserved to themselves ample civil and religious freedom and equality before the law; who during the last twelvemonth have enjoyed exemption from any grievous or general calamity, and to whom prosperity in agriculture, manufactures, and commerce has been vouchsafed: now, therefore, by these considerations, i recommend that on thursday, the 28th day of november next, the people meet in their respective places of worship and there make their acknowledgments to god for his kindness and bounty. in witness whereof i have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the united states to be affixed. [seal.] done at the city of washington, this 11th day of october, a.d. 1872, and of the independence of the united states the ninety-seventh. u.s. grant. by the president: hamilton fish, _secretary of state_. by the president of the united states of america. a proclamation. whereas upon information received by me from his majesty the emperor of the french that discriminating duties before the date of said information levied in french ports upon merchandise imported from the countries of its origin in vessels of the united states were discontinued and abolished, and in pursuance of the provisions of an act of congress of the 7th of january, 1824, and of an act in addition thereto of the 24th of may, 1828, i did, on the 12th day of june, 1869, issue my proclamation[66] declaring that the discriminating duties before that date levied upon merchandise imported from the countries of its origin into ports of the united states in french vessels were thereby discontinued and abolished; and whereas upon information subsequently received by me that the levying of such duties on all merchandise imported into france in vessels of the united states, whether from the country of its origin or from other countries, had been discontinued, i did, on the 20th of november, 1869, in pursuance of the provisions of the said acts of congress and by the authority in me vested thereby, issue my proclamation[67] declaring that the discriminating duties before that date levied upon merchandise imported into the united states in french vessels, either from the countries of its origin or from any other country, were thereby discontinued and abolished; and whereas by the provisions of the said acts of congress of january 7, 1824, and of the 24th of may, 1828, as well as by the terms of the said proclamations of the 12th of june, 1869, and of the 20th of november, 1869, the said suspension of discriminating duties upon merchandise imported into the united states in french vessels was granted by the united states on condition that, and to continue so long as, merchandise imported into france in vessels of the united states should be admitted into the ports of france on the same terms of exemption from the payment of such discriminating duties; and whereas information has been received by me that by a law of the french republic passed on the 30th of january, 1872, and published on the 3d of february, 1872, merchandise imported into france in vessels of the united states from countries other than the united states is (with the exception of certain articles enumerated in said law) subjected to discriminating duties; and whereas by the operation of said law of the french republic of the 30th of january, 1872, the exemption of french vessels and their cargoes granted by the terms of the said proclamations of the 12th of june, 1869, and of the 20th of november, 1869, in accordance with the provisions of the acts of congress aforesaid, has ceased to be reciprocal on the part of france toward vessels owned by citizens of the united states and their cargoes: now, therefore, i, ulysses s. grant, president of the united states of america, by virtue of the authority vested in me by an act of congress of the 7th day of january, 1824, and by an act in addition thereto of the 24th day of may, 1828, do hereby declare and proclaim that on and after this date the said suspension of the collection of discriminating duties upon merchandise imported into the united states in french vessels from countries other than france, provided for by my said proclamations of the 12th day of june, 1869, and the 20th day of november, 1869, shall cease and determine, and all the provisions of the acts imposing discriminating foreign tonnage and import duties in the united states are hereby revived, and shall henceforth be and remain in full force as relates to goods and merchandise imported into the united states in french vessels from countries other than france, so long as any discriminating duties shall continue to be imposed by france upon goods and merchandise imported into france in vessels of the united states from countries other than the united states. in testimony whereof i have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the united states to be affixed. [seal.] done at the city of washington, this 30th day of october, a.d. 1872, and of the independence of the united states the ninety-seventh. u.s. grant. by the president: hamilton fish, _secretary of state_. [footnote 66: see pp. 15-16.] [footnote 67: see p. 19.] executive orders washington, _april 16, 1872_. the advisory board of the civil service, having completed the grouping contemplated by the rules already adopted, have recommended certain provisions for carrying the rules into effect. the recommendations as herewith published are approved, and the provisions will be enforced as rapidly as the proper arrangements can be made; and the thirteenth of the rules adopted on the 19th day of december last is amended to read as published herewith. the utmost fidelity and diligence will be expected of all officers in every branch of the public service. political assessments, as they are called, have been forbidden within the various departments; and while the right of all persons in official position to take part in politics is acknowledged, and the elective franchise is recognized as a high trust to be discharged by all entitled to its exercise, whether in the employment of the government or in private life, honesty and efficiency, not political activity, will determine the tenure of office. u.s. grant. by the president: hamilton fish, _secretary of state_. [for rules for the civil service promulgated by the president december 19, 1871, see pp. 157-159.] [rule 13, as amended.] 13. from these rules are excepted the heads of departments, assistant secretaries of departments, assistant attorneys-general, assistant postmasters-general, solicitor-general, solicitor of the treasury, naval solicitor, solicitor of internal revenue, examiner of claims in the state department, treasurer of the united states, register of the treasury, first and second comptrollers of the treasury, other heads of bureaus in the several departments, judges of the united states courts, district attorneys, private secretary of the president, ambassadors and other public ministers, superintendent of the coast survey, director of the mint, governors of territories, special commissioners, special counsel, visiting and examining boards, persons appointed to positions without compensation for services, dispatch agents, and bearers of dispatches. regulations and classification. 1. no person will be appointed to any position in the civil service who shall not have furnished satisfactory evidence of his fidelity to the union and the constitution of the united states. 2. the evidence in regard to character, health, age, and knowledge of the english language required by the first rule shall be furnished in writing, and if such evidence shall be satisfactory to the head of the department in which the appointment is to be made the applicant shall be notified when and where to appear for examination; but when the applicants are so numerous that the examination of all whose preliminary papers are satisfactory is plainly impracticable, the head of the department shall select for examination a practicable number of those who are apparently best qualified. 3. examinations to fill vacancies in any of the executive departments in washington shall be held not only at the city of washington, but also, when directed by the head of the department in which the vacancy may exist, in the several states, either at the capital or other convenient place. 4. the appointment of persons to be employed exclusively in the secret service of the government, also of persons to be employed as translators, stenographers, or private secretaries, or to be designated for secret service, to fill vacancies in clerkships in either of the executive departments at washington, may be excepted from the operation of the rules. 5. when a vacancy occurs in a consular office of which the lawful annual compensation is $3,000 or more, it will be filled, at the discretion of the president, either by the transfer of some person already in the service or by a new appointment, which may be excepted from the operation of the rules. but if the vacancy occur in an office of which the lawful annual compensation, by salary or by fees ascertained by the last official returns, is more than $1,000 and less than $3,000, and it is not filled by transfer, applications will be addressed to the secretary of state, inclosing proper certificates of character, responsibility, and capacity, and the secretary will notify the applicant who upon investigation appears to be most suitable and competent to attend for examination; and if he shall be found qualified he will be nominated for confirmation, but if not found qualified, or if his nomination be not confirmed by the senate, the secretary will proceed in like manner with the other applicants who appear to him to be qualified. if, however, no applicants under this regulation shall be found suitable and qualified, the vacancy will be filled at discretion. the appointment of commercial agents and of consuls whose annual compensation is $1,000 or less (if derived from fees, the amount to be ascertained by the last official returns), of vice-consuls, deputy consuls, and of consular agents and other officers who are appointed upon the nomination of the principal officer, and for whom he is responsible upon his official bond, may be, until otherwise ordered, excepted from the operation of the rules. 6. when a vacancy occurs in the office of collector of the customs, naval officer, appraiser, or surveyor of the customs in the customs districts of new york, boston and charlestown, baltimore, san francisco, new orleans, philadelphia, vermont (burlington), oswego, niagara, buffalo creek, champlain, portland and falmouth, corpus christi, oswegatchie, mobile, brazos de santiago (brownsville), texas (galveston, etc.), savannah, charleston, chicago, or detroit, the secretary of the treasury shall ascertain if any of the subordinates in the customs districts in which such vacancy occurs are suitable persons qualified to discharge efficiently the duties of the office to be filled; and if such persons be found he shall certify to the president the name or names of those subordinates, not exceeding three, who in his judgment are best qualified for the position, from which the president will make the nomination to fill the vacancy; but if no such subordinate be found qualified, or if the nomination be not confirmed, the nomination will be made at the discretion of the president. vacancies occurring in such positions in the customs service in the said districts as are included in the subjoined classification will be filled in accordance with the rules. appointments to all other positions in the customs service in said districts may be, until otherwise ordered, excepted from the operation of the rules. 7. when a vacancy occurs in the office of collector, appraiser, surveyor, or other chief officer in any customs district not specified in the preceding regulation, applications in writing from any subordinate or subordinates in the customs service of the district, or from other person or persons residing within the said district, may be addressed to the secretary of the treasury, inclosing proper certificates of character, responsibility, and capacity; and if any of the subordinates so applying shall be found suitable and qualified, the name or names, not exceeding three, of the best qualified shall be certified by the board of examiners to the secretary, and from this list the nomination or appointment will be made; but if no such subordinate be found qualified, the said board shall certify to the secretary the name or names, not exceeding three, of the best qualified among the other applicants, and from this list the nomination or appointment will be made. if, however, no applicants under this regulation shall be found suitable and qualified, the vacancy will be filled at discretion. appointments to all other positions in the customs service in said districts may be, until otherwise ordered, excepted from the operation of the rules. 8. when a vacancy occurs in the office of postmaster in cities having, according to the census of 1870, a population of 20,000 or more, the postmaster-general shall ascertain if any of the subordinates in such office are suitable persons qualified to discharge efficiently the duties of postmaster, and if such are found he shall certify to the president the name or names of those subordinates, not exceeding three in number, who in his judgment are best qualified for the position, from which list the president will make the nomination to fill the vacancy; but if no such subordinate be found so qualified, or if the nomination be not confirmed by the senate, the nomination will be made at the discretion of the president. vacancies occurring in such positions in the said post-office as are included in the subjoined classification will be filled in accordance with the rules. appointments to all other positions in the said post-offices may be, until otherwise ordered, excepted from the operation of the rules. 9. when a vacancy occurs in the office of postmaster of a class not otherwise provided for, applications for the position from any subordinate or subordinates in the office, or from other persons residing within the delivery of the office, may be addressed to the postmaster-general, inclosing proper certificates of character, responsibility, and capacity; and if any of the subordinates so applying shall be found suitable and qualified, the name or names of the best qualified, not exceeding three, shall be certified by the board of examiners to the postmaster-general, and from them the nomination or appointment shall be made; but if no subordinate be found qualified, the said board shall certify to the postmaster-general the name or names, not exceeding three, of the best qualified among the other applicants, and from them the nomination or appointment shall be made. if, however, no applicants under this regulation shall be found suitable and qualified, the vacancy will be filled at discretion. appointments to all other positions in the said post-offices may be, until otherwise ordered, excepted from the operation of the rules. 10. special agents of the post-office department shall be appointed by the postmaster-general at discretion from persons already in the postal service, and who shall have served therein for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the appointment; but if no person within the service shall, in the judgment of the postmaster-general, be suitable and qualified, the appointment shall be made from all applicants under the rules. 11. mail-route messengers shall be appointed in the manner provided for the appointment of postmasters whose annual salary is less than $200. 12. when a vacancy occurs in the office of register or receiver of the land office, or of pension agent, applications in writing from residents in the district in which the vacancy occurs may be addressed to the secretary of the interior, inclosing proper certificates of character, responsibility, and capacity; and if any of the applicants shall be found suitable and qualified, the name or names, not exceeding three, of the best qualified shall be certified by the board of examiners to the secretary, and from this list the nomination will be made. if, however, no applicants under this regulation shall be found suitable and qualified, the nomination will be made at discretion. 13. when a vacancy occurs in the office of united states marshal, applications in writing from residents in the district in which the vacancy occurs may be addressed to the attorney-general of the united states, inclosing proper certificates of character, responsibility, and capacity; and if any of the applicants shall be found suitable and qualified, the name or names, not exceeding three, of the best qualified shall be certified by the board of examiners to the attorney-general, and from this list the nomination will be made. if, however, no applicants under this regulation shall be found suitable and qualified, the nomination will be made at discretion. 14. appointments to fill vacancies occurring in offices in the several territories, excepting those of judges of the united states courts, indian agents, and superintendents, will be made from suitable and qualified persons domiciled in the territory in which the vacancy occurs, if any such are found. 15. it shall be the duty of the examining board in each of the departments to report to the advisory board such modifications in the rules and regulations as in the judgment of such examining board are required for appointments to certain positions to which, by reason of distance, or of difficult access, or of other sufficient cause, the rules and regulations can not be applied with advantage; and if the reason for such modifications shall be satisfactory to the advisory board, said board will recommend them for approval. 16. nothing in these rules and regulations shall prevent the reappointment at discretion of the incumbents of any office the term of which is fixed by law, and when such reappointment is made no vacancy within the meaning of the rules shall be deemed to have occurred. 17. appointments to all positions in the civil service not included in the subjoined classification, nor otherwise specially provided for by the rules and regulations, may, until otherwise ordered, be excepted from the operation of the rules. executive mansion, _washington, d.c., may 27, 1872_. sir:[68] the president directs me to say that the several departments of the government will be closed on the 30th instant, in order to enable the employees of the government to participate, in connection with the grand army of the republic, in the decoration of the graves of the soldiers who fell during the rebellion. i am, sir, your obedient servant, horace porter, _secretary_. [footnote 68: addressed to the heads of the executive departments, etc.] department of state, _washington, october 11, 1872_. the undersigned is charged by the president with the painful duty of announcing to the people of the united states the death of an illustrious citizen. william henry seward, distinguished for faithful and eminent service in varied public trusts during a long series of years, died at auburn, in the state of new york, yesterday, october 10. charged with the administration of the department of state at a most critical period in the history of the nation, mr. seward brought to the duties of that office exalted patriotism, unwearied industry, and consummate ability. a grateful nation will cherish his name, his fame, and his memory. the several executive departments will cause appropriate honors to be rendered to the memory of the deceased statesman at home and abroad. hamilton fish, _secretary of state_. fourth annual message. executive mansion, _december 2, 1872_. _to the senate and house of representatives_: in transmitting to you this my fourth annual message it is with thankfulness to the giver of all good that as a nation we have been blessed for the past year with peace at home, peace abroad, and a general prosperity vouchsafed to but few peoples. with the exception of the recent devastating fire which swept from the earth with a breath, as it were, millions of accumulated wealth in the city of boston, there has been no overshadowing calamity within the year to record. it is gratifying to note how, like their fellow-citizens of the city of chicago under similar circumstances a year earlier, the citizens of boston are rallying under their misfortunes, and the prospect that their energy and perseverance will overcome all obstacles and show the same prosperity soon that they would had no disaster befallen them. otherwise we have been free from pestilence, war, and calamities, which often overtake nations; and, as far as human judgment can penetrate the future, no cause seems to exist to threaten our present peace. when congress adjourned in june last, a question had been raised by great britain, and was then pending, which for a time seriously imperiled the settlement by friendly arbitration of the grave differences between this government and that of her britannic majesty, which by the treaty of washington had been referred to the tribunal of arbitration which had met at geneva, in switzerland. the arbitrators, however, disposed of the question which had jeoparded the whole of the treaty and threatened to involve the two nations in most unhappy relations toward each other in a manner entirely satisfactory to this government and in accordance with the views and the policy which it had maintained. the tribunal, which had convened at geneva in december, concluded its laborious session on the 14th day of september last, on which day, having availed itself of the discretionary power given to it by the treaty to award a sum in gross, it made its decision, whereby it awarded the sum of $15,500,000 in gold as the indemnity to be paid by great britain to the united states for the satisfaction of all the claims referred to its consideration. this decision happily disposes of a long-standing difference between the two governments, and, in connection with another award, made by the german emperor under a reference to him by the same treaty, leaves these two governments without a shadow upon the friendly relations which it is my sincere hope may forever remain equally unclouded. the report of the agent of the united states appointed to attend the geneva tribunal, accompanied by the protocols of the proceedings of the arbitrators, the arguments of the counsel of both governments, the award of the tribunal, and the opinions given by the several arbitrators, is transmitted herewith. i have caused to be communicated to the heads of the three friendly powers who complied with the joint request made to them under the treaty the thanks of this government for the appointment of arbitrators made by them respectively, and also my thanks to the eminent personages named by them, and my appreciation of the dignity, patience, impartiality, and great ability with which they discharged their arduous and high functions. her majesty's government has communicated to me the appreciation by her majesty of the ability and indefatigable industry displayed by mr. adams, the arbitrator named on the part of this government during the protracted inquiries and discussions of the tribunal. i cordially unite with her majesty in this appreciation. it is due to the agent of the united states before the tribunal to record my high appreciation of the marked ability, unwearied patience, and the prudence and discretion with which he has conducted the very responsible and delicate duties committed to him, as it is also due to the learned and eminent counsel who attended the tribunal on the part of this government to express my sense of the talents and wisdom which they brought to bear in the attainment of the result so happily reached. it will be the province of congress to provide for the distribution among those who may be entitled to it of their respective shares of the money to be paid. although the sum awarded is not payable until a year from the date of the award, it is deemed advisable that no time be lost in making a proper examination of the several cases in which indemnification may be due. i consequently recommend the creation of a board of commissioners for the purpose. by the thirty-fourth article of the treaty of washington the respective claims of the united states and of great britain in their construction of the treaty of the 15th of june, 1846, defining the boundary line between their respective territories, were submitted to the arbitration and award of his majesty the emperor of germany, to decide which of those claims is most in accordance with the true interpretation of the treaty of 1846. his majesty the emperor of germany, having been pleased to undertake the arbitration, has the earnest thanks of this government and of the people of the united states for the labor, pains, and care which he has devoted to the consideration of this long-pending difference. i have caused an expression of my thanks to be communicated to his majesty. mr. bancroft, the representative of this government at berlin, conducted the case and prepared the statement on the part of the united states with the ability that his past services justified the public in expecting at his hands. as a member of the cabinet at the date of the treaty which has given rise to the discussion between the two governments, as the minister to great britain when the construction now pronounced unfounded was first advanced, and as the agent and representative of the government to present the case and to receive the award, he has been associated with the question in all of its phases, and in every stage has manifested a patriotic zeal and earnestness in maintenance of the claim of the united states. he is entitled to much credit for the success which has attended the submission. after a patient investigation of the case and of the statements of each party, his majesty the emperor, on the 21st day of october last, signed his award in writing, decreeing that the claim of the government of the united states, that the boundary line between the territories of her britannic majesty and the united states should be drawn through the haro channel, is most in accordance with the true interpretation of the treaty concluded on the 15th of june, 1846, between the governments of her britannic majesty and of the united states. copies of the "case" presented on behalf of each government, and of the "statement in reply" of each, and a translation of the award, are transmitted herewith. this award confirms the united states in their claim to the important archipelago of islands lying between the continent and vancouvers island, which for more than twenty-six years (ever since the ratification of the treaty) great britain has contested, and leaves us, for the first time in the history of the united states as a nation, without a question of disputed boundary between our territory and the possessions of great britain on this continent. it is my grateful duty to acknowledge the prompt, spontaneous action of her majesty's government in giving effect to the award. in anticipation of any request from this government, and before the reception in the united states of the award signed by the emperor, her majesty had given instructions for the removal of her troops which had been stationed there and for the cessation of all exercise or claim of jurisdiction, so as to leave the united states in the exclusive possession of the lately disputed territory. i am gratified to be able to announce that the orders for the removal of the troops have been executed, and that the military joint occupation of san juan has ceased. the islands are now in the exclusive possession of the united states. it now becomes necessary to complete the survey and determination of that portion of the boundary line (through the haro channel) upon which the commission which determined the remaining part of the line were unable to agree. i recommend the appointment of a commission to act jointly with one which may be named by her majesty for that purpose. experience of the difficulties attending the determination of our admitted line of boundary, after the occupation of the territory and its settlement by those owing allegiance to the respective governments, points to the importance of establishing, by natural objects or other monuments, the actual line between the territory acquired by purchase from russia and the adjoining possessions of her britannic majesty. the region is now so sparsely occupied that no conflicting interests of individuals or of jurisdiction are likely to interfere to the delay or embarrassment of the actual location of the line. if deferred until population shall enter and occupy the territory, some trivial contest of neighbors may again array the two governments in antagonism. i therefore recommend the appointment of a commission, to act jointly with one that may be appointed on the part of great britain, to determine the line between our territory of alaska and the conterminous possessions of great britain. in my last annual message i recommended the legislation necessary on the part of the united states to bring into operation the articles of the treaty of washington of may 8, 1871, relating to the fisheries and to other matters touching the relations of the united states toward the british north american possessions, to become operative so soon as the proper legislation should be had on the part of great britain and its possessions. that legislation on the part of great britain and its possessions had not then been had, and during the session of congress a question was raised which for the time raised a doubt whether any action by congress in the direction indicated would become important. this question has since been disposed of, and i have received notice that the imperial parliament and the legislatures of the provincial governments have passed laws to carry the provisions of the treaty on the matters referred to into operation. i therefore recommend your early adoption of the legislation in the same direction necessary on the part of this government. the joint commission for determining the boundary line between the united states and the british possessions between the lake of the woods and the rocky mountains has organized and entered upon its work. it is desirable that the force be increased, in order that the completion of the survey and determination of the line may be the sooner attained. to this end i recommend that a sufficient appropriation be made. with france, our earliest ally; russia, the constant and steady friend of the united states; germany, with whose government and people we have so many causes of friendship and so many common sympathies, and the other powers of europe, our relations are maintained on the most friendly terms. since my last annual message the exchange has been made of the ratifications of a treaty with the austro-hungarian empire relating to naturalization; also of a treaty with the german empire respecting consuls and trade-marks; also of a treaty with sweden and norway relating to naturalization; all of which treaties have been duly proclaimed. congress at its last session having made an appropriation to defray the expense of commissioners on the part of the united states to the international statistical congress at st. petersburg, the persons appointed in that character proceeded to their destination and attended the sessions of the congress. their report shall in due season be laid before you. this congress meets at intervals of about three years, and has held its sessions in several of the countries of europe. i submit to your consideration the propriety of extending an invitation to the congress to hold its next meeting in the united states. the centennial celebration to be held in 1876 would afford an appropriate occasion for such meeting. preparations are making for the international exposition to be held during the next year in vienna, on a scale of very great magnitude. the tendency of these expositions is in the direction of advanced civilization, and of the elevation of industry and of labor, and of the increase of human happiness, as well as of greater intercourse and good will between nations. as this exposition is to be the first which will have been held in eastern europe, it is believed that american inventors and manufacturers will be ready to avail themselves of the opportunity for the presentation of their productions if encouraged by proper aid and protection. at the last session of congress authority was given for the appointment of one or more agents to represent this government at the exposition. the authority thus given has been exercised, but, in the absence of any appropriation, there is danger that the important benefits which the occasion offers will in a large degree be lost to citizens of the united states. i commend the subject strongly to your consideration, and recommend that an adequate appropriation be made for the purpose. to further aid american exhibitors at the vienna exposition, i would recommend, in addition to an appropriation of money, that the secretary of the navy be authorized to fit up two naval vessels to transport between our atlantic cities and trieste, or the most convenient port to vienna, and back, their articles for exhibition. since your last session the president of the mexican republic, distinguished by his high character and by his services to his country, has died. his temporary successor has now been elected with great unanimity by the people--a proof of confidence on their part in his patriotism and wisdom which it is believed will be confirmed by the results of his administration. it is particularly desirable that nothing should be left undone by the government of either republic to strengthen their relations as neighbors and friends. it is much to be regretted that many lawless acts continue to disturb the quiet of the settlements on the border between our territory and that of mexico, and that complaints of wrongs to american citizens in various parts of the country are made. the revolutionary condition in which the neighboring republic has so long been involved has in some degree contributed to this disturbance. it is to be hoped that with a more settled rule of order through the republic, which may be expected from the present government, the acts of which just complaint is made will cease. the proceedings of the commission under the convention with mexico of the 4th of july, 1868, on the subject of claims, have, unfortunately, been checked by an obstacle, for the removal of which measures have been taken by the two governments which it is believed will prove successful. the commissioners appointed, pursuant to the joint resolution of congress of the 7th of may last, to inquire into depredations on the texan frontier have diligently made investigations in that quarter. their report upon the subject will be communicated to you. their researches were necessarily incomplete, partly on account of the limited appropriation made by congress. mexico, on the part of that government, has appointed a similar commission to investigate these outrages. it is not announced officially, but the press of that country states that the fullest investigation is desired, and that the cooperation of all parties concerned is invited to secure that end. i therefore recommend that a special appropriation be made at the earliest day practicable, to enable the commissioners on the part of the united states to return to their labors without delay. it is with regret that i have again to announce a continuance of the disturbed condition of the island of cuba. no advance toward the pacification of the discontented part of the population has been made. while the insurrection has gained no advantages and exhibits no more of the elements of power or of the prospects of ultimate success than were exhibited a year ago, spain, on the other hand, has not succeeded in its repression, and the parties stand apparently in the same relative attitude which they have occupied for a long time past. this contest has lasted now for more than four years. were its scene at a distance from our neighborhood, we might be indifferent to its result, although humanity could not be unmoved by many of its incidents wherever they might occur. it is, however, at our door. i can not doubt that the continued maintenance of slavery in cuba is among the strongest inducements to the continuance of this strife. a terrible wrong is the natural cause of a terrible evil. the abolition of slavery and the introduction of other reforms in the administration of government in cuba could not fail to advance the restoration of peace and order. it is greatly to be hoped that the present liberal government of spain will voluntarily adopt this view. the law of emancipation, which was passed more than two years since, has remained unexecuted in the absence of regulations for its enforcement. it was but a feeble step toward emancipation, but it was the recognition of right, and was hailed as such, and exhibited spain in harmony with sentiments of humanity and of justice and in sympathy with the other powers of the christian and civilized world. within the past few weeks the regulations for carrying out the law of emancipation have been announced, giving evidence of the sincerity of intention of the present government to carry into effect the law of 1870. i have not failed to urge the consideration of the wisdom, the policy, and the justice of a more effective system for the abolition of the great evil which oppresses a race and continues a bloody and destructive contest close to our border, as well as the expediency and the justice of conceding reforms of which the propriety is not questioned. deeply impressed with the conviction that the continuance of slavery is one of the most active causes of the continuance of the unhappy condition in cuba, i regret to believe that citizens of the united states, or those claiming to be such, are large holders in cuba of what is there claimed as property, but which is forbidden and denounced by the laws of the united states. they are thus, in defiance of the spirit of our own laws, contributing to the continuance of this distressing and sickening contest. in my last annual message i referred to this subject, and i again recommend such legislation as may be proper to denounce, and, if not prevent, at least to discourage american citizens from holding or dealing in slaves. it is gratifying to announce that the ratifications of the convention concluded under the auspices of this government between spain on the one part and the allied republics of the pacific on the other, providing for an armistice, have been exchanged. a copy of the instrument is herewith submitted. it is hoped that this may be followed by a permanent peace between the same parties. the differences which at one time threatened the maintenance of peace between brazil and the argentine republic it is hoped are in the way of satisfactory adjustment. with these states, as with the republics of central and of south america, we continue to maintain the most friendly relations. it is with regret, however, i announce that the government of venezuela has made no further payments on account of the awards under the convention of the 25th of april, 1866. that republic is understood to be now almost, if not quite, tranquilized. it is hoped, therefore, that it will lose no time in providing for the unpaid balance of its debt to the united states, which, having originated in injuries to our citizens by venezuelan authorities, and having been acknowledged, pursuant to a treaty, in the most solemn form known among nations, would seem to deserve a preference over debts of a different origin and contracted in a different manner. this subject is again recommended to the attention of congress for such action as may be deemed proper. our treaty relations with japan remain unchanged. an imposing embassy from that interesting and progressive nation visited this country during the year that is passing, but, being unprovided with powers for the signing of a convention in this country, no conclusion in that direction was reached. it is hoped, however, that the interchange of opinions which took place during their stay in this country has led to a mutual appreciation of the interests which may be promoted when the revision of the existing treaty shall be undertaken. in this connection i renew my recommendation of one year ago, that- to give importance to and to add to the efficiency of our diplomatic relations with japan and china, and to further aid in retaining the good opinion of those peoples, and to secure to the united states its share of the commerce destined to flow between those nations and the balance of the commercial world, an appropriation be made to support at least four american youths in each of those countries, to serve as a part of the official family of our ministers there. our representatives would not even then be placed upon an equality with the representatives of great britain and of some other powers. as now situated, our representatives in japan and china have to depend for interpreters and translators upon natives of those countries, who know our language imperfectly, or procure for the occasion the services of employees in foreign business houses or the interpreters to other foreign ministers. i renew the recommendation made on a previous occasion, of the transfer to the department of the interior, to which they seem more appropriately to belong, of all the powers and duties in relation to the territories with which the department of state is now charged by law or by custom. congress from the beginning of the government has wisely made provision for the relief of distressed seamen in foreign countries. no similar provision, however, has hitherto been made for the relief of citizens in distress abroad other than seamen. it is understood to be customary with other governments to authorize consuls to extend such relief to their citizens or subjects in certain cases. a similar authority and an appropriation to carry it into effect are recommended in the case of citizens of the united states destitute or sick under such circumstances. it is well known that such citizens resort to foreign countries in great numbers. though most of them are able to bear the expenses incident to locomotion, there are some who, through accident or otherwise, become penniless, and have no friends at home able to succor them. persons in this situation must either perish, cast themselves upon the charity of foreigners, or be relieved at the private charge of our own officers, who usually, even with the most benevolent dispositions, have nothing to spare for such purposes. should the authority and appropriation asked for be granted, care will be taken so to carry the beneficence of congress into effect that it shall not be unnecessarily or unworthily bestowed. treasury. the moneys received and covered into the treasury during the fiscal year ended june 30, 1872, were: from customs $216,370,286.77 from sales of public lands 2,575,714.19 from internal revenue 130,642,177.72 from tax on national-bank circulation, etc. 6,523,396.39 from pacific railway companies 749,861.87 from customs fines, etc. 1,136,442.34 from fees--consular, patent, land, etc. 2,284,095.92 from miscellaneous sources 4,412,254.71 ______________ total ordinary receipts 374,694,229.91 from premium on sales of coin 9,412,637.65 ______________ total net receipts 374,106,867.56 balance in treasury june 30, 1871 (including $18,228.35 received from "unavailable") 109,935,705.59 ______________ total available cash 484,042,573.15 the net expenditures by warrants during the same period were: for civil expenses $16,187,059.20 for foreign intercourse 1,859,369.14 for indians 7,061,728.82 for pensions 28,533,402.76 for military establishment, including fortifications, river and harbor improvements, and arsenals 35,372,157.20 for naval establishment, including vessels and machinery and improvements at navy-yards 21,249,809.99 for miscellaneous civil, including public buildings, light-houses, and collecting the revenue 42,958,329.08 for interest on the public debt 117,357,839.72 ______________ total, exclusive of principal and premium on the public debt 270,559,695.91 for premium on bonds purchased $6,958,266.76 for redemption of the public debt 99,960,253.54 _____________ 106,918,520.30 ______________ total net disbursements 377,478,216.21 balance in treasury june 30, 1872 106,564,356.94 ______________ total 484,042,573.15 from the foregoing statement it appears that the net reduction of the principal of the debt during the fiscal year ending june 30, 1872, was $99,960,253.54. the source of this reduction is as follows: net ordinary receipts during the year $364,694,229.91 net ordinary expenditures, including interest on the public debt 270,559,695.91 ______________ leaving surplus revenue 94,134,534.00 add amount received from premium on sales of gold, in excess of the premium paid on bonds purchased 2,454,370.89 add the amount of the reduction of the cash balance at the close of the year, accompanied with same at commencement of the year 3,371,348.65 ______________ total 99,960,253.54 this statement treats solely of the principal of the public debt. by the monthly statement of the public debt, which adds together the principal, interest due and unpaid, and interest accrued to date, not due, and deducts the cash in the treasury as ascertained on the day of publication, the reduction was $100,544,491.28. the source of this reduction is as follows: reduction in principal account $99,960,003.54 reduction in unpaid-interest account 3,330,952.96 ______________ 103,290,956.50 reduction in cash on hand 2,746,465.22 ______________ 100,544,491.28 on the basis of the last table the statements show a reduction of the public debt from the 1st of march, 1869, to the present time as follows: from march 1, 1869, to march 1, 1870 $87,134,782.84 from march 1, 1870, to march 1, 1871 117,619,630.25 from march 1, 1871, to march 1, 1872 94,895,348.94 from march 1, 1872, to november 1, 1872 (eight months) 64,047,237.84 total 363,696,999.87 with the great reduction of taxation by the acts of congress at its last session, the expenditure of the government in collecting the revenue will be much reduced for the next fiscal year. it is very doubtful, however, whether any further reduction of so vexatious a burden upon any people will be practicable for the present. at all events, as a measure of justice to the holders of the nation's certificates of indebtedness, i would recommend that no more legislation be had on this subject, unless it be to correct errors of omission or commission in the present laws, until sufficient time has elapsed to prove that it can be done and still leave sufficient revenue to meet current expenses of government, pay interest on the public debt, and provide for the sinking fund established by law. the preservation of our national credit is of the highest importance; next in importance to this comes a solemn duty to provide a national currency of fixed, unvarying value as compared with gold, and as soon as practicable, having due regard for the interests of the debtor class and the vicissitudes of trade and commerce, convertible into gold at par. war department. the report of the secretary of war shows the expenditures of the war department for the fiscal year ending june 30, 1871, to be $35,799,991.82, and for the fiscal year ending june 30, 1872, to be $35,372,157.20, showing a reduction in favor of the last fiscal year of $427,834.62. the estimates for military appropriations for the next fiscal year, ending june 30, 1874, are $33,801,378.78. the estimates of the chief of engineers are submitted separately for fortifications, river and harbor improvements, and for public buildings and grounds and the washington aqueduct. the affairs of the freedmen's bureau have all been transferred to the war department, and regulations have been put into execution for the speedy payment of bounty, pay, etc., due colored soldiers, properly coming under that bureau. all war accounts, for money and property, prior to 1871 have been examined and transmitted to the treasury for final settlement. during the fiscal year there has been paid for transportation on railroads $1,300,000, of which $800,857 was over the pacific railroads; for transportation by water $626,373.52, and by stage $48,975.84; for the purchase of transportation animals, wagons, hire of teamsters, etc., $924,650.64. about $370,000 have been collected from southern railroads during the year, leaving about $4,000,000 still due. the quartermaster has examined and transmitted to the accounting officers for settlement $367,172.72 of claims by loyal citizens for quartermaster stores taken during the war. subsistence supplies to the amount of $89,048.12 have been issued to indians. the annual average mean strength of the army was 24,101 white and 2,494 colored soldiers. the total deaths for the year reported were 367 white and 54 colored. the distribution of the medical and surgical history of the war is yet to be ordered by congress. there exists an absolute necessity for a medical corps of the full number established by act of congress of july 28, 1866, there being now fifty-nine vacancies, and the number of successful candidates rarely exceeds eight or ten in any one year. the river and harbor improvements have been carried on with energy and economy. though many are only partially completed, the results have saved to commerce many times the amount expended. the increase of commerce, with greater depths of channels, greater security in navigation, and the saving of time, adds millions to the wealth of the country and increases the resources of the government. the bridge across the mississippi river at rock island has been completed, and the proper site has been determined upon for the bridge at la crosse. the able and exhaustive report made by the commission appointed to investigate the sutro tunnel has been transmitted to congress. the observations and reports of the signal office have been continued. stations have been maintained at each of the principal lake, seaport, and river cities. ten additional stations have been established in the united states, and arrangements have been made for an exchange of reports with canada, and a similar exchange of observations is contemplated with the west india islands. the favorable attention of congress is invited to the following recommendations of the secretary of war: a discontinuance of the appointment of extra lieutenants to serve as adjutants and quartermasters; the adoption of a code providing specific penalties for well-defined offenses, so that the inequality of sentences adjudged by courts-martial may be adjusted; the consolidation of accounts under which expenditures are made, as a measure of economy; a reappropriation of the money for the construction of a depot at san antonio, the title to the site being now perfected; a special act placing the cemetery at the city of mexico on the same basis as other national cemeteries; authority to purchase sites for military posts in texas; the appointment of commissary sergeants from noncommissioned officers, as a measure for securing the better care and protection of supplies; an appropriation for the publication of the catalogue and tables of the anatomical section of the army medical museum; a reappropriation of the amount for the manufacture of breech-loading arms, should the selection be so delayed by the board of officers as to leave the former appropriation unexpended at the close of the fiscal year; the sale of such arsenals east of the mississippi as can be spared, and the proceeds applied to the establishment of one large arsenal of construction and repair upon the atlantic coast and the purchase of a suitable site for a proving and experimental ground for heavy ordnance; the abrogation of laws which deprive inventors in the united states service from deriving any benefit from their inventions; the repeal of the law prohibiting promotions in the staff corps; a continuance of the work upon coast defenses; the repeal of the seventh section of the act of july 13, 1866, taking from engineer soldiers the per diem granted to other troops; a limitation of time for presentation of old war claims for subsistence supplies under act of july 4, 1864; and a modification in the mode of the selection of cadets for the military academy, in order to enhance the usefulness of the academy, which is impaired by reason of the large amount of time necessarily expended in giving new cadets a thorough knowledge of the more elementary branches of learning, which they should acquire before entering the academy. also an appropriation for philosophical apparatus and an increase in the numbers and pay of the military academy band. the attention of congress will be called during its present session to various enterprises for the more certain and cheaper transportation of the constantly increasing surplus of western and southern products to the atlantic seaboard. the subject is one that will force itself upon the legislative branch of the government sooner or later, and i suggest, therefore, that immediate steps be taken to gain all available information to insure equable and just legislation. one route to connect the mississippi valley with the atlantic, at charleston, s.c., and savannah, ga., by water, by the way of the ohio and tennessee rivers, and canals and slack-water navigation to the savannah and ocmulgee rivers, has been surveyed, and report made by an accomplished engineer officer of the army. second and third new routes will be proposed for the consideration of congress, namely, by an extension of the kanawha and james river canal to the ohio, and by extension of the chesapeake and ohio canal. i am not prepared to recommend government aid to these or other enterprises until it is clearly shown that they are not only of national interest, but that when completed they will be of a value commensurate with their cost. that production increases more rapidly than the means of transportation in our country has been demonstrated by past experience. that the unprecedented growth in population and products of the whole country will require additional facilities--and cheaper ones for the more bulky articles of commerce to reach tide water and a market will be demanded in the near future--is equally demonstrable. i would therefore suggest either a committee or a commission to be authorized to consider this whole question, and to report to congress at some future day for its better guidance in legislating on this important subject. the railroads of the country have been rapidly extended during the last few years to meet the growing demands of producers, and reflect much credit upon the capitalists and managers engaged in their construction. in addition to these, a project to facilitate commerce by the building of a ship canal around niagara falls, on the united states side, which has been agitated for many years, will no doubt be called to your attention at this session. looking to the great future growth of the country and the increasing demands of commerce, it might be well while on this subject not only to have examined and reported upon the various practicable routes for connecting the mississippi with tide water on the atlantic, but the feasibility of an almost continuous landlocked navigation from maine to the gulf of mexico. such a route along our coast would be of great value at all times, and of inestimable value in case of a foreign war. nature has provided the greater part of this route, and the obstacles to overcome are easily within the skill of the engineer. i have not alluded to this subject with the view of having any further expenditure of public money at this time than may be necessary to procure and place all the necessary information before congress in an authentic form, to enable it hereafter, if deemed practicable and worthy, to legislate on the subject without delay. navy department. the report of the secretary of the navy herewith accompanying explains fully the condition of that branch of the public service, its wants and deficiencies, expenses incurred during the past year, and appropriations for the same. it also gives a complete history of the services of the navy for the past year in addition to its regular service. it is evident that unless early steps are taken to preserve our navy in a very few years the united states will be the weakest nation upon the ocean, of all great powers. with an energetic, progressive, business people like ours, penetrating and forming business relations with every part of the known world, a navy strong enough to command the respect of our flag abroad is necessary for the full protection of their rights. i recommend careful consideration by congress of the recommendations made by the secretary of the navy. post-office department. the accompanying report of the postmaster-general furnishes a full and satisfactory exhibit of the operations of the post-office department during the year. the ordinary revenues of the department for the fiscal year ending june 30, 1872, amounted to $21,915,426.37, and the expenditures to $26,658,192.31. compared with the previous fiscal year the increase of revenue was $1,878,330.95, or 9.37 per cent, and the increase of expenditures $2,268,088.23, or 9.29 per cent. adding to the ordinary revenues the annual appropriation of $700,000 for free matter and the amounts paid to the subsidized mail steamship lines from special appropriations, the deficiency paid out of the general treasury was $3,317,765.94, an excess of $389,707.28 over the deficiency for the year 1871. other interesting statistical information relating to our rapidly extending postal service is furnished in this report. the total length of railroad mail routes on the 30th of june, 1872, was 57,911 miles, 8,077 additional miles of such service having been put into operation during the year. eight new lines of railway post-offices have been established, with an aggregate length of 2,909 miles. the number of letters exchanged in the mails with foreign countries was 24,362,500, an increase of 4,066,502, or 20 per cent, over the number in 1871; and the postage thereon amounted to $1,871,257.25. the total weight of the mails exchanged with european countries exceeded 820 tons. the cost of the united states transatlantic mail steamship service was $220,301.70. the total cost of the united states ocean steamship service, including the amounts paid to the subsidized lines of mail steamers, was $1,027,020.97. the following are the only steamship lines now receiving subsidies for mail service under special acts of congress: the pacific mail steamship company receive $500,000 per annum for conveying a monthly mail between san francisco, japan, and china, which will be increased to $1,000,000 per annum for a semimonthly mail on and after october 1, 1873; the united states and brazil mail steamship company receive $150,000 per annum for conveying a monthly mail between new york and rio de janeiro, brazil; and the california, oregon and mexican steamship company receive $75,000 per annum for conveying a monthly mail between san francisco and honolulu (hawaiian islands), making the total amount of mail steamship subsidies at present $725,000 per annum. our postal communications with all parts of the civilized world have been placed upon a most advantageous footing by the improved postal conventions and arrangements recently concluded with the leading commercial countries of europe and america, and the gratifying statement is made that with the conclusion of a satisfactory convention with france, the details of which have been definitely agreed to by the head of the french postal department, subject to the approval of the minister of finance, little remains to be accomplished by treaty for some time to come with respect either to reduction of rates or improved facilities of postal intercourse. your favorable consideration is respectfully invited to the recommendations made by the postmaster-general for an increase of service from monthly to semimonthly trips on the mail steamship route to brazil; for a subsidy in aid of the establishment of an american line of mail steamers between san francisco, new zealand, and australia; for the establishment of post-office savings banks, and for the increase of the salaries of the heads of bureaus. i have heretofore recommended the abolition of the franking privilege, and see no reason now for changing my views on that subject. it not having been favorably regarded by congress, however, i now suggest a modification of that privilege to correct its glaring and costly abuses. i would recommend also the appointment of a committee or commission to take into consideration the best method (equitable to private corporations who have invested their time and capital in the establishment of telegraph lines) of acquiring the title to all telegraph lines now in operation, and of connecting this service with the postal service of the nation. it is not probable that this subject could receive the proper consideration during the limits of a short session of congress, but it may be initiated, so that future action may be fair to the government and to private parties concerned. there are but three lines of ocean steamers--namely, the pacific mail steamship company, between san francisco, china, and japan, with provision made for semimonthly service after october 1, 1873; the united states and brazil line, monthly; and the california, new zealand, and australian line, monthly--plying between the united states and foreign ports, and owned and operated under our flag. i earnestly recommend that such liberal contracts for carrying the mails be authorized with these lines as will insure their continuance. if the expediency of extending the aid of government to lines of steamers which hitherto have not received it should be deemed worthy of the consideration of congress, political and commercial objects make it advisable to bestow such aid on a line under our flag between panama and the western south american ports. by this means much trade now diverted to other countries might be brought to us, to the mutual advantage of this country and those lying in that quarter of the continent of america. the report of the secretary of the treasury will show an alarming falling off in our carrying trade for the last ten or twelve years, and even for the past year. i do not believe that public treasure can be better expended in the interest of the whole people than in trying to recover this trade. an expenditure of $5,000,000 per annum for the next five years, if it would restore to us our proportion of the carrying trade of the world, would be profitably expended. the price of labor in europe has so much enhanced within the last few years that the cost of building and operating ocean steamers in the united states is not so much greater than in europe; and i believe the time has arrived for congress to take this subject into serious consideration. department of justice. detailed statements of the disbursements through the department of justice will be furnished by the report of the attorney-general, and though these have been somewhat increased by the recent acts of congress "to enforce the rights of citizens of the united states to vote in the several states of the union," and "to enforce the provisions of the fourteenth amendment to the constitution of the united states," and the amendments thereto, i can not question the necessity and salutary effect of those enactments. reckless and lawless men, i regret to say, have associated themselves together in some localities to deprive other citizens of those rights guaranteed to them by the constitution of the united states, and to that end have committed deeds of blood and violence; but the prosecution and punishment of many of these persons have tended greatly to the repression of such disorders. i do not doubt that a great majority of the people in all parts of the country favor the full enjoyment by all classes of persons of those rights to which they are entitled under the constitution and laws, and i invoke the aid and influence of all good citizens to prevent organizations whose objects are by unlawful means to interfere with those rights. i look with confidence to the time, not far distant, when the obvious advantages of good order and peace will induce an abandonment of all combinations prohibited by the acts referred to, and when it will be unnecessary to carry on prosecutions or inflict punishment to protect citizens from the lawless doings of such combinations. applications have been made to me to pardon persons convicted of a violation of said acts, upon the ground that clemency in such cases would tend to tranquilize the public mind, and to test the virtue of that policy i am disposed, as far as my sense of justice will permit, to give to these applications a favorable consideration; but any action thereon is not to be construed as indicating any change in my determination to enforce with vigor such acts so long as the conspiracies and combinations therein named disturb the peace of the country. it is much to be regretted, and is regretted by no one more than myself, that a necessity has ever existed to execute the "enforcement act." no one can desire more than i that the necessity of applying it may never again be demanded. interior department. the secretary of the interior reports satisfactory improvement and progress in each of the several bureaus under the control of the interior department. they are all in excellent condition. the work which in some of them for some years has been in arrears has been brought down to a recent date, and in all the current business is being promptly dispatched. indians. the policy which was adopted at the beginning of this administration with regard to the management of the indians has been as successful as its most ardent friends anticipated within so short a time. it has reduced the expense of their management; decreased their forays upon the white settlements; tended to give the largest opportunity for the extension of the great railways through the public domain and the pushing of settlements into more remote districts of the country, and at the same time improved the condition of the indians. the policy will be maintained without any change excepting such as further experience may show to be necessary to render it more efficient. the subject of converting the so-called indian territory south of kansas into a home for the indian, and erecting therein a territorial form of government, is one of great importance as a complement of the existing indian policy. the question of removal to that territory has within the past year been presented to many of the tribes resident upon other and less desirable portions of the public domain, and has generally been received by them with favor. as a preliminary step to the organization of such a territory, it will be necessary to confine the indians now resident therein to farms of proper size, which should be secured to them in fee; the residue to be used for the settlement of other friendly indians. efforts will be made in the immediate future to induce the removal of as many peaceably disposed indians to the indian territory as can be settled properly without disturbing the harmony of those already there. there is no other location now available where a people who are endeavoring to acquire a knowledge of pastoral and agricultural pursuits can be as well accommodated as upon the unoccupied lands in the indian territory. a territorial government should, however, protect the indians from the inroads of whites for a term of years, until they become sufficiently advanced in the arts and civilization to guard their own rights, and from the disposal of the lands held by them for the same period. lands. during the last fiscal year there were disposed of out of the public lands 11,864,975 acres, a quantity greater by 1,099,270 acres than was disposed of the previous year. of this amount 1,370,320 acres were sold for cash, 389,460 acres located with military warrants, 4,671,332 acres taken for homesteads, 693,613 acres located with college scrip, 3,554,887 acres granted to railroads, 465,347 acres granted to wagon roads, 714,255 acres given to states as swamp land, 5,760 acres located by indian scrip. the cash receipts from all sources in the land office amounted to $3,218,100. during the same period 22,016,608 acres of the public lands were surveyed, which, added to the quantity before surveyed, amounts to 583,364,780 acres, leaving 1,257,633,628 acres of the public lands still unsurveyed. the reports from the subordinates of the land office contain interesting information in regard to their respective districts. they uniformly mention the fruitfulness of the soil during the past season and the increased yields of all kinds of produce. even in those states and territories where mining is the principal business agricultural products have exceeded the local demand, and liberal shipments have been made to distant points. patents. during the year ending september 30, 1872, there were issued from the patent office 13,626 patents, 233 extensions, and 556 certificates and registries of trade-marks. during the same time 19,587 applications for patents, including reissues and designs, have been received and 3,100 caveats filed. the fees received during the same period amounted to $700,954.86, and the total expenditures to $623,553.90, making the net receipts over the expenditures $77,400.96. since 1836 200,000 applications for patents have been filed and about 133,000 patents issued. the office is being conducted under the same laws and general organization as were adopted at its original inauguration, when only from 100 to 500 applications were made per annum. the commissioner shows that the office has outgrown the original plan, and that a new organization has become necessary. this subject was presented to congress in a special communication in february last, with my approval and the approval of the secretary of the interior, and the suggestions contained in said communication were embraced in the bill that was reported to the house by the committee on patents at the last session. the subject of the reorganization of the patent office, as contemplated by the bill referred to, is one of such importance to the industrial interests of the country that i commend it to the attention of congress. the commissioner also treats the subject of the separation of the patent office from the department of the interior. this subject is also embraced in the bill heretofore referred to. the commissioner complains of the want of room for the model gallery and for the working force and necessary files of the office. it is impossible to transact the business of the office properly without more room in which to arrange files and drawings, that must be consulted hourly in the transaction of business. the whole of the patent office building will soon be needed, if it is not already, for the accommodation of the business of the patent office. pensions. the amount paid for pensions in the last fiscal year was $30,169,340, an amount larger by $3,708,434 than was paid during the preceding year. of this amount $2,313,409 were paid under the act of congress of february 17, 1871, to survivors of the war of 1812. the annual increase of pensions by the legislation of congress has more than kept pace with the natural yearly losses from the rolls. the act of congress of june 8, 1872, has added an estimated amount of $750,000 per annum to the rolls, without increasing the number of pensioners. we can not, therefore, look for any substantial decrease in the expenditures of this department for some time to come, or so long as congress continues to so change the rates of pension. the whole number of soldiers enlisted in the war of the rebellion was 2,688,523. the total number of claims for invalid pensions is 176,000, being but 6 per cent of the whole number of enlisted men. the total number of claims on hand at the beginning of the year was 91,689; the number received during the year was 26,574; the number disposed of was 39,178, making a net gain of 12,604. the number of claims now on file is 79,085. on the 30th of june, 1872, there were on the rolls the names of 95,405 invalid military pensioners, 113,518 widows, orphans, and dependent relatives, making an aggregate of 208,923 army pensioners. at the same time there were on the rolls the names of 1,449 navy pensioners and 1,730 widows, orphans, and dependent relatives, making the whole number of naval pensioners 3,179. there have been received since the passage of the act to provide pensions for the survivors of the war of 1812 36,551 applications, prior to june 30, 1872. of these there were allowed during the last fiscal year 20,126 claims; 4,845 were rejected during the year, leaving 11,580 claims pending at that date. the number of pensions of all classes granted during the last fiscal year was 33,838. during that period there were dropped from the rolls, for various causes, 9,104 names, leaving a grand total of 232,229 pensioners on the rolls on the 30th of june, 1872. it is thought that the claims for pensions on account of the war of 1812 will all be disposed of by the 1st of may, 1873. it is estimated that $30,480,000 will be required for the pension service during the next fiscal year. the census. the ninth census is about completed. its early completion is a subject of congratulation, inasmuch as the use to be made of the statistics therein contained depends very greatly on the promptitude of publication. the secretary of the interior recommends that a census be taken in 1875, which recommendation should receive the early attention of congress. the interval at present established between the federal census is so long that the information obtained at the decennial period as to the material condition, wants, and resources of the nation is of little practical value after the expiration of the first half of that period. it would probably obviate the constitutional provision regarding the decennial census if a census taken in 1875 should be divested of all political character and no reapportionment of congressional representation be made under it. such a census, coming, as it would, in the last year of the first century of our national existence, would furnish a noble monument of the progress of the united states during that century. education. the rapidly increasing interest in education is a most encouraging feature in the current history of the country, and it is no doubt true that this is due in a great measure to the efforts of the bureau of education. that office is continually receiving evidences, which abundantly prove its efficiency, from the various institutions of learning and educators of all kinds throughout the country. the report of the commissioner contains a vast amount of educational details of great interest. the bill now pending before congress, providing for the appropriation of the net proceeds of the sales of public lands for educational purposes, to aid the states in the general education of their rising generation, is a measure of such great importance to our real progress and is so unanimously approved by the leading friends of education that i commend it to the favorable attention of congress. territories. affairs in the territories are generally satisfactory. the energy and business capacity of the pioneers who are settling up the vast domains not yet incorporated into states are keeping pace in internal improvements and civil government with the older communities. in but one of them (utah) is the condition of affairs unsatisfactory, except so far as the quiet of the citizen may be disturbed by real or imaginary danger of indian hostilities. it has seemed to be the policy of the legislature of utah to evade all responsibility to the government of the united states, and even to hold a position in hostility to it. i recommend a careful revision of the present laws of the territory by congress, and the enactment of such a law (the one proposed in congress at its last session, for instance, or something similar to it) as will secure peace, the equality of all citizens before the law, and the ultimate extinguishment of polygamy. since the establishment of a territorial government for the district of columbia the improvement of the condition of the city of washington and surroundings and the increased prosperity of the citizens are observable to the most casual visitor. the nation, being a large owner of property in the city, should bear, with the citizens of the district, its just share of the expense of these improvements. i recommend, therefore, an appropriation to reimburse the citizens for the work done by them along and in front of public grounds during the past year, and liberal appropriations in order that the improvements and embellishments of the public buildings and grounds may keep pace with the improvements made by the territorial authorities. agriculture. the report of the commissioner of agriculture gives a very full and interesting account of the several divisions of that department--the horticultural, agricultural, statistical, entomological, and chemical--and the benefits conferred by each upon the agricultural interests of the country. the whole report is a complete history, in detail, of the workings of that department in all its branches, showing the manner in which the farmer, merchant, and miner is informed, and the extent to which he is aided in his pursuits. the commissioner makes one recommendation--that measures be taken by congress to protect and induce the planting of forests--and suggests that no part of the public lands should be disposed of without the condition that one-tenth of it should be reserved in timber where it exists, and where it does not exist inducements should be offered for planting it. centennial celebration. in accordance with the terms of the act of congress approved march 3, 1871, providing for the celebration of the one hundredth anniversary of american independence, a commission has been organized, consisting of two members from each of the states and territories. this commission has held two sessions, and has made satisfactory progress in the organization and in the initiatory steps necessary for carrying out the provisions of the act, and for executing also the provisions of the act of june 1, 1872, creating a centennial board of finance. a preliminary report of progress has been received from the president of the commission, and is herewith transmitted. it will be the duty of the commission at your coming session to transmit a full report of the progress made, and to lay before you the details relating to the exhibition of american and foreign arts, products, and manufactures, which by the terms of the act is to be held under the auspices of the government of the united states in the city of philadelphia in the year 1876. this celebration will be looked forward to by american citizens with great interest, as marking a century of greater progress and prosperity than is recorded in the history of any other nation, and as serving a further good purpose in bringing together on our soil peoples of all the commercial nations of the earth in a manner calculated to insure international good feeling. civil service. an earnest desire has been felt to correct abuses which have grown up in the civil service of the country through the defective method of making appointments to office. heretofore federal offices have been regarded too much as the reward of political services. under authority of congress rules have been established to regulate the tenure of office and the mode of appointments. it can not be expected that any system of rules can be entirely effective and prove a perfect remedy for the existing evils until they have been thoroughly tested by actual practice and amended according to the requirements of the service. during my term of office it shall be my earnest endeavor to so apply the rules as to secure the greatest possible reform in the civil service of the government, but it will require the direct action of congress to render the enforcement of the system binding upon my successors; and i hope that the experience of the past year, together with appropriate legislation by congress, may reach a satisfactory solution of this question and secure to the public service for all time a practical method of obtaining faithful and efficient officers and employees. u.s. grant. special messages. washington, _december 2, 1872_. _to the senate and house of representatives:_ i transmit herewith a report, dated the 2d instant, received from the secretary of state, supplementary to the report submitted by him under date of the 8th of november, 1871, with reference to the expenditures authorized by the fourth and fifth paragraphs of the act of march 3, 1871, and by the act of may 18, 1872, making appropriations for the increased expenses and compensation for extraordinary services of certain diplomatic and consular officers of the united states by reason of the late war between france and prussia. these expenditures have been made on my approval. u.s. grant. washington, _december 3, 1872_. _to the senate and house of representatives:_ i transmit herewith to congress a report, dated the 2d instant, with the accompanying papers,[69] received from the secretary of state, in compliance with the requirements of the eighteenth section of the act entitled "an act to regulate the diplomatic and consular systems of the united states," approved august 18, 1856. u.s. grant. [footnote 69: report of fees collected, etc., by consular officers of the united states for 1871, and tariff of consular fees.] washington, _december 3, 1872_. _to the senate of the united states:_ i transmit to the senate, for its consideration with a view to ratification, a convention between the united states of america and the united states of mexico, signed in this city on the 27th ultimo, further extending the time fixed by the convention between the same parties of the 4th of july, 1868, for the duration of the joint commission on the subject of claims. u.s. grant. washington, _december 3, 1872_. _to the senate of the united states:_ i transmit to the senate, for its consideration with a view to ratification, a treaty between the united states of america and the republic of ecuador, providing for the mutual surrender of fugitive criminals, signed at quito on the 28th of june last. u.s. grant. washington, _december 3, 1872_. _to the senate of the united states:_ i transmit, for the consideration of the senate with a view to ratification, a convention between the united states and his majesty the king of denmark, relating to naturalization. u.s. grant. washington, _december 9, 1872_. _to the senate of the united states:_ in answer to the resolution of the senate of the 5th instant, i transmit herewith a report[70] from the secretary of state. u.s. grant. [footnote 70: stating that the correspondence relative to the existence of slavery on the coast of africa and to the action taken by great britain and other countries for its suppression was transmitted with the annual message of the president on the 2d instant.] executive mansion, _december 12, 1872_. _to the house of representatives:_ in compliance with section 2 of the act making appropriations for the consular and diplomatic expenses of the government for the year ended june 30, 1871, and for other purposes, i herewith transmit a report received from the secretary of the treasury, giving the name of, the report made by, and the amount paid to the single consular agent of the united states.[71] u.s. grant. [footnote 71: de b. randolph keim.] washington, _december 16, 1872_. _to the senate and house of representatives:_ i transmit to congress a report from the secretary of state, accompanied by that of the commissioners for inquiring into depredations upon the frontier of the state of texas, appointed pursuant to the joint resolution of the 7th of may last. u.s. grant. washington, _january 5, 1873_. _to the senate of the united states:_ i transmit, for the consideration of the senate with a view to ratification, a convention for the surrender of criminals between the united states of america and the republic of honduras, which was signed at comayagua on the 4th day of june, 1873. u.s. grant. washington, _january 13, 1873_. _to the house of representatives:_ in answer to resolution of the house of representatives of the 16th of december last, calling for information relative to the condition of affairs in louisiana, and what, if any, action has been taken in regard thereto, i herewith transmit the report of the attorney-general and the papers by which it is accompanied. u.s. grant. washington, _january 22, 1873_. _to the senate of the united states:_ i transmit herewith to the senate, for its consideration with a view to ratification, an additional article to the treaty between the united states and her britannic majesty of the 8th of may, 1871. u.s. grant. executive mansion, _january 31, 1873_. _to the senate and house of representatives:_ in compliance with section 2 of the act approved july 11, 1870, entitled "an act making appropriations for the consular and diplomatic expenses of the government for the year ending june 30, 1871, and for other purposes," i have the honor to submit herewith a letter of the secretary of the treasury relative to the consular agent[72] appointed under authority of said act, together with the amounts paid such agent, and to transmit the report of the said agent upon the consular service of the united states. u.s. grant. [footnote 72: de b. randolph keim.] washington, _february 8, 1873_. _to the house of representatives:_ in answer to the resolution of the house of representatives of the 29th of january, requesting information in relation to the case of bernhard bernstein,[73] i transmit herewith a report from the secretary of state upon that subject, with accompanying documents. u.s. grant. [footnote 73: claim against russia for illegal arrest and imprisonment.] washington, _february 13, 1873_. _to the senate and house of representatives:_ i transmit herewith a report from the secretary of state and accompanying papers.[74] u.s. grant. [footnote 74: report of the united states commissioner to the international penitentiary congress of london, and appendix containing summary of proceedings of the national prison congress of baltimore.] executive mansion, _february 14, 1873_. _to the senate and house of representatives:_ i consider it my duty to call the attention of congress to the condition of affairs in the territory of utah, and to the dangers likely to arise if it continues during the coming recess, from a threatened conflict between the federal and territorial authorities. no discussion is necessary in regard to the general policy of congress respecting the territories of the united states, and i only wish now to refer to so much of that policy as concerns their judicial affairs and the enforcement of law within their borders. no material differences are found in respect to these matters in the organic acts of the territories, but an examination of them will show that it has been the invariable policy of congress to place and keep their civil and criminal jurisdiction, with certain limited exceptions, in the hands of persons nominated by the president and confirmed by the senate, and that the general administration of justice should be as prescribed by congressional enactment. sometimes the power given to the territorial legislatures has been somewhat larger and sometimes somewhat smaller than the powers generally conferred. never, however, have powers been given to a territorial legislature inconsistent with the idea that the general judicature of the territory was to be under the direct supervision of the national government. accordingly, the organic law creating the territory of utah, passed september 9, 1850, provided for the appointment of a supreme court, the judges of which are judges of the district courts, a clerk, marshal, and an attorney, and to these federal officers is confided jurisdiction in all important matters; but, as decided recently by the supreme court, the act requires jurors to serve in these courts to be selected in such manner as the territorial legislature sees fit to prescribe. it has undoubtedly been the desire of congress, so far as the same might be compatible with the supervisory control of the territorial government, to leave the minor details connected with the administration of law to regulation by local authority; but such a desire ought not to govern when the effect will be, owing to the peculiar circumstances of the case, to produce a conflict between the federal and the territorial authorities, or to impede the enforcement of law, or in any way to endanger the peace and good order of the territory. evidently it was never intended to intrust the territorial legislature with power which would enable it, by creating judicatures of its own or increasing the jurisdiction of courts appointed by territorial authority, although recognized by congress, to take the administration of the law out of the hands of the judges appointed by the president or to interfere with their action. several years of unhappy experience make it apparent that in both of these respects the territory of utah requires special legislation by congress. public opinion in that territory, produced by circumstances too notorious to require further notice, makes it necessary, in my opinion, in order to prevent the miscarriage of justice and to maintain the supremacy of the laws of the united states and of the federal government, to provide that the selection of grand and petit jurors for the district courts, if not put under the control of federal officers, shall be placed in the hands of persons entirely independent of those who are determined not to enforce any act of congress obnoxious to them, and also to pass some act which shall deprive the probate courts, or any court created by the territorial legislature, of any power to interfere with or impede the action of the courts held by the united states judges. i am convinced that so long as congress leaves the selection of jurors to the local authorities it will be futile to make any effort to enforce laws not acceptable to a majority of the people of the territory, or which interfere with local prejudices or provide for the punishment of polygamy or any of its affiliated vices or crimes. i presume that congress, in passing upon the subject, will provide all reasonable and proper safeguards to secure honest and impartial jurors, whose verdicts will command confidence and be a guaranty of equal protection to all good and law-abiding citizens, and at the same time make it understood that crime can not be committed with impunity. i have before said that while the laws creating the several territories have generally contained uniform provisions in respect to the judiciary, yet congress has occasionally varied these provisions in minor details, as the circumstances of the territory affected seemed to demand; and in creating the territory of utah congress evidently thought that circumstances there might require judicial remedies not necessary in other territories, for by section 9 of the act creating that territory it is provided that a writ of error may be brought from the decision of any judge of the supreme or district court of the territory to the supreme court of the united states upon any writ of _habeas corpus_ involving the question of personal freedom--a provision never inserted in any other territorial act except that creating the territory of new mexico. this extraordinary provision shows that congress intended to mold the organic law to the peculiar necessities of the territory, and the legislation which i now recommend is in full harmony with the precedent thus established. i am advised that united states courts in utah have been greatly embarrassed by the action of the territorial legislature in conferring criminal jurisdiction and the power to issue writs of _habeas corpus_ on the probate courts in the territory, and by their consequent interference with the administration of justice. manifestly the legislature of the territory can not give to any court whatever the power to discharge by _habeas corpus_ persons held by or under process from the courts created by congress, but complaint is made that persons so held have been discharged in that way by the probate courts. i can not doubt that congress will agree with me that such a state of things ought not longer to be tolerated, and that no class of persons anywhere should be allowed to treat the laws of the united states with open defiance and contempt. apprehensions are entertained that if congress adjourns without any action upon this subject turbulence and disorder will follow, rendering military interference necessary--a result i should greatly deprecate; and in view of this and other obvious considerations, i earnestly recommend that congress, at the present session, pass some act which will enable the district courts of utah to proceed with independence and efficiency in the administration of law and justice. u.s. grant. washington, _february 17, 1873_. _to the senate of the united states:_ in answer to a resolution of the senate of the 14th instant, adopted in executive session, requiring of the secretary of state information touching the business before the late mixed commission on claims under the convention with mexico, i transmit a report from the secretary of state and the papers by which it was accompanied. u.s. grant. washington, _february 24, 1873_. _to the senate and house of representatives:_ in my annual message to congress at the opening of the second session of the present congress, in december, 1871, i recommended the legislation necessary on the part of the united states to bring into operation the articles of the treaty of washington of may 8, 1871, relative to the fisheries and to other matters touching the relations of the united states toward the british north american possessions, to become operative so soon as the proper legislation should be had on the part of great britain and its possessions. that legislation on the part of great britain and its possessions had not then been had. having, prior to the meeting of congress in december last, received official information of the consideration by great britain and its possessions of the legislation necessary on their part to bring those articles into operation, i communicated that fact to congress in my annual message at the opening of the present session, and renewed the recommendation for your early adoption of the legislation in the same direction necessary on the part of this government. the near approach of the end of the session induces me again to urgently call your attention to the importance of this legislation on the part of congress. it will be remembered that the treaty of washington resulted from an overture on the part of great britain to treat with reference to the fisheries on the coast of her majesty's possessions in north america and other questions between them affecting the relations of the united states toward these possessions. to this overture a reply was made on the part of this government that while appreciating the importance of a friendly and complete understanding between the two governments with reference to the subject specially suggested by the british government, it was thought that the removal of the differences growing out of what were generically known as the alabama claims was essential to the restoration of cordial and amicable relations between the two governments, and the assent of this government to treat on the subject of the fisheries was made dependent on the assent of great britain to allow the joint commission which it had prepared on the questions suggested by that government to treat also and settle the differences growing out of the alabama claims. great britain assented to this, and the treaty of washington proposed a settlement of both classes of questions. those relating to the alabama claims and to the northwestern water boundary, commonly known as the san juan question, have been disposed of in pursuance of the terms of the treaty. those relating to the fisheries were made by the terms of the treaty to depend upon the legislation which the constitutions of the respective governments made necessary to carry those provisions into effect. great britain and her possessions have on their part enacted the necessary legislation. this government is now enjoying the advantages of those provisions of the treaty which were the result of the condition of its assent to treat upon the questions which great britain had submitted. the tribunal at geneva has made an award in favor of the united states on the alabama claims, and his majesty the emperor of germany has decided in favor of the contention of the united states on the northwestern boundary line. i can not urge too strongly the importance of your early consideration of the legislation that may be necessary on the part of this government. in addition to the claim that great britain may have upon the good faith of this government to consider the legislation necessary in connection with the questions which that government presented as the subject of a negotiation which has resulted so favorably to this government upon the other questions in which the united states felt so much interest, it is of importance that the rights of the american fishermen, as provided for under the treaty, should be determined before the now approaching fishing season opens, and that the serious difficulties to the fishing interests and the grave questions between the two governments that may arise therefrom be averted. u.s. grant. executive mansion, _february 25, 1873_. _to the senate and house of representatives:_ your attention is respectfully invited to the condition of affairs in the state of louisiana. grave complications have grown out of the election there on the 6th of november last, chiefly attributable, it is believed, to an organized attempt on the part of those controlling the election officers and returns to defeat in that election the will of a majority of the electors of the state. different persons are claiming the executive offices, two bodies are claiming to be the legislative assembly of the state, and the confusion and uncertainty produced in this way fall with paralyzing effect upon all its interests. controversy arose as soon as the election occurred over its proceedings and results, but i declined to interfere until suit involving this controversy to some extent was brought in the circuit court of the united states under and by virtue of the act of may 31, 1870, entitled "an act to enforce the right of citizens of the united states to vote in the several states of the union, and for other purposes." finding that resistance was made to judicial process in that suit, without any opportunity, and, in my judgment, without any right, to review the judgment of the court upon the jurisdictional or other questions arising in the case, i directed the united states marshal to enforce such process and to use, if necessary, troops for that purpose, in accordance with the thirteenth section of said act, which provides that "it shall be lawful for the president of the united states to employ such part of the land or naval forces of the united states or of the militia as shall be necessary to aid in the execution of judicial process under this act." two bodies of persons claimed to be the returning board for the state, and the circuit court in that case decided that the one to which lynch belonged, usually designated by his name, was the lawful returning board; and this decision has been repeatedly affirmed by the district and supreme courts of the state. having no opportunity or power to canvass the votes, and the exigencies of the case demanding an immediate decision, i conceived it to be my duty to recognize those persons as elected who received and held their credentials to office from what then appeared to me to be, and has since been decided by the supreme court of the state to be, the legal returning board. conformably to the decisions of this board, a full set of state officers has been installed and a legislative assembly organized, constituting, if not a _de jure_, at least a _de facto_ government, which, since some time in december last, has had possession of the offices and been exercising the usual powers of government; but opposed to this has been another government claiming to control the affairs of the state, and which has to some extent been _pro forma_ organized. recent investigation into said election has developed so many frauds and forgeries as to make it doubtful what candidates received a majority of the votes actually cast, and in view of these facts a variety of action has been proposed. i have no specific recommendation to make upon the subject, but if there is any practicable way of removing these difficulties by legislation, then i earnestly request that such action may be taken at the present session of congress. it seems advisable that i should state now what course i shall feel bound to pursue in reference to the matter in the event of no action by congress at this time. subject to any satisfactory arrangement that may be made by the parties to the controversy, which of all things is the most desirable, it will be my duty, so far as it may be necessary for me to act, to adhere to that government heretofore recognized by me. to judge of the election and qualifications of its members is the exclusive province of the senate, as it is also the exclusive province of the house to judge of the election and qualifications of its members; but as to state offices, filled and held under state laws, the decisions of the state judicial tribunals, it seems to me, ought to be respected. i am extremely anxious to avoid any appearance of undue interference in state affairs, and if congress differs from me as to what ought to be done i respectfully urge its immediate decision to that effect; otherwise i shall feel obliged, as far as i can by the exercise of legitimate authority, to put an end to the unhappy controversy which disturbs the peace and prostrates the business of louisiana, by the recognition and support of that government which is recognized and upheld by the courts of the state. u.s. grant. veto messages. executive mansion, _january 6, 1873_. _to the house of representatives:_ i return herewith, for the further consideration of congress, house bill no. 2291, entitled "an act for the relief of edmund jussen," to which i have not appended my approval, for the following reasons: the bill directs the accounting officers to transfer from mr. jussen's account to that of his successor all indebtedness arising from the loss or destruction or nontaking of warehouse bonds on certain spirits destroyed by fire. this provision would be wholly ineffective in so far as it proposes to increase the liability of mr. jussen's successor, he having been appointed subsequently to the destruction of the spirits. it might operate to relieve mr. jussen, but it seems probable that he is already relieved by the act of may 27, 1872, passed since the introduction of this bill. that act provides for the rebatement of taxes on distilled spirits destroyed by fire, except in cases where the owners of such spirits may be indemnified against tax by a valid claim of insurance. the relief of the taxpayers of course includes the relief of collectors from liability caused by failure to take bonds. it does not appear whether there was any insurance in this case. if not, the applicant is already relieved; but if there was an insurance the effect of this bill, if it became a law, might be to except mr. jussen from the operation of the general rule established by the proviso of the act of may 27, 1872. if such exception be proper, it should not be confined to an individual case, but extended to all. if there was an insurance, this bill would relieve mr, jussen from the liability with which it is very doubtful if his successor could be legally charged, or with which he ought to be charged. u.s. grant. executive mansion, _january 22, 1873_. the speaker of the house of representatives. sir: i herewith return to the house of representatives, in which it originated, h.r. no. 630, entitled "an act in relation to new trials in the court of claims," without my approval. the object of the bill is to reduce from two years to six months the time in which a new trial, upon motion of the united states, may be granted in the court of claims. great difficulties are now experienced in contesting fraudulent and unjust claims against the government prosecuted in said court, and the effect of this bill, if it becomes a law, will be to increase those difficulties. persons sue in this court generally with the advantage of a personal knowledge of the circumstances of the case, and are prompted by personal interest to activity in its preparation for trial, which consists sometimes in the production of false testimony and the suppression of the truth, while the united states are dependent for defense upon such inquiries as the officers of the government, generally strangers to the transaction, are enabled to make, not infrequently in remote parts of the country and among those not averse to depredations upon the national treasury. instances have occurred where the existing opportunities for a new trial have enabled the government to discover and defeat claims that ought not to have been allowed, after judgments thereon had been rendered by the court of claims. by referring to the act which it is proposed to modify it will be seen that the payment of judgments recovered is not necessarily suspended for two years; but where the proofs are doubtful or suspicious the government may appeal to the supreme court, and in the meantime may avail itself of any discovery or revelation of new evidence touching the facts of the case. i fail to see the necessity or advantages of the proposed change in the law, and whatever may be the purposes of the bill, its effect, if passed, i am apprehensive will be to facilitate the prosecution of fraudulent claims against the united states. believing that justice can and will be done to honest claimants in the court of claims as the law now stands, and believing also that the proposed change in the law will remove a valuable safeguard to the treasury, i must for these reasons respectfully withhold my assent to the bill. u.s. grant. executive mansion, _january 29, 1873_. _to the senate of the united states:_ i have the honor to return herewith senate bill no. 490, entitled "an act for the relief of the east tennessee university," without my approval. this claim, for which $18,500 are appropriated out of the moneys of the united states, arises in part for the destruction of property by troops in time of war, and therefore the same objections attach to it as were expressed in my message of june 1, 1872, returning the senate bill awarding $25,000 to j. milton best. if the precedent is once established that the government is liable for the ravages of war, the end of demands upon the public treasury can not be forecast. the loyalty of the people of the section in which the university is located, under circumstances of personal danger and trials, thus entitling them to the most favorable construction of the obligation of the government toward them, is admitted, and nothing but regard for my duty to the whole people, in opposing a principle which, if allowed, will entail greater burdens upon the whole than the relief which will be afforded to a part by allowing this bill to become a law, could induce me to return it with objections. recognizing the claims of these citizens to sympathy and the most favorable consideration of their claims by the government, i would heartily favor a donation of the amount appropriated by this bill for their relief. u.s. grant. washington, _february 8, 1873_. _to the house of representatives:_ i have the honor to return herewith house bill (h.r. 2852) entitled "an act for the relief of james a. mccullah, late collector of the fifth district of missouri," without my approval, for the following reasons: it is provided in section 34 of the act of june 30, 1864, as amended by the act of july 13, 1866, that it shall be proved to the satisfaction of the commissioner of internal revenue that due diligence was used by the collector, who shall certify the facts to the first comptroller. this bill, should it become a law, clearly excuses mr. mccullah, late collector, from showing that he used due diligence for the collection of the tax in question while the lists remained in his hands. u.s. grant. executive mansion, _february 11, 1873_. _to the senate of the united states:_ i return herewith without my approval senate bill no. 161, entitled "an act for the relief of those suffering from the destruction of salt works near manchester, ky., pursuant to the order of major-general carlos buell." all the objections made by me to the bill for the relief of j. milton best, and also of the east tennessee university, apply with equal force to this bill. according to the official report of brigadier-general craft, by whose immediate command the property in question was destroyed, there was a large rebel force in the neighborhood, who were using the salt works and had carried away a considerable quantity of salt, and were preparing to take more as soon as the necessary transportation could be procured; and he further states "that the leaders of the rebellion calculated upon their supply of salt to come from these works," and that in his opinion their destruction was a military necessity. i understand him to say, in effect, that the salt works were captured from the rebels; that it was impracticable to hold them, and that they were demolished so as to be of no further use to the enemy. i can not agree that the owners of property destroyed under such circumstances are entitled to compensation therefor from the united states. whatever other view may be taken of the subject, it is incontrovertible that these salt works were destroyed by the union army while engaged in regular military operations, and that the sole object of their destruction was to weaken, cripple, or defeat the armies of the so-called southern confederacy. i am greatly apprehensive that the allowance of this claim could and would be construed into the recognition of a principle binding the united states to pay for all property which their military forces destroyed in the late war for the union. no liability by the government to pay for property destroyed by the union forces in conducting a battle or siege has yet been claimed, but the precedent proposed by this bill leads directly and strongly in that direction, for it is difficult upon any ground of reason or justice to distinguish between a case of that kind and the one under consideration. had general craft and his command destroyed the salt works by shelling out the enemy found in their actual occupancy, the case would not have been different in principle from the one presented in this bill. what possible difference can it make in the rights of owners or the obligations of the government whether the destruction was in driving the enemy out or in keeping them out of the possession of the salt works? this bill does not present a case where private property is taken for public use in any sense of the constitution. it was not taken from the owners, but from the enemy; and it was not then used by the government, but destroyed. its destruction was one of the casualties of war, and, though not happening in actual conflict, was perhaps as disastrous to the rebels as would have been a victory in battle. owners of property destroyed to prevent the spread of a conflagration, as a general rule, are not entitled to compensation therefor; and for reasons equally strong the necessary destruction of property found in the hands of the public enemy, and constituting a part of their military supplies, does not entitle the owner to indemnity from the government for damages to him in that way. i fully appreciate the hardship of the case, and would be glad if my convictions of duty allowed me to join in the proposed relief; but i can not consent to the doctrine which is found in this bill, as it seems to me, by which the national treasury is exposed to all claims for property injured or destroyed by the armies of the united states in the late protracted and destructive war in this country. u.s. grant. proclamation. by the president of the united states of america. a proclamation. whereas objects of interest to the united states require that the senate should be convened at 12 o'clock on the 4th of march next, to receive and act upon such communications as may be made to it on the part of the executive: now, therefore, i, ulysses s. grant, president of the united states, have considered it to be my duty to issue this my proclamation, declaring that an extraordinary occasion requires the senate of the united states to convene for the transaction of business at the capitol, in the city of washington, on the 4th day of march next, at 12 o'clock at noon on that day, of which all who shall at that time be entitled to act as members of that body are hereby required to take notice. given under my hand and the seal of the united states, at washington, the 21st day of february, a.d. 1873, and of the independence of the united states of america the ninety-seventh. [seal.] u.s. grant. by the president: hamilton fish, _secretary of state_. executive orders. by the president of the united states. executive order. washington, _january 17, 1873_. whereas it has been brought to the notice of the president of the united states that many persons holding civil office by appointment from him or otherwise under the constitution and laws of the united states, while holding such federal positions, accept offices under the authority of the states and territories in which they reside, or of municipal corporations under the charters and ordinances of such corporations, thereby assuming the duties of the state, territorial, or municipal office at the same time that they are charged with the duties of the civil office held under federal authority; and whereas it is believed that, with few exceptions, the holding of two such offices by the same person is incompatible with a due and faithful discharge of the duties of either office; that it frequently gives rise to great inconvenience, and often results in detriment to the public service, and, moreover, is not in harmony with the genius of the government: in view of the premises, therefore, the president has deemed it proper thus and hereby to give public notice that from and after the 4th day of march, a.d. 1873 (except as herein specified), persons holding any federal civil office by appointment under the constitution and laws of the united states will be expected, while holding such office, not to accept or hold any office under any state or territorial government or under the charter or ordinances of any municipal corporation; and further, that the acceptance or continued holding of any such state, territorial, or municipal office, whether elective or by appointment, by any person holding civil office as aforesaid under the government of the united states, other than judicial offices under the constitution of the united states, will be deemed a vacation of the federal office held by such person, and will be taken to be and will be treated as a resignation by such federal officer of his commission or appointment in the service of the united states. the offices of justices of the peace, of notaries public, and of commissioners to take the acknowledgment of deeds, of bail, or to administer oaths shall not be deemed within the purview of this order, and are excepted from its operation and may be held by federal officers. the appointment of deputy marshal of the united states may be conferred upon sheriffs or deputy sheriffs; and deputy postmasters the emoluments of whose office do not exceed $600 per annum are also excepted from the operations of this order, and may accept and hold appointments under state, territorial, or municipal authority, provided die same be found not to interfere with the discharge of their duties as postmaster. heads of departments and other officers of the government who have the appointment of subordinate officers are required to take notice of this order, and to see to the enforcement of its provisions and terms within the sphere of their respective departments or offices and as relates to the several persons holding appointments under them, respectively. by order of the president: hamilton fish, _secretary of state_. department of state, _washington, january 28, 1873_. inquiries having been made from various quarters as to the application of the executive order issued on the 17th january, relating to the holding of state or municipal offices by persons holding civil offices under the federal government, the president directs the following reply to be made: it has been asked whether the order prohibits a federal officer from holding also the office of an alderman or of a common councilman in a city, or of a town councilman of a town or village, or of appointments under city, town, or village governments. by some it has been suggested that there may be distinction made in case the office be with or without salary or compensation. the city or town offices of the description referred to, by whatever names they may be locally known, whether held by election or by appointment, and whether with or without salary or compensation, are of the class which the executive order intends not to be held by persons holding federal offices. it has been asked whether the order prohibits federal officers from holding positions on boards of education, school committees, public libraries, religious or eleemosynary institutions incorporated or established or sustained by state or municipal authority. positions and service on such boards or committees and professorships in colleges are not regarded as "offices" within the contemplation of the executive order, but as employments or service in which all good citizens may be engaged without incompatibility, and in many cases without necessary interference with any position which they may hold under the federal government. officers of the federal government may therefore engage in such service, provided the attention required by such employment does not interfere with the regular and efficient discharge of the duties of their office under the federal government. the head of the department under whom the federal office is held will in all cases be the sole judge whether or not the employment does thus interfere. the question has also been asked with regard to officers of the state militia. congress having exercised the power conferred by the constitution to provide for organizing the militia, which is liable to be called forth to be employed in the service of the united states, and is thus in some sense under the control of the general government, and is, moreover, of the greatest value to the public, the executive order of the 17th january is not considered as prohibiting federal officers from being officers of the militia in the states and territories. it has been asked whether the order prohibits persons holding office under the federal government being members of local or municipal fire departments; also whether it applies to mechanics employed by the day in the armories, arsenals, and navy-yards, etc., of the united states. unpaid service in local or municipal fire departments is not regarded as an office within the intent of the executive order, and may be performed by federal officers, provided it does not interfere with the regular and efficient discharge of the duties of the federal office, of which the head of the department under which the office is held will in each case be the judge. employment by the day as mechanics and laborers in the armories, arsenals, navy-yards, etc., does not constitute an office of any kind, and those thus employed are not within the contemplation of the executive order. master workmen and others who hold appointments from the government or from any department, whether for a fixed time or at the pleasure of the appointing power, are embraced within the operation of the order. by order of the president: hamilton fish, _secretary of state_. second inaugural address. fellow-citizens: under providence i have been called a second time to act as executive over this great nation. it has been my endeavor in the past to maintain all the laws, and, so far as lay in my power, to act for the best interests of the whole people. my best efforts will be given in the same direction in the future, aided, i trust, by my four years' experience in the office. when my first term of the office of chief executive began, the country had not recovered from the effects of a great internal revolution, and three of the former states of the union had not been restored to their federal relations. it seemed to me wise that no new questions should be raised so long as that condition of affairs existed. therefore the past four years, so far as i could control events, have been consumed in the effort to restore harmony, public credit, commerce, and all the arts of peace and progress. it is my firm conviction that the civilized world is tending toward republicanism, or government by the people through their chosen representatives, and that our own great republic is destined to be the guiding star to all others. under our republic we support an army less than that of any european power of any standing and a navy less than that of either of at least five of them. there could be no extension of territory on the continent which would call for an increase of this force, but rather might such extension enable us to diminish it. the theory of government changes with general progress. now that the telegraph is made available for communicating thought, together with rapid transit by steam, all parts of a continent are made contiguous for all purposes of government, and communication between the extreme limits of the country made easier than it was throughout the old thirteen states at the beginning of our national existence. the effects of the late civil strife have been to free the slave and make him a citizen. yet he is not possessed of the civil rights which citizenship should carry with it. this is wrong, and should be corrected. to this correction i stand committed, so far as executive influence can avail. social equality is not a subject to be legislated upon, nor shall i ask that anything be done to advance the social status of the colored man, except to give him a fair chance to develop what there is good in him, give him access to the schools, and when he travels let him feel assured that his conduct will regulate the treatment and fare he will receive. the states lately at war with the general government are now happily rehabilitated, and no executive control is exercised in any one of them that would not be exercised in any other state under like circumstances. in the first year of the past administration the proposition came up for the admission of santo domingo as a territory of the union. it was not a question of my seeking, but was a proposition from the people of santo domingo, and which i entertained. i believe now, as i did then, that it was for the best interest of this country, for the people of santo domingo, and all concerned that the proposition should be received favorably. it was, however, rejected constitutionally, and therefore the subject was never brought up again by me. in future, while i hold my present office, the subject of acquisition of territory must have the support of the people before i will recommend any proposition looking to such acquisition. i say here, however, that i do not share in the apprehension held by many as to the danger of governments becoming weakened and destroyed by reason of their extension of territory. commerce, education, and rapid transit of thought and matter by telegraph and steam have changed all this. rather do i believe that our great maker is preparing the world, in his own good time, to become one nation, speaking one language, and when armies and navies will be no longer required. my efforts in the future will be directed to the restoration of good feeling between the different sections of our common country; to the restoration of our currency to a fixed value as compared with the world's standard of values--gold--and, if possible, to a par with it; to the construction of cheap routes of transit throughout the land, to the end that the products of all may find a market and leave a living remuneration to the producer; to the maintenance of friendly relations with all our neighbors and with distant nations; to the reestablishment of our commerce and share in the carrying trade upon the ocean; to the encouragement of such manufacturing industries as can be economically pursued in this country, to the end that the exports of home products and industries may pay for our imports--the only sure method of returning to and permanently maintaining a specie basis; to the elevation of labor; and, by a humane course, to bring the aborigines of the country under the benign influences of education and civilization. it is either this or war of extermination. wars of extermination, engaged in by people pursuing commerce and all industrial pursuits, are expensive even against the weakest people, and are demoralizing and wicked. our superiority of strength and advantages of civilization should make us lenient toward the indian. the wrong inflicted upon him should be taken into account and the balance placed to his credit. the moral view of the question should be considered and the question asked, can not the indian be made a useful and productive member of society by proper teaching and treatment? if the effort is made in good faith, we will stand better before the civilized nations of the earth and in our own consciences for having made it. all these things are not to be accomplished by one individual, but they will receive my support and such recommendations to congress as will in my judgment best serve to carry them into effect. i beg your support and encouragement. it has been, and is, my earnest desire to correct abuses that have grown up in the civil service of the country. to secure this reformation rules regulating methods of appointment and promotions were established and have been tried. my efforts for such reformation shall be continued to the best of my judgment. the spirit of the rules adopted will be maintained. i acknowledge before this assemblage, representing, as it does, every section of our country, the obligation i am under to my countrymen for the great honor they have conferred on me by returning me to the highest office within their gift, and the further obligation resting on me to render to them the best services within my power. this i promise, looking forward with the greatest anxiety to the day when i shall be released from responsibilities that at times are almost overwhelming, and from which i have scarcely had a respite since the eventful firing upon fort sumter, in april, 1861, to the present day. my services were then tendered and accepted under the first call for troops growing out of that event. i did not ask for place or position, and was entirely without influence or the acquaintance of persons of influence, but was resolved to perform my part in a struggle threatening the very existence of the nation. i performed a conscientious duty, without asking promotion or command, and without a revengeful feeling toward any section or individual. notwithstanding this, throughout the war, and from my candidacy for my present office in 1868 to the close of the last presidential campaign, i have been the subject of abuse and slander scarcely ever equaled in political history, which to-day i feel that i can afford to disregard in view of your verdict, which i gratefully accept as my vindication. march 4, 1873. proclamations. by the president of the united states of america. a proclamation. whereas, under the pretense that william p. kellogg, the present executive of louisiana, and the officers associated with him in the state administration were not duly elected, certain turbulent and disorderly persons have combined together with force and arms to resist the laws and constituted authorities of said state; and whereas it has been duly certified by the proper local authorities and judicially determined by the inferior and supreme courts of said state that said officers are entitled to hold their offices, respectively, and execute and discharge the functions thereof; and whereas congress, at its late session, upon a due consideration of the subject, tacitly recognized the said executive and his associates, then as now in office, by refusing to take any action with respect thereto; and whereas it is provided in the constitution of the united states that the united states shall protect every state in this union, on application of the legislature, or of the executive when the legislature can not be convened, against domestic violence; and whereas it is provided in the laws of the united states that in all cases of insurrection in any state or of obstruction to the laws thereof it shall be lawful for the president of the united states, on application of the legislature of such state, or of the executive when the legislature can not be convened, to call forth the militia of any other state or states, or to employ such part of the land and naval forces as shall be judged necessary, for the purpose of suppressing such insurrection or causing the laws to be duly executed; and whereas the legislature of said state is not now in session, and can not be convened in time to meet the present emergency, and the executive of said state, under section 4 of article iv of the constitution of the united states and the laws passed in pursuance thereof, has therefore made application to me for such part of the military force of the united states as may be necessary and adequate to protect said state and the citizens thereof against domestic violence and to enforce the due execution of the laws; and whereas it is required that whenever it may be necessary, in the judgment of the president, to use the military force for the purpose aforesaid, he shall forthwith, by proclamation, command such insurgents to disperse and retire peaceably to their respective homes within a limited time: now, therefore, i, ulysses s. grant, president of the united states, do hereby make proclamation and command said turbulent and disorderly persons to disperse and retire peaceably to their respective abodes within twenty days from this date, and hereafter to submit themselves to the laws and constituted authorities of said state; and i invoke the aid and cooperation of all good citizens thereof to uphold law and preserve the public peace. in witness whereof i have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the united states to be affixed. [seal.] done at the city of washington, this 22d day of may, a.d. 1873, and of the independence of the united states the ninety-seventh. u.s. grant. by the president: j.c. bancroft davis, _acting secretary of state_. by the president of the united states of america. a proclamation. whereas by the thirty-third article of a treaty concluded at washington on the 8th day of may, 1871, between the united states and her britannic majesty it was provided that- articles xviii to xxv, inclusive, and article xxx of this treaty shall take effect as soon as the laws required to carry them into operation shall have been passed by the imperial parliament of great britain, by the parliament of canada, and by the legislature of prince edwards island on the one hand, and by the congress of the united states on the other. and whereas by the first section of an act entitled "an act to carry into effect the provisions of the treaty between the united states and great britain signed in the city of washington the 8th day of may, 1871, relating to the fisheries," it is provided- that whenever the president of the united states shall receive satisfactory evidence that the imperial parliament of great britain, the parliament of canada, and the legislature of prince edwards island have passed laws on their part to give full effect to the provisions of the treaty between the united states and great britain signed at the city of washington on the 8th day of may, 1871, as contained in articles eighteenth to twenty-fifth, inclusive, and article thirtieth of said treaty, he is hereby authorized to issue his proclamation declaring that he has such evidence. and whereas the secretary of state of the united states and her britannic majesty's envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary at washington have recorded in a protocol a conference held by them at the department of state, in washington, on the 7th day of june, 1873, in the following language: protocol of a conference held at washington on the 7th day of june, 1873. whereas it is provided by article xxxiii of the treaty between her majesty the queen of the united kingdom of great britain and ireland and the united states of america signed at washington on the 8th of may, 1871, as follows: "article xxxiii. "the foregoing articles xviii to xxv, inclusive, and article xxx of this treaty shall take effect as soon as the laws required to carry them into operation shall have been passed by the imperial parliament of great britain, by the parliament of canada, and by the legislature of prince edwards island on the one hand, and by the congress of the united states on the other. such assent having been given, the said articles shall remain in force for the period of ten years from the date at which they may come into operation, and, further, until the expiration of two years after either of the high contracting parties shall have given notice to the other of its wish to terminate the same; each of the high contracting parties being at liberty to give such notice to the other at the end of the said period of ten years or at any time afterwards;" and whereas, in accordance with the stipulations of the above-recited article, an act was passed by the imperial parliament of great britain in the thirty-fifth and thirty-sixth years of the reign of queen victoria, intituled "an act to carry into effect a treaty between her majesty and the united states of america;" and whereas an act was passed by the senate and house of commons of canada in the fifth session of the first parliament held in the thirty-fifth year of her majesty's reign and assented to in her majesty's name by the governor-general on the 14th day of june, 1872, intituled "an act relating to the treaty of washington, 1871;" and whereas an act was passed by the legislature of prince edwards island and assented to by the lieutenant-governor of that colony on the 29th day of june, 1872, intituled "an act relating to the treaty of washington, 1871;" and whereas an act was passed by the senate and house of representatives of the united states of america in congress assembled, and approved on the 1st day of march, 1873, by the president of the united states, intituled "an act to carry into effect the provisions of the treaty between the united states and great britain signed in the city of washington the 8th day of may, 1871, relating to fisheries:" the undersigned, hamilton fish, secretary of state of the united states, and the right hon. sir edward thornton, one of her majesty's most honorable privy council, knight commander of the most honorable order of the bath, her britannic majesty's envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to the united states of america, duly authorized for this purpose by their respective governments, having met together at washington, and having found that the laws required to carry the articles xviii to xxv, inclusive, and article xxx of the treaty aforesaid into operation have been passed by the imperial parliament of great britain, by the parliament of canada, and by the legislature of prince edwards island on the one part, and by the congress of the united states on the other, hereby declare that articles xviii to xxv, inclusive, and article xxx of the treaty between her britannic majesty and the united states of america of the 8th of may, 1871, will take effect on the 1st day of july next. in witness whereof the undersigned have signed this protocol and have hereunto affixed their seals. done in duplicate at washington, this 7th day of june, 1873. [seal.] (signed) hamilton fish. [seal.] (signed) edwd. thornton. now, therefore, i, ulysses s. grant, president of the united states of america, in pursuance of the premises, do hereby declare that i have received satisfactory evidence that the imperial parliament of great britain, the parliament of canada, and the legislature of prince edwards island have passed laws on their part to give full effect to the provisions of the said treaty as contained in articles eighteenth to twenty-fifth, inclusive, and article thirtieth of said treaty. in testimony whereof i have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the united states to be affixed. [seal.] done at the city of washington, this 1st day of july, a.d. 1873, and of the independence of the united states of america the ninety-seventh. u.s. grant. by the president: hamilton fish, _secretary of state_. by the president of the united states of america. a proclamation. whereas by the act of congress approved march 3, 1871, providing for a national celebration of the one hundredth anniversary of the independence of the united states by the holding of an international exhibition of arts, manufactures, and products of the soil and mine in the city of philadelphia in the year 1876, it is provided as follows: that whenever the president shall be informed by the governor of the state of pennsylvania that provision has been made for the erection of suitable buildings for the purpose, and for the exclusive control by the commission herein provided for of the proposed exhibition, the president shall, through the department of state, make proclamation of the same, setting forth the time at which the exhibition will open and the place at which it will be held; and he shall communicate to the diplomatic representatives of all nations copies of the same, together with such regulations as may be adopted by the commissioners, for publication in their respective countries. and whereas his excellency the governor of the said state of pennsylvania did, on the 24th day of june, 1873, inform me that provision has been made for the erection of said buildings and for the exclusive control by the commission provided for in the said act of the proposed exhibition; and whereas the president of the united states centennial commission has officially informed me of the dates fixed for the opening and closing of the said exhibition and the place at which it is to be held: now, therefore, be it known that i, ulysses s. grant, president of the united states, in conformity with the provisions of the act of congress aforesaid, do hereby declare and proclaim that there will be held at the city of philadelphia, in the state of pennsylvania, an international exhibition of arts, manufactures, and products of the soil and mine, to be opened on the 19th day of april, a.d. 1876, and to be closed on the 19th day of october, in the same year. and in the interest of peace, civilization, and domestic and international friendship and intercourse, i commend the celebration and exhibition to the people of the united states, and in behalf of this government and people i cordially commend them to all nations who may be pleased to take part therein. in testimony whereof i have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the united states to be affixed. [seal.] done at the city of washington, this 3d day of july, 1873, and of the independence of the united states the ninety-seventh. u.s. grant. by the president: hamilton fish, _secretary of state_. by the president of the united states of america. a proclamation. whereas satisfactory evidence was given me on the 13th day of september current by the marquis de noailles, envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary from the french republic, that on and after the 1st day of october next merchandise imported into france in vessels of the united states, from whatever country, will be subject to no other duties or imposts than those which shall be collected upon merchandise imported into france from countries of its origin or from any other country in french vessels: now, therefore, i, ulysses s. grant, president of the united states of america, by virtue of the authority vested in me by law, do hereby declare and proclaim that on and after the 1st day of october next, so long as merchandise imported into france in vessels of the united states, whether from the countries of its origin or from other countries, shall be admitted into the ports of france on the terms aforesaid, the discriminating duties heretofore levied upon merchandise imported into the united states in french vessels, either from the countries of its origin or from any other country, shall be and are discontinued and abolished. in testimony whereof i have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the united states to be affixed. done at the city of washington, this 22d day of september, a.d. 1873, and of the independence of the united states of america the ninety-eighth. [seal.] u.s. grant. by the president: j.c. bancroft davis, _acting secretary of state_. by the president of the united states of america. a proclamation. the approaching close of another year brings with it the occasion for renewed thanksgiving and acknowledgment to the almighty ruler of the universe for the unnumbered mercies which he has bestowed upon us. abundant harvests have been among the rewards of industry. with local exceptions, health has been among the many blessings enjoyed. tranquillity at home and peace with other nations have prevailed. frugal industry is regaining its merited recognition and its merited rewards. gradually but, under the providence of god, surely, as we trust, the nation is recovering from the lingering results of a dreadful civil strife. for these and all the other mercies vouchsafed it becomes us as a people to return heartfelt and grateful acknowledgments, and with our thanksgiving for blessings we may unite prayers for the cessation of local and temporary sufferings. i therefore recommend that on thursday, the 27th day of november next, the people meet in their respective places of worship to make their acknowledgments to almighty god for his bounties and his protection, and to offer to him prayers for their continuance. in witness whereof i have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the united states to be affixed. [seal.] done at the city of washington, this 14th day of october, a.d. 1873, and of the independence of the united states the ninety-eighth. u.s. grant. by the president: hamilton fish, _secretary of state_. executive orders. washington, _march 14, 1873_. in consequence of the peculiar and confidential relations which from the nature of the service must exist and be maintained between the department of state and its clerks, rules 2,3, and 4 of the rules and regulations for the civil service promulgated by the president 19th of december, 1871, as amended by the executive order 16th of april, 1872, shall in their application to that department be modified as follows, namely: vacancies occurring in any grade of consulates or clerkships in the department may be filled either by transfer from some other grade or service--clerical, consular, or diplomatic--under the department of state, or by the appointment of some person who has previously served under the department of state to its satisfaction, or by the appointment of some person who has made application to the secretary of state, with proper certificates of character, responsibility, and capacity, in the manner provided for applications for consulates of which the lawful annual compensation is more than $1,000 and less than $3,000, and who has on examination been found qualified for the position. u.s. grant. [from the new-york daily tribune, may 10, 1873.] washington, _may 9, 1873_. the president announces with deep regret the death of the hon. salmon p. chase, chief justice of the united states, who closed a life of long public service, in the city of new york, on the 7th instant, having filled the offices of senator of the united states, governor of ohio, secretary of the treasury, and crowning a long career in the exalted position of chief justice of the united states. the president directs that the public offices in washington be closed on saturday, the 10th instant, the day of his funeral, and that they be draped in mourning for the period of thirty days, and that the flags be displayed at half-mast on the public buildings and forts and on the national vessels on the day of the funeral, in honor of the memory of the illustrious dead. by order of the president: hamilton fish, _secretary of state_. executive mansion, _washington, d.c., may 21, 1873_. sir:[75] the president directs me to say that the several departments of the government will be closed on the 30th instant, in order to enable the employees of the government to participate, in connection with the grand army of the republic, in the decoration of the graves of the soldiers who fell during the rebellion. i am, sir, your obedient servant, o.e. babcock, _secretary_. [footnote 75: addressed to the heads of the executive departments, etc.] washington, _august 5, 1873_. the civil service commission, at its session at washington which terminated june 4, 1873, recommended certain further rules to be prescribed by the president for the government of the civil service of the united states. these rules as herewith published are approved, and their provisions will be enforced as rapidly as the proper arrangements can be made. u.s. grant. by the president: hamilton fish, _secretary of state_. further rules for promoting the efficiency of the civil service of the united states. _rule 1_.--it being essential to the public welfare to maintain in the executive the exercise of the power of nomination and appointment vested by the constitution, and thereby to secure that measure of independence and separate responsibility which is contemplated by that instrument; and it being needful, in making such nominations and appointments, that the appointing power should obtain and in the proper department preserve the evidence of fitness in reference to which all such nominations and appointments should be made: therefore recommendations concerning any nomination or appointment to office or place in the civil service can not be considered unless made in writing, signed by the person making them, setting forth the character of the person recommended and his qualifications for the office in reference to which the recommendation is made; nor, when the recommendation is by a person holding an office or station in or under the government of the united states, can such written recommendation, except when made in response to a written request by the officer making the appointment, or in the discharge of an official duty imposed by the constitution or the laws, be considered as entitled to any greater weight than if made by such person as a private individual. but this rule shall not apply to recommendations made by officers as to their own subordinates. _rule 2_.--while it is not the purpose of the rules and regulations prescribed for the government of the civil service either to restrict the power of removal or to extend the tenure of service, such power will not be exercised arbitrarily, and therefore applications must not be entertained by any authority having the duty of nomination or appointment for the removal of any person in the civil service, nor will any person be removed for the mere purpose of making a place for any other person. _rule 3_.--to prevent any misapprehension in the public mind in regard to the functions of the members of the civil service commission and of the members of any board of examiners, it is declared not to be any part of the duty or authority of any such member to act upon, take part in, or in any way entertain any recommendation, application, or question concerning appointments or removals in respect of the civil service, otherwise than in the strict discharge of their respective duties as prescribed by the rules and regulations; and for the same purpose it is further declared that the functions of the members of said commission as to the matters aforesaid extend only to the question of the proper rules and regulations to be made and to supervising their application, and that the functions of the examiners as to said matters extend only to preparing for, conducting, rating, and making reports concerning examinations required to be made under such rules and regulations. _rule 4_.--the grouping heretofore made for the executive departments at washington is hereby modified by striking out the words "female clerks, copyists, and counters, at $900 a year," these places being below the grade of clerkships of class 1; and all applicants for such positions shall be examined in (1) penmanship, (2) copying, (3) elements of english grammar, chiefly orthography, and (4) fundamental rules of arithmetic, except that mere counters may be examined only in the fundamental rules of arithmetic and as to their facility in counting money; and those found competent by such examination shall be reported in the order of their excellence as eligible for appointment, and selections may be made by the appointing power, at discretion, from the list of those so reported, being at liberty to give preference to such as may be justly regarded as having the highest claims to public consideration by reason of loss of support or of property occasioned by the death or disability of any person in the defense of the union in war or in other public service of the government. and in the notices of the examination of females to fill vacancies among those last mentioned it shall be stated as follows: "that from among all those who shall pass a satisfactory examination the head of the department will be at liberty to select such persons for the vacancies as may be justly regarded as having the highest claims to public consideration." _rule 5_.--the notices to appear at any examinations other than those referred to in the fourth rule of this series, so far as practicable and necessary to prevent misapprehension, shall advise female applicants to whom they may be sent of any limitation which the law or the necessities of the public service impose upon such applicants entering the vacancies for which the examinations are to take place. _rule 6_.--that it shall be the duty of the respective boards of examiners, on the written request of heads of departments, to hold examinations in anticipation of vacancies, as well as to fill vacancies, and to prepare lists showing the results of competition, so that when any such vacancy may happen there shall be those thus shown to be eligible to nomination or appointment, from whom the proper selection shall be made according to the provisions of the rules and regulations relating to competitive examination; and examinations upon like request shall be held in reference to vacancies to be filled under the fourth rule of this series. _rule 7._--applicants for appointment as cashiers of collectors of customs, cashiers of assistant treasurers, cashiers of postmasters, superintendents of money-order divisions in post-offices, and other custodians of large sums of public money for whose fidelity another officer has given official bonds may be appointed at discretion; but this rule shall not apply to any appointment to a position grouped below the grade of assistant teller. _rule 8_.--in cases of defalcation or embezzlement of public money, or other emergency calling for immediate action, where the public service would be materially injured unless the vacancy is promptly filled without resorting to the methods of selection and appointment prescribed by the rules and regulations, or when a vacancy happens at a place remote and difficult of access and the methods prescribed for filling it can not be applied without causing delay injurious to the public service, the appointment may be made at discretion; but this rule shall not apply to any place which is provided to be filled under the rules of competitive examination. _rule 9_.--for the purpose of bringing the examinations for the civil service as near to the residences of those desiring to be examined as the appropriation at the command of the president will warrant, and for the further purpose of facilitating as far as practicable the making of selections for such service equably from the several portions of the union, while at the same time preserving the principle of promoting merit as tested by fair competition, it is provided as follows: (1) that the several states and territories are grouped into five divisions, to be designated as civil-service districts, the said districts to be numbered consecutively from one to five, as follows: i. the first district embraces the states of maine, new hampshire, massachusetts, vermont, connecticut, rhode island, and new york; and the examinations therein shall be held alternately at the city of new york and the city of boston, but first at the city of new york. ii. the second district embraces the states of new jersey, pennsylvania, delaware, maryland, north carolina, virginia, west virginia, and the district of columbia; and the examinations therein shall be held at washington. iii. the third district embraces the states of ohio, michigan, indiana, wisconsin, and kentucky; and the examinations therein shall be held alternately at cincinnati and detroit, but first at cincinnati. iv. the fourth district embraces the states of illinois, missouri, minnesota, iowa, kansas, nebraska, nevada, california, and oregon, and also all the territories except new mexico and the district of columbia; and the examinations therein shall be held at st. louis. v. the fifth district embraces the states of south carolina, georgia, florida, alabama, mississippi, arkansas, louisiana, texas, and tennessee, together with the territory of new mexico; and the examinations therein shall be held alternately at the city of savannah and the city of memphis, but first at the city of savannah. (2) that in each of said districts examinations for admission to the civil service at washington shall be conducted as hereinafter provided; and those whose residence is within any such district at the time of filing the application for examination shall be regarded as belonging to such district in reference both to competition and to appointments; and each district shall be treated as a sphere of competition, and those so residing therein, wherever examined, shall be regarded as competing only with each other; but a person residing in any district may be allowed or notified to be examined in any other district. (3) all applications for examination for service at washington must be addressed to the head of the department at that city which the applicant desires to enter, and be in conformity to the previous rules and regulations so far as the same are not modified by this series; and every such application must be dated, must give the town or municipality as well as the state or territory where the applicant has his legal residence, and also his post-office address. (4) each of the heads of departments will cause to be kept in permanent form a register of all such applicants for his department, to be called a "register of applicants," and will cause such applications to be preserved on file for convenient reference. (5) the provisions of the former rules and regulations in reference to the examining boards in the departments and in the other local offices in the various cities, so far as consistent herewith, are continued until otherwise ordered. (6) the president will employ or designate a suitable person to be chief examiner, whose duty it will be, subject to the supervision of the civil service commission, to promote uniformity in preparing for, conducting, reporting, and grading the examinations by said boards at washington, and to prepare for, attend, supervise, and report the examinations herein provided to be held elsewhere than at washington. (7) the several heads of departments must also cause to be made in permanent form and to be preserved a "record of persons eligible for appointment," arranging under separate headings those resident in each separate district, wherein shall be entered the names of the persons who have been examined within twelve months now last past, and who are still eligible to nomination or appointment; and to such record must from time to time be added the names of those persons who shall hereafter pass an examination which shall show them to be so eligible for nomination or appointment. and such "record of persons eligible for appointment" shall be so kept and the names therein be so classified that all those whose residences appearing as aforesaid to be in the same districts shall be tabulated together, so as to show their relative excellence in each said district, except that the names of all those examined under the fourth rule of this series shall be separately entered upon the "record of persons eligible for appointment" for each department, so as to show where they reside. (8) that the officer having the power of making nomination or appointment may resort for that purpose to those so entered in the "record of persons eligible for appointment" as residing in either of said civil-service districts; but (except in respect of those examined under said rule 4) the method of competition heretofore provided must be regarded as applying among those so registered as residing in any such district, and as requiring the nomination and appointment to be made from some one of the three persons graded as the highest on some one of said five several arrangements of persons so eligible. (9) at a reasonable time before any examination is to take place each head of department will furnish the chief examiner with a list of those to be examined, and ten days before any examination is to take place in any said district, elsewhere than at washington, notice shall be sent by mail by such chief examiner to all such applicants residing or allowed to be examined in such district, stating the time and place of such examination and the other matters of which the rules and regulations require notice to be given. (10) for the purpose of the examinations last mentioned the said chief examiner shall receive from the several heads of departments at washington and from the head of any local office which may request to have any examinations made of persons for said offices the names of those who are to be examined at any place outside of washington, and shall make a list of the same, showing the date of the filing of each application, which he shall produce at the place of examination; and the examination shall be held of all those on such list who shall duly appear and submit thereto, provided the number be not so great, in the opinion of the examining board, as to render the examination of the whole impracticable, in which event only a reasonable number, to be selected in the order of the date of the filing of their applications, need be examined. (11) for each place outside of washington where such examination is to be held the president will designate persons, to be, when practicable, suitable officers of the united states, who, together with such chief examiner, or some substituted departmental examiner from washington to be sent in his place when such chief examiner can not attend, shall constitute the board for such examination; and by said persons, or a majority thereof, of whom such chief examiner or said substitute shall be one, such examinations shall be held and certified in a uniform manner; and the time occupied by each person examined shall be noted on the examination papers. the questions to be put to those examined as applicants through the request of either head of department or head of local office shall be such as may be provided and as might be put if all such examinations were, or were to be, conducted under the rules and regulations by the examining boards of any such department in washington or by any such local board. (12) the chief examiner or his substitute shall make reports to each department and local office separately in respect of all such persons as either said head of department or of a local office requested to be examined, and said reports, respectively, shall be accompanied by the examination papers of those so separately reported; and the board of examiners in each department or local office shall make up and state the excellence of each person so reported as examined, and such excellence, being not below the minimum grade of 70 per cent, shall be duly entered in the "record of persons eligible for appointment" in the proper district or local office. (13) the district examinations herein provided for shall be held not more than twice in any one year in the same district, except in washington, where an examination may be held in respect of each department as frequently as the head of such department, subject to the approval of the president, may direct; and all persons so examined in washington, wherever they may reside, shall be entered on the "record of persons eligible for appointment" equally as if examined elsewhere. (14) whenever the entry of the name of any person has been on the "record of persons eligible for appointment" during eighteen consecutive months, such entry shall be marked "time expired," and such name shall not again be placed thereon except as the result of another examination. (15) persons who may be required to be examined for any custom-house, post-office, or other local office or place of service other than washington may be notified by the head of such office to appear and be examined at any examination provided for under this rule; and the result of such examination shall be reported by the chief examiner or his substitute to the proper examining board for such office or place, or to the head of the local office; and such board shall enter the name, with the proper indication of the grade of excellence, among those who are to compete at any such place or office, and from whom selection, on the basis of competition, shall be made. (16) but where the result of any examination aforesaid shall show the excellence of any such applicant to be below the minimum grade of 70 per cent (on the basis of l00 as perfect), the only entry thereof to be made in registers of the department or of local office shall be of the words "not eligible," which shall be written against the name of such person in the register of applicants; and such applicant shall not be again examined for any department or office within six months of the date of the former examination. (17) the provisions of this rule do not apply to examinations for promotion, nor do they apply to the state department, in which examinations will be conducted under the provisions of the executive order of march 14, 1873. (18) subject to the other provisions of this rule, the times of holding the examinations herein provided for in the first, third, fourth, and fifth districts, respectively, shall be fixed by the chief examiner after consultation with the heads of departments at washington. one examination, however, shall be held in each of the last-mentioned districts prior to the 1st day of november next, and the chief examiner shall on or before that date make a report in writing to the civil service commission, setting forth generally the facts in regard to the examinations referred to in this rule and appropriate suggestions for increasing their usefulness. _rule 10_.--so many of the persons employed by the president under the ninth section of the act of march 3, 1871, as are referred to in the opinion of the attorney-general of the date of august 31, 1871, under the name of the civil service commission, and are still in such employment, together with the successors of those who have resigned, and their successors, shall hereafter be regarded as composing and shall be designated as "the civil service commission;" and the use of the designation "advisory board," as referring to such persons, will be hereafter discontinued. general orders, no. 102. war department, adjutant-general's office, _washington, october 10, 1873_. the president of the united states commands it to be made known that all soldiers who have deserted their colors, and who shall, on or before the 1st day of january, 1874, surrender themselves at any military station, shall receive a full pardon, only forfeiting the pay and allowances due them at the time of desertion, and shall be restored to duty without trial or punishment on condition that they faithfully serve through the term of their enlistment. by order of the secretary of war: e.d. townsend, _adjutant-general_. fifth annual message. executive mansion, _december 1, 1873_. _to the senate and house of representatives_: the year that has passed since the submission of my last message to congress has, especially during the latter part of it, been an eventful one to the country. in the midst of great national prosperity a financial crisis has occurred that has brought low fortunes of gigantic proportions; political partisanship has almost ceased to exist, especially in the agricultural regions; and, finally, the capture upon the high seas of a vessel bearing our flag has for a time threatened the most serious consequences, and has agitated the public mind from one end of the country to the other. but this, happily, now is in the course of satisfactory adjustment, honorable to both nations concerned. the relations of the united states, however, with most of the other powers continue to be friendly and cordial. with france, germany, russia, italy, and the minor european powers; with brazil and most of the south american republics, and with japan, nothing has occurred during the year to demand special notice. the correspondence between the department of state and various diplomatic representatives in or from those countries is transmitted herewith. in executing the will of congress, as expressed in its joint resolution of the 14th of february last, and in accordance with the provisions of the resolution, a number of "practical artisans," of "scientific men," and of "honorary commissioners" were authorized to attend the exposition at vienna as commissioners on the part of the united states. it is believed that we have obtained the object which congress had in view when it passed the joint resolution--"in order to enable the people of the united states to participate in the advantages of the international exhibition of the products of agriculture, manufactures, and the fine arts to be held at vienna." i take pleasure in adding that the american exhibitors have received a gratifying number of diplomas and of medals. during the exposition a conference was held at vienna for the purpose of consultation on the systems prevailing in different countries for the protection of inventions. i authorized a representative from the patent office to be present at vienna at the time when this conference was to take place, in order to aid as far as he might in securing any possible additional protection to american inventors in europe. the report of this agent will be laid before congress. it is my pleasant duty to announce to congress that the emperor of china, on attaining his majority, received the diplomatic representatives of the western powers in person. an account of these ceremonies and of the interesting discussions which preceded them will be found in the documents transmitted herewith. the accompanying papers show that some advance, although slight, has been made during the past year toward the suppression of the infamous chinese cooly trade. i recommend congress to inquire whether additional legislation be not needed on this subject. the money awarded to the united states by the tribunal of arbitration at geneva was paid by her majesty's government a few days in advance of the time when it would have become payable according to the terms of the treaty. in compliance with the provisions of the act of march 3, 1873, it was at once paid into the treasury, and used to redeem, so far as it might, the public debt of the united states; and the amount so redeemed was invested in a 5 per cent registered bond of the united states for $15,500,000, which is now held by the secretary of state, subject to the future disposition of congress. i renew my recommendation, made at the opening of the last session of congress, that a commission be created for the purpose of auditing and determining the amounts of the several "direct losses growing out of the destruction of vessels and their cargoes" by the _alabama_, the _florida_, or the _shenandoah_ after leaving melbourne, for which the sufferers have received no equivalent or compensation, and of ascertaining the names of the persons entitled to receive compensation for the same, making the computations upon the basis indicated by the tribunal of arbitration at geneva; and that payment of such losses be authorized to an extent not to exceed the awards of the tribunal at geneva. by an act approved on the 14th day of february last congress made provision for completing, jointly with an officer or commissioner to be named by her britannic majesty, the determination of so much of the boundary line between the territory of the united states and the possessions of great britain as was left uncompleted by the commissioners appointed under the act of congress of august 11, 1856. under the provisions of this act the northwest water boundary of the united states has been determined and marked in accordance with the award of the emperor of germany. a protocol and a copy of the map upon which the line was thus marked are contained in the papers submitted herewith. i also transmit a copy of the report of the commissioner for marking the northern boundary between the united states and the british possessions west of the lake of the woods, of the operations of the commission during the past season. surveys have been made to a point 497 miles west of the lake of the woods, leaving about 350 miles to be surveyed, the field work of which can be completed during the next season. the mixed commission organized under the provisions of the treaty of washington for settling and determining the claims of citizens of either power against the other arising out of acts committed against their persons or property during the period between april 13, 1861, and april 9, 1865, made its final award on the 25th day of september last. it was awarded that the government of the united states should pay to the government of her britannic majesty, within twelve months from the date of the award, the sum of $1,929,819 in gold. the commission disallowed or dismissed all other claims of british subjects against the united states. the amount of the claims presented by the british government, but disallowed or dismissed, is understood to be about $93,000,000. it also disallowed all the claims of citizens of the united states against great britain which were referred to it. i recommend the early passage of an act appropriating the amount necessary to pay this award against the united states. i have caused to be communicated to the government of the king of italy the thanks of this government for the eminent services rendered by count corti as the third commissioner on this commission. with dignity, learning, and impartiality he discharged duties requiring great labor and constant patience, to the satisfaction, i believe, of both governments. i recommend legislation to create a special court, to consist of three judges, who shall be empowered to hear and determine all claims of aliens upon the united states arising out of acts committed against their persons or property during the insurrection. the recent reference under the treaty of washington was confined to claims of british subjects arising during the period named in the treaty; but it is understood that there are other british claims of a similar nature, arising after the 9th of april, 1865, and it is known that other claims of a like nature are advanced by citizens or subjects of other powers. it is desirable to have these claims also examined and disposed of. official information being received from the dutch government of a state of war between the king of the netherlands and the sultan of acheen, the officers of the united states who were near the seat of the war were instructed to observe an impartial neutrality. it is believed that they have done so. the joint commission under the convention with mexico of 1868, having again been legally prolonged, has resumed its business, which, it is hoped, may be brought to an early conclusion. the distinguished representative of her britannic majesty at washington has kindly consented, with the approval of his government, to assume the arduous and responsible duties of umpire in this commission, and to lend the weight of his character and name to such decisions as may not receive the acquiescence of both the arbitrators appointed by the respective governments. the commissioners appointed pursuant to the authority of congress to examine into the nature and extent of the forays by trespassers from that country upon the herds of texas have made a report, which will be submitted for your consideration. the venezuelan government has been apprised of the sense of congress in regard to the awards of the joint commission under the convention of 25th april, 1866, as expressed in the act of the 25th of february last. it is apprehended that that government does not realize the character of its obligations under that convention. as there is reason to believe, however, that its hesitancy in recognizing them springs, in part at least, from real difficulty in discharging them in connection with its obligations to other governments, the expediency of further forbearance on our part is believed to be worthy of your consideration. the ottoman government and that of egypt have latterly shown a disposition to relieve foreign consuls of the judicial powers which heretofore they have exercised in the turkish dominions, by organizing other tribunals. as congress, however, has by law provided for the discharge of judicial functions by consuls of the united states in that quarter under the treaty of 1830, i have not felt at liberty formally to accept the proposed change without the assent of congress, whose decision upon the subject at as early a period as may be convenient is earnestly requested. i transmit herewith, for the consideration and determination of congress, an application of the republic of santo domingo to this government to exercise a protectorate over that republic. since the adjournment of congress the following treaties with foreign powers have been proclaimed: a naturalization convention with denmark; a convention with mexico for renewing the claims commission; a convention of friendship, commerce, and extradition with the orange free state, and a naturalization convention with ecuador. i renew the recommendation made in my message of december, 1870, that congress authorize the postmaster-general to issue all commissions to officials appointed through his department. i invite the earnest attention of congress to the existing laws of the united states respecting expatriation and the election of nationality by individuals. many citizens of the united states reside permanently abroad with their families. under the provisions of the act approved february 10, 1855, the children of such persons are to be deemed and taken to be citizens of the united states, but the rights of citizenship are not to descend to persons whose fathers never resided in the united states. it thus happens that persons who have never resided within the united states have been enabled to put forward a pretension to the protection of the united states against the claim to military service of the government under whose protection they were born and have been reared. in some cases even naturalized citizens of the united states have returned to the land of their birth, with intent to remain there, and their children, the issue of a marriage contracted there after their return, and who have never been in the united states, have laid claim to our protection when the lapse of many years had imposed upon them the duty of military service to the only government which had ever known them personally. until the year 1868 it was left, embarrassed by conflicting opinions of courts and of jurists, to determine how far the doctrine of perpetual allegiance derived from our former colonial relations with great britain was applicable to american citizens. congress then wisely swept these doubts away by enacting that-any declaration, instruction, opinion, order, or decision of any officer of this government which denies, restricts, impairs, or questions the right of expatriation is inconsistent with the fundamental principles of this government. but congress did not indicate in that statute, nor has it since done so, what acts are to be deemed to work expatriation. for my own guidance in determining such questions i required (under the provisions of the constitution) the opinion in writing of the principal officer in each of the executive departments upon certain questions relating to this subject. the result satisfies me that further legislation has become necessary. i therefore commend the subject to the careful consideration of congress, and i transmit herewith copies of the several opinions of the principal officers of the executive departments, together with other correspondence and pertinent information on the same subject. the united states, who led the way in the overthrow of the feudal doctrine of perpetual allegiance, are among the last to indicate how their own citizens may elect another nationality. the papers submitted herewith indicate what is necessary to place us on a par with other leading nations in liberality of legislation on this international question. we have already in our treaties assented to the principles which would need to be embodied in laws intended to accomplish such results. we have agreed that citizens of the united states may cease to be citizens and may voluntarily render allegiance to other powers. we have agreed that residence in a foreign land without intent to return, shall of itself work expatriation. we have agreed in some instances upon the length of time necessary for such continued residence to work a presumption of such intent. i invite congress now to mark out and define when and how expatriation can be accomplished; to regulate by law the condition of american women marrying foreigners; to fix the status of children born in a foreign country of american parents residing more or less permanently abroad, and to make rules for determining such other kindred points as may seem best to congress. in compliance with the request of congress, i transmitted to the american minister at madrid, with instructions to present it to the spanish government, the joint resolution approved on the 3d of march last, tendering to the people of spain, in the name and on the behalf of the american people, the congratulations of congress upon the efforts to consolidate in spain the principles of universal liberty in a republican form of government. the existence of this new republic was inaugurated by striking the fetters from the slaves in porto rico. this beneficent measure was followed by the release of several thousand persons illegally held as slaves in cuba. next, the captain-general of that colony was deprived of the power to set aside the orders of his superiors at madrid, which had pertained to the office since 1825. the sequestered estates of american citizens, which had been the cause of long and fruitless correspondence, were ordered to be restored to their owners. all these liberal steps were taken in the face of a violent opposition directed by the reactionary slaveholders of havana, who are vainly striving to stay the march of ideas which has terminated slavery in christendom, cuba only excepted. unhappily, however, this baneful influence has thus far succeeded in defeating the efforts of all liberal-minded men in spain to abolish slavery in cuba, and in preventing the promised reform in that island. the struggle for political supremacy continues there. the proslavery and aristocratic party in cuba is gradually arraigning itself in more and more open hostility and defiance of the home government, while it still maintains a political connection with the republic in the peninsula; and although usurping and defying the authority of the home government whenever such usurpation or defiance tends in the direction of oppression or of the maintenance of abuses, it is still a power in madrid, and is recognized by the government. thus an element more dangerous to continued colonial relations between cuba and spain than that which inspired the insurrection at yara--an element opposed to granting any relief from misrule and abuse, with no aspirations after freedom, commanding no sympathies in generous breasts, aiming to rivet still stronger the shackles of slavery and oppression--has seized many of the emblems of power in cuba, and, under professions of loyalty to the mother country, is exhausting the resources of the island, and is doing acts which are at variance with those principles of justice, of liberality, and of right which give nobility of character to a republic. in the interests of humanity, of civilization, and of progress, it is to be hoped that this evil influence may be soon averted. the steamer _virginius_ was on the 26th day of september, 1870, duly registered at the port of new york as a part of the commercial marine of the united states. on the 4th of october, 1870, having received the certificate of her register in the usual legal form, she sailed from the port of new york and has not since been within the territorial jurisdiction of the united states. on the 31st day of october last, while sailing under the flag of the united states on the high seas, she was forcibly seized by the spanish gunboat _tornado_, and was carried into the port of santiago de cuba, where fifty-three of her passengers and crew were inhumanly, and, so far at least as relates to those who were citizens of the united states, without due process of law, put to death. it is a well-established principle, asserted by the united states from the beginning of their national independence, recognized by great britain and other maritime powers, and stated by the senate in a resolution passed unanimously on the 16th of june, 1858, that- american vessels on the high seas in time of peace, bearing the american flag, remain under the jurisdiction of the country to which they belong, and therefore any visitation, molestation, or detention of such vessel by force, or by the exhibition of force, on the part of a foreign power is in derogation of the sovereignty of the united states. in accordance with this principle, the restoration of the _virginius_ and the surrender of the survivors of her passengers and crew, and a due reparation to the flag, and the punishment of the authorities who had been guilty of the illegal acts of violence, were demanded. the spanish government has recognized the justice of the demand, and has arranged for the immediate delivery of the vessel, and for the surrender of the survivors of the passengers and crew, and for a salute to the flag, and for proceedings looking to the punishment of those who may be proved to have been guilty of illegal acts of violence toward citizens of the united states, and also toward indemnifying those who may be shown to be entitled to indemnity. a copy of a protocol of a conference between the secretary of state and the spanish minister, in which the terms of this arrangement were agreed to, is transmitted herewith. the correspondence on this subject with the legation of the united states in madrid was conducted in cipher and by cable, and needs the verification of the actual text of the correspondence. it has seemed to me to be due to the importance of the case not to submit this correspondence until the accurate text can be received by mail. it is expected shortly, and will be submitted when received. in taking leave of this subject for the present i wish to renew the expression of my conviction that the existence of african slavery in cuba is a principal cause of the lamentable condition of the island. i do not doubt that congress shares with me the hope that it will soon be made to disappear, and that peace and prosperity may follow its abolition. the embargoing of american estates in cuba, cruelty to american citizens detected in no act of hostility to the spanish government, the murdering of prisoners taken with arms in their hands, and, finally, the capture upon the high seas of a vessel sailing under the united states flag and bearing a united states registry have culminated in an outburst of indignation that has seemed for a time to threaten war. pending negotiations between the united states and the government of spain on the subject of this capture, i have authorized the secretary of the navy to put our navy on a war footing, to the extent, at least, of the entire annual appropriation for that branch of the service, trusting to congress and the public opinion of the american people to justify my action. assuming from the action of the last congress in appointing a committee on privileges and elections to prepare and report to this congress a constitutional amendment to provide a better method of electing the president and vice-president of the united states, and also from the necessity of such an amendment, that there will be submitted to the state legislatures for ratification such an improvement in our constitution, i suggest two others for your consideration: first. to authorize the executive to approve of so much of any measure passing the two houses of congress as his judgment may dictate, without approving the whole, the disapproved portion or portions to be subjected to the same rules as now, to wit, to be referred back to the house in which the measure or measures originated, and, if passed by a two-thirds vote of the two houses, then to become a law without the approval of the president. i would add to this a provision that there should be no legislation by congress during the last twenty-four hours of its sitting, except upon vetoes, in order to give the executive an opportunity to examine and approve or disapprove bills understandingly. second. to provide by amendment that when an extra session of congress is convened by executive proclamation legislation during the continuance of such extra session shall be confined to such subjects as the executive may bring before it from time to time in writing. the advantages to be gained by these two amendments are too obvious for me to comment upon them. one session in each year is provided for by the constitution, in which there are no restrictions as to the subjects of legislation by congress. if more are required, it is always in the power of congress, during their term of office, to provide for sessions at any time. the first of these amendments would protect the public against the many abuses and waste of public moneys which creep into appropriation bills and other important measures passing during the expiring hours of congress, to which otherwise due consideration can not be given. treasury department. the receipts of the government from all sources for the last fiscal year were $333,738,204, and expenditures on all accounts $290,345,245, thus showing an excess of receipts over expenditures of $43,392,959. but it is not probable that this favorable exhibit will be shown for the present fiscal year. indeed, it is very doubtful whether, except with great economy on the part of congress in making appropriations and the same economy in administering the various departments of government, the revenues will not fall short of meeting actual expenses, including interest on the public debt. i commend to congress such economy, and point out two sources where it seems to me it might commence, to wit, in the appropriations for public buildings in the many cities where work has not yet been commenced; in the appropriations for river and harbor improvement in those localities where the improvements are of but little benefit to general commerce, and for fortifications. there is a still more fruitful source of expenditure, which i will point out later in this message. i refer to the easy method of manufacturing claims for losses incurred in suppressing the late rebellion. i would not be understood here as opposing the erection of good, substantial, and even ornamental buildings by the government wherever such buildings are needed. in fact, i approve of the government owning its own buildings in all sections of the country, and hope the day is not far distant when it will not only possess them, but will erect in the capital suitable residences for all persons who now receive commutation for quarters or rent at government expense, and for the cabinet, thus setting an example to the states which may induce them to erect buildings for their senators. but i would have this work conducted at a time when the revenues of the country would abundantly justify it. the revenues have materially fallen off for the first five months of the present fiscal year from what they were expected to produce, owing to the general panic now prevailing, which commenced about the middle of september last. the full effect of this disaster, if it should not prove a "blessing in disguise," is yet to be demonstrated. in either event it is your duty to heed the lesson and to provide by wise and well-considered legislation, as far as it lies in your power, against its recurrence, and to take advantage of all benefits that may have accrued. my own judgment is that, however much individuals may have suffered, one long step has been taken toward specie payments; that we can never have permanent prosperity until a specie basis is reached; and that a specie basis can not be reached and maintained until our exports, exclusive of gold, pay for our imports, interest due abroad, and other specie obligations, or so nearly so as to leave an appreciable accumulation of the precious metals in the country from the products of our mines. the development of the mines of precious metals during the past year and the prospective development of them for years to come are gratifying in their results. could but one-half of the gold extracted from the mines be retained at home, our advance toward specie payments would be rapid. to increase our exports sufficient currency is required to keep all the industries of the country employed. without this national as well as individual bankruptcy must ensue. undue inflation, on the other hand, while it might give temporary relief, would only lead to inflation of prices, the impossibility of competing in our own markets for the products of home skill and labor, and repeated renewals of present experiences. elasticity to our circulating medium, therefore, and just enough of it to transact the legitimate business of the country and to keep all industries employed, is what is most to be desired. the exact medium is specie, the recognized medium of exchange the world over. that obtained, we shall have a currency of an exact degree of elasticity. if there be too much of it for the legitimate purposes of trade and commerce, it will flow out of the country. if too little, the reverse will result. to hold what we have and to appreciate our currency to that standard is the problem deserving of the most serious consideration of congress. the experience of the present panic has proven that the currency of the country, based, as it is, upon the credit of the country, is the best that has ever been devised. usually in times of such trials currency has become worthless, or so much depreciated in value as to inflate the values of all the necessaries of life as compared with the currency. everyone holding it has been anxious to dispose of it on any terms. now we witness the reverse. holders of currency hoard it as they did gold in former experiences of a like nature. it is patent to the most casual observer that much more currency, or money, is required to transact the legitimate trade of the country during the fall and winter months, when the vast crops are being removed, than during the balance of the year. with our present system the amount in the country remains the same throughout the entire year, resulting in an accumulation of all the surplus capital of the country in a few centers when not employed in the moving of crops, tempted there by the offer of interest on call loans. interest being paid, this surplus capital must earn this interest paid with a profit. being subject to "call," it can not be loaned, only in part at best, to the merchant or manufacturer for a fixed term. hence, no matter how much currency there might be in the country, it would be absorbed, prices keeping pace with the volume, and panics, stringency, and disasters would ever be recurring with the autumn. elasticity in our monetary system, therefore, is the object to be attained first, and next to that, as far as possible, a prevention of the use of other people's money in stock and other species of speculation. to prevent the latter it seems to me that one great step would be taken by prohibiting the national banks from paying interest on deposits, by requiring them to hold their reserves in their own vaults, and by forcing them into resumption, though it would only be in legal-tender notes. for this purpose i would suggest the establishment of clearing houses for your consideration. to secure the former many plans have been suggested, most, if not all, of which look to me more like inflation on the one hand, or compelling the government, on the other, to pay interest, without corresponding benefits, upon the surplus funds of the country during the seasons when otherwise unemployed. i submit for your consideration whether this difficulty might not be overcome by authorizing the secretary of the treasury to issue at any time to national banks of issue any amount of their own notes below a fixed percentage of their issue (say 40 per cent), upon the banks' depositing with the treasurer of the united states an amount of government bonds equal to the amount of notes demanded, the banks to forfeit to the government, say, 4 per cent of the interest accruing on the bonds so pledged during the time they remain with the treasurer as security for the increased circulation, the bonds so pledged to be redeemable by the banks at their pleasure, either in whole or in part, by returning their own bills for cancellation to an amount equal to the face of the bonds withdrawn. i would further suggest for your consideration the propriety of authorizing national banks to diminish their standing issue at pleasure, by returning for cancellation their own bills and withdrawing so many united states bonds as are pledged for the bills returned. in view of the great actual contraction that has taken place in the currency and the comparative contraction continuously going on, due to the increase of population, increase of manufactories and all the industries, i do not believe there is too much of it now for the dullest period of the year. indeed, if clearing houses should be established, thus forcing redemption, it is a question for your consideration whether banking should not be made free, retaining all the safeguards now required to secure bill holders. in any modification of the present laws regulating national banks, as a further step toward preparing for resumption of specie payments, i invite your attention to a consideration of the propriety of exacting from them the retention as a part of their reserve either the whole or a part of the gold interest accruing upon the bonds pledged as security for their issue. i have not reflected enough on the bearing this might have in producing a scarcity of coin with which to pay duties on imports to give it my positive recommendation. but your attention is invited to the subject. during the last four years the currency has been contracted, directly, by the withdrawal of 3 per cent certificates, compound-interest notes, and "seven-thirty" bonds outstanding on the 4th of march, 1869, all of which took the place of legal-tenders in the bank reserves to the extent of $63,000,000. during the same period there has been a much larger comparative contraction of the currency. the population of the country has largely increased. more than 25,000 miles of railroad have been built, requiring the active use of capital to operate them. millions of acres of land have been opened to cultivation, requiring capital to move the products. manufactories have multiplied beyond all precedent in the same period of time, requiring capital weekly for the payment of wages and for the purchase of material; and probably the largest of all comparative contraction arises from the organizing of free labor in the south. now every laborer there receives his wages, and, for want of savings banks, the greater part of such wages is carried in the pocket or hoarded until required for use. these suggestions are thrown out for your consideration, without any recommendation that they shall be adopted literally, but hoping that the best method may be arrived at to secure such an elasticity of the currency as will keep employed all the industries of the country and prevent such an inflation as will put off indefinitely the resumption of specie payments, an object so devoutly to be wished for by all, and by none more earnestly than the class of people most directly interested--those who "earn their bread by the sweat of their brow." the decisions of congress on this subject will have the hearty support of the executive. in previous messages i have called attention to the decline in american shipbuilding and recommended such legislation as would secure to us our proportion of the carrying trade. stimulated by high rates and abundance of freight, the progress for the last year in shipbuilding has been very satisfactory. there has been an increase of about 3 per cent in the amount transported in american vessels over the amount of last year. with the reduced cost of material which has taken place, it may reasonably be hoped that this progress will be maintained, and even increased. however, as we pay about $80,000,000 per annum to foreign vessels for the transportation to a market of our surplus products, thus increasing the balance of trade against us to this amount, the subject is one worthy of your serious consideration. "cheap transportation" is a subject that has attracted the attention of both producers and consumers for the past few years, and has contributed to, if it has not been the direct cause of, the recent panic and stringency. as congress, at its last session, appointed a special committee to investigate this whole subject during the vacation and report at this session, i have nothing to recommend until their report is read. there is one work, however, of a national character, in which the greater portion of the east and the west, the north and the south, are equally interested, to which i will invite your attention. the state of new york has a canal connecting lake erie with tide water on the hudson river. the state of illinois has a similar work connecting lake michigan with navigable water on the illinois river, thus making water communication inland between the east and the west and south. these great artificial water courses are the property of the states through which they pass, and pay toll to those states. would it not be wise statesmanship to pledge these states that if they will open these canals for the passage of large vessels the general government will look after and keep in navigable condition the great public highways with which they connect, to wit, the overslaugh on the hudson, the st. clair flats, and the illinois and mississippi rivers? this would be a national work; one of great value to the producers of the west and south in giving them cheap transportation for their produce to the seaboard and a market, and to the consumers in the east in giving them cheaper food, particularly of those articles of food which do not find a foreign market, and the prices of which, therefore, are not regulated by foreign demands. the advantages of such a work are too obvious for argument. i submit the subject to you, therefore, without further comment. in attempting to regain our lost commerce and carrying trade i have heretofore called attention to the states south of us offering a field where much might be accomplished. to further this object i suggest that a small appropriation be made, accompanied with authority for the secretary of the navy to fit out a naval vessel to ascend the amazon river to the mouth of the madeira; thence to explore that river and its tributaries into bolivia, and to report to congress at its next session, or as soon as practicable, the accessibility of the country by water, its resources, and the population so reached. such an exploration would cost but little; it can do no harm, and may result in establishing a trade of value to both nations. in further connection with the treasury department i would recommend a revision and codification of the tariff laws and the opening of more mints for coming money, with authority to coin for such nations as may apply. war department. the attention of congress is invited to the recommendations contained in the report of the secretary of war herewith accompanying. the apparent great cost of supporting the army is fully explained by this report, and i hope will receive your attention. while inviting your general attention to all the recommendations made by the secretary of war, there are two which i would especially invite you to consider: first, the importance of preparing for war in time of peace by providing proper armament for our seacoast defenses. proper armament is of vastly more importance than fortifications. the latter can be supplied very speedily for temporary purposes when needed; the former can not. the second is the necessity of reopening promotion in the staff corps of the army. particularly is this necessity felt in the medical, pay, and ordnance departments. at this time it is necessary to employ "contract surgeons" to supply the necessary medical attendance required by the army. with the present force of the pay department it is now difficult to make the payments to troops provided for by law. long delays in payments are productive of desertions and other demoralization, and the law prohibits the payment of troops by other than regular army paymasters. there are now sixteen vacancies in the ordnance department, thus leaving that branch of the service without sufficient officers to conduct the business of the different arsenals on a large scale if ever required. navy department. during the past year our navy has been depleted by the sale of some vessels no longer fit for naval service and by the condemnation of others not yet disposed of. this, however, has been more than compensated for by the repair of six of the old wooden ships and by the building of eight new sloops of war, authorized by the last congress. the building of these latter has occurred at a doubly fortunate time. they are about being completed at a time when they may possibly be much needed, and the work upon them has not only given direct employment to thousands of men, but has no doubt been the means of keeping open establishments for other work at a time of great financial distress. since the commencement of the last month, however, the distressing occurrences which have taken place in the waters of the caribbean sea, almost on our very seaboard, while they illustrate most forcibly the necessity always existing that a nation situated like ours should maintain in a state of possible efficiency a navy adequate to its responsibilities, has at the same time demanded that all the effective force we really have shall be put in immediate readiness for warlike service. this has been and is being done promptly and effectively, and i am assured that all the available ships and every authorized man of the american navy will be ready for whatever action is required for the safety of our citizens or the maintenance of our honor. this, of course, will require the expenditure in a short time of some of the appropriations which were calculated to extend through the fiscal year, but congress will, i doubt not, understand and appreciate the emergency, and will provide adequately not only for the present preparation, but for the future maintenance of our naval force. the secretary of the navy has during the past year been quietly putting some of our most effective monitors in condition for service, and thus the exigency finds us in a much better condition for work than we could possibly have been without his action. post-office department. a complete exhibit is presented in the accompanying report of the postmaster-general of the operations of the post-office department during the year. the ordinary postal revenues for the fiscal year ended june 30, 1873, amounted to $22,996,741.57, and the expenditures of all kinds to $29,084,945.67. the increase of revenues over 1872 was $1,081,315.20, and the increase of expenditures $2,426,753.36. independent of the payments made from special appropriations for mail steamship lines, the amount drawn from the general treasury to meet deficiencies was $5,265,475. the constant and rapid extension of our postal service, particularly upon railways, and the improved facilities for the collection, transmission, distribution, and delivery of the mails which are constantly being provided account for the increased expenditures of this popular branch of the public service. the total number of post-offices in operation on june 30, 1873, was 33,244, a net increase of 1,381 over the number reported the preceding year. the number of presidential offices was 1,363, an increase of 163 during the year. the total length of railroad mail routes at the close of the year was 63,457 miles, an increase of 5,546 miles over the year 1872. fifty-nine railway post-office lines were in operation june 30, 1873, extending over 14,866 miles of railroad routes and performing an aggregate service of 34,925 miles daily. the number of letters exchanged with foreign countries was 27,459,185, an increase of 3,096,685 over the previous year, and the postage thereon amounted to $2,021,310.86. the total weight of correspondence exchanged in the mails with european countries exceeded 912 tens, an increase of 92 tons over the previous year. the total cost of the united states ocean steamship service, including $725,000 paid from special appropriations to subsidized lines of mail steamers, was $1,047,271.35. new or additional postal conventions have been concluded with sweden, norway, belgium, germany, canada, newfoundland, and japan, reducing postage rates on correspondence exchanged with those countries; and further efforts have been made to conclude a satisfactory postal convention with france, but without success. i invite the favorable consideration of congress to the suggestions and recommendations of the postmaster-general for an extension of the free-delivery system in all cities having a population of not less than 10,000; for the prepayment of postage on newspapers and other printed matter of the second class; for a uniform postage and limit of weight on miscellaneous matter; for adjusting the compensation of all postmasters not appointed by the president, by the old method of commissions on the actual receipts of the office, instead of the present mode of fixing the salary in advance upon special returns; and especially do i urge favorable action by congress on the important recommendations of the postmaster-general for the establishment of united states postal savings depositories. your attention is also again called to a consideration of the question of postal telegraphs and the arguments adduced in support thereof, in the hope that you may take such action in connection therewith as in your judgment will most contribute to the best interests of the country. department of justice. affairs in utah require your early and special attention. the supreme court of the united states, in the case of clinton _vs_. englebrecht, decided that the united states marshal of that territory could not lawfully summon jurors for the district courts; and those courts hold that the territorial marshal can not lawfully perform that duty, because he is elected by the legislative assembly, and not appointed as provided for in the act organizing the territory. all proceedings at law are practically abolished by these decisions, and there have been but few or no jury trials in the district courts of that territory since the last session of congress. property is left without protection by the courts, and crimes go unpunished. to prevent anarchy there it is absolutely necessary that congress provide the courts with some mode of obtaining jurors, and i recommend legislation to that end, and also that the probate courts of the territory, now assuming to issue writs of injunction and _habeas corpus_ and to try criminal cases and questions as to land titles, be denied all jurisdiction not possessed ordinarily by courts of that description. i have become impressed with the belief that the act approved march 2, 1867, entitled "an act to establish a uniform system of bankruptcy throughout the united states," is productive of more evil than good at this time. many considerations might be urged for its total repeal, but, if this is not considered advisable, i think it will not be seriously questioned that those portions of said act providing for what is called involuntary bankruptcy operate to increase the financial embarrassments of the country. careful and prudent men very often become involved in debt in the transaction of their business, and though they may possess ample property, if it could be made available for that purpose, to meet all their liabilities, yet, on account of the extraordinary scarcity of money, they may be unable to meet all their pecuniary obligations as they become due, in consequence of which they are liable to be prostrated in their business by proceedings in bankruptcy at the instance of unrelenting creditors. people are now so easily alarmed as to monetary matters that the mere filing of a petition in bankruptcy by an unfriendly creditor will necessarily embarrass, and oftentimes accomplish the financial ruin, of a responsible business man. those who otherwise might make lawful and just arrangements to relieve themselves from difficulties produced by the present stringency in money are prevented by their constant exposure to attack and disappointment by proceedings against them in bankruptcy, and, besides, the law is made use of in many cases by obdurate creditors to frighten or force debtors into a compliance with their wishes and into acts of injustice to other creditors and to themselves. i recommend that so much of said act as provides for involuntary bankruptcy on account of the suspension of payment be repealed. your careful attention is invited to the subject of claims against the government and to the facilities afforded by existing laws for their prosecution. each of the departments of state, treasury, and war has demands for many millions of dollars upon its files, and they are rapidly accumulating. to these may be added those now pending before congress, the court of claims, and the southern claims commission, making in the aggregate an immense sum. most of these grow out of the rebellion, and are intended to indemnify persons on both sides for their losses during the war; and not a few of them are fabricated and supported by false testimony. projects are on foot, it is believed, to induce congress to provide for new classes of claims, and to revive old ones through the repeal or modification of the statute of limitations, by which they are now barred. i presume these schemes, if proposed, will be received with little favor by congress, and i recommend that persons having claims against the united states cognizable by any tribunal or department thereof be required to present them at an early day, and that legislation be directed as far as practicable to the defeat of unfounded and unjust demands upon the government; and i would suggest, as a means of preventing fraud, that witnesses be called upon to appear in person to testify before those tribunals having said claims before them for adjudication. probably the largest saving to the national treasury can be secured by timely legislation on these subjects of any of the economic measures that will be proposed. you will be advised of the operations of the department of justice by the report of the attorney-general, and i invite your attention to the amendments of existing laws suggested by him, with the view of reducing the expenses of that department. department of the interior. the policy inaugurated toward the indians at the beginning of the last administration has been steadily pursued, and, i believe, with beneficial results. it will be continued with only such modifications as time and experience may demonstrate as necessary. with the encroachment of civilization upon the indian reservations and hunting grounds, disturbances have taken place between the indians and whites during the past year, and probably will continue to do so until each race appreciates that the other has rights which must be respected. the policy has been to collect the indians as rapidly as possible on reservations, and as far as practicable within what is known as the indian territory, and to teach them the arts of civilization and self-support. where found off their reservations, and endangering the peace and safety of the whites, they have been punished, and will continue to be for like offenses. the indian territory south of kansas and west of arkansas is sufficient in area and agricultural resources to support all the indians east of the rocky mountains. in time, no doubt, all of them, except a few who may elect to make their homes among white people, will be collected there. as a preparatory step for this consummation, i am now satisfied that a territorial form of government should be given them, which will secure the treaty rights of the original settlers and protect their homesteads from alienation for a period of twenty years. the operations of the patent office are growing to such a magnitude and the accumulation of material is becoming so great that the necessity of more room is becoming more obvious day by day. i respectfully invite your attention to the reports of the secretary of the interior and commissioner of patents on this subject. the business of the general land office exhibits a material increase in all its branches during the last fiscal year. during that time there were disposed of out of the public lands 13,030,606 acres, being an amount greater by 1,165,631 acres than was disposed of during the preceding year. of the amount disposed of, 1,626,266 acres were sold for cash, 214,940 acres were located with military land warrants, 3,793,612 acres were taken for homesteads, 653,446 acres were located with agricultural-college scrip, 6,083,536 acres were certified by railroads, 76,576 acres were granted to wagon roads, 238,548 acres were approved to states as swamp lands, 138,681 acres were certified for agricultural colleges, common schools, universities, and seminaries, 190,775 acres were approved to states for internal improvements, and 14,222 acres were located with indian scrip. the cash receipts during the same time were $3,408,515.50, being $190,415.50 in excess of the receipts of the previous year. during the year 30,488,132 acres of public land were surveyed, an increase over the amount surveyed the previous year of 1,037,193 acres, and, added to the area previously surveyed, aggregates 616,554,895 acres which have been surveyed, leaving 1,218,443,505 acres of the public land still unsurveyed. the increased and steadily increasing facilities for reaching our unoccupied public domain and for the transportation of surplus products enlarge the available field for desirable homestead locations, thus stimulating settlement and extending year by year in a gradually increasing ratio the area of occupation and cultivation. the expressed desire of the representatives of a large colony of citizens of russia to emigrate to this country, as is understood, with the consent of their government, if certain concessions can be made to enable them to settle in a compact colony, is of great interest, as going to show the light in which our institutions are regarded by an industrious, intelligent, and wealthy people, desirous of enjoying civil and religious liberty; and the acquisition of so large an immigration of citizens of a superior class would without doubt be of substantial benefit to the country. i invite attention to the suggestion of the secretary of the interior in this behalf. there was paid during the last fiscal year for pensions, including the expense of disbursement, $29,185,289.62, being an amount less by $984,050.98 than was expended for the same purpose the preceding year. although this statement of expenditures would indicate a material reduction in amount compared with the preceding year, it is believed that the changes in the pension laws at the last session of congress will absorb that amount the current year. at the close of the last fiscal year there were on the pension rolls 99,804 invalid military pensioners and 112,088 widows, orphans, and dependent relatives of deceased soldiers, making a total of that class of 211,892; 18,266 survivors of the war of 1812 and 5,053 widows of soldiers of that war pensioned under the act of congress of february 14, 1871, making a total of that class of 23,319; 1,430 invalid navy pensioners and 1,770 widows, orphans, and dependent relatives of deceased officers, sailors, and marines of the navy, making a total of navy pensioners of 3,200, and a grand total of pensioners of all classes of 238,411, showing a net increase during the last fiscal year of 6,182. during the last year the names of 16,405 pensioners were added to the rolls, and 10,223 names were dropped therefrom for various causes. the system adopted for the detection of frauds against the government in the matter of pensions has been productive of satisfactory results, but legislation is needed to provide, if possible, against the perpetration of such frauds in future. the evidently increasing interest in the cause of education is a most encouraging feature in the general progress and prosperity of the country, and the bureau of education is earnest in its efforts to give proper direction to the new appliances and increased facilities which are being offered to aid the educators of the country in their great work. the ninth census has been completed, the report thereof published and distributed, and the working force of the bureau disbanded. the secretary of the interior renews his recommendation for a census to be taken in 1875, to which subject the attention of congress is invited. the original suggestion in that behalf has met with the general approval of the country; and even if it be not deemed advisable at present to provide for a regular quinquennial census, a census taken in 1875, the report of which could be completed and published before the one hundredth anniversary of our national independence, would be especially interesting and valuable, as showing the progress of the country during the first century of our national existence. it is believed, however, that a regular census every five years would be of substantial benefit to the country, inasmuch as our growth hitherto has been so rapid that the results of the decennial census are necessarily unreliable as a basis of estimates for the latter years of a decennial period. district of columbia. under the very efficient management of the governor and the board of public works of this district the city of washington is rapidly assuming the appearance of a capital of which the nation may well be proud. from being a most unsightly place three years ago, disagreeable to pass through in summer in consequence of the dust arising from unpaved streets, and almost impassable in the winter from the mud, it is now one of the most sightly cities in the country, and can boast of being the best paved. the work has been done systematically, the plans, grades, location of sewers, water and gas mains being determined upon before the work was commenced, thus securing permanency when completed. i question whether so much has ever been accomplished before in any american city for the same expenditures. the government having large reservations in the city, and the nation at large having an interest in their capital, i recommend a liberal policy toward the district of columbia, and that the government should bear its just share of the expense of these improvements. every citizen visiting the capital feels a pride in its growing beauty, and that he too is part owner in the investments made here. i would suggest to congress the propriety of promoting the establishment in this district of an institution of learning, or university of the highest class, by the donation of lands. there is no place better suited for such an institution than the national capital. there is no other place in which every citizen is so directly interested. civil-service reform. in three successive messages to congress i have called attention to the subject of "civil-service reform." action has been taken so far as to authorize the appointment of a board to devise rules governing methods of making appointments and promotions, but there never has been any action making these rules, or any rules, binding, or even entitled to observance, where persons desire the appointment of a friend or the removal of an official who may be disagreeable to them. to have any rules effective they must have the acquiescence of congress as well as of the executive. i commend, therefore, the subject to your attention, and suggest that a special committee of congress might confer with the civil-service board during the present session for the purpose of devising such rules as can be maintained, and which will secure the services of honest and capable officials, and which will also protect them in a degree of independence while in office. proper rules will protect congress, as well as the executive, from much needless persecution, and will prove of great value to the public at large. i would recommend for your favorable consideration the passage of an enabling act for the admission of colorado as a state in the union. it possesses all the elements of a prosperous state, agricultural and mineral, and, i believe, has a population now to justify such admission. in connection with this i would also recommend the encouragement of a canal for purposes of irrigation from the eastern slope of the rocky mountains to the missouri river. as a rule i am opposed to further donations of public lands for internal improvements owned and controlled by private corporations, but in this instance i would make an exception. between the missouri river and the rocky mountains there is an arid belt of public land from 300 to 500 miles in width, perfectly valueless for the occupation of man, for the want of sufficient rain to secure the growth of any product. an irrigating canal would make productive a belt as wide as the supply of water could be made to spread over across this entire country, and would secure a cordon of settlements connecting the present population of the mountain and mining regions with that of the older states. all the land reclaimed would be clear gain. if alternate sections are retained by the government, i would suggest that the retained sections be thrown open to entry under the homestead laws, or sold to actual settlers for a very low price. i renew my previous recommendation to congress for general amnesty. the number engaged in the late rebellion yet laboring under disabilities is very small, but enough to keep up a constant irritation. no possible danger can accrue to the government by restoring them to eligibility to hold office. i suggest for your consideration the enactment of a law to better secure the civil rights which freedom should secure, but has not effectually secured, to the enfranchised slave. u.s. grant. special messages. washington, _december 2, 1873_. _to the senate and house of representatives_: i herewith transmit to congress a report, dated the 2d instant, with accompanying papers,[76] received from the secretary of state, in compliance with the requirements of the sixteenth and eighteenth sections of the act entitled "an act to regulate the diplomatic and consular systems of the united states," approved august 18, 1856. u.s. grant. [footnote 76: report of fees collected, etc., by consular officers of the united states for 1872, list of consular officers and their official residences, and tariff of consular fees.] washington, _january 5, 1874_. _to the senate of the united states_: i transmit, for the consideration of the senate with a view to ratification, a convention for the surrender of criminals between the united states of america and the republic of honduras, which was signed at comayagua on the 4th day of june, 1873. u.s. grant. washington, _january 5, 1874_. _to the senate and house of representatives_: in my annual message of december last i gave reason to expect that when the full and accurate text of the correspondence relating to the steamer _virginius_, which had been telegraphed in cipher, should be received the papers concerning the capture of the vessel, the execution of a part of its passengers and crew, and the restoration of the ship and the survivors would be transmitted to congress. in compliance with the expectations then held out, i now transmit the papers and correspondence on that subject. on the 26th day of september, 1870, the _virginius_ was registered in the custom-house at new york as the property of a citizen of the united states, he having first made oath, as required by law, that he was "the true and only owner of the said vessel, and that there was no subject or citizen of any foreign prince or state, directly or indirectly, by way of trust, confidence, or otherwise, interested therein." having complied with the requisites of the statute in that behalf, she cleared in the usual way for the port of curaã§oa, and on or about the 4th day of october, 1870, sailed for that port. it is not disputed that she made the voyage according to her clearance, nor that from that day to this she has not returned within the territorial jurisdiction of the united states. it is also understood that she preserved her american papers, and that when within foreign ports she made the practice of putting forth a claim to american nationality, which was recognized by the authorities at such ports. when, therefore, she left the port of kingston, in october last, under the flag of the united states, she would appear to have had, as against all powers except the united states, the right to fly that flag and to claim its protection, as enjoyed by all regularly documented vessels registered as part of our commercial marine. no state of war existed conferring upon a maritime power the right to molest and detain upon the high seas a documented vessel, and it can not be pretended that the _virginius_ had placed herself without the pale of all law by acts of piracy against the human race. if her papers were irregular or fraudulent, the offense was one against the laws of the united states, justiciable only in their tribunals. when, therefore, it became known that the _virginius_ had been captured on the high seas by a spanish man-of-war; that the american flag had been hauled down by the captors; that the vessel had been carried to a spanish port, and that spanish tribunals were taking jurisdiction over the persons of those found on her, and exercising that jurisdiction upon american citizens, not only in violation of the rules of international law, but in contravention of the provisions of the treaty of 1795, i directed a demand to be made upon spain for the restoration of the vessel and for the return of the survivors to the protection of the united states, for a salute to the flag, and for the punishment of the offending parties. the principles upon which these demands rested could not be seriously questioned, but it was suggested by the spanish government that there were grave doubts whether the _virginius_ was entitled to the character given her by her papers, and that therefore it might be proper for the united states, after the surrender of the vessel and the survivors, to dispense with the salute to the flag, should such fact be established to their satisfaction. this seemed to be reasonable and just. i therefore assented to it, on the assurance that spain would then declare that no insult to the flag of the united states had been intended. i also authorized an agreement to be made that should it be shown to the satisfaction of this government that the _virginius_ was improperly bearing the flag proceedings should be instituted in our courts for the punishment of the offense committed against the united states. on her part spain undertook to proceed against those who had offended the sovereignty of the united states, or who had violated their treaty rights. the surrender of the vessel and the survivors to the jurisdiction of the tribunals of the united states was an admission of the principles upon which our demands had been founded. i therefore had no hesitation in agreeing to the arrangement finally made between the two governments--an arrangement which was moderate and just, and calculated to cement the good relations which have so long existed between spain and the united states. under this agreement the _virginius_, with the american flag flying, was delivered to the navy of the united states at bahia honda, in the island of cuba, on the 16th ultimo. she was then in an unseaworthy condition. in the passage to new york she encountered one of the most tempestuous of our winter storms. at the risk of their lives the officers and crew placed in charge of her attempted to keep her afloat. their efforts were unavailing, and she sank off cape fear. the prisoners who survived the massacres were surrendered at santiago de cuba on the 18th ultimo, and reached the port of new york in safety. the evidence submitted on the part of spain to establish the fact that the _virginius_ at the time of her capture was improperly bearing the flag of the united states is transmitted herewith, together with the opinion of the attorney-general thereon and a copy of the note of the spanish minister, expressing on behalf of his government a disclaimer of an intent of indignity to the flag of the united states. u.s. grant. washington, _january 5, 1874_. _to the senate of the united states_: i transmit, for the consideration of the senate with a view to ratification, a convention between the united states of america and the republic of salvador, which was signed at san salvador on the 12th of may last, stipulating for an extension of the period for exchanging the ratifications of the treaty of amity, commerce, and consular privileges concluded between the two countries on the 6th december, 1870. u.s. grant. washington, _january 5, 1874_. _to the senate of the united states_: i transmit, for the consideration of the senate with a view to ratification, a convention between the united states of america and the republic of salvador, which was signed at san salvador on the 12th of may last, for an extension of the period for exchanging the ratifications of the treaty for the extradition of criminals concluded between the two countries on the 23d of may, 1870. u.s. grant. washington, _january 6, 1874_. _to the senate of the united states_: i transmit to the senate an "agreement," signed at lima on the 5th of june last by mr. francis thomas, envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of the united states, and mr. josã© de la riva aguero, minister for foreign affairs of peru, providing for an extension of the time for the exchange of the ratifications of the treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation and the treaty of extradition between the united states and peru of the 6th and 12th of september, 1870, respectively. the limit of the proposed extension is to be nine months from the time when the senate of the united states may approve thereof. the expediency of this approval is consequently submitted to the consideration of the senate. the instruments themselves were approved by that body on the 31st of march, 1871, and they were ratified by me in order that our ratifications might be ready for exchange for those of peru. the omission of the latter seasonably to perform that act is understood to have been occasioned solely by the delay in the meeting of the congress of that republic, whose sanction, pursuant to its constitution, was necessary. u.s. grant. executive mansion, _washington, january 7, 1874_. _to the house of representatives_: in reply to the resolution of the house of representatives of the 15th of last december, requesting a revision of the estimates for the expenses of the government for the fiscal year ending june 30, 1875, i have the honor to transmit herewith amended estimates and replies from the several departments. u.s. grant. executive mansion, _january 8, 1874_. _to the senate and house of representatives_: in compliance with the act of congress approved march 3, 1873, entitled "an act to authorize inquiries into the causes of steam-boiler explosions," i directed the secretaries of the treasury and navy departments to create a commission to conduct the experiments and collect the information contemplated by the act. such a commission was created, and i have the honor to submit herewith a report of the result of their labors to the present time. u.s. grant. executive mansion, _january 13, 1874_. _to the senate of the united states_: since nominating the hon. caleb gushing for chief justice of the supreme court of the united states information has reached me which induces me to withdraw him from nomination as the highest judicial officer of the government, and i do therefore hereby withdraw said nomination. u.s. grant. executive mansion, _january 19, 1874_. _to the senate of the united states_: in reply to the resolution of the senate of the 8th instant, requesting information "relative to any unauthorized occupation or invasion of or encroachment upon the indian territory, so called, by individuals or bodies of men, in violation of treaty stipulations," i have the honor to submit herewith the reply of the secretary of the interior, to whom the resolution was referred. u.s. grant. washington, _january 27, 1874_. _to the senate of the united states_: i transmit, for the consideration of the senate with a view to its ratification, a protocol relative to a claim on the government of chile in the case of the ship _good return_. u.s. grant. washington, _february 6, 1874_. _to the house of representatives_: i transmit to the house of representatives, in answer to their resolution of the 16th ultimo, a report from the secretary of state, with accompanying papers.[77] u.s. grant. [footnote 77: correspondence relative to the refusal of the united states consul at cadiz, spain, to certify invoices of wine shipped from that port, etc.] washington, _february 6, 1874_. _to the senate and house of representatives_: i transmit herewith a copy of a communication, dated the 22d ultimo, received from the governor of the state of new york, in which it is announced that, in accordance with the invitation of congress as expressed in the act approved july 2, 1864, that state now presents for acceptance a bronze statue of george clinton, deceased, one of its distinguished citizens. u.s. grant. executive mansion, _washington, february 9, 1874_. _to the house of representatives_: i have the honor to transmit herewith the report of the secretary of the department of the interior, to whom was referred the resolution of the house of representatives of january 7, requesting "a statement of the extent and nature of the contracts, purchases, and expenditures for the indian service made since july 1, 1873, setting forth which, if any, of them were made or entered into without conference with the board of indian commissioners appointed by the president, and the extent and description of contracts and vouchers objected to by said board, stating to what extent payments have been made thereon against their remonstrance." u.s. grant. executive mansion, _washington, february 10, 1874_. _to the house of representatives_: i have the honor to transmit herewith reports from the secretaries of the war department and department of the interior, to whom were referred the resolutions of the house of representatives of the 7th of january last, requesting "copies of all the correspondence between the different departments of the government and the peace commissioners during the war with the modoc indians in southern oregon and northern california during the years 1872 and 1873; also copies of all the correspondence with and orders issued to the military authorities engaged in said war up to the period of the removal of said modoc indians from the states of oregon and california." u.s. grant. washington, _february 17, 1874_. _to the senate and house of representatives_: i transmit herewith a communication from the secretary of state and accompanying papers.[78] u.s. grant. [footnote 78: report of john m. thacher, united states delegate to the international patent congress held at vienna in august, 1873, and exhibits.] executive mansion, _february 19, 1874_. _to the senate and house of representatives_: i have the honor to transmit herewith a memorial upon the "cultivation of timber and the preservation of forests," and a draft of a joint resolution prepared by the american association for the advancement of science, together with a communication from the commissioner of the general land office upon the same subject. u.s. grant. executive mansion, _washington, february 25, 1874_. _to the senate and house of representatives_: i have the honor herewith to submit the report of the centennial commissioners, and to add a word in the way of recommendation. there have now been international expositions held by three of the great powers of europe. it seems fitting that the one hundredth anniversary of our independence should be marked by an event that will display to the world the growth and progress of a nation devoted to freedom and to the pursuit of fame, fortune, and honors by the lowest citizen as well as the highest. a failure in this enterprise would be deplorable. success can be assured by arousing public opinion to the importance of the occasion. to secure this end, in my judgment, congressional legislation is necessary to make the exposition both national and international. the benefits to be derived from a successful international exposition are manifold. it will necessarily be accompanied by expenses beyond the receipts from the exposition itself, but they will be compensated for many fold by the commingling of people from all sections of our own country; by bringing together the people of different nationalities; by bringing into juxtaposition, for ready examination, our own and foreign skill and progress in manufactures, agriculture, art, science, and civilization. the selection of the site for the exposition seems to me appropriate, from the fact that one hundred years before the date fixed for the exposition the declaration of independence, which launched us into the galaxy of nations as an independent people, emanated from the same spot. we have much in our varied climate, soil, mineral products, and skill of which advantage can be taken by other nationalities to their profit. in return they will bring to our shores works of their skill and familiarize our people with them, to the mutual advantage of all parties. let us have a complete success in our centennial exposition or suppress it in its infancy, acknowledging our inability to give it the international character to which our self-esteem aspires. u.s. grant. executive mansion, _washington, d.c., march 4, 1874_. _to the house of representatives_: i have the honor to transmit herewith replies from the several departments, in answer to a resolution of the house of representatives of the 16th of january last, requesting a list of all expenses incurred by the various departments for transportation of any matter which before the abolition of the franking privilege was carried in the mails. u.s. grant. washington, _march 20, 1874_. _to the senate of the united states_: i transmit herewith, for the consideration of the senate and with a view to its ratification, a convention concluded between the united states and belgium on the 19th march, 1874, concerning extradition. u.s. grant. executive mansion, _march 23, 1874_. _to the senate and house of representatives_: i have the honor to transmit herewith the report of the board of commissioners on the irrigation of the san joaquin, tulare, and sacramento valleys, of the state of california, and also the original maps accompanying said report. u.s. grant. executive mansion, _washington, april 18, 1874_. _to the senate and house of representatives_: herewith i transmit the report of the civil service commission authorized by the act of congress of march 3, 1871, and invite your special attention thereto. if sustained by congress, i have no doubt the rules can, after the experience gained, be so improved and enforced as to still more materially benefit the public service and relieve the executive, members of congress, and the heads of departments from influences prejudicial to good administration. the rules, as they have heretofore been enforced, have resulted beneficially, as is shown by the opinions of the members of the cabinet and their subordinates in the departments, and in that opinion i concur; but rules applicable to officers who are to be appointed by and with the advice and consent of the senate are in great measure impracticable, except in so far as they may be sustained by the action of that body. this must necessarily remain so unless the direct sanction of the senate is given to the rules. i advise for the present only such appropriation as may be adequate to continue the work in its present form, and would leave to the future to determine whether the direct sanction of congress should be given to rules that may, perhaps, be devised for regulating the method of selection of appointees, or a portion of them, who need to be confirmed by the senate. the same amount appropriated last year would be adequate for the coming year, but i think the public interest would be promoted by authority in the executive for allowing a small compensation for special service performed beyond usual office hours, under the act of 1871, to persons already in the service of the government. u.s. grant. washington, _april 21, 1874_. _to the senate and house of representatives_: i transmit herewith to the senate and house of representatives a communication from the secretary of state and the report by which it is accompanied, upon samoan or navigators islands. u.s. grant. executive mansion, _washington, april 23, 1874_. _to the house of representatives_: i transmit herewith the papers called for by the resolution of the house of representatives of the 20th instant, requesting all correspondence by telegraph or otherwise between the persons claiming to be governor of arkansas and myself relating to the troubles in that state, together with copies of any order or directions given by me or under my direction to the military officer in charge of the garrison or in command of the united states troops at little rock. u.s. grant. executive mansion, _washington, april 28, 1874_. _to the house of representatives_: i have the honor to transmit herewith additional correspondence received since my communication of the 23d instant, in reply to the resolution of the house of representatives of the 20th instant, requesting copies of correspondence between persons claiming to be governor of arkansas and myself relating to troubles in that state. u.s. grant. executive mansion, _washington, april 30, 1874_. _to the house of representatives_: in pursuance of the resolution of the house of representatives of the 15th instant, requesting to be informed "what geographical and geological surveys under different departments and branches of the government are operating in the same and contiguous areas of territory west of the mississippi river, and whether it be not practicable to consolidate them under one department or to define the geographical limits to be embraced by each," i have the honor to transmit herewith the views of the officers of the war and interior departments on the subjects named in the said resolution, and invite attention thereto. where surveys are made with the view of sectionizing the public lands, preparatory to opening them for settlement or entry, there is no question but such surveys and all work connected therewith should be under the direct control of the interior department or the commissioner of the general land office, subject to the supervision of the secretary of the interior. but where the object is to complete the map of the country; to determine the geographical, astronomical, geodetic, topographic, hydrographic, meteorological, geological, and mineralogical features of the country--in other words, to collect full information of the unexplored or but partially known portions of the country--it seems to me a matter of no importance as to which department of the government should have control of the work. the conditions which should control this subject are, in my judgment, first, which department is prepared to do the work best; second, which can do it the most expeditiously and economically. as the country to be explored is occupied in great part by uncivilized indians, all parties engaged in the work at hand must be supplied with escorts from the army, thus placing a large portion of the expense upon the war department; and as the engineer corps of the army is composed of scientific gentlemen, educated and practiced for just the kind of work to be done, and as they are under pay whether employed in this work or not, it would seem that the second condition named would be more fully complied with by employing them to do the work. there is but little doubt that they will accomplish it as promptly and as well, and much more economically. u.s. grant. washington, _may 19, 1874_. _to the house of representatives_: i transmit herewith, in answer to the resolution of the house of representatives of the 9th instant, a report[79] from the secretary of state, with accompanying papers. u.s. grant. [footnote 79: relating to the involuntary deportation to the united states of foreign convicts, paupers, idiots, insane persons, etc., and transmitting correspondence relative thereto.] washington, _may 25, 1874_. _to the senate and house of representatives_: in response to the resolution of the senate of the 15th instant, i have the honor to transmit herewith "all papers and correspondence relating to the troubles in the state of arkansas not heretofore communicated to either house of congress." u.s. grant. washington, _may 25, 1874_. _to the senate and house of representatives_: i have the honor to transmit, in response to the resolution of the senate of the 18th instant, requesting "the answers in full received by the civil service commission in reply to their circular addressed to the various heads of departments and bureaus requesting a report as to the operation and effect of the civil-service rules in the several departments and offices," a copy of a letter received from the chairman of the civil service commission, to whom the resolution was referred. u.s. grant. washington, _may 26, 1874_. _to the senate of the united states_: i transmit herewith a report from the secretary of state, and accompanying it copies of all papers on file or on record in the department of state respecting the claim on brazil concerning the _caroline_. u.s. grant. washington, _may 26, 1874_. _to the senate and house of representatives_: i transmit to the senate and house of representatives a communication from the secretary of state and a copy of the report of the commissioners to inquire into depredations on the frontiers of texas, by which it is accompanied. u.s. grant. washington, _june 15, 1874_. _to the senate of the united states_: i transmit, for the consideration of the senate with a view to ratification, a declaration respecting trade-marks between the united states and the emperor of russia, concluded and signed at st. petersburg on the 16/28 day of march last. u.s. grant. washington, _june 18, 1874_. _to the senate of the united states_: the plenipotentiaries of her britannic majesty at washington have submitted to the secretary of state, for my consideration, a draft of a treaty for the reciprocal regulation of the commerce and trade between the united states and canada, with provisions for the enlargement of the canadian canals and for their use by united states vessels on terms of equality with british vessels. i transmit herewith a report from the secretary of state, with a copy of the draft thus proposed. i am of the opinion that a proper treaty for such purposes would result beneficially for the united states. it would not only open or enlarge markets for our products, but it would increase the facilities of transportation from the grain-growing states of the west to the seaboard. the proposed draft has many features to commend it to our favorable consideration; but whether it makes all the concessions which could justly be required of great britain, or whether it calls for more concessions from the united states than we should yield, i am not prepared to say. among its provisions are articles proposing to dispense with the arbitration respecting the fisheries, which was provided for by the treaty of washington, in the event of the conclusion and ratification of a treaty and the passage of all the necessary legislation to enforce it. these provisions, as well as other considerations, make it desirable that this subject should receive attention before the close of the present session. i therefore express an earnest wish that the senate may be able to consider and determine before the adjournment of congress whether it will give its constitutional concurrence to the conclusion of a treaty with great britain for the purposes already named, either in such form as is proposed by the british plenipotentiaries or in such other more acceptable form as the senate may prefer. u.s. grant. washington, _june 18, 1874_. _to the senate and house of representatives_: i transmit herewith a report from the secretary of state and its accompanying papers.[80] u.s. grant. [footnote 80: report of the united states delegates to the eighth session of the international statistical congress, held at st. petersburg, russia, in august, 1872, and appendix.] executive mansion, _washington, june 20, 1874_. _to the senate and house of representatives_: i respectfully invite the attention of congress to one feature of the bill entitled "an act for the government of the district of columbia, and for other purposes." provision is therein made for the payment of the debts of the district in bonds to be issued by the sinking-fund commissioners, running fifty years and bearing interest at the rate of 3.65 per cent per annum, with the payment of the principal and interest guaranteed by the united states. the government by which these debts were created is abolished, and no other provision seems to be made for their payment. judging from the transactions in other bonds, there are good grounds, in my opinion, for the apprehension that bonds bearing this rate of interest when issued will be worth much less than their equivalent in the current money of the united states. this appears to me to be unjust to those to whom these bonds are to be paid, and, to the extent of the difference between their face and real value, looks like repudiating the debts of the district. my opinion is that to require creditors of the district of columbia to receive these bonds at par when it is apparent that to be converted into money they must be sold at a large discount will not only prove greatly injurious to the credit of the district, but will reflect unfavorably upon the credit and good faith of the united states. i would recommend, therefore, that provision be made at the present session of congress to increase the interest upon these bonds, so that when sold they will bring an equivalent in money, and that the secretary of the treasury be authorized to negotiate the sale of these bonds at not less than par and pay the proceeds thereof to those who may be ascertained to have valid claims against the district of columbia. u.s. grant. veto messages. executive mansion, _washington, april 10, 1874_. _to the house of representatives_: i have the honor to herewith return to you without my approval house bill no. 1224, entitled "an act for the relief of william h. denniston, late an acting second lieutenant, seventieth new york volunteers," for the reasons set forth in the accompanying letter of the secretary of war. u.s. grant. war department, _washington, d.c., april 8, 1874_. the president. sir: i have the honor to return house bill no. 1224, "for the relief of william h. denniston, late an acting second lieutenant, seventieth new york volunteers," with the remark that the name of william h. denniston, as an officer or private, is not borne on any rolls of the seventieth new york volunteers on file in the department. of this fact the committee on military affairs of the house of representatives was informed by letter from the adjutant-general's office dated december 19, 1873. no vacancy existed in company d (the company claimed) of this regiment for a second lieutenant during the period claimed, second lieutenant j.b. zeigler having filled that position to may 6, 1862, and second lieutenant james stevenson from that date to june 25, 1862. on regimental return for july, 1862, edward shields is reported promoted second lieutenant june 15, 1862. there is no evidence in the department that he actually served as a second lieutenant for the time covered by the bill herewith, and it is therefore respectfully recommended that the bill be returned to the house of representatives without approval. when the records of the war department, prepared under laws and regulations having in view the establishment and preservation of data necessary to the protection of the public interests as well as that of the claimants, fail to show service, it is a subject of importance to legalize a claim wherein the military department of the government has not seen the order under which the alleged service may have been claimed. a precedent of the kind is beyond doubt an injury to the public interest, and will tend to other special acts of relief under which thousands of muster rolls certified at the date, under the articles of war, as exhibiting the true state of the command will be invalidated, and large appropriations of money will be required to settle claims the justness of which can not always be determined at a date so remote from their origin. very respectfully, your obedient servant, wm. w. belknap, _secretary of war_. executive mansion, _april 22, 1874_. _to the senate of the united states_: herewith i return senate bill no. 617, entitled "an act to fix the amount of united states notes and the circulation of national banks, and for other purposes," without my approval. in doing so i must express my regret at not being able to give my assent to a measure which has received the sanction of a majority of the legislators chosen by the people to make laws for their guidance, and i have studiously sought to find sufficient arguments to justify such assent, but unsuccessfully. practically it is a question whether the measure under discussion would give an additional dollar to the irredeemable paper currency of the country or not, and whether by requiring three-fourths of the reserve to be retained by the banks and prohibiting interest to be received on the balance it might not prove a contraction. but the fact can not be concealed that theoretically the bill increases the paper circulation $100,000,000, less only the amount of reserves restrained from circulation by the provision of the second section. the measure has been supported on the theory that it would give increased circulation. it is a fair inference, therefore, that if in practice the measure should fail to create the abundance of circulation expected of it the friends of the measure, particularly those out of congress, would clamor for such inflation as would give the expected relief. the theory, in my belief, is a departure from true principles of finance, national interest, national obligations to creditors, congressional promises, party pledges (on the part of both political parties), and of personal views and promises made by me in every annual message sent to congress and in each inaugural address. in my annual message to congress in december, 1869, the following passages appear: among the evils growing out of the rebellion, and not yet referred to, is that of an irredeemable currency. it is an evil which i hope will receive your most earnest attention. it is a duty, and one of the highest duties, of government to secure to the citizen a medium of exchange of fixed, unvarying value. this implies a return to a specie basis, and no substitute for it can be devised. it should be commenced now and reached at the earliest practicable moment consistent with a fair regard to the interests of the debtor class. immediate resumption, if practicable, would not be desirable. it would compel the debtor class to pay, beyond their contracts, the premium on gold at the date of their purchase, and would bring bankruptcy and ruin to thousands. fluctuation, however, in the paper value of the measure of all values (gold) is detrimental to the interests of trade. it makes the man of business an involuntary gambler, for in all sales where future payment is to be made both parties speculate as to what will be the value of the currency to be paid and received. i earnestly recommend to you, then, such legislation as will insure a gradual return to specie payments and put an immediate stop to fluctuations in the value of currency. i still adhere to the views then expressed. as early as december 4, 1865, the house of representatives passed a resolution, by a vote of 144 yeas to 6 nays, concurring "in the views of the secretary of the treasury in relation to the necessity of a contraction of the currency, with a view to as early a resumption of specie payments as the business interests of the country will permit," and pledging "cooperative action to this end as speedily as possible." the first act passed by the forty-first congress, [approved] on the 18th day of march, 1869, was as follows: an act to strengthen the public credit. _be it enacted, etc._, that in order to remove any doubt as to the purpose of the government to discharge all just obligations to the public creditors, and to settle conflicting questions and interpretations of the law by virtue of which such obligations have been contracted, it is hereby provided and declared that the faith of the united states is solemnly pledged to the payment in coin or its equivalent of all the obligations of the united states not bearing interest, known as united states notes, and all the interest-bearing obligations of the united states, except in cases where the law authorizing the issue of any such obligation has expressly provided that the same may be paid in lawful money or in other currency than gold and silver; but none of the said interest-bearing obligations not already due shall be redeemed or paid before maturity unless at such time united states notes shall be convertible into coin at the option of the holder, or unless at such time bonds of the united states bearing a lower rate of interest than the bonds to be redeemed can be sold at par in coin. and the united states also solemnly pledges its faith to make provision at the earliest practicable period for the redemption of the united states notes in coin. this act still remains as a continuing pledge of the faith of the united states "to make provision at the earliest practicable period for the redemption of the united states notes in coin." a declaration contained in the act of june 30, 1864, created an obligation that the total amount of united states notes issued or to be issued should never exceed $400,000,000. the amount in actual circulation was actually reduced to $356,000,000, at which point congress passed the act of february 4, 1868, suspending the further reduction of the currency. the forty-four millions have ever been regarded as a reserve, to be used only in case of emergency, such as has occurred on several occasions, and must occur when from any cause revenues suddenly fall below expenditures; and such a reserve is necessary, because the fractional currency, amounting to fifty millions, is redeemable in legal tender on call. it may be said that such a return of fractional currency for redemption is impossible; but let steps be taken for a return to a specie basis and it will be found that silver will take the place of fractional currency as rapidly as it can be supplied, when the premium on gold reaches a sufficiently low point. with the amount of united states notes to be issued permanently fixed within proper limits and the treasury so strengthened as to be able to redeem them in coin on demand it will then be safe to inaugurate a system of free banking with such provisions as to make compulsory redemption of the circulating notes of the banks in coin, or in united states notes, themselves redeemable and made equivalent to coin. as a measure preparatory to free banking, and for placing the government in a condition to redeem its notes in coin "at the earliest practicable period," the revenues of the country should be increased so as to pay current expenses, provide for the sinking fund required by law, and also a surplus to be retained in the treasury in gold. i am not a believer in any artificial method of making paper money equal to coin when the coin is not owned or held ready to redeem the promises to pay, for paper money is nothing more than promises to pay, and is valuable exactly in proportion to the amount of coin that it can be converted into. while coin is not used as a circulating medium, or the currency of the country is not convertible into it at par, it becomes an article of commerce as much as any other product. the surplus will seek a foreign market as will any other surplus. the balance of trade has nothing to do with the question. duties on imports being required in coin creates a limited demand for gold. about enough to satisfy that demand remains in the country. to increase this supply i see no way open but by the government hoarding through the means above given, and possibly by requiring the national banks to aid. it is claimed by the advocates of the measure herewith returned that there is an unequal distribution of the banking capital of the country. i was disposed to give great weight to this view of the question at first, but on reflection it will be remembered that there still remains $4,000,000 of authorized bank-note circulation assigned to states having less than their quota not yet taken. in addition to this the states having less than their quota of bank circulation have the option of twenty-five millions more to be taken from those states having more than their proportion. when this is all taken up, or when specie payments are fully restored or are in rapid process of restoration, will be the time to consider the question of "more currency." u.s. grant. executive mansion, _washington, may 12, 1874_. _to the house of representatives_: i return herewith without my signature house bill no. 1331, entitled "an act for the relief of joab spencer and james r. mead for supplies furnished the kansas tribe of indians." i withheld my approval of said bill for reasons which satisfy me the claim should not be allowed for the entire amount stated in the bill, and which are set forth in the letter of the secretary of the interior of the 7th instant, a copy of which, with the accompanying papers, is herewith transmitted. u.s. grant. department of the interior, _washington, d.c., may 7, 1874_. the president. sir: i have the honor to return herewith engrossed bill h.r. 1331, entitled "an act for the relief of joab spencer and james r. mead for supplies furnished the kansas tribe of indians," and to state that said bill was the subject of a report made to the department by the commissioner of indian affairs on the 11th ultimo, with which he submitted letters from enoch hoag, superintendent of indian affairs, and mahlon stubbs, indian agent, representing that the justness and correctness of the claim of spencer & mead had not been established, and suggesting that further proceedings in the premises be deferred until a thorough investigation of the facts and circumstances of the case could be had. the suggestion of the indian agent received the concurrence of the commissioner of indian affairs and the approval of this department, and on the 17th ultimo the attention of congress was invited to the subject in a letter addressed to the speaker of the house of representatives by the secretary of the interior. at the latter date the bill appears to have been pending in the senate, of which fact this department at that time was not informed. on the 5th instant the engrossed bill (h.r. no. 1331) was received by reference from the executive office, and forwarded to the commissioner of indian affairs for a further report on the subject, and on the 6th instant that officer returned said bill to this department with a letter presenting his views in relation to the matter and suggesting that the rights of the indians and of messrs. spencer & mead would be fully protected by a modification of the bill authorizing the secretary of the interior to pay such amount of their claim as might be found to be due. the suggestion meets the approval of this department. copies of the papers connected with this claim are herewith submitted.[81] i have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant, b.r. cowen, _acting secretary_. [footnote 81: omitted.] proclamations. by the president of the united states of america. a proclamation. whereas certain turbulent and disorderly persons, pretending that elisha baxter, the present executive of arkansas, was not elected, have combined together with force and arms to resist his authority as such executive and other authorities of said state; and whereas said elisha baxter has been declared duly elected by the general assembly of said state, as provided in the constitution thereof, and has for a long period been exercising the functions of said office, into which he was inducted according to the constitution and laws of said state, and ought by its citizens to be considered as the lawful executive thereof; and whereas it is provided in the constitution of the united states that the united states shall protect every state in the union, on application of the legislature, or of the executive when the legislature can not be convened, against domestic violence; and whereas said elisha baxter, under section 4 of article iv of the constitution of the united states and the laws passed in pursuance thereof, has heretofore made application to me to protect said state and the citizens thereof against domestic violence; and whereas the general assembly of said state was convened in extra session at the capital thereof on the 11th instant, pursuant to a call made by said elisha baxter, and both houses thereof have passed a joint resolution also applying to me to protect the state against domestic violence; and whereas it is provided in the laws of the united states that in all cases of insurrection in any state or of obstruction to the laws thereof it shall be lawful for the president of the united states, on application of the legislature of such state, or of the executive when the legislature can not be convened, to employ such part of the land and naval forces as shall be judged necessary for the purpose of suppressing such insurrection or causing the laws to be duly executed; and whereas it is required that whenever it may be necessary, in the judgment of the president, to use the military force for the purpose aforesaid, he shall forthwith, by proclamation, command such insurgents to disperse and retire peaceably to their respective homes within a limited time: now, therefore, i, ulysses s. grant, president of the united states, do hereby make proclamation and command all turbulent and disorderly persons to disperse and retire peaceably to their respective abodes within ten days from this date, and hereafter to submit themselves to the lawful authority of said executive and the other constituted authorities of said state; and i invoke the aid and cooperation of all good citizens thereof to uphold law and preserve public peace. in witness whereof i have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the united states to be affixed. done at the city of washington, this 15th day of may, a.d. 1874, and of the independence of the united states the ninety-eighth. [seal.] u.s. grant. by the president: hamilton fish, _secretary of state_. by the president of the united states of america. a proclamation. whereas by the thirty-third article of a treaty concluded at washington on the 8th day of may, 1871, between the united states and her britannic majesty, it was provided that-articles xviii to xxv, inclusive, and article xxx of this treaty shall take effect as soon as the laws required to carry them into operation shall have been passed by the imperial parliament of great britain, by the parliament of canada, and by the legislature of prince edwards island on the one hand, and by the congress of the united states on the other. and whereas it is provided by article xxxii of the treaty aforesaid that- the provisions and stipulations of articles xviii to xxv of this treaty, inclusive, shall extend to the colony of newfoundland so far as they are applicable. but if the imperial parliament, the legislature of newfoundland, or the congress of the united states shall not embrace the colony of newfoundland in their laws enacted for carrying the foregoing articles into effect, then this article shall be of no effect; but the omission to make provision by law to give it effect, by either of the legislative bodies aforesaid, shall not in any way impair any other articles of this treaty. and whereas by the second section of an act entitled "an act to carry into effect the provisions of the treaty between the united states and great britain signed in the city of washington the 8th day of may, 1871, relating to the fisheries," it is provided- that whenever the colony of newfoundland shall give its consent to the application of the stipulations and provisions of the said articles eighteenth to twenty-fifth of said treaty, inclusive, to that colony, and the legislature thereof and the imperial parliament shall pass the necessary laws for that purpose, the above-enumerated articles, being the produce of the fisheries of the colony of newfoundland, shall be admitted into the united states free of duty from and after the date of a proclamation by the president of the united states declaring that he has satisfactory evidence that the said colony of newfoundland has consented, in a due and proper manner, to have the provisions of the said articles eighteenth to twenty-fifth, inclusive, of the said treaty extended to it, and to allow the united states the full benefits of all the stipulations therein contained, and shall be so admitted free of duty so long as the said articles eighteenth to twenty-fifth, inclusive, and article thirtieth of said treaty shall remain in force according to the terms and conditions of article thirty-third of said treaty. and whereas the secretary of state of the united states and her britannic majesty's envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary at washington have recorded in a protocol of a conference held by them at the department of state in washington on the 28th day of may, 1874, in the following language: protocol of a conference held at washington on the 28th day of may, 1874. whereas it is provided by article xxxii of the treaty between the united states of america and her majesty the queen of the united kingdom of great britain and ireland signed at washington on the 8th of may, 1871, as follows: "article xxxii. "it is further agreed that the provisions and stipulations of articles xviii to xxv of this treaty, inclusive, shall extend to the colony of newfoundland so far as they are applicable. but if the imperial parliament, the legislature of newfoundland, or the congress of the united states shall not embrace the colony of newfoundland in their laws enacted for carrying the foregoing articles into effect, then this article shall be of no effect; but the omission to make provision by law to give it effect, by either of the legislative bodies aforesaid, shall not in any way impair any other articles of this treaty;" and whereas an act was passed by the senate and house of representatives of the united states of america in congress assembled, and approved on the 1st day of march, 1873, by the president of the united states, entitled "an act to carry into effect the provisions of the treaty between the united states and great britain signed in the city of washington the 8th of may, 1871, relating to fisheries," by which act it is provided: "sec. 2. that whenever the colony of newfoundland shall give its consent to the application of the stipulations and provisions of the said articles eighteenth to twenty-fifth of said treaty, inclusive, to that colony, and the legislature thereof and the imperial parliament shall pass the necessary laws for that purpose, the above-enumerated articles, being the produce of the fisheries of the colony of newfoundland, shall be admitted into the united states free of duty from and after the date of a proclamation by the president of the united states declaring that he has satisfactory evidence that the said colony of newfoundland has consented, in a due and proper manner, to have the provisions of the said articles eighteenth to twenty-fifth, inclusive, of the said treaty extended to it, and to allow the united states the full benefits of all the stipulations therein contained, and shall be so admitted free of duty so long as the said articles eighteenth to twenty-fifth, inclusive, and article thirtieth of said treaty shall remain in force according to the terms and conditions of article thirty-third of said treaty;" and whereas an act was passed by the governor, legislative council, and assembly of newfoundland, in legislative session convened, in the thirty-seventh year of her majesty's reign, and assented to by her majesty on the 12th day of may, 1874, intituled "an act to carry into effect the provisions of the treaty of washington as far as they relate to this colony:" the undersigned, hamilton fish, secretary of state of the united states, and the right hon. sir edward thornton, one of her majesty's most honorable privy council, knight commander of the most honorable order of the bath, her britannic majesty's envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to the united states of america, duly authorized for this purpose by their respective governments, having met together at washington, and having found that the laws required to carry the articles xviii to xxv, inclusive, and articles xxx and xxxii of the treaty aforesaid into operation have been passed by the congress of the united states on the one part, and by the imperial parliament of great britain, by the parliament of canada, and by the legislature of prince edwards island and the legislature of newfoundland on the other, hereby declare that articles xviii to xxv, inclusive, and article xxx of the treaty between the united states of america and her britannic majesty shall take effect in accordance with article xxxiii of said treaty between the citizens of the united states of america and her majesty's subjects in the colony of newfoundland on the 1st day of june next. in witness whereof the undersigned have signed this protocol and have hereunto affixed their seals. done in duplicate at washington, this 28th day of may, 1874. [seal.] hamilton fish. [seal.] edwd. thornton. now, therefore, i, ulysses s. grant, president of the united states of america, in pursuance of the premises, do hereby declare that i have received satisfactory evidence that the imperial parliament of great britain and the legislature of newfoundland have passed laws on their part to give full effect to the provisions of the said treaty as contained in articles eighteenth to twenty-fifth, inclusive, and article thirtieth of said treaty. in testimony whereof i have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the united states to be affixed. done at the city of washington, this 29th day of may, a.d. 1874, and of the independence of the united states of america the ninety-eighth. [seal.] u.s. grant. by the president: hamilton fish, _secretary of state_. by the president of the united states of america. a proclamation. whereas it has been satisfactorily represented to me that turbulent and disorderly persons have combined together with force and arms to overthrow the state government of louisiana and to resist the laws and constituted authorities of said state; and whereas it is provided in the constitution of the united states that the united states shall protect every state in this union, on application of the legislature, or of the executive when the legislature can not be convened, against domestic violence; and whereas it is provided in the laws of the united states that in all cases of insurrection in any state or of obstruction to the laws thereof it shall be lawful for the president of the united states, on application of the legislature of such state, or of the executive when the legislature can not be convened, to call forth the militia of any other state or states, or to employ such part of the land and naval forces as shall be judged necessary, for the purpose of suppressing such insurrection or causing the laws to be duly executed; and whereas the legislature of said state is not now in session and can not be convened in time to meet the present emergency, and the executive of said state, under section 4 of article iv of the constitution of the united states and the laws passed in pursuance thereof, has therefore made application to me for such part of the military force of the united states as may be necessary and adequate to protect said state and the citizens thereof against domestic violence and to enforce the due execution of the laws; and whereas it is required that whenever it may be necessary, in the judgment of the president, to use the military force for the purpose aforesaid, he shall forthwith, by proclamation, command such insurgents to disperse and retire peaceably to their respective homes within a limited time: now, therefore, i, ulysses s. grant, president of the united states, do hereby make proclamation and command said turbulent and disorderly persons to disperse and retire peaceably to their respective abodes within five days from this date, and hereafter to submit themselves to the laws and constituted authorities of said state; and i invoke the aid and cooperation of all good citizens thereof to uphold law and preserve the public peace. in witness whereof i have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the united states to be affixed. done at the city of washington, this 15th day of september, a.d. 1874, and of the independence of the united states the ninety-ninth. [seal.] u.s. grant. by the president: hamilton fish, _secretary of state_. by the president of the united states of america. a proclamation. we are reminded by the changing seasons that it is time to pause in our daily avocations and offer thanks to almighty god for the mercies and abundance of the year which is drawing to a close. the blessings of free government continue to be vouchsafed to us; the earth has responded to the labor of the husbandman; the land has been free from pestilence; internal order is being maintained, and peace with other powers has prevailed. it is fitting that at stated periods we should cease from our accustomed pursuits and from the turmoil of our daily lives and unite in thankfulness for the blessings of the past and in the cultivation of kindly feelings toward each other. now, therefore, recognizing these considerations, i, ulysses s. grant, president of the united states, do recommend to all citizens to assemble in their respective places of worship on thursday, the 26th day of november next, and express their thanks for the mercy and favor of almighty god, and, laying aside all political contentions and all secular occupations, to observe such day as a day of rest, thanksgiving, and praise. in witness whereof i have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the united states to be affixed. done at the city of washington, this 27th day of october, a.d. 1874, and of the independence of the united states the ninety-ninth. [seal.] u.s. grant. by the president: hamilton fish, _secretary of state_. by the president of the united states of america. a proclamation. whereas, pursuant to the second section of the act of congress approved the 23d of march last, entitled "an act to authorize the president to accept for citizens of the united states the jurisdiction of certain tribunals in the ottoman dominions and egypt, established or to be established under the authority of the sublime porte and of the government of egypt," the president is authorized, for the benefit of american citizens residing in the turkish dominions, to accept the recent law of the ottoman porte ceding the right of foreigners possessing immovable property in said dominions; and whereas, pursuant to the authority thus in me vested, i have authorized george h. boker, accredited as minister resident of the united states to the ottoman porte, to sign on behalf of this government the protocol accepting the law aforesaid of the said ottoman porte, which protocol and law are, word for word, as follows: [translation.] the united states of america and his majesty the sultan being desirous to establish by a special act the agreement entered upon between them regarding the admission of american citizens to the right of holding real estate granted to foreigners by the law promulgated on the 7th of sepher, 1284 (january 18, 1867), have authorized: the president of the united states of america, george h. boker, minister resident of the united states of america near the sublime porte, and his imperial majesty the sultan, his excellency a. aarifi pasha, his minister of foreign affairs, to sign the protocol which follows: protocol. the law granting foreigners the right of holding real estate does not interfere with the immunities specified by the treaties, and which will continue to protect the person and the movable property of foreigners who may become owners of real estate. as the exercise of this right of possessing real property may induce foreigners to establish themselves in larger numbers in the ottoman empire, the imperial government thinks it proper to anticipate and to prevent the difficulties to which the application of this law may give rise in certain localities. such is the object of the arrangements which follow: the domicile of any person residing upon the ottoman soil being inviolable, and as no one can enter it without the consent of the owner, except by virtue of orders emanating from competent authority and with the assistance of the magistrate or functionary invested with the necessary powers, the residence of foreigners is inviolable on the same principle, in conformity with the treaties, and the agents of the public force can not enter it without the assistance of the consul or of the delegate of the consul of the power on which the foreigner depends. by residence we understand the house of inhabitation and its dependencies; that is to say, the outhouses, courts, gardens, and neighboring inclosures, to the exclusion of all other parts of the property. in the localities distant by less than nine hours' journey from the consular residence, the agents of the public force can not enter the residence of a foreigner without the assistance of a consul, as was before said. on his part the consul is bound to give his immediate assistance to the local authority so as not to let six hours elapse between the moment which he may be informed and the moment of his departure or the departure of his delegate, so that the action of the authorities may never be suspended more than twenty-four hours. in the localities distant by nine hours or more than nine hours of travel from the residence of the consular agent, the agents of the public force may, on the request of the local authority, and with the assistance of three members of the council of the elders of the commune, enter into the residence of a foreigner without being assisted by the consular agent, but only in case of urgency and for the search and the proof of the crime of murder, of attempt at murder, of incendiarism, of armed robbery either with infraction or by night in an inhabited house, of armed rebellion, and of the fabrication of counterfeit money; and this entry may be made whether the crime was committed by a foreigner or by an ottoman subject, and whether it took place in the residence of a foreigner or not in his residence, or in any other place. these regulations are not applicable but to the parts of the real estate which constitute the residence, as it has been heretofore defined. beyond the residence the action of the police shall be exercised freely and without reserve; but in case a person charged with crime or offense should be arrested, and the accused shall be a foreigner, the immunities attached to his person shall be observed in respect to him. the functionary or the officer charged with the accomplishment of a domiciliary visit in the exceptional circumstances determined before, and the members of the council of elders who shall assist him, will be obliged to make out a _procã¨s verbal_ of the domiciliary visit and to communicate it immediately to the superior authority under whose jurisdiction they are, and the latter shall transmit it to the nearest consular agent without delay. a special regulation will be promulgated by the sublime porte to determine the mode of action of the local police in the several cases provided heretofore. in localities more distant than nine hours' travel from the residence of the consular agent, in which the law of the judicial organization of the _velayet_ may be in force, foreigners shall be tried without the assistance of the consular delegate by the council of elders fulfilling the function of justices of the peace, and by the tribunal of the canton, as well for actions not exceeding 1,000 piasters as for offenses entailing a fine of 500 piasters only at the maximum. foreigners shall have in any case the right of appeal to the tribunal of the arrondissement against the judgments issued as above stated, and the appeal shall be followed and judged with the assistance of the consul in conformity with the treaties. the appeal shall always suspend the execution of a sentence. in all cases the forcible execution of the judgments, issued on the conditions determined heretofore, shall not take place without the cooperation of the consul or of his delegate. the imperial government will enact a law which shall determine the rules of procedure to be observed by the parties in the application of the preceding regulations. foreigners, in whatever locality they may be, may freely submit themselves to the jurisdiction of the council of elders or of the tribunal of the canton without the assistance of the consul in cases which do not exceed the competency of these councils or tribunals, reserving always the right of appeal before the tribunal of the arrondissement, where the case may be brought and tried with the assistance of the consul or his delegate. the consent of a foreigner to be tried as above stated, without the assistance of his consul, shall always be given in writing and in advance of all procedure. it is well understood that all these restrictions do not concern cases which have for their object questions of real estate, which shall be tried and determined under the conditions established by the law. the right of defense and the publicity of the hearings shall be assured in all cases to foreigners who may appear before the ottoman tribunals, as well as to ottoman subjects. the preceding dispositions shall remain in force until the revision of the ancient treaties, a revision which the sublime porte reserves to itself the right to bring about hereafter by an understanding between it and the friendly powers. in witness whereof the respective plenipotentiaries have signed the protocol and have affixed thereto their seals. done at constantinople the 11th of august, 1874. [seal.] (signed) a. aarifi. [seal.] (signed) geo. h. boker. [translation.] law conceding to foreigners the right of holding real estate in the ottoman empire. imperial rescript.--let it be done in conformity with the contents. 7 sepher, 1284 (january 18, 1867). with the object of developing the prosperity of the country, to put an end to the difficulties, to the abuses, and to the uncertainties which have arisen on the subject of the right of foreigners to hold property in the ottoman empire, and to complete, in accordance with a precise regulation, the safeguards which are due to financial interests and to administrative action, the following legislative enactments have been promulgated by the order of his imperial majesty the sultan: article i. foreigners are admitted by the same privilege as ottoman subjects, and without any other restriction, to enjoy the right of holding real estate, whether in the city or the country, throughout the empire, with the exception of the province of the hã©djaz, by submitting themselves to the laws and the regulations which govern ottoman subjects as is hereafter stated. this arrangement does not concern subjects of ottoman birth who have changed their nationality, who shall be governed in this matter by a special law. art. ii. foreigners, proprietors of real estate in town or in country, are in consequence placed upon terms of equality with ottoman subjects in all things that concern their landed property. the legal effect of this equality is-first. to oblige them to conform to all the laws and regulations of the police or of the municipality which govern at present or may govern hereafter the enjoyment, the transmission, the alienation, and the hypothecation of landed property. second. to pay all charges and taxes, under whatever form or denomination they may be, that are levied, or may be levied hereafter, upon city or country property. third. to render them directly amenable to the ottoman civil tribunals in all questions relating to landed property and in all real actions, whether as plaintiffs or as defendants, even when either party is a foreigner. in short, they are in all things to hold real estate by the same title, on the same condition, and under the same forms as ottoman owners, and without being able to avail themselves of their personal nationality, except under the reserve of the immunities attached to their persons and their movable goods, according to the treaties. art. iii. in case of the bankruptcy of a foreigner possessing real estate, the assignees of the bankrupt may apply to the authorities and to the ottoman civil tribunals requiring the sale of the real estate possessed by the bankrupt, and which by its nature and according to law is responsible for the debts of the owner. the same course shall be followed when a foreigner shall have obtained against another foreigner owning real estate a judgment of condemnation before a foreign tribunal. for the execution of this judgment against the real estate of his debtor he shall apply to the competent ottoman authorities in order to obtain the sale of that real estate which is responsible for the debts of the owner; and this judgment shall be executed by the ottoman authorities and tribunals only after they have decided that the real estate of which the sale is required really belongs to the category of that property which may be sold for the payment of debt. art. iv. foreigners have the privilege to dispose, by donation or by testament, of that real estate of which such disposition is permitted by law. as to that real estate of which they may not have disposed or of which the law does not permit them to dispose by gift or testament, its succession shall be governed in accordance with ottoman law. art. v. all foreigners shall enjoy the privileges of the present law as soon as the powers on which they depend shall agree to the arrangements proposed by the sublime porte for the exercise of the right to hold real estate. now, therefore, be it known that i, ulysses s. grant, president of the united states of america, have caused the said protocol and law to be made public for the information and guidance of citizens of the united states. in witness whereof i have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the united states to be affixed. [seal.] done at the city of washington, this 29th day of october, a.d. 1874, and of the independence of the united states of america the ninety-ninth. u.s. grant. by the president: hamilton fish, _secretary of state_. executive orders. by the president of the united states. executive order. washington, _january 23, 1874_. whereas it has been brought to the notice of the president of the united states that in the international exhibition of arts, manufactures, and products of the soil and mine to be held in the city of philadelphia in the year 1876 for the purpose of celebrating the one hundredth anniversary of the independence of the united states it is desirable that from the executive departments of the government of the united states in which there may be articles suitable for the purpose intended there should appear such articles and materials as will, when presented in a collective exhibition, illustrate the functions and administrative faculties of the government in time of peace and its resources as a war power, and thereby serve to demonstrate the nature of our institutions and their adaptations to the wants of the people: now, for the purpose of securing a complete and harmonious arrangement of the articles and materials designed to be exhibited from the executive departments of the government, it is ordered that a board to be composed of one person to be named by the head of each of the executive departments which may have articles and materials to be exhibited, and also of one person to be named in behalf of the smithsonian institution and one to be named in behalf of the department of agriculture, be charged with the preparation, arrangement, and safe-keeping of such articles and materials as the heads of the several departments and the commissioner of agriculture and the director of the smithsonian institution may respectively decide shall be embraced in the collection; that one of the persons thus named, to be designated by the president, shall be chairman of such board, and that the board appoint from their own number such other officers as they may think necessary; and that the said board when organized be authorized, under the direction of the president, to confer with the executive officers of the centennial exhibition in relation to such matters connected with the subject as may pertain to the respective departments having articles and materials on exhibition; and that the names of the persons thus selected by the heads of the several departments, the commissioner of agriculture, and the director of the smithsonian institution shall be submitted to the president for designation. by order of the president: hamilton fish, _secretary of state_. general orders, no. 22. war department, adjutant-general's office, _washington, march 9, 1874_. i. the following order has been received from the president of the united states: executive mansion, _washington, march 9, 1874_. it is with deep regret that the president announces to the people of the united states the death of millard fillmore, one of his honored predecessors, who died at buffalo, n.y., last evening. the long-continued and useful public service and eminent purity of character of the deceased ex-president will be remembered beyond the days of mourning in which a nation will be thrown by the event which is thus announced. as a mark of respect to his memory, it is ordered that the executive mansion and the several departments at washington be draped in mourning until the close of the day on which the funeral shall take place, and that all business be suspended on the day of the funeral. it is further ordered that the war and navy departments cause suitable military and naval honors to be paid on the occasion to the memory of the eminent citizen whose life is now closed. u.s. grant. by the president: hamilton fish, _secretary of state_. ii. in compliance with the president's instructions, the troops will be paraded at 10 o'clock a.m. on the day after the receipt of this order at each military post, when the order will be read to them, and the labors of that day will thereafter cease. the national flag will be displayed at half-staff. at dawn of day thirteen guns will be fired, and afterwards at intervals of thirty minutes between the rising and setting sun a single gun, and at the close of the day a national salute of thirty-seven guns. the officers of the army will wear crape on the left arm and on their swords and the colors of the several regiments will be put in mourning for the period of thirty days. by order of the secretary of war: e.d. townsend, _adjutant-general_. special order. navy department, _washington, march 9, 1874_. the president of the united states announces the death of ex-president millard fillmore in the following order: [for order see preceding page.] in pursuance of the foregoing order, it is hereby directed that the ensign at each naval station and of each vessel of the united states navy in commission be hoisted at half-mast from sunrise to sunset, and that a gun be fired at intervals of every half hour from sunrise to sunset at each naval station and on board of flagships and of vessels acting singly, on thursday, the 12th instant, the day of the funeral, where this order may be received in time, otherwise on the day after its receipt. the officers of the navy and marine corps will wear the usual badge of mourning attached to the sword hilt and on the left arm for the period of thirty days. geo. m. robeson, _secretary of the navy_. executive mansion, _washington, d.c., may 27, 1874_. sir:[82] the president directs me to say that the several departments of the government will be closed on the 30th instant, in order to enable the employees to participate in the decoration of the graves of the soldiers who fell during the rebellion. i am, sir, your obedient servant, o.e. babcock, _secretary_. [footnote 82: addressed to the heads of the executive departments, etc.] washington, _may 29, 1874_. the civil service commission, at its sessions at washington, having recommended certain rules[83] to be prescribed by the president for the government of the light-house service of the united states, these rules as herewith published are approved, and their provisions will be enforced by the proper officers. u.s. grant. [footnote 83: omitted.] august 31, 1874. it appearing to me from their trial at washington and at the city of new york that the further extension of the civil-service rules will promote the efficiency of the public service, it is ordered that such rules be, and they are hereby, extended to the several federal offices at the city and in the customs district of boston, and that the proper measures be taken for carrying this order into effect. u.s. grant. sixth annual message. executive mansion, _december 7, 1874_. _to the senate and house of representatives_: since the convening of congress one year ago the nation has undergone a prostration in business and industries such as has not been witnessed with us for many years. speculation as to the causes for this prostration might be indulged in without profit, because as many theories would be advanced as there would be independent writers--those who expressed their own views without borrowing--upon the subject. without indulging in theories as to the cause of this prostration, therefore, i will call your attention only to the fact, and to some plain questions as to which it would seem there should be no disagreement. during this prostration two essential elements of prosperity have been most abundant--labor and capital. both have been largely unemployed. where security has been undoubted, capital has been attainable at very moderate rates. where labor has been wanted, it has been found in abundance, at cheap rates compared with what--of necessaries and comforts of life--could be purchased with the wages demanded. two great elements of prosperity, therefore, have not been denied us. a third might be added: our soil and climate are unequaled, within the limits of any contiguous territory under one nationality, for its variety of products to feed and clothe a people and in the amount of surplus to spare to feed less favored peoples. therefore, with these facts in view, it seems to me that wise statesmanship, at this session of congress, would dictate legislation ignoring the past; directing in proper channels these great elements of prosperity to any people. debt, debt abroad, is the only element that can, with always a sound currency, enter into our affairs to cause any continued depression in the industries and prosperity of our people. a great conflict for national existence made necessary, for temporary purposes, the raising of large sums of money from whatever source attainable. it made it necessary, in the wisdom of congress--and i do not doubt their wisdom in the premises, regarding the necessity of the times--to devise a system of national currency which it proved to be impossible to keep on a par with the recognized currency of the civilized world. this begot a spirit of speculation involving an extravagance and luxury not required for the happiness or prosperity of a people, and involving, both directly and indirectly, foreign indebtedness. the currency, being of fluctuating value, and therefore unsafe to hold for legitimate transactions requiring money, became a subject of speculation within itself. these two causes, however, have involved us in a foreign indebtedness, contracted in good faith by borrower and lender, which should be paid in coin, and according to the bond agreed upon when the debt was contracted--gold or its equivalent. the good faith of the government can not be violated toward creditors without national disgrace. but our commerce should be encouraged; american shipbuilding and carrying capacity increased; foreign markets sought for products of the soil and manufactories, to the end that we may be able to pay these debts. where a new market can be created for the sale of our products, either of the soil, the mine, or the manufactory, a new means is discovered of utilizing our idle capital and labor to the advantage of the whole people. but, in my judgment, the first step toward accomplishing this object is to secure a currency of fixed, stable value; a currency good wherever civilization reigns; one which, if it becomes superabundant with one people, will find a market with some other; a currency which has as its basis the labor necessary to produce it, which will give to it its value. gold and silver are now the recognized medium of exchange the civilized world over, and to this we should return with the least practicable delay. in view of the pledges of the american congress when our present legal-tender system was adopted, and debt contracted, there should be no delay--certainly no unnecessary delay--in fixing by legislation a method by which we will return to specie. to the accomplishment of this end i invite your special attention. i believe firmly that there can be no prosperous and permanent revival of business and industries until a policy is adopted--with legislation to carry it out--looking to a return to a specie basis. it is easy to conceive that the debtor and speculative classes may think it of value to them to make so-called money abundant until they can throw a portion of their burdens upon others. but even these, i believe, would be disappointed in the result if a course should be pursued which will keep in doubt the value of the legal-tender medium of exchange. a revival of productive industry is needed by all classes; by none more than the holders of property, of whatever sort, with debts to liquidate from realization upon its sale. but admitting that these two classes of citizens are to be benefited by expansion, would it be honest to give it? would not the general loss be too great to justify such relief? would it not be just as honest and prudent to authorize each debtor to issue his own legal-tenders to the extent of his liabilities? than to do this, would it not be safer, for fear of overissues by unscrupulous creditors, to say that all debt obligations are obliterated in the united states, and now we commence anew, each possessing all he has at the time free from incumbrance? these propositions are too absurd to be entertained for a moment by thinking or honest people. yet every delay in preparation for final resumption partakes of this dishonesty, and is only less in degree as the hope is held out that a convenient season will at last arrive for the good work of redeeming our pledges to commence. it will never come, in my opinion, except by positive action by congress, or by national disasters which will destroy, for a time at least, the credit of the individual and the state at large. a sound currency might be reached by total bankruptcy and discredit of the integrity of the nation and of individuals. i believe it is in the power of congress at this session to devise such legislation as will renew confidence, revive all the industries, start us on a career of prosperity to last for many years and to save the credit of the nation and of the people. steps toward the return to a specie basis are the great requisites to this devoutly to be sought for end. there are others which i may touch upon hereafter. a nation dealing in a currency below that of specie in value labors under two great disadvantages: first, having no use for the world's acknowledged medium of exchange, gold and silver, these are driven out of the country because there is no need for their use; second, the medium of exchange in use being of a fluctuating value--for, after all, it is only worth just what it will purchase of gold and silver, metals having an intrinsic value just in proportion to the honest labor it takes to produce them--a larger margin must be allowed for profit by the manufacturer and producer. it is months from the date of production to the date of realization. interest upon capital must be charged, and risk of fluctuation in the value of that which is to be received in payment added. hence high prices, acting as a protection to the foreign producer, who receives nothing in exchange for the products of his skill and labor except a currency good, at a stable value, the world over. it seems to me that nothing is clearer than that the greater part of the burden of existing prostration, for the want of a sound financial system, falls upon the working man, who must after all produce the wealth, and the salaried man, who superintends and conducts business. the burden falls upon them in two ways--by the deprivation of employment and by the decreased purchasing power of their salaries. it is the duty of congress to devise the method of correcting the evils which are acknowledged to exist, and not mine. but i will venture to suggest two or three things which seem to me as absolutely necessary to a return to specie payments, the first great requisite in a return to prosperity. the legal-tender clause to the law authorizing the issue of currency by the national government should be repealed, to take effect as to all contracts entered into after a day fixed in the repealing act--not to apply, however, to payments of salaries by government, or for other expenditures now provided by law to be paid in currency, in the interval pending between repeal and final resumption. provision should be made by which the secretary of the treasury can obtain gold as it may become necessary from time to time from the date when specie redemption commences. to this might and should be added a revenue sufficiently in excess of expenses to insure an accumulation of gold in the treasury to sustain permanent redemption. i commend this subject to your careful consideration, believing that a favorable solution is attainable, and if reached by this congress that the present and future generations will ever gratefully remember it as their deliverer from a thraldom of evil and disgrace. with resumption, free banking may be authorized with safety, giving the same full protection to bill holders which they have under existing laws. indeed, i would regard free banking as essential. it would give proper elasticity to the currency. as more currency should be required for the transaction of legitimate business, new banks would be started, and in turn banks would wind up their business when it was found that there was a superabundance of currency. the experience and judgment of the people can best decide just how much currency is required for the transaction of the business of the country. it is unsafe to leave the settlement of this question to congress, the secretary of the treasury, or the executive. congress should make the regulation under which banks may exist, but should not make banking a monopoly by limiting the amount of redeemable paper currency that shall be authorized. such importance do i attach to this subject, and so earnestly do i commend it to your attention, that i give it prominence by introducing it at the beginning of this message. during the past year nothing has occurred to disturb the general friendly and cordial relations of the united states with other powers. the correspondence submitted herewith between this government and its diplomatic representatives, as also with the representatives of other countries, shows a satisfactory condition of all questions between the united states and the most of those countries, and with few exceptions, to which reference is hereafter made, the absence of any points of difference to be adjusted. the notice directed by the resolution of congress of june 17, 1874, to be given to terminate the convention of july 17, 1858, between the united states and belgium has been given, and the treaty will accordingly terminate on the 1st day of july, 1875. this convention secured to certain belgian vessels entering the ports of the united states exceptional privileges which are not accorded to our own vessels. other features of the convention have proved satisfactory, and have tended to the cultivation of mutually beneficial commercial intercourse and friendly relations between the two countries. i hope that negotiations which have been invited will result in the celebration of another treaty which may tend to the interests of both countries. our relations with china continue to be friendly. during the past year the fear of hostilities between china and japan, growing out of the landing of an armed force upon the island of formosa by the latter, has occasioned uneasiness. it is earnestly hoped, however, that the difficulties arising from this cause will be adjusted, and that the advance of civilization in these empires may not be retarded by a state of war. in consequence of the part taken by certain citizens of the united states in this expedition, our representatives in those countries have been instructed to impress upon the governments of china and japan the firm intention of this country to maintain strict neutrality in the event of hostilities, and to carefully prevent any infraction of law on the part of our citizens. in connection with this subject i call the attention of congress to a generally conceded fact--that the great proportion of the chinese immigrants who come to our shores do not come voluntarily, to make their homes with us and their labor productive of general prosperity, but come under contracts with headmen, who own them almost absolutely. in a worse form does this apply to chinese women. hardly a perceptible percentage of them perform any honorable labor, but they are brought for shameful purposes, to the disgrace of the communities where settled and to the great demoralization of the youth of those localities. if this evil practice can be legislated against, it will be my pleasure as well as duty to enforce any regulation to secure so desirable an end. it is hoped that negotiations between the government of japan and the treaty powers, looking to the further opening of the empire and to the removal of various restrictions upon trade and travel, may soon produce the results desired, which can not fail to inure to the benefit of all the parties. having on previous occasions submitted to the consideration of congress the propriety of the release of the japanese government from the further payment of the indemnity under the convention of october 22, 1864, and as no action had been taken thereon, it became my duty to regard the obligations of the convention as in force; and as the other powers interested had received their portion of the indemnity in full, the minister of the united states in japan has, in behalf of this government, received the remainder of the amount due to the united states under the convention of simonosaki. i submit the propriety of applying the income of a part, if not of the whole, of this fund to the education in the japanese language of a number of young men to be under obligations to serve the government for a specified time as interpreters at the legation and the consulates in japan. a limited number of japanese youths might at the same time be educated in our own vernacular, and mutual benefits would result to both governments. the importance of having our own citizens, competent and familiar with the language of japan, to act as interpreters and in other capacities connected with the legation and the consulates in that country can not readily be overestimated. the amount awarded to the government of great britain by the mixed commission organized under the provisions of the treaty of washington in settlement of the claims of british subjects arising from acts committed between april 13, 1861, and april 9, 1865, became payable, under the terms of the treaty, within the past year, and was paid upon the 21st day of september, 1874. in this connection i renew my recommendation, made at the opening of the last session of congress, that a special court be created to hear and determine all claims of aliens against the united states arising from acts committed against their persons or property during the insurrection. it appears equitable that opportunity should be offered to citizens of other states to present their claims, as well as to those british subjects whose claims were not admissible under the late commission, to the early decision of some competent tribunal. to this end i recommend the necessary legislation to organize a court to dispose of all claims of aliens of the nature referred to in an equitable and satisfactory manner, and to relieve congress and the departments from the consideration of these questions. the legislation necessary to extend to the colony of newfoundland certain articles of the treaty of washington of the 8th day of may, 1871, having been had, a protocol to that effect was signed in behalf of the united states and of great britain on the 28th day of may last, and was duly proclaimed on the following day. a copy of the proclamation[84] is submitted herewith. a copy of the report of the commissioner appointed under the act of march 19, 1872, for surveying and marking the boundary between the united states and the british possessions from the lake of the woods to the summit of the rocky mountains is herewith transmitted. i am happy to announce that the field work of the commission has been completed, and the entire line from the northwest corner of the lake of the woods to the summit of the rocky mountains has been run and marked upon the surface of the earth. it is believed that the amount remaining unexpended of the appropriation made at the last session of congress will be sufficient to complete the office work. i recommend that the authority of congress be given to the use of the unexpended balance of the appropriation in the completion of the work of the commission in making its report and preparing the necessary maps. the court known as the court of commissioners of alabama claims, created by an act of congress of the last session, has organized and commenced its work, and it is to be hoped that the claims admissible under the provisions of the act may be speedily ascertained and paid. it has been deemed advisable to exercise the discretion conferred upon the executive at the last session by accepting the conditions required by the government of turkey for the privilege of allowing citizens of the united states to hold real estate in the former country, and by assenting to a certain change in the jurisdiction of courts in the latter. a copy of the proclamation[85] upon these subjects is herewith communicated. there has been no material change in our relations with the independent states of this hemisphere which were formerly under the dominion of spain. marauding on the frontiers between mexico and texas still frequently takes place, despite the vigilance of the civil and military authorities in that quarter. the difficulty of checking such trespasses along the course of a river of such length as the rio grande, and so often fordable, is obvious. it is hoped that the efforts of this government will be seconded by those of mexico to the effectual suppression of these acts of wrong. from a report upon the condition of the business before the american and mexican joint claims commission, made by the agent on the part of the united states, and dated october 28, 1874, it appears that of the 1,017 claims filed on the part of citizens of the united states, 483 had been finally decided and 75 were in the hands of the umpire, leaving 462 to be disposed of; and of the 998 claims filed against the united states, 726 had been finally decided, 1 was before the umpire, and 271 remained to be disposed of. since the date of such report other claims have been disposed of, reducing somewhat the number still pending; and others have been passed upon by the arbitrators. it has become apparent, in view of these figures and of the fact that the work devolving on the umpire is particularly laborious, that the commission will be unable to dispose of the entire number of claims pending prior to the 1st day of february, 1875--the date fixed for its expiration. negotiations are pending looking to the securing of the results of the decisions which have been reached and to a further extension of the commission for a limited time, which it is confidently hoped will suffice to bring all the business now before it to a final close. the strife in the argentine republic is to be deplored, both on account of the parties thereto and from the probable effects on the interests of those engaged in the trade to that quarter, of whom the united states are among the principal. as yet, so far as i am aware, there has been no violation of our neutrality rights, which, as well as our duties in that respect, it shall be my endeavor to maintain and observe. it is with regret i announce that no further payment has been received from the government of venezuela on account of awards in favor of citizens of the united states. hopes have been entertained that if that republic could escape both foreign and civil war for a few years its great natural resources would enable it to honor its obligations. though it is now understood to be at peace with other countries, a serious insurrection is reported to be in progress in an important region of that republic. this may be taken advantage of as another reason to delay the payment of the dues of our citizens. the deplorable strife in cuba continues without any marked change in the relative advantages of the contending forces. the insurrection continues, but spain has gained no superiority. six years of strife give to the insurrection a significance which can not be denied. its duration and the tenacity of its adherence, together with the absence of manifested power of suppression on the part of spain, can not be controverted, and may make some positive steps on the part of other powers a matter of self-necessity. i had confidently hoped at this time to be able to announce the arrangement of some of the important questions between this government and that of spain, but the negotiations have been protracted. the unhappy intestine dissensions of spain command our profound sympathy, and must be accepted as perhaps a cause of some delay. an early settlement, in part at least, of the questions between the governments is hoped. in the meantime, awaiting the results of immediately pending negotiations, i defer a further and fuller communication on the subject of the relations of this country and spain. i have again to call the attention of congress to the unsatisfactory condition of the existing laws with reference to expatriation and the election of nationality. formerly, amid conflicting opinions and decisions, it was difficult to exactly determine how far the doctrine of perpetual allegiance was applicable to citizens of the united states. congress by the act of the 27th of july, 1868, asserted the abstract right of expatriation as a fundamental principle of this government. notwithstanding such assertion and the necessity of frequent application of the principle, no legislation has been had defining what acts or formalities shall work expatriation or when a citizen shall be deemed to have renounced or to have lost his citizenship. the importance of such definition is obvious. the representatives of the united states in foreign countries are continually called upon to lend their aid and the protection of the united states to persons concerning the good faith or the reality of whose citizenship there is at least great question. in some cases the provisions of the treaties furnish some guide; in others it seems left to the person claiming the benefits of citizenship, while living in a foreign country, contributing in no manner to the performance of the duties of a citizen of the united states, and without intention at any time to return and undertake those duties, to use the claims to citizenship of the united states simply as a shield from the performance of the obligations of a citizen elsewhere. the status of children born of american parents residing in a foreign country, of american women who have married aliens, of american citizens residing abroad where such question is not regulated by treaty, are all sources of frequent difficulty and discussion. legislation on these and similar questions, and particularly defining when and under what circumstances expatriation can be accomplished or is to be presumed, is especially needed. in this connection i earnestly call the attention of congress to the difficulties arising from fraudulent naturalization. the united states wisely, freely, and liberally offers its citizenship to all who may come in good faith to reside within its limits on their complying with certain prescribed reasonable and simple formalities and conditions. among the highest duties of the government is that to afford firm, sufficient, and equal protection to all its citizens, whether native born or naturalized. care should be taken that a right carrying with it such support from the government should not be fraudulently obtained, and should be bestowed only upon full proof of a compliance with the law; and yet frequent instances are brought to the attention of the government of illegal and fraudulent naturalization and of the unauthorized use of certificates thus improperly obtained. in some cases the fraudulent character of the naturalization has appeared upon the face of the certificate itself; in others examination discloses that the holder had not complied with the law, and in others certificates have been obtained where the persons holding them not only were not entitled to be naturalized, but had not even been within the united states at the time of the pretended naturalization. instances of each of these classes of fraud are discovered at our legations, where the certificates of naturalization are presented either for the purpose of obtaining passports or in demanding the protection of the legation. when the fraud is apparent on the face of such certificates, they are taken up by the representatives of the government and forwarded to the department of state. but even then the record of the court in which the fraudulent naturalization occurred remains, and duplicate certificates are readily obtainable. upon the presentation of these for the issue of passports or in demanding protection of the government, the fraud sometimes escapes notice, and such certificates are not infrequently used in transactions of business to the deception and injury of innocent parties. without placing any additional obstacles in the way of the obtainment of citizenship by the worthy and well-intentioned foreigner who comes in good faith to cast his lot with ours, i earnestly recommend further legislation to punish fraudulent naturalization and to secure the ready cancellation of the record of every naturalization made in fraud. since my last annual message the exchange has been made of the ratification of treaties of extradition with belgium, ecuador, peru, and salvador; also of a treaty of commerce and navigation with peru, and one of commerce and consular privileges with salvador; all of which have been duly proclaimed, as has also a declaration with russia with reference to trade-marks. the report of the secretary of the treasury, which by law is made directly to congress, and forms no part of this message, will show the receipts and expenditures of the government for the last fiscal year, the amount received from each source of revenue, and the amount paid out for each of the departments of government, it will be observed from this report that the amount of receipts over expenditures has been but $2,344,882.30 for the fiscal year ending june 30, 1874, and that for the current fiscal year the estimated receipts over expenditures will not much exceed $9,000,000. in view of the large national debt existing and the obligation to add 1 per cent per annum to the sinking fund, a sum amounting now to over $34,000,000 per annum, i submit whether revenues should not be increased or expenditures diminished to reach this amount of surplus. not to provide for the sinking fund is a partial failure to comply with the contracts and obligations of the government. at the last session of congress a very considerable reduction was made in rates of taxation and in the number of articles submitted to taxation; the question may well be asked, whether or not, in some instances, unwisely. in connection with this subject, too, i venture the opinion that the means of collecting the revenue, especially from imports, have been so embarrassed by legislation as to make it questionable whether or not large amounts are not lost by failure to collect, to the direct loss of the treasury and to the prejudice of the interests of honest importers and taxpayers. the secretary of the treasury in his report favors legislation looking to an early return to specie payments, thus supporting views previously expressed in this message. he also recommends economy in appropriations; calls attention to the loss of revenue from repealing the tax on tea and coffee, without benefit to the consumer; recommends an increase of 10 cents a gallon on whisky, and, further, that no modification be made in the banking and currency bill passed at the last session of congress, unless modification should become necessary by reason of the adoption of measures for returning to specie payments. in these recommendations i cordially join. i would suggest to congress the propriety of readjusting the tariff so as to increase the revenue, and at the same time decrease the number of articles upon which duties are levied. those articles which enter into our manufactures and are not produced at home, it seems to me, should be entered free. those articles of manufacture which we produce a constituent part of, but do not produce the whole, that part which we do not produce should enter free also. i will instance fine wool, dyes, etc. these articles must be imported to form a part of the manufacture of the higher grades of woolen goods. chemicals used as dyes, compounded in medicines, and used in various ways in manufactures come under this class. the introduction free of duty of such wools as we do not produce would stimulate the manufacture of goods requiring the use of those we do produce, and therefore would be a benefit to home production. there are many articles entering into "home manufactures" which we do not produce ourselves the tariff upon which increases the cost of producing the manufactured article. all corrections in this regard are in the direction of bringing labor and capital in harmony with each other and of supplying one of the elements of prosperity so much needed. the report of the secretary of war herewith attached, and forming a part of this message, gives all the information concerning the operations, wants, and necessities of the army, and contains many suggestions and recommendations which i commend to your special attention. there is no class of government employees who are harder worked than the army--officers and men; none who perform their tasks more cheerfully and efficiently and under circumstances of greater privations and hardships. legislation is desirable to render more efficient this branch of the public service. all the recommendations of the secretary of war i regard as judicious, and i especially commend to your attention the following: the consolidation of government arsenals; the restoration of mileage to officers traveling under orders; the exemption of money received from the sale of subsistence stores from being covered into the treasury; the use of appropriations for the purchase of subsistence stores without waiting for the beginning of the fiscal year for which the appropriation is made; for additional appropriations for the collection of torpedo material; for increased appropriations for the manufacture of arms; for relieving the various states from indebtedness for arms charged to them during the rebellion; for dropping officers from the rolls of the army without trial for the offense of drawing pay more than once for the same period; for the discouragement of the plan to pay soldiers by check, and for the establishment of a professorship of rhetoric and english literature at west point. the reasons for these recommendations are obvious, and are set forth sufficiently in the reports attached. i also recommend that the status of the staff corps of the army be fixed, where this has not already been done, so that promotions may be made and vacancies filled as they occur in each grade when reduced below the number to be fixed by law. the necessity for such legislation is specially felt now in the pay department. the number of officers in that department is below the number adequate to the performance of the duties required of them by law. the efficiency of the navy has been largely increased during the last year. under the impulse of the foreign complications which threatened us at the commencement of the last session of congress, most of our efficient wooden ships were put in condition for immediate service, and the repairs of our ironclad fleet were pushed with the utmost vigor. the result is that most of these are now in an effective state and need only to be manned and put in commission to go at once into service. some of the new sloops authorized by congress are already in commission, and most of the remainder are launched and wait only the completion of their machinery to enable them to take their places as part of our effective force. two iron torpedo ships have been completed during the last year, and four of our large double-turreted ironclads are now undergoing repairs. when these are finished, everything that is useful of our navy, as now authorized, will be in condition for service, and with the advance in the science of torpedo warfare the american navy, comparatively small as it is, will be found at any time powerful for the purposes of a peaceful nation. much has been accomplished during the year in aid of science and to increase the sum of general knowledge and further the interests of commerce and civilization. extensive and much-needed soundings have been made for hydrographic purposes and to fix the proper routes of ocean telegraphs. further surveys of the great isthmus have been undertaken and completed, and two vessels of the navy are now employed, in conjunction with those of england, france, germany, and russia, in observations connected with the transit of venus, so useful and interesting to the scientific world. the estimates for this branch of the public service do not differ materially from those of last year, those for the general support of the service being somewhat less and those for permanent improvements at the various stations rather larger than the corresponding estimate made a year ago. the regular maintenance and a steady increase in the efficiency of this most important arm in proportion to the growth of our maritime intercourse and interests is recommended to the attention of congress. the use of the navy in time of peace might be further utilized by a direct authorization of the employment of naval vessels in explorations and surveys of the supposed navigable waters of other nationalities on this continent, especially the tributaries of the two great rivers of south america, the orinoco and the amazon. nothing prevents, under existing laws, such exploration, except that expenditures must be made in such expeditions beyond those usually provided for in the appropriations. the field designated is unquestionably one of interest and one capable of large development of commercial interests--advantageous to the peoples reached and to those who may establish relations with them. education of the people entitled to exercise the right of franchise i regard essential to general prosperity everywhere, and especially so in republics, where birth, education, or previous condition does not enter into account in giving suffrage. next to the public school, the post-office is the great agent of education over our vast territory. the rapidity with which new sections are being settled, thus increasing the carrying of mails in a more rapid ratio than the increase of receipts, is not alarming. the report of the postmaster-general herewith attached shows that there was an increase of revenue in his department in 1873 over the previous year of $1,674,411, and an increase of cost of carrying the mails and paying employees of $3,041,468.91. the report of the postmaster-general gives interesting statistics of his department, and compares them with the corresponding statistics of a year ago, showing a growth in every branch of the department. a postal convention has been concluded with new south wales, an exchange of postal cards established with switzerland, and the negotiations pending for several years past with france have been terminated in a convention with that country, which went into effect last august. an international postal congress was convened in berne, switzerland, in september last, at which the united states was represented by an officer of the post-office department of much experience and of qualification for the position. a convention for the establishment of an international postal union was agreed upon and signed by the delegates of the countries represented, subject to the approval of the proper authorities of those countries. i respectfully direct your attention to the report of the postmaster-general and to his suggestions in regard to an equitable adjustment of the question of compensation to railroads for carrying the mails. your attention will be drawn to the unsettled condition of affairs in some of the southern states. on the 14th of september last the governor of louisiana called upon me, as provided by the constitution and laws of the united states, to aid in suppressing domestic violence in that state. this call was made in view of a proclamation issued on that day by d.b. penn, claiming that he was elected lieutenant-governor in 1872, and calling upon the militia of the state to arm, assemble, and drive from power the usurpers, as he designated the officers of the state government. on the next day i issued my proclamation[1] commanding the insurgents to disperse within five days from the date thereof, and subsequently learned that on that day they had taken forcible possession of the statehouse. steps were taken by me to support the existing and recognized state government, but before the expiration of the five days the insurrectionary movement was practically abandoned, and the officers of the state government, with some minor exceptions, resumed their powers and duties. considering that the present state administration of louisiana has been the only government in that state for nearly two years; that it has been tacitly acknowledged and acquiesced in as such by congress, and more than once expressly recognized by me, i regarded it as my clear duty, when legally called upon for that purpose, to prevent its overthrow by an armed mob under pretense of fraud and irregularity in the election of 1872. i have heretofore called the attention of congress to this subject, stating that on account of the frauds and forgeries committed at said election, and because it appears that the returns thereof were never legally canvassed, it was impossible to tell thereby who were chosen; but from the best sources of information at my command i have always believed that the present state officers received a majority of the legal votes actually cast at that election. i repeat what i said in my special message of february 23, 1873, that in the event of no action by congress i must continue to recognize the government heretofore recognized by me. i regret to say that with preparations for the late election decided indications appeared in some localities in the southern states of a determination, by acts of violence and intimidation, to deprive citizens of the freedom of the ballot because of their political opinions. bands of men, masked and armed, made their appearance; white leagues and other societies were formed; large quantities of arms and ammunition were imported and distributed to these organizations; military drills, with menacing demonstrations, were held, and with all these murders enough were committed to spread terror among those whose political action was to be suppressed, if possible, by these intolerant and criminal proceedings. in some places colored laborers were compelled to vote according to the wishes of their employers, under threats of discharge if they acted otherwise; and there are too many instances in which, when these threats were disregarded, they were remorselessly executed by those who made them. i understand that the fifteenth amendment to the constitution was made to prevent this and a like state of things, and the act of may 31, 1870, with amendments, was passed to enforce its provisions, the object of both being to guarantee to all citizens the right to vote and to protect them in the free enjoyment of that right. enjoined by the constitution "to take care that the laws be faithfully executed," and convinced by undoubted evidence that violations of said act had been committed and that a widespread and flagrant disregard of it was contemplated, the proper officers were instructed to prosecute the offenders, and troops were stationed at convenient points to aid these officers, if necessary, in the performance of their official duties. complaints are made of this interference by federal authority; but if said amendment and act do not provide for such interference under the circumstances as above stated, then they are without meaning, force, or effect, and the whole scheme of colored enfranchisement is worse than mockery and little better than a crime. possibly congress may find it due to truth and justice to ascertain, by means of a committee, whether the alleged wrongs to colored citizens for political purposes are real or the reports thereof were manufactured for the occasion. the whole number of troops in the states of louisiana, alabama, georgia, florida, south carolina, north carolina, kentucky, tennessee, arkansas, mississippi, maryland, and virginia at the time of the election was 4,082. this embraces the garrisons of all the forts from the delaware to the gulf of mexico. another trouble has arisen in arkansas. article 13 of the constitution of that state (which was adopted in 1868, and upon the approval of which by congress the state was restored to representation as one of the states of the union) provides in effect that before any amendments proposed to this constitution shall become a part thereof they shall be passed by two successive assemblies and then submitted to and ratified by a majority of the electors of the state voting thereon. on the 11th of may, 1874, the governor convened an extra session of the general assembly of the state, which on the 18th of the same month passed an act providing for a convention to frame a new constitution. pursuant to this act, and at an election held on the 30th of june, 1874, the convention was approved, and delegates were chosen thereto, who assembled on the 14th of last july and framed a new constitution, the schedule of which provided for the election of an entire new set of state officers in a manner contrary to the then existing election laws of the state. on the 13th of october, 1874, this constitution, as therein provided, was submitted to the people for their approval or rejection, and according to the election returns was approved by a large majority of those qualified to vote thereon; and at the same election persons were chosen to fill all the state, county, and township offices. the governor elected in 1872 for the term of four years turned over his office to the governor chosen under the new constitution, whereupon the lieutenant-governor, also elected in 1872 for a term of four years, claiming to act as governor, and alleging that said proceedings by which the new constitution was made and a new set of officers elected were unconstitutional, illegal, and void, called upon me, as provided in section 4, article iv, of the constitution, to protect the state against domestic violence. as congress is now investigating the political affairs of arkansas, i have declined to interfere. the whole subject of executive interference with the affairs of a state is repugnant to public opinion, to the feelings of those who, from their official capacity, must be used in such interposition, and to him or those who must direct. unless most clearly on the side of law, such interference becomes a crime; with the law to support it, it is condemned without a hearing. i desire, therefore, that all necessity for executive direction in local affairs may become unnecessary and obsolete. i invite the attention, not of congress, but of the people of the united states, to the causes and effects of these unhappy questions. is there not a disposition on one side to magnify wrongs and outrages, and on the other side to belittle them or justify them? if public opinion could be directed to a correct survey of what is and to rebuking wrong and aiding the proper authorities in punishing it, a better state of feeling would be inculcated, and the sooner we would have that peace which would leave the states free indeed to regulate their own domestic affairs. i believe on the part of our citizens of the southern states--the better part of them--there is a disposition to be law abiding, and to do no violence either to individuals or to the laws existing. but do they do right in ignoring the existence of violence and bloodshed in resistance to constituted authority? i sympathize with their prostrate condition, and would do all in my power to relieve them, acknowledging that in some instances they have had most trying governments to live under, and very oppressive ones in the way of taxation for nominal improvements, not giving benefits equal to the hardships imposed. but can they proclaim themselves entirely irresponsible for this condition? they can not. violence has been rampant in some localities, and has either been justified or denied by those who could have prevented it. the theory is even raised that there is to be no further interference on the part of the general government to protect citizens within a state where the state authorities fail to give protection. this is a great mistake. while i remain executive all the laws of congress and the provisions of the constitution, including the recent amendments added thereto, will be enforced with rigor, but with regret that they should have added one jot or tittle to executive duties or powers. let there be fairness in the discussion of southern questions, the advocates of both or all political parties giving honest, truthful reports of occurrences, condemning the wrong and upholding the right, and soon all will be well. under existing conditions the negro votes the republican ticket because he knows his friends are of that party. many a good citizen votes the opposite, not because he agrees with the great principles of state which separate parties, but because, generally, he is opposed to negro rule. this is a most delusive cry. treat the negro as a citizen and a voter, as he is and must remain, and soon parties will be divided, not on the color line, but on principle. then we shall have no complaint of sectional interference. the report of the attorney-general contains valuable recommendations relating to the administration of justice in the courts of the united states, to which i invite your attention. i respectfully suggest to congress the propriety of increasing the number of judicial districts in the united states to eleven (the present number being nine) and the creation of two additional judgeships. the territory to be traversed by the circuit judges is so great and the business of the courts so steadily increasing that it is growing more and more impossible for them to keep up with the business requiring their attention. whether this would involve the necessity of adding two more justices of the supreme court to the present number i submit to the judgment of congress. the attention of congress is invited to the report of the secretary of the interior and to the legislation asked for by him. the domestic interests of the people are more intimately connected with this department than with either of the other departments of government. its duties have been added to from time to time until they have become so onerous that without the most perfect system and order it will be impossible for any secretary of the interior to keep trace of all official transactions having his sanction and done in his name, and for which he is held personally responsible. the policy adopted for the management of indian affairs, known as the peace policy, has been adhered to with most beneficial results. it is confidently hoped that a few years more will relieve our frontiers from danger of indian depredations. i commend the recommendation of the secretary for the extension of the homestead laws to the indians and for some sort of territorial government for the indian territory. a great majority of the indians occupying this territory are believed yet to be incapable of maintaining their rights against the more civilized and enlightened white man. any territorial form of government given them, therefore, should protect them in their homes and property for a period of at least twenty years, and before its final adoption should be ratified by a majority of those affected. the report of the secretary of the interior herewith attached gives much interesting statistical information, which i abstain from giving an abstract of, but refer you to the report itself. the act of congress providing the oath which pensioners must subscribe to before drawing their pensions cuts off from this bounty a few survivors of the war of 1812 residing in the southern states. i recommend the restoration of this bounty to all such. the number of persons whose names would thus be restored to the list of pensioners is not large. they are all old persons, who could have taken no part in the rebellion, and the services for which they were awarded pensions were in defense of the whole country. the report of the commissioner of agriculture herewith contains suggestions of much interest to the general public, and refers to the approaching centennial and the part his department is ready to take in it. i feel that the nation at large is interested in having this exposition a success, and commend to congress such action as will secure a greater general interest in it. already many foreign nations have signified their intention to be represented at it, and it may be expected that every civilized nation will be represented. the rules adopted to improve the civil service of the government have been adhered to as closely as has been practicable with the opposition with which they meet. the effect, i believe, has been beneficial on the whole, and has tended to the elevation of the service. but it is impracticable to maintain them without direct and positive support of congress. generally the support which this reform receives is from those who give it their support only to find fault when the rules are apparently departed from. removals from office without preferring charges against parties removed are frequently cited as departures from the rules adopted, and the retention of those against whom charges are made by irresponsible persons and without good grounds is also often condemned as a violation of them. under these circumstances, therefore, i announce that if congress adjourns without positive legislation on the subject of "civil-service reform" i will regard such action as a disapproval of the system, and will abandon it, except so far as to require examinations for certain appointees, to determine their fitness. competitive examinations will be abandoned. the gentlemen who have given their services, without compensation, as members of the board to devise rules and regulations for the government of the civil service of the country have shown much zeal and earnestness in their work, and to them, as well as to myself, it will be a source of mortification if it is to be thrown away. but i repeat that it is impossible to carry this system to a successful issue without general approval and assistance and positive law to support it. i have stated that three elements of prosperity to the nation--capital, labor, skilled and unskilled, and products of the soil--still remain with us. to direct the employment of these is a problem deserving the most serious attention of congress. if employment can be given to all the labor offering itself, prosperity necessarily follows. i have expressed the opinion, and repeat it, that the first requisite to the accomplishment of this end is the substitution of a sound currency in place of one of a fluctuating value. this secured, there are many interests that might be fostered to the great profit of both labor and capital. how to induce capital to employ labor is the question. the subject of cheap transportation has occupied the attention of congress. much new light on this question will without doubt be given by the committee appointed by the last congress to investigate and report upon this subject. a revival of shipbuilding, and particularly of iron steamship building, is of vast importance to our national prosperity. the united states is now paying over $100,000,000 per annum for freights and passage on foreign ships--to be carried abroad and expended in the employment and support of other peoples--beyond a fair percentage of what should go to foreign vessels, estimating on the tonnage and travel of each respectively. it is to be regretted that this disparity in the carrying trade exists, and to correct it i would be willing to see a great departure from the usual course of government in supporting what might usually be termed private enterprise. i would not suggest as a remedy direct subsidy to american steamship lines, but i would suggest the direct offer of ample compensation for carrying the mails between atlantic seaboard cities and the continent on american-owned and american-built steamers, and would extend this liberality to vessels carrying the mails to south american states and to central america and mexico, and would pursue the same policy from our pacific seaports to foreign seaports on the pacific. it might be demanded that vessels built for this service should come up to a standard fixed by legislation in tonnage, speed, and all other qualities, looking to the possibility of government requiring them at some time for war purposes. the right also of taking possession of them in such emergency should be guarded. i offer these suggestions, believing them worthy of consideration, in all seriousness, affecting all sections and all interests alike. if anything better can be done to direct the country into a course of general prosperity, no one will be more ready than i to second the plan. forwarded herewith will be found the report of the commissioners appointed under an act of congress approved june 20, 1874, to wind up the affairs of the district government. it will be seen from the report that the net debt of the district of columbia, less securities on hand and available, is: bonded debt issued prior to july 1, 1874 $8,883,940.43 3.65 bonds, act of congress june 20, 1874 2,088,168.73 certificates of the board of audit 4,770,558.45 _____________ 15,742,667.61 less special-improvement assessments (chargeable to private property) in excess of any demand against such assessments $1,614,054.37 less chesapeake and ohio canal bonds 75,000.00 and washington and alexandria railroad bonds 59,000.00 _____________ in the hands of the commissioners of the sinking fund 1,748,054.37 _____________ leaving actual debt, less said assets 13,994,613.24 in addition to this there are claims preferred against the government of the district amounting, in the estimated aggregate reported by the board of audit, to $3,147,787.48, of which the greater part will probably be rejected. this sum can with no more propriety be included in the debt account of the district government than can the thousands of claims against the general government be included as a portion of the national debt. but the aggregate sum thus stated includes something more than the funded debt chargeable exclusively to the district of columbia. the act of congress of june 20, 1874, contemplates an apportionment between the united states government and the district of columbia in respect of the payment of the principal and interest of the 3.65 bonds. therefore in computing with precision the bonded debt of the district the aggregate sums above stated as respects 3.65 bonds now issued, the outstanding certificates of the board of audit, and the unadjusted claims pending before that board should be reduced to the extent of the amount to be apportioned to the united states government in the manner indicated in the act of congress of june 20, 1874. i especially invite your attention to the recommendations of the commissioners of the sinking fund relative to the ambiguity of the act of june 20, 1874, the interest on the district bonds, and the consolidation of the indebtedness of the district. i feel much indebted to the gentlemen who consented to leave their private affairs and come from a distance to attend to the business of this district, and for the able and satisfactory manner in which it has been conducted. i am sure their services will be equally appreciated by the entire country. it will be seen from the accompanying full report of the board of health that the sanitary condition of the district is very satisfactory. in my opinion the district of columbia should be regarded as the grounds of the national capital, in which the entire people are interested. i do not allude to this to urge generous appropriations to the district, but to draw the attention of congress, in framing a law for the government of the district, to the magnificent scale on which the city was planned by the founders of the government; the manner in which, for ornamental purposes, the reservations, streets, and avenues were laid out, and the proportion of the property actually possessed by the general government. i think the proportion of the expenses of the government and improvements to be borne by the general government, the cities of washington and georgetown, and the county should be carefully and equitably defined. in accordance with section 3, act approved june 23, 1874, i appointed a board to make a survey of the mouth of the mississippi river with a view to determine the best method of obtaining and maintaining a depth of water sufficient for the purposes of commerce, etc.; and in accordance with an act entitled "an act to provide for the appointment of a commission of engineers to investigate and report a permanent plan for the reclamation of the alluvial basin of the mississippi river subject to inundation," i appointed a commission of engineers. neither board has yet completed its labors. when their reports are received, they will be forwarded to congress without delay. u.s. grant. [footnote 84: see pp. 273-276.] [footnote 85: see pp. 277-281.] [footnote 86: see pp. 276-277.] special messages. washington, _december 8, 1874_. _to the senate of the united states_: in answer to the resolution of the senate of the 3d of february, 1873, i transmit herewith a report from the secretary of state, together with the papers[87] which accompanied it. u.s. grant. [footnote 87: dispatches in regard to the records and public documents of the mexican government relative to the lands embraced within the territories of arizona and new mexico.] washington, _december 8, 1874_. _to the senate of the united states_: i transmit to the senate, for consideration with a view to ratification, a convention between the united states of america and the ottoman empire, relative to the extradition of criminals fugitives from justice, signed by their respective plenipotentiaries at constantinople on the 11th of august last. u.s. grant. washington, _december 8, 1874_. _to the senate of the united states_: i transmit to the senate, for consideration with a view to ratification, a convention concluded between the united states of america and the mexican republic on the 20th of november last, for further extending the time for the duration of the joint commission respecting claims, originally fixed by the convention between the united states and mexico signed on the 4th of july, 1868, and extended by those of the 19th of april, 1871, and 27th of november, 1872, between the same parties. u.s. grant. washington, _december 8, 1874_. _to the senate of the united states_: i transmit to the senate, for consideration with a view to ratification, a convention between the united states of america and the ottoman empire, relative to the naturalization of citizens and subjects of the two countries, signed by their respective plenipotentiaries at constantinople on the 11th of august last. a copy of the correspondence which accompanied the convention on the subject is herewith transmitted. u.s. grant. washington, _december 8, 1874_. _to the senate and house of representatives_: i transmit herewith a report, dated the 8th instant, with accompanying papers,[88] from the secretary of state, in compliance with the requirements of section 208 of the revised statutes of the united states. u.s. grant. [footnote 88: report of fees collected, etc., by consular officers of the united states for 1873, list of consular officers, and tariff of consular fees prescribed by the president september 1, 1874.] executive mansion, _december 22, 1874_. the speaker of the house of representatives: i have the honor to transmit herewith, for the information of congress, a memorial[89] forwarded to me by a convention of colored citizens assembled in the city of montgomery, ala., on the 2d of this month. u.s. grant. [footnote 89: asking all the rights of citizenship.] executive mansion, _january 5, 1875_. _to the senate of the united states_: in answer to the resolution of the senate of the 21st december last, requesting the return of its resolution of the 17th of the same month, advising and consenting to the appointment of j.c.s. colby to be consul of the united states at chin-kiang, i have the honor to state that mr. colby's commission was signed on the 17th day of december, and upon inquiry at the department of state it was found that it had been forwarded to him by mail before the receipt of the resolution of recall. u.s. grant. executive mansion, _january 12, 1875_. _to the senate and house of representatives_: in accordance with the requirements of the joint resolution approved march 25, 1874, authorizing an inquiry into and report upon the causes of epidemic cholera, i have the honor to transmit herewith reports upon the subject from the secretaries of the treasury and war departments. u.s. grant. executive mansion, _january 13, 1875_. _to the senate of the united states_: i have the honor to make the following answer to a senate resolution of the 8th instant, asking for information as to any interference by any military officer or any part of the army of the united states with the organization or proceedings of the general assembly of the state of louisiana, or either branch thereof; and also inquiring in regard to the existence of armed organizations in that state hostile to the government thereof and intent on overturning such government by force. to say that lawlessness, turbulence, and bloodshed have characterized the political affairs of that state since its reorganization under the reconstruction acts is only to repeat what has become well known as a part of its unhappy history; but it may be proper here to refer to the election of 1868, by which the republican vote of the state, through fraud and violence, was reduced to a few thousands, and the bloody riots of 1866 and 1868, to show that the disorders there are not due to any recent causes or to any late action of the federal authorities. preparatory to the election of 1872 a shameful and undisguised conspiracy was formed to carry that election against the republicans, without regard to law or right, and to that end the most glaring frauds and forgeries were committed in the returns, after many colored citizens had been denied registration and others deterred by fear from casting their ballots. when the time came for a final canvass of the votes, in view of the foregoing facts william p. kellogg, the republican candidate for governor, brought suit upon the equity side of the united states circuit court for louisiana, and against warmoth and others, who had obtained possession of the returns of the election, representing that several thousand voters of the state had been deprived of the elective franchise on account of their color, and praying that steps might be taken to have said votes counted and for general relief. to enable the court to inquire as to the truth of these allegations, a temporary restraining order was issued against the defendants, which was at once wholly disregarded and treated with contempt by those to whom it was directed. these proceedings have been widely denounced as an unwarrantable interference by the federal judiciary with the election of state officers; but it is to be remembered that by the fifteenth amendment to the constitution of the united states the political equality of colored citizens is secured, and under the second section of that amendment, providing that congress shall have power to enforce its provisions by appropriate legislation, an act was passed on the 31st of may, 1870, and amended in 1871, the object of which was to prevent the denial or abridgment of suffrage to citizens on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude; and it has been held by all the federal judges before whom the question has arisen, including justice strong, of the supreme court, that the protection afforded by this amendment and these acts extends to state as well as other elections. that it is the duty of the federal courts to enforce the provisions of the constitution of the united states and the laws passed in pursuance thereof is too clear for controversy. section 15 of said act, after numerous provisions therein to prevent an evasion of the fifteenth amendment, provides that the jurisdiction of the circuit court of the united states shall extend to all cases in law or equity arising under the provisions of said act and of the act amendatory thereof. congress seems to have contemplated equitable as well as legal proceedings to prevent the denial of suffrage to colored citizens; and it may be safely asserted that if kellogg's bill in the above-named case did not present a case for the equitable interposition of the court, that no such case can arise under the act. that the courts of the united states have the right to interfere in various ways with state elections so as to maintain political equality and rights therein, irrespective of race or color, is comparatively a new, and to some seems to be a startling, idea, but it results as clearly from the fifteenth amendment to the constitution and the acts that have been passed to enforce that amendment as the abrogation of state laws upholding slavery results from the thirteenth amendment to the constitution. while the jurisdiction of the court in the case of kellogg _vs_. warmoth and others is clear to my mind, it seems that some of the orders made by the judge in that and the kindred case of antoine were illegal. but while they are so held and considered, it is not to be forgotten that the mandate of his court had been contemptuously defied, and they were made while wild scenes of anarchy were sweeping away all restraint of law and order. doubtless the judge of this court made grave mistakes; but the law allows the chancellor great latitude, not only in punishing those who contemn his orders and injunctions, but in preventing the consummation of the wrong which he has judicially forbidden. whatever may be said or thought of those matters, it was only made known to me that process of the united states court was resisted, and as said act especially provides for the use of the army and navy when necessary to enforce judicial process arising thereunder, i considered it my duty to see that such process was executed according to the judgment of the court. resulting from these proceedings, through various controversies and complications, a state administration was organized with william p. kellogg as governor, which, in the discharge of my duty under section 4, article iv, of the constitution, i have recognized as the government of the state. it has been bitterly and persistently alleged that kellogg was not elected. whether he was or not is not altogether certain, nor is it any more certain that his competitor, mcenery, was chosen. the election was a gigantic fraud, and there are no reliable returns of its result. kellogg obtained possession of the office, and in my opinion has more right to it than his competitor. on the 20th of february, 1873, the committee on privileges and elections of the senate made a report in which they say they were satisfied by testimony that the manipulation of the election machinery by warmoth and others was equivalent to 20,000 votes; and they add that to recognize the mcenery government "would be recognizing a government based upon fraud, in defiance of the wishes and intention of the voters of the state." assuming the correctness of the statements in this report (and they seem to have been generally accepted by the country), the great crime in louisiana, about which so much has been said, is that one is holding the office of governor who was cheated out of 20,000 votes, against another whose title to the office is undoubtedly based on fraud and in defiance of the wishes and intentions of the voters of the state. misinformed and misjudging as to the nature and extent of this report, the supporters of mcenery proceeded to displace by force in some counties of the state the appointees of governor kellogg, and on the 13th of april, in an effort of that kind, a butchery of citizens was committed at colfax, which in bloodthirstiness and barbarity is hardly surpassed by any acts of savage warfare. to put this matter beyond controversy i quote from the charge of judge woods, of the united states circuit court, to the jury in the case of the united states _vs_. cruikshank and others, in new orleans in march, 1874. he said: in the case on trial there are many facts not in controversy. i proceed to state some of them in the presence and hearing of counsel on both sides; and if i state as a conceded fact any matter that is disputed, they can correct me. after stating the origin of the difficulty, which grew out of an attempt of white persons to drive the parish judge and sheriff, appointees of kellogg, from office, and their attempted protection by colored persons, which led to some fighting, in which quite a number of negroes were killed, the judge states: most of those who were not killed were taken prisoners. fifteen or sixteen of the blacks had lifted the boards and taken refuge under the floor of the court-house. they were all captured. about thirty-seven men were taken prisoners. the number is not definitely fixed. they were kept under guard until dark. they were led out, two by two, and shot. most of the men were shot to death. a few were wounded, not mortally, and by pretending to be dead were afterwards, during the night, able to make their escape. among them was the levi nelson named in the indictment. the dead bodies of the negroes killed in this affair were left unburied until tuesday, april 15, when they were buried by a deputy marshal and an officer of the militia from new orleans. these persons found fifty-nine dead bodies. they showed pistol-shot wounds, the great majority in the head, and most of them in the back of the head. in addition to the fifty-nine dead bodies found, some charred remains of dead bodies were discovered near the court-house. six dead bodies were found under a warehouse, all shot in the head but one or two, which were shot in the breast. the only white men injured from the beginning of these troubles to their close were hadnot and harris. the court-house and its contents were entirely consumed. there is no evidence that anyone in the crowd of whites bore any lawful warrant for the arrest of any of the blacks. there is no evidence that either nash or cazabat, after the affair, ever demanded their offices, to which they had set up claim, but register continued to act as parish judge and shaw as sheriff. these are facts in this case as i understand them to be admitted. to hold the people of louisiana generally responsible for these atrocities would not be just, but it is a lamentable fact that insuperable obstructions were thrown in the way of punishing these murderers; and the so-called conservative papers of the state not only justified the massacre, but denounced as federal tyranny and despotism the attempt of the united states officers to bring them to justice. fierce denunciations ring through the country about office holding and election matters in louisiana, while every one of the colfax miscreants goes unwhipped of justice, and no way can be found in this boasted land of civilization and christianity to punish the perpetrators of this bloody and monstrous crime. not unlike this was the massacre in august last. several northern young men of capital and enterprise had started the little and flourishing town of coushatta. some of them were republicans and officeholders under kellogg. they were therefore doomed to death. six of them were seized and carried away from their homes and murdered in cold blood. no one has been punished, and the conservative press of the state denounced all efforts to that end and boldly justified the crime. many murders of a like character have been committed in individual cases, which can not here be detailed. for example, t.s. crawford, judge, and p.h. harris, district attorney, of the twelfth judicial district of the state, on their way to court were shot from their horses by men in ambush on the 8th of october, 1873; and the widow of the former, in a communication to the department of justice, tells a piteous tale of the persecutions of her husband because he was a union man, and of the efforts made to screen those who had committed a crime which, to use her own language, "left two widows and nine orphans desolate." to say that the murder of a negro or a white republican is not considered a crime in louisiana would probably be unjust to a great part of the people, but it is true that a great number of such murders have been committed and no one has been punished therefor; and manifestly, as to them, the spirit of hatred and violence is stronger than law. representations were made to me that the presence of troops in louisiana was unnecessary and irritating to the people, and that there was no danger of public disturbance if they were taken away. consequently early in last summer the troops were all withdrawn from the state, with the exception of a small garrison at new orleans barracks. it was claimed that a comparative state of quiet had supervened. political excitement as to louisiana affairs seemed to be dying out. but the november election was approaching, and it was necessary for party purposes that the flame should be rekindled. accordingly, on the 14th of september d.p. penn, claiming that he was elected lieutenant-governor in 1872, issued an inflammatory proclamation calling upon the militia of the state to arm, assemble, and drive from power the usurpers, as he designated the officers of the state. the white leagues, armed and ready for the conflict, promptly responded. on the same day the governor made a formal requisition upon me, pursuant to the act of 1795 and section 4, article iv, of the constitution, to aid in suppressing domestic violence. on the next day i issued my proclamation[1] commanding the insurgents to disperse within five days from the date thereof; but before the proclamation was published in new orleans the organized and armed forces recognizing a usurping governor had taken forcible possession of the statehouse and temporarily subverted the government. twenty or more people were killed, including a number of the police of the city. the streets of the city were stained with blood. all that was desired in the way of excitement had been accomplished, and, in view of the steps taken to repress it, the revolution is apparently, though it is believed not really, abandoned, and the cry of federal usurpation and tyranny in louisiana was renewed with redoubled energy. troops had been sent to the state under this requisition of the governor, and as other disturbances seemed imminent they were allowed to remain there to render the executive such aid as might become necessary to enforce the laws of the state and repress the continued violence which seemed inevitable the moment federal support should be withdrawn. prior to, and with a view to, the late election in louisiana white men associated themselves together in armed bodies called "white leagues," and at the same time threats were made in the democratic journals of the state that the election should be carried against the republicans at all hazards, which very naturally greatly alarmed the colored voters. by section 8 of the act of february 28, 1871, it is made the duty of united states marshals and their deputies at polls where votes are cast for representatives in congress to keep the peace and prevent any violations of the so-called enforcement acts and other offenses against the laws of the united states; and upon a requisition of the marshal of louisiana, and in view of said armed organizations and other portentous circumstances, i caused detachments of troops to be stationed in various localities in the state, to aid him in the performance of his official duties. that there was intimidation of republican voters at the election, notwithstanding these precautions, admits of no doubt. the following are specimens of the means used: on the 14th of october eighty persons signed and published the following at shreveport: we, the undersigned, merchants of the city of shreveport, in obedience to a request of the shreveport campaign club, agree to use every endeavor to get our employees to vote the people's ticket at the ensuing election, and in the event of their refusal so to do, or in case they vote the radical ticket, to refuse to employ them at the expiration of their present contracts. on the same day another large body of persons published in the same place a paper in which they used the following language: we, the undersigned, merchants of the city of shreveport, alive to the great importance of securing good and honest government to the state, do agree and pledge ourselves not to advance any supplies or money to any planter the coming year who will give employment or rent lands to laborers who vote the radical ticket in the coming election. i have no information of the proceedings of the returning board for said election which may not be found in its report, which has been published; but it is a matter of public information that a great part of the time taken to canvass the votes was consumed by the arguments of lawyers, several of whom represented each party before the board. i have no evidence that the proceedings of this board were not in accordance with the law under which they acted. whether in excluding from their count certain returns they were right or wrong is a question that depends upon the evidence they had before them; but it is very clear that the law gives them the power, if they choose to exercise it, of deciding that way, and, _prima facie_, the persons whom they return as elected are entitled to the offices for which they were candidates. respecting the alleged interference by the military with the organization of the legislature of louisiana on the 4th instant, i have no knowledge or information which has not been received by me since that time and published. my first information was from the papers of the morning of the 5th of january. i did not know that any such thing was anticipated, and no orders nor suggestions were ever given to any military officer in that state upon that subject prior to the occurrence. i am well aware that any military interference by the officers or troops of the united states with the organization of the state legislature or any of its proceedings, or with any civil department of the government, is repugnant to our ideas of government. i can conceive of no case, not involving rebellion or insurrection, where such interference by authority of the general government ought to be permitted or can be justified. but there are circumstances connected with the late legislative imbroglio in louisiana which seem to exempt the military from any intentional wrong in that matter. knowing that they had been placed in louisiana to prevent domestic violence and aid in the enforcement of the state laws, the officers and troops of the united states may well have supposed that it was their duty to act when called upon by the governor for that purpose. each branch of a legislative assembly is the judge of the election and qualifications of its own members; but if a mob or a body of unauthorized persons seize and hold the legislative hall in a tumultuous and riotous manner, and so prevent any organization by those legally returned as elected, it might become the duty of the state executive to interpose, if requested by a majority of the members elect, to suppress the disturbance and enable the persons elected to organize the house. any exercise of this power would only be justifiable under most extraordinary circumstances, and it would then be the duty of the governor to call upon the constabulary or, if necessary, the military force of the state. but with reference to louisiana, it is to be borne in mind that any attempt by the governor to use the police force of that state at this time would have undoubtedly precipitated a bloody conflict with the white league, as it did on the 14th of september. there is no doubt but that the presence of the united states troops upon that occasion prevented bloodshed and the loss of life. both parties appear to have relied upon them as conservators of the public peace. the first call was made by the democrats, to remove persons obnoxious to them from the legislative halls; and the second was from the republicans, to remove persons who had usurped seats in the legislature without legal certificates authorizing them to seats, and in sufficient number to change the majority. nobody was disturbed by the military who had a legal right at that time to occupy a seat in the legislature. that the democratic minority of the house undertook to seize its organization by fraud and violence; that in this attempt they trampled under foot law; that they undertook to make persons not returned as elected members, so as to create a majority; that they acted under a preconcerted plan, and under false pretenses introduced into the hall a body of men to support their pretensions by force if necessary, and that conflict, disorder, and riotous proceedings followed are facts that seem to be well established; and i am credibly informed that these violent proceedings were a part of a premeditated plan to have the house organized in this way, recognize what has been called the mcenery senate, then to depose governor kellogg, and so revolutionize the state government. whether it was wrong for the governor, at the request of the majority of the members returned as elected to the house, to use such means as were in his power to defeat these lawless and revolutionary proceedings is perhaps a debatable question; but it is quite certain that there would have been no trouble if those who now complain of illegal interference had allowed the house to be organized in a lawful and regular manner. when those who inaugurate disorder and anarchy disavow such proceedings, it will be time enough to condemn those who by such means as they have prevent the success of their lawless and desperate schemes. lieutenant-general sheridan was requested by me to go to louisiana to observe and report the situation there, and, if in his opinion necessary, to assume the command, which he did on the 4th instant, after the legislative disturbances had occurred, at 9 o'clock p.m., a number of hours after the disturbances. no party motives nor prejudices can reasonably be imputed to him; but honestly convinced by what he has seen and heard there, he has characterized the leaders of the white leagues in severe terms and suggested summary modes of procedure against them, which, though they can not be adopted, would, if legal, soon put an end to the troubles and disorders in that state. general sheridan was looking at facts, and possibly, not thinking of proceedings which would be the only proper ones to pursue in time of peace, thought more of the utterly lawless condition of society surrounding him at the time of his dispatch and of what would prove a sure remedy. he never proposed to do an illegal act nor expressed determination to proceed beyond what the law in the future might authorize for the punishment of the atrocities which have been committed, and the commission of which can not be successfully denied. it is a deplorable fact that political crimes and murders have been committed in louisiana which have gone unpunished, and which have been justified or apologized for, which must rest as a reproach upon the state and country long after the present generation has passed away. i have no desire to have united states troops interfere in the domestic concerns of louisiana or any other state. on the 9th of december last governor kellogg telegraphed to me his apprehensions that the white league intended to make another attack upon the statehouse, to which, on the same day, i made the following answer, since which no communication has been sent to him: your dispatch of this date just received. it is exceedingly unpalatable to use troops in anticipation of danger. let the state authorities be right, and then proceed with their duties without apprehension of danger. if they are then molested, the question will be determined whether the united states is able to maintain law and order within its limits or not. i have deplored the necessity which seemed to make it my duty under the constitution and laws to direct such interference. i have always refused except where it seemed to be my imperative duty to act in such a manner under the constitution and laws of the united states. i have repeatedly and earnestly entreated the people of the south to live together in peace and obey the laws; and nothing would give me greater pleasure than to see reconciliation and tranquillity everywhere prevail, and thereby remove all necessity for the presence of troops among them. i regret, however, to say that this state of things does not exist, nor does its existence seem to be desired, in some localities; and as to those it may be proper for me to say that to the extent that congress has conferred power upon me to prevent it neither kuklux klans, white leagues, nor any other association using arms and violence to execute their unlawful purposes can be permitted in that way to govern any part of this country; nor can i see with indifference union men or republicans ostracized, persecuted, and murdered on account of their opinions, as they now are in some localities. i have heretofore urged the case of louisiana upon the attention of congress, and i can not but think that its inaction has produced great evil. to summarize: in september last an armed, organized body of men, in the support of candidates who had been put in nomination for the offices of governor and lieutenant-governor at the november election in 1872, and who had been declared not elected by the board of canvassers, recognized by all the courts to which the question had been submitted, undertook to subvert and overthrow the state government that had been recognized by me in accordance with previous precedents. the recognized governor was driven from the statehouse, and but for his finding shelter in the united states custom-house, in the capital of the state of which he was governor, it is scarcely to be doubted that he would have been killed. from the statehouse, before he had been driven to the custom-house, a call was made, in accordance with the fourth section, fourth article, of the constitution of the united states, for the aid of the general government to suppress domestic violence. under those circumstances, and in accordance with my sworn duties, my proclamation[91] of the 15th of september, 1874, was issued. this served to reinstate governor kellogg to his position nominally, but it can not be claimed that the insurgents have to this day surrendered to the state authorities the arms belonging to the state, or that they have in any sense disarmed. on the contrary, it is known that the same armed organizations that existed on the 14th of september, 1874, in opposition to the recognized state government, still retain their organization, equipments, and commanders, and can be called out at any hour to resist the state government. under these circumstances the same military force has been continued in louisiana as was sent there under the first call, and under the same general instructions. i repeat that the task assumed by the troops is not a pleasant one to them; that the army is not composed of lawyers, capable of judging at a moment's notice of just how far they can go in the maintenance of law and order, and that it was impossible to give specific instructions providing for all possible contingencies that might arise. the troops were bound to act upon the judgment of the commanding officer upon each sudden contingency that arose, or wait instructions which could only reach them after the threatened wrongs had been committed which they were called on to prevent. it should be recollected, too, that upon my recognition of the kellogg government i reported the fact, with the grounds of recognition, to congress, and asked that body to take action in the matter; otherwise i should regard their silence as an acquiescence in my course. no action has been taken by that body, and i have maintained the position then marked out. if error has been committed by the army in these matters, it has always been on the side of the preservation of good order, the maintenance of law, and the protection of life. their bearing reflects credit upon the soldiers, and if wrong has resulted the blame is with the turbulent element surrounding them. i now earnestly ask that such action be taken by congress as to leave my duties perfectly clear in dealing with the affairs of louisiana, giving assurance at the same time that whatever may be done by that body in the premises will be executed according to the spirit and letter of the law, without fear or favor. i herewith transmit copies of documents containing more specific information as to the subject-matter of the resolution. u.s. grant. [footnote 90: see pp. 276-277.] [footnote 91: see pp. 275-277.] executive mansion, _january 14, 1875_. _to the senate of the united states_: senate bill no. 1044, "to provide for the resumption of specie payments," is before me, and this day receives my signature of approval. i venture upon this unusual method of conveying the notice of approval to the "house in which the measure originated" because of its great importance to the country at large and in order to suggest further legislation which seems to me essential to make this law effective. it is a subject of congratulation that a measure has become law which fixes a date when specie resumption shall commence and implies an obligation on the part of congress, if in its power, to give such legislation as may prove necessary to redeem this promise. to this end i respectfully call your attention to a few suggestions: first. the necessity of an increased revenue to carry out the obligation of adding to the sinking fund annually 1 per cent of the public debt, amounting now to about $34,000,000 per annum, and to carry out the promises of this measure to redeem, under certain contingencies, eighty millions of the present legal-tenders, and, without contingency, the fractional currency now in circulation. how to increase the surplus revenue is for congress to devise, but i will venture to suggest that the duty on tea and coffee might be restored without permanently enhancing the cost to the consumers, and that the 10 per cent horizontal reduction of the tariff on articles specified in the law of june 6, 1872, be repealed. the supply of tea and coffee already on hand in the united states would in all probability be advanced in price by adopting this measure. but it is known that the adoption of free entry to those articles of necessity did not cheapen them, but merely added to the profits of the countries producing them, or of the middlemen in those countries, who have the exclusive trade in them. second. the first section of the bill now under consideration provides that the fractional currency shall be redeemed in silver coin as rapidly as practicable. there is no provision preventing the fluctuation in the value of the paper currency. with gold at a premium of anything over 10 per cent above the currency in use, it is probable, almost certain, that silver would be bought up for exportation as fast as it was put out, or until change would become so scarce as to make the premium on it equal to the premium on gold, or sufficiently high to make it no longer profitable to buy for export, thereby causing a direct loss to the community at large and great embarrassment to trade. as the present law commands final resumption on the 1st day of january, 1879, and as the gold receipts by the treasury are larger than the gold payments and the currency receipts are smaller than the currency payments, thereby making monthly sales of gold necessary to meet current currency expenses, it occurs to me that these difficulties might be remedied by authorizing the secretary of the treasury to redeem legal-tender notes, whenever presented in sums of not less than $100 and multiples thereof, at a premium for gold of 10 per cent, less interest at the rate of 2-1/2 per cent per annum from the 1st day of january, 1875, to the date of putting this law into operation, and diminishing this premium at the same rate until final resumption, changing the rate of premium demanded from time to time as the interest amounts to one-quarter of 1 per cent. i suggest this rate of interest because it would bring currency at par with gold at the date fixed by law for final resumption. i suggest 10 per cent as the demand premium at the beginning because i believe this rate would insure the retention of silver in the country for change. the provisions of the third section of the act will prevent combinations being made to exhaust the treasury of coin. with such a law it is presumable that no gold would be called for not required for legitimate business purposes. when large amounts of coin should be drawn from the treasury, correspondingly large amounts of currency would be withdrawn from circulation, thus causing a sufficient stringency in currency to stop the outward flow of coin. the advantages of a currency of a fixed known value would also be reached. in my opinion, by the enactment of such a law business and industries would revive and the beginning of prosperity on a firm basis would be reached. other means of increasing revenue than those suggested should probably be devised, and also other legislation. in fact, to carry out the first section of the act another mint becomes a necessity. with the present facilities for coinage, it would take a period probably beyond that fixed by law for final specie resumption to coin the silver necessary to transact the business of the country. there are now smelting furnaces, for extracting the silver and gold from the ores brought from the mountain territories, in chicago, st. louis, and omaha--three in the former city--and as much of the change required will be wanted in the mississippi valley states, and as the metals to be coined come from west of those states, and, as i understand, the charges for transportation of bullion from either of the cities named to the mint in philadelphia or to new york city amount to $4 for each $1,000 worth, with an equal expense for transportation back, it would seem a fair argument in favor of adopting one or more of those cities as the place or places for the establishment of new coining facilities. i have ventured upon this subject with great diffidence, because it is so unusual to approve a measure--as i most heartily do this, even if no further legislation is attainable at this time--and to announce the fact by message. but i do so because i feel that it is a subject of such vital importance to the whole country that it should receive the attention of and be discussed by congress and the people through the press, and in every way, to the end that the best and most satisfactory course may be reached of executing what i deem most beneficial legislation on a most vital question to the interests and prosperity of the nation. u.s. grant. executive mansion, _january 20, 1875_. _to the house of representatives_: i have the honor to transmit herewith a report from a board composed of one person named by the head of each executive department and of the department of agriculture and smithsonian institution, for the purpose of securing a complete and harmonious arrangement of the articles and materials designed to be exhibited from the executive departments of the government at the international exhibition to be held in the city of philadelphia in the year 1876 for the purpose of celebrating the one hundredth anniversary of the independence of the united states. the report gives a statement of what is proposed to be exhibited by each department, together with an estimate of the expense which will have to be incurred. submitting to congress the estimate made by the board, i recommend that congress make a suitable appropriation to enable the different departments to make a complete and creditable showing of the articles and materials designed to be exhibited by the government, and which will undoubtedly form one of the most interesting features of the exhibition. u.s. grant. executive mansion, _january 20, 1875_. _to the senate and house of representatives_: in my annual message of december 1, 1873, while inviting general attention to all the recommendations made by the secretary of war, your special consideration was invited to "the importance of preparing for war in time of peace by providing proper armament for our seacoast defenses. proper armament is of vastly more importance than fortifications. the latter can be supplied very speedily for temporary purposes when needed; the former can not." these views gain increased strength and pertinence as the years roll by, and i have now again the honor to call special attention to the condition of the "armament of our fortifications" and the absolute necessity for immediate provision by congress for the procurement of heavy cannon. the large expenditures required to supply the number of guns for our forts is the strongest argument that can be adduced for a liberal annual appropriation for their gradual accumulation. in time of war such preparations can not be made; cannon can not be purchased in open market nor manufactured at short notice; they must be the product of years of experience and labor. i herewith enclose copies of a report of the chief of ordnance and of a board of ordnance officers on the trial of an 8-inch rifle converted from a 10-inch smooth-bore, which shows very conclusively an economical means of utilizing these useless smooth-bores and making them into 8-inch rifles, capable of piercing 7 inches of iron. the 1,294 10-inch rodman guns should, in my opinion, be so utilized, and the appropriation requested by the chief of ordnance of $250,000 to commence these conversions is urgently recommended. while convinced of the economy and necessity of these conversions, the determination of the best and most economical method of providing guns of still larger caliber should no longer be delayed. the experience of other nations, based on the new conditions of defense brought prominently forward by the introduction of ironclads into every navy afloat, demands heavier metal and rifle guns of not less than 12 inches in caliber. these enormous masses, hurling a shot of 700 pounds, can alone meet many of the requirements of the national defenses. they must be provided, and experiments on a large scale can alone give the data necessary for the determination of the question. a suitable proving ground, with all the facilities and conveniences referred to by the chief of ordnance, with a liberal annual appropriation, is an undoubted necessity. the guns now ready for trial can not be experimented with without funds, and the estimate of $250,000 for the purpose is deemed reasonable and is strongly recommended. the constant appeals for legislation on the "armament of fortifications" ought no longer to be disregarded if congress desires in peace to prepare the important material without which future wars must inevitably lead to disaster. this subject is submitted with the hope that the consideration it deserves may be given it at the present session. u.s. grant. executive mansion, _january 25, 1875_. _to the senate and house of representatives_: i have the honor to transmit herewith the report of the commission of engineers appointed in compliance with the act of congress approved june 22, 1874, to investigate and report a permanent plan for the reclamation of the alluvial basin of the mississippi river subject to inundation. u.s. grant. executive mansion, _january 26, 1875_. _to the senate and house of representatives_: i have the honor to transmit herewith, for the information of congress, a report of the progress made to this date by the united states centennial commission appointed in accordance with the requirements of the act approved june 1, 1872. u.s. grant. washington, _february 1, 1875_. _to the senate of the united states_: i transmit to the senate, for consideration with a view to ratification, a treaty concluded on the 30th ultimo between this government and his hawaiian majesty, on the subject of commercial reciprocity. i also transmit, for the information of the senate, the papers mentioned in the subjoined list, relating to the commerce between the united states and the hawaiian islands. u.s. grant. executive mansion, _february 1, 1875_. _to the senate and house of representatives_: i have the honor to lay before congress a communication of the secretary of war relative to the action taken in issuing certain supplies to the suffering people in kansas and nebraska, in consequence of the drought and grasshopper plague, and to respectfully request that such action be approved. u.s. grant. executive mansion, _february 8, 1875_. _to the senate of the united states_: herewith i have the honor to send, in accordance with the resolution of the senate of the 3d instant, all the information in my possession not heretofore furnished relating to affairs in the state of arkansas. i will venture to express the opinion that all the testimony shows that in the election of 1872 joseph brooks was lawfully elected governor of that state; that he has been unlawfully deprived of the possession of his office since that time; that in 1874 the constitution of the state was by violence, intimidation, and revolutionary proceedings overthrown and a new constitution adopted and a new state government established. these proceedings, if permitted to stand, practically ignore all rights of minorities in all the states. also, what is there to prevent each of the states recently readmitted to federal relations on certain conditions changing their constitutions and violating their pledges if this action in arkansas is acquiesced in? i respectfully submit whether a precedent so dangerous to the stability of state government, if not of the national government also, should be recognized by congress. i earnestly ask that congress will take definite action in this matter to relieve the executive from acting upon questions which should be decided by the legislative branch of the government. u.s. grant. executive mansion, _february 19, 1875_. _to the senate and house of representatives_: under the requirements of section 6 of the "act for the government of the district of columbia, and for other purposes," approved june 20, 1874, i have the honor to submit herewith the report of the board of audit upon the amount equitably chargeable to the street-railroad companies pursuant to the charters of said companies or the acts of congress relating thereto, together with the reasons therefor. u.s. grant. veto messages. executive mansion, _january 30, 1875_. _to the house of representatives_: i have the honor to return herewith house bill no. 4462, entitled "an act for the relief of alexander burtch," from which i withhold my approval for the reasons given in the accompanying letter of the secretary of war. u.s. grant. war department, _washington city, january 28, 1875_. the president. sir: i have the honor to return house bill no. 4462, "for the relief of alexander burtch." it appears from the records of this office that alexander burtch, company h, first indiana artillery, enlisted july 24, 1861, for three years, reenlisted as a veteran january 1, 1864, and deserted at fort gaines, ala., september 25, 1865, and was a deserter at large at date of muster-out of his company, january 10, 1866. this department emphatically objects to this bill becoming a law upon the ground of its great injustice to every soldier who served honorably until his services were no longer required by the government. very respectfully, your obedient servant, wm. w. belknap, _secretary of war_. executive mansion, _february 12, 1875_. _to the house of representatives_: i have the honor to return herewith house bill no. 2352, entitled "an act granting a pension to lewis hinely," from which i withhold my approval for the reasons given in the accompanying letter of the secretary of the interior. u.s. grant. department of the interior, _washington, february 11, 1875_. the president. sir: i have the honor to return herewith house bill no. 2352, "granting a pension to lewis hinely." i am informed by the commissioner of pensions that the act does not designate the person for whose benefit it was passed. his true name, as verified by his own signature to papers on file in the pension office, is louis heinlig, and as there were several soldiers in the company and regiment named in the act whose names are similar to that specified therein, a correction appears to be necessary in order that the beneficiary of the act may be properly identified should the bill become a law. i have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant, c. delano, _secretary_. washington, _march 3, 1875_. _to the house of representatives_:[92] house bill no. 3341[93] is herewith returned without my approval, for the reasons, first, that it appropriates from the treasury a large sum of money at a time when the revenue is insufficient for current wants and this proposed further drain on the treasury. the issue of bonds, authorized by the bill to a very large and indefinite amount, would seriously embarrass the refunding operations now progressing, whereby the interest of the bonded debt of the united states is being largely reduced. second, i do not believe that any considerable portion of the ex-soldiers who, it is supposed, will be beneficiaries of this appropriation are applicants for it, but, rather, it would result more in a measure for the relief of claim agents and middlemen who would intervene to collect or discount the bounties granted by it. the passage of this bill at this time is inconsistent with the measures of economy now demanded by the necessities of the country. u.s. grant. [footnote 92: pocket veto. this message was written in the president's room at the capitol, but failed to reach the house of representatives before the final adjournment of congress. the original is filed at the executive mansion.] [footnote 93: "an act to equalize the bounties of soldiers who served in the late war for the union."] [the following messages were sent to the special session of the senate convened by proclamation (see p. 324) of february 17, 1875.] special messages. washington, _march 8, 1875_. _to the senate of the united states_: i nominate in the medical department, army of the united states, benjamin f. pope, assistant surgeon, to rank from may 14, 1867. note.--october 5, 1870, assistant surgeon b.f. pope, united states army, applied for discharge to date december 31, 1870, under section 3, act of july 15, 1870. by letter from the adjutant-general's office, war department, november 2, 1870, he was informed he could not be discharged as requested, as the president had decided staff officers did not come under the provisions of the act. subsequently the president decided that staff officers who applied and could be spared could go out under the act. accordingly, assistant surgeon pope was discharged, on his original application, to date december 31, 1870, by special order of that date, this because time did not permit to communicate with him, and the belief that his desire to leave the service was unchanged. he drew a year's pay and mileage under the order, came to washington, and on may 19, 1871, applied for revocation of the order of discharge on the ground that, having been officially notified of disapproval, he had made arrangements to remain in service. forwarded by the surgeon-general recommended. disapproved by the secretary of war may 23, 1871. june 17, 1871, the order of discharge was revoked. assistant-surgeon pope then refunded the year's pay and mileage and drew pay for continuous service. u.s. grant. washington, _march 9, 1875_. _to the senate of the united states_: pursuant to the authority conferred upon me by the joint resolution of congress approved on the 17th of june last, due notice was, on the 1st day of july last, given to the government of belgium, through the minister of the united states at brussels, of the desire of this government to terminate the treaty between the united states and his majesty the king of the belgians of the 17th of july, 1858. it being deemed advisable, however, that another instrument, with provisions more consonant with the interests of this country, should be entered into with that government, i directed that negotiations should be set on foot for the purpose. they have resulted in the treaty[94] between the same parties of the 8th instant, which is now transmitted for the consideration of the senate with a view to its ratification. u.s. grant. [footnote 94: of commerce and navigation.] washington, _march 15, 1875_. _to the senate_: in answer to the resolution of the senate of the 12th of march instant, i herewith transmit a report[95] from the secretary of state, with accompanying correspondence. u.s. grant. [footnote 95: stating that the question of indemnity demanded from spain for the execution or detention of a portion of the crew of the steamer _virginius_ and for the execution of passengers, citizens of the united states, had been disposed of by an agreement between the two countries, and transmitting correspondence connected therewith.] executive mansion, _march 17, 1875_. _to the senate of the united states_: i have the honor to transmit herewith communications from the secretaries of war and the interior, in answer to the resolution of the senate of the 15th instant, requesting "any information in my possession in regard to the proposed emigration to the black hills country, in the sioux indian reservation; whether such emigration is with the consent of the indian tribes holding said country under the treaty of february 24, 1869, and, if not, what measures will be taken in relation to the same." u.s. grant. proclamations. by the president of the united states of america. a proclamation. whereas it is provided in the constitution of the united states that the united states shall protect every state in the union, on application of the legislature, or of the executive (when the legislature can not be convened), against domestic violence; and whereas it is provided by the laws of the united states that in all cases of insurrection in any state or of obstruction to the laws thereof it shall be lawful for the president of the united states, on application of the legislature of such state, or of the executive (when the legislature can not be convened), to call forth the militia of any other state or states, or to employ such part of the land and naval force as shall be judged necessary, for the purpose of suppressing such insurrection or of causing the laws to be duly executed; and whereas the legislature of the state of mississippi, now in session, have represented to me, in a concurrent resolution of that body, that several of the legally elected officers of warren county, in said state, are prevented from executing the duties of their respective offices by force and violence; that the public buildings and records of said county have been taken into the possession of and are now held by lawless and unauthorized persons; that many peaceable citizens of said county have been killed, and others have been compelled to abandon and remain away from their homes and families; that illegal and riotous seizures and imprisonments have been made by such lawless persons; and, further, that a large number of armed men from adjacent states have invaded mississippi to aid such lawless persons, and are still ready to give them such aid; and whereas it is further represented as aforesaid by said legislature that the courts of said county can not be held, and that the governor of said state has no sufficient force at his command to execute the laws thereof in said county and suppress said violence without causing a conflict of races and endangering life and property to an alarming extent; and whereas the said legislature as aforesaid have made application to me for such part of the military force of the united states as may be necessary and adequate to protect said state and the citizens thereof against the domestic violence hereinbefore mentioned and to enforce the due execution of the laws; and whereas the laws of the united states require that whenever it may be necessary, in the judgment of the president, to use the military force for the purposes aforesaid, he shall forthwith, by proclamation, command such insurgents to disperse and retire peaceably to their respective abodes within a limited time: now, therefore, i, ulysses s. grant, president of the united states, do hereby command said disorderly and turbulent persons to disperse and retire peaceably to their respective abodes within five days from the date hereof, and that they refrain from forcible resistance to the laws and submit themselves peaceably to the lawful authorities of said county and state. in witness whereof i have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the united states to be affixed. [seal.] done at the city of washington, this 21st day of december, a.d. 1874, and of the independence of the united states the ninety-ninth. u.s. grant. by the president: hamilton fish, _secretary of state_. by the president of the united states of america. a proclamation. whereas objects of interest to the united states require that the senate should be convened at 12 o'clock on the 5th day of march next to receive and act upon such communications as may be made to it on the part of the executive: now, therefore, i, ulysses s. grant, president of the united states, have considered it to be my duty to issue this my proclamation, declaring that an extraordinary occasion requires the senate of the united states to convene for the transaction of business at the capitol, in the city of washington, on the 5th day of march next, at 12 o'clock at noon on that day, of which all who shall at that time be entitled to act as members of that body are hereby required to take notice. [seal.] given under my hand and the seal of the united states, at washington, the 17th day of february, a.d. 1875, and of the independence of the united states of america the ninety-ninth. u.s. grant. by the president: hamilton fish, _secretary of state_. by the president of the united states of america. a proclamation. whereas by the eighth section of the act of congress entitled "an act for the creation of a court for the adjudication and disposition of certain moneys received into the treasury under an award made by the tribunal of arbitration constituted by virtue of the first article of the treaty concluded at washington the 8th of may, a.d. 1871, between the united states of america and the queen of great britain," approved june 23, 1874, it is provided- that the judges of the court created by this act shall convene in the city of washington as soon as conveniently may be after their appointment; and the said court shall exist for one year from the date of its first convening and organizing; and should it be found impracticable to complete the work of the said court before the expiration of the said one year, the president may by proclamation extend the time of the duration thereof to a period not more than six months beyond the expiration of the said one year; and in such case all the provisions of this act shall be taken and held to be the same as though the continuance of the said court had been originally fixed by this act at the limit to which it may be thus extended. and whereas it has been made satisfactorily to appear to me that the said court convened on the 22d of july, 1874, and that a large portion of the business of said court still remains undisposed of, and that it is found impracticable to complete the work of the said court before the expiration of the said one year from its first convening and organizing: now, therefore, be it known that i, ulysses s. grant, president of the united states of america, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the provisions of the said eighth section of the act of congress aforesaid, do hereby extend the time of the duration of said "court of commissioners of alabama claims" for a period of six months from and after the 22d day of july, a.d. 1875. in testimony whereof i have hereunto signed my name and have caused the seal of the united states to be affixed. [seal.] done at the city of washington, this 2d day of june, a.d. 1875, and of the independence of the united states the ninety-ninth. u.s. grant. by the president: hamilton fish, _secretary of state_. by the president of the united states of america. a proclamation. in accordance with a practice at once wise and beautiful, we have been accustomed, as the year is drawing to a close, to devote an occasion to the humble expression of our thanks to almighty god for the ceaseless and distinguished benefits bestowed upon us as a nation and for his mercies and protection during the closing year. amid the rich and free enjoyment of all our advantages, we should not forget the source from whence they are derived and the extent of our obligation to the father of all mercies. we have full reason to renew our thanks to almighty god for favors bestowed upon us during the past year. by his continuing mercy civil and religious liberty have been maintained, peace has reigned within our borders, labor and enterprise have produced their merited rewards; and to his watchful providence we are indebted for security from pestilence and other national calamity. apart from national blessings, each individual among us has occasion to thoughtfully recall and devoutly recognize the favors and protection which he has enjoyed. now, therefore, i, ulysses s. grant, president of the united states, do recommend that on thursday, the 25th day of november, the people of the united states, abstaining from all secular pursuits and from their accustomed avocations, do assemble in their respective places of worship, and, in such form as may seem most appropriate in their own hearts, offer to almighty god their acknowledgments and thanks for all his mercies and their humble prayers for a continuance of his divine favor. in witness whereof i have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the united states to be affixed. [seal.] done at the city of washington, this 27th day of october, a.d. 1875, and of the independence of the united states the one hundredth. u.s. grant. by the president: hamilton fish, _secretary of state_. executive orders. executive mansion, _march 9, 1875_. in order to carry out the provisions of the fifth section of the act of congress entitled "an act making appropriations for sundry civil expenses of the government for the fiscal year ending june 30, 1876, and for other purposes," approved march 3, 1875, the board heretofore appointed to take charge of the articles and materials to be exhibited by the several executive departments, the smithsonian institution, and the agricultural department at the international exhibition of 1876 is hereby continued under the following regulations and distribution of duties, viz: the funds appropriated by the above-named section will be drawn from the treasury upon the requisition of the chairman of the board, and be disbursed as are other public moneys under the existing laws relating to disbursing officers. an officer of the army will be detailed by the secretary of war as disbursing officer of the board. each representative of an executive department and the representatives of the smithsonian institution, of the agricultural department, and the united states commissioner of food fishes will have charge of the matters pertaining to his respective department, subject to the general advisement of the board; and all bills will be paid by the disbursing officer upon vouchers certified by such representative and countersigned by the chairman of the board. the disbursing officer will render monthly accounts current of all advances to and disbursements by him to the first auditor of the treasury for audit and settlement in the same manner as are other accounts of disbursing officers of the government. each representative will be held responsible to the head of his respective department for all public property of the united states furnished by the head of such department or otherwise coming to his hands for the purposes of the exhibition, and will render proper accounts of the same to such head of department until the property is returned. u.s. grant, _president united states_. treasury department, _march 9, 1875_. the board of examiners, _treasury department_: by direction of the president, the rules and regulations known as the civil-service rules, etc., governing appointments and promotions under the treasury department are hereby abolished, and hereafter all appointments will be made as provided for by section 164, revised statutes, enacted june 22, 1874. you are instructed and directed to transfer all books, papers, records, and public property in your possession to the chief clerk of the department, and notify all sub-boards of the promulgation of this order. the clerks and other employees now on duty under the direction of the board of examiners will report to the chief clerk for assignment to duty. i am, very respectfully, b.h. bristow, _secretary_. [a similar order was, by direction of the president, issued by the heads of the other executive departments.] executive mansion, _march 25, 1875_. in pursuance of the fourth section of the act entitled "an act making appropriations for sundry civil expenses of the government for the fiscal year ending june 30, 1876, and for other purposes," approved march 3, 1875, a board is hereby appointed, to consist of lieutenant-colonel t.t.s. laidley, ordnance department, united states army, president of the board; commander l.a. beardslee, united states navy; lieutenant-colonel q.a. gillmore, engineer department, united states army; david smith, chief engineer, united states navy; w. sooy smith, civil engineer; a.s. holly, civil engineer; r.h. thurston, civil engineer, who will convene at the watertown arsenal, mass., on april 15, 1875, or as soon thereafter as practicable, for the purpose of determining by actual tests the strength and value of all kinds of iron, steel, and other metals which may be submitted to them or by them procured, and to prepare tables which will exhibit the strength and value of said materials for constructive and mechanical purposes, and to provide for the building of a suitable machine for establishing such tests, the machine to be set up and maintained at the watertown arsenal. the funds appropriated for the purposes of these tests will be disbursed under the ordnance department of the army, and the board will receive instructions from and make its report to the chief of ordnance. mr. r.h. thurston, civil engineer, is designated as secretary of the board, at an annual compensation of $1,200. actual traveling expenses, as provided by law, will be allowed the members of the board. u.s. grant. executive mansion, _washington, may 24, 1875_. sir:[96] the president directs me to say that the several departments of the government will be closed on saturday, the 29th instant, in order to enable the employees to participate in the decoration of the graves of the soldiers who fell during the rebellion. i am, sir, your obedient servant, o.e. babcock, _secretary_. [footnote 96: addressed to the heads of the executive departments, etc,] treasury department, _washington, d.c., july 3, 1875_. _to collectors of customs_: the importation of breech-loading rifles, and fixed ammunition suitable therefor, into the territory of alaska, and the shipment of such rifles or ammunition to any port or place in the territory of alaska, are hereby forbidden, and collectors of customs are instructed to refuse clearance of any vessel having on board any such arms or ammunition destined for any port or place in said territory. if, however, any vessel intends to touch or trade at a port in alaska territory or to pass within the waters thereof, but shall be ultimately destined for some port or place not within the limits of said territory, and shall have on board any such firearms or ammunition, the master or chief officer thereof will be required to execute and deliver to the collector of customs at the port of clearance a good and sufficient bond, with two sureties, in double the value of such merchandise, conditioned that such arms or ammunition, or any part thereof, shall not be landed or disposed of within the territory of alaska. such bond shall be taken for such time as the collector shall deem proper, and may be satisfied upon proofs similar to those required to satisfy ordinary export bonds, showing that such arms have been landed at some foreign port; or, if such merchandise is landed at any port of the united states not within the limits of the territory of alaska, the bond may be satisfied upon production of a certificate to that effect from the collector of the port where it is so landed. chas. f. conant, _acting secretary_. approved: u.s. grant, _president_. executive mansion, _july 27, 1875_. in conformity to provisions contained in the river and harbor act approved march 3, 1875, granting to james b. eads and his associates authority to use, for the construction of jetties at the mouth of the mississippi river, any materials on the public lands of the united states that shall be suitable for and may be needed in said works, under such regulations as the secretary of war shall prescribe, it is hereby ordered and directed-1. that the general supervision of all matters properly appertaining to the grant therein made is placed in the officer of engineers, major c.b. comstock, detailed by the secretary of war, under the provisions of the said act, to report to him "the depth of water and width of channel secured and maintained from time to time in said channel, together with such other information as the secretary of war may direct." 2. _protection of the interests of the united states so far as the taking of material is concerned_.--said eads and his associates shall, prior to taking material from any public lands, obtain authority to do so from the secretary of war, their applications specifying the kinds and amounts of material they wish to take from each subdivision of the public lands; and they shall at once cease from such taking on being notified that the authority is withdrawn. 3. _protection of the interests of the united states so far as structures are concerned._--said eads and his associates and contractors are authorized to erect, at their own expense, such shops, dwellings, storehouses, and wharves on the military reservation at the mouth of the mississippi as may be necessary for the prosecution of the work, and shall furnish a list and plan showing the location of the same to the secretary of war; but these shall be erected in such a way and at such places as not unnecessarily to interfere with navigation or any other interest in which the united states is concerned, whereof the secretary of war shall be the judge. at his direction any such structure shall be at once removed. 4. _protection of james b. eads's interests_.--no person save said eads and his contractors shall erect any building, tent, or other habitation on the military reservation at the mouth of the mississippi river. any person so doing may be summarily ejected by the united states marshal or his deputy. but as authority has already been given to james b. eads by the secretary of war to collect the material aforesaid until he should be furnished with the regulations as now herein given, the said eads is authorized to continue collecting materials under that authority until the 1st day of september, 1875, after which time these regulations will go into effect. u.s. grant. general orders, no. 73. war department, adjutant-general's office, _washington, august 2, 1875_. i. the following order has been received from the president of the united states: executive mansion, _washington, july 31, 1875_. it becomes the painful duty of the president to announce to the people of the united states the death of andrew johnson, the last survivor of his honored predecessors, which occurred in carter county, east tennessee, at an early hour this morning. the solemnity of the occasion which called him to the presidency, with the varied nature and length of his public services, will cause him to be long remembered and occasion mourning for the death of a distinguished public servant. as a mark of respect for the memory of the deceased, it is ordered that the executive mansion and several departments of the government at washington be draped in mourning until the close of the day designated for his funeral, and that all public business be suspended on that day. it is further ordered that the war and navy departments cause suitable honors to be paid on the occasion to the memory of the illustrious dead. u.s. grant. by the president: john l. cadwalader, _acting secretary of state_. ii. in compliance with the president's instructions, the troops will be paraded at 10 o'clock a.m. on the day after the receipt of this order at each military post, when the order will be read to them, and the labors of that day will thereafter cease. the national flag will be displayed at half-staff. at dawn of day thirteen guns will be fired, and afterwards at intervals of thirty minutes, between the rising and setting sun a single gun, and at the close of the day a national salute of thirty-seven guns. the officers of the army will wear crape on the left arm and on their swords and the colors of the several regiments will be put in mourning for the period of thirty days. by order of the secretary of war: e.d. townsend, _adjutant-general_. special order. navy department, _washington, august 2, 1875_. the president of the united states announces the death of ex-president andrew johnson in the following order: [for order see preceding page.] in pursuance of the foregoing order, it is hereby directed that the ensign at each naval station and of each vessel of the united states navy in commission be hoisted at half-mast from sunrise to sunset, and that a gun be fired at intervals of every half hour from sunrise to sunset at each naval station and on board of flagships and of vessels acting singly, on tuesday, the 3d instant, the day of the funeral, where this order may be received in time, otherwise on the day after its receipt. the officers of the navy and marine corps will wear the usual badge of mourning attached to the sword hilt and on the left arm for the period of thirty days. daniel ammen, _acting secretary of the navy_. general orders, no. 97. war department, adjutant-general's office, _washington, november 22, 1875_. i. the following order announces the decease of henry wilson, vice-president of the united states: executive mansion, _washington, november 22, 1875_. it is with profound sorrow that the president has to announce to the people of the united states the death of the vice-president, henry wilson, who died in the capitol of the nation this morning. the eminent station of the deceased, his high character, his long career in the service of his state and of the union, his devotion to the cause of freedom, and the ability which he brought to the discharge of every duty stand conspicuous and are indelibly impressed on the hearts and affections of the american people. in testimony of respect for this distinguished citizen and faithful public servant the various departments of the government will be closed on the day of the funeral, and the executive mansion and all the executive departments in washington will be draped with badges of mourning for thirty days. the secretaries of war and of the navy will issue orders that appropriate military and naval honors be rendered to the memory of one whose virtues and services will long be borne in recollection by a grateful nation. u.s. grant. by the president: hamilton fish, _secretary of state_. ii. on the day next succeeding the receipt of this order at each military post the troops will be paraded at 10 o'clock a. m. and this order read to them. the national flag will be displayed at half-staff. at dawn of day thirteen guns will be fired. commencing at 12 o'clock noon seventeen minute guns will be fired, and at the close of the day the national salute of thirty-seven guns. the usual badge of mourning will be worn by officers of the army and the colors of the several regiments will be put in mourning for the period of three months. by order of the secretary of war: e.d. townsend, _adjutant-general_. special order. navy department, _washington, november 23, 1875_. the president of the united states announces the death of vice-president henry wilson in the following order: [for order see preceding page.] in pursuance of the foregoing order, it is hereby directed that upon the day following the receipt of this the ensign at each united states naval station and of each united states naval vessel in commission be hoisted at half-mast from sunrise to sunset, and that thirteen guns be fired at sunrise, nineteen minute guns at meridian, and a national salute at sunset at each united states naval station and on board flagships and vessels acting singly, at home or abroad. the officers of the navy and marine corps will wear the usual badge of mourning for three months. geo. m. robeson, _secretary of the navy_. seventh annual message. executive mansion, _december 7, 1875_. _to the senate and house of representatives_: in submitting my seventh annual message to congress, in this centennial year of our national existence as a free and independent people, it affords me great pleasure to recur to the advancement that has been made from the time of the colonies, one hundred years ago. we were then a people numbering only 3,000,000. now we number more than 40,000,000. then industries were confined almost exclusively to the tillage of the soil. now manufactories absorb much of the labor of the country. our liberties remain unimpaired; the bondmen have been freed from slavery; we have become possessed of the respect, if not the friendship, of all civilized nations. our progress has been great in all the arts--in science, agriculture, commerce, navigation, mining, mechanics, law, medicine, etc,: and in general education the progress is likewise encouraging. our thirteen states have become thirty-eight, including colorado (which has taken the initiatory steps to become a state), and eight territories, including the indian territory and alaska, and excluding colorado, making a territory extending from the atlantic to the pacific. on the south we have extended to the gulf of mexico, and in the west from the mississippi to the pacific. one hundred years ago the cotton gin, the steamship, the railroad, the telegraph, the reaping, sewing, and modern printing machines, and numerous other inventions of scarcely less value to our business and happiness were entirely unknown. in 1776 manufactories scarcely existed even in name in all this vast territory. in 1870 more than 2,000,000 persons were employed in manufactories, producing more than $2,100,000,000 of products in amount annually, nearly equal to our national debt. from nearly the whole of the population of 1776 being engaged in the one occupation of agriculture, in 1870 so numerous and diversified had become the occupation of our people that less than 6,000,000 out of more than 40,000,000 were so engaged. the extraordinary effect produced in our country by a resort to diversified occupations has built a market for the products of fertile lands distant from the seaboard and the markets of the world. the american system of locating various and extensive manufactories next to the plow and the pasture, and adding connecting railroads and steamboats, has produced in our distant interior country a result noticeable by the intelligent portions of all commercial nations. the ingenuity and skill of american mechanics have been demonstrated at home and abroad in a manner most flattering to their pride. but for the extraordinary genius and ability of our mechanics, the achievements of our agriculturists, manufacturers, and transporters throughout the country would have been impossible of attainment. the progress of the miner has also been great. of coal our production was small; now many millions of tons are mined annually. so with iron, which formed scarcely an appreciable part of our products half a century ago, we now produce more than the world consumed at the beginning of our national existence. lead, zinc, and copper, from being articles of import, we may expect to be large exporters of in the near future. the development of gold and silver mines in the united states and territories has not only been remarkable, but has had a large influence upon the business of all commercial nations. our merchants in the last hundred years have had a success and have established a reputation for enterprise, sagacity, progress, and integrity unsurpassed by peoples of older nationalities. this "good name" is not confined to their homes, but goes out upon every sea and into every port where commerce enters. with equal pride we can point to our progress in all of the learned professions. as we are now about to enter upon our second centennial--commencing our manhood as a nation--it is well to look back upon the past and study what will be best to preserve and advance our future greatness. from the fall of adam for his transgression to the present day no nation has ever been free from threatened danger to its prosperity and happiness. we should look to the dangers threatening us, and remedy them so far as lies in our power. we are a republic whereof one man is as good as another before the law. under such a form of government it is of the greatest importance that all should be possessed of education and intelligence enough to cast a vote with a right understanding of its meaning. a large association of ignorant men can not for any considerable period oppose a successful resistance to tyranny and oppression from the educated few, but will inevitably sink into acquiescence to the will of intelligence, whether directed by the demagogue or by priestcraft. hence the education of the masses becomes of the first necessity for the preservation of our institutions. they are worth preserving, because they have secured the greatest good to the greatest proportion of the population of any form of government yet devised. all other forms of government approach it just in proportion to the general diffusion of education and independence of thought and action. as the primary step, therefore, to our advancement in all that has marked our progress in the past century, i suggest for your earnest consideration, and most earnestly recommend it, that a constitutional amendment be submitted to the legislatures of the several states for ratification, making it the duty of each of the several states to establish and forever maintain free public schools adequate to the education of all the children in the rudimentary branches within their respective limits, irrespective of sex, color, birthplace, or religions; forbidding the teaching in said schools of religious, atheistic, or pagan tenets; and prohibiting the granting of any school funds or school taxes, or any part thereof, either by legislative, municipal, or other authority, for the benefit or in aid, directly or indirectly, of any religious sect or denomination, or in aid or for the benefit of any other object of any nature or kind whatever. in connection with this important question i would also call your attention to the importance of correcting an evil that, if permitted to continue, will probably lead to great trouble in our land before the close of the nineteenth century. it is the accumulation of vast amounts of untaxed church property. in 1850, i believe, the church property of the united states which paid no tax, municipal or state, amounted to about $83,000,000. in 1860 the amount had doubled; in 1875 it is about $1,000,000,000. by 1900, without check, it is safe to say this property will reach a sum exceeding $3,000,000,000. so vast a sum, receiving all the protection and benefits of government without bearing its proportion of the burdens and expenses of the same, will not be looked upon acquiescently by those who have to pay the taxes. in a growing country, where real estate enhances so rapidly with time, as in the united states, there is scarcely a limit to the wealth that may be acquired by corporations, religious or otherwise, if allowed to retain real estate without taxation. the contemplation of so vast a property as here alluded to, without taxation, may lead to sequestration without constitutional authority and through blood. i would suggest the taxation of all property equally, whether church or corporation, exempting only the last resting place of the dead and possibly, with proper restrictions, church edifices. our relations with most of the foreign powers continue on a satisfactory and friendly footing. increased intercourse, the extension of commerce, and the cultivation of mutual interests have steadily improved our relations with the large majority of the powers of the world, rendering practicable the peaceful solution of questions which from time to time necessarily arise, leaving few which demand extended or particular notice. the correspondence of the department of state with our diplomatic representatives abroad is transmitted herewith. i am happy to announce the passage of an act by the general cortes of portugal, proclaimed since the adjournment of congress, for the abolition of servitude in the portuguese colonies. it is to be hoped that such legislation may be another step toward the great consummation to be reached, when no man shall be permitted, directly or indirectly, under any guise, excuse, or form of law, to hold his fellow-man in bondage. i am of opinion also that it is the duty of the united states, as contributing toward that end, and required by the spirit of the age in which we live, to provide by suitable legislation that no citizen of the united states shall hold slaves as property in any other country or be interested therein. chile has made reparation in the case of the whale ship _good return_, seized without sufficient cause upward of forty years ago. though she had hitherto denied her accountability, the denial was never acquiesced in by this government, and the justice of the claim has been so earnestly contended for that it has been gratifying that she should have at last acknowledged it. the arbitrator in the case of the united states steamer _montijo_, for the seizure and detention of which the government of the united states of colombia was held accountable, has decided in favor of the claim. this decision has settled a question which had been pending for several years, and which, while it continued open, might more or less disturb the good understanding which it is desirable should be maintained between the two republics. a reciprocity treaty with the king of the hawaiian islands was concluded some months since. as it contains a stipulation that it shall not take effect until congress shall enact the proper legislation for that purpose, copies of the instrument are herewith submitted, in order that, if such should be the pleasure of congress, the necessary legislation upon the subject may be adopted. in march last an arrangement was made, through mr. cushing, our minister in madrid, with the spanish government for the payment by the latter to the united states of the sum of $80,000 in coin, for the purpose of the relief of the families or persons of the ship's company and certain passengers of the _virginius_. this sum was to have been paid in three installments at two months each. it is due to the spanish government that i should state that the payments were fully and spontaneously anticipated by that government, and that the whole amount was paid within but a few days more than two months from the date of the agreement, a copy of which is herewith transmitted. in pursuance of the terms of the adjustment, i have directed the distribution of the amount among the parties entitled thereto, including the ship's company and such of the passengers as were american citizens. payments are made accordingly, on the application by the parties entitled thereto. the past year has furnished no evidence of an approaching termination of the ruinous conflict which has been raging for seven years in the neighboring island of cuba. the same disregard of the laws of civilized warfare and of the just demands of humanity which has heretofore called forth expressions of condemnation from the nations of christendom has continued to blacken the sad scene. desolation, ruin, and pillage are pervading the rich fields of one of the most fertile and productive regions of the earth, and the incendiary's torch, firing plantations and valuable factories and buildings, is the agent marking the alternate advance or retreat of contending parties. the protracted continuance of this strife seriously affects the interests of all commercial nations, but those of the united states more than others, by reason of close proximity, its larger trade and intercourse with cuba, and the frequent and intimate personal and social relations which have grown up between its citizens and those of the island. moreover, the property of our citizens in cuba is large, and is rendered insecure and depreciated in value and in capacity of production by the continuance of the strife and the unnatural mode of its conduct. the same is true, differing only in degree, with respect to the interests and people of other nations; and the absence of any reasonable assurance of a near termination of the conflict must of necessity soon compel the states thus suffering to consider what the interests of their own people and their duty toward themselves may demand. i have hoped that spain would be enabled to establish peace in her colony, to afford security to the property and the interests of our citizens, and allow legitimate scope to trade and commerce and the natural productions of the island. because of this hope, and from an extreme reluctance to interfere in the most remote manner in the affairs of another and a friendly nation, especially of one whose sympathy and friendship in the struggling infancy of our own existence must ever be remembered with gratitude, i have patiently and anxiously waited the progress of events. our own civil conflict is too recent for us not to consider the difficulties which surround a government distracted by a dynastic rebellion at home at the same time that it has to cope with a separate insurrection in a distant colony. but whatever causes may have produced the situation which so grievously affects our interests, it exists, with all its attendant evils operating directly upon this country and its people. thus far all the efforts of spain have proved abortive, and time has marked no improvement in the situation. the armed bands of either side now occupy nearly the same ground as in the past, with the difference, from time to time, of more lives sacrificed, more property destroyed, and wider extents of fertile and productive fields and more and more of valuable property constantly wantonly sacrificed to the incendiary's torch. in contests of this nature, where a considerable body of people who have attempted to free themselves of the control of the superior government have reached such point in occupation of territory, in power, and in general organization as to constitute in fact a body politic; having a government in substance as well as in name; possessed of the elements of stability and equipped with the machinery for the administration of internal policy and the execution of its laws; prepared and able to administer justice at home, as well as in its dealings with other powers, it is within the province of those other powers to recognize its existence as a new and independent nation. in such cases other nations simply deal with an actually existing condition of things, and recognize as one of the powers of the earth that body politic which, possessing the necessary elements, has in fact become a new power. in a word, the creation of a new state is a fact. to establish the condition of things essential to the recognition of this fact there must be a people occupying a known territory, united under some known and defined form of government, acknowledged by those subject thereto, in which the functions of government are administered by usual methods, competent to mete out justice to citizens and strangers, to afford remedies for public and for private wrongs, and able to assume the correlative international obligations and capable of performing the corresponding international duties resulting from its acquisition of the rights of sovereignty. a power should exist complete in its organization, ready to take and able to maintain its place among the nations of the earth. while conscious that the insurrection in cuba has shown a strength and endurance which make it at least doubtful whether it be in the power of spain to subdue it, it seems unquestionable that no such civil organization exists which may be recognized as an independent government capable of performing its international obligations and entitled to be treated as one of the powers of the earth. a recognition under such circumstances would be inconsistent with the facts, and would compel the power granting it soon to support by force the government to which it had really given its only claim of existence. in my judgment the united states should adhere to the policy and the principles which have heretofore been its sure and safe guides in like contests between revolted colonies and their mother country, and, acting only upon the clearest evidence, should avoid any possibility of suspicion or of imputation. a recognition of the independence of cuba being, in my opinion, impracticable and indefensible, the question which next presents itself is that of the recognition of belligerent rights in the parties to the contest. in a former message to congress i had occasion to consider this question, and reached the conclusion that the conflict in cuba, dreadful and devastating as were its incidents, did not rise to the fearful dignity of war. regarding it now, after this lapse of time, i am unable to see that any notable success or any marked or real advance on the part of the insurgents has essentially changed the character of the contest. it has acquired greater age, but not greater or more formidable proportions. it is possible that the acts of foreign powers, and even acts of spain herself, of this very nature, might be pointed to in defense of such recognition. but now, as in its past-history, the united states should carefully avoid the false lights which might lead it into the mazes of doubtful law and of questionable propriety, and adhere rigidly and sternly to the rule, which has been its guide, of doing only that which is right and honest and of good report. the question of according or of withholding rights of belligerency must be judged in every case in view of the particular attending facts. unless justified by necessity, it is always, and justly, regarded as an unfriendly act and a gratuitous demonstration of moral support to the rebellion. it is necessary, and it is required, when the interests and rights of another government or of its people are so far affected by a pending civil conflict as to require a definition of its relations to the parties thereto. but this conflict must be one which will be recognized in the sense of international law as war. belligerence, too, is a fact. the mere existence of contending armed bodies and their occasional conflicts do not constitute war in the sense referred to. applying to the existing condition of affairs in cuba the tests recognized by publicists and writers on international law, and which have been observed by nations of dignity, honesty, and power when free from sensitive or selfish and unworthy motives, i fail to find in the insurrection the existence of such a substantial political organization, real, palpable, and manifest to the world, having the forms and capable of the ordinary functions of government coward its own people and to other states, with courts for the administration of justice, with a local habitation, possessing such organization of force, such material, such occupation of territory, as to take the contest out of the category of a mere rebellious insurrection or occasional skirmishes and place it on the terrible footing of war, to which a recognition of belligerency would aim to elevate it. the contest, moreover, is solely on land; the insurrection has not possessed itself of a single seaport whence it may send forth its flag, nor has it any means of communication with foreign powers except through the military lines of its adversaries. no apprehension of any of those sudden and difficult complications which a war upon the ocean is apt to precipitate upon the vessels, both commercial and national, and upon the consular officers of other powers calls for the definition of their relations to the parties to the contest. considered as a question of expediency, i regard the accordance of belligerent rights still to be as unwise and premature as i regard it to be, at present, indefensible as a measure of right. such recognition entails upon the country according the rights which flow from it difficult and complicated duties, and requires the exaction from the contending parties of the strict observance of their rights and obligations; it confers the right of search upon the high seas by vessels of both parties; it would subject the carrying of arms and munitions of war, which now may be transported freely and without interruption in the vessels of the united states, to detention and to possible seizure; it would give rise to countless vexatious questions, would release the parent government from responsibility for acts done by the insurgents, and would invest spain with the right to exercise the supervision recognized by our treaty of 1795 over our commerce on the high seas, a very large part of which, in its traffic between the atlantic and the gulf states and between all of them and the states on the pacific, passes through the waters which wash the shores of cuba. the exercise of this supervision could scarce fail to lead, if not to abuses, certainly to collisions perilous to the peaceful relations of the two states. there can be little doubt to what result such supervision would before long draw this nation. it would be unworthy of the united states to inaugurate the possibilities of such result by measures of questionable right or expediency or by any indirection. apart from any question of theoretical right, i am satisfied that while the accordance of belligerent rights to the insurgents in cuba might give them a hope and an inducement to protract the struggle, it would be but a delusive hope, and would not remove the evils which this government and its people are experiencing, but would draw the united states into complications which it has waited long and already suffered much to avoid. the recognition of independence or of belligerency being thus, in my judgment, equally inadmissible, it remains to consider what course shall be adopted should the conflict not soon be brought to an end by acts of the parties themselves, and should the evils which result therefrom, affecting all nations, and particularly the united states, continue. in such event i am of opinion that other nations will be compelled to assume the responsibility which devolves upon them, and to seriously consider the only remaining measures possible--mediation and intervention. owing, perhaps, to the large expanse of water separating the island from the peninsula, the want of harmony and of personal sympathy between the inhabitants of the colony and those sent thither to rule them, and want of adaptation of the ancient colonial system of europe to the present times and to the ideas which the events of the past century have developed, the contending parties appear to have within themselves no depository of common confidence to suggest wisdom when passion and excitement have their sway and to assume the part of peacemaker. in this view in the earlier days of the contest the good offices of the united states as a mediator were tendered in good faith, without any selfish purpose, in the interest of humanity and in sincere friendship for both parties, but were at the time declined by spain, with the declaration, nevertheless, that at a future time they would be indispensable. no intimation has been received that in the opinion of spain that time has been reached. and yet the strife continues, with all its dread horrors and all its injuries to the interests of the united states and of other nations. each party seems quite capable of working great injury and damage to the other, as well as to all the relations and interests dependent on the existence of peace in the island; but they seem incapable of reaching any adjustment, and both have thus far failed of achieving any success whereby one party shall possess and control the island to the exclusion of the other. under these circumstances the agency of others, either by mediation or by intervention, seems to be the only alternative which must, sooner or later, be invoked for the termination of the strife. at the same time, while thus impressed i do not at this time recommend the adoption of any measure of intervention. i shall be ready at all times, and as the equal friend of both parties, to respond to a suggestion that the good offices of the united states will be acceptable to aid in bringing about a peace honorable to both. it is due to spain, so far as this government is concerned, that the agency of a third power, to which i have adverted, shall be adopted only as a last expedient. had it been the desire of the united states to interfere in the affairs of cuba, repeated opportunities for so doing have been presented within the last few years; but we have remained passive, and have performed our whole duty and all international obligations to spain with friendship, fairness, and fidelity, and with a spirit of patience and forbearance which negatives every possible suggestion of desire to interfere or to add to the difficulties with which she has been surrounded. the government of spain has recently submitted to our minister at madrid certain proposals which it is hoped may be found to be the basis, if not the actual submission, of terms to meet the requirements of the particular griefs of which this government has felt itself entitled to complain. these proposals have not yet reached me in their full text. on their arrival they will be taken into careful examination, and may, i hope, lead to a satisfactory adjustment of the questions to which they refer and remove the possibility of future occurrences such as have given rise to our just complaints. it is understood also that renewed efforts are being made to introduce reforms in the internal administration of the island. persuaded, however, that a proper regard for the interests of the united states and of its citizens entitles it to relief from the strain to which it has been subjected by the difficulties of the questions and the wrongs and losses which arise from the contest in cuba, and that the interests of humanity itself demand the cessation of the strife before the whole island shall be laid waste and larger sacrifices of life be made, i shall feel it my duty, should my hopes of a satisfactory adjustment and of the early restoration of peace and the removal of future causes of complaint be, unhappily, disappointed, to make a further communication to congress at some period not far remote, and during the present session, recommending what may then seem to me to be necessary. the free zone, so called, several years since established by the mexican government in certain of the states of that republic adjacent to our frontier, remains in full operation. it has always been materially injurious to honest traffic, for it operates as an incentive to traders in mexico to supply without customs charges the wants of inhabitants on this side of the line, and prevents the same wants from being supplied by merchants of the united states, thereby to a considerable extent defrauding our revenue and checking honest commercial enterprise. depredations by armed bands from mexico on the people of texas near the frontier continue. though the main object of these incursions is robbery, they frequently result in the murder of unarmed and peaceably disposed persons, and in some instances even the united states post-offices and mail communications have been attacked. renewed remonstrances upon this subject have been addressed to the mexican government, but without much apparent effect. the military force of this government disposable for service in that quarter is quite inadequate to effectually guard the line, even at those points where the incursions are usually made. an experiment of an armed vessel on the rio grande for that purpose is on trial, and it is hoped that, if not thwarted by the shallowness of the river and other natural obstacles, it may materially contribute to the protection of the herdsmen of texas. the proceedings of the joint commission under the convention between the united states and mexico of the 4th of july, 1868, on the subject of claims, will soon be brought to a close. the result of those proceedings will then be communicated to congress. i am happy to announce that the government of venezuela has, upon further consideration, practically abandoned its objection to pay to the united states that share of its revenue which some years since it allotted toward the extinguishment of the claims of foreigners generally. in thus reconsidering its determination that government has shown a just sense of self-respect which can not fail to reflect credit upon it in the eyes of all disinterested persons elsewhere. it is to be regretted, however, that its payments on account of claims of citizens of the united states are still so meager in amount, and that the stipulations of the treaty in regard to the sums to be paid and the periods when those payments were to take place should have been so signally disregarded. since my last annual message the exchange has been made of the ratification of a treaty of commerce and navigation with belgium, and of conventions with the mexican republic for the further extension of the joint commission respecting claims; with the hawaiian islands for commercial reciprocity, and with the ottoman empire for extradition; all of which have been duly proclaimed. the court of commissioners of alabama claims has prosecuted its important duties very assiduously and very satisfactorily. it convened and was organized on the 22d day of july, 1874, and by the terms of the act under which it was created was to exist for one year from that date. the act provided, however, that should it be found impracticable to complete the work of the court before the expiration of the year the president might by proclamation extend the time of its duration to a period not more than six months beyond the expiration of the one year. having received satisfactory evidence that it would be impracticable to complete the work within the time originally fixed, i issued a proclamation[97] (a copy of which is presented herewith) extending the time of duration of the court for a period of six months from and after the 22d day of july last. a report made through the clerk of the court (communicated herewith) shows the condition of the calendar on the 1st of november last and the large amount of work which has been accomplished. one thousand three hundred and eighty-two claims have been presented, of which 682 had been disposed of at the date of the report. i am informed that 170 cases were decided during the month of november. arguments are being made and decisions given in the remaining cases with all the dispatch consistent with the proper consideration of the questions submitted. many of these claims are in behalf of mariners, or depend on the evidence of mariners, whose absence has delayed the taking or the return of the necessary evidence. it is represented to me that it will be impracticable for the court to finally dispose of all the cases before it within the present limit of its duration. justice to the parties claimant, who have been at large expense in preparing their claims and obtaining the evidence in their support, suggests a short extension, to enable the court to dispose of all of the claims which have been presented. i recommend the legislation which may be deemed proper to enable the court to complete the work before it. i recommend that some suitable provision be made, by the creation of a special court or by conferring the necessary jurisdiction upon some appropriate tribunal, for the consideration and determination of the claims of aliens against the government of the united states which have arisen within some reasonable limitation of time, or which may hereafter arise, excluding all claims barred by treaty provisions or otherwise. it has been found impossible to give proper consideration to these claims by the executive departments of the government. such a tribunal would afford an opportunity to aliens other than british subjects to present their claims on account of acts committed against their persons or property during the rebellion, as also to those subjects of great britain whose claims, having arisen subsequent to the 9th day of april, 1865, could not be presented to the late commission organized pursuant to the provisions of the treaty of washington. the electric telegraph has become an essential and indispensable agent in the transmission of business and social messages. its operation on land, and within the limit of particular states, is necessarily under the control of the jurisdiction within which it operates. the lines on the high seas, however, are not subject to the particular control of any one government. in 1869 a concession was granted by the french government to a company which proposed to lay a cable from the shores of france to the united states. at that time there was a telegraphic connection between the united states and the continent of europe (through the possessions of great britain at either end of the line), under the control of an association which had, at large outlay of capital and at great risk, demonstrated the practicability of maintaining such means of communication. the cost of correspondence by this agency was great, possibly not too large at the time for a proper remuneration for so hazardous and so costly an enterprise. it was, however, a heavy charge upon a means of communication which the progress in the social and commercial intercourse of the world found to be a necessity, and the obtaining of this french concession showed that other capital than that already invested was ready to enter into competition, with assurance of adequate return for their outlay. impressed with the conviction that the interests, not only of the people of the united states, but of the world at large, demanded, or would demand, the multiplication of such means of communication between separated continents, i was desirous that the proposed connection should be made; but certain provisions of this concession were deemed by me to be objectionable, particularly one which gave for a long term of years the exclusive right of telegraphic communication by submarine cable between the shores of france and the united states. i could not concede that any power should claim the right to land a cable on the shores of the united states and at the same time deny to the united states, or to its citizens or grantees, an equal right to land a cable on its shores. the right to control the conditions for the laying of a cable within the jurisdictional waters of the united states, to connect our shores with those of any foreign state, pertains exclusively to the government of the united states, under such limitations and conditions as congress may impose. in the absence of legislation by congress i was unwilling, on the one hand, to yield to a foreign state the right to say that its grantees might land on our shores while it denied a similar right to our people to land on its shores, and, on the other hand, i was reluctant to deny to the great interests of the world and of civilization the facilities of such communication as were proposed. i therefore withheld any resistance to the landing of the cable on condition that the offensive monopoly feature of the concession be abandoned, and that the right of any cable which may be established by authority of this government to land upon french territory and to connect with french land lines and enjoy all the necessary facilities or privileges incident to the use thereof upon as favorable terms as any other company be conceded. as the result thereof the company in question renounced the exclusive privilege, and the representative of france was informed that, understanding this relinquishment to be construed as granting the entire reciprocity and equal facilities which had been demanded, the opposition to the landing of the cable was withdrawn. the cable, under this french concession, was landed in the month of july, 1869, and has been an efficient and valuable agent of communication between this country and the other continent. it soon passed under the control, however, of those who had the management of the cable connecting great britain with this continent, and thus whatever benefit to the public might have ensued from competition between the two lines was lost, leaving only the greater facilities of an additional line and the additional security in case of accident to one of them. but these increased facilities and this additional security, together with the control of the combined capital of the two companies, gave also greater power to prevent the future construction of other lines and to limit the control of telegraphic communication between the two continents to those possessing the lines already laid. within a few months past a cable has been laid, known as the united states direct cable company, connecting the united states directly with great britain. as soon as this cable was reported to be laid and in working order the rates of the then existing consolidated companies were greatly reduced. soon, however, a break was announced in this new cable, and immediately the rates of the other line, which had been reduced, were again raised. this cable being now repaired, the rates appear not to be reduced by either line from those formerly charged by the consolidated companies. there is reason to believe that large amounts of capital, both at home and abroad, are ready to seek profitable investment in the advancement of this useful and most civilizing means of intercourse and correspondence. they await, however, the assurance of the means and conditions on which they may safely be made tributary to the general good. as these cable telegraph lines connect separate states, there are questions as to their organization and control which probably can be best, if not solely, settled by conventions between the respective states. in the absence, however, of international conventions on the subject, municipal legislation may secure many points which appear to me important, if not indispensable for the protection of the public against the extortions which may result from a monopoly of the right of operating cable telegrams or from a combination between several lines: i. no line should be allowed to land on the shores of the united states under the concession from another power which does not admit the right of any other line or lines, formed in the united states, to land and freely connect with and operate through its land lines. ii. no line should be allowed to land on the shores of the united states which is not, by treaty stipulation with the government from whose shores it proceeds, or by prohibition in its charter, or otherwise to the satisfaction of this government, prohibited from consolidating or amalgamating with any other cable telegraph line, or combining therewith for the purpose of regulating and maintaining the cost of telegraphing. iii. all lines should be bound to give precedence in the transmission of the official messages of the governments of the two countries between which it may be laid. iv. a power should be reserved to the two governments, either conjointly or to each, as regards the messages dispatched from its shores, to fix a limit to the charges to be demanded for the transmission of messages. i present this subject to the earnest consideration of congress. in the meantime, and unless congress otherwise direct, i shall not oppose the landing of any telegraphic cable which complies with and assents to the points above enumerated, but will feel it my duty to prevent the landing of any which does not conform to the first and second points as stated, and which will not stipulate to concede to this government the precedence in the transmission of its official messages and will not enter into a satisfactory arrangement with regard to its charges. among the pressing and important subjects to which, in my opinion, the attention of congress should be directed are those relating to fraudulent naturalization and expatriation. the united states, with great liberality, offers its citizenship to all who in good faith comply with the requirements of law. these requirements are as simple and upon as favorable terms to the emigrant as the high privilege to which he is admitted can or should permit. i do not propose any additional requirements to those which the law now demands; but the very simplicity and the want of unnecessary formality in our law have made fraudulent naturalization not infrequent, to the discredit and injury of all honest citizens, whether native or naturalized. cases of this character are continually being brought to the notice of the government by our representatives abroad, and also those of persons resident in other countries, most frequently those who, if they have remained in this country long enough to entitle them to become naturalized, have generally not much overpassed that period, and have returned to the country of their origin, where they reside, avoiding all duties to the united states by their absence, and claiming to be exempt from all duties to the country of their nativity and of their residence by reason of their alleged naturalization. it is due to this government itself and to the great mass of the naturalized citizens who entirely, both in name and in fact, become citizens of the united states that the high privilege of citizenship of the united states should not be held by fraud or in derogation of the laws and of the good name of every honest citizen. on many occasions it has been brought to the knowledge of the government that certificates of naturalization are held and protection or interference claimed by parties who admit that not only they were not within the united states at the time of the pretended naturalization, but that they have never resided in the united states; in others the certificate and record of the court show on their face that the person claiming to be naturalized had not resided the required time in the united states; in others it is admitted upon examination that the requirements of law have not been complied with; in some cases, even, such certificates have been matter of purchase. these are not isolated cases, arising at rare intervals, but of common occurrence, and which are reported from all quarters of the globe. such occurrences can not, and do not, fail to reflect upon the government and injure all honest citizens. such a fraud being discovered, however, there is no practicable means within the control of the government by which the record of naturalization can be vacated; and should the certificate be taken up, as it usually is, by the diplomatic and consular representatives of the government to whom it may have been presented, there is nothing to prevent the person claiming to have been naturalized from obtaining a new certificate from the court in place of that which has been taken from him. the evil has become so great and of such frequent occurrence that i can not too earnestly recommend that some effective measures be adopted to provide a proper remedy and means for the vacating of any record thus fraudulently made, and of punishing the guilty parties to the transaction. in this connection i refer also to the question of expatriation and the election of nationality. the united states was foremost in upholding the right of expatriation, and was principally instrumental in overthrowing the doctrine of perpetual allegiance. congress has declared the right of expatriation to be a natural and inherent right of all people; but while many other nations have enacted laws providing what formalities shall be necessary to work a change of allegiance, the united states has enacted no provisions of law and has in no respect marked out how and when expatriation may be accomplished by its citizens. instances are brought to the attention of the government where citizens of the united states, either naturalized or native born, have formally become citizens or subjects of foreign powers, but who, nevertheless, in the absence of any provisions of legislation on this question, when involved in difficulties or when it seems to be their interest, claim to be citizens of the united states and demand the intervention of a government which they have long since abandoned and to which for years they have rendered no service nor held themselves in any way amenable. in other cases naturalized citizens, immediately after naturalization, have returned to their native country; have become engaged in business; have accepted offices or pursuits inconsistent with american citizenship, and evidence no intent to return to the united states until called upon to discharge some duty to the country where they are residing, when at once they assert their citizenship and call upon the representatives of the government to aid them in their unjust pretensions. it is but justice to all _bona fide_ citizens that no doubt should exist on such questions, and that congress should determine by enactment of law how expatriation may be accomplished and change of citizenship be established. i also invite your attention to the necessity of regulating by law the status of american women who may marry foreigners, and of defining more fully that of children born in a foreign country of american parents who may reside abroad; and also of some further provision regulating or giving legal effect to marriages of american citizens contracted in foreign countries. the correspondence submitted herewith shows a few of the constantly occurring questions on these points presented to the consideration of the government. there are few subjects to engage the attention of congress on which more delicate relations or more important interests are dependent. in the month of july last the building erected for the department of state was taken possession of and occupied by that department. i am happy to announce that the archives and valuable papers of the government in the custody of that department are now safely deposited and properly cared for. the report of the secretary of the treasury shows the receipts from customs for the fiscal year ending june 30, 1874, to have been $163,103,833.69, and for the fiscal year ending june 30, 1875, to have been $157,167,722.35, a decrease for the last fiscal year of $5,936,111.34. receipts from internal revenue for the year ending the 30th of june, 1874, were $102,409,784.90, and for the year ending june 30, 1875, $110,007,493.58; increase, $7,597,708.68. the report also shows a complete history of the workings of the department for the last year, and contains recommendations for reforms and for legislation which i concur in, but can not comment on so fully as i should like to do if space would permit, but will confine myself to a few suggestions which i look upon as vital to the best interests of the whole people--coining within the purview of "treasury;" i mean specie resumption. too much stress can not be laid upon this question, and i hope congress may be induced, at the earliest day practicable, to insure the consummation of the act of the last congress, at its last session, to bring about specie resumption "on and after the 1st of january, 1879," at furthest. it would be a great blessing if this could be consummated even at an earlier day. nothing seems to me more certain than that a full, healthy, and permanent reaction can not take place in favor of the industries and financial welfare of the country until we return to a measure of values recognized throughout the civilized world. while we use a currency not equivalent to this standard the world's recognized standard, specie, becomes a commodity like the products of the soil, the surplus seeking a market wherever there is a demand for it. under our present system we should want none, nor would we have any, were it not that customs dues must be paid in coin and because of the pledge to pay interest on the public debt in coin. the yield of precious metals would flow out for the purchase of foreign productions and leave the united states "hewers of wood and drawers of water," because of wiser legislation on the subject of finance by the nations with whom we have dealings. i am not prepared to say that i can suggest the best legislation to secure the end most heartily recommended. it will be a source of great gratification to me to be able to approve any measure of congress looking effectively toward securing "resumption." unlimited inflation would probably bring about specie payments more speedily than any legislation looking to redemption of the legal-tenders in coin; but it would be at the expense of honor. the legal-tenders would have no value beyond settling present liabilities, or, properly speaking, repudiating them. they would buy nothing after debts were all settled. there are a few measures which seem to me important in this connection and which i commend to your earnest consideration: a repeal of so much of the legal-tender act as makes these notes receivable for debts contracted after a date to be fixed in the act itself, say not later than the 1st of january, 1877. we should then have quotations at real values, not fictitious ones. gold would no longer be at a premium, but currency at a discount. a healthy reaction would set in at once, and with it a desire to make the currency equal to what it purports to be. the merchants, manufacturers, and tradesmen of every calling could do business on a fair margin of profit, the money to be received having an unvarying value. laborers and all classes who work for stipulated pay or salary would receive more for their income, because extra profits would no longer be charged by the capitalists to compensate for the risk of a downward fluctuation in the value of the currency. second. that the secretary of the treasury be authorized to redeem, say, not to exceed $2,000,000 monthly of legal-tender notes, by issuing in their stead a long bond, bearing interest at the rate of 3.65 per cent per annum, of denominations ranging from $50 up to $1,000 each. this would in time reduce the legal-tender notes to a volume that could be kept afloat without demanding redemption in large sums suddenly. third. that additional power be given to the secretary of the treasury to accumulate gold for final redemption, either by increasing revenue, curtailing expenses, or both (it is preferable to do both); and i recommend that reduction of expenditures be made wherever it can be done without impairing government obligations or crippling the due execution thereof. one measure for increasing the revenue--and the only one i think of--is the restoration of the duty on tea and coffee. these duties would add probably $18,000,000 to the present amount received from imports, and would in no way increase the prices paid for those articles by the consumers. these articles are the products of countries collecting revenue from exports, and as we, the largest consumers, reduce the duties they proportionately increase them. with this addition to the revenue, many duties now collected, and which give but an insignificant return for the cost of collection, might be remitted, and to the direct advantage of consumers at home. i would mention those articles which enter into manufactures of all sorts. all duty paid upon such articles goes directly to the cost of the article when manufactured here, and must be paid for by the consumers. these duties not only come from the consumers at home, but act as a protection to foreign manufacturers of the same completed articles in our own and distant markets. i will suggest or mention another subject bearing upon the problem of "how to enable the secretary of the treasury to accumulate balances." it is to devise some better method of verifying claims against the government than at present exists through the court of claims, especially those claims growing out of the late war. nothing is more certain than that a very large percentage of the amounts passed and paid are either wholly fraudulent or are far in excess of the real losses sustained. the large amount of losses proven--on good testimony according to existing laws, by affidavits of fictitious or unscrupulous persons--to have been sustained on small farms and plantations are not only far beyond the possible yield of those places for any one year, but, as everyone knows who has had experience in tilling the soil and who has visited the scenes of these spoliations, are in many instances more than the individual claimants were ever worth, including their personal and real estate. the report of the attorney-general, which will be submitted to congress at an early day, will contain a detailed history of awards made and of claims pending of the class here referred to. the report of the secretary of war, accompanying this message, gives a detailed account of army operations for the year just passed, expenses for maintenance, etc., with recommendations for legislation to which i respectfully invite your attention. to some of these i invite special attention: first. the necessity of making $300,000 of the appropriation for the subsistence department available before the beginning of the next fiscal year. without this provision troops at points distant from supply production must either go without food or existing laws must be violated. it is not attended with cost to the treasury. second. his recommendation for the enactment of a system of annuities for the families of deceased officers by voluntary deductions from the monthly pay of officers. this again is not attended with burden upon the treasury, and would for the future relieve much distress which every old army officer has witnessed in the past--of officers dying suddenly or being killed, leaving families without even the means of reaching their friends, if fortunate enough to have friends to aid them. third. the repeal of the law abolishing mileage, and a return to the old system. fourth. the trial with torpedoes under the corps of engineers, and appropriation for the same. should war ever occur between the united states and any maritime power, torpedoes will be among if not the most effective and cheapest auxiliary for the defense of harbors, and also in aggressive operations, that we can have. hence it is advisable to learn by experiment their best construction and application, as well as effect. fifth. a permanent organization for the signal-service corps. this service has now become a necessity of peace as well as war, under the advancement made by the present able management. sixth. a renewal of the appropriation for compiling the official records of the war, etc. the condition of our navy at this time is a subject of satisfaction. it does not contain, it is true, any of the powerful cruising ironclads which make so much of the maritime strength of some other nations, but neither our continental situation nor our foreign policy requires that we should have a large number of ships of this character, while this situation and the nature of our ports combine to make those of other nations little dangerous to us under any circumstances. our navy does contain, however, a considerable number of ironclads of the monitor class, which, though not properly cruisers, are powerful and effective for harbor defense and for operations near our own shores. of these all the single-turreted ones, fifteen in number, have been substantially rebuilt, their rotten wooden beams replaced with iron, their hulls strengthened, and their engines and machinery thoroughly repaired, so that they are now in the most efficient condition and ready for sea as soon as they can be manned and put in commission. the five double-turreted ironclads belonging to our navy, by far the most powerful of our ships for fighting purposes, are also in hand undergoing complete repairs, and could be ready for sea in periods varying from four to six months. with these completed according to the present design and our two iron torpedo boats now ready, our ironclad fleet will be, for the purposes of defense at home, equal to any force that can readily be brought against it. of our wooden navy also cruisers of various sizes, to the number of about forty, including those now in commission, are in the atlantic, and could be ready for duty as fast as men could be enlisted for those not already in commission. of these, one-third are in effect new ships, and though some of the remainder need considerable repairs to their boilers and machinery, they all are, or can readily be made, effective. this constitutes a fleet of more than fifty war ships, of which fifteen are ironclad, now in hand on the atlantic coast. the navy has been brought to this condition by a judicious and practical application of what could be spared from the current appropriations of the last few years and from that made to meet the possible emergency of two years ago. it has been done quietly, without proclamation or display, and though it has necessarily straitened the department in its ordinary expenditure, and, as far as the ironclads are concerned, has added nothing to the cruising force of the navy, yet the result is not the less satisfactory because it is to be found in a great increase of real rather than apparent force. the expenses incurred in the maintenance of an effective naval force in all its branches are necessarily large, but such force is essential to our position, relations, and character, and affects seriously the weight of our principles and policy throughout the whole sphere of national responsibilities. the estimates for the regular support of this branch of the service for the next year amount to a little less in the aggregate than those made for the current year; but some additional appropriations are asked for objects not included in the ordinary maintenance of the navy, but believed to be of pressing importance at this time. it would, in my opinion, be wise at once to afford sufficient means for the immediate completion of the five double-turreted monitors now undergoing repairs, which must otherwise advance slowly, and only as money can be spared from current expenses. supplemented by these, our navy, armed with the destructive weapons of modern warfare, manned by our seamen, and in charge of our instructed officers, will present a force powerful for the home purposes of a responsible though peaceful nation. the report of the postmaster-general herewith transmitted gives a full history of the workings of the department for the year just past. it will be observed that the deficiency to be supplied from the general treasury is increased over the amount required for the preceding year. in a country so vast in area as the united states, with large portions sparsely settled, it must be expected that this important service will be more or less a burden upon the treasury for many years to come. but there is no branch of the public service which interests the whole people more than that of cheap and rapid transmission of the mails to every inhabited part of our territory. next to the free school, the post-office is the great educator of the people, and it may well receive the support of the general government. the subsidy of $150,000 per annum given to vessels of the united states for carrying the mails between new york and rio de janeiro having ceased on the 30th day of september last, we are without direct mail facilities with the south american states. this is greatly to be regretted, and i do not hesitate to recommend the authorization of a renewal of that contract, and also that the service may be increased from monthly to semi-monthly trips. the commercial advantages to be gained by a direct line of american steamers to the south american states will far outweigh the expense of the service. by act of congress approved march 3, 1875, almost all matter, whether properly mail matter or not, may be sent any distance through the mails, in packages not exceeding 4 pounds in weight, for the sum of 16 cents per pound. so far as the transmission of real mail matter goes, this would seem entirely proper; but i suggest that the law be so amended as to exclude from the mails merchandise of all descriptions, and limit this transportation to articles enumerated, and which may be classed as mail matter proper. the discovery of gold in the black hills, a portion of the sioux reservation, has had the effect to induce a large emigration of miners to that point. thus far the effort to protect the treaty rights of the indians to that section has been successful, but the next year will certainly witness a large increase of such emigration. the negotiations for the relinquishment of the gold fields having failed, it will be necessary for congress to adopt some measures to relieve the embarrassment growing out of the causes named. the secretary of the interior suggests that the supplies now appropriated for the sustenance of that people, being no longer obligatory under the treaty of 1868, but simply a gratuity, may be issued or withheld at his discretion. the condition of the indian territory, to which i have referred in several of my former annual messages, remains practically unchanged. the secretary of the interior has taken measures to obtain a full report of the condition of that territory, and will make it the subject of a special report at an early day. it may then be necessary to make some further recommendation in regard to legislation for the government of that territory. the steady growth and increase of the business of the patent office indicates in some measure the progress of the industrial activity of the country. the receipts of the office are in excess of its expenditures, and the office generally is in a prosperous and satisfactory condition. the report of the general land office shows that there were 2,459,601 acres less disposed of during this than during the last year. more than one-half of this decrease was in lands disposed of under the homestead and timber-culture laws. the cause of this decrease is supposed to be found in the grasshopper scourge and the droughts which prevailed so extensively in some of the frontier states and territories during that time as to discourage and deter entries by actual settlers. the cash receipts were less by $690,322.23 than during the preceding year. the entire surveyed area of the public domain is 680,253,094 acres, of which 26,077,531 acres were surveyed during the past year, leaving 1,154,471,762 acres still unsurveyed. the report of the commissioner presents many interesting suggestions in regard to the management and disposition of the public domain and the modification of existing laws, the apparent importance of which should insure for them the careful consideration of congress. the number of pensioners still continues to decrease, the highest number having been reached during the year ending june 30, 1873. during the last year 11,557 names were added to the rolls, and 12,977 were dropped therefrom, showing a net decrease of 1,420. but while the number of pensioners has decreased, the annual amount due on the pension rolls has increased $44,733.13. this is caused by the greatly increased average rate of pensions, which, by the liberal legislation of congress, has increased from $90.26 in 1872 to $103.91 in 1875 to each invalid pensioner, an increase in the average rate of 15 per cent in the three years. during the year ending june 30, 1875, there was paid on account of pensions, including the expenses of disbursement, $29,683,116, being $910,632 less than was paid the preceding year. this reduction in amount of expenditures was produced by the decrease in the amount of arrearages due on allowed claims and on pensions the rate of which was increased by the legislation of the preceding session of congress. at the close of the last fiscal year there were on the pension rolls 234,821 persons, of whom 210,363 were army pensioners, 105,478 being invalids and 104,885 widows and dependent relatives; 3,420 were navy pensioners, of whom 1,636 were invalids and 1,784 widows and dependent relatives; 21,038 were pensioners of the war of 1812, 15,875 of whom were survivors and 5,163 were widows. it is estimated that $29,535,000 will be required for the payment of pensions for the next fiscal year, an amount $965,000 less than the estimate for the present year. the geological explorations have been prosecuted with energy during the year, covering an area of about 40,000 square miles in the territories of colorado, utah, and new mexico, developing the agricultural and mineral resources and furnishing interesting scientific and topographical details of that region. the method for the treatment of the indians adopted at the beginning of my first term has been steadily pursued, and with satisfactory and encouraging results. it has been productive of evident improvement in the condition of that race, and will be continued, with only such modifications as further experience may indicate to be necessary. the board heretofore appointed to take charge of the articles and materials pertaining to the war, the navy, the treasury, the interior, and the post-office departments, and the department of agriculture, the smithsonian institution, and the commission of food fishes, to be contributed, under the legislation of last session, to the international exhibition to be held at philadelphia during the centennial year 1876, has been diligent in the discharge of the duties which have devolved upon it; and the preparations so far made with the means at command give assurance that the governmental contribution will be made one of the marked characteristics of the exhibition. the board has observed commendable economy in the matter of the erection of a building for the governmental exhibit, the expense of which it is estimated will not exceed, say, $80,000. this amount has been withdrawn, under the law, from the appropriations of five of the principal departments, which leaves some of those departments without sufficient means to render their respective practical exhibits complete and satisfactory. the exhibition being an international one, and the government being a voluntary contributor, it is my opinion that its contribution should be of a character, in quality and extent, to sustain the dignity and credit of so distinguished a contributor. the advantages to the country of a creditable display are, in an international point of view, of the first importance, while an indifferent or uncreditable participation by the government would be humiliating to the patriotic feelings of our people themselves. i commend the estimates of the board for the necessary additional appropriations to the favorable consideration of congress. the powers of europe almost without exception, many of the south american states, and even the more distant eastern powers have manifested their friendly sentiments toward the united states and the interest of the world in our progress by taking steps to join with us in celebrating the centennial of the nation, and i strongly recommend that a more national importance be given to this exhibition by such legislation and by such appropriation as will insure its success. its value in bringing to our shores innumerable useful works of art and skill, the commingling of the citizens of foreign countries and our own, and the interchange of ideas and manufactures will far exceed any pecuniary outlay we may make. i transmit herewith the report of the commissioner of agriculture, together with the reports of the commissioners, the board of audit, and the board of health of the district of columbia, to all of which i invite your attention. the bureau of agriculture has accomplished much in disseminating useful knowledge to the agriculturist, and also in introducing new and useful productions adapted to our soil and climate, and is worthy of the continued encouragement of the government. the report of the commissioner of education, which accompanies the report of the secretary of the interior, shows a gratifying progress in educational matters. in nearly every annual message that i have had the honor of transmitting to congress i have called attention to the anomalous, not to say scandalous, condition of affairs existing in the territory of utah, and have asked for definite legislation to correct it. that polygamy should exist in a free, enlightened, and christian country, without the power to punish so flagrant a crime against decency and morality, seems preposterous. true, there is no law to sustain this unnatural vice; but what is needed is a law to punish it as a crime, and at the same time to fix the status of the innocent children, the offspring of this system, and of the possibly innocent plural wives. but as an institution polygamy should be banished from the land. while this is being done i invite the attention of congress to another, though perhaps no less an evil--the importation of chinese women, but few of whom are brought to our shores to pursue honorable or useful occupations. observations while visiting the territories of wyoming, utah, and colorado during the past autumn convinced me that existing laws regulating the disposition of public lands, timber, etc., and probably the mining laws themselves, are very defective and should be carefully amended, and at an early day. territory where cultivation of the soil can only be followed by irrigation, and where irrigation is not practicable the lands can only be used as pasturage, and this only where stock can reach water (to quench its thirst), can not be governed by the same laws as to entries as lands every acre of which is an independent estate by itself. land must be held in larger quantities to justify the expense of conducting water upon it to make it fruitful, or to justify utilizing it as pasturage. the timber in most of the territories is principally confined to the mountain regions, which are held for entry in small quantities only, and as mineral lands. the timber is the property of the united states, for the disposal of which there is now no adequate law. the settler must become a consumer of this timber, whether he lives upon the plain or engages in working the mines. hence every man becomes either a trespasser himself or knowingly a patron of trespassers. my opportunities for observation were not sufficient to justify me in recommending specific legislation on these subjects, but i do recommend that a joint committee of the two houses of congress, sufficiently large to be divided into subcommittees, be organized to visit all the mining states and territories during the coming summer, and that the committee shall report to congress at the next session such laws or amendments to laws as it may deem necessary to secure the best interests of the government and the people of these territories, who are doing so much for their development. i am sure the citizens occupying the territory described do not wish to be trespassers, nor will they be if legal ways are provided for them to become owners of these actual necessities of their position. as this will be the last annual message which i shall have the honor of transmitting to congress before my successor is chosen, i will repeat or recapitulate the questions which i deem of vital importance which may be legislated upon and settled at this session: first. that the states shall be required to afford the opportunity of a good common-school education to every child within their limits. second. no sectarian tenets shall ever be taught in any school supported in whole or in part by the state, nation, or by the proceeds of any tax levied upon any community. make education compulsory so far as to deprive all persons who can not read and write from becoming voters after the year 1890, disfranchising none, however, on grounds of illiteracy who may be voters at the time this amendment takes effect. third. declare church and state forever separate and distinct, but each free within their proper spheres; and that all church property shall bear its own proportion of taxation. fourth. drive out licensed immorality, such as polygamy and the importation of women for illegitimate purposes. to recur again to the centennial year, it would seem as though now, as we are about to begin the second century of our national existence, would be a most fitting time for these reforms. fifth. enact such laws as will insure a speedy return to a sound currency, such as will command the respect of the world. believing that these views will commend themselves to the great majority of the right-thinking and patriotic citizens of the united states, i submit the rest to congress. u.s. grant. [footnote 97: see pp. 324-325.] special messages. executive mansion, _january 6, 1876_. _to the senate of the united states_: in reply to the resolution of the senate of the 27th of february last, requesting the president to institute inquiries as to the proper place for the establishment of a branch mint at some point in the western states or in the mississippi valley, i transmit herewith the report, and accompanying papers, of the director of the mint, who was charged with the duty of making the inquiries called for by said resolution. u.s. grant. washington, _january 21, 1876_. _to the house of representatives_: i transmit to the house of representatives, in answer to their resolution of the 17th instant, a report from the secretary of state, with accompanying documents.[98] u.s. grant. [footnote 98: correspondence with spain relative to cuba.] washington, _january 25, 1876_. _to the house of representatives_: in answer to the resolution of the house of representatives of the 22d of january instant, i herewith transmit a report[99] from the secretary of state. u.s. grant. [footnote 99: stating that no correspondence had taken place during the year 1875 with any european government other than spain relative to cuba.] executive mansion, _february 3, 1876_. _to the senate of the united states_: in answer to the resolution of the senate of the 19th of january instant, requesting the examination, with a view to ascertaining their suitableness for the purposes of a mint, of the building and grounds situated in columbus, ohio, known as the "capital university," and proposed to be donated to the united states by f. michel, of said city, i have the honor to transmit herewith the report of the director of the mint, accompanied by a diagram of the building and lot. u.s. grant. executive mansion, _february, 1876_. _to the house of representatives_: in answer to the resolution of the 6th of january of the house of representatives, requesting to be informed "of the number of indian agents, regular and special, clerks, and other employees in the indian service, except those on duty in the office of the secretary of the interior, and the amounts paid to each as salaries and expenses," i have the honor to transmit herewith a copy of a report, dated the 31st ultimo, from the commissioner of indian affairs, together with the statements therein referred to. u.s. grant. washington, _february 8, 1876_. _to the senate of the united states_: i transmit to the senate, in answer to the resolution[100] of that body of the 18th ultimo, a report from the secretary of state, with accompanying papers. u.s. grant. [footnote 100: calling for correspondence with any government or its representatives relative to the centennial celebration to be held in philadelphia.] executive mansion, _february 28, 1876_. _to the senate and house of representatives_: i lay before you herewith a communication from the secretary of the interior, of date 26th instant, upon the subject of the deficiency of supplies at the red cloud agency, nebr. this matter has already been presented to you by the secretary, and the house of representatives has requested an investigation by a military officer of the cause of this deficiency. i have taken proper steps to comply with this request of the house, but the present need of supplies is not disputed. a prolonged delay in furnishing provisions to these indians will cause great distress and be likely to provoke raids on white settlements, and possibly lead to general outbreak and hostilities. i therefore deem it proper to invite your attention to the importance of early and favorable action upon the estimates heretofore and herewith submitted. these estimates and the views of the secretary in regard to this emergency meet with my full concurrence, and i recommend that the appropriations asked for be made at the earliest day practicable. u.s. grant. washington, _march 3, 1876_. _to the house of representatives_: in answer to the resolution of the house of representatives of the 21st ultimo, i transmit herewith a report from the secretary of state, and accompanying papers,[101] together with a report from the secretary of the treasury. u.s. grant. [footnote 101: correspondence relative to the mode of transferring to the united states the alabama indemnity of $15,500,000, and correspondence and papers showing the payment of the indemnity, the form of receipt given therefor, and the disposition of the indemnity.] executive mansion, _march 6, 1876_. _to the senate of the united states_: in answer to the resolution of the senate of the 7th of january last, requesting a "statement of the number of military arrests made in the territory of alaska during the past five years, together with the date of each, the charge on which made in each case, the names of the persons arrested, and the period and character of the imprisonment of each in that territory before trial or surrender to the civil authorities for trial," i have the honor to submit herewith the report of the acting secretary of war. u.s. grant. washington, _march 10, 1876_. _to the senate of the united states_: i transmit to the senate, for consideration with a view to ratification, a metric convention between the united states and certain foreign governments, signed at paris on the 20th of may, 1875, by mr. e.b. washburne, the minister of the united states at that capital, acting on behalf of this government, and by the representatives acting on behalf of the foreign powers therein mentioned. a copy of certain papers on the subject, mentioned in the subjoined list, is also transmitted for the information of the senate. u.s. grant. washington, _march 22, 1876_. _to the house of representatives_: in answer to a resolution[102] of the house of representatives of the 23d of february ultimo, i transmit herewith a report of the secretary of state and the papers which accompany it. u.s. grant. [footnote 102: calling for information or facts relative to the charges against george f. seward, united states minister to china.] executive mansion, _march 23, 1876_. _to the house of representatives_: in answer to the resolution of the house of representatives of the 3d of february last, requesting the president "to require a competent, experienced military officer of the united states to execute the duties of an indian agent so far as to repair to the red cloud agency, and, in his discretion, other sioux agencies, with instructions to inquire into the causes of" the exhaustion of the appropriation for the subsistence and support of the sioux indians for the present fiscal year; "as also his opinion as to whether any further and what amount should be appropriated for the subsistence and support of said indians for the remainder of the current fiscal year," i have the honor to transmit herewith the report of lieutenant-colonel merritt, of the ninth cavalry, who was charged by the secretary of war with the duty of making the inquiries called for by said resolution. u.s. grant. executive mansion, _march 24, 1876_. _to the senate of the united states_: in further answer to the resolution of the senate of the 7th of january last, requesting to be furnished "with a statement of the number of military arrests made in the territory of alaska during the past five years, together with the date of each, the charge on which made in each case, the names of the persons arrested, and the period and character of the imprisonment of each in that territory before trial or surrender to the civil authorities for trial," i have the honor to transmit herewith the report of the secretary of war. u.s. grant. executive mansion, _march 27, 1876_. _to the house of representatives_: in further answer to the resolution of the house of the 6th of january last, with regard to certain expenditures and employees in the indian service, except those on duty in the office of the secretary of the interior, etc., i have the honor to transmit to you a supplementary report received from the secretary of the interior, respecting and explaining a clerical error to be found in that portion of the statement of the interior department which relates to the expenditures of the board of indian commissioners, and to ask its consideration in connection with the papers which accompanied my message of the 3d of february last. u.s. grant. executive mansion, _march 27, 1876_. _to the house of representatives_: i have the honor to transmit herewith a communication received from the chairman of the board on behalf of the united states executive departments, containing in detail the operations of the board and setting forth the present embarrassments under which it is now laboring in the endeavor to conduct the participation of the government in the centennial exhibition, and showing very clearly the necessity of additional funds to carry out the undertaking in a creditable manner. u.s. grant. executive mansion, _april 3, 1876_. _to the house of representatives_: i have the honor to transmit herewith, for your information, a communication from the secretary of the interior of this date, upon the urgent necessities of the pawnee indians. this tribe has recently been removed to the indian territory, and is without means of subsistence except as supplied by the government. its members have evinced a disposition to become self-supporting, and it is believed that only temporary aid will be required by them. the sums advanced by the united states for this purpose it is expected will be refunded from the proceeds of the sale of the pawnee reservation in nebraska. the present destitute condition of these indians would seem to call for immediate relief, and i recommend the subject to your early and favorable consideration. u.s. grant. executive mansion, _april 6, 1876_. _to the senate of the united states_: in further answer to the resolution of the senate of the 7th of january last (partial answers having been transmitted on the 6th and 24th ultimo), calling for a statement of "the number of military arrests in the territory of alaska during the past five years," etc., i have the honor to submit herewith a report, with accompanying papers, received from the secretary of war. u.s. grant. executive mansion, _april 19, 1876_. _to the senate and house of representatives_: i have the honor to transmit herewith to congress the final report of the board of audit constituted by section 6 of the "act for the government of the district of columbia, and for other purposes," approved june 20, 1874, and abolished by the joint resolution approved march 14, 1876, and to call your attention to the statements therein presented. u.s. grant. washington, _may 1, 1876_. _to the senate_: i transmit herewith, for the information of congress, a report of the president of the centennial commission upon the ceremonies to be observed at the opening of the exhibition on the 10th instant. it will be observed that an invitation is therein extended to senators and representatives to be present on that occasion. u.s. grant. [the same message was sent to the house of representatives.] washington, _may 1, 1876_. _to the senate_: i transmit herewith, for the consideration of the senate with a view to its ratification by that body, a treaty between the united states and mexico, concluded on the 29th ultimo. u.s. grant. washington, _may 1, 1876_. _to the house of representatives_: i transmit herewith, in answer to the resolution of the house of representatives of 15th march last, a report[103] from the secretary of state and accompanying papers. u.s. grant. [footnote 103: explanatory of the object, intent, and character of the power conferred upon a. b. steinberger, special agent to the samoan or navigators islands, and transmitting correspondence relative to the object, operation, and result of his agency.] washington, _may 4, 1876_. _to the house of representatives_: i have given very attentive consideration to a resolution of the house of representatives passed on the 3d of april, requesting the president of the united states to inform the house whether any executive offices acts, or duties, and, if any, what, have within a specified period been performed at a distance from the seat of government established by law, etc. i have never hesitated and shall not hesitate to communicate to congress, and to either branch thereof, all the information which the constitution makes it the duty of the president to give, or which my judgment may suggest to me or a request from either house may indicate to me will be useful in the discharge of the appropriate duties confided to them. i fail, however, to find in the constitution of the united states the authority given to the house of representatives (one branch of the congress, in which is vested the legislative power of the government) to require of the executive, an independent branch of the government, coordinate with the senate and house of representatives, an account of his discharge of his appropriate and purely executive offices, acts, and duties, either as to when, where, or how performed. what the house of representatives may require as a right in its demand upon the executive for information is limited to what is necessary for the proper discharge of its powers of legislation or of impeachment. the inquiry in the resolution of the house as to where executive acts have within the last seven years been performed and at what distance from any particular spot or for how long a period at any one time, etc., does not necessarily belong to the province of legislation. it does not profess to be asked for that object. if this information be sought through an inquiry of the president as to his executive acts in view or in aid of the power of impeachment vested in the house, it is asked in derogation of an inherent natural right, recognized in this country by a constitutional guaranty which protects every citizen, the president as well as the humblest in the land, from being made a witness against himself. during the time that i have had the honor to occupy the position of president of this government it has been, and while i continue to occupy that position it will continue to be, my earnest endeavor to recognize and to respect the several trusts and duties and powers of the coordinate branches of the government, not encroaching upon them nor allowing encroachments upon the proper powers of the office which the people of the united states have confided to me, but aiming to preserve in their proper relations the several powers and functions of each of the coordinate branches of the government, agreeably to the constitution and in accordance with the solemn oath which i have taken to "preserve, protect, and defend" that instrument. in maintenance of the rights secured by the constitution to the executive branch of the government i am compelled to decline any specific or detailed answer to the request of the house for information as to "any executive offices, acts, or duties, and, if any, what, have been performed at a distance from the seat of government established by law, and for how long a period at any one time and in what part of the united states." if, however, the house of representatives desires to know whether during the period of upward of seven years during which i have held the office of president of the united states i have been absent from the seat of government, and whether during that period i have performed or have neglected to perform the duties of my office, i freely inform the house that from the time of my entrance upon my office i have been in the habit, as were all of my predecessors (with the exception of one, who lived only one month after assuming the duties of his office, and one whose continued presence in washington was necessary from the existence at the time of a powerful rebellion), of absenting myself at times from the seat of government, and that during such absences i did not neglect or forego the obligations or the duties of my office, but continued to discharge all of the executive offices, acts, and duties which were required of me as the president of the united states. i am not aware that a failure occurred in any one instance of my exercising the functions and powers of my office in every case requiring their discharge, or of my exercising all necessary executive acts, in whatever part of the united states i may at the time have been. fortunately, the rapidity of travel and of mail communication and the facility of almost instantaneous correspondence with the offices at the seat of government, which the telegraph affords to the president in whatever section of the union he may be, enable him in these days to maintain as constant and almost as quick intercourse with the departments at washington as may be maintained while he remains at the capital. the necessity of the performance of executive acts by the president of the united states exists and is devolved upon him, wherever he may be within the united states, during his term of office by the constitution of the united states. his civil powers are no more limited or capable of limitation as to the place where they shall be exercised than are those which he might be required to discharge in his capacity of commander in chief of the army and navy, which latter powers it is evident he might be called upon to exercise, possibly, even without the limits of the united states. had the efforts of those recently in rebellion against the government been successful in driving a late president of the united states from washington, it is manifest that he must have discharged his functions, both civil and military, elsewhere than in the place named by law as the seat of government. no act of congress can limit, suspend, or confine this constitutional duty. i am not aware of the existence of any act of congress which assumes thus to limit or restrict the exercise of the functions of the executive. were there such acts, i should nevertheless recognize the superior authority of the constitution, and should exercise the powers required thereby of the president. the act to which reference is made in the resolution of the house relates to the establishing of the seat of government and the providing of suitable buildings and removal thereto of the offices attached to the government, etc. it was not understood at its date and by general washington to confine the president in the discharge of his duties and powers to actual presence at the seat of government. on the 30th of march, 1791, shortly after the passage of the act referred to, general washington issued an executive proclamation having reference to the subject of this very act from georgetown, a place remote from philadelphia, which then was the seat of government, where the act referred to directed that "all offices attached to the seat of government" should for the time remain. that none of his successors have entertained the idea that their executive offices could be performed only at the seat of government is evidenced by the hundreds upon hundreds of such acts performed by my predecessors in unbroken line from washington to lincoln, a memorandum of the general nature and character of some of which acts is submitted herewith; and no question has ever been raised as to the validity of those acts or as to the right and propriety of the executive to exercise the powers of his office in any part of the united states. u.s. grant. _memorandum of absences of the presidents of the united states from the national capital during each of the several administrations, and of public and executive acts performed during the time of such absences_. president washington was frequently absent from the capital; he appears to have been thus absent at least one hundred and eighty-one days during his term. during his several absences he discharged official and executive duties; among them-in march, 1791, he issued a proclamation, dated at georgetown, in reference to running the boundary for the territory of the permanent seat of the government. from mount vernon he signed an official letter to the emperor of morocco, and from the same place the commission of oliver wolcott as comptroller of the treasury and the proclamation respecting the whisky insurrection in pennsylvania; also various sea letters, the proclamation of the treaty of 1795 between the united states and spain, the executive order of august 4, 1792, relative to the duties on distilled spirits, etc. when at germantown he signed the commission of john breckenridge as attorney of the united states for kentucky, and that of engineer of the united states mint. he proposed to have mr. yrujo officially presented, as envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary from spain, to him at mount vernon; but although mr. yrujo went there for the purpose, the ceremony of presentation was prevented by mr. yrujo's having accidentally left his credentials. president john adams was absent from the capital during his term of four years, on various occasions, three hundred and eighty-five days. he discharged official duties and performed the most solemn public acts at quincy in the same manner as when at the seat of government. in 1797 (august 25) he forwarded to the secretary of state a number of passports which he had signed at quincy. he issued at quincy commissions to numerous officers of various grades, civil and military. on the 28th of september, 1797, he forwarded to the secretary of state a commission for a justice of the supreme court, signed in blank at quincy, instructing the secretary to fill it with the name of john marshall if he would accept, and, if not, bushrod washington. he issued a proclamation opening trade with certain ports of st. domingo, and signed warrants for the execution of two soldiers and for a pardon. president jefferson was absent from the seat of government during his two terms of office seven hundred and ninety-six days, more than one-fourth of the whole official period. during his absence he signed and issued from monticello seventy-five commissions, one letter to the emperor of russia, and nine letters of credence to diplomatic agents of the united states accredited to other governments. president madison was absent from the seat of government during his two presidential terms six hundred and thirty-seven days. he signed and issued from montpelier during his absence from the capital seventy-one commissions, one proclamation, and nine letters of credence to ministers, accrediting them to foreign governments, and, as it appears, transacted generally all the necessary routine business incident to the executive office. president monroe was absent from the capital during his presidential service of eight years seven hundred and eight days, independent of the year 1824 and the two months of 1825, for which period no data are found. he transacted public business wherever he happened to be, sometimes at his farm in virginia, again at his summer resort on the chesapeake, and sometimes while traveling. he signed and issued from these several places, away from the capital, numerous commissions to civil officers of the government, exequaturs to foreign consuls, letters of credence, two letters to sovereigns, and thirty-seven pardons. president john q. adams was absent from the capital during his presidential term of four years two hundred and twenty-two days. during such absence he performed official and public acts, signing and issuing commissions, exequaturs, pardons, proclamations, etc. referring to his absence in august and september, 1827, mr. adams, in his memoirs, volume 8, page 75, says: "i left with him [the chief clerk] some blank signatures, to be used when necessary for proclamations, remission of penalties, and commissions of consuls, taking of him a receipt for the number and kind of blanks left with him, with directions to return to me when i came back all the signed blanks remaining unused and to keep and give me an account of all those that shall have been disposed of. this has been my constant practice with respect to signed blanks of this description. i do the same with regard to patents and land grants." president jackson was absent from the capital during his presidential service of eight years five hundred and two days. he also performed executive duties and public acts while absent. he appears to have signed and issued while absent from the capital very many public papers, embracing commissions, letters of credence, exequaturs, pardons, and among them four executive proclamations. on the 26th of june, 1833, he addressed a letter from boston to mr. duane, secretary of the treasury, giving his views at large on the removal of the "deposits" from the united states bank and placing them in the state banks, directing that the change, with all its arrangements, should be, if possible, completed by the 15th september following, and recommending that amos kendall should be appointed an agent of the treasury department to make the necessary arrangements with the state banks. soon after, september 23, a paper signed by the president and purporting to have been read to the cabinet was published in the newspapers of the day. early in the next session of congress a resolution passed the senate inquiring of the president whether the paper was genuine or not and if it was published by his authority, and requesting that a copy be laid before that body. the president replied, avowing the genuineness of the paper and that it was published by his authority, but declined to furnish a copy to the senate on the ground that it was purely executive business, and that the request of the senate was an undue interference with the independence of the executive, a coordinate branch of the government. in january, 1837 (26th), he refused the privilege to a committee under a resolution of the house of representatives to make a general investigation of the executive departments without specific charges, on the ground, among others, that the use of the books, papers, etc., of the departments for such purpose would interfere with the discharge of the public duties devolving upon the heads of the different departments, and necessarily disarrange and retard the public business. president van buren was absent from the capital during his presidential term one hundred and thirty-one days. he discharged executive duties and performed official and public acts during these absences. among the papers signed by president van buren during his absence from the seat of government are commissions (one of these being for a united states judge of a district court), pardons, etc. president tyler was absent from the capital during his presidential term one hundred and sixty-three days, and performed public acts and duties during such absences, signing public papers and documents to the number of twenty-eight, in which were included commissions, exequaturs, letters of credence, pardons, and one proclamation making public the treaty of 1842 between the united states and ecuador. president polk was absent from the capital during his presidential term thirty-seven days, and appears to have signed but two official public papers during such absence. president taylor was absent from the capital during the time he served as president thirty-one days, and while absent signed two commissions, three "full powers," two exequaturs, and the proclamation of august 11, 1849, relative to a threatened invasion of cuba or some of the provinces of mexico. president fillmore was absent from the capital during the time he served as president sixty days. during such absence he signed pardons, commissions, exequaturs, etc. president pierce was absent from the capital in all during his presidential term fifty-seven days. the several periods of absence which make up this aggregate were each brief, and it does not appear that during these absences the president signed any public official documents, except one pardon. president buchanan was absent from the capital during his presidential term fifty-seven days, and the official papers which he is shown to have signed during such absence are three exequaturs and one letter of credence. in addition to the public documents and papers executed by the several presidents during their absences from the seat of government, constant official correspondence was maintained by each with the heads of the different executive departments. washington, _may 15, 1876_. _to the house of representatives_: in answer to the resolution of the house of representatives of the 10th ultimo, i transmit herewith a report and accompanying papers upon the subject[104] from the secretary of state. u.s. grant. [footnote 104: course pursued to enforce the provisions of the convention with venezuela of april 25, 1866, and the payment of adjudicated claims under act approved february 25, 1873.] washington, _may 16, 1876_. _to the house of representatives_: in answer to a resolution of the house of representatives of the 5th instant, requesting information as to payments by the government of venezuela on account of claims of citizens of the united states under the convention of the 25th of april, 1866, i transmit a report from the secretary of state, to whom the resolution was referred. u.s. grant. washington, _may 19, 1876_. _to the senate_: i transmit herewith, in answer to a resolution of the senate of the 27th march last, a report[105] from the secretary of state and an accompanying paper. u.s. grant. [footnote 105: relating to amount of money in the custody of the department of state to the credit of the awards of the mixed commission under the treaty with venezuela of april 25, 1866.] washington, _may 31, 1876_. _to the house of representatives_: i transmit, in answer to a resolution of the house of representatives of the 22d instant, a report of the secretary of state, with its accompanying papers[106]. u.s. grant. [footnote 106: relating to the steps taken for the protection of american citizens in the ottoman dominions.] executive mansion, _june 7, 1876_. _to the senate and house of representatives_: i herewith transmit the report of the board appointed to test iron, steel, and other metals, in accordance with the provisions of section 4 of "an act making appropriations for sundry civil expenses of the government for the fiscal year ending june 30, 1876, and for other purposes," approved march 3, 1875. this board is to determine by actual tests the strength and value of all metals, and to prepare tables which will exhibit their strength and value for all constructions. the accompanying memorials and resolutions of scientific associations, colleges, and schools strongly advocate the continuation of this board, which is national in its character and general in its investigations. the board asks for an appropriation of $50,000 for the ensuing year, and that any unexpended balances remaining on hand on the 30th of june, 1876, may be reappropriated. this recommendation is submitted for favorable action, in the belief that the labors of the board will, in the benefits accruing to important industrial interests, more than repay to the country at large any money that may be so expended. u.s. grant. washington, _june 10, 1876_. _to the house of representatives_: i transmit herewith, in answer to the resolution of the house of representatives of the 30th day of march last, a report from the secretary of state, with accompanying papers, which presents the correspondence and condition of the question[107] up to the day of its date. u.s. grant. [footnote 107: the refusal of great britain to surrender certain fugitive criminals in accordance with the extradition clause of the treaty of august 9, 1842.] washington, _june 14, 1876_. _to the senate_: in answer to the resolution of the senate of the 26th april ultimo, i herewith transmit a report[108] from the secretary of state, with accompanying documents. u.s. grant. [footnote 108: relating to claims before and judgments rendered by the alabama claims commission arising from captures by the rebel cruiser _shenandoah_.] executive mansion, _june 17, 1876_. _to the senate and house of representatives_: the near approach of a new fiscal year and the failure of congress up to this time to provide the necessary means to continue all the functions of government make it my duty to call your attention to the embarrassments that must ensue if the fiscal year is allowed to close without remedial action on your part. article i, section 9, of the constitution declares: no money shall be drawn from the treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by law. to insure economy of expenditure and security of the public treasure congress has from time to time enacted laws to restrain the use of public moneys, except for the specific purpose for which appropriated and within the time for which appropriated; and to prevent contracting debts in anticipation of appropriate appropriations, revised statutes, section 3679, provides: no department of the government shall expend in any one fiscal year any sum in excess of appropriations made by congress for that fiscal year, or involve the government in any contract for the future payment of money in excess of such appropriations. section 3732 provides: no contract or purchase on behalf of the united states shall be made unless the same is authorized by law or is under an appropriation adequate to its fulfillment, except in the war and navy departments, for clothing, subsistence, forage, fuel, quarters, or transportation, which, however, shall not exceed the necessities of the current year. section 3678, as follows: all sums appropriated for the various branches of expenditure in the public service shall be applied solely to the objects for which they are respectively made, and for no others. section 3690, that- all balances of appropriations contained in the annual appropriation bills, and made specifically for the service of any fiscal year, and remaining unexpended at the expiration of such fiscal year, shall only be applied to the payment of expenses properly incurred during that year or to the fulfillment of contracts properly made within that year; and balances not needed for such purposes shall be carried to the surplus fund. this section, however, shall not apply to appropriations known as permanent or indefinite appropriations. the effect of the laws quoted, taken in connection with the constitutional provision referred to, is, as above stated, to prohibit any outlay of public money toward defraying even the current and necessary expenses of government after the expiration of the year for which appropriated, excepting when those expenses are provided for by some permanent appropriation, and excepting in the war and navy departments, under section 3732. the number of permanent appropriations are very limited, and cover but few of the necessary expenditures of the government. they are nearly all, if not quite all, embraced in sections 3687, 3688, and 3689 of the revised statutes. that contained in section 3687 is applicable to _expenses of collecting the revenue from customs_, that in section 3688 to the payment of interest on the _public debt_, and that in section 3689 to various objects too numerous to detail here. it will be observed that while section 3679, quoted above, provides that _no_ department shall in any one fiscal year involve the government in any contract for the future payment of money in excess of the appropriation for that year, section 3732, also quoted above, confers, by clear implication, upon the heads of the war and navy departments full authority, even in the absence of any appropriation, to purchase or contract for clothing, subsistence, forage, fuel, quarters, or transportation not exceeding the necessities of the current year. the latter provision is special and exceptional in its character, and is to be regarded as excluded from the operation of the former more general one. but if any of the appropriation bills above enumerated should fail to be matured before the expiration of the current fiscal year, the government would be greatly embarrassed for want of the necessary funds to carry on the service. precluded from expending money not appropriated, the departments would have to suspend the service so far as the appropriations for it should have failed to be made. a careful examination of this subject will demonstrate the embarrassed condition all branches of the government will be in, and especially the executive, if there should be a failure to pass the necessary appropriation bills before the 1st of july, or otherwise provide. i commend this subject most earnestly to your consideration, and urge that some measure be speedily adopted to avert the evils which would result from nonaction by congress. i will venture the suggestion, by way of remedy, that a joint resolution, properly guarded, might be passed through the two houses of congress, extending the provisions of all appropriations for the present fiscal year to the next in all cases where there is a failure on the 1st of july to supply such appropriation; each appropriation so extended to hold good until congress shall have passed a corresponding appropriation applicable to the new fiscal year, when all moneys expended under laws enacted for this fiscal year shall be deducted from the corresponding appropriation for the next. to make my ideas on this subject more clear, i have caused to be drawn up a joint resolution embodying them more fully. u.s. grant. joint resolution to provide for defraying temporarily the ordinary and necessary expenses of the public service. whereas the ordinary and necessary expenses of the public service in its various branches, comprising among others the expenses which especially pertain to the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of the government, to the consular and diplomatic service, to the postal service, to the support of the army, and to the maintenance of the navy, are generally met by annual appropriations which expire at the end of the current fiscal year; and whereas no public funds will be available to defray these expenses as the same shall accrue after that period unless appropriations shall have been previously made therefor by law; and whereas, to avoid the great embarrassment to the public service that might otherwise ensue, it is expedient to make provision for defraying temporarily such of these expenses as would be unprovided for in case some one of the usual annual appropriation bills designed to provide therefor should fail to be matured by the end of the fiscal year now current: therefore, _resolved by the senate and house of representatives of the united states of america in congress assembled_, that in case any of the following appropriation bills for the fiscal year ending june 30, 1877, shall not have passed by the commencement of such year, so that the funds to be appropriated thereby may then be available for expenditure--that is to say, the bill providing for the legislative, executive, and judicial expenses; the bill providing for the consular and diplomatic expenses; the bill providing for the service of the post-office department; the bill providing for the support of the army, and the bill providing for the naval service--the appropriation act for the current fiscal year corresponding in its general description and object to such appropriation bill shall extend to the fiscal year next ensuing until such appropriation bill is enacted and takes effect, to the end that the provisions of such appropriation act which apply to the ordinary and necessary expenses of the public service for the current fiscal year shall in like manner be applicable to similar expenses which may accrue during the period intervening between the end of the current fiscal year and the time when such appropriation bill for the next ensuing fiscal year shall be enacted and take effect. washington, _june 20, 1876_. _to the senate and house of representatives_: by the tenth article of the treaty between the united states and great britain signed in washington on the 9th day of august, 1842, it was agreed that the two governments should, upon mutual requisitions respectively made, deliver up to justice all persons who, being charged with certain crimes therein enumerated, committed within the jurisdiction of either, should seek an asylum or be found within the territories of the other. the only condition or limitation contained in the treaty to the reciprocal obligation thus to deliver up the fugitive was that it should be done only upon such evidence of criminality as, according to the laws of the place where the fugitive or person so charged should be found, would justify his apprehension and commitment for trial if the crime or offense had there been committed. in the month of february last a requisition was duly made, in pursuance of the provisions of the treaty, by this government upon that of great britain for the surrender of one ezra d. winslow, charged with extensive forgeries and the utterance of forged paper, committed within the jurisdiction of the united states, who had sought an asylum and was found within the territories of her britannic majesty and was apprehended in london. the evidence of the criminality of the fugitive was duly furnished and heard, and, being found sufficient to justify his apprehension and commitment for trial if the crimes had been committed in great britain, he was held and committed for extradition. her majesty's government, however, did not deliver up the fugitive in accordance with the terms of the treaty, notwithstanding every requirement thereof had been met on the part of the united states, but, instead of surrendering the fugitive, demanded certain assurances or stipulations not mentioned in the treaty, but foreign to its provisions, as a condition of the performance by great britain of her obligations under the treaty. in a recent communication to the house of representatives, and in answer to a call from that body for information on this case, i submitted the correspondence which has passed between the two governments with reference thereto. it will be found in executive document no. 173 of the house of representatives of the present session, and i respectfully refer thereto for more detailed information bearing on the question. it appears from the correspondence that the british government bases its refusal to surrender the fugitive and its demand for stipulations or assurances from this government on the requirements of a purely domestic enactment of the british parliament, passed in the year 1870. this act was brought to the notice of this government shortly after its enactment, and her majesty's government was advised that the united states understood it as giving continued effect to the existing engagements under the treaty of 1842 for the extradition of criminals; and with this knowledge on its part, and without dissent from the declared views of the united states as to the unchanged nature of the reciprocal rights and obligations of the two powers under the treaty, great britain has continued to make requisitions and to grant surrenders in numerous instances, without suggestion that it was contemplated to depart from the practice under the treaty which has obtained for more than thirty years, until now, for the first time, in this case of winslow, it is assumed that under this act of parliament her majesty may require a stipulation or agreement not provided for in the treaty as a condition to the observance by her government of its treaty obligations toward this country. this i have felt it my duty emphatically to repel. in addition to the case of winslow, requisition was also made by this government on that of great britain for the surrender of charles j. brent, also charged with forgery, committed in the united states, and found in great britain. the evidence of criminality was duly heard and the fugitive committed for extradition. a similar stipulation to that demanded in winslow's case was also asked in brent's, and was likewise refused. it is with extreme regret that i am now called upon to announce to you that her majesty's government has finally released both of these fugitives, winslow and brent, and set them at liberty, thus omitting to comply with the provisions and requirements of the treaty under which the extradition of fugitive criminals is made between the two governments. the position thus taken by the british government, if adhered to, can not but be regarded as the abrogation and annulment of the article of the treaty on extradition. under these circumstances it will not, in my judgment, comport with the dignity or self-respect of this government to make demands upon that government for the surrender of fugitive criminals, nor to entertain any requisition of that character from that government under the treaty. it will be a cause of deep regret if a treaty which has been thus far beneficial in its practical operation, which has worked so well and so efficiently, and which, notwithstanding the exciting and at times violent political disturbances of which both countries have been the scene during its existence, has given rise to no complaints on the part of either government against either its spirit or its provisions, should be abruptly terminated. it has tended to the protection of society and to the general interests of both countries. its violation or annulment would be a retrograde step in international intercourse. i have been anxious and have made the effort to enlarge its scope and to make a new treaty which would be a still more efficient agent for the punishment and prevention of crime. at the same time, i have felt it my duty to decline to entertain a proposition made by great britain, pending its refusal to execute the existing treaty, to amend it by practically conceding by treaty the identical conditions which that government demands under its act of parliament. in addition to the impossibility of the united states entering upon negotiations under the menace of an intended violation or a refusal to execute the terms of an existing treaty i deemed it inadvisable to treat of only the one amendment proposed by great britain while the united states desires an enlargement of the list of crimes for which extradition may be asked, and other improvements which experience has shown might be embodied in a new treaty. it is for the wisdom of congress to determine whether the article of the treaty relating to extradition is to be any longer regarded as obligatory on the government of the united states or as forming part of the supreme law of the land. should the attitude of the british government remain unchanged, i shall not, without an expression of the wish of congress that i should do so, take any action either in making or granting requisitions for the surrender of fugitive criminals under the treaty of 1842. respectfully submitted. u.s. grant. executive mansion, _july 8, 1876_. _to the senate of the united states_: i have the honor to transmit herewith a report[109] from general w.t. sherman [j.d. cameron, secretary of war], together with the most recent reports received from brigadier-general a.h. terry, as a response to the resolution of the senate of the 7th instant, a copy of which is attached to this message. u.s. grant. [footnote 109: relating to hostile demonstrations of the sioux indians and the disaster to the forces under general custer.] washington, _july 13, 1876_. _to the house of representatives_: i transmit herewith, in answer to a resolution of the house of representatives of the 1st ultimo, a report[110] from the secretary of state upon the subject. u.s. grant. [footnote 110: stating that no correspondence has taken place with great britain relative to the sequestration of the lands and property in new zealand claimed by william webster, an american citizen.] washington, _july 19, 1876_. _to the house of representatives_: i transmit a report from the secretary of state, in answer to the resolution of the house of representatives of the 1st of april last, on the subject of commercial intercourse with mexico and central america. u.s. grant. executive mansion, _july 31, 1876_. _to the house of representatives_: the act making appropriations for sundry civil expenses of the government for the fiscal year ending june 30, 1877, is so defective in what it omits to provide for that i can not announce its approval without at the same time pointing out what seems to me to be its defects. it makes but inadequate provision for the service at best, and in some instances fails to make any provision whatever. notably among the first class is the reduction in the ordinary annual appropriations for the revenue-cutter service, to the prejudice of the customs revenue. the same may be said of the signal service, as also the failure to provide for the increased expense devolved upon the mints and assay offices by recent legislation, and thus tending to defeat the objects of that legislation. of this class also are public buildings, for the protection, preservation, and completion of which there is no adequate appropriation, while the sum of $100,000 only is appropriated for the repairs of the different navy yards and stations and the preservation of the same, the ordinary and customary appropriations for which are not less than $1,000,000. a similar reduction is made in the expenses for armories and arsenals. the provision for the ordinary judicial expenses is much less than the estimated amount for that important service, the actual expenditures of the last fiscal year, and the certain demands of the current year. the provision for the expenses of the surveys of public lands is less than one-half of the usual appropriation for that service and what are understood to be its actual demands. reduction in the expenditures for light-houses, beacons, and fog stations is also made in similar proportion. of the class for which no appropriation is made, among the most noticeable, perhaps, is that portion of the general expenses of the district of columbia on behalf of the united states, as appropriated in former years, and the judgments of the court of claims. the failure to make a reasonable contribution to the expenses of the nation's capital is an apparent dereliction on the part of the united states and rank injustice to the people here who bear the burdens, while to refuse or neglect to provide for the payment of solemn judgments of its own courts is apparently to repudiate. of a different character, but as prejudicial to the treasury, is the omission to make provision to enable the secretary of the treasury to have the rebel archives and records of captured and abandoned property examined and information furnished therefrom for the use of the government. finally, without further specification of detail, it may be said that the act which in its title purports to make provision for a diverse and greatly extended civil service unhappily appropriates an amount not more than 65 per cent of its ordinary demands. the legislative department establishes and defines the service, and devolves upon the executive departments the obligation of submitting annually the needful estimates of expenses of such service. congress properly exacts implicit obedience to the requirements of the law in the administration of the public service and rigid accountability in the expenditures therefor. it is submitted that a corresponding responsibility and obligation rest upon it to make the adequate appropriations to render possible such administration and tolerable such exaction. anything short of an ample provision for a specified service is necessarily fraught with disaster to the public interests and is a positive injustice to those charged with its execution. to appropriate and to execute are corresponding obligations and duties, and the adequacy of the former is the necessary measure of the efficiency of the execution. in this eighth month of the present session of congress--nearly one month of the fiscal year to which this appropriation applies having passed--i do not feel warranted in vetoing an absolutely necessary appropriation bill; but in signing it i deem it a duty to show where the responsibility belongs for whatever embarrassments may arise in the execution of the trust confided to me. u.s. grant. executive mansion, _july 31, 1876_. _to the senate of the united states_: in response to the resolution of the senate of july 20, 1876, calling upon the president to communicate to the senate, if in his opinion not incompatible with the public interest, any information in regard to the slaughter of american citizens at hamburg, s.c., i have the honor to submit the following inclosures, to wit: no. 1. letter of the 22d of july, 1876, from governor d.h. chamberlain, of south carolina, to me. no. 2. my reply thereto. no. 3. report of hon. william stone, attorney-general of south carolina. no. 4. report of general h.w. purvis, adjutant and inspector general of south carolina. no. 5. copy of evidence taken before a coroner's jury investigating facts relating to the hamburg massacre. no. 6. printed copy of statement by m.c. butler, of south carolina. no. 7. printed letter from the same to the editors of the journal of commerce. no. 8. copy of letter from governor chamberlain to the hon. t.j. robertson. no. 9. an address to the american people by the colored citizens of charleston, s.c. no. 10. an address by a committee appointed at a convention of leading representatives of columbia, s.c. no. 11. copy of letter of july 15, 1876, from the district attorney of mississippi to the attorney-general of the united states. no. 12. letter from same to same. no. 13. copy of report of a grand jury lately in session in oxford, miss. these inclosures embrace all the information in my possession touching the late disgraceful and brutal slaughter of unoffending men at the town of hamburg, s.c. my letter to governor chamberlain contains all the comments i wish to make on the subject. as allusion is made in that letter to the condition of other states, and particularly to louisiana and mississippi, i have added to the inclosures letters and testimony in regard to the lawless condition of a portion of the people of the latter state. in regard to louisiana affairs, murders and massacres of innocent men for opinion's sake or on account of color have been of too recent date and of too frequent occurrence to require recapitulation or testimony here. all are familiar with their horrible details, the only wonder being that so many justify them or apologize for them. but recently a committee of the senate of the united states visited the state of mississippi to take testimony on the subject of frauds and violence in elections. their report has not yet been made public, but i await its forthcoming with a feeling of confidence that it will fully sustain all that i have stated relating to fraud and violence in the state of mississippi. u.s. grant. executive mansion, _august 11, 1876_. _to the senate and house of representatives_: i transmit herewith a telegram of the 5th of august instant from lieutenant-general sheridan to general sherman, a letter of the 11th of the present month from general sherman to the secretary of war, and a letter from the latter of the same date to me, all setting forth the possible needs of the army in consequence of existing hostilities. i would strongly urge upon congress the necessity for making some provision for a contingency which may arise during the vacation--for more troops in the indian country than it is now possible to send. it would seem to me to be much more economical and better to authorize an increase of the present cavalry force by 2,500 privates, but if this is not deemed advisable, then that the president be authorized to call out not exceeding five regiments, 1,000 strong each, of volunteers, to serve for a period not exceeding six months. should this latter authority be given, i would not order out any volunteers unless in my opinion, based upon reports from the scene of war, i deemed it absolutely necessary, and then only the smallest number considered sufficient to meet the emergency. u.s. grant. executive mansion, _august 14, 1876_. _to the house of representatives_: in affixing my signature to the river and harbor bill, no. 3822, i deem it my duty to announce to the house of representatives my objections to some features of the bill, and the reason i sign it. if it was obligatory upon the executive to expend all the money appropriated by congress, i should return the river and harbor bill with my objections, notwithstanding the great inconvenience to the public interests resulting therefrom and the loss of expenditures from previous congresses upon incompleted works. without enumerating, many appropriations are made for works of purely private or local interest, in no sense national. i can not give my sanction to these, and will take care that during my term of office no public money shall be expended upon them. there is very great necessity for economy of expenditures at this time, growing out of the loss of revenue likely to arise from a deficiency of appropriations to insure a thorough collection of the same. the reduction of revenue districts, diminution of special agents, and total abolition of supervisors may result in great falling off of the revenue. it may be a question to consider whether any expenditure can be authorized under the river and harbor appropriation further than to protect works already done and paid for. under no circumstances will i allow expenditures upon works not clearly national. u.s. grant. washington, _august 14, 1876_. _to the house of representatives_: in announcing, as i do, that i have attached my signature of official approval to the "act making appropriations for the consular and diplomatic service of the government for the year ending june 30, 1877, and for other purposes," it is my duty to call attention to a provision in the act directing that notice be sent to certain of the diplomatic and consular officers of the government "to close their offices." in the literal sense of this direction it would be an invasion of the constitutional prerogatives and duty of the executive. by the constitution the president "shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of the senate, to make treaties, provided two-thirds of the senators present concur; and he shall nominate, and, by and with the advice and consent of the senate, shall appoint, ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls," etc. it is within the power of congress to grant or withhold appropriation of money for the payment of salaries and expenses of the foreign representatives of the government. in the early days of the government a sum in gross was appropriated, leaving it to the executive to determine the grade of the officers and the countries to which they should be sent. latterly, for very many years, specific sums have been appropriated for designated missions or employments, and as a rule the omission by congress to make an appropriation for any specific port has heretofore been accepted as an indication of a wish on the part of congress which the executive branch of the government respected and complied with. in calling attention to the passage which i have indicated i assume that the intention of the provision is only to exercise the constitutional prerogative of congress over the expenditures of the government and to fix a time at which the compensation of certain diplomatic and consular officers shall cease, and not to invade the constitutional rights of the executive, which i should be compelled to resist; and my present object is not to discuss or dispute the wisdom of failing to appropriate for several offices, but to guard against the construction that might possibly be placed on the language used, as implying a right in the legislative branch to direct the closing or discontinuing of any of the diplomatic or consular offices of the government. u.s. grant. [for message of august 15, 1876, withdrawing objections to senate bill no. 779, see p. 388.] washington, _august 15, 1876_. _to the senate of the united states_: i transmit to the senate, in answer to its resolution of the 24th ultimo, a report from the secretary of state, with its accompanying statement.[111] u.s. grant. [footnote 111: aggregate number of civil officers in or connected with the department of state from 1859 to 1875, inclusive.] veto messages. executive mansion, _february 3, 1876_. _to the house of representatives_: i have the honor to return herewith without my approval house bill no. 1561, entitled "an act transferring the custody of certain indian trust funds from the secretary of the interior to the treasurer of the united states," for the reasons set forth in the accompanying communication from the secretary of the interior. u.s. grant. department of the interior, _washington, february 7, 1876_. the president. sir: i acknowledge the receipt of your communication of the 29th ultimo, transmitting house bill no. 1561 and requesting this department to report whether any objections to its becoming a law are known to exist. in reply i have the honor to state that i am fearful that the act is not sufficiently definite in terms to accomplish the end desired, namely, the mere transfer of the custody of said trust funds, enabling this department to receive the interest from the custodian and apply it as heretofore without the intervention of congress. the nature of the guardianship and control over the indians exercised by me as secretary and trustee is such as to require this department to keep an account of the funds to their credit or held in trust for them, and to receive the interest on their trust funds promptly when due. i am fearful that this bill may not allow me to do so, and to guard against any danger of embarrassment in the transaction of this business i inclose a draft of a bill[112] which, if substituted for the one already passed, will, it is believed, obviate the difficulties which may arise if the present bill should become a law. very respectfully, your obedient servant, z. chandler, _secretary_. [footnote 112: omitted.] executive mansion, _march 27, 1876_. _to the house of representatives_: i have the honor to return herewith without my approval the bill (h.r. no. 83) entitled "an act for the relief of james a. hile, of lewis county, mo.," for the reasons set forth in the accompanying communication of the secretary of war. u.s. grant. war department, _washington city, march 25, 1876_. the president. sir: i have the honor to return act h.r. 83, with the following report from the adjutant-general: "it appears from the records of this office that james a. hile, private company f, twenty-first missouri volunteers, enlisted july 15, 1861; deserted june 14, 1862; returned august 2, 1862; was restored to duty by special order no. 38, headquarters district of columbus, department of tennessee, dated columbus, ky., february 26, 1863. he reenlisted february 28, 1864, as a veteran volunteer; was tried by general court-martial for absence without leave from november 25, 1864, to december 13, 1864, and sentenced to forfeit all pay and allowances for time absent by general order no. 48, headquarters second division, sixteenth army corps, dated may 22, 1865. "on the muster-out roll of company dated april 19, 1866, he is reported, 'deserted march 1, 1866, at bladen springs, ala.' "this man, in his application to this office for discharge, stated under oath (affidavit dated july 27, 1870) that he left his command without leave and returned to his home february 28, 1866, having previously applied for a furlough, which was refused. "this man, according to his own statement under oath, did desert as reported, and if this bill becomes a law it will be an injustice to every soldier who served honorably with his command until his services were no longer required by the government, in addition to falsifying the record, as the bill directs the record shall be made to show he is _no deserter_. "this is only one of many similar cases." the remarks of the adjutant-general adverse to the passage of the bill are concurred in. very respectfully, your obedient servant, alphonso taft, _secretary of war_. executive mansion, _march 31, 1876_. _to the senate of the united states_: for the reasons set forth in the accompanying communication from the secretary of the treasury, i have the honor to return herewith without my approval senate bill no. 489, entitled "an act for the relief of g.b. tyler and e.h. luckett, assignees of william t. cheatham." u.s. grant. treasury department, _march 30, 1876_. the president: referring to the letter of the 25th instant, written by your direction, transmitting senate bill no. 489, "for the relief of g.b. tyler and b.h. luckett, assignees of william t. cheatham," and requesting my opinion as to the propriety of its approval by you, i have to say that there are no data on file in the department, so far as i can learn, which indicate that the amount it is proposed by this bill to refund to the assignees of mr. cheatham was wrongfully collected or that the amount should be refunded. the commissioner of internal revenue, in his report to me in reference to the matter, says: "the reimbursement to the united states by said cheatham of the salary paid to this storekeeper by the collector of internal revenue for the months of december, 1869, and january, 1870, was in accordance with the provisions of joint resolution of march 29, 1869 (16 u.s. statutes at large, p. 52), and there appears to be no reason for the refunding by the united states to the assignees of said cheatham the salary of this storekeeper that would not apply with equal force to similar payments by all other distillers who were operating their distilleries or had spirits in their warehouses at that time." the facts above stated are considered by this office valid and serious objections to the approval of this bill, and they would have been communicated to the congressional committee before the passage of the bill had they called the attention of this office to the subject. the bill is herewith returned. i have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant, b.h. bristow, _secretary_. executive mansion, _april 18, 1876_. _to the senate of the united states_: herewith i return senate bill no. 172, entitled "an act fixing the salary of the president of the united states," without my approval. i am constrained to this course from a sense of duty to my successors in office, to myself, and to what is due to the dignity of the position of chief magistrate of a nation of more than 40,000,000 people. when the salary of the president of the united states, pursuant to the constitution, was fixed at $25,000 per annum, we were a nation of but 3,000,000 people, poor from a long and exhaustive war, without commerce or manufactures, with but few wants and those cheaply supplied. the salary must then have been deemed small for the responsibilities and dignity of the position, but justifiably so from the impoverished condition of the treasury and the simplicity it was desired to cultivate in the republic. the salary of congressmen under the constitution was first fixed at $6 per day for the time actually in session--an average of about one hundred and twenty days to each session--or $720 per year, or less than one-thirtieth of the salary of the president. congress have legislated upon their own salaries from time to time since, until finally it reached $5,000 per annum, or one-fifth that of the president, before the salary of the latter was increased. no one having a knowledge of the cost of living at the national capital will contend that the present salary of congressmen is too high, unless it is the intention to make the office one entirely of honor, when the salary should be abolished--a proposition repugnant to our republican ideas and institutions. i do not believe the citizens of this republic desire their public servants to serve them without a fair compensation for their services. twenty-five thousand dollars does not defray the expenses of the executive for one year, or has not in my experience. it is not now one-fifth in value of what it was at the time of the adoption of the constitution in supplying demands and wants. having no personal interest in this matter, i have felt myself free to return this bill to the house in which it originated with my objections, believing that in doing so i meet the wishes and judgment of the great majority of those who indirectly pay all the salaries and other expenses of government. u.s. grant. executive mansion, _may 26, 1876_. _to the house of representatives_: i return herewith without my approval house bill no. 1922, entitled "an act providing for the recording of deeds, mortgages, and other conveyances affecting real estate in the district of columbia." the objection to affixing my signature to this bill may be found in the communication addressed to me by the attorney-general, and which accompanies this message. u.s. grant. department of justice, _washington, may 23, 1876_. the president. sir: in reply to your note of the 19th instant, in which you request me to report whether there are objections to your approval of "an act providing for the recording of deeds, mortgages, and other conveyances affecting real estate in the district of columbia," being house bill no. 1922, i have the honor to state that the bill seems to me objectionable because of indefiniteness and uncertainty as to the time which it purports to fix when deeds of trust, mortgages, etc., shall take effect and be valid as to creditors and subsequent purchasers for valuable consideration without notice. although there is no constitutional objection to the act, yet for the reason above stated i hesitate to advise its approval. very respectfully, your obedient servant, edwards pierrepont, _attorney-general_. executive mansion, _june 9, 1876_. _to the senate of the united states_: i return herewith without my approval senate bill no. 165, entitled "an act for the relief of michael w. brock, of meigs county, tenn., late a private in company d, tenth tennessee volunteers." the objection to affixing my signature to this bill may be found in the indorsement (which accompanies this message) by the adjutant-general of the army. u.s. grant. war department, adjutant-general's office, _washington, june 8, 1876_. respectfully returned to the secretary of war. the records of this office show that michael w. brock, company d, tenth tennessee volunteers, deserted november 24, 1864, due united states for horse and horse equipments, carbine, saber, and pistol, all complete. he presented satisfactory evidence of his having left the service by proper authority, and the charge of desertion has been removed and the soldier furnished an honorable discharge. no evidence has been presented to this office to establish that he was erroneously charged with government property. if satisfactory evidence is furnished showing conclusively that this soldier was erroneously charged with government property, taken at time of his reported desertion, the charge will be removed, and in that case the inclosed act for his relief will be unnecessary. ed townsend, _adjutant-general_. executive mansion, _june 30, 1876_. _to the senate of the united states_: i return herewith without my approval senate bill no. 692, entitled "an act to amend chapter 166 of the laws of the second session of the forty-third congress." the objections to affixing my signature to this bill may be found in the report, which accompanies this message, of the chief of engineers of the army to the secretary of war. u.s. grant. war department, _washington city, june 28, 1876_. the president: sir: i have the honor to return herewith senate bill no. 692, "to amend chapter 166 of the laws of the second session of the forty-third congress," and beg to invite your attention to the report of the chief of engineers dated the 27th instant, copy inclosed, and for the reasons stated in said report it is believed the bill should not become a law. very respectfully, your obedient servant, j.d. cameron, _secretary of war_. office of the chief of engineers, _june 27, 1876_. respectfully returned to the honorable the secretary of war. "an act to aid in the improvement of the fox and wisconsin rivers, in the state of wisconsin," approved march 3, 1875, contains the following clause: "in case any lands or other property is now or shall be flowed or injured by means of any part of the works of said improvement heretofore or hereafter constructed, for which compensation is now or shall become legally owing, and in the opinion of the officer in charge it is not prudent that the dam or dams be lowered, the amount of such compensation may be ascertained in like manner," etc. the dams referred to in the above clause are at the outlets of lake winnebago, known as the neenah or menasha channels of the lower fox river. the officer of the department of justice appointed under the provisions of the act referred to to represent the interests of the united states in legal proceedings "for flowage damages hereinbefore described," acting apparently under the assumption that because the dams in question had not been lowered it was the opinion of the officer in charge that they should not be lowered, has had such surveys, investigations, etc., made as were deemed necessary by him to protect the interests of the united states, and under this action it is understood that, at the instance of claimants, judges of the circuit court have appointed commissioners to decide on the amount of compensation due, and the judges have fixed the rate of compensation the commissioners are to receive. these commissioners are not appointed at the instance of the united states. in this way the awards for damages have already been made to the amount of $70,000, and ultimately a much larger sum will be claimed to be due from the united states. the officer of engineers in charge of the improvement of the fox and wisconsin rivers reports that the dams which have occasioned the flowage were not constructed by the canal companies, and are not at all necessary for the purposes of navigation, and so far as that is concerned could not only be lowered, but entirely dispensed with. they were built by private parties solely for their own use and profit and for water-power purposes, and have raised the water level and caused the flowage, for which they should be held liable. in view of the preceding facts, and for the additional reason that the subject of the liability of the united states is now being investigated by the department of justice, it is respectfully suggested that the inclosed act to amend chapter 166 of the laws of the second session of the forty-third congress (s. 692) should not become a law. a.a. humphreys, _brigadier-general and chief of engineers_. executive mansion, _july 11, 1876_. _to the house of representatives_: for the reasons set forth in the accompanying report of the secretary of war, i have the honor to return herewith without my approval house bill no. 1337, entitled "an act for the relief of nelson tiffany." u.s. grant. war department, _june 7, 1876_. the president. sir: i have the honor to return house bill no. 1337, "for the relief of nelson tiffany." the adjutant-general, to whom the bill was referred, reports as follows: "nelson tiffany, private, company a, twenty-fifth massachusetts volunteers, deserted october 10, 1864, and remained absent until april 25, 1865, when he surrendered under the president's proclamation, thereby acknowledging his desertion. "if this bill becomes a law, it will not only falsify the records of this department, but will be an injustice to every man who served honorably during the war of the rebellion." * * * * * very respectfully, your obedient servant, j.d. cameron, _secretary of war_. executive mansion, _july 13, 1876_. _to the house of representatives_: for the reasons stated in the accompanying report by the commissioner of pensions to the secretary of the interior, i have the honor to return without my approval house bill no. 11, entitled "an act granting a pension to eliza jane blumer." u.s. grant. department of the interior, _washington july 8, 1876_. the president. sir: i have the honor to return herewith a bill (h.r. 11) entitled "an act granting a pension to eliza jane blumer," and to invite your attention to the inclosed copy of a communication addressed to me on the 7th instant by the commissioner of pensions, relating to said bill. in the opinion of this department the misdescription of the soldier in the bill is of such a character as would render it difficult, if not impossible, to carry the provisions of the bill into effect should it become a law. i have the honor to be, with great respect, your obedient servant, chas. t. gorham, _acting secretary_. department of the interior, _washington, d.c., july 7, 1876_. the honorable secretary of the interior. sir: i have the honor to return herewith engrossed house bill no. 11, giving to eliza jane blumer a pension as a widow of henry a. blumer, private of company a, forty-seventh pennsylvania volunteers, with the suggestion that if the bill is intended to pension eliza blumer, whose application, no. 46382, on file in this office, has been rejected, it should designate the soldier as of company b of said regiment, it failing to appear from the records of the war department that he served in any other company than that last named. i am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant, j.a. bentley, _commissioner_. executive mansion, _july 20, 1876_. _to the house of representatives_: i have the honor to return herewith without my approval house bill no. 2684, entitled "an act to amend sections 3946, 3951, and 3954 of the revised statutes." it is the judgment of the postmaster-general, whose report accompanies this message, that if this bill should become a law in its present form it would fail to give effect to its provisions. the remedial suggestions in his report are respectfully recommended to your attention, u.s. grant. post-office department, _washington, d.c., july 19, 1876_. the president of the united states, _washington, d.c._ sir: i have the honor to return herewith house bill no. 2684, "to amend sections 3946, 3951, and 3954 of the revised statutes," with the following objections thereto: the sections of the revised statutes which this bill proposes to amend were substantially repealed by the twelfth section of the act entitled "an act making appropriations for the service of the post-office department for the fiscal year ending june 30, 1875, and for other purposes," approved june 23, 1874. the sections of the revised statutes numbered as indicated in the bill were enacted as sections 246 and 251 of the "act to revise, consolidate, and amend the statutes relating to the post-office department," approved june 8, 1872. these sections were subsequently embodied in the revision of the statutes. if the accompanying bill should become a law in its present form, it would, in my judgment, fail to give effect to its provisions. the bill is a very important one for the service of the post-office department. efforts have been made for four or five years past to induce congress to pass just such a law. to break up the vicious system of straw bidding, this bill would be very valuable, and i regret exceedingly that a mistake should have been made in the title and enacting clause which will render its provisions inoperative. i therefore suggest that the attention of the house in which it originated shall be called to the defects in the bill explained above; and to enable that body to understand very fully what, in my judgment, would be required to perfect it, i would suggest that the title should read "a bill to amend subsections 246 and 251 of section 12 of an act entitled 'an act making appropriations for the service of the post-office department for the fiscal year ending june 30, 1875, and for other purposes,' approved june 23, 1874, and also to amend section 3954 of the revised statutes," and that the enacting clause of the bill should be changed in conformity therewith. i have the honor to be, with great respect, your obedient servant, jas. n. tyner, _postmaster-general_. executive mansion, _august 14, 1876_. _to the house of representatives_: for the reason stated in the accompanying communication, submitted to me by the secretary of war, i have the honor to return herewith without my approval house bill no. 36, entitled "an act to restore the name of captain edward s. meyer to the active list of the army." u.s. grant. war department, _washington, d.c., august 4, 1876_. the president. sir: i have the honor to return house bill no. 36, "to restore the name of captain edward s. meyer to the active list of the army," and beg to invite your attention to the inclosed report of the adjutant-general of this date, stating objections to the approval of the bill. very respectfully, your obedient servant, j.d. cameron, _secretary of war_. adjutant-general's office, _august 4, 1876_. respectfully returned to the secretary of war. edward s. meyer served as a private in the fourth ohio volunteers (three months) from may 4, 1861, to august 18, 1861. he again enlisted as private, nineteenth ohio volunteers, september 10, 1861; was promoted first lieutenant november 1, 1861, and resigned september 27, 1862. he was commissioned captain, one hundred and seventh ohio volunteers, november 11, 1862; was wounded at chancellorsville, va., may 2, 1863, and discharged for physical disability january 1, 1865. he was again mustered into service february 8, 1865, as major, fifth united states veteran volunteers (hancock's corps), and mustered out march 20, 1866. was brevetted lieutenant-colonel, colonel, and brigadier-general of volunteers march 13, 1865. he was appointed captain, thirty-fifth united states infantry, july 28, 1866; became unassigned august 12, 1869; assigned to nineteenth infantry august 5, 1870, and transferred to ninth cavalry january 1, 1871. retired august 24, 1872. july 8, 1869, captain meyer applied for retirement on account of wounds received at chancellorsville may 2, 1863, by which he was incapacitated for active service. no action was then had on the request, pending action by congress reducing the army. october 6, 1869, he asked to be placed on waiting orders, being unfit for duty, and no possibility of improvement without going north. he was accordingly relieved from duty and ordered home to await orders. december 18, 1869, he called on the secretary of war and asked to be assigned to duty. january 4, 1870, he again applied to be assigned to duty with some regiment on the frontier, stating that his wound had healed, etc., and asking to withdraw his previous request for retirement. this was accompanied by a similar request from his father, mr. s. meyer, of ohio. july 29, 1870, he applied the third time to withdraw application for retirement and to be assigned to duty. on january 1, 1871, in accordance with his repeated requests to be assigned to duty, he was assigned to the ninth cavalry, serving in texas. he joined the regiment, and on march 4, 1872, he renewed his former request to be ordered before a retiring board, stating that he found his injuries would not allow him to remain on duty on the frontier; that his disability was constantly increasing, etc. the medical director of the department approved the request, and added that captain meyer's wounds certainly unfitted him for service on the frontier. april 13, 1872, senator sherman joined in requesting retirement of captain meyer. he was ordered before the retiring board and on august 20, 1872, was examined. the board found captain meyer "incapacitated for active service, and that said incapacity results from a gunshot wound received in his lower jaw at the battle of chancellorsville, va., may 2, 1863," when captain in one hundred and seventh ohio volunteers. he was retired in accordance with the finding. march 21 and december 6, 1873, captain meyer asked restoration to active service and reappointment as a captain of cavalry, which application was disapproved by the general of the army. pending the action on the bill before congress no reports were called for as to the official facts of record in the war department, and no evidence has been filed in this office showing that he has sufficiently recovered. the absence of such evidence and the fact that after one assignment to active duty he has failed to be sufficiently recovered are submitted as objections why the bill should not be approved. e.d. townsend, _adjutant-general_. executive mansion, _august 15, 1876_. _to the house of representatives_: i herewith return house bill no. 4085 without my approval. the repeal of the clause in the original bill for paving pennsylvania avenue fixing the time for the completion of the work by december 1, 1876, is objectionable in this, that it fixes no date when the work is to be completed. experience shows that where contractors have unlimited time to complete any given work they consult their own convenience, and not the public good. should congress deem it proper to amend the present bill in such manner as to fix the date for the completion of the work to be done by any date between december 1 and the close of my official term, it will receive my approval. u.s. grant. executive mansion, _august 15, 1876_. _to the senate of the united states_: for the reasons stated in the accompanying communication, submitted to me by the acting secretary of the interior, i have the honor to return herewith without my approval senate bill no. 779, entitled "an act to provide for the sale of a portion of the reservation of the confederated otoe and missouria and the sacs and foxes of the missouri tribes of indians, in the states of kansas and nebraska." u.s. grant. department of the interior, _washington, d.c., august 14, 1876_. the president. sir: i have the honor to return herewith the bill (s. no. 779) entitled "an act to provide for the sale of a portion of the reservation of the confederated otoe and missouria and the sacs and foxes of the missouri tribes of indians, in the states of kansas and nebraska," and to invite your attention to the inclosed copy of a letter this day addressed to me by the commissioner of indian affairs, stating that the bill, in his opinion, should not become a law. i fully concur in the opinion expressed by the commissioner, and for the reasons stated in his letter do not feel at liberty to recommend your approval of the bill. i have the honor to be, with great respect, your obedient servant, chas. t. gorham, _acting secretary_. department of the interior, office of indian affairs, _washington, d.c., august 14, 1876_. the honorable secretary of the interior. sir: i have the honor to return herewith, in accordance with your verbal request, a bill entitled "an act to provide for the sale of a portion of the reservation of the confederated otoe and missouria and the sacs and foxes of the missouri tribes of indians, in the states of kansas and nebraska," with my views thereon, the same having passed both houses of congress and now awaits the approval of the president. your attention is respectfully invited to the act of june 10, 1872 (17 u.s. statutes at large, p. 391), which provides for the sale of these reservations, or a portion of them. the whole of both these reservations has been surveyed, a portion in accordance with this act of congress and the remainder with a view to the allotment of lands to the indians. the second section of the bill provides for the appraisement of the whole reservation, while the third section authorizes the sale of a portion not exceeding 120,000 acres, a portion of which is in kansas. the bill authorizes the sale of that portion lying in kansas through the land office located at beatrice, nebr. no provision is made for the relief of such indians, if any there be, who may have settled upon the portion authorized to be sold, and who may have made improvements thereon. moreover, in fulfillment of treaty obligations, the assent of the indians to the operations of the whole bill, and not simply to the first section, should be required, as in the case of the menominees (16 u.s. statutes at large, p. 410). in my opinion, this bill should not receive the approval of the president. i have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant, j.q. smith, _commissioner_. [the senate proceeded, as the constitution prescribes, to reconsider the said bill returned by the president of the united states with his objections, and pending the question, shall the bill pass, the objections of the president of the united states to the contrary notwithstanding? the following message was received:] executive mansion, _august 15, 1876_, _to the senate of the united states_: upon further investigation i am convinced that my message of this date, withholding my signature from senate bill no. 779, entitled "an act to provide for the sale of a portion of the reservation of the confederated otoe and missouria and the sacs and foxes of the missouri tribes of indians, in the states of kansas and nebraska," was premature, and i request, therefore, that the bill may be returned, in order that i may affix my signature to it. u.s. grant. [a motion to refer the last message to the committee on privileges and elections was, after debate, determined in the negative; and the question recurring, shall the bill pass, the objections of the president of the united states to the contrary notwithstanding? it was determined in the affirmative--yeas 36, nays 0.] executive mansion, _august 15, 1876_. _to the senate of the united states_: for the reasons presented in the accompanying communications, submitted by the secretary of war, i have the honor to return herewith without my approval senate bill no. 561, entitled "an act for the relief of major junius t. turner." u.s. grant. war department, _washington city, august 14, 1876_. the president. sir: i have the honor to return senate bill 561, "for the relief of major junius t. turner," with copy of the report of the adjutant-general of this date, stating objections to the approval of the bill. very respectfully, your obedient servant, j.d. cameron, _secretary of war_. war department, adjutant-general's office, _august 14, 1876_. respectfully returned to the secretary of war. the following objections exist to this bill becoming a law: the bill as passed both houses awards "such sum as shall equal the travel pay of a captain of volunteers from washington, d.c., to san francisco, cal.," whereas at the date of the discharge of junius t. turner he was a private of company b, california battalion, second massachusetts cavalry, and not a commissioned officer. aside from this, under the established regulations and rulings of the treasury and war departments, "a soldier, on receiving and accepting a commission as a company officer, is not entitled to traveling allowances." a departure from this rule, heretofore adhered to, would open up a very wide field for similar claims. private junius t. turner, second massachusetts cavalry, was discharged by way of favor march 28, 1864, to accept promotion as second lieutenant, third maryland cavalry, and was mustered as of that grade in said regiment march 29, 1864. he was honorably discharged september 7, 1865, as captain, third maryland cavalry, as set forth in the inclosed official copy of a letter[113] from this office, dated june 7, 1876, to hon. c.d. macdougall, m.c., of committee on military affairs, house of representatives. e.d. townsend, _adjutant-general_. [footnote 113: omitted.] [the senate proceeded, as the constitution prescribes, to reconsider the said bill returned by the president of the united states with his objections, and pending the question, shall the bill pass, the objections of the president of the united states to the contrary notwithstanding? it was ordered that the message be referred to the committee on military affairs. at the next (second) session of the forty-fourth congress the following message was received:] executive mansion, _january 12, 1877_. _to the senate of the united states_: on the eve of the adjournment of the last session of congress i returned to the senate bill no. 561, entitled "an act for the relief of major junius t. turner," with my objections to its becoming a law. i now desire to withdraw those objections, as i am satisfied they were made under a misapprehension of the facts. u.s. grant. [this message was also referred to the committee on military affairs, which committee, on february 13, 1877, reported to the senate a recommendation that the bill do pass, the objections of the president of the united states to the contrary notwithstanding. no action was taken.] proclamations. by the president of the united states of america. a proclamation. whereas by the first section of an act entitled "an act to authorize the president to accept for citizens of the united states the jurisdiction of certain tribunals in the ottoman dominions and egypt, established or to be established under the authority of the sublime porte and of the government of egypt," approved march 23, 1874, it was enacted as follows: that whenever the president of the united states shall receive satisfactory information that the ottoman government or that of egypt has organized other tribunals on a basis likely to secure to citizens of the united states in their domains the same impartial justice which they now enjoy there under the judicial functions exercised by the minister, consuls, and other functionaries of the united states pursuant to the act of congress approved the 22d of june, 1860, entitled "an act to carry into effect provisions of the treaties between the united states, china, persia, and other countries giving certain judicial powers to ministers and consuls or other functionaries of the united states in those countries, and for other purposes," he is hereby authorized to suspend the operations of said acts as to the dominions in which such tribunals may be organized so far as the jurisdiction of said tribunals may embrace matters now cognizable by the minister, consuls, or other functionaries of the united states in said dominions, and to notify the government of the sublime porte, or that of egypt, or either of them, that the united states during such suspension will, as aforesaid, accept for their citizens the jurisdiction of the tribunals aforesaid over citizens of the united states which has heretofore been exercised by the minister, consuls, or other functionaries of the united states. and whereas satisfactory information has been received by me that the government of egypt has organized other tribunals on a basis likely to secure to citizens of the united states in the dominions subject to such government the impartial justice which they now enjoy there under the judicial functions exercised by the minister, consul, or other functionaries of the united states pursuant to the said act of congress approved june 22, 1860: now, therefore, i, ulysses s. grant, president of the united states of america, by virtue of the power and authority conferred upon me by the said act approved march 23, 1874, do hereby suspend during the pleasure of the president the operation of the said act approved june 22, 1860, as to the said dominions subject to the government of egypt in which such tribunals have been organized, so far as the jurisdiction of said tribunals may embrace matters now cognizable by the minister, consuls, or other functionaries of the united states in said dominions, except as to cases actually commenced before the date hereof. in witness whereof i have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the united states to be affixed. [seal.] done at the city of washington, this 27th day of march, a.d. 1876, and of the independence of the united states of america the one hundredth. u.s. grant. by the president: hamilton fish, _secretary of state_. by the president of the united states. a proclamation. whereas a joint resolution of the senate and house of representatives of the united states was duly approved on the 13th day of march last, which resolution is as follows: _be it resolved by the senate and house of representatives of the united states of america in congress assembled_, that it be, and is hereby, recommended by the senate and house of representatives to the people of the several states that they assemble in their several counties or towns on the approaching centennial anniversary of our national independence, and that they cause to have delivered on such day an historical sketch of said county or town from its formation, and that a copy of said sketch may be filed, in print or manuscript, in the clerk's office of said county, and an additional copy, in print or manuscript, be filed in the office of the librarian of congress, to the intent that a complete record may thus be obtained of the progress of our institutions during the first centennial of their existence. and whereas it is deemed proper that such recommendation be brought to the notice and knowledge of the people of the united states: now, therefore, i, ulysses s. grant, president of the united states, do hereby declare and make known the same, in the hope that the object of such resolution may meet the approval of the people of the united states and that proper steps may be taken to carry the same into effect. [seal.] given under my hand, at the city of washington, the 25th day of may, a.d. 1876, and of the independence of the united states the one hundredth. u.s. grant. by the president: hamilton fish, _secretary of state_. by the president of the united states of america. a proclamation. the centennial anniversary of the day on which the people of the united states declared their right to a separate and equal station among the powers of the earth seems to demand an exceptional observance. the founders of the government, at its birth and in its feebleness, invoked the blessings and the protection of a divine providence, and the thirteen colonies and three millions of people have expanded into a nation of strength and numbers commanding the position which then was asserted and for which fervent prayers were then offered. it seems fitting that on the occurrence of the hundredth anniversary of our existence as a nation a grateful acknowledgment should be made to almighty god for the protection and the bounties which he has vouchsafed to our beloved country. i therefore invite the good people of the united states, on the approaching 4th day of july, in addition to the usual observances with which they are accustomed to greet the return of the day, further, in such manner and at such time as in their respective localities and religious associations may be most convenient, to mark its recurrence by some public religious and devout thanksgiving to almighty god for the blessings which have been bestowed upon us as a nation during the century of our existence, and humbly to invoke a continuance of his favor and of his protection. in witness whereof i have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the united states to be affixed. [seal.] done at the city of washington, this 26th day of june, a.d. 1876, and of the independence of the united states of america the one hundredth. u.s. grant. by the president: hamilton fish, _secretary of state_. by the president of the united states of america. a proclamation. whereas the congress of the united states did, by an act approved on the 3d day of march, 1875, authorize the inhabitants of the territory of colorado to form for themselves out of said territory a state government with the name of the state of colorado, and for the admission of such state into the union on an equal footing with the original states upon certain conditions in said act specified; and whereas it was provided by said act of congress that the convention elected by the people of said territory to frame a state constitution should, when assembled for that purpose and after organization, declare on behalf of the people that they adopt the constitution of the united states, and should also provide by an ordinance, irrevocable without the consent of the united states and the people of said state, that perfect toleration of religious sentiment shall be secured and that no inhabitant of said state shall ever be molested in person or property on account of his or her mode of religious worship, and that the people inhabiting said territory do agree and declare that they forever disclaim all right and title to the unappropriated public lands lying within said territory and that the same shall be and remain at the sole and entire disposition of the united states, and that the lands belonging to citizens of the united states residing without the said state shall never be taxed higher than the lands belonging to residents thereof, and that no taxes shall be imposed by the state on lands or property therein belonging to or which may hereafter be purchased by the united states; and whereas it was further provided by said act that the constitution thus formed for the people of the territory of colorado should, by an ordinance of the convention forming the same, be submitted to the people of said territory for ratification or rejection at an election to be held in the month of july, 1876, at which election the lawful voters of said new state should vote directly for or against the proposed constitution, and the returns of said election should be made to the acting governor of the territory, who, with the chief justice and united states attorney of said territory, or any two of them, should canvass the same, and, if a majority of legal votes should be cast for said constitution in said proposed state the said acting governor should certify the same to the president of the united states, together with a copy of said constitution and ordinances, whereupon it should be the duty of the president of the united states to issue his proclamation declaring the state admitted into the union on an equal footing with the original states, without any further action whatever on the part of congress; and whereas it has been certified to me by the acting governor of said territory of colorado that within the time prescribed by said act of congress a constitution for said proposed state has been adopted and the same ratified by a majority of the legal voters of said proposed new state, in accordance with the conditions prescribed by said act of congress; and whereas a duly authenticated copy of said constitution and of the declaration and ordinance required by said act has been received by me: now, therefore, i, ulysses s. grant, president of the united states of america, do, in accordance with the provisions of the act of congress aforesaid, declare and proclaim the fact that the fundamental conditions imposed by congress on the state of colorado to entitle that state to admission to the union have been ratified and accepted, and that the admission of the said state into the union is now complete. in testimony whereof i have hereunto set my hand and have caused the seal of the united states to be affixed. [seal.] done at the city of washington, this 1st day of august, a.d. 1876, and of the independence of the united states of america the one hundred and first. u.s. grant. by the president: hamilton fish, _secretary of state_. by the president of the united states of america. a proclamation. whereas by article v of a convention concluded at washington upon the 30th day of january, 1875, between the united states of america and his majesty the king of the hawaiian islands it was provided as follows, viz: the present convention shall take effect as soon as it shall have been approved and proclaimed by his majesty the king of the hawaiian islands and shall have been ratified and duly proclaimed on the part of the government of the united states, but not until a law to carry it into operation shall have been passed by the congress of the united states of america. such assent having been given and the ratifications of the convention having been exchanged as provided in article vi, the convention shall remain in force for seven years from the date at which it may come into operation, and, further, until the expiration of twelve months after either of the high contracting parties shall give notice to the other of its wish to terminate the same, each of the high contracting parties being at liberty to give such notice to the other at the end of the said term of seven years or at any time thereafter. and whereas such convention has been approved and proclaimed by his majesty the king of the hawaiian islands and has been ratified and duly proclaimed on the part of the united states, and a law to carry the same into operation has been passed by the congress of the united states, and the ratifications of the convention have been exchanged as provided in article vi thereof; and whereas the acting secretary of state of the united states and his majesty's envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary at washington have recorded in a protocol a conference held by them at washington on the 9th day of september, 1876, in the following language: whereas it is provided by article v of the convention between the united states of america and his majesty the king of the hawaiian islands concerning commercial reciprocity, signed at washington on the 30th day of january, 1875, as follows: "art. v. the present convention shall take effect as soon as it shall have been approved and proclaimed by his majesty the king of the hawaiian islands and shall have been ratified and duly proclaimed on the part of the government of the united states, but not until the law to carry it into operation shall have been passed by the congress of the united states of america. such assent having been given and the ratifications of the convention having been exchanged as provided in article vi, the convention shall remain in force for seven years from the date at which it may come into operation, and, further, until the expiration of twelve months after either of the high contracting parties shall give notice to the other of its wish to terminate the same, each of the high contracting parties being at liberty to give such notice to the other at the end of the said term of seven years or at any time thereafter;" and whereas the said convention has been approved and proclaimed by his majesty the king of the hawaiian islands, and has been ratified and duly proclaimed on the part of the government of the united states; and whereas an act was passed by the senate and house of representatives of the united states of america in congress assembled, entitled "an act to carry into effect a convention between the united states of america and his majesty the king of the hawaiian islands signed on the 30th day of january, 1875," which was approved on the 15th day of august, in the year 1876; and whereas an act was passed by the legislative assembly of the hawaiian islands entitled "an act to carry into effect a convention between his majesty the king and the united states of america signed at washington on the 30th day of january; 1875," which was duly approved on the 18th day of july, in the year 1876; and whereas the ratifications of the said convention have been exchanged as provided in article vi: the undersigned, william hunter, acting secretary of state of the united states of america, and the hon. elisha h. allen, chief justice of the supreme court, chancellor of the kingdom, member of the privy council of state, and his majesty's envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to the united states of america, duly authorized for this purpose by their respective governments, have met together at washington, and, having found the said convention has been approved and proclaimed by his majesty the king of the hawaiian islands and has been ratified and duly proclaimed on the part of the government of the united states, and that the laws required to carry the said treaty into operation have been passed by the congress of the united states of america on the one part and by the legislative assembly of the hawaiian islands on the other, hereby declare that the convention aforesaid, concluded between the united states of america and his majesty the king of the hawaiian islands on the 30th day of january, 1875, will take effect on the date hereof. now, therefore, i, ulysses s. grant, president of the united states of america, in pursuance of the premises, do declare that the said convention has been approved and proclaimed by his majesty the king of the hawaiian islands and been ratified and duly proclaimed on the part of the government of the united states, and that the necessary legislation has been passed to carry the same into effect, and that the ratifications of the convention have been exchanged as provided in article vi. in testimony whereof i have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the united states to be affixed. [seal.] done in the city of washington, this 9th day of september, a.d. 1876, and of the independence of the united states of america the one hundred and first. u.s. grant. by the president: w. hunter, _acting secretary of state_. by the president of the united states of america. a proclamation. whereas it has been satisfactorily shown to me that insurrection and domestic violence exist in several counties of the state of south carolina, and that certain combinations of men against law exist in many counties of said state known as "rifle clubs," who ride up and down by day and night in arms, murdering some peaceable citizens and intimidating others, which combinations, though forbidden by the laws of the state, can not be controlled or suppressed by the ordinary course of justice; and whereas it is provided in the constitution of the united states that the united states shall protect every state in this union, on application of the legislature, or of the executive (when the legislature can not be convened), against domestic violence; and whereas by laws in pursuance of the above it is provided (in the laws of the united states) that in all cases of insurrection in any state or of obstruction to the laws thereof it shall be lawful for the president of the united states, on application of the legislature of such state, or of the executive (when the legislature can not be convened), to call forth the militia of any other state or states, or to employ such part of the land and naval forces as shall be judged necessary, for the purpose of suppressing such insurrection or causing the laws to be duly executed; and whereas the legislature of said state is not now in session and can not be convened in time to meet the present emergency and the executive of said state, under section 4 of article iv of the constitution of the united states and the laws passed in pursuance thereof, has therefore made due application to me in the premises for such part of the military force of the united states as may be necessary and adequate to protect said state and the citizens thereof against domestic violence and to enforce the due execution of the laws; and whereas it is required that whenever it may be necessary, in the judgment of the president, to use the military force for the purpose aforesaid, he shall forthwith, by proclamation, command such insurgents to disperse and retire peaceably to their respective homes within a limited time: now, therefore, i, ulysses s. grant, president of the united states, do hereby make proclamation and command all persons engaged in said unlawful and insurrectionary proceedings to disperse and retire peaceably to their respective abodes within three days from this date, and hereafter abandon said combinations and submit themselves to the laws and constituted authorities of said state. and i invoke the aid and cooperation of all good citizens thereof to uphold the laws and preserve the public peace. in witness whereof i have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the united states to be affixed. [seal.] done at the city of washington, this 17th day of october, a.d. 1876, and of the independence of the united states one hundred and one. u.s. grant. by the president: john l. cadwalader, _acting secretary of state_. by the president of the united states of america. a proclamation. from year to year we have been accustomed to pause in our daily pursuits and set apart a time to offer our thanks to almighty god for the special blessings he has vouchsafed to us, with our prayers for a continuance thereof. we have at this time equal reason to be thankful for his continued protection and for the many material blessings which his bounty has bestowed. in addition to these favors accorded to us as individuals, we have especial occasion to express our hearty thanks to almighty god that by his providence and guidance our government, established a century ago, has been enabled to fulfill the purpose of its founders in offering an asylum to the people of every race, securing civil and religious liberty to all within its borders, and meting out to every individual alike justice and equality before the law. it is, moreover, especially our duty to offer our humble prayers to the father of all mercies for a continuance of his divine favor to us as a nation and as individuals. by reason of all these considerations, i, ulysses s. grant, president of the united states, do recommend to the people of the united states to devote the 30th day of november next to the expression of their thanks and prayers to almighty god, and, laying aside their daily avocations and all secular occupations, to assemble in their respective places of worship and observe such day as a day of thanksgiving and rest. in witness whereof i have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the united states to be affixed. [seal.] done at the city of washington, this 26th day of october, a.d. 1876, and of the independence of the united states of america the one hundred and first. u.s. grant. by the president: hamilton fish, _secretary of state_. executive orders. executive mansion, _washington, may 20, 1876_. sir:[114] the president directs me to say that the several departments of the government will be closed on tuesday, the 30th instant, to enable the employees to participate in the decoration of the graves of the soldiers who fell during the rebellion. i am, sir, your obedient servant, c.c. sniffen, _secretary_. [footnote 114: addressed to the heads of the executive departments, etc.] war department, _washington city, august 10, 1876_. by direction of the president, general w.t. sherman and brigadier-general m.c. meigs, quartermaster-general united states army, are appointed members of the commission to examine "the whole subject of reform and reorganization of the army of the united states," as provided by section 4, act approved july 24, 1876, "making appropriations for the support of the army for the fiscal year ending june 30, 1877, and for other purposes." j.d. cameron, _secretary of war_. washington, _august 21, 1876_. it is with extreme pain that the president announces to the people of the united states the death of the speaker of the house of representatives, the hon. michael c. kerr, of indiana. a man of great intellectual endowments, large culture, great probity and earnestness in his devotion to the public interests, has passed from the position, power, and usefulness to which he had been recently called. the body over which he had been selected to preside not being in session to render its tribute of affection and respect to the memory of the deceased, the president invites the people of the united states to a solemn recognition of the public and private worth and the services of a pure and eminent character. u.s. grant. by the president: john l. cadwalader, _acting secretary of state_. executive mansion, _november 23, 1876_. a joint resolution adopted by congress august 5, 1876, declares that- whereas it is ascertained that the hostile indians of the northwest are largely equipped with arms which require special metallic cartridges, and that such special ammunition is in large part supplied to such hostile indians, directly or indirectly, through traders and others in the indian country: therefore, _resolved by the senate and house of representatives of the united states of america in congress assembled_, that the president of the united states is hereby authorized and requested to take such measures as in his judgment may be necessary to prevent such special metallic ammunition being conveyed to such hostile indians, and is further authorized to declare the same contraband of war in such district of country as he may designate during the continuance of hostilities. to carry into effect the above-cited resolution, the sale of fixed ammunition or metallic cartridges by any trader or other person in any district of the indian country occupied by hostile indians, or over which they roam, is hereby prohibited; and all such ammunition or cartridges introduced into said country by traders or other persons, and that are liable in any way or manner, directly or indirectly, to be received by such hostile indians, shall be deemed contraband of war, seized by any military officer and confiscated; and the district of country to which this prohibition shall apply during the continuance of hostilities is hereby designated as that which embraces all indian country, or country occupied by indians or subject to their visits, lying within the territories of montana, dakota, and wyoming and the states of nebraska and colorado. u.s. grant. eighth annual message. executive mansion, _december 5, 1876_. _to the senate and house of representatives_: in submitting my eighth and last annual message to congress it seems proper that i should refer to and in some degree recapitulate the events and official acts of the past eight years. it was my fortune, or misfortune, to be called to the office of chief executive without any previous political training. from the age of 17 i had never even witnessed the excitement attending a presidential campaign but twice antecedent to my own candidacy, and at but one of them was i eligible as a voter. under such circumstances it is but reasonable to suppose that errors of judgment must have occurred. even had they not, differences of opinion between the executive, bound by an oath to the strict performance of his duties, and writers and debaters must have arisen. it is not necessarily evidence of blunder on the part of the executive because there are these differences of views. mistakes have been made, as all can see and i admit, but it seems to me oftener in the selections made of the assistants appointed to aid in carrying out the various duties of administering the government--in nearly every case selected without a personal acquaintance with the appointee, but upon recommendations of the representatives chosen directly by the people. it is impossible, where so many trusts are to be allotted, that the right parties should be chosen in every instance. history shows that no administration from the time of washington to the present has been free from these mistakes. but i leave comparisons to history, claiming only that i have acted in every instance from a conscientious desire to do what was right, constitutional, within the law, and for the very best interests of the whole people. failures have been errors of judgment, not of intent. my civil career commenced, too, at a most critical and difficult time. less than four years before, the country had emerged from a conflict such as no other nation had ever survived. nearly one-half of the states had revolted against the government, and of those remaining faithful to the union a large percentage of the population sympathized with the rebellion and made an "enemy in the rear" almost as dangerous as the more honorable enemy in the front. the latter committed errors of judgment, but they maintained them openly and courageously; the former received the protection of the government they would see destroyed, and reaped all the pecuniary advantage to be gained out of the then existing state of affairs, many of them by obtaining contracts and by swindling the government in the delivery of their goods. immediately on the cessation of hostilities the then noble president, who had carried the country so far through its perils, fell a martyr to his patriotism at the hands of an assassin. the intervening time to my first inauguration was filled up with wranglings between congress and the new executive as to the best mode of "reconstruction," or, to speak plainly, as to whether the control of the government should be thrown immediately into the hands of those who had so recently and persistently tried to destroy it, or whether the victors should continue to have an equal voice with them in this control. reconstruction, as finally agreed upon, means this and only this, except that the late slave was enfranchised, giving an increase, as was supposed, to the union-loving and union-supporting votes. if _free_ in the full sense of the word, they would not disappoint this expectation. hence at the beginning of my first administration the work of reconstruction, much embarrassed by the long delay, virtually commenced. it was the work of the legislative branch of the government. my province was wholly in approving their acts, which i did most heartily, urging the legislatures of states that had not yet done so to ratify the fifteenth amendment to the constitution. the country was laboring under an enormous debt, contracted in the suppression of rebellion, and taxation was so oppressive as to discourage production. another danger also threatened us--a foreign war. the last difficulty had to be adjusted, and was adjusted without a war and in a manner highly honorable to all parties concerned. taxes have been reduced within the last seven years nearly $300,000,000, and the national debt has been reduced in the same time over $435,000,000. by refunding the 6 per cent bonded debt for bonds bearing 5 and 4-1/2 per cent interest, respectively, the annual interest has been reduced from over $130,000,000 in 1869 to but little over $100,000,000 in 1876. the balance of trade has been changed from over $130,000,000 against the united states in 1869 to more than $120,000,000 in our favor in 1876. it is confidently believed that the balance of trade in favor of the united states will increase, not diminish, and that the pledge of congress to resume specie payments in 1879 will be easily accomplished, even in the absence of much-desired further legislation on the subject. a policy has been adopted toward the indian tribes inhabiting a large portion of the territory of the united states which has been humane and has substantially ended indian hostilities in the whole land except in a portion of nebraska, and dakota, wyoming, and montana territories--the black hills region and approaches thereto. hostilities there have grown out of the avarice of the white man, who has violated our treaty stipulations in his search for gold. the question might be asked why the government has not enforced obedience to the terms of the treaty prohibiting the occupation of the black hills region by whites. the answer is simple: the first immigrants to the black hills were removed by troops, but rumors of rich discoveries of gold took into that region increased numbers. gold has actually been found in paying quantity, and an effort to remove the miners would only result in the desertion of the bulk of the troops that might be sent there to remove them. all difficulty in this matter has, however, been removed--subject to the approval of congress--by a treaty ceding the black hills and approaches to settlement by citizens. the subject of indian policy and treatment is so fully set forth by the secretary of the interior and the commissioner of indian affairs, and my views so fully expressed therein, that i refer to their reports and recommendations as my own. the relations of the united states with foreign powers continue on a friendly footing. questions have arisen from time to time in the foreign relations of the government, but the united states have been happily free during the past year from the complications and embarrassments which have surrounded some of the foreign powers. the diplomatic correspondence submitted herewith contains information as to certain of the matters which have occupied the government. the cordiality which attends our relations with the powers of the earth has been plainly shown by the general participation of foreign nations in the exhibition which has just closed and by the exertions made by distant powers to show their interest in and friendly feelings toward the united states in the commemoration of the centennial of the nation. the government and people of the united states have not only fully appreciated this exhibition of kindly feeling, but it may be justly and fairly expected that no small benefits will result both to ourselves and other nations from a better acquaintance, and a better appreciation of our mutual advantages and mutual wants. congress at its last session saw fit to reduce the amount usually appropriated for foreign intercourse by withholding appropriations for representatives of the united states in certain foreign countries and for certain consular officers, and by reducing the amounts usually appropriated for certain other diplomatic posts, and thus necessitating a change in the grade of the representatives. for these reasons, immediately upon the passage of the bill making appropriations for the diplomatic and consular service for the present fiscal year, instructions were issued to the representatives of the united states at bolivia, ecuador, and colombia, and to the consular officers for whom no appropriation had been made, to close their respective legations and consulates and cease from the performance of their duties; and in like manner steps were immediately taken to substitute chargã©s d'affaires for ministers resident in portugal, denmark, greece, switzerland, and paraguay. while thoroughly impressed with the wisdom of sound economy in the foreign service, as in other branches of the government, i can not escape the conclusion that in some instances the withholding of appropriations will prove an expensive economy, and that the small retrenchment secured by a change of grade in certain diplomatic posts is not an adequate consideration for the loss of influence and importance which will attend our foreign representatives under this reduction. i am of the opinion that a reexamination of the subject will cause a change in some instances in the conclusions reached on these subjects at the last session of congress. the court of commissioners of alabama claims, whose functions were continued by an act of the last session of congress until the 1st day of january, 1877, has carried on its labors with diligence and general satisfaction. by a report from the clerk of the court, transmitted herewith, bearing date november 14, 1876, it appears that within the time now allowed by law the court will have disposed of all the claims presented for adjudication. this report also contains a statement of the general results of the labors of the court to the date thereof. it is a cause of satisfaction that the method adopted for the satisfaction of the classes of claims submitted to the court, which are of long standing and justly entitled to early consideration, should have proved successful and acceptable. it is with satisfaction that i am enabled to state that the work of the joint commission for determining the boundary line between the united states and british possessions from the northwest angle of the lake of the woods to the rocky mountains, commenced in 1872, has been completed. the final agreements of the commissioners, with the maps, have been duly signed, and the work of the commission is complete. the fixing of the boundary upon the pacific coast by the protocol of march 10, 1873, pursuant to the award of the emperor of germany by article xxxiv of the treaty of washington, with the termination of the work of this commission, adjusts and fixes the entire boundary between the united states and the british possessions, except as to the portion of territory ceded by russia to the united states under the treaty of 1867. the work intrusted to the commissioner and the officers of the army attached to the commission has been well and satisfactorily performed. the original of the final agreement of the commissioners, signed upon the 29th of may, 1876, with the original official "lists of astronomical stations observed," the original official "list of monuments marking the international boundary line," and the maps, records, and general reports relating to the commission, have been deposited in the department of state. the official report of the commissioner on the part of the united states, with the report of the chief astronomer of the united states, will be submitted to congress within a short time. i reserve for a separate communication to congress a statement of the condition of the questions which lately arose with great britain respecting the surrender of fugitive criminals under the treaty of 1842. the ottoman government gave notice, under date of january 15, 1874, of its desire to terminate the treaty of 1862, concerning commerce and navigation, pursuant to the provisions of the twenty-second article thereof. under this notice the treaty terminated upon the 5th day of june, 1876. that government has invited negotiations toward the conclusion of a new treaty. by the act of congress of march 23, 1874, the president was authorized, when he should receive satisfactory information that the ottoman government or that of egypt had organized new tribunals likely to secure to citizens of the united states the same impartial justice enjoyed under the exercise of judicial functions by diplomatic and consular officers of the united states, to suspend the operation of the act of june 22, 1860, and to accept for citizens of the united states the jurisdiction of the new tribunals. satisfactory information having been received of the organization of such new tribunals in egypt, i caused a proclamation[115] to be issued upon the 27th of march last, suspending the operation of the act of june 22, 1860, in egypt, according to the provisions of the act. a copy of the proclamation accompanies this message. the united states has united with the other powers in the organization of these courts. it is hoped that the jurisdictional questions which have arisen may be readily adjusted, and that this advance in judicial reform may be hindered by no obstacles. the necessary legislation to carry into effect the convention respecting commercial reciprocity concluded with the hawaiian islands in 1875 having been had, the proclamation to carry into effect the convention, as provided by the act approved august 15, 1876, was duly issued upon the 9th day of september last. a copy thereof accompanies this message.[116] the commotions which have been prevalent in mexico for some time past, and which, unhappily, seem to be net yet wholly quieted, have led to complaints of citizens of the united states of injuries by persons in authority. it is hoped, however, that these will ultimately be adjusted to the satisfaction of both governments. the frontier of the united states in that quarter has not been exempt from acts of violence by citizens of one republic on those of the other. the frequency of these is supposed to be increased and their adjustment made more difficult by the considerable changes in the course of the lower part of the rio grande river, which river is a part of the boundary between the two countries. these changes have placed on either side of that river portions of land which by existing conventions belong to the jurisdiction of the government on the opposite side of the river. the subject of adjustment of this cause of difficulty is under consideration between the two republics. the government of the united states of colombia has paid the award in the case of the steamer _montijo_, seized by authorities of that government some years since, and the amount has been transferred to the claimants. it is with satisfaction that i am able to announce that the joint commission for the adjustment of claims between the united states and mexico under the convention of 1868, the duration of which has been several times extended, has brought its labors to a close. from the report of the agent of the united states, which accompanies the papers transmitted herewith, it will be seen that within the time limited by the commission 1,017 claims on the part of citizens of the united states against mexico were referred to the commission. of these claims 831 were dismissed or disallowed, and in 186 cases awards were made in favor of the claimants against the mexican republic, amounting in the aggregate to $4,125,622.20. within the same period 998 claims on the part of citizens of the mexican republic against the united states were referred to the commission. of these claims 831 were dismissed or disallowed, and in 167 cases awards were made in favor of the claimants against the united states, amounting in the aggregate to $150,498.41. by the terms of the convention the amount of these awards is to be deducted from the amount awarded in favor of our citizens against mexico, and the balance only to be paid by mexico to the united states, leaving the united states to make provision for this proportion of the awards in favor of its own citizens. i invite your attention to the legislation which will be necessary to provide for the payment. in this connection i am pleased to be able to express the acknowledgments due to sir edward thornton, the umpire of the commission, who has given to the consideration of the large number of claims submitted to him much time, unwearied patience, and that firmness and intelligence which are well known to belong to the accomplished representative of great britain, and which are likewise recognized by the representative in this country of the republic of mexico. monthly payments of a very small part of the amount due by the government of venezuela to citizens of the united states on account of claims of the latter against that government continue to be made with reasonable punctuality. that government has proposed to change the system which it has hitherto pursued in this respect by issuing bonds for part of the amount of the several claims. the proposition, however, could not, it is supposed, properly be accepted, at least without the consent of the holders of certificates of the indebtedness of venezuela. these are so much dispersed that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to ascertain their disposition on the subject. in former messages i have called the attention of congress to the necessity of legislation with regard to fraudulent naturalization and to the subject of expatriation and the election of nationality. the numbers of persons of foreign birth seeking a home in the united states, the ease and facility with which the honest emigrant may, after the lapse of a reasonable time, become possessed of all the privileges of citizenship of the united states, and the frequent occasions which induce such adopted citizens to return to the country of their birth render the subject of naturalization and the safeguards which experience has proved necessary for the protection of the honest naturalized citizen of paramount importance. the very simplicity in the requirements of law on this question affords opportunity for fraud, and the want of uniformity in the proceedings and records of the various courts and in the forms of the certificates of naturalization issued affords a constant source of difficulty. i suggest no additional requirements to the acquisition of citizenship beyond those now existing, but i invite the earnest attention of congress to the necessity and wisdom of some provisions regarding uniformity in the records and certificates, and providing against the frauds which frequently take place and for the vacating of a record of naturalization obtained in fraud. these provisions are needed in aid and for the protection of the honest citizen of foreign birth, and for the want of which he is made to suffer not infrequently. the united states has insisted upon the right of expatriation, and has obtained, after a long struggle, an admission of the principle contended for by acquiescence therein on the part of many foreign powers and by the conclusion of treaties on that subject. it is, however, but justice to the government to which such naturalized citizens have formerly owed allegiance, as well as to the united states, that certain fixed and definite rules should be adopted governing such cases and providing how expatriation may be accomplished. while emigrants in large numbers become citizens of the united states, it is also true that persons, both native born and naturalized, once citizens of the united states, either by formal acts or as the effect of a series of facts and circumstances, abandon their citizenship and cease to be entitled to the protection of the united states, but continue on convenient occasions to assert a claim to protection in the absence of provisions on these questions. and in this connection i again invite your attention to the necessity of legislation concerning the marriages of american citizens contracted abroad, and concerning the status of american women who may marry foreigners and of children born of american parents in a foreign country. the delicate and complicated questions continually occurring with reference to naturalization, expatriation, and the status of such persons as i have above referred to induce me to earnestly direct your attention again to these subjects. in like manner i repeat my recommendation that some means be provided for the hearing and determination of the just and subsisting claims of aliens upon the government of the united states within a reasonable limitation, and of such as may hereafter arise. while by existing provisions of law the court of claims may in certain cases be resorted to by an alien claimant, the absence of any general provisions governing all such cases and the want of a tribunal skilled in the disposition of such cases upon recognized fixed and settled principles, either provides no remedy in many deserving cases or compels a consideration of such claims by congress or the executive department of the government. it is believed that other governments are in advance of the united states upon this question, and that the practice now adopted is entirely unsatisfactory. congress, by an act approved the 3d day of march, 1875, authorized the inhabitants of the territory of colorado to form a state government, with the name of the state of colorado, and therein provided for the admission of said state, when formed, into the union upon an equal footing with the original states. a constitution having been adopted and ratified by the people of that state, and the acting governor having certified to me the facts as provided by said act, together with a copy of such constitution and ordinances as provided for in the said act, and the provisions of the said act of congress having been duly complied with, i issued a proclamation[117] upon the 1st of august, 1876, a copy of which is hereto annexed. the report of the secretary of war shows that the army has been actively employed during the year in subduing, at the request of the indian bureau, certain wild bands of the sioux indian nation and in preserving the peace at the south during the election. the commission constituted under the act of july 24, 1876, to consider and report on the "whole subject of the reform and reorganization of the army" met in august last, and has collected a large mass of statistics and opinions bearing on the subject before it. these are now under consideration, and their report is progressing. i am advised, though, by the president of the commission that it will be impracticable to comply with the clause of the act requiring the report to be presented, through me, to congress on the first day of this session, as there has not yet been time for that mature deliberation which the importance of the subject demands. therefore i ask that the time of making the report be extended to the 29th day of january, 1877. in accordance with the resolution of august 15, 1876, the army regulations prepared under the act of march 1, 1875, have not been promulgated, but are held until after the report of the above-mentioned commission shall have been received and acted on. by the act of august 15, 1876, the cavalry force of the army was increased by 2,500 men, with the proviso that they should be discharged on the expiration of hostilities. under this authority the cavalry regiments have been strengthened, and a portion of them are now in the field pursuing the remnants of the indians with whom they have been engaged during the summer. the estimates of the war department are made up on the basis of the number of men authorized by law, and their requirements as shown by years of experience, and also with the purpose on the part of the bureau officers to provide for all contingencies that may arise during the time for which the estimates are made. exclusive of engineer estimates (presented in accordance with acts of congress calling for surveys and estimates for improvements at various localities), the estimates now presented are about six millions in excess of the appropriations for the years 1874-75 and 1875-76. this increase is asked in order to provide for the increased cavalry force (should their services be necessary), to prosecute economically work upon important public buildings, to provide for armament of fortifications and manufacture of small arms, and to replenish the working stock in the supply departments. the appropriations for these last named have for the past few years been so limited that the accumulations in store will be entirely exhausted during the present year, and it will be necessary to at once begin to replenish them. i invite your special attention to the following recommendations of the secretary of war: first. that the claims under the act of july 4, 1864, for supplies taken by the army during the war be removed from the offices of the quartermaster and commissary generals and transferred to the southern claims commission. these claims are of precisely similar nature to those now before the southern claims commission, and the war department bureaus have not the clerical force for their examination nor proper machinery for investigating the loyalty of the claimants. second. that congress sanction the scheme of an annuity fund for the benefit of the families of deceased officers, and that it also provide for the permanent organization of the signal service, both of which were recommended in my last annual message. third. that the manufacturing operations of the ordnance department be concentrated at three arsenals and an armory, and that the remaining arsenals be sold and the proceeds applied to this object by the ordnance department. the appropriations for river and harbor improvements for the current year were $5,015,000. with my approval, the secretary of war directed that of this amount $2,000,000 should be expended, and no new works should be begun and none prosecuted which were not of national importance. subsequently this amount was increased to $2,237,600, and the works are now progressing on this basis. the improvement of the south pass of the mississippi river, under james b. eads and his associates, is progressing favorably. at the present time there is a channel of 20.3 feet in depth between the jetties at the mouth of the pass and 18.5 feet at the head of the pass. neither channel, however, has the width required before payments can be made by the united states. a commission of engineer officers is now examining these works, and their reports will be presented as soon as received. the report of the secretary of the navy shows that branch of the service to be in condition as effective as it is possible to keep it with the means and authority given the department. it is, of course, not possible to rival the costly and progressive establishments of great european powers with the old material of our navy, to which no increase has been authorized since the war, except the eight small cruisers built to supply the place of others which had gone to decay. yet the most has been done that was possible with the means at command; and by substantially rebuilding some of our old ships with durable material and completely repairing and refitting our monitor fleet the navy has been gradually so brought up that, though it does not maintain its relative position among the progressive navies of the world, it is now in a condition more powerful and effective than it ever has been in time of peace. the complete repairs of our five heavy ironclads are only delayed on account of the inadequacy of the appropriations made last year for the working bureaus of the department, which were actually less in amount than those made before the war, notwithstanding the greatly enhanced price of labor and materials and the increase in the cost of the naval service growing out of the universal use and great expense of steam machinery. the money necessary for these repairs should be provided at once, that they may be completed without further unnecessary delay and expense. when this is done, all the strength that there is in our navy will be developed and useful to its full capacity, and it will be powerful for purposes of defense, and also for offensive action, should the necessity for that arise within a reasonable distance from our shores. the fact that our navy is not more modern and powerful than it is has been made a cause of complaint against the secretary of the navy by persons who at the same time criticise and complain of his endeavors to bring the navy that we have to its best and most efficient condition; but the good sense of the country will understand that it is really due to his practical action that we have at this time any effective naval force at command. the report of the postmaster-general shows the excess of expenditures (excluding expenditures on account of previous years) over receipts for the fiscal year ended june 30, 1876, to be $4,151,988.66. estimated expenditures for the fiscal year ending june 30, 1878, are $36,723,432.43. estimated revenue for same period is $30,645,165, leaving estimated excess of expenditure, to be appropriated as a deficiency, of $6,078,267.43. the postmaster-general, like his predecessor, is convinced that a change in the basis of adjusting the salaries of postmasters of the fourth class is necessary for the good of the service as well as for the interests of the government, and urgently recommends that the compensation of the class of postmasters above mentioned be based upon the business of their respective offices, as ascertained from the sworn returns to the auditor of stamps canceled. a few postmasters in the southern states have expressed great apprehension of their personal safety on account of their connection with the postal service, and have specially requested that their reports of apprehended danger should not be made public lest it should result in the loss of their lives. but no positive testimony of interference has been submitted, except in the case of a mail messenger at spartanburg, in south carolina, who reported that he had been violently driven away while in charge of the mails on account of his political affiliations. an assistant superintendent of the railway mail service investigated this case and reported that the messenger had disappeared from his post, leaving his work to be performed by a substitute. the postmaster-general thinks this case is sufficiently suggestive to justify him in recommending that a more severe punishment should be provided for the offense of assaulting any person in charge of the mails or of retarding or otherwise obstructing them by threats of personal injury. "a very gratifying result is presented in the fact that the deficiency of this department during the last fiscal year was reduced to $4,081,790.18, as against $6,169,938.88 of the preceding year. the difference can be traced to the large increase in its ordinary receipts (which greatly exceed the estimates therefor) and a slight decrease in its expenditures." the ordinary _receipts_ of the post-office department for the past seven fiscal years have increased at an average of over 8 per cent per annum, while the increase of _expenditures_ for the same period has been but about 5.50 per cent per annum, and the _decrease_ of _deficiency_ in the revenues has been at the rate of nearly 2 per cent per annum. the report of the commissioner of agriculture accompanying this message will be found one of great interest, marking, as it does, the great progress of the last century in the variety of products of the soil; increased knowledge and skill in the labor of producing, saving, and manipulating the same to prepare them for the use of man; in the improvements in machinery to aid the agriculturist in his labors, and in a knowledge of those scientific subjects necessary to a thorough system of economy in agricultural production, namely, chemistry, botany, entomology, etc. a study of this report by those interested in agriculture and deriving their support from it will find it of value in pointing out those articles which are raised in greater quantity than the needs of the world require, and must sell, therefore, for less than the cost of production, and those which command a profit over cost of production because there is not an overproduction. i call special attention to the need of the department for a new gallery for the reception of the exhibits returned from the centennial exhibition, including the exhibits donated by very many foreign nations, and to the recommendations of the commissioner of agriculture generally. the reports of the district commissioners and the board of health are just received--too late to read them and to make recommendations thereon--and are herewith submitted. the international exhibition held in philadelphia this year, in commemoration of the one hundredth anniversary of american independence, has proven a great success, and will, no doubt, be of enduring advantage to the country. it has shown the great progress in the arts, sciences, and mechanical skill made in a single century, and demonstrated that we are but little behind older nations in any one branch, while in some we scarcely have a rival. it has served, too, not only to bring peoples and products of skill and labor from all parts of the world together, but in bringing together people from all sections of our own country, which must prove a great benefit in the information imparted and pride of country engendered. it has been suggested by scientists interested in and connected with the smithsonian institution, in a communication herewith, that the government exhibit be removed to the capital and a suitable building be erected or purchased for its accommodation as a permanent exhibit. i earnestly recommend this; and believing that congress would second this view, i directed that all government exhibits at the centennial exhibition should remain where they are, except such as might be injured by remaining in a building not intended as a protection in inclement weather, or such as may be wanted by the department furnishing them, until the question of permanent exhibition is acted on. although the moneys appropriated by congress to enable the participation of the several executive departments in the international exhibition of 1876 were not sufficient to carry out the undertaking to the full extent at first contemplated, it gives me pleasure to refer to the very efficient and creditable manner in which the board appointed from these several departments to provide an exhibition on the part of the government have discharged their duties with the funds placed at their command. without a precedent to guide them in the preparation of such a display, the success of their labors was amply attested by the sustained attention which the contents of the government building attracted during the period of the exhibition from both foreign and native visitors. i am strongly impressed with the value of the collection made by the government for the purposes of the exhibition, illustrating, as it does, the mineral resources of the country, the statistical and practical evidences of our growth as a nation, and the uses of the mechanical arts and the applications of applied science in the administration of the affairs of government. many nations have voluntarily contributed their exhibits to the united states to increase the interest in any permanent exhibition congress may provide for. for this act of generosity they should receive the thanks of the people, and i respectfully suggest that a resolution of congress to that effect be adopted. the attention of congress can not be too earnestly called to the necessity of throwing some greater safeguard over the method of choosing and declaring the election of a president. under the present system there seems to be no provided remedy for contesting the election in any one state. the remedy is partially, no doubt, in the enlightenment of electors. the compulsory support of the free school and the disfranchisement of all who can not read and write the english language, after a fixed probation, would meet my hearty approval. i would not make this apply, however, to those already voters, but i would to all becoming so after the expiration of the probation fixed upon. foreigners coming to this country to become citizens, who are educated in their own language, should acquire the requisite knowledge of ours during the necessary residence to obtain naturalization. if they did not take interest enough in our language to acquire sufficient knowledge of it to enable them to study the institutions and laws of the country intelligently, i would not confer upon them the right to make such laws nor to select those who do. i append to this message, for convenient reference, a synopsis of administrative events and of all recommendations to congress made by me during the last seven years. time may show some of these recommendations not to have been wisely conceived, but i believe the larger part will do no discredit to the administration. one of these recommendations met with the united opposition of one political party in the senate and with a strong opposition from the other, namely, the treaty for the annexation of santo domingo to the united states, to which i will specially refer, maintaining, as i do, that if my views had been concurred in the country would be in a more prosperous condition to-day, both politically and financially. santo domingo is fertile, and upon its soil may be grown just those tropical products of which the united states use so much, and which are produced or prepared for market now by slave labor almost exclusively, namely, sugar, coffee, dyewoods, mahogany, tropical fruits, tobacco, etc. about 75 per cent of the exports of cuba are consumed in the united states. a large percentage of the exports of brazil also find the same market. these are paid for almost exclusively in coin, legislation, particularly in cuba, being unfavorable to a mutual exchange of the products of each country. flour shipped from the mississippi river to havana can pass by the very entrance to the city on its way to a port in spain, there pay a duty fixed upon articles to be reexported, transferred to a spanish vessel and brought back almost to the point of starting, paying a second duty, and still leave a profit over what would be received by direct shipment. all that is produced in cuba could be produced in santo domingo. being a part of the united states, commerce between the island and mainland would be free. there would be no export duties on her shipments nor import duties on those coming here. there would be no import duties upon the supplies, machinery, etc., going from the states. the effect that would have been produced upon cuban commerce, with these advantages to a rival, is observable at a glance. the cuban question would have been settled long ago in favor of "free cuba." hundreds of american vessels would now be advantageously used in transporting the valuable woods and other products of the soil of the island to a market and in carrying supplies and emigrants to it. the island is but sparsely settled, while it has an area sufficient for the profitable employment of several millions of people. the soil would have soon fallen into the hands of united states capitalists. the products are so valuable in commerce that emigration there would have been encouraged; the emancipated race of the south would have found there a congenial home, where their civil rights would not be disputed and where their labor would be so much sought after that the poorest among them could have found the means to go. thus in cases of great oppression and cruelty, such as has been practiced upon them in many places within the last eleven years, whole communities would have sought refuge in santo domingo. i do not suppose the whole race would have gone, nor is it desirable that they should go. their labor is desirable--indispensable almost--where they now are. but the possession of this territory would have left the negro "master of the situation," by enabling him to demand his rights at home on pain of finding them elsewhere. i do not present these views now as a recommendation for a renewal of the subject of annexation, but i do refer to it to vindicate my previous action in regard to it. with the present term of congress my official life terminates. it is not probable that public affairs will ever again receive attention from me further than as a citizen of the republic, always taking a deep interest in the honor, integrity, and prosperity of the whole land. u.s. grant. [footnote 115: see pp. 390-391.] [footnote 116: see pp. 394-395.] [footnote 117: see pp. 392-394.] special messages. executive mansion, _december 6, 1876_. _to the senate and house of representatives_: i have the honor to transmit herewith a letter (accompanied by testimony) addressed to me by hon. john sherman and other distinguished citizens, in regard to the canvass of the vote for electors in the state of louisiana. u.s. grant. executive mansion, _december 14, 1876_. _to the house of representatives_: in answer to a resolution of the 7th instant of the house of representatives, asking to be informed whether any, and what, negotiations have or are being made with the sioux indians for their removal to the indian territory, and under what authority the same has been and is being done, i submit herewith a report received from the secretary of the interior, which contains, it is believed, all the information in possession of his department touching the matter of the resolution. u.s. grant. executive mansion, _december 14, 1876_. _to the senate of the united states_: in answer to the resolution of the senate of the 6th instant, requesting information "as to whether troops of the united states were stationed at the city of petersburg, in the state of virginia, on the 7th of november, 1876, and, if so, under what authority and for what purpose," i submit the inclosed letters from the secretary of war, to whom the resolution was referred, together with the report of the general of the army and accompanying papers. these inclosures will give all the information called for by the resolution, and i confidently believe will justify the action taken. it is well understood that the presence of united states troops at polling places never prevented the free exercise of the franchise by any citizen, of whatever political faith. if, then, they have had any effect whatever upon the ballot cast, it has been to insure protection to the citizen casting it, in giving it to the candidate of his unbiased choice, without fear, and thus securing the very essence of liberty. it may be the presence of twenty-four united states soldiers, under the command of a captain and lieutenant, quartered in the custom-house at petersburg, va., on the 7th of november, at a considerable distance from any polling place, without any interference on their part whatever, and without going near the polls during the election, _may have secured a different result from what would have been obtained if they had not been there_ (to maintain the peace in case of riot) _on the face of the returns_; but if such is the case it is only proof that in this one congressional district in the state of virginia the legal and constitutional voters have been able to return as elected the candidate of their choice. u.s. grant. executive mansion, _december 22, 1876_. _to the senate and house of representatives_: i have the honor to transmit herewith a letter, submitted by the secretary of the interior, from the commissioner of indian affairs, accompanied by the report and journal of proceedings of the commission appointed on the 24th day of august last to obtain certain concessions from the sioux indians, in accordance with the provisions contained in the indian appropriation act for the current fiscal year. i ask your special consideration of these articles of agreement, as among other advantages to be gained by them is the clear right of citizens to go into a country of which they have taken possession and from which they can not be excluded. u.s. grant. executive mansion, _december 22, 1876_. _to the senate and house of representatives_: i have the honor to transmit herewith a report (and papers which accompanied it) of the progress of the work committed to their charge, addressed to me by the commissioners appointed under the act of congress approved july 19, 1876, authorizing the repavement of pennsylvania avenue. u.s. grant. washington, _december 23, 1876_. _to the house of representatives_: when congress adjourned in august last the execution of the extradition article of the treaty of 1842 between the united states and great britain had been interrupted. the united states had demanded of her majesty's government the surrender of certain fugitives from justice charged with crimes committed within the jurisdiction of the united states, who had sought asylum and were found within the territories of her british majesty, and had, in due compliance with the requirements of the treaty, furnished the evidence of the criminality of the fugitives, which had been found sufficient to justify their apprehension and commitment for trial, as required by the treaty, and the fugitives were held and committed for extradition. her majesty's government, however, demanded from the united states certain assurances or stipulations as a condition for the surrender of these fugitives. as the treaty contemplated no such conditions to the performance of the obligations which each government had assumed, the demand for stipulations on the part of this government was repelled. her majesty's government thereupon, in june last, released two of the fugitives (ezra d. winslow and charles j. brent), and subsequently released a third (one william e. gray), and, refusing to surrender, set them at liberty. in a message to the two houses of congress on the 20th day of june last, in view of the condition of facts as above referred to, i said: the position thus taken by the british government, if adhered to, can not but be regarded as the abrogation and annulment of the article of the treaty on extradition. under these circumstances it will not, in my judgment, comport with the dignity or self-respect of this government to make demands upon that government for the surrender of fugitive criminals, nor to entertain any requisition of that character from that government under the treaty. article xi of the treaty of 1842 provided that "the tenth article [that relating to extradition] should continue in force until one or the other of the parties should signify its wish to terminate it, and no longer." in view, however, of the great importance of an extradition treaty, especially between two states as intimately connected in commercial and social relations as are the united states and great britain, and in the hope that her majesty's government might yet reach a different decision from that then attained, i abstained from recommending any action by congress terminating the extradition article of the treaty. i have, however, declined to take any steps under the treaty toward extradition. it is with great satisfaction that i am able now to announce to congress and to the country that by the voluntary act of her majesty's government the obstacles which had been interposed to the execution of the extradition article of the treaty have been removed. on the 27th of october last her majesty's representative at this capital, under instructions from lord derby, informed this government that her majesty's government would be prepared, as a temporary measure, until a new extradition treaty can be concluded, to put in force all powers vested in it for the surrender of accused persons to the government of the united states under the treaty of 1842, without asking for any engagement as to such persons not being tried in the united states for other than the offenses for which extradition had been demanded. i was happy to greet this announcement as the removal of the obstacles which had arrested the execution of the extradition treaty between the two countries. in reply to the note of her majesty's representative, after referring to the applications heretofore made by the united states for the surrender of the fugitives referred to in the correspondence which was laid before congress at its last session, it was stated that on an indication of readiness to surrender these persons an agent would be authorized to receive them, and i would be ready to respond to requisitions which may be made on the part of her majesty's government under the tenth article of the treaty of 1842, which i would then regard as in full force until such time as either government shall avail itself of the right to terminate it provided by the eleventh article, or until a more comprehensive arrangement can be reached between the two governments in regard to the extradition of criminals--an object to which the attention of this government would gladly be given, with an earnest desire for a mutually satisfactory result. a copy of the correspondence between her majesty's representative at this capital and the secretary of state on the subject is transmitted herewith. it is with great satisfaction that i have now to announce that her majesty's government, while expressing its desire not to be understood to recede from the interpretation which in its previous correspondence it has put upon the treaty, but having regard to the prospect of a new treaty and the power possessed by either party of spontaneously denouncing the old one, caused the rearrest on the 4th instant of brent, one of the fugitives who had been previously discharged, and, after awaiting the requisite time within which the fugitive is entitled to appeal or to apply for his discharge, on the 21st instant surrendered him to the agent appointed on behalf of this government to receive and to convey him to the united states. her majesty's government has expressed an earnest desire to rearrest and to deliver up winslow and gray, the other fugitives who had been arrested and committed on the requisition of the united states, but were released because of the refusal of the united states to give the assurances and stipulations then required by great britain. these persons, however, are believed to have escaped from british jurisdiction; a diligent search has failed to discover them. as the surrender of brent without condition or stipulation of any kind being asked removes the obstacle which interrupted the execution of the treaty, i shall no longer abstain from making demands upon her majesty's government for the surrender of fugitive criminals, nor from entertaining requisitions of that character from that government under the treaty of 1842, but will again regard the treaty as operative, hoping to be able before long to conclude with her majesty's government a new treaty of a broader and more comprehensive nature. u.s. grant. washington, _january 8, 1877_. _to the house of representatives_: in answer to the resolution of the house of representatives of the 19th ultimo, i transmit herewith the report of the secretary of state, together with the papers[118] which accompanied it. u.s. grant. [footnote 118: correspondence relative to the venezuelan mixed commission held under the convention of april 25, 1866, for the settlement of claims against venezuela.] [for message of january 12, 1877, withdrawing objections to senate bill no. 561, see pp. 389-390.] executive mansion, _january 12, 1877_. _to the house of representatives_: in reply to a resolution of inquiry dated december 23, 1876, of the house of representatives, respecting the expenditure of certain moneys appropriated by the act of august 14, 1876, for river and harbor improvements, i have the honor to transmit herewith, for your information, a report and accompanying papers received from the secretary of war, to whom the resolution was referred. u.s. grant. executive mansion, _january 15, 1877_. _to the house of representatives_: the joint resolution authorizing the secretary of war to supply blankets to the reform school in the district of columbia is before me. i am in entire sympathy with the purpose of the resolution, but before taking any action upon it i deem it my duty to submit for your consideration the accompanying letter, received from the secretary of war, embodying a report, made in anticipation of the passage of the resolution, by the quartermaster-general of the army, in which, among other facts, it is stated that- the appropriation for clothing for the army for this fiscal year is much smaller than usual, and the supply of blankets which it will allow us to purchase is so small that none can properly be spared for other purposes than the supply of the army. if it be thought by congress worth while to cause the supply of blankets for the institution referred to to be procured through the war department, it is respectfully suggested that provision to meet the expense be made by special appropriation. u.s. grant. executive mansion, _january 19, 1877_. _to the house of representatives_: at the request of the attorney-general, i have the honor to transmit herewith a report in answer to the resolution of the house adopted on the 1st of august, 1876, relative to certain matters occurring in the administration of the provisional government of the district of columbia, and chiefly affecting the commissioners and the late board of audit. u.s. grant. washington, _january 20, 1877_. _to the senate of the united states_: herewith i transmit a report from the secretary of state, with accompanying papers, relating to the court of commissioners of alabama claims. u.s. grant. executive mansion, _january 22, 1877_. _to the house of representatives_: in answer to the resolution of the house of representatives of the 8th of december last, inquiring whether any increase in the cavalry force of the army on the mexican frontier of texas has been made, as authorized by the act of july 24, 1876, and whether any troops have been removed from the frontier of texas and from the post of fort sill, on the kiowa and comanche reservation, and whether, if so, their places have been supplied by other forces, i have the honor to transmit a report received from the secretary of war. u.s. grant. executive mansion, _january 22, 1877_. _to the house of representatives_: on the 9th day of december, 1876, the following resolution of the house of representatives was received, namely: _resolved_, that the president be requested, if not incompatible with the public interest, to transmit to this house copies of any and all orders or directions emanating from him or from either of the executive departments of the government to any military commander or civil officer with reference to the service of the army, or any portion thereof, in the states of virginia, south carolina, louisiana, and florida since the 1st of august last, together with reports by telegraph or otherwise from either or any of said military commanders or civil officers. it was immediately or soon thereafter referred to the secretary of war and the attorney-general, the custodians of all retained copies of "orders or directions" given by the executive departments of the government covered by the above inquiry, together with all information upon which such "orders or directions" were given. the information, it will be observed, is voluminous, and, with the limited clerical force in the department of justice, has consumed the time up to the present. many of the communications accompanying this have been already made public in connection with messages heretofore sent to congress. this class of information includes the important documents received from the governor of south carolina and sent to congress with my message on the subject of the hamburg massacre; also the documents accompanying my response to the resolution of the house of representatives in regard to the soldiers stationed at petersburg. there have also come to me and to the department of justice, from time to time, other earnest written communications from persons holding public trusts and from others residing in the south, some of which i append hereto as bearing upon the precarious condition of the public peace in those states. these communications i have reason to regard as made by respectable and responsible men. many of them deprecate the publication of their names as involving danger to them personally. the reports heretofore made by committees of congress of the results of their inquiries in mississippi and louisiana, and the newspapers of several states recommending "the mississippi plan," have also furnished important data for estimating the danger to the public peace and order in those states. it is enough to say that these different kinds and sources of evidence have left no doubt whatever in my mind that intimidation has been used, and actual violence, to an extent requiring the aid of the united states government, where it was practicable to furnish such aid, in south carolina, in florida, and in louisiana, as well as in mississippi, in alabama, and in georgia. the troops of the united states have been but sparingly used, and in no case so as to interfere with the free exercise of the right of suffrage. very few troops were available for the purpose of preventing or suppressing the violence and intimidation existing in the states above named. in no case, except that of south carolina, was the number of soldiers in any state increased in anticipation of the election, saving that twenty-four men and an officer were sent from fort foote to petersburg, va., where disturbances were threatened prior to the election. no troops were stationed at the voting places. in florida and in louisiana, respectively, the small number of soldiers already in the said states were stationed at such points in each state as were most threatened with violence, where they might be available as a posse for the officer whose duty it was to preserve the peace and prevent intimidation of voters. such a disposition of the troops seemed to me reasonable and justified bylaw and precedent, while its omission would have been inconsistent with the constitutional duty of the president of the united states "to take care that the laws be faithfully executed." the statute expressly forbids the bringing of troops to the polls "except where it is necessary to keep the peace," implying that to keep the peace it may be done. but this even, so far as i am advised, has not in any case been done. the stationing of a company or part of a company in the vicinity, where they would be available to prevent riot, has been the only use made of troops prior to and at the time of the elections. where so stationed, they could be called in an emergency requiring it by a marshal or deputy marshal as a posse to aid in suppressing unlawful violence. the evidence which has come to me has left me no ground to doubt that if there had been more military force available it would have been my duty to have disposed of it in several states with a view to the prevention of the violence and intimidation which have undoubtedly contributed to the defeat of the election law in mississippi, alabama, and georgia, as well as in south carolina, louisiana, and florida. by article iv, section 4, of the constitution- the united states shall guarantee to every state in this union a republican form of government, and shall protect each of them against invasion, and on application of the legislature, or of the executive (when the legislature can not be convened), against domestic violence. by act of congress (u.s. revised statutes, secs. 1034, 1035) the president, in case of "insurrection in any state" or of "unlawful obstruction to the enforcement of the laws of the united states by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings," or whenever "domestic violence in any state so obstructs the execution of the laws thereof and of the united states as to deprive any portion of the people of such state" of their civil or political rights, is authorized to employ such parts of the land and naval forces as he may deem necessary to enforce the execution of the laws and preserve the peace and sustain the authority of the state and of the united states. acting under this title (69) of the revised statutes united states, i accompanied the sending of troops to south carolina with a proclamation[119] such as is therein prescribed. the president is also authorized by act of congress "to employ such part of the land or naval forces of the united states * * * as shall be necessary to prevent the violation and to enforce the due execution of the provisions" of title 24 of the revised statutes of the united states, for the protection of the civil rights of citizens, among which is the provision against conspiracies "to prevent, by force, intimidation, or threat, any citizen who is lawfully entitled to vote from giving his support or advocacy in a legal manner toward or in favor of the election of any lawfully qualified person as an elector for president or vice-president or as a member of congress of the united states." (u.s. revised statutes, sec. 1989.) in cases falling under this title i have not considered it necessary to issue a proclamation to precede or accompany the employment of such part of the army as seemed to be necessary. in case of insurrection against a state government or against the government of the united states a proclamation is appropriate; but in keeping the peace of the united states at an election at which members of congress are elected no such call from the state or proclamation by the president is prescribed by statute or required by precedent. in the case of south carolina insurrection and domestic violence against the state government were clearly shown, and the application of the governor founded thereon was duly presented, and i could not deny his constitutional request without abandoning my duty as the executive of the national government. the companies stationed in the other states have been employed to secure the better execution of the laws of the united states and to preserve the peace of the united states. after the election had been had, and where violence was apprehended by which the returns from the counties and precincts might be destroyed, troops were ordered to the state of florida, and those already in louisiana were ordered to the points in greatest danger of violence. i have not employed troops on slight occasions, nor in any case where it has not been necessary to the enforcement of the laws of the united states. in this i have been guided by the constitution and the laws which have been enacted and the precedents which have been formed under it. it has been necessary to employ troops occasionally to overcome resistance to the internal-revenue laws from the time of the resistance to the collection of the whisky tax in pennsylvania, under washington, to the present time. in 1854, when it was apprehended that resistance would be made in boston to the seizure and return to his master of a fugitive slave, the troops there stationed were employed to enforce the master's right under the constitution, and troops stationed at new york were ordered to be in readiness to go to boston if it should prove to be necessary. in 1859, when john brown, with a small number of men, made his attack upon harpers ferry, the president ordered united states troops to assist in the apprehension and suppression of him and his party without a formal call of the legislature or governor of virginia and without proclamation of the president. without citing further instances in which the executive has exercised his power, as commander of the army and navy, to prevent or suppress resistance to the laws of the united states, or where he has exercised like authority in obedience to a call from a state to suppress insurrection, i desire to assure both congress and the country that it has been my purpose to administer the executive powers of the government fairly, and in no instance to disregard or transcend the limits of the constitution. u.s. grant. [footnote 119: see pp. 396-397.] washington, _january 23, 1877_. _to the senate of the united states_: i transmit, in answer to a resolution of the senate of the 16th instant, a report of the secretary of state, with its accompanying papers.[120] u.s. grant. [footnote 120: correspondence with diplomatic officers of the united states in turkey relative to atrocities and massacres by turks in bulgaria.] washington, _january 25, 1877_. _to the senate of the united states_: i transmit to the senate, for consideration with a view to ratification, a treaty between the united states and his majesty the king of spain, in relation to the extradition of criminals, signed on the 5th of january, 1877. u.s. grant. executive mansion, _january 29, 1877_. _to the senate and house of representatives_: i have the honor to transmit herewith the proceedings of the commission appointed to examine "the whole subject of reform and reorganization of the army of the united states," under the provisions of the act of congress approved july 24, 1876. the commission report that so fully has their time been occupied by other important duties that they are not at this time prepared to submit a plan or make proper recommendations. u.s. grant. executive mansion, _january 29, 1877_. _to the house of representatives_: i have the honor to transmit herewith reports and accompanying papers received from the secretaries of state and war, in answer to the resolution of the house of representatives of the 9th instant, relative "to the imprisonment and detention by the mexican authorities at matamoras of john jay smith, an american citizen, and also to the wounding and robbing by mexican soldiers at new laredo of dr. samuel huggins, an american citizen." u.s. grant. executive mansion, _january 29, 1877_. _to the senate of the united states_: i follow the example heretofore occasionally permitted of communicating in this mode my approval of the "act to provide for and regulate the counting of votes for president and vice-president, and the decision of questions arising thereon, for the term commencing march 4, a.d. 1877," because of my appreciation of the imminent peril to the institutions of the country from which, in my judgment, the act affords a wise and constitutional means of escape. for the first time in the history of our country, under the constitution as it now is, a dispute exists with regard to the result of the election of the chief magistrate of the nation. it is understood that upon the disposition of disputes touching the electoral votes cast at the late election by one or more of the states depends the question whether one or the other of the candidates for the presidency is to be the lawful chief magistrate. the importance of having clearly ascertained, by a procedure regulated by law, which of the two citizens has been elected, and of having the right to this high office recognized and cheerfully agreed in by all the people of the republic, can not be overestimated, and leads me to express to congress and to the nation my great satisfaction at the adoption of a measure that affords an orderly means of decision of a gravely exciting question. while the history of our country in its earlier periods shows that the president of the senate has counted the votes and declared their standing, our whole history shows that in no instance of doubt or dispute has he exercised the power of deciding, and that the two houses of congress have disposed of all such doubts and disputes, although in no instance hitherto have they been such that their decision could essentially have affected the result. for the first time the government of the united states is now brought to meet the question as one vital to the result, and this under conditions not the best calculated to produce an agreement or to induce calm feeling in the several branches of the government or among the people of the country. in a case where, as now, the result is involved, it is the highest duty of the lawmaking power to provide in advance a constitutional, orderly, and just method of executing the constitution in this most interesting and critical of its provisions. the doing so, far from being a compromise of right, is an enforcement of right and an execution of powers conferred by the constitution on congress. i think that this orderly method has been secured by the bill, which, appealing to the constitution and the law as the guide in ascertaining rights, provides a means of deciding questions of single returns through the direct action of congress, and in respect to double returns by a tribunal of inquiry, whose decisions stand unless both houses of congress shall concur in determining otherwise, thus securing a definite disposition of all questions of dispute, in whatever aspect they may arise. with or without this law, as all of the states have voted, and as a tie vote is impossible, it must be that one of the two candidates has been elected; and it would be deplorable to witness an irregular controversy as to which of the two should receive or which should continue to hold the office. in all periods of history controversies have arisen as to the succession or choice of the chiefs of states, and no party or citizens loving their country and its free institutions can sacrifice too much of mere feeling in preserving through the upright course of law their country from the smallest danger to its peace on such an occasion; and it can not be impressed too firmly in the hearts of all the people that true liberty and real progress can exist only through a cheerful adherence to constitutional law. the bill purports to provide only for the settlement of questions arising from the recent elections. the fact that such questions can arise demonstrates the necessity, which i can not doubt will before long be supplied, of permanent general legislation to meet cases which have not been contemplated in the constitution or laws of the country. the bill may not be perfect, and its provisions may not be such as would be best applicable to all future occasions, but it is calculated to meet the present condition of the question and of the country. the country is agitated. it needs and it desires peace and quiet and harmony between all parties and all sections. its industries are arrested, labor unemployed, capital idle, and enterprise paralyzed by reason of the doubt and anxiety attending the uncertainty of a double claim to the chief magistracy of the nation. it wants to be assured that the result of the election will be accepted without resistance from the supporters of the disappointed candidate, and that its highest officer shall not hold his place with a questioned title of right. believing that the bill will secure these ends, i give it my signature. u.s. grant. executive mansion, _january 30, 1877_. _to the senate and house of representatives_: i desire to call the attention of congress to the importance of providing for the continuance of the board for testing iron, steel, and other metals, which by the sundry civil appropriation act of last year was ordered to be discontinued at the end of the present fiscal year. this board, consisting of engineers and other scientific experts from the army, the navy, and from civil life (all of whom, except the secretary, give their time and labors to this object without compensation), was organized by authority of congress in the spring of 1875, and immediately drafted a comprehensive plan for its investigations and contracted for a testing machine of 400 tons capacity, which would enable it to properly conduct the experiments. meanwhile the subcommittees of the board have devoted their time to such experiments as could be made with the smaller testing machines already available. this large machine is just now completed and ready for erection at the watertown arsenal, and the real labors of the board are therefore just about to be commenced. if the board is to be discontinued at the end of the present fiscal year, the money already appropriated and the services of the gentlemen who have given so much time to the subject will be unproductive of any results. the importance of these experiments can hardly be overestimated when we consider the almost endless variety of purposes for which iron and steel are employed in this country and the many thousands of lives which daily depend on the soundness of iron structures. i need hardly refer to the recent disaster at the ashtabula bridge, in ohio, and the conflicting theories of experts as to the cause of it, as an instance of what might have been averted by a more thorough knowledge of the properties of iron and the best modes of construction. these experiments can not properly be conducted by private firms, not only on account of the expense, but because the results must rest upon the authority of disinterested persons. they must therefore be undertaken under the sanction of the government. compared with their great value to the industrial interests of the country, the expense is very slight. the board recommend an appropriation of $40,000 for the next fiscal year, and i earnestly commend their request to the favorable consideration of congress. i also recommend that the board be required to conduct their investigations under the direction of the secretary of war, and to make full report of their progress to that officer in time to be incorporated in his annual report. u.s. grant. washington, _february 2, 1877_. _to the senate of the united states_: i transmit, in answer to a resolution of the senate of the 10th ultimo, a report of the secretary of state, with its accompanying papers.[121] u.s. grant. [footnote 121: preliminary and final reports of j. hubley ashton, agent of the united states before the united states and mexican claims commission.] executive mansion, _february 3, 1877_. _to the senate and house of representatives_: by the act of congress approved january 14, 1875, "to provide for the resumption of specie payments," the 1st of january, 1879, is fixed as the date when such resumption is to begin. it may not be desirable to fix an earlier date when it shall actually become obligatory upon the government to redeem its outstanding legal-tender notes in coin on presentation, but it is certainly most desirable, and will prove most beneficial to every pecuniary interest of the country, to hasten the day when the paper circulation of the country and the gold coin shall have equal values. at a later day, if currency and coin should retain equal values, it might become advisable to authorize or direct resumption. i believe the time has come when by a simple act of the legislative branch of the government this most desirable result can be attained. i am strengthened in this view by the course trade has taken in the last two years and by the strength of the credit of the united states at home and abroad. for the fiscal year ending june 30, 1876, the exports of the united states exceeded the imports by $120,213,102; but our exports include $40,569,621 of specie and bullion in excess of imports of the same commodities. for the six months of the present fiscal year from july 1, 1876, to january 1, 1877, the excess of exports over imports amounted to $107,544,869, and the import of specie and bullion exceeded the export of the precious metals by $6,192,147 in the same time. the actual excess of exports over imports for the six months, exclusive of specie and bullion, amounted to $113,737,040, showing for the time being the accumulation of specie and bullion in the country amounting to more than $6,000,000, in addition to the national product of these metals for the same period--a total increase of gold and silver for the six months not far short of $60,000,000. it is very evident that unless this great increase of the precious metals can be utilized at home in such a way as to make it in some manner remunerative to the holders it must seek a foreign market as surely as would any other product of the soil or the manufactory. any legislation which will keep coin and bullion at home will, in my judgment, soon bring about practical resumption, and will add the coin of the country to the circulating medium, thus securing a healthy "inflation" of a sound currency, to the great advantage of every legitimate business interest. the act to provide for the resumption of specie payments authorizes the secretary of the treasury to issue bonds of either of the descriptions named in the act of congress approved july 14, 1870, entitled "an act to authorize the refunding of the national debt," for not less than par in gold. with the present value of the 4-1/2 per cent bonds in the markets of the world, they could be exchanged at par for gold, thus strengthening the treasury to meet final resumption and to keep the excess of coin over demand, pending its permanent use as a circulating medium, at home. all that would be further required would be to reduce the volume of legal-tender notes in circulation. to accomplish this i would suggest an act authorizing the secretary of the treasury to issue 4 per cent bonds, with forty years to run before maturity, to be exchanged for legal-tender notes whenever presented in sums of $50 or any multiple thereof, the whole amount of such bonds, however, not to exceed $150,000,000. to increase the home demand for such bonds i would recommend that they be available for deposit in the united states treasury for banking purposes under the various provisions of law relating to national banks. i would suggest further that national banks be required to retain a certain percentage of the coin interest received by them from the bonds deposited with the treasury to secure their circulation. i would also recommend the repeal of the third section of the joint resolution "for the issue of silver coin," approved july 22, 1876, limiting the subsidiary coin and fractional currency to $50,000,000. i am satisfied that if congress will enact some such law as will accomplish the end suggested they will give a relief to the country instant in its effects, and for which they will receive the gratitude of the whole people. u.s. grant. executive mansion, _february 9, 1877_. _to the senate and house of representatives_: the accompanying memorial is transmitted to congress at the request of a committee, composed of many distinguished citizens of new york, recently appointed to cooperate with a generous body of french citizens who design to erect in the harbor of new york a colossal statue of "liberty enlightening the world." very little is asked of us to do, and i hope that the wishes of the memorialists may receive your very favorable consideration. u.s. grant. executive mansion, _february 9, 1877_. _to the senate and house of representatives_: i transmit herewith the catalogues and report of the board on behalf of the executive departments at the international exhibition of 1876, with their accompanying illustrations. the labors performed by the members of the board, as evinced by the voluminous mass of information found in the various papers from the officers charged with their preparation, have been in the highest degree commendable, and believing that the publication of these papers will form an interesting memorial of the greatest of international exhibitions and of the centennial anniversary of the independence of our country, i recommend that they be printed in a suitable form for distribution and preservation. the letter of the chairman of the board will give to congress the history of its organization, the law and executive orders under which it has acted, and the steps which have been taken to preserve the large and instructive collections made, with a view to their forming a part of a national museum, should congress make the necessary appropriations for such a desirable object. u.s. grant. washington, _february 15, 1877_. _to the senate of the united states_: i transmit herewith, in answer to the resolution of the senate of the 13th instant, a report from the secretary of state, with accompanying papers.[122] u.s. grant. [footnote 122: statements of appropriations and expenditures of the department of state from march 4, 1789, to june 30, 1876, inclusive.] washington, _february 23, 1877_. _to the senate and house of representatives_: i transmit herewith a report from the secretary of state, bearing date the 20th instant, with its accompaniments, being the report of the commissioner of the united states and of the officers of engineers attached to the commission appointed to determine the boundary line between the united states and the possessions of great britain from the northwest angle of the lake of the woods to the summit of the rocky mountains. these reports announce the completion of the labors of this commission, whereby the entire boundary line between the united states and the possessions of great britain is marked and determined, except as to that part of the territory of the united states which was ceded by russia under the treaty of 1867. u.s. grant. washington, _february 24, 1877_. _to the house of representatives_: i transmit herewith, in answer to the resolution of the house of representatives of the 25th ultimo, a report from the secretary of state, with accompanying papers.[123] u.s. grant. [footnote 123: correspondence, etc., connected with the agency of a.b. steinberger in the samoan islands.] executive mansion, _february 26, 1877_. _to the senate of the united states_: i have the honor to return herewith senate bill no. 234, entitled "an act to allow a pension of $37 per month to soldiers who have lost both an arm and a leg." under existing law soldiers who have lost both an arm and a leg are entitled to draw a monthly pension of $18. as the object of this bill is to allow them $18 per month for each of these disabilities, or $36 in all, it is returned simply for an amendment of title which shall agree with its provisions. when this shall have been done, i will very gladly give it my immediate approval. u.s. grant. washington, _february 28, 1877_. _to the senate of the united states_: in answer to the resolution[124] of the senate of the 27th instant, i transmit herewith a report of the secretary of state, together with the papers which accompanied it. u.s. grant. [footnote 124: directing the secretary of state to transmit any communication demanding the payment of moneys claimed to be due the dominican government from the united states.] veto messages. executive mansion, _january 15, 1877_. _to the house of representatives_: for the reasons set forth in the accompanying communication addressed to the secretary of the interior by the commissioner of the general land office, i have the honor to return herewith without my signature the bill (h.r. 2041) entitled "an act to amend section 2291 of the revised statutes of the united states, in relation to proof required in homestead entries." u.s. grant. department of the interior, _washington, d.c., january 12, 1877_. the president. sir: i have the honor to return herewith enrolled bill h.r. no. 2041, entitled "an act to amend section 2291 of the revised statutes of the united states, in relation to proof required in homestead entries," which accompanied your letter of the 10th instant, requesting to be informed whether any objection was known to this department why the same should not become a law. the matter was referred to the commissioner of the general land office, and i transmit herewith a copy of a letter from him suggesting certain amendments to the second section of said act. i concur in the recommendations made by the commissioner. i have the honor to be, with great respect, your obedient servant, z. chandler, _secretary_. department of the interior, general land office, _washington, d.c., january 11, 1877_. the honorable secretary of the interior. sir: i am in receipt, by your reference of yesterday's date, of "an act to amend section 2291 of the revised statutes of the united states, in relation to proof required in homestead entries," which has passed both houses of congress and now awaits the signature of the president. the purpose of the act is to enable parties seeking title under the homestead law to make final proof before a judge or clerk of court in the county or district where the lands are situated. its provisions are in conformity with the views and recommendations of this office, and i see no objection to them in so far as relates to the taking of the testimony. i observe, however, that the second section provides that the proofs, affidavits, and oaths shall be filed in the office of the register, and no provision is made for the transmission of either the original papers or duplicates to this office, in order that patents may properly issue thereon, the provisions relating to certification for the purposes of evidence seeming to require that they shall remain on file in the district office. there is, therefore, no opportunity for the supervisory control of the commissioner over entries so made to be exercised under the statutes, and thus the express requirements of existing law, as well as the essential harmony of the land system, are interfered with by its provisions. to remedy this defect in the proposed law i recommend that the act be returned to the legislative body with the request for an enactment in lieu of the second section which shall provide for the regular transmission of the papers to this office, as in other cases, or the simple striking out of the section altogether, as the provisions of existing law would then cover the case, and require the same disposal of this class of entries as obtains under present regulations so far as relates to the transmission of papers and proof to this office and the certification of the same by the commissioner, under seal, for purposes of evidence. i observe in section 3, line 4, the omission of the word "he" after the word "corrupt," which destroys the grammatical construction of the language and was probably a clerical error. i return herewith the act referred to. very respectfully, your obedient servant, a. williamson, _commissioner_. executive mansion, _january 23, 1877_. _to the house of representatives_: i return herewith house bill (no. 4350) to abolish the board of commissioners of the metropolitan police of the district of columbia and to transfer its duties to the commissioners of the district of columbia, without my approval. it is my judgment that the police commissioners, while appointed by the executive, should report to and receive instructions from the district commissioners. under other circumstances than those existing at present i would have no objection to the entire abolition of the board and seeing the duties devolved directly upon the district commissioners. the latter should, in my opinion, have supervision and control over the acts of the police commissioners under any circumstances; but as recent events have shown that gross violations of law have existed in this district for years directly under the eyes of the police, it is highly desirable that the board of police commissioners should be continued in some form until the evil complained of is eradicated and until the police force is put on a footing to prevent, if possible, a recurrence of the evil. the board of police commissioners have recently been charged with the direct object of accomplishing this end. u.s. grant. washington, _january 26, 1877_. _to the house of representatives_: i return to the house of representatives, in which they originated, two joint resolutions, the one entitled "joint resolution relating to congratulations from the argentine republic," the other entitled "joint resolution in reference to congratulations from the republic of pretoria, south africa." the former of these resolutions purports to direct the secretary of state to acknowledge a dispatch of congratulation from the argentine republic and the high appreciation of congress of the compliment thus conveyed. the other directs the secretary of state to communicate to the republic of pretoria the high appreciation of congress of the complimentary terms in which said republic has referred to the first centennial of our national independence. sympathizing, as i do, in the spirit of courtesy and friendly recognition which has prompted the passage of these resolutions, i can not escape the conviction that their adoption has inadvertently involved the exercise of a power which infringes upon the constitutional rights of the executive. the usage of governments generally confines their correspondence and interchange of opinion and of sentiments of congratulation, as well as of discussion, to one certain established agency. to allow correspondence or interchange between states to be conducted by or with more than one such agency would necessarily lead to confusion, and possibly to contradictory presentation of views and to international complications. the constitution of the united states, following the established usage of nations, has indicated the president as the agent to represent the national sovereignty in its intercourse with foreign powers and to receive all official communications from them. it gives him the power, by and with the advice and consent of the senate, to make treaties and to appoint embassadors and other public ministers; it intrusts to him solely "to receive embassadors and other public ministers," thus vesting in him the origination of negotiations and the reception and conduct of all correspondence with foreign states, making him, in the language of one of the most eminent writers on constitutional law, "the constitutional organ of communication with foreign states." no copy of the addresses which it is proposed to acknowledge is furnished. i have no knowledge of their tone, language, or purport. from the tenor of the two joint resolutions it is to be inferred that these communications are probably purely congratulatory. friendly and kindly intentioned as they may be, the presentation by a foreign state of any communication to a branch of the government not contemplated by the constitution for the reception of communications from foreign states might, if allowed to pass without notice, become a precedent for the address by foreigners or by foreign states of communications of a different nature and with wicked designs. if congress can direct the correspondence of the secretary of state with foreign governments, a case very different from that now under consideration might arise, when that officer might be directed to present to the same foreign government entirely different and antagonistic views or statements. by the act of congress establishing what is now the department of state, then known as the department of foreign affairs, the secretary is to "perform and execute such duties as shall from time to time be enjoined on or intrusted to him by the president of the united states, agreeably to the constitution, relative to correspondence, commissions, or instructions to or with public ministers or consuls from the united states, or to negotiations with public ministers from foreign states or princes, or to memorials or other applications from foreign public ministers or other foreigners, or to such other matters respecting foreign affairs as the president of the united states shall assign to the said department; and furthermore, the said principal officer [the secretary of state] shall conduct the business of the said department in such manner as the president of the united states shall from time to time order or instruct." this law, which remains substantially unchanged, confirms the view that the whole correspondence of the government with and from foreign states is intrusted to the president; that the secretary of state conducts such correspondence exclusively under the orders and instructions of the president, and that no communication or correspondence from foreigners or from a foreign state can properly be addressed to any branch or department of the government except that to which such correspondence has been committed by the constitution and the laws. i therefore feel it my duty to return the joint resolutions without my approval to the house of representatives, in which they originated. in addition to the reasons already stated for withholding my constitutional approval from these resolutions is the fact that no information is furnished as to the terms or purport of the communications to which acknowledgments are desired; no copy of the communications accompanies the resolutions, nor is the name even of the officer or of the body to whom an acknowledgment could be addressed given; it is not known whether these congratulatory addresses proceed from the head of the state or from legislative bodies; and as regards the resolution relating to the republic of pretoria, i can not learn that any state or government of that name exists. u.s. grant. executive mansion, _january 26, 1877_. _to the senate of the united states_: i have the honor to return herewith without my approval senate bill no. 685, entitled "an act to place the name of daniel h. kelly upon the muster roll of company f, second tennessee infantry." the reasons for withholding my signature to this bill may be found in the accompanying report received from the secretary of war. u.s. grant. war department, _january 24, 1877_. the president. sir: i have the honor to return herewith senate bill 685, "to place the name of daniel h. kelly upon the muster roll of company f, second tennessee infantry," with the report of the adjutant-general, as follows: "the inclosed act directs the secretary of war to place the name of daniel h. kelly upon the muster roll of company f, second tennessee infantry, to date december 1, 1861. there is no record of the enlistment, service, or death of this man on file in this office, and if this act becomes a law as it now reads it will be of no benefit to the heirs." i have the honor to be, sir, with great respect, your obedient servant, j.d. cameron, _secretary of war_. executive mansion, _february 14, 1877_. _to the house of representatives_: i have the honor to return herewith without my approval house bill no. 3367, entitled "an act to remove the charge of desertion from the military record of alfred rouland." the reasons for withholding my signature may be found in the accompanying report received from the secretary of war. u.s. grant. war department, _washington city, february 8, 1877_. the president. sir: i have the honor to return house bill 3367, "to remove the charge of desertion from the military record of alfred rouland," and inclose copy of the report of the adjutant-general, dated the 8th instant, who recommends that the bill be not approved. in this connection i would invite attention to reports of the military committees of the house and senate (house report no. 461, forty-fourth congress, first session; senate report no. 578, forty-fourth congress, second session) in the case, of which copies are herewith. i have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant, j.d. cameron, _secretary of war_. war department, adjutant-general's office, _february 8, 1877_. respectfully returned to the secretary of war. this man is reported on the muster-out roll of his company as having "deserted at wilmington, n.c., april 16, 1866." in his petition of december 28, 1874, on file in this office, occurs the following language: "i was transferred to the twenty-eighth michigan volunteers, and performed duty with that regiment from the 28th june, 1865, until the 16th day of april, 1866, when, being in a reduced and weak condition from continued chills and fever, and being in great fear of smallpox, which had become very prevalent at wilmington, n.c., where my company was then stationed, i left my command without leave and returned to michigan." * * * this man is consequently a deserter in fact, and should this bill, restoring to an honorable status an admitted deserter, become a law, it will defeat every end of military discipline and justice, besides working a great injustice to every soldier who served faithfully and honorably. it is therefore strongly recommended that it be not approved. e.d. townsend, _adjutant-general_. executive mansion, _february 14, 1877_. _to the house of representatives_: i return the house bill no. 3155, entitled "an act to perfect the revision of the statutes of the united states," without my approval. my objection is to the single provision which amends section 3823 of the revised statutes. that section is as follows: sec. 3823. the clerk of the house of representatives shall select in virginia, south carolina, north carolina, georgia, florida, alabama, mississippi, louisiana, texas, and arkansas one or more newspapers, not exceeding the number allowed by law, in which such treaties and laws of the united states as may be ordered for publication in newspapers according to law shall be published, and in some one or more of which so selected all such advertisements as may be ordered for publication in said districts by any united states court or judge thereof, or by any officer of such courts, or by any executive officer of the united states, shall be published, the compensation for which and other terms of publication shall be fixed by said clerk at a rate not exceeding $2 per page for the publication of treaties and laws, and not exceeding $1 per square of eight lines of space for the publication of advertisements, the accounts for which shall be adjusted by the proper accounting officers and paid in the manner now authorized by law in the like cases. the bill proposes to amend this section as follows: by striking out all after the word "in" in the first line to the word "one" in the third line, and inserting therefor the words "each state and territory of the united states." prior to 1867 the advertising of the executive departments had been subject to the direction of the heads of those departments, and had been published in newspapers selected by them and on terms fixed by them. in the year 1867 (14 u.s. statutes at large, pp. 466, 467), while the ten states above named were yet unrestricted, and when there existed a radical difference of opinion between the executive and legislative departments as to the administration of the government in those states, this provision was enacted. subsequently, during the same year (15 u.s. statutes at large, p. 8), so much of this provision "as relates to the publication of the laws and treaties of the united states" was extended to all the states and territories, leaving the advertisements ordered by congress and by the executive departments unaffected thereby. the continuance of this provision after the reconstruction acts had taken effect and the bringing it forward into the revised statutes were probably through inadvertence. the existence of this section (3823) of the revised statutes seems to have been ignored by congress itself in the adoption of section 3941, authorizing the postmaster-general to advertise in such newspapers as he may choose. but the present act, if it should go into effect, would compel him and the other heads of the executive departments, as well as all the courts, to publish all their advertisements in newspapers selected by the clerk of the house of representatives. it would make general in its operation a provision which, was exceptional and temporary in its origin and character. this, in my judgment, would be unwise, if not also an actual encroachment upon the constitutional rights of the executive branch of the government. the person who should be appointed by law to select all the newspapers throughout the country to which the patronage of all branches of the government of the united states should be given, if not an officer of the united states under article ii, section 2, clause 2, of the constitution, would certainly have powers and duties which have hitherto been regarded as official. but without reference to the question of its constitutionality, i am satisfied that this provision would not operate usefully or fairly. i am constrained, therefore, to withhold from it my approval. i regret that my objection to this one clause of the act can not be made available without withholding my approval from the entire act, which is otherwise unobjectionable. u.s. grant. executive mansion, _february 28, 1877_. _to the senate of the united states_: i have the honor to return herewith without my approval senate bill no. 691, entitled "an act for the relief of edward a. leland." the reasons for withholding my approval may be found in the accompanying communication received from the secretary of the interior. u.s. grant. department of the interior, _washington, february 27, 1877_. the president. sir: i have the honor to return herewith the bill (s. 691) entitled "an act for the relief of edward a. leland," accompanied by a copy of a letter from the commissioner of patents suggesting an objection to the bill in its present form, and to recommend that it be returned to congress for amendment in accordance with the suggestions of the commissioner. i have the honor to be, very respectfully, z. chandler, _secretary_. department of the interior, united states patent office, _washington, d.c., february 27, 1877_. hon. z. chandler, _secretary of the interior_. sir: in the matter of the enrolled bill (s. 691) extending letters patent of edward a. leland, i have the honor to report that said letters patent were granted for an improved paint can august 14, 1860, for the term of fourteen years; that they consequently expired on the 14th day of august, 1874, whereupon the invention became the property of the public. the present act proposes to extend the term of the patent seven years from said 14th day of august, 1874, and give to it the same effect in law as if it had been originally granted for the term of twenty-one years. it will be seen, therefore, that those who have innocently used and purchased the invention since the expiration of the letters patent on the 14th of august, 1874, under the impression that the invention was the property of the public, will, by the retroactive terms of the bill, be liable for damages for such use upon suits for infringement. this hardship is generally, if not always, provided against by a proviso to such bills, setting forth in terms "that no person shall be held liable for the infringement of said patent, if extended, for making use of said invention since the expiration of the original term of said patent and prior to the date of its extension." unless such a proviso is incorporated into the present bill, the injustice alluded to may be done. very respectfully, your obedient servant, ellis spear, _commissioner of patents_. proclamation. by the president of the united states of america. a proclamation. whereas objects of interest to the united states require that the senate should be convened at 12 o'clock on the 5th day of march next to receive and act upon such communications as may be made to it on the part of the executive: now, therefore, i, ulysses s. grant, president of the united states, have considered it to be my duty to issue this my proclamation, declaring that an extraordinary occasion requires the senate of the united states to convene for the transaction of business at the capitol, in the city of washington, on the 5th day of march next, at 12 o'clock at noon on that day, of which all who shall at that time be entitled to act as members of that body are hereby required to take notice. [seal.] given under my hand and the seal of the united states, at washington, the 2d day of march, a.d. 1877, and of the independence of the united states of america the one hundred and first. u.s. grant. by the president: hamilton fish, _secretary of state_. personal memoirs of u. s. grant, complete by u. s. grant preface. "man proposes and god disposes." there are but few important events in the affairs of men brought about by their own choice. although frequently urged by friends to write my memoirs i had determined never to do so, nor to write anything for publication. at the age of nearly sixty-two i received an injury from a fall, which confined me closely to the house while it did not apparently affect my general health. this made study a pleasant pastime. shortly after, the rascality of a business partner developed itself by the announcement of a failure. this was followed soon after by universal depression of all securities, which seemed to threaten the extinction of a good part of the income still retained, and for which i am indebted to the kindly act of friends. at this juncture the editor of the century magazine asked me to write a few articles for him. i consented for the money it gave me; for at that moment i was living upon borrowed money. the work i found congenial, and i determined to continue it. the event is an important one for me, for good or evil; i hope for the former. in preparing these volumes for the public, i have entered upon the task with the sincere desire to avoid doing injustice to any one, whether on the national or confederate side, other than the unavoidable injustice of not making mention often where special mention is due. there must be many errors of omission in this work, because the subject is too large to be treated of in two volumes in such way as to do justice to all the officers and men engaged. there were thousands of instances, during the rebellion, of individual, company, regimental and brigade deeds of heroism which deserve special mention and are not here alluded to. the troops engaged in them will have to look to the detailed reports of their individual commanders for the full history of those deeds. the first volume, as well as a portion of the second, was written before i had reason to suppose i was in a critical condition of health. later i was reduced almost to the point of death, and it became impossible for me to attend to anything for weeks. i have, however, somewhat regained my strength, and am able, often, to devote as many hours a day as a person should devote to such work. i would have more hope of satisfying the expectation of the public if i could have allowed myself more time. i have used my best efforts, with the aid of my eldest son, f. d. grant, assisted by his brothers, to verify from the records every statement of fact given. the comments are my own, and show how i saw the matters treated of whether others saw them in the same light or not. with these remarks i present these volumes to the public, asking no favor but hoping they will meet the approval of the reader. u. s. grant. mount macgregor, new york, july 1, 1885. contents volume i. chapter i. ancestry--birth--boyhood. chapter ii. west point--graduation. chapter iii. army life--causes of the mexican war--camp salubrity. chapter iv. corpus christi--mexican smuggling--spanish rule in mexico --supplying transportation. chapter v. trip to austin--promotion to full second-lieutenant--army of occupation. chapter vi. advance of the army--crossing the colorado--the rio grande. chapter vii. the mexican war--the battle of palo alto--the battle of resaca de la palma--army of invasion--general taylor--movement on camargo. chapter viii. advance on monterey--the black fort--the battle of monterey--surrender of the city. chapter ix. political intrigue--buena vista--movement against vera cruz --siege and capture of vera cruz. chapter x. march to jalapa--battle of cerro gordo--perote--puebla--scott and taylor. chapter xi. advance on the city of mexico--battle of contreras--assault at churubusco--negotiations for peace--battle of molino del rey --storming of chapultepec--san cosme--evacuation of the city--halls of the montezumas. chapter xii. promotion to first lieutenant--capture of the city of mexico--the army--mexican soldiers--peace negotiations. chapter xiii. treaty of peace--mexican bull fights--regimental quartermaster--trip to popocatapetl--trip to the caves of mexico. chapter xiv. return of the army--marriage--ordered to the pacific coast --crossing the isthmus--arrival at san francisco. chapter xv. san francisco--early california experiences--life on the pacific coast--promoted captain--flush times in california. chapter xvi. resignation--private life--life at galena--the coming crisis. chapter xvii. outbreak of the rebellion--presiding at a union meeting --mustering officer of state troops--lyon at camp jackson--services tendered to the government. chapter xviii. appointed colonel of the 21st illinois--personnel of the regiment--general logan--march to missouri--movement against harris at florida, mo.--general pope in command--stationed at mexico, mo. chapter xix. commissioned brigadier-general--command at ironton, mo. --jefferson city--cape girardeau--general prentiss--seizure of paducah --headquarters at cairo. chapter xx. general fremont in command--movement against belmont--battle of belmont--a narrow escape--after the battle. chapter xxi. general halleck in command--commanding the district of cairo--movement on fort henry--capture of fort henry. chapter xxii. investment of fort donelson--the naval operations--attack of the enemy--assaulting the works--surrender of the fort. chapter xxiii. promoted major-general of volunteers--unoccupied territory--advance upon nashville--situation of the troops--confederate retreat--relieved of the command--restored to the command--general smith. chapter xxiv. the army at pittsburg landing--injured by a fall--the confederate attack at shiloh--the first day's fight at shiloh--general sherman--condition of the army--close of the first day's fight--the second day's fight--retreat and defeat of the confederates. chapter xxv. struck by a bullet--precipitate retreat of the confederates--intrenchments at shiloh--general buell--general johnston --remarks on shiloh. chapter xxvi. halleck assumes command in the field--the advance upon corinth--occupation of corinth--the army separated. chapter xxvii. headquarters moved to memphis--on the road to memphis --escaping jackson--complaints and requests--halleck appointed commander-in-chief--return to corinth--movements of bragg--surrender of clarksville--the advance upon chattanooga--sheridan colonel of a michigan regiment. chapter xxviii. advance of van dorn and price--price enters iuka--battle of iuka. chapter xxix. van dorn's movements--battle of corinth--command of the department of the tennessee. chapter xxx. the campaign against vicksburg--employing the freedmen --occupation of holly springs--sherman ordered to memphis--sherman's movements down the mississippi--van dorn captures holly springs --collecting forage and food. chapter xxxi. headquarters moved to holly springs--general mcclernand in command--assuming command at young's point--operations above vicksburg --fortifications about vicksburg--the canal--lake providence--operations at yazoo pass. chapter xxxii. the bayous west of the mississippi--criticisms of the northern press--running the batteries--loss of the indianola --disposition of the troops. chapter xxxiii. attack on grand gulf--operations below vicksburg. chapter xxxiv. capture of port gibson--grierson's raid--occupation of grand gulf--movement up the big black--battle of raymond. chapter xxxv. movement against jackson--fall of jackson--intercepting the enemy--battle of champion's hill. chapter xxxvi. battle of black river bridge--crossing the big black --investment of vicksburg--assaulting the works. chapter xxxvii. siege of vicksburg. chapter xxxviii. johnston's movements--fortifications at haines's bluff --explosion of the mine--explosion of the second mine--preparing for the assault--the flag of truce--meeting with pemberton--negotiations for surrender--accepting the terms--surrender of vicksburg. chapter xxxix. retrospect of the campaign--sherman's movements--proposed movement upon mobile--a painful accident--ordered to report at cairo. volume one begins: chapter i. ancestry--birth--boyhood. my family is american, and has been for generations, in all its branches, direct and collateral. mathew grant, the founder of the branch in america, of which i am a descendant, reached dorchester, massachusetts, in may, 1630. in 1635 he moved to what is now windsor, connecticut, and was the surveyor for that colony for more than forty years. he was also, for many years of the time, town clerk. he was a married man when he arrived at dorchester, but his children were all born in this country. his eldest son, samuel, took lands on the east side of the connecticut river, opposite windsor, which have been held and occupied by descendants of his to this day. i am of the eighth generation from mathew grant, and seventh from samuel. mathew grant's first wife died a few years after their settlement in windsor, and he soon after married the widow rockwell, who, with her first husband, had been fellow-passengers with him and his first wife, on the ship mary and john, from dorchester, england, in 1630. mrs. rockwell had several children by her first marriage, and others by her second. by intermarriage, two or three generations later, i am descended from both the wives of mathew grant. in the fifth descending generation my great grandfather, noah grant, and his younger brother, solomon, held commissions in the english army, in 1756, in the war against the french and indians. both were killed that year. my grandfather, also named noah, was then but nine years old. at the breaking out of the war of the revolution, after the battles of concord and lexington, he went with a connecticut company to join the continental army, and was present at the battle of bunker hill. he served until the fall of yorktown, or through the entire revolutionary war. he must, however, have been on furlough part of the time--as i believe most of the soldiers of that period were--for he married in connecticut during the war, had two children, and was a widower at the close. soon after this he emigrated to westmoreland county, pennsylvania, and settled near the town of greensburg in that county. he took with him the younger of his two children, peter grant. the elder, solomon, remained with his relatives in connecticut until old enough to do for himself, when he emigrated to the british west indies. not long after his settlement in pennsylvania, my grandfather, captain noah grant, married a miss kelly, and in 1799 he emigrated again, this time to ohio, and settled where the town of deerfield now stands. he had now five children, including peter, a son by his first marriage. my father, jesse r. grant, was the second child--oldest son, by the second marriage. peter grant went early to maysville, kentucky, where he was very prosperous, married, had a family of nine children, and was drowned at the mouth of the kanawha river, virginia, in 1825, being at the time one of the wealthy men of the west. my grandmother grant died in 1805, leaving seven children. this broke up the family. captain noah grant was not thrifty in the way of "laying up stores on earth," and, after the death of his second wife, he went, with the two youngest children, to live with his son peter, in maysville. the rest of the family found homes in the neighborhood of deerfield, my father in the family of judge tod, the father of the late governor tod, of ohio. his industry and independence of character were such, that i imagine his labor compensated fully for the expense of his maintenance. there must have been a cordiality in his welcome into the tod family, for to the day of his death he looked upon judge tod and his wife, with all the reverence he could have felt if they had been parents instead of benefactors. i have often heard him speak of mrs. tod as the most admirable woman he had ever known. he remained with the tod family only a few years, until old enough to learn a trade. he went first, i believe, with his half-brother, peter grant, who, though not a tanner himself, owned a tannery in maysville, kentucky. here he learned his trade, and in a few years returned to deerfield and worked for, and lived in the family of a mr. brown, the father of john brown--"whose body lies mouldering in the grave, while his soul goes marching on." i have often heard my father speak of john brown, particularly since the events at harper's ferry. brown was a boy when they lived in the same house, but he knew him afterwards, and regarded him as a man of great purity of character, of high moral and physical courage, but a fanatic and extremist in whatever he advocated. it was certainly the act of an insane man to attempt the invasion of the south, and the overthrow of slavery, with less than twenty men. my father set up for himself in business, establishing a tannery at ravenna, the county seat of portage county. in a few years he removed from ravenna, and set up the same business at point pleasant, clermont county, ohio. during the minority of my father, the west afforded but poor facilities for the most opulent of the youth to acquire an education, and the majority were dependent, almost exclusively, upon their own exertions for whatever learning they obtained. i have often heard him say that his time at school was limited to six months, when he was very young, too young, indeed, to learn much, or to appreciate the advantages of an education, and to a "quarter's schooling" afterwards, probably while living with judge tod. but his thirst for education was intense. he learned rapidly, and was a constant reader up to the day of his death in his eightieth year. books were scarce in the western reserve during his youth, but he read every book he could borrow in the neighborhood where he lived. this scarcity gave him the early habit of studying everything he read, so that when he got through with a book, he knew everything in it. the habit continued through life. even after reading the daily papers--which he never neglected--he could give all the important information they contained. he made himself an excellent english scholar, and before he was twenty years of age was a constant contributor to western newspapers, and was also, from that time until he was fifty years old, an able debater in the societies for this purpose, which were common in the west at that time. he always took an active part in politics, but was never a candidate for office, except, i believe, that he was the first mayor of georgetown. he supported jackson for the presidency; but he was a whig, a great admirer of henry clay, and never voted for any other democrat for high office after jackson. my mother's family lived in montgomery county, pennsylvania, for several generations. i have little information about her ancestors. her family took no interest in genealogy, so that my grandfather, who died when i was sixteen years old, knew only back to his grandfather. on the other side, my father took a great interest in the subject, and in his researches, he found that there was an entailed estate in windsor, connecticut, belonging to the family, to which his nephew, lawson grant --still living--was the heir. he was so much interested in the subject that he got his nephew to empower him to act in the matter, and in 1832 or 1833, when i was a boy ten or eleven years old, he went to windsor, proved the title beyond dispute, and perfected the claim of the owners for a consideration--three thousand dollars, i think. i remember the circumstance well, and remember, too, hearing him say on his return that he found some widows living on the property, who had little or nothing beyond their homes. from these he refused to receive any recompense. my mother's father, john simpson, moved from montgomery county, pennsylvania, to clermont county, ohio, about the year 1819, taking with him his four children, three daughters and one son. my mother, hannah simpson, was the third of these children, and was then over twenty years of age. her oldest sister was at that time married, and had several children. she still lives in clermont county at this writing, october 5th, 1884, and is over ninety ears of age. until her memory failed her, a few years ago, she thought the country ruined beyond recovery when the democratic party lost control in 1860. her family, which was large, inherited her views, with the exception of one son who settled in kentucky before the war. he was the only one of the children who entered the volunteer service to suppress the rebellion. her brother, next of age and now past eighty-eight, is also still living in clermont county, within a few miles of the old homestead, and is as active in mind as ever. he was a supporter of the government during the war, and remains a firm believer, that national success by the democratic party means irretrievable ruin. in june, 1821, my father, jesse r. grant, married hannah simpson. i was born on the 27th of april, 1822, at point pleasant, clermont county, ohio. in the fall of 1823 we moved to georgetown, the county seat of brown, the adjoining county east. this place remained my home, until at the age of seventeen, in 1839, i went to west point. the schools, at the time of which i write, were very indifferent. there were no free schools, and none in which the scholars were classified. they were all supported by subscription, and a single teacher--who was often a man or a woman incapable of teaching much, even if they imparted all they knew--would have thirty or forty scholars, male and female, from the infant learning the a b c's up to the young lady of eighteen and the boy of twenty, studying the highest branches taught--the three r's, "reading, 'riting, 'rithmetic." i never saw an algebra, or other mathematical work higher than the arithmetic, in georgetown, until after i was appointed to west point. i then bought a work on algebra in cincinnati; but having no teacher it was greek to me. my life in georgetown was uneventful. from the age of five or six until seventeen, i attended the subscription schools of the village, except during the winters of 1836-7 and 1838-9. the former period was spent in maysville, kentucky, attending the school of richardson and rand; the latter in ripley, ohio, at a private school. i was not studious in habit, and probably did not make progress enough to compensate for the outlay for board and tuition. at all events both winters were spent in going over the same old arithmetic which i knew every word of before, and repeating: "a noun is the name of a thing," which i had also heard my georgetown teachers repeat, until i had come to believe it--but i cast no reflections upon my old teacher, richardson. he turned out bright scholars from his school, many of whom have filled conspicuous places in the service of their states. two of my contemporaries there --who, i believe, never attended any other institution of learning--have held seats in congress, and one, if not both, other high offices; these are wadsworth and brewster. my father was, from my earliest recollection, in comfortable circumstances, considering the times, his place of residence, and the community in which he lived. mindful of his own lack of facilities for acquiring an education, his greatest desire in maturer years was for the education of his children. consequently, as stated before, i never missed a quarter from school from the time i was old enough to attend till the time of leaving home. this did not exempt me from labor. in my early days, every one labored more or less, in the region where my youth was spent, and more in proportion to their private means. it was only the very poor who were exempt. while my father carried on the manufacture of leather and worked at the trade himself, he owned and tilled considerable land. i detested the trade, preferring almost any other labor; but i was fond of agriculture, and of all employment in which horses were used. we had, among other lands, fifty acres of forest within a mile of the village. in the fall of the year choppers were employed to cut enough wood to last a twelve-month. when i was seven or eight years of age, i began hauling all the wood used in the house and shops. i could not load it on the wagons, of course, at that time, but i could drive, and the choppers would load, and some one at the house unload. when about eleven years old, i was strong enough to hold a plough. from that age until seventeen i did all the work done with horses, such as breaking up the land, furrowing, ploughing corn and potatoes, bringing in the crops when harvested, hauling all the wood, besides tending two or three horses, a cow or two, and sawing wood for stoves, etc., while still attending school. for this i was compensated by the fact that there was never any scolding or punishing by my parents; no objection to rational enjoyments, such as fishing, going to the creek a mile away to swim in summer, taking a horse and visiting my grandparents in the adjoining county, fifteen miles off, skating on the ice in winter, or taking a horse and sleigh when there was snow on the ground. while still quite young i had visited cincinnati, forty-five miles away, several times, alone; also maysville, kentucky, often, and once louisville. the journey to louisville was a big one for a boy of that day. i had also gone once with a two-horse carriage to chilicothe, about seventy miles, with a neighbor's family, who were removing to toledo, ohio, and returned alone; and had gone once, in like manner, to flat rock, kentucky, about seventy miles away. on this latter occasion i was fifteen years of age. while at flat rock, at the house of a mr. payne, whom i was visiting with his brother, a neighbor of ours in georgetown, i saw a very fine saddle horse, which i rather coveted, and proposed to mr. payne, the owner, to trade him for one of the two i was driving. payne hesitated to trade with a boy, but asking his brother about it, the latter told him that it would be all right, that i was allowed to do as i pleased with the horses. i was seventy miles from home, with a carriage to take back, and mr. payne said he did not know that his horse had ever had a collar on. i asked to have him hitched to a farm wagon and we would soon see whether he would work. it was soon evident that the horse had never worn harness before; but he showed no viciousness, and i expressed a confidence that i could manage him. a trade was at once struck, i receiving ten dollars difference. the next day mr. payne, of georgetown, and i started on our return. we got along very well for a few miles, when we encountered a ferocious dog that frightened the horses and made them run. the new animal kicked at every jump he made. i got the horses stopped, however, before any damage was done, and without running into anything. after giving them a little rest, to quiet their fears, we started again. that instant the new horse kicked, and started to run once more. the road we were on, struck the turnpike within half a mile of the point where the second runaway commenced, and there there was an embankment twenty or more feet deep on the opposite side of the pike. i got the horses stopped on the very brink of the precipice. my new horse was terribly frightened and trembled like an aspen; but he was not half so badly frightened as my companion, mr. payne, who deserted me after this last experience, and took passage on a freight wagon for maysville. every time i attempted to start, my new horse would commence to kick. i was in quite a dilemma for a time. once in maysville i could borrow a horse from an uncle who lived there; but i was more than a day's travel from that point. finally i took out my bandanna--the style of handkerchief in universal use then--and with this blindfolded my horse. in this way i reached maysville safely the next day, no doubt much to the surprise of my friend. here i borrowed a horse from my uncle, and the following day we proceeded on our journey. about half my school-days in georgetown were spent at the school of john d. white, a north carolinian, and the father of chilton white who represented the district in congress for one term during the rebellion. mr. white was always a democrat in politics, and chilton followed his father. he had two older brothers--all three being school-mates of mine at their father's school--who did not go the same way. the second brother died before the rebellion began; he was a whig, and afterwards a republican. his oldest brother was a republican and brave soldier during the rebellion. chilton is reported as having told of an earlier horse-trade of mine. as he told the story, there was a mr. ralston living within a few miles of the village, who owned a colt which i very much wanted. my father had offered twenty dollars for it, but ralston wanted twenty-five. i was so anxious to have the colt, that after the owner left, i begged to be allowed to take him at the price demanded. my father yielded, but said twenty dollars was all the horse was worth, and told me to offer that price; if it was not accepted i was to offer twenty-two and a half, and if that would not get him, to give the twenty-five. i at once mounted a horse and went for the colt. when i got to mr. ralston's house, i said to him: "papa says i may offer you twenty dollars for the colt, but if you won't take that, i am to offer twenty-two and a half, and if you won't take that, to give you twenty-five." it would not require a connecticut man to guess the price finally agreed upon. this story is nearly true. i certainly showed very plainly that i had come for the colt and meant to have him. i could not have been over eight years old at the time. this transaction caused me great heart-burning. the story got out among the boys of the village, and it was a long time before i heard the last of it. boys enjoy the misery of their companions, at least village boys in that day did, and in later life i have found that all adults are not free from the peculiarity. i kept the horse until he was four years old, when he went blind, and i sold him for twenty dollars. when i went to maysville to school, in 1836, at the age of fourteen, i recognized my colt as one of the blind horses working on the tread-wheel of the ferry-boat. i have describes enough of my early life to give an impression of the whole. i did not like to work; but i did as much of it, while young, as grown men can be hired to do in these days, and attended school at the same time. i had as many privileges as any boy in the village, and probably more than most of them. i have no recollection of ever having been punished at home, either by scolding or by the rod. but at school the case was different. the rod was freely used there, and i was not exempt from its influence. i can see john d. white--the school teacher --now, with his long beech switch always in his hand. it was not always the same one, either. switches were brought in bundles, from a beech wood near the school house, by the boys for whose benefit they were intended. often a whole bundle would be used up in a single day. i never had any hard feelings against my teacher, either while attending the school, or in later years when reflecting upon my experience. mr. white was a kindhearted man, and was much respected by the community in which he lived. he only followed the universal custom of the period, and that under which he had received his own education. chapter ii. west point--graduation. in the winter of 1838-9 i was attending school at ripley, only ten miles distant from georgetown, but spent the christmas holidays at home. during this vacation my father received a letter from the honorable thomas morris, then united states senator from ohio. when he read it he said to me, "ulysses, i believe you are going to receive the appointment." "what appointment?" i inquired. "to west point; i have applied for it." "but i won't go," i said. he said he thought i would, and i thought so too, if he did. i really had no objection to going to west point, except that i had a very exalted idea of the acquirements necessary to get through. i did not believe i possessed them, and could not bear the idea of failing. there had been four boys from our village, or its immediate neighborhood, who had been graduated from west point, and never a failure of any one appointed from georgetown, except in the case of the one whose place i was to take. he was the son of dr. bailey, our nearest and most intimate neighbor. young bailey had been appointed in 1837. finding before the january examination following, that he could not pass, he resigned and went to a private school, and remained there until the following year, when he was reappointed. before the next examination he was dismissed. dr. bailey was a proud and sensitive man, and felt the failure of his son so keenly that he forbade his return home. there were no telegraphs in those days to disseminate news rapidly, no railroads west of the alleghanies, and but few east; and above all, there were no reporters prying into other people's private affairs. consequently it did not become generally known that there was a vacancy at west point from our district until i was appointed. i presume mrs. bailey confided to my mother the fact that bartlett had been dismissed, and that the doctor had forbidden his son's return home. the honorable thomas l. hamer, one of the ablest men ohio ever produced, was our member of congress at the time, and had the right of nomination. he and my father had been members of the same debating society (where they were generally pitted on opposite sides), and intimate personal friends from their early manhood up to a few years before. in politics they differed. hamer was a life-long democrat, while my father was a whig. they had a warm discussion, which finally became angry--over some act of president jackson, the removal of the deposit of public moneys, i think--after which they never spoke until after my appointment. i know both of them felt badly over this estrangement, and would have been glad at any time to come to a reconciliation; but neither would make the advance. under these circumstances my father would not write to hamer for the appointment, but he wrote to thomas morris, united states senator from ohio, informing him that there was a vacancy at west point from our district, and that he would be glad if i could be appointed to fill it. this letter, i presume, was turned over to mr. hamer, and, as there was no other applicant, he cheerfully appointed me. this healed the breach between the two, never after reopened. besides the argument used by my father in favor of my going to west point--that "he thought i would go"--there was another very strong inducement. i had always a great desire to travel. i was already the best travelled boy in georgetown, except the sons of one man, john walker, who had emigrated to texas with his family, and immigrated back as soon as he could get the means to do so. in his short stay in texas he acquired a very different opinion of the country from what one would form going there now. i had been east to wheeling, virginia, and north to the western reserve, in ohio, west to louisville, and south to bourbon county, kentucky, besides having driven or ridden pretty much over the whole country within fifty miles of home. going to west point would give me the opportunity of visiting the two great cities of the continent, philadelphia and new york. this was enough. when these places were visited i would have been glad to have had a steamboat or railroad collision, or any other accident happen, by which i might have received a temporary injury sufficient to make me ineligible, for a time, to enter the academy. nothing of the kind occurred, and i had to face the music. georgetown has a remarkable record for a western village. it is, and has been from its earliest existence, a democratic town. there was probably no time during the rebellion when, if the opportunity could have been afforded, it would not have voted for jefferson davis for president of the united states, over mr. lincoln, or any other representative of his party; unless it was immediately after some of john morgan's men, in his celebrated raid through ohio, spent a few hours in the village. the rebels helped themselves to whatever they could find, horses, boots and shoes, especially horses, and many ordered meals to be prepared for them by the families. this was no doubt a far pleasanter duty for some families than it would have been to render a like service for union soldiers. the line between the rebel and union element in georgetown was so marked that it led to divisions even in the churches. there were churches in that part of ohio where treason was preached regularly, and where, to secure membership, hostility to the government, to the war and to the liberation of the slaves, was far more essential than a belief in the authenticity or credibility of the bible. there were men in georgetown who filled all the requirements for membership in these churches. yet this far-off western village, with a population, including old and young, male and female, of about one thousand--about enough for the organization of a single regiment if all had been men capable of bearing arms--furnished the union army four general officers and one colonel, west point graduates, and nine generals and field officers of volunteers, that i can think of. of the graduates from west point, all had citizenship elsewhere at the breaking out of the rebellion, except possibly general a. v. kautz, who had remained in the army from his graduation. two of the colonels also entered the service from other localities. the other seven, general mcgroierty, colonels white, fyffe, loudon and marshall, majors king and bailey, were all residents of georgetown when the war broke out, and all of them, who were alive at the close, returned there. major bailey was the cadet who had preceded me at west point. he was killed in west virginia, in his first engagement. as far as i know, every boy who has entered west point from that village since my time has been graduated. i took passage on a steamer at ripley, ohio, for pittsburg, about the middle of may, 1839. western boats at that day did not make regular trips at stated times, but would stop anywhere, and for any length of time, for passengers or freight. i have myself been detained two or three days at a place after steam was up, the gang planks, all but one, drawn in, and after the time advertised for starting had expired. on this occasion we had no vexatious delays, and in about three days pittsburg was reached. from pittsburg i chose passage by the canal to harrisburg, rather than by the more expeditious stage. this gave a better opportunity of enjoying the fine scenery of western pennsylvania, and i had rather a dread of reaching my destination at all. at that time the canal was much patronized by travellers, and, with the comfortable packets of the period, no mode of conveyance could be more pleasant, when time was not an object. from harrisburg to philadelphia there was a railroad, the first i had ever seen, except the one on which i had just crossed the summit of the alleghany mountains, and over which canal boats were transported. in travelling by the road from harrisburg, i thought the perfection of rapid transit had been reached. we travelled at least eighteen miles an hour, when at full speed, and made the whole distance averaging probably as much as twelve miles an hour. this seemed like annihilating space. i stopped five days in philadelphia, saw about every street in the city, attended the theatre, visited girard college (which was then in course of construction), and got reprimanded from home afterwards, for dallying by the way so long. my sojourn in new york was shorter, but long enough to enable me to see the city very well. i reported at west point on the 30th or 31st of may, and about two weeks later passed my examination for admission, without difficulty, very much to my surprise. a military life had no charms for me, and i had not the faintest idea of staying in the army even if i should be graduated, which i did not expect. the encampment which preceded the commencement of academic studies was very wearisome and uninteresting. when the 28th of august came--the date for breaking up camp and going into barracks--i felt as though i had been at west point always, and that if i staid to graduation, i would have to remain always. i did not take hold of my studies with avidity, in fact i rarely ever read over a lesson the second time during my entire cadetship. i could not sit in my room doing nothing. there is a fine library connected with the academy from which cadets can get books to read in their quarters. i devoted more time to these, than to books relating to the course of studies. much of the time, i am sorry to say, was devoted to novels, but not those of a trashy sort. i read all of bulwer's then published, cooper's, marryat's, scott's, washington irving's works, lever's, and many others that i do not now remember. mathematics was very easy to me, so that when january came, i passed the examination, taking a good standing in that branch. in french, the only other study at that time in the first year's course, my standing was very low. in fact, if the class had been turned the other end foremost i should have been near head. i never succeeded in getting squarely at either end of my class, in any one study, during the four years. i came near it in french, artillery, infantry and cavalry tactics, and conduct. early in the session of the congress which met in december, 1839, a bill was discussed abolishing the military academy. i saw in this an honorable way to obtain a discharge, and read the debates with much interest, but with impatience at the delay in taking action, for i was selfish enough to favor the bill. it never passed, and a year later, although the time hung drearily with me, i would have been sorry to have seen it succeed. my idea then was to get through the course, secure a detail for a few years as assistant professor of mathematics at the academy, and afterwards obtain a permanent position as professor in some respectable college; but circumstances always did shape my course different from my plans. at the end of two years the class received the usual furlough, extending from the close of the june examination to the 28th of august. this i enjoyed beyond any other period of my life. my father had sold out his business in georgetown--where my youth had been spent, and to which my day-dreams carried me back as my future home, if i should ever be able to retire on a competency. he had moved to bethel, only twelve miles away, in the adjoining county of clermont, and had bought a young horse that had never been in harness, for my special use under the saddle during my furlough. most of my time was spent among my old school-mates--these ten weeks were shorter than one week at west point. persons acquainted with the academy know that the corps of cadets is divided into four companies for the purpose of military exercises. these companies are officered from the cadets, the superintendent and commandant selecting the officers for their military bearing and qualifications. the adjutant, quartermaster, four captains and twelve lieutenants are taken from the first, or senior class; the sergeants from the second, or junior class; and the corporals from the third, or sophomore class. i had not been "called out" as a corporal, but when i returned from furlough i found myself the last but one--about my standing in all the tactics--of eighteen sergeants. the promotion was too much for me. that year my standing in the class--as shown by the number of demerits of the year--was about the same as it was among the sergeants, and i was dropped, and served the fourth year as a private. during my first year's encampment general scott visited west point, and reviewed the cadets. with his commanding figure, his quite colossal size and showy uniform, i thought him the finest specimen of manhood my eyes had ever beheld, and the most to be envied. i could never resemble him in appearance, but i believe i did have a presentiment for a moment that some day i should occupy his place on review--although i had no intention then of remaining in the army. my experience in a horse-trade ten years before, and the ridicule it caused me, were too fresh in my mind for me to communicate this presentiment to even my most intimate chum. the next summer martin van buren, then president of the united states, visited west point and reviewed the cadets; he did not impress me with the awe which scott had inspired. in fact i regarded general scott and captain c. f. smith, the commandant of cadets, as the two men most to be envied in the nation. i retained a high regard for both up to the day of their death. the last two years wore away more rapidly than the first two, but they still seemed about five times as long as ohio years, to me. at last all the examinations were passed, and the members of the class were called upon to record their choice of arms of service and regiments. i was anxious to enter the cavalry, or dragoons as they were then called, but there was only one regiment of dragoons in the army at that time, and attached to that, besides the full complement of officers, there were at least four brevet second lieutenants. i recorded therefore my first choice, dragoons; second, 4th infantry; and got the latter. again there was a furlough--or, more properly speaking, leave of absence for the class were now commissioned officers--this time to the end of september. again i went to ohio to spend my vacation among my old school-mates; and again i found a fine saddle horse purchased for my special use, besides a horse and buggy that i could drive--but i was not in a physical condition to enjoy myself quite as well as on the former occasion. for six months before graduation i had had a desperate cough ("tyler's grip" it was called), and i was very much reduced, weighing but one hundred and seventeen pounds, just my weight at entrance, though i had grown six inches in stature in the mean time. there was consumption in my father's family, two of his brothers having died of that disease, which made my symptoms more alarming. the brother and sister next younger than myself died, during the rebellion, of the same disease, and i seemed the most promising subject for it of the three in 1843. having made alternate choice of two different arms of service with different uniforms, i could not get a uniform suit until notified of my assignment. i left my measurement with a tailor, with directions not to make the uniform until i notified him whether it was to be for infantry or dragoons. notice did not reach me for several weeks, and then it took at least a week to get the letter of instructions to the tailor and two more to make the clothes and have them sent to me. this was a time of great suspense. i was impatient to get on my uniform and see how it looked, and probably wanted my old school-mates, particularly the girls, to see me in it. the conceit was knocked out of me by two little circumstances that happened soon after the arrival of the clothes, which gave me a distaste for military uniform that i never recovered from. soon after the arrival of the suit i donned it, and put off for cincinnati on horseback. while i was riding along a street of that city, imagining that every one was looking at me, with a feeling akin to mine when i first saw general scott, a little urchin, bareheaded, footed, with dirty and ragged pants held up by bare a single gallows--that's what suspenders were called then--and a shirt that had not seen a wash-tub for weeks, turned to me and cried: "soldier! will you work? no, sir--ee; i'll sell my shirt first!!" the horse trade and its dire consequences were recalled to mind. the other circumstance occurred at home. opposite our house in bethel stood the old stage tavern where "man and beast" found accommodation, the stable-man was rather dissipated, but possessed of some humor. on my return i found him parading the streets, and attending in the stable, barefooted, but in a pair of sky-blue nankeen pantaloons--just the color of my uniform trousers--with a strip of white cotton sheeting sewed down the outside seams in imitation of mine. the joke was a huge one in the mind of many of the people, and was much enjoyed by them; but i did not appreciate it so highly. during the remainder of my leave of absence, my time was spent in visiting friends in georgetown and cincinnati, and occasionally other towns in that part of the state. chapter iii. army life--causes of the mexican war--camp salubrity. on the 30th of september i reported for duty at jefferson barracks, st. louis, with the 4th united states infantry. it was the largest military post in the country at that time, being garrisoned by sixteen companies of infantry, eight of the 3d regiment, the remainder of the 4th. colonel steven kearney, one of the ablest officers of the day, commanded the post, and under him discipline was kept at a high standard, but without vexatious rules or regulations. every drill and roll-call had to be attended, but in the intervals officers were permitted to enjoy themselves, leaving the garrison, and going where they pleased, without making written application to state where they were going for how long, etc., so that they were back for their next duty. it did seem to me, in my early army days, that too many of the older officers, when they came to command posts, made it a study to think what orders they could publish to annoy their subordinates and render them uncomfortable. i noticed, however, a few years later, when the mexican war broke out, that most of this class of officers discovered they were possessed of disabilities which entirely incapacitated them for active field service. they had the moral courage to proclaim it, too. they were right; but they did not always give their disease the right name. at west point i had a class-mate--in the last year of our studies he was room-mate also--f. t. dent, whose family resided some five miles west of jefferson barracks. two of his unmarried brothers were living at home at that time, and as i had taken with me from ohio, my horse, saddle and bridle, i soon found my way out to white haven, the name of the dent estate. as i found the family congenial my visits became frequent. there were at home, besides the young men, two daughters, one a school miss of fifteen, the other a girl of eight or nine. there was still an older daughter of seventeen, who had been spending several years at boarding-school in st. louis, but who, though through school, had not yet returned home. she was spending the winter in the city with connections, the family of colonel john o'fallon, well known in st. louis. in february she returned to her country home. after that i do not know but my visits became more frequent; they certainly did become more enjoyable. we would often take walks, or go on horseback to visit the neighbors, until i became quite well acquainted in that vicinity. sometimes one of the brothers would accompany us, sometimes one of the younger sisters. if the 4th infantry had remained at jefferson barracks it is possible, even probable, that this life might have continued for some years without my finding out that there was anything serious the matter with me; but in the following may a circumstance occurred which developed my sentiment so palpably that there was no mistaking it. the annexation of texas was at this time the subject of violent discussion in congress, in the press, and by individuals. the administration of president tyler, then in power, was making the most strenuous efforts to effect the annexation, which was, indeed, the great and absorbing question of the day. during these discussions the greater part of the single rifle regiment in the army--the 2d dragoons, which had been dismounted a year or two before, and designated "dismounted rifles"--was stationed at fort jessup, louisiana, some twenty-five miles east of the texas line, to observe the frontier. about the 1st of may the 3d infantry was ordered from jefferson barracks to louisiana, to go into camp in the neighborhood of fort jessup, and there await further orders. the troops were embarked on steamers and were on their way down the mississippi within a few days after the receipt of this order. about the time they started i obtained a leave of absence for twenty days to go to ohio to visit my parents. i was obliged to go to st. louis to take a steamer for louisville or cincinnati, or the first steamer going up the ohio river to any point. before i left st. louis orders were received at jefferson barracks for the 4th infantry to follow the 3d. a messenger was sent after me to stop my leaving; but before he could reach me i was off, totally ignorant of these events. a day or two after my arrival at bethel i received a letter from a classmate and fellow lieutenant in the 4th, informing me of the circumstances related above, and advising me not to open any letter post marked st. louis or jefferson barracks, until the expiration of my leave, and saying that he would pack up my things and take them along for me. his advice was not necessary, for no other letter was sent to me. i now discovered that i was exceedingly anxious to get back to jefferson barracks, and i understood the reason without explanation from any one. my leave of absence required me to report for duty, at jefferson barracks, at the end of twenty days. i knew my regiment had gone up the red river, but i was not disposed to break the letter of my leave; besides, if i had proceeded to louisiana direct, i could not have reached there until after the expiration of my leave. accordingly, at the end of the twenty days, i reported for duty to lieutenant ewell, commanding at jefferson barracks, handing him at the same time my leave of absence. after noticing the phraseology of the order--leaves of absence were generally worded, "at the end of which time he will report for duty with his proper command"--he said he would give me an order to join my regiment in louisiana. i then asked for a few days' leave before starting, which he readily granted. this was the same ewell who acquired considerable reputation as a confederate general during the rebellion. he was a man much esteemed, and deservedly so, in the old army, and proved himself a gallant and efficient officer in two wars --both in my estimation unholy. i immediately procured a horse and started for the country, taking no baggage with me, of course. there is an insignificant creek--the gravois--between jefferson barracks and the place to which i was going, and at that day there was not a bridge over it from its source to its mouth. there is not water enough in the creek at ordinary stages to run a coffee mill, and at low water there is none running whatever. on this occasion it had been raining heavily, and, when the creek was reached, i found the banks full to overflowing, and the current rapid. i looked at it a moment to consider what to do. one of my superstitions had always been when i started to go any where, or to do anything, not to turn back, or stop until the thing intended was accomplished. i have frequently started to go to places where i had never been and to which i did not know the way, depending upon making inquiries on the road, and if i got past the place without knowing it, instead of turning back, i would go on until a road was found turning in the right direction, take that, and come in by the other side. so i struck into the stream, and in an instant the horse was swimming and i being carried down by the current. i headed the horse towards the other bank and soon reached it, wet through and without other clothes on that side of the stream. i went on, however, to my destination and borrowed a dry suit from my --future--brother-in-law. we were not of the same size, but the clothes answered every purpose until i got more of my own. before i returned i mustered up courage to make known, in the most awkward manner imaginable, the discovery i had made on learning that the 4th infantry had been ordered away from jefferson barracks. the young lady afterwards admitted that she too, although until then she had never looked upon me other than as a visitor whose company was agreeable to her, had experienced a depression of spirits she could not account for when the regiment left. before separating it was definitely understood that at a convenient time we would join our fortunes, and not let the removal of a regiment trouble us. this was in may, 1844. it was the 22d of august, 1848, before the fulfilment of this agreement. my duties kept me on the frontier of louisiana with the army of observation during the pendency of annexation; and afterwards i was absent through the war with mexico, provoked by the action of the army, if not by the annexation itself. during that time there was a constant correspondence between miss dent and myself, but we only met once in the period of four years and three months. in may, 1845, i procured a leave for twenty days, visited st. louis, and obtained the consent of the parents for the union, which had not been asked for before. as already stated, it was never my intention to remain in the army long, but to prepare myself for a professorship in some college. accordingly, soon after i was settled at jefferson barracks, i wrote a letter to professor church--professor of mathematics at west point--requesting him to ask my designation as his assistant, when next a detail had to be made. assistant professors at west point are all officers of the army, supposed to be selected for their special fitness for the particular branch of study they are assigned to teach. the answer from professor church was entirely satisfactory, and no doubt i should have been detailed a year or two later but for the mexican war coming on. accordingly i laid out for myself a course of studies to be pursued in garrison, with regularity, if not persistency. i reviewed my west point course of mathematics during the seven months at jefferson barracks, and read many valuable historical works, besides an occasional novel. to help my memory i kept a book in which i would write up, from time to time, my recollections of all i had read since last posting it. when the regiment was ordered away, i being absent at the time, my effects were packed up by lieutenant haslett, of the 4th infantry, and taken along. i never saw my journal after, nor did i ever keep another, except for a portion of the time while travelling abroad. often since a fear has crossed my mind lest that book might turn up yet, and fall into the hands of some malicious person who would publish it. i know its appearance would cause me as much heart-burning as my youthful horse-trade, or the later rebuke for wearing uniform clothes. the 3d infantry had selected camping grounds on the reservation at fort jessup, about midway between the red river and the sabine. our orders required us to go into camp in the same neighborhood, and await further instructions. those authorized to do so selected a place in the pine woods, between the old town of natchitoches and grand ecore, about three miles from each, and on high ground back from the river. the place was given the name of camp salubrity, and proved entitled to it. the camp was on a high, sandy, pine ridge, with spring branches in the valley, in front and rear. the springs furnished an abundance of cool, pure water, and the ridge was above the flight of mosquitoes, which abound in that region in great multitudes and of great voracity. in the valley they swarmed in myriads, but never came to the summit of the ridge. the regiment occupied this camp six months before the first death occurred, and that was caused by an accident. there was no intimation given that the removal of the 3d and 4th regiments of infantry to the western border of louisiana was occasioned in any way by the prospective annexation of texas, but it was generally understood that such was the case. ostensibly we were intended to prevent filibustering into texas, but really as a menace to mexico in case she appeared to contemplate war. generally the officers of the army were indifferent whether the annexation was consummated or not; but not so all of them. for myself, i was bitterly opposed to the measure, and to this day regard the war, which resulted, as one of the most unjust ever waged by a stronger against a weaker nation. it was an instance of a republic following the bad example of european monarchies, in not considering justice in their desire to acquire additional territory. texas was originally a state belonging to the republic of mexico. it extended from the sabine river on the east to the rio grande on the west, and from the gulf of mexico on the south and east to the territory of the united states and new mexico--another mexican state at that time--on the north and west. an empire in territory, it had but a very sparse population, until settled by americans who had received authority from mexico to colonize. these colonists paid very little attention to the supreme government, and introduced slavery into the state almost from the start, though the constitution of mexico did not, nor does it now, sanction that institution. soon they set up an independent government of their own, and war existed, between texas and mexico, in name from that time until 1836, when active hostilities very nearly ceased upon the capture of santa anna, the mexican president. before long, however, the same people--who with permission of mexico had colonized texas, and afterwards set up slavery there, and then seceded as soon as they felt strong enough to do so--offered themselves and the state to the united states, and in 1845 their offer was accepted. the occupation, separation and annexation were, from the inception of the movement to its final consummation, a conspiracy to acquire territory out of which slave states might be formed for the american union. even if the annexation itself could be justified, the manner in which the subsequent war was forced upon mexico cannot. the fact is, annexationists wanted more territory than they could possibly lay any claim to, as part of the new acquisition. texas, as an independent state, never had exercised jurisdiction over the territory between the nueces river and the rio grande. mexico had never recognized the independence of texas, and maintained that, even if independent, the state had no claim south of the nueces. i am aware that a treaty, made by the texans with santa anna while he was under duress, ceded all the territory between the nueces and the rio grande--, but he was a prisoner of war when the treaty was made, and his life was in jeopardy. he knew, too, that he deserved execution at the hands of the texans, if they should ever capture him. the texans, if they had taken his life, would have only followed the example set by santa anna himself a few years before, when he executed the entire garrison of the alamo and the villagers of goliad. in taking military possession of texas after annexation, the army of occupation, under general taylor, was directed to occupy the disputed territory. the army did not stop at the nueces and offer to negotiate for a settlement of the boundary question, but went beyond, apparently in order to force mexico to initiate war. it is to the credit of the american nation, however, that after conquering mexico, and while practically holding the country in our possession, so that we could have retained the whole of it, or made any terms we chose, we paid a round sum for the additional territory taken; more than it was worth, or was likely to be, to mexico. to us it was an empire and of incalculable value; but it might have been obtained by other means. the southern rebellion was largely the outgrowth of the mexican war. nations, like individuals, are punished for their transgressions. we got our punishment in the most sanguinary and expensive war of modern times. the 4th infantry went into camp at salubrity in the month of may, 1844, with instructions, as i have said, to await further orders. at first, officers and men occupied ordinary tents. as the summer heat increased these were covered by sheds to break the rays of the sun. the summer was whiled away in social enjoyments among the officers, in visiting those stationed at, and near, fort jessup, twenty-five miles away, visiting the planters on the red river, and the citizens of natchitoches and grand ecore. there was much pleasant intercourse between the inhabitants and the officers of the army. i retain very agreeable recollections of my stay at camp salubrity, and of the acquaintances made there, and no doubt my feeling is shared by the few officers living who were there at the time. i can call to mind only two officers of the 4th infantry, besides myself, who were at camp salubrity with the regiment, who are now alive. with a war in prospect, and belonging to a regiment that had an unusual number of officers detailed on special duty away from the regiment, my hopes of being ordered to west point as instructor vanished. at the time of which i now write, officers in the quartermaster's, commissary's and adjutant--general's departments were appointed from the line of the army, and did not vacate their regimental commissions until their regimental and staff commissions were for the same grades. generally lieutenants were appointed to captaincies to fill vacancies in the staff corps. if they should reach a captaincy in the line before they arrived at a majority in the staff, they would elect which commission they would retain. in the 4th infantry, in 1844, at least six line officers were on duty in the staff, and therefore permanently detached from the regiment. under these circumstances i gave up everything like a special course of reading, and only read thereafter for my own amusement, and not very much for that, until the war was over. i kept a horse and rode, and staid out of doors most of the time by day, and entirely recovered from the cough which i had carried from west point, and from all indications of consumption. i have often thought that my life was saved, and my health restored, by exercise and exposure, enforced by an administrative act, and a war, both of which i disapproved. as summer wore away, and cool days and colder nights came upon us, the tents. we were occupying ceased to afford comfortable quarters; and "further orders" not reaching us, we began to look about to remedy the hardship. men were put to work getting out timber to build huts, and in a very short time all were comfortably housed--privates as well as officers. the outlay by the government in accomplishing this was nothing, or nearly nothing. the winter was spent more agreeably than the summer had been. there were occasional parties given by the planters along the "coast"--as the bottom lands on the red river were called. the climate was delightful. near the close of the short session of congress of 1844-5, the bill for the annexation of texas to the united states was passed. it reached president tyler on the 1st of march, 1845, and promptly received his approval. when the news reached us we began to look again for "further orders." they did not arrive promptly, and on the 1st of may following i asked and obtained a leave of absence for twenty days, for the purpose of visiting--st. louis. the object of this visit has been before stated. early in july the long expected orders were received, but they only took the regiment to new orleans barracks. we reached there before the middle of the month, and again waited weeks for still further orders. the yellow fever was raging in new orleans during the time we remained there, and the streets of the city had the appearance of a continuous well-observed sunday. i recollect but one occasion when this observance seemed to be broken by the inhabitants. one morning about daylight i happened to be awake, and, hearing the discharge of a rifle not far off, i looked out to ascertain where the sound came from. i observed a couple of clusters of men near by, and learned afterwards that "it was nothing; only a couple of gentlemen deciding a difference of opinion with rifles, at twenty paces." i do not remember if either was killed, or even hurt, but no doubt the question of difference was settled satisfactorily, and "honorably," in the estimation of the parties engaged. i do not believe i ever would have the courage to fight a duel. if any man should wrong me to the extent of my being willing to kill him, i would not be willing to give him the choice of weapons with which it should be done, and of the time, place and distance separating us, when i executed him. if i should do another such a wrong as to justify him in killing me, i would make any reasonable atonement within my power, if convinced of the wrong done. i place my opposition to duelling on higher grounds than here stated. no doubt a majority of the duels fought have been for want of moral courage on the part of those engaged to decline. at camp salubrity, and when we went to new orleans barracks, the 4th infantry was commanded by colonel vose, then an old gentleman who had not commanded on drill for a number of years. he was not a man to discover infirmity in the presence of danger. it now appeared that war was imminent, and he felt that it was his duty to brush up his tactics. accordingly, when we got settled down at our new post, he took command of the regiment at a battalion drill. only two or three evolutions had been gone through when he dismissed the battalion, and, turning to go to his own quarters, dropped dead. he had not been complaining of ill health, but no doubt died of heart disease. he was a most estimable man, of exemplary habits, and by no means the author of his own disease. chapter iv. corpus christi--mexican smuggling--spanish rule in mexico--supplying transportation. early in september the regiment left new orleans for corpus christi, now in texas. ocean steamers were not then common, and the passage was made in sailing vessels. at that time there was not more than three feet of water in the channel at the outlet of corpus christi bay; the debarkation, therefore, had to take place by small steamers, and at an island in the channel called shell island, the ships anchoring some miles out from shore. this made the work slow, and as the army was only supplied with one or two steamers, it took a number of days to effect the landing of a single regiment with its stores, camp and garrison equipage, etc. there happened to be pleasant weather while this was going on, but the land-swell was so great that when the ship and steamer were on opposite sides of the same wave they would be at considerable distance apart. the men and baggage were let down to a point higher than the lower deck of the steamer, and when ship and steamer got into the trough between the waves, and were close together, the load would be drawn over the steamer and rapidly run down until it rested on the deck. after i had gone ashore, and had been on guard several days at shell island, quite six miles from the ship, i had occasion for some reason or other to return on board. while on the suviah--i think that was the name of our vessel--i heard a tremendous racket at the other end of the ship, and much and excited sailor language, such as "damn your eyes," etc. in a moment or two the captain, who was an excitable little man, dying with consumption, and not weighing much over a hundred pounds, came running out, carrying a sabre nearly as large and as heavy as he was, and crying, that his men had mutinied. it was necessary to sustain the captain without question, and in a few minutes all the sailors charged with mutiny were in irons. i rather felt for a time a wish that i had not gone aboard just then. as the men charged with mutiny submitted to being placed in irons without resistance, i always doubted if they knew that they had mutinied until they were told. by the time i was ready to leave the ship again i thought i had learned enough of the working of the double and single pulley, by which passengers were let down from the upper deck of the ship to the steamer below, and determined to let myself down without assistance. without saying anything of my intentions to any one, i mounted the railing, and taking hold of the centre rope, just below the upper block, i put one foot on the hook below the lower block, and stepped off just as i did so some one called out "hold on." it was too late. i tried to "hold on" with all my might, but my heels went up, and my head went down so rapidly that my hold broke, and i plunged head foremost into the water, some twenty-five feet below, with such velocity that it seemed to me i never would stop. when i came to the surface again, being a fair swimmer, and not having lost my presence of mind, i swam around until a bucket was let down for me, and i was drawn up without a scratch or injury. i do not believe there was a man on board who sympathized with me in the least when they found me uninjured. i rather enjoyed the joke myself. the captain of the suviah died of his disease a few months later, and i believe before the mutineers were tried. i hope they got clear, because, as before stated, i always thought the mutiny was all in the brain of a very weak and sick man. after reaching shore, or shell island, the labor of getting to corpus christi was slow and tedious. there was, if my memory serves me, but one small steamer to transport troops and baggage when the 4th infantry arrived. others were procured later. the distance from shell island to corpus christi was some sixteen or eighteen miles. the channel to the bay was so shallow that the steamer, small as it was, had to be dragged over the bottom when loaded. not more than one trip a day could be effected. later this was remedied, by deepening the channel and increasing the number of vessels suitable to its navigation. corpus christi is near the head of the bay of the same name, formed by the entrance of the nueces river into tide-water, and is on the west bank of that bay. at the time of its first occupancy by united states troops there was a small mexican hamlet there, containing probably less than one hundred souls. there was, in addition, a small american trading post, at which goods were sold to mexican smugglers. all goods were put up in compact packages of about one hundred pounds each, suitable for loading on pack mules. two of these packages made a load for an ordinary mexican mule, and three for the larger ones. the bulk of the trade was in leaf tobacco, and domestic cotton-cloths and calicoes. the mexicans had, before the arrival of the army, but little to offer in exchange except silver. the trade in tobacco was enormous, considering the population to be supplied. almost every mexican above the age of ten years, and many much younger, smoked the cigarette. nearly every mexican carried a pouch of leaf tobacco, powdered by rolling in the hands, and a roll of corn husks to make wrappers. the cigarettes were made by the smokers as they used them. up to the time of which i write, and for years afterwards--i think until the administration of president juarez--the cultivation, manufacture and sale of tobacco constituted a government monopoly, and paid the bulk of the revenue collected from internal sources. the price was enormously high, and made successful smuggling very profitable. the difficulty of obtaining tobacco is probably the reason why everybody, male and female, used it at that time. i know from my own experience that when i was at west point, the fact that tobacco, in every form, was prohibited, and the mere possession of the weed severely punished, made the majority of the cadets, myself included, try to acquire the habit of using it. i failed utterly at the time and for many years afterward; but the majority accomplished the object of their youthful ambition. under spanish rule mexico was prohibited from producing anything that the mother-country could supply. this rule excluded the cultivation of the grape, olive and many other articles to which the soil and climate were well adapted. the country was governed for "revenue only;" and tobacco, which cannot be raised in spain, but is indigenous to mexico, offered a fine instrumentality for securing this prime object of government. the native population had been in the habit of using "the weed" from a period, back of any recorded history of this continent. bad habits--if not restrained by law or public opinion--spread more rapidly and universally than good ones, and the spanish colonists adopted the use of tobacco almost as generally as the natives. spain, therefore, in order to secure the largest revenue from this source, prohibited the cultivation, except in specified localities--and in these places farmed out the privilege at a very high price. the tobacco when raised could only be sold to the government, and the price to the consumer was limited only by the avarice of the authorities, and the capacity of the people to pay. all laws for the government of the country were enacted in spain, and the officers for their execution were appointed by the crown, and sent out to the new el dorado. the mexicans had been brought up ignorant of how to legislate or how to rule. when they gained their independence, after many years of war, it was the most natural thing in the world that they should adopt as their own the laws then in existence. the only change was, that mexico became her own executor of the laws and the recipient of the revenues. the tobacco tax, yielding so large a revenue under the law as it stood, was one of the last, if not the very last, of the obnoxious imposts to be repealed. now, the citizens are allowed to cultivate any crops the soil will yield. tobacco is cheap, and every quality can be produced. its use is by no means so general as when i first visited the country. gradually the "army of occupation" assembled at corpus christi. when it was all together it consisted of seven companies of the 2d regiment of dragoons, four companies of light artillery, five regiments of infantry --the 3d, 4th, 5th, 7th and 8th--and one regiment of artillery acting as infantry--not more than three thousand men in all. general zachary taylor commanded the whole. there were troops enough in one body to establish a drill and discipline sufficient to fit men and officers for all they were capable of in case of battle. the rank and file were composed of men who had enlisted in time of peace, to serve for seven dollars a month, and were necessarily inferior as material to the average volunteers enlisted later in the war expressly to fight, and also to the volunteers in the war for the preservation of the union. the men engaged in the mexican war were brave, and the officers of the regular army, from highest to lowest, were educated in their profession. a more efficient army for its number and armament, i do not believe ever fought a battle than the one commanded by general taylor in his first two engagements on mexican--or texan soil. the presence of united states troops on the edge of the disputed territory furthest from the mexican settlements, was not sufficient to provoke hostilities. we were sent to provoke a fight, but it was essential that mexico should commence it. it was very doubtful whether congress would declare war; but if mexico should attack our troops, the executive could announce, "whereas, war exists by the acts of, etc.," and prosecute the contest with vigor. once initiated there were but few public men who would have the courage to oppose it. experience proves that the man who obstructs a war in which his nation is engaged, no matter whether right or wrong, occupies no enviable place in life or history. better for him, individually, to advocate "war, pestilence, and famine," than to act as obstructionist to a war already begun. the history of the defeated rebel will be honorable hereafter, compared with that of the northern man who aided him by conspiring against his government while protected by it. the most favorable posthumous history the stay-at-home traitor can hope for is--oblivion. mexico showing no willingness to come to the nueces to drive the invaders from her soil, it became necessary for the "invaders" to approach to within a convenient distance to be struck. accordingly, preparations were begun for moving the army to the rio grande, to a point near matamoras. it was desirable to occupy a position near the largest centre of population possible to reach, without absolutely invading territory to which we set up no claim whatever. the distance from corpus christi to matamoras is about one hundred and fifty miles. the country does not abound in fresh water, and the length of the marches had to be regulated by the distance between water supplies. besides the streams, there were occasional pools, filled during the rainy season, some probably made by the traders, who travelled constantly between corpus christi and the rio grande, and some by the buffalo. there was not at that time a single habitation, cultivated field, or herd of domestic animals, between corpus christi and matamoras. it was necessary, therefore, to have a wagon train sufficiently large to transport the camp and garrison equipage, officers' baggage, rations for the army, and part rations of grain for the artillery horses and all the animals taken from the north, where they had been accustomed to having their forage furnished them. the army was but indifferently supplied with transportation. wagons and harness could easily be supplied from the north but mules and horses could not so readily be brought. the american traders and mexican smugglers came to the relief. contracts were made for mules at from eight to eleven dollars each. the smugglers furnished the animals, and took their pay in goods of the description before mentioned. i doubt whether the mexicans received in value from the traders five dollars per head for the animals they furnished, and still more, whether they paid anything but their own time in procuring them. such is trade; such is war. the government paid in hard cash to the contractor the stipulated price. between the rio grande and the nueces there was at that time a large band of wild horses feeding; as numerous, probably, as the band of buffalo roaming further north was before its rapid extermination commenced. the mexicans used to capture these in large numbers and bring them into the american settlements and sell them. a picked animal could be purchased at from eight to twelve dollars, but taken at wholesale, they could be bought for thirty-six dollars a dozen. some of these were purchased for the army, and answered a most useful purpose. the horses were generally very strong, formed much like the norman horse, and with very heavy manes and tails. a number of officers supplied themselves with these, and they generally rendered as useful service as the northern animal in fact they were much better when grazing was the only means of supplying forage. there was no need for haste, and some months were consumed in the necessary preparations for a move. in the meantime the army was engaged in all the duties pertaining to the officer and the soldier. twice, that i remember, small trains were sent from corpus christi, with cavalry escorts, to san antonio and austin, with paymasters and funds to pay off small detachments of troops stationed at those places. general taylor encouraged officers to accompany these expeditions. i accompanied one of them in december, 1845. the distance from corpus christi to san antonio was then computed at one hundred and fifty miles. now that roads exist it is probably less. from san antonio to austin we computed the distance at one hundred and ten miles, and from the latter place back to corpus christi at over two hundred miles. i know the distance now from san antonio to austin is but little over eighty miles, so that our computation was probably too high. there was not at the time an individual living between corpus christi and san antonio until within about thirty miles of the latter point, where there were a few scattering mexican settlements along the san antonio river. the people in at least one of these hamlets lived underground for protection against the indians. the country abounded in game, such as deer and antelope, with abundance of wild turkeys along the streams and where there were nut-bearing woods. on the nueces, about twenty-five miles up from corpus christi, were a few log cabins, the remains of a town called san patricio, but the inhabitants had all been massacred by the indians, or driven away. san antonio was about equally divided in population between americans and mexicans. from there to austin there was not a single residence except at new braunfels, on the guadalupe river. at that point was a settlement of germans who had only that year come into the state. at all events they were living in small huts, about such as soldiers would hastily construct for temporary occupation. from austin to corpus christi there was only a small settlement at bastrop, with a few farms along the colorado river; but after leaving that, there were no settlements except the home of one man, with one female slave, at the old town of goliad. some of the houses were still standing. goliad had been quite a village for the period and region, but some years before there had been a mexican massacre, in which every inhabitant had been killed or driven away. this, with the massacre of the prisoners in the alamo, san antonio, about the same time, more than three hundred men in all, furnished the strongest justification the texans had for carrying on the war with so much cruelty. in fact, from that time until the mexican war, the hostilities between texans and mexicans was so great that neither was safe in the neighborhood of the other who might be in superior numbers or possessed of superior arms. the man we found living there seemed like an old friend; he had come from near fort jessup, louisiana, where the officers of the 3d and 4th infantry and the 2d dragoons had known him and his family. he had emigrated in advance of his family to build up a home for them. chapter v. trip to austin--promotion to full second lieutenant--army of occupation. when our party left corpus christi it was quite large, including the cavalry escort, paymaster, major dix, his clerk and the officers who, like myself, were simply on leave; but all the officers on leave, except lieutenant benjamin--afterwards killed in the valley of mexico --lieutenant, now general, augur, and myself, concluded to spend their allotted time at san antonio and return from there. we were all to be back at corpus christi by the end of the month. the paymaster was detained in austin so long that, if we had waited for him, we would have exceeded our leave. we concluded, therefore, to start back at once with the animals we had, and having to rely principally on grass for their food, it was a good six days' journey. we had to sleep on the prairie every night, except at goliad, and possibly one night on the colorado, without shelter and with only such food as we carried with us, and prepared ourselves. the journey was hazardous on account of indians, and there were white men in texas whom i would not have cared to meet in a secluded place. lieutenant augur was taken seriously sick before we reached goliad and at a distance from any habitation. to add to the complication, his horse--a mustang that had probably been captured from the band of wild horses before alluded to, and of undoubted longevity at his capture--gave out. it was absolutely necessary to get for ward to goliad to find a shelter for our sick companion. by dint of patience and exceedingly slow movements, goliad was at last reached, and a shelter and bed secured for our patient. we remained over a day, hoping that augur might recover sufficiently to resume his travels. he did not, however, and knowing that major dix would be along in a few days, with his wagon-train, now empty, and escort, we arranged with our louisiana friend to take the best of care of the sick lieutenant until thus relieved, and went on. i had never been a sportsman in my life; had scarcely ever gone in search of game, and rarely seen any when looking for it. on this trip there was no minute of time while travelling between san patricio and the settlements on the san antonio river, from san antonio to austin, and again from the colorado river back to san patricio, when deer or antelope could not be seen in great numbers. each officer carried a shot-gun, and every evening, after going into camp, some would go out and soon return with venison and wild turkeys enough for the entire camp. i, however, never went out, and had no occasion to fire my gun; except, being detained over a day at goliad, benjamin and i concluded to go down to the creek--which was fringed with timber, much of it the pecan--and bring back a few turkeys. we had scarcely reached the edge of the timber when i heard the flutter of wings overhead, and in an instant i saw two or three turkeys flying away. these were soon followed by more, then more, and more, until a flock of twenty or thirty had left from just over my head. all this time i stood watching the turkeys to see where they flew--with my gun on my shoulder, and never once thought of levelling it at the birds. when i had time to reflect upon the matter, i came to the conclusion that as a sportsman i was a failure, and went back to the house. benjamin remained out, and got as many turkeys as he wanted to carry back. after the second night at goliad, benjamin and i started to make the remainder of the journey alone. we reached corpus christi just in time to avoid "absence without leave." we met no one not even an indian --during the remainder of our journey, except at san patricio. a new settlement had been started there in our absence of three weeks, induced possibly by the fact that there were houses already built, while the proximity of troops gave protection against the indians. on the evening of the first day out from goliad we heard the most unearthly howling of wolves, directly in our front. the prairie grass was tall and we could not see the beasts, but the sound indicated that they were near. to my ear it appeared that there must have been enough of them to devour our party, horses and all, at a single meal. the part of ohio that i hailed from was not thickly settled, but wolves had been driven out long before i left. benjamin was from indiana, still less populated, where the wolf yet roamed over the prairies. he understood the nature of the animal and the capacity of a few to make believe there was an unlimited number of them. he kept on towards the noise, unmoved. i followed in his trail, lacking moral courage to turn back and join our sick companion. i have no doubt that if benjamin had proposed returning to goliad, i would not only have "seconded the motion" but have suggested that it was very hard-hearted in us to leave augur sick there in the first place; but benjamin did not propose turning back. when he did speak it was to ask: "grant, how many wolves do you think there are in that pack?" knowing where he was from, and suspecting that he thought i would over-estimate the number, i determined to show my acquaintance with the animal by putting the estimate below what possibly could be correct, and answered: "oh, about twenty," very indifferently. he smiled and rode on. in a minute we were close upon them, and before they saw us. there were just two of them. seated upon their haunches, with their mouths close together, they had made all the noise we had been hearing for the past ten minutes. i have often thought of this incident since when i have heard the noise of a few disappointed politicians who had deserted their associates. there are always more of them before they are counted. a week or two before leaving corpus christi on this trip, i had been promoted from brevet second-lieutenant, 4th infantry, to full second-lieutenant, 7th infantry. frank gardner,(*1) of the 7th, was promoted to the 4th in the same orders. we immediately made application to be transferred, so as to get back to our old regiments. on my return, i found that our application had been approved at washington. while in the 7th infantry i was in the company of captain holmes, afterwards a lieutenant-general in the confederate army. i never came in contact with him in the war of the rebellion, nor did he render any very conspicuous service in his high rank. my transfer carried me to the company of captain mccall, who resigned from the army after the mexican war and settled in philadelphia. he was prompt, however, to volunteer when the rebellion broke out, and soon rose to the rank of major-general in the union army. i was not fortunate enough to meet him after he resigned. in the old army he was esteemed very highly as a soldier and gentleman. our relations were always most pleasant. the preparations at corpus christi for an advance progressed as rapidly in the absence of some twenty or more lieutenants as if we had been there. the principal business consisted in securing mules, and getting them broken to harness. the process was slow but amusing. the animals sold to the government were all young and unbroken, even to the saddle, and were quite as wild as the wild horses of the prairie. usually a number would be brought in by a company of mexicans, partners in the delivery. the mules were first driven into a stockade, called a corral, inclosing an acre or more of ground. the mexicans,--who were all experienced in throwing the lasso,--would go into the corral on horseback, with their lassos attached to the pommels of their saddles. soldiers detailed as teamsters and black smiths would also enter the corral, the former with ropes to serve as halters, the latter with branding irons and a fire to keep the irons heated. a lasso was then thrown over the neck of a mule, when he would immediately go to the length of his tether, first one end, then the other in the air. while he was thus plunging and gyrating, another lasso would be thrown by another mexican, catching the animal by a fore-foot. this would bring the mule to the ground, when he was seized and held by the teamsters while the blacksmith put upon him, with hot irons, the initials "u. s." ropes were then put about the neck, with a slipnoose which would tighten around the throat if pulled. with a man on each side holding these ropes, the mule was released from his other bindings and allowed to rise. with more or less difficulty he would be conducted to a picket rope outside and fastened there. the delivery of that mule was then complete. this process was gone through with every mule and wild horse with the army of occupation. the method of breaking them was less cruel and much more amusing. it is a well-known fact that where domestic animals are used for specific purposes from generation to generation, the descendants are easily, as a rule, subdued to the same uses. at that time in northern mexico the mule, or his ancestors, the horse and the ass, was seldom used except for the saddle or pack. at all events the corpus christi mule resisted the new use to which he was being put. the treatment he was subjected to in order to overcome his prejudices was summary and effective. the soldiers were principally foreigners who had enlisted in our large cities, and, with the exception of a chance drayman among them, it is not probable that any of the men who reported themselves as competent teamsters had ever driven a mule-team in their lives, or indeed that many had had any previous experience in driving any animal whatever to harness. numbers together can accomplish what twice their number acting individually could not perform. five mules were allotted to each wagon. a teamster would select at the picket rope five animals of nearly the same color and general appearance for his team. with a full corps of assistants, other teamsters, he would then proceed to get his mules together. in two's the men would approach each animal selected, avoiding as far as possible its heels. two ropes would be put about the neck of each animal, with a slip noose, so that he could be choked if too unruly. they were then led out, harnessed by force and hitched to the wagon in the position they had to keep ever after. two men remained on either side of the leader, with the lassos about its neck, and one man retained the same restraining influence over each of the others. all being ready, the hold would be slackened and the team started. the first motion was generally five mules in the air at one time, backs bowed, hind feet extended to the rear. after repeating this movement a few times the leaders would start to run. this would bring the breeching tight against the mules at the wheels, which these last seemed to regard as a most unwarrantable attempt at coercion and would resist by taking a seat, sometimes going so far as to lie down. in time all were broken in to do their duty submissively if not cheerfully, but there never was a time during the war when it was safe to let a mexican mule get entirely loose. their drivers were all teamsters by the time they got through. i recollect one case of a mule that had worked in a team under the saddle, not only for some time at corpus christi, where he was broken, but all the way to the point opposite matamoras, then to camargo, where he got loose from his fastenings during the night. he did not run away at first, but staid in the neighborhood for a day or two, coming up sometimes to the feed trough even; but on the approach of the teamster he always got out of the way. at last, growing tired of the constant effort to catch him, he disappeared altogether. nothing short of a mexican with his lasso could have caught him. regulations would not have warranted the expenditure of a dollar in hiring a man with a lasso to catch that mule; but they did allow the expenditure "of the mule," on a certificate that he had run away without any fault of the quartermaster on whose returns he was borne, and also the purchase of another to take his place. i am a competent witness, for i was regimental quartermaster at the time. while at corpus christi all the officers who had a fancy for riding kept horses. the animals cost but little in the first instance, and when picketed they would get their living without any cost. i had three not long before the army moved, but a sad accident bereft me of them all at one time. a colored boy who gave them all the attention they got --besides looking after my tent and that of a class-mate and fellow-lieutenant and cooking for us, all for about eight dollars per month, was riding one to water and leading the other two. the led horses pulled him from his seat and all three ran away. they never were heard of afterwards. shortly after that some one told captain bliss, general taylor's adjutant-general, of my misfortune. "yes; i heard grant lost five or six dollars' worth of horses the other day," he replied. that was a slander; they were broken to the saddle when i got them and cost nearly twenty dollars. i never suspected the colored boy of malicious intent in letting them get away, because, if they had not escaped, he could have had one of them to ride on the long march then in prospect. chapter vi. advance of the army--crossing the colorado--the rio grande. at last the preparations were complete and orders were issued for the advance to begin on the 8th of march. general taylor had an army of not more than three thousand men. one battery, the siege guns and all the convalescent troops were sent on by water to brazos santiago, at the mouth of the rio grande. a guard was left back at corpus christi to look after public property and to take care of those who were too sick to be removed. the remainder of the army, probably not more than twenty five hundred men, was divided into three brigades, with the cavalry independent. colonel twiggs, with seven companies of dragoons and a battery of light artillery, moved on the 8th. he was followed by the three infantry brigades, with a day's interval between the commands. thus the rear brigade did not move from corpus christi until the 11th of march. in view of the immense bodies of men moved on the same day over narrow roads, through dense forests and across large streams, in our late war, it seems strange now that a body of less than three thousand men should have been broken into four columns, separated by a day's march. general taylor was opposed to anything like plundering by the troops, and in this instance, i doubt not, he looked upon the enemy as the aggrieved party and was not willing to injure them further than his instructions from washington demanded. his orders to the troops enjoined scrupulous regard for the rights of all peaceable persons and the payment of the highest price for all supplies taken for the use of the army. all officers of foot regiments who had horses were permitted to ride them on the march when it did not interfere with their military duties. as already related, having lost my "five or six dollars' worth of horses" but a short time before i determined not to get another, but to make the journey on foot. my company commander, captain mccall, had two good american horses, of considerably more value in that country, where native horses were cheap, than they were in the states. he used one himself and wanted the other for his servant. he was quite anxious to know whether i did not intend to get me another horse before the march began. i told him no; i belonged to a foot regiment. i did not understand the object of his solicitude at the time, but, when we were about to start, he said: "there, grant, is a horse for you." i found that he could not bear the idea of his servant riding on a long march while his lieutenant went a-foot. he had found a mustang, a three-year old colt only recently captured, which had been purchased by one of the colored servants with the regiment for the sum of three dollars. it was probably the only horse at corpus christi that could have been purchased just then for any reasonable price. five dollars, sixty-six and two-thirds per cent. advance, induced the owner to part with the mustang. i was sorry to take him, because i really felt that, belonging to a foot regiment, it was my duty to march with the men. but i saw the captain's earnestness in the matter, and accepted the horse for the trip. the day we started was the first time the horse had ever been under saddle. i had, however, but little difficulty in breaking him, though for the first day there were frequent disagreements between us as to which way we should go, and sometimes whether we should go at all. at no time during the day could i choose exactly the part of the column i would march with; but after that, i had as tractable a horse as any with the army, and there was none that stood the trip better. he never ate a mouthful of food on the journey except the grass he could pick within the length of his picket rope. a few days out from corpus christi, the immense herd of wild horses that ranged at that time between the nueces and the rio grande was seen directly in advance of the head of the column and but a few miles off. it was the very band from which the horse i was riding had been captured but a few weeks before. the column was halted for a rest, and a number of officers, myself among them, rode out two or three miles to the right to see the extent of the herd. the country was a rolling prairie, and, from the higher ground, the vision was obstructed only by the earth's curvature. as far as the eye could reach to our right, the herd extended. to the left, it extended equally. there was no estimating the number of animals in it; i have no idea that they could all have been corralled in the state of rhode island, or delaware, at one time. if they had been, they would have been so thick that the pasturage would have given out the first day. people who saw the southern herd of buffalo, fifteen or twenty years ago, can appreciate the size of the texas band of wild horses in 1846. at the point where the army struck the little colorado river, the stream was quite wide and of sufficient depth for navigation. the water was brackish and the banks were fringed with timber. here the whole army concentrated before attempting to cross. the army was not accompanied by a pontoon train, and at that time the troops were not instructed in bridge building. to add to the embarrassment of the situation, the army was here, for the first time, threatened with opposition. buglers, concealed from our view by the brush on the opposite side, sounded the "assembly," and other military calls. like the wolves before spoken of, they gave the impression that there was a large number of them and that, if the troops were in proportion to the noise, they were sufficient to devour general taylor and his army. there were probably but few troops, and those engaged principally in watching the movements of the "invader." a few of our cavalry dashed in, and forded and swam the stream, and all opposition was soon dispersed. i do not remember that a single shot was fired. the troops waded the stream, which was up to their necks in the deepest part. teams were crossed by attaching a long rope to the end of the wagon tongue passing it between the two swing mules and by the side of the leader, hitching his bridle as well as the bridle of the mules in rear to it, and carrying the end to men on the opposite shore. the bank down to the water was steep on both sides. a rope long enough to cross the river, therefore, was attached to the back axle of the wagon, and men behind would hold the rope to prevent the wagon "beating" the mules into the water. this latter rope also served the purpose of bringing the end of the forward one back, to be used over again. the water was deep enough for a short distance to swim the little mexican mules which the army was then using, but they, and the wagons, were pulled through so fast by the men at the end of the rope ahead, that no time was left them to show their obstinacy. in this manner the artillery and transportation of the "army of occupation" crossed the colorado river. about the middle of the month of march the advance of the army reached the rio grande and went into camp near the banks of the river, opposite the city of matamoras and almost under the guns of a small fort at the lower end of the town. there was not at that time a single habitation from corpus christi until the rio grande was reached. the work of fortifying was commenced at once. the fort was laid out by the engineers, but the work was done by the soldiers under the supervision of their officers, the chief engineer retaining general directions. the mexicans now became so incensed at our near approach that some of their troops crossed the river above us, and made it unsafe for small bodies of men to go far beyond the limits of camp. they captured two companies of dragoons, commanded by captains thornton and hardee. the latter figured as a general in the late war, on the confederate side, and was author of the tactics first used by both armies. lieutenant theodric porter, of the 4th infantry, was killed while out with a small detachment; and major cross, the assistant quartermaster-general, had also been killed not far from camp. there was no base of supplies nearer than point isabel, on the coast, north of the mouth of the rio grande and twenty-five miles away. the enemy, if the mexicans could be called such at this time when no war had been declared, hovered about in such numbers that it was not safe to send a wagon train after supplies with any escort that could be spared. i have already said that general taylor's whole command on the rio grande numbered less than three thousand men. he had, however, a few more troops at point isabel or brazos santiago. the supplies brought from corpus christi in wagons were running short. work was therefore pushed with great vigor on the defences, to enable the minimum number of troops to hold the fort. all the men who could be employed, were kept at work from early dawn until darkness closed the labors of the day. with all this the fort was not completed until the supplies grew so short that further delay in obtaining more could not be thought of. by the latter part of april the work was in a partially defensible condition, and the 7th infantry, major jacob brown commanding, was marched in to garrison it, with some few pieces of artillery. all the supplies on hand, with the exception of enough to carry the rest of the army to point isabel, were left with the garrison, and the march was commenced with the remainder of the command, every wagon being taken with the army. early on the second day after starting the force reached its destination, without opposition from the mexicans. there was some delay in getting supplies ashore from vessels at anchor in the open roadstead. chapter vii. the mexican war--the battle of palo alto--the battle of resaca de la palma--army of invasion--general taylor--movement on camargo. while general taylor was away with the bulk of his army, the little garrison up the river was besieged. as we lay in our tents upon the sea-shore, the artillery at the fort on the rio grande could be distinctly heard. the war had begun. there were no possible means of obtaining news from the garrison, and information from outside could not be otherwise than unfavorable. what general taylor's feelings were during this suspense i do not know; but for myself, a young second-lieutenant who had never heard a hostile gun before, i felt sorry that i had enlisted. a great many men, when they smell battle afar off, chafe to get into the fray. when they say so themselves they generally fail to convince their hearers that they are as anxious as they would like to make believe, and as they approach danger they become more subdued. this rule is not universal, for i have known a few men who were always aching for a fight when there was no enemy near, who were as good as their word when the battle did come. but the number of such men is small. on the 7th of may the wagons were all loaded and general taylor started on his return, with his army reinforced at point isabel, but still less than three thousand strong, to relieve the garrison on the rio grande. the road from point isabel to matamoras is over an open, rolling, treeless prairie, until the timber that borders the bank of the rio grande is reached. this river, like the mississippi, flows through a rich alluvial valley in the most meandering manner, running towards all points of the compass at times within a few miles. formerly the river ran by resaca de la palma, some four or five miles east of the present channel. the old bed of the river at resaca had become filled at places, leaving a succession of little lakes. the timber that had formerly grown upon both banks, and for a considerable distance out, was still standing. this timber was struck six or eight miles out from the besieged garrison, at a point known as palo alto--"tall trees" or "woods." early in the forenoon of the 8th of may as palo alto was approached, an army, certainly outnumbering our little force, was seen, drawn up in line of battle just in front of the timber. their bayonets and spearheads glistened in the sunlight formidably. the force was composed largely of cavalry armed with lances. where we were the grass was tall, reaching nearly to the shoulders of the men, very stiff, and each stock was pointed at the top, and hard and almost as sharp as a darning-needle. general taylor halted his army before the head of column came in range of the artillery of the mexicans. he then formed a line of battle, facing the enemy. his artillery, two batteries and two eighteen-pounder iron guns, drawn by oxen, were placed in position at intervals along the line. a battalion was thrown to the rear, commanded by lieutenant-colonel childs, of the artillery, as reserves. these preparations completed, orders were given for a platoon of each company to stack arms and go to a stream off to the right of the command, to fill their canteens and also those of the rest of their respective companies. when the men were all back in their places in line, the command to advance was given. as i looked down that long line of about three thousand armed men, advancing towards a larger force also armed, i thought what a fearful responsibility general taylor must feel, commanding such a host and so far away from friends. the mexicans immediately opened fire upon us, first with artillery and then with infantry. at first their shots did not reach us, and the advance was continued. as we got nearer, the cannon balls commenced going through the ranks. they hurt no one, however, during this advance, because they would strike the ground long before they reached our line, and ricochetted through the tall grass so slowly that the men would see them and open ranks and let them pass. when we got to a point where the artillery could be used with effect, a halt was called, and the battle opened on both sides. the infantry under general taylor was armed with flint-lock muskets, and paper cartridges charged with powder, buck-shot and ball. at the distance of a few hundred yards a man might fire at you all day without your finding it out. the artillery was generally six-pounder brass guns throwing only solid shot; but general taylor had with him three or four twelve-pounder howitzers throwing shell, besides his eighteen-pounders before spoken of, that had a long range. this made a powerful armament. the mexicans were armed about as we were so far as their infantry was concerned, but their artillery only fired solid shot. we had greatly the advantage in this arm. the artillery was advanced a rod or two in front of the line, and opened fire. the infantry stood at order arms as spectators, watching the effect of our shots upon the enemy, and watching his shots so as to step out of their way. it could be seen that the eighteen-pounders and the howitzers did a great deal of execution. on our side there was little or no loss while we occupied this position. during the battle major ringgold, an accomplished and brave artillery officer, was mortally wounded, and lieutenant luther, also of the artillery, was struck. during the day several advances were made, and just at dusk it became evident that the mexicans were falling back. we again advanced, and occupied at the close of the battle substantially the ground held by the enemy at the beginning. in this last move there was a brisk fire upon our troops, and some execution was done. one cannon-ball passed through our ranks, not far from me. it took off the head of an enlisted man, and the under jaw of captain page of my regiment, while the splinters from the musket of the killed soldier, and his brains and bones, knocked down two or three others, including one officer, lieutenant wallen, --hurting them more or less. our casualties for the day were nine killed and forty-seven wounded. at the break of day on the 9th, the army under taylor was ready to renew the battle; but an advance showed that the enemy had entirely left our front during the night. the chaparral before us was impenetrable except where there were roads or trails, with occasionally clear or bare spots of small dimensions. a body of men penetrating it might easily be ambushed. it was better to have a few men caught in this way than the whole army, yet it was necessary that the garrison at the river should be relieved. to get to them the chaparral had to be passed. thus i assume general taylor reasoned. he halted the army not far in advance of the ground occupied by the mexicans the day before, and selected captain c. f. smith, of the artillery, and captain mccall, of my company, to take one hundred and fifty picked men each and find where the enemy had gone. this left me in command of the company, an honor and responsibility i thought very great. smith and mccall found no obstruction in the way of their advance until they came up to the succession of ponds, before described, at resaca. the mexicans had passed them and formed their lines on the opposite bank. this position they had strengthened a little by throwing up dead trees and brush in their front, and by placing artillery to cover the approaches and open places. smith and mccall deployed on each side of the road as well as they could, and engaged the enemy at long range. word was sent back, and the advance of the whole army was at once commenced. as we came up we were deployed in like manner. i was with the right wing, and led my company through the thicket wherever a penetrable place could be found, taking advantage of any clear spot that would carry me towards the enemy. at last i got pretty close up without knowing it. the balls commenced to whistle very thick overhead, cutting the limbs of the chaparral right and left. we could not see the enemy, so i ordered my men to lie down, an order that did not have to be enforced. we kept our position until it became evident that the enemy were not firing at us, and then withdrew to find better ground to advance upon. by this time some progress had been made on our left. a section of artillery had been captured by the cavalry, and some prisoners had been taken. the mexicans were giving way all along the line, and many of them had, no doubt, left early. i at last found a clear space separating two ponds. there seemed to be a few men in front and i charged upon them with my company. there was no resistance, and we captured a mexican colonel, who had been wounded, and a few men. just as i was sending them to the rear with a guard of two or three men, a private came from the front bringing back one of our officers, who had been badly wounded in advance of where i was. the ground had been charged over before. my exploit was equal to that of the soldier who boasted that he had cut off the leg of one of the enemy. when asked why he did not cut off his head, he replied: "some one had done that before." this left no doubt in my mind but that the battle of resaca de la palma would have been won, just as it was, if i had not been there. there was no further resistance. the evening of the 9th the army was encamped on its old ground near the fort, and the garrison was relieved. the siege had lasted a number of days, but the casualties were few in number. major jacob brown, of the 7th infantry, the commanding officer, had been killed, and in his honor the fort was named. since then a town of considerable importance has sprung up on the ground occupied by the fort and troops, which has also taken his name. the battles of palo alto and resaca de la palma seemed to us engaged, as pretty important affairs; but we had only a faint conception of their magnitude until they were fought over in the north by the press and the reports came back to us. at the same time, or about the same time, we learned that war existed between the united states and mexico, by the acts of the latter country. on learning this fact general taylor transferred our camps to the south or west bank of the river, and matamoras was occupied. we then became the "army of invasion." up to this time taylor had none but regular troops in his command; but now that invasion had already taken place, volunteers for one year commenced arriving. the army remained at matamoras until sufficiently reinforced to warrant a movement into the interior. general taylor was not an officer to trouble the administration much with his demands, but was inclined to do the best he could with the means given him. he felt his responsibility as going no further. if he had thought that he was sent to perform an impossibility with the means given him, he would probably have informed the authorities of his opinion and left them to determine what should be done. if the judgment was against him he would have gone on and done the best he could with the means at hand without parading his grievance before the public. no soldier could face either danger or responsibility more calmly than he. these are qualities more rarely found than genius or physical courage. general taylor never made any great show or parade, either of uniform or retinue. in dress he was possibly too plain, rarely wearing anything in the field to indicate his rank, or even that he was an officer; but he was known to every soldier in his army, and was respected by all. i can call to mind only one instance when i saw him in uniform, and one other when i heard of his wearing it, on both occasions he was unfortunate. the first was at corpus christi. he had concluded to review his army before starting on the march and gave orders accordingly. colonel twiggs was then second in rank with the army, and to him was given the command of the review. colonel and brevet brigadier-general worth, a far different soldier from taylor in the use of the uniform, was next to twiggs in rank, and claimed superiority by virtue of his brevet rank when the accidents of service threw them where one or the other had to command. worth declined to attend the review as subordinate to twiggs until the question was settled by the highest authority. this broke up the review, and the question was referred to washington for final decision. general taylor was himself only a colonel, in real rank, at that time, and a brigadier-general by brevet. he was assigned to duty, however, by the president, with the rank which his brevet gave him. worth was not so assigned, but by virtue of commanding a division he must, under the army regulations of that day, have drawn the pay of his brevet rank. the question was submitted to washington, and no response was received until after the army had reached the rio grande. it was decided against general worth, who at once tendered his resignation and left the army, going north, no doubt, by the same vessel that carried it. this kept him out of the battles of palo alto and resaca de la palma. either the resignation was not accepted, or general worth withdrew it before action had been taken. at all events he returned to the army in time to command his division in the battle of monterey, and served with it to the end of the war. the second occasion on which general taylor was said to have donned his uniform, was in order to receive a visit from the flag officer of the naval squadron off the mouth of the rio grande. while the army was on that river the flag officer sent word that he would call on the general to pay his respects on a certain day. general taylor, knowing that naval officers habitually wore all the uniform the "law allowed" on all occasions of ceremony, thought it would be only civil to receive his guest in the same style. his uniform was therefore got out, brushed up, and put on, in advance of the visit. the flag officer, knowing general taylor's aversion to the wearing of the uniform, and feeling that it would be regarded as a compliment should he meet him in civilian's dress, left off his uniform for this occasion. the meeting was said to have been embarrassing to both, and the conversation was principally apologetic. the time was whiled away pleasantly enough at matamoras, while we were waiting for volunteers. it is probable that all the most important people of the territory occupied by our army left their homes before we got there, but with those remaining the best of relations apparently existed. it was the policy of the commanding general to allow no pillaging, no taking of private property for public or individual use without satisfactory compensation, so that a better market was afforded than the people had ever known before. among the troops that joined us at matamoras was an ohio regiment, of which thomas l. hamer, the member of congress who had given me my appointment to west point, was major. he told me then that he could have had the colonelcy, but that as he knew he was to be appointed a brigadier-general, he preferred at first to take the lower grade. i have said before that hamer was one of the ablest men ohio ever produced. at that time he was in the prime of life, being less than fifty years of age, and possessed an admirable physique, promising long life. but he was taken sick before monterey, and died within a few days. i have always believed that had his life been spared, he would have been president of the united states during the term filled by president pierce. had hamer filled that office his partiality for me was such, there is but little doubt i should have been appointed to one of the staff corps of the army--the pay department probably--and would therefore now be preparing to retire. neither of these speculations is unreasonable, and they are mentioned to show how little men control their own destiny. reinforcements having arrived, in the month of august the movement commenced from matamoras to camargo, the head of navigation on the rio grande. the line of the rio grande was all that was necessary to hold, unless it was intended to invade mexico from the north. in that case the most natural route to take was the one which general taylor selected. it entered a pass in the sierra madre mountains, at monterey, through which the main road runs to the city of mexico. monterey itself was a good point to hold, even if the line of the rio grande covered all the territory we desired to occupy at that time. it is built on a plain two thousand feet above tide water, where the air is bracing and the situation healthy. on the 19th of august the army started for monterey, leaving a small garrison at matamoras. the troops, with the exception of the artillery, cavalry, and the brigade to which i belonged, were moved up the river to camargo on steamers. as there were but two or three of these, the boats had to make a number of trips before the last of the troops were up. those who marched did so by the south side of the river. lieutenant-colonel garland, of the 4th infantry, was the brigade commander, and on this occasion commanded the entire marching force. one day out convinced him that marching by day in that latitude, in the month of august, was not a beneficial sanitary measure, particularly for northern men. the order of marching was changed and night marches were substituted with the best results. when camargo was reached, we found a city of tents outside the mexican hamlet. i was detailed to act as quartermaster and commissary to the regiment. the teams that had proven abundantly sufficient to transport all supplies from corpus christi to the rio grande over the level prairies of texas, were entirely inadequate to the needs of the reinforced army in a mountainous country. to obviate the deficiency, pack mules were hired, with mexicans to pack and drive them. i had charge of the few wagons allotted to the 4th infantry and of the pack train to supplement them. there were not men enough in the army to manage that train without the help of mexicans who had learned how. as it was the difficulty was great enough. the troops would take up their march at an early hour each day. after they had started, the tents and cooking utensils had to be made into packages, so that they could be lashed to the backs of the mules. sheet-iron kettles, tent-poles and mess chests were inconvenient articles to transport in that way. it took several hours to get ready to start each morning, and by the time we were ready some of the mules first loaded would be tired of standing so long with their loads on their backs. sometimes one would start to run, bowing his back and kicking up until he scattered his load; others would lie down and try to disarrange their loads by attempting to get on the top of them by rolling on them; others with tent-poles for part of their loads would manage to run a tent-pole on one side of a sapling while they would take the other. i am not aware of ever having used a profane expletive in my life; but i would have the charity to excuse those who may have done so, if they were in charge of a train of mexican pack mules at the time. chapter viii. advance on monterey--the black fort--the battle of monterey--surrender of the city. the advance from camargo was commenced on the 5th of september. the army was divided into four columns, separated from each other by one day's march. the advance reached cerralvo in four days and halted for the remainder of the troops to come up. by the 13th the rear-guard had arrived, and the same day the advance resumed its march, followed as before, a day separating the divisions. the forward division halted again at marin, twenty-four miles from monterey. both this place and cerralvo were nearly deserted, and men, women and children were seen running and scattered over the hills as we approached; but when the people returned they found all their abandoned property safe, which must have given them a favorable opinion of los grengos--"the yankees." from marin the movement was in mass. on the 19th general taylor, with his army, was encamped at walnut springs, within three miles of monterey. the town is on a small stream coming out of the mountain-pass, and is backed by a range of hills of moderate elevation. to the north, between the city and walnut springs, stretches an extensive plain. on this plain, and entirely outside of the last houses of the city, stood a strong fort, enclosed on all sides, to which our army gave the name of "black fort." its guns commanded the approaches to the city to the full extent of their range. there were two detached spurs of hills or mountains to the north and northwest of the city, which were also fortified. on one of these stood the bishop's palace. the road to saltillo leaves the upper or western end of the city under the fire of the guns from these heights. the lower or eastern end was defended by two or three small detached works, armed with artillery and infantry. to the south was the mountain stream before mentioned, and back of that the range of foot-hills. the plaza in the centre of the city was the citadel, properly speaking. all the streets leading from it were swept by artillery, cannon being intrenched behind temporary parapets. the house-tops near the plaza were converted into infantry fortifications by the use of sand-bags for parapets. such were the defences of monterey in september, 1847. general ampudia, with a force of certainly ten thousand men, was in command. general taylor's force was about six thousand five hundred strong, in three divisions, under generals butler, twiggs and worth. the troops went into camp at walnut springs, while the engineer officers, under major mansfield--a general in the late war--commenced their reconnoissance. major mansfield found that it would be practicable to get troops around, out of range of the black fort and the works on the detached hills to the north-west of the city, to the saltillo road. with this road in our possession, the enemy would be cut off from receiving further supplies, if not from all communication with the interior. general worth, with his division somewhat reinforced, was given the task of gaining possession of the saltillo road, and of carrying the detached works outside the city, in that quarter. he started on his march early in the afternoon of the 20th. the divisions under generals butler and twiggs were drawn up to threaten the east and north sides of the city and the works on those fronts, in support of the movement under general worth. worth's was regarded as the main attack on monterey, and all other operations were in support of it. his march this day was uninterrupted; but the enemy was seen to reinforce heavily about the bishop's palace and the other outside fortifications on their left. general worth reached a defensible position just out of range of the enemy's guns on the heights north-west of the city, and bivouacked for the night. the engineer officers with him--captain sanders and lieutenant george g. meade, afterwards the commander of the victorious national army at the battle of gettysburg--made a reconnoissance to the saltillo road under cover of night. during the night of the 20th general taylor had established a battery, consisting of two twenty-four-pounder howitzers and a ten inch mortar, at a point from which they could play upon black fort. a natural depression in the plain, sufficiently deep to protect men standing in it from the fire from the fort, was selected and the battery established on the crest nearest the enemy. the 4th infantry, then consisting of but six reduced companies, was ordered to support the artillerists while they were intrenching themselves and their guns. i was regimental quartermaster at the time and was ordered to remain in charge of camp and the public property at walnut springs. it was supposed that the regiment would return to its camp in the morning. the point for establishing the siege battery was reached and the work performed without attracting the attention of the enemy. at daylight the next morning fire was opened on both sides and continued with, what seemed to me at that day, great fury. my curiosity got the better of my judgment, and i mounted a horse and rode to the front to see what was going on. i had been there but a short time when an order to charge was given, and lacking the moral courage to return to camp--where i had been ordered to stay--i charged with the regiment as soon as the troops were out of the depression they came under the fire of black fort. as they advanced they got under fire from batteries guarding the east, or lower, end of the city, and of musketry. about one-third of the men engaged in the charge were killed or wounded in the space of a few minutes. we retreated to get out of fire, not backward, but eastward and perpendicular to the direct road running into the city from walnut springs. i was, i believe, the only person in the 4th infantry in the charge who was on horseback. when we got to a lace of safety the regiment halted and drew itself together--what was left of it. the adjutant of the regiment, lieutenant hoskins, who was not in robust health, found himself very much fatigued from running on foot in the charge and retreat, and, seeing me on horseback, expressed a wish that he could be mounted also. i offered him my horse and he accepted the offer. a few minutes later i saw a soldier, a quartermaster's man, mounted, not far away. i ran to him, took his horse and was back with the regiment in a few minutes. in a short time we were off again; and the next place of safety from the shots of the enemy that i recollect of being in, was a field of cane or corn to the north-east of the lower batteries. the adjutant to whom i had loaned my horse was killed, and i was designated to act in his place. this charge was ill-conceived, or badly executed. we belonged to the brigade commanded by lieutenant-colonel garland, and he had received orders to charge the lower batteries of the city, and carry them if he could without too much loss, for the purpose of creating a diversion in favor of worth, who was conducting the movement which it was intended should be decisive. by a movement by the left flank garland could have led his men beyond the range of the fire from black fort and advanced towards the northeast angle of the city, as well covered from fire as could be expected. there was no undue loss of life in reaching the lower end of monterey, except that sustained by garland's command. meanwhile quitman's brigade, conducted by an officer of engineers, had reached the eastern end of the city, and was placed under cover of the houses without much loss. colonel garland's brigade also arrived at the suburbs, and, by the assistance of some of our troops that had reached house-tops from which they could fire into a little battery covering the approaches to the lower end of the city, the battery was speedily captured and its guns were turned upon another work of the enemy. an entrance into the east end of the city was now secured, and the houses protected our troops so long as they were inactive. on the west general worth had reached the saltillo road after some fighting but without heavy loss. he turned from his new position and captured the forts on both heights in that quarter. this gave him possession of the upper or west end of monterey. troops from both twiggs's and butler's divisions were in possession of the east end of the town, but the black fort to the north of the town and the plaza in the centre were still in the possession of the enemy. our camps at walnut springs, three miles away, were guarded by a company from each regiment. a regiment of kentucky volunteers guarded the mortars and howitzers engaged against black fort. practically monterey was invested. there was nothing done on the 22d by the united states troops; but the enemy kept up a harmless fire upon us from black fort and the batteries still in their possession at the east end of the city. during the night they evacuated these; so that on the morning of the 23d we held undisputed possession of the east end of monterey. twiggs's division was at the lower end of the city, and well covered from the fire of the enemy. but the streets leading to the plaza--all spanish or spanish-american towns have near their centres a square called a plaza--were commanded from all directions by artillery. the houses were flat-roofed and but one or two stories high, and about the plaza the roofs were manned with infantry, the troops being protected from our fire by parapets made of sand-bags. all advances into the city were thus attended with much danger. while moving along streets which did not lead to the plaza, our men were protected from the fire, and from the view, of the enemy except at the crossings; but at these a volley of musketry and a discharge of grape-shot were invariably encountered. the 3d and 4th regiments of infantry made an advance nearly to the plaza in this way and with heavy loss. the loss of the 3d infantry in commissioned officers was especially severe. there were only five companies of the regiment and not over twelve officers present, and five of these officers were killed. when within a square of the plaza this small command, ten companies in all, was brought to a halt. placing themselves under cover from the shots of the enemy, the men would watch to detect a head above the sand-bags on the neighboring houses. the exposure of a single head would bring a volley from our soldiers. we had not occupied this position long when it was discovered that our ammunition was growing low. i volunteered to go back (*2) to the point we had started from, report our position to general twiggs, and ask for ammunition to be forwarded. we were at this time occupying ground off from the street, in rear of the houses. my ride back was an exposed one. before starting i adjusted myself on the side of my horse furthest from the enemy, and with only one foot holding to the cantle of the saddle, and an arm over the neck of the horse exposed, i started at full run. it was only at street crossings that my horse was under fire, but these i crossed at such a flying rate that generally i was past and under cover of the next block of houses before the enemy fired. i got out safely without a scratch. at one place on my ride, i saw a sentry walking in front of a house, and stopped to inquire what he was doing there. finding that the house was full of wounded american officers and soldiers, i dismounted and went in. i found there captain williams, of the engineer corps, wounded in the head, probably fatally, and lieutenant territt, also badly wounded his bowels protruding from his wound. there were quite a number of soldiers also. promising them to report their situation, i left, readjusted myself to my horse, recommenced the run, and was soon with the troops at the east end. before ammunition could be collected, the two regiments i had been with were seen returning, running the same gauntlet in getting out that they had passed in going in, but with comparatively little loss. the movement was countermanded and the troops were withdrawn. the poor wounded officers and men i had found, fell into the hands of the enemy during the night, and died. while this was going on at the east, general worth, with a small division of troops, was advancing towards the plaza from the opposite end of the city. he resorted to a better expedient for getting to the plaza--the citadel--than we did on the east. instead of moving by the open streets, he advanced through the houses, cutting passageways from one to another. without much loss of life, he got so near the plaza during the night that before morning, ampudia, the mexican commander, made overtures for the surrender of the city and garrison. this stopped all further hostilities. the terms of surrender were soon agreed upon. the prisoners were paroled and permitted to take their horses and personal property with them. my pity was aroused by the sight of the mexican garrison of monterey marching out of town as prisoners, and no doubt the same feeling was experienced by most of our army who witnessed it. many of the prisoners were cavalry, armed with lances, and mounted on miserable little half-starved horses that did not look as if they could carry their riders out of town. the men looked in but little better condition. i thought how little interest the men before me had in the results of the war, and how little knowledge they had of "what it was all about." after the surrender of the garrison of monterey a quiet camp life was led until midwinter. as had been the case on the rio grande, the people who remained at their homes fraternized with the "yankees" in the pleasantest manner. in fact, under the humane policy of our commander, i question whether the great majority of the mexican people did not regret our departure as much as they had regretted our coming. property and person were thoroughly protected, and a market was afforded for all the products of the country such as the people had never enjoyed before. the educated and wealthy portion of the population here, as elsewhere, abandoned their homes and remained away from them as long as they were in the possession of the invaders; but this class formed a very small percentage of the whole population. chapter ix. political intrigue--buena vista--movement against vera cruz--siege and capture of vera cruz. the mexican war was a political war, and the administration conducting it desired to make party capital out of it. general scott was at the head of the army, and, being a soldier of acknowledged professional capacity, his claim to the command of the forces in the field was almost indisputable and does not seem to have been denied by president polk, or marcy, his secretary of war. scott was a whig and the administration was democratic. general scott was also known to have political aspirations, and nothing so popularizes a candidate for high civil positions as military victories. it would not do therefore to give him command of the "army of conquest." the plans submitted by scott for a campaign in mexico were disapproved by the administration, and he replied, in a tone possibly a little disrespectful, to the effect that, if a soldier's plans were not to be supported by the administration, success could not be expected. this was on the 27th of may, 1846. four days later general scott was notified that he need not go to mexico. general gaines was next in rank, but he was too old and feeble to take the field. colonel zachary taylor--a brigadier-general by brevet--was therefore left in command. he, too, was a whig, but was not supposed to entertain any political ambitions; nor did he; but after the fall of monterey, his third battle and third complete victory, the whig papers at home began to speak of him as the candidate of their party for the presidency. something had to be done to neutralize his growing popularity. he could not be relieved from duty in the field where all his battles had been victories: the design would have been too transparent. it was finally decided to send general scott to mexico in chief command, and to authorize him to carry out his own original plan: that is, capture vera cruz and march upon the capital of the country. it was no doubt supposed that scott's ambition would lead him to slaughter taylor or destroy his chances for the presidency, and yet it was hoped that he would not make sufficient capital himself to secure the prize. the administration had indeed a most embarrassing problem to solve. it was engaged in a war of conquest which must be carried to a successful issue, or the political object would be unattained. yet all the capable officers of the requisite rank belonged to the opposition, and the man selected for his lack of political ambition had himself become a prominent candidate for the presidency. it was necessary to destroy his chances promptly. the problem was to do this without the loss of conquest and without permitting another general of the same political party to acquire like popularity. the fact is, the administration of mr. polk made every preparation to disgrace scott, or, to speak more correctly, to drive him to such desperation that he would disgrace himself. general scott had opposed conquest by the way of the rio grande, matamoras and saltillo from the first. now that he was in command of all the forces in mexico, he withdrew from taylor most of his regular troops and left him only enough volunteers, as he thought, to hold the line then in possession of the invading army. indeed scott did not deem it important to hold anything beyond the rio grande, and authorized taylor to fall back to that line if he chose. general taylor protested against the depletion of his army, and his subsequent movement upon buena vista would indicate that he did not share the views of his chief in regard to the unimportance of conquest beyond the rio grande. scott had estimated the men and material that would be required to capture vera cruz and to march on the capital of the country, two hundred and sixty miles in the interior. he was promised all he asked and seemed to have not only the confidence of the president, but his sincere good wishes. the promises were all broken. only about half the troops were furnished that had been pledged, other war material was withheld and scott had scarcely started for mexico before the president undertook to supersede him by the appointment of senator thomas h. benton as lieutenant-general. this being refused by congress, the president asked legislative authority to place a junior over a senior of the same grade, with the view of appointing benton to the rank of major-general and then placing him in command of the army, but congress failed to accede to this proposition as well, and scott remained in command: but every general appointed to serve under him was politically opposed to the chief, and several were personally hostile. general scott reached brazos santiago or point isabel, at the mouth of the rio grande, late in december, 1846, and proceeded at once up the river to camargo, where he had written general taylor to meet him. taylor, however, had gone to, or towards tampico, for the purpose of establishing a post there. he had started on this march before he was aware of general scott being in the country. under these circumstances scott had to issue his orders designating the troops to be withdrawn from taylor, without the personal consultation he had expected to hold with his subordinate. general taylor's victory at buena vista, february 22d, 23d, and 24th, 1847, with an army composed almost entirely of volunteers who had not been in battle before, and over a vastly superior force numerically, made his nomination for the presidency by the whigs a foregone conclusion. he was nominated and elected in 1848. i believe that he sincerely regretted this turn in his fortunes, preferring the peace afforded by a quiet life free from abuse to the honor of filling the highest office in the gift of any people, the presidency of the united states. when general scott assumed command of the army of invasion, i was in the division of general david twiggs, in taylor's command; but under the new orders my regiment was transferred to the division of general william worth, in which i served to the close of the war. the troops withdrawn from taylor to form part of the forces to operate against vera cruz, were assembled at the mouth of the rio grande preparatory to embarkation for their destination. i found general worth a different man from any i had before served directly under. he was nervous, impatient and restless on the march, or when important or responsible duty confronted him. there was not the least reason for haste on the march, for it was known that it would take weeks to assemble shipping enough at the point of our embarkation to carry the army, but general worth moved his division with a rapidity that would have been commendable had he been going to the relief of a beleaguered garrison. the length of the marches was regulated by the distances between places affording a supply of water for the troops, and these distances were sometimes long and sometimes short. general worth on one occasion at least, after having made the full distance intended for the day, and after the troops were in camp and preparing their food, ordered tents struck and made the march that night which had been intended for the next day. some commanders can move troops so as to get the maximum distance out of them without fatigue, while others can wear them out in a few days without accomplishing so much. general worth belonged to this latter class. he enjoyed, however, a fine reputation for his fighting qualities, and thus attached his officers and men to him. the army lay in camp upon the sand-beach in the neighborhood of the mouth of the rio grande for several weeks, awaiting the arrival of transports to carry it to its new field of operations. the transports were all sailing vessels. the passage was a tedious one, and many of the troops were on shipboard over thirty days from the embarkation at the mouth of the rio grande to the time of debarkation south of vera cruz. the trip was a comfortless one for officers and men. the transports used were built for carrying freight and possessed but limited accommodations for passengers, and the climate added to the discomfort of all. the transports with troops were assembled in the harbor of anton lizardo, some sixteen miles south of vera cruz, as they arrived, and there awaited the remainder of the fleet, bringing artillery, ammunition and supplies of all kinds from the north. with the fleet there was a little steam propeller dispatch-boat--the first vessel of the kind i had ever seen, and probably the first of its kind ever seen by any one then with the army. at that day ocean steamers were rare, and what there were were sidewheelers. this little vessel, going through the fleet so fast, so noiselessly and with its propeller under water out of view, attracted a great deal of attention. i recollect that lieutenant sidney smith, of the 4th infantry, by whom i happened to be standing on the deck of a vessel when this propeller was passing, exclaimed, "why, the thing looks as if it was propelled by the force of circumstances." finally on the 7th of march, 1847, the little army of ten or twelve thousand men, given scott to invade a country with a population of seven or eight millions, a mountainous country affording the greatest possible natural advantages for defence, was all assembled and ready to commence the perilous task of landing from vessels lying in the open sea. the debarkation took place inside of the little island of sacrificios, some three miles south of vera cruz. the vessels could not get anywhere near shore, so that everything had to be landed in lighters or surf-boats; general scott had provided these before leaving the north. the breakers were sometimes high, so that the landing was tedious. the men were got ashore rapidly, because they could wade when they came to shallow water; but the camp and garrison equipage, provisions, ammunition and all stores had to be protected from the salt water, and therefore their landing took several days. the mexicans were very kind to us, however, and threw no obstacles in the way of our landing except an occasional shot from their nearest fort. during the debarkation one shot took off the head of major albertis. no other, i believe, reached anywhere near the same distance. on the 9th of march the troops were landed and the investment of vera cruz, from the gulf of mexico south of the city to the gulf again on the north, was soon and easily effected. the landing of stores was continued until everything was got ashore. vera cruz, at the time of which i write and up to 1880, was a walled city. the wall extended from the water's edge south of the town to the water again on the north. there were fortifications at intervals along the line and at the angles. in front of the city, and on an island half a mile out in the gulf, stands san juan de ulloa, an enclosed fortification of large dimensions and great strength for that period. against artillery of the present day the land forts and walls would prove elements of weakness rather than strength. after the invading army had established their camps out of range of the fire from the city, batteries were established, under cover of night, far to the front of the line where the troops lay. these batteries were intrenched and the approaches sufficiently protected. if a sortie had been made at any time by the mexicans, the men serving the batteries could have been quickly reinforced without great exposure to the fire from the enemy's main line. no serious attempt was made to capture the batteries or to drive our troops away. the siege continued with brisk firing on our side till the 27th of march, by which time a considerable breach had been made in the wall surrounding the city. upon this general morales, who was governor of both the city and of san juan de ulloa, commenced a correspondence with general scott looking to the surrender of the town, forts and garrison. on the 29th vera cruz and san juan de ulloa were occupied by scott's army. about five thousand prisoners and four hundred pieces of artillery, besides large amounts of small arms and ammunition, fell into the hands of the victorious force. the casualties on our side during the siege amounted to sixty-four officers and men, killed and wounded. chapter x. march to jalapa--battle of cerro gordo--perote--puebla--scott and taylor. general scott had less than twelve thousand men at vera cruz. he had been promised by the administration a very much larger force, or claimed that he had, and he was a man of veracity. twelve thousand was a very small army with which to penetrate two hundred and sixty miles into an enemy's country, and to besiege the capital; a city, at that time, of largely over one hundred thousand inhabitants. then, too, any line of march that could be selected led through mountain passes easily defended. in fact, there were at that time but two roads from vera cruz to the city of mexico that could be taken by an army; one by jalapa and perote, the other by cordova and orizaba, the two coming together on the great plain which extends to the city of mexico after the range of mountains is passed. it was very important to get the army away from vera cruz as soon as possible, in order to avoid the yellow fever, or vomito, which usually visits that city early in the year, and is very fatal to persons not acclimated; but transportation, which was expected from the north, was arriving very slowly. it was absolutely necessary to have enough to supply the army to jalapa, sixty-five miles in the interior and above the fevers of the coast. at that point the country is fertile, and an army of the size of general scott's could subsist there for an indefinite period. not counting the sick, the weak and the garrisons for the captured city and fort, the moving column was now less than ten thousand strong. this force was composed of three divisions, under generals twiggs, patterson, and worth. the importance of escaping the vomito was so great that as soon as transportation enough could be got together to move a division the advance was commenced. on the 8th of april, twiggs's division started for jalapa. he was followed very soon by patterson, with his division. general worth was to bring up the rear with his command as soon as transportation enough was assembled to carry six days' rations for his troops with the necessary ammunition and camp and garrison equipage. it was the 13th of april before this division left vera cruz. the leading division ran against the enemy at cerro gordo, some fifty miles west, on the road to jalapa, and went into camp at plan del rio, about three miles from the fortifications. general patterson reached plan del rio with his division soon after twiggs arrived. the two were then secure against an attack from santa anna, who commanded the mexican forces. at all events they confronted the enemy without reinforcements and without molestation, until the 18th of april. general scott had remained at vera cruz to hasten preparations for the field; but on the 12th, learning the situation at the front, he hastened on to take personal supervision. he at once commenced his preparations for the capture of the position held by santa anna and of the troops holding it. cerro gordo is one of the higher spurs of the mountains some twelve to fifteen miles east of jalapa, and santa anna had selected this point as the easiest to defend against an invading army. the road, said to have been built by cortez, zigzags around the mountain-side and was defended at every turn by artillery. on either side were deep chasms or mountain walls. a direct attack along the road was an impossibility. a flank movement seemed equally impossible. after the arrival of the commanding-general upon the scene, reconnoissances were sent out to find, or to make, a road by which the rear of the enemy's works might be reached without a front attack. these reconnoissances were made under the supervision of captain robert e. lee, assisted by lieutenants p. g. t. beauregard, isaac i. stevens, z. b. tower, g. w. smith, george b. mcclellan, and j. g. foster, of the corps of engineers, all officers who attained rank and fame, on one side or the other, in the great conflict for the preservation of the unity of the nation. the reconnoissance was completed, and the labor of cutting out and making roads by the flank of the enemy was effected by the 17th of the month. this was accomplished without the knowledge of santa anna or his army, and over ground where he supposed it impossible. on the same day general scott issued his order for the attack on the 18th. the attack was made as ordered, and perhaps there was not a battle of the mexican war, or of any other, where orders issued before an engagement were nearer being a correct report of what afterwards took place. under the supervision of the engineers, roadways had been opened over chasms to the right where the walls were so steep that men could barely climb them. animals could not. these had been opened under cover of night, without attracting the notice of the enemy. the engineers, who had directed the opening, led the way and the troops followed. artillery was let down the steep slopes by hand, the men engaged attaching a strong rope to the rear axle and letting the guns down, a piece at a time, while the men at the ropes kept their ground on top, paying out gradually, while a few at the front directed the course of the piece. in like manner the guns were drawn by hand up the opposite slopes. in this way scott's troops reached their assigned position in rear of most of the intrenchments of the enemy, unobserved. the attack was made, the mexican reserves behind the works beat a hasty retreat, and those occupying them surrendered. on the left general pillow's command made a formidable demonstration, which doubtless held a part of the enemy in his front and contributed to the victory. i am not pretending to give full details of all the battles fought, but of the portion that i saw. there were troops engaged on both sides at other points in which both sustained losses; but the battle was won as here narrated. the surprise of the enemy was complete, the victory overwhelming; some three thousand prisoners fell into scott's hands, also a large amount of ordnance and ordnance stores. the prisoners were paroled, the artillery parked and the small arms and ammunition destroyed. the battle of buena vista was probably very important to the success of general scott at cerro gordo and in his entire campaign from vera cruz to the great plains reaching to the city of mexico. the only army santa anna had to protect his capital and the mountain passes west of vera cruz, was the one he had with him confronting general taylor. it is not likely that he would have gone as far north as monterey to attack the united states troops when he knew his country was threatened with invasion further south. when taylor moved to saltillo and then advanced on to buena vista, santa anna crossed the desert confronting the invading army, hoping no doubt to crush it and get back in time to meet general scott in the mountain passes west of vera cruz. his attack on taylor was disastrous to the mexican army, but, notwithstanding this, he marched his army to cerro gordo, a distance not much short of one thousand miles by the line he had to travel, in time to intrench himself well before scott got there. if he had been successful at buena vista his troops would no doubt have made a more stubborn resistance at cerro gordo. had the battle of buena vista not been fought santa anna would have had time to move leisurely to meet the invader further south and with an army not demoralized nor depleted by defeat. after the battle the victorious army moved on to jalapa, where it was in a beautiful, productive and healthy country, far above the fevers of the coast. jalapa, however, is still in the mountains, and between there and the great plain the whole line of the road is easy of defence. it was important, therefore, to get possession of the great highway between the sea-coast and the capital up to the point where it leaves the mountains, before the enemy could have time to re-organize and fortify in our front. worth's division was selected to go forward to secure this result. the division marched to perote on the great plain, not far from where the road debouches from the mountains. there is a low, strong fort on the plain in front of the town, known as the castle of perote. this, however, offered no resistance and fell into our hands, with its armament. general scott having now only nine or ten thousand men west of vera cruz, and the time of some four thousand of them being about to expire, a long delay was the consequence. the troops were in a healthy climate, and where they could subsist for an indefinite period even if their line back to vera cruz should be cut off. it being ascertained that the men whose time would expire before the city of mexico could possibly fall into the hands of the american army, would not remain beyond the term for which they had volunteered, the commanding-general determined to discharge them at once, for a delay until the expiration of their time would have compelled them to pass through vera cruz during the season of the vomito. this reduced scott's force in the field to about five thousand men. early in may, worth, with his division, left perote and marched on to puebla. the roads were wide and the country open except through one pass in a spur of mountains coming up from the south, through which the road runs. notwithstanding this the small column was divided into two bodies, moving a day apart. nothing occurred on the march of special note, except that while lying at the town of amozoque--an easy day's march east of puebla--a body of the enemy's cavalry, two or three thousand strong, was seen to our right, not more than a mile away. a battery or two, with two or three infantry regiments, was sent against them and they soon disappeared. on the 15th of may we entered the city of puebla. general worth was in command at puebla until the latter end of may, when general scott arrived. here, as well as on the march up, his restlessness, particularly under responsibilities, showed itself. during his brief command he had the enemy hovering around near the city, in vastly superior numbers to his own. the brigade to which i was attached changed quarters three different times in about a week, occupying at first quarters near the plaza, in the heart of the city; then at the western entrance; then at the extreme east. on one occasion general worth had the troops in line, under arms, all day, with three days' cooked rations in their haversacks. he galloped from one command to another proclaiming the near proximity of santa anna with an army vastly superior to his own. general scott arrived upon the scene the latter part of the month, and nothing more was heard of santa anna and his myriads. there were, of course, bodies of mounted mexicans hovering around to watch our movements and to pick up stragglers, or small bodies of troops, if they ventured too far out. these always withdrew on the approach of any considerable number of our soldiers. after the arrival of general scott i was sent, as quartermaster, with a large train of wagons, back two days' march at least, to procure forage. we had less than a thousand men as escort, and never thought of danger. we procured full loads for our entire train at two plantations, which could easily have furnished as much more. there had been great delay in obtaining the authority of congress for the raising of the troops asked for by the administration. a bill was before the national legislature from early in the session of 1846-7, authorizing the creation of ten additional regiments for the war to be attached to the regular army, but it was the middle of february before it became a law. appointments of commissioned officers had then to be made; men had to be enlisted, the regiments equipped and the whole transported to mexico. it was august before general scott received reinforcement sufficient to warrant an advance. his moving column, not even now more than ten thousand strong, was in four divisions, commanded by generals twiggs, worth, pillow and quitman. there was also a cavalry corps under general harney, composed of detachments of the 1st, 2d, and 3d dragoons. the advance commenced on the 7th of august with twiggs's division in front. the remaining three divisions followed, with an interval of a day between. the marches were short, to make concentration easier in case of attack. i had now been in battle with the two leading commanders conducting armies in a foreign land. the contrast between the two was very marked. general taylor never wore uniform, but dressed himself entirely for comfort. he moved about the field in which he was operating to see through his own eyes the situation. often he would be without staff officers, and when he was accompanied by them there was no prescribed order in which they followed. he was very much given to sit his horse side-ways--with both feet on one side--particularly on the battlefield. general scott was the reverse in all these particulars. he always wore all the uniform prescribed or allowed by law when he inspected his lines; word would be sent to all division and brigade commanders in advance, notifying them of the hour when the commanding general might be expected. this was done so that all the army might be under arms to salute their chief as he passed. on these occasions he wore his dress uniform, cocked hat, aiguillettes, sabre and spurs. his staff proper, besides all officers constructively on his staff--engineers, inspectors, quartermasters, etc., that could be spared--followed, also in uniform and in prescribed order. orders were prepared with great care and evidently with the view that they should be a history of what followed. in their modes of expressing thought, these two generals contrasted quite as strongly as in their other characteristics. general scott was precise in language, cultivated a style peculiarly his own; was proud of his rhetoric; not averse to speaking of himself, often in the third person, and he could bestow praise upon the person he was talking about without the least embarrassment. taylor was not a conversationalist, but on paper he could put his meaning so plainly that there could be no mistaking it. he knew how to express what he wanted to say in the fewest well-chosen words, but would not sacrifice meaning to the construction of high-sounding sentences. but with their opposite characteristics both were great and successful soldiers; both were true, patriotic and upright in all their dealings. both were pleasant to serve under--taylor was pleasant to serve with. scott saw more through the eyes of his staff officers than through his own. his plans were deliberately prepared, and fully expressed in orders. taylor saw for himself, and gave orders to meet the emergency without reference to how they would read in history. chapter xi. advance on the city of mexico--battle of contreras--assault at churubusco--negotiations for peace--battle of molino del rey--storming of chapultepec--san cosme--evacuation of the city--halls of the montezumas. the route followed by the army from puebla to the city of mexico was over rio frio mountain, the road leading over which, at the highest point, is about eleven thousand feet above tide water. the pass through this mountain might have been easily defended, but it was not; and the advanced division reached the summit in three days after leaving puebla. the city of mexico lies west of rio frio mountain, on a plain backed by another mountain six miles farther west, with others still nearer on the north and south. between the western base of rio frio and the city of mexico there are three lakes, chalco and xochimilco on the left and texcoco on the right, extending to the east end of the city of mexico. chalco and texcoco are divided by a narrow strip of land over which the direct road to the city runs. xochimilco is also to the left of the road, but at a considerable distance south of it, and is connected with lake chalco by a narrow channel. there is a high rocky mound, called el penon, on the right of the road, springing up from the low flat ground dividing the lakes. this mound was strengthened by intrenchments at its base and summit, and rendered a direct attack impracticable. scott's army was rapidly concentrated about ayotla and other points near the eastern end of lake chalco. reconnoissances were made up to within gun-shot of el penon, while engineers were seeking a route by the south side of lake chalco to flank the city, and come upon it from the south and south-west. a way was found around the lake, and by the 18th of august troops were in st. augustin tlalpam, a town about eleven miles due south from the plaza of the capital. between st. augustin tlalpam and the city lie the hacienda of san antonio and the village of churubusco, and south-west of them is contreras. all these points, except st. augustin tlalpam, were intrenched and strongly garrisoned. contreras is situated on the side of a mountain, near its base, where volcanic rocks are piled in great confusion, reaching nearly to san antonio. this made the approach to the city from the south very difficult. the brigade to which i was attached--garland's, of worth's division--was sent to confront san antonio, two or three miles from st. augustin tlalpam, on the road to churubusco and the city of mexico. the ground on which san antonio stands is completely in the valley, and the surface of the land is only a little above the level of the lakes, and, except to the south-west, it was cut up by deep ditches filled with water. to the south-west is the pedregal--the volcanic rock before spoken of--over which cavalry or artillery could not be passed, and infantry would make but poor progress if confronted by an enemy. from the position occupied by garland's brigade, therefore, no movement could be made against the defences of san antonio except to the front, and by a narrow causeway, over perfectly level ground, every inch of which was commanded by the enemy's artillery and infantry. if contreras, some three miles west and south, should fall into our hands, troops from there could move to the right flank of all the positions held by the enemy between us and the city. under these circumstances general scott directed the holding of the front of the enemy without making an attack until further orders. on the 18th of august, the day of reaching san augustin tlalpam, garland's brigade secured a position within easy range of the advanced intrenchments of san antonio, but where his troops were protected by an artificial embankment that had been thrown up for some other purpose than defense. general scott at once set his engineers reconnoitring the works about contreras, and on the 19th movements were commenced to get troops into positions from which an assault could be made upon the force occupying that place. the pedregal on the north and north-east, and the mountain on the south, made the passage by either flank of the enemy's defences difficult, for their work stood exactly between those natural bulwarks; but a road was completed during the day and night of the 19th, and troops were got to the north and west of the enemy. this affair, like that of cerro gordo, was an engagement in which the officers of the engineer corps won special distinction. in fact, in both cases, tasks which seemed difficult at first sight were made easier for the troops that had to execute them than they would have been on an ordinary field. the very strength of each of these positions was, by the skill of the engineers, converted into a defence for the assaulting parties while securing their positions for final attack. all the troops with general scott in the valley of mexico, except a part of the division of general quitman at san augustin tlalpam and the brigade of garland (worth's division) at san antonio, were engaged at the battle of contreras, or were on their way, in obedience to the orders of their chief, to reinforce those who were engaged. the assault was made on the morning of the 20th, and in less than half an hour from the sound of the advance the position was in our hands, with many prisoners and large quantities of ordnance and other stores. the brigade commanded by general riley was from its position the most conspicuous in the final assault, but all did well, volunteers and regulars. from the point occupied by garland's brigade we could see the progress made at contreras and the movement of troops toward the flank and rear of the enemy opposing us. the mexicans all the way back to the city could see the same thing, and their conduct showed plainly that they did not enjoy the sight. we moved out at once, and found them gone from our immediate front. clarke's brigade of worth's division now moved west over the point of the pedregal, and after having passed to the north sufficiently to clear san antonio, turned east and got on the causeway leading to churubusco and the city of mexico. when he approached churubusco his left, under colonel hoffman, attacked a tete-de-pont at that place and brought on an engagement. about an hour after, garland was ordered to advance directly along the causeway, and got up in time to take part in the engagement. san antonio was found evacuated, the evacuation having probably taken place immediately upon the enemy seeing the stars and stripes waving over contreras. the troops that had been engaged at contreras, and even then on their way to that battle-field, were moved by a causeway west of, and parallel to the one by way of san antonio and churubusco. it was expected by the commanding general that these troops would move north sufficiently far to flank the enemy out of his position at churubusco, before turning east to reach the san antonio road, but they did not succeed in this, and churubusco proved to be about the severest battle fought in the valley of mexico. general scott coming upon the battle-field about this juncture, ordered two brigades, under shields, to move north and turn the right of the enemy. this shields did, but not without hard fighting and heavy loss. the enemy finally gave way, leaving in our hands prisoners, artillery and small arms. the balance of the causeway held by the enemy, up to the very gates of the city, fell in like manner. i recollect at this place that some of the gunners who had stood their ground, were deserters from general taylor's army on the rio grande. both the strategy and tactics displayed by general scott in these various engagements of the 20th of august, 1847, were faultless as i look upon them now, after the lapse of so many years. as before stated, the work of the engineer officers who made the reconnoissances and led the different commands to their destinations, was so perfect that the chief was able to give his orders to his various subordinates with all the precision he could use on an ordinary march. i mean, up to the points from which the attack was to commence. after that point is reached the enemy often induces a change of orders not before contemplated. the enemy outside the city outnumbered our soldiery quite three to one, but they had become so demoralized by the succession of defeats this day, that the city of mexico could have been entered without much further bloodshed. in fact, captain philip kearney --afterwards a general in the war of the rebellion--rode with a squadron of cavalry to the very gates of the city, and would no doubt have entered with his little force, only at that point he was badly wounded, as were several of his officers. he had not heard the call for a halt. general franklin pierce had joined the army in mexico, at puebla, a short time before the advance upon the capital commenced. he had consequently not been in any of the engagements of the war up to the battle of contreras. by an unfortunate fall of his horse on the afternoon of the 19th he was painfully injured. the next day, when his brigade, with the other troops engaged on the same field, was ordered against the flank and rear of the enemy guarding the different points of the road from san augustin tlalpam to the city, general pierce attempted to accompany them. he was not sufficiently recovered to do so, and fainted. this circumstance gave rise to exceedingly unfair and unjust criticisms of him when he became a candidate for the presidency. whatever general pierce's qualifications may have been for the presidency, he was a gentleman and a man of courage. i was not a supporter of him politically, but i knew him more intimately than i did any other of the volunteer generals. general scott abstained from entering the city at this time, because mr. nicholas p. trist, the commissioner on the part of the united states to negotiate a treaty of peace with mexico, was with the army, and either he or general scott thought--probably both of them--that a treaty would be more possible while the mexican government was in possession of the capital than if it was scattered and the capital in the hands of an invader. be this as it may, we did not enter at that time. the army took up positions along the slopes of the mountains south of the city, as far west as tacubaya. negotiations were at once entered into with santa anna, who was then practically the government and the immediate commander of all the troops engaged in defence of the country. a truce was signed which denied to either party the right to strengthen its position, or to receive reinforcements during the continuance of the armistices, but authorized general scott to draw supplies for his army from the city in the meantime. negotiations were commenced at once and were kept up vigorously between mr. trist and the commissioners appointed on the part of mexico, until the 2d of september. at that time mr. trist handed in his ultimatum. texas was to be given up absolutely by mexico, and new mexico and california ceded to the united states for a stipulated sum to be afterwards determined. i do not suppose mr. trist had any discretion whatever in regard to boundaries. the war was one of conquest, in the interest of an institution, and the probabilities are that private instructions were for the acquisition of territory out of which new states might be carved. at all events the mexicans felt so outraged at the terms proposed that they commenced preparations for defence, without giving notice of the termination of the armistice. the terms of the truce had been violated before, when teams had been sent into the city to bring out supplies for the army. the first train entering the city was very severely threatened by a mob. this, however, was apologized for by the authorities and all responsibility for it denied; and thereafter, to avoid exciting the mexican people and soldiery, our teams with their escorts were sent in at night, when the troops were in barracks and the citizens in bed. the circumstance was overlooked and negotiations continued. as soon as the news reached general scott of the second violation of the armistice, about the 4th of september, he wrote a vigorous note to president santa anna, calling his attention to it, and, receiving an unsatisfactory reply, declared the armistice at an end. general scott, with worth's division, was now occupying tacubaya, a village some four miles south-west of the city of mexico, and extending from the base up the mountain-side for the distance of half a mile. more than a mile west, and also a little above the plain, stands molino del rey. the mill is a long stone structure, one story high and several hundred feet in length. at the period of which i speak general scott supposed a portion of the mill to be used as a foundry for the casting of guns. this, however, proved to be a mistake. it was valuable to the mexicans because of the quantity of grain it contained. the building is flat roofed, and a line of sand-bags over the outer walls rendered the top quite a formidable defence for infantry. chapultepec is a mound springing up from the plain to the height of probably three hundred feet, and almost in a direct line between molino del rey and the western part of the city. it was fortified both on the top and on the rocky and precipitous sides. the city of mexico is supplied with water by two aqueducts, resting on strong stone arches. one of these aqueducts draws its supply of water from a mountain stream coming into it at or near molino del rey, and runs north close to the west base of chapultepec; thence along the centre of a wide road, until it reaches the road running east into the city by the garita san cosme; from which point the aqueduct and road both run east to the city. the second aqueduct starts from the east base of chapultepec, where it is fed by a spring, and runs north-east to the city. this aqueduct, like the other, runs in the middle of a broad road-way, thus leaving a space on each side. the arches supporting the aqueduct afforded protection for advancing troops as well as to those engaged defensively. at points on the san cosme road parapets were thrown across, with an embrasure for a single piece of artillery in each. at the point where both road and aqueduct turn at right angles from north to east, there was not only one of these parapets supplied by one gun and infantry supports, but the houses to the north of the san cosme road, facing south and commanding a view of the road back to chapultepec, were covered with infantry, protected by parapets made of sandbags. the roads leading to garitas (the gates) san cosme and belen, by which these aqueducts enter the city, were strongly intrenched. deep, wide ditches, filled with water, lined the sides of both roads. such were the defences of the city of mexico in september, 1847, on the routes over which general scott entered. prior to the mexican war general scott had been very partial to general worth--indeed he continued so up to the close of hostilities--but, for some reason, worth had become estranged from his chief. scott evidently took this coldness somewhat to heart. he did not retaliate, however, but on the contrary showed every disposition to appease his subordinate. it was understood at the time that he gave worth authority to plan and execute the battle of molino del rey without dictation or interference from any one, for the very purpose of restoring their former relations. the effort failed, and the two generals remained ever after cold and indifferent towards each other, if not actually hostile. the battle of molino del rey was fought on the 8th of september. the night of the 7th, worth sent for his brigade and regimental commanders, with their staffs, to come to his quarters to receive instructions for the morrow. these orders contemplated a movement up to within striking distance of the mills before daylight. the engineers had reconnoitred the ground as well as possible, and had acquired all the information necessary to base proper orders both for approach and attack. by daylight on the morning of the 8th, the troops to be engaged at molino were all at the places designated. the ground in front of the mills, to the south, was commanded by the artillery from the summit of chapultepec as well as by the lighter batteries at hand; but a charge was made, and soon all was over. worth's troops entered the mills by every door, and the enemy beat a hasty retreat back to chapultepec. had this victory been followed up promptly, no doubt americans and mexicans would have gone over the defences of chapultepec so near together that the place would have fallen into our hands without further loss. the defenders of the works could not have fired upon us without endangering their own men. this was not done, and five days later more valuable lives were sacrificed to carry works which had been so nearly in our possession on the 8th. i do not criticise the failure to capture chapultepec at this time. the result that followed the first assault could not possibly have been foreseen, and to profit by the unexpected advantage, the commanding general must have been on the spot and given the necessary instructions at the moment, or the troops must have kept on without orders. it is always, however, in order to follow a retreating foe, unless stopped or otherwise directed. the loss on our side at molino del rey was severe for the numbers engaged. it was especially so among commissioned officers. i was with the earliest of the troops to enter the mills. in passing through to the north side, looking towards chapultepec, i happened to notice that there were armed mexicans still on top of the building, only a few feet from many of our men. not seeing any stairway or ladder reaching to the top of the building, i took a few soldiers, and had a cart that happened to be standing near brought up, and, placing the shafts against the wall and chocking the wheels so that the cart could not back, used the shafts as a sort of ladder extending to within three or four feet of the top. by this i climbed to the roof of the building, followed by a few men, but found a private soldier had preceded me by some other way. there were still quite a number of mexicans on the roof, among them a major and five or six officers of lower grades, who had not succeeded in getting away before our troops occupied the building. they still had their arms, while the soldier before mentioned was walking as sentry, guarding the prisoners he had surrounded, all by himself. i halted the sentinel, received the swords from the commissioned officers, and proceeded, with the assistance of the soldiers now with me, to disable the muskets by striking them against the edge of the wall, and throw them to the ground below. molino del rey was now captured, and the troops engaged, with the exception of an appropriate guard over the captured position and property, were marched back to their quarters in tacubaya. the engagement did not last many minutes, but the killed and wounded were numerous for the number of troops engaged. during the night of the 11th batteries were established which could play upon the fortifications of chapultepec. the bombardment commenced early on the morning of the 12th, but there was no further engagement during this day than that of the artillery. general scott assigned the capture of chapultepec to general pillow, but did not leave the details to his judgment. two assaulting columns, two hundred and fifty men each, composed of volunteers for the occasion, were formed. they were commanded by captains mckinzie and casey respectively. the assault was successful, but bloody. in later years, if not at the time, the battles of molino del rey and chapultepec have seemed to me to have been wholly unnecessary. when the assaults upon the garitas of san cosme and belen were determined upon, the road running east to the former gate could have been reached easily, without an engagement, by moving along south of the mills until west of them sufficiently far to be out of range, thence north to the road above mentioned; or, if desirable to keep the two attacking columns nearer together, the troops could have been turned east so as to come on the aqueduct road out of range of the guns from chapultepec. in like manner, the troops designated to act against belen could have kept east of chapultepec, out of range, and come on to the aqueduct, also out of range of chapultepec. molino del rey and chapultepec would both have been necessarily evacuated if this course had been pursued, for they would have been turned. general quitman, a volunteer from the state of mississippi, who stood well with the army both as a soldier and as a man, commanded the column acting against belen. general worth commanded the column against san cosme. when chapultepec fell the advance commenced along the two aqueduct roads. i was on the road to san cosme, and witnessed most that took place on that route. when opposition was encountered our troops sheltered themselves by keeping under the arches supporting the aqueduct, advancing an arch at a time. we encountered no serious obstruction until within gun-shot of the point where the road we were on intersects that running east to the city, the point where the aqueduct turns at a right angle. i have described the defences of this position before. there were but three commissioned officers besides myself, that i can now call to mind, with the advance when the above position was reached. one of these officers was a lieutenant semmes, of the marine corps. i think captain gore, and lieutenant judah, of the 4th infantry, were the others. our progress was stopped for the time by the single piece of artillery at the angle of the roads and the infantry occupying the house-tops back from it. west of the road from where we were, stood a house occupying the south-west angle made by the san cosme road and the road we were moving upon. a stone wall ran from the house along each of these roads for a considerable distance and thence back until it joined, enclosing quite a yard about the house. i watched my opportunity and skipped across the road and behind the south wall. proceeding cautiously to the west corner of the enclosure, i peeped around and seeing nobody, continued, still cautiously, until the road running east and west was reached. i then returned to the troops, and called for volunteers. all that were close to me, or that heard me, about a dozen, offered their services. commanding them to carry their arms at a trail, i watched our opportunity and got them across the road and under cover of the wall beyond, before the enemy had a shot at us. our men under cover of the arches kept a close watch on the intrenchments that crossed our path and the house-tops beyond, and whenever a head showed itself above the parapets they would fire at it. our crossing was thus made practicable without loss. when we reached a safe position i instructed my little command again to carry their arms at a trail, not to fire at the enemy until they were ordered, and to move very cautiously following me until the san cosme road was reached; we would then be on the flank of the men serving the gun on the road, and with no obstruction between us and them. when we reached the south-west corner of the enclosure before described, i saw some united states troops pushing north through a shallow ditch near by, who had come up since my reconnaissance. this was the company of captain horace brooks, of the artillery, acting as infantry. i explained to brooks briefly what i had discovered and what i was about to do. he said, as i knew the ground and he did not, i might go on and he would follow. as soon as we got on the road leading to the city the troops serving the gun on the parapet retreated, and those on the house-tops near by followed; our men went after them in such close pursuit--the troops we had left under the arches joining--that a second line across the road, about half-way between the first and the garita, was carried. no reinforcements had yet come up except brooks's company, and the position we had taken was too advanced to be held by so small a force. it was given up, but retaken later in the day, with some loss. worth's command gradually advanced to the front now open to it. later in the day in reconnoitring i found a church off to the south of the road, which looked to me as if the belfry would command the ground back of the garita san cosme. i got an officer of the voltigeurs, with a mountain howitzer and men to work it, to go with me. the road being in possession of the enemy, we had to take the field to the south to reach the church. this took us over several ditches breast deep in water and grown up with water plants. these ditches, however, were not over eight or ten feet in width. the howitzer was taken to pieces and carried by the men to its destination. when i knocked for admission a priest came to the door who, while extremely polite, declined to admit us. with the little spanish then at my command, i explained to him that he might save property by opening the door, and he certainly would save himself from becoming a prisoner, for a time at least; and besides, i intended to go in whether he consented or not. he began to see his duty in the same light that i did, and opened the door, though he did not look as if it gave him special pleasure to do so. the gun was carried to the belfry and put together. we were not more than two or three hundred yards from san cosme. the shots from our little gun dropped in upon the enemy and created great confusion. why they did not send out a small party and capture us, i do not know. we had no infantry or other defences besides our one gun. the effect of this gun upon the troops about the gate of the city was so marked that general worth saw it from his position. (*3) he was so pleased that he sent a staff officer, lieutenant pemberton--later lieutenant-general commanding the defences of vicksburg--to bring me to him. he expressed his gratification at the services the howitzer in the church steeple was doing, saying that every shot was effective, and ordered a captain of voltigeurs to report to me with another howitzer to be placed along with the one already rendering so much service. i could not tell the general that there was not room enough in the steeple for another gun, because he probably would have looked upon such a statement as a contradiction from a second lieutenant. i took the captain with me, but did not use his gun. the night of the 13th of september was spent by the troops under general worth in the houses near san cosme, and in line confronting the general line of the enemy across to belen. the troops that i was with were in the houses north of the road leading into the city, and were engaged during the night in cutting passage-ways from one house to another towards the town. during the night santa anna, with his army--except the deserters--left the city. he liberated all the convicts confined in the town, hoping, no doubt, that they would inflict upon us some injury before daylight; but several hours after santa anna was out of the way, the city authorities sent a delegation to general scott to ask--if not demand--an armistice, respecting church property, the rights of citizens and the supremacy of the city government in the management of municipal affairs. general scott declined to trammel himself with conditions, but gave assurances that those who chose to remain within our lines would be protected so long as they behaved themselves properly. general quitman had advanced along his line very successfully on the 13th, so that at night his command occupied nearly the same position at belen that worth's troops did about san cosme. after the interview above related between general scott and the city council, orders were issued for the cautious entry of both columns in the morning. the troops under worth were to stop at the alameda, a park near the west end of the city. quitman was to go directly to the plaza, and take possession of the palace--a mass of buildings on the east side in which congress has its sessions, the national courts are held, the public offices are all located, the president resides, and much room is left for museums, receptions, etc. this is the building generally designated as the "halls of the montezumas." chapter xii. promotion to first lieutenant--capture of the city of mexico--the army --mexican soldiers--peace negotiations. on entering the city the troops were fired upon by the released convicts, and possibly by deserters and hostile citizens. the streets were deserted, and the place presented the appearance of a "city of the dead," except for this firing by unseen persons from house-tops, windows, and around corners. in this firing the lieutenant-colonel of my regiment, garland, was badly wounded, lieutenant sidney smith, of the 4th infantry, was also wounded mortally. he died a few days after, and by his death i was promoted to the grade of first lieutenant.(*4) i had gone into the battle of palo alto in may, 1846, a second lieutenant, and i entered the city of mexico sixteen months later with the same rank, after having been in all the engagements possible for any one man and in a regiment that lost more officers during the war than it ever had present at any one engagement. my regiment lost four commissioned officers, all senior to me, by steamboat explosions during the mexican war. the mexicans were not so discriminating. they sometimes picked off my juniors. general scott soon followed the troops into the city, in state. i wonder that he was not fired upon, but i believe he was not; at all events he was not hurt. he took quarters at first in the "halls of the montezumas," and from there issued his wise and discreet orders for the government of a conquered city, and for suppressing the hostile acts of liberated convicts already spoken of--orders which challenge the respect of all who study them. lawlessness was soon suppressed, and the city of mexico settled down into a quiet, law-abiding place. the people began to make their appearance upon the streets without fear of the invaders. shortly afterwards the bulk of the troops were sent from the city to the villages at the foot of the mountains, four or five miles to the south and south-west. whether general scott approved of the mexican war and the manner in which it was brought about, i have no means of knowing. his orders to troops indicate only a soldierly spirit, with probably a little regard for the perpetuation of his own fame. on the other hand, general taylor's, i think, indicate that he considered the administration accountable for the war, and felt no responsibility resting on himself further than for the faithful performance of his duties. both generals deserve the commendations of their countrymen and to live in the grateful memory of this people to the latest generation. earlier in this narrative i have stated that the plain, reached after passing the mountains east of perote, extends to the cities of puebla and mexico. the route travelled by the army before reaching puebla, goes over a pass in a spur of mountain coming up from the south. this pass is very susceptible of defence by a smaller against a larger force. again, the highest point of the road-bed between vera cruz and the city of mexico is over rio frio mountain, which also might have been successfully defended by an inferior against a superior force. but by moving north of the mountains, and about thirty miles north of puebla, both of these passes would have been avoided. the road from perote to the city of mexico, by this latter route, is as level as the prairies in our west. arriving due north from puebla, troops could have been detached to take possession of that place, and then proceeding west with the rest of the army no mountain would have been encountered before reaching the city of mexico. it is true this road would have brought troops in by guadalupe--a town, church and detached spur of mountain about two miles north of the capital, all bearing the same general name --and at this point lake texcoco comes near to the mountain, which was fortified both at the base and on the sides: but troops could have passed north of the mountain and come in only a few miles to the north-west, and so flanked the position, as they actually did on the south. it has always seemed to me that this northern route to the city of mexico, would have been the better one to have taken. but my later experience has taught me two lessons: first, that things are seen plainer after the events have occurred; second, that the most confident critics are generally those who know the least about the matter criticised. i know just enough about the mexican war to approve heartily of most of the generalship, but to differ with a little of it. it is natural that an important city like puebla should not have been passed with contempt; it may be natural that the direct road to it should have been taken; but it could have been passed, its evacuation insured and possession acquired without danger of encountering the enemy in intricate mountain defiles. in this same way the city of mexico could have been approached without any danger of opposition, except in the open field. but general scott's successes are an answer to all criticism. he invaded a populous country, penetrating two hundred and sixty miles into the interior, with a force at no time equal to one-half of that opposed to him; he was without a base; the enemy was always intrenched, always on the defensive; yet he won every battle, he captured the capital, and conquered the government. credit is due to the troops engaged, it is true, but the plans and the strategy were the general's. i had now made marches and been in battle under both general scott and general taylor. the former divided his force of 10,500 men into four columns, starting a day apart, in moving from puebla to the capital of the nation, when it was known that an army more than twice as large as his own stood ready to resist his coming. the road was broad and the country open except in crossing the rio frio mountain. general taylor pursued the same course in marching toward an enemy. he moved even in smaller bodies. i never thought at the time to doubt the infallibility of these two generals in all matters pertaining to their profession. i supposed they moved in small bodies because more men could not be passed over a single road on the same day with their artillery and necessary trains. later i found the fallacy of this belief. the rebellion, which followed as a sequence to the mexican war, never could have been suppressed if larger bodies of men could not have been moved at the same time than was the custom under scott and taylor. the victories in mexico were, in every instance, over vastly superior numbers. there were two reasons for this. both general scott and general taylor had such armies as are not often got together. at the battles of palo alto and resaca-de-la-palma, general taylor had a small army, but it was composed exclusively of regular troops, under the best of drill and discipline. every officer, from the highest to the lowest, was educated in his profession, not at west point necessarily, but in the camp, in garrison, and many of them in indian wars. the rank and file were probably inferior, as material out of which to make an army, to the volunteers that participated in all the later battles of the war; but they were brave men, and then drill and discipline brought out all there was in them. a better army, man for man, probably never faced an enemy than the one commanded by general taylor in the earliest two engagements of the mexican war. the volunteers who followed were of better material, but without drill or discipline at the start. they were associated with so many disciplined men and professionally educated officers, that when they went into engagements it was with a confidence they would not have felt otherwise. they became soldiers themselves almost at once. all these conditions we would enjoy again in case of war. the mexican army of that day was hardly an organization. the private soldier was picked up from the lower class of the inhabitants when wanted; his consent was not asked; he was poorly clothed, worse fed, and seldom paid. he was turned adrift when no longer wanted. the officers of the lower grades were but little superior to the men. with all this i have seen as brave stands made by some of these men as i have ever seen made by soldiers. now mexico has a standing army larger than that of the united states. they have a military school modelled after west point. their officers are educated and, no doubt, generally brave. the mexican war of 1846-8 would be an impossibility in this generation. the mexicans have shown a patriotism which it would be well if we would imitate in part, but with more regard to truth. they celebrate the anniversaries of chapultepec and molino del rey as of very great victories. the anniversaries are recognized as national holidays. at these two battles, while the united states troops were victorious, it was at very great sacrifice of life compared with what the mexicans suffered. the mexicans, as on many other occasions, stood up as well as any troops ever did. the trouble seemed to be the lack of experience among the officers, which led them after a certain time to simply quit, without being particularly whipped, but because they had fought enough. their authorities of the present day grow enthusiastic over their theme when telling of these victories, and speak with pride of the large sum of money they forced us to pay in the end. with us, now twenty years after the close of the most stupendous war ever known, we have writers --who profess devotion to the nation--engaged in trying to prove that the union forces were not victorious; practically, they say, we were slashed around from donelson to vicksburg and to chattanooga; and in the east from gettysburg to appomattox, when the physical rebellion gave out from sheer exhaustion. there is no difference in the amount of romance in the two stories. i would not have the anniversaries of our victories celebrated, nor those of our defeats made fast days and spent in humiliation and prayer; but i would like to see truthful history written. such history will do full credit to the courage, endurance and soldierly ability of the american citizen, no matter what section of the country he hailed from, or in what ranks he fought. the justice of the cause which in the end prevailed, will, i doubt not, come to be acknowledged by every citizen of the land, in time. for the present, and so long as there are living witnesses of the great war of sections, there will be people who will not be consoled for the loss of a cause which they believed to be holy. as time passes, people, even of the south, will begin to wonder how it was possible that their ancestors ever fought for or justified institutions which acknowledged the right of property in man. after the fall of the capital and the dispersal of the government of mexico, it looked very much as if military occupation of the country for a long time might be necessary. general scott at once began the preparation of orders, regulations and laws in view of this contingency. he contemplated making the country pay all the expenses of the occupation, without the army becoming a perceptible burden upon the people. his plan was to levy a direct tax upon the separate states, and collect, at the ports left open to trade, a duty on all imports. from the beginning of the war private property had not been taken, either for the use of the army or of individuals, without full compensation. this policy was to be pursued. there were not troops enough in the valley of mexico to occupy many points, but now that there was no organized army of the enemy of any size, reinforcements could be got from the rio grande, and there were also new volunteers arriving from time to time, all by way of vera cruz. military possession was taken of cuernavaca, fifty miles south of the city of mexico; of toluca, nearly as far west, and of pachuca, a mining town of great importance, some sixty miles to the north-east. vera cruz, jalapa, orizaba, and puebla were already in our possession. meanwhile the mexican government had departed in the person of santa anna, and it looked doubtful for a time whether the united states commissioner, mr. trist, would find anybody to negotiate with. a temporary government, however, was soon established at queretaro, and trist began negotiations for a conclusion of the war. before terms were finally agreed upon he was ordered back to washington, but general scott prevailed upon him to remain, as an arrangement had been so nearly reached, and the administration must approve his acts if he succeeded in making such a treaty as had been contemplated in his instructions. the treaty was finally signed the 2d of february, 1848, and accepted by the government at washington. it is that known as the "treaty of guadalupe hidalgo," and secured to the united states the rio grande as the boundary of texas, and the whole territory then included in new mexico and upper california, for the sum of $15,000,000. soon after entering the city of mexico, the opposition of generals pillow, worth and colonel duncan to general scott became very marked. scott claimed that they had demanded of the president his removal. i do not know whether this is so or not, but i do know of their unconcealed hostility to their chief. at last he placed them in arrest, and preferred charges against them of insubordination and disrespect. this act brought on a crisis in the career of the general commanding. he had asserted from the beginning that the administration was hostile to him; that it had failed in its promises of men and war material; that the president himself had shown duplicity if not treachery in the endeavor to procure the appointment of benton: and the administration now gave open evidence of its enmity. about the middle of february orders came convening a court of inquiry, composed of brevet brigadier-general towson, the paymaster-general of the army, brigadier-general cushing and colonel belknap, to inquire into the conduct of the accused and the accuser, and shortly afterwards orders were received from washington, relieving scott of the command of the army in the field and assigning major-general william o. butler of kentucky to the place. this order also released pillow, worth and duncan from arrest. if a change was to be made the selection of general butler was agreeable to every one concerned, so far as i remember to have heard expressions on the subject. there were many who regarded the treatment of general scott as harsh and unjust. it is quite possible that the vanity of the general had led him to say and do things that afforded a plausible pretext to the administration for doing just what it did and what it had wanted to do from the start. the court tried the accuser quite as much as the accused. it was adjourned before completing its labors, to meet in frederick, maryland. general scott left the country, and never after had more than the nominal command of the army until early in 1861. he certainly was not sustained in his efforts to maintain discipline in high places. the efforts to kill off politically the two successful generals, made them both candidates for the presidency. general taylor was nominated in 1848, and was elected. four years later general scott received the nomination but was badly beaten, and the party nominating him died with his defeat.(*5) chapter xiii. treaty of peace--mexican bull fights--regimental quartermaster--trip to popocatapetl--trip to the caves of mexico. the treaty of peace between the two countries was signed by the commissioners of each side early in february, 1848. it took a considerable time for it to reach washington, receive the approval of the administration, and be finally ratified by the senate. it was naturally supposed by the army that there would be no more fighting, and officers and men were of course anxious to get home, but knowing there must be delay they contented themselves as best they could. every sunday there was a bull fight for the amusement of those who would pay their fifty cents. i attended one of them--just one--not wishing to leave the country without having witnessed the national sport. the sight to me was sickening. i could not see how human beings could enjoy the sufferings of beasts, and often of men, as they seemed to do on these occasions. at these sports there are usually from four to six bulls sacrificed. the audience occupies seats around the ring in which the exhibition is given, each seat but the foremost rising higher than the one in front, so that every one can get a full view of the sport. when all is ready a bull is turned into the ring. three or four men come in, mounted on the merest skeletons of horses blind or blind-folded and so weak that they could not make a sudden turn with their riders without danger of falling down. the men are armed with spears having a point as sharp as a needle. other men enter the arena on foot, armed with red flags and explosives about the size of a musket cartridge. to each of these explosives is fastened a barbed needle which serves the purpose of attaching them to the bull by running the needle into the skin. before the animal is turned loose a lot of these explosives are attached to him. the pain from the pricking of the skin by the needles is exasperating; but when the explosions of the cartridges commence the animal becomes frantic. as he makes a lunge towards one horseman, another runs a spear into him. he turns towards his last tormentor when a man on foot holds out a red flag; the bull rushes for this and is allowed to take it on his horns. the flag drops and covers the eyes of the animal so that he is at a loss what to do; it is jerked from him and the torment is renewed. when the animal is worked into an uncontrollable frenzy, the horsemen withdraw, and the matadores --literally murderers--enter, armed with knives having blades twelve or eighteen inches long, and sharp. the trick is to dodge an attack from the animal and stab him to the heart as he passes. if these efforts fail the bull is finally lassoed, held fast and killed by driving a knife blade into the spinal column just back of the horns. he is then dragged out by horses or mules, another is let into the ring, and the same performance is renewed. on the occasion when i was present one of the bulls was not turned aside by the attacks in the rear, the presentations of the red flag, etc., etc., but kept right on, and placing his horns under the flanks of a horse threw him and his rider to the ground with great force. the horse was killed and the rider lay prostrate as if dead. the bull was then lassoed and killed in the manner above described. men came in and carried the dead man off in a litter. when the slaughtered bull and horse were dragged out, a fresh bull was turned into the ring. conspicuous among the spectators was the man who had been carried out on a litter but a few minutes before. he was only dead so far as that performance went; but the corpse was so lively that it could not forego the chance of witnessing the discomfiture of some of his brethren who might not be so fortunate. there was a feeling of disgust manifested by the audience to find that he had come to life again. i confess that i felt sorry to see the cruelty to the bull and the horse. i did not stay for the conclusion of the performance; but while i did stay, there was not a bull killed in the prescribed way. bull fights are now prohibited in the federal district--embracing a territory around the city of mexico, somewhat larger than the district of columbia--and they are not an institution in any part of the country. during one of my recent visits to mexico, bull fights were got up in my honor at puebla and at pachuca. i was not notified in advance so as to be able to decline and thus prevent the performance; but in both cases i civilly declined to attend. another amusement of the people of mexico of that day, and one which nearly all indulged in, male and female, old and young, priest and layman, was monte playing. regular feast weeks were held every year at what was then known as st. augustin tlalpam, eleven miles out of town. there were dealers to suit every class and condition of people. in many of the booths tlackos--the copper coin of the country, four of them making six and a quarter cents of our money--were piled up in great quantities, with some silver, to accommodate the people who could not bet more than a few pennies at a time. in other booths silver formed the bulk of the capital of the bank, with a few doubloons to be changed if there should be a run of luck against the bank. in some there was no coin except gold. here the rich were said to bet away their entire estates in a single day. all this is stopped now. for myself, i was kept somewhat busy during the winter of 1847-8. my regiment was stationed in tacubaya. i was regimental quartermaster and commissary. general scott had been unable to get clothing for the troops from the north. the men were becoming--well, they needed clothing. material had to be purchased, such as could be obtained, and people employed to make it up into "yankee uniforms." a quartermaster in the city was designated to attend to this special duty; but clothing was so much needed that it was seized as fast as made up. a regiment was glad to get a dozen suits at a time. i had to look after this matter for the 4th infantry. then our regimental fund had run down and some of the musicians in the band had been without their extra pay for a number of months. the regimental bands at that day were kept up partly by pay from the government, and partly by pay from the regimental fund. there was authority of law for enlisting a certain number of men as musicians. so many could receive the pay of non-commissioned officers of the various grades, and the remainder the pay of privates. this would not secure a band leader, nor good players on certain instruments. in garrison there are various ways of keeping up a regimental fund sufficient to give extra pay to musicians, establish libraries and ten-pin alleys, subscribe to magazines and furnish many extra comforts to the men. the best device for supplying the fund is to issue bread to the soldiers instead of flour. the ration used to be eighteen ounces per day of either flour or bread; and one hundred pounds of flour will make one hundred and forty pounds of bread. this saving was purchased by the commissary for the benefit of the fund. in the emergency the 4th infantry was laboring under, i rented a bakery in the city, hired bakers--mexicans--bought fuel and whatever was necessary, and i also got a contract from the chief commissary of the army for baking a large amount of hard bread. in two months i made more money for the fund than my pay amounted to during the entire war. while stationed at monterey i had relieved the post fund in the same way. there, however, was no profit except in the saving of flour by converting it into bread. in the spring of 1848 a party of officers obtained leave to visit popocatapetl, the highest volcano in america, and to take an escort. i went with the party, many of whom afterwards occupied conspicuous positions before the country. of those who "went south," and attained high rank, there was lieutenant richard anderson, who commanded a corps at spottsylvania; captain sibley, a major-general, and, after the war, for a number of years in the employ of the khedive of egypt; captain george crittenden, a rebel general; s. b. buckner, who surrendered fort donelson; and mansfield lovell, who commanded at new orleans before that city fell into the hands of the national troops. of those who remained on our side there were captain andrew porter, lieutenant c. p. stone and lieutenant z. b. tower. there were quite a number of other officers, whose names i cannot recollect. at a little village (ozumba) near the base of popocatapetl, where we purposed to commence the ascent, we procured guides and two pack mules with forage for our horses. high up on the mountain there was a deserted house of one room, called the vaqueria, which had been occupied years before by men in charge of cattle ranging on the mountain. the pasturage up there was very fine when we saw it, and there were still some cattle, descendants of the former domestic herd, which had now become wild. it was possible to go on horseback as far as the vaqueria, though the road was somewhat hazardous in places. sometimes it was very narrow with a yawning precipice on one side, hundreds of feet down to a roaring mountain torrent below, and almost perpendicular walls on the other side. at one of these places one of our mules loaded with two sacks of barley, one on each side, the two about as big as he was, struck his load against the mountain-side and was precipitated to the bottom. the descent was steep but not perpendicular. the mule rolled over and over until the bottom was reached, and we supposed of course the poor animal was dashed to pieces. what was our surprise, not long after we had gone into bivouac, to see the lost mule, cargo and owner coming up the ascent. the load had protected the animal from serious injury; and his owner had gone after him and found a way back to the path leading up to the hut where we were to stay. the night at the vaqueria was one of the most unpleasant i ever knew. it was very cold and the rain fell in torrents. a little higher up the rain ceased and snow began. the wind blew with great velocity. the log-cabin we were in had lost the roof entirely on one side, and on the other it was hardly better then a sieve. there was little or no sleep that night. as soon as it was light the next morning, we started to make the ascent to the summit. the wind continued to blow with violence and the weather was still cloudy, but there was neither rain nor snow. the clouds, however, concealed from our view the country below us, except at times a momentary glimpse could be got through a clear space between them. the wind carried the loose snow around the mountain-sides in such volumes as to make it almost impossible to stand up against it. we labored on and on, until it became evident that the top could not be reached before night, if at all in such a storm, and we concluded to return. the descent was easy and rapid, though dangerous, until we got below the snow line. at the cabin we mounted our horses, and by night were at ozumba. the fatigues of the day and the loss of sleep the night before drove us to bed early. our beds consisted of a place on the dirt-floor with a blanket under us. soon all were asleep; but long before morning first one and then another of our party began to cry out with excruciating pain in the eyes. not one escaped it. by morning the eyes of half the party were so swollen that they were entirely closed. the others suffered pain equally. the feeling was about what might be expected from the prick of a sharp needle at a white heat. we remained in quarters until the afternoon bathing our eyes in cold water. this relieved us very much, and before night the pain had entirely left. the swelling, however, continued, and about half the party still had their eyes entirely closed; but we concluded to make a start back, those who could see a little leading the horses of those who could not see at all. we moved back to the village of ameca ameca, some six miles, and stopped again for the night. the next morning all were entirely well and free from pain. the weather was clear and popocatapetl stood out in all its beauty, the top looking as if not a mile away, and inviting us to return. about half the party were anxious to try the ascent again, and concluded to do so. the remainder--i was with the remainder--concluded that we had got all the pleasure there was to be had out of mountain climbing, and that we would visit the great caves of mexico, some ninety miles from where we then were, on the road to acapulco. the party that ascended the mountain the second time succeeded in reaching the crater at the top, with but little of the labor they encountered in their first attempt. three of them--anderson, stone and buckner--wrote accounts of their journey, which were published at the time. i made no notes of this excursion, and have read nothing about it since, but it seems to me that i can see the whole of it as vividly as if it were but yesterday. i have been back at ameca ameca, and the village beyond, twice in the last five years. the scene had not changed materially from my recollection of it. the party which i was with moved south down the valley to the town of cuantla, some forty miles from ameca ameca. the latter stands on the plain at the foot of popocatapetl, at an elevation of about eight thousand feet above tide water. the slope down is gradual as the traveller moves south, but one would not judge that, in going to cuantla, descent enough had been made to occasion a material change in the climate and productions of the soil; but such is the case. in the morning we left a temperate climate where the cereals and fruits are those common to the united states, we halted in the evening in a tropical climate where the orange and banana, the coffee and the sugar-cane were flourishing. we had been travelling, apparently, on a plain all day, but in the direction of the flow of water. soon after the capture of the city of mexico an armistice had been agreed to, designating the limits beyond which troops of the respective armies were not to go during its continuance. our party knew nothing about these limits. as we approached cuantla bugles sounded the assembly, and soldiers rushed from the guard-house in the edge of the town towards us. our party halted, and i tied a white pocket handkerchief to a stick and, using it as a flag of truce, proceeded on to the town. captains sibley and porter followed a few hundred yards behind. i was detained at the guard-house until a messenger could be dispatched to the quarters of the commanding general, who authorized that i should be conducted to him. i had been with the general but a few minutes when the two officers following announced themselves. the mexican general reminded us that it was a violation of the truce for us to be there. however, as we had no special authority from our own commanding general, and as we knew nothing about the terms of the truce, we were permitted to occupy a vacant house outside the guard for the night, with the promise of a guide to put us on the road to cuernavaca the next morning. cuernavaca is a town west of guantla. the country through which we passed, between these two towns, is tropical in climate and productions and rich in scenery. at one point, about half-way between the two places, the road goes over a low pass in the mountains in which there is a very quaint old town, the inhabitants of which at that day were nearly all full-blooded indians. very few of them even spoke spanish. the houses were built of stone and generally only one story high. the streets were narrow, and had probably been paved before cortez visited the country. they had not been graded, but the paving had been done on the natural surface. we had with us one vehicle, a cart, which was probably the first wheeled vehicle that had ever passed through that town. on a hill overlooking this town stands the tomb of an ancient king; and it was understood that the inhabitants venerated this tomb very highly, as well as the memory of the ruler who was supposed to be buried in it. we ascended the mountain and surveyed the tomb; but it showed no particular marks of architectural taste, mechanical skill or advanced civilization. the next day we went into cuernavaca. after a day's rest at cuernavaca our party set out again on the journey to the great caves of mexico. we had proceeded but a few miles when we were stopped, as before, by a guard and notified that the terms of the existing armistice did not permit us to go further in that direction. upon convincing the guard that we were a mere party of pleasure seekers desirous of visiting the great natural curiosities of the country which we expected soon to leave, we were conducted to a large hacienda near by, and directed to remain there until the commanding general of that department could be communicated with and his decision obtained as to whether we should be permitted to pursue our journey. the guard promised to send a messenger at once, and expected a reply by night. at night there was no response from the commanding general, but the captain of the guard was sure he would have a reply by morning. again in the morning there was no reply. the second evening the same thing happened, and finally we learned that the guard had sent no message or messenger to the department commander. we determined therefore to go on unless stopped by a force sufficient to compel obedience. after a few hours' travel we came to a town where a scene similar to the one at cuantia occurred. the commanding officer sent a guide to conduct our party around the village and to put us upon our road again. this was the last interruption: that night we rested at a large coffee plantation, some eight miles from the cave we were on the way to visit. it must have been a saturday night; the peons had been paid off, and spent part of the night in gambling away their scanty week's earnings. their coin was principally copper, and i do not believe there was a man among them who had received as much as twenty-five cents in money. they were as much excited, however, as if they had been staking thousands. i recollect one poor fellow, who had lost his last tlacko, pulled off his shirt and, in the most excited manner, put that up on the turn of a card. monte was the game played, the place out of doors, near the window of the room occupied by the officers of our party. the next morning we were at the mouth of the cave at an early hour, provided with guides, candles and rockets. we explored to a distance of about three miles from the entrance, and found a succession of chambers of great dimensions and of great beauty when lit up with our rockets. stalactites and stalagmites of all sizes were discovered. some of the former were many feet in diameter and extended from ceiling to floor; some of the latter were but a few feet high from the floor; but the formation is going on constantly, and many centuries hence these stalagmites will extend to the ceiling and become complete columns. the stalagmites were all a little concave, and the cavities were filled with water. the water percolates through the roof, a drop at a time--often the drops several minutes apart--and more or less charged with mineral matter. evaporation goes on slowly, leaving the mineral behind. this in time makes the immense columns, many of them thousands of tons in weight, which serve to support the roofs over the vast chambers. i recollect that at one point in the cave one of these columns is of such huge proportions that there is only a narrow passage left on either side of it. some of our party became satisfied with their explorations before we had reached the point to which the guides were accustomed to take explorers, and started back without guides. coming to the large column spoken of, they followed it entirely around, and commenced retracing their steps into the bowels of the mountain, without being aware of the fact. when the rest of us had completed our explorations, we started out with our guides, but had not gone far before we saw the torches of an approaching party. we could not conceive who these could be, for all of us had come in together, and there were none but ourselves at the entrance when we started in. very soon we found it was our friends. it took them some time to conceive how they had got where they were. they were sure they had kept straight on for the mouth of the cave, and had gone about far enough to have reached it. chapter xiv. return of the army--marriage--ordered to the pacific coast--crossing the isthmus--arrival at san francisco. my experience in the mexican war was of great advantage to me afterwards. besides the many practical lessons it taught, the war brought nearly all the officers of the regular army together so as to make them personally acquainted. it also brought them in contact with volunteers, many of whom served in the war of the rebellion afterwards. then, in my particular case, i had been at west point at about the right time to meet most of the graduates who were of a suitable age at the breaking out of the rebellion to be trusted with large commands. graduating in 1843, i was at the military academy from one to four years with all cadets who graduated between 1840 and 1846--seven classes. these classes embraced more than fifty officers who afterwards became generals on one side or the other in the rebellion, many of them holding high commands. all the older officers, who became conspicuous in the rebellion, i had also served with and known in mexico: lee, j. e. johnston, a. s. johnston, holmes, hebert and a number of others on the confederate side; mccall, mansfield, phil. kearney and others on the national side. the acquaintance thus formed was of immense service to me in the war of the rebellion--i mean what i learned of the characters of those to whom i was afterwards opposed. i do not pretend to say that all movements, or even many of them, were made with special reference to the characteristics of the commander against whom they were directed. but my appreciation of my enemies was certainly affected by this knowledge. the natural disposition of most people is to clothe a commander of a large army whom they do not know, with almost superhuman abilities. a large part of the national army, for instance, and most of the press of the country, clothed general lee with just such qualities, but i had known him personally, and knew that he was mortal; and it was just as well that i felt this. the treaty of peace was at last ratified, and the evacuation of mexico by united states troops was ordered. early in june the troops in the city of mexico began to move out. many of them, including the brigade to which i belonged, were assembled at jalapa, above the vomito, to await the arrival of transports at vera cruz: but with all this precaution my regiment and others were in camp on the sand beach in a july sun, for about a week before embarking, while the fever raged with great virulence in vera cruz, not two miles away. i can call to mind only one person, an officer, who died of the disease. my regiment was sent to pascagoula, mississippi, to spend the summer. as soon as it was settled in camp i obtained a leave of absence for four months and proceeded to st. louis. on the 22d of august, 1848, i was married to miss julia dent, the lady of whom i have before spoken. we visited my parents and relations in ohio, and, at the end of my leave, proceeded to my post at sackett's harbor, new york. in april following i was ordered to detroit, michigan, where two years were spent with but few important incidents. the present constitution of the state of michigan was ratified during this time. by the terms of one of its provisions, all citizens of the united states residing within the state at the time of the ratification became citizens of michigan also. during my stay in detroit there was an election for city officers. mr. zachariah chandler was the candidate of the whigs for the office of mayor, and was elected, although the city was then reckoned democratic. all the officers stationed there at the time who offered their votes were permitted to cast them. i did not offer mine, however, as i did not wish to consider myself a citizen of michigan. this was mr. chandler's first entry into politics, a career he followed ever after with great success, and in which he died enjoying the friendship, esteem and love of his countrymen. in the spring of 1851 the garrison at detroit was transferred to sackett's harbor, and in the following spring the entire 4th infantry was ordered to the pacific coast. it was decided that mrs. grant should visit my parents at first for a few months, and then remain with her own family at their st. louis home until an opportunity offered of sending for her. in the month of april the regiment was assembled at governor's island, new york harbor, and on the 5th of july eight companies sailed for aspinwall. we numbered a little over seven hundred persons, including the families of officers and soldiers. passage was secured for us on the old steamer ohio, commanded at the time by captain schenck, of the navy. it had not been determined, until a day or two before starting, that the 4th infantry should go by the ohio; consequently, a complement of passengers had already been secured. the addition of over seven hundred to this list crowded the steamer most uncomfortably, especially for the tropics in july. in eight days aspinwall was reached. at that time the streets of the town were eight or ten inches under water, and foot passengers passed from place to place on raised foot-walks. july is at the height of the wet season, on the isthmus. at intervals the rain would pour down in streams, followed in not many minutes by a blazing, tropical summer's sun. these alternate changes, from rain to sunshine, were continuous in the afternoons. i wondered how any person could live many months in aspinwall, and wondered still more why any one tried. in the summer of 1852 the panama railroad was completed only to the point where it now crosses the chagres river. from there passengers were carried by boats to gorgona, at which place they took mules for panama, some twenty-five miles further. those who travelled over the isthmus in those days will remember that boats on the chagres river were propelled by natives not inconveniently burdened with clothing. these boats carried thirty to forty passengers each. the crews consisted of six men to a boat, armed with long poles. there were planks wide enough for a man to walk on conveniently, running along the sides of each boat from end to end. the men would start from the bow, place one end of their poles against the river bottom, brace their shoulders against the other end, and then walk to the stern as rapidly as they could. in this way from a mile to a mile and a half an hour could be made, against the current of the river. i, as regimental quartermaster, had charge of the public property and had also to look after the transportation. a contract had been entered into with the steamship company in new york for the transportation of the regiment to california, including the isthmus transit. a certain amount of baggage was allowed per man, and saddle animals were to be furnished to commissioned officers and to all disabled persons. the regiment, with the exception of one company left as guards to the public property--camp and garrison equipage principally--and the soldiers with families, took boats, propelled as above described, for gorgona. from this place they marched to panama, and were soon comfortably on the steamer anchored in the bay, some three or four miles from the town. i, with one company of troops and all the soldiers with families, all the tents, mess chests and camp kettles, was sent to cruces, a town a few miles higher up the chagres river than gorgona. there i found an impecunious american who had taken the contract to furnish transportation for the regiment at a stipulated price per hundred pounds for the freight and so much for each saddle animal. but when we reached cruces there was not a mule, either for pack or saddle, in the place. the contractor promised that the animals should be on hand in the morning. in the morning he said that they were on the way from some imaginary place, and would arrive in the course of the day. this went on until i saw that he could not procure the animals at all at the price he had promised to furnish them for. the unusual number of passengers that had come over on the steamer, and the large amount of freight to pack, had created an unprecedented demand for mules. some of the passengers paid as high as forty dollars for the use of a mule to ride twenty-five miles, when the mule would not have sold for ten dollars in that market at other times. meanwhile the cholera had broken out, and men were dying every hour. to diminish the food for the disease, i permitted the company detailed with me to proceed to panama. the captain and the doctors accompanied the men, and i was left alone with the sick and the soldiers who had families. the regiment at panama was also affected with the disease; but there were better accommodations for the well on the steamer, and a hospital, for those taken with the disease, on an old hulk anchored a mile off. there were also hospital tents on shore on the island of flamingo, which stands in the bay. i was about a week at cruces before transportation began to come in. about one-third of the people with me died, either at cruces or on the way to panama. there was no agent of the transportation company at cruces to consult, or to take the responsibility of procuring transportation at a price which would secure it. i therefore myself dismissed the contractor and made a new contract with a native, at more than double the original price. thus we finally reached panama. the steamer, however, could not proceed until the cholera abated, and the regiment was detained still longer. altogether, on the isthmus and on the pacific side, we were delayed six weeks. about one-seventh of those who left new york harbor with the 4th infantry on the 5th of july, now lie buried on the isthmus of panama or on flamingo island in panama bay. one amusing circumstance occurred while we were lying at anchor in panama bay. in the regiment there was a lieutenant slaughter who was very liable to sea-sickness. it almost made him sick to see the wave of a table-cloth when the servants were spreading it. soon after his graduation, slaughter was ordered to california and took passage by a sailing vessel going around cape horn. the vessel was seven months making the voyage, and slaughter was sick every moment of the time, never more so than while lying at anchor after reaching his place of destination. on landing in california he found orders which had come by the isthmus, notifying him of a mistake in his assignment; he should have been ordered to the northern lakes. he started back by the isthmus route and was sick all the way. but when he arrived at the east he was again ordered to california, this time definitely, and at this date was making his third trip. he was as sick as ever, and had been so for more than a month while lying at anchor in the bay. i remember him well, seated with his elbows on the table in front of him, his chin between his hands, and looking the picture of despair. at last he broke out, "i wish i had taken my father's advice; he wanted me to go into the navy; if i had done so, i should not have had to go to sea so much." poor slaughter! it was his last sea voyage. he was killed by indians in oregon. by the last of august the cholera had so abated that it was deemed safe to start. the disease did not break out again on the way to california, and we reached san francisco early in september. chapter xv. san francisco--early california experiences--life on the pacific coast --promoted captain--flush times in california. san francisco at that day was a lively place. gold, or placer digging as it was called, was at its height. steamers plied daily between san francisco and both stockton and sacramento. passengers and gold from the southern mines came by the stockton boat; from the northern mines by sacramento. in the evening when these boats arrived, long wharf--there was but one wharf in san francisco in 1852--was alive with people crowding to meet the miners as they came down to sell their "dust" and to "have a time." of these some were runners for hotels, boarding houses or restaurants; others belonged to a class of impecunious adventurers, of good manners and good presence, who were ever on the alert to make the acquaintance of people with some ready means, in the hope of being asked to take a meal at a restaurant. many were young men of good family, good education and gentlemanly instincts. their parents had been able to support them during their minority, and to give them good educations, but not to maintain them afterwards. from 1849 to 1853 there was a rush of people to the pacific coast, of the class described. all thought that fortunes were to be picked up, without effort, in the gold fields on the pacific. some realized more than their most sanguine expectations; but for one such there were hundreds disappointed, many of whom now fill unknown graves; others died wrecks of their former selves, and many, without a vicious instinct, became criminals and outcasts. many of the real scenes in early california life exceed in strangeness and interest any of the mere products of the brain of the novelist. those early days in california brought out character. it was a long way off then, and the journey was expensive. the fortunate could go by cape horn or by the isthmus of panama; but the mass of pioneers crossed the plains with their ox-teams. this took an entire summer. they were very lucky when they got through with a yoke of worn-out cattle. all other means were exhausted in procuring the outfit on the missouri river. the immigrant, on arriving, found himself a stranger, in a strange land, far from friends. time pressed, for the little means that could be realized from the sale of what was left of the outfit would not support a man long at california prices. many became discouraged. others would take off their coats and look for a job, no matter what it might be. these succeeded as a rule. there were many young men who had studied professions before they went to california, and who had never done a day's manual labor in their lives, who took in the situation at once and went to work to make a start at anything they could get to do. some supplied carpenters and masons with material--carrying plank, brick, or mortar, as the case might be; others drove stages, drays, or baggage wagons, until they could do better. more became discouraged early and spent their time looking up people who would "treat," or lounging about restaurants and gambling houses where free lunches were furnished daily. they were welcomed at these places because they often brought in miners who proved good customers. my regiment spent a few weeks at benicia barracks, and then was ordered to fort vancouver, on the columbia river, then in oregon territory. during the winter of 1852-3 the territory was divided, all north of the columbia river being taken from oregon to make washington territory. prices for all kinds of supplies were so high on the pacific coast from 1849 until at least 1853--that it would have been impossible for officers of the army to exist upon their pay, if it had not been that authority was given them to purchase from the commissary such supplies as he kept, at new orleans wholesale prices. a cook could not be hired for the pay of a captain. the cook could do better. at benicia, in 1852, flour was 25 cents per pound; potatoes were 16 cents; beets, turnips and cabbage, 6 cents; onions, 37 1/2 cents; meat and other articles in proportion. in 1853 at vancouver vegetables were a little lower. i with three other officers concluded that we would raise a crop for ourselves, and by selling the surplus realize something handsome. i bought a pair of horses that had crossed the plains that summer and were very poor. they recuperated rapidly, however, and proved a good team to break up the ground with. i performed all the labor of breaking up the ground while the other officers planted the potatoes. our crop was enormous. luckily for us the columbia river rose to a great height from the melting of the snow in the mountains in june, and overflowed and killed most of our crop. this saved digging it up, for everybody on the pacific coast seemed to have come to the conclusion at the same time that agriculture would be profitable. in 1853 more than three-quarters of the potatoes raised were permitted to rot in the ground, or had to be thrown away. the only potatoes we sold were to our own mess. while i was stationed on the pacific coast we were free from indian wars. there were quite a number of remnants of tribes in the vicinity of portland in oregon, and of fort vancouver in washington territory. they had generally acquired some of the vices of civilization, but none of the virtues, except in individual cases. the hudson's bay company had held the north-west with their trading posts for many years before the united states was represented on the pacific coast. they still retained posts along the columbia river and one at fort vancouver, when i was there. their treatment of the indians had brought out the better qualities of the savages. farming had been undertaken by the company to supply the indians with bread and vegetables; they raised some cattle and horses; and they had now taught the indians to do the labor of the farm and herd. they always compensated them for their labor, and always gave them goods of uniform quality and at uniform price. before the advent of the american, the medium of exchange between the indian and the white man was pelts. afterward it was silver coin. if an indian received in the sale of a horse a fifty dollar gold piece, not an infrequent occurrence, the first thing he did was to exchange it for american half dollars. these he could count. he would then commence his purchases, paying for each article separately, as he got it. he would not trust any one to add up the bill and pay it all at once. at that day fifty dollar gold pieces, not the issue of the government, were common on the pacific coast. they were called slugs. the indians, along the lower columbia as far as the cascades and on the lower willamette, died off very fast during the year i spent in that section; for besides acquiring the vices of the white people they had acquired also their diseases. the measles and the small-pox were both amazingly fatal. in their wild state, before the appearance of the white man among them, the principal complaints they were subject to were those produced by long involuntary fasting, violent exercise in pursuit of game, and over-eating. instinct more than reason had taught them a remedy for these ills. it was the steam bath. something like a bake-oven was built, large enough to admit a man lying down. bushes were stuck in the ground in two rows, about six feet long and some two or three feet apart; other bushes connected the rows at one end. the tops of the bushes were drawn together to interlace, and confined in that position; the whole was then plastered over with wet clay until every opening was filled. just inside the open end of the oven the floor was scooped out so as to make a hole that would hold a bucket or two of water. these ovens were always built on the banks of a stream, a big spring, or pool of water. when a patient required a bath, a fire was built near the oven and a pile of stones put upon it. the cavity at the front was then filled with water. when the stones were sufficiently heated, the patient would draw himself into the oven; a blanket would be thrown over the open end, and hot stones put into the water until the patient could stand it no longer. he was then withdrawn from his steam bath and doused into the cold stream near by. this treatment may have answered with the early ailments of the indians. with the measles or small-pox it would kill every time. during my year on the columbia river, the small-pox exterminated one small remnant of a band of indians entirely, and reduced others materially. i do not think there was a case of recovery among them, until the doctor with the hudson bay company took the matter in hand and established a hospital. nearly every case he treated recovered. i never, myself, saw the treatment described in the preceding paragraph, but have heard it described by persons who have witnessed it. the decimation among the indians i knew of personally, and the hospital, established for their benefit, was a hudson's bay building not a stone's throw from my own quarters. the death of colonel bliss, of the adjutant general's department, which occurred july 5th, 1853, promoted me to the captaincy of a company then stationed at humboldt bay, california. the notice reached me in september of the same year, and i very soon started to join my new command. there was no way of reaching humboldt at that time except to take passage on a san francisco sailing vessel going after lumber. red wood, a species of cedar, which on the pacific coast takes the place filled by white pine in the east, then abounded on the banks of humboldt bay. there were extensive saw-mills engaged in preparing this lumber for the san francisco market, and sailing vessels, used in getting it to market, furnished the only means of communication between humboldt and the balance of the world. i was obliged to remain in san francisco for several days before i found a vessel. this gave me a good opportunity of comparing the san francisco of 1852 with that of 1853. as before stated, there had been but one wharf in front of the city in 1852--long wharf. in 1853 the town had grown out into the bay beyond what was the end of this wharf when i first saw it. streets and houses had been built out on piles where the year before the largest vessels visiting the port lay at anchor or tied to the wharf. there was no filling under the streets or houses. san francisco presented the same general appearance as the year before; that is, eating, drinking and gambling houses were conspicuous for their number and publicity. they were on the first floor, with doors wide open. at all hours of the day and night in walking the streets, the eye was regaled, on every block near the water front, by the sight of players at faro. often broken places were found in the street, large enough to let a man down into the water below. i have but little doubt that many of the people who went to the pacific coast in the early days of the gold excitement, and have never been heard from since, or who were heard from for a time and then ceased to write, found watery graves beneath the houses or streets built over san francisco bay. besides the gambling in cards there was gambling on a larger scale in city lots. these were sold "on change," much as stocks are now sold on wall street. cash, at time of purchase, was always paid by the broker; but the purchaser had only to put up his margin. he was charged at the rate of two or three per cent. a month on the difference, besides commissions. the sand hills, some of them almost inaccessible to foot-passengers, were surveyed off and mapped into fifty vara lots--a vara being a spanish yard. these were sold at first at very low prices, but were sold and resold for higher prices until they went up to many thousands of dollars. the brokers did a fine business, and so did many such purchasers as were sharp enough to quit purchasing before the final crash came. as the city grew, the sand hills back of the town furnished material for filling up the bay under the houses and streets, and still further out. the temporary houses, first built over the water in the harbor, soon gave way to more solid structures. the main business part of the city now is on solid ground, made where vessels of the largest class lay at anchor in the early days. i was in san francisco again in 1854. gambling houses had disappeared from public view. the city had become staid and orderly. chapter xvi. resignation--private life--life at galena--the coming crisis. my family, all this while, was at the east. it consisted now of a wife and two children. i saw no chance of supporting them on the pacific coast out of my pay as an army officer. i concluded, therefore, to resign, and in march applied for a leave of absence until the end of the july following, tendering my resignation to take effect at the end of that time. i left the pacific coast very much attached to it, and with the full expectation of making it my future home. that expectation and that hope remained uppermost in my mind until the lieutenant-generalcy bill was introduced into congress in the winter of 1863-4. the passage of that bill, and my promotion, blasted my last hope of ever becoming a citizen of the further west. in the late summer of 1854 i rejoined my family, to find in it a son whom i had never seen, born while i was on the isthmus of panama. i was now to commence, at the age of thirty-two, a new struggle for our support. my wife had a farm near st. louis, to which we went, but i had no means to stock it. a house had to be built also. i worked very hard, never losing a day because of bad weather, and accomplished the object in a moderate way. if nothing else could be done i would load a cord of wood on a wagon and take it to the city for sale. i managed to keep along very well until 1858, when i was attacked by fever and ague. i had suffered very severely and for a long time from this disease, while a boy in ohio. it lasted now over a year, and, while it did not keep me in the house, it did interfere greatly with the amount of work i was able to perform. in the fall of 1858 i sold out my stock, crops and farming utensils at auction, and gave up farming. in the winter i established a partnership with harry boggs, a cousin of mrs. grant, in the real estate agency business. i spent that winter at st. louis myself, but did not take my family into town until the spring. our business might have become prosperous if i had been able to wait for it to grow. as it was, there was no more than one person could attend to, and not enough to support two families. while a citizen of st. louis and engaged in the real estate agency business, i was a candidate for the office of county engineer, an office of respectability and emolument which would have been very acceptable to me at that time. the incumbent was appointed by the county court, which consisted of five members. my opponent had the advantage of birth over me (he was a citizen by adoption) and carried off the prize. i now withdrew from the co-partnership with boggs, and, in may, 1860, removed to galena, illinois, and took a clerkship in my father's store. while a citizen of missouri, my first opportunity for casting a vote at a presidential election occurred. i had been in the army from before attaining my majority and had thought but little about politics, although i was a whig by education and a great admirer of mr. clay. but the whig party had ceased to exist before i had an opportunity of exercising the privilege of casting a ballot; the know-nothing party had taken its place, but was on the wane; and the republican party was in a chaotic state and had not yet received a name. it had no existence in the slave states except at points on the borders next to free states. in st. louis city and county, what afterwards became the republican party was known as the free-soil democracy, led by the honorable frank p. blair. most of my neighbors had known me as an officer of the army with whig proclivities. they had been on the same side, and, on the death of their party, many had become know-nothings, or members of the american party. there was a lodge near my new home, and i was invited to join it. i accepted the invitation; was initiated; attended a meeting just one week later, and never went to another afterwards. i have no apologies to make for having been one week a member of the american party; for i still think native-born citizens of the united states should have as much protection, as many privileges in their native country, as those who voluntarily select it for a home. but all secret, oath-bound political parties are dangerous to any nation, no matter how pure or how patriotic the motives and principles which first bring them together. no political party can or ought to exist when one of its corner-stones is opposition to freedom of thought and to the right to worship god "according to the dictate of one's own conscience," or according to the creed of any religious denomination whatever. nevertheless, if a sect sets up its laws as binding above the state laws, wherever the two come in conflict this claim must be resisted and suppressed at whatever cost. up to the mexican war there were a few out and out abolitionists, men who carried their hostility to slavery into all elections, from those for a justice of the peace up to the presidency of the united states. they were noisy but not numerous. but the great majority of people at the north, where slavery did not exist, were opposed to the institution, and looked upon its existence in any part of the country as unfortunate. they did not hold the states where slavery existed responsible for it; and believed that protection should be given to the right of property in slaves until some satisfactory way could be reached to be rid of the institution. opposition to slavery was not a creed of either political party. in some sections more anti-slavery men belonged to the democratic party, and in others to the whigs. but with the inauguration of the mexican war, in fact with the annexation of texas, "the inevitable conflict" commenced. as the time for the presidential election of 1856--the first at which i had the opportunity of voting--approached, party feeling began to run high. the republican party was regarded in the south and the border states not only as opposed to the extension of slavery, but as favoring the compulsory abolition of the institution without compensation to the owners. the most horrible visions seemed to present themselves to the minds of people who, one would suppose, ought to have known better. many educated and, otherwise, sensible persons appeared to believe that emancipation meant social equality. treason to the government was openly advocated and was not rebuked. it was evident to my mind that the election of a republican president in 1856 meant the secession of all the slave states, and rebellion. under these circumstances i preferred the success of a candidate whose election would prevent or postpone secession, to seeing the country plunged into a war the end of which no man could foretell. with a democrat elected by the unanimous vote of the slave states, there could be no pretext for secession for four years. i very much hoped that the passions of the people would subside in that time, and the catastrophe be averted altogether; if it was not, i believed the country would be better prepared to receive the shock and to resist it. i therefore voted for james buchanan for president. four years later the republican party was successful in electing its candidate to the presidency. the civilized world has learned the consequence. four millions of human beings held as chattels have been liberated; the ballot has been given to them; the free schools of the country have been opened to their children. the nation still lives, and the people are just as free to avoid social intimacy with the blacks as ever they were, or as they are with white people. while living in galena i was nominally only a clerk supporting myself and family on a stipulated salary. in reality my position was different. my father had never lived in galena himself, but had established my two brothers there, the one next younger than myself in charge of the business, assisted by the youngest. when i went there it was my father's intention to give up all connection with the business himself, and to establish his three sons in it: but the brother who had really built up the business was sinking with consumption, and it was not thought best to make any change while he was in this condition. he lived until september, 1861, when he succumbed to that insidious disease which always flatters its victims into the belief that they are growing better up to the close of life. a more honorable man never transacted business. in september, 1861, i was engaged in an employment which required all my attention elsewhere. during the eleven months that i lived in galena prior to the first call for volunteers, i had been strictly attentive to my business, and had made but few acquaintances other than customers and people engaged in the same line with myself. when the election took place in november, 1860, i had not been a resident of illinois long enough to gain citizenship and could not, therefore, vote. i was really glad of this at the time, for my pledges would have compelled me to vote for stephen a. douglas, who had no possible chance of election. the contest was really between mr. breckinridge and mr. lincoln; between minority rule and rule by the majority. i wanted, as between these candidates, to see mr. lincoln elected. excitement ran high during the canvass, and torch-light processions enlivened the scene in the generally quiet streets of galena many nights during the campaign. i did not parade with either party, but occasionally met with the "wide awakes" --republicans--in their rooms, and superintended their drill. it was evident, from the time of the chicago nomination to the close of the canvass, that the election of the republican candidate would be the signal for some of the southern states to secede. i still had hopes that the four years which had elapsed since the first nomination of a presidential candidate by a party distinctly opposed to slavery extension, had given time for the extreme pro-slavery sentiment to cool down; for the southerners to think well before they took the awful leap which they had so vehemently threatened. but i was mistaken. the republican candidate was elected, and solid substantial people of the north-west, and i presume the same order of people throughout the entire north, felt very serious, but determined, after this event. it was very much discussed whether the south would carry out its threat to secede and set up a separate government, the corner-stone of which should be, protection to the "divine" institution of slavery. for there were people who believed in the "divinity" of human slavery, as there are now people who believe mormonism and polygamy to be ordained by the most high. we forgive them for entertaining such notions, but forbid their practice. it was generally believed that there would be a flurry; that some of the extreme southern states would go so far as to pass ordinances of secession. but the common impression was that this step was so plainly suicidal for the south, that the movement would not spread over much of the territory and would not last long. doubtless the founders of our government, the majority of them at least, regarded the confederation of the colonies as an experiment. each colony considered itself a separate government; that the confederation was for mutual protection against a foreign foe, and the prevention of strife and war among themselves. if there had been a desire on the part of any single state to withdraw from the compact at any time while the number of states was limited to the original thirteen, i do not suppose there would have been any to contest the right, no matter how much the determination might have been regretted. the problem changed on the ratification of the constitution by all the colonies; it changed still more when amendments were added; and if the right of any one state to withdraw continued to exist at all after the ratification of the constitution, it certainly ceased on the formation of new states, at least so far as the new states themselves were concerned. it was never possessed at all by florida or the states west of the mississippi, all of which were purchased by the treasury of the entire nation. texas and the territory brought into the union in consequence of annexation, were purchased with both blood and treasure; and texas, with a domain greater than that of any european state except russia, was permitted to retain as state property all the public lands within its borders. it would have been ingratitude and injustice of the most flagrant sort for this state to withdraw from the union after all that had been spent and done to introduce her; yet, if separation had actually occurred, texas must necessarily have gone with the south, both on account of her institutions and her geographical position. secession was illogical as well as impracticable; it was revolution. now, the right of revolution is an inherent one. when people are oppressed by their government, it is a natural right they enjoy to relieve themselves of the oppression, if they are strong enough, either by withdrawal from it, or by overthrowing it and substituting a government more acceptable. but any people or part of a people who resort to this remedy, stake their lives, their property, and every claim for protection given by citizenship--on the issue. victory, or the conditions imposed by the conqueror--must be the result. in the case of the war between the states it would have been the exact truth if the south had said,--"we do not want to live with you northern people any longer; we know our institution of slavery is obnoxious to you, and, as you are growing numerically stronger than we, it may at some time in the future be endangered. so long as you permitted us to control the government, and with the aid of a few friends at the north to enact laws constituting your section a guard against the escape of our property, we were willing to live with you. you have been submissive to our rule heretofore; but it looks now as if you did not intend to continue so, and we will remain in the union no longer." instead of this the seceding states cried lustily,--"let us alone; you have no constitutional power to interfere with us." newspapers and people at the north reiterated the cry. individuals might ignore the constitution; but the nation itself must not only obey it, but must enforce the strictest construction of that instrument; the construction put upon it by the southerners themselves. the fact is the constitution did not apply to any such contingency as the one existing from 1861 to 1865. its framers never dreamed of such a contingency occurring. if they had foreseen it, the probabilities are they would have sanctioned the right of a state or states to withdraw rather than that there should be war between brothers. the framers were wise in their generation and wanted to do the very best possible to secure their own liberty and independence, and that also of their descendants to the latest days. it is preposterous to suppose that the people of one generation can lay down the best and only rules of government for all who are to come after them, and under unforeseen contingencies. at the time of the framing of our constitution the only physical forces that had been subdued and made to serve man and do his labor, were the currents in the streams and in the air we breathe. rude machinery, propelled by water power, had been invented; sails to propel ships upon the waters had been set to catch the passing breeze--but the application of stream to propel vessels against both wind and current, and machinery to do all manner of work had not been thought of. the instantaneous transmission of messages around the world by means of electricity would probably at that day have been attributed to witchcraft or a league with the devil. immaterial circumstances had changed as greatly as material ones. we could not and ought not to be rigidly bound by the rules laid down under circumstances so different for emergencies so utterly unanticipated. the fathers themselves would have been the first to declare that their prerogatives were not irrevocable. they would surely have resisted secession could they have lived to see the shape it assumed. i travelled through the northwest considerably during the winter of 1860-1. we had customers in all the little towns in south-west wisconsin, south-east minnesota and north-east iowa. these generally knew i had been a captain in the regular army and had served through the mexican war. consequently wherever i stopped at night, some of the people would come to the public-house where i was, and sit till a late hour discussing the probabilities of the future. my own views at that time were like those officially expressed by mr. seward at a later day, that "the war would be over in ninety days." i continued to entertain these views until after the battle of shiloh. i believe now that there would have been no more battles at the west after the capture of fort donelson if all the troops in that region had been under a single commander who would have followed up that victory. there is little doubt in my mind now that the prevailing sentiment of the south would have been opposed to secession in 1860 and 1861, if there had been a fair and calm expression of opinion, unbiased by threats, and if the ballot of one legal voter had counted for as much as that of any other. but there was no calm discussion of the question. demagogues who were too old to enter the army if there should be a war, others who entertained so high an opinion of their own ability that they did not believe they could be spared from the direction of the affairs of state in such an event, declaimed vehemently and unceasingly against the north; against its aggressions upon the south; its interference with southern rights, etc., etc. they denounced the northerners as cowards, poltroons, negro-worshippers; claimed that one southern man was equal to five northern men in battle; that if the south would stand up for its rights the north would back down. mr. jefferson davis said in a speech, delivered at la grange, mississippi, before the secession of that state, that he would agree to drink all the blood spilled south of mason and dixon's line if there should be a war. the young men who would have the fighting to do in case of war, believed all these statements, both in regard to the aggressiveness of the north and its cowardice. they, too, cried out for a separation from such people. the great bulk of the legal voters of the south were men who owned no slaves; their homes were generally in the hills and poor country; their facilities for educating their children, even up to the point of reading and writing, were very limited; their interest in the contest was very meagre--what there was, if they had been capable of seeing it, was with the north; they too needed emancipation. under the old regime they were looked down upon by those who controlled all the affairs in the interest of slave-owners, as poor white trash who were allowed the ballot so long as they cast it according to direction. i am aware that this last statement may be disputed and individual testimony perhaps adduced to show that in ante-bellum days the ballot was as untrammelled in the south as in any section of the country; but in the face of any such contradiction i reassert the statement. the shot-gun was not resorted to. masked men did not ride over the country at night intimidating voters; but there was a firm feeling that a class existed in every state with a sort of divine right to control public affairs. if they could not get this control by one means they must by another. the end justified the means. the coercion, if mild, was complete. there were two political parties, it is true, in all the states, both strong in numbers and respectability, but both equally loyal to the institution which stood paramount in southern eyes to all other institutions in state or nation. the slave-owners were the minority, but governed both parties. had politics ever divided the slave-holders and the non-slave-holders, the majority would have been obliged to yield, or internecine war would have been the consequence. i do not know that the southern people were to blame for this condition of affairs. there was a time when slavery was not profitable, and the discussion of the merits of the institution was confined almost exclusively to the territory where it existed. the states of virginia and kentucky came near abolishing slavery by their own acts, one state defeating the measure by a tie vote and the other only lacking one. but when the institution became profitable, all talk of its abolition ceased where it existed; and naturally, as human nature is constituted, arguments were adduced in its support. the cotton-gin probably had much to do with the justification of slavery. the winter of 1860-1 will be remembered by middle-aged people of to-day as one of great excitement. south carolina promptly seceded after the result of the presidential election was known. other southern states proposed to follow. in some of them the union sentiment was so strong that it had to be suppressed by force. maryland, delaware, kentucky and missouri, all slave states, failed to pass ordinances of secession; but they were all represented in the so-called congress of the so-called confederate states. the governor and lieutenant-governor of missouri, in 1861, jackson and reynolds, were both supporters of the rebellion and took refuge with the enemy. the governor soon died, and the lieutenant-governor assumed his office; issued proclamations as governor of the state; was recognized as such by the confederate government, and continued his pretensions until the collapse of the rebellion. the south claimed the sovereignty of states, but claimed the right to coerce into their confederation such states as they wanted, that is, all the states where slavery existed. they did not seem to think this course inconsistent. the fact is, the southern slave-owners believed that, in some way, the ownership of slaves conferred a sort of patent of nobility--a right to govern independent of the interest or wishes of those who did not hold such property. they convinced themselves, first, of the divine origin of the institution and, next, that that particular institution was not safe in the hands of any body of legislators but themselves. meanwhile the administration of president buchanan looked helplessly on and proclaimed that the general government had no power to interfere; that the nation had no power to save its own life. mr. buchanan had in his cabinet two members at least, who were as earnest--to use a mild term--in the cause of secession as mr. davis or any southern statesman. one of them, floyd, the secretary of war, scattered the army so that much of it could be captured when hostilities should commence, and distributed the cannon and small arms from northern arsenals throughout the south so as to be on hand when treason wanted them. the navy was scattered in like manner. the president did not prevent his cabinet preparing for war upon their government, either by destroying its resources or storing them in the south until a de facto government was established with jefferson davis as its president, and montgomery, alabama, as the capital. the secessionists had then to leave the cabinet. in their own estimation they were aliens in the country which had given them birth. loyal men were put into their places. treason in the executive branch of the government was estopped. but the harm had already been done. the stable door was locked after the horse had been stolen. during all of the trying winter of 1860-1, when the southerners were so defiant that they would not allow within their borders the expression of a sentiment hostile to their views, it was a brave man indeed who could stand up and proclaim his loyalty to the union. on the other hand men at the north--prominent men--proclaimed that the government had no power to coerce the south into submission to the laws of the land; that if the north undertook to raise armies to go south, these armies would have to march over the dead bodies of the speakers. a portion of the press of the north was constantly proclaiming similar views. when the time arrived for the president-elect to go to the capital of the nation to be sworn into office, it was deemed unsafe for him to travel, not only as a president-elect, but as any private citizen should be allowed to do. instead of going in a special car, receiving the good wishes of his constituents at all the stations along the road, he was obliged to stop on the way and to be smuggled into the capital. he disappeared from public view on his journey, and the next the country knew, his arrival was announced at the capital. there is little doubt that he would have been assassinated if he had attempted to travel openly throughout his journey. chapter xvii. outbreak of the rebellion--presiding at a union meeting--mustering officer of state troops--lyon at camp jackson--services tendered to the government. the 4th of march, 1861, came, and abraham lincoln was sworn to maintain the union against all its enemies. the secession of one state after another followed, until eleven had gone out. on the 11th of april fort sumter, a national fort in the harbor of charleston, south carolina, was fired upon by the southerners and a few days after was captured. the confederates proclaimed themselves aliens, and thereby debarred themselves of all right to claim protection under the constitution of the united states. we did not admit the fact that they were aliens, but all the same, they debarred themselves of the right to expect better treatment than people of any other foreign state who make war upon an independent nation. upon the firing on sumter president lincoln issued his first call for troops and soon after a proclamation convening congress in extra session. the call was for 75,000 volunteers for ninety days' service. if the shot fired at fort sumter "was heard around the world," the call of the president for 75,000 men was heard throughout the northern states. there was not a state in the north of a million of inhabitants that would not have furnished the entire number faster than arms could have been supplied to them, if it had been necessary. as soon as the news of the call for volunteers reached galena, posters were stuck up calling for a meeting of the citizens at the court-house in the evening. business ceased entirely; all was excitement; for a time there were no party distinctions; all were union men, determined to avenge the insult to the national flag. in the evening the court-house was packed. although a comparative stranger i was called upon to preside; the sole reason, possibly, was that i had been in the army and had seen service. with much embarrassment and some prompting i made out to announce the object of the meeting. speeches were in order, but it is doubtful whether it would have been safe just then to make other than patriotic ones. there was probably no one in the house, however, who felt like making any other. the two principal speeches were by b. b. howard, the post-master and a breckinridge democrat at the november election the fall before, and john a. rawlins, an elector on the douglas ticket. e. b. washburne, with whom i was not acquainted at that time, came in after the meeting had been organized, and expressed, i understood afterwards, a little surprise that galena could not furnish a presiding officer for such an occasion without taking a stranger. he came forward and was introduced, and made a speech appealing to the patriotism of the meeting. after the speaking was over volunteers were called for to form a company. the quota of illinois had been fixed at six regiments; and it was supposed that one company would be as much as would be accepted from galena. the company was raised and the officers and non-commissioned officers elected before the meeting adjourned. i declined the captaincy before the balloting, but announced that i would aid the company in every way i could and would be found in the service in some position if there should be a war. i never went into our leather store after that meeting, to put up a package or do other business. the ladies of galena were quite as patriotic as the men. they could not enlist, but they conceived the idea of sending their first company to the field uniformed. they came to me to get a description of the united states uniform for infantry; subscribed and bought the material; procured tailors to cut out the garments, and the ladies made them up. in a few days the company was in uniform and ready to report at the state capital for assignment. the men all turned out the morning after their enlistment, and i took charge, divided them into squads and superintended their drill. when they were ready to go to springfield i went with them and remained there until they were assigned to a regiment. there were so many more volunteers than had been called for that the question whom to accept was quite embarrassing to the governor, richard yates. the legislature was in session at the time, however, and came to his relief. a law was enacted authorizing the governor to accept the services of ten additional regiments, one from each congressional district, for one month, to be paid by the state, but pledged to go into the service of the united states if there should be a further call during their term. even with this relief the governor was still very much embarrassed. before the war was over he was like the president when he was taken with the varioloid: "at last he had something he could give to all who wanted it." in time the galena company was mustered into the united states service, forming a part of the 11th illinois volunteer infantry. my duties, i thought, had ended at springfield, and i was prepared to start home by the evening train, leaving at nine o'clock. up to that time i do not think i had been introduced to governor yates, or had ever spoken to him. i knew him by sight, however, because he was living at the same hotel and i often saw him at table. the evening i was to quit the capital i left the supper room before the governor and was standing at the front door when he came out. he spoke to me, calling me by my old army title "captain," and said he understood that i was about leaving the city. i answered that i was. he said he would be glad if i would remain over-night and call at the executive office the next morning. i complied with his request, and was asked to go into the adjutant-general's office and render such assistance as i could, the governor saying that my army experience would be of great service there. i accepted the proposition. my old army experience i found indeed of very great service. i was no clerk, nor had i any capacity to become one. the only place i ever found in my life to put a paper so as to find it again was either a side coat-pocket or the hands of a clerk or secretary more careful than myself. but i had been quartermaster, commissary and adjutant in the field. the army forms were familiar to me and i could direct how they should be made out. there was a clerk in the office of the adjutant-general who supplied my deficiencies. the ease with which the state of illinois settled its accounts with the government at the close of the war is evidence of the efficiency of mr. loomis as an accountant on a large scale. he remained in the office until that time. as i have stated, the legislature authorized the governor to accept the services of ten additional regiments. i had charge of mustering these regiments into the state service. they were assembled at the most convenient railroad centres in their respective congressional districts. i detailed officers to muster in a portion of them, but mustered three in the southern part of the state myself. one of these was to assemble at belleville, some eighteen miles south-east of st. louis. when i got there i found that only one or two companies had arrived. there was no probability of the regiment coming together under five days. this gave me a few idle days which i concluded to spend in st. louis. there was a considerable force of state militia at camp jackson, on the outskirts of st. louis, at the time. there is but little doubt that it was the design of governor claiborn jackson to have these troops ready to seize the united states arsenal and the city of st. louis. why they did not do so i do not know. there was but a small garrison, two companies i think, under captain n. lyon at the arsenal, and but for the timely services of the hon. f. p. blair, i have little doubt that st. louis would have gone into rebel hands, and with it the arsenal with all its arms and ammunition. blair was a leader among the union men of st. louis in 1861. there was no state government in missouri at the time that would sanction the raising of troops or commissioned officers to protect united states property, but blair had probably procured some form of authority from the president to raise troops in missouri and to muster them into the service of the united states. at all events, he did raise a regiment and took command himself as colonel. with this force he reported to captain lyon and placed himself and regiment under his orders. it was whispered that lyon thus reinforced intended to break up camp jackson and capture the militia. i went down to the arsenal in the morning to see the troops start out. i had known lyon for two years at west point and in the old army afterwards. blair i knew very well by sight. i had heard him speak in the canvass of 1858, possibly several times, but i had never spoken to him. as the troops marched out of the enclosure around the arsenal, blair was on his horse outside forming them into line preparatory to their march. i introduced myself to him and had a few moments' conversation and expressed my sympathy with his purpose. this was my first personal acquaintance with the honorable--afterwards major-general f. p. blair. camp jackson surrendered without a fight and the garrison was marched down to the arsenal as prisoners of war. up to this time the enemies of the government in st. louis had been bold and defiant, while union men were quiet but determined. the enemies had their head-quarters in a central and public position on pine street, near fifth--from which the rebel flag was flaunted boldly. the union men had a place of meeting somewhere in the city, i did not know where, and i doubt whether they dared to enrage the enemies of the government by placing the national flag outside their head-quarters. as soon as the news of the capture of camp jackson reached the city the condition of affairs was changed. union men became rampant, aggressive, and, if you will, intolerant. they proclaimed their sentiments boldly, and were impatient at anything like disrespect for the union. the secessionists became quiet but were filled with suppressed rage. they had been playing the bully. the union men ordered the rebel flag taken down from the building on pine street. the command was given in tones of authority and it was taken down, never to be raised again in st. louis. i witnessed the scene. i had heard of the surrender of the camp and that the garrison was on its way to the arsenal. i had seen the troops start out in the morning and had wished them success. i now determined to go to the arsenal and await their arrival and congratulate them. i stepped on a car standing at the corner of 4th and pine streets, and saw a crowd of people standing quietly in front of the head-quarters, who were there for the purpose of hauling down the flag. there were squads of other people at intervals down the street. they too were quiet but filled with suppressed rage, and muttered their resentment at the insult to, what they called, "their" flag. before the car i was in had started, a dapper little fellow--he would be called a dude at this day --stepped in. he was in a great state of excitement and used adjectives freely to express his contempt for the union and for those who had just perpetrated such an outrage upon the rights of a free people. there was only one other passenger in the car besides myself when this young man entered. he evidently expected to find nothing but sympathy when he got away from the "mud sills" engaged in compelling a "free people" to pull down a flag they adored. he turned to me saying: "things have come to a ---pretty pass when a free people can't choose their own flag. where i came from if a man dares to say a word in favor of the union we hang him to a limb of the first tree we come to." i replied that "after all we were not so intolerant in st. louis as we might be; i had not seen a single rebel hung yet, nor heard of one; there were plenty of them who ought to be, however." the young man subsided. he was so crestfallen that i believe if i had ordered him to leave the car he would have gone quietly out, saying to himself: "more yankee oppression." by nightfall the late defenders of camp jackson were all within the walls of the st. louis arsenal, prisoners of war. the next day i left st. louis for mattoon, illinois, where i was to muster in the regiment from that congressional district. this was the 21st illinois infantry, the regiment of which i subsequently became colonel. i mustered one regiment afterwards, when my services for the state were about closed. brigadier-general john pope was stationed at springfield, as united states mustering officer, all the time i was in the state service. he was a native of illinois and well acquainted with most of the prominent men in the state. i was a carpet-bagger and knew but few of them. while i was on duty at springfield the senators, representatives in congress, ax-governors and the state legislators were nearly all at the state capital. the only acquaintance i made among them was with the governor, whom i was serving, and, by chance, with senator s. a. douglas. the only members of congress i knew were washburne and philip foulk. with the former, though he represented my district and we were citizens of the same town, i only became acquainted at the meeting when the first company of galena volunteers was raised. foulk i had known in st. louis when i was a citizen of that city. i had been three years at west point with pope and had served with him a short time during the mexican war, under general taylor. i saw a good deal of him during my service with the state. on one occasion he said to me that i ought to go into the united states service. i told him i intended to do so if there was a war. he spoke of his acquaintance with the public men of the state, and said he could get them to recommend me for a position and that he would do all he could for me. i declined to receive endorsement for permission to fight for my country. going home for a day or two soon after this conversation with general pope, i wrote from galena the following letter to the adjutant-general of the army. galena, illinois, may 24, 1861. col. l. thomas adjt. gen. u. s. a., washington, d. c. sir:--having served for fifteen years in the regular army, including four years at west point, and feeling it the duty of every one who has been educated at the government expense to offer their services for the support of that government, i have the honor, very respectfully, to tender my services, until the close of the war, in such capacity as may be offered. i would say, in view of my present age and length of service, i feel myself competent to command a regiment, if the president, in his judgment, should see fit to intrust one to me. since the first call of the president i have been serving on the staff of the governor of this state, rendering such aid as i could in the organization of our state militia, and am still engaged in that capacity. a letter addressed to me at springfield, illinois, will reach me. i am very respectfully, your obt. svt., u. s. grant. this letter failed to elicit an answer from the adjutant-general of the army. i presume it was hardly read by him, and certainly it could not have been submitted to higher authority. subsequent to the war general badeau having heard of this letter applied to the war department for a copy of it. the letter could not be found and no one recollected ever having seen it. i took no copy when it was written. long after the application of general badeau, general townsend, who had become adjutant-general of the army, while packing up papers preparatory to the removal of his office, found this letter in some out-of-the-way place. it had not been destroyed, but it had not been regularly filed away. i felt some hesitation in suggesting rank as high as the colonelcy of a regiment, feeling somewhat doubtful whether i would be equal to the position. but i had seen nearly every colonel who had been mustered in from the state of illinois, and some from indiana, and felt that if they could command a regiment properly, and with credit, i could also. having but little to do after the muster of the last of the regiments authorized by the state legislature, i asked and obtained of the governor leave of absence for a week to visit my parents in covington, kentucky, immediately opposite cincinnati. general mcclellan had been made a major-general and had his headquarters at cincinnati. in reality i wanted to see him. i had known him slightly at west point, where we served one year together, and in the mexican war. i was in hopes that when he saw me he would offer me a position on his staff. i called on two successive days at his office but failed to see him on either occasion, and returned to springfield. chapter xviii. appointed colonel of the 21st illinois--personnel of the regiment --general logan--march to missouri--movement against harris at florida, mo.--general pope in command--stationed at mexico, mo. while i was absent from the state capital on this occasion the president's second call for troops was issued. this time it was for 300,000 men, for three years or the war. this brought into the united states service all the regiments then in the state service. these had elected their officers from highest to lowest and were accepted with their organizations as they were, except in two instances. a chicago regiment, the 19th infantry, had elected a very young man to the colonelcy. when it came to taking the field the regiment asked to have another appointed colonel and the one they had previously chosen made lieutenant-colonel. the 21st regiment of infantry, mustered in by me at mattoon, refused to go into the service with the colonel of their selection in any position. while i was still absent governor yates appointed me colonel of this latter regiment. a few days after i was in charge of it and in camp on the fair grounds near springfield. my regiment was composed in large part of young men of as good social position as any in their section of the state. it embraced the sons of farmers, lawyers, physicians, politicians, merchants, bankers and ministers, and some men of maturer years who had filled such positions themselves. there were also men in it who could be led astray; and the colonel, elected by the votes of the regiment, had proved to be fully capable of developing all there was in his men of recklessness. it was said that he even went so far at times as to take the guard from their posts and go with them to the village near by and make a night of it. when there came a prospect of battle the regiment wanted to have some one else to lead them. i found it very hard work for a few days to bring all the men into anything like subordination; but the great majority favored discipline, and by the application of a little regular army punishment all were reduced to as good discipline as one could ask. the ten regiments which had volunteered in the state service for thirty days, it will be remembered, had done so with a pledge to go into the national service if called upon within that time. when they volunteered the government had only called for ninety days' enlistments. men were called now for three years or the war. they felt that this change of period released them from the obligation of re-volunteering. when i was appointed colonel, the 21st regiment was still in the state service. about the time they were to be mustered into the united states service, such of them as would go, two members of congress from the state, mcclernand and logan, appeared at the capital and i was introduced to them. i had never seen either of them before, but i had read a great deal about them, and particularly about logan, in the newspapers. both were democratic members of congress, and logan had been elected from the southern district of the state, where he had a majority of eighteen thousand over his republican competitor. his district had been settled originally by people from the southern states, and at the breaking out of secession they sympathized with the south. at the first outbreak of war some of them joined the southern army; many others were preparing to do so; others rode over the country at night denouncing the union, and made it as necessary to guard railroad bridges over which national troops had to pass in southern illinois, as it was in kentucky or any of the border slave states. logan's popularity in this district was unbounded. he knew almost enough of the people in it by their christian names, to form an ordinary congressional district. as he went in politics, so his district was sure to go. the republican papers had been demanding that he should announce where he stood on the questions which at that time engrossed the whole of public thought. some were very bitter in their denunciations of his silence. logan was not a man to be coerced into an utterance by threats. he did, however, come out in a speech before the adjournment of the special session of congress which was convened by the president soon after his inauguration, and announced his undying loyalty and devotion to the union. but i had not happened to see that speech, so that when i first met logan my impressions were those formed from reading denunciations of him. mcclernand, on the other hand, had early taken strong grounds for the maintenance of the union and had been praised accordingly by the republican papers. the gentlemen who presented these two members of congress asked me if i would have any objections to their addressing my regiment. i hesitated a little before answering. it was but a few days before the time set for mustering into the united states service such of the men as were willing to volunteer for three years or the war. i had some doubt as to the effect a speech from logan might have; but as he was with mcclernand, whose sentiments on the all-absorbing questions of the day were well known, i gave my consent. mcclernand spoke first; and logan followed in a speech which he has hardly equalled since for force and eloquence. it breathed a loyalty and devotion to the union which inspired my men to such a point that they would have volunteered to remain in the army as long as an enemy of the country continued to bear arms against it. they entered the united states service almost to a man. general logan went to his part of the state and gave his attention to raising troops. the very men who at first made it necessary to guard the roads in southern illinois became the defenders of the union. logan entered the service himself as colonel of a regiment and rapidly rose to the rank of major-general. his district, which had promised at first to give much trouble to the government, filled every call made upon it for troops, without resorting to the draft. there was no call made when there were not more volunteers than were asked for. that congressional district stands credited at the war department to-day with furnishing more men for the army than it was called on to supply. i remained in springfield with my regiment until the 3d of july, when i was ordered to quincy, illinois. by that time the regiment was in a good state of discipline and the officers and men were well up in the company drill. there was direct railroad communication between springfield and quincy, but i thought it would be good preparation for the troops to march there. we had no transportation for our camp and garrison equipage, so wagons were hired for the occasion and on the 3d of july we started. there was no hurry, but fair marches were made every day until the illinois river was crossed. there i was overtaken by a dispatch saying that the destination of the regiment had been changed to ironton, missouri, and ordering me to halt where i was and await the arrival of a steamer which had been dispatched up the illinois river to take the regiment to st. louis. the boat, when it did come, grounded on a sand-bar a few miles below where we were in camp. we remained there several days waiting to have the boat get off the bar, but before this occurred news came that an illinois regiment was surrounded by rebels at a point on the hannibal and st. joe railroad some miles west of palmyra, in missouri, and i was ordered to proceed with all dispatch to their relief. we took the cars and reached quincy in a few hours. when i left galena for the last time to take command of the 21st regiment i took with me my oldest son, frederick d. grant, then a lad of eleven years of age. on receiving the order to take rail for quincy i wrote to mrs. grant, to relieve what i supposed would be her great anxiety for one so young going into danger, that i would send fred home from quincy by river. i received a prompt letter in reply decidedly disapproving my proposition, and urging that the lad should be allowed to accompany me. it came too late. fred was already on his way up the mississippi bound for dubuque, iowa, from which place there was a railroad to galena. my sensations as we approached what i supposed might be "a field of battle" were anything but agreeable. i had been in all the engagements in mexico that it was possible for one person to be in; but not in command. if some one else had been colonel and i had been lieutenant-colonel i do not think i would have felt any trepidation. before we were prepared to cross the mississippi river at quincy my anxiety was relieved; for the men of the besieged regiment came straggling into town. i am inclined to think both sides got frightened and ran away. i took my regiment to palmyra and remained there for a few days, until relieved by the 19th illinois infantry. from palmyra i proceeded to salt river, the railroad bridge over which had been destroyed by the enemy. colonel john m. palmer at that time commanded the 13th illinois, which was acting as a guard to workmen who were engaged in rebuilding this bridge. palmer was my senior and commanded the two regiments as long as we remained together. the bridge was finished in about two weeks, and i received orders to move against colonel thomas harris, who was said to be encamped at the little town of florida, some twenty-five miles south of where we then were. at the time of which i now write we had no transportation and the country about salt river was sparsely settled, so that it took some days to collect teams and drivers enough to move the camp and garrison equipage of a regiment nearly a thousand strong, together with a week's supply of provision and some ammunition. while preparations for the move were going on i felt quite comfortable; but when we got on the road and found every house deserted i was anything but easy. in the twenty-five miles we had to march we did not see a person, old or young, male or female, except two horsemen who were on a road that crossed ours. as soon as they saw us they decamped as fast as their horses could carry them. i kept my men in the ranks and forbade their entering any of the deserted houses or taking anything from them. we halted at night on the road and proceeded the next morning at an early hour. harris had been encamped in a creek bottom for the sake of being near water. the hills on either side of the creek extend to a considerable height, possibly more than a hundred feet. as we approached the brow of the hill from which it was expected we could see harris' camp, and possibly find his men ready formed to meet us, my heart kept getting higher and higher until it felt to me as though it was in my throat. i would have given anything then to have been back in illinois, but i had not the moral courage to halt and consider what to do; i kept right on. when we reached a point from which the valley below was in full view i halted. the place where harris had been encamped a few days before was still there and the marks of a recent encampment were plainly visible, but the troops were gone. my heart resumed its place. it occurred to me at once that harris had been as much afraid of me as i had been of him. this was a view of the question i had never taken before; but it was one i never forgot afterwards. from that event to the close of the war, i never experienced trepidation upon confronting an enemy, though i always felt more or less anxiety. i never forgot that he had as much reason to fear my forces as i had his. the lesson was valuable. inquiries at the village of florida divulged the fact that colonel harris, learning of my intended movement, while my transportation was being collected took time by the forelock and left florida before i had started from salt river. he had increased the distance between us by forty miles. the next day i started back to my old camp at salt river bridge. the citizens living on the line of our march had returned to their houses after we passed, and finding everything in good order, nothing carried away, they were at their front doors ready to greet us now. they had evidently been led to believe that the national troops carried death and devastation with them wherever they went. in a short time after our return to salt river bridge i was ordered with my regiment to the town of mexico. general pope was then commanding the district embracing all of the state of missouri between the mississippi and missouri rivers, with his headquarters in the village of mexico. i was assigned to the command of a sub-district embracing the troops in the immediate neighborhood, some three regiments of infantry and a section of artillery. there was one regiment encamped by the side of mine. i assumed command of the whole and the first night sent the commander of the other regiment the parole and countersign. not wishing to be outdone in courtesy, he immediately sent me the countersign for his regiment for the night. when he was informed that the countersign sent to him was for use with his regiment as well as mine, it was difficult to make him understand that this was not an unwarranted interference of one colonel over another. no doubt he attributed it for the time to the presumption of a graduate of west point over a volunteer pure and simple. but the question was soon settled and we had no further trouble. my arrival in mexico had been preceded by that of two or three regiments in which proper discipline had not been maintained, and the men had been in the habit of visiting houses without invitation and helping themselves to food and drink, or demanding them from the occupants. they carried their muskets while out of camp and made every man they found take the oath of allegiance to the government. i at once published orders prohibiting the soldiers from going into private houses unless invited by the inhabitants, and from appropriating private property to their own or to government uses. the people were no longer molested or made afraid. i received the most marked courtesy from the citizens of mexico as long as i remained there. up to this time my regiment had not been carried in the school of the soldier beyond the company drill, except that it had received some training on the march from springfield to the illinois river. there was now a good opportunity of exercising it in the battalion drill. while i was at west point the tactics used in the army had been scott's and the musket the flint lock. i had never looked at a copy of tactics from the time of my graduation. my standing in that branch of studies had been near the foot of the class. in the mexican war in the summer of 1846, i had been appointed regimental quartermaster and commissary and had not been at a battalion drill since. the arms had been changed since then and hardee's tactics had been adopted. i got a copy of tactics and studied one lesson, intending to confine the exercise of the first day to the commands i had thus learned. by pursuing this course from day to day i thought i would soon get through the volume. we were encamped just outside of town on the common, among scattering suburban houses with enclosed gardens, and when i got my regiment in line and rode to the front i soon saw that if i attempted to follow the lesson i had studied i would have to clear away some of the houses and garden fences to make room. i perceived at once, however, that hardee's tactics--a mere translation from the french with hardee's name attached --was nothing more than common sense and the progress of the age applied to scott's system. the commands were abbreviated and the movement expedited. under the old tactics almost every change in the order of march was preceded by a "halt," then came the change, and then the "forward march." with the new tactics all these changes could be made while in motion. i found no trouble in giving commands that would take my regiment where i wanted it to go and carry it around all obstacles. i do not believe that the officers of the regiment ever discovered that i had never studied the tactics that i used. chapter xix. commissioned brigadier-general--command at ironton, mo.--jefferson city --cape girardeau--general prentiss--seizure of paducah--headquarters at cairo. i had not been in mexico many weeks when, reading a st. louis paper, i found the president had asked the illinois delegation in congress to recommend some citizens of the state for the position of brigadier-general, and that they had unanimously recommended me as first on a list of seven. i was very much surprised because, as i have said, my acquaintance with the congressmen was very limited and i did not know of anything i had done to inspire such confidence. the papers of the next day announced that my name, with three others, had been sent to the senate, and a few days after our confirmation was announced. when appointed brigadier-general i at once thought it proper that one of my aides should come from the regiment i had been commanding, and so selected lieutenant c. b. lagow. while living in st. louis, i had had a desk in the law office of mcclellan, moody and hillyer. difference in views between the members of the firm on the questions of the day, and general hard times in the border cities, had broken up this firm. hillyer was quite a young man, then in his twenties, and very brilliant. i asked him to accept a place on my staff. i also wanted to take one man from my new home, galena. the canvass in the presidential campaign the fall before had brought out a young lawyer by the name of john a. rawlins, who proved himself one of the ablest speakers in the state. he was also a candidate for elector on the douglas ticket. when sumter was fired upon and the integrity of the union threatened, there was no man more ready to serve his country than he. i wrote at once asking him to accept the position of assistant adjutant-general with the rank of captain, on my staff. he was about entering the service as major of a new regiment then organizing in the north-western part of the state; but he threw this up and accepted my offer. neither hillyer nor lagow proved to have any particular taste or special qualifications for the duties of the soldier, and the former resigned during the vicksburg campaign; the latter i relieved after the battle of chattanooga. rawlins remained with me as long as he lived, and rose to the rank of brigadier general and chief-of-staff to the general of the army--an office created for him--before the war closed. he was an able man, possessed of great firmness, and could say "no" so emphatically to a request which he thought should not be granted that the person he was addressing would understand at once that there was no use of pressing the matter. general rawlins was a very useful officer in other ways than this. i became very much attached to him. shortly after my promotion i was ordered to ironton, missouri, to command a district in that part of the state, and took the 21st illinois, my old regiment, with me. several other regiments were ordered to the same destination about the same time. ironton is on the iron mountain railroad, about seventy miles south of st. louis, and situated among hills rising almost to the dignity of mountains. when i reached there, about the 8th of august, colonel b. gratz brown --afterwards governor of missouri and in 1872 vice-presidential candidate --was in command. some of his troops were ninety days' men and their time had expired some time before. the men had no clothing but what they had volunteered in, and much of this was so worn that it would hardly stay on. general hardee--the author of the tactics i did not study--was at greenville some twenty-five miles further south, it was said, with five thousand confederate troops. under these circumstances colonel brown's command was very much demoralized. a squadron of cavalry could have ridden into the valley and captured the entire force. brown himself was gladder to see me on that occasion than he ever has been since. i relieved him and sent all his men home within a day or two, to be mustered out of service. within ten days after reaching ironton i was prepared to take the offensive against the enemy at greenville. i sent a column east out of the valley we were in, with orders to swing around to the south and west and come into the greenville road ten miles south of ironton. another column marched on the direct road and went into camp at the point designated for the two columns to meet. i was to ride out the next morning and take personal command of the movement. my experience against harris, in northern missouri, had inspired me with confidence. but when the evening train came in, it brought general b. m. prentiss with orders to take command of the district. his orders did not relieve me, but i knew that by law i was senior, and at that time even the president did not have the authority to assign a junior to command a senior of the same grade. i therefore gave general prentiss the situation of the troops and the general condition of affairs, and started for st. louis the same day. the movement against the rebels at greenville went no further. from st. louis i was ordered to jefferson city, the capital of the state, to take command. general sterling price, of the confederate army, was thought to be threatening the capital, lexington, chillicothe and other comparatively large towns in the central part of missouri. i found a good many troops in jefferson city, but in the greatest confusion, and no one person knew where they all were. colonel mulligan, a gallant man, was in command, but he had not been educated as yet to his new profession and did not know how to maintain discipline. i found that volunteers had obtained permission from the department commander, or claimed they had, to raise, some of them, regiments; some battalions; some companies--the officers to be commissioned according to the number of men they brought into the service. there were recruiting stations all over town, with notices, rudely lettered on boards over the doors, announcing the arm of service and length of time for which recruits at that station would be received. the law required all volunteers to serve for three years or the war. but in jefferson city in august, 1861, they were recruited for different periods and on different conditions; some were enlisted for six months, some for a year, some without any condition as to where they were to serve, others were not to be sent out of the state. the recruits were principally men from regiments stationed there and already in the service, bound for three years if the war lasted that long. the city was filled with union fugitives who had been driven by guerilla bands to take refuge with the national troops. they were in a deplorable condition and must have starved but for the support the government gave them. they had generally made their escape with a team or two, sometimes a yoke of oxen with a mule or a horse in the lead. a little bedding besides their clothing and some food had been thrown into the wagon. all else of their worldly goods were abandoned and appropriated by their former neighbors; for the union man in missouri who staid at home during the rebellion, if he was not immediately under the protection of the national troops, was at perpetual war with his neighbors. i stopped the recruiting service, and disposed the troops about the outskirts of the city so as to guard all approaches. order was soon restored. i had been at jefferson city but a few days when i was directed from department headquarters to fit out an expedition to lexington, booneville and chillicothe, in order to take from the banks in those cities all the funds they had and send them to st. louis. the western army had not yet been supplied with transportation. it became necessary therefore to press into the service teams belonging to sympathizers with the rebellion or to hire those of union men. this afforded an opportunity of giving employment to such of the refugees within our lines as had teams suitable for our purposes. they accepted the service with alacrity. as fast as troops could be got off they were moved west some twenty miles or more. in seven or eight days from my assuming command at jefferson city, i had all the troops, except a small garrison, at an advanced position and expected to join them myself the next day. but my campaigns had not yet begun, for while seated at my office door, with nothing further to do until it was time to start for the front, i saw an officer of rank approaching, who proved to be colonel jefferson c. davis. i had never met him before, but he introduced himself by handing me an order for him to proceed to jefferson city and relieve me of the command. the orders directed that i should report at department headquarters at st. louis without delay, to receive important special instructions. it was about an hour before the only regular train of the day would start. i therefore turned over to colonel davis my orders, and hurriedly stated to him the progress that had been made to carry out the department instructions already described. i had at that time but one staff officer, doing myself all the detail work usually performed by an adjutant-general. in an hour after being relieved from the command i was on my way to st. louis, leaving my single staff officer(*6) to follow the next day with our horses and baggage. the "important special instructions" which i received the next day, assigned me to the command of the district of south-east missouri, embracing all the territory south of st. louis, in missouri, as well as all southern illinois. at first i was to take personal command of a combined expedition that had been ordered for the capture of colonel jeff. thompson, a sort of independent or partisan commander who was disputing with us the possession of south-east missouri. troops had been ordered to move from ironton to cape girardeau, sixty or seventy miles to the south-east, on the mississippi river; while the forces at cape girardeau had been ordered to move to jacksonville, ten miles out towards ironton; and troops at cairo and bird's point, at the junction of the ohio and mississippi rivers, were to hold themselves in readiness to go down the mississippi to belmont, eighteen miles below, to be moved west from there when an officer should come to command them. i was the officer who had been selected for this purpose. cairo was to become my headquarters when the expedition terminated. in pursuance of my orders i established my temporary headquarters at cape girardeau and sent instructions to the commanding officer at jackson, to inform me of the approach of general prentiss from ironton. hired wagons were kept moving night and day to take additional rations to jackson, to supply the troops when they started from there. neither general prentiss nor colonel marsh, who commanded at jackson, knew their destination. i drew up all the instructions for the contemplated move, and kept them in my pocket until i should hear of the junction of our troops at jackson. two or three days after my arrival at cape girardeau, word came that general prentiss was approaching that place (jackson). i started at once to meet him there and to give him his orders. as i turned the first corner of a street after starting, i saw a column of cavalry passing the next street in front of me. i turned and rode around the block the other way, so as to meet the head of the column. i found there general prentiss himself, with a large escort. he had halted his troops at jackson for the night, and had come on himself to cape girardeau, leaving orders for his command to follow him in the morning. i gave the general his orders--which stopped him at jackson--but he was very much aggrieved at being placed under another brigadier-general, particularly as he believed himself to be the senior. he had been a brigadier, in command at cairo, while i was mustering officer at springfield without any rank. but we were nominated at the same time for the united states service, and both our commissions bore date may 17th, 1861. by virtue of my former army rank i was, by law, the senior. general prentiss failed to get orders to his troops to remain at jackson, and the next morning early they were reported as approaching cape girardeau. i then ordered the general very peremptorily to countermarch his command and take it back to jackson. he obeyed the order, but bade his command adieu when he got them to jackson, and went to st. louis and reported himself. this broke up the expedition. but little harm was done, as jeff. thompson moved light and had no fixed place for even nominal headquarters. he was as much at home in arkansas as he was in missouri and would keep out of the way of a superior force. prentiss was sent to another part of the state. general prentiss made a great mistake on the above occasion, one that he would not have committed later in the war. when i came to know him better, i regretted it much. in consequence of this occurrence he was off duty in the field when the principal campaign at the west was going on, and his juniors received promotion while he was where none could be obtained. he would have been next to myself in rank in the district of south-east missouri, by virtue of his services in the mexican war. he was a brave and very earnest soldier. no man in the service was more sincere in his devotion to the cause for which we were battling; none more ready to make sacrifices or risk life in it. on the 4th of september i removed my headquarters to cairo and found colonel richard oglesby in command of the post. we had never met, at least not to my knowledge. after my promotion i had ordered my brigadier-general's uniform from new york, but it had not yet arrived, so that i was in citizen's dress. the colonel had his office full of people, mostly from the neighboring states of missouri and kentucky, making complaints or asking favors. he evidently did not catch my name when i was presented, for on my taking a piece of paper from the table where he was seated and writing the order assuming command of the district of south-east missouri, colonel richard j. oglesby to command the post at bird's point, and handing it to him, he put on an expression of surprise that looked a little as if he would like to have some one identify me. but he surrendered the office without question. the day after i assumed command at cairo a man came to me who said he was a scout of general fremont. he reported that he had just come from columbus, a point on the mississippi twenty miles below on the kentucky side, and that troops had started from there, or were about to start, to seize paducah, at the mouth of the tennessee. there was no time for delay; i reported by telegraph to the department commander the information i had received, and added that i was taking steps to get off that night to be in advance of the enemy in securing that important point. there was a large number of steamers lying at cairo and a good many boatmen were staying in the town. it was the work of only a few hours to get the boats manned, with coal aboard and steam up. troops were also designated to go aboard. the distance from cairo to paducah is about forty-five miles. i did not wish to get there before daylight of the 6th, and directed therefore that the boats should lie at anchor out in the stream until the time to start. not having received an answer to my first dispatch, i again telegraphed to department headquarters that i should start for paducah that night unless i received further orders. hearing nothing, we started before midnight and arrived early the following morning, anticipating the enemy by probably not over six or eight hours. it proved very fortunate that the expedition against jeff. thompson had been broken up. had it not been, the enemy would have seized paducah and fortified it, to our very great annoyance. when the national troops entered the town the citizens were taken by surprise. i never after saw such consternation depicted on the faces of the people. men, women and children came out of their doors looking pale and frightened at the presence of the invader. they were expecting rebel troops that day. in fact, nearly four thousand men from columbus were at that time within ten or fifteen miles of paducah on their way to occupy the place. i had but two regiments and one battery with me, but the enemy did not know this and returned to columbus. i stationed my troops at the best points to guard the roads leading into the city, left gunboats to guard the river fronts and by noon was ready to start on my return to cairo. before leaving, however, i addressed a short printed proclamation to the citizens of paducah assuring them of our peaceful intentions, that we had come among them to protect them against the enemies of our country, and that all who chose could continue their usual avocations with assurance of the protection of the government. this was evidently a relief to them; but the majority would have much preferred the presence of the other army. i reinforced paducah rapidly from the troops at cape girardeau; and a day or two later general c. f. smith, a most accomplished soldier, reported at cairo and was assigned to the command of the post at the mouth of the tennessee. in a short time it was well fortified and a detachment was sent to occupy smithland, at the mouth of the cumberland. the state government of kentucky at that time was rebel in sentiment, but wanted to preserve an armed neutrality between the north and the south, and the governor really seemed to think the state had a perfect right to maintain a neutral position. the rebels already occupied two towns in the state, columbus and hickman, on the mississippi; and at the very moment the national troops were entering paducah from the ohio front, general lloyd tilghman--a confederate--with his staff and a small detachment of men, were getting out in the other direction, while, as i have already said, nearly four thousand confederate troops were on kentucky soil on their way to take possession of the town. but, in the estimation of the governor and of those who thought with him, this did not justify the national authorities in invading the soil of kentucky. i informed the legislature of the state of what i was doing, and my action was approved by the majority of that body. on my return to cairo i found authority from department headquarters for me to take paducah "if i felt strong enough," but very soon after i was reprimanded from the same quarters for my correspondence with the legislature and warned against a repetition of the offence. soon after i took command at cairo, general fremont entered into arrangements for the exchange of the prisoners captured at camp jackson in the month of may. i received orders to pass them through my lines to columbus as they presented themselves with proper credentials. quite a number of these prisoners i had been personally acquainted with before the war. such of them as i had so known were received at my headquarters as old acquaintances, and ordinary routine business was not disturbed by their presence. on one occasion when several were present in my office my intention to visit cape girardeau the next day, to inspect the troops at that point, was mentioned. something transpired which postponed my trip; but a steamer employed by the government was passing a point some twenty or more miles above cairo, the next day, when a section of rebel artillery with proper escort brought her to. a major, one of those who had been at my headquarters the day before, came at once aboard and after some search made a direct demand for my delivery. it was hard to persuade him that i was not there. this officer was major barrett, of st. louis. i had been acquainted with his family before the war. chapter xx. general fremont in command--movement against belmont--battle of belmont --a narrow escape--after the battle. from the occupation of paducah up to the early part of november nothing important occurred with the troops under my command. i was reinforced from time to time and the men were drilled and disciplined preparatory for the service which was sure to come. by the 1st of november i had not fewer than 20,000 men, most of them under good drill and ready to meet any equal body of men who, like themselves, had not yet been in an engagement. they were growing impatient at lying idle so long, almost in hearing of the guns of the enemy they had volunteered to fight against. i asked on one or two occasions to be allowed to move against columbus. it could have been taken soon after the occupation of paducah; but before november it was so strongly fortified that it would have required a large force and a long siege to capture it. in the latter part of october general fremont took the field in person and moved from jefferson city against general sterling price, who was then in the state of missouri with a considerable command. about the first of november i was directed from department headquarters to make a demonstration on both sides of the mississippi river with the view of detaining the rebels at columbus within their lines. before my troops could be got off, i was notified from the same quarter that there were some 3,000 of the enemy on the st. francis river about fifty miles west, or south-west, from cairo, and was ordered to send another force against them. i dispatched colonel oglesby at once with troops sufficient to compete with the reported number of the enemy. on the 5th word came from the same source that the rebels were about to detach a large force from columbus to be moved by boats down the mississippi and up the white river, in arkansas, in order to reinforce price, and i was directed to prevent this movement if possible. i accordingly sent a regiment from bird's point under colonel w. h. l. wallace to overtake and reinforce oglesby, with orders to march to new madrid, a point some distance below columbus, on the missouri side. at the same time i directed general c. f. smith to move all the troops he could spare from paducah directly against columbus, halting them, however, a few miles from the town to await further orders from me. then i gathered up all the troops at cairo and fort holt, except suitable guards, and moved them down the river on steamers convoyed by two gunboats, accompanying them myself. my force consisted of a little over 3,000 men and embraced five regiments of infantry, two guns and two companies of cavalry. we dropped down the river on the 6th to within about six miles of columbus, debarked a few men on the kentucky side and established pickets to connect with the troops from paducah. i had no orders which contemplated an attack by the national troops, nor did i intend anything of the kind when i started out from cairo; but after we started i saw that the officers and men were elated at the prospect of at last having the opportunity of doing what they had volunteered to do--fight the enemies of their country. i did not see how i could maintain discipline, or retain the confidence of my command, if we should return to cairo without an effort to do something. columbus, besides being strongly fortified, contained a garrison much more numerous than the force i had with me. it would not do, therefore, to attack that point. about two o'clock on the morning of the 7th, i learned that the enemy was crossing troops from columbus to the west bank to be dispatched, presumably, after oglesby. i knew there was a small camp of confederates at belmont, immediately opposite columbus, and i speedily resolved to push down the river, land on the missouri side, capture belmont, break up the camp and return. accordingly, the pickets above columbus were drawn in at once, and about daylight the boats moved out from shore. in an hour we were debarking on the west bank of the mississippi, just out of range of the batteries at columbus. the ground on the west shore of the river, opposite columbus, is low and in places marshy and cut up with sloughs. the soil is rich and the timber large and heavy. there were some small clearings between belmont and the point where we landed, but most of the country was covered with the native forests. we landed in front of a cornfield. when the debarkation commenced, i took a regiment down the river to post it as a guard against surprise. at that time i had no staff officer who could be trusted with that duty. in the woods, at a short distance below the clearing, i found a depression, dry at the time, but which at high water became a slough or bayou. i placed the men in the hollow, gave them their instructions and ordered them to remain there until they were properly relieved. these troops, with the gunboats, were to protect our transports. up to this time the enemy had evidently failed to divine our intentions. from columbus they could, of course, see our gunboats and transports loaded with troops. but the force from paducah was threatening them from the land side, and it was hardly to be expected that if columbus was our object we would separate our troops by a wide river. they doubtless thought we meant to draw a large force from the east bank, then embark ourselves, land on the east bank and make a sudden assault on columbus before their divided command could be united. about eight o'clock we started from the point of debarkation, marching by the flank. after moving in this way for a mile or a mile and a half, i halted where there was marshy ground covered with a heavy growth of timber in our front, and deployed a large part of my force as skirmishers. by this time the enemy discovered that we were moving upon belmont and sent out troops to meet us. soon after we had started in line, his skirmishers were encountered and fighting commenced. this continued, growing fiercer and fiercer, for about four hours, the enemy being forced back gradually until he was driven into his camp. early in this engagement my horse was shot under me, but i got another from one of my staff and kept well up with the advance until the river was reached. the officers and men engaged at belmont were then under fire for the first time. veterans could not have behaved better than they did up to the moment of reaching the rebel camp. at this point they became demoralized from their victory and failed to reap its full reward. the enemy had been followed so closely that when he reached the clear ground on which his camp was pitched he beat a hasty retreat over the river bank, which protected him from our shots and from view. this precipitate retreat at the last moment enabled the national forces to pick their way without hinderance through the _abatis_--the only artificial defence the enemy had. the moment the camp was reached our men laid down their arms and commenced rummaging the tents to pick up trophies. some of the higher officers were little better than the privates. they galloped about from one cluster of men to another and at every halt delivered a short eulogy upon the union cause and the achievements of the command. all this time the troops we had been engaged with for four hours, lay crouched under cover of the river bank, ready to come up and surrender if summoned to do so; but finding that they were not pursued, they worked their way up the river and came up on the bank between us and our transports. i saw at the same time two steamers coming from the columbus side towards the west shore, above us, black--or gray--with soldiers from boiler-deck to roof. some of my men were engaged in firing from captured guns at empty steamers down the river, out of range, cheering at every shot. i tried to get them to turn their guns upon the loaded steamers above and not so far away. my efforts were in vain. at last i directed my staff officers to set fire to the camps. this drew the fire of the enemy's guns located on the heights of columbus. they had abstained from firing before, probably because they were afraid of hitting their own men; or they may have supposed, until the camp was on fire, that it was still in the possession of their friends. about this time, too, the men we had driven over the bank were seen in line up the river between us and our transports. the alarm "surrounded" was given. the guns of the enemy and the report of being surrounded, brought officers and men completely under control. at first some of the officers seemed to think that to be surrounded was to be placed in a hopeless position, where there was nothing to do but surrender. but when i announced that we had cut our way in and could cut our way out just as well, it seemed a new revelation to officers and soldiers. they formed line rapidly and we started back to our boats, with the men deployed as skirmishers as they had been on entering camp. the enemy was soon encountered, but his resistance this time was feeble. again the confederates sought shelter under the river banks. we could not stop, however, to pick them up, because the troops we had seen crossing the river had debarked by this time and were nearer our transports than we were. it would be prudent to get them behind us; but we were not again molested on our way to the boats. from the beginning of the fighting our wounded had been carried to the houses at the rear, near the place of debarkation. i now set the troops to bringing their wounded to the boats. after this had gone on for some little time i rode down the road, without even a staff officer, to visit the guard i had stationed over the approach to our transports. i knew the enemy had crossed over from columbus in considerable numbers and might be expected to attack us as we were embarking. this guard would be encountered first and, as they were in a natural intrenchment, would be able to hold the enemy for a considerable time. my surprise was great to find there was not a single man in the trench. riding back to the boat i found the officer who had commanded the guard and learned that he had withdrawn his force when the main body fell back. at first i ordered the guard to return, but finding that it would take some time to get the men together and march them back to their position, i countermanded the order. then fearing that the enemy we had seen crossing the river below might be coming upon us unawares, i rode out in the field to our front, still entirely alone, to observe whether the enemy was passing. the field was grown up with corn so tall and thick as to cut off the view of even a person on horseback, except directly along the rows. even in that direction, owing to the overhanging blades of corn, the view was not extensive. i had not gone more than a few hundred yards when i saw a body of troops marching past me not fifty yards away. i looked at them for a moment and then turned my horse towards the river and started back, first in a walk, and when i thought myself concealed from the view of the enemy, as fast as my horse could carry me. when at the river bank i still had to ride a few hundred yards to the point where the nearest transport lay. the cornfield in front of our transports terminated at the edge of a dense forest. before i got back the enemy had entered this forest and had opened a brisk fire upon the boats. our men, with the exception of details that had gone to the front after the wounded, were now either aboard the transports or very near them. those who were not aboard soon got there, and the boats pushed off. i was the only man of the national army between the rebels and our transports. the captain of a boat that had just pushed out but had not started, recognized me and ordered the engineer not to start the engine; he then had a plank run out for me. my horse seemed to take in the situation. there was no path down the bank and every one acquainted with the mississippi river knows that its banks, in a natural state, do not vary at any great angle from the perpendicular. my horse put his fore feet over the bank without hesitation or urging, and with his hind feet well under him, slid down the bank and trotted aboard the boat, twelve or fifteen feet away, over a single gang plank. i dismounted and went at once to the upper deck. the mississippi river was low on the 7th of november, 1861, so that the banks were higher than the heads of men standing on the upper decks of the steamers. the rebels were some distance back from the river, so that their fire was high and did us but little harm. our smoke-stack was riddled with bullets, but there were only three men wounded on the boats, two of whom were soldiers. when i first went on deck i entered the captain's room adjoining the pilot-house, and threw myself on a sofa. i did not keep that position a moment, but rose to go out on the deck to observe what was going on. i had scarcely left when a musket ball entered the room, struck the head of the sofa, passed through it and lodged in the foot. when the enemy opened fire on the transports our gunboats returned it with vigor. they were well out in the stream and some distance down, so that they had to give but very little elevation to their guns to clear the banks of the river. their position very nearly enfiladed the line of the enemy while he was marching through the cornfield. the execution was very great, as we could see at the time and as i afterwards learned more positively. we were very soon out of range and went peacefully on our way to cairo, every man feeling that belmont was a great victory and that he had contributed his share to it. our loss at belmont was 485 in killed, wounded and missing. about 125 of our wounded fell into the hands of the enemy. we returned with 175 prisoners and two guns, and spiked four other pieces. the loss of the enemy, as officially reported, was 642 men, killed, wounded and missing. we had engaged about 2,500 men, exclusive of the guard left with the transports. the enemy had about 7,000; but this includes the troops brought over from columbus who were not engaged in the first defence of belmont. the two objects for which the battle of belmont was fought were fully accomplished. the enemy gave up all idea of detaching troops from columbus. his losses were very heavy for that period of the war. columbus was beset by people looking for their wounded or dead kin, to take them home for medical treatment or burial. i learned later, when i had moved further south, that belmont had caused more mourning than almost any other battle up to that time. the national troops acquired a confidence in themselves at belmont that did not desert them through the war. the day after the battle i met some officers from general polk's command, arranged for permission to bury our dead at belmont and also commenced negotiations for the exchange of prisoners. when our men went to bury their dead, before they were allowed to land they were conducted below the point where the enemy had engaged our transports. some of the officers expressed a desire to see the field; but the request was refused with the statement that we had no dead there. while on the truce-boat i mentioned to an officer, whom i had known both at west point and in the mexican war, that i was in the cornfield near their troops when they passed; that i had been on horseback and had worn a soldier's overcoat at the time. this officer was on general polk's staff. he said both he and the general had seen me and that polk had said to his men, "there is a yankee; you may try your marksmanship on him if you wish," but nobody fired at me. belmont was severely criticised in the north as a wholly unnecessary battle, barren of results, or the possibility of them from the beginning. if it had not been fought, colonel oglesby would probably have been captured or destroyed with his three thousand men. then i should have been culpable indeed. chapter xxi. general halleck in command--commanding the district of cairo--movement on fort henry--capture of fort henry. while at cairo i had frequent opportunities of meeting the rebel officers of the columbus garrison. they seemed to be very fond of coming up on steamers under flags of truce. on two or three occasions i went down in like manner. when one of their boats was seen coming up carrying a white flag, a gun would be fired from the lower battery at fort holt, throwing a shot across the bow as a signal to come no farther. i would then take a steamer and, with my staff and occasionally a few other officers, go down to receive the party. there were several officers among them whom i had known before, both at west point and in mexico. seeing these officers who had been educated for the profession of arms, both at school and in actual war, which is a far more efficient training, impressed me with the great advantage the south possessed over the north at the beginning of the rebellion. they had from thirty to forty per cent. of the educated soldiers of the nation. they had no standing army and, consequently, these trained soldiers had to find employment with the troops from their own states. in this way what there was of military education and training was distributed throughout their whole army. the whole loaf was leavened. the north had a great number of educated and trained soldiers, but the bulk of them were still in the army and were retained, generally with their old commands and rank, until the war had lasted many months. in the army of the potomac there was what was known as the "regular brigade," in which, from the commanding officer down to the youngest second lieutenant, every one was educated to his profession. so, too, with many of the batteries; all the officers, generally four in number to each, were men educated for their profession. some of these went into battle at the beginning under division commanders who were entirely without military training. this state of affairs gave me an idea which i expressed while at cairo; that the government ought to disband the regular army, with the exception of the staff corps, and notify the disbanded officers that they would receive no compensation while the war lasted except as volunteers. the register should be kept up, but the names of all officers who were not in the volunteer service at the close, should be stricken from it. on the 9th of november, two days after the battle of belmont, major-general h. w. halleck superseded general fremont in command of the department of the missouri. the limits of his command took in arkansas and west kentucky east to the cumberland river. from the battle of belmont until early in february, 1862, the troops under my command did little except prepare for the long struggle which proved to be before them. the enemy at this time occupied a line running from the mississippi river at columbus to bowling green and mill springs, kentucky. each of these positions was strongly fortified, as were also points on the tennessee and cumberland rivers near the tennessee state line. the works on the tennessee were called fort heiman and fort henry, and that on the cumberland was fort donelson. at these points the two rivers approached within eleven miles of each other. the lines of rifle pits at each place extended back from the water at least two miles, so that the garrisons were in reality only seven miles apart. these positions were of immense importance to the enemy; and of course correspondingly important for us to possess ourselves of. with fort henry in our hands we had a navigable stream open to us up to muscle shoals, in alabama. the memphis and charleston railroad strikes the tennessee at eastport, mississippi, and follows close to the banks of the river up to the shoals. this road, of vast importance to the enemy, would cease to be of use to them for through traffic the moment fort henry became ours. fort donelson was the gate to nashville--a place of great military and political importance--and to a rich country extending far east in kentucky. these two points in our possession the enemy would necessarily be thrown back to the memphis and charleston road, or to the boundary of the cotton states, and, as before stated, that road would be lost to them for through communication. the designation of my command had been changed after halleck's arrival, from the district of south-east missouri to the district of cairo, and the small district commanded by general c. f. smith, embracing the mouths of the tennessee and cumberland rivers, had been added to my jurisdiction. early in january, 1862, i was directed by general mcclellan, through my department commander, to make a reconnoissance in favor of brigadier-general don carlos buell, who commanded the department of the ohio, with headquarters at louisville, and who was confronting general s. b. buckner with a larger confederate force at bowling green. it was supposed that buell was about to make some move against the enemy, and my demonstration was intended to prevent the sending of troops from columbus, fort henry or donelson to buckner. i at once ordered general smith to send a force up the west bank of the tennessee to threaten forts heiman and henry; mcclernand at the same time with a force of 6,000 men was sent out into west kentucky, threatening columbus with one column and the tennessee river with another. i went with mcclernand's command. the weather was very bad; snow and rain fell; the roads, never good in that section, were intolerable. we were out more than a week splashing through the mud, snow and rain, the men suffering very much. the object of the expedition was accomplished. the enemy did not send reinforcements to bowling green, and general george h. thomas fought and won the battle of mill springs before we returned. as a result of this expedition general smith reported that he thought it practicable to capture fort heiman. this fort stood on high ground, completely commanding fort henry on the opposite side of the river, and its possession by us, with the aid of our gunboats, would insure the capture of fort henry. this report of smith's confirmed views i had previously held, that the true line of operations for us was up the tennessee and cumberland rivers. with us there, the enemy would be compelled to fall back on the east and west entirely out of the state of kentucky. on the 6th of january, before receiving orders for this expedition, i had asked permission of the general commanding the department to go to see him at st. louis. my object was to lay this plan of campaign before him. now that my views had been confirmed by so able a general as smith, i renewed my request to go to st. louis on what i deemed important military business. the leave was granted, but not graciously. i had known general halleck but very slightly in the old army, not having met him either at west point or during the mexican war. i was received with so little cordiality that i perhaps stated the object of my visit with less clearness than i might have done, and i had not uttered many sentences before i was cut short as if my plan was preposterous. i returned to cairo very much crestfallen. flag-officer foote commanded the little fleet of gunboats then in the neighborhood of cairo and, though in another branch of the service, was subject to the command of general halleck. he and i consulted freely upon military matters and he agreed with me perfectly as to the feasibility of the campaign up the tennessee. notwithstanding the rebuff i had received from my immediate chief, i therefore, on the 28th of january, renewed the suggestion by telegraph that "if permitted, i could take and hold fort henry on the tennessee." this time i was backed by flag-officer foote, who sent a similar dispatch. on the 29th i wrote fully in support of the proposition. on the 1st of february i received full instructions from department headquarters to move upon fort henry. on the 2d the expedition started. in february, 1862, there were quite a good many steamers laid up at cairo for want of employment, the mississippi river being closed against navigation below that point. there were also many men in the town whose occupation had been following the river in various capacities, from captain down to deck hand but there were not enough of either boats or men to move at one time the 17,000 men i proposed to take with me up the tennessee. i loaded the boats with more than half the force, however, and sent general mcclernand in command. i followed with one of the later boats and found mcclernand had stopped, very properly, nine miles below fort henry. seven gunboats under flag-officer foote had accompanied the advance. the transports we had with us had to return to paducah to bring up a division from there, with general c. f. smith in command. before sending the boats back i wanted to get the troops as near to the enemy as i could without coming within range of their guns. there was a stream emptying into the tennessee on the east side, apparently at about long range distance below the fort. on account of the narrow water-shed separating the tennessee and cumberland rivers at that point, the stream must be insignificant at ordinary stages, but when we were there, in february, it was a torrent. it would facilitate the investment of fort henry materially if the troops could be landed south of that stream. to test whether this could be done i boarded the gunboat essex and requested captain wm. porter commanding it, to approach the fort to draw its fire. after we had gone some distance past the mouth of the stream we drew the fire of the fort, which fell much short of us. in consequence i had made up my mind to return and bring the troops to the upper side of the creek, when the enemy opened upon us with a rifled gun that sent shot far beyond us and beyond the stream. one shot passed very near where captain porter and i were standing, struck the deck near the stern, penetrated and passed through the cabin and so out into the river. we immediately turned back, and the troops were debarked below the mouth of the creek. when the landing was completed i returned with the transports to paducah to hasten up the balance of the troops. i got back on the 5th with the advance, the remainder following as rapidly as the steamers could carry them. at ten o'clock at night, on the 5th, the whole command was not yet up. being anxious to commence operations as soon as possible before the enemy could reinforce heavily, i issued my orders for an advance at 11 a.m. on the 6th. i felt sure that all the troops would be up by that time. fort henry occupies a bend in the river which gave the guns in the water battery a direct fire down the stream. the camp outside the fort was intrenched, with rifle pits and outworks two miles back on the road to donelson and dover. the garrison of the fort and camp was about 2,800, with strong reinforcements from donelson halted some miles out. there were seventeen heavy guns in the fort. the river was very high, the banks being overflowed except where the bluffs come to the water's edge. a portion of the ground on which fort henry stood was two feet deep in water. below, the water extended into the woods several hundred yards back from the bank on the east side. on the west bank fort heiman stood on high ground, completely commanding fort henry. the distance from fort henry to donelson is but eleven miles. the two positions were so important to the enemy, as he saw his interest, that it was natural to suppose that reinforcements would come from every quarter from which they could be got. prompt action on our part was imperative. the plan was for the troops and gunboats to start at the same moment. the troops were to invest the garrison and the gunboats to attack the fort at close quarters. general smith was to land a brigade of his division on the west bank during the night of the 5th and get it in rear of heiman. at the hour designated the troops and gunboats started. general smith found fort heiman had been evacuated before his men arrived. the gunboats soon engaged the water batteries at very close quarters, but the troops which were to invest fort henry were delayed for want of roads, as well as by the dense forest and the high water in what would in dry weather have been unimportant beds of streams. this delay made no difference in the result. on our first appearance tilghman had sent his entire command, with the exception of about one hundred men left to man the guns in the fort, to the outworks on the road to dover and donelson, so as to have them out of range of the guns of our navy; and before any attack on the 6th he had ordered them to retreat on donelson. he stated in his subsequent report that the defence was intended solely to give his troops time to make their escape. tilghman was captured with his staff and ninety men, as well as the armament of the fort, the ammunition and whatever stores were there. our cavalry pursued the retreating column towards donelson and picked up two guns and a few stragglers; but the enemy had so much the start, that the pursuing force did not get in sight of any except the stragglers. all the gunboats engaged were hit many times. the damage, however, beyond what could be repaired by a small expenditure of money, was slight, except to the essex. a shell penetrated the boiler of that vessel and exploded it, killing and wounding forty-eight men, nineteen of whom were soldiers who had been detailed to act with the navy. on several occasions during the war such details were made when the complement of men with the navy was insufficient for the duty before them. after the fall of fort henry captain phelps, commanding the iron-clad carondelet, at my request ascended the tennessee river and thoroughly destroyed the bridge of the memphis and ohio railroad. chapter xxii. investment of fort donelson--the naval operations--attack of the enemy --assaulting the works--surrender of the fort. i informed the department commander of our success at fort henry and that on the 8th i would take fort donelson. but the rain continued to fall so heavily that the roads became impassable for artillery and wagon trains. then, too, it would not have been prudent to proceed without the gunboats. at least it would have been leaving behind a valuable part of our available force. on the 7th, the day after the fall of fort henry, i took my staff and the cavalry--a part of one regiment--and made a reconnoissance to within about a mile of the outer line of works at donelson. i had known general pillow in mexico, and judged that with any force, no matter how small, i could march up to within gunshot of any intrenchments he was given to hold. i said this to the officers of my staff at the time. i knew that floyd was in command, but he was no soldier, and i judged that he would yield to pillow's pretensions. i met, as i expected, no opposition in making the reconnoissance and, besides learning the topography of the country on the way and around fort donelson, found that there were two roads available for marching; one leading to the village of dover, the other to donelson. fort donelson is two miles north, or down the river, from dover. the fort, as it stood in 1861, embraced about one hundred acres of land. on the east it fronted the cumberland; to the north it faced hickman's creek, a small stream which at that time was deep and wide because of the back-water from the river; on the south was another small stream, or rather a ravine, opening into the cumberland. this also was filled with back-water from the river. the fort stood on high ground, some of it as much as a hundred feet above the cumberland. strong protection to the heavy guns in the water batteries had been obtained by cutting away places for them in the bluff. to the west there was a line of rifle pits some two miles back from the river at the farthest point. this line ran generally along the crest of high ground, but in one place crossed a ravine which opens into the river between the village and the fort. the ground inside and outside of this intrenched line was very broken and generally wooded. the trees outside of the rifle-pits had been cut down for a considerable way out, and had been felled so that their tops lay outwards from the intrenchments. the limbs had been trimmed and pointed, and thus formed an _abatis_ in front of the greater part of the line. outside of this intrenched line, and extending about half the entire length of it, is a ravine running north and south and opening into hickman creek at a point north of the fort. the entire side of this ravine next to the works was one long _abatis_. general halleck commenced his efforts in all quarters to get reinforcements to forward to me immediately on my departure from cairo. general hunter sent men freely from kansas, and a large division under general nelson, from buell's army, was also dispatched. orders went out from the war department to consolidate fragments of companies that were being recruited in the western states so as to make full companies, and to consolidate companies into regiments. general halleck did not approve or disapprove of my going to fort donelson. he said nothing whatever to me on the subject. he informed buell on the 7th that i would march against fort donelson the next day; but on the 10th he directed me to fortify fort henry strongly, particularly to the land side, saying that he forwarded me intrenching tools for that purpose. i received this dispatch in front of fort donelson. i was very impatient to get to fort donelson because i knew the importance of the place to the enemy and supposed he would reinforce it rapidly. i felt that 15,000 men on the 8th would be more effective than 50,000 a month later. i asked flag-officer foote, therefore, to order his gunboats still about cairo to proceed up the cumberland river and not to wait for those gone to eastport and florence; but the others got back in time and we started on the 12th. i had moved mcclernand out a few miles the night before so as to leave the road as free as possible. just as we were about to start the first reinforcement reached me on transports. it was a brigade composed of six full regiments commanded by colonel thayer, of nebraska. as the gunboats were going around to donelson by the tennessee, ohio and cumberland rivers, i directed thayer to turn about and go under their convoy. i started from fort henry with 15,000 men, including eight batteries and part of a regiment of cavalry, and, meeting with no obstruction to detain us, the advance arrived in front of the enemy by noon. that afternoon and the next day were spent in taking up ground to make the investment as complete as possible. general smith had been directed to leave a portion of his division behind to guard forts henry and heiman. he left general lew. wallace with 2,500 men. with the remainder of his division he occupied our left, extending to hickman creek. mcclernand was on the right and covered the roads running south and south-west from dover. his right extended to the back-water up the ravine opening into the cumberland south of the village. the troops were not intrenched, but the nature of the ground was such that they were just as well protected from the fire of the enemy as if rifle-pits had been thrown up. our line was generally along the crest of ridges. the artillery was protected by being sunk in the ground. the men who were not serving the guns were perfectly covered from fire on taking position a little back from the crest. the greatest suffering was from want of shelter. it was midwinter and during the siege we had rain and snow, thawing and freezing alternately. it would not do to allow camp-fires except far down the hill out of sight of the enemy, and it would not do to allow many of the troops to remain there at the same time. in the march over from fort henry numbers of the men had thrown away their blankets and overcoats. there was therefore much discomfort and absolute suffering. during the 12th and 13th, and until the arrival of wallace and thayer on the 14th, the national forces, composed of but 15,000 men, without intrenchments, confronted an intrenched army of 21,000, without conflict further than what was brought on by ourselves. only one gunboat had arrived. there was a little skirmishing each day, brought on by the movement of our troops in securing commanding positions; but there was no actual fighting during this time except once, on the 13th, in front of mcclernand's command. that general had undertaken to capture a battery of the enemy which was annoying his men. without orders or authority he sent three regiments to make the assault. the battery was in the main line of the enemy, which was defended by his whole army present. of course the assault was a failure, and of course the loss on our side was great for the number of men engaged. in this assault colonel william morrison fell badly wounded. up to this time the surgeons with the army had no difficulty in finding room in the houses near our line for all the sick and wounded; but now hospitals were overcrowded. owing, however, to the energy and skill of the surgeons the suffering was not so great as it might have been. the hospital arrangements at fort donelson were as complete as it was possible to make them, considering the inclemency of the weather and the lack of tents, in a sparsely settled country where the houses were generally of but one or two rooms. on the return of captain walke to fort henry on the 10th, i had requested him to take the vessels that had accompanied him on his expedition up the tennessee, and get possession of the cumberland as far up towards donelson as possible. he started without delay, taking, however, only his own gunboat, the carondelet, towed by the steamer alps. captain walke arrived a few miles below donelson on the 12th, a little after noon. about the time the advance of troops reached a point within gunshot of the fort on the land side, he engaged the water batteries at long range. on the 13th i informed him of my arrival the day before and of the establishment of most of our batteries, requesting him at the same time to attack again that day so that i might take advantage of any diversion. the attack was made and many shots fell within the fort, creating some consternation, as we now know. the investment on the land side was made as complete as the number of troops engaged would admit of. during the night of the 13th flag-officer foote arrived with the iron-clads st. louis, louisville and pittsburg and the wooden gunboats tyler and conestoga, convoying thayer's brigade. on the morning of the 14th thayer was landed. wallace, whom i had ordered over from fort henry, also arrived about the same time. up to this time he had been commanding a brigade belonging to the division of general c. f. smith. these troops were now restored to the division they belonged to, and general lew. wallace was assigned to the command of a division composed of the brigade of colonel thayer and other reinforcements that arrived the same day. this new division was assigned to the centre, giving the two flanking divisions an opportunity to close up and form a stronger line. the plan was for the troops to hold the enemy within his lines, while the gunboats should attack the water batteries at close quarters and silence his guns if possible. some of the gunboats were to run the batteries, get above the fort and above the village of dover. i had ordered a reconnoissance made with the view of getting troops to the river above dover in case they should be needed there. that position attained by the gunboats it would have been but a question of time--and a very short time, too--when the garrison would have been compelled to surrender. by three in the afternoon of the 14th flag-officer foote was ready, and advanced upon the water batteries with his entire fleet. after coming in range of the batteries of the enemy the advance was slow, but a constant fire was delivered from every gun that could be brought to bear upon the fort. i occupied a position on shore from which i could see the advancing navy. the leading boat got within a very short distance of the water battery, not further off i think than two hundred yards, and i soon saw one and then another of them dropping down the river, visibly disabled. then the whole fleet followed and the engagement closed for the day. the gunboat which flag-officer foote was on, besides having been hit about sixty times, several of the shots passing through near the waterline, had a shot enter the pilot-house which killed the pilot, carried away the wheel and wounded the flag-officer himself. the tiller-ropes of another vessel were carried away and she, too, dropped helplessly back. two others had their pilot-houses so injured that they scarcely formed a protection to the men at the wheel. the enemy had evidently been much demoralized by the assault, but they were jubilant when they saw the disabled vessels dropping down the river entirely out of the control of the men on board. of course i only witnessed the falling back of our gunboats and felt sad enough at the time over the repulse. subsequent reports, now published, show that the enemy telegraphed a great victory to richmond. the sun went down on the night of the 14th of february, 1862, leaving the army confronting fort donelson anything but comforted over the prospects. the weather had turned intensely cold; the men were without tents and could not keep up fires where most of them had to stay, and, as previously stated, many had thrown away their overcoats and blankets. two of the strongest of our gunboats had been disabled, presumably beyond the possibility of rendering any present assistance. i retired this night not knowing but that i would have to intrench my position, and bring up tents for the men or build huts under the cover of the hills. on the morning of the 15th, before it was yet broad day, a messenger from flag-officer foote handed me a note, expressing a desire to see me on the flag-ship and saying that he had been injured the day before so much that he could not come himself to me. i at once made my preparations for starting. i directed my adjutant-general to notify each of the division commanders of my absence and instruct them to do nothing to bring on an engagement until they received further orders, but to hold their positions. from the heavy rains that had fallen for days and weeks preceding and from the constant use of the roads between the troops and the landing four to seven miles below, these roads had become cut up so as to be hardly passable. the intense cold of the night of the 14th-15th had frozen the ground solid. this made travel on horseback even slower than through the mud; but i went as fast as the roads would allow. when i reached the fleet i found the flag-ship was anchored out in the stream. a small boat, however, awaited my arrival and i was soon on board with the flag-officer. he explained to me in short the condition in which he was left by the engagement of the evening before, and suggested that i should intrench while he returned to mound city with his disabled boats, expressing at the time the belief that he could have the necessary repairs made and be back in ten days. i saw the absolute necessity of his gunboats going into hospital and did not know but i should be forced to the alternative of going through a siege. but the enemy relieved me from this necessity. when i left the national line to visit flag-officer foote i had no idea that there would be any engagement on land unless i brought it on myself. the conditions for battle were much more favorable to us than they had been for the first two days of the investment. from the 12th to the 14th we had but 15,000 men of all arms and no gunboats. now we had been reinforced by a fleet of six naval vessels, a large division of troops under general l. wallace and 2,500 men brought over from fort henry belonging to the division of c. f. smith. the enemy, however, had taken the initiative. just as i landed i met captain hillyer of my staff, white with fear, not for his personal safety, but for the safety of the national troops. he said the enemy had come out of his lines in full force and attacked and scattered mcclernand's division, which was in full retreat. the roads, as i have said, were unfit for making fast time, but i got to my command as soon as possible. the attack had been made on the national right. i was some four or five miles north of our left. the line was about three miles long. in reaching the point where the disaster had occurred i had to pass the divisions of smith and wallace. i saw no sign of excitement on the portion of the line held by smith; wallace was nearer the scene of conflict and had taken part in it. he had, at an opportune time, sent thayer's brigade to the support of mcclernand and thereby contributed to hold the enemy within his lines. i saw everything favorable for us along the line of our left and centre. when i came to the right appearances were different. the enemy had come out in full force to cut his way out and make his escape. mcclernand's division had to bear the brunt of the attack from this combined force. his men had stood up gallantly until the ammunition in their cartridge-boxes gave out. there was abundance of ammunition near by lying on the ground in boxes, but at that stage of the war it was not all of our commanders of regiments, brigades, or even divisions, who had been educated up to the point of seeing that their men were constantly supplied with ammunition during an engagement. when the men found themselves without ammunition they could not stand up against troops who seemed to have plenty of it. the division broke and a portion fled, but most of the men, as they were not pursued, only fell back out of range of the fire of the enemy. it must have been about this time that thayer pushed his brigade in between the enemy and those of our troops that were without ammunition. at all events the enemy fell back within his intrenchments and was there when i got on the field. i saw the men standing in knots talking in the most excited manner. no officer seemed to be giving any directions. the soldiers had their muskets, but no ammunition, while there were tons of it close at hand. i heard some of the men say that the enemy had come out with knapsacks, and haversacks filled with rations. they seemed to think this indicated a determination on his part to stay out and fight just as long as the provisions held out. i turned to colonel j. d. webster, of my staff, who was with me, and said: "some of our men are pretty badly demoralized, but the enemy must be more so, for he has attempted to force his way out, but has fallen back: the one who attacks first now will be victorious and the enemy will have to be in a hurry if he gets ahead of me." i determined to make the assault at once on our left. it was clear to my mind that the enemy had started to march out with his entire force, except a few pickets, and if our attack could be made on the left before the enemy could redistribute his forces along the line, we would find but little opposition except from the intervening _abatis_. i directed colonel webster to ride with me and call out to the men as we passed: "fill your cartridge-boxes, quick, and get into line; the enemy is trying to escape and he must not be permitted to do so." this acted like a charm. the men only wanted some one to give them a command. we rode rapidly to smith's quarters, when i explained the situation to him and directed him to charge the enemy's works in his front with his whole division, saying at the same time that he would find nothing but a very thin line to contend with. the general was off in an incredibly short time, going in advance himself to keep his men from firing while they were working their way through the _abatis_ intervening between them and the enemy. the outer line of rifle-pits was passed, and the night of the 15th general smith, with much of his division, bivouacked within the lines of the enemy. there was now no doubt but that the confederates must surrender or be captured the next day. there seems from subsequent accounts to have been much consternation, particularly among the officers of high rank, in dover during the night of the 15th. general floyd, the commanding officer, who was a man of talent enough for any civil position, was no soldier and, possibly, did not possess the elements of one. he was further unfitted for command, for the reason that his conscience must have troubled him and made him afraid. as secretary of war he had taken a solemn oath to maintain the constitution of the united states and to uphold the same against all its enemies. he had betrayed that trust. as secretary of war he was reported through the northern press to have scattered the little army the country had so that the most of it could be picked up in detail when secession occurred. about a year before leaving the cabinet he had removed arms from northern to southern arsenals. he continued in the cabinet of president buchanan until about the 1st of january, 1861, while he was working vigilantly for the establishment of a confederacy made out of united states territory. well may he have been afraid to fall into the hands of national troops. he would no doubt have been tried for misappropriating public property, if not for treason, had he been captured. general pillow, next in command, was conceited, and prided himself much on his services in the mexican war. he telegraphed to general johnston, at nashville, after our men were within the rebel rifle-pits, and almost on the eve of his making his escape, that the southern troops had had great success all day. johnston forwarded the dispatch to richmond. while the authorities at the capital were reading it floyd and pillow were fugitives. a council of war was held by the enemy at which all agreed that it would be impossible to hold out longer. general buckner, who was third in rank in the garrison but much the most capable soldier, seems to have regarded it a duty to hold the fort until the general commanding the department, a. s. johnston, should get back to his headquarters at nashville. buckner's report shows, however, that he considered donelson lost and that any attempt to hold the place longer would be at the sacrifice of the command. being assured that johnston was already in nashville, buckner too agreed that surrender was the proper thing. floyd turned over the command to pillow, who declined it. it then devolved upon buckner, who accepted the responsibility of the position. floyd and pillow took possession of all the river transports at dover and before morning both were on their way to nashville, with the brigade formerly commanded by floyd and some other troops, in all about 3,000. some marched up the east bank of the cumberland; others went on the steamers. during the night forrest also, with his cavalry and some other troops about a thousand in all, made their way out, passing between our right and the river. they had to ford or swim over the back-water in the little creek just south of dover. before daylight general smith brought to me the following letter from general buckner: headquarters, fort donelson, february 16, 1862. sir:--in consideration of all the circumstances governing the present situation of affairs at this station, i propose to the commanding officer of the federal forces the appointment of commissioners to agree upon terms of capitulation of the forces and fort under my command, and in that view suggest an armistice until 12 o'clock to-day. i am, sir, very respectfully, your ob't se'v't, s. b. buckner, brig. gen. c. s. a. to brigadier-general u. s. grant, com'ding u. s. forces, near fort donelson. to this i responded as follows: headquarters army in the field, camp near donelson, february 16, 1862. general s. b. buckner, confederate army. sir:--yours of this date, proposing armistice and appointment of commissioners to settle terms of capitulation, is just received. no terms except an unconditional and immediate surrender can be accepted. i propose to move immediately upon your works. i am, sir, very respectfully, your ob't se'v't, u. s. grant, brig. gen. to this i received the following reply: headquarters, dover, tennessee, february 16, 1862. to brig. gen'l u. s. grant, u. s. army. sir:--the distribution of the forces under my command, incident to an unexpected change of commanders, and the overwhelming force under your command, compel me, notwithstanding the brilliant success of the confederate arms yesterday, to accept the ungenerous and unchivalrous terms which you propose. i am, sir, your very ob't se'v't, s. b. buckner, brig. gen. c. s. a. general buckner, as soon as he had dispatched the first of the above letters, sent word to his different commanders on the line of rifle-pits, notifying them that he had made a proposition looking to the surrender of the garrison, and directing them to notify national troops in their front so that all fighting might be prevented. white flags were stuck at intervals along the line of rifle-pits, but none over the fort. as soon as the last letter from buckner was received i mounted my horse and rode to dover. general wallace, i found, had preceded me an hour or more. i presume that, seeing white flags exposed in his front, he rode up to see what they meant and, not being fired upon or halted, he kept on until he found himself at the headquarters of general buckner. i had been at west point three years with buckner and afterwards served with him in the army, so that we were quite well acquainted. in the course of our conversation, which was very friendly, he said to me that if he had been in command i would not have got up to donelson as easily as i did. i told him that if he had been in command i should not have tried in the way i did: i had invested their lines with a smaller force than they had to defend them, and at the same time had sent a brigade full 5,000 strong, around by water; i had relied very much upon their commander to allow me to come safely up to the outside of their works. i asked general buckner about what force he had to surrender. he replied that he could not tell with any degree of accuracy; that all the sick and weak had been sent to nashville while we were about fort henry; that floyd and pillow had left during the night, taking many men with them; and that forrest, and probably others, had also escaped during the preceding night: the number of casualties he could not tell; but he said i would not find fewer than 12,000, nor more than 15,000. he asked permission to send parties outside of the lines to bury his dead, who had fallen on the 15th when they tried to get out. i gave directions that his permit to pass our limits should be recognized. i have no reason to believe that this privilege was abused, but it familiarized our guards so much with the sight of confederates passing to and fro that i have no doubt many got beyond our pickets unobserved and went on. the most of the men who went in that way no doubt thought they had had war enough, and left with the intention of remaining out of the army. some came to me and asked permission to go, saying that they were tired of the war and would not be caught in the ranks again, and i bade them go. the actual number of confederates at fort donelson can never be given with entire accuracy. the largest number admitted by any writer on the southern side, is by colonel preston johnston. he gives the number at 17,000. but this must be an underestimate. the commissary general of prisoners reported having issued rations to 14,623 fort donelson prisoners at cairo, as they passed that point. general pillow reported the killed and wounded at 2,000; but he had less opportunity of knowing the actual numbers than the officers of mcclernand's division, for most of the killed and wounded fell outside their works, in front of that division, and were buried or cared for by buckner after the surrender and when pillow was a fugitive. it is known that floyd and pillow escaped during the night of the 15th, taking with them not less than 3,000 men. forrest escaped with about 1,000 and others were leaving singly and in squads all night. it is probable that the confederate force at donelson, on the 15th of february, 1862, was 21,000 in round numbers. on the day fort donelson fell i had 27,000 men to confront the confederate lines and guard the road four or five miles to the left, over which all our supplies had to be drawn on wagons. during the 16th, after the surrender, additional reinforcements arrived. during the siege general sherman had been sent to smithland, at the mouth of the cumberland river, to forward reinforcements and supplies to me. at that time he was my senior in rank and there was no authority of law to assign a junior to command a senior of the same grade. but every boat that came up with supplies or reinforcements brought a note of encouragement from sherman, asking me to call upon him for any assistance he could render and saying that if he could be of service at the front i might send for him and he would waive rank. chapter xxiii. promoted major-general of volunteers--unoccupied territory--advance upon nashville--situation of the troops--confederate retreat--relieved of the command--restored to the command--general smith. the news of the fall of fort donelson caused great delight all over the north. at the south, particularly in richmond, the effect was correspondingly depressing. i was promptly promoted to the grade of major-general of volunteers, and confirmed by the senate. all three of my division commanders were promoted to the same grade and the colonels who commanded brigades were made brigadier-generals in the volunteer service. my chief, who was in st. louis, telegraphed his congratulations to general hunter in kansas for the services he had rendered in securing the fall of fort donelson by sending reinforcements so rapidly. to washington he telegraphed that the victory was due to general c. f. smith; "promote him," he said, "and the whole country will applaud." on the 19th there was published at st. louis a formal order thanking flag-officer foote and myself, and the forces under our command, for the victories on the tennessee and the cumberland. i received no other recognition whatever from general halleck. but general cullum, his chief of staff, who was at cairo, wrote me a warm congratulatory letter on his own behalf. i approved of general smith's promotion highly, as i did all the promotions that were made. my opinion was and still is that immediately after the fall of fort donelson the way was opened to the national forces all over the south-west without much resistance. if one general who would have taken the responsibility had been in command of all the troops west of the alleghanies, he could have marched to chattanooga, corinth, memphis and vicksburg with the troops we then had, and as volunteering was going on rapidly over the north there would soon have been force enough at all these centres to operate offensively against any body of the enemy that might be found near them. rapid movements and the acquisition of rebellious territory would have promoted volunteering, so that reinforcements could have been had as fast as transportation could have been obtained to carry them to their destination. on the other hand there were tens of thousands of strong able-bodied young men still at their homes in the south-western states, who had not gone into the confederate army in february, 1862, and who had no particular desire to go. if our lines had been extended to protect their homes, many of them never would have gone. providence ruled differently. time was given the enemy to collect armies and fortify his new positions; and twice afterwards he came near forcing his north-western front up to the ohio river. i promptly informed the department commander of our success at fort donelson and that the way was open now to clarksville and nashville; and that unless i received orders to the contrary i should take clarksville on the 21st and nashville about the 1st of march. both these places are on the cumberland river above fort donelson. as i heard nothing from headquarters on the subject, general c. f. smith was sent to clarksville at the time designated and found the place evacuated. the capture of forts henry and donelson had broken the line the enemy had taken from columbus to bowling green, and it was known that he was falling back from the eastern point of this line and that buell was following, or at least advancing. i should have sent troops to nashville at the time i sent to clarksville, but my transportation was limited and there were many prisoners to be forwarded north. none of the reinforcements from buell's army arrived until the 24th of february. then general nelson came up, with orders to report to me with two brigades, he having sent one brigade to cairo. i knew general buell was advancing on nashville from the north, and i was advised by scouts that the rebels were leaving that place, and trying to get out all the supplies they could. nashville was, at that time, one of the best provisioned posts in the south. i had no use for reinforcements now, and thinking buell would like to have his troops again, i ordered nelson to proceed to nashville without debarking at fort donelson. i sent a gunboat also as a convoy. the cumberland river was very high at the time; the railroad bridge at nashville had been burned, and all river craft had been destroyed, or would be before the enemy left. nashville is on the west bank of the cumberland, and buell was approaching from the east. i thought the steamers carrying nelson's division would be useful in ferrying the balance of buell's forces across. i ordered nelson to put himself in communication with buell as soon as possible, and if he found him more than two days off from nashville to return below the city and await orders. buell, however, had already arrived in person at edgefield, opposite nashville, and mitchell's division of his command reached there the same day. nelson immediately took possession of the city. after nelson had gone and before i had learned of buell's arrival, i sent word to department headquarters that i should go to nashville myself on the 28th if i received no orders to the contrary. hearing nothing, i went as i had informed my superior officer i would do. on arriving at clarksville i saw a fleet of steamers at the shore--the same that had taken nelson's division--and troops going aboard. i landed and called on the commanding officer, general c. f. smith. as soon as he saw me he showed an order he had just received from buell in these words: nashville, february 25, 1862. general c. f. smith, commanding u. s. forces, clarksville. general:--the landing of a portion of our troops, contrary to my intentions, on the south side of the river has compelled me to hold this side at every hazard. if the enemy should assume the offensive, and i am assured by reliable persons that in view of my position such is his intention, my force present is altogether inadequate, consisting of only 15,000 men. i have to request you, therefore, to come forward with all the available force under your command. so important do i consider the occasion that i think it necessary to give this communication all the force of orders, and i send four boats, the diana, woodford, john rain, and autocrat, to bring you up. in five or six days my force will probably be sufficient to relieve you. very respectfully, your ob't srv't, d. c. buell, brigadier-general comd'g. p. s.--the steamers will leave here at 12 o'clock to-night. general smith said this order was nonsense. but i told him it was better to obey it. the general replied, "of course i must obey," and said his men were embarking as fast as they could. i went on up to nashville and inspected the position taken by nelson's troops. i did not see buell during the day, and wrote him a note saying that i had been in nashville since early morning and had hoped to meet him. on my return to the boat we met. his troops were still east of the river, and the steamers that had carried nelson's division up were mostly at clarksville to bring smith's division. i said to general buell my information was that the enemy was retreating as fast as possible. general buell said there was fighting going on then only ten or twelve miles away. i said: "quite probably; nashville contained valuable stores of arms, ammunition and provisions, and the enemy is probably trying to carry away all he can. the fighting is doubtless with the rear-guard who are trying to protect the trains they are getting away with." buell spoke very positively of the danger nashville was in of an attack from the enemy. i said, in the absence of positive information, i believed my information was correct. he responded that he "knew." "well," i said, "i do not know; but as i came by clarksville general smith's troops were embarking to join you." smith's troops were returned the same day. the enemy were trying to get away from nashville and not to return to it. at this time general albert sidney johnston commanded all the confederate troops west of the alleghany mountains, with the exception of those in the extreme south. on the national side the forces confronting him were divided into, at first three, then four separate departments. johnston had greatly the advantage in having supreme command over all troops that could possibly be brought to bear upon one point, while the forces similarly situated on the national side, divided into independent commands, could not be brought into harmonious action except by orders from washington. at the beginning of 1862 johnston's troops east of the mississippi occupied a line extending from columbus, on his left, to mill springs, on his right. as we have seen, columbus, both banks of the tennessee river, the west bank of the cumberland and bowling green, all were strongly fortified. mill springs was intrenched. the national troops occupied no territory south of the ohio, except three small garrisons along its bank and a force thrown out from louisville to confront that at bowling green. johnston's strength was no doubt numerically inferior to that of the national troops; but this was compensated for by the advantage of being sole commander of all the confederate forces at the west, and of operating in a country where his friends would take care of his rear without any detail of soldiers. but when general george h. thomas moved upon the enemy at mill springs and totally routed him, inflicting a loss of some 300 killed and wounded, and forts henry and heiman fell into the hands of the national forces, with their armaments and about 100 prisoners, those losses seemed to dishearten the confederate commander so much that he immediately commenced a retreat from bowling green on nashville. he reached this latter place on the 14th of february, while donelson was still besieged. buell followed with a portion of the army of the ohio, but he had to march and did not reach the east bank of the cumberland opposite nashville until the 24th of the month, and then with only one division of his army. the bridge at nashville had been destroyed and all boats removed or disabled, so that a small garrison could have held the place against any national troops that could have been brought against it within ten days after the arrival of the force from bowling green. johnston seemed to lie quietly at nashville to await the result at fort donelson, on which he had staked the possession of most of the territory embraced in the states of kentucky and tennessee. it is true, the two generals senior in rank at fort donelson were sending him encouraging dispatches, even claiming great confederate victories up to the night of the 16th when they must have been preparing for their individual escape. johnston made a fatal mistake in intrusting so important a command to floyd, who he must have known was no soldier even if he possessed the elements of one. pillow's presence as second was also a mistake. if these officers had been forced upon him and designated for that particular command, then he should have left nashville with a small garrison under a trusty officer, and with the remainder of his force gone to donelson himself. if he had been captured the result could not have been worse than it was. johnston's heart failed him upon the first advance of national troops. he wrote to richmond on the 8th of february, "i think the gunboats of the enemy will probably take fort donelson without the necessity of employing their land force in cooperation." after the fall of that place he abandoned nashville and chattanooga without an effort to save either, and fell back into northern mississippi, where, six weeks later, he was destined to end his career. from the time of leaving cairo i was singularly unfortunate in not receiving dispatches from general halleck. the order of the 10th of february directing me to fortify fort henry strongly, particularly to the land side, and saying that intrenching tools had been sent for that purpose, reached me after donelson was invested. i received nothing direct which indicated that the department commander knew we were in possession of donelson. i was reporting regularly to the chief of staff, who had been sent to cairo, soon after the troops left there, to receive all reports from the front and to telegraph the substance to the st. louis headquarters. cairo was at the southern end of the telegraph wire. another line was started at once from cairo to paducah and smithland, at the mouths of the tennessee and cumberland respectively. my dispatches were all sent to cairo by boat, but many of those addressed to me were sent to the operator at the end of the advancing wire and he failed to forward them. this operator afterwards proved to be a rebel; he deserted his post after a short time and went south taking his dispatches with him. a telegram from general mcclellan to me of february 16th, the day of the surrender, directing me to report in full the situation, was not received at my headquarters until the 3d of march. on the 2d of march i received orders dated march 1st to move my command back to fort henry, leaving only a small garrison at donelson. from fort henry expeditions were to be sent against eastport, mississippi, and paris, tennessee. we started from donelson on the 4th, and the same day i was back on the tennessee river. on march 4th i also received the following dispatch from general halleck: maj.-gen. u. s. grant, fort henry: you will place maj.-gen. c. f. smith in command of expedition, and remain yourself at fort henry. why do you not obey my orders to report strength and positions of your command? h. w. halleck, major-general. i was surprised. this was the first intimation i had received that general halleck had called for information as to the strength of my command. on the 6th he wrote to me again. "your going to nashville without authority, and when your presence with your troops was of the utmost importance, was a matter of very serious complaint at washington, so much so that i was advised to arrest you on your return." this was the first i knew of his objecting to my going to nashville. that place was not beyond the limits of my command, which, it had been expressly declared in orders, were "not defined." nashville is west of the cumberland river, and i had sent troops that had reported to me for duty to occupy the place. i turned over the command as directed and then replied to general halleck courteously, but asked to be relieved from further duty under him. later i learned that general halleck had been calling lustily for more troops, promising that he would do something important if he could only be sufficiently reinforced. mcclellan asked him what force he then had. halleck telegraphed me to supply the information so far as my command was concerned, but i received none of his dispatches. at last halleck reported to washington that he had repeatedly ordered me to give the strength of my force, but could get nothing out of me; that i had gone to nashville, beyond the limits of my command, without his authority, and that my army was more demoralized by victory than the army at bull run had been by defeat. general mcclellan, on this information, ordered that i should be relieved from duty and that an investigation should be made into any charges against me. he even authorized my arrest. thus in less than two weeks after the victory at donelson, the two leading generals in the army were in correspondence as to what disposition should be made of me, and in less than three weeks i was virtually in arrest and without a command. on the 13th of march i was restored to command, and on the 17th halleck sent me a copy of an order from the war department which stated that accounts of my misbehavior had reached washington and directed him to investigate and report the facts. he forwarded also a copy of a detailed dispatch from himself to washington entirely exonerating me; but he did not inform me that it was his own reports that had created all the trouble. on the contrary, he wrote to me, "instead of relieving you, i wish you, as soon as your new army is in the field, to assume immediate command, and lead it to new victories." in consequence i felt very grateful to him, and supposed it was his interposition that had set me right with the government. i never knew the truth until general badeau unearthed the facts in his researches for his history of my campaigns. general halleck unquestionably deemed general c. f. smith a much fitter officer for the command of all the forces in the military district than i was, and, to render him available for such command, desired his promotion to antedate mine and those of the other division commanders. it is probable that the general opinion was that smith's long services in the army and distinguished deeds rendered him the more proper person for such command. indeed i was rather inclined to this opinion myself at that time, and would have served as faithfully under smith as he had done under me. but this did not justify the dispatches which general halleck sent to washington, or his subsequent concealment of them from me when pretending to explain the action of my superiors. on receipt of the order restoring me to command i proceeded to savannah on the tennessee, to which point my troops had advanced. general smith was delighted to see me and was unhesitating in his denunciation of the treatment i had received. he was on a sick bed at the time, from which he never came away alive. his death was a severe loss to our western army. his personal courage was unquestioned, his judgment and professional acquirements were unsurpassed, and he had the confidence of those he commanded as well as of those over him. chapter xxiv. the army at pittsburg landing--injured by a fall--the confederate attack at shiloh--the first day's fight at shiloh--general sherman--condition of the army--close of the first day's fight--the second day's fight --retreat and defeat of the confederates. when i reassumed command on the 17th of march i found the army divided, about half being on the east bank of the tennessee at savannah, while one division was at crump's landing on the west bank about four miles higher up, and the remainder at pittsburg landing, five miles above crump's. the enemy was in force at corinth, the junction of the two most important railroads in the mississippi valley--one connecting memphis and the mississippi river with the east, and the other leading south to all the cotton states. still another railroad connects corinth with jackson, in west tennessee. if we obtained possession of corinth the enemy would have no railroad for the transportation of armies or supplies until that running east from vicksburg was reached. it was the great strategic position at the west between the tennessee and the mississippi rivers and between nashville and vicksburg. i at once put all the troops at savannah in motion for pittsburg landing, knowing that the enemy was fortifying at corinth and collecting an army there under johnston. it was my expectation to march against that army as soon as buell, who had been ordered to reinforce me with the army of the ohio, should arrive; and the west bank of the river was the place to start from. pittsburg is only about twenty miles from corinth, and hamburg landing, four miles further up the river, is a mile or two nearer. i had not been in command long before i selected hamburg as the place to put the army of the ohio when it arrived. the roads from pittsburg and hamburg to corinth converge some eight miles out. this disposition of the troops would have given additional roads to march over when the advance commenced, within supporting distance of each other. before i arrived at savannah, sherman, who had joined the army of the tennessee and been placed in command of a division, had made an expedition on steamers convoyed by gunboats to the neighborhood of eastport, thirty miles south, for the purpose of destroying the railroad east of corinth. the rains had been so heavy for some time before that the low-lands had become impassable swamps. sherman debarked his troops and started out to accomplish the object of the expedition; but the river was rising so rapidly that the back-water up the small tributaries threatened to cut off the possibility of getting back to the boats, and the expedition had to return without reaching the railroad. the guns had to be hauled by hand through the water to get back to the boats. on the 17th of march the army on the tennessee river consisted of five divisions, commanded respectively by generals c. f. smith, mcclernand, l. wallace, hurlbut and sherman. general w. h. l. wallace was temporarily in command of smith's division, general smith, as i have said, being confined to his bed. reinforcements were arriving daily and as they came up they were organized, first into brigades, then into a division, and the command given to general prentiss, who had been ordered to report to me. general buell was on his way from nashville with 40,000 veterans. on the 19th of march he was at columbia, tennessee, eighty-five miles from pittsburg. when all reinforcements should have arrived i expected to take the initiative by marching on corinth, and had no expectation of needing fortifications, though this subject was taken into consideration. mcpherson, my only military engineer, was directed to lay out a line to intrench. he did so, but reported that it would have to be made in rear of the line of encampment as it then ran. the new line, while it would be nearer the river, was yet too far away from the tennessee, or even from the creeks, to be easily supplied with water, and in case of attack these creeks would be in the hands of the enemy. the fact is, i regarded the campaign we were engaged in as an offensive one and had no idea that the enemy would leave strong intrenchments to take the initiative when he knew he would be attacked where he was if he remained. this view, however, did not prevent every precaution being taken and every effort made to keep advised of all movements of the enemy. johnston's cavalry meanwhile had been well out towards our front, and occasional encounters occurred between it and our outposts. on the 1st of april this cavalry became bold and approached our lines, showing that an advance of some kind was contemplated. on the 2d johnston left corinth in force to attack my army. on the 4th his cavalry dashed down and captured a small picket guard of six or seven men, stationed some five miles out from pittsburg on the corinth road. colonel buckland sent relief to the guard at once and soon followed in person with an entire regiment, and general sherman followed buckland taking the remainder of a brigade. the pursuit was kept up for some three miles beyond the point where the picket guard had been captured, and after nightfall sherman returned to camp and reported to me by letter what had occurred. at this time a large body of the enemy was hovering to the west of us, along the line of the mobile and ohio railroad. my apprehension was much greater for the safety of crump's landing than it was for pittsburg. i had no apprehension that the enemy could really capture either place. but i feared it was possible that he might make a rapid dash upon crump's and destroy our transports and stores, most of which were kept at that point, and then retreat before wallace could be reinforced. lew. wallace's position i regarded as so well chosen that he was not removed. at this time i generally spent the day at pittsburg and returned to savannah in the evening. i was intending to remove my headquarters to pittsburg, but buell was expected daily and would come in at savannah. i remained at this point, therefore, a few days longer than i otherwise should have done, in order to meet him on his arrival. the skirmishing in our front, however, had been so continuous from about the 3d of april that i did not leave pittsburg each night until an hour when i felt there would be no further danger before the morning. on friday the 4th, the day of buckland's advance, i was very much injured by my horse falling with me, and on me, while i was trying to get to the front where firing had been heard. the night was one of impenetrable darkness, with rain pouring down in torrents; nothing was visible to the eye except as revealed by the frequent flashes of lightning. under these circumstances i had to trust to the horse, without guidance, to keep the road. i had not gone far, however, when i met general w. h. l. wallace and colonel (afterwards general) mcpherson coming from the direction of the front. they said all was quiet so far as the enemy was concerned. on the way back to the boat my horse's feet slipped from under him, and he fell with my leg under his body. the extreme softness of the ground, from the excessive rains of the few preceding days, no doubt saved me from a severe injury and protracted lameness. as it was, my ankle was very much injured, so much so that my boot had to be cut off. for two or three days after i was unable to walk except with crutches. on the 5th general nelson, with a division of buell's army, arrived at savannah and i ordered him to move up the east bank of the river, to be in a position where he could be ferried over to crump's landing or pittsburg as occasion required. i had learned that general buell himself would be at savannah the next day, and desired to meet me on his arrival. affairs at pittsburg landing had been such for several days that i did not want to be away during the day. i determined, therefore, to take a very early breakfast and ride out to meet buell, and thus save time. he had arrived on the evening of the 5th, but had not advised me of the fact and i was not aware of it until some time after. while i was at breakfast, however, heavy firing was heard in the direction of pittsburg landing, and i hastened there, sending a hurried note to buell informing him of the reason why i could not meet him at savannah. on the way up the river i directed the dispatch-boat to run in close to crump's landing, so that i could communicate with general lew. wallace. i found him waiting on a boat apparently expecting to see me, and i directed him to get his troops in line ready to execute any orders he might receive. he replied that his troops were already under arms and prepared to move. up to that time i had felt by no means certain that crump's landing might not be the point of attack. on reaching the front, however, about eight a.m., i found that the attack on pittsburg was unmistakable, and that nothing more than a small guard, to protect our transports and stores, was needed at crump's. captain baxter, a quartermaster on my staff, was accordingly directed to go back and order general wallace to march immediately to pittsburg by the road nearest the river. captain baxter made a memorandum of this order. about one p.m., not hearing from wallace and being much in need of reinforcements, i sent two more of my staff, colonel mcpherson and captain rowley, to bring him up with his division. they reported finding him marching towards purdy, bethel, or some point west from the river, and farther from pittsburg by several miles than when he started. the road from his first position to pittsburg landing was direct and near the river. between the two points a bridge had been built across snake creek by our troops, at which wallace's command had assisted, expressly to enable the troops at the two places to support each other in case of need. wallace did not arrive in time to take part in the first day's fight. general wallace has since claimed that the order delivered to him by captain baxter was simply to join the right of the army, and that the road over which he marched would have taken him to the road from pittsburg to purdy where it crosses owl creek on the right of sherman; but this is not where i had ordered him nor where i wanted him to go. i never could see and do not now see why any order was necessary further than to direct him to come to pittsburg landing, without specifying by what route. his was one of three veteran divisions that had been in battle, and its absence was severely felt. later in the war general wallace would not have made the mistake that he committed on the 6th of april, 1862. i presume his idea was that by taking the route he did he would be able to come around on the flank or rear of the enemy, and thus perform an act of heroism that would redound to the credit of his command, as well as to the benefit of his country. some two or three miles from pittsburg landing was a log meeting-house called shiloh. it stood on the ridge which divides the waters of snake and lick creeks, the former emptying into the tennessee just north of pittsburg landing, and the latter south. this point was the key to our position and was held by sherman. his division was at that time wholly raw, no part of it ever having been in an engagement; but i thought this deficiency was more than made up by the superiority of the commander. mcclernand was on sherman's left, with troops that had been engaged at forts henry and donelson and were therefore veterans so far as western troops had become such at that stage of the war. next to mcclernand came prentiss with a raw division, and on the extreme left, stuart with one brigade of sherman's division. hurlbut was in rear of prentiss, massed, and in reserve at the time of the onset. the division of general c. f. smith was on the right, also in reserve. general smith was still sick in bed at savannah, but within hearing of our guns. his services would no doubt have been of inestimable value had his health permitted his presence. the command of his division devolved upon brigadier-general w. h. l. wallace, a most estimable and able officer; a veteran too, for he had served a year in the mexican war and had been with his command at henry and donelson. wallace was mortally wounded in the first day's engagement, and with the change of commanders thus necessarily effected in the heat of battle the efficiency of his division was much weakened. the position of our troops made a continuous line from lick creek on the left to owl creek, a branch of snake creek, on the right, facing nearly south and possibly a little west. the water in all these streams was very high at the time and contributed to protect our flanks. the enemy was compelled, therefore, to attack directly in front. this he did with great vigor, inflicting heavy losses on the national side, but suffering much heavier on his own. the confederate assaults were made with such a disregard of losses on their own side that our line of tents soon fell into their hands. the ground on which the battle was fought was undulating, heavily timbered with scattered clearings, the woods giving some protection to the troops on both sides. there was also considerable underbrush. a number of attempts were made by the enemy to turn our right flank, where sherman was posted, but every effort was repulsed with heavy loss. but the front attack was kept up so vigorously that, to prevent the success of these attempts to get on our flanks, the national troops were compelled, several times, to take positions to the rear nearer pittsburg landing. when the firing ceased at night the national line was all of a mile in rear of the position it had occupied in the morning. in one of the backward moves, on the 6th, the division commanded by general prentiss did not fall back with the others. this left his flanks exposed and enabled the enemy to capture him with about 2,200 of his officers and men. general badeau gives four o'clock of the 6th as about the time this capture took place. he may be right as to the time, but my recollection is that the hour was later. general prentiss himself gave the hour as half-past five. i was with him, as i was with each of the division commanders that day, several times, and my recollection is that the last time i was with him was about half-past four, when his division was standing up firmly and the general was as cool as if expecting victory. but no matter whether it was four or later, the story that he and his command were surprised and captured in their camps is without any foundation whatever. if it had been true, as currently reported at the time and yet believed by thousands of people, that prentiss and his division had been captured in their beds, there would not have been an all-day struggle, with the loss of thousands killed and wounded on the confederate side. with the single exception of a few minutes after the capture of prentiss, a continuous and unbroken line was maintained all day from snake creek or its tributaries on the right to lick creek or the tennessee on the left above pittsburg. there was no hour during the day when there was not heavy firing and generally hard fighting at some point on the line, but seldom at all points at the same time. it was a case of southern dash against northern pluck and endurance. three of the five divisions engaged on sunday were entirely raw, and many of the men had only received their arms on the way from their states to the field. many of them had arrived but a day or two before and were hardly able to load their muskets according to the manual. their officers were equally ignorant of their duties. under these circumstances it is not astonishing that many of the regiments broke at the first fire. in two cases, as i now remember, colonels led their regiments from the field on first hearing the whistle of the enemy's bullets. in these cases the colonels were constitutional cowards, unfit for any military position; but not so the officers and men led out of danger by them. better troops never went upon a battle-field than many of these, officers and men, afterwards proved themselves to be, who fled panic stricken at the first whistle of bullets and shell at shiloh. during the whole of sunday i was continuously engaged in passing from one part of the field to another, giving directions to division commanders. in thus moving along the line, however, i never deemed it important to stay long with sherman. although his troops were then under fire for the first time, their commander, by his constant presence with them, inspired a confidence in officers and men that enabled them to render services on that bloody battle-field worthy of the best of veterans. mcclernand was next to sherman, and the hardest fighting was in front of these two divisions. mcclernand told me on that day, the 6th, that he profited much by having so able a commander supporting him. a casualty to sherman that would have taken him from the field that day would have been a sad one for the troops engaged at shiloh. and how near we came to this! on the 6th sherman was shot twice, once in the hand, once in the shoulder, the ball cutting his coat and making a slight wound, and a third ball passed through his hat. in addition to this he had several horses shot during the day. the nature of this battle was such that cavalry could not be used in front; i therefore formed ours into line in rear, to stop stragglers--of whom there were many. when there would be enough of them to make a show, and after they had recovered from their fright, they would be sent to reinforce some part of the line which needed support, without regard to their companies, regiments or brigades. on one occasion during the day i rode back as far as the river and met general buell, who had just arrived; i do not remember the hour, but at that time there probably were as many as four or five thousand stragglers lying under cover of the river bluff, panic-stricken, most of whom would have been shot where they lay, without resistance, before they would have taken muskets and marched to the front to protect themselves. this meeting between general buell and myself was on the dispatch-boat used to run between the landing and savannah. it was brief, and related specially to his getting his troops over the river. as we left the boat together, buell's attention was attracted by the men lying under cover of the river bank. i saw him berating them and trying to shame them into joining their regiments. he even threatened them with shells from the gunboats near by. but it was all to no effect. most of these men afterward proved themselves as gallant as any of those who saved the battle from which they had deserted. i have no doubt that this sight impressed general buell with the idea that a line of retreat would be a good thing just then. if he had come in by the front instead of through the stragglers in the rear, he would have thought and felt differently. could he have come through the confederate rear, he would have witnessed there a scene similar to that at our own. the distant rear of an army engaged in battle is not the best place from which to judge correctly what is going on in front. later in the war, while occupying the country between the tennessee and the mississippi, i learned that the panic in the confederate lines had not differed much from that within our own. some of the country people estimated the stragglers from johnston's army as high as 20,000. of course this was an exaggeration. the situation at the close of sunday was as follows: along the top of the bluff just south of the log-house which stood at pittsburg landing, colonel j. d. webster, of my staff, had arranged twenty or more pieces of artillery facing south or up the river. this line of artillery was on the crest of a hill overlooking a deep ravine opening into the tennessee. hurlbut with his division intact was on the right of this artillery, extending west and possibly a little north. mcclernand came next in the general line, looking more to the west. his division was complete in its organization and ready for any duty. sherman came next, his right extending to snake creek. his command, like the other two, was complete in its organization and ready, like its chief, for any service it might be called upon to render. all three divisions were, as a matter of course, more or less shattered and depleted in numbers from the terrible battle of the day. the division of w. h. l. wallace, as much from the disorder arising from changes of division and brigade commanders, under heavy fire, as from any other cause, had lost its organization and did not occupy a place in the line as a division. prentiss' command was gone as a division, many of its members having been killed, wounded or captured, but it had rendered valiant services before its final dispersal, and had contributed a good share to the defence of shiloh. the right of my line rested near the bank of snake creek, a short distance above the bridge which had been built by the troops for the purpose of connecting crump's landing and pittsburg landing. sherman had posted some troops in a log-house and out-buildings which overlooked both the bridge over which wallace was expected and the creek above that point. in this last position sherman was frequently attacked before night, but held the point until he voluntarily abandoned it to advance in order to make room for lew. wallace, who came up after dark. there was, as i have said, a deep ravine in front of our left. the tennessee river was very high and there was water to a considerable depth in the ravine. here the enemy made a last desperate effort to turn our flank, but was repelled. the gunboats tyler and lexington, gwin and shirk commanding, with the artillery under webster, aided the army and effectually checked their further progress. before any of buell's troops had reached the west bank of the tennessee, firing had almost entirely ceased; anything like an attempt on the part of the enemy to advance had absolutely ceased. there was some artillery firing from an unseen enemy, some of his shells passing beyond us; but i do not remember that there was the whistle of a single musket-ball heard. as his troops arrived in the dusk general buell marched several of his regiments part way down the face of the hill where they fired briskly for some minutes, but i do not think a single man engaged in this firing received an injury. the attack had spent its force. general lew. wallace, with 5,000 effective men, arrived after firing had ceased for the day, and was placed on the right. thus night came, wallace came, and the advance of nelson's division came; but none --unless night--in time to be of material service to the gallant men who saved shiloh on that first day against large odds. buell's loss on the 6th of april was two men killed and one wounded, all members of the 36th indiana infantry. the army of the tennessee lost on that day at least 7,000 men. the presence of two or three regiments of buell's army on the west bank before firing ceased had not the slightest effect in preventing the capture of pittsburg landing. so confident was i before firing had ceased on the 6th that the next day would bring victory to our arms if we could only take the initiative, that i visited each division commander in person before any reinforcements had reached the field. i directed them to throw out heavy lines of skirmishers in the morning as soon as they could see, and push them forward until they found the enemy, following with their entire divisions in supporting distance, and to engage the enemy as soon as found. to sherman i told the story of the assault at fort donelson, and said that the same tactics would win at shiloh. victory was assured when wallace arrived, even if there had been no other support. i was glad, however, to see the reinforcements of buell and credit them with doing all there was for them to do. during the night of the 6th the remainder of nelson's division, buell's army crossed the river and were ready to advance in the morning, forming the left wing. two other divisions, crittenden's and mccook's, came up the river from savannah in the transports and were on the west bank early on the 7th. buell commanded them in person. my command was thus nearly doubled in numbers and efficiency. during the night rain fell in torrents and our troops were exposed to the storm without shelter. i made my headquarters under a tree a few hundred yards back from the river bank. my ankle was so much swollen from the fall of my horse the friday night preceding, and the bruise was so painful, that i could get no rest. the drenching rain would have precluded the possibility of sleep without this additional cause. some time after midnight, growing restive under the storm and the continuous pain, i moved back to the log-house under the bank. this had been taken as a hospital, and all night wounded men were being brought in, their wounds dressed, a leg or an arm amputated as the case might require, and everything being done to save life or alleviate suffering. the sight was more unendurable than encountering the enemy's fire, and i returned to my tree in the rain. the advance on the morning of the 7th developed the enemy in the camps occupied by our troops before the battle began, more than a mile back from the most advanced position of the confederates on the day before. it is known now that they had not yet learned of the arrival of buell's command. possibly they fell back so far to get the shelter of our tents during the rain, and also to get away from the shells that were dropped upon them by the gunboats every fifteen minutes during the night. the position of the union troops on the morning of the 7th was as follows: general lew. wallace on the right; sherman on his left; then mcclernand and then hurlbut. nelson, of buell's army, was on our extreme left, next to the river. crittenden was next in line after nelson and on his right, mccook followed and formed the extreme right of buell's command. my old command thus formed the right wing, while the troops directly under buell constituted the left wing of the army. these relative positions were retained during the entire day, or until the enemy was driven from the field. in a very short time the battle became general all along the line. this day everything was favorable to the union side. we had now become the attacking party. the enemy was driven back all day, as we had been the day before, until finally he beat a precipitate retreat. the last point held by him was near the road leading from the landing to corinth, on the left of sherman and right of mcclernand. about three o'clock, being near that point and seeing that the enemy was giving way everywhere else, i gathered up a couple of regiments, or parts of regiments, from troops near by, formed them in line of battle and marched them forward, going in front myself to prevent premature or long-range firing. at this point there was a clearing between us and the enemy favorable for charging, although exposed. i knew the enemy were ready to break and only wanted a little encouragement from us to go quickly and join their friends who had started earlier. after marching to within musket-range i stopped and let the troops pass. the command, charge, was given, and was executed with loud cheers and with a run; when the last of the enemy broke. (*7) chapter xxv. struck by a bullet--precipitate retreat of the confederates --intrenchments at shiloh--general buell--general johnston--remarks on shiloh. during this second day of the battle i had been moving from right to left and back, to see for myself the progress made. in the early part of the afternoon, while riding with colonel mcpherson and major hawkins, then my chief commissary, we got beyond the left of our troops. we were moving along the northern edge of a clearing, very leisurely, toward the river above the landing. there did not appear to be an enemy to our right, until suddenly a battery with musketry opened upon us from the edge of the woods on the other side of the clearing. the shells and balls whistled about our ears very fast for about a minute. i do not think it took us longer than that to get out of range and out of sight. in the sudden start we made, major hawkins lost his hat. he did not stop to pick it up. when we arrived at a perfectly safe position we halted to take an account of damages. mcpherson's horse was panting as if ready to drop. on examination it was found that a ball had struck him forward of the flank just back of the saddle, and had gone entirely through. in a few minutes the poor beast dropped dead; he had given no sign of injury until we came to a stop. a ball had struck the metal scabbard of my sword, just below the hilt, and broken it nearly off; before the battle was over it had broken off entirely. there were three of us: one had lost a horse, killed; one a hat and one a sword-scabbard. all were thankful that it was no worse. after the rain of the night before and the frequent and heavy rains for some days previous, the roads were almost impassable. the enemy carrying his artillery and supply trains over them in his retreat, made them still worse for troops following. i wanted to pursue, but had not the heart to order the men who had fought desperately for two days, lying in the mud and rain whenever not fighting, and i did (*8) not feel disposed to positively order buell, or any part of his command, to pursue. although the senior in rank at the time i had been so only a few weeks. buell was, and had been for some time past, a department commander, while i commanded only a district. i did not meet buell in person until too late to get troops ready and pursue with effect; but had i seen him at the moment of the last charge i should have at least requested him to follow. i rode forward several miles the day after the battle, and found that the enemy had dropped much, if not all, of their provisions, some ammunition and the extra wheels of their caissons, lightening their loads to enable them to get off their guns. about five miles out we found their field hospital abandoned. an immediate pursuit must have resulted in the capture of a considerable number of prisoners and probably some guns. shiloh was the severest battle fought at the west during the war, and but few in the east equalled it for hard, determined fighting. i saw an open field, in our possession on the second day, over which the confederates had made repeated charges the day before, so covered with dead that it would have been possible to walk across the clearing, in any direction, stepping on dead bodies, without a foot touching the ground. on our side national and confederate troops were mingled together in about equal proportions; but on the remainder of the field nearly all were confederates. on one part, which had evidently not been ploughed for several years, probably because the land was poor, bushes had grown up, some to the height of eight or ten feet. there was not one of these left standing unpierced by bullets. the smaller ones were all cut down. contrary to all my experience up to that time, and to the experience of the army i was then commanding, we were on the defensive. we were without intrenchments or defensive advantages of any sort, and more than half the army engaged the first day was without experience or even drill as soldiers. the officers with them, except the division commanders and possibly two or three of the brigade commanders, were equally inexperienced in war. the result was a union victory that gave the men who achieved it great confidence in themselves ever after. the enemy fought bravely, but they had started out to defeat and destroy an army and capture a position. they failed in both, with very heavy loss in killed and wounded, and must have gone back discouraged and convinced that the "yankee" was not an enemy to be despised. after the battle i gave verbal instructions to division commanders to let the regiments send out parties to bury their own dead, and to detail parties, under commissioned officers from each division, to bury the confederate dead in their respective fronts and to report the numbers so buried. the latter part of these instructions was not carried out by all; but they were by those sent from sherman's division, and by some of the parties sent out by mcclernand. the heaviest loss sustained by the enemy was in front of these two divisions. the criticism has often been made that the union troops should have been intrenched at shiloh. up to that time the pick and spade had been but little resorted to at the west. i had, however, taken this subject under consideration soon after re-assuming command in the field, and, as already stated, my only military engineer reported unfavorably. besides this, the troops with me, officers and men, needed discipline and drill more than they did experience with the pick, shovel and axe. reinforcements were arriving almost daily, composed of troops that had been hastily thrown together into companies and regiments--fragments of incomplete organizations, the men and officers strangers to each other. under all these circumstances i concluded that drill and discipline were worth more to our men than fortifications. general buell was a brave, intelligent officer, with as much professional pride and ambition of a commendable sort as i ever knew. i had been two years at west point with him, and had served with him afterwards, in garrison and in the mexican war, several years more. he was not given in early life or in mature years to forming intimate acquaintances. he was studious by habit, and commanded the confidence and respect of all who knew him. he was a strict disciplinarian, and perhaps did not distinguish sufficiently between the volunteer who "enlisted for the war" and the soldier who serves in time of peace. one system embraced men who risked life for a principle, and often men of social standing, competence, or wealth and independence of character. the other includes, as a rule, only men who could not do as well in any other occupation. general buell became an object of harsh criticism later, some going so far as to challenge his loyalty. no one who knew him ever believed him capable of a dishonorable act, and nothing could be more dishonorable than to accept high rank and command in war and then betray the trust. when i came into command of the army in 1864, i requested the secretary of war to restore general buell to duty. after the war, during the summer of 1865, i travelled considerably through the north, and was everywhere met by large numbers of people. every one had his opinion about the manner in which the war had been conducted: who among the generals had failed, how, and why. correspondents of the press were ever on hand to hear every word dropped, and were not always disposed to report correctly what did not confirm their preconceived notions, either about the conduct of the war or the individuals concerned in it. the opportunity frequently occurred for me to defend general buell against what i believed to be most unjust charges. on one occasion a correspondent put in my mouth the very charge i had so often refuted--of disloyalty. this brought from general buell a very severe retort, which i saw in the new york world some time before i received the letter itself. i could very well understand his grievance at seeing untrue and disgraceful charges apparently sustained by an officer who, at the time, was at the head of the army. i replied to him, but not through the press. i kept no copy of my letter, nor did i ever see it in print; neither did i receive an answer. general albert sidney johnston, who commanded the confederate forces at the beginning of the battle, was disabled by a wound on the afternoon of the first day. this wound, as i understood afterwards, was not necessarily fatal, or even dangerous. but he was a man who would not abandon what he deemed an important trust in the face of danger and consequently continued in the saddle, commanding, until so exhausted by the loss of blood that he had to be taken from his horse, and soon after died. the news was not long in reaching our side and i suppose was quite an encouragement to the national soldiers. i had known johnston slightly in the mexican war and later as an officer in the regular army. he was a man of high character and ability. his contemporaries at west point, and officers generally who came to know him personally later and who remained on our side, expected him to prove the most formidable man to meet that the confederacy would produce. i once wrote that nothing occurred in his brief command of an army to prove or disprove the high estimate that had been placed upon his military ability; but after studying the orders and dispatches of johnston i am compelled to materially modify my views of that officer's qualifications as a soldier. my judgment now is that he was vacillating and undecided in his actions. all the disasters in kentucky and tennessee were so discouraging to the authorities in richmond that jefferson davis wrote an unofficial letter to johnston expressing his own anxiety and that of the public, and saying that he had made such defence as was dictated by long friendship, but that in the absence of a report he needed facts. the letter was not a reprimand in direct terms, but it was evidently as much felt as though it had been one. general johnston raised another army as rapidly as he could, and fortified or strongly intrenched at corinth. he knew the national troops were preparing to attack him in his chosen position. but he had evidently become so disturbed at the results of his operations that he resolved to strike out in an offensive campaign which would restore all that was lost, and if successful accomplish still more. we have the authority of his son and biographer for saying that his plan was to attack the forces at shiloh and crush them; then to cross the tennessee and destroy the army of buell, and push the war across the ohio river. the design was a bold one; but we have the same authority for saying that in the execution johnston showed vacillation and indecision. he left corinth on the 2d of april and was not ready to attack until the 6th. the distance his army had to march was less than twenty miles. beauregard, his second in command, was opposed to the attack for two reasons: first, he thought, if let alone the national troops would attack the confederates in their intrenchments; second, we were in ground of our own choosing and would necessarily be intrenched. johnston not only listened to the objection of beauregard to an attack, but held a council of war on the subject on the morning of the 5th. on the evening of the same day he was in consultation with some of his generals on the same subject, and still again on the morning of the 6th. during this last consultation, and before a decision had been reached, the battle began by the national troops opening fire on the enemy. this seemed to settle the question as to whether there was to be any battle of shiloh. it also seems to me to settle the question as to whether there was a surprise. i do not question the personal courage of general johnston, or his ability. but he did not win the distinction predicted for him by many of his friends. he did prove that as a general he was over-estimated. general beauregard was next in rank to johnston and succeeded to the command, which he retained to the close of the battle and during the subsequent retreat on corinth, as well as in the siege of that place. his tactics have been severely criticised by confederate writers, but i do not believe his fallen chief could have done any better under the circumstances. some of these critics claim that shiloh was won when johnston fell, and that if he had not fallen the army under me would have been annihilated or captured. ifs defeated the confederates at shiloh. there is little doubt that we would have been disgracefully beaten if all the shells and bullets fired by us had passed harmlessly over the enemy and if all of theirs had taken effect. commanding generals are liable to be killed during engagements; and the fact that when he was shot johnston was leading a brigade to induce it to make a charge which had been repeatedly ordered, is evidence that there was neither the universal demoralization on our side nor the unbounded confidence on theirs which has been claimed. there was, in fact, no hour during the day when i doubted the eventual defeat of the enemy, although i was disappointed that reinforcements so near at hand did not arrive at an earlier hour. the description of the battle of shiloh given by colonel wm. preston johnston is very graphic and well told. the reader will imagine that he can see each blow struck, a demoralized and broken mob of union soldiers, each blow sending the enemy more demoralized than ever towards the tennessee river, which was a little more than two miles away at the beginning of the onset. if the reader does not stop to inquire why, with such confederate success for more than twelve hours of hard fighting, the national troops were not all killed, captured or driven into the river, he will regard the pen picture as perfect. but i witnessed the fight from the national side from eight o'clock in the morning until night closed the contest. i see but little in the description that i can recognize. the confederate troops fought well and deserve commendation enough for their bravery and endurance on the 6th of april, without detracting from their antagonists or claiming anything more than their just dues. the reports of the enemy show that their condition at the end of the first day was deplorable; their losses in killed and wounded had been very heavy, and their stragglers had been quite as numerous as on the national side, with the difference that those of the enemy left the field entirely and were not brought back to their respective commands for many days. on the union side but few of the stragglers fell back further than the landing on the river, and many of these were in line for duty on the second day. the admissions of the highest confederate officers engaged at shiloh make the claim of a victory for them absurd. the victory was not to either party until the battle was over. it was then a union victory, in which the armies of the tennessee and the ohio both participated. but the army of the tennessee fought the entire rebel army on the 6th and held it at bay until near night; and night alone closed the conflict and not the three regiments of nelson's division. the confederates fought with courage at shiloh, but the particular skill claimed i could not and still cannot see; though there is nothing to criticise except the claims put forward for it since. but the confederate claimants for superiority in strategy, superiority in generalship and superiority in dash and prowess are not so unjust to the union troops engaged at shiloh as are many northern writers. the troops on both sides were american, and united they need not fear any foreign foe. it is possible that the southern man started in with a little more dash than his northern brother; but he was correspondingly less enduring. the endeavor of the enemy on the first day was simply to hurl their men against ours--first at one point, then at another, sometimes at several points at once. this they did with daring and energy, until at night the rebel troops were worn out. our effort during the same time was to be prepared to resist assaults wherever made. the object of the confederates on the second day was to get away with as much of their army and material as possible. ours then was to drive them from our front, and to capture or destroy as great a part as possible of their men and material. we were successful in driving them back, but not so successful in captures as if farther pursuit could have been made. as it was, we captured or recaptured on the second day about as much artillery as we lost on the first; and, leaving out the one great capture of prentiss, we took more prisoners on monday than the enemy gained from us on sunday. on the 6th sherman lost seven pieces of artillery, mcclernand six, prentiss eight, and hurlbut two batteries. on the 7th sherman captured seven guns, mcclernand three and the army of the ohio twenty. at shiloh the effective strength of the union forces on the morning of the 6th was 33,000 men. lew. wallace brought 5,000 more after nightfall. beauregard reported the enemy's strength at 40,955. according to the custom of enumeration in the south, this number probably excluded every man enlisted as musician or detailed as guard or nurse, and all commissioned officers--everybody who did not carry a musket or serve a cannon. with us everybody in the field receiving pay from the government is counted. excluding the troops who fled, panic-stricken, before they had fired a shot, there was not a time during the 6th when we had more than 25,000 men in line. on the 7th buell brought 20,000 more. of his remaining two divisions, thomas's did not reach the field during the engagement; wood's arrived before firing had ceased, but not in time to be of much service. our loss in the two days' fight was 1,754 killed, 8,408 wounded and 2,885 missing. of these, 2,103 were in the army of the ohio. beauregard reported a total loss of 10,699, of whom 1,728 were killed, 8,012 wounded and 957 missing. this estimate must be incorrect. we buried, by actual count, more of the enemy's dead in front of the divisions of mcclernand and sherman alone than here reported, and 4,000 was the estimate of the burial parties of the whole field. beauregard reports the confederate force on the 6th at over 40,000, and their total loss during the two days at 10,699; and at the same time declares that he could put only 20,000 men in battle on the morning of the 7th. the navy gave a hearty support to the army at shiloh, as indeed it always did both before and subsequently when i was in command. the nature of the ground was such, however, that on this occasion it could do nothing in aid of the troops until sundown on the first day. the country was broken and heavily timbered, cutting off all view of the battle from the river, so that friends would be as much in danger from fire from the gunboats as the foe. but about sundown, when the national troops were back in their last position, the right of the enemy was near the river and exposed to the fire of the two gun-boats, which was delivered with vigor and effect. after nightfall, when firing had entirely ceased on land, the commander of the fleet informed himself, approximately, of the position of our troops and suggested the idea of dropping a shell within the lines of the enemy every fifteen minutes during the night. this was done with effect, as is proved by the confederate reports. up to the battle of shiloh i, as well as thousands of other citizens, believed that the rebellion against the government would collapse suddenly and soon, if a decisive victory could be gained over any of its armies. donelson and henry were such victories. an army of more than 21,000 men was captured or destroyed. bowling green, columbus and hickman, kentucky, fell in consequence, and clarksville and nashville, tennessee, the last two with an immense amount of stores, also fell into our hands. the tennessee and cumberland rivers, from their mouths to the head of navigation, were secured. but when confederate armies were collected which not only attempted to hold a line farther south, from memphis to chattanooga, knoxville and on to the atlantic, but assumed the offensive and made such a gallant effort to regain what had been lost, then, indeed, i gave up all idea of saving the union except by complete conquest. up to that time it had been the policy of our army, certainly of that portion commanded by me, to protect the property of the citizens whose territory was invaded, without regard to their sentiments, whether union or secession. after this, however, i regarded it as humane to both sides to protect the persons of those found at their homes, but to consume everything that could be used to support or supply armies. protection was still continued over such supplies as were within lines held by us and which we expected to continue to hold; but such supplies within the reach of confederate armies i regarded as much contraband as arms or ordnance stores. their destruction was accomplished without bloodshed and tended to the same result as the destruction of armies. i continued this policy to the close of the war. promiscuous pillaging, however, was discouraged and punished. instructions were always given to take provisions and forage under the direction of commissioned officers who should give receipts to owners, if at home, and turn the property over to officers of the quartermaster or commissary departments to be issued as if furnished from our northern depots. but much was destroyed without receipts to owners, when it could not be brought within our lines and would otherwise have gone to the support of secession and rebellion. this policy i believe exercised a material influence in hastening the end. the battle of shiloh, or pittsburg landing, has been perhaps less understood, or, to state the case more accurately, more persistently misunderstood, than any other engagement between national and confederate troops during the entire rebellion. correct reports of the battle have been published, notably by sherman, badeau and, in a speech before a meeting of veterans, by general prentiss; but all of these appeared long subsequent to the close of the rebellion and after public opinion had been most erroneously formed. i myself made no report to general halleck, further than was contained in a letter, written immediately after the battle informing him that an engagement had been fought and announcing the result. a few days afterwards general halleck moved his headquarters to pittsburg landing and assumed command of the troops in the field. although next to him in rank, and nominally in command of my old district and army, i was ignored as much as if i had been at the most distant point of territory within my jurisdiction; and although i was in command of all the troops engaged at shiloh i was not permitted to see one of the reports of general buell or his subordinates in that battle, until they were published by the war department long after the event. for this reason i never made a full official report of this engagement. chapter xxvi. halleck assumes command in the field--the advance upon corinth --occupation of corinth--the army separated. general halleck arrived at pittsburg landing on the 11th of april and immediately assumed command in the field. on the 21st general pope arrived with an army 30,000 strong, fresh from the capture of island number ten in the mississippi river. he went into camp at hamburg landing five miles above pittsburg. halleck had now three armies: the army of the ohio, buell commanding; the army of the mississippi, pope commanding; and the army of the tennessee. his orders divided the combined force into the right wing, reserve, centre and left wing. major-general george h. thomas, who had been in buell's army, was transferred with his division to the army of the tennessee and given command of the right wing, composed of all of that army except mcclernand's and lew. wallace's divisions. mcclernand was assigned to the command of the reserve, composed of his own and lew. wallace's divisions. buell commanded the centre, the army of the ohio; and pope the left wing, the army of the mississippi. i was named second in command of the whole, and was also supposed to be in command of the right wing and reserve. orders were given to all the commanders engaged at shiloh to send in their reports without delay to department headquarters. those from officers of the army of the tennessee were sent through me; but from the army of the ohio they were sent by general buell without passing through my hands. general halleck ordered me, verbally, to send in my report, but i positively declined on the ground that he had received the reports of a part of the army engaged at shiloh without their coming through me. he admitted that my refusal was justifiable under the circumstances, but explained that he had wanted to get the reports off before moving the command, and as fast as a report had come to him he had forwarded it to washington. preparations were at once made upon the arrival of the new commander for an advance on corinth. owl creek, on our right, was bridged, and expeditions were sent to the north-west and west to ascertain if our position was being threatened from those quarters; the roads towards corinth were corduroyed and new ones made; lateral roads were also constructed, so that in case of necessity troops marching by different routes could reinforce each other. all commanders were cautioned against bringing on an engagement and informed in so many words that it would be better to retreat than to fight. by the 30th of april all preparations were complete; the country west to the mobile and ohio railroad had been reconnoitred, as well as the road to corinth as far as monterey twelve miles from pittsburg. everywhere small bodies of the enemy had been encountered, but they were observers and not in force to fight battles. corinth, mississippi, lies in a south-westerly direction from pittsburg landing and about nineteen miles away as the bird would fly, but probably twenty-two by the nearest wagon-road. it is about four miles south of the line dividing the states of tennessee and mississippi, and at the junction of the mississippi and chattanooga railroad with the mobile and ohio road which runs from columbus to mobile. from pittsburg to corinth the land is rolling, but at no point reaching an elevation that makes high hills to pass over. in 1862 the greater part of the country was covered with forest with intervening clearings and houses. underbrush was dense in the low grounds along the creeks and ravines, but generally not so thick on the high land as to prevent men passing through with ease. there are two small creeks running from north of the town and connecting some four miles south, where they form bridge creek which empties into the tuscumbia river. corinth is on the ridge between these streams and is a naturally strong defensive position. the creeks are insignificant in volume of water, but the stream to the east widens out in front of the town into a swamp impassable in the presence of an enemy. on the crest of the west bank of this stream the enemy was strongly intrenched. corinth was a valuable strategic point for the enemy to hold, and consequently a valuable one for us to possess ourselves of. we ought to have seized it immediately after the fall of donelson and nashville, when it could have been taken without a battle, but failing then it should have been taken, without delay on the concentration of troops at pittsburg landing after the battle of shiloh. in fact the arrival of pope should not have been awaited. there was no time from the battle of shiloh up to the evacuation of corinth when the enemy would not have left if pushed. the demoralization among the confederates from their defeats at henry and donelson; their long marches from bowling green, columbus, and nashville, and their failure at shiloh; in fact from having been driven out of kentucky and tennessee, was so great that a stand for the time would have been impossible. beauregard made strenuous efforts to reinforce himself and partially succeeded. he appealed to the people of the south-west for new regiments, and received a few. a. s. johnston had made efforts to reinforce in the same quarter, before the battle of shiloh, but in a different way. he had negroes sent out to him to take the place of teamsters, company cooks and laborers in every capacity, so as to put all his white men into the ranks. the people, while willing to send their sons to the field, were not willing to part with their negroes. it is only fair to state that they probably wanted their blacks to raise supplies for the army and for the families left at home. beauregard, however, was reinforced by van dorn immediately after shiloh with 17,000 men. interior points, less exposed, were also depleted to add to the strength at corinth. with these reinforcements and the new regiments, beauregard had, during the month of may, 1862, a large force on paper, but probably not much over 50,000 effective men. we estimated his strength at 70,000. our own was, in round numbers, 120,000. the defensible nature of the ground at corinth, and the fortifications, made 50,000 then enough to maintain their position against double that number for an indefinite time but for the demoralization spoken of. on the 30th of april the grand army commenced its advance from shiloh upon corinth. the movement was a siege from the start to the close. the national troops were always behind intrenchments, except of course the small reconnoitring parties sent to the front to clear the way for an advance. even the commanders of these parties were cautioned, "not to bring on an engagement." "it is better to retreat than to fight." the enemy were constantly watching our advance, but as they were simply observers there were but few engagements that even threatened to become battles. all the engagements fought ought to have served to encourage the enemy. roads were again made in our front, and again corduroyed; a line was intrenched, and the troops were advanced to the new position. cross roads were constructed to these new positions to enable the troops to concentrate in case of attack. the national armies were thoroughly intrenched all the way from the tennessee river to corinth. for myself i was little more than an observer. orders were sent direct to the right wing or reserve, ignoring me, and advances were made from one line of intrenchments to another without notifying me. my position was so embarrassing in fact that i made several applications during the siege to be relieved. general halleck kept his headquarters generally, if not all the time, with the right wing. pope being on the extreme left did not see so much of his chief, and consequently got loose as it were at times. on the 3d of may he was at seven mile creek with the main body of his command, but threw forward a division to farmington, within four miles of corinth. his troops had quite a little engagement at farmington on that day, but carried the place with considerable loss to the enemy. there would then have been no difficulty in advancing the centre and right so as to form a new line well up to the enemy, but pope was ordered back to conform with the general line. on the 8th of may he moved again, taking his whole force to farmington, and pushed out two divisions close to the rebel line. again he was ordered back. by the 4th of may the centre and right wing reached monterey, twelve miles out. their advance was slow from there, for they intrenched with every forward movement. the left wing moved up again on the 25th of may and intrenched itself close to the enemy. the creek with the marsh before described, separated the two lines. skirmishers thirty feet apart could have maintained either line at this point. our centre and right were, at this time, extended so that the right of the right wing was probably five miles from corinth and four from the works in their front. the creek, which was a formidable obstacle for either side to pass on our left, became a very slight obstacle on our right. here the enemy occupied two positions. one of them, as much as two miles out from his main line, was on a commanding elevation and defended by an intrenched battery with infantry supports. a heavy wood intervened between this work and the national forces. in rear to the south there was a clearing extending a mile or more, and south of this clearing a log-house which had been loop-holed and was occupied by infantry. sherman's division carried these two positions with some loss to himself, but with probably greater to the enemy, on the 28th of may, and on that day the investment of corinth was complete, or as complete as it was ever made. thomas' right now rested west of the mobile and ohio railroad. pope's left commanded the memphis and charleston railroad east of corinth. some days before i had suggested to the commanding general that i thought if he would move the army of the mississippi at night, by the rear of the centre and right, ready to advance at daylight, pope would find no natural obstacle in his front and, i believed, no serious artificial one. the ground, or works, occupied by our left could be held by a thin picket line, owing to the stream and swamp in front. to the right the troops would have a dry ridge to march over. i was silenced so quickly that i felt that possibly i had suggested an unmilitary movement. later, probably on the 28th of may, general logan, whose command was then on the mobile and ohio railroad, said to me that the enemy had been evacuating for several days and that if allowed he could go into corinth with his brigade. trains of cars were heard coming in and going out of corinth constantly. some of the men who had been engaged in various capacities on railroads before the war claimed that they could tell, by putting their ears to the rail, not only which way the trains were moving but which trains were loaded and which were empty. they said loaded trains had been going out for several days and empty ones coming in. subsequent events proved the correctness of their judgment. beauregard published his orders for the evacuation of corinth on the 26th of may and fixed the 29th for the departure of his troops, and on the 30th of may general halleck had his whole army drawn up prepared for battle and announced in orders that there was every indication that our left was to be attacked that morning. corinth had already been evacuated and the national troops marched on and took possession without opposition. everything had been destroyed or carried away. the confederate commander had instructed his soldiers to cheer on the arrival of every train to create the impression among the yankees that reinforcements were arriving. there was not a sick or wounded man left by the confederates, nor stores of any kind. some ammunition had been blown up--not removed--but the trophies of war were a few quaker guns, logs of about the diameter of ordinary cannon, mounted on wheels of wagons and pointed in the most threatening manner towards us. the possession of corinth by the national troops was of strategic importance, but the victory was barren in every other particular. it was nearly bloodless. it is a question whether the morale of the confederate troops engaged at corinth was not improved by the immunity with which they were permitted to remove all public property and then withdraw themselves. on our side i know officers and men of the army of the tennessee--and i presume the same is true of those of the other commands--were disappointed at the result. they could not see how the mere occupation of places was to close the war while large and effective rebel armies existed. they believed that a well-directed attack would at least have partially destroyed the army defending corinth. for myself i am satisfied that corinth could have been captured in a two days' campaign commenced promptly on the arrival of reinforcements after the battle of shiloh. general halleck at once commenced erecting fortifications around corinth on a scale to indicate that this one point must be held if it took the whole national army to do it. all commanding points two or three miles to the south, south-east and south-west were strongly fortified. it was expected in case of necessity to connect these forts by rifle-pits. they were laid out on a scale that would have required 100,000 men to fully man them. it was probably thought that a final battle of the war would be fought at that point. these fortifications were never used. immediately after the occupation of corinth by the national troops, general pope was sent in pursuit of the retreating garrison and general buell soon followed. buell was the senior of the two generals and commanded the entire column. the pursuit was kept up for some thirty miles, but did not result in the capture of any material of war or prisoners, unless a few stragglers who had fallen behind and were willing captives. on the 10th of june the pursuing column was all back at corinth. the army of the tennessee was not engaged in any of these movements. the confederates were now driven out of west tennessee, and on the 6th of june, after a well-contested naval battle, the national forces took possession of memphis and held the mississippi river from its source to that point. the railroad from columbus to corinth was at once put in good condition and held by us. we had garrisons at donelson, clarksville and nashville, on the cumberland river, and held the tennessee river from its mouth to eastport. new orleans and baton rouge had fallen into the possession of the national forces, so that now the confederates at the west were narrowed down for all communication with richmond to the single line of road running east from vicksburg. to dispossess them of this, therefore, became a matter of the first importance. the possession of the mississippi by us from memphis to baton rouge was also a most important object. it would be equal to the amputation of a limb in its weakening effects upon the enemy. after the capture of corinth a movable force of 80,000 men, besides enough to hold all the territory acquired, could have been set in motion for the accomplishment of any great campaign for the suppression of the rebellion. in addition to this fresh troops were being raised to swell the effective force. but the work of depletion commenced. buell with the army of the ohio was sent east, following the line of the memphis and charleston railroad. this he was ordered to repair as he advanced --only to have it destroyed by small guerilla bands or other troops as soon as he was out of the way. if he had been sent directly to chattanooga as rapidly as he could march, leaving two or three divisions along the line of the railroad from nashville forward, he could have arrived with but little fighting, and would have saved much of the loss of life which was afterwards incurred in gaining chattanooga. bragg would then not have had time to raise an army to contest the possession of middle and east tennessee and kentucky; the battles of stone river and chickamauga would not necessarily have been fought; burnside would not have been besieged in knoxville without the power of helping himself or escaping; the battle of chattanooga would not have been fought. these are the negative advantages, if the term negative is applicable, which would probably have resulted from prompt movements after corinth fell into the possession of the national forces. the positive results might have been: a bloodless advance to atlanta, to vicksburg, or to any other desired point south of corinth in the interior of mississippi. chapter xxvii. headquarters moved to memphis--on the road to memphis--escaping jackson --complaints and requests--halleck appointed commander-in-chief--return to corinth--movements of bragg--surrender of clarksville--the advance upon chattanooga--sheridan colonel of a michigan regiment. my position at corinth, with a nominal command and yet no command, became so unbearable that i asked permission of halleck to remove my headquarters to memphis. i had repeatedly asked, between the fall of donelson and the evacuation of corinth, to be relieved from duty under halleck; but all my applications were refused until the occupation of the town. i then obtained permission to leave the department, but general sherman happened to call on me as i was about starting and urged me so strongly not to think of going, that i concluded to remain. my application to be permitted to remove my headquarters to memphis was, however, approved, and on the 21st of june i started for that point with my staff and a cavalry escort of only a part of one company. there was a detachment of two or three companies going some twenty-five miles west to be stationed as a guard to the railroad. i went under cover of this escort to the end of their march, and the next morning proceeded to la grange with no convoy but the few cavalry men i had with me. from la grange to memphis the distance is forty-seven miles. there were no troops stationed between these two points, except a small force guarding a working party which was engaged in repairing the railroad. not knowing where this party would be found i halted at la grange. general hurlbut was in command there at the time and had his headquarters tents pitched on the lawn of a very commodious country house. the proprietor was at home and, learning of my arrival, he invited general hurlbut and me to dine with him. i accepted the invitation and spent a very pleasant afternoon with my host, who was a thorough southern gentleman fully convinced of the justice of secession. after dinner, seated in the capacious porch, he entertained me with a recital of the services he was rendering the cause. he was too old to be in the ranks himself--he must have been quite seventy then--but his means enabled him to be useful in other ways. in ordinary times the homestead where he was now living produced the bread and meat to supply the slaves on his main plantation, in the low-lands of mississippi. now he raised food and forage on both places, and thought he would have that year a surplus sufficient to feed three hundred families of poor men who had gone into the war and left their families dependent upon the "patriotism" of those better off. the crops around me looked fine, and i had at the moment an idea that about the time they were ready to be gathered the "yankee" troops would be in the neighborhood and harvest them for the benefit of those engaged in the suppression of the rebellion instead of its support. i felt, however, the greatest respect for the candor of my host and for his zeal in a cause he thoroughly believed in, though our views were as wide apart as it is possible to conceive. the 23d of june, 1862, on the road from la grange to memphis was very warm, even for that latitude and season. with my staff and small escort i started at an early hour, and before noon we arrived within twenty miles of memphis. at this point i saw a very comfortable-looking white-haired gentleman seated at the front of his house, a little distance from the road. i let my staff and escort ride ahead while i halted and, for an excuse, asked for a glass of water. i was invited at once to dismount and come in. i found my host very genial and communicative, and staid longer than i had intended, until the lady of the house announced dinner and asked me to join them. the host, however, was not pressing, so that i declined the invitation and, mounting my horse, rode on. about a mile west from where i had been stopping a road comes up from the southeast, joining that from la grange to memphis. a mile west of this junction i found my staff and escort halted and enjoying the shade of forest trees on the lawn of a house located several hundred feet back from the road, their horses hitched to the fence along the line of the road. i, too, stopped and we remained there until the cool of the afternoon, and then rode into memphis. the gentleman with whom i had stopped twenty miles from memphis was a mr. de loche, a man loyal to the union. he had not pressed me to tarry longer with him because in the early part of my visit a neighbor, a dr. smith, had called and, on being presented to me, backed off the porch as if something had hit him. mr. de loche knew that the rebel general jackson was in that neighborhood with a detachment of cavalry. his neighbor was as earnest in the southern cause as was mr. de loche in that of the union. the exact location of jackson was entirely unknown to mr. de loche; but he was sure that his neighbor would know it and would give information of my presence, and this made my stay unpleasant to him after the call of dr. smith. i have stated that a detachment of troops was engaged in guarding workmen who were repairing the railroad east of memphis. on the day i entered memphis, jackson captured a small herd of beef cattle which had been sent east for the troops so engaged. the drovers were not enlisted men and he released them. a day or two after one of these drovers came to my headquarters and, relating the circumstances of his capture, said jackson was very much disappointed that he had not captured me; that he was six or seven miles south of the memphis and charleston railroad when he learned that i was stopping at the house of mr. de loche, and had ridden with his command to the junction of the road he was on with that from la grange and memphis, where he learned that i had passed three-quarters of an hour before. he thought it would be useless to pursue with jaded horses a well-mounted party with so much of a start. had he gone three-quarters of a mile farther he would have found me with my party quietly resting under the shade of trees and without even arms in our hands with which to defend ourselves. general jackson of course did not communicate his disappointment at not capturing me to a prisoner, a young drover; but from the talk among the soldiers the facts related were learned. a day or two later mr. de loche called on me in memphis to apologize for his apparent incivility in not insisting on my staying for dinner. he said that his wife accused him of marked discourtesy, but that, after the call of his neighbor, he had felt restless until i got away. i never met general jackson before the war, nor during it, but have met him since at his very comfortable summer home at manitou springs, colorado. i reminded him of the above incident, and this drew from him the response that he was thankful now he had not captured me. i certainly was very thankful too. my occupation of memphis as district headquarters did not last long. the period, however, was marked by a few incidents which were novel to me. up to that time i had not occupied any place in the south where the citizens were at home in any great numbers. dover was within the fortifications at fort donelson, and, as far as i remember, every citizen was gone. there were no people living at pittsburg landing, and but very few at corinth. memphis, however, was a populous city, and there were many of the citizens remaining there who were not only thoroughly impressed with the justice of their cause, but who thought that even the "yankee soldiery" must entertain the same views if they could only be induced to make an honest confession. it took hours of my time every day to listen to complaints and requests. the latter were generally reasonable, and if so they were granted; but the complaints were not always, or even often, well founded. two instances will mark the general character. first: the officer who commanded at memphis immediately after the city fell into the hands of the national troops had ordered one of the churches of the city to be opened to the soldiers. army chaplains were authorized to occupy the pulpit. second: at the beginning of the war the confederate congress had passed a law confiscating all property of "alien enemies" at the south, including the debts of southerners to northern men. in consequence of this law, when memphis was occupied the provost-marshal had forcibly collected all the evidences he could obtain of such debts. almost the first complaints made to me were these two outrages. the gentleman who made the complaints informed me first of his own high standing as a lawyer, a citizen and a christian. he was a deacon in the church which had been defiled by the occupation of union troops, and by a union chaplain filling the pulpit. he did not use the word "defile," but he expressed the idea very clearly. he asked that the church be restored to the former congregation. i told him that no order had been issued prohibiting the congregation attending the church. he said of course the congregation could not hear a northern clergyman who differed so radically with them on questions of government. i told him the troops would continue to occupy that church for the present, and that they would not be called upon to hear disloyal sentiments proclaimed from the pulpit. this closed the argument on the first point. then came the second. the complainant said that he wanted the papers restored to him which had been surrendered to the provost-marshal under protest; he was a lawyer, and before the establishment of the "confederate states government" had been the attorney for a number of large business houses at the north; that "his government" had confiscated all debts due "alien enemies," and appointed commissioners, or officers, to collect such debts and pay them over to the "government": but in his case, owing to his high standing, he had been permitted to hold these claims for collection, the responsible officials knowing that he would account to the "government" for every dollar received. he said that his "government," when it came in possession of all its territory, would hold him personally responsible for the claims he had surrendered to the provost-marshal. his impudence was so sublime that i was rather amused than indignant. i told him, however, that if he would remain in memphis i did not believe the confederate government would ever molest him. he left, no doubt, as much amazed at my assurance as i was at the brazenness of his request. on the 11th of july general halleck received telegraphic orders appointing him to the command of all the armies, with headquarters in washington. his instructions pressed him to proceed to his new field of duty with as little delay as was consistent with the safety and interests of his previous command. i was next in rank, and he telegraphed me the same day to report at department headquarters at corinth. i was not informed by the dispatch that my chief had been ordered to a different field and did not know whether to move my headquarters or not. i telegraphed asking if i was to take my staff with me, and received word in reply: "this place will be your headquarters. you can judge for yourself." i left memphis for my new field without delay, and reached corinth on the 15th of the month. general halleck remained until the 17th of july; but he was very uncommunicative, and gave me no information as to what i had been called to corinth for. when general halleck left to assume the duties of general-in-chief i remained in command of the district of west tennessee. practically i became a department commander, because no one was assigned to that position over me and i made my reports direct to the general-in-chief; but i was not assigned to the position of department commander until the 25th of october. general halleck while commanding the department of the mississippi had had control as far east as a line drawn from chattanooga north. my district only embraced west tennessee and kentucky west of the cumberland river. buell, with the army of the ohio, had, as previously stated, been ordered east towards chattanooga, with instructions to repair the memphis and charleston railroad as he advanced. troops had been sent north by halleck along the line of the mobile and ohio railroad to put it in repair as far as columbus. other troops were stationed on the railroad from jackson, tennessee, to grand junction, and still others on the road west to memphis. the remainder of the magnificent army of 120,000 men which entered corinth on the 30th of may had now become so scattered that i was put entirely on the defensive in a territory whose population was hostile to the union. one of the first things i had to do was to construct fortifications at corinth better suited to the garrison that could be spared to man them. the structures that had been built during the months of may and june were left as monuments to the skill of the engineer, and others were constructed in a few days, plainer in design but suited to the command available to defend them. i disposed the troops belonging to the district in conformity with the situation as rapidly as possible. the forces at donelson, clarksville and nashville, with those at corinth and along the railroad eastward, i regarded as sufficient for protection against any attack from the west. the mobile and ohio railroad was guarded from rienzi, south of corinth, to columbus; and the mississippi central railroad from jackson, tennessee, to bolivar. grand junction and la grange on the memphis railroad were abandoned. south of the army of the tennessee, and confronting it, was van dorn, with a sufficient force to organize a movable army of thirty-five to forty thousand men, after being reinforced by price from missouri. this movable force could be thrown against either corinth, bolivar or memphis; and the best that could be done in such event would be to weaken the points not threatened in order to reinforce the one that was. nothing could be gained on the national side by attacking elsewhere, because the territory already occupied was as much as the force present could guard. the most anxious period of the war, to me, was during the time the army of the tennessee was guarding the territory acquired by the fall of corinth and memphis and before i was sufficiently reinforced to take the offensive. the enemy also had cavalry operating in our rear, making it necessary to guard every point of the railroad back to columbus, on the security of which we were dependent for all our supplies. headquarters were connected by telegraph with all points of the command except memphis and the mississippi below columbus. with these points communication was had by the railroad to columbus, then down the river by boat. to reinforce memphis would take three or four days, and to get an order there for troops to move elsewhere would have taken at least two days. memphis therefore was practically isolated from the balance of the command. but it was in sherman's hands. then too the troops were well intrenched and the gunboats made a valuable auxiliary. during the two months after the departure of general halleck there was much fighting between small bodies of the contending armies, but these encounters were dwarfed by the magnitude of the main battles so as to be now almost forgotten except by those engaged in them. some of them, however, estimated by the losses on both sides in killed and wounded, were equal in hard fighting to most of the battles of the mexican war which attracted so much of the attention of the public when they occurred. about the 23d of july colonel ross, commanding at bolivar, was threatened by a large force of the enemy so that he had to be reinforced from jackson and corinth. on the 27th there was skirmishing on the hatchie river, eight miles from bolivar. on the 30th i learned from colonel p. h. sheridan, who had been far to the south, that bragg in person was at rome, georgia, with his troops moving by rail (by way of mobile) to chattanooga and his wagon train marching overland to join him at rome. price was at this time at holly springs, mississippi, with a large force, and occupied grand junction as an outpost. i proposed to the general-in-chief to be permitted to drive him away, but was informed that, while i had to judge for myself, the best use to make of my troops was not to scatter them, but hold them ready to reinforce buell. the movement of bragg himself with his wagon trains to chattanooga across country, while his troops were transported over a long round-about road to the same destination, without need of guards except when in my immediate front, demonstrates the advantage which troops enjoy while acting in a country where the people are friendly. buell was marching through a hostile region and had to have his communications thoroughly guarded back to a base of supplies. more men were required the farther the national troops penetrated into the enemy's country. i, with an army sufficiently powerful to have destroyed bragg, was purely on the defensive and accomplishing no more than to hold a force far inferior to my own. on the 2d of august i was ordered from washington to live upon the country, on the resources of citizens hostile to the government, so far as practicable. i was also directed to "handle rebels within our lines without gloves," to imprison them, or to expel them from their homes and from our lines. i do not recollect having arrested and confined a citizen (not a soldier) during the entire rebellion. i am aware that a great many were sent to northern prisons, particularly to joliet, illinois, by some of my subordinates with the statement that it was my order. i had all such released the moment i learned of their arrest; and finally sent a staff officer north to release every prisoner who was said to be confined by my order. there were many citizens at home who deserved punishment because they were soldiers when an opportunity was afforded to inflict an injury to the national cause. this class was not of the kind that were apt to get arrested, and i deemed it better that a few guilty men should escape than that a great many innocent ones should suffer. on the 14th of august i was ordered to send two more divisions to buell. they were sent the same day by way of decatur. on the 22d colonel rodney mason surrendered clarksville with six companies of his regiment. colonel mason was one of the officers who had led their regiments off the field at almost the first fire of the rebels at shiloh. he was by nature and education a gentleman, and was terribly mortified at his action when the battle was over. he came to me with tears in his eyes and begged to be allowed to have another trial. i felt great sympathy for him and sent him, with his regiment, to garrison clarksville and donelson. he selected clarksville for his headquarters, no doubt because he regarded it as the post of danger, it being nearer the enemy. but when he was summoned to surrender by a band of guerillas, his constitutional weakness overcame him. he inquired the number of men the enemy had, and receiving a response indicating a force greater than his own he said if he could be satisfied of that fact he would surrender. arrangements were made for him to count the guerillas, and having satisfied himself that the enemy had the greater force he surrendered and informed his subordinate at donelson of the fact, advising him to do the same. the guerillas paroled their prisoners and moved upon donelson, but the officer in command at that point marched out to meet them and drove them away. among other embarrassments, at the time of which i now write, was the fact that the government wanted to get out all the cotton possible from the south and directed me to give every facility toward that end. pay in gold was authorized, and stations on the mississippi river and on the railroad in our possession had to be designated where cotton would be received. this opened to the enemy not only the means of converting cotton into money, which had a value all over the world and which they so much needed, but it afforded them means of obtaining accurate and intelligent information in regard to our position and strength. it was also demoralizing to the troops. citizens obtaining permits from the treasury department had to be protected within our lines and given facilities to get out cotton by which they realized enormous profits. men who had enlisted to fight the battles of their country did not like to be engaged in protecting a traffic which went to the support of an enemy they had to fight, and the profits of which went to men who shared none of their dangers. on the 30th of august colonel m. d. leggett, near bolivar, with the 20th and 29th ohio volunteer infantry, was attacked by a force supposed to be about 4,000 strong. the enemy was driven away with a loss of more than one hundred men. on the 1st of september the bridge guard at medon was attacked by guerillas. the guard held the position until reinforced, when the enemy were routed leaving about fifty of their number on the field dead or wounded, our loss being only two killed and fifteen wounded. on the same day colonel dennis, with a force of less than 500 infantry and two pieces of artillery, met the cavalry of the enemy in strong force, a few miles west of medon, and drove them away with great loss. our troops buried 179 of the enemy's dead, left upon the field. afterwards it was found that all the houses in the vicinity of the battlefield were turned into hospitals for the wounded. our loss, as reported at the time, was forty-five killed and wounded. on the 2d of september i was ordered to send more reinforcements to buell. jackson and bolivar were yet threatened, but i sent the reinforcements. on the 4th i received direct orders to send granger's division also to louisville, kentucky. general buell had left corinth about the 10th of june to march upon chattanooga; bragg, who had superseded beauregard in command, sent one division from tupelo on the 27th of june for the same place. this gave buell about seventeen days' start. if he had not been required to repair the railroad as he advanced, the march could have been made in eighteen days at the outside, and chattanooga must have been reached by the national forces before the rebels could have possibly got there. the road between nashville and chattanooga could easily have been put in repair by other troops, so that communication with the north would have been opened in a short time after the occupation of the place by the national troops. if buell had been permitted to move in the first instance, with the whole of the army of the ohio and that portion of the army of the mississippi afterwards sent to him, he could have thrown four divisions from his own command along the line of road to repair and guard it. granger's division was promptly sent on the 4th of september. i was at the station at corinth when the troops reached that point, and found general p. h. sheridan with them. i expressed surprise at seeing him and said that i had not expected him to go. he showed decided disappointment at the prospect of being detained. i felt a little nettled at his desire to get away and did not detain him. sheridan was a first lieutenant in the regiment in which i had served eleven years, the 4th infantry, and stationed on the pacific coast when the war broke out. he was promoted to a captaincy in may, 1861, and before the close of the year managed in some way, i do not know how, to get east. he went to missouri. halleck had known him as a very successful young officer in managing campaigns against the indians on the pacific coast, and appointed him acting-quartermaster in south-west missouri. there was no difficulty in getting supplies forward while sheridan served in that capacity; but he got into difficulty with his immediate superiors because of his stringent rules for preventing the use of public transportation for private purposes. he asked to be relieved from further duty in the capacity in which he was engaged and his request was granted. when general halleck took the field in april, 1862, sheridan was assigned to duty on his staff. during the advance on corinth a vacancy occurred in the colonelcy of the 2d michigan cavalry. governor blair, of michigan, telegraphed general halleck asking him to suggest the name of a professional soldier for the vacancy, saying he would appoint a good man without reference to his state. sheridan was named; and was so conspicuously efficient that when corinth was reached he was assigned to command a cavalry brigade in the army of the mississippi. he was in command at booneville on the 1st of july with two small regiments, when he was attacked by a force full three times as numerous as his own. by very skilful manoeuvres and boldness of attack he completely routed the enemy. for this he was made a brigadier-general and became a conspicuous figure in the army about corinth. on this account i was sorry to see him leaving me. his departure was probably fortunate, for he rendered distinguished services in his new field. granger and sheridan reached louisville before buell got there, and on the night of their arrival sheridan with his command threw up works around the railroad station for the defence of troops as they came from the front. chapter xxviii. advance of van dorn and price--price enters iuka--battle of iuka. at this time, september 4th, i had two divisions of the army of the mississippi stationed at corinth, rienzi, jacinto and danville. there were at corinth also davies' division and two brigades of mcarthur's, besides cavalry and artillery. this force constituted my left wing, of which rosecrans was in command. general ord commanded the centre, from bethel to humboldt on the mobile and ohio railroad and from jackson to bolivar where the mississippi central is crossed by the hatchie river. general sherman commanded on the right at memphis with two of his brigades back at brownsville, at the crossing of the hatchie river by the memphis and ohio railroad. this made the most convenient arrangement i could devise for concentrating all my spare forces upon any threatened point. all the troops of the command were within telegraphic communication of each other, except those under sherman. by bringing a portion of his command to brownsville, from which point there was a railroad and telegraph back to memphis, communication could be had with that part of my command within a few hours by the use of couriers. in case it became necessary to reinforce corinth, by this arrangement all the troops at bolivar, except a small guard, could be sent by rail by the way of jackson in less than twenty-four hours; while the troops from brownsville could march up to bolivar to take their place. on the 7th of september i learned of the advance of van dorn and price, apparently upon corinth. one division was brought from memphis to bolivar to meet any emergency that might arise from this move of the enemy. i was much concerned because my first duty, after holding the territory acquired within my command, was to prevent further reinforcing of bragg in middle tennessee. already the army of northern virginia had defeated the army under general pope and was invading maryland. in the centre general buell was on his way to louisville and bragg marching parallel to him with a large confederate force for the ohio river. i had been constantly called upon to reinforce buell until at this time my entire force numbered less than 50,000 men, of all arms. this included everything from cairo south within my jurisdiction. if i too should be driven back, the ohio river would become the line dividing the belligerents west of the alleghanies, while at the east the line was already farther north than when hostilities commenced at the opening of the war. it is true nashville was never given up after its first capture, but it would have been isolated and the garrison there would have been obliged to beat a hasty retreat if the troops in west tennessee had been compelled to fall back. to say at the end of the second year of the war the line dividing the contestants at the east was pushed north of maryland, a state that had not seceded, and at the west beyond kentucky, another state which had been always loyal, would have been discouraging indeed. as it was, many loyal people despaired in the fall of 1862 of ever saving the union. the administration at washington was much concerned for the safety of the cause it held so dear. but i believe there was never a day when the president did not think that, in some way or other, a cause so just as ours would come out triumphant. up to the 11th of september rosecrans still had troops on the railroad east of corinth, but they had all been ordered in. by the 12th all were in except a small force under colonel murphy of the 8th wisconsin. he had been detained to guard the remainder of the stores which had not yet been brought in to corinth. on the 13th of september general sterling price entered iuka, a town about twenty miles east of corinth on the memphis and charleston railroad. colonel murphy with a few men was guarding the place. he made no resistance, but evacuated the town on the approach of the enemy. i was apprehensive lest the object of the rebels might be to get troops into tennessee to reinforce bragg, as it was afterwards ascertained to be. the authorities at washington, including the general-in-chief of the army, were very anxious, as i have said, about affairs both in east and middle tennessee; and my anxiety was quite as great on their account as for any danger threatening my command. i had not force enough at corinth to attack price even by stripping everything; and there was danger that before troops could be got from other points he might be far on his way across the tennessee. to prevent this all spare forces at bolivar and jackson were ordered to corinth, and cars were concentrated at jackson for their transportation. within twenty-four hours from the transmission of the order the troops were at their destination, although there had been a delay of four hours resulting from the forward train getting off the track and stopping all the others. this gave a reinforcement of near 8,000 men, general ord in command. general rosecrans commanded the district of corinth with a movable force of about 9,000 independent of the garrison deemed necessary to be left behind. it was known that general van dorn was about a four days' march south of us, with a large force. it might have been part of his plan to attack at corinth, price coming from the east while he came up from the south. my desire was to attack price before van dorn could reach corinth or go to his relief. general rosecrans had previously had his headquarters at iuka, where his command was spread out along the memphis and charleston railroad eastward. while there he had a most excellent map prepared showing all the roads and streams in the surrounding country. he was also personally familiar with the ground, so that i deferred very much to him in my plans for the approach. we had cars enough to transport all of general ord's command, which was to go by rail to burnsville, a point on the road about seven miles west of iuka. from there his troops were to march by the north side of the railroad and attack price from the north-west, while rosecrans was to move eastward from his position south of corinth by way of the jacinto road. a small force was to hold the jacinto road where it turns to the north-east, while the main force moved on the fulton road which comes into iuka further east. this plan was suggested by rosecrans. bear creek, a few miles to the east of the fulton road, is a formidable obstacle to the movement of troops in the absence of bridges, all of which, in september, 1862, had been destroyed in that vicinity. the tennessee, to the north-east, not many miles away, was also a formidable obstacle for an army followed by a pursuing force. ord was on the north-west, and even if a rebel movement had been possible in that direction it could have brought only temporary relief, for it would have carried price's army to the rear of the national forces and isolated it from all support. it looked to me that, if price would remain in iuka until we could get there, his annihilation was inevitable. on the morning of the 18th of september general ord moved by rail to burnsville, and there left the cars and moved out to perform his part of the programme. he was to get as near the enemy as possible during the day and intrench himself so as to hold his position until the next morning. rosecrans was to be up by the morning of the 19th on the two roads before described, and the attack was to be from all three quarters simultaneously. troops enough were left at jacinto and rienzi to detain any cavalry that van dorn might send out to make a sudden dash into corinth until i could be notified. there was a telegraph wire along the railroad, so there would be no delay in communication. i detained cars and locomotives enough at burnsville to transport the whole of ord's command at once, and if van dorn had moved against corinth instead of iuka i could have thrown in reinforcements to the number of 7,000 or 8,000 before he could have arrived. i remained at burnsville with a detachment of about 900 men from ord's command and communicated with my two wings by courier. ord met the advance of the enemy soon after leaving burnsville. quite a sharp engagement ensued, but he drove the rebels back with considerable loss, including one general officer killed. he maintained his position and was ready to attack by daylight the next morning. i was very much disappointed at receiving a dispatch from rosecrans after midnight from jacinto, twenty-two miles from iuka, saying that some of his command had been delayed, and that the rear of his column was not yet up as far as jacinto. he said, however, that he would still be at iuka by two o'clock the next day. i did not believe this possible because of the distance and the condition of the roads, which was bad; besides, troops after a forced march of twenty miles are not in a good condition for fighting the moment they get through. it might do in marching to relieve a beleaguered garrison, but not to make an assault. i immediately sent ord a copy of rosecrans' dispatch and ordered him to be in readiness to attack the moment he heard the sound of guns to the south or south-east. he was instructed to notify his officers to be on the alert for any indications of battle. during the 19th the wind blew in the wrong direction to transmit sound either towards the point where ord was, or to burnsville where i had remained. a couple of hours before dark on the 19th rosecrans arrived with the head of his column at barnets, the point where the jacinto road to iuka leaves the road going east. he here turned north without sending any troops to the fulton road. while still moving in column up the jacinto road he met a force of the enemy and had his advance badly beaten and driven back upon the main road. in this short engagement his loss was considerable for the number engaged, and one battery was taken from him. the wind was still blowing hard and in the wrong direction to transmit sounds towards either ord or me. neither he nor i nor any one in either command heard a gun that was fired upon the battle-field. after the engagement rosecrans sent me a dispatch announcing the result. this was brought by a courier. there was no road between burnsville and the position then occupied by rosecrans and the country was impassable for a man on horseback. the courier bearing the message was compelled to move west nearly to jacinto before he found a road leading to burnsville. this made it a late hour of the night before i learned of the battle that had taken place during the afternoon. i at once notified ord of the fact and ordered him to attack early in the morning. the next morning rosecrans himself renewed the attack and went into iuka with but little resistance. ord also went in according to orders, without hearing a gun from the south of town but supposing the troops coming from the south-west must be up by that time. rosecrans, however, had put no troops upon the fulton road, and the enemy had taken advantage of this neglect and retreated by that road during the night. word was soon brought to me that our troops were in iuka. i immediately rode into town and found that the enemy was not being pursued even by the cavalry. i ordered pursuit by the whole of rosecrans' command and went on with him a few miles in person. he followed only a few miles after i left him and then went into camp, and the pursuit was continued no further. i was disappointed at the result of the battle of iuka--but i had so high an opinion of general rosecrans that i found no fault at the time. chapter xxix. van dorn's movements--battle of corinth--command of the department of the tennessee. on the 19th of september general geo. h. thomas was ordered east to reinforce buell. this threw the army at my command still more on the defensive. the memphis and charleston railroad was abandoned, except at corinth, and small forces were left at chewalla and grand junction. soon afterwards the latter of these two places was given up and bolivar became our most advanced position on the mississippi central railroad. our cavalry was kept well to the front and frequent expeditions were sent out to watch the movements of the enemy. we were in a country where nearly all the people, except the negroes, were hostile to us and friendly to the cause we were trying to suppress. it was easy, therefore, for the enemy to get early information of our every move. we, on the contrary, had to go after our information in force, and then often returned without it. on the 22d bolivar was threatened by a large force from south of grand junction, supposed to be twenty regiments of infantry with cavalry and artillery. i reinforced bolivar, and went to jackson in person to superintend the movement of troops to whatever point the attack might be made upon. the troops from corinth were brought up in time to repel the threatened movement without a battle. our cavalry followed the enemy south of davis' mills in mississippi. on the 30th i found that van dorn was apparently endeavoring to strike the mississippi river above memphis. at the same time other points within my command were so threatened that it was impossible to concentrate a force to drive him away. there was at this juncture a large union force at helena, arkansas, which, had it been within my command, i could have ordered across the river to attack and break up the mississippi central railroad far to the south. this would not only have called van dorn back, but would have compelled the retention of a large rebel force far to the south to prevent a repetition of such raids on the enemy's line of supplies. geographical lines between the commands during the rebellion were not always well chosen, or they were too rigidly adhered to. van dorn did not attempt to get upon the line above memphis, as had apparently been his intention. he was simply covering a deeper design; one much more important to his cause. by the 1st of october it was fully apparent that corinth was to be attacked with great force and determination, and that van dorn, lovell, price, villepigue and rust had joined their strength for this purpose. there was some skirmishing outside of corinth with the advance of the enemy on the 3d. the rebels massed in the north-west angle of the memphis and charleston and the mobile and ohio railroads, and were thus between the troops at corinth and all possible reinforcements. any fresh troops for us must come by a circuitous route. on the night of the 3d, accordingly, i ordered general mcpherson, who was at jackson, to join rosecrans at corinth with reinforcements picked up along the line of the railroad equal to a brigade. hurlbut had been ordered from bolivar to march for the same destination; and as van dorn was coming upon corinth from the north-west some of his men fell in with the advance of hurlbut's and some skirmishing ensued on the evening of the 3d. on the 4th van dorn made a dashing attack, hoping, no doubt, to capture rosecrans before his reinforcements could come up. in that case the enemy himself could have occupied the defences of corinth and held at bay all the union troops that arrived. in fact he could have taken the offensive against the reinforcements with three or four times their number and still left a sufficient garrison in the works about corinth to hold them. he came near success, some of his troops penetrating the national lines at least once, but the works that were built after halleck's departure enabled rosecrans to hold his position until the troops of both mcpherson and hurlbut approached towards the rebel front and rear. the enemy was finally driven back with great slaughter: all their charges, made with great gallantry, were repulsed. the loss on our side was heavy, but nothing to compare with van dorn's. mcpherson came up with the train of cars bearing his command as close to the enemy as was prudent, debarked on the rebel flank and got in to the support of rosecrans just after the repulse. his approach, as well as that of hurlbut, was known to the enemy and had a moral effect. general rosecrans, however, failed to follow up the victory, although i had given specific orders in advance of the battle for him to pursue the moment the enemy was repelled. he did not do so, and i repeated the order after the battle. in the first order he was notified that the force of 4,000 men which was going to his assistance would be in great peril if the enemy was not pursued. general ord had joined hurlbut on the 4th and being senior took command of his troops. this force encountered the head of van dorn's retreating column just as it was crossing the hatchie by a bridge some ten miles out from corinth. the bottom land here was swampy and bad for the operations of troops, making a good place to get an enemy into. ord attacked the troops that had crossed the bridge and drove them back in a panic. many were killed, and others were drowned by being pushed off the bridge in their hurried retreat. ord followed and met the main force. he was too weak in numbers to assault, but he held the bridge and compelled the enemy to resume his retreat by another bridge higher up the stream. ord was wounded in this engagement and the command devolved on hurlbut. rosecrans did not start in pursuit till the morning of the 5th and then took the wrong road. moving in the enemy's country he travelled with a wagon train to carry his provisions and munitions of war. his march was therefore slower than that of the enemy, who was moving towards his supplies. two or three hours of pursuit on the day of battle, without anything except what the men carried on their persons, would have been worth more than any pursuit commenced the next day could have possibly been. even when he did start, if rosecrans had followed the route taken by the enemy, he would have come upon van dorn in a swamp with a stream in front and ord holding the only bridge; but he took the road leading north and towards chewalla instead of west, and, after having marched as far as the enemy had moved to get to the hatchie, he was as far from battle as when he started. hurlbut had not the numbers to meet any such force as van dorn's if they had been in any mood for fighting, and he might have been in great peril. i now regarded the time to accomplish anything by pursuit as past and, after rosecrans reached jonesboro, i ordered him to return. he kept on to ripley, however, and was persistent in wanting to go farther. i thereupon ordered him to halt and submitted the matter to the general-in-chief, who allowed me to exercise my judgment in the matter, but inquired "why not pursue?" upon this i ordered rosecrans back. had he gone much farther he would have met a greater force than van dorn had at corinth and behind intrenchments or on chosen ground, and the probabilities are he would have lost his army. the battle of corinth was bloody, our loss being 315 killed, 1,812 wounded and 232 missing. the enemy lost many more. rosecrans reported 1,423 dead and 2,225 prisoners. we fought behind breastworks, which accounts in some degree for the disparity. among the killed on our side was general hackelman. general oglesby was badly, it was for some time supposed mortally, wounded. i received a congratulatory letter from the president, which expressed also his sorrow for the losses. this battle was recognized by me as being a decided victory, though not so complete as i had hoped for, nor nearly so complete as i now think was within the easy grasp of the commanding officer at corinth. since the war it is known that the result, as it was, was a crushing blow to the enemy, and felt by him much more than it was appreciated at the north. the battle relieved me from any further anxiety for the safety of the territory within my jurisdiction, and soon after receiving reinforcements i suggested to the general-in-chief a forward movement against vicksburg. on the 23d of october i learned of pemberton's being in command at holly springs and much reinforced by conscripts and troops from alabama and texas. the same day general rosecrans was relieved from duty with my command, and shortly after he succeeded buell in the command of the army in middle tennessee. i was delighted at the promotion of general rosecrans to a separate command, because i still believed that when independent of an immediate superior the qualities which i, at that time, credited him with possessing, would show themselves. as a subordinate i found that i could not make him do as i wished, and had determined to relieve him from duty that very day. at the close of the operations just described my force, in round numbers, was 48,500. of these 4,800 were in kentucky and illinois, 7,000 in memphis, 19,200 from mound city south, and 17,500 at corinth. general mcclernand had been authorized from washington to go north and organize troops to be used in opening the mississippi. these new levies with other reinforcements now began to come in. on the 25th of october i was placed in command of the department of the tennessee. reinforcements continued to come from the north and by the 2d of november i was prepared to take the initiative. this was a great relief after the two and a half months of continued defence over a large district of country, and where nearly every citizen was an enemy ready to give information of our every move. i have described very imperfectly a few of the battles and skirmishes that took place during this time. to describe all would take more space than i can allot to the purpose; to make special mention of all the officers and troops who distinguished themselves, would take a volume. (*9) chapter xxx. the campaign against vicksburg--employing the freedmen--occupation of holly springs--sherman ordered to memphis--sherman's movements down the mississippi--van dorn captures holly springs--collecting forage and food. vicksburg was important to the enemy because it occupied the first high ground coming close to the river below memphis. from there a railroad runs east, connecting with other roads leading to all points of the southern states. a railroad also starts from the opposite side of the river, extending west as far as shreveport, louisiana. vicksburg was the only channel, at the time of the events of which this chapter treats, connecting the parts of the confederacy divided by the mississippi. so long as it was held by the enemy, the free navigation of the river was prevented. hence its importance. points on the river between vicksburg and port hudson were held as dependencies; but their fall was sure to follow the capture of the former place. the campaign against vicksburg commenced on the 2d of november as indicated in a dispatch to the general-in-chief in the following words: "i have commenced a movement on grand junction, with three divisions from corinth and two from bolivar. will leave here [jackson, tennessee] to-morrow, and take command in person. if found practicable, i will go to holly springs, and, may be, grenada, completing railroad and telegraph as i go." at this time my command was holding the mobile and ohio railroad from about twenty-five miles south of corinth, north to columbus, kentucky; the mississippi central from bolivar north to its junction with the mobile and ohio; the memphis and charleston from corinth east to bear creek, and the mississippi river from cairo to memphis. my entire command was no more than was necessary to hold these lines, and hardly that if kept on the defensive. by moving against the enemy and into his unsubdued, or not yet captured, territory, driving their army before us, these lines would nearly hold themselves; thus affording a large force for field operations. my moving force at that time was about 30,000 men, and i estimated the enemy confronting me, under pemberton, at about the same number. general mcpherson commanded my left wing and general c. s. hamilton the centre, while sherman was at memphis with the right wing. pemberton was fortified at the tallahatchie, but occupied holly springs and grand junction on the mississippi central railroad. on the 8th we occupied grand junction and la grange, throwing a considerable force seven or eight miles south, along the line of the railroad. the road from bolivar forward was repaired and put in running order as the troops advanced. up to this time it had been regarded as an axiom in war that large bodies of troops must operate from a base of supplies which they always covered and guarded in all forward movements. there was delay therefore in repairing the road back, and in gathering and forwarding supplies to the front. by my orders, and in accordance with previous instructions from washington, all the forage within reach was collected under the supervision of the chief quartermaster and the provisions under the chief commissary, receipts being given when there was any one to take them; the supplies in any event to be accounted for as government stores. the stock was bountiful, but still it gave me no idea of the possibility of supplying a moving column in an enemy's country from the country itself. it was at this point, probably, where the first idea of a "freedman's bureau" took its origin. orders of the government prohibited the expulsion of the negroes from the protection of the army, when they came in voluntarily. humanity forbade allowing them to starve. with such an army of them, of all ages and both sexes, as had congregated about grand junction, amounting to many thousands, it was impossible to advance. there was no special authority for feeding them unless they were employed as teamsters, cooks and pioneers with the army; but only able-bodied young men were suitable for such work. this labor would support but a very limited percentage of them. the plantations were all deserted; the cotton and corn were ripe: men, women and children above ten years of age could be employed in saving these crops. to do this work with contrabands, or to have it done, organization under a competent chief was necessary. on inquiring for such a man chaplain eaton, now and for many years the very able united states commissioner of education, was suggested. he proved as efficient in that field as he has since done in his present one. i gave him all the assistants and guards he called for. we together fixed the prices to be paid for the negro labor, whether rendered to the government or to individuals. the cotton was to be picked from abandoned plantations, the laborers to receive the stipulated price (my recollection is twelve and a half cents per pound for picking and ginning) from the quartermaster, he shipping the cotton north to be sold for the benefit of the government. citizens remaining on their plantations were allowed the privilege of having their crops saved by freedmen on the same terms. at once the freedmen became self-sustaining. the money was not paid to them directly, but was expended judiciously and for their benefit. they gave me no trouble afterwards. later the freedmen were engaged in cutting wood along the mississippi river to supply the large number of steamers on that stream. a good price was paid for chopping wood used for the supply of government steamers (steamers chartered and which the government had to supply with fuel). those supplying their own fuel paid a much higher price. in this way a fund was created not only sufficient to feed and clothe all, old and young, male and female, but to build them comfortable cabins, hospitals for the sick, and to supply them with many comforts they had never known before. at this stage of the campaign against vicksburg i was very much disturbed by newspaper rumors that general mcclernand was to have a separate and independent command within mine, to operate against vicksburg by way of the mississippi river. two commanders on the same field are always one too many, and in this case i did not think the general selected had either the experience or the qualifications to fit him for so important a position. i feared for the safety of the troops intrusted to him, especially as he was to raise new levies, raw troops, to execute so important a trust. but on the 12th i received a dispatch from general halleck saying that i had command of all the troops sent to my department and authorizing me to fight the enemy where i pleased. the next day my cavalry was in holly springs, and the enemy fell back south of the tallahatchie. holly springs i selected for my depot of supplies and munitions of war, all of which at that time came by rail from columbus, kentucky, except the few stores collected about la grange and grand junction. this was a long line (increasing in length as we moved south) to maintain in an enemy's country. on the 15th of november, while i was still at holly springs, i sent word to sherman to meet me at columbus. we were but forty-seven miles apart, yet the most expeditious way for us to meet was for me to take the rail to columbus and sherman a steamer for the same place. at that meeting, besides talking over my general plans i gave him his orders to join me with two divisions and to march them down the mississippi central railroad if he could. sherman, who was always prompt, was up by the 29th to cottage hill, ten miles north of oxford. he brought three divisions with him, leaving a garrison of only four regiments of infantry, a couple of pieces of artillery and a small detachment of cavalry. further reinforcements he knew were on their way from the north to memphis. about this time general halleck ordered troops from helena, arkansas (territory west of the mississippi was not under my command then) to cut the road in pemberton's rear. the expedition was under generals hovey and c. c. washburn and was successful so far as reaching the railroad was concerned, but the damage done was very slight and was soon repaired. the tallahatchie, which confronted me, was very high, the railroad bridge destroyed and pemberton strongly fortified on the south side. a crossing would have been impossible in the presence of an enemy. i sent the cavalry higher up the stream and they secured a crossing. this caused the enemy to evacuate their position, which was possibly accelerated by the expedition of hovey and washburn. the enemy was followed as far south as oxford by the main body of troops, and some seventeen miles farther by mcpherson's command. here the pursuit was halted to repair the railroad from the tallahatchie northward, in order to bring up supplies. the piles on which the railroad bridge rested had been left standing. the work of constructing a roadway for the troops was but a short matter, and, later, rails were laid for cars. during the delay at oxford in repairing railroads i learned that an expedition down the mississippi now was inevitable and, desiring to have a competent commander in charge, i ordered sherman on the 8th of december back to memphis to take charge. the following were his orders: headquarters 13th army corps, department of the tennessee. oxford, mississippi, december 8,1862. major-general w. t. sherman, commanding right wing: you will proceed, with as little delay as possible, to memphis, tennessee, taking with you one division of your present command. on your arrival at memphis you will assume command of all the troops there, and that portion of general curtis's forces at present east of the mississippi river, and organize them into brigades and divisions in your own army. as soon as possible move with them down the river to the vicinity of vicksburg, and with the co-operation of the gunboat fleet under command of flag-officer porter proceed to the reduction of that place in such a manner as circumstances, and your own judgment, may dictate. the amount of rations, forage, land transportation, etc., necessary to take, will be left entirely with yourself. the quartermaster at st. louis will be instructed to send you transportation for 30,000 men; should you still find yourself deficient, your quartermaster will be authorized to make up the deficiency from such transports as may come into the port of memphis. on arriving in memphis, put yourself in communication with admiral porter, and arrange with him for his co-operation. inform me at the earliest practicable day of the time when you will embark, and such plans as may then be matured. i will hold the forces here in readiness to co-operate with you in such manner as the movements of the enemy may make necessary. leave the district of memphis in the command of an efficient officer, and with a garrison of four regiments of infantry, the siege guns, and whatever cavalry may be there. u. s. grant, major-general. this idea had presented itself to my mind earlier, for on the 3d of december i asked halleck if it would not be well to hold the enemy south of the yallabusha and move a force from helena and memphis on vicksburg. on the 5th again i suggested, from oxford, to halleck that if the helena troops were at my command i though it would be possible to take them and the memphis forces south of the mouth of the yazoo river, and thus secure vicksburg and the state of mississippi. halleck on the same day, the 5th of december, directed me not to attempt to hold the country south of the tallahatchie, but to collect 25,000 troops at memphis by the 20th for the vicksburg expedition. i sent sherman with two divisions at once, informed the general-in-chief of the fact, and asked whether i should command the expedition down the river myself or send sherman. i was authorized to do as i though best for the accomplishment of the great object in view. i sent sherman and so informed general halleck. as stated, my action in sending sherman back was expedited by a desire to get him in command of the forces separated from my direct supervision. i feared that delay might bring mcclernand, who was his senior and who had authority from the president and secretary of war to exercise that particular command,--and independently. i doubted mcclernand's fitness; and i had good reason to believe that in forestalling him i was by no means giving offence to those whose authority to command was above both him and me. neither my orders to general sherman, nor the correspondence between us or between general halleck and myself, contemplated at the time my going further south than the yallabusha. pemberton's force in my front was the main part of the garrison of vicksburg, as the force with me was the defence of the territory held by us in west tennessee and kentucky. i hoped to hold pemberton in my front while sherman should get in his rear and into vicksburg. the further north the enemy could be held the better. it was understood, however, between general sherman and myself that our movements were to be co-operative; if pemberton could not be held away from vicksburg i was to follow him; but at that time it was not expected to abandon the railroad north of the yallabusha. with that point as a secondary base of supplies, the possibility of moving down the yazoo until communications could be opened with the mississippi was contemplated. it was my intention, and so understood by sherman and his command, that if the enemy should fall back i would follow him even to the gates of vicksburg. i intended in such an event to hold the road to grenada on the yallabusha and cut loose from there, expecting to establish a new base of supplies on the yazoo, or at vicksburg itself, with grenada to fall back upon in case of failure. it should be remembered that at the time i speak of it had not been demonstrated that an army could operate in an enemy's territory depending upon the country for supplies. a halt was called at oxford with the advance seventeen miles south of there, to bring up the road to the latter point and to bring supplies of food, forage and munitions to the front. on the 18th of december i received orders from washington to divide my command into four army corps, with general mcclernand to command one of them and to be assigned to that part of the army which was to operate down the mississippi. this interfered with my plans, but probably resulted in my ultimately taking the command in person. mcclernand was at that time in springfield, illinois. the order was obeyed without any delay. dispatches were sent to him the same day in conformity. on the 20th general van dorn appeared at holly springs, my secondary base of supplies, captured the garrison of 1,500 men commanded by colonel murphy, of the 8th wisconsin regiment, and destroyed all our munitions of war, food and forage. the capture was a disgraceful one to the officer commanding but not to the troops under him. at the same time forrest got on our line of railroad between jackson, tennessee, and columbus, kentucky, doing much damage to it. this cut me off from all communication with the north for more than a week, and it was more than two weeks before rations or forage could be issued from stores obtained in the regular way. this demonstrated the impossibility of maintaining so long a line of road over which to draw supplies for an army moving in an enemy's country. i determined, therefore, to abandon my campaign into the interior with columbus as a base, and returned to la grange and grand junction destroying the road to my front and repairing the road to memphis, making the mississippi river the line over which to draw supplies. pemberton was falling back at the same time. the moment i received the news of van dorn's success i sent the cavalry at the front back to drive him from the country. he had start enough to move north destroying the railroad in many places, and to attack several small garrisons intrenched as guards to the railroad. all these he found warned of his coming and prepared to receive him. van dorn did not succeed in capturing a single garrison except the one at holly springs, which was larger than all the others attacked by him put together. murphy was also warned of van dorn's approach, but made no preparations to meet him. he did not even notify his command. colonel murphy was the officer who, two months before, had evacuated iuka on the approach of the enemy. general rosecrans denounced him for the act and desired to have him tried and punished. i sustained the colonel at the time because his command was a small one compared with that of the enemy--not one-tenth as large--and i thought he had done well to get away without falling into their hands. his leaving large stores to fall into price's possession i looked upon as an oversight and excused it on the ground of inexperience in military matters. he should, however, have destroyed them. this last surrender demonstrated to my mind that rosecrans' judgment of murphy's conduct at iuka was correct. the surrender of holly springs was most reprehensible and showed either the disloyalty of colonel murphy to the cause which he professed to serve, or gross cowardice. after the war was over i read from the diary of a lady who accompanied general pemberton in his retreat from the tallahatchie, that the retreat was almost a panic. the roads were bad and it was difficult to move the artillery and trains. why there should have been a panic i do not see. no expedition had yet started down the mississippi river. had i known the demoralized condition of the enemy, or the fact that central mississippi abounded so in all army supplies, i would have been in pursuit of pemberton while his cavalry was destroying the roads in my rear. after sending cavalry to drive van dorn away, my next order was to dispatch all the wagons we had, under proper escort, to collect and bring in all supplies of forage and food from a region of fifteen miles east and west of the road from our front back to grand junction, leaving two months' supplies for the families of those whose stores were taken. i was amazed at the quantity of supplies the country afforded. it showed that we could have subsisted off the country for two months instead of two weeks without going beyond the limits designated. this taught me a lesson which was taken advantage of later in the campaign when our army lived twenty days with the issue of only five days' rations by the commissary. our loss of supplies was great at holly springs, but it was more than compensated for by those taken from the country and by the lesson taught. the news of the capture of holly springs and the destruction of our supplies caused much rejoicing among the people remaining in oxford. they came with broad smiles on their faces, indicating intense joy, to ask what i was going to do now without anything for my soldiers to eat. i told them that i was not disturbed; that i had already sent troops and wagons to collect all the food and forage they could find for fifteen miles on each side of the road. countenances soon changed, and so did the inquiry. the next was, "what are we to do?" my response was that we had endeavored to feed ourselves from our own northern resources while visiting them; but their friends in gray had been uncivil enough to destroy what we had brought along, and it could not be expected that men, with arms in their hands, would starve in the midst of plenty. i advised them to emigrate east, or west, fifteen miles and assist in eating up what we left. chapter xxxi. headquarters moved to holly springs--general m'clernand in command --assuming command at young's point--operations above vicksburg --fortifications about vicksburg--the canal--lake providence --operations at yazoo pass. this interruption in my communications north--i was really cut off from communication with a great part of my own command during this time --resulted in sherman's moving from memphis before mcclernand could arrive, for my dispatch of the 18th did not reach mcclernand. pemberton got back to vicksburg before sherman got there. the rebel positions were on a bluff on the yazoo river, some miles above its mouth. the waters were high so that the bottoms were generally overflowed, leaving only narrow causeways of dry land between points of debarkation and the high bluffs. these were fortified and defended at all points. the rebel position was impregnable against any force that could be brought against its front. sherman could not use one-fourth of his force. his efforts to capture the city, or the high ground north of it, were necessarily unavailing. sherman's attack was very unfortunate, but i had no opportunity of communicating with him after the destruction of the road and telegraph to my rear on the 20th. he did not know but what i was in the rear of the enemy and depending on him to open a new base of supplies for the troops with me. i had, before he started from memphis, directed him to take with him a few small steamers suitable for the navigation of the yazoo, not knowing but that i might want them to supply me after cutting loose from my base at grenada. on the 23d i removed my headquarters back to holly springs. the troops were drawn back gradually, but without haste or confusion, finding supplies abundant and no enemy following. the road was not damaged south of holly springs by van dorn, at least not to an extent to cause any delay. as i had resolved to move headquarters to memphis, and to repair the road to that point, i remained at holly springs until this work was completed. on the 10th of january, the work on the road from holly springs to grand junction and thence to memphis being completed, i moved my headquarters to the latter place. during the campaign here described, the losses (mostly captures) were about equal, crediting the rebels with their holly springs capture, which they could not hold. when sherman started on his expedition down the river he had 20,000 men, taken from memphis, and was reinforced by 12,000 more at helena, arkansas. the troops on the west bank of the river had previously been assigned to my command. mcclernand having received the orders for his assignment reached the mouth of the yazoo on the 2d of january, and immediately assumed command of all the troops with sherman, being a part of his own corps, the 13th, and all of sherman's, the 15th. sherman, and admiral porter with the fleet, had withdrawn from the yazoo. after consultation they decided that neither the army nor navy could render service to the cause where they were, and learning that i had withdrawn from the interior of mississippi, they determined to return to the arkansas river and to attack arkansas post, about fifty miles up that stream and garrisoned by about five or six thousand men. sherman had learned of the existence of this force through a man who had been captured by the enemy with a steamer loaded with ammunition and other supplies intended for his command. the man had made his escape. mcclernand approved this move reluctantly, as sherman says. no obstacle was encountered until the gunboats and transports were within range of the fort. after three days' bombardment by the navy an assault was made by the troops and marines, resulting in the capture of the place, and in taking 5,000 prisoners and 17 guns. i was at first disposed to disapprove of this move as an unnecessary side movement having no especial bearing upon the work before us; but when the result was understood i regarded it as very important. five thousand confederate troops left in the rear might have caused us much trouble and loss of property while navigating the mississippi. immediately after the reduction of arkansas post and the capture of the garrison, mcclernand returned with his entire force to napoleon, at the mouth of the arkansas river. from here i received messages from both sherman and admiral porter, urging me to come and take command in person, and expressing their distrust of mcclernand's ability and fitness for so important and intricate an expedition. on the 17th i visited mcclernand and his command at napoleon. it was here made evident to me that both the army and navy were so distrustful of mcclernand's fitness to command that, while they would do all they could to insure success, this distrust was an element of weakness. it would have been criminal to send troops under these circumstances into such danger. by this time i had received authority to relieve mcclernand, or to assign any person else to the command of the river expedition, or to assume command in person. i felt great embarrassment about mcclernand. he was the senior major-general after myself within the department. it would not do, with his rank and ambition, to assign a junior over him. nothing was left, therefore, but to assume the command myself. i would have been glad to put sherman in command, to give him an opportunity to accomplish what he had failed in the december before; but there seemed no other way out of the difficulty, for he was junior to mcclernand. sherman's failure needs no apology. on the 20th i ordered general mcclernand with the entire command, to young's point and milliken's bend, while i returned to memphis to make all the necessary preparation for leaving the territory behind me secure. general hurlbut with the 16th corps was left in command. the memphis and charleston railroad was held, while the mississippi central was given up. columbus was the only point between cairo and memphis, on the river, left with a garrison. all the troops and guns from the posts on the abandoned railroad and river were sent to the front. on the 29th of january i arrived at young's point and assumed command the following day. general mcclernand took exception in a most characteristic way--for him. his correspondence with me on the subject was more in the nature of a reprimand than a protest. it was highly insubordinate, but i overlooked it, as i believed, for the good of the service. general mcclernand was a politician of very considerable prominence in his state; he was a member of congress when the secession war broke out; he belonged to that political party which furnished all the opposition there was to a vigorous prosecution of the war for saving the union; there was no delay in his declaring himself for the union at all hazards, and there was no uncertain sound in his declaration of where he stood in the contest before the country. he also gave up his seat in congress to take the field in defence of the principles he had proclaimed. the real work of the campaign and siege of vicksburg now began. the problem was to secure a footing upon dry ground on the east side of the river from which the troops could operate against vicksburg. the mississippi river, from cairo south, runs through a rich alluvial valley of many miles in width, bound on the east by land running from eighty up to two or more hundred feet above the river. on the west side the highest land, except in a few places, is but little above the highest water. through this valley the river meanders in the most tortuous way, varying in direction to all points of the compass. at places it runs to the very foot of the bluffs. after leaving memphis, there are no such highlands coming to the water's edge on the east shore until vicksburg is reached. the intervening land is cut up by bayous filled from the river in high water--many of them navigable for steamers. all of them would be, except for overhanging trees, narrowness and tortuous course, making it impossible to turn the bends with vessels of any considerable length. marching across this country in the face of an enemy was impossible; navigating it proved equally impracticable. the strategical way according to the rule, therefore, would have been to go back to memphis; establish that as a base of supplies; fortify it so that the storehouses could be held by a small garrison, and move from there along the line of railroad, repairing as we advanced, to the yallabusha, or to jackson, mississippi. at this time the north had become very much discouraged. many strong union men believed that the war must prove a failure. the elections of 1862 had gone against the party which was for the prosecution of the war to save the union if it took the last man and the last dollar. voluntary enlistments had ceased throughout the greater part of the north, and the draft had been resorted to to fill up our ranks. it was my judgment at the time that to make a backward movement as long as that from vicksburg to memphis, would be interpreted, by many of those yet full of hope for the preservation of the union, as a defeat, and that the draft would be resisted, desertions ensue and the power to capture and punish deserters lost. there was nothing left to be done but to go forward to a decisive victory. this was in my mind from the moment i took command in person at young's point. the winter of 1862-3 was a noted one for continuous high water in the mississippi and for heavy rains along the lower river. to get dry land, or rather land above the water, to encamp the troops upon, took many miles of river front. we had to occupy the levees and the ground immediately behind. this was so limited that one corps, the 17th, under general mcpherson, was at lake providence, seventy miles above vicksburg. it was in january the troops took their position opposite vicksburg. the water was very high and the rains were incessant. there seemed no possibility of a land movement before the end of march or later, and it would not do to lie idle all this time. the effect would be demoralizing to the troops and injurious to their health. friends in the north would have grown more and more discouraged, and enemies in the same section more and more insolent in their gibes and denunciation of the cause and those engaged in it. i always admired the south, as bad as i thought their cause, for the boldness with which they silenced all opposition and all croaking, by press or by individuals, within their control. war at all times, whether a civil war between sections of a common country or between nations, ought to be avoided, if possible with honor. but, once entered into, it is too much for human nature to tolerate an enemy within their ranks to give aid and comfort to the armies of the opposing section or nation. vicksburg, as stated before, is on the first high land coming to the river's edge, below that on which memphis stands. the bluff, or high land, follows the left bank of the yazoo for some distance and continues in a southerly direction to the mississippi river, thence it runs along the mississippi to warrenton, six miles below. the yazoo river leaves the high land a short distance below haines' bluff and empties into the mississippi nine miles above vicksburg. vicksburg is built on this high land where the mississippi washes the base of the hill. haines' bluff, eleven miles from vicksburg, on the yazoo river, was strongly fortified. the whole distance from there to vicksburg and thence to warrenton was also intrenched, with batteries at suitable distances and rifle-pits connecting them. from young's point the mississippi turns in a north-easterly direction to a point just above the city, when it again turns and runs south-westerly, leaving vessels, which might attempt to run the blockade, exposed to the fire of batteries six miles below the city before they were in range of the upper batteries. since then the river has made a cut-off, leaving what was the peninsula in front of the city, an island. north of the yazoo was all a marsh, heavily timbered, cut up with bayous, and much overflowed. a front attack was therefore impossible, and was never contemplated; certainly not by me. the problem then became, how to secure a landing on high ground east of the mississippi without an apparent retreat. then commenced a series of experiments to consume time, and to divert the attention of the enemy, of my troops and of the public generally. i, myself, never felt great confidence that any of the experiments resorted to would prove successful. nevertheless i was always prepared to take advantage of them in case they did. in 1862 general thomas williams had come up from new orleans and cut a ditch ten or twelve feet wide and about as deep, straight across from young's point to the river below. the distance across was a little over a mile. it was williams' expectation that when the river rose it would cut a navigable channel through; but the canal started in an eddy from both ends, and, of course, it only filled up with water on the rise without doing any execution in the way of cutting. mr. lincoln had navigated the mississippi in his younger days and understood well its tendency to change its channel, in places, from time to time. he set much store accordingly by this canal. general mcclernand had been, therefore, directed before i went to young's point to push the work of widening and deepening this canal. after my arrival the work was diligently pushed with about 4,000 men--as many as could be used to advantage--until interrupted by a sudden rise in the river that broke a dam at the upper end, which had been put there to keep the water out until the excavation was completed. this was on the 8th of march. even if the canal had proven a success, so far as to be navigable for steamers, it could not have been of much advantage to us. it runs in a direction almost perpendicular to the line of bluffs on the opposite side, or east bank, of the river. as soon as the enemy discovered what we were doing he established a battery commanding the canal throughout its length. this battery soon drove out our dredges, two in number, which were doing the work of thousands of men. had the canal been completed it might have proven of some use in running transports through, under the cover of night, to use below; but they would yet have to run batteries, though for a much shorter distance. while this work was progressing we were busy in other directions, trying to find an available landing on high ground on the east bank of the river, or to make water-ways to get below the city, avoiding the batteries. on the 30th of january, the day after my arrival at the front, i ordered general mcpherson, stationed with his corps at lake providence, to cut the levee at that point. if successful in opening a channel for navigation by this route, it would carry us to the mississippi river through the mouth of the red river, just above port hudson and four hundred miles below vicksburg by the river. lake providence is a part of the old bed of the mississippi, about a mile from the present channel. it is six miles long and has its outlet through bayou baxter, bayou macon, and the tensas, washita and red rivers. the last three are navigable streams at all seasons. bayous baxter and macon are narrow and tortuous, and the banks are covered with dense forests overhanging the channel. they were also filled with fallen timber, the accumulation of years. the land along the mississippi river, from memphis down, is in all instances highest next to the river, except where the river washes the bluffs which form the boundary of the valley through which it winds. bayou baxter, as it reaches lower land, begins to spread out and disappears entirely in a cypress swamp before it reaches the macon. there was about two feet of water in this swamp at the time. to get through it, even with vessels of the lightest draft, it was necessary to clear off a belt of heavy timber wide enough to make a passage way. as the trees would have to be cut close to the bottom--under water--it was an undertaking of great magnitude. on the 4th of february i visited general mcpherson, and remained with him several days. the work had not progressed so far as to admit the water from the river into the lake, but the troops had succeeded in drawing a small steamer, of probably not over thirty tons' capacity, from the river into the lake. with this we were able to explore the lake and bayou as far as cleared. i saw then that there was scarcely a chance of this ever becoming a practicable route for moving troops through an enemy's country. the distance from lake providence to the point where vessels going by that route would enter the mississippi again, is about four hundred and seventy miles by the main river. the distance would probably be greater by the tortuous bayous through which this new route would carry us. the enemy held port hudson, below where the red river debouches, and all the mississippi above to vicksburg. the red river, washita and tensas were, as has been said, all navigable streams, on which the enemy could throw small bodies of men to obstruct our passage and pick off our troops with their sharpshooters. i let the work go on, believing employment was better than idleness for the men. then, too, it served as a cover for other efforts which gave a better prospect of success. this work was abandoned after the canal proved a failure. lieutenant-colonel wilson of my staff was sent to helena, arkansas, to examine and open a way through moon lake and the yazoo pass if possible. formerly there was a route by way of an inlet from the mississippi river into moon lake, a mile east of the river, thence east through yazoo pass to coldwater, along the latter to the tallahatchie, which joins the yallabusha about two hundred and fifty miles below moon lake and forms the yazoo river. these were formerly navigated by steamers trading with the rich plantations along their banks; but the state of mississippi had built a strong levee across the inlet some years before, leaving the only entrance for vessels into this rich region the one by way of the mouth of the yazoo several hundreds of miles below. on the 2d of february this dam, or levee, was cut. the river being high the rush of water through the cut was so great that in a very short time the entire obstruction was washed away. the bayous were soon filled and much of the country was overflowed. this pass leaves the mississippi river but a few miles below helena. on the 24th general ross, with his brigade of about 4,500 men on transports, moved into this new water-way. the rebels had obstructed the navigation of yazoo pass and the coldwater by felling trees into them. much of the timber in this region being of greater specific gravity than water, and being of great size, their removal was a matter of great labor; but it was finally accomplished, and on the 11th of march ross found himself, accompanied by two gunboats under the command of lieutenant-commander watson smith, confronting a fortification at greenwood, where the tallahatchie and yallabusha unite and the yazoo begins. the bends of the rivers are such at this point as to almost form an island, scarcely above water at that stage of the river. this island was fortified and manned. it was named fort pemberton after the commander at vicksburg. no land approach was accessible. the troops, therefore, could render no assistance towards an assault further than to establish a battery on a little piece of ground which was discovered above water. the gunboats, however, attacked on the 11th and again on the 13th of march. both efforts were failures and were not renewed. one gunboat was disabled and we lost six men killed and twenty-five wounded. the loss of the enemy was less. fort pemberton was so little above the water that it was thought that a rise of two feet would drive the enemy out. in hope of enlisting the elements on our side, which had been so much against us up to this time, a second cut was made in the mississippi levee, this time directly opposite helena, or six miles above the former cut. it did not accomplish the desired result, and ross, with his fleet, started back. on the 22d he met quinby with a brigade at yazoo pass. quinby was the senior of ross, and assumed command. he was not satisfied with returning to his former position without seeing for himself whether anything could be accomplished. accordingly fort pemberton was revisited by our troops; but an inspection was sufficient this time without an attack. quinby, with his command, returned with but little delay. in the meantime i was much exercised for the safety of ross, not knowing that quinby had been able to join him. reinforcements were of no use in a country covered with water, as they would have to remain on board of their transports. relief had to come from another quarter. so i determined to get into the yazoo below fort pemberton. steel's bayou empties into the yazoo river between haines' bluff and its mouth. it is narrow, very tortuous, and fringed with a very heavy growth of timber, but it is deep. it approaches to within one mile of the mississippi at eagle bend, thirty miles above young's point. steel's bayou connects with black bayou, black bayou with deer creek, deer creek with rolling fork, rolling fork with the big sunflower river, and the big sunflower with the yazoo river about ten miles above haines' bluff in a right line but probably twenty or twenty-five miles by the winding of the river. all these waterways are of about the same nature so far as navigation is concerned, until the sunflower is reached; this affords free navigation. admiral porter explored this waterway as far as deer creek on the 14th of march, and reported it navigable. on the next day he started with five gunboats and four mortar-boats. i went with him for some distance. the heavy overhanging timber retarded progress very much, as did also the short turns in so narrow a stream. the gunboats, however, ploughed their way through without other damage than to their appearance. the transports did not fare so well although they followed behind. the road was somewhat cleared for them by the gunboats. in the evening i returned to headquarters to hurry up reinforcements. sherman went in person on the 16th, taking with him stuart's division of the 15th corps. they took large river transports to eagle bend on the mississippi, where they debarked and marched across to steel's bayou, where they re-embarked on the transports. the river steamers, with their tall smokestacks and light guards extending out, were so much impeded that the gunboats got far ahead. porter, with his fleet, got within a few hundred yards of where the sailing would have been clear and free from the obstructions caused by felling trees into the water, when he encountered rebel sharp-shooters, and his progress was delayed by obstructions in his front. he could do nothing with gunboats against sharpshooters. the rebels, learning his route, had sent in about 4,000 men--many more than there were sailors in the fleet. sherman went back, at the request of the admiral, to clear out black bayou and to hurry up reinforcements, which were far behind. on the night of the 19th he received notice from the admiral that he had been attacked by sharp-shooters and was in imminent peril. sherman at once returned through black bayou in a canoe, and passed on until he met a steamer, with the last of the reinforcements he had, coming up. they tried to force their way through black bayou with their steamer, but, finding it slow and tedious work, debarked and pushed forward on foot. it was night when they landed, and intensely dark. there was but a narrow strip of land above water, and that was grown up with underbrush or cane. the troops lighted their way through this with candles carried in their hands for a mile and a half, when they came to an open plantation. here the troops rested until morning. they made twenty-one miles from this resting-place by noon the next day, and were in time to rescue the fleet. porter had fully made up his mind to blow up the gunboats rather than have them fall into the hands of the enemy. more welcome visitors he probably never met than the "boys in blue" on this occasion. the vessels were backed out and returned to their rendezvous on the mississippi; and thus ended in failure the fourth attempt to get in rear of vicksburg. chapter xxxii. the bayous west of the mississippi--criticisms of the northern press --running the batteries--loss of the indianola--disposition of the troops. the original canal scheme was also abandoned on the 27th of march. the effort to make a waterway through lake providence and the connecting bayous was abandoned as wholly impracticable about the same time. at milliken's bend, and also at young's point, bayous or channels start, which connecting with other bayous passing richmond, louisiana, enter the mississippi at carthage twenty-five or thirty miles above grand gulf. the mississippi levee cuts the supply of water off from these bayous or channels, but all the rainfall behind the levee, at these points, is carried through these same channels to the river below. in case of a crevasse in this vicinity, the water escaping would find its outlet through the same channels. the dredges and laborers from the canal having been driven out by overflow and the enemy's batteries, i determined to open these other channels, if possible. if successful the effort would afford a route, away from the enemy's batteries, for our transports. there was a good road back of the levees, along these bayous, to carry the troops, artillery and wagon trains over whenever the water receded a little, and after a few days of dry weather. accordingly, with the abandonment of all the other plans for reaching a base heretofore described, this new one was undertaken. as early as the 4th of february i had written to halleck about this route, stating that i thought it much more practicable than the other undertaking (the lake providence route), and that it would have been accomplished with much less labor if commenced before the water had got all over the country. the upper end of these bayous being cut off from a water supply, further than the rainfall back of the levees, was grown up with dense timber for a distance of several miles from their source. it was necessary, therefore, to clear this out before letting in the water from the river. this work was continued until the waters of the river began to recede and the road to richmond, louisiana, emerged from the water. one small steamer and some barges were got through this channel, but no further use could be made of it because of the fall in the river. beyond this it was no more successful than the other experiments with which the winter was whiled away. all these failures would have been very discouraging if i had expected much from the efforts; but i had not. from the first the most i hoped to accomplish was the passage of transports, to be used below vicksburg, without exposure to the long line of batteries defending that city. this long, dreary and, for heavy and continuous rains and high water, unprecedented winter was one of great hardship to all engaged about vicksburg. the river was higher than its natural banks from december, 1862, to the following april. the war had suspended peaceful pursuits in the south, further than the production of army supplies, and in consequence the levees were neglected and broken in many places and the whole country was covered with water. troops could scarcely find dry ground on which to pitch their tents. malarial fevers broke out among the men. measles and small-pox also attacked them. the hospital arrangements and medical attendance were so perfect, however, that the loss of life was much less than might have been expected. visitors to the camps went home with dismal stories to relate; northern papers came back to the soldiers with these stories exaggerated. because i would not divulge my ultimate plans to visitors, they pronounced me idle, incompetent and unfit to command men in an emergency, and clamored for my removal. they were not to be satisfied, many of them, with my simple removal, but named who my successor should be. mcclernand, fremont, hunter and mcclellan were all mentioned in this connection. i took no steps to answer these complaints, but continued to do my duty, as i understood it, to the best of my ability. every one has his superstitions. one of mine is that in positions of great responsibility every one should do his duty to the best of his ability where assigned by competent authority, without application or the use of influence to change his position. while at cairo i had watched with very great interest the operations of the army of the potomac, looking upon that as the main field of the war. i had no idea, myself, of ever having any large command, nor did i suppose that i was equal to one; but i had the vanity to think that as a cavalry officer i might succeed very well in the command of a brigade. on one occasion, in talking about this to my staff officers, all of whom were civilians without any military education whatever, i said that i would give anything if i were commanding a brigade of cavalry in the army of the potomac and i believed i could do some good. captain hillyer spoke up and suggested that i make application to be transferred there to command the cavalry. i then told him that i would cut my right arm off first, and mentioned this superstition. in time of war the president, being by the constitution commander-in-chief of the army and navy, is responsible for the selection of commanders. he should not be embarrassed in making his selections. i having been selected, my responsibility ended with my doing the best i knew how. if i had sought the place, or obtained it through personal or political influence, my belief is that i would have feared to undertake any plan of my own conception, and would probably have awaited direct orders from my distant superiors. persons obtaining important commands by application or political influence are apt to keep a written record of complaints and predictions of defeat, which are shown in case of disaster. somebody must be responsible for their failures. with all the pressure brought to bear upon them, both president lincoln and general halleck stood by me to the end of the campaign. i had never met mr. lincoln, but his support was constant. at last the waters began to recede; the roads crossing the peninsula behind the levees of the bayous, were emerging from the waters; the troops were all concentrated from distant points at milliken's bend preparatory to a final move which was to crown the long, tedious and discouraging labors with success. i had had in contemplation the whole winter the movement by land to a point below vicksburg from which to operate, subject only to the possible but not expected success of some one of the expedients resorted to for the purpose of giving us a different base. this could not be undertaken until the waters receded. i did not therefore communicate this plan, even to an officer of my staff, until it was necessary to make preparations for the start. my recollection is that admiral porter was the first one to whom i mentioned it. the co-operation of the navy was absolutely essential to the success (even to the contemplation) of such an enterprise. i had no more authority to command porter than he had to command me. it was necessary to have part of his fleet below vicksburg if the troops went there. steamers to use as ferries were also essential. the navy was the only escort and protection for these steamers, all of which in getting below had to run about fourteen miles of batteries. porter fell into the plan at once, and suggested that he had better superintend the preparation of the steamers selected to run the batteries, as sailors would probably understand the work better than soldiers. i was glad to accept his proposition, not only because i admitted his argument, but because it would enable me to keep from the enemy a little longer our designs. porter's fleet was on the east side of the river above the mouth of the yazoo, entirely concealed from the enemy by the dense forests that intervened. even spies could not get near him, on account of the undergrowth and overflowed lands. suspicions of some mysterious movements were aroused. our river guards discovered one day a small skiff moving quietly and mysteriously up the river near the east shore, from the direction of vicksburg, towards the fleet. on overhauling the boat they found a small white flag, not much larger than a handkerchief, set up in the stern, no doubt intended as a flag of truce in case of discovery. the boat, crew and passengers were brought ashore to me. the chief personage aboard proved to be jacob thompson, secretary of the interior under the administration of president buchanan. after a pleasant conversation of half an hour or more i allowed the boat and crew, passengers and all, to return to vicksburg, without creating a suspicion that there was a doubt in my mind as to the good faith of mr. thompson and his flag. admiral porter proceeded with the preparation of the steamers for their hazardous passage of the enemy's batteries. the great essential was to protect the boilers from the enemy's shot, and to conceal the fires under the boilers from view. this he accomplished by loading the steamers, between the guards and boilers on the boiler deck up to the deck above, with bales of hay and cotton, and the deck in front of the boilers in the same way, adding sacks of grain. the hay and grain would be wanted below, and could not be transported in sufficient quantity by the muddy roads over which we expected to march. before this i had been collecting, from st. louis and chicago, yawls and barges to be used as ferries when we got below. by the 16th of april porter was ready to start on his perilous trip. the advance, flagship benton, porter commanding, started at ten o'clock at night, followed at intervals of a few minutes by the lafayette with a captured steamer, the price, lashed to her side, the louisville, mound city, pittsburgh and carondelet--all of these being naval vessels. next came the transports --forest queen, silver wave and henry clay, each towing barges loaded with coal to be used as fuel by the naval and transport steamers when below the batteries. the gunboat tuscumbia brought up the rear. soon after the start a battery between vicksburg and warrenton opened fire across the intervening peninsula, followed by the upper batteries, and then by batteries all along the line. the gunboats ran up close under the bluffs, delivering their fire in return at short distances, probably without much effect. they were under fire for more than two hours and every vessel was struck many times, but with little damage to the gunboats. the transports did not fare so well. the henry clay was disabled and deserted by her crew. soon after a shell burst in the cotton packed about the boilers, set the vessel on fire and burned her to the water's edge. the burning mass, however, floated down to carthage before grounding, as did also one of the barges in tow. the enemy were evidently expecting our fleet, for they were ready to light up the river by means of bonfires on the east side and by firing houses on the point of land opposite the city on the louisiana side. the sight was magnificent, but terrible. i witnessed it from the deck of a river transport, run out into the middle of the river and as low down as it was prudent to go. my mind was much relieved when i learned that no one on the transports had been killed and but few, if any, wounded. during the running of the batteries men were stationed in the holds of the transports to partially stop with cotton shot-holes that might be made in the hulls. all damage was afterwards soon repaired under the direction of admiral porter. the experiment of passing batteries had been tried before this, however, during the war. admiral farragut had run the batteries at port hudson with the flagship hartford and one iron-clad and visited me from below vicksburg. the 13th of february admiral porter had sent the gunboat indianola, lieutenant-commander george brown commanding, below. she met colonel ellet of the marine brigade below natchez on a captured steamer. two of the colonel's fleet had previously run the batteries, producing the greatest consternation among the people along the mississippi from vicksburg (*10) to the red river. the indianola remained about the mouth of the red river some days, and then started up the mississippi. the confederates soon raised the queen of the west, (*11) and repaired her. with this vessel and the ram webb, which they had had for some time in the red river, and two other steamers, they followed the indianola. the latter was encumbered with barges of coal in tow, and consequently could make but little speed against the rapid current of the mississippi. the confederate fleet overtook her just above grand gulf, and attacked her after dark on the 24th of february. the indianola was superior to all the others in armament, and probably would have destroyed them or driven them away, but for her encumbrance. as it was she fought them for an hour and a half, but, in the dark, was struck seven or eight times by the ram and other vessels, and was finally disabled and reduced to a sinking condition. the armament was thrown overboard and the vessel run ashore. officers and crew then surrendered. i had started mcclernand with his corps of four divisions on the 29th of march, by way of richmond, louisiana, to new carthage, hoping that he might capture grand gulf before the balance of the troops could get there; but the roads were very bad, scarcely above water yet. some miles from new carthage the levee to bayou vidal was broken in several places, overflowing the roads for the distance of two miles. boats were collected from the surrounding bayous, and some constructed on the spot from such material as could be collected, to transport the troops across the overflowed interval. by the 6th of april mcclernand had reached new carthage with one division and its artillery, the latter ferried through the woods by these boats. on the 17th i visited new carthage in person, and saw that the process of getting troops through in the way we were doing was so tedious that a better method must be devised. the water was falling, and in a few days there would not be depth enough to use boats; nor would the land be dry enough to march over. mcclernand had already found a new route from smith's plantation where the crevasse occurred, to perkins' plantation, eight to twelve miles below new carthage. this increased the march from milliken's bend from twenty-seven to nearly forty miles. four bridges had to be built across bayous, two of them each over six hundred feet long, making about two thousand feet of bridging in all. the river falling made the current in these bayous very rapid, increasing the difficulty of building and permanently fastening these bridges; but the ingenuity of the "yankee soldier" was equal to any emergency. the bridges were soon built of such material as could be found near by, and so substantial were they that not a single mishap occurred in crossing all the army with artillery, cavalry and wagon trains, except the loss of one siege gun (a thirty-two pounder). this, if my memory serves me correctly, broke through the only pontoon bridge we had in all our march across the peninsula. these bridges were all built by mcclernand's command, under the supervision of lieutenant hains of the engineer corps. i returned to milliken's bend on the 18th or 19th, and on the 20th issued the following final order for the movement of troops: headquarters department of the tennessee, milliken's bend, louisiana, april 20, 1863. special orders, no. 110. * * * * * * * viii. the following orders are published for the information and guidance of the "army in the field," in its present movement to obtain a foothold on the east bank of the mississippi river, from which vicksburg can be approached by practicable roads. first.--the thirteenth army corps, major-general john a. mcclernand commanding, will constitute the right wing. second.--the fifteenth army corps, major-general w. t. sherman commanding, will constitute the left wing. third.--the seventeenth army corps, major-general james b. mcpherson commanding, will constitute the centre. fourth.--the order of march to new carthage will be from right to left. fifth.--reserves will be formed by divisions from each army corps; or, an entire army corps will be held as a reserve, as necessity may require. when the reserve is formed by divisions, each division will remain under the immediate command of its respective corps commander, unless otherwise specially ordered for a particular emergency. sixth.--troops will be required to bivouac, until proper facilities can be afforded for the transportation of camp equipage. seventh.--in the present movement, one tent will be allowed to each company for the protection of rations from rain; one wall tent for each regimental headquarters; one wall tent for each brigade headquarters; and one wall tent for each division headquarters; corps commanders having the books and blanks of their respective commands to provide for, are authorized to take such tents as are absolutely necessary, but not to exceed the number allowed by general orders no. 160, a. g. o., series of 1862. eighth.--all the teams of the three army corps, under the immediate charge of the quartermasters bearing them on their returns, will constitute a train for carrying supplies and ordnance and the authorized camp equipage of the army. ninth.--as fast as the thirteenth army corps advances, the seventeenth army corps will take its place; and it, in turn, will be followed in like manner by the fifteenth army corps. tenth.--two regiments from each army corps will be detailed by corps commanders, to guard the lines from richmond to new carthage. eleventh.--general hospitals will be established by the medical director between duckport and milliken's bend. all sick and disabled soldiers will be left in these hospitals. surgeons in charge of hospitals will report convalescents as fast as they become fit for duty. each corps commander will detail an intelligent and good drill officer, to remain behind and take charge of the convalescents of their respective corps; officers so detailed will organize the men under their charge into squads and companies, without regard to the regiments they belong to; and in the absence of convalescent commissioned officers to command them, will appoint non-commissioned officers or privates. the force so organized will constitute the guard of the line from duckport to milliken's bend. they will furnish all the guards and details required for general hospitals, and with the contrabands that may be about the camps, will furnish all the details for loading and unloading boats. twelfth.--the movement of troops from milliken's bend to new carthage will be so conducted as to allow the transportation of ten days' supply of rations, and one-half the allowance of ordnance, required by previous orders. thirteenth.--commanders are authorized and enjoined to collect all the beef cattle, corn and other necessary supplies on the line of march; but wanton destruction of property, taking of articles useless for military purposes, insulting citizens, going into and searching houses without proper orders from division commanders, are positively prohibited. all such irregularities must be summarily punished. fourteenth.--brigadier-general j. c. sullivan is appointed to the command of all the forces detailed for the protection of the line from here to new carthage. his particular attention is called to general orders, no. 69, from adjutant-general's office, washington, of date march 20, 1863. by order of major-general u. s. grant. mcclernand was already below on the mississippi. two of mcpherson's divisions were put upon the march immediately. the third had not yet arrived from lake providence; it was on its way to milliken's bend and was to follow on arrival. sherman was to follow mcpherson. two of his divisions were at duckport and young's point, and the third under steele was under orders to return from greenville, mississippi, where it had been sent to expel a rebel battery that had been annoying our transports. it had now become evident that the army could not be rationed by a wagon train over the single narrow and almost impassable road between milliken's bend and perkins' plantation. accordingly six more steamers were protected as before, to run the batteries, and were loaded with supplies. they took twelve barges in tow, loaded also with rations. on the night of the 22d of april they ran the batteries, five getting through more or less disabled while one was sunk. about half the barges got through with their needed freight. when it was first proposed to run the blockade at vicksburg with river steamers there were but two captains or masters who were willing to accompany their vessels, and but one crew. volunteers were called for from the army, men who had had experience in any capacity in navigating the western rivers. captains, pilots, mates, engineers and deck-hands enough presented themselves to take five times the number of vessels we were moving through this dangerous ordeal. most of them were from logan's division, composed generally of men from the southern part of illinois and from missouri. all but two of the steamers were commanded by volunteers from the army, and all but one so manned. in this instance, as in all others during the war, i found that volunteers could be found in the ranks and among the commissioned officers to meet every call for aid whether mechanical or professional. colonel w. s. oliver was master of transportation on this occasion by special detail. chapter xxxiii. attack on grand gulf--operations below vicksburg. on the 24th my headquarters were with the advance at perkins' plantation. reconnoissances were made in boats to ascertain whether there was high land on the east shore of the river where we might land above grand gulf. there was none practicable. accordingly the troops were set in motion for hard times, twenty-two miles farther down the river and nearly opposite grand gulf. the loss of two steamers and six barges reduced our transportation so that only 10,000 men could be moved by water. some of the steamers that had got below were injured in their machinery, so that they were only useful as barges towed by those less severely injured. all the troops, therefore, except what could be transported in one trip, had to march. the road lay west of lake st. joseph. three large bayous had to be crossed. they were rapidly bridged in the same manner as those previously encountered. (*12) on the 27th mcclernand's corps was all at hard times, and mcpherson's was following closely. i had determined to make the attempt to effect a landing on the east side of the river as soon as possible. accordingly, on the morning of the 29th, mcclernand was directed to embark all the troops from his corps that our transports and barges could carry. about 10,000 men were so embarked. the plan was to have the navy silence the guns at grand gulf, and to have as many men as possible ready to debark in the shortest possible time under cover of the fire of the navy and carry the works by storm. the following order was issued: perkins plantation, la., april 27,1863. major-general j. a. mcclernand, commanding 13th a. c. commence immediately the embarkation of your corps, or so much of it as there is transportation for. have put aboard the artillery and every article authorized in orders limiting baggage, except the men, and hold them in readiness, with their places assigned, to be moved at a moment's warning. all the troops you may have, except those ordered to remain behind, send to a point nearly opposite grand gulf, where you see, by special orders of this date, general mcpherson is ordered to send one division. the plan of the attack will be for the navy to attack and silence all the batteries commanding the river. your corps will be on the river, ready to run to and debark on the nearest eligible land below the promontory first brought to view passing down the river. once on shore, have each commander instructed beforehand to form his men the best the ground will admit of, and take possession of the most commanding points, but avoid separating your command so that it cannot support itself. the first object is to get a foothold where our troops can maintain themselves until such time as preparations can be made and troops collected for a forward movement. admiral porter has proposed to place his boats in the position indicated to you a few days ago, and to bring over with them such troops as may be below the city after the guns of the enemy are silenced. it may be that the enemy will occupy positions back from the city, out of range of the gunboats, so as to make it desirable to run past grand gulf and land at rodney. in case this should prove the plan, a signal will be arranged and you duly informed, when the transports are to start with this view. or, it may be expedient for the boats to run past, but not the men. in this case, then, the transports would have to be brought back to where the men could land and move by forced marches to below grand gulf, re-embark rapidly and proceed to the latter place. there will be required, then, three signals; one, to indicate that the transports can run down and debark the troops at grand gulf; one, that the transports can run by without the troops; and the last, that the transports can run by with the troops on board. should the men have to march, all baggage and artillery will be left to run the blockade. if not already directed, require your men to keep three days' rations in their haversacks, not to be touched until a movement commences. u. s. grant, major-general. at 8 o'clock a.m., 29th, porter made the attack with his entire strength present, eight gunboats. for nearly five and a half hours the attack was kept up without silencing a single gun of the enemy. all this time mcclernand's 10,000 men were huddled together on the transports in the stream ready to attempt a landing if signalled. i occupied a tug from which i could see the effect of the battle on both sides, within range of the enemy's guns; but a small tug, without armament, was not calculated to attract the fire of batteries while they were being assailed themselves. about half-past one the fleet withdrew, seeing their efforts were entirely unavailing. the enemy ceased firing as soon as we withdrew. i immediately signalled the admiral and went aboard his ship. the navy lost in this engagement eighteen killed and fifty-six wounded. a large proportion of these were of the crew of the flagship, and most of those from a single shell which penetrated the ship's side and exploded between decks where the men were working their guns. the sight of the mangled and dying men which met my eye as i boarded the ship was sickening. grand gulf is on a high bluff where the river runs at the very foot of it. it is as defensible upon its front as vicksburg and, at that time, would have been just as impossible to capture by a front attack. i therefore requested porter to run the batteries with his fleet that night, and to take charge of the transports, all of which would be wanted below. there is a long tongue of land from the louisiana side extending towards grand gulf, made by the river running nearly east from about three miles above and nearly in the opposite direction from that point for about the same distance below. the land was so low and wet that it would not have been practicable to march an army across but for a levee. i had had this explored before, as well as the east bank below to ascertain if there was a possible point of debarkation north of rodney. it was found that the top of the levee afforded a good road to march upon. porter, as was always the case with him, not only acquiesced in the plan, but volunteered to use his entire fleet as transports. i had intended to make this request, but he anticipated me. at dusk, when concealed from the view of the enemy at grand gulf, mcclernand landed his command on the west bank. the navy and transports ran the batteries successfully. the troops marched across the point of land under cover of night, unobserved. by the time it was light the enemy saw our whole fleet, ironclads, gunboats, river steamers and barges, quietly moving down the river three miles below them, black, or rather blue, with national troops. when the troops debarked, the evening of the 29th, it was expected that we would have to go to rodney, about nine miles below, to find a landing; but that night a colored man came in who informed me that a good landing would be found at bruinsburg, a few miles above rodney, from which point there was a good road leading to port gibson some twelve miles in the interior. the information was found correct, and our landing was effected without opposition. sherman had not left his position above vicksburg yet. on the morning of the 27th i ordered him to create a diversion by moving his corps up the yazoo and threatening an attack on haines' bluff. my object was to compel pemberton to keep as much force about vicksburg as i could, until i could secure a good footing on high land east of the river. the move was eminently successful and, as we afterwards learned, created great confusion about vicksburg and doubts about our real design. sherman moved the day of our attack on grand gulf, the 29th, with ten regiments of his command and eight gunboats which porter had left above vicksburg. he debarked his troops and apparently made every preparation to attack the enemy while the navy bombarded the main forts at haines' bluff. this move was made without a single casualty in either branch of the service. on the first of may sherman received orders from me (sent from hard times the evening of the 29th of april) to withdraw from the front of haines' bluff and follow mcpherson with two divisions as fast as he could. i had established a depot of supplies at perkins' plantation. now that all our gunboats were below grand gulf it was possible that the enemy might fit out boats in the big black with improvised armament and attempt to destroy these supplies. mcpherson was at hard times with a portion of his corps, and the depot was protected by a part of his command. the night of the 29th i directed him to arm one of the transports with artillery and send it up to perkins' plantation as a guard; and also to have the siege guns we had brought along moved there and put in position. the embarkation below grand gulf took place at de shroon's, louisiana, six miles above bruinsburg, mississippi. early on the morning of 30th of april mcclernand's corps and one division of mcpherson's corps were speedily landed. when this was effected i felt a degree of relief scarcely ever equalled since. vicksburg was not yet taken it is true, nor were its defenders demoralized by any of our previous moves. i was now in the enemy's country, with a vast river and the stronghold of vicksburg between me and my base of supplies. but i was on dry ground on the same side of the river with the enemy. all the campaigns, labors, hardships and exposures from the month of december previous to this time that had been made and endured, were for the accomplishment of this one object. i had with me the 13th corps, general mcclernand commanding, and two brigades of logan's division of the 17th corps, general mcpherson commanding--in all not more than twenty thousand men to commence the campaign with. these were soon reinforced by the remaining brigade of logan's division and crocker's division of the 17th corps. on the 7th of may i was further reinforced by sherman with two divisions of his, the 15th corps. my total force was then about thirty-three thousand men. the enemy occupied grand gulf, haines' bluff and jackson with a force of nearly sixty thousand men. jackson is fifty miles east of vicksburg and is connected with it by a railroad. my first problem was to capture grand gulf to use as a base. bruinsburg is two miles from high ground. the bottom at that point is higher than most of the low land in the valley of the mississippi, and a good road leads to the bluff. it was natural to expect the garrison from grand gulf to come out to meet us and prevent, if they could, our reaching this solid base. bayou pierre enters the mississippi just above bruinsburg and, as it is a navigable stream and was high at the time, in order to intercept us they had to go by port gibson, the nearest point where there was a bridge to cross upon. this more than doubled the distance from grand gulf to the high land back of bruinsburg. no time was to be lost in securing this foothold. our transportation was not sufficient to move all the army across the river at one trip, or even two; but the landing of the 13th corps and one division of the 17th was effected during the day, april 30th, and early evening. mcclernand was advanced as soon as ammunition and two days' rations (to last five) could be issued to his men. the bluffs were reached an hour before sunset and mcclernand was pushed on, hoping to reach port gibson and save the bridge spanning the bayou pierre before the enemy could get there; for crossing a stream in the presence of an enemy is always difficult. port gibson, too, is the starting point of roads to grand gulf, vicksburg and jackson. mcclernand's advance met the enemy about five miles west of port gibson at thompson's plantation. there was some firing during the night, but nothing rising to the dignity of a battle until daylight. the enemy had taken a strong natural position with most of the grand gulf garrison, numbering about seven or eight thousand men, under general bowen. his hope was to hold me in check until reinforcements under loring could reach him from vicksburg; but loring did not come in time to render much assistance south of port gibson. two brigades of mcpherson's corps followed mcclernand as fast as rations and ammunition could be issued, and were ready to take position upon the battlefield whenever the 13th corps could be got out of the way. the country in this part of mississippi stands on edge, as it were, the roads running along the ridges except when they occasionally pass from one ridge to another. where there are no clearings the sides of the hills are covered with a very heavy growth of timber and with undergrowth, and the ravines are filled with vines and canebrakes, almost impenetrable. this makes it easy for an inferior force to delay, if not defeat, a far superior one. near the point selected by bowen to defend, the road to port gibson divides, taking two ridges which do not diverge more than a mile or two at the widest point. these roads unite just outside the town. this made it necessary for mcclernand to divide his force. it was not only divided, but it was separated by a deep ravine of the character above described. one flank could not reinforce the other except by marching back to the junction of the roads. mcclernand put the divisions of hovey, carr and a. j. smith upon the right-hand branch and osterhaus on the left. i was on the field by ten a.m., and inspected both flanks in person. on the right the enemy, if not being pressed back, was at least not repulsing our advance. on the left, however, osterhaus was not faring so well. he had been repulsed with some loss. as soon as the road could be cleared of mcclernand's troops i ordered up mcpherson, who was close upon the rear of the 13th corps, with two brigades of logan's division. this was about noon. i ordered him to send one brigade (general john e. smith's was selected) to support osterhaus, and to move to the left and flank the enemy out of his position. this movement carried the brigade over a deep ravine to a third ridge and, when smith's troops were seen well through the ravine, osterhaus was directed to renew his front attack. it was successful and unattended by heavy loss. the enemy was sent in full retreat on their right, and their left followed before sunset. while the movement to our left was going on, mcclernand, who was with his right flank, sent me frequent requests for reinforcements, although the force with him was not being pressed. i had been upon the ground and knew it did not admit of his engaging all the men he had. we followed up our victory until night overtook us about two miles from port gibson; then the troops went into bivouac for the night. chapter xxxiv. capture of port gibson--grierson's raid--occupation of grand gulf --movement up the big black--battle of raymond. we started next morning for port gibson as soon as it was light enough to see the road. we were soon in the town, and i was delighted to find that the enemy had not stopped to contest our crossing further at the bridge, which he had burned. the troops were set to work at once to construct a bridge across the south fork of the bayou pierre. at this time the water was high and the current rapid. what might be called a raft-bridge was soon constructed from material obtained from wooden buildings, stables, fences, etc., which sufficed for carrying the whole army over safely. colonel j. h. wilson, a member of my staff, planned and superintended the construction of this bridge, going into the water and working as hard as any one engaged. officers and men generally joined in this work. when it was finished the army crossed and marched eight miles beyond to the north fork that day. one brigade of logan's division was sent down the stream to occupy the attention of a rebel battery, which had been left behind with infantry supports to prevent our repairing the burnt railroad bridge. two of his brigades were sent up the bayou to find a crossing and reach the north fork to repair the bridge there. the enemy soon left when he found we were building a bridge elsewhere. before leaving port gibson we were reinforced by crocker's division, mcpherson's corps, which had crossed the mississippi at bruinsburg and come up without stopping except to get two days' rations. mcpherson still had one division west of the mississippi river, guarding the road from milliken's bend to the river below until sherman's command should relieve it. on leaving bruinsburg for the front i left my son frederick, who had joined me a few weeks before, on board one of the gunboats asleep, and hoped to get away without him until after grand gulf should fall into our hands; but on waking up he learned that i had gone, and being guided by the sound of the battle raging at thompson's hill--called the battle of port gibson--found his way to where i was. he had no horse to ride at the time, and i had no facilities for even preparing a meal. he, therefore, foraged around the best he could until we reached grand gulf. mr. c. a. dana, then an officer of the war department, accompanied me on the vicksburg campaign and through a portion of the siege. he was in the same situation as fred so far as transportation and mess arrangements were concerned. the first time i call to mind seeing either of them, after the battle, they were mounted on two enormous horses, grown white from age, each equipped with dilapidated saddles and bridles. our trains arrived a few days later, after which we were all perfectly equipped. my son accompanied me throughout the campaign and siege, and caused no anxiety either to me or to his mother, who was at home. he looked out for himself and was in every battle of the campaign. his age, then not quite thirteen, enabled him to take in all he saw, and to retain a recollection of it that would not be possible in more mature years. when the movement from bruinsburg commenced we were without a wagon train. the train still west of the mississippi was carried around with proper escort, by a circuitous route from milliken's bend to hard times seventy or more miles below, and did not get up for some days after the battle of port gibson. my own horses, headquarters' transportation, servants, mess chest, and everything except what i had on, was with this train. general a. j. smith happened to have an extra horse at bruinsburg which i borrowed, with a saddle-tree without upholstering further than stirrups. i had no other for nearly a week. it was necessary to have transportation for ammunition. provisions could be taken from the country; but all the ammunition that can be carried on the person is soon exhausted when there is much fighting. i directed, therefore, immediately on landing that all the vehicles and draft animals, whether horses, mules, or oxen, in the vicinity should be collected and loaded to their capacity with ammunition. quite a train was collected during the 30th, and a motley train it was. in it could be found fine carriages, loaded nearly to the top with boxes of cartridges that had been pitched in promiscuously, drawn by mules with plough, harness, straw collars, rope-lines, etc.; long-coupled wagons, with racks for carrying cotton bales, drawn by oxen, and everything that could be found in the way of transportation on a plantation, either for use or pleasure. the making out of provision returns was stopped for the time. no formalities were to retard our progress until a position was secured when the time could be spared to observe them. it was at port gibson i first heard through a southern paper of the complete success of colonel grierson, who was making a raid through central mississippi. he had started from la grange april 17th with three regiments of about 1,700 men. on the 21st he had detached colonel hatch with one regiment to destroy the railroad between columbus and macon and then return to la grange. hatch had a sharp fight with the enemy at columbus and retreated along the railroad, destroying it at okalona and tupelo, and arriving in la grange april 26. grierson continued his movement with about 1,000 men, breaking the vicksburg and meridian railroad and the new orleans and jackson railroad, arriving at baton rouge may 2d. this raid was of great importance, for grierson had attracted the attention of the enemy from the main movement against vicksburg. during the night of the 2d of may the bridge over the north fork was repaired, and the troops commenced crossing at five the next morning. before the leading brigade was over it was fired upon by the enemy from a commanding position; but they were soon driven off. it was evident that the enemy was covering a retreat from grand gulf to vicksburg. every commanding position from this (grindstone) crossing to hankinson's ferry over the big black was occupied by the retreating foe to delay our progress. mcpherson, however, reached hankinson's ferry before night, seized the ferry boat, and sent a detachment of his command across and several miles north on the road to vicksburg. when the junction of the road going to vicksburg with the road from grand gulf to raymond and jackson was reached, logan with his division was turned to the left towards grand gulf. i went with him a short distance from this junction. mcpherson had encountered the largest force yet met since the battle of port gibson and had a skirmish nearly approaching a battle; but the road logan had taken enabled him to come up on the enemy's right flank, and they soon gave way. mcpherson was ordered to hold hankinson's ferry and the road back to willow springs with one division; mcclernand, who was now in the rear, was to join in this as well as to guard the line back down the bayou. i did not want to take the chances of having an enemy lurking in our rear. on the way from the junction to grand gulf, where the road comes into the one from vicksburg to the same place six or seven miles out, i learned that the last of the enemy had retreated past that place on their way to vicksburg. i left logan to make the proper disposition of his troops for the night, while i rode into the town with an escort of about twenty cavalry. admiral porter had already arrived with his fleet. the enemy had abandoned his heavy guns and evacuated the place. when i reached grand gulf may 3d i had not been with my baggage since the 27th of april and consequently had had no change of underclothing, no meal except such as i could pick up sometimes at other headquarters, and no tent to cover me. the first thing i did was to get a bath, borrow some fresh underclothing from one of the naval officers and get a good meal on the flag-ship. then i wrote letters to the general-in-chief informing him of our present position, dispatches to be telegraphed from cairo, orders to general sullivan commanding above vicksburg, and gave orders to all my corps commanders. about twelve o'clock at night i was through my work and started for hankinson's ferry, arriving there before daylight. while at grand gulf i heard from banks, who was on the red river, and who said that he could not be at port hudson before the 10th of may and then with only 15,000 men. up to this time my intention had been to secure grand gulf, as a base of supplies, detach mcclernand's corps to banks and co-operate with him in the reduction of port hudson. the news from banks forced upon me a different plan of campaign from the one intended. to wait for his co-operation would have detained me at least a month. the reinforcements would not have reached ten thousand men after deducting casualties and necessary river guards at all high points close to the river for over three hundred miles. the enemy would have strengthened his position and been reinforced by more men than banks could have brought. i therefore determined to move independently of banks, cut loose from my base, destroy the rebel force in rear of vicksburg and invest or capture the city. grand gulf was accordingly given up as a base and the authorities at washington were notified. i knew well that halleck's caution would lead him to disapprove of this course; but it was the only one that gave any chance of success. the time it would take to communicate with washington and get a reply would be so great that i could not be interfered with until it was demonstrated whether my plan was practicable. even sherman, who afterwards ignored bases of supplies other than what were afforded by the country while marching through four states of the confederacy with an army more than twice as large as mine at this time, wrote me from hankinson's ferry, advising me of the impossibility of supplying our army over a single road. he urged me to "stop all troops till your army is partially supplied with wagons, and then act as quick as possible; for this road will be jammed, as sure as life." to this i replied: "i do not calculate upon the possibility of supplying the army with full rations from grand gulf. i know it will be impossible without constructing additional roads. what i do expect is to get up what rations of hard bread, coffee and salt we can, and make the country furnish the balance." we started from bruinsburg with an average of about two days' rations, and received no more from our own supplies for some days; abundance was found in the mean time. a delay would give the enemy time to reinforce and fortify. mcclernand's and mcpherson's commands were kept substantially as they were on the night of the 2d, awaiting supplies sufficient to give them three days' rations in haversacks. beef, mutton, poultry and forage were found in abundance. quite a quantity of bacon and molasses was also secured from the country, but bread and coffee could not be obtained in quantity sufficient for all the men. every plantation, however, had a run of stone, propelled by mule power, to grind corn for the owners and their slaves. all these were kept running while we were stopping, day and night, and when we were marching, during the night, at all plantations covered by the troops. but the product was taken by the troops nearest by, so that the majority of the command was destined to go without bread until a new base was established on the yazoo above vicksburg. while the troops were awaiting the arrival of rations i ordered reconnoissances made by mcclernand and mcpherson, with the view of leading the enemy to believe that we intended to cross the big black and attack the city at once. on the 6th sherman arrived at grand gulf and crossed his command that night and the next day. three days' rations had been brought up from grand gulf for the advanced troops and were issued. orders were given for a forward movement the next day. sherman was directed to order up blair, who had been left behind to guard the road from milliken's bend to hard times with two brigades. the quartermaster at young's point was ordered to send two hundred wagons with blair, and the commissary was to load them with hard bread, coffee, sugar, salt and one hundred thousand pounds of salt meat. on the 3d hurlbut, who had been left at memphis, was ordered to send four regiments from his command to milliken's bend to relieve blair's division, and on the 5th he was ordered to send lauman's division in addition, the latter to join the army in the field. the four regiments were to be taken from troops near the river so that there would be no delay. during the night of the 6th mcpherson drew in his troops north of the big black and was off at an early hour on the road to jackson, via rocky springs, utica and raymond. that night he and mcclernand were both at rocky springs ten miles from hankinson's ferry. mcpherson remained there during the 8th, while mcclernand moved to big sandy and sherman marched from grand gulf to hankinson's ferry. the 9th, mcpherson moved to a point within a few miles west of utica; mcclernand and sherman remained where they were. on the 10th mcpherson moved to utica, sherman to big sandy; mcclernand was still at big sandy. the 11th, mcclernand was at five mile creek; sherman at auburn; mcpherson five miles advanced from utica. may 12th, mcclernand was at fourteen mile creek; sherman at fourteen mile creek; mcpherson at raymond after a battle. after mcpherson crossed the big black at hankinson's ferry vicksburg could have been approached and besieged by the south side. it is not probable, however, that pemberton would have permitted a close besiegement. the broken nature of the ground would have enabled him to hold a strong defensible line from the river south of the city to the big black, retaining possession of the railroad back to that point. it was my plan, therefore, to get to the railroad east of vicksburg, and approach from that direction. accordingly, mcpherson's troops that had crossed the big black were withdrawn and the movement east to jackson commenced. as has been stated before, the country is very much broken and the roads generally confined to the tops of the hills. the troops were moved one (sometimes two) corps at a time to reach designated points out parallel to the railroad and only from six to ten miles from it. mcclernand's corps was kept with its left flank on the big black guarding all the crossings. fourteen mile creek, a stream substantially parallel with the railroad, was reached and crossings effected by mcclernand and sherman with slight loss. mcpherson was to the right of sherman, extending to raymond. the cavalry was used in this advance in reconnoitring to find the roads: to cover our advances and to find the most practicable routes from one command to another so they could support each other in case of an attack. in making this move i estimated pemberton's movable force at vicksburg at about eighteen thousand men, with smaller forces at haines' bluff and jackson. it would not be possible for pemberton to attack me with all his troops at one place, and i determined to throw my army between his and fight him in detail. this was done with success, but i found afterwards that i had entirely under-estimated pemberton's strength. up to this point our movements had been made without serious opposition. my line was now nearly parallel with the jackson and vicksburg railroad and about seven miles south of it. the right was at raymond eighteen miles from jackson, mcpherson commanding; sherman in the centre on fourteen mile creek, his advance thrown across; mcclernand to the left, also on fourteen mile creek, advance across, and his pickets within two miles of edward's station, where the enemy had concentrated a considerable force and where they undoubtedly expected us to attack. mcclernand's left was on the big black. in all our moves, up to this time, the left had hugged the big black closely, and all the ferries had been guarded to prevent the enemy throwing a force on our rear. mcpherson encountered the enemy, five thousand strong with two batteries under general gregg, about two miles out of raymond. this was about two p.m. logan was in advance with one of his brigades. he deployed and moved up to engage the enemy. mcpherson ordered the road in rear to be cleared of wagons, and the balance of logan's division, and crocker's, which was still farther in rear, to come forward with all dispatch. the order was obeyed with alacrity. logan got his division in position for assault before crocker could get up, and attacked with vigor, carrying the enemy's position easily, sending gregg flying from the field not to appear against our front again until we met at jackson. in this battle mcpherson lost 66 killed, 339 wounded, and 37 missing --nearly or quite all from logan's division. the enemy's loss was 100 killed, 305 wounded, besides 415 taken prisoners. i regarded logan and crocker as being as competent division commanders as could be found in or out of the army and both equal to a much higher command. crocker, however, was dying of consumption when he volunteered. his weak condition never put him on the sick report when there was a battle in prospect, as long as he could keep on his feet. he died not long after the close of the rebellion. chapter xxxv. movement against jackson--fall of jackson--intercepting the enemy --battle of champion's hill. when the news reached me of mcpherson's victory at raymond about sundown my position was with sherman. i decided at once to turn the whole column towards jackson and capture that place without delay. pemberton was now on my left, with, as i supposed, about 18,000 men; in fact, as i learned afterwards, with nearly 50,000. a force was also collecting on my right, at jackson, the point where all the railroads communicating with vicksburg connect. all the enemy's supplies of men and stores would come by that point. as i hoped in the end to besiege vicksburg i must first destroy all possibility of aid. i therefore determined to move swiftly towards jackson, destroy or drive any force in that direction and then turn upon pemberton. but by moving against jackson, i uncovered my own communication. so i finally decided to have none--to cut loose altogether from my base and move my whole force eastward. i then had no fears for my communications, and if i moved quickly enough could turn upon pemberton before he could attack me in the rear. accordingly, all previous orders given during the day for movements on the 13th were annulled by new ones. mcpherson was ordered at daylight to move on clinton, ten miles from jackson; sherman was notified of my determination to capture jackson and work from there westward. he was ordered to start at four in the morning and march to raymond. mcclernand was ordered to march with three divisions by dillon's to raymond. one was left to guard the crossing of the big black. on the 10th i had received a letter from banks, on the red river, asking reinforcements. porter had gone to his assistance with a part of his fleet on the 3d, and i now wrote to him describing my position and declining to send any troops. i looked upon side movements as long as the enemy held port hudson and vicksburg as a waste of time and material. general joseph e. johnston arrived at jackson in the night of the 13th from tennessee, and immediately assumed command of all the confederate troops in mississippi. i knew he was expecting reinforcements from the south and east. on the 6th i had written to general halleck: "information from the other side leaves me to believe the enemy are bringing forces from tullahoma." up to this time my troops had been kept in supporting distances of each other, as far as the nature of the country would admit. reconnoissances were constantly made from each corps to enable them to acquaint themselves with the most practicable routes from one to another in case a union became necessary. mcpherson reached clinton with the advance early on the 13th and immediately set to work destroying the railroad. sherman's advance reached raymond before the last of mcpherson's command had got out of the town. mcclernand withdrew from the front of the enemy, at edward's station, with much skill and without loss, and reached his position for the night in good order. on the night of the 13th, mcpherson was ordered to march at early dawn upon jackson, only fifteen miles away. sherman was given the same order; but he was to move by the direct road from raymond to jackson, which is south of the road mcpherson was on and does not approach within two miles of it at the point where it crossed the line of intrenchments which, at that time, defended the city. mcclernand was ordered to move one division of his command to clinton, one division a few miles beyond mississippi springs following sherman's line, and a third to raymond. he was also directed to send his siege guns, four in number with the troops going by mississippi springs. mcclernand's position was an advantageous one in any event. with one division at clinton he was in position to reinforce mcpherson, at jackson, rapidly if it became necessary; the division beyond mississippi springs was equally available to reinforce sherman; the one at raymond could take either road. he still had two other divisions farther back now that blair had come up, available within a day at jackson. if this last command should not be wanted at jackson, they were already one day's march from there on their way to vicksburg and on three different roads leading to the latter city. but the most important consideration in my mind was to have a force confronting pemberton if he should come out to attack my rear. this i expected him to do; as shown further on, he was directed by johnston to make this very move. i notified general halleck that i should attack the state capital on the 14th. a courier carried the dispatch to grand gulf through an unprotected country. sherman and mcpherson communicated with each other during the night and arranged to reach jackson at about the same hour. it rained in torrents during the night of the 13th and the fore part of the day of the 14th. the roads were intolerable, and in some places on sherman's line, where the land was low, they were covered more than a foot deep with water. but the troops never murmured. by nine o'clock crocker, of mcpherson's corps, who was now in advance, came upon the enemy's pickets and speedily drove them in upon the main body. they were outside of the intrenchments in a strong position, and proved to be the troops that had been driven out of raymond. johnston had been reinforced; during the night by georgia and south carolina regiments, so that his force amounted to eleven thousand men, and he was expecting still more. sherman also came upon the rebel pickets some distance out from the town, but speedily drove them in. he was now on the south and south-west of jackson confronting the confederates behind their breastworks, while mcpherson's right was nearly two miles north, occupying a line running north and south across the vicksburg railroad. artillery was brought up and reconnoissances made preparatory to an assault. mcpherson brought up logan's division while he deployed crocker's for the assault. sherman made similar dispositions on the right. by eleven a.m. both were ready to attack. crocker moved his division forward, preceded by a strong skirmish line. these troops at once encountered the enemy's advance and drove it back on the main body, when they returned to their proper regiment and the whole division charged, routing the enemy completely and driving him into this main line. this stand by the enemy was made more than two miles outside of his main fortifications. mcpherson followed up with his command until within range of the guns of the enemy from their intrenchments, when he halted to bring his troops into line and reconnoitre to determine the next move. it was now about noon. while this was going on sherman was confronting a rebel battery which enfiladed the road on which he was marching--the mississippi springs road--and commanded a bridge spanning a stream over which he had to pass. by detaching right and left the stream was forced and the enemy flanked and speedily driven within the main line. this brought our whole line in front of the enemy's line of works, which was continuous on the north, west and south sides from the pearl river north of the city to the same river south. i was with sherman. he was confronted by a force sufficient to hold us back. appearances did not justify an assault where we were. i had directed sherman to send a force to the right, and to reconnoitre as far as to the pearl river. this force, tuttle's division, not returning i rode to the right with my staff, and soon found that the enemy had left that part of the line. tuttle's movement or mcpherson's pressure had no doubt led johnston to order a retreat, leaving only the men at the guns to retard us while he was getting away. tuttle had seen this and, passing through the lines without resistance, came up in the rear of the artillerists confronting sherman and captured them with ten pieces of artillery. i rode immediately to the state house, where i was soon followed by sherman. about the same time mcpherson discovered that the enemy was leaving his front, and advanced crocker, who was so close upon the enemy that they could not move their guns or destroy them. he captured seven guns and, moving on, hoisted the national flag over the rebel capital of mississippi. stevenson's brigade was sent to cut off the rebel retreat, but was too late or not expeditious enough. our loss in this engagement was: mcpherson, 37 killed, 228 wounded; sherman, 4 killed and 21 wounded and missing. the enemy lost 845 killed, wounded and captured. seventeen guns fell into our hands, and the enemy destroyed by fire their store-houses, containing a large amount of commissary stores. on this day blair reached new auburn and joined mcclernand's 4th division. he had with him two hundred wagons loaded with rations, the only commissary supplies received during the entire campaign. i slept that night in the room that johnston was said to have occupied the night before. about four in the afternoon i sent for the corps commanders and directed the dispositions to be made of their troops. sherman was to remain in jackson until he destroyed that place as a railroad centre, and manufacturing city of military supplies. he did the work most effectually. sherman and i went together into a manufactory which had not ceased work on account of the battle nor for the entrance of yankee troops. our presence did not seem to attract the attention of either the manager or the operatives, most of whom were girls. we looked on for a while to see the tent cloth which they were making roll out of the looms, with "c. s. a." woven in each bolt. there was an immense amount of cotton, in bales, stacked outside. finally i told sherman i thought they had done work enough. the operatives were told they could leave and take with them what cloth they could carry. in a few minutes cotton and factory were in a blaze. the proprietor visited washington while i was president to get his pay for this property, claiming that it was private. he asked me to give him a statement of the fact that his property had been destroyed by national troops, so that he might use it with congress where he was pressing, or proposed to press, his claim. i declined. on the night of the 13th johnston sent the following dispatch to pemberton at edward's station: "i have lately arrived, and learn that major-general sherman is between us with four divisions at clinton. it is important to establish communication, that you may be reinforced. if practicable, come up in his rear at once. to beat such a detachment would be of immense value. all the troops you can quickly assemble should be brought. time is all-important." this dispatch was sent in triplicate, by different messengers. one of the messengers happened to be a loyal man who had been expelled from memphis some months before by hurlbut for uttering disloyal and threatening sentiments. there was a good deal of parade about his expulsion, ostensibly as a warning to those who entertained the sentiments he expressed; but hurlbut and the expelled man understood each other. he delivered his copy of johnston's dispatch to mcpherson who forwarded it to me. receiving this dispatch on the 14th i ordered mcpherson to move promptly in the morning back to bolton, the nearest point where johnston could reach the road. bolton is about twenty miles west of jackson. i also informed mcclernand of the capture of jackson and sent him the following order: "it is evidently the design of the enemy to get north of us and cross the big black, and beat us into vicksburg. we must not allow them to do this. turn all your forces towards bolton station, and make all dispatch in getting there. move troops by the most direct road from wherever they may be on the receipt of this order." and to blair i wrote: "their design is evidently to cross the big black and pass down the peninsula between the big black and yazoo rivers. we must beat them. turn your troops immediately to bolton; take all the trains with you. smith's division, and any other troops now with you, will go to the same place. if practicable, take parallel roads, so as to divide your troops and train." johnston stopped on the canton road only six miles north of jackson, the night of the 14th. he sent from there to pemberton dispatches announcing the loss of jackson, and the following order: "as soon as the reinforcements are all up, they must be united to the rest of the army. i am anxious to see a force assembled that may be able to inflict a heavy blow upon the enemy. can grant supply himself from the mississippi? can you not cut him off from it, and above all, should he be compelled to fall back for want of supplies, beat him." the concentration of my troops was easy, considering the character of the country. mcpherson moved along the road parallel with and near the railroad. mcclernand's command was, one division (hovey's) on the road mcpherson had to take, but with a start of four miles. one (osterhaus) was at raymond, on a converging road that intersected the other near champion's hill; one (carr's) had to pass over the same road with osterhaus, but being back at mississippi springs, would not be detained by it; the fourth (smith's) with blair's division, was near auburn with a different road to pass over. mcclernand faced about and moved promptly. his cavalry from raymond seized bolton by half-past nine in the morning, driving out the enemy's pickets and capturing several men. the night of the 15th hovey was at bolton; carr and osterhaus were about three miles south, but abreast, facing west; smith was north of raymond with blair in his rear. mcpherson's command, with logan in front, had marched at seven o'clock, and by four reached hovey and went into camp; crocker bivouacked just in hovey's rear on the clinton road. sherman with two divisions, was in jackson, completing the destruction of roads, bridges and military factories. i rode in person out to clinton. on my arrival i ordered mcclernand to move early in the morning on edward's station, cautioning him to watch for the enemy and not bring on an engagement unless he felt very certain of success. i naturally expected that pemberton would endeavor to obey the orders of his superior, which i have shown were to attack us at clinton. this, indeed, i knew he could not do; but i felt sure he would make the attempt to reach that point. it turned out, however, that he had decided his superior's plans were impracticable, and consequently determined to move south from edward's station and get between me and my base. i, however, had no base, having abandoned it more than a week before. on the 15th pemberton had actually marched south from edward's station, but the rains had swollen baker's creek, which he had to cross so much that he could not ford it, and the bridges were washed away. this brought him back to the jackson road, on which there was a good bridge over baker's creek. some of his troops were marching until midnight to get there. receiving here early on the 16th a repetition of his order to join johnston at clinton, he concluded to obey, and sent a dispatch to his chief, informing him of the route by which he might be expected. about five o'clock in the morning (16th) two men, who had been employed on the jackson and vicksburg railroad, were brought to me. they reported that they had passed through pemberton's army in the night, and that it was still marching east. they reported him to have eighty regiments of infantry and ten batteries; in all, about twenty-five thousand men. i had expected to leave sherman at jackson another day in order to complete his work; but getting the above information i sent him orders to move with all dispatch to bolton, and to put one division with an ammunition train on the road at once, with directions to its commander to march with all possible speed until he came up to our rear. within an hour after receiving this order steele's division was on the road. at the same time i dispatched to blair, who was near auburn, to move with all speed to edward's station. mcclernand was directed to embrace blair in his command for the present. blair's division was a part of the 15th army corps (sherman's); but as it was on its way to join its corps, it naturally struck our left first, now that we had faced about and were moving west. the 15th corps, when it got up, would be on our extreme right. mcpherson was directed to get his trains out of the way of the troops, and to follow hovey's division as closely as possible. mcclernand had two roads about three miles apart, converging at edward's station, over which to march his troops. hovey's division of his corps had the advance on a third road (the clinton) still farther north. mcclernand was directed to move blair's and a. j. smith's divisions by the southernmost of these roads, and osterhaus and carr by the middle road. orders were to move cautiously with skirmishers to the front to feel for the enemy. smith's division on the most southern road was the first to encounter the enemy's pickets, who were speedily driven in. osterhaus, on the middle road, hearing the firing, pushed his skirmishers forward, found the enemy's pickets and forced them back to the main line. about the same time hovey encountered the enemy on the northern or direct wagon road from jackson to vicksburg. mcpherson was hastening up to join hovey, but was embarrassed by hovey's trains occupying the roads. i was still back at clinton. mcpherson sent me word of the situation, and expressed the wish that i was up. by half-past seven i was on the road and proceeded rapidly to the front, ordering all trains that were in front of troops off the road. when i arrived hovey's skirmishing amounted almost to a battle. mcclernand was in person on the middle road and had a shorter distance to march to reach the enemy's position than mcpherson. i sent him word by a staff officer to push forward and attack. these orders were repeated several times without apparently expediting mcclernand's advance. champion's hill, where pemberton had chosen his position to receive us, whether taken by accident or design, was well selected. it is one of the highest points in that section, and commanded all the ground in range. on the east side of the ridge, which is quite precipitous, is a ravine running first north, then westerly, terminating at baker's creek. it was grown up thickly with large trees and undergrowth, making it difficult to penetrate with troops, even when not defended. the ridge occupied by the enemy terminated abruptly where the ravine turns westerly. the left of the enemy occupied the north end of this ridge. the bolton and edward's station wagon-road turns almost due south at this point and ascends the ridge, which it follows for about a mile; then turning west, descends by a gentle declivity to baker's creek, nearly a mile away. on the west side the slope of the ridge is gradual and is cultivated from near the summit to the creek. there was, when we were there, a narrow belt of timber near the summit west of the road. from raymond there is a direct road to edward's station, some three miles west of champion's hill. there is one also to bolton. from this latter road there is still another, leaving it about three and a half miles before reaching bolton and leads direct to the same station. it was along these two roads that three divisions of mcclernand's corps, and blair of sherman's, temporarily under mcclernand, were moving. hovey of mcclernand's command was with mcpherson, farther north on the road from bolton direct to edward's station. the middle road comes into the northern road at the point where the latter turns to the west and descends to baker's creek; the southern road is still several miles south and does not intersect the others until it reaches edward's station. pemberton's lines covered all these roads, and faced east. hovey's line, when it first drove in the enemy's pickets, was formed parallel to that of the enemy and confronted his left. by eleven o'clock the skirmishing had grown into a hard-contested battle. hovey alone, before other troops could be got to assist him, had captured a battery of the enemy. but he was not able to hold his position and had to abandon the artillery. mcpherson brought up his troops as fast as possible, logan in front, and posted them on the right of hovey and across the flank of the enemy. logan reinforced hovey with one brigade from his division; with his other two he moved farther west to make room for crocker, who was coming up as rapidly as the roads would admit. hovey was still being heavily pressed, and was calling on me for more reinforcements. i ordered crocker, who was now coming up, to send one brigade from his division. mcpherson ordered two batteries to be stationed where they nearly enfiladed the enemy's line, and they did good execution. from logan's position now a direct forward movement carried him over open fields, in rear of the enemy and in a line parallel with them. he did make exactly this move, attacking, however, the enemy through the belt of woods covering the west slope of the hill for a short distance. up to this time i had kept my position near hovey where we were the most heavily pressed; but about noon i moved with a part of my staff by our right around, until i came up with logan himself. i found him near the road leading down to baker's creek. he was actually in command of the only road over which the enemy could retreat; hovey, reinforced by two brigades from mcpherson's command, confronted the enemy's left; crocker, with two brigades, covered their left flank; mcclernand two hours before, had been within two miles and a half of their centre with two divisions, and the two divisions, blair's and a. j. smith's, were confronting the rebel right; ransom, with a brigade of mcarthur's division of the 17th corps (mcpherson's), had crossed the river at grand gulf a few days before, and was coming up on their right flank. neither logan nor i knew that we had cut off the retreat of the enemy. just at this juncture a messenger came from hovey, asking for more reinforcements. there were none to spare. i then gave an order to move mcpherson's command by the left flank around to hovey. this uncovered the rebel line of retreat, which was soon taken advantage of by the enemy. during all this time, hovey, reinforced as he was by a brigade from logan and another from crocker, and by crocker gallantly coming up with two other brigades on his right, had made several assaults, the last one about the time the road was opened to the rear. the enemy fled precipitately. this was between three and four o'clock. i rode forward, or rather back, to where the middle road intersects the north road, and found the skirmishers of carr's division just coming in. osterhaus was farther south and soon after came up with skirmishers advanced in like manner. hovey's division, and mcpherson's two divisions with him, had marched and fought from early dawn, and were not in the best condition to follow the retreating foe. i sent orders to osterhaus to pursue the enemy, and to carr, whom i saw personally, i explained the situation and directed him to pursue vigorously as far as the big black, and to cross it if he could; osterhaus to follow him. the pursuit was continued until after dark. the battle of champion's hill lasted about four hours, hard fighting, preceded by two or three hours of skirmishing, some of which almost rose to the dignity of battle. every man of hovey's division and of mcpherson's two divisions was engaged during the battle. no other part of my command was engaged at all, except that as described before. osterhaus's and a. j. smith's divisions had encountered the rebel advanced pickets as early as half-past seven. their positions were admirable for advancing upon the enemy's line. mcclernand, with two divisions, was within a few miles of the battle-field long before noon and in easy hearing. i sent him repeated orders by staff officers fully competent to explain to him the situation. these traversed the wood separating us, without escort, and directed him to push forward; but he did not come. it is true, in front of mcclernand there was a small force of the enemy and posted in a good position behind a ravine obstructing his advance; but if he had moved to the right by the road my staff officers had followed the enemy must either have fallen back or been cut off. instead of this he sent orders to hovey, who belonged to his corps, to join on to his right flank. hovey was bearing the brunt of the battle at the time. to obey the order he would have had to pull out from the front of the enemy and march back as far as mcclernand had to advance to get into battle and substantially over the same ground. of course i did not permit hovey to obey the order of his intermediate superior. we had in this battle about 15,000 men absolutely engaged. this excludes those that did not get up, all of mcclernand's command except hovey. our loss was 410 killed, 1,844 wounded and 187 missing. hovey alone lost 1,200 killed, wounded and missing--more than one-third of his division. had mcclernand come up with reasonable promptness, or had i known the ground as i did afterwards, i cannot see how pemberton could have escaped with any organized force. as it was he lost over three thousand killed and wounded and about three thousand captured in battle and in pursuit. loring's division, which was the right of pemberton's line, was cut off from the retreating army and never got back into vicksburg. pemberton himself fell back that night to the big black river. his troops did not stop before midnight and many of them left before the general retreat commenced, and no doubt a good part of them returned to their homes. logan alone captured 1,300 prisoners and eleven guns. hovey captured 300 under fire and about 700 in all, exclusive of 500 sick and wounded whom he paroled, thus making 1,200. mcpherson joined in the advance as soon as his men could fill their cartridge-boxes, leaving one brigade to guard our wounded. the pursuit was continued as long as it was light enough to see the road. the night of the 16th of may found mcpherson's command bivouacked from two to six miles west of the battlefield, along the line of the road to vicksburg. carr and osterhaus were at edward's station, and blair was about three miles south-east; hovey remained on the field where his troops had fought so bravely and bled so freely. much war material abandoned by the enemy was picked up on the battle-field, among it thirty pieces of artillery. i pushed through the advancing column with my staff and kept in advance until after night. finding ourselves alone we stopped and took possession of a vacant house. as no troops came up we moved back a mile or more until we met the head of the column just going into bivouac on the road. we had no tents, so we occupied the porch of a house which had been taken for a rebel hospital and which was filled with wounded and dying who had been brought from the battle-field we had just left. while a battle is raging one can see his enemy mowed down by the thousand, or the ten thousand, with great composure; but after the battle these scenes are distressing, and one is naturally disposed to do as much to alleviate the suffering of an enemy as a friend. chapter xxxvi. battle of black river bridge--crossing the big black--investment of vicksburg--assaulting the works. we were now assured of our position between johnston and pemberton, without a possibility of a junction of their forces. pemberton might have made a night march to the big black, crossed the bridge there and, by moving north on the west side, have eluded us and finally returned to johnston. but this would have given us vicksburg. it would have been his proper move, however, and the one johnston would have made had he been in pemberton's place. in fact it would have been in conformity with johnston's orders to pemberton. sherman left jackson with the last of his troops about noon on the 16th and reached bolton, twenty miles west, before halting. his rear guard did not get in until two a.m. the 17th, but renewed their march by daylight. he paroled his prisoners at jackson, and was forced to leave his own wounded in care of surgeons and attendants. at bolton he was informed of our victory. he was directed to commence the march early next day, and to diverge from the road he was on to bridgeport on the big black river, some eleven miles above the point where we expected to find the enemy. blair was ordered to join him there with the pontoon train as early as possible. this movement brought sherman's corps together, and at a point where i hoped a crossing of the big black might be effected and sherman's corps used to flank the enemy out of his position in our front, thus opening a crossing for the remainder of the army. i informed him that i would endeavor to hold the enemy in my front while he crossed the river. the advance division, carr's (mcclernand's corps), resumed the pursuit at half-past three a.m. on the 17th, followed closely by osterhaus, mcpherson bringing up the rear with his corps. as i expected, the enemy was found in position on the big black. the point was only six miles from that where my advance had rested for the night, and was reached at an early hour. here the river makes a turn to the west, and has washed close up to the high land; the east side is a low bottom, sometimes overflowed at very high water, but was cleared and in cultivation. a bayou runs irregularly across this low land, the bottom of which, however, is above the surface of the big black at ordinary stages. when the river is full water runs through it, converting the point of land into an island. the bayou was grown up with timber, which the enemy had felled into the ditch. at this time there was a foot or two of water in it. the rebels had constructed a parapet along the inner bank of this bayou by using cotton bales from the plantation close by and throwing dirt over them. the whole was thoroughly commanded from the height west of the river. at the upper end of the bayou there was a strip of uncleared land which afforded a cover for a portion of our men. carr's division was deployed on our right, lawler's brigade forming his extreme right and reaching through these woods to the river above. osterhaus' division was deployed to the left of carr and covered the enemy's entire front. mcpherson was in column on the road, the head close by, ready to come in wherever he could be of assistance. while the troops were standing as here described an officer from banks' staff came up and presented me with a letter from general halleck, dated the 11th of may. it had been sent by the way of new orleans to banks to be forwarded to me. it ordered me to return to grand gulf and to co-operate from there with banks against port hudson, and then to return with our combined forces to besiege vicksburg. i told the officer that the order came too late, and that halleck would not give it now if he knew our position. the bearer of the dispatch insisted that i ought to obey the order, and was giving arguments to support his position when i heard great cheering to the right of our line and, looking in that direction, saw lawler in his shirt sleeves leading a charge upon the enemy. i immediately mounted my horse and rode in the direction of the charge, and saw no more of the officer who delivered the dispatch; i think not even to this day. the assault was successful. but little resistance was made. the enemy fled from the west bank of the river, burning the bridge behind him and leaving the men and guns on the east side to fall into our hands. many tried to escape by swimming the river. some succeeded and some were drowned in the attempt. eighteen guns were captured and 1,751 prisoners. our loss was 39 killed, 237 wounded and 3 missing. the enemy probably lost but few men except those captured and drowned. but for the successful and complete destruction of the bridge, i have but little doubt that we should have followed the enemy so closely as to prevent his occupying his defences around vicksburg. as the bridge was destroyed and the river was high, new bridges had to be built. it was but little after nine o'clock a.m. when the capture took place. as soon as work could be commenced, orders were given for the construction of three bridges. one was taken charge of by lieutenant hains, of the engineer corps, one by general mcpherson himself and one by general ransom, a most gallant and intelligent volunteer officer. my recollection is that hains built a raft bridge; mcpherson a pontoon, using cotton bales in large numbers, for pontoons; and that ransom felled trees on opposite banks of the river, cutting only on one side of the tree, so that they would fall with their tops interlacing in the river, without the trees being entirely severed from their stumps. a bridge was then made with these trees to support the roadway. lumber was taken from buildings, cotton gins and wherever found, for this purpose. by eight o'clock in the morning of the 18th all three bridges were complete and the troops were crossing. sherman reached bridgeport about noon of the 17th and found blair with the pontoon train already there. a few of the enemy were intrenched on the west bank, but they made little resistance and soon surrendered. two divisions were crossed that night and the third the following morning. on the 18th i moved along the vicksburg road in advance of the troops and as soon as possible joined sherman. my first anxiety was to secure a base of supplies on the yazoo river above vicksburg. sherman's line of march led him to the very point on walnut hills occupied by the enemy the december before when he was repulsed. sherman was equally anxious with myself. our impatience led us to move in advance of the column and well up with the advanced skirmishers. there were some detached works along the crest of the hill. these were still occupied by the enemy, or else the garrison from haines' bluff had not all got past on their way to vicksburg. at all events the bullets of the enemy whistled by thick and fast for a short time. in a few minutes sherman had the pleasure of looking down from the spot coveted so much by him the december before on the ground where his command had lain so helpless for offensive action. he turned to me, saying that up to this minute he had felt no positive assurance of success. this, however, he said was the end of one of the greatest campaigns in history and i ought to make a report of it at once. vicksburg was not yet captured, and there was no telling what might happen before it was taken; but whether captured or not, this was a complete and successful campaign. i do not claim to quote sherman's language; but the substance only. my reason for mentioning this incident will appear further on. mcpherson, after crossing the big black, came into the jackson and vicksburg road which sherman was on, but to his rear. he arrived at night near the lines of the enemy, and went into camp. mcclernand moved by the direct road near the railroad to mount albans, and then turned to the left and put his troops on the road from baldwin's ferry to vicksburg. this brought him south of mcpherson. i now had my three corps up the works built for the defence of vicksburg, on three roads --one to the north, one to the east and one to the south-east of the city. by the morning of the 19th the investment was as complete as my limited number of troops would allow. sherman was on the right, and covered the high ground from where it overlooked the yazoo as far south-east as his troops would extend. mcpherson joined on to his left, and occupied ground on both sides of the jackson road. mcclernand took up the ground to his left and extended as far towards warrenton as he could, keeping a continuous line. on the 19th there was constant skirmishing with the enemy while we were getting into better position. the enemy had been much demoralized by his defeats at champion's hill and the big black, and i believed he would not make much effort to hold vicksburg. accordingly, at two o'clock i ordered an assault. it resulted in securing more advanced positions for all our troops where they were fully covered from the fire of the enemy. the 20th and 21st were spent in strengthening our position and in making roads in rear of the army, from yazoo river or chickasaw bayou. most of the army had now been for three weeks with only five days' rations issued by the commissary. they had an abundance of food, however, but began to feel the want of bread. i remember that in passing around to the left of the line on the 21st, a soldier, recognizing me, said in rather a low voice, but yet so that i heard him, "hard tack." in a moment the cry was taken up all along the line, "hard tack! hard tack!" i told the men nearest to me that we had been engaged ever since the arrival of the troops in building a road over which to supply them with everything they needed. the cry was instantly changed to cheers. by the night of the 21st all the troops had full rations issued to them. the bread and coffee were highly appreciated. i now determined on a second assault. johnston was in my rear, only fifty miles away, with an army not much inferior in numbers to the one i had with me, and i knew he was being reinforced. there was danger of his coming to the assistance of pemberton, and after all he might defeat my anticipations of capturing the garrison if, indeed, he did not prevent the capture of the city. the immediate capture of vicksburg would save sending me the reinforcements which were so much wanted elsewhere, and would set free the army under me to drive johnston from the state. but the first consideration of all was--the troops believed they could carry the works in their front, and would not have worked so patiently in the trenches if they had not been allowed to try. the attack was ordered to commence on all parts of the line at ten o'clock a.m. on the 22d with a furious cannonade from every battery in position. all the corps commanders set their time by mine so that all might open the engagement at the same minute. the attack was gallant, and portions of each of the three corps succeeded in getting up to the very parapets of the enemy and in planting their battle flags upon them; but at no place were we able to enter. general mcclernand reported that he had gained the enemy's intrenchments at several points, and wanted reinforcements. i occupied a position from which i believed i could see as well as he what took place in his front, and i did not see the success he reported. but his request for reinforcements being repeated i could not ignore it, and sent him quinby's division of the 17th corps. sherman and mcpherson were both ordered to renew their assaults as a diversion in favor of mcclernand. this last attack only served to increase our casualties without giving any benefit whatever. as soon as it was dark our troops that had reached the enemy's line and been obliged to remain there for security all day, were withdrawn; and thus ended the last assault upon vicksburg. chapter xxxvii siege of vicksburg. i now determined upon a regular siege--to "out-camp the enemy," as it were, and to incur no more losses. the experience of the 22d convinced officers and men that this was best, and they went to work on the defences and approaches with a will. with the navy holding the river, the investment of vicksburg was complete. as long as we could hold our position the enemy was limited in supplies of food, men and munitions of war to what they had on hand. these could not last always. the crossing of troops at bruinsburg commenced april 30th. on the 18th of may the army was in rear of vicksburg. on the 19th, just twenty days after the crossing, the city was completely invested and an assault had been made: five distinct battles (besides continuous skirmishing) had been fought and won by the union forces; the capital of the state had fallen and its arsenals, military manufactories and everything useful for military purposes had been destroyed; an average of about one hundred and eighty miles had been marched by the troops engaged; but five days' rations had been issued, and no forage; over six thousand prisoners had been captured, and as many more of the enemy had been killed or wounded; twenty-seven heavy cannon and sixty-one field-pieces had fallen into our hands; and four hundred miles of the river, from vicksburg to port hudson, had become ours. the union force that had crossed the mississippi river up to this time was less than forty-three thousand men. one division of these, blair's, only arrived in time to take part in the battle of champion's hill, but was not engaged there; and one brigade, ransom's of mcpherson's corps, reached the field after the battle. the enemy had at vicksburg, grand gulf, jackson, and on the roads between these places, over sixty thousand men. they were in their own country, where no rear guards were necessary. the country is admirable for defence, but difficult for the conduct of an offensive campaign. all their troops had to be met. we were fortunate, to say the least, in meeting them in detail: at port gibson seven or eight thousand; at raymond, five thousand; at jackson, from eight to eleven thousand; at champion's hill, twenty-five thousand; at the big black, four thousand. a part of those met at jackson were all that was left of those encountered at raymond. they were beaten in detail by a force smaller than their own, upon their own ground. our loss up to this time was: killed wounded missing port gibson..... 131 719 25 south fork bayou pierre..... .. 1 .. skirmishes, may 3 ..... 1 9 .. fourteen mile creek..... 6 24 .. raymond............... 66 339 39 jackson..... 42 251 7 champion's hill..... 410 1,844 187 big black..... 39 237 3 bridgeport..... .. 1 .. total..... 695 3,425 259 of the wounded many were but slightly so, and continued on duty. not half of them were disabled for any length of time. after the unsuccessful assault of the 22d the work of the regular siege began. sherman occupied the right starting from the river above vicksburg, mcpherson the centre (mcarthur's division now with him) and mcclernand the left, holding the road south to warrenton. lauman's division arrived at this time and was placed on the extreme left of the line. in the interval between the assaults of the 19th and 22d, roads had been completed from the yazoo river and chickasaw bayou, around the rear of the army, to enable us to bring up supplies of food and ammunition; ground had been selected and cleared on which the troops were to be encamped, and tents and cooking utensils were brought up. the troops had been without these from the time of crossing the mississippi up to this time. all was now ready for the pick and spade. prentiss and hurlbut were ordered to send forward every man that could be spared. cavalry especially was wanted to watch the fords along the big black, and to observe johnston. i knew that johnston was receiving reinforcements from bragg, who was confronting rosecrans in tennessee. vicksburg was so important to the enemy that i believed he would make the most strenuous efforts to raise the siege, even at the risk of losing ground elsewhere. my line was more than fifteen miles long, extending from haines' bluff to vicksburg, thence to warrenton. the line of the enemy was about seven. in addition to this, having an enemy at canton and jackson, in our rear, who was being constantly reinforced, we required a second line of defence facing the other way. i had not troops enough under my command to man these. general halleck appreciated the situation and, without being asked, forwarded reinforcements with all possible dispatch. the ground about vicksburg is admirable for defence. on the north it is about two hundred feet above the mississippi river at the highest point and very much cut up by the washing rains; the ravines were grown up with cane and underbrush, while the sides and tops were covered with a dense forest. farther south the ground flattens out somewhat, and was in cultivation. but here, too, it was cut up by ravines and small streams. the enemy's line of defence followed the crest of a ridge from the river north of the city eastward, then southerly around to the jackson road, full three miles back of the city; thence in a southwesterly direction to the river. deep ravines of the description given lay in front of these defences. as there is a succession of gullies, cut out by rains along the side of the ridge, the line was necessarily very irregular. to follow each of these spurs with intrenchments, so as to command the slopes on either side, would have lengthened their line very much. generally therefore, or in many places, their line would run from near the head of one gully nearly straight to the head of another, and an outer work triangular in shape, generally open in the rear, was thrown up on the point; with a few men in this outer work they commanded the approaches to the main line completely. the work to be done, to make our position as strong against the enemy as his was against us, was very great. the problem was also complicated by our wanting our line as near that of the enemy as possible. we had but four engineer officers with us. captain prime, of the engineer corps, was the chief, and the work at the beginning was mainly directed by him. his health soon gave out, when he was succeeded by captain comstock, also of the engineer corps. to provide assistants on such a long line i directed that all officers who had graduated at west point, where they had necessarily to study military engineering, should in addition to their other duties assist in the work. the chief quartermaster and the chief commissary were graduates. the chief commissary, now the commissary-general of the army, begged off, however, saying that there was nothing in engineering that he was good for unless he would do for a sap-roller. as soldiers require rations while working in the ditches as well as when marching and fighting, and as we would be sure to lose him if he was used as a sap-roller, i let him off. the general is a large man; weighs two hundred and twenty pounds, and is not tall. we had no siege guns except six thirty-two pounders, and there were none at the west to draw from. admiral porter, however, supplied us with a battery of navy-guns of large calibre, and with these, and the field artillery used in the campaign, the siege began. the first thing to do was to get the artillery in batteries where they would occupy commanding positions; then establish the camps, under cover from the fire of the enemy but as near up as possible; and then construct rifle-pits and covered ways, to connect the entire command by the shortest route. the enemy did not harass us much while we were constructing our batteries. probably their artillery ammunition was short; and their infantry was kept down by our sharpshooters, who were always on the alert and ready to fire at a head whenever it showed itself above the rebel works. in no place were our lines more than six hundred yards from the enemy. it was necessary, therefore, to cover our men by something more than the ordinary parapet. to give additional protection sand bags, bullet-proof, were placed along the tops of the parapets far enough apart to make loop-holes for musketry. on top of these, logs were put. by these means the men were enabled to walk about erect when off duty, without fear of annoyance from sharpshooters. the enemy used in their defence explosive musket-balls, no doubt thinking that, bursting over our men in the trenches, they would do some execution; but i do not remember a single case where a man was injured by a piece of one of these shells. when they were hit and the ball exploded, the wound was terrible. in these cases a solid ball would have hit as well. their use is barbarous, because they produce increased suffering without any corresponding advantage to those using them. the enemy could not resort to our method to protect their men, because we had an inexhaustible supply of ammunition to draw upon and used it freely. splinters from the timber would have made havoc among the men behind. there were no mortars with the besiegers, except what the navy had in front of the city; but wooden ones were made by taking logs of the toughest wood that could be found, boring them out for six or twelve pound shells and binding them with strong iron bands. these answered as coehorns, and shells were successfully thrown from them into the trenches of the enemy. the labor of building the batteries and intrenching was largely done by the pioneers, assisted by negroes who came within our lines and who were paid for their work; but details from the troops had often to be made. the work was pushed forward as rapidly as possible, and when an advanced position was secured and covered from the fire of the enemy the batteries were advanced. by the 30th of june there were two hundred and twenty guns in position, mostly light field-pieces, besides a battery of heavy guns belonging to, manned and commanded by the navy. we were now as strong for defence against the garrison of vicksburg as they were against us; but i knew that johnston was in our rear, and was receiving constant reinforcements from the east. he had at this time a larger force than i had had at any time prior to the battle of champion's hill. as soon as the news of the arrival of the union army behind vicksburg reached the north, floods of visitors began to pour in. some came to gratify curiosity; some to see sons or brothers who had passed through the terrible ordeal; members of the christian and sanitary associations came to minister to the wants of the sick and the wounded. often those coming to see a son or brother would bring a dozen or two of poultry. they did not know how little the gift would be appreciated. many of the soldiers had lived so much on chickens, ducks and turkeys without bread during the march, that the sight of poultry, if they could get bacon, almost took away their appetite. but the intention was good. among the earliest arrivals was the governor of illinois, with most of the state officers. i naturally wanted to show them what there was of most interest. in sherman's front the ground was the most broken and most wooded, and more was to be seen without exposure. i therefore took them to sherman's headquarters and presented them. before starting out to look at the lines--possibly while sherman's horse was being saddled --there were many questions asked about the late campaign, about which the north had been so imperfectly informed. there was a little knot around sherman and another around me, and i heard sherman repeating, in the most animated manner, what he had said to me when we first looked down from walnut hills upon the land below on the 18th of may, adding: "grant is entitled to every bit of the credit for the campaign; i opposed it. i wrote him a letter about it." but for this speech it is not likely that sherman's opposition would have ever been heard of. his untiring energy and great efficiency during the campaign entitle him to a full share of all the credit due for its success. he could not have done more if the plan had been his own. (*13) on the 26th of may i sent blair's division up the yazoo to drive out a force of the enemy supposed to be between the big black and the yazoo. the country was rich and full of supplies of both food and forage. blair was instructed to take all of it. the cattle were to be driven in for the use of our army, and the food and forage to be consumed by our troops or destroyed by fire; all bridges were to be destroyed, and the roads rendered as nearly impassable as possible. blair went forty-five miles and was gone almost a week. his work was effectually done. i requested porter at this time to send the marine brigade, a floating nondescript force which had been assigned to his command and which proved very useful, up to haines' bluff to hold it until reinforcements could be sent. on the 26th i also received a letter from banks, asking me to reinforce him with ten thousand men at port hudson. of course i could not comply with his request, nor did i think he needed them. he was in no danger of an attack by the garrison in his front, and there was no army organizing in his rear to raise the siege. on the 3d of june a brigade from hurlbut's command arrived, general kimball commanding. it was sent to mechanicsburg, some miles north-east of haines' bluff and about midway between the big black and the yazoo. a brigade of blair's division and twelve hundred cavalry had already, on blair's return from the yazoo, been sent to the same place with instructions to watch the crossings of the big black river, to destroy the roads in his (blair's) front, and to gather or destroy all supplies. on the 7th of june our little force of colored and white troops across the mississippi, at milliken's bend, were attacked by about 3,000 men from richard taylor's trans-mississippi command. with the aid of the gunboats they were speedily repelled. i sent mower's brigade over with instructions to drive the enemy beyond the tensas bayou; and we had no further trouble in that quarter during the siege. this was the first important engagement of the war in which colored troops were under fire. these men were very raw, having all been enlisted since the beginning of the siege, but they behaved well. on the 8th of june a full division arrived from hurlbut's command, under general sooy smith. it was sent immediately to haines' bluff, and general c. c. washburn was assigned to the general command at that point. on the 11th a strong division arrived from the department of the missouri under general herron, which was placed on our left. this cut off the last possible chance of communication between pemberton and johnston, as it enabled lauman to close up on mcclernand's left while herron intrenched from lauman to the water's edge. at this point the water recedes a few hundred yards from the high land. through this opening no doubt the confederate commanders had been able to get messengers under cover of night. on the 14th general parke arrived with two divisions of burnside's corps, and was immediately dispatched to haines' bluff. these latter troops--herron's and parke's--were the reinforcements already spoken of sent by halleck in anticipation of their being needed. they arrived none too soon. i now had about seventy-one thousand men. more than half were disposed across the peninsula, between the yazoo at haines' bluff and the big black, with the division of osterhaus watching the crossings of the latter river farther south and west from the crossing of the jackson road to baldwin's ferry and below. there were eight roads leading into vicksburg, along which and their immediate sides, our work was specially pushed and batteries advanced; but no commanding point within range of the enemy was neglected. on the 17th i received a letter from general sherman and one on the 18th from general mcpherson, saying that their respective commands had complained to them of a fulsome, congratulatory order published by general mcclernand to the 13th corps, which did great injustice to the other troops engaged in the campaign. this order had been sent north and published, and now papers containing it had reached our camps. the order had not been heard of by me, and certainly not by troops outside of mcclernand's command until brought in this way. i at once wrote to mcclernand, directing him to send me a copy of this order. he did so, and i at once relieved him from the command of the 13th army corps and ordered him back to springfield, illinois. the publication of his order in the press was in violation of war department orders and also of mine. chapter xxxviii. johnston's movements--fortifications at haines' bluff--explosion of the mine--explosion of the second mine--preparing for the assault--the flag of truce--meeting with pemberton--negotiations for surrender--accepting the terms--surrender of vicksburg. on the 22d of june positive information was received that johnston had crossed the big black river for the purpose of attacking our rear, to raise the siege and release pemberton. the correspondence between johnston and pemberton shows that all expectation of holding vicksburg had by this time passed from johnston's mind. i immediately ordered sherman to the command of all the forces from haines' bluff to the big black river. this amounted now to quite half the troops about vicksburg. besides these, herron and a. j. smith's divisions were ordered to hold themselves in readiness to reinforce sherman. haines' bluff had been strongly fortified on the land side, and on all commanding points from there to the big black at the railroad crossing batteries had been constructed. the work of connecting by rifle-pits where this was not already done, was an easy task for the troops that were to defend them. we were now looking west, besieging pemberton, while we were also looking east to defend ourselves against an expected siege by johnston. but as against the garrison of vicksburg we were as substantially protected as they were against us. where we were looking east and north we were strongly fortified, and on the defensive. johnston evidently took in the situation and wisely, i think, abstained from making an assault on us because it would simply have inflicted loss on both sides without accomplishing any result. we were strong enough to have taken the offensive against him; but i did not feel disposed to take any risk of losing our hold upon pemberton's army, while i would have rejoiced at the opportunity of defending ourselves against an attack by johnston. from the 23d of may the work of fortifying and pushing forward our position nearer to the enemy had been steadily progressing. at three points on the jackson road, in front of leggett's brigade, a sap was run up to the enemy's parapet, and by the 25th of june we had it undermined and the mine charged. the enemy had countermined, but did not succeed in reaching our mine. at this particular point the hill on which the rebel work stands rises abruptly. our sap ran close up to the outside of the enemy's parapet. in fact this parapet was also our protection. the soldiers of the two sides occasionally conversed pleasantly across this barrier; sometimes they exchanged the hard bread of the union soldiers for the tobacco of the confederates; at other times the enemy threw over hand-grenades, and often our men, catching them in their hands, returned them. our mine had been started some distance back down the hill; consequently when it had extended as far as the parapet it was many feet below it. this caused the failure of the enemy in his search to find and destroy it. on the 25th of june at three o'clock, all being ready, the mine was exploded. a heavy artillery fire all along the line had been ordered to open with the explosion. the effect was to blow the top of the hill off and make a crater where it stood. the breach was not sufficient to enable us to pass a column of attack through. in fact, the enemy having failed to reach our mine had thrown up a line farther back, where most of the men guarding that point were placed. there were a few men, however, left at the advance line, and others working in the countermine, which was still being pushed to find ours. all that were there were thrown into the air, some of them coming down on our side, still alive. i remember one colored man, who had been under ground at work when the explosion took place, who was thrown to our side. he was not much hurt, but terribly frightened. some one asked him how high he had gone up. "dun no, massa, but t'ink 'bout t'ree mile," was his reply. general logan commanded at this point and took this colored man to his quarters, where he did service to the end of the siege. as soon as the explosion took place the crater was seized by two regiments of our troops who were near by, under cover, where they had been placed for the express purpose. the enemy made a desperate effort to expel them, but failed, and soon retired behind the new line. from here, however, they threw hand-grenades, which did some execution. the compliment was returned by our men, but not with so much effect. the enemy could lay their grenades on the parapet, which alone divided the contestants, and roll them down upon us; while from our side they had to be thrown over the parapet, which was at considerable elevation. during the night we made efforts to secure our position in the crater against the missiles of the enemy, so as to run trenches along the outer base of their parapet, right and left; but the enemy continued throwing their grenades, and brought boxes of field ammunition (shells), the fuses of which they would light with portfires, and throw them by hand into our ranks. we found it impossible to continue this work. another mine was consequently started which was exploded on the 1st of july, destroying an entire rebel redan, killing and wounding a considerable number of its occupants and leaving an immense chasm where it stood. no attempt to charge was made this time, the experience of the 25th admonishing us. our loss in the first affair was about thirty killed and wounded. the enemy must have lost more in the two explosions than we did in the first. we lost none in the second. from this time forward the work of mining and pushing our position nearer to the enemy was prosecuted with vigor, and i determined to explode no more mines until we were ready to explode a number at different points and assault immediately after. we were up now at three different points, one in front of each corps, to where only the parapet of the enemy divided us. at this time an intercepted dispatch from johnston to pemberton informed me that johnston intended to make a determined attack upon us in order to relieve the garrison at vicksburg. i knew the garrison would make no formidable effort to relieve itself. the picket lines were so close to each other--where there was space enough between the lines to post pickets--that the men could converse. on the 21st of june i was informed, through this means, that pemberton was preparing to escape, by crossing to the louisiana side under cover of night; that he had employed workmen in making boats for that purpose; that the men had been canvassed to ascertain if they would make an assault on the "yankees" to cut their way out; that they had refused, and almost mutinied, because their commander would not surrender and relieve their sufferings, and had only been pacified by the assurance that boats enough would be finished in a week to carry them all over. the rebel pickets also said that houses in the city had been pulled down to get material to build these boats with. afterwards this story was verified: on entering the city we found a large number of very rudely constructed boats. all necessary steps were at once taken to render such an attempt abortive. our pickets were doubled; admiral porter was notified, so that the river might be more closely watched; material was collected on the west bank of the river to be set on fire and light up the river if the attempt was made; and batteries were established along the levee crossing the peninsula on the louisiana side. had the attempt been made the garrison of vicksburg would have been drowned, or made prisoners on the louisiana side. general richard taylor was expected on the west bank to co-operate in this movement, i believe, but he did not come, nor could he have done so with a force sufficient to be of service. the mississippi was now in our possession from its source to its mouth, except in the immediate front of vicksburg and of port hudson. we had nearly exhausted the country, along a line drawn from lake providence to opposite bruinsburg. the roads west were not of a character to draw supplies over for any considerable force. by the 1st of july our approaches had reached the enemy's ditch at a number of places. at ten points we could move under cover to within from five to one hundred yards of the enemy. orders were given to make all preparations for assault on the 6th of july. the debouches were ordered widened to afford easy egress, while the approaches were also to be widened to admit the troops to pass through four abreast. plank, and bags filled with cotton packed in tightly, were ordered prepared, to enable the troops to cross the ditches. on the night of the 1st of july johnston was between brownsville and the big black, and wrote pemberton from there that about the 7th of the month an attempt would be made to create a diversion to enable him to cut his way out. pemberton was a prisoner before this message reached him. on july 1st pemberton, seeing no hope of outside relief, addressed the following letter to each of his four division commanders: "unless the siege of vicksburg is raised, or supplies are thrown in, it will become necessary very shortly to evacuate the place. i see no prospect of the former, and there are many great, if not insuperable obstacles in the way of the latter. you are, therefore, requested to inform me with as little delay as possible, as to the condition of your troops and their ability to make the marches and undergo the fatigues necessary to accomplish a successful evacuation." two of his generals suggested surrender, and the other two practically did the same. they expressed the opinion that an attempt to evacuate would fail. pemberton had previously got a message to johnston suggesting that he should try to negotiate with me for a release of the garrison with their arms. johnston replied that it would be a confession of weakness for him to do so; but he authorized pemberton to use his name in making such an arrangement. on the 3d about ten o'clock a.m. white flags appeared on a portion of the rebel works. hostilities along that part of the line ceased at once. soon two persons were seen coming towards our lines bearing a white flag. they proved to be general bowen, a division commander, and colonel montgomery, aide-de-camp to pemberton, bearing the following letter to me: "i have the honor to propose an armistice for--hours, with the view to arranging terms for the capitulation of vicksburg. to this end, if agreeable to you, i will appoint three commissioners, to meet a like number to be named by yourself at such place and hour to-day as you may find convenient. i make this proposition to save the further effusion of blood, which must otherwise be shed to a frightful extent, feeling myself fully able to maintain my position for a yet indefinite period. this communication will be handed you under a flag of truce, by major-general john s. bowen." it was a glorious sight to officers and soldiers on the line where these white flags were visible, and the news soon spread to all parts of the command. the troops felt that their long and weary marches, hard fighting, ceaseless watching by night and day, in a hot climate, exposure to all sorts of weather, to diseases and, worst of all, to the gibes of many northern papers that came to them saying all their suffering was in vain, that vicksburg would never be taken, were at last at an end and the union sure to be saved. bowen was received by general a. j. smith, and asked to see me. i had been a neighbor of bowen's in missouri, and knew him well and favorably before the war; but his request was refused. he then suggested that i should meet pemberton. to this i sent a verbal message saying that, if pemberton desired it, i would meet him in front of mcpherson's corps at three o'clock that afternoon. i also sent the following written reply to pemberton's letter: "your note of this date is just received, proposing an armistice for several hours, for the purpose of arranging terms of capitulation through commissioners, to be appointed, etc. the useless effusion of blood you propose stopping by this course can be ended at any time you may choose, by the unconditional surrender of the city and garrison. men who have shown so much endurance and courage as those now in vicksburg, will always challenge the respect of an adversary, and i can assure you will be treated with all the respect due to prisoners of war. i do not favor the proposition of appointing commissioners to arrange the terms of capitulation, because i have no terms other than those indicated above." at three o'clock pemberton appeared at the point suggested in my verbal message, accompanied by the same officers who had borne his letter of the morning. generals ord, mcpherson, logan and a. j. smith, and several officers of my staff, accompanied me. our place of meeting was on a hillside within a few hundred feet of the rebel lines. near by stood a stunted oak-tree, which was made historical by the event. it was but a short time before the last vestige of its body, root and limb had disappeared, the fragments taken as trophies. since then the same tree has furnished as many cords of wood, in the shape of trophies, as "the true cross." pemberton and i had served in the same division during part of the mexican war. i knew him very well therefore, and greeted him as an old acquaintance. he soon asked what terms i proposed to give his army if it surrendered. my answer was the same as proposed in my reply to his letter. pemberton then said, rather snappishly, "the conference might as well end," and turned abruptly as if to leave. i said, "very well." general bowen, i saw, was very anxious that the surrender should be consummated. his manner and remarks while pemberton and i were talking, showed this. he now proposed that he and one of our generals should have a conference. i had no objection to this, as nothing could be made binding upon me that they might propose. smith and bowen accordingly had a conference, during which pemberton and i, moving a short distance away towards the enemy's lines were in conversation. after a while bowen suggested that the confederate army should be allowed to march out with the honors of war, carrying their small arms and field artillery. this was promptly and unceremoniously rejected. the interview here ended, i agreeing, however, to send a letter giving final terms by ten o'clock that night. word was sent to admiral porter soon after the correspondence with pemberton commenced, so that hostilities might be stopped on the part of both army and navy. it was agreed on my paging with pemberton that they should not be renewed until our correspondence ceased. when i returned to my headquarters i sent for all the corps and division commanders with the army immediately confronting vicksburg. half the army was from eight to twelve miles off, waiting for johnston. i informed them of the contents of pemberton's letters, of my reply and the substance of the interview, and that i was ready to hear any suggestion; but would hold the power of deciding entirely in my own hands. this was the nearest approach to a "council of war" i ever held. against the general, and almost unanimous judgment of the council i sent the following letter: "in conformity with agreement of this afternoon, i will submit the following proposition for the surrender of the city of vicksburg, public stores, etc. on your accepting the terms proposed, i will march in one division as a guard, and take possession at eight a.m. to-morrow. as soon as rolls can be made out, and paroles be signed by officers and men, you will be allowed to march out of our lines, the officers taking with them their side-arms and clothing, and the field, staff and cavalry officers one horse each. the rank and file will be allowed all their clothing, but no other property. if these conditions are accepted, any amount of rations you may deem necessary can be taken from the stores you now have, and also the necessary cooking utensils for preparing them. thirty wagons also, counting two two-horse or mule teams as one, will be allowed to transport such articles as cannot be carried along. the same conditions will be allowed to all sick and wounded officers and soldiers as fast as they become able to travel. the paroles for these latter must be signed, however, whilst officers present are authorized to sign the roll of prisoners." by the terms of the cartel then in force, prisoners captured by either army were required to be forwarded as soon as possible to either aiken's landing below dutch gap on the james river, or to vicksburg, there to be exchanged, or paroled until they could be exchanged. there was a confederate commissioner at vicksburg, authorized to make the exchange. i did not propose to take him a prisoner, but to leave him free to perform the functions of his office. had i insisted upon an unconditional surrender there would have been over thirty thousand men to transport to cairo, very much to the inconvenience of the army on the mississippi. thence the prisoners would have had to be transported by rail to washington or baltimore; thence again by steamer to aiken's--all at very great expense. at aiken's they would have had to be paroled, because the confederates did not have union prisoners to give in exchange. then again pemberton's army was largely composed of men whose homes were in the south-west; i knew many of them were tired of the war and would get home just as soon as they could. a large number of them had voluntarily come into our lines during the siege, and requested to be sent north where they could get employment until the war was over and they could go to their homes. late at night i received the following reply to my last letter: "i have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of this date, proposing terms of capitulation for this garrison and post. in the main your terms are accepted; but, in justice both to the honor and spirit of my troops manifested in the defence of vicksburg, i have to submit the following amendments, which, if acceded to by you, will perfect the agreement between us. at ten o'clock a.m. to-morrow, i propose to evacuate the works in and around vicksburg, and to surrender the city and garrison under my command, by marching out with my colors and arms, stacking them in front of my present lines. after which you will take possession. officers to retain their side-arms and personal property, and the rights and property of citizens to be respected." this was received after midnight. my reply was as follows: "i have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of 3d july. the amendment proposed by you cannot be acceded to in full. it will be necessary to furnish every officer and man with a parole signed by himself, which, with the completion of the roll of prisoners, will necessarily take some time. again, i can make no stipulations with regard to the treatment of citizens and their private property. while i do not propose to cause them any undue annoyance or loss, i cannot consent to leave myself under any restraint by stipulations. the property which officers will be allowed to take with them will be as stated in my proposition of last evening; that is, officers will be allowed their private baggage and side-arms, and mounted officers one horse each. if you mean by your proposition for each brigade to march to the front of the lines now occupied by it, and stack arms at ten o'clock a.m., and then return to the inside and there remain as prisoners until properly paroled, i will make no objection to it. should no notification be received of your acceptance of my terms by nine o'clock a.m. i shall regard them as having been rejected, and shall act accordingly. should these terms be accepted, white flags should be displayed along your lines to prevent such of my troops as may not have been notified, from firing upon your men." pemberton promptly accepted these terms. during the siege there had been a good deal of friendly sparring between the soldiers of the two armies, on picket and where the lines were close together. all rebels were known as "johnnies," all union troops as "yanks." often "johnny" would call: "well, yank, when are you coming into town?" the reply was sometimes: "we propose to celebrate the 4th of july there." sometimes it would be: "we always treat our prisoners with kindness and do not want to hurt them;" or, "we are holding you as prisoners of war while you are feeding yourselves." the garrison, from the commanding general down, undoubtedly expected an assault on the fourth. they knew from the temper of their men it would be successful when made; and that would be a greater humiliation than to surrender. besides it would be attended with severe loss to them. the vicksburg paper, which we received regularly through the courtesy of the rebel pickets, said prior to the fourth, in speaking of the "yankee" boast that they would take dinner in vicksburg that day, that the best receipt for cooking a rabbit was "first ketch your rabbit." the paper at this time and for some time previous was printed on the plain side of wall paper. the last number was issued on the fourth and announced that we had "caught our rabbit." i have no doubt that pemberton commenced his correspondence on the third with a two-fold purpose: first, to avoid an assault, which he knew would be successful, and second, to prevent the capture taking place on the great national holiday, the anniversary of the declaration of american independence. holding out for better terms as he did he defeated his aim in the latter particular. at the appointed hour the garrison of vicksburg marched out of their works and formed line in front, stacked arms and marched back in good order. our whole army present witnessed this scene without cheering. logan's division, which had approached nearest the rebel works, was the first to march in; and the flag of one of the regiments of his division was soon floating over the court-house. our soldiers were no sooner inside the lines than the two armies began to fraternize. our men had had full rations from the time the siege commenced, to the close. the enemy had been suffering, particularly towards the last. i myself saw our men taking bread from their haversacks and giving it to the enemy they had so recently been engaged in starving out. it was accepted with avidity and with thanks. pemberton says in his report: "if it should be asked why the 4th of july was selected as the day for surrender, the answer is obvious. i believed that upon that day i should obtain better terms. well aware of the vanity of our foe, i knew they would attach vast importance to the entrance on the 4th of july into the stronghold of the great river, and that, to gratify their national vanity, they would yield then what could not be extorted from them at any other time." this does not support my view of his reasons for selecting the day he did for surrendering. but it must be recollected that his first letter asking terms was received about 10 o'clock a.m., july 3d. it then could hardly be expected that it would take twenty-four hours to effect a surrender. he knew that johnston was in our rear for the purpose of raising the siege, and he naturally would want to hold out as long as he could. he knew his men would not resist an assault, and one was expected on the fourth. in our interview he told me he had rations enough to hold out for some time--my recollection is two weeks. it was this statement that induced me to insert in the terms that he was to draw rations for his men from his own supplies. on the 4th of july general holmes, with an army of eight or nine thousand men belonging to the trans-mississippi department, made an attack upon helena, arkansas. he was totally defeated by general prentiss, who was holding helena with less than forty-two hundred soldiers. holmes reported his loss at 1,636, of which 173 were killed; but as prentiss buried 400, holmes evidently understated his losses. the union loss was 57 killed, 127 wounded, and between 30 and 40 missing. this was the last effort on the part of the confederacy to raise the siege of vicksburg. on the third, as soon as negotiations were commenced, i notified sherman and directed him to be ready to take the offensive against johnston, drive him out of the state and destroy his army if he could. steele and ord were directed at the same time to be in readiness to join sherman as soon as the surrender took place. of this sherman was notified. i rode into vicksburg with the troops, and went to the river to exchange congratulations with the navy upon our joint victory. at that time i found that many of the citizens had been living under ground. the ridges upon which vicksburg is built, and those back to the big black, are composed of a deep yellow clay of great tenacity. where roads and streets are cut through, perpendicular banks are left and stand as well as if composed of stone. the magazines of the enemy were made by running passage-ways into this clay at places where there were deep cuts. many citizens secured places of safety for their families by carving out rooms in these embankments. a door-way in these cases would be cut in a high bank, starting from the level of the road or street, and after running in a few feet a room of the size required was carved out of the clay, the dirt being removed by the door-way. in some instances i saw where two rooms were cut out, for a single family, with a door-way in the clay wall separating them. some of these were carpeted and furnished with considerable elaboration. in these the occupants were fully secure from the shells of the navy, which were dropped into the city night and dav without intermission. i returned to my old headquarters outside in the afternoon, and did not move into the town until the sixth. on the afternoon of the fourth i sent captain wm. m. dunn of my staff to cairo, the nearest point where the telegraph could be reached, with a dispatch to the general-in-chief. it was as follows: "the enemy surrendered this morning. the only terms allowed is their parole as prisoners of war. this i regard as a great advantage to us at this moment. it saves, probably, several days in the capture, and leaves troops and transports ready for immediate service. sherman, with a large force, moves immediately on johnston, to drive him from the state. i will send troops to the relief of banks, and return the 9th army corps to burnside." this news, with the victory at gettysburg won the same day, lifted a great load of anxiety from the minds of the president, his cabinet and the loyal people all over the north. the fate of the confederacy was sealed when vicksburg fell. much hard fighting was to be done afterwards and many precious lives were to be sacrificed; but the morale was with the supporters of the union ever after. i at the same time wrote to general banks informing him of the fall and sending him a copy of the terms; also saying i would send him all the troops he wanted to insure the capture of the only foothold the enemy now had on the mississippi river. general banks had a number of copies of this letter printed, or at least a synopsis of it, and very soon a copy fell into the hands of general gardner, who was then in command of port hudson. gardner at once sent a letter to the commander of the national forces saying that he had been informed of the surrender of vicksburg and telling how the information reached him. he added that if this was true, it was useless for him to hold out longer. general banks gave him assurances that vicksburg had been surrendered, and general gardner surrendered unconditionally on the 9th of july. port hudson with nearly 6,000 prisoners, 51 guns, 5,000 small-arms and other stores fell into the hands of the union forces: from that day to the close of the rebellion the mississippi river, from its source to its mouth, remained in the control of the national troops. pemberton and his army were kept in vicksburg until the whole could be paroled. the paroles were in duplicate, by organization (one copy for each, federals and confederates), and signed by the commanding officers of the companies or regiments. duplicates were also made for each soldier and signed by each individually, one to be retained by the soldier signing and one to be retained by us. several hundred refused to sign their paroles, preferring to be sent to the north as prisoners to being sent back to fight again. others again kept out of the way, hoping to escape either alternative. pemberton appealed to me in person to compel these men to sign their paroles, but i declined. it also leaked out that many of the men who had signed their paroles, intended to desert and go to their homes as soon as they got out of our lines. pemberton hearing this, again appealed to me to assist him. he wanted arms for a battalion, to act as guards in keeping his men together while being marched to a camp of instruction, where he expected to keep them until exchanged. this request was also declined. it was precisely what i expected and hoped that they would do. i told him, however, that i would see that they marched beyond our lines in good order. by the eleventh, just one week after the surrender, the paroles were completed and the confederate garrison marched out. many deserted, and fewer of them were ever returned to the ranks to fight again than would have been the case had the surrender been unconditional and the prisoners sent to the james river to be paroled. as soon as our troops took possession of the city guards were established along the whole line of parapet, from the river above to the river below. the prisoners were allowed to occupy their old camps behind the intrenchments. no restraint was put upon them, except by their own commanders. they were rationed about as our own men, and from our supplies. the men of the two armies fraternized as if they had been fighting for the same cause. when they passed out of the works they had so long and so gallantly defended, between lines of their late antagonists, not a cheer went up, not a remark was made that would give pain. really, i believe there was a feeling of sadness just then in the breasts of most of the union soldiers at seeing the dejection of their late antagonists. the day before the departure the following order was issued: "paroled prisoners will be sent out of here to-morrow. they will be authorized to cross at the railroad bridge, and move from there to edward's ferry, (*14) and on by way of raymond. instruct the commands to be orderly and quiet as these prisoners pass, to make no offensive remarks, and not to harbor any who fall out of ranks after they have passed." chapter xxxix. retrospect of the campaign--sherman's movements--proposed movement upon mobile--a painful accident--ordered to report at cairo. the capture of vicksburg, with its garrison, ordnance and ordnance stores, and the successful battles fought in reaching them, gave new spirit to the loyal people of the north. new hopes for the final success of the cause of the union were inspired. the victory gained at gettysburg, upon the same day, added to their hopes. now the mississippi river was entirely in the possession of the national troops; for the fall of vicksburg gave us port hudson at once. the army of northern virginia was driven out of pennsylvania and forced back to about the same ground it occupied in 1861. the army of the tennessee united with the army of the gulf, dividing the confederate states completely. the first dispatch i received from the government after the fall of vicksburg was in these words: "i fear your paroling the prisoners at vicksburg, without actual delivery to a proper agent as required by the seventh article of the cartel, may be construed into an absolute release, and that the men will immediately be placed in the ranks of the enemy. such has been the case elsewhere. if these prisoners have not been allowed to depart, you will detain them until further orders." halleck did not know that they had already been delivered into the hands of major watts, confederate commissioner for the exchange of prisoners. at vicksburg 31,600 prisoners were surrendered, together with 172 cannon about 60,000 muskets and a large amount of ammunition. the small-arms of the enemy were far superior to the bulk of ours. up to this time our troops at the west had been limited to the old united states flint-lock muskets changed into percussion, or the belgian musket imported early in the war--almost as dangerous to the person firing it as to the one aimed at--and a few new and improved arms. these were of many different calibers, a fact that caused much trouble in distributing ammunition during an engagement. the enemy had generally new arms which had run the blockade and were of uniform caliber. after the surrender i authorized all colonels whose regiments were armed with inferior muskets, to place them in the stack of captured arms and replace them with the latter. a large number of arms turned in to the ordnance department as captured, were thus arms that had really been used by the union army in the capture of vicksburg. in this narrative i have not made the mention i should like of officers, dead and alive, whose services entitle them to special mention. neither have i made that mention of the navy which its services deserve. suffice it to say, the close of the siege of vicksburg found us with an army unsurpassed, in proportion to its numbers, taken as a whole of officers and men. a military education was acquired which no other school could have given. men who thought a company was quite enough for them to command properly at the beginning, would have made good regimental or brigade commanders; most of the brigade commanders were equal to the command of a division, and one, ransom, would have been equal to the command of a corps at least. logan and crocker ended the campaign fitted to command independent armies. general f. p. blair joined me at milliken's bend a full-fledged general, without having served in a lower grade. he commanded a division in the campaign. i had known blair in missouri, where i had voted against him in 1858 when he ran for congress. i knew him as a frank, positive and generous man, true to his friends even to a fault, but always a leader. i dreaded his coming; i knew from experience that it was more difficult to command two generals desiring to be leaders than it was to command one army officered intelligently and with subordination. it affords me the greatest pleasure to record now my agreeable disappointment in respect to his character. there was no man braver than he, nor was there any who obeyed all orders of his superior in rank with more unquestioning alacrity. he was one man as a soldier, another as a politician. the navy under porter was all it could be, during the entire campaign. without its assistance the campaign could not have been successfully made with twice the number of men engaged. it could not have been made at all, in the way it was, with any number of men without such assistance. the most perfect harmony reigned between the two arms of the service. there never was a request made, that i am aware of, either of the flag-officer or any of his subordinates, that was not promptly complied with. the campaign of vicksburg was suggested and developed by circumstances. the elections of 1862 had gone against the prosecution of the war. voluntary enlistments had nearly ceased and the draft had been resorted to; this was resisted, and a defeat or backward movement would have made its execution impossible. a forward movement to a decisive victory was necessary. accordingly i resolved to get below vicksburg, unite with banks against port hudson, make new orleans a base and, with that base and grand gulf as a starting point, move our combined forces against vicksburg. upon reaching grand gulf, after running its batteries and fighting a battle, i received a letter from banks informing me that he could not be at port hudson under ten days, and then with only fifteen thousand men. the time was worth more than the reinforcements; i therefore determined to push into the interior of the enemy's country. with a large river behind us, held above and below by the enemy, rapid movements were essential to success. jackson was captured the day after a new commander had arrived, and only a few days before large reinforcements were expected. a rapid movement west was made; the garrison of vicksburg was met in two engagements and badly defeated, and driven back into its stronghold and there successfully besieged. it looks now as though providence had directed the course of the campaign while the army of the tennessee executed the decree. upon the surrender of the garrison of vicksburg there were three things that required immediate attention. the first was to send a force to drive the enemy from our rear, and out of the state. the second was to send reinforcements to banks near port hudson, if necessary, to complete the triumph of opening the mississippi from its source to its mouth to the free navigation of vessels bearing the stars and stripes. the third was to inform the authorities at washington and the north of the good news, to relieve their long suspense and strengthen their confidence in the ultimate success of the cause they had so much at heart. soon after negotiations were opened with general pemberton for the surrender of the city, i notified sherman, whose troops extended from haines' bluff on the left to the crossing of the vicksburg and jackson road over the big black on the right, and directed him to hold his command in readiness to advance and drive the enemy from the state as soon as vicksburg surrendered. steele and ord were directed to be in readiness to join sherman in his move against general johnston, and sherman was advised of this also. sherman moved promptly, crossing the big black at three different points with as many columns, all concentrating at bolton, twenty miles west of jackson. johnston heard of the surrender of vicksburg almost as soon as it occurred, and immediately fell back on jackson. on the 8th of july sherman was within ten miles of jackson and on the 11th was close up to the defences of the city and shelling the town. the siege was kept up until the morning of the 17th, when it was found that the enemy had evacuated during the night. the weather was very hot, the roads dusty and the water bad. johnston destroyed the roads as he passed and had so much the start that pursuit was useless; but sherman sent one division, steele's, to brandon, fourteen miles east of jackson. the national loss in the second capture of jackson was less than one thousand men, killed, wounded and missing. the confederate loss was probably less, except in captured. more than this number fell into our hands as prisoners. medicines and food were left for the confederate wounded and sick who had to be left behind. a large amount of rations was issued to the families that remained in jackson. medicine and food were also sent to raymond for the destitute families as well as the sick and wounded, as i thought it only fair that we should return to these people some of the articles we had taken while marching through the country. i wrote to sherman: "impress upon the men the importance of going through the state in an orderly manner, abstaining from taking anything not absolutely necessary for their subsistence while travelling. they should try to create as favorable an impression as possible upon the people." provisions and forage, when called for by them, were issued to all the people, from bruinsburg to jackson and back to vicksburg, whose resources had been taken for the supply of our army. very large quantities of groceries and provisions were so issued. sherman was ordered back to vicksburg, and his troops took much the same position they had occupied before--from the big black to haines' bluff. having cleaned up about vicksburg and captured or routed all regular confederate forces for more than a hundred miles in all directions, i felt that the troops that had done so much should be allowed to do more before the enemy could recover from the blow he had received, and while important points might be captured without bloodshed. i suggested to the general-in-chief the idea of a campaign against mobile, starting from lake pontchartrain. halleck preferred another course. the possession of the trans-mississippi by the union forces seemed to possess more importance in his mind than almost any campaign east of the mississippi. i am well aware that the president was very anxious to have a foothold in texas, to stop the clamor of some of the foreign governments which seemed to be seeking a pretext to interfere in the war, at least so far as to recognize belligerent rights to the confederate states. this, however, could have been easily done without wasting troops in western louisiana and eastern texas, by sending a garrison at once to brownsville on the rio grande. halleck disapproved of my proposition to go against mobile, so that i was obliged to settle down and see myself put again on the defensive as i had been a year before in west tennessee. it would have been an easy thing to capture mobile at the time i proposed to go there. having that as a base of operations, troops could have been thrown into the interior to operate against general bragg's army. this would necessarily have compelled bragg to detach in order to meet this fire in his rear. if he had not done this the troops from mobile could have inflicted inestimable damage upon much of the country from which his army and lee's were yet receiving their supplies. i was so much impressed with this idea that i renewed my request later in july and again about the 1st of august, and proposed sending all the troops necessary, asking only the assistance of the navy to protect the debarkation of troops at or near mobile. i also asked for a leave of absence to visit new orleans, particularly if my suggestion to move against mobile should be approved. both requests were refused. so far as my experience with general halleck went it was very much easier for him to refuse a favor than to grant one. but i did not regard this as a favor. it was simply in line of duty, though out of my department. the general-in-chief having decided against me, the depletion of an army, which had won a succession of great victories, commenced, as had been the case the year before after the fall of corinth when the army was sent where it would do the least good. by orders, i sent to banks a force of 4,000 men; returned the 9th corps to kentucky and, when transportation had been collected, started a division of 5,000 men to schofield in missouri where price was raiding the state. i also detached a brigade under ransom to natchez, to garrison that place permanently. this latter move was quite fortunate as to the time when ransom arrived there. the enemy happened to have a large number, about 5,000 head, of beef cattle there on the way from texas to feed the eastern armies, and also a large amount of munitions of war which had probably come through texas from the rio grande and which were on the way to lee's and other armies in the east. the troops that were left with me around vicksburg were very busily and unpleasantly employed in making expeditions against guerilla bands and small detachments of cavalry which infested the interior, and in destroying mills, bridges and rolling stock on the railroads. the guerillas and cavalry were not there to fight but to annoy, and therefore disappeared on the first approach of our troops. the country back of vicksburg was filled with deserters from pemberton's army and, it was reported, many from johnston's also. the men determined not to fight again while the war lasted. those who lived beyond the reach of the confederate army wanted to get to their homes. those who did not, wanted to get north where they could work for their support till the war was over. besides all this there was quite a peace feeling, for the time being, among the citizens of that part of mississippi, but this feeling soon subsided. it is not probable that pemberton got off with over 4,000 of his army to the camp where he proposed taking them, and these were in a demoralized condition. on the 7th of august i further depleted my army by sending the 13th corps, general ord commanding, to banks. besides this i received orders to co-operate with the latter general in movements west of the mississippi. having received this order i went to new orleans to confer with banks about the proposed movement. all these movements came to naught. during this visit i reviewed banks' army a short distance above carrollton. the horse i rode was vicious and but little used, and on my return to new orleans ran away and, shying at a locomotive in the street, fell, probably on me. i was rendered insensible, and when i regained consciousness i found myself in a hotel near by with several doctors attending me. my leg was swollen from the knee to the thigh, and the swelling, almost to the point of bursting, extended along the body up to the arm-pit. the pain was almost beyond endurance. i lay at the hotel something over a week without being able to turn myself in bed. i had a steamer stop at the nearest point possible, and was carried to it on a litter. i was then taken to vicksburg, where i remained unable to move for some time afterwards. while i was absent general sherman declined to assume command because, he said, it would confuse the records; but he let all the orders be made in my name, and was glad to render any assistance he could. no orders were issued by my staff, certainly no important orders, except upon consultation with and approval of sherman. on the 13th of september, while i was still in new orleans, halleck telegraphed to me to send all available forces to memphis and thence to tuscumbia, to co-operate with rosecrans for the relief of chattanooga. on the 15th he telegraphed again for all available forces to go to rosecrans. this was received on the 27th. i was still confined to my bed, unable to rise from it without assistance; but i at once ordered sherman to send one division to memphis as fast as transports could be provided. the division of mcpherson's corps, which had got off and was on the way to join steele in arkansas, was recalled and sent, likewise, to report to hurlbut at memphis. hurlbut was directed to forward these two divisions with two others from his own corps at once, and also to send any other troops that might be returning there. halleck suggested that some good man, like sherman or mcpherson, should be sent to memphis to take charge of the troops going east. on this i sent sherman, as being, i thought, the most suitable person for an independent command, and besides he was entitled to it if it had to be given to any one. he was directed to take with him another division of his corps. this left one back, but having one of mcpherson's divisions he had still the equivalent. before the receipt by me of these orders the battle of chickamauga had been fought and rosecrans forced back into chattanooga. the administration as well as the general-in-chief was nearly frantic at the situation of affairs there. mr. charles a. dana, an officer of the war department, was sent to rosecrans' headquarters. i do not know what his instructions were, but he was still in chattanooga when i arrived there at a later period. it seems that halleck suggested that i should go to nashville as soon as able to move and take general direction of the troops moving from the west. i received the following dispatch dated october 3d: "it is the wish of the secretary of war that as soon as general grant is able he will come to cairo and report by telegraph." i was still very lame, but started without delay. arriving at columbus on the 16th i reported by telegraph: "your dispatch from cairo of the 3d directing me to report from cairo was received at 11.30 on the 10th. left the same day with staff and headquarters and am here en route for cairo." end of volume i. personal memoirs of u. s. grant volume ii. contents. chapter xl. first meeting with secretary stanton--general rosecrans --commanding military division of mississippi--andrew johnson's address --arrival at chattanooga. chapter xli. assuming the command at chattanooga--opening a line of supplies--battle of wauhatchie--on the picket line. chapter xlii. condition of the army--rebuilding the railroad--general burnside's situation--orders for battle--plans for the attack--hooker's position--sherman's movements. chapter xliii. preparations for battle--thomas carries the first line of the enemy--sherman carries missionary ridge--battle of lookout mountain --general hooker's fight. chapter xliv. battle of chattanooga--a gallant charge--complete rout of the enemy--pursuit of the confederates--general bragg--remarks on chattanooga. chapter xlv. the relief of knoxville--headquarters moved to nashville --visiting knoxville--cipher dispatches--withholding orders. chapter xlvi. operations in mississippi--longstreet in east tennessee --commissioned lieutenant-general--commanding the armies of the united states--first interview with president lincoln. chapter xlvii. the military situation--plans for the campaign--sheridan assigned to command of the cavalry--flank movements--forrest at fort pillow--general banks's expedition--colonel mosby--an incident of the wilderness campaign. chapter xlviii. commencement of the grand campaign--general butler's position--sheridan's first raid. chapter xlix. sherman s campaign in georgia--siege of atlanta--death of general mcpherson--attempt to capture andersonville--capture of atlanta. chapter l. grand movement of the army of the potomac--crossing the rapidan--entering the wilderness--battle of the wilderness. chapter li. after the battle--telegraph and signal service--movement by the left flank. chapter lii. battle of spottsylvania--hancock's position--assault of warren's and wright's corps--upton promoted on the field--good news from butler and sheridan. chapter liii. hancock's assault--losses of the confederates--promotions recommended--discomfiture of the enemy--ewell's attack--reducing the artillery. chapter liv. movement by the left flank--battle of north anna--an incident of the march--moving on richmond--south of the pamunkey --position of the national army. chapter lv. advance on cold harbor--an anecdote of the war--battle of cold harbor--correspondence with lee retrospective. chapter lvi. left flank movement across the chickahominy and james --general lee--visit to butler--the movement on petersburg --the investment of petersburg. chapter lvii. raid on the virginia central railroad--raid on the weldon railroad--early's movement upon washington--mining the works before petersburg--explosion of the mine before petersburg--campaign in the shenandoah valley--capture of the weldon railroad. chapter lviii. sheridan's advance--visit to sheridan--sheridan's victory in the shenandoah--sheridan's ride to winchester--close of the campaign for the winter. chapter lix. the campaign in georgia--sherman's march to the sea--war anecdotes--the march on savannah--investment of savannah--capture of savannah. chapter lx. the battle of franklin--the battle of nashville chapter lxi. expedition against fort fisher--attack on the fort--failure of the expedition--second expedition against the fort--capture of fort fisher. chapter lxii. sherman's march north--sheridan ordered to lynchburg --canby ordered to move against mobile--movements of schofield and thomas --capture of columbia, south carolina--sherman in the carolinas. chapter lxiii. arrival of the peace commissioners--lincoln and the peace commissioners--an anecdote of lincoln--the winter before petersburg --sheridan destroys the railroad--gordon carries the picket line--parke recaptures the line--the battle of white oak road. chapter lxiv. interview with sheridan--grand movement of the army of the potomac--sheridan's advance on five forks--battle of five forks--parke and wright storm the enemy's line--battles before petersburg. chapter lxv. the capture of petersburg--meeting president lincoln in petersburg--the capture of richmond--pursuing the enemy--visit to sheridan and meade. chapter lxvi. battle of sailor's creek--engagement at farmville --correspondence with general lee--sheridan intercepts the enemy. chapter lxvii. negotiations at appomattox--interview with lee at mclean's house--the terms of surrender--lee's surrender--interview with lee after the surrender. chapter lxviii. morale of the two armies--relative conditions of the north and south--president lincoln visits richmond--arrival at washington--president lincoln's assassination--president johnson's policy. chapter lxix. sherman and johnston--johnston's surrender to sherman --capture of mobile--wilson's expedition--capture of jefferson davis --general thomas's qualities--estimate of general canby. chapter lxx. the end of the war--the march to washington--one of lincoln's anecdotes--grand review at washington--characteristics of lincoln and stanton--estimate of the different corps commanders. conclusion appendix chapter xl. first meeting with secretary stanton--general rosecrans--commanding military division of mississippi--andrew johnson's address--arrival at chattanooga. the reply (to my telegram of october 16, 1863, from cairo, announcing my arrival at that point) came on the morning of the 17th, directing me to proceed immediately to the galt house, louisville, where i would meet an officer of the war department with my instructions. i left cairo within an hour or two after the receipt of this dispatch, going by rail via indianapolis. just as the train i was on was starting out of the depot at indianapolis a messenger came running up to stop it, saying the secretary of war was coming into the station and wanted to see me. i had never met mr. stanton up to that time, though we had held frequent conversations over the wires the year before, when i was in tennessee. occasionally at night he would order the wires between the war department and my headquarters to be connected, and we would hold a conversation for an hour or two. on this occasion the secretary was accompanied by governor brough of ohio, whom i had never met, though he and my father had been old acquaintances. mr. stanton dismissed the special train that had brought him to indianapolis, and accompanied me to louisville. up to this time no hint had been given me of what was wanted after i left vicksburg, except the suggestion in one of halleck's dispatches that i had better go to nashville and superintend the operation of troops sent to relieve rosecrans. soon after we started the secretary handed me two orders, saying that i might take my choice of them. the two were identical in all but one particular. both created the "military division of mississippi," (giving me the command) composed of the departments of the ohio, the cumberland, and the tennessee, and all the territory from the alleghanies to the mississippi river north of banks's command in the south-west. one order left the department commanders as they were, while the other relieved rosecrans and assigned thomas to his place. i accepted the latter. we reached louisville after night and, if i remember rightly, in a cold, drizzling rain. the secretary of war told me afterwards that he caught a cold on that occasion from which he never expected to recover. he never did. a day was spent in louisville, the secretary giving me the military news at the capital and talking about the disappointment at the results of some of the campaigns. by the evening of the day after our arrival all matters of discussion seemed exhausted, and i left the hotel to spend the evening away, both mrs. grant (who was with me) and myself having relatives living in louisville. in the course of the evening mr. stanton received a dispatch from mr. c. a. dana, then in chattanooga, informing him that unless prevented rosecrans would retreat, and advising peremptory orders against his doing so. as stated before, after the fall of vicksburg i urged strongly upon the government the propriety of a movement against mobile. general rosecrans had been at murfreesboro', tennessee, with a large and well-equipped army from early in the year 1863, with bragg confronting him with a force quite equal to his own at first, considering it was on the defensive. but after the investment of vicksburg bragg's army was largely depleted to strengthen johnston, in mississippi, who was being reinforced to raise the siege. i frequently wrote general halleck suggesting that rosecrans should move against bragg. by so doing he would either detain the latter's troops where they were or lay chattanooga open to capture. general halleck strongly approved the suggestion, and finally wrote me that he had repeatedly ordered rosecrans to advance, but that the latter had constantly failed to comply with the order, and at last, after having held a council of war, had replied in effect that it was a military maxim "not to fight two decisive battles at the same time." if true, the maxim was not applicable in this case. it would be bad to be defeated in two decisive battles fought the same day, but it would not be bad to win them. i, however, was fighting no battle, and the siege of vicksburg had drawn from rosecrans' front so many of the enemy that his chances of victory were much greater than they would be if he waited until the siege was over, when these troops could be returned. rosecrans was ordered to move against the army that was detaching troops to raise the siege. finally he did move, on the 24th of june, but ten days afterwards vicksburg surrendered, and the troops sent from bragg were free to return. it was at this time that i recommended to the general-in-chief the movement against mobile. i knew the peril the army of the cumberland was in, being depleted continually, not only by ordinary casualties, but also by having to detach troops to hold its constantly extending line over which to draw supplies, while the enemy in front was as constantly being strengthened. mobile was important to the enemy, and in the absence of a threatening force was guarded by little else than artillery. if threatened by land and from the water at the same time the prize would fall easily, or troops would have to be sent to its defence. those troops would necessarily come from bragg. my judgment was overruled, and the troops under my command were dissipated over other parts of the country where it was thought they could render the most service. soon it was discovered in washington that rosecrans was in trouble and required assistance. the emergency was now too immediate to allow us to give this assistance by making an attack in rear of bragg upon mobile. it was therefore necessary to reinforce directly, and troops were sent from every available point. rosecrans had very skilfully manoeuvred bragg south of the tennessee river, and through and beyond chattanooga. if he had stopped and intrenched, and made himself strong there, all would have been right and the mistake of not moving earlier partially compensated. but he pushed on, with his forces very much scattered, until bragg's troops from mississippi began to join him. then bragg took the initiative. rosecrans had to fall back in turn, and was able to get his army together at chickamauga, some miles south-east of chattanooga, before the main battle was brought on. the battle was fought on the 19th and 20th of september, and rosecrans was badly defeated, with a heavy loss in artillery and some sixteen thousand men killed, wounded and captured. the corps under major-general george h. thomas stood its ground, while rosecrans, with crittenden and mccook, returned to chattanooga. thomas returned also, but later, and with his troops in good order. bragg followed and took possession of missionary ridge, overlooking chattanooga. he also occupied lookout mountain, west of the town, which rosecrans had abandoned, and with it his control of the river and the river road as far back as bridgeport. the national troops were now strongly intrenched in chattanooga valley, with the tennessee river behind them and the enemy occupying commanding heights to the east and west, with a strong line across the valley from mountain to mountain, and with chattanooga creek, for a large part of the way, in front of their line. on the 29th halleck telegraphed me the above results, and directed all the forces that could be spared from my department to be sent to rosecrans. long before this dispatch was received sherman was on his way, and mcpherson was moving east with most of the garrison of vicksburg. a retreat at that time would have been a terrible disaster. it would not only have been the loss of a most important strategic position to us, but it would have been attended with the loss of all the artillery still left with the army of the cumberland and the annihilation of that army itself, either by capture or demoralization. all supplies for rosecrans had to be brought from nashville. the railroad between this base and the army was in possession of the government up to bridgeport, the point at which the road crosses to the south side of the tennessee river; but bragg, holding lookout and raccoon mountains west of chattanooga, commanded the railroad, the river and the shortest and best wagon-roads, both south and north of the tennessee, between chattanooga and bridgeport. the distance between these two places is but twenty-six miles by rail, but owing to the position of bragg, all supplies for rosecrans had to be hauled by a circuitous route north of the river and over a mountainous country, increasing the distance to over sixty miles. this country afforded but little food for his animals, nearly ten thousand of which had already starved, and not enough were left to draw a single piece of artillery or even the ambulances to convey the sick. the men had been on half rations of hard bread for a considerable time, with but few other supplies except beef driven from nashville across the country. the region along the road became so exhausted of food for the cattle that by the time they reached chattanooga they were much in the condition of the few animals left alive there--"on the lift." indeed, the beef was so poor that the soldiers were in the habit of saying, with a faint facetiousness, that they were living on "half rations of hard bread and beef dried on the hoof." nothing could be transported but food, and the troops were without sufficient shoes or other clothing suitable for the advancing season. what they had was well worn. the fuel within the federal lines was exhausted, even to the stumps of trees. there were no teams to draw it from the opposite bank, where it was abundant. the only way of supplying fuel, for some time before my arrival, had been to cut trees on the north bank of the river at a considerable distance up the stream, form rafts of it and float it down with the current, effecting a landing on the south side within our lines by the use of paddles or poles. it would then be carried on the shoulders of the men to their camps. if a retreat had occurred at this time it is not probable that any of the army would have reached the railroad as an organized body, if followed by the enemy. on the receipt of mr. dana's dispatch mr. stanton sent for me. finding that i was out he became nervous and excited, inquiring of every person he met, including guests of the house, whether they knew where i was, and bidding them find me and send me to him at once. about eleven o'clock i returned to the hotel, and on my way, when near the house, every person met was a messenger from the secretary, apparently partaking of his impatience to see me. i hastened to the room of the secretary and found him pacing the floor rapidly in his dressing-gown. saying that the retreat must be prevented, he showed me the dispatch. i immediately wrote an order assuming command of the military division of the mississippi, and telegraphed it to general rosecrans. i then telegraphed to him the order from washington assigning thomas to the command of the army of the cumberland; and to thomas that he must hold chattanooga at all hazards, informing him at the same time that i would be at the front as soon as possible. a prompt reply was received from thomas, saying, "we will hold the town till we starve." i appreciated the force of this dispatch later when i witnessed the condition of affairs which prompted it. it looked, indeed, as if but two courses were open: one to starve, the other to surrender or be captured. on the morning of the 20th of october i started, with my staff, and proceeded as far as nashville. at that time it was not prudent to travel beyond that point by night, so i remained in nashville until the next morning. here i met for the first time andrew johnson, military governor of tennessee. he delivered a speech of welcome. his composure showed that it was by no means his maiden effort. it was long, and i was in torture while he was delivering it, fearing something would be expected from me in response. i was relieved, however, the people assembled having apparently heard enough. at all events they commenced a general hand-shaking, which, although trying where there is so much of it, was a great relief to me in this emergency. from nashville i telegraphed to burnside, who was then at knoxville, that important points in his department ought to be fortified, so that they could be held with the least number of men; to admiral porter at cairo, that sherman's advance had passed eastport, mississippi, that rations were probably on their way from st. louis by boat for supplying his army, and requesting him to send a gunboat to convoy them; and to thomas, suggesting that large parties should be put at work on the wagon-road then in use back to bridgeport. on the morning of the 21st we took the train for the front, reaching stevenson alabama, after dark. rosecrans was there on his way north. he came into my car and we held a brief interview, in which he described very clearly the situation at chattanooga, and made some excellent suggestions as to what should be done. my only wonder was that he had not carried them out. we then proceeded to bridgeport, where we stopped for the night. from here we took horses and made our way by jasper and over waldron's ridge to chattanooga. there had been much rain, and the roads were almost impassable from mud, knee-deep in places, and from wash-outs on the mountain sides. i had been on crutches since the time of my fall in new orleans, and had to be carried over places where it was not safe to cross on horseback. the roads were strewn with the debris of broken wagons and the carcasses of thousands of starved mules and horses. at jasper, some ten or twelve miles from bridgeport, there was a halt. general o. o. howard had his headquarters there. from this point i telegraphed burnside to make every effort to secure five hundred rounds of ammunition for his artillery and small-arms. we stopped for the night at a little hamlet some ten or twelve miles farther on. the next day we reached chattanooga a little before dark. i went directly to general thomas's headquarters, and remaining there a few days, until i could establish my own. during the evening most of the general officers called in to pay their respects and to talk about the condition of affairs. they pointed out on the map the line, marked with a red or blue pencil, which rosecrans had contemplated falling back upon. if any of them had approved the move they did not say so to me. i found general w. f. smith occupying the position of chief engineer of the army of the cumberland. i had known smith as a cadet at west point, but had no recollection of having met him after my graduation, in 1843, up to this time. he explained the situation of the two armies and the topography of the country so plainly that i could see it without an inspection. i found that he had established a saw-mill on the banks of the river, by utilizing an old engine found in the neighborhood; and, by rafting logs from the north side of the river above, had got out the lumber and completed pontoons and roadway plank for a second bridge, one flying bridge being there already. he was also rapidly getting out the materials and constructing the boats for a third bridge. in addition to this he had far under way a steamer for plying between chattanooga and bridgeport whenever we might get possession of the river. this boat consisted of a scow, made of the plank sawed out at the mill, housed in, and a stern wheel attached which was propelled by a second engine taken from some shop or factory. i telegraphed to washington this night, notifying general halleck of my arrival, and asking to have general sherman assigned to the command of the army of the tennessee, headquarters in the field. the request was at once complied with. chapter xli. assuming the command at chattanooga--opening a line of supplies--battle of wauhatchie--on the picket line. the next day, the 24th, i started out to make a personal inspection, taking thomas and smith with me, besides most of the members of my personal staff. we crossed to the north side of the river, and, moving to the north of detached spurs of hills, reached the tennessee at brown's ferry, some three miles below lookout mountain, unobserved by the enemy. here we left our horses back from the river and approached the water on foot. there was a picket station of the enemy on the opposite side, of about twenty men, in full view, and we were within easy range. they did not fire upon us nor seem to be disturbed by our presence. they must have seen that we were all commissioned officers. but, i suppose, they looked upon the garrison of chattanooga as prisoners of war, feeding or starving themselves, and thought it would be inhuman to kill any of them except in self-defence. that night i issued orders for opening the route to bridgeport--a cracker line, as the soldiers appropriately termed it. they had been so long on short rations that my first thought was the establishment of a line over which food might reach them. chattanooga is on the south bank of the tennessee, where that river runs nearly due west. it is at the northern end of a valley five or six miles in width, through which chattanooga creek runs. to the east of the valley is missionary ridge, rising from five to eight hundred feet above the creek and terminating somewhat abruptly a half mile or more before reaching the tennessee. on the west of the valley is lookout mountain, twenty-two hundred feet above-tide water. just below the town the tennessee makes a turn to the south and runs to the base of lookout mountain, leaving no level ground between the mountain and river. the memphis and charleston railroad passes this point, where the mountain stands nearly perpendicular. east of missionary ridge flows the south chickamauga river; west of lookout mountain is lookout creek; and west of that, raccoon mountains. lookout mountain, at its northern end, rises almost perpendicularly for some distance, then breaks off in a gentle slope of cultivated fields to near the summit, where it ends in a palisade thirty or more feet in height. on the gently sloping ground, between the upper and lower palisades, there is a single farmhouse, which is reached by a wagon-road from the valley east. the intrenched line of the enemy commenced on the north end of missionary ridge and extended along the crest for some distance south, thence across chattanooga valley to lookout mountain. lookout mountain was also fortified and held by the enemy, who also kept troops in lookout valley west, and on raccoon mountain, with pickets extending down the river so as to command the road on the north bank and render it useless to us. in addition to this there was an intrenched line in chattanooga valley extending from the river east of the town to lookout mountain, to make the investment complete. besides the fortifications on mission ridge, there was a line at the base of the hill, with occasional spurs of rifle-pits half-way up the front. the enemy's pickets extended out into the valley towards the town, so far that the pickets of the two armies could converse. at one point they were separated only by the narrow creek which gives its name to the valley and town, and from which both sides drew water. the union lines were shorter than those of the enemy. thus the enemy, with a vastly superior force, was strongly fortified to the east, south, and west, and commanded the river below. practically, the army of the cumberland was besieged. the enemy had stopped with his cavalry north of the river the passing of a train loaded with ammunition and medical supplies. the union army was short of both, not having ammunition enough for a day's fighting. general halleck had, long before my coming into this new field, ordered parts of the 11th and 12th corps, commanded respectively by generals howard and slocum, hooker in command of the whole, from the army of the potomac to reinforce rosecrans. it would have been folly to send them to chattanooga to help eat up the few rations left there. they were consequently left on the railroad, where supplies could be brought to them. before my arrival, thomas ordered their concentration at bridgeport. general w. f. smith had been so instrumental in preparing for the move which i was now about to make, and so clear in his judgment about the manner of making it, that i deemed it but just to him that he should have command of the troops detailed to execute the design, although he was then acting as a staff officer and was not in command of troops. on the 24th of october, after my return to chattanooga, the following details were made: general hooker, who was now at bridgeport, was ordered to cross to the south side of the tennessee and march up by whitesides and wauhatchie to brown's ferry. general palmer, with a division of the 14th corps, army of the cumberland, was ordered to move down the river on the north side, by a back road, until opposite whitesides, then cross and hold the road in hooker's rear after he had passed. four thousand men were at the same time detailed to act under general smith directly from chattanooga. eighteen hundred of them, under general hazen, were to take sixty pontoon boats, and under cover of night float by the pickets of the enemy at the north base of lookout, down to brown's ferry, then land on the south side and capture or drive away the pickets at that point. smith was to march with the remainder of the detail, also under cover of night, by the north bank of the river to brown's ferry, taking with him all the material for laying the bridge as soon as the crossing was secured. on the 26th, hooker crossed the river at bridgeport and commenced his eastward march. at three o'clock on the morning of the 27th, hazen moved into the stream with his sixty pontoons and eighteen hundred brave and well-equipped men. smith started enough in advance to be near the river when hazen should arrive. there are a number of detached spurs of hills north of the river at chattanooga, back of which is a good road parallel to the stream, sheltered from the view from the top of lookout. it was over this road smith marched. at five o'clock hazen landed at brown's ferry, surprised the picket guard, and captured most of it. by seven o'clock the whole of smith's force was ferried over and in possession of a height commanding the ferry. this was speedily fortified, while a detail was laying the pontoon bridge. by ten o'clock the bridge was laid, and our extreme right, now in lookout valley, was fortified and connected with the rest of the army. the two bridges over the tennessee river--a flying one at chattanooga and the new one at brown's ferry--with the road north of the river, covered from both the fire and the view of the enemy, made the connection complete. hooker found but slight obstacles in his way, and on the afternoon of the 28th emerged into lookout valley at wauhatchie. howard marched on to brown's ferry, while geary, who commanded a division in the 12th corps, stopped three miles south. the pickets of the enemy on the river below were now cut off, and soon came in and surrendered. the river was now opened to us from lookout valley to bridgeport. between brown's ferry and kelly's ferry the tennessee runs through a narrow gorge in the mountains, which contracts the stream so much as to increase the current beyond the capacity of an ordinary steamer to stem it. to get up these rapids, steamers must be cordelled; that is, pulled up by ropes from the shore. but there is no difficulty in navigating the stream from bridgeport to kelly's ferry. the latter point is only eight miles from chattanooga and connected with it by a good wagon-road, which runs through a low pass in the raccoon mountains on the south side of the river to brown's ferry, thence on the north side to the river opposite chattanooga. there were several steamers at bridgeport, and abundance of forage, clothing and provisions. on the way to chattanooga i had telegraphed back to nashville for a good supply of vegetables and small rations, which the troops had been so long deprived of. hooker had brought with him from the east a full supply of land transportation. his animals had not been subjected to hard work on bad roads without forage, but were in good condition. in five days from my arrival in chattanooga the way was open to bridgeport and, with the aid of steamers and hooker's teams, in a week the troops were receiving full rations. it is hard for any one not an eye-witness to realize the relief this brought. the men were soon reclothed and also well fed, an abundance of ammunition was brought up, and a cheerfulness prevailed not before enjoyed in many weeks. neither officers nor men looked upon themselves any longer as doomed. the weak and languid appearance of the troops, so visible before, disappeared at once. i do not know what the effect was on the other side, but assume it must have been correspondingly depressing. mr. davis had visited bragg but a short time before, and must have perceived our condition to be about as bragg described it in his subsequent report. "these dispositions," he said, "faithfully sustained, insured the enemy's speedy evacuation of chattanooga for want of food and forage. possessed of the shortest route to his depot, and the one by which reinforcements must reach him, we held him at our mercy, and his destruction was only a question of time." but the dispositions were not "faithfully sustained," and i doubt not but thousands of men engaged in trying to "sustain" them now rejoice that they were not. there was no time during the rebellion when i did not think, and often say, that the south was more to be benefited by its defeat than the north. the latter had the people, the institutions, and the territory to make a great and prosperous nation. the former was burdened with an institution abhorrent to all civilized people not brought up under it, and one which degraded labor, kept it in ignorance, and enervated the governing class. with the outside world at war with this institution, they could not have extended their territory. the labor of the country was not skilled, nor allowed to become so. the whites could not toil without becoming degraded, and those who did were denominated "poor white trash." the system of labor would have soon exhausted the soil and left the people poor. the non-slaveholders would have left the country, and the small slaveholder must have sold out to his more fortunate neighbor. soon the slaves would have outnumbered the masters, and, not being in sympathy with them, would have risen in their might and exterminated them. the war was expensive to the south as well as to the north, both in blood and treasure, but it was worth all it cost. the enemy was surprised by the movements which secured to us a line of supplies. he appreciated its importance, and hastened to try to recover the line from us. his strength on lookout mountain was not equal to hooker's command in the valley below. from missionary ridge he had to march twice the distance we had from chattanooga, in order to reach lookout valley; but on the night of the 28th and 29th an attack was made on geary at wauhatchie by longstreet's corps. when the battle commenced, hooker ordered howard up from brown's ferry. he had three miles to march to reach geary. on his way he was fired upon by rebel troops from a foot-hill to the left of the road and from which the road was commanded. howard turned to the left, charged up the hill and captured it before the enemy had time to intrench, taking many prisoners. leaving sufficient men to hold this height, he pushed on to reinforce geary. before he got up, geary had been engaged for about three hours against a vastly superior force. the night was so dark that the men could not distinguish one from another except by the light of the flashes of their muskets. in the darkness and uproar hooker's teamsters became frightened and deserted their teams. the mules also became frightened, and breaking loose from their fastenings stampeded directly towards the enemy. the latter, no doubt, took this for a charge, and stampeded in turn. by four o'clock in the morning the battle had entirely ceased, and our "cracker line" was never afterward disturbed. in securing possession of lookout valley, smith lost one man killed and four or five wounded. the enemy lost most of his pickets at the ferry, captured. in the night engagement of the 28th-9th hooker lost 416 killed and wounded. i never knew the loss of the enemy, but our troops buried over one hundred and fifty of his dead and captured more than a hundred. after we had secured the opening of a line over which to bring our supplies to the army, i made a personal inspection to see the situation of the pickets of the two armies. as i have stated, chattanooga creek comes down the centre of the valley to within a mile or such a matter of the town of chattanooga, then bears off westerly, then north-westerly, and enters the tennessee river at the foot of lookout mountain. this creek, from its mouth up to where it bears off west, lay between the two lines of pickets, and the guards of both armies drew their water from the same stream. as i would be under short-range fire and in an open country, i took nobody with me, except, i believe, a bugler, who stayed some distance to the rear. i rode from our right around to our left. when i came to the camp of the picket guard of our side, i heard the call, "turn out the guard for the commanding general." i replied, "never mind the guard," and they were dismissed and went back to their tents. just back of these, and about equally distant from the creek, were the guards of the confederate pickets. the sentinel on their post called out in like manner, "turn out the guard for the commanding general," and, i believe, added, "general grant." their line in a moment front-faced to the north, facing me, and gave a salute, which i returned. the most friendly relations seemed to exist between the pickets of the two armies. at one place there was a tree which had fallen across the stream, and which was used by the soldiers of both armies in drawing water for their camps. general longstreet's corps was stationed there at the time, and wore blue of a little different shade from our uniform. seeing a soldier in blue on this log, i rode up to him, commenced conversing with him, and asked whose corps he belonged to. he was very polite, and, touching his hat to me, said he belonged to general longstreet's corps. i asked him a few questions--but not with a view of gaining any particular information--all of which he answered, and i rode off. chapter xlii. condition of the army--rebuilding the railroad--general burnside's situation--orders for battle--plans for the attack--hooker's position --sherman's movements. having got the army of the cumberland in a comfortable position, i now began to look after the remainder of my new command. burnside was in about as desperate a condition as the army of the cumberland had been, only he was not yet besieged. he was a hundred miles from the nearest possible base, big south fork of the cumberland river, and much farther from any railroad we had possession of. the roads back were over mountains, and all supplies along the line had long since been exhausted. his animals, too, had been starved, and their carcasses lined the road from cumberland gap, and far back towards lexington, ky. east tennessee still furnished supplies of beef, bread and forage, but it did not supply ammunition, clothing, medical supplies, or small rations, such as coffee, sugar, salt and rice. sherman had started from memphis for corinth on the 11th of october. his instructions required him to repair the road in his rear in order to bring up supplies. the distance was about three hundred and thirty miles through a hostile country. his entire command could not have maintained the road if it had been completed. the bridges had all been destroyed by the enemy, and much other damage done. a hostile community lived along the road; guerilla bands infested the country, and more or less of the cavalry of the enemy was still in the west. often sherman's work was destroyed as soon as completed, and he only a short distance away. the memphis and charleston railroad strikes the tennessee river at eastport, mississippi. knowing the difficulty sherman would have to supply himself from memphis, i had previously ordered supplies sent from st. louis on small steamers, to be convoyed by the navy, to meet him at eastport. these he got. i now ordered him to discontinue his work of repairing roads and to move on with his whole force to stevenson, alabama, without delay. this order was borne to sherman by a messenger, who paddled down the tennessee in a canoe and floated over muscle shoals; it was delivered at iuka on the 27th. in this sherman was notified that the rebels were moving a force towards cleveland, east tennessee, and might be going to nashville, in which event his troops were in the best position to beat them there. sherman, with his characteristic promptness, abandoned the work he was engaged upon and pushed on at once. on the 1st of november he crossed the tennessee at eastport, and that day was in florence, alabama, with the head of column, while his troops were still crossing at eastport, with blair bringing up the rear. sherman's force made an additional army, with cavalry, artillery, and trains, all to be supplied by the single track road from nashville. all indications pointed also to the probable necessity of supplying burnside's command in east tennessee, twenty-five thousand more, by the same route. a single track could not do this. i gave, therefore, an order to sherman to halt general g. m. dodge's command, of about eight thousand men, at athens, and subsequently directed the latter to arrange his troops along the railroad from decatur north towards nashville, and to rebuild that road. the road from nashville to decatur passes over a broken country, cut up with innumerable streams, many of them of considerable width, and with valleys far below the road-bed. all the bridges over these had been destroyed, and the rails taken up and twisted by the enemy. all the cars and locomotives not carried off had been destroyed as effectually as they knew how to destroy them. all bridges and culverts had been destroyed between nashville and decatur, and thence to stevenson, where the memphis and charleston and the nashville and chattanooga roads unite. the rebuilding of this road would give us two roads as far as stevenson over which to supply the army. from bridgeport, a short distance farther east, the river supplements the road. general dodge, besides being a most capable soldier, was an experienced railroad builder. he had no tools to work with except those of the pioneers--axes, picks, and spades. with these he was able to intrench his men and protect them against surprises by small parties of the enemy. as he had no base of supplies until the road could be completed back to nashville, the first matter to consider after protecting his men was the getting in of food and forage from the surrounding country. he had his men and teams bring in all the grain they could find, or all they needed, and all the cattle for beef, and such other food as could be found. millers were detailed from the ranks to run the mills along the line of the army. when these were not near enough to the troops for protection they were taken down and moved up to the line of the road. blacksmith shops, with all the iron and steel found in them, were moved up in like manner. blacksmiths were detailed and set to work making the tools necessary in railroad and bridge building. axemen were put to work getting out timber for bridges and cutting fuel for locomotives when the road should be completed. car-builders were set to work repairing the locomotives and cars. thus every branch of railroad building, making tools to work with, and supplying the workmen with food, was all going on at once, and without the aid of a mechanic or laborer except what the command itself furnished. but rails and cars the men could not make without material, and there was not enough rolling stock to keep the road we already had worked to its full capacity. there were no rails except those in use. to supply these deficiencies i ordered eight of the ten engines general mcpherson had at vicksburg to be sent to nashville, and all the cars he had except ten. i also ordered the troops in west tennessee to points on the river and on the memphis and charleston road, and ordered the cars, locomotives and rails from all the railroads except the memphis and charleston to nashville. the military manager of railroads also was directed to furnish more rolling stock and, as far as he could, bridge material. general dodge had the work assigned him finished within forty days after receiving his orders. the number of bridges to rebuild was one hundred and eighty-two, many of them over deep and wide chasms; the length of road repaired was one hundred and two miles. the enemy's troops, which it was thought were either moving against burnside or were going to nashville, went no farther than cleveland. their presence there, however, alarmed the authorities at washington, and, on account of our helpless condition at chattanooga, caused me much uneasiness. dispatches were constantly coming, urging me to do something for burnside's relief; calling attention to the importance of holding east tennessee; saying the president was much concerned for the protection of the loyal people in that section, etc. we had not at chattanooga animals to pull a single piece of artillery, much less a supply train. reinforcements could not help burnside, because he had neither supplies nor ammunition sufficient for them; hardly, indeed, bread and meat for the men he had. there was no relief possible for him except by expelling the enemy from missionary ridge and about chattanooga. on the 4th of november longstreet left our front with about fifteen thousand troops, besides wheeler's cavalry, five thousand more, to go against burnside. the situation seemed desperate, and was more aggravating because nothing could be done until sherman should get up. the authorities at washington were now more than ever anxious for the safety of burnside's army, and plied me with dispatches faster than ever, urging that something should be done for his relief. on the 7th, before longstreet could possibly have reached knoxville, i ordered thomas peremptorily to attack the enemy's right, so as to force the return of the troops that had gone up the valley. i directed him to take mules, officers' horses, or animals wherever he could get them to move the necessary artillery. but he persisted in the declaration that he could not move a single piece of artillery, and could not see how he could possibly comply with the order. nothing was left to be done but to answer washington dispatches as best i could; urge sherman forward, although he was making every effort to get forward, and encourage burnside to hold on, assuring him that in a short time he should be relieved. all of burnside's dispatches showed the greatest confidence in his ability to hold his position as long as his ammunition held out. he even suggested the propriety of abandoning the territory he held south and west of knoxville, so as to draw the enemy farther from his base and make it more difficult for him to get back to chattanooga when the battle should begin. longstreet had a railroad as far as loudon; but from there to knoxville he had to rely on wagon trains. burnside's suggestion, therefore, was a good one, and it was adopted. on the 14th i telegraphed him: "sherman's advance has reached bridgeport. his whole force will be ready to move from there by tuesday at farthest. if you can hold longstreet in check until he gets up, or by skirmishing and falling back can avoid serious loss to yourself and gain time, i will be able to force the enemy back from here and place a force between longstreet and bragg that must inevitably make the former take to the mountain-passes by every available road, to get to his supplies. sherman would have been here before this but for high water in elk river driving him some thirty miles up that river to cross." and again later in the day, indicating my plans for his relief, as follows: "your dispatch and dana's just received. being there, you can tell better how to resist longstreet's attack than i can direct. with your showing you had better give up kingston at the last moment and save the most productive part of your possessions. every arrangement is now made to throw sherman's force across the river, just at and below the mouth of chickamauga creek, as soon as it arrives. thomas will attack on his left at the same time, and together it is expected to carry missionary ridge, and from there push a force on to the railroad between cleveland and dalton. hooker will at the same time attack, and, if he can, carry lookout mountain. the enemy now seems to be looking for an attack on his left flank. this favors us. to further confirm this, sherman's advance division will march direct from whiteside to trenton. the remainder of his force will pass over a new road just made from whiteside to kelly's ferry, thus being concealed from the enemy, and leave him to suppose the whole force is going up lookout valley. sherman's advance has only just reached bridgeport. the rear will only reach there on the 16th. this will bring it to the 19th as the earliest day for making the combined movement as desired. inform me if you think you can sustain yourself until this time. i can hardly conceive of the enemy breaking through at kingston and pushing for kentucky. if they should, however, a new problem would be left for solution. thomas has ordered a division of cavalry to the vicinity of sparta. i will ascertain if they have started, and inform you. it will be entirely out of the question to send you ten thousand men, not because they cannot be spared, but how would they be fed after they got even one day east from here?" longstreet, for some reason or other, stopped at loudon until the 13th. that being the terminus of his railroad communications, it is probable he was directed to remain there awaiting orders. he was in a position threatening knoxville, and at the same time where he could be brought back speedily to chattanooga. the day after longstreet left loudon, sherman reached bridgeport in person and proceeded on to see me that evening, the 14th, and reached chattanooga the next day. my orders for battle were all prepared in advance of sherman's arrival (*15), except the dates, which could not be fixed while troops to be engaged were so far away. the possession of lookout mountain was of no special advantage to us now. hooker was instructed to send howard's corps to the north side of the tennessee, thence up behind the hills on the north side, and to go into camp opposite chattanooga; with the remainder of the command, hooker was, at a time to be afterwards appointed, to ascend the western slope between the upper and lower palisades, and so get into chattanooga valley. the plan of battle was for sherman to attack the enemy's right flank, form a line across it, extend our left over south chickamauga river so as to threaten or hold the railroad in bragg's rear, and thus force him either to weaken his lines elsewhere or lose his connection with his base at chickamauga station. hooker was to perform like service on our right. his problem was to get from lookout valley to chattanooga valley in the most expeditious way possible; cross the latter valley rapidly to rossville, south of bragg's line on missionary ridge, form line there across the ridge facing north, with his right flank extended to chickamauga valley east of the ridge, thus threatening the enemy's rear on that flank and compelling him to reinforce this also. thomas, with the army of the cumberland, occupied the centre, and was to assault while the enemy was engaged with most of his forces on his two flanks. to carry out this plan, sherman was to cross the tennessee at brown's ferry and move east of chattanooga to a point opposite the north end of mission ridge, and to place his command back of the foot-hills out of sight of the enemy on the ridge. there are two streams called chickamauga emptying into the tennessee river east of chattanooga--north chickamauga, taking its rise in tennessee, flowing south, and emptying into the river some seven or eight miles east; while the south chickamauga, which takes its rise in georgia, flows northward, and empties into the tennessee some three or four miles above the town. there were now one hundred and sixteen pontoons in the north chickamauga river, their presence there being unknown to the enemy. at night a division was to be marched up to that point, and at two o'clock in the morning moved down with the current, thirty men in each boat. a few were to land east of the mouth of the south chickamauga, capture the pickets there, and then lay a bridge connecting the two banks of the river. the rest were to land on the south side of the tennessee, where missionary ridge would strike it if prolonged, and a sufficient number of men to man the boats were to push to the north side to ferry over the main body of sherman's command while those left on the south side intrenched themselves. thomas was to move out from his lines facing the ridge, leaving enough of palmer's corps to guard against an attack down the valley. lookout valley being of no present value to us, and being untenable by the enemy if we should secure missionary ridge, hooker's orders were changed. his revised orders brought him to chattanooga by the established route north of the tennessee. he was then to move out to the right to rossville. hooker's position in lookout valley was absolutely essential to us so long as chattanooga was besieged. it was the key to our line for supplying the army. but it was not essential after the enemy was dispersed from our front, or even after the battle for this purpose was begun. hooker's orders, therefore, were designed to get his force past lookout mountain and chattanooga valley, and up to missionary ridge. by crossing the north face of lookout the troops would come into chattanooga valley in rear of the line held by the enemy across the valley, and would necessarily force its evacuation. orders were accordingly given to march by this route. but days before the battle began the advantages as well as the disadvantages of this plan of action were all considered. the passage over the mountain was a difficult one to make in the face of an enemy. it might consume so much time as to lose us the use of the troops engaged in it at other points where they were more wanted. after reaching chattanooga valley, the creek of the same name, quite a formidable stream to get an army over, had to be crossed. i was perfectly willing that the enemy should keep lookout mountain until we got through with the troops on missionary ridge. by marching hooker to the north side of the river, thence up the stream, and recrossing at the town, he could be got in position at any named time; when in this new position, he would have chattanooga creek behind him, and the attack on missionary ridge would unquestionably cause the evacuation by the enemy of his line across the valley and on lookout mountain. hooker's order was changed accordingly. as explained elsewhere, the original order had to be reverted to, because of a flood in the river rendering the bridge at brown's ferry unsafe for the passage of troops at the exact juncture when it was wanted to bring all the troops together against missionary ridge. the next day after sherman's arrival i took him, with generals thomas and smith and other officers, to the north side of the river, and showed them the ground over which sherman had to march, and pointed out generally what he was expected to do. i, as well as the authorities in washington, was still in a great state of anxiety for burnside's safety. burnside himself, i believe, was the only one who did not share in this anxiety. nothing could be done for him, however, until sherman's troops were up. as soon, therefore, as the inspection was over, sherman started for bridgeport to hasten matters, rowing a boat himself, i believe, from kelly's ferry. sherman had left bridgeport the night of the 14th, reached chattanooga the evening of the 15th, made the above-described inspection on the morning of the 16th, and started back the same evening to hurry up his command, fully appreciating the importance of time. his march was conducted with as much expedition as the roads and season would admit of. by the 20th he was himself at brown's ferry with the head of column, but many of his troops were far behind, and one division (ewing's) was at trenton, sent that way to create the impression that lookout was to be taken from the south. sherman received his orders at the ferry, and was asked if he could not be ready for the assault the following morning. news had been received that the battle had been commenced at knoxville. burnside had been cut off from telegraphic communications. the president, the secretary of war, and general halleck, were in an agony of suspense. my suspense was also great, but more endurable, because i was where i could soon do something to relieve the situation. it was impossible to get sherman's troops up for the next day. i then asked him if they could not be got up to make the assault on the morning of the 22d, and ordered thomas to move on that date. but the elements were against us. it rained all the 20th and 21st. the river rose so rapidly that it was difficult to keep the pontoons in place. general orlando b. willcox, a division commander under burnside, was at this time occupying a position farther up the valley than knoxville --about maynardville--and was still in telegraphic communication with the north. a dispatch was received from him saying that he was threatened from the east. the following was sent in reply: "if you can communicate with general burnside, say to him that our attack on bragg will commence in the morning. if successful, such a move will be made as i think will relieve east tennessee, if he can hold out. longstreet passing through our lines to kentucky need not cause alarm. he would find the country so bare that he would lose his transportation and artillery before reaching kentucky, and would meet such a force before he got through, that he could not return." meantime, sherman continued his crossing without intermission as fast as his troops could be got up. the crossing had to be effected in full view of the enemy on the top of lookout mountain. once over, however, the troops soon disappeared behind the detached hill on the north side, and would not come to view again, either to watchmen on lookout mountain or missionary ridge, until they emerged between the hills to strike the bank of the river. but when sherman's advance reached a point opposite the town of chattanooga, howard, who, it will be remembered, had been concealed behind the hills on the north side, took up his line of march to join the troops on the south side. his crossing was in full view both from missionary ridge and the top of lookout, and the enemy of course supposed these troops to be sherman's. this enabled sherman to get to his assigned position without discovery. chapter xliii. preparations for battle--thomas carries the first line of the enemy --sherman carries missionary ridge--battle of lookout mountain --general hooker's fight. on the 20th, when so much was occurring to discourage--rains falling so heavily as to delay the passage of troops over the river at brown's ferry and threatening the entire breaking of the bridge; news coming of a battle raging at knoxville; of willcox being threatened by a force from the east--a letter was received from bragg which contained these words: "as there may still be some non-combatants in chattanooga, i deem it proper to notify you that prudence would dictate their early withdrawal." of course, i understood that this was a device intended to deceive; but i did not know what the intended deception was. on the 22d, however, a deserter came in who informed me that bragg was leaving our front, and on that day buckner's division was sent to reinforce longstreet at knoxville, and another division started to follow but was recalled. the object of bragg's letter, no doubt, was in some way to detain me until knoxville could be captured, and his troops there be returned to chattanooga. during the night of the 21st the rest of the pontoon boats, completed, one hundred and sixteen in all, were carried up to and placed in north chickamauga. the material for the roadway over these was deposited out of view of the enemy within a few hundred yards of the bank of the tennessee, where the north end of the bridge was to rest. hearing nothing from burnside, and hearing much of the distress in washington on his account, i could no longer defer operations for his relief. i determined, therefore, to do on the 23d, with the army of the cumberland, what had been intended to be done on the 24th. the position occupied by the army of the cumberland had been made very strong for defence during the months it had been besieged. the line was about a mile from the town, and extended from citico creek, a small stream running near the base of missionary ridge and emptying into the tennessee about two miles below the mouth of the south chickamauga, on the left, to chattanooga creek on the right. all commanding points on the line were well fortified and well equipped with artillery. the important elevations within the line had all been carefully fortified and supplied with a proper armament. among the elevations so fortified was one to the east of the town, named fort wood. it owed its importance chiefly to the fact that it lay between the town and missionary ridge, where most of the strength of the enemy was. fort wood had in it twenty-two pieces of artillery, most of which would reach the nearer points of the enemy's line. on the morning of the 23d thomas, according to instructions, moved granger's corps of two divisions, sheridan and t. j. wood commanding, to the foot of fort wood, and formed them into line as if going on parade, sheridan on the right, wood to the left, extending to or near citico creek. palmer, commanding the 14th corps, held that part of our line facing south and southwest. he supported sheridan with one division (baird's), while his other division under johnson remained in the trenches, under arms, ready to be moved to any point. howard's corps was moved in rear of the centre. the picket lines were within a few hundred yards of each other. at two o'clock in the afternoon all were ready to advance. by this time the clouds had lifted so that the enemy could see from his elevated position all that was going on. the signal for advance was given by a booming of cannon from fort wood and other points on the line. the rebel pickets were soon driven back upon the main guards, which occupied minor and detached heights between the main ridge and our lines. these too were carried before halting, and before the enemy had time to reinforce their advance guards. but it was not without loss on both sides. this movement secured to us a line fully a mile in advance of the one we occupied in the morning, and the one which the enemy had occupied up to this time. the fortifications were rapidly turned to face the other way. during the following night they were made strong. we lost in this preliminary action about eleven hundred killed and wounded, while the enemy probably lost quite as heavily, including the prisoners that were captured. with the exception of the firing of artillery, kept up from missionary ridge and fort wood until night closed in, this ended the fighting for the first day. the advantage was greatly on our side now, and if i could only have been assured that burnside could hold out ten days longer i should have rested more easily. but we were doing the best we could for him and the cause. by the night of the 23d sherman's command was in a position to move, though one division (osterhaus's) had not yet crossed the river at brown's ferry. the continuous rise in the tennessee had rendered it impossible to keep the bridge at that point in condition for troops to cross; but i was determined to move that night even without this division. orders were sent to osterhaus accordingly to report to hooker, if he could not cross by eight o'clock on the morning of the 24th. because of the break in the bridge, hooker's orders were again changed, but this time only back to those first given to him. general w. f. smith had been assigned to duty as chief engineer of the military division. to him were given the general direction of moving troops by the boats from north chickamauga, laying the bridge after they reached their position, and generally all the duties pertaining to his office of chief engineer. during the night general morgan l. smith's division was marched to the point where the pontoons were, and the brigade of giles a. smith was selected for the delicate duty of manning the boats and surprising the enemy's pickets on the south bank of the river. during this night also general j. m. brannan, chief of artillery, moved forty pieces of artillery, belonging to the army of the cumberland, and placed them on the north side of the river so as to command the ground opposite, to aid in protecting the approach to the point where the south end of the bridge was to rest. he had to use sherman's artillery horses for this purpose, thomas having none. at two o'clock in the morning, november 24th, giles a. smith pushed out from the north chickamauga with his one hundred and sixteen boats, each loaded with thirty brave and well-armed men. the boats with their precious freight dropped down quietly with the current to avoid attracting the attention of any one who could convey information to the enemy, until arriving near the mouth of south chickamauga. here a few boats were landed, the troops debarked, and a rush was made upon the picket guard known to be at that point. the guard were surprised, and twenty of their number captured. the remainder of the troops effected a landing at the point where the bridge was to start, with equally good results. the work of ferrying over sherman's command from the north side of the tennessee was at once commenced, using the pontoons for the purpose. a steamer was also brought up from the town to assist. the rest of m. l. smith's division came first, then the division of john e. smith. the troops as they landed were put to work intrenching their position. by daylight the two entire divisions were over, and well covered by the works they had built. the work of laying the bridge, on which to cross the artillery and cavalry, was now begun. the ferrying over the infantry was continued with the steamer and the pontoons, taking the pontoons, however, as fast as they were wanted to put in their place in the bridge. by a little past noon the bridge was completed, as well as one over the south chickamauga connecting the troops left on that side with their comrades below, and all the infantry and artillery were on the south bank of the tennessee. sherman at once formed his troops for assault on missionary ridge. by one o'clock he started with m. l. smith on his left, keeping nearly the course of chickamauga river; j. e. smith next to the right and a little to the rear; and ewing still farther to the right and also a little to the rear of j. e. smith's command, in column, ready to deploy to the right if an enemy should come from that direction. a good skirmish line preceded each of these columns. soon the foot of the hill was reached; the skirmishers pushed directly up, followed closely by their supports. by half-past three sherman was in possession of the height without having sustained much loss. a brigade from each division was now brought up, and artillery was dragged to the top of the hill by hand. the enemy did not seem to be aware of this movement until the top of the hill was gained. there had been a drizzling rain during the day, and the clouds were so low that lookout mountain and the top of missionary ridge were obscured from the view of persons in the valley. but now the enemy opened fire upon their assailants, and made several attempts with their skirmishers to drive them away, but without avail. later in the day a more determined attack was made, but this, too, failed, and sherman was left to fortify what he had gained. sherman's cavalry took up its line of march soon after the bridge was completed, and by half-past three the whole of it was over both bridges and on its way to strike the enemy's communications at chickamauga station. all of sherman's command was now south of the tennessee. during the afternoon general giles a. smith was severely wounded and carried from the field. thomas having done on the 23d what was expected of him on the 24th, there was nothing for him to do this day except to strengthen his position. howard, however, effected a crossing of citico creek and a junction with sherman, and was directed to report to him. with two or three regiments of his command he moved in the morning along the banks of the tennessee, and reached the point where the bridge was being laid. he went out on the bridge as far as it was completed from the south end, and saw sherman superintending the work from the north side and moving himself south as fast as an additional boat was put in and the roadway put upon it. howard reported to his new chief across the chasm between them, which was now narrow and in a few minutes closed. while these operations were going on to the east of chattanooga, hooker was engaged on the west. he had three divisions: osterhaus's, of the 15th corps, army of the tennessee; geary's, 12th corps, army of the potomac; and cruft's, 14th corps, army of the cumberland. geary was on the right at wauhatchie, cruft at the centre, and osterhaus near brown's ferry. these troops were all west of lookout creek. the enemy had the east bank of the creek strongly picketed and intrenched, and three brigades of troops in the rear to reinforce them if attacked. these brigades occupied the summit of the mountain. general carter l. stevenson was in command of the whole. why any troops, except artillery with a small infantry guard, were kept on the mountain-top, i do not see. a hundred men could have held the summit--which is a palisade for more than thirty feet down--against the assault of any number of men from the position hooker occupied. the side of lookout mountain confronting hooker's command was rugged, heavily timbered, and full of chasms, making it difficult to advance with troops, even in the absence of an opposing force. farther up, the ground becomes more even and level, and was in cultivation. on the east side the slope is much more gradual, and a good wagon road, zigzagging up it, connects the town of chattanooga with the summit. early on the morning of the 24th hooker moved geary's division, supported by a brigade of cruft's, up lookout creek, to effect a crossing. the remainder of cruft's division was to seize the bridge over the creek, near the crossing of the railroad. osterhaus was to move up to the bridge and cross it. the bridge was seized by gross's brigade after a slight skirmish with the pickets guarding it. this attracted the enemy so that geary's movement farther up was not observed. a heavy mist obscured him from the view of the troops on the top of the mountain. he crossed the creek almost unobserved, and captured the picket of over forty men on guard near by. he then commenced ascending the mountain directly in his front. by this time the enemy was seen coming down from their camps on the mountain slope, and filing into their rifle-pits to contest the crossing of the bridge. by eleven o'clock the bridge was complete. osterhaus was up, and after some sharp skirmishing the enemy was driven away with considerable loss in killed and captured. while the operations at the bridge were progressing, geary was pushing up the hill over great obstacles, resisted by the enemy directly in his front, and in face of the guns on top of the mountain. the enemy, seeing their left flank and rear menaced, gave way, and were followed by cruft and osterhaus. soon these were up abreast of geary, and the whole command pushed up the hill, driving the enemy in advance. by noon geary had gained the open ground on the north slope of the mountain, with his right close up to the base of the upper palisade, but there were strong fortifications in his front. the rest of the command coming up, a line was formed from the base of the upper palisade to the mouth of chattanooga creek. thomas and i were on the top of orchard knob. hooker's advance now made our line a continuous one. it was in full view, extending from the tennessee river, where sherman had crossed, up chickamauga river to the base of mission ridge, over the top of the north end of the ridge to chattanooga valley, then along parallel to the ridge a mile or more, across the valley to the mouth of chattanooga creek, thence up the slope of lookout mountain to the foot of the upper palisade. the day was hazy, so that hooker's operations were not visible to us except at moments when the clouds would rise. but the sound of his artillery and musketry was heard incessantly. the enemy on his front was partially fortified, but was soon driven out of his works. during the afternoon the clouds, which had so obscured the top of lookout all day as to hide whatever was going on from the view of those below, settled down and made it so dark where hooker was as to stop operations for the time. at four o'clock hooker reported his position as impregnable. by a little after five direct communication was established, and a brigade of troops was sent from chattanooga to reinforce him. these troops had to cross chattanooga creek and met with some opposition, but soon overcame it, and by night the commander, general carlin, reported to hooker and was assigned to his left. i now telegraphed to washington: "the fight to-day progressed favorably. sherman carried the end of missionary ridge, and his right is now at the tunnel, and his left at chickamauga creek. troops from lookout valley carried the point of the mountain, and now hold the eastern slope and a point high up. hooker reports two thousand prisoners taken, besides which a small number have fallen into our hands from missionary ridge." the next day the president replied: "your dispatches as to fighting on monday and tuesday are here. well done. many thanks to all. remember burnside." and halleck also telegraphed: "i congratulate you on the success thus far of your plans. i fear that burnside is hard pushed, and that any further delay may prove fatal. i know you will do all in your power to relieve him." the division of jefferson c. davis, army of the cumberland, had been sent to the north chickamauga to guard the pontoons as they were deposited in the river, and to prevent all ingress or egress of citizens. on the night of the 24th his division, having crossed with sherman, occupied our extreme left from the upper bridge over the plain to the north base of missionary ridge. firing continued to a late hour in the night, but it was not connected with an assault at any point. chapter xliv. battle of chattanooga--a gallant charge--complete rout of the enemy --pursuit of the confederates--general bragg--remarks on chattanooga. at twelve o'clock at night, when all was quiet, i began to give orders for the next day, and sent a dispatch to willcox to encourage burnside. sherman was directed to attack at daylight. hooker was ordered to move at the same hour, and endeavor to intercept the enemy's retreat if he still remained; if he had gone, then to move directly to rossville and operate against the left and rear of the force on missionary ridge. thomas was not to move until hooker had reached missionary ridge. as i was with him on orchard knob, he would not move without further orders from me. the morning of the 25th opened clear and bright, and the whole field was in full view from the top of orchard knob. it remained so all day. bragg's headquarters were in full view, and officers--presumably staff officers--could be seen coming and going constantly. the point of ground which sherman had carried on the 24th was almost disconnected from the main ridge occupied by the enemy. a low pass, over which there is a wagon road crossing the hill, and near which there is a railroad tunnel, intervenes between the two hills. the problem now was to get to the main ridge. the enemy was fortified on the point; and back farther, where the ground was still higher, was a second fortification commanding the first. sherman was out as soon as it was light enough to see, and by sunrise his command was in motion. three brigades held the hill already gained. morgan l. smith moved along the east base of missionary ridge; loomis along the west base, supported by two brigades of john e. smith's division; and corse with his brigade was between the two, moving directly towards the hill to be captured. the ridge is steep and heavily wooded on the east side, where m. l. smith's troops were advancing, but cleared and with a more gentle slope on the west side. the troops advanced rapidly and carried the extreme end of the rebel works. morgan l. smith advanced to a point which cut the enemy off from the railroad bridge and the means of bringing up supplies by rail from chickamauga station, where the main depot was located. the enemy made brave and strenuous efforts to drive our troops from the position we had gained, but without success. the contest lasted for two hours. corse, a brave and efficient commander, was badly wounded in this assault. sherman now threatened both bragg's flank and his stores, and made it necessary for him to weaken other points of his line to strengthen his right. from the position i occupied i could see column after column of bragg's forces moving against sherman. every confederate gun that could be brought to bear upon the union forces was concentrated upon him. j. e. smith, with two brigades, charged up the west side of the ridge to the support of corse's command, over open ground and in the face of a heavy fire of both artillery and musketry, and reached the very parapet of the enemy. he lay here for a time, but the enemy coming with a heavy force upon his right flank, he was compelled to fall back, followed by the foe. a few hundred yards brought smith's troops into a wood, where they were speedily reformed, when they charged and drove the attacking party back to his intrenchments. seeing the advance, repulse, and second advance of j. e. smith from the position i occupied, i directed thomas to send a division to reinforce him. baird's division was accordingly sent from the right of orchard knob. it had to march a considerable distance directly under the eye of the enemy to reach its position. bragg at once commenced massing in the same direction. this was what i wanted. but it had now got to be late in the afternoon, and i had expected before this to see hooker crossing the ridge in the neighborhood of rossville and compelling bragg to mass in that direction also. the enemy had evacuated lookout mountain during the night, as i expected he would. in crossing the valley he burned the bridge over chattanooga creek, and did all he could to obstruct the roads behind him. hooker was off bright and early, with no obstructions in his front but distance and the destruction above named. he was detained four hours crossing chattanooga creek, and thus was lost the immediate advantage i expected from his forces. his reaching bragg's flank and extending across it was to be the signal for thomas's assault of the ridge. but sherman's condition was getting so critical that the assault for his relief could not be delayed any longer. sheridan's and wood's divisions had been lying under arms from early morning, ready to move the instant the signal was given. i now directed thomas to order the charge at once (*16). i watched eagerly to see the effect, and became impatient at last that there was no indication of any charge being made. the centre of the line which was to make the charge was near where thomas and i stood, but concealed from view by an intervening forest. turning to thomas to inquire what caused the delay, i was surprised to see thomas j. wood, one of the division commanders who was to make the charge, standing talking to him. i spoke to general wood, asking him why he did not charge as ordered an hour before. he replied very promptly that this was the first he had heard of it, but that he had been ready all day to move at a moment's notice. i told him to make the charge at once. he was off in a moment, and in an incredibly short time loud cheering was heard, and he and sheridan were driving the enemy's advance before them towards missionary ridge. the confederates were strongly intrenched on the crest of the ridge in front of us, and had a second line half-way down and another at the base. our men drove the troops in front of the lower line of rifle-pits so rapidly, and followed them so closely, that rebel and union troops went over the first line of works almost at the same time. many rebels were captured and sent to the rear under the fire of their own friends higher up the hill. those that were not captured retreated, and were pursued. the retreating hordes being between friends and pursuers caused the enemy to fire high to avoid killing their own men. in fact, on that occasion the union soldier nearest the enemy was in the safest position. without awaiting further orders or stopping to reform, on our troops went to the second line of works; over that and on for the crest--thus effectually carrying out my orders of the 18th for the battle and of the 24th (*17) for this charge. i watched their progress with intense interest. the fire along the rebel line was terrific. cannon and musket balls filled the air: but the damage done was in small proportion to the ammunition expended. the pursuit continued until the crest was reached, and soon our men were seen climbing over the confederate barriers at different points in front of both sheridan's and wood's divisions. the retreat of the enemy along most of his line was precipitate and the panic so great that bragg and his officers lost all control over their men. many were captured, and thousands threw away their arms in their flight. sheridan pushed forward until he reached the chickamauga river at a point above where the enemy crossed. he met some resistance from troops occupying a second hill in rear of missionary ridge, probably to cover the retreat of the main body and of the artillery and trains. it was now getting dark, but sheridan, without halting on that account pushed his men forward up this second hill slowly and without attracting the attention of the men placed to defend it, while he detached to the right and left to surround the position. the enemy discovered the movement before these dispositions were complete, and beat a hasty retreat, leaving artillery, wagon trains, and many prisoners in our hands. to sheridan's prompt movement the army of the cumberland, and the nation, are indebted for the bulk of the capture of prisoners, artillery, and small-arms that day. except for his prompt pursuit, so much in this way would not have been accomplished. while the advance up mission ridge was going forward, general thomas with staff, general gordon granger, commander of the corps making the assault, and myself and staff occupied orchard knob, from which the entire field could be observed. the moment the troops were seen going over the last line of rebel defences, i ordered granger to join his command, and mounting my horse i rode to the front. general thomas left about the same time. sheridan on the extreme right was already in pursuit of the enemy east of the ridge. wood, who commanded the division to the left of sheridan, accompanied his men on horseback in the charge, but did not join sheridan in the pursuit. to the left, in baird's front where bragg's troops had massed against sherman, the resistance was more stubborn and the contest lasted longer. i ordered granger to follow the enemy with wood's division, but he was so much excited, and kept up such a roar of musketry in the direction the enemy had taken, that by the time i could stop the firing the enemy had got well out of the way. the enemy confronting sherman, now seeing everything to their left giving way, fled also. sherman, however, was not aware of the extent of our success until after nightfall, when he received orders to pursue at daylight in the morning. as soon as sherman discovered that the enemy had left his front he directed his reserves, davis's division of the army of the cumberland, to push over the pontoon-bridge at the mouth of the chickamauga, and to move forward to chickamauga station. he ordered howard to move up the stream some two miles to where there was an old bridge, repair it during the night, and follow davis at four o'clock in the morning. morgan l. smith was ordered to reconnoitre the tunnel to see if that was still held. nothing was found there but dead bodies of men of both armies. the rest of sherman's command was directed to follow howard at daylight in the morning to get on to the railroad towards graysville. hooker, as stated, was detained at chattanooga creek by the destruction of the bridge at that point. he got his troops over, with the exception of the artillery, by fording the stream at a little after three o'clock. leaving his artillery to follow when the bridge should be reconstructed, he pushed on with the remainder of his command. at rossville he came upon the flank of a division of the enemy, which soon commenced a retreat along the ridge. this threw them on palmer. they could make but little resistance in the position they were caught in, and as many of them as could do so escaped. many, however, were captured. hooker's position during the night of the 25th was near rossville, extending east of the ridge. palmer was on his left, on the road to graysville. during the night i telegraphed to willcox that bragg had been defeated, and that immediate relief would be sent to burnside if he could hold out; to halleck i sent an announcement of our victory, and informed him that forces would be sent up the valley to relieve burnside. before the battle of chattanooga opened i had taken measures for the relief of burnside the moment the way should be clear. thomas was directed to have the little steamer that had been built at chattanooga loaded to its capacity with rations and ammunition. granger's corps was to move by the south bank of the tennessee river to the mouth of the holston, and up that to knoxville accompanied by the boat. in addition to the supplies transported by boat, the men were to carry forty rounds of ammunition in their cartridge-boxes, and four days' rations in haversacks. in the battle of chattanooga, troops from the army of the potomac, from the army of the tennessee, and from the army of the cumberland participated. in fact, the accidents growing out of the heavy rains and the sudden rise in the tennessee river so mingled the troops that the organizations were not kept together, under their respective commanders, during the battle. hooker, on the right, had geary's division of the 12th corps, army of the potomac; osterhaus's division of the 15th corps, army of the tennessee; and cruft's division of the army of the cumberland. sherman had three divisions of his own army, howard's corps from the army of the potomac, and jefferson c. davis's division of the army of the cumberland. there was no jealousy--hardly rivalry. indeed, i doubt whether officers or men took any note at the time of the fact of this intermingling of commands. all saw a defiant foe surrounding them, and took it for granted that every move was intended to dislodge him, and it made no difference where the troops came from so that the end was accomplished. the victory at chattanooga was won against great odds, considering the advantage the enemy had of position, and was accomplished more easily than was expected by reason of bragg's making several grave mistakes: first, in sending away his ablest corps commander with over twenty thousand troops; second, in sending away a division of troops on the eve of battle; third, in placing so much of a force on the plain in front of his impregnable position. it was known that mr. jefferson davis had visited bragg on missionary ridge a short time before my reaching chattanooga. it was reported and believed that he had come out to reconcile a serious difference between bragg and longstreet, and finding this difficult to do, planned the campaign against knoxville, to be conducted by the latter general. i had known both bragg and longstreet before the war, the latter very well. we had been three years at west point together, and, after my graduation, for a time in the same regiment. then we served together in the mexican war. i had known bragg in mexico, and met him occasionally subsequently. i could well understand how there might be an irreconcilable difference between them. bragg was a remarkably intelligent and well-informed man, professionally and otherwise. he was also thoroughly upright. but he was possessed of an irascible temper, and was naturally disputatious. a man of the highest moral character and the most correct habits, yet in the old army he was in frequent trouble. as a subordinate he was always on the lookout to catch his commanding officer infringing his prerogatives; as a post commander he was equally vigilant to detect the slightest neglect, even of the most trivial order. i have heard in the old army an anecdote very characteristic of bragg. on one occasion, when stationed at a post of several companies commanded by a field officer, he was himself commanding one of the companies and at the same time acting as post quartermaster and commissary. he was first lieutenant at the time, but his captain was detached on other duty. as commander of the company he made a requisition upon the quartermaster--himself--for something he wanted. as quartermaster he declined to fill the requisition, and endorsed on the back of it his reasons for so doing. as company commander he responded to this, urging that his requisition called for nothing but what he was entitled to, and that it was the duty of the quartermaster to fill it. as quartermaster he still persisted that he was right. in this condition of affairs bragg referred the whole matter to the commanding officer of the post. the latter, when he saw the nature of the matter referred, exclaimed: "my god, mr. bragg, you have quarrelled with every officer in the army, and now you are quarrelling with yourself!" longstreet was an entirely different man. he was brave, honest, intelligent, a very capable soldier, subordinate to his superiors, just and kind to his subordinates, but jealous of his own rights, which he had the courage to maintain. he was never on the lookout to detect a slight, but saw one as soon as anybody when intentionally given. it may be that longstreet was not sent to knoxville for the reason stated, but because mr. davis had an exalted opinion of his own military genius, and thought he saw a chance of "killing two birds with one stone." on several occasions during the war he came to the relief of the union army by means of his superior military genius. i speak advisedly when i saw mr. davis prided himself on his military capacity. he says so himself, virtually, in his answer to the notice of his nomination to the confederate presidency. some of his generals have said so in their writings since the downfall of the confederacy. my recollection is that my first orders for the battle of chattanooga were as fought. sherman was to get on missionary ridge, as he did; hooker to cross the north end of lookout mountain, as he did, sweep across chattanooga valley and get across the south end of the ridge near rossville. when hooker had secured that position the army of the cumberland was to assault in the centre. before sherman arrived, however, the order was so changed as that hooker was directed to come to chattanooga by the north bank of the tennessee river. the waters in the river, owing to heavy rains, rose so fast that the bridge at brown's ferry could not be maintained in a condition to be used in crossing troops upon it. for this reason hooker's orders were changed by telegraph back to what they were originally.-----note.--from this point on this volume was written (with the exception of the campaign in the wilderness, which had been previously written) by general grant, after his great illness in april, and the present arrangement of the subject-matter was made by him between the 10th and 18th of july, 1885. chapter xlv. the relief of knoxville--headquarters moved to nashville--visiting knoxville-cipher dispatches--withholding orders. chattanooga now being secure to the national troops beyond any doubt, i immediately turned my attention to relieving knoxville, about the situation of which the president, in particular, was very anxious. prior to the battles, i had made preparations for sending troops to the relief of burnside at the very earliest moment after securing chattanooga. we had there two little steamers which had been built and fitted up from the remains of old boats and put in condition to run. general thomas was directed to have one of these boats loaded with rations and ammunition and move up the tennessee river to the mouth of the holston, keeping the boat all the time abreast of the troops. general granger, with the 4th corps reinforced to make twenty thousand men, was to start the moment missionary ridge was carried, and under no circumstances were the troops to return to their old camps. with the provisions carried, and the little that could be got in the country, it was supposed he could hold out until longstreet was driven away, after which event east tennessee would furnish abundance of food for burnside's army and his own also. while following the enemy on the 26th, and again on the morning of the 27th, part of the time by the road to ringgold, i directed thomas, verbally, not to start granger until he received further orders from me; advising him that i was going to the front to more fully see the situation. i was not right sure but that bragg's troops might be over their stampede by the time they reached dalton. in that case bragg might think it well to take the road back to cleveland, move thence towards knoxville, and, uniting with longstreet, make a sudden dash upon burnside. when i arrived at ringgold, however, on the 27th, i saw that the retreat was most earnest. the enemy had been throwing away guns, caissons and small-arms, abandoning provisions, and, altogether, seemed to be moving like a disorganized mob, with the exception of cleburne's division, which was acting as rear-guard to cover the retreat. when hooker moved from rossville toward ringgold palmer's division took the road to graysville, and sherman moved by the way of chickamauga station toward the same point. as soon as i saw the situation at ringgold i sent a staff officer back to chattanooga to advise thomas of the condition of affairs, and direct him by my orders to start granger at once. feeling now that the troops were already on the march for the relief of burnside i was in no hurry to get back, but stayed at ringgold through the day to prepare for the return of our troops. ringgold is in a valley in the mountains, situated between east chickamauga creek and taylor's ridge, and about twenty miles south-east from chattanooga. i arrived just as the artillery that hooker had left behind at chattanooga creek got up. his men were attacking cleburne's division, which had taken a strong position in the adjacent hills so as to cover the retreat of the confederate army through a narrow gorge which presents itself at that point. just beyond the gorge the valley is narrow, and the creek so tortuous that it has to be crossed a great many times in the course of the first mile. this attack was unfortunate, and cost us some men unnecessarily. hooker captured, however, 3 pieces of artillery and 230 prisoners, and 130 rebel dead were left upon the field. i directed general hooker to collect the flour and wheat in the neighboring mills for the use of the troops, and then to destroy the mills and all other property that could be of use to the enemy, but not to make any wanton destruction. at this point sherman came up, having reached graysville with his troops, where he found palmer had preceded him. palmer had picked up many prisoners and much abandoned property on the route. i went back in the evening to graysville with sherman, remained there over night and did not return to chattanooga until the following night, the 29th. i then found that thomas had not yet started granger, thus having lost a full day which i deemed of so much importance in determining the fate of knoxville. thomas and granger were aware that on the 23d of the month burnside had telegraphed that his supplies would last for ten or twelve days and during that time he could hold out against longstreet, but if not relieved within the time indicated he would be obliged to surrender or attempt to retreat. to effect a retreat would have been an impossibility. he was already very low in ammunition, and with an army pursuing he would not have been able to gather supplies. finding that granger had not only not started but was very reluctant to go, he having decided for himself that it was a very bad move to make, i sent word to general sherman of the situation and directed him to march to the relief of knoxville. i also gave him the problem that we had to solve--that burnside had now but four to six days supplies left, and that he must be relieved within that time. sherman, fortunately, had not started on his return from graysville, having sent out detachments on the railroad which runs from dalton to cleveland and knoxville to thoroughly destroy that road, and these troops had not yet returned to camp. i was very loath to send sherman, because his men needed rest after their long march from memphis and hard fighting at chattanooga. but i had become satisfied that burnside would not be rescued if his relief depended upon general granger's movements. sherman had left his camp on the north side of the tennessee river, near chattanooga, on the night of the 23d, the men having two days' cooked rations in their haversacks. expecting to be back in their tents by that time and to be engaged in battle while out, they took with them neither overcoats nor blankets. the weather was already cold, and at night they must have suffered more or less. the two days' rations had already lasted them five days; and they were now to go through a country which had been run over so much by confederate troops that there was but little probability of finding much food. they did, however, succeed in capturing some flour. they also found a good deal of bran in some of the mills, which the men made up into bread; and in this and other ways they eked out an existence until they could reach knoxville. i was so very anxious that burnside should get news of the steps being taken for his relief, and thus induce him to hold out a little longer if it became necessary, that i determined to send a message to him. i therefore sent a member of my staff, colonel j. h. wilson, to get into knoxville if he could report to burnside the situation fully, and give him all the encouragement possible. mr. charles a. dana was at chattanooga during the battle, and had been there even before i assumed command. mr. dana volunteered to accompany colonel wilson, and did accompany him. i put the information of what was being done for the relief of knoxville into writing, and directed that in some way or other it must be secretly managed so as to have a copy of this fall into the hands of general longstreet. they made the trip safely; general longstreet did learn of sherman's coming in advance of his reaching there, and burnside was prepared to hold out even for a longer time if it had been necessary. burnside had stretched a boom across the holston river to catch scows and flats as they floated down. on these, by previous arrangements with the loyal people of east tennessee, were placed flour and corn, with forage and provisions generally, and were thus secured for the use of the union troops. they also drove cattle into knoxville by the east side, which was not covered by the enemy; so that when relief arrived burnside had more provisions on hand than when he had last reported. our total loss (not including burnside's) in all these engagements amounted to 757 killed, 4,529 wounded and 330 missing. we captured 6,142 prisoners--about 50 per cent. more than the enemy reported for their total loss--40 pieces of artillery, 69 artillery carriages and caissons and over 7,000 stands of small-arms. the enemy's loss in arms was probably much greater than here reported, because we picked up a great many that were found abandoned. i had at chattanooga, in round numbers, about 60,000 men. bragg had about half this number, but his position was supposed to be impregnable. it was his own fault that he did not have more men present. he had sent longstreet away with his corps swelled by reinforcements up to over twenty thousand men, thus reducing his own force more than one-third and depriving himself of the presence of the ablest general of his command. he did this, too, after our troops had opened a line of communication by way of brown's and kelly's ferries with bridgeport, thus securing full rations and supplies of every kind; and also when he knew reinforcements were coming to me. knoxville was of no earthly use to him while chattanooga was in our hands. if he should capture chattanooga, knoxville with its garrison would have fallen into his hands without a struggle. i have never been able to see the wisdom of this move. then, too, after sherman had arrived, and when bragg knew that he was on the north side of the tennessee river, he sent buckner's division to reinforce longstreet. he also started another division a day later, but our attack having commenced before it reached knoxville bragg ordered it back. it had got so far, however, that it could not return to chattanooga in time to be of service there. it is possible this latter blunder may have been made by bragg having become confused as to what was going on on our side. sherman had, as already stated, crossed to the north side of the tennessee river at brown's ferry, in full view of bragg's troops from lookout mountain, a few days before the attack. they then disappeared behind foot hills, and did not come to the view of the troops on missionary ridge until they met their assault. bragg knew it was sherman's troops that had crossed, and, they being so long out of view, may have supposed that they had gone up the north bank of the tennessee river to the relief of knoxville and that longstreet was therefore in danger. but the first great blunder, detaching longstreet, cannot be accounted for in any way i know of. if he had captured chattanooga, east tennessee would have fallen without a struggle. it would have been a victory for us to have got our army away from chattanooga safely. it was a manifold greater victory to drive away the besieging army; a still greater one to defeat that army in his chosen ground and nearly annihilate it. the probabilities are that our loss in killed was the heavier, as we were the attacking party. the enemy reported his loss in killed at 361: but as he reported his missing at 4,146, while we held over 6,000 of them as prisoners, and there must have been hundreds if not thousands who deserted, but little reliance can be placed on this report. there was certainly great dissatisfaction with bragg on the part of the soldiers for his harsh treatment of them, and a disposition to get away if they could. then, too, chattanooga, following in the same half year with gettysburg in the east and vicksburg in the west, there was much the same feeling in the south at this time that there had been in the north the fall and winter before. if the same license had been allowed the people and press in the south that was allowed in the north, chattanooga would probably have been the last battle fought for the preservation of the union. general william f. smith's services in these battles had been such that i thought him eminently entitled to promotion. i was aware that he had previously been named by the president for promotion to the grade of major-general, but that the senate had rejected the nomination. i was not aware of the reasons for this course, and therefore strongly recommended him for a major-generalcy. my recommendation was heeded and the appointment made. upon the raising of the siege of knoxville i, of course, informed the authorities at washington--the president and secretary of war--of the fact, which caused great rejoicing there. the president especially was rejoiced that knoxville had been relieved (*18) without further bloodshed. the safety of burnside's army and the loyal people of east tennessee had been the subject of much anxiety to the president for several months, during which time he was doing all he could to relieve the situation; sending a new commander (*19) with a few thousand troops by the way of cumberland gap, and telegraphing me daily, almost hourly, to "remember burnside," "do something for burnside," and other appeals of like tenor. he saw no escape for east tennessee until after our victory at chattanooga. even then he was afraid that burnside might be out of ammunition, in a starving condition, or overpowered: and his anxiety was still intense until he heard that longstreet had been driven from the field. burnside followed longstreet only to strawberry plains, some twenty miles or more east, and then stopped, believing that longstreet would leave the state. the latter did not do so, however, but stopped only a short distance farther on and subsisted his army for the entire winter off east tennessee. foster now relieved burnside. sherman made disposition of his troops along the tennessee river in accordance with instructions. i left thomas in command at chattanooga, and, about the 20th of december, moved my headquarters to nashville, tennessee. nashville was the most central point from which to communicate with my entire military division, and also with the authorities at washington. while remaining at chattanooga i was liable to have my telegraphic communications cut so as to throw me out of communication with both my command and washington. nothing occurred at nashville worthy of mention during the winter, (*20) so i set myself to the task of having troops in positions from which they could move to advantage, and in collecting all necessary supplies so as to be ready to claim a due share of the enemy's attention upon the appearance of the first good weather in the spring. i expected to retain the command i then had, and prepared myself for the campaign against atlanta. i also had great hopes of having a campaign made against mobile from the gulf. i expected after atlanta fell to occupy that place permanently, and to cut off lee's army from the west by way of the road running through augusta to atlanta and thence south-west. i was preparing to hold atlanta with a small garrison, and it was my expectation to push through to mobile if that city was in our possession: if not, to savannah; and in this manner to get possession of the only east and west railroad that would then be left to the enemy. but the spring campaign against mobile was not made. the army of the ohio had been getting supplies over cumberland gap until their animals had nearly all starved. i now determined to go myself to see if there was any possible chance of using that route in the spring, and if not to abandon it. accordingly i left nashville in the latter part of december by rail for chattanooga. from chattanooga i took one of the little steamers previously spoken of as having been built there, and, putting my horses aboard, went up to the junction of the clinch with the tennessee. from that point the railroad had been repaired up to knoxville and out east to strawberry plains. i went by rail therefore to knoxville, where i remained for several days. general john g. foster was then commanding the department of the ohio. it was an intensely cold winter, the thermometer being down as low as zero every morning for more than a week while i was at knoxville and on my way from there on horseback to lexington, kentucky, the first point where i could reach rail to carry me back to my headquarters at nashville. the road over cumberland gap, and back of it, was strewn with debris of broken wagons and dead animals, much as i had found it on my first trip to chattanooga over waldron's ridge. the road had been cut up to as great a depth as clay could be by mules and wagons, and in that condition frozen; so that the ride of six days from strawberry plains to lexington over these holes and knobs in the road was a very cheerless one, and very disagreeable. i found a great many people at home along that route, both in tennessee and kentucky, and, almost universally, intensely loyal. they would collect in little places where we would stop of evenings, to see me, generally hearing of my approach before we arrived. the people naturally expected to see the commanding general the oldest person in the party. i was then forty-one years of age, while my medical director was gray-haired and probably twelve or more years my senior. the crowds would generally swarm around him, and thus give me an opportunity of quietly dismounting and getting into the house. it also gave me an opportunity of hearing passing remarks from one spectator to another about their general. those remarks were apt to be more complimentary to the cause than to the appearance of the supposed general, owing to his being muffled up, and also owing to the travel-worn condition we were all in after a hard day's ride. i was back in nashville by the 13th of january, 1864. when i started on this trip it was necessary for me to have some person along who could turn dispatches into cipher, and who could also read the cipher dispatches which i was liable to receive daily and almost hourly. under the rules of the war department at that time, mr. stanton had taken entire control of the matter of regulating the telegraph and determining how it should be used, and of saying who, and who alone, should have the ciphers. the operators possessed of the ciphers, as well as the ciphers used, were practically independent of the commanders whom they were serving immediately under, and had to report to the war department through general stager all the dispatches which they received or forwarded. i was obliged to leave the telegraphic operator back at nashville, because that was the point at which all dispatches to me would come, to be forwarded from there. as i have said, it was necessary for me also to have an operator during this inspection who had possession of this cipher to enable me to telegraph to my division and to the war department without my dispatches being read by all the operators along the line of wires over which they were transmitted. accordingly i ordered the cipher operator to turn over the key to captain cyrus b. comstock, of the corps of engineers, whom i had selected as a wise and discreet man who certainly could be trusted with the cipher if the operator at my headquarters could. the operator refused point blank to turn over the key to captain comstock as directed by me, stating that his orders from the war department were not to give it to anybody--the commanding general or any one else. i told him i would see whether he would or not. he said that if he did he would be punished. i told him if he did not he most certainly would be punished. finally, seeing that punishment was certain if he refused longer to obey my order, and being somewhat remote (even if he was not protected altogether from the consequences of his disobedience to his orders) from the war department, he yielded. when i returned from knoxville i found quite a commotion. the operator had been reprimanded very severely and ordered to be relieved. i informed the secretary of war, or his assistant secretary in charge of the telegraph, stager, that the man could not be relieved, for he had only obeyed my orders. it was absolutely necessary for me to have the cipher, and the man would most certainly have been punished if he had not delivered it; that they would have to punish me if they punished anybody, or words to that effect. this was about the only thing approaching a disagreeable difference between the secretary of war and myself that occurred until the war was over, when we had another little spat. owing to his natural disposition to assume all power and control in all matters that he had anything whatever to do with, he boldly took command of the armies, and, while issuing no orders on the subject, prohibited any order from me going out of the adjutant-general's office until he had approved it. this was done by directing the adjutant-general to hold any orders that came from me to be issued from the adjutant-general's office until he had examined them and given his approval. he never disturbed himself, either, in examining my orders until it was entirely convenient for him; so that orders which i had prepared would often lie there three or four days before he would sanction them. i remonstrated against this in writing, and the secretary apologetically restored me to my rightful position of general-in-chief of the army. but he soon lapsed again and took control much as before. after the relief of knoxville sherman had proposed to burnside that he should go with him to drive longstreet out of tennessee; but burnside assured him that with the troops which had been brought by granger, and which were to be left, he would be amply prepared to dispose of longstreet without availing himself of this offer. as before stated sherman's command had left their camps north of the tennessee, near chattanooga, with two days' rations in their haversacks, without coats or blankets, and without many wagons, expecting to return to their camps by the end of that time. the weather was now cold and they were suffering, but still they were ready to make the further sacrifice, had it been required, for the good of the cause which had brought them into service. sherman, having accomplished the object for which he was sent, marched back leisurely to his old camp on the tennessee river. chapter xlvi. operations in mississippi--longstreet in east tennessee--commissioned lieutenant-general--commanding the armies of the united states--first interview with president lincoln. soon after his return from knoxville i ordered sherman to distribute his forces from stevenson to decatur and thence north to nashville; sherman suggested that he be permitted to go back to mississippi, to the limits of his own department and where most of his army still remained, for the purpose of clearing out what confederates might still be left on the east bank of the mississippi river to impede its navigation by our boats. he expected also to have the co-operation of banks to do the same thing on the west shore. of course i approved heartily. about the 10th of january sherman was back in memphis, where hurlbut commanded, and got together his memphis men, or ordered them collected and sent to vicksburg. he then went to vicksburg and out to where mcpherson was in command, and had him organize his surplus troops so as to give him about 20,000 men in all. sherman knew that general (bishop) polk was occupying meridian with his headquarters, and had two divisions of infantry with a considerable force of cavalry scattered west of him. he determined, therefore, to move directly upon meridian. i had sent some 2,500 cavalry under general sooy smith to sherman's department, and they had mostly arrived before sherman got to memphis. hurlbut had 7,000 cavalry, and sherman ordered him to reinforce smith so as to give the latter a force of about 7,000 with which to go against forrest, who was then known to be south-east from memphis. smith was ordered to move about the 1st of february. while sherman was waiting at vicksburg for the arrival of hurlbut with his surplus men, he sent out scouts to ascertain the position and strength of the enemy and to bring back all the information they could gather. when these scouts returned it was through them that he got the information of general polk's being at meridian, and of the strength and disposition of his command. forrest had about 4,000 cavalry with him, composed of thoroughly well-disciplined men, who under so able a leader were very effective. smith's command was nearly double that of forrest, but not equal, man to man, for the lack of a successful experience such as forrest's men had had. the fact is, troops who have fought a few battles and won, and followed up their victories, improve upon what they were before to an extent that can hardly be counted by percentage. the difference in result is often decisive victory instead of inglorious defeat. this same difference, too, is often due to the way troops are officered, and for the particular kind of warfare which forrest had carried on neither army could present a more effective officer than he was. sherman got off on the 3d of february and moved out on his expedition, meeting with no opposition whatever until he crossed the big black, and with no great deal of opposition after that until he reached jackson, mississippi. this latter place he reached on the 6th or 7th, brandon on the 8th, and morton on the 9th. up to this time he moved in two columns to enable him to get a good supply of forage, etc., and expedite the march. here, however, there were indications of the concentration of confederate infantry, and he was obliged to keep his army close together. he had no serious engagement; but he met some of the enemy who destroyed a few of his wagons about decatur, mississippi, where, by the way, sherman himself came near being picked up. he entered meridian on the 14th of the month, the enemy having retreated toward demopolis, alabama. he spent several days in meridian in thoroughly destroying the railroad to the north and south, and also for the purpose of hearing from sooy smith, who he supposed had met forrest before this time and he hoped had gained a decisive victory because of a superiority of numbers. hearing nothing of him, however, he started on his return trip to vicksburg. there he learned that smith, while waiting for a few of his men who had been ice-bound in the ohio river, instead of getting off on the 1st as expected, had not left until the 11th. smith did meet forrest, but the result was decidedly in forrest's favor. sherman had written a letter to banks, proposing a co-operative movement with him against shreveport, subject to my approval. i disapproved of sherman's going himself, because i had other important work for him to do, but consented that he might send a few troops to the aid of banks, though their time to remain absent must be limited. we must have them for the spring campaign. the trans-mississippi movement proved abortive. my eldest son, who had accompanied me on the vicksburg campaign and siege, had while there contracted disease, which grew worse, until he had grown so dangerously ill that on the 24th of january i obtained permission to go to st. louis, where he was staying at the time, to see him, hardly expecting to find him alive on my arrival. while i was permitted to go, i was not permitted to turn over my command to any one else, but was directed to keep the headquarters with me and to communicate regularly with all parts of my division and with washington, just as though i had remained at nashville. when i obtained this leave i was at chattanooga, having gone there again to make preparations to have the troops of thomas in the southern part of tennessee co-operate with sherman's movement in mississippi. i directed thomas, and logan who was at scottsboro, alabama, to keep up a threatening movement to the south against j. e. johnston, who had again relieved bragg, for the purpose of making him keep as many troops as possible there. i learned through confederate sources that johnston had already sent two divisions in the direction of mobile, presumably to operate against sherman, and two more divisions to longstreet in east tennessee. seeing that johnston had depleted in this way, i directed thomas to send at least ten thousand men, besides stanley's division which was already to the east, into east tennessee, and notified schofield, who was now in command in east tennessee, of this movement of troops into his department and also of the reinforcements longstreet had received. my object was to drive longstreet out of east tennessee as a part of the preparations for my spring campaign. about this time general foster, who had been in command of the department of the ohio after burnside until schofield relieved him (*21), advised me that he thought it would be a good thing to keep longstreet just where he was; that he was perfectly quiet in east tennessee, and if he was forced to leave there, his whole well-equipped army would be free to go to any place where it could effect the most for their cause. i thought the advice was good, and, adopting that view, countermanded the orders for pursuit of longstreet. on the 12th of february i ordered thomas to take dalton and hold it, if possible; and i directed him to move without delay. finding that he had not moved, on the 17th i urged him again to start, telling him how important it was, that the object of the movement was to co-operate with sherman, who was moving eastward and might be in danger. then again on the 21st, he not yet having started, i asked him if he could not start the next day. he finally got off on the 22d or 23d. the enemy fell back from his front without a battle, but took a new position quite as strong and farther to the rear. thomas reported that he could not go any farther, because it was impossible with his poor teams, nearly starved, to keep up supplies until the railroads were repaired. he soon fell back. schofield also had to return for the same reason. he could not carry supplies with him, and longstreet was between him and the supplies still left in the country. longstreet, in his retreat, would be moving towards his supplies, while our forces, following, would be receding from theirs. on the 2d of march, however, i learned of sherman's success, which eased my mind very much. the next day, the 3d, i was ordered to washington. the bill restoring the grade of lieutenant-general of the army had passed through congress and became a law on the 26th of february. my nomination had been sent to the senate on the 1st of march and confirmed the next day (the 2d). i was ordered to washington on the 3d to receive my commission, and started the day following that. the commission was handed to me on the 9th. it was delivered to me at the executive mansion by president lincoln in the presence of his cabinet, my eldest son, those of my staff who were with me and and a few other visitors. the president in presenting my commission read from a paper--stating, however, as a preliminary, and prior to the delivery of it, that he had drawn that up on paper, knowing my disinclination to speak in public, and handed me a copy in advance so that i might prepare a few lines of reply. the president said: "general grant, the nation's appreciation of what you have done, and its reliance upon you for what remains to be done in the existing great struggle, are now presented, with this commission constituting you lieutenant-general in the army of the united states. with this high honor, devolves upon you, also, a corresponding responsibility. as the country herein trusts you, so, under god, it will sustain you. i scarcely need to add, that, with what i here speak for the nation, goes my own hearty personal concurrence." to this i replied: "mr. president, i accept the commission, with gratitude for the high honor conferred. with the aid of the noble armies that have fought in so many fields for our common country, it will be my earnest endeavor not to disappoint your expectations. i feel the full weight of the responsibilities now devolving on me; and i know that if they are met, it will be due to those armies, and above all, to the favor of that providence which leads both nations and men." on the 10th i visited the headquarters of the army of the potomac at brandy station; then returned to washington, and pushed west at once to make my arrangements for turning over the commands there and giving general directions for the preparations to be made for the spring campaign. it had been my intention before this to remain in the west, even if i was made lieutenant-general; but when i got to washington and saw the situation it was plain that here was the point for the commanding general to be. no one else could, probably, resist the pressure that would be brought to bear upon him to desist from his own plans and pursue others. i determined, therefore, before i started back to have sherman advanced to my late position, mcpherson to sherman's in command of the department, and logan to the command of mcpherson's corps. these changes were all made on my recommendation and without hesitation. my commission as lieutenant-general was given to me on the 9th of march, 1864. on the following day, as already stated, i visited general meade, commanding the army of the potomac, at his headquarters at brandy station, north of the rapidan. i had known general meade slightly in the mexican war, but had not met him since until this visit. i was a stranger to most of the army of the potomac, i might say to all except the officers of the regular army who had served in the mexican war. there had been some changes ordered in the organization of that army before my promotion. one was the consolidation of five corps into three, thus throwing some officers of rank out of important commands. meade evidently thought that i might want to make still one more change not yet ordered. he said to me that i might want an officer who had served with me in the west, mentioning sherman specially, to take his place. if so, he begged me not to hesitate about making the change. he urged that the work before us was of such vast importance to the whole nation that the feeling or wishes of no one person should stand in the way of selecting the right men for all positions. for himself, he would serve to the best of his ability wherever placed. i assured him that i had no thought of substituting any one for him. as to sherman, he could not be spared from the west. this incident gave me even a more favorable opinion of meade than did his great victory at gettysburg the july before. it is men who wait to be selected, and not those who seek, from whom we may always expect the most efficient service. meade's position afterwards proved embarrassing to me if not to him. he was commanding an army and, for nearly a year previous to my taking command of all the armies, was in supreme command of the army of the potomac--except from the authorities at washington. all other general officers occupying similar positions were independent in their commands so far as any one present with them was concerned. i tried to make general meade's position as nearly as possible what it would have been if i had been in washington or any other place away from his command. i therefore gave all orders for the movements of the army of the potomac to meade to have them executed. to avoid the necessity of having to give orders direct, i established my headquarters near his, unless there were reasons for locating them elsewhere. this sometimes happened, and i had on occasions to give orders direct to the troops affected. on the 11th i returned to washington and, on the day after, orders were published by the war department placing me in command of all the armies. i had left washington the night before to return to my old command in the west and to meet sherman whom i had telegraphed to join me in nashville. sherman assumed command of the military division of the mississippi on the 18th of march, and we left nashville together for cincinnati. i had sherman accompany me that far on my way back to washington so that we could talk over the matters about which i wanted to see him, without losing any more time from my new command than was necessary. the first point which i wished to discuss was particularly about the co-operation of his command with mine when the spring campaign should commence. there were also other and minor points, minor as compared with the great importance of the question to be decided by sanguinary war--the restoration to duty of officers who had been relieved from important commands, namely mcclellan, burnside and fremont in the east, and buell, mccook, negley and crittenden in the west. some time in the winter of 1863-64 i had been invited by the general-in-chief to give my views of the campaign i thought advisable for the command under me--now sherman's. general j. e. johnston was defending atlanta and the interior of georgia with an army, the largest part of which was stationed at dalton, about 38 miles south of chattanooga. dalton is at the junction of the railroad from cleveland with the one from chattanooga to atlanta. there could have been no difference of opinion as to the first duty of the armies of the military division of the mississippi. johnston's army was the first objective, and that important railroad centre, atlanta, the second. at the time i wrote general halleck giving my views of the approaching campaign, and at the time i met general sherman, it was expected that general banks would be through with the campaign which he had been ordered upon before my appointment to the command of all the armies, and would be ready to co-operate with the armies east of the mississippi, his part in the programme being to move upon mobile by land while the navy would close the harbor and assist to the best of its ability. (*22) the plan therefore was for sherman to attack johnston and destroy his army if possible, to capture atlanta and hold it, and with his troops and those of banks to hold a line through to mobile, or at least to hold atlanta and command the railroad running east and west, and the troops from one or other of the armies to hold important points on the southern road, the only east and west road that would be left in the possession of the enemy. this would cut the confederacy in two again, as our gaining possession of the mississippi river had done before. banks was not ready in time for the part assigned to him, and circumstances that could not be foreseen determined the campaign which was afterwards made, the success and grandeur of which has resounded throughout all lands. in regard to restoring officers who had been relieved from important commands to duty again, i left sherman to look after those who had been removed in the west while i looked out for the rest. i directed, however, that he should make no assignment until i could speak to the secretary of war about the matter. i shortly after recommended to the secretary the assignment of general buell to duty. i received the assurance that duty would be offered to him; and afterwards the secretary told me that he had offered buell an assignment and that the latter had declined it, saying that it would be degradation to accept the assignment offered. i understood afterwards that he refused to serve under either sherman or canby because he had ranked them both. both graduated before him and ranked him in the old army. sherman ranked him as a brigadier-general. all of them ranked me in the old army, and sherman and buell did as brigadiers. the worst excuse a soldier can make for declining service is that he once ranked the commander he is ordered to report to. on the 23d of march i was back in washington, and on the 26th took up my headquarters at culpeper court-house, a few miles south of the headquarters of the army of the potomac. although hailing from illinois myself, the state of the president, i never met mr. lincoln until called to the capital to receive my commission as lieutenant-general. i knew him, however, very well and favorably from the accounts given by officers under me at the west who had known him all their lives. i had also read the remarkable series of debates between lincoln and douglas a few years before, when they were rival candidates for the united states senate. i was then a resident of missouri, and by no means a "lincoln man" in that contest; but i recognized then his great ability. in my first interview with mr. lincoln alone he stated to me that he had never professed to be a military man or to know how campaigns should be conducted, and never wanted to interfere in them: but that procrastination on the part of commanders, and the pressure from the people at the north and congress, which was always with him, forced him into issuing his series of "military orders"--one, two, three, etc. he did not know but they were all wrong, and did know that some of them were. all he wanted or had ever wanted was some one who would take the responsibility and act, and call on him for all the assistance needed, pledging himself to use all the power of the government in rendering such assistance. assuring him that i would do the best i could with the means at hand, and avoid as far as possible annoying him or the war department, our first interview ended. the secretary of war i had met once before only, but felt that i knew him better. while commanding in west tennessee we had occasionally held conversations over the wires, at night, when they were not being otherwise used. he and general halleck both cautioned me against giving the president my plans of campaign, saying that he was so kind-hearted, so averse to refusing anything asked of him, that some friend would be sure to get from him all he knew. i should have said that in our interview the president told me he did not want to know what i proposed to do. but he submitted a plan of campaign of his own which he wanted me to hear and then do as i pleased about. he brought out a map of virginia on which he had evidently marked every position occupied by the federal and confederate armies up to that time. he pointed out on the map two streams which empty into the potomac, and suggested that the army might be moved on boats and landed between the mouths of these streams. we would then have the potomac to bring our supplies, and the tributaries would protect our flanks while we moved out. i listened respectfully, but did not suggest that the same streams would protect lee's flanks while he was shutting us up. i did not communicate my plans to the president, nor did i to the secretary of war or to general halleck. march the 26th my headquarters were, as stated, at culpeper, and the work of preparing for an early campaign commenced. chapter xlvii. the military situation--plans for the campaign--sheridan assigned to command of the cavalry--flank movements--forrest at fort pillow--general banks's expedition--colonel mosby--an incident of the wilderness campaign. when i assumed command of all the armies the situation was about this: the mississippi river was guarded from st. louis to its mouth; the line of the arkansas was held, thus giving us all the north-west north of that river. a few points in louisiana not remote from the river were held by the federal troops, as was also the mouth of the rio grande. east of the mississippi we held substantially all north of the memphis and charleston railroad as far east as chattanooga, thence along the line of the tennessee and holston rivers, taking in nearly all of the state of tennessee. west virginia was in our hands; and that part of old virginia north of the rapidan and east of the blue ridge we also held. on the sea-coast we had fortress monroe and norfolk in virginia; plymouth, washington and new berne in north carolina; beaufort, folly and morris islands, hilton head, port royal and fort pulaski in south carolina and georgia; fernandina, st. augustine, key west and pensacola in florida. the balance of the southern territory, an empire in extent, was still in the hands of the enemy. sherman, who had succeeded me in the command of the military division of the mississippi, commanded all the troops in the territory west of the alleghanies and north of natchez, with a large movable force about chattanooga. his command was subdivided into four departments, but the commanders all reported to sherman and were subject to his orders. this arrangement, however, insured the better protection of all lines of communication through the acquired territory, for the reason that these different department commanders could act promptly in case of a sudden or unexpected raid within their respective jurisdictions without awaiting the orders of the division commander. in the east the opposing forces stood in substantially the same relations towards each other as three years before, or when the war began; they were both between the federal and confederate capitals. it is true, footholds had been secured by us on the sea-coast, in virginia and north carolina, but, beyond that, no substantial advantage had been gained by either side. battles had been fought of as great severity as had ever been known in war, over ground from the james river and chickahominy, near richmond, to gettysburg and chambersburg, in pennsylvania, with indecisive results, sometimes favorable to the national army, sometimes to the confederate army; but in every instance, i believe, claimed as victories for the south by the southern press if not by the southern generals. the northern press, as a whole, did not discourage these claims; a portion of it always magnified rebel success and belittled ours, while another portion, most sincerely earnest in their desire for the preservation of the union and the overwhelming success of the federal armies, would nevertheless generally express dissatisfaction with whatever victories were gained because they were not more complete. that portion of the army of the potomac not engaged in guarding lines of communication was on the northern bank of the rapidan. the army of northern virginia confronting it on the opposite bank of the same river, was strongly intrenched and commanded by the acknowledged ablest general in the confederate army. the country back to the james river is cut up with many streams, generally narrow, deep, and difficult to cross except where bridged. the region is heavily timbered, and the roads narrow, and very bad after the least rain. such an enemy was not, of course, unprepared with adequate fortifications at convenient intervals all the way back to richmond, so that when driven from one fortified position they would always have another farther to the rear to fall back into. to provision an army, campaigning against so formidable a foe through such a country, from wagons alone seemed almost impossible. system and discipline were both essential to its accomplishment. the union armies were now divided into nineteen departments, though four of them in the west had been concentrated into a single military division. the army of the potomac was a separate command and had no territorial limits. there were thus seventeen distinct commanders. before this time these various armies had acted separately and independently of each other, giving the enemy an opportunity often of depleting one command, not pressed, to reinforce another more actively engaged. i determined to stop this. to this end i regarded the army of the potomac as the centre, and all west to memphis along the line described as our position at the time, and north of it, the right wing; the army of the james, under general butler, as the left wing, and all the troops south, as a force in rear of the enemy. some of these latter were occupying positions from which they could not render service proportionate to their numerical strength. all such were depleted to the minimum necessary to hold their positions as a guard against blockade runners; where they could not do this their positions were abandoned altogether. in this way ten thousand men were added to the army of the james from south carolina alone, with general gillmore in command. it was not contemplated that general gillmore should leave his department; but as most of his troops were taken, presumably for active service, he asked to accompany them and was permitted to do so. officers and soldiers on furlough, of whom there were many thousands, were ordered to their proper commands; concentration was the order of the day, and to have it accomplished in time to advance at the earliest moment the roads would permit was the problem. as a reinforcement to the army of the potomac, or to act in support of it, the 9th army corps, over twenty thousand strong, under general burnside, had been rendezvoused at annapolis, maryland. this was an admirable position for such a reinforcement. the corps could be brought at the last moment as a reinforcement to the army of the potomac, or it could be thrown on the sea-coast, south of norfolk, in virginia or north carolina, to operate against richmond from that direction. in fact burnside and the war department both thought the 9th corps was intended for such an expedition up to the last moment. my general plan now was to concentrate all the force possible against the confederate armies in the field. there were but two such, as we have seen, east of the mississippi river and facing north. the army of northern virginia, general robert e. lee commanding, was on the south bank of the rapidan, confronting the army of the potomac; the second, under general joseph e. johnston, was at dalton, georgia, opposed to sherman who was still at chattanooga. beside these main armies the confederates had to guard the shenandoah valley, a great storehouse to feed their armies from, and their line of communications from richmond to tennessee. forrest, a brave and intrepid cavalry general, was in the west with a large force; making a larger command necessary to hold what we had gained in middle and west tennessee. we could not abandon any territory north of the line held by the enemy because it would lay the northern states open to invasion. but as the army of the potomac was the principal garrison for the protection of washington even while it was moving on lee, so all the forces to the west, and the army of the james, guarded their special trusts when advancing from them as well as when remaining at them. better indeed, for they forced the enemy to guard his own lines and resources at a greater distance from ours, and with a greater force. little expeditions could not so well be sent out to destroy a bridge or tear up a few miles of railroad track, burn a storehouse, or inflict other little annoyances. accordingly i arranged for a simultaneous movement all along the line. sherman was to move from chattanooga, johnston's army and atlanta being his objective points. (*23) crook, commanding in west virginia, was to move from the mouth of the gauley river with a cavalry force and some artillery, the virginia and tennessee railroad to be his objective. either the enemy would have to keep a large force to protect their communications, or see them destroyed and a large amount of forage and provision, which they so much needed, fall into our hands. sigel was in command in the valley of virginia. he was to advance up the valley, covering the north from an invasion through that channel as well while advancing as by remaining near harper's ferry. every mile he advanced also gave us possession of stores on which lee relied. butler was to advance by the james river, having richmond and petersburg as his objective. before the advance commenced i visited butler at fort monroe. this was the first time i had ever met him. before giving him any order as to the part he was to play in the approaching campaign i invited his views. they were very much such as i intended to direct, and as i did direct (*24), in writing, before leaving. general w. f. smith, who had been promoted to the rank of major-general shortly after the battle of chattanooga on my recommendation, had not yet been confirmed. i found a decided prejudice against his confirmation by a majority of the senate, but i insisted that his services had been such that he should be rewarded. my wishes were now reluctantly complied with, and i assigned him to the command of one of the corps under general butler. i was not long in finding out that the objections to smith's promotion were well founded. in one of my early interviews with the president i expressed my dissatisfaction with the little that had been accomplished by the cavalry so far in the war, and the belief that it was capable of accomplishing much more than it had done if under a thorough leader. i said i wanted the very best man in the army for that command. halleck was present and spoke up, saying: "how would sheridan do?" i replied: "the very man i want." the president said i could have anybody i wanted. sheridan was telegraphed for that day, and on his arrival was assigned to the command of the cavalry corps with the army of the potomac. this relieved general alfred pleasonton. it was not a reflection on that officer, however, for i did not know but that he had been as efficient as any other cavalry commander. banks in the department of the gulf was ordered to assemble all the troops he had at new orleans in time to join in the general move, mobile to be his objective. at this time i was not entirely decided as to whether i should move the army of the potomac by the right flank of the enemy, or by his left. each plan presented advantages. (*25) if by his right--my left--the potomac, chesapeake bay and tributaries would furnish us an easy hauling distance of every position the army could occupy from the rapidan to the james river. but lee could, if he chose, detach or move his whole army north on a line rather interior to the one i would have to take in following. a movement by his left--our right--would obviate this; but all that was done would have to be done with the supplies and ammunition we started with. all idea of adopting this latter plan was abandoned when the limited quantity of supplies possible to take with us was considered. the country over which we would have to pass was so exhausted of all food or forage that we would be obliged to carry everything with us. while these preparations were going on the enemy was not entirely idle. in the west forrest made a raid in west tennessee up to the northern border, capturing the garrison of four or five hundred men at union city, and followed it up by an attack on paducah, kentucky, on the banks of the ohio. while he was able to enter the city he failed to capture the forts or any part of the garrison. on the first intelligence of forrest's raid i telegraphed sherman to send all his cavalry against him, and not to let him get out of the trap he had put himself into. sherman had anticipated me by sending troops against him before he got my order. forrest, however, fell back rapidly, and attacked the troops at fort pillow, a station for the protection of the navigation of the mississippi river. the garrison consisted of a regiment of colored troops, infantry, and a detachment of tennessee cavalry. these troops fought bravely, but were overpowered. i will leave forrest in his dispatches to tell what he did with them. "the river was dyed," he says, "with the blood of the slaughtered for two hundred yards. the approximate loss was upward of five hundred killed, but few of the officers escaping. my loss was about twenty killed. it is hoped that these facts will demonstrate to the northern people that negro soldiers cannot cope with southerners." subsequently forrest made a report in which he left out the part which shocks humanity to read. at the east, also, the rebels were busy. i had said to halleck that plymouth and washington, north carolina, were unnecessary to hold. it would be better to have the garrisons engaged there added to butler's command. if success attended our arms both places, and others too, would fall into our hands naturally. these places had been occupied by federal troops before i took command of the armies, and i knew that the executive would be reluctant to abandon them, and therefore explained my views; but before my views were carried out the rebels captured the garrison at plymouth. i then ordered the abandonment of washington, but directed the holding of new berne at all hazards. this was essential because new berne was a port into which blockade runners could enter. general banks had gone on an expedition up the red river long before my promotion to general command. i had opposed the movement strenuously, but acquiesced because it was the order of my superior at the time. by direction of halleck i had reinforced banks with a corps of about ten thousand men from sherman's command. this reinforcement was wanted back badly before the forward movement commenced. but banks had got so far that it seemed best that he should take shreveport on the red river, and turn over the line of that river to steele, who commanded in arkansas, to hold instead of the line of the arkansas. orders were given accordingly, and with the expectation that the campaign would be ended in time for banks to return a. j. smith's command to where it belonged and get back to new orleans himself in time to execute his part in the general plan. but the expedition was a failure. banks did not get back in time to take part in the programme as laid down. nor was smith returned until long after the movements of may, 1864, had been begun. the services of forty thousand veteran troops, over and above the number required to hold all that was necessary in the department of the gulf, were thus paralyzed. it is but just to banks, however, to say that his expedition was ordered from washington and he was in no way responsible except for the conduct of it. i make no criticism on this point. he opposed the expedition. by the 27th of april spring had so far advanced as to justify me in fixing a day for the great move. on that day burnside left annapolis to occupy meade's position between bull run and the rappahannock. meade was notified and directed to bring his troops forward to his advance. on the following day butler was notified of my intended advance on the 4th of may, and he was directed to move the night of the same day and get as far up the james river as possible by daylight, and push on from there to accomplish the task given him. he was also notified that reinforcements were being collected in washington city, which would be forwarded to him should the enemy fall back into the trenches at richmond. the same day sherman was directed to get his forces up ready to advance on the 5th. sigel was in winchester and was notified to move in conjunction with the others. the criticism has been made by writers on the campaign from the rapidan to the james river that all the loss of life could have been obviated by moving the army there on transports. richmond was fortified and intrenched so perfectly that one man inside to defend was more than equal to five outside besieging or assaulting. to get possession of lee's army was the first great object. with the capture of his army richmond would necessarily follow. it was better to fight him outside of his stronghold than in it. if the army of the potomac had been moved bodily to the james river by water lee could have moved a part of his forces back to richmond, called beauregard from the south to reinforce it, and with the balance moved on to washington. then, too, i ordered a move, simultaneous with that of the army of the potomac, up the james river by a formidable army already collected at the mouth of the river. while my headquarters were at culpeper, from the 26th of march to the 4th of may, i generally visited washington once a week to confer with the secretary of war and president. on the last occasion, a few days before moving, a circumstance occurred which came near postponing my part in the campaign altogether. colonel john s. mosby had for a long time been commanding a partisan corps, or regiment, which operated in the rear of the army of the potomac. on my return to the field on this occasion, as the train approached warrenton junction, a heavy cloud of dust was seen to the east of the road as if made by a body of cavalry on a charge. arriving at the junction the train was stopped and inquiries made as to the cause of the dust. there was but one man at the station, and he informed us that mosby had crossed a few minutes before at full speed in pursuit of federal cavalry. had he seen our train coming, no doubt he would have let his prisoners escape to capture the train. i was on a special train, if i remember correctly, without any guard. since the close of the war i have come to know colonel mosby personally, and somewhat intimately. he is a different man entirely from what i had supposed. he is slender, not tall, wiry, and looks as if he could endure any amount of physical exercise. he is able, and thoroughly honest and truthful. there were probably but few men in the south who could have commanded successfully a separate detachment in the rear of an opposing army, and so near the border of hostilities, as long as he did without losing his entire command. on this same visit to washington i had my last interview with the president before reaching the james river. he had of course become acquainted with the fact that a general movement had been ordered all along the line, and seemed to think it a new feature in war. i explained to him that it was necessary to have a great number of troops to guard and hold the territory we had captured, and to prevent incursions into the northern states. these troops could perform this service just as well by advancing as by remaining still; and by advancing they would compel the enemy to keep detachments to hold them back, or else lay his own territory open to invasion. his answer was: "oh, yes! i see that. as we say out west, if a man can't skin he must hold a leg while somebody else does." there was a certain incident connected with the wilderness campaign of which it may not be out of place to speak; and to avoid a digression further on i will mention it here. a few days before my departure from culpeper the honorable e. b. washburne visited me there, and remained with my headquarters for some distance south, through the battle in the wilderness and, i think, to spottsylvania. he was accompanied by a mr. swinton, whom he presented as a literary gentleman who wished to accompany the army with a view of writing a history of the war when it was over. he assured me--and i have no doubt swinton gave him the assurance--that he was not present as a correspondent of the press. i expressed an entire willingness to have him (swinton) accompany the army, and would have allowed him to do so as a correspondent, restricted, however, in the character of the information he could give. we received richmond papers with about as much regularity as if there had been no war, and knew that our papers were received with equal regularity by the confederates. it was desirable, therefore, that correspondents should not be privileged spies of the enemy within our lines. probably mr. swinton expected to be an invited guest at my headquarters, and was disappointed that he was not asked to become so. at all events he was not invited, and soon i found that he was corresponding with some paper (i have now forgotten which one), thus violating his word either expressed or implied. he knew of the assurance washburne had given as to the character of his mission. i never saw the man from the day of our introduction to the present that i recollect. he accompanied us, however, for a time at least. the second night after crossing the rapidan (the night of the 5th of may) colonel w. r. rowley, of my staff, was acting as night officer at my headquarters. a short time before midnight i gave him verbal instructions for the night. three days later i read in a richmond paper a verbatim report of these instructions. a few nights still later (after the first, and possibly after the second, day's fighting in the wilderness) general meade came to my tent for consultation, bringing with him some of his staff officers. both his staff and mine retired to the camp-fire some yards in front of the tent, thinking our conversation should be private. there was a stump a little to one side, and between the front of the tent and camp-fire. one of my staff, colonel t. s. bowers, saw what he took to be a man seated on the ground and leaning against the stump, listening to the conversation between meade and myself. he called the attention of colonel rowley to it. the latter immediately took the man by the shoulder and asked him, in language more forcible than polite, what he was doing there. the man proved to be swinton, the "historian," and his replies to the question were evasive and unsatisfactory, and he was warned against further eaves-dropping. the next i heard of mr. swinton was at cold harbor. general meade came to my headquarters saying that general burnside had arrested swinton, who at some previous time had given great offence, and had ordered him to be shot that afternoon. i promptly ordered the prisoner to be released, but that he must be expelled from the lines of the army not to return again on pain of punishment. chapter xlviii. commencement of the grand campaign--general butler's position --sheridan's first raid. the armies were now all ready to move for the accomplishment of a single object. they were acting as a unit so far as such a thing was possible over such a vast field. lee, with the capital of the confederacy, was the main end to which all were working. johnston, with atlanta, was an important obstacle in the way of our accomplishing the result aimed at, and was therefore almost an independent objective. it was of less importance only because the capture of johnston and his army would not produce so immediate and decisive a result in closing the rebellion as would the possession of richmond, lee and his army. all other troops were employed exclusively in support of these two movements. this was the plan; and i will now endeavor to give, as concisely as i can, the method of its execution, outlining first the operations of minor detached but co-operative columns. as stated before, banks failed to accomplish what he had been sent to do on the red river, and eliminated the use of forty thousand veterans whose cooperation in the grand campaign had been expected--ten thousand with sherman and thirty thousand against mobile. sigel's record is almost equally brief. he moved out, it is true, according to programme; but just when i was hoping to hear of good work being done in the valley i received instead the following announcement from halleck: "sigel is in full retreat on strasburg. he will do nothing but run; never did anything else." the enemy had intercepted him about new market and handled him roughly, leaving him short six guns, and some nine hundred men out of his six thousand. the plan had been for an advance of sigel's forces in two columns. though the one under his immediate command failed ingloriously the other proved more fortunate. under crook and averell his western column advanced from the gauley in west virginia at the appointed time, and with more happy results. they reached the virginia and tennessee railroad at dublin and destroyed a depot of supplies, besides tearing up several miles of road and burning the bridge over new river. having accomplished this they recrossed the alleghanies to meadow bluffs and there awaited further orders. butler embarked at fort monroe with all his command, except the cavalry and some artillery which moved up the south bank of the james river. his steamers moved first up chesapeake bay and york river as if threatening the rear of lee's army. at midnight they turned back, and butler by daylight was far up the james river. he seized city point and bermuda hundred early in the day, without loss and, no doubt, very much to the surprise of the enemy. this was the accomplishment of the first step contemplated in my instructions to butler. he was to act from here, looking to richmond as his objective point. i had given him to understand that i should aim to fight lee between the rapidan and richmond if he would stand; but should lee fall back into richmond i would follow up and make a junction of the armies of the potomac and the james on the james river. he was directed to secure a footing as far up the south side of the river as he could at as early a date as possible. butler was in position by the 6th of may and had begun intrenching, and on the 7th he sent out his cavalry from suffolk to cut the weldon railroad. he also sent out detachments to destroy the railroad between petersburg and richmond, but no great success attended these latter efforts. he made no great effort to establish himself on that road and neglected to attack petersburg, which was almost defenceless. about the 11th he advanced slowly until he reached the works at drury's bluff, about half way between bermuda hundred and richmond. in the mean time beauregard had been gathering reinforcements. on the 16th he attacked butler with great vigor, and with such success as to limit very materially the further usefulness of the army of the james as a distinct factor in the campaign. i afterward ordered a portion of it to join the army of the potomac, leaving a sufficient force with butler to man his works, hold securely the footing he had already gained and maintain a threatening front toward the rear of the confederate capital. the position which general butler had chosen between the two rivers, the james and appomattox, was one of great natural strength, one where a large area of ground might be thoroughly inclosed by means of a single intrenched line, and that a very short one in comparison with the extent of territory which it thoroughly protected. his right was protected by the james river, his left by the appomattox, and his rear by their junction--the two streams uniting near by. the bends of the two streams shortened the line that had been chosen for intrenchments, while it increased the area which the line inclosed. previous to ordering any troops from butler i sent my chief engineer, general barnard, from the army of the potomac to that of the james to inspect butler's position and ascertain whether i could again safely make an order for general butler's movement in co-operation with mine, now that i was getting so near richmond; or, if i could not, whether his position was strong enough to justify me in withdrawing some of his troops and having them brought round by water to white house to join me and reinforce the army of the potomac. general barnard reported the position very strong for defensive purposes, and that i could do the latter with great security; but that general butler could not move from where he was, in co-operation, to produce any effect. he said that the general occupied a place between the james and appomattox rivers which was of great strength, and where with an inferior force he could hold it for an indefinite length of time against a superior; but that he could do nothing offensively. i then asked him why butler could not move out from his lines and push across the richmond and petersburg railroad to the rear and on the south side of richmond. he replied that it was impracticable, because the enemy had substantially the same line across the neck of land that general butler had. he then took out his pencil and drew a sketch of the locality, remarking that the position was like a bottle and that butler's line of intrenchments across the neck represented the cork; that the enemy had built an equally strong line immediately in front of him across the neck; and it was therefore as if butler was in a bottle. he was perfectly safe against an attack; but, as barnard expressed it, the enemy had corked the bottle and with a small force could hold the cork in its place. this struck me as being very expressive of his position, particularly when i saw the hasty sketch which general barnard had drawn; and in making my subsequent report i used that expression without adding quotation marks, never thinking that anything had been said that would attract attention--as this did, very much to the annoyance, no doubt, of general butler and, i know, very much to my own. i found afterwards that this was mentioned in the notes of general badeau's book, which, when they were shown to me, i asked to have stricken out; yet it was retained there, though against my wishes. i make this statement here because, although i have often made it before, it has never been in my power until now to place it where it will correct history; and i desire to rectify all injustice that i may have done to individuals, particularly to officers who were gallantly serving their country during the trying period of the war for the preservation of the union. general butler certainly gave his very earnest support to the war; and he gave his own best efforts personally to the suppression of the rebellion. the further operations of the army of the james can best be treated of in connection with those of the army of the potomac, the two being so intimately associated and connected as to be substantially one body in which the individuality of the supporting wing is merged. before giving the reader a summary of sherman's great atlanta campaign, which must conclude my description of the various co-operative movements preparatory to proceeding with that of the operations of the centre, i will briefly mention sheridan's first raid upon lee's communications which, though an incident of the operations on the main line and not specifically marked out in the original plan, attained in its brilliant execution and results all the proportions of an independent campaign. by thus anticipating, in point of time, i will be able to more perfectly observe the continuity of events occurring in my immediate front when i shall have undertaken to describe our advance from the rapidan. on the 8th of may, just after the battle of the wilderness and when we were moving on spottsylvania i directed sheridan verbally to cut loose from the army of the potomac, pass around the left of lee's army and attack his cavalry: to cut the two roads--one running west through gordonsville, charlottesville and lynchburg, the other to richmond, and, when compelled to do so for want of forage and rations, to move on to the james river and draw these from butler's supplies. this move took him past the entire rear of lee's army. these orders were also given in writing through meade. the object of this move was three-fold. first, if successfully executed, and it was, he would annoy the enemy by cutting his line of supplies and telegraphic communications, and destroy or get for his own use supplies in store in the rear and coming up. second, he would draw the enemy's cavalry after him, and thus better protect our flanks, rear and trains than by remaining with the army. third, his absence would save the trains drawing his forage and other supplies from fredericksburg, which had now become our base. he started at daylight the next morning, and accomplished more than was expected. it was sixteen days before he got back to the army of the potomac. the course sheridan took was directly to richmond. before night stuart, commanding the confederate cavalry, came on to the rear of his command. but the advance kept on, crossed the north anna, and at beaver dam, a station on the virginia central railroad, recaptured four hundred union prisoners on their way to richmond, destroyed the road and used and destroyed a large amount of subsistence and medical stores. stuart, seeing that our cavalry was pushing towards richmond, abandoned the pursuit on the morning of the 10th and, by a detour and an exhausting march, interposed between sheridan and richmond at yellow tavern, only about six miles north of the city. sheridan destroyed the railroad and more supplies at ashland, and on the 11th arrived in stuart's front. a severe engagement ensued in which the losses were heavy on both sides, but the rebels were beaten, their leader mortally wounded, and some guns and many prisoners were captured. sheridan passed through the outer defences of richmond, and could, no doubt, have passed through the inner ones. but having no supports near he could not have remained. after caring for his wounded he struck for the james river below the city, to communicate with butler and to rest his men and horses as well as to get food and forage for them. he moved first between the chickahominy and the james, but in the morning (the 12th) he was stopped by batteries at mechanicsville. he then turned to cross to the north side of the chickahominy by meadow bridge. he found this barred, and the defeated confederate cavalry, reorganized, occupying the opposite side. the panic created by his first entrance within the outer works of richmond having subsided troops were sent out to attack his rear. he was now in a perilous position, one from which but few generals could have extricated themselves. the defences of richmond, manned, were to the right, the chickahominy was to the left with no bridge remaining and the opposite bank guarded, to the rear was a force from richmond. this force was attacked and beaten by wilson's and gregg's divisions, while sheridan turned to the left with the remaining division and hastily built a bridge over the chickahominy under the fire of the enemy, forced a crossing and soon dispersed the confederates he found there. the enemy was held back from the stream by the fire of the troops not engaged in bridge building. on the 13th sheridan was at bottom's bridge, over the chickahominy. on the 14th he crossed this stream and on that day went into camp on the james river at haxall's landing. he at once put himself into communication with general butler, who directed all the supplies he wanted to be furnished. sheridan had left the army of the potomac at spottsylvania, but did not know where either this or lee's army was now. great caution therefore had to be exercised in getting back. on the 17th, after resting his command for three days, he started on his return. he moved by the way of white house. the bridge over the pamunkey had been burned by the enemy, but a new one was speedily improvised and the cavalry crossed over it. on the 22d he was at aylett's on the matapony, where he learned the position of the two armies. on the 24th he joined us on the march from north anna to cold harbor, in the vicinity of chesterfield. sheridan in this memorable raid passed entirely around lee's army: encountered his cavalry in four engagements, and defeated them in all; recaptured four hundred union prisoners and killed and captured many of the enemy; destroyed and used many supplies and munitions of war; destroyed miles of railroad and telegraph, and freed us from annoyance by the cavalry of the enemy for more than two weeks. chapter xlix. sherman's campaign in georgia--siege of atlanta--death of general mcpherson--attempt to capture andersonville--capture of atlanta. after separating from sherman in cincinnati i went on to washington, as already stated, while he returned to nashville to assume the duties of his new command. his military division was now composed of four departments and embraced all the territory west of the alleghany mountains and east of the mississippi river, together with the state of arkansas in the trans-mississippi. the most easterly of these was the department of the ohio, general schofield commanding; the next was the department of the cumberland, general thomas commanding; the third the department of the tennessee, general mcpherson commanding; and general steele still commanded the trans-mississippi, or department of arkansas. the last-named department was so far away that sherman could not communicate with it very readily after starting on his spring campaign, and it was therefore soon transferred from his military division to that of the gulf, where general canby, who had relieved general banks, was in command. the movements of the armies, as i have stated in a former chapter, were to be simultaneous, i fixing the day to start when the season should be far enough advanced, it was hoped, for the roads to be in a condition for the troops to march. general sherman at once set himself to work preparing for the task which was assigned him to accomplish in the spring campaign. mcpherson lay at huntsville with about twenty-four thousand men, guarding those points of tennessee which were regarded as most worth holding; thomas, with over sixty thousand men of the army of the cumberland, was at chattanooga; and schofield, with about fourteen thousand men, was at knoxville. with these three armies, numbering about one hundred thousand men in all, sherman was to move on the day fixed for the general advance, with a view of destroying johnston's army and capturing atlanta. he visited each of these commands to inform himself as to their condition, and it was found to be, speaking generally, good. one of the first matters to turn his attention to was that of getting, before the time arrived for starting, an accumulation of supplies forward to chattanooga, sufficiently large to warrant a movement. he found, when he got to that place, that the trains over the single-track railroad, which was frequently interrupted for a day or two at a time, were only sufficient to meet the daily wants of the troops without bringing forward any surplus of any kind. he found, however, that trains were being used to transport all the beef cattle, horses for the cavalry, and even teams that were being brought to the front. he at once changed all this, and required beef cattle, teams, cavalry horses, and everything that could travel, even the troops, to be marched, and used the road exclusively for transporting supplies. in this way he was able to accumulate an abundance before the time finally fixed upon for the move, the 4th of may. as i have said already, johnston was at dalton, which was nearly one-fourth of the way between chattanooga and atlanta. the country is mountainous all the way to atlanta, abounding in mountain streams, some of them of considerable volume. dalton is on ground where water drains towards atlanta and into one of the main streams rising north-east from there and flowing south-west--this being the general direction which all the main streams of that section take, with smaller tributaries entering into them. johnston had been preparing himself for this campaign during the entire winter. the best positions for defence had been selected all the way from dalton back to atlanta, and very strongly intrenched; so that, as he might be forced to fall back from one position, he would have another to fall into in his rear. his position at dalton was so very strongly intrenched that no doubt he expected, or at least hoped, to hold sherman there and prevent him from getting any further. with a less skilful general, and one disposed to take no risks, i have no doubt that he would have succeeded. sherman's plan was to start schofield, who was farthest back, a few days in advance from knoxville, having him move on the direct road to dalton. thomas was to move out to ringgold. it had been sherman's intention to cross mcpherson over the tennessee river at huntsville or decatur, and move him south from there so as to have him come into the road running from chattanooga to atlanta a good distance to the rear of the point johnston was occupying; but when that was contemplated it was hoped that mcpherson alone would have troops enough to cope with johnston, if the latter should move against him while unsupported by the balance of the army. in this he was disappointed. two of mcpherson's veteran divisions had re-enlisted on the express provision that they were to have a furlough. this furlough had not yet expired, and they were not back. then, again, sherman had lent banks two divisions under a. j. smith, the winter before, to co-operate with the trans-mississippi forces, and this with the express pledge that they should be back by a time specified, so as to be prepared for this very campaign. it is hardly necessary to say they were not returned. that department continued to absorb troops to no purpose to the end of the war. this left mcpherson so weak that the part of the plan above indicated had to be changed. he was therefore brought up to chattanooga and moved from there on a road to the right of thomas--the two coming together about dalton. the three armies were abreast, all ready to start promptly on time. sherman soon found that dalton was so strongly fortified that it was useless to make any attempt to carry it by assault; and even to carry it by regular approaches was impracticable. there was a narrowing up in the mountain, between the national and confederate armies, through which a stream, a wagon road and a railroad ran. besides, the stream had been dammed so that the valley was a lake. through this gorge the troops would have to pass. mcpherson was therefore sent around by the right, to come out by the way of snake creek gap into the rear of the enemy. this was a surprise to johnston, and about the 13th he decided to abandon his position at dalton. on the 15th there was very hard fighting about resaca; but our cavalry having been sent around to the right got near the road in the enemy's rear. again johnston fell back, our army pursuing. the pursuit was continued to kingston, which was reached on the 19th with very little fighting, except that newton's division overtook the rear of johnston's army and engaged it. sherman was now obliged to halt for the purpose of bringing up his railroad trains. he was depending upon the railroad for all of his supplies, and as of course the railroad was wholly destroyed as johnston fell back, it had to be rebuilt. this work was pushed forward night and day, and caused much less delay than most persons would naturally expect in a mountainous country where there were so many bridges to be rebuilt. the campaign to atlanta was managed with the most consummate skill, the enemy being flanked out of one position after another all the way there. it is true this was not accomplished without a good deal of fighting --some of it very hard fighting, rising to the dignity of very important battles--neither were single positions gained in a day. on the contrary, weeks were spent at some; and about atlanta more than a month was consumed. it was the 23d of may before the road was finished up to the rear of sherman's army and the pursuit renewed. this pursuit brought him up to the vicinity of allatoona. this place was very strongly intrenched, and naturally a very defensible position. an assault upon it was not thought of, but preparations were made to flank the enemy out of it. this was done by sending a large force around our right, by the way of dallas, to reach the rear of the enemy. before reaching there, however, they found the enemy fortified in their way, and there resulted hard fighting for about a week at a place called new hope church. on the left our troops also were fortified, and as close up to the enemy as they could get. they kept working still farther around to the left toward the railroad. this was the case more particularly with the cavalry. by the 4th of june johnston found that he was being hemmed in so rapidly that he drew off and allatoona was left in our possession. allatoona, being an important place, was strongly intrenched for occupation by our troops before advancing farther, and made a secondary base of supplies. the railroad was finished up to that point, the intrenchments completed, storehouses provided for food, and the army got in readiness for a further advance. the rains, however, were falling in such torrents that it was impossible to move the army by the side roads which they would have to move upon in order to turn johnston out of his new position. while sherman's army lay here, general f. p. blair returned to it, bringing with him the two divisions of veterans who had been on furlough. johnston had fallen back to marietta and kenesaw mountain, where strong intrenchments awaited him. at this latter place our troops made an assault upon the enemy's lines after having got their own lines up close to him, and failed, sustaining considerable loss. but during the progress of the battle schofield was gaining ground to the left; and the cavalry on his left were gaining still more toward the enemy's rear. these operations were completed by the 3d of july, when it was found that johnston had evacuated the place. he was pursued at once. sherman had made every preparation to abandon the railroad, leaving a strong guard in his intrenchments. he had intended, moving out with twenty days' rations and plenty of ammunition, to come in on the railroad again at the chattahoochee river. johnston frustrated this plan by himself starting back as above stated. this time he fell back to the chattahoochee. about the 5th of july he was besieged again, sherman getting easy possession of the chattahoochee river both above and below him. the enemy was again flanked out of his position, or so frightened by flanking movements that on the night of the 9th he fell back across the river. here johnston made a stand until the 17th, when sherman's old tactics prevailed again and the final movement toward atlanta began. johnston was now relieved of the command, and hood superseded him. johnston's tactics in this campaign do not seem to have met with much favor, either in the eyes of the administration at richmond, or of the people of that section of the south in which he was commanding. the very fact of a change of commanders being ordered under such circumstances was an indication of a change of policy, and that now they would become the aggressors--the very thing our troops wanted. for my own part, i think that johnston's tactics were right. anything that could have prolonged the war a year beyond the time that it did finally close, would probably have exhausted the north to such an extent that they might then have abandoned the contest and agreed to a separation. atlanta was very strongly intrenched all the way around in a circle about a mile and a half outside of the city. in addition to this, there were advanced intrenchments which had to be taken before a close siege could be commenced. sure enough, as indicated by the change of commanders, the enemy was about to assume the offensive. on the 20th he came out and attacked the army of the cumberland most furiously. hooker's corps, and newton's and johnson's divisions were the principal ones engaged in this contest, which lasted more than an hour; but the confederates were then forced to fall back inside their main lines. the losses were quite heavy on both sides. on this day general gresham, since our postmaster-general, was very badly wounded. during the night hood abandoned his outer lines, and our troops were advanced. the investment had not been relinquished for a moment during the day. during the night of the 21st hood moved out again, passing by our left flank, which was then in motion to get a position farther in rear of him, and a desperate battle ensued, which lasted most of the day of the 22d. at first the battle went very much in favor of the confederates, our troops being somewhat surprised. while our troops were advancing they were struck in flank, and their flank was enveloped. but they had become too thorough veterans to be thrown into irreparable confusion by an unexpected attack when off their guard, and soon they were in order and engaging the enemy, with the advantage now of knowing where their antagonist was. the field of battle continued to expand until it embraced about seven miles of ground. finally, however, and before night, the enemy was driven back into the city (*26). it was during this battle that mcpherson, while passing from one column to another, was instantly killed. in his death the army lost one of its ablest, purest and best generals. garrard had been sent out with his cavalry to get upon the railroad east of atlanta and to cut it in the direction of augusta. he was successful in this, and returned about the time of the battle. rousseau had also come up from tennessee with a small division of cavalry, having crossed the tennessee river about decatur and made a raid into alabama. finally, when hard pressed, he had come in, striking the railroad in rear of sherman, and reported to him about this time. the battle of the 22d is usually known as the battle of atlanta, although the city did not fall into our hands until the 2d of september. preparations went on, as before, to flank the enemy out of his position. the work was tedious, and the lines that had to be maintained were very long. our troops were gradually worked around to the east until they struck the road between decatur and atlanta. these lines were strongly fortified, as were those to the north and west of the city--all as close up to the enemy's lines as practicable--in order to hold them with the smallest possible number of men, the design being to detach an army to move by our right and try to get upon the railroad down south of atlanta. on the 27th the movement by the right flank commenced. on the 28th the enemy struck our right flank, general logan commanding, with great vigor. logan intrenched himself hastily, and by that means was enabled to resist all assaults and inflict a great deal of damage upon the enemy. these assaults were continued to the middle of the afternoon, and resumed once or twice still later in the day. the enemy's losses in these unsuccessful assaults were fearful. during that evening the enemy in logan's front withdrew into the town. this now left sherman's army close up to the confederate lines, extending from a point directly east of the city around by the north and west of it for a distance of fully ten miles; the whole of this line being intrenched, and made stronger every day they remained there. in the latter part of july sherman sent stoneman to destroy the railroads to the south, about macon. he was then to go east and, if possible, release our prisoners about andersonville. there were painful stories current at the time about the great hardships these prisoners had to endure in the way of general bad treatment, in the way in which they were housed, and in the way in which they were fed. great sympathy was felt for them; and it was thought that even if they could be turned loose upon the country it would be a great relief to them. but the attempt proved a failure. mccook, who commanded a small brigade, was first reported to have been captured; but he got back, having inflicted a good deal of damage upon the enemy. he had also taken some prisoners; but encountering afterwards a largely superior force of the enemy he was obliged to drop his prisoners and get back as best he could with what men he had left. he had lost several hundred men out of his small command. on the 4th of august colonel adams, commanding a little brigade of about a thousand men, returned reporting stoneman and all but himself as lost. i myself had heard around richmond of the capture of stoneman, and had sent sherman word, which he received. the rumor was confirmed there, also, from other sources. a few days after colonel adams's return colonel capron also got in with a small detachment and confirmed the report of the capture of stoneman with something less than a thousand men. it seems that stoneman, finding the escape of all his force was impossible, had made arrangements for the escape of two divisions. he covered the movement of these divisions to the rear with a force of about seven hundred men, and at length surrendered himself and this detachment to the commanding confederate. in this raid, however, much damage was inflicted upon the enemy by the destruction of cars, locomotives, army wagons, manufactories of military supplies, etc. on the 4th and 5th sherman endeavored to get upon the railroad to our right, where schofield was in command, but these attempts failed utterly. general palmer was charged with being the cause of this failure, to a great extent, by both general sherman and general schofield; but i am not prepared to say this, although a question seems to have arisen with palmer as to whether schofield had any right to command him. if he did raise this question while an action was going on, that act alone was exceedingly reprehensible. about the same time wheeler got upon our railroad north of resaca and destroyed it nearly up to dalton. this cut sherman off from communication with the north for several days. sherman responded to this attack on his lines of communication by directing one upon theirs. kilpatrick started on the night of the 18th of august to reach the macon road about jonesboro. he succeeded in doing so, passed entirely around the confederate lines of atlanta, and was back again in his former position on our left by the 22d. these little affairs, however, contributed but very little to the grand result. they annoyed, it is true, but any damage thus done to a railroad by any cavalry expedition is soon repaired. sherman made preparations for a repetition of his tactics; that is, for a flank movement with as large a force as could be got together to some point in the enemy's rear. sherman commenced this last movement on the 25th of august, and on the 1st of september was well up towards the railroad twenty miles south of atlanta. here he found hardee intrenched, ready to meet him. a battle ensued, but he was unable to drive hardee away before night set in. under cover of the night, however, hardee left of his own accord. that night hood blew up his military works, such as he thought would be valuable in our hands, and decamped. the next morning at daylight general h. w. slocum, who was commanding north of the city, moved in and took possession of atlanta, and notified sherman. sherman then moved deliberately back, taking three days to reach the city, and occupied a line extending from decatur on the left to atlanta in the centre, with his troops extending out of the city for some distance to the right. the campaign had lasted about four months, and was one of the most memorable in history. there was but little if anything in the whole campaign, now that it is over, to criticise at all, and nothing to criticise severely. it was creditable alike to the general who commanded and the army which had executed it. sherman had on this campaign some bright, wide-awake division and brigade commanders whose alertness added a host to the efficiency of his command. the troops now went to work to make themselves comfortable, and to enjoy a little rest after their arduous campaign. the city of atlanta was turned into a military base. the citizens were all compelled to leave. sherman also very wisely prohibited the assembling of the army of sutlers and traders who always follow in the wake of an army in the field, if permitted to do so, from trading with the citizens and getting the money of the soldiers for articles of but little use to them, and for which they are made to pay most exorbitant prices. he limited the number of these traders to one for each of his three armies. the news of sherman's success reached the north instantaneously, and set the country all aglow. this was the first great political campaign for the republicans in their canvass of 1864. it was followed later by sheridan's campaign in the shenandoah valley; and these two campaigns probably had more effect in settling the election of the following november than all the speeches, all the bonfires, and all the parading with banners and bands of music in the north. chapter l. grand movement of the army of the potomac--crossing the rapidan --entering the wilderness--battle of the wilderness. soon after midnight, may 3d-4th, the army of the potomac moved out from its position north rapidan, to start upon that memorable campaign, destined to result in the capture of the confederate capital and the army defending it. this was not to be accomplished, however, without as desperate fighting as the world has ever witnessed; not to be consummated in a day, a week, a month, single season. the losses inflicted, and endured, were destined to be severe; but the armies now confronting each other had already been in deadly conflict for a period of three years, with immense losses in killed, by death from sickness, captured and wounded; and neither had made any real progress accomplishing the final end. it is true the confederates had, so far, held their capital, and they claimed this to be their sole object. but previously they had boldly proclaimed their intention to capture philadelphia, new york, and the national capital, and had made several attempts to do so, and once or twice had come fearfully near making their boast good--too near for complacent contemplation by the loyal north. they had also come near losing their own capital on at least one occasion. so here was a stand-off. the campaign now begun was destined to result in heavier losses, to both armies, in a given time, than any previously suffered; but the carnage was to be limited to a single year, and to accomplish all that had been anticipated or desired at the beginning in that time. we had to have hard fighting to achieve this. the two armies had been confronting each other so long, without any decisive result, that they hardly knew which could whip. ten days' rations, with a supply of forage and ammunition were taken in wagons. beef cattle were driven with the trains, and butchered as wanted. three days rations in addition, in haversacks, and fifty rounds of cartridges, were carried on the person of each soldier. the country over which the army had to operate, from the rapidan to the crossing of the james river, is rather flat, and is cut by numerous streams which make their way to the chesapeake bay. the crossings of these streams by the army were generally made not far above tide-water, and where they formed a considerable obstacle to the rapid advance of troops even when the enemy did not appear in opposition. the country roads were narrow and poor. most of the country is covered with a dense forest, in places, like the wilderness and along the chickahominy, almost impenetrable even for infantry except along the roads. all bridges were naturally destroyed before the national troops came to them. the army of the potomac was composed of three infantry and one cavalry corps, commanded respectively by generals w. s. hancock, g. k. warren, (*27) john sedgwick and p. h. sheridan. the artillery was commanded by general henry j. hunt. this arm was in such abundance that the fourth of it could not be used to advantage in such a country as we were destined to pass through. the surplus was much in the way, taking up as it did so much of the narrow and bad roads, and consuming so much of the forage and other stores brought up by the trains. the 5th corps, general warren commanding, was in advance on the right, and marched directly for germania ford, preceded by one division of cavalry, under general j. h. wilson. general sedgwick followed warren with the 6th corps. germania ford was nine or ten miles below the right of lee's line. hancock, with the 2d corps, moved by another road, farther east, directly upon ely's ford, six miles below germania, preceded by gregg's division of cavalry, and followed by the artillery. torbert's division of cavalry was left north of the rapidan, for the time, to picket the river and prevent the enemy from crossing and getting into our rear. the cavalry seized the two crossings before daylight, drove the enemy's pickets guarding them away, and by six o'clock a.m. had the pontoons laid ready for the crossing of the infantry and artillery. this was undoubtedly a surprise to lee. the fact that the movement was unopposed proves this. burnside, with the 9th corps, was left back at warrenton, guarding the railroad from bull run forward to preserve control of it in case our crossing the rapidan should be long delayed. he was instructed, however, to advance at once on receiving notice that the army had crossed; and a dispatch was sent to him a little after one p.m. giving the information that our crossing had been successful. the country was heavily wooded at all the points of crossing, particularly on the south side of the river. the battle-field from the crossing of the rapidan until the final movement from the wilderness toward spottsylvania was of the same character. there were some clearings and small farms within what might be termed the battle-field; but generally the country was covered with a dense forest. the roads were narrow and bad. all the conditions were favorable for defensive operations. there are two roads, good for that part of virginia, running from orange court house to the battle-field. the most southerly of these roads is known as the orange court house plank road, the northern one as the orange turnpike. there are also roads from east of the battle-field running to spottsylvania court house, one from chancellorsville, branching at aldrich's; the western branch going by piney branch church, alsop's, thence by the brock road to spottsylvania; the east branch goes by gates's, thence to spottsylvania. the brock road runs from germania ford through the battle-field and on to the court house. as spottsylvania is approached the country is cut up with numerous roads, some going to the town direct, and others crossing so as to connect the farms with roads going there. lee's headquarters were at orange court house. from there to fredericksburg he had the use of the two roads above described running nearly parallel to the wilderness. this gave him unusual facilities, for that country, for concentrating his forces to his right. these roads strike the road from germania ford in the wilderness. as soon as the crossing of the infantry was assured, the cavalry pushed forward, wilson's division by wilderness tavern to parker's store, on the orange plank road; gregg to the left towards chancellorsville. warren followed wilson and reached the wilderness tavern by noon, took position there and intrenched. sedgwick followed warren. he was across the river and in camp on the south bank, on the right of warren, by sundown. hancock, with the 2d corps, moved parallel with warren and camped about six miles east of him. before night all the troops, and by the evening of the 5th the trains of more than four thousand wagons, were safely on the south side of the river. there never was a corps better organized than was the quartermaster's corps with the army of the potomac in 1864. with a wagon-train that would have extended from the rapidan to richmond, stretched along in single file and separated as the teams necessarily would be when moving, we could still carry only three days' forage and about ten to twelve days' rations, besides a supply of ammunition. to overcome all difficulties, the chief quartermaster, general rufus ingalls, had marked on each wagon the corps badge with the division color and the number of the brigade. at a glance, the particular brigade to which any wagon belonged could be told. the wagons were also marked to note the contents: if ammunition, whether for artillery or infantry; if forage, whether grain or hay; if rations, whether, bread, pork, beans, rice, sugar, coffee or whatever it might be. empty wagons were never allowed to follow the army or stay in camp. as soon as a wagon was empty it would return to the base of supply for a load of precisely the same article that had been taken from it. empty trains were obliged to leave the road free for loaded ones. arriving near the army they would be parked in fields nearest to the brigades they belonged to. issues, except of ammunition, were made at night in all cases. by this system the hauling of forage for the supply train was almost wholly dispensed with. they consumed theirs at the depots. i left culpeper court house after all the troops had been put in motion, and passing rapidly to the front, crossed the rapidan in advance of sedgwick's corps; and established headquarters for the afternoon and night in a deserted house near the river. orders had been given, long before this movement began, to cut down the baggage of officers and men to the lowest point possible. notwithstanding this i saw scattered along the road from culpeper to germania ford wagon-loads of new blankets and overcoats, thrown away by the troops to lighten their knapsacks; an improvidence i had never witnessed before. lee, while his pickets and signal corps must have discovered at a very early hour on the morning of the 4th of may, that the army of the potomac was moving, evidently did not learn until about one o'clock in the afternoon by what route we would confront his army. this i judge from the fact that at 1.15 p.m., an hour and a quarter after warren had reached old wilderness tavern, our officers took off rebel signals which, when translated, were seen to be an order to his troops to occupy their intrenchments at mine run. here at night dispatches were received announcing that sherman, butler and crook had moved according to programme. on discovering the advance of the army of the potomac, lee ordered hill, ewell and longstreet, each commanding corps, to move to the right to attack us, hill on the orange plank road, longstreet to follow on the same road. longstreet was at this time--middle of the afternoon--at gordonsville, twenty or more miles away. ewell was ordered by the orange pike. he was near by and arrived some four miles east of mine run before bivouacking for the night. my orders were given through general meade for an early advance on the morning of the 5th. warren was to move to parker's store, and wilson's cavalry--then at parker's store--to move on to craig's meeting-house. sedgwick followed warren, closing in on his right. the army of the potomac was facing to the west, though our advance was made to the south, except when facing the enemy. hancock was to move south-westward to join on the left of warren, his left to reach to shady grove church. at six o'clock, before reaching parker's store, warren discovered the enemy. he sent word back to this effect, and was ordered to halt and prepare to meet and attack him. wright, with his division of sedgwick's corps, was ordered, by any road he could find, to join on to warren's right, and getty with his division, also of sedgwick's corps, was ordered to move rapidly by warren's rear and get on his left. this was the speediest way to reinforce warren who was confronting the enemy on both the orange plank and turnpike roads. burnside had moved promptly on the 4th, on receiving word that the army of the potomac had safely crossed the rapidan. by making a night march, although some of his troops had to march forty miles to reach the river, he was crossing with the head of his column early on the morning of the 5th. meade moved his headquarters on to old wilderness tavern, four miles south of the river, as soon as it was light enough to see the road. i remained to hasten burnside's crossing and to put him in position. burnside at this time was not under meade's command, and was his senior in rank. getting information of the proximity of the enemy, i informed meade, and without waiting to see burnside, at once moved forward my headquarters to where meade was. it was my plan then, as it was on all other occasions, to take the initiative whenever the enemy could be drawn from his intrenchments if we were not intrenched ourselves. warren had not yet reached the point where he was to halt, when he discovered the enemy near by. neither party had any advantage of position. warren was, therefore, ordered to attack as soon as he could prepare for it. at nine o'clock hancock was ordered to come up to the support of getty. he himself arrived at getty's front about noon, but his troops were yet far in the rear. getty was directed to hold his position at all hazards until relieved. about this hour warren was ready, and attacked with favorable though not decisive results. getty was somewhat isolated from warren and was in a precarious condition for a time. wilson, with his division of cavalry, was farther south, and was cut off from the rest of the army. at two o'clock hancock's troops began to arrive, and immediately he was ordered to join getty and attack the enemy. but the heavy timber and narrow roads prevented him from getting into position for attack as promptly as he generally did when receiving such orders. at four o'clock he again received his orders to attack, and general getty received orders from meade a few minutes later to attack whether hancock was ready or not. he met the enemy under heth within a few hundred yards. hancock immediately sent two divisions, commanded by birney and mott, and later two brigades, carroll's and owen's, to the support of getty. this was timely and saved getty. during the battle getty and carroll were wounded, but remained on the field. one of birney's most gallant brigade commanders--alexander hays--was killed. i had been at west point with hays for three years, and had served with him through the mexican war, a portion of the time in the same regiment. he was a most gallant officer, ready to lead his command wherever ordered. with him it was "come, boys," not "go." wadsworth's division and baxter's brigade of the 2d division were sent to reinforce hancock and getty; but the density of the intervening forest was such that, there being no road to march upon, they did not get up with the head of column until night, and bivouacked where they were without getting into position. during the afternoon sheridan sent gregg's division of cavalry to todd's tavern in search of wilson. this was fortunate. he found wilson engaged with a superior force under general rosser, supported by infantry, and falling back before it. together they were strong enough to turn the tables upon the enemy and themselves become aggressive. they soon drove the rebel cavalry back beyond corbin's bridge. fighting between hancock and hill continued until night put a close to it. neither side made any special progress. after the close of the battle of the 5th of may my orders were given for the following morning. we knew longstreet with 12,000 men was on his way to join hill's right, near the brock road, and might arrive during the night. i was anxious that the rebels should not take the initiative in the morning, and therefore ordered hancock to make an assault at 4.30 o'clock. meade asked to have the hour changed to six. deferring to his wishes as far as i was willing, the order was modified and five was fixed as the hour to move. hancock had now fully one-half of the army of the potomac. wadsworth with his division, which had arrived the night before, lay in a line perpendicular to that held by hill, and to the right of hancock. he was directed to move at the same time, and to attack hill's left. burnside, who was coming up with two divisions, was directed to get in between warren and wadsworth, and attack as soon as he could get in position to do so. sedgwick and warren were to make attacks in their front, to detain as many of the enemy as they could and to take advantage of any attempt to reinforce hill from that quarter. burnside was ordered if he should succeed in breaking the enemy's centre, to swing around to the left and envelop the right of lee's army. hancock was informed of all the movements ordered. burnside had three divisions, but one of them--a colored division--was sent to guard the wagon train, and he did not see it again until july. lee was evidently very anxious that there should be no battle on his right until longstreet got up. this is evident from the fact that notwithstanding the early hour at which i had ordered the assault, both for the purpose of being the attacking party and to strike before longstreet got up, lee was ahead in his assault on our right. his purpose was evident, but he failed. hancock was ready to advance by the hour named, but learning in time that longstreet was moving a part of his corps by the catharpin road, thus threatening his left flank, sent a division of infantry, commanded by general barlow, with all his artillery, to cover the approaches by which longstreet was expected. this disposition was made in time to attack as ordered. hancock moved by the left of the orange plank road, and wadsworth by the right of it. the fighting was desperate for about an hour, when the enemy began to break up in great confusion. i believed then, and see no reason to change that opinion now, that if the country had been such that hancock and his command could have seen the confusion and panic in the lines of the enemy, it would have been taken advantage of so effectually that lee would not have made another stand outside of his richmond defences. gibbon commanded hancock's left, and was ordered to attack, but was not able to accomplish much. on the morning of the 6th sheridan was sent to connect with hancock's left and attack the enemy's cavalry who were trying to get on our left and rear. he met them at the intersection of the furnace and brock roads and at todd's tavern, and defeated them at both places. later he was attacked, and again the enemy was repulsed. hancock heard the firing between sheridan and stuart, and thinking the enemy coming by that road, still further reinforced his position guarding the entrance to the brock road. another incident happened during the day to further induce hancock to weaken his attacking column. word reached him that troops were seen moving towards him from the direction of todd's tavern, and brooke's brigade was detached to meet this new enemy; but the troops approaching proved to be several hundred convalescents coming from chancellorsville, by the road hancock had advanced upon, to join their respective commands. at 6.50 o'clock a.m., burnside, who had passed wilderness tavern at six o'clock, was ordered to send a division to the support of hancock, but to continue with the remainder of his command in the execution of his previous order. the difficulty of making a way through the dense forests prevented burnside from getting up in time to be of any service on the forenoon of the sixth. hancock followed hill's retreating forces, in the morning, a mile or more. he maintained this position until, along in the afternoon, longstreet came upon him. the retreating column of hill meeting reinforcements that had not yet been engaged, became encouraged and returned with them. they were enabled, from the density of the forest, to approach within a few hundred yards of our advance before being discovered. falling upon a brigade of hancock's corps thrown to the advance, they swept it away almost instantly. the enemy followed up his advantage and soon came upon mott's division, which fell back in great confusion. hancock made dispositions to hold his advanced position, but after holding it for a time, fell back into the position that he had held in the morning, which was strongly intrenched. in this engagement the intrepid wadsworth while trying to rally his men was mortally wounded and fell into the hands of the enemy. the enemy followed up, but made no immediate attack. the confederate general jenkins was killed and longstreet seriously wounded in this engagement. longstreet had to leave the field, not to resume command for many weeks. his loss was a severe one to lee, and compensated in a great measure for the mishap, or misapprehensions, which had fallen to our lot during the day. after longstreet's removal from the field lee took command of his right in person. he was not able, however, to rally his men to attack hancock's position, and withdrew from our front for the purpose of reforming. hancock sent a brigade to clear his front of all remnants that might be left of longstreet's or hill's commands. this brigade having been formed at right angles to the intrenchments held by hancock's command, swept down the whole length of them from left to right. a brigade of the enemy was encountered in this move; but it broke and disappeared without a contest. firing was continued after this, but with less fury. burnside had not yet been able to get up to render any assistance. but it was now only about nine in the morning, and he was getting into position on hancock's right. at 4.15 in the afternoon lee attacked our left. his line moved up to within a hundred yards of ours and opened a heavy fire. this status was maintained for about half an hour. then a part of mott's division and ward's brigade of birney's division gave way and retired in disorder. the enemy under r. h. anderson took advantage of this and pushed through our line, planting their flags on a part of the intrenchments not on fire. but owing to the efforts of hancock, their success was but temporary. carroll, of gibbon's division, moved at a double quick with his brigade and drove back the enemy, inflicting great loss. fighting had continued from five in the morning sometimes along the whole line, at other times only in places. the ground fought over had varied in width, but averaged three-quarters of a mile. the killed, and many of the severely wounded, of both armies, lay within this belt where it was impossible to reach them. the woods were set on fire by the bursting shells, and the conflagration raged. the wounded who had not strength to move themselves were either suffocated or burned to death. finally the fire communicated with our breastworks, in places. being constructed of wood, they burned with great fury. but the battle still raged, our men firing through the flames until it became too hot to remain longer. lee was now in distress. his men were in confusion, and his personal efforts failed to restore order. these facts, however, were learned subsequently, or we would have taken advantage of his condition and no doubt gained a decisive success. his troops were withdrawn now, but i revoked the order, which i had given previously to this assault, for hancock to attack, because his troops had exhausted their ammunition and did not have time to replenish from the train, which was at some distance. burnside, sedgwick, and warren had all kept up an assault during all this time; but their efforts had no other effect than to prevent the enemy from reinforcing his right from the troops in their front. i had, on the 5th, ordered all the bridges over the rapidan to be taken up except one at germania ford. the troops on sedgwick's right had been sent to enforce our left. this left our right in danger of being turned, and us of being cut off from all present base of supplies. sedgwick had refused his right and intrenched it for protection against attack. but late in the afternoon of the 6th early came out from his lines in considerable force and got in upon sedgwick's right, notwithstanding the precautions taken, and created considerable confusion. early captured several hundred prisoners, among them two general officers. the defence, however, was vigorous; and night coming on, the enemy was thrown into as much confusion as our troops, engaged, were. early says in his memoirs that if we had discovered the confusion in his lines we might have brought fresh troops to his great discomfort. many officers, who had not been attacked by early, continued coming to my headquarters even after sedgwick had rectified his lines a little farther to the rear, with news of the disaster, fully impressed with the idea that the enemy was pushing on and would soon be upon me. during the night all of lee's army withdrew within their intrenchments. on the morning of the 7th general custer drove the enemy's cavalry from catharpin furnace to todd's tavern. pickets and skirmishers were sent along our entire front to find the position of the enemy. some went as far as a mile and a half before finding him. but lee showed no disposition to come out of his works. there was no battle during the day, and but little firing except in warren's front; he being directed about noon to make a reconnoissance in force. this drew some sharp firing, but there was no attempt on the part of lee to drive him back. this ended the battle of the wilderness. chapter li. after the battle--telegraph and signal service--movement by the left flank. more desperate fighting has not been witnessed on this continent than that of the 5th and 6th of may. our victory consisted in having successfully crossed a formidable stream, almost in the face of an enemy, and in getting the army together as a unit. we gained an advantage on the morning of the 6th, which, if it had been followed up, must have proven very decisive. in the evening the enemy gained an advantage; but was speedily repulsed. as we stood at the close, the two armies were relatively in about the same condition to meet each other as when the river divided them. but the fact of having safely crossed was a victory. our losses in the wilderness were very severe. those of the confederates must have been even more so; but i have no means of speaking with accuracy upon this point. the germania ford bridge was transferred to ely's ford to facilitate the transportation of the wounded to washington. it may be as well here as elsewhere to state two things connected with all movements of the army of the potomac: first, in every change of position or halt for the night, whether confronting the enemy or not, the moment arms were stacked the men intrenched themselves. for this purpose they would build up piles of logs or rails if they could be found in their front, and dig a ditch, throwing the dirt forward on the timber. thus the digging they did counted in making a depression to stand in, and increased the elevation in front of them. it was wonderful how quickly they could in this way construct defences of considerable strength. when a halt was made with the view of assaulting the enemy, or in his presence, these would be strengthened or their positions changed under the direction of engineer officers. the second was, the use made of the telegraph and signal corps. nothing could be more complete than the organization and discipline of this body of brave and intelligent men. insulated wires--insulated so that they would transmit messages in a storm, on the ground or under water--were wound upon reels, making about two hundred pounds weight of wire to each reel. two men and one mule were detailed to each reel. the pack-saddle on which this was carried was provided with a rack like a sawbuck placed crosswise of the saddle, and raised above it so that the reel, with its wire, would revolve freely. there was a wagon, supplied with a telegraph operator, battery and telegraph instruments for each division, each corps, each army, and one for my headquarters. there were wagons also loaded with light poles, about the size and length of a wall tent pole, supplied with an iron spike in one end, used to hold the wires up when laid, so that wagons and artillery would not run over them. the mules thus loaded were assigned to brigades, and always kept with the command they were assigned to. the operators were also assigned to particular headquarters, and never changed except by special orders. the moment the troops were put in position to go into camp all the men connected with this branch of service would proceed to put up their wires. a mule loaded with a coil of wire would be led to the rear of the nearest flank of the brigade he belonged to, and would be led in a line parallel thereto, while one man would hold an end of the wire and uncoil it as the mule was led off. when he had walked the length of the wire the whole of it would be on the ground. this would be done in rear of every brigade at the same time. the ends of all the wires would then be joined, making a continuous wire in the rear of the whole army. the men, attached to brigades or divisions, would all commence at once raising the wires with their telegraph poles. this was done by making a loop in the wire and putting it over the spike and raising the pole to a perpendicular position. at intervals the wire would be attached to trees, or some other permanent object, so that one pole was sufficient at a place. in the absence of such a support two poles would have to be used, at intervals, placed at an angle so as to hold the wire firm in its place. while this was being done the telegraph wagons would take their positions near where the headquarters they belonged to were to be established, and would connect with the wire. thus, in a few minutes longer time than it took a mule to walk the length of its coil, telegraphic communication would be effected between all the headquarters of the army. no orders ever had to be given to establish the telegraph. the signal service was used on the march. the men composing this corps were assigned to specified commands. when movements were made, they would go in advance, or on the flanks, and seize upon high points of ground giving a commanding view of the country, if cleared, or would climb tall trees on the highest points if not cleared, and would denote, by signals, the positions of different parts of our own army, and often the movements of the enemy. they would also take off the signals of the enemy and transmit them. it would sometimes take too long a time to make translations of intercepted dispatches for us to receive any benefit from them. but sometimes they gave useful information. on the afternoon of the 7th i received news from washington announcing that sherman had probably attacked johnston that day, and that butler had reached city point safely and taken it by surprise on the 5th. i had given orders for a movement by the left flank, fearing that lee might move rapidly to richmond to crush butler before i could get there. my order for this movement was as follows: headquarters armies of the u. s., may 7, 1864, 6.30 a.m. major-general meade, commanding a. p. make all preparations during the day for a night march to take position at spottsylvania c. h. with one army corps, at todd's tavern with one, and another near the intersection of the piney branch and spottsylvania road with the road from alsop's to old court house. if this move is made the trains should be thrown forward early in the morning to the ny river. i think it would be advisable in making the change to leave hancock where he is until warren passes him. he could then follow and become the right of the new line. burnside will move to piney branch church. sedgwick can move along the pike to chancellorsville and on to his destination. burnside will move on the plank road to the intersection of it with the orange and fredericksburg plank road, then follow sedgwick to his place of destination. all vehicles should be got out of hearing of the enemy before the troops move, and then move off quietly. it is more than probable that the enemy concentrate for a heavy attack on hancock this afternoon. in case they do we must be prepared to resist them, and follow up any success we may gain, with our whole force. such a result would necessarily modify these instructions. all the hospitals should be moved to-day to chancellorsville. u. s. grant, lieut.-general. during the 7th sheridan had a fight with the rebel cavalry at todd's tavern, but routed them, thus opening the way for the troops that were to go by that route at night. soon after dark warren withdrew from the front of the enemy, and was soon followed by sedgwick. warren's march carried him immediately behind the works where hancock's command lay on the brock road. with my staff and a small escort of cavalry i preceded the troops. meade with his staff accompanied me. the greatest enthusiasm was manifested by hancock's men as we passed by. no doubt it was inspired by the fact that the movement was south. it indicated to them that they had passed through the "beginning of the end" in the battle just fought. the cheering was so lusty that the enemy must have taken it for a night attack. at all events it drew from him a furious fusillade of artillery and musketry, plainly heard but not felt by us. meade and i rode in advance. we had passed but a little way beyond our left when the road forked. we looked to see, if we could, which road sheridan had taken with his cavalry during the day. it seemed to be the right-hand one, and accordingly we took it. we had not gone far, however, when colonel c. b. comstock, of my staff, with the instinct of the engineer, suspecting that we were on a road that would lead us into the lines of the enemy, if he, too, should be moving, dashed by at a rapid gallop and all alone. in a few minutes he returned and reported that lee was moving, and that the road we were on would bring us into his lines in a short distance. we returned to the forks of the road, left a man to indicate the right road to the head of warren's column when it should come up, and continued our journey to todd's tavern, where we arrived after midnight. my object in moving to spottsylvania was two-fold: first, i did not want lee to get back to richmond in time to attempt to crush butler before i could get there; second, i wanted to get between his army and richmond if possible; and, if not, to draw him into the open field. but lee, by accident, beat us to spottsylvania. our wagon trains had been ordered easterly of the roads the troops were to march upon before the movement commenced. lee interpreted this as a semi-retreat of the army of the potomac to fredericksburg, and so informed his government. accordingly he ordered longstreet's corps--now commanded by anderson--to move in the morning (the 8th) to spottsylvania. but the woods being still on fire, anderson could not go into bivouac, and marched directly on to his destination that night. by this accident lee got possession of spottsylvania. it is impossible to say now what would have been the result if lee's orders had been obeyed as given; but it is certain that we would have been in spottsylvania, and between him and his capital. my belief is that there would have been a race between the two armies to see which could reach richmond first, and the army of the potomac would have had the shorter line. thus, twice since crossing the rapidan we came near closing the campaign, so far as battles were concerned, from the rapidan to the james river or richmond. the first failure was caused by our not following up the success gained over hill's corps on the morning of the 6th, as before described: the second, when fires caused by that battle drove anderson to make a march during the night of the 7th-8th which he was ordered to commence on the morning of the 8th. but accident often decides the fate of battle. sheridan's cavalry had had considerable fighting during the afternoon of the 7th, lasting at todd's tavern until after night, with the field his at the close. he issued the necessary orders for seizing spottsylvania and holding the bridge over the po river, which lee's troops would have to cross to get to spottsylvania. but meade changed sheridan's orders to merritt--who was holding the bridge--on his arrival at todd's tavern, and thereby left the road free for anderson when he came up. wilson, who was ordered to seize the town, did so, with his division of cavalry; but he could not hold it against the confederate corps which had not been detained at the crossing of the po, as it would have been but for the unfortunate change in merritt's orders. had he been permitted to execute the orders sheridan gave him, he would have been guarding with two brigades of cavalry the bridge over the po river which anderson had to cross, and must have detained him long enough to enable warren to reinforce wilson and hold the town. anderson soon intrenched himself--if indeed the intrenchments were not already made--immediately across warren's front. warren was not aware of his presence, but probably supposed it was the cavalry which merritt had engaged earlier in the day. he assaulted at once, but was repulsed. he soon organized his men, as they were not pursued by the enemy, and made a second attack, this time with his whole corps. this time he succeeded in gaining a position immediately in the enemy's front, where he intrenched. his right and left divisions--the former crawford's, the latter wadsworth's, now commanded by cutler--drove the enemy back some distance. at this time my headquarters had been advanced to piney branch church. i was anxious to crush anderson before lee could get a force to his support. to this end sedgwick who was at piney branch church, was ordered to warren's support. hancock, who was at todd's tavern, was notified of warren's engagement, and was directed to be in readiness to come up. burnside, who was with the wagon trains at aldrich's on our extreme left, received the same instructions. sedgwick was slow in getting up for some reason--probably unavoidable, because he was never at fault when serious work was to be done--so that it was near night before the combined forces were ready to attack. even then all of sedgwick's command did not get into the engagement. warren led the last assault, one division at a time, and of course it failed. warren's difficulty was twofold: when he received an order to do anything, it would at once occur to his mind how all the balance of the army should be engaged so as properly to co-operate with him. his ideas were generally good, but he would forget that the person giving him orders had thought of others at the time he had of him. in like manner, when he did get ready to execute an order, after giving most intelligent instructions to division commanders, he would go in with one division, holding the others in reserve until he could superintend their movements in person also, forgetting that division commanders could execute an order without his presence. his difficulty was constitutional and beyond his control. he was an officer of superior ability, quick perceptions, and personal courage to accomplish anything that could be done with a small command. lee had ordered hill's corps--now commanded by early--to move by the very road we had marched upon. this shows that even early in the morning of the 8th lee had not yet become acquainted with my move, but still thought that the army of the potomac had gone to fredericksburg. indeed, he informed the authorities at richmond he had possession of spottsylvania and was on my flank. anderson was in possession of spottsylvania, through no foresight of lee, however. early only found that he had been following us when he ran against hancock at todd's tavern. his coming detained hancock from the battle-field of spottsylvania for that day; but he, in like manner, kept early back and forced him to move by another route. had i ordered the movement for the night of the 7th by my left flank, it would have put hancock in the lead. it would also have given us an hour or earlier start. it took all that time for warren to get the head of his column to the left of hancock after he had got his troops out of their line confronting the enemy. this hour, and hancock's capacity to use his whole force when necessary, would, no doubt, have enabled him to crush anderson before he could be reinforced. but the movement made was tactical. it kept the troops in mass against a possible assault by the enemy. our left occupied its intrenchments while the two corps to the right passed. if an attack had been made by the enemy he would have found the 2d corps in position, fortified, and, practically, the 5th and 6th corps in position as reserves, until his entire front was passed. by a left flank movement the army would have been scattered while still passing the front of the enemy, and before the extreme right had got by it would have been very much exposed. then, too, i had not yet learned the special qualifications of the different corps commanders. at that time my judgment was that warren was the man i would suggest to succeed meade should anything happen to that gallant soldier to take him from the field. as i have before said, warren was a gallant soldier, an able man; and he was beside thoroughly imbued with the solemnity and importance of the duty he had to perform. chapter lii. battle of spottsylvania--hancock's position--assault of warren's and wright's corps--upton promoted on the field--good news from butler and sheridan. the mattapony river is formed by the junction of the mat, the ta, the po and the ny rivers, the last being the northernmost of the four. it takes its rise about a mile south and a little east of the wilderness tavern. the po rises south-west of the place, but farther away. spottsylvania is on the ridge dividing these two streams, and where they are but a few miles apart. the brock road reaches spottsylvania without crossing either of these streams. lee's army coming up by the catharpin road, had to cross the po at wooden bridge. warren and hancock came by the brock road. sedgwick crossed the ny at catharpin furnace. burnside coming by aldrich's to gates's house, had to cross the ny near the enemy. he found pickets at the bridge, but they were soon driven off by a brigade of willcox's division, and the stream was crossed. this brigade was furiously attacked; but the remainder of the division coming up, they were enabled to hold their position, and soon fortified it. about the time i received the news of this attack, word came from hancock that early had left his front. he had been forced over to the catharpin road, crossing the po at corbin's and again at wooden bridge. these are the bridges sheridan had given orders to his cavalry to occupy on the 8th, while one division should occupy spottsylvania. these movements of the enemy gave me the idea that lee was about to make the attempt to get to, or towards, fredericksburg to cut off my supplies. i made arrangements to attack his right and get between him and richmond if he should try to execute this design. if he had any such intention it was abandoned as soon as burnside was established south of the ny. the po and the ny are narrow little streams, but deep, with abrupt banks, and bordered by heavily wooded and marshy bottoms--at the time we were there--and difficult to cross except where bridged. the country about was generally heavily timbered, but with occasional clearings. it was a much better country to conduct a defensive campaign in than an offensive one. by noon of the 9th the position of the two armies was as follows: lee occupied a semicircle facing north, north-west and north-east, inclosing the town. anderson was on his left extending to the po, ewell came next, then early. warren occupied our right, covering the brock and other roads converging at spottsylvania; sedgwick was to his left and burnside on our extreme left. hancock was yet back at todd's tavern, but as soon as it was known that early had left hancock's front the latter was ordered up to warren's right. he formed a line with three divisions on the hill overlooking the po early in the afternoon, and was ordered to cross the po and get on the enemy's flank. the fourth division of hancock's corps, mott commanding, was left at todd's when the corps first came up; but in the afternoon it was brought up and placed to the left of sedgwick's--now wright's--6th corps. in the morning general sedgwick had been killed near the right of his intrenchments by rebel sharpshooters. his loss was a severe one to the army of the potomac and to the nation. general h. g. wright succeeded him in the command of his corps. hancock was now, nine p.m. of the 9th of may, across the left flank of lee's army, but separated from it, and also from the remainder of meade's army, by the po river. but for the lateness of the hour and the darkness of the night he would have attempted to cross the river again at wooden bridge, thus bringing himself on the same side with both friend and foe. the po at the points where hancock's corps crossed runs nearly due east. just below his lower crossing--the troops crossed at three points--it turns due south, and after passing under wooden bridge soon resumes a more easterly direction. during the night this corps built three bridges over the po; but these were in rear. the position assumed by hancock's corps forced lee to reinforce his left during the night. accordingly on the morning of the 10th, when hancock renewed his effort to get over the po to his front, he found himself confronted by some of early's command, which had been brought from the extreme right of the enemy during the night. he succeeded in effecting a crossing with one brigade, however, but finding the enemy intrenched in his front, no more were crossed. hancock reconnoitred his front on the morning of the 10th, with the view of forcing a crossing, if it was found that an advantage could be gained. the enemy was found strongly intrenched on the high ground overlooking the river, and commanding the wooden bridge with artillery. anderson's left rested on the po, where it turns south; therefore, for hancock to cross over--although it would bring him to the same side of the stream with the rest of the army--would still farther isolate him from it. the stream would have to be crossed twice in the face of the enemy to unite with the main body. the idea of crossing was therefore abandoned. lee had weakened the other parts of his line to meet this movement of hancock's, and i determined to take advantage of it. accordingly in the morning, orders were issued for an attack in the afternoon on the centre by warren's and wright's corps, hancock to command all the attacking force. two of his divisions were brought to the north side of the po. gibbon was placed to the right of warren, and birney in his rear as a reserve. barlow's division was left south of the stream, and mott of the same corps was still to the left of wright's corps. burnside was ordered to reconnoitre his front in force, and, if an opportunity presented, to attack with vigor. the enemy seeing barlow's division isolated from the rest of the army, came out and attacked with fury. barlow repulsed the assault with great slaughter, and with considerable loss to himself. but the enemy reorganized and renewed the assault. birney was now moved to the high ground overlooking the river crossings built by our troops, and covered the crossings. the second assault was repulsed, again with severe loss to the enemy, and barlow was withdrawn without further molestation. general t. g. stevenson was killed in this move. between the lines, where warren's assault was to take place, there was a ravine grown up with large trees and underbrush, making it almost impenetrable by man. the slopes on both sides were also covered with a heavy growth of timber. warren, before noon, reconnoitred his front twice, the first time with one and the second with two divisions. he was repulsed on both occasions, but gained such information of the ground as to induce him to report recommending the assault. wright also reconnoitred his front and gained a considerably advanced position from the one he started from. he then organized a storming party, consisting of twelve regiments, and assigned colonel emory upton, of the 121st new york volunteers, to the command of it. about four o'clock in the afternoon the assault was ordered, warren's and wright's corps, with mott's division of hancock's corps, to move simultaneously. the movement was prompt, and in a few minutes the fiercest of struggles began. the battle-field was so densely covered with forest that but little could be seen, by any one person, as to the progress made. meade and i occupied the best position we could get, in rear of warren. warren was repulsed with heavy loss, general j. c. rice being among the killed. he was not followed, however, by the enemy, and was thereby enabled to reorganize his command as soon as covered from the guns of the enemy. to the left our success was decided, but the advantage was lost by the feeble action of mott. upton with his assaulting party pushed forward and crossed the enemy's intrenchments. turning to the right and left he captured several guns and some hundreds of prisoners. mott was ordered to his assistance but failed utterly. so much time was lost in trying to get up the troops which were in the right position to reinforce, that i ordered upton to withdraw; but the officers and men of his command were so averse to giving up the advantage they had gained that i withdrew the order. to relieve them, i ordered a renewal of the assault. by this time hancock, who had gone with birney's division to relieve barlow, had returned, bringing the division with him. his corps was now joined with warren's and wright's in this last assault. it was gallantly made, many men getting up to, and over, the works of the enemy; but they were not able to hold them. at night they were withdrawn. upton brought his prisoners with him, but the guns he had captured he was obliged to abandon. upton had gained an important advantage, but a lack in others of the spirit and dash possessed by him lost it to us. before leaving washington i had been authorized to promote officers on the field for special acts of gallantry. by this authority i conferred the rank of brigadier-general upon upton on the spot, and this act was confirmed by the president. upton had been badly wounded in this fight. burnside on the left had got up to within a few hundred yards of spottsylvania court house, completely turning lee's right. he was not aware of the importance of the advantage he had gained, and i, being with the troops where the heavy fighting was, did not know of it at the time. he had gained his position with but little fighting, and almost without loss. burnside's position now separated him widely from wright's corps, the corps nearest to him. at night he was ordered to join on to this. this brought him back about a mile, and lost to us an important advantage. i attach no blame to burnside for this, but i do to myself for not having had a staff officer with him to report to me his position. the enemy had not dared to come out of his line at any point to follow up his advantage, except in the single instance of his attack on barlow. then he was twice repulsed with heavy loss, though he had an entire corps against two brigades. barlow took up his bridges in the presence of this force. on the 11th there was no battle and but little firing; none except by mott who made a reconnoissance to ascertain if there was a weak point in the enemy's line. i wrote the following letter to general halleck: near spottsylvania c. h., may 11, 1864--8.30 a.m. major-general halleck, chief of staff of the army, washington, d. c. we have now ended the 6th day of very hard fighting. the result up to this time is much in our favor. but our losses have been heavy as well as those of the enemy. we have lost to this time eleven general officers killed, wounded and missing, and probably twenty thousand men. i think the loss of the enemy must be greater--we having taken over four thousand prisoners in battle, whilst he has taken from us but few except a few stragglers. i am now sending back to belle plain all my wagons for a fresh supply of provisions and ammunition, and purpose to fight it out on this line if it takes all summer. the arrival of reinforcements here will be very encouraging to the men, and i hope they will be sent as fast as possible, and in as great numbers. my object in having them sent to belle plain was to use them as an escort to our supply trains. if it is more convenient to send them out by train to march from the railroad to belle plain or fredericksburg, send them so. i am satisfied the enemy are very shaky, and are only kept up to the mark by the greatest exertions on the part of their officers, and by keeping them intrenched in every position they take. up to this time there is no indication of any portion of lee's army being detached for the defence of richmond. u. s. grant, lieut.-general. and also, i received information, through the war department, from general butler that his cavalry under kautz had cut the railroad south of petersburg, separating beauregard from richmond, and had whipped hill, killing, wounding and capturing many. also that he was intrenched, and could maintain himself. on this same day came news from sheridan to the effect that he had destroyed ten miles of the railroad and telegraph between lee and richmond, one and a half million rations, and most of the medical stores for his army. on the 8th i had directed sheridan verbally to cut loose from the army of the potomac and pass around the left of lee's army and attack his cavalry and communications, which was successfully executed in the manner i have already described. chapter liii. hancock's assault-losses of the confederates--promotions recommended --discomfiture of the enemy--ewell's attack-reducing the artillery. in the reconnoissance made by mott on the 11th, a salient was discovered at the right centre. i determined that an assault should be made at that point. (*28) accordingly in the afternoon hancock was ordered to move his command by the rear of warren and wright, under cover of night, to wright's left, and there form it for an assault at four o'clock the next morning. the night was dark, it rained heavily, and the road was difficult, so that it was midnight when he reached the point where he was to halt. it took most of the night to get the men in position for their advance in the morning. the men got but little rest. burnside was ordered to attack (*29) on the left of the salient at the same hour. i sent two of my staff officers to impress upon him the importance of pushing forward vigorously. hancock was notified of this. warren and wright were ordered to hold themselves in readiness to join in the assault if circumstances made it advisable. i occupied a central position most convenient for receiving information from all points. hancock put barlow on his left, in double column, and birney to his right. mott followed birney, and gibbon was held in reserve. the morning of the 12th opened foggy, delaying the start more than half an hour. the ground over which hancock had to pass to reach the enemy, was ascending and heavily wooded to within two or three hundred yards of the enemy's intrenchments. in front of birney there was also a marsh to cross. but, notwithstanding all these difficulties, the troops pushed on in quick time without firing a gun, and when within four or five hundred yards of the enemy's line broke out in loud cheers, and with a rush went up to and over the breastworks. barlow and birney entered almost simultaneously. here a desperate hand-to-hand conflict took place. the men of the two sides were too close together to fire, but used their guns as clubs. the hand conflict was soon over. hancock's corps captured some four thousand prisoners among them a division and a brigade commander twenty or more guns with their horses, caissons, and ammunition, several thousand stand of arms, and many colors. hancock, as soon as the hand-to-hand conflict was over, turned the guns of the enemy against him and advanced inside the rebel lines. about six o'clock i ordered warren's corps to the support of hancock's. burnside, on the left, had advanced up east of the salient to the very parapet of the enemy. potter, commanding one of his divisions, got over but was not able to remain there. however, he inflicted a heavy loss upon the enemy; but not without loss in return. this victory was important, and one that lee could not afford to leave us in full possession of. he made the most strenuous efforts to regain the position he had lost. troops were brought up from his left and attacked hancock furiously. hancock was forced to fall back: but he did so slowly, with his face to the enemy, inflicting on him heavy loss, until behind the breastworks he had captured. these he turned, facing them the other way, and continued to hold. wright was ordered up to reinforce hancock, and arrived by six o'clock. he was wounded soon after coming up but did not relinquish the command of his corps, although the fighting lasted until one o'clock the next morning. at eight o'clock warren was ordered up again, but was so slow in making his dispositions that his orders were frequently repeated, and with emphasis. at eleven o'clock i gave meade written orders to relieve warren from his command if he failed to move promptly. hancock placed batteries on high ground in his rear, which he used against the enemy, firing over the heads of his own troops. burnside accomplished but little on our left of a positive nature, but negatively a great deal. he kept lee from reinforcing his centre from that quarter. if the 5th corps, or rather if warren, had been as prompt as wright was with the 6th corps, better results might have been obtained. lee massed heavily from his left flank on the broken point of his line. five times during the day he assaulted furiously, but without dislodging our troops from their new position. his losses must have been fearful. sometimes the belligerents would be separated by but a few feet. in one place a tree, eighteen inches in diameter, was cut entirely down by musket balls. all the trees between the lines were very much cut to pieces by artillery and musketry. it was three o'clock next morning before the fighting ceased. some of our troops had then been twenty hours under fire. in this engagement we did not lose a single organization, not even a company. the enemy lost one division with its commander, one brigade and one regiment, with heavy losses elsewhere.(*30) our losses were heavy, but, as stated, no whole company was captured. at night lee took a position in rear of his former one, and by the following morning he was strongly intrenched in it. warren's corps was now temporarily broken up, cutler's division sent to wright, and griffin's to hancock. meade ordered his chief of staff, general humphreys, to remain with warren and the remaining division, and authorized him to give it orders in his name. during the day i was passing along the line from wing to wing continuously. about the centre stood a house which proved to be occupied by an old lady and her daughter. she showed such unmistakable signs of being strongly union that i stopped. she said she had not seen a union flag for so long a time that it did her heart good to look upon it again. she said her husband and son, being, union men, had had to leave early in the war, and were now somewhere in the union army, if alive. she was without food or nearly so, so i ordered rations issued to her, and promised to find out if i could where the husband and son were. there was no fighting on the 13th, further than a little skirmishing between mott's division and the enemy. i was afraid that lee might be moving out, and i did not want him to go without my knowing it. the indications were that he was moving, but it was found that he was only taking his new position back from the salient that had been captured. our dead were buried this day. mott's division was reduced to a brigade, and assigned to birney's division. during this day i wrote to washington recommending sherman and meade (*31) for promotion to the grade of major-general in the regular army; hancock for brigadier-general; wright, gibbon and humphreys to be major-generals of volunteers; and upton and carroll to be brigadiers. upton had already been named as such, but the appointment had to be confirmed by the senate on the nomination of the president. the night of the 13th warren and wright were moved by the rear to the left of burnside. the night was very dark and it rained heavily, the roads were so bad that the troops had to cut trees and corduroy the road a part of the way, to get through. it was midnight before they got to the point where they were to halt, and daylight before the troops could be organized to advance to their position in line. they gained their position in line, however, without any fighting, except a little in wright's front. here upton had to contend for an elevation which we wanted and which the enemy was not disposed to yield. upton first drove the enemy, and was then repulsed in turn. ayres coming to his support with his brigade (of griffin's division, warren's corps), the position was secured and fortified. there was no more battle during the 14th. this brought our line east of the court house and running north and south and facing west. during the night of the 14th-15th lee moved to cover this new front. this left hancock without an enemy confronting him. he was brought to the rear of our new centre, ready to be moved in any direction he might be wanted. on the 15th news came from butler and averill. the former reported the capture of the outer works at drury's bluff, on the james river, and that his cavalry had cut the railroad and telegraph south of richmond on the danville road: and the latter, the destruction of a depot of supplies at dublin, west virginia, and the breaking of new river bridge on the virginia and tennessee railroad. the next day news came from sherman and sheridan. sherman had forced johnston out of dalton, georgia, and was following him south. the report from sheridan embraced his operations up to his passing the outer defences of richmond. the prospect must now have been dismal in richmond. the road and telegraph were cut between the capital and lee. the roads and wires were cut in every direction from the rebel capital. temporarily that city was cut off from all communication with the outside except by courier. this condition of affairs, however, was of but short duration. i wrote halleck: near spottsylvania c. h., may 16, 1864, 8 a.m. major-general halleck, washington, d. c.: we have had five days almost constant rain without any prospect yet of it clearing up. the roads have now become so impassable that ambulances with wounded men can no longer run between here and fredericksburg. all offensive operations necessarily cease until we can have twenty-four hours of dry weather. the army is in the best of spirits, and feel the greatest confidence of ultimate success. * * * * * * you can assure the president and secretary of war that the elements alone have suspended hostilities, and that it is in no manner due to weakness or exhaustion on our part. u. s. grant, lieut.-general. the condition of the roads was such that nothing was done on the 17th. but that night hancock and wright were to make a night march back to their old positions, and to make an assault at four o'clock in the morning. lee got troops back in time to protect his old line, so the assault was unsuccessful. on this day (18th) the news was almost as discouraging to us as it had been two days before in the rebel capital. as stated above, hancock's and wright's corps had made an unsuccessful assault. news came that sigel had been defeated at new market, badly, and was retreating down the valley. not two hours before, i had sent the inquiry to halleck whether sigel could not get to staunton to stop supplies coming from there to lee. i asked at once that sigel might be relieved, and some one else put in his place. hunter's name was suggested, and i heartily approved. further news from butler reported him driven from drury's bluff, but still in possession of the petersburg road. banks had been defeated in louisiana, relieved, and canby put in his place. this change of commander was not on my suggestion. all this news was very discouraging. all of it must have been known by the enemy before it was by me. in fact, the good news (for the enemy) must have been known to him at the moment i thought he was in despair, and his anguish had been already relieved when we were enjoying his supposed discomfiture, but this was no time for repining. i immediately gave orders for a movement by the left flank, on towards richmond, to commence on the night of the 19th. i also asked halleck to secure the cooperation of the navy in changing our base of supplies from fredericksburg to port royal, on the rappahannock. up to this time i had received no reinforcements, except six thousand raw troops under brigadier general robert o. tyler, just arrived. they had not yet joined their command, hancock's corps, but were on our right. this corps had been brought to the rear of the centre, ready to move in any direction. lee, probably suspecting some move on my part, and seeing our right entirely abandoned, moved ewell's corps about five o'clock in the afternoon, with early's as a reserve, to attack us in that quarter. tyler had come up from fredericksburg, and had been halted on the road to the right of our line, near kitching's brigade of warren's corps. tyler received the attack with his raw troops, and they maintained their position, until reinforced, in a manner worthy of veterans. hancock was in a position to reinforce speedily, and was the soldier to do it without waiting to make dispositions. birney was thrown to tyler's right and crawford to his left, with gibbon as a reserve; and ewell was whirled back speedily and with heavy loss. warren had been ordered to get on ewell's flank and in his rear, to cut him off from his intrenchments. but his efforts were so feeble that under the cover of night ewell got back with only the loss of a few hundred prisoners, besides his killed and wounded. the army being engaged until after dark, i rescinded the order for the march by our left flank that night. as soon as it was discovered that the enemy were coming out to attack, i naturally supposed they would detach a force to destroy our trains. the withdrawal of hancock from the right uncovered one road from spottsylvania to fredericksburg over which trains drew our supplies. this was guarded by a division of colored troops, commanded by general ferrero, belonging to burnside's corps. ferrero was therefore promptly notified, and ordered to throw his cavalry pickets out to the south and be prepared to meet the enemy if he should come; if he had to retreat to do so towards fredericksburg. the enemy did detach as expected, and captured twenty-five or thirty wagons which, however, were soon retaken. in consequence of the disasters that had befallen us in the past few days, lee could be reinforced largely, and i had no doubt he would be. beauregard had come up from the south with troops to guard the confederate capital when it was in danger. butler being driven back, most of the troops could be sent to lee. hoke was no longer needed in north carolina; and sigel's troops having gone back to cedar creek, whipped, many troops could be spared from the valley. the wilderness and spottsylvania battles convinced me that we had more artillery than could ever be brought into action at any one time. it occupied much of the road in marching, and taxed the trains in bringing up forage. artillery is very useful when it can be brought into action, but it is a very burdensome luxury where it cannot be used. before leaving spottsylvania, therefore, i sent back to the defences of washington over one hundred pieces of artillery, with the horses and caissons. this relieved the roads over which we were to march of more than two hundred six-horse teams, and still left us more artillery than could be advantageously used. in fact, before reaching the james river i again reduced the artillery with the army largely. i believed that, if one corps of the army was exposed on the road to richmond, and at a distance from the main army, lee would endeavor to attack the exposed corps before reinforcements could come up; in which case the main army could follow lee up and attack him before he had time to intrench. so i issued the following orders: near spottsylvania c. h., va., may 18, 1864. major-general meade, commanding army of the potomac. before daylight to-morrow morning i propose to draw hancock and burnside from the position they now hold, and put burnside to the left of wright. wright and burnside should then force their way up as close to the enemy as they can get without a general engagement, or with a general engagement if the enemy will come out of their works to fight, and intrench. hancock should march and take up a position as if in support of the two left corps. to-morrow night, at twelve or one o'clock, he will be moved south-east with all his force and as much cavalry as can be given to him, to get as far towards richmond on the line of the fredericksburg railroad as he can make, fighting the enemy in whatever force he can find him. if the enemy make a general move to meet this, they will be followed by the other three corps of the army, and attacked, if possible, before time is given to intrench. suitable directions will at once be given for all trains and surplus artillery to conform to this movement. u. s. grant. on the 20th, lee showing no signs of coming out of his lines, orders were renewed for a left-flank movement, to commence after night. chapter liv. movement by the left flank--battle of north anna--an incident of the march--moving on richmond--south of the pamunkey--position of the national army. we were now to operate in a different country from any we had before seen in virginia. the roads were wide and good, and the country well cultivated. no men were seen except those bearing arms, even the black man having been sent away. the country, however, was new to us, and we had neither guides nor maps to tell us where the roads were, or where they led to. engineer and staff officers were put to the dangerous duty of supplying the place of both maps and guides. by reconnoitring they were enabled to locate the roads in the vicinity of each army corps. our course was south, and we took all roads leading in that direction which would not separate the army too widely. hancock who had the lead had marched easterly to guiney's station, on the fredericksburg railroad, thence southerly to bowling green and milford. he was at milford by the night of the 21st. here he met a detachment of pickett's division coming from richmond to reinforce lee. they were speedily driven away, and several hundred captured. warren followed on the morning of the 21st, and reached guiney's station that night without molestation. burnside and wright were retained at spottsylvania to keep up the appearance of an intended assault, and to hold lee, if possible, while hancock and warren should get start enough to interpose between him and richmond. lee had now a superb opportunity to take the initiative either by attacking wright and burnside alone, or by following by the telegraph road and striking hancock's and warren's corps, or even hancock's alone, before reinforcements could come up. but he did not avail himself of either opportunity. he seemed really to be misled as to my designs; but moved by his interior line--the telegraph road--to make sure of keeping between his capital and the army of the potomac. he never again had such an opportunity of dealing a heavy blow. the evening of the 21st burnside, 9th corps, moved out followed by wright, 6th corps. burnside was to take the telegraph road; but finding stanard's ford, over the po, fortified and guarded, he turned east to the road taken by hancock and warren without an attempt to dislodge the enemy. the night of the 21st i had my headquarters near the 6th corps, at guiney's station, and the enemy's cavalry was between us and hancock. there was a slight attack on burnside's and wright's corps as they moved out of their lines; but it was easily repulsed. the object probably was only to make sure that we were not leaving a force to follow upon the rear of the confederates. by the morning of the 22d burnside and wright were at guiney's station. hancock's corps had now been marching and fighting continuously for several days, not having had rest even at night much of the time. they were, therefore, permitted to rest during the 22d. but warren was pushed to harris's store, directly west of milford, and connected with it by a good road, and burnside was sent to new bethel church. wright's corps was still back at guiney's station. i issued the following order for the movement of the troops the next day: new bethel, va., may 22, 1864 major-general meade, commanding army of the potomac. direct corps commanders to hold their troops in readiness to march at five a.m. to-morrow. at that hour each command will send out cavalry and infantry on all roads to their front leading south, and ascertain, if possible, where the enemy is. if beyond the south anna, the 5th and 6th corps will march to the forks of the road, where one branch leads to beaver dam station, the other to jericho bridge, then south by roads reaching the anna, as near to and east of hawkins creek as they can be found. the 2d corps will move to chesterfield ford. the 9th corps will be directed to move at the same time to jericho bridge. the map only shows two roads for the four corps to march upon, but, no doubt, by the use of plantation roads, and pressing in guides, others can be found, to give one for each corps. the troops will follow their respective reconnoitring parties. the trains will be moved at the same time to milford station. headquarters will follow the 9th corps. u. s. grant, lieut.-general. warren's corps was moved from harris's store to jericho ford, wright's following. warren arrived at the ford early in the afternoon, and by five o'clock effected a crossing under the protection of sharpshooters. the men had to wade in water up to their waists. as soon as enough troops were over to guard the ford, pontoons were laid and the artillery and the rest of the troops crossed. the line formed was almost perpendicular to the course of the river--crawford on the left, next to the river, griffin in the centre, and cutler on the right. lee was found intrenched along the front of their line. the whole of hill's corps was sent against warren's right before it had got in position. a brigade of cutler's division was driven back, the enemy following, but assistance coming up the enemy was in turn driven back into his trenches with heavy loss in killed and wounded, with about five hundred prisoners left in our hands. by night wright's corps was up ready to reinforce warren. on the 23d hancock's corps was moved to the wooden bridge which spans the north anna river just west of where the fredericksburg railroad crosses. it was near night when the troops arrived. they found the bridge guarded, with troops intrenched, on the north side. hancock sent two brigades, egan's and pierce's, to the right and left, and when properly disposed they charged simultaneously. the bridge was carried quickly, the enemy retreating over it so hastily that many were shoved into the river, and some of them were drowned. several hundred prisoners were captured. the hour was so late that hancock did not cross until next morning. burnside's corps was moved by a middle road running between those described above, and which strikes the north anna at ox ford, midway between telegraph road and jericho ford. the hour of its arrival was too late to cross that night. on the 24th hancock's corps crossed to the south side of the river without opposition, and formed line facing nearly west. the railroad in rear was taken possession of and destroyed as far as possible. wright's corps crossed at jericho early the same day, and took position to the right of warren's corps, extending south of the virginia central railroad. this road was torn up for a considerable distance to the rear (west), the ties burned, and the rails bent and twisted by heating them over the burning ties. it was found, however, that burnside's corps could not cross at ox ford. lee had taken a position with his centre on the river at this point, with the two wings thrown back, his line making an acute angle where it overlooked the river. before the exact position of the whole of lee's line was accurately known, i directed hancock and warren each to send a brigade to ox ford by the south side of the river. they found the enemy too strong to justify a serious attack. a third ford was found between ox ford and jericho. burnside was directed to cross a division over this ford, and to send one division to hancock. crittenden was crossed by this newly-discovered ford, and formed up the river to connect with crawford's left. potter joined hancock by way of the wooden bridge. crittenden had a severe engagement with some of hill's corps on his crossing the river, and lost heavily. when joined to warren's corps he was no further molested. burnside still guarded ox ford from the north side. lee now had his entire army south of the north anna. our lines covered his front, with the six miles separating the two wings guarded by but a single division. to get from one wing to the other the river would have to be crossed twice. lee could reinforce any part of his line from all points of it in a very short march; or could concentrate the whole of it wherever he might choose to assault. we were, for the time, practically two armies besieging. lee had been reinforced, and was being reinforced, largely. about this time the very troops whose coming i had predicted, had arrived or were coming in. pickett with a full division from richmond was up; hoke from north carolina had come with a brigade; and breckinridge was there: in all probably not less than fifteen thousand men. but he did not attempt to drive us from the field. on the 22d or 23d i received dispatches from washington saying that sherman had taken kingston, crossed the etowah river and was advancing into georgia. i was seated at the time on the porch of a fine plantation house waiting for burnside's corps to pass. meade and his staff, besides my own staff, were with me. the lady of the house, a mrs. tyler, and an elderly lady, were present. burnside seeing us, came up on the porch, his big spurs and saber rattling as he walked. he touched his hat politely to the ladies, and remarked that he supposed they had never seen so many "live yankees" before in their lives. the elderly lady spoke up promptly saying, "oh yes, i have; many more." "where?" said burnside. "in richmond." prisoners, of course, was understood. i read my dispatch aloud, when it was received. this threw the younger lady into tears. i found the information she had received (and i suppose it was the information generally in circulation through the south) was that lee was driving us from the state in the most demoralized condition and that in the south-west our troops were but little better than prisoners of war. seeing our troops moving south was ocular proof that a part of her information was incorrect, and she asked me if my news from sherman was true. i assured her that there was no doubt about it. i left a guard to protect the house from intrusion until the troops should have all passed, and assured her that if her husband was in hiding she could bring him in and he should be protected also. but i presume he was in the confederate army. on the 25th i gave orders, through halleck, to hunter, who had relieved sigel, to move up the valley of virginia, cross over the blue ridge to charlottesville and go as far as lynchburg if possible, living upon the country and cutting the railroads and canal as he went. after doing this he could find his way back to his base, or join me. on the same day news was received that lee was falling back on richmond. this proved not to be true. but we could do nothing where we were unless lee would assume the offensive. i determined, therefore, to draw out of our present position and make one more effort to get between him and richmond. i had no expectation now, however, of succeeding in this; but i did expect to hold him far enough west to enable me to reach the james river high up. sheridan was now again with the army of the potomac. on the 26th i informed the government at washington of the position of the two armies; of the reinforcements the enemy had received; of the move i proposed to make (*32); and directed that our base of supplies should be shifted to white house, on the pamunkey. the wagon train and guards moved directly from port royal to white house. supplies moved around by water, guarded by the navy. orders had previously been sent, through halleck, for butler to send smith's corps to white house. this order was repeated on the 25th, with directions that they should be landed on the north side of the pamunkey, and marched until they joined the army of the potomac. it was a delicate move to get the right wing of the army of the potomac from its position south of the north anna in the presence of the enemy. to accomplish it, i issued the following order: quarles' mills, va., may 25, 1864. major general meade, commanding a. p. direct generals warren and wright to withdraw all their teams and artillery, not in position, to the north side of the river to-morrow. send that belonging to general wright's corps as far on the road to hanover town as it can go, without attracting attention to the fact. send with it wright's best division or division under his ablest commander. have their places filled up in the line so if possible the enemy will not notice their withdrawal. send the cavalry to-morrow afternoon, or as much of it as you may deem necessary, to watch and seize, if they can, littlepage's bridge and taylor's ford, and to remain on one or other side of the river at these points until the infantry and artillery all pass. as soon as it is dark to-morrow night start the division which you withdraw first from wright's corps to make a forced march to hanover town, taking with them no teams to impede their march. at the same time this division starts commence withdrawing all of the 5th and 6th corps from the south side of the river, and march them for the same place. the two divisions of the 9th corps not now with hancock, may be moved down the north bank of the river where they will be handy to support hancock if necessary, or will be that much on their road to follow the 5th and 6th corps. hancock should hold his command in readiness to follow as soon as the way is clear for him. to-morrow it will leave nothing for him to do, but as soon as he can he should get all his teams and spare artillery on the road or roads which he will have to take. as soon as the troops reach hanover town they should get possession of all the crossings they can in that neighborhood. i think it would be well to make a heavy cavalry demonstration on the enemy's left, to-morrow afternoon, also. u. s. grant, lieut.-general. wilson's division of cavalry was brought up from the left and moved by our right south to little river. here he manoeuvred to give the impression that we were going to attack the left flank of lee's army. under cover of night our right wing was withdrawn to the north side of the river, lee being completely deceived by wilson's feint. on the afternoon of the 26th sheridan moved, sending gregg's and torbert's cavalry to taylor's and littlepage's fords towards hanover. as soon as it was dark both divisions moved quietly to hanover ferry, leaving small guards behind to keep up the impression that crossings were to be attempted in the morning. sheridan was followed by a division of infantry under general russell. on the morning of the 27th the crossing was effected with but little loss, the enemy losing thirty or forty, taken prisoners. thus a position was secured south of the pamunkey. russell stopped at the crossing while the cavalry pushed on to hanover town. here barringer's, formerly gordon's, brigade of rebel cavalry was encountered, but it was speedily driven away. warren's and wright's corps were moved by the rear of burnside's and hancock's corps. when out of the way these latter corps followed, leaving pickets confronting the enemy. wilson's cavalry followed last, watching all the fords until everything had recrossed; then taking up the pontoons and destroying other bridges, became the rear-guard. two roads were traversed by the troops in this move. the one nearest to and north of the north anna and pamunkey was taken by wright, followed by hancock. warren, followed by burnside, moved by a road farther north, and longer. the trains moved by a road still farther north, and had to travel a still greater distance. all the troops that had crossed the pamunkey on the morning of the 27th remained quiet during the rest of the day, while the troops north of that stream marched to reach the crossing that had been secured for them. lee had evidently been deceived by our movement from north anna; for on the morning of the 27th he telegraphed to richmond: "enemy crossed to north side, and cavalry and infantry crossed at hanover town." the troops that had then crossed left his front the night of the 25th. the country we were now in was a difficult one to move troops over. the streams were numerous, deep and sluggish, sometimes spreading out into swamps grown up with impenetrable growths of trees and underbrush. the banks were generally low and marshy, making the streams difficult to approach except where there were roads and bridges. hanover town is about twenty miles from richmond. there are two roads leading there; the most direct and shortest one crossing the chickahominy at meadow bridge, near the virginia central railroad, the second going by new and old cold harbor. a few miles out from hanover town there is a third road by way of mechanicsville to richmond. new cold harbor was important to us because while there we both covered the roads back to white house (where our supplies came from), and the roads south-east over which we would have to pass to get to the james river below the richmond defences. on the morning of the 28th the army made an early start, and by noon all had crossed except burnside's corps. this was left on the north side temporarily to guard the large wagon train. a line was at once formed extending south from the river, wright's corps on the right, hancock's in the centre, and warren's on the left, ready to meet the enemy if he should come. at the same time sheridan was directed to reconnoitre towards mechanicsville to find lee's position. at hawes' shop, just where the middle road leaves the direct road to richmond, he encountered the confederate cavalry dismounted and partially intrenched. gregg attacked with his division, but was unable to move the enemy. in the evening custer came up with a brigade. the attack was now renewed, the cavalry dismounting and charging as infantry. this time the assault was successful, both sides losing a considerable number of men. but our troops had to bury the dead, and found that more confederate than union soldiers had been killed. the position was easily held, because our infantry was near. on the 29th a reconnoissance was made in force, to find the position of lee. wright's corps pushed to hanover court house. hancock's corps pushed toward totopotomoy creek; warren's corps to the left on the shady grove church road, while burnside was held in reserve. our advance was pushed forward three miles on the left with but little fighting. there was now an appearance of a movement past our left flank, and sheridan was sent to meet it. on the 30th hancock moved to the totopotomoy, where he found the enemy strongly fortified. wright was moved to the right of hancock's corps, and burnside was brought forward and crossed, taking position to the left of hancock. warren moved up near huntley corners on the shady grove church road. there was some skirmishing along the centre, and in the evening early attacked warren with some vigor, driving him back at first, and threatening to turn our left flank. as the best means of reinforcing the left, hancock was ordered to attack in his front. he carried and held the rifle-pits. while this was going on warren got his men up, repulsed early, and drove him more than a mile. on this day i wrote to halleck ordering all the pontoons in washington to be sent to city point. in the evening news was received of the arrival of smith with his corps at white house. i notified meade, in writing, as follows: near hawes' shop, va., 6.40 p.m., may 30, 1864. major-general meade, commanding a. p. general smith will debark his force at the white house tonight and start up the south bank of the pamunkey at an early hour, probably at 3 a.m. in the morning. it is not improbable that the enemy, being aware of smith's movement, will be feeling to get on our left flank for the purpose of cutting him off, or by a dash to crush him and get back before we are aware of it. sheridan ought to be notified to watch the enemy's movements well out towards cold harbor, and also on the mechanicsville road. wright should be got well massed on hancock's right, so that, if it becomes necessary, he can take the place of the latter readily whilst troops are being thrown east of the totopotomoy if necessary. i want sheridan to send a cavalry force of at least half a brigade, if not a whole brigade, at 5 a.m. in the morning, to communicate with smith and to return with him. i will send orders for smith by the messenger you send to sheridan with his orders. u. s. grant. i also notified smith of his danger, and the precautions that would be taken to protect him. the night of the 30th lee's position was substantially from atlee's station on the virginia central railroad south and east to the vicinity of cold harbor. ours was: the left of warren's corps was on the shady grove road, extending to the mechanicsville road and about three miles south of the totopotomoy. burnside to his right, then hancock, and wright on the extreme right, extending towards hanover court house, six miles south-east of it. sheridan with two divisions of cavalry was watching our left front towards cold harbor. wilson with his division on our right was sent to get on the virginia central railroad and destroy it as far back as possible. he got possession of hanover court house the next day after a skirmish with young's cavalry brigade. the enemy attacked sheridan's pickets, but reinforcements were sent up and the attack was speedily repulsed and the enemy followed some distance towards cold harbor. chapter lv. advance on cold harbor--an anecdote of the war--battle of cold harbor --correspondence with lee--retrospective. on the 31st sheridan advanced to near old cold harbor. he found it intrenched and occupied by cavalry and infantry. a hard fight ensued but the place was carried. the enemy well knew the importance of cold harbor to us, and seemed determined that we should not hold it. he returned with such a large force that sheridan was about withdrawing without making any effort to hold it against such odds; but about the time he commenced the evacuation he received orders to hold the place at all hazards, until reinforcements could be sent to him. he speedily turned the rebel works to face against them and placed his men in position for defence. night came on before the enemy was ready for assault. wright's corps was ordered early in the evening to march directly to cold harbor passing by the rear of the army. it was expected to arrive by daylight or before; but the night was dark and the distance great, so that it was nine o'clock the 1st of june before it reached its destination. before the arrival of wright the enemy had made two assaults on sheridan, both of which were repulsed with heavy loss to the enemy. wright's corps coming up, there was no further assault on cold harbor. smith, who was coming up from white house, was also directed to march directly to cold harbor, and was expected early on the morning of the 1st of june; but by some blunder the order which reached smith directed him to newcastle instead of cold harbor. through this blunder smith did not reach his destination until three o'clock in the afternoon, and then with tired and worn-out men from their long and dusty march. he landed twelve thousand five hundred men from butler's command, but a division was left at white house temporarily and many men had fallen out of ranks in their long march. before the removal of wright's corps from our right, after dark on the 31st, the two lines, federal and confederate, were so close together at that point that either side could detect directly any movement made by the other. finding at daylight that wright had left his front, lee evidently divined that he had gone to our left. at all events, soon after light on the 1st of june anderson, who commanded the corps on lee's left, was seen moving along warren's front. warren was ordered to attack him vigorously in flank, while wright was directed to move out and get on his front. warren fired his artillery at the enemy; but lost so much time in making ready that the enemy got by, and at three o'clock he reported the enemy was strongly intrenched in his front, and besides his lines were so long that he had no mass of troops to move with. he seemed to have forgotten that lines in rear of an army hold themselves while their defenders are fighting in their front. wright reconnoitred some distance to his front: but the enemy finding old cold harbor already taken had halted and fortified some distance west. by six o'clock in the afternoon wright and smith were ready to make an assault. in front of both the ground was clear for several hundred yards and then became wooded. both charged across this open space and into the wood, capturing and holding the first line of rifle-pits of the enemy, and also capturing seven or eight hundred prisoners. while this was going on, the enemy charged warren three separate times with vigor, but were repulsed each time with loss. there was no officer more capable, nor one more prompt in acting, than warren when the enemy forced him to it. there was also an attack upon hancock's and burnside's corps at the same time; but it was feeble and probably only intended to relieve anderson who was being pressed by wright and smith. during the night the enemy made frequent attacks with the view of dispossessing us of the important position we had gained, but without effecting their object. hancock was moved from his place in line during the night and ordered to the left of wright. i expected to take the offensive on the morning of the 2d, but the night was so dark, the heat and dust so excessive and the roads so intricate and hard to keep, that the head of column only reached old cold harbor at six o'clock, but was in position at 7.30 a.m. preparations were made for an attack in the afternoon, but did not take place until the next morning. warren's corps was moved to the left to connect with smith: hancock's corps was got into position to the left of wright's, and burnside was moved to bethesda church in reserve. while warren and burnside were making these changes the enemy came out several times and attacked them, capturing several hundred prisoners. the attacks were repulsed, but not followed up as they should have been. i was so annoyed at this that i directed meade to instruct his corps commanders that they should seize all such opportunities when they occurred, and not wait for orders, all of our manoeuvres being made for the very purpose of getting the enemy out of his cover. on this day wilson returned from his raid upon the virginia central railroad, having damaged it considerably. but, like ourselves, the rebels had become experts in repairing such damage. sherman, in his memoirs, relates an anecdote of his campaign to atlanta that well illustrates this point. the rebel cavalry lurking in his rear to burn bridges and obstruct his communications had become so disgusted at hearing trains go whistling by within a few hours after a bridge had been burned, that they proposed to try blowing up some of the tunnels. one of them said, "no use, boys, old sherman carries duplicate tunnels with him, and will replace them as fast as you can blow them up; better save your powder." sheridan was engaged reconnoitring the banks of the chickahominy, to find crossings and the condition of the roads. he reported favorably. during the night lee moved his left up to make his line correspond to ours. his lines extended now from the totopotomoy to new cold harbor. mine from bethesda church by old cold harbor to the chickahominy, with a division of cavalry guarding our right. an assault was ordered for the 3d, to be made mainly by the corps of hancock, wright and smith; but warren and burnside were to support it by threatening lee's left, and to attack with great earnestness if he should either reinforce more threatened points by drawing from that quarter or if a favorable opportunity should present itself. the corps commanders were to select the points in their respective fronts where they would make their assaults. the move was to commence at half-past four in the morning. hancock sent barlow and gibbon forward at the appointed hour, with birney as a reserve. barlow pushed forward with great vigor, under a heavy fire of both artillery and musketry, through thickets and swamps. notwithstanding all the resistance of the enemy and the natural obstructions to overcome, he carried a position occupied by the enemy outside their main line where the road makes a deep cut through a bank affording as good a shelter for troops as if it had been made for that purpose. three pieces of artillery had been captured here, and several hundred prisoners. the guns were immediately turned against the men who had just been using them. no (*33) assistance coming to him, he (barlow) intrenched under fire and continued to hold his place. gibbon was not so fortunate in his front. he found the ground over which he had to pass cut up with deep ravines, and a morass difficult to cross. but his men struggled on until some of them got up to the very parapet covering the enemy. gibbon gained ground much nearer the enemy than that which he left, and here he intrenched and held fast. wright's corps moving in two lines captured the outer rifle-pits in their front, but accomplished nothing more. smith's corps also gained the outer rifle-pits in its front. the ground over which this corps (18th) had to move was the most exposed of any over which charges were made. an open plain intervened between the contending forces at this point, which was exposed both to a direct and a cross fire. smith, however, finding a ravine running towards his front, sufficiently deep to protect men in it from cross fire, and somewhat from a direct fire, put martindale's division in it, and with brooks supporting him on the left and devens on the right succeeded in gaining the outer--probably picket--rifle-pits. warren and burnside also advanced and gained ground--which brought the whole army on one line. this assault cost us heavily and probably without benefit to compensate: but the enemy was not cheered by the occurrence sufficiently to induce him to take the offensive. in fact, nowhere after the battle of the wilderness did lee show any disposition to leave his defences far behind him. fighting was substantially over by half-past seven in the morning. at eleven o'clock i started to visit all the corps commanders to see for myself the different positions gained and to get their opinion of the practicability of doing anything more in their respective fronts. hancock gave the opinion that in his front the enemy was too strong to make any further assault promise success. wright thought he could gain the lines of the enemy, but it would require the cooperation of hancock's and smith's corps. smith thought a lodgment possible, but was not sanguine: burnside thought something could be done in his front, but warren differed. i concluded, therefore to make no more assaults, and a little after twelve directed in the following letter that all offensive action should cease. cold harbor, june 3, 1864.-12.30 p.m. major-general meade, commanding a. p. the opinion of corps commanders not being sanguine of success in case an assault is ordered, you may direct a suspension of farther advance for the present. hold our most advanced positions and strengthen them. whilst on the defensive our line may be contracted from the right if practicable. reconnoissances should be made in front of every corps and advances made to advantageous positions by regular approaches. to aid the expedition under general hunter it is necessary that we should detain all the army now with lee until the former gets well on his way to lynchburg. to do this effectually it will be better to keep the enemy out of the intrenchments of richmond than to have them go back there. wright and hancock should be ready to assault in case the enemy should break through general smith's lines, and all should be ready to resist an assault. u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. the remainder of the day was spent in strengthening the line we now held. by night we were as strong against lee as he was against us. during the night the enemy quitted our right front, abandoning some of their wounded, and without burying their dead. these we were able to care for. but there were many dead and wounded men between the lines of the contending forces, which were now close together, who could not be cared for without a cessation of hostilities. so i wrote the following: cold harbor, va., june 5, 1864. general r. e. lee, commanding confederate army. it is reported to me that there are wounded men, probably of both armies, now lying exposed and suffering between the lines occupied respectively by the two armies. humanity would dictate that some provision should be made to provide against such hardships. i would propose, therefore, that hereafter, when no battle is raging, either party be authorized to send to any point between the pickets or skirmish lines, unarmed men bearing litters to pick up their dead or wounded, without being fired upon by the other party. any other method, equally fair to both parties, you may propose for meeting the end desired will be accepted by me. u. s. grant, lieut.-general. lee replied that he feared such an arrangement would lead to misunderstanding, and proposed that in future, when either party wished to remove their dead and wounded, a flag of truce be sent. i answered this immediately by saying: cold harbor, va., june 6, 1864. general r. e. lee, commanding army of n. va. your communication of yesterday's date is received. i will send immediately, as you propose, to collect the dead and wounded between the lines of the two armies, and will also instruct that you be allowed to do the same. i propose that the time for doing this be between the hours of 12 m. and 3 p.m. to-day. i will direct all parties going out to bear a white flag, and not to attempt to go beyond where we have dead or wounded, and not beyond or on ground occupied by your troops. u. s. grant, lieut.-general. lee's response was that he could not consent to the burial of the dead and removal of the wounded in the way i proposed, but when either party desired such permission it should be asked for by flag of truce and he had directed that any parties i may have sent out, as mentioned in my letter, to be turned back. i answered: cold harbor, va, june 6, 1864. general r. e. lee. commanding army, n. va. the knowledge that wounded men are now suffering from want of attention, between the two armies, compels me to ask a suspension of hostilities for sufficient time to collect them in, say two hours. permit me to say that the hours you may fix upon for this will be agreeable to me, and the same privilege will be extended to such parties as you may wish to send out on the same duty without further application. u. s. grant, lieut.-general. lee acceded to this; but delays in transmitting the correspondence brought it to the 7th of june--forty-eight hours after it commenced --before parties were got out to collect the men left upon the field. in the meantime all but two of the wounded had died. and i wrote to lee: cold harbor, va., june 7, 1864. 10.30 a.m. gen. r. e. lee, commanding army of n. va. i regret that your note of seven p.m. yesterday should have been received at the nearest corps headquarters, to where it was delivered, after the hour which had been given for the removal of the dead and wounded had expired; 10.45 p.m. was the hour at which it was received at corps headquarters, and between eleven and twelve it reached my headquarters. as a consequence, it was not understood by the troops of this army that there was a cessation of hostilities for the purpose of collecting the dead and wounded, and none were collected. two officers and six men of the 8th and 25th north carolina regts., who were out in search of the bodies of officers of their respective regiments, were captured and brought into our lines, owing to this want of understanding. i regret this, but will state that as soon as i learned the fact, i directed that they should not be held as prisoners, but must be returned to their commands. these officers and men having been carelessly brought through our lines to the rear have not determined whether they will be sent back the way they came, or whether they will be sent by some other route. regretting that all my efforts for alleviating the sufferings of wounded men left upon the battle-field have been rendered nugatory, i remain, &c., u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. i have always regretted that the last assault at cold harbor was ever made. i might say the same thing of the assault of the 22d of may, 1863, at vicksburg. at cold harbor no advantage whatever was gained to compensate for the heavy loss we sustained. indeed, the advantages other than those of relative losses, were on the confederate side. before that, the army of northern virginia seemed to have acquired a wholesome regard for the courage, endurance, and soldierly qualities generally of the army of the potomac. they no longer wanted to fight them "one confederate to five yanks." indeed, they seemed to have given up any idea of gaining any advantage of their antagonist in the open field. they had come to much prefer breastworks in their front to the army of the potomac. this charge seemed to revive their hopes temporarily; but it was of short duration. the effect upon the army of the potomac was the reverse. when we reached the james river, however, all effects of the battle of cold harbor seemed to have disappeared. there was more justification for the assault at vicksburg. we were in a southern climate, at the beginning of the hot season. the army of the tennessee had won five successive victories over the garrison of vicksburg in the three preceding weeks. they had driven a portion of that army from port gibson with considerable loss, after having flanked them out of their stronghold at grand gulf. they had attacked another portion of the same army at raymond, more than fifty miles farther in the interior of the state, and driven them back into jackson with great loss in killed, wounded, captured and missing, besides loss of large and small arms: they had captured the capital of the state of mississippi, with a large amount of materials of war and manufactures. only a few days before, they had beaten the enemy then penned up in the town first at champion's hill, next at big black river bridge, inflicting upon him a loss of fifteen thousand or more men (including those cut off from returning) besides large losses in arms and ammunition. the army of the tennessee had come to believe that they could beat their antagonist under any circumstances. there was no telling how long a regular siege might last. as i have stated, it was the beginning of the hot season in a southern climate. there was no telling what the casualties might be among northern troops working and living in trenches, drinking surface water filtered through rich vegetation, under a tropical sun. if vicksburg could have been carried in may, it would not only have saved the army the risk it ran of a greater danger than from the bullets of the enemy, but it would have given us a splendid army, well equipped and officered, to operate elsewhere with. these are reasons justifying the assault. the only benefit we gained--and it was a slight one for so great a sacrifice--was that the men worked cheerfully in the trenches after that, being satisfied with digging the enemy out. had the assault not been made, i have no doubt that the majority of those engaged in the siege of vicksburg would have believed that had we assaulted it would have proven successful, and would have saved life, health and comfort. chapter lvi. left flank movement across the chickahominy and james--general lee --visit to butler--the movement on petersburg--the investment of petersburg. lee's position was now so near richmond, and the intervening swamps of the chickahominy so great an obstacle to the movement of troops in the face of an enemy, that i determined to make my next left flank move carry the army of the potomac south of the james river. (*34) preparations for this were promptly commenced. the move was a hazardous one to make: the chickahominy river, with its marshy and heavily timbered approaches, had to be crossed; all the bridges over it east of lee were destroyed; the enemy had a shorter line and better roads to travel on to confront me in crossing; more than fifty miles intervened between me and butler, by the roads i should have to travel, with both the james and the chickahominy unbridged to cross; and last, the army of the potomac had to be got out of a position but a few hundred yards from the enemy at the widest place. lee, if he did not choose to follow me, might, with his shorter distance to travel and his bridges over the chickahominy and the james, move rapidly on butler and crush him before the army with me could come to his relief. then too he might spare troops enough to send against hunter who was approaching lynchburg, living upon the country he passed through, and without ammunition further than what he carried with him. but the move had to be made, and i relied upon lee's not seeing my danger as i saw it. besides we had armies on both sides of the james river and not far from the confederate capital. i knew that its safety would be a matter of the first consideration with the executive, legislative and judicial branches of the so-called confederate government, if it was not with the military commanders. but i took all the precaution i knew of to guard against all dangers. sheridan was sent with two divisions, to communicate with hunter and to break up the virginia central railroad and the james river canal, on the 7th of june, taking instructions to hunter to come back with him (*35). hunter was also informed by way of washington and the valley that sheridan was on the way to meet him. the canal and central road, and the regions penetrated by them, were of vast importance to the enemy, furnishing and carrying a large per cent. of all the supplies for the army of northern virginia and the people of richmond. before sheridan got off on the 7th news was received from hunter reporting his advance to staunton and successful engagement with the enemy near that place on the 5th, in which the confederate commander, w. s. jones, was killed. on the 4th of june the enemy having withdrawn his left corps, burnside on our right was moved up between warren and smith. on the 5th birney returned to hancock, which extended his left now to the chickahominy, and warren was withdrawn to cold harbor. wright was directed to send two divisions to the left to extend down the banks of that stream to bottom's bridge. the cavalry extended still farther east to jones's bridge. on the 7th abercrombie--who was in command at white house, and who had been in command at our base of supplies in all the changes made from the start--was ordered to take up the iron from the york river railroad and put it on boats, and to be in readiness to move by water to city point. on the 8th meade was directed to fortify a line down the bank overlooking the chickahominy, under cover of which the army could move. on the 9th abercrombie was directed to send all organized troops arriving at white house, without debarking from their transports, to report to butler. halleck was at this time instructed to send all reinforcements to city point. on the 11th i wrote: cold harbor, va., june 11, 1864. major-gen. b. f. butler, commanding department of va. and n. c. the movement to transfer this army to the south side of the james river will commence after dark to-morrow night. col. comstock, of my staff, was sent specially to ascertain what was necessary to make your position secure in the interval during which the enemy might use most of his force against you, and also, to ascertain what point on the river we should reach to effect a crossing if it should not be practicable to reach this side of the river at bermuda hundred. colonel comstock has not yet returned, so that i cannot make instructions as definite as i would wish, but the time between this and sunday night being so short in which to get word to you, i must do the best i can. colonel dent goes to the chickahominy to take to you the 18th corps. the corps will leave its position in the trenches as early in the evening, tomorrow, as possible, and make a forced march to cole's landing or ferry, where it should reach by ten a.m. the following morning. this corps numbers now 15,300 men. they take with them neither wagons nor artillery; these latter marching with the balance of the army to the james river. the remainder of the army will cross the chickahominy at long bridge and at jones's, and strike the river at the most practicable crossing below city point. i directed several days ago that all reinforcements for the army should be sent to you. i am not advised of the number that may have gone, but suppose you have received from six to ten thousand. general smith will also reach you as soon as the enemy could, going by the way of richmond. the balance of the force will not be more than one day behind, unless detained by the whole of lee's army, in which case you will be strong enough. i wish you would direct the proper staff officers, your chief-engineer and your chief-quartermaster, to commence at once the collection of all the means in their reach for crossing the army on its arrival. if there is a point below city point where a pontoon bridge can be thrown, have it laid. expecting the arrival of the 18th corps by monday night, if you deem it practicable from the force you have to seize and hold petersburg, you may prepare to start, on the arrival of troops to hold your present lines. i do not want petersburg visited, however, unless it is held, nor an attempt to take it, unless you feel a reasonable degree of confidence of success. if you should go there, i think troops should take nothing with them except what they can carry, depending upon supplies being sent after the place is secured. if colonel dent should not succeed in securing the requisite amount of transportation for the 18th corps before reaching you, please have the balance supplied. u. s. grant, lieut.-general. p. s.--on reflection i will send the 18th corps by way of white house. the distance which they will have to march will be enough shorter to enable them to reach you about the same time, and the uncertainty of navigation on the chickahominy will be avoided. u. s. grant. cold harbor, va., june 11,1864. major-general g. g. meade, commanding army of the potomac. colonel comstock, who visited the james river for the purpose of ascertaining the best point below bermuda hundred to which to march the army has not yet returned. it is now getting so late, however, that all preparations may be made for the move to-morrow night without waiting longer. the movement will be made as heretofore agreed upon, that is, the 18th corps make a rapid march with the infantry alone, their wagons and artillery accompanying the balance of the army to cole's landing or ferry, and there embark for city point, losing no time for rest until they reach the latter point. the 5th corps will seize long bridge and move out on the long bridge road to its junction with quaker road, or until stopped by the enemy. the other three corps will follow in such order as you may direct, one of them crossing at long bridge, and two at jones's bridge. after the crossing is effected, the most practicable roads will be taken to reach about fort powhattan. of course, this is supposing the enemy makes no opposition to our advance. the 5th corps, after securing the passage of the balance of the army, will join or follow in rear of the corps which crosses the same bridge with themselves. the wagon trains should be kept well east of the troops, and if a crossing can be found, or made lower down than jones's they should take it. u. s. grant, lieut.-general. p. s.--in view of the long march to reach cole's landing, and the uncertainty of being able to embark a large number of men there, the direction of the 18th corps may be changed to white house. they should be directed to load up transports, and start them as fast as loaded without waiting for the whole corps or even whole divisions to go together. u. s. grant. about this time word was received (through the richmond papers of the 11th) that crook and averell had united and were moving east. this, with the news of hunter's successful engagement near staunton, was no doubt known to lee before it was to me. then sheridan leaving with two divisions of cavalry, looked indeed threatening, both to lee's communications and supplies. much of his cavalry was sent after sheridan, and early with ewell's entire corps was sent to the valley. supplies were growing scarce in richmond, and the sources from which to draw them were in our hands. people from outside began to pour into richmond to help eat up the little on hand. consternation reigned there. on the 12th smith was ordered to move at night to white house, not to stop until he reached there, and to take boats at once for city point, leaving his trains and artillery to move by land. soon after dark some of the cavalry at long bridge effected a crossing by wading and floundering through the water and mud, leaving their horses behind, and drove away the cavalry pickets. a pontoon bridge was speedily thrown across, over which the remainder of the army soon passed and pushed out for a mile or two to watch and detain any advance that might be made from the other side. warren followed the cavalry, and by the morning of the 13th had his whole corps over. hancock followed warren. burnside took the road to jones's bridge, followed by wright. ferrero's division, with the wagon train, moved farther east, by window shades and cole's ferry, our rear being covered by cavalry. it was known that the enemy had some gunboats at richmond. these might run down at night and inflict great damage upon us before they could be sunk or captured by our navy. general butler had, in advance, loaded some vessels with stone ready to be sunk so as to obstruct the channel in an emergency. on the 13th i sent orders to have these sunk as high up the river as we could guard them, and prevent their removal by the enemy. as soon as warren's corps was over the chickahominy it marched out and joined the cavalry in holding the roads from richmond while the army passed. no attempt was made by the enemy to impede our march, however, but warren and wilson reported the enemy strongly fortified in their front. by the evening of the 13th hancock's corps was at charles city court house on the james river. burnside's and wright's corps were on the chickahominy, and crossed during the night, warren's corps and the cavalry still covering the army. the material for a pontoon bridge was already at hand and the work of laying it was commenced immediately, under the superintendence of brigadier-general benham, commanding the engineer brigade. on the evening of the 14th the crossing commenced, hancock in advance, using both the bridge and boats. when the wilderness campaign commenced the army of the potomac, including burnside's--which was a separate command until the 24th of may when it was incorporated with the main army--numbered about 116,000 men. during the progress of the campaign about 40,000 reinforcements were received. at the crossing of the james river june 14th-15th the army numbered about 115,000. besides the ordinary losses incident to a campaign of six weeks' nearly constant fighting or skirmishing, about one-half of the artillery was sent back to washington, and many men were discharged by reason of the expiration of their term of service.* in estimating our strength every enlisted man and every commissioned officer present is included, no matter how employed; in bands, sick in field hospitals, hospital attendants, company cooks and all. operating in an enemy's country, and being supplied always from a distant base, large detachments had at all times to be sent from the front, not only to guard the base of supplies and the roads to it, but all the roads leading to our flanks and rear. we were also operating in a country unknown to us, and without competent guides or maps showing the roads accurately. the manner of estimating numbers in the two armies differs materially. in the confederate army often only bayonets are taken into account, never, i believe, do they estimate more than are handling the guns of the artillery and armed with muskets (*36) or carbines. generally the latter are far enough away to be excluded from the count in any one field. officers and details of enlisted men are not included. in the northern armies the estimate is most liberal, taking in all connected with the army and drawing pay. estimated in the same manner as ours, lee had not less than 80,000 men at the start. his reinforcements were about equal to ours during the campaign, deducting the discharged men and those sent back. he was on the defensive, and in a country in which every stream, every road, every obstacle to the movement of troops and every natural defence was familiar to him and his army. the citizens were all friendly to him and his cause, and could and did furnish him with accurate reports of our every move. rear guards were not necessary for him, and having always a railroad at his back, large wagon trains were not required. all circumstances considered we did not have any advantage in numbers. general lee, who had led the army of northern virginia in all these contests, was a very highly estimated man in the confederate army and states, and filled also a very high place in the estimation of the people and press of the northern states. his praise was sounded throughout the entire north after every action he was engaged in: the number of his forces was always lowered and that of the national forces exaggerated. he was a large, austere man, and i judge difficult of approach to his subordinates. to be extolled by the entire press of the south after every engagement, and by a portion of the press north with equal vehemence, was calculated to give him the entire confidence of his troops and to make him feared by his antagonists. it was not an uncommon thing for my staff-officers to hear from eastern officers, "well, grant has never met bobby lee yet." there were good and true officers who believe now that the army of northern virginia was superior to the army of the potomac man to man. i do not believe so, except as the advantages spoken of above made them so. before the end i believe the difference was the other way. the army of northern virginia became despondent and saw the end. it did not please them. the national army saw the same thing, and were encouraged by it. the advance of the army of the potomac reached the james on the 14th of june. preparations were at once commenced for laying the pontoon bridges and crossing the river. as already stated, i had previously ordered general butler to have two vessels loaded with stone and carried up the river to a point above that occupied by our gunboats, where the channel was narrow, and sunk there so as to obstruct the passage and prevent confederate gunboats from coming down the river. butler had had these boats filled and put in position, but had not had them sunk before my arrival. i ordered this done, and also directed that he should turn over all material and boats not then in use in the river to be used in ferrying the troops across. i then, on the 14th, took a steamer and ran up to bermuda hundred to see general butler for the purpose of directing a movement against petersburg, while our troops of the army of the potomac were crossing. i had sent general w. f. smith back from cold harbor by the way of white house, thence on steamers to city point for the purpose of giving general butler more troops with which to accomplish this result. general butler was ordered to send smith with his troops reinforced, as far as that could be conveniently done, from other parts of the army of the james. he gave smith about six thousand reinforcements, including some twenty-five hundred cavalry under kautz, and about thirty-five hundred colored infantry under hinks. the distance which smith had to move to reach the enemy's lines was about six miles, and the confederate advance line of works was but two miles outside of petersburg. smith was to move under cover of night, up close to the enemy's works, and assault as soon as he could after daylight. i believed then, and still believe, that petersburg could have been easily captured at that time. it only had about 2,500 men in the defences besides some irregular troops, consisting of citizens and employees in the city who took up arms in case of emergency. smith started as proposed, but his advance encountered a rebel force intrenched between city point and their lines outside of petersburg. this position he carried, with some loss to the enemy; but there was so much delay that it was daylight before his troops really got off from there. while there i informed general butler that hancock's corps would cross the river and move to petersburg to support smith in case the latter was successful, and that i could reinforce there more rapidly than lee could reinforce from his position. i returned down the river to where the troops of the army of the potomac now were, communicated to general meade, in writing, the directions i had given to general butler and directed him (meade) to cross hancock's corps over under cover of night, and push them forward in the morning to petersburg; halting them, however, at a designated point until they could hear from smith. i also informed general meade that i had ordered rations from bermuda hundred for hancock's corps, and desired him to issue them speedily, and to lose no more time than was absolutely necessary. the rations did not reach him, however, and hancock, while he got all his corps over during the night, remained until half-past ten in the hope of receiving them. he then moved without them, and on the road received a note from general w. f. smith, asking him to come on. this seems to be the first information that general hancock had received of the fact that he was to go to petersburg, or that anything particular was expected of him. otherwise he would have been there by four o'clock in the afternoon. smith arrived in front of the enemy's lines early in the forenoon of the 15th, and spent the day until after seven o'clock in the evening in reconnoitering what appeared to be empty works. the enemy's line consisted of redans occupying commanding positions, with rifle-pits connecting them. to the east side of petersburg, from the appomattox back, there were thirteen of these redans extending a distance of several miles, probably three. if they had been properly manned they could have held out against any force that could have attacked them, at least until reinforcements could have got up from the north of richmond. smith assaulted with the colored troops, and with success. by nine o'clock at night he was in possession of five of these redans and, of course, of the connecting lines of rifle-pits. all of them contained artillery, which fell into our hands. hancock came up and proposed to take any part assigned to him; and smith asked him to relieve his men who were in the trenches. next morning, the 16th, hancock himself was in command, and captured another redan. meade came up in the afternoon and succeeded hancock, who had to be relieved, temporarily, from the command of his corps on account of the breaking out afresh of the wound he had received at gettysburg. during the day meade assaulted and carried one more redan to his right and two to his left. in all this we lost very heavily. the works were not strongly manned, but they all had guns in them which fell into our hands, together with the men who were handling them in the effort to repel these assaults. up to this time beauregard, who had commanded south of richmond, had received no reinforcements, except hoke's division from drury's bluff,(*37) which had arrived on the morning of the 16th; though he had urged the authorities very strongly to send them, believing, as he did, that petersburg would be a valuable prize which we might seek. during the 17th the fighting was very severe and the losses heavy; and at night our troops occupied about the same position they had occupied in the morning, except that they held a redan which had been captured by potter during the day. during the night, however, beauregard fell back to the line which had been already selected, and commenced fortifying it. our troops advanced on the 18th to the line which he had abandoned, and found that the confederate loss had been very severe, many of the enemy's dead still remaining in the ditches and in front of them. colonel j. l. chamberlain, of the 20th maine, was wounded on the 18th. he was gallantly leading his brigade at the time, as he had been in the habit of doing in all the engagements in which he had previously been engaged. he had several times been recommended for a brigadier-generalcy for gallant and meritorious conduct. on this occasion, however, i promoted him on the spot, and forwarded a copy of my order to the war department, asking that my act might be confirmed and chamberlain's name sent to the senate for confirmation without any delay. this was done, and at last a gallant and meritorious officer received partial justice at the hands of his government, which he had served so faithfully and so well. if general hancock's orders of the 15th had been communicated to him, that officer, with his usual promptness, would undoubtedly have been upon the ground around petersburg as early as four o'clock in the afternoon of the 15th. the days were long and it would have given him considerable time before night. i do not think there is any doubt that petersburg itself could have been carried without much loss; or, at least, if protected by inner detached works, that a line could have been established very much in rear of the one then occupied by the enemy. this would have given us control of both the weldon and south side railroads. this would also have saved an immense amount of hard fighting which had to be done from the 15th to the 18th, and would have given us greatly the advantage in the long siege which ensued. i now ordered the troops to be put under cover and allowed some of the rest which they had so long needed. they remained quiet, except that there was more or less firing every day, until the 22d, when general meade ordered an advance towards the weldon railroad. we were very anxious to get to that road, and even round to the south side railroad if possible. meade moved hancock's corps, now commanded by birney, to the left, with a view to at least force the enemy to stay within the limits of his own line. general wright, with the 6th corps, was ordered by a road farther south, to march directly for the weldon road. the enemy passed in between these two corps and attacked vigorously, and with very serious results to the national troops, who were then withdrawn from their advanced position. the army of the potomac was given the investment of petersburg, while the army of the james held bermuda hundred and all the ground we possessed north of the james river. the 9th corps, burnside's, was placed upon the right at petersburg; the 5th, warren's, next; the 2d, birney's, next; then the 6th, wright's, broken off to the left and south. thus began the siege of petersburg. chapter lvii. raid on the virginia central railroad--raid on the weldon railroad --early 's movement upon washington--mining the works before petersburg --explosion of the mine before petersburg--campaign in the shenandoah valley--capture of the weldon railroad. on the 7th of june, while at cold harbor, i had as already indicated sent sheridan with two divisions of cavalry to destroy as much as he could of the virginia central railroad. general hunter had been operating up the shenandoah valley with some success, having fought a battle near staunton where he captured a great many prisoners, besides killing and wounding a good many men. after the battle he formed a junction at staunton with averell and crook, who had come up from the kanawha, or gauley river. it was supposed, therefore, that general hunter would be about charlottesville, virginia, by the time sheridan could get there, doing on the way the damage that he was sent to do. i gave sheridan instructions to have hunter, in case he should meet him about charlottesville, join and return with him to the army of the potomac. lee, hearing of hunter's success in the valley, started breckinridge out for its defence at once. learning later of sheridan's going with two divisions, he also sent hampton with two divisions of cavalry, his own and fitz-hugh lee's. sheridan moved to the north side of the north anna to get out west, and learned of the movement of these troops to the south side of the same stream almost as soon as they had started. he pushed on to get to trevilian station to commence his destruction at that point. on the night of the 10th he bivouacked some six or seven miles east of trevilian, while fitz-hugh lee was the same night at trevilian station and hampton but a few miles away. during the night hampton ordered an advance on sheridan, hoping, no doubt, to surprise and very badly cripple him. sheridan, however, by a counter move sent custer on a rapid march to get between the two divisions of the enemy and into their rear. this he did successfully, so that at daylight, when the assault was made, the enemy found himself at the same time resisted in front and attacked in rear, and broke in some confusion. the losses were probably very light on both sides in killed and wounded, but sheridan got away with some five hundred prisoners and sent them to city point. during that day, the 11th, sheridan moved into trevilian station, and the following day proceeded to tear up the road east and west. there was considerable fighting during the whole of the day, but the work of destruction went on. in the meantime, at night, the enemy had taken possession of the crossing which sheridan had proposed to take to go north when he left trevilian. sheridan learned, however, from some of the prisoners he had captured here, that general hunter was about lynchburg, and therefore that there was no use of his going on to charlottesville with a view to meet him. sheridan started back during the night of the 12th, and made his way north and farther east, coming around by the north side of white house, and arriving there on the 21st. here he found an abundance of forage for his animals, food for his men, and security while resting. he had been obliged to leave about ninety of his own men in the field-hospital which he had established near trevilian, and these necessarily fell into the hands of the enemy. white house up to this time had been a depot; but now that our troops were all on the james river, it was no longer wanted as a store of supplies. sheridan was, therefore, directed to break it up; which he did on the 22d of june, bringing the garrison and an immense wagon train with him. all these were over the james river by the 26th of the month, and sheridan ready to follow. in the meantime meade had sent wilson's division on a raid to destroy the weldon and south side roads. now that sheridan was safe and hampton free to return to richmond with his cavalry, wilson's position became precarious. meade therefore, on the 27th, ordered sheridan over the river to make a demonstration in favor of wilson. wilson got back, though not without severe loss, having struck both roads, but the damage done was soon repaired. after these events comparative quiet reigned about petersburg until late in july. the time, however, was spent in strengthening the intrenchments and making our position generally more secure against a sudden attack. in the meantime i had to look after other portions of my command, where things had not been going on so favorably, always, as i could have wished. general hunter who had been appointed to succeed sigel in the shenandoah valley immediately took up the offensive. he met the enemy on the 5th of june at piedmont, and defeated him. on the 8th he formed a junction with crook and averell at staunton, from which place he moved direct on lynchburg, via lexington, which he reached and invested on the 16th. up to this time he was very successful; and but for the difficulty of taking with him sufficient ordnance stores over so long a march, through a hostile country, he would, no doubt, have captured lynchburg. the destruction of the enemy's supplies and manufactories had been very great. to meet this movement under general hunter, general lee sent early with his corps, a part of which reached lynchburg before hunter. after some skirmishing on the 17th and 18th, general hunter, owing to a want of ammunition to give battle, retired from before the place. unfortunately, this want of ammunition left him no choice of route for his return but by the way of the gauley and kanawha rivers, thence up the ohio river, returning to harper's ferry by way of the baltimore and ohio railroad. a long time was consumed in making this movement. meantime the valley was left open to early's troops, and others in that quarter; and washington also was uncovered. early took advantage of this condition of affairs and moved on washington. in the absence of hunter, general lew wallace, with headquarters at baltimore, commanded the department in which the shenandoah lay. his surplus of troops with which to move against the enemy was small in number. most of these were raw and, consequently, very much inferior to our veterans and to the veterans which early had with him; but the situation of washington was precarious, and wallace moved with commendable promptitude to meet the enemy at the monocacy. he could hardly have expected to defeat him badly, but he hoped to cripple and delay him until washington could be put into a state of preparation for his reception. i had previously ordered general meade to send a division to baltimore for the purpose of adding to the defences of washington, and he had sent ricketts's division of the 6th corps (wright's), which arrived in baltimore on the 8th of july. finding that wallace had gone to the front with his command, ricketts immediately took the cars and followed him to the monocacy with his entire division. they met the enemy and, as might have been expected, were defeated; but they succeeded in stopping him for the day on which the battle took place. the next morning early started on his march to the capital of the nation, arriving before it on the 11th. learning of the gravity of the situation i had directed general meade to also order wright with the rest of his corps directly to washington for the relief of that place, and the latter reached there the very day that early arrived before it. the 19th corps, which had been stationed in louisiana, having been ordered up to reinforce the armies about richmond, had about this time arrived at fortress monroe, on their way to join us. i diverted them from that point to washington, which place they reached, almost simultaneously with wright, on the 11th. the 19th corps was commanded by major-general emory. early made his reconnoissance with a view of attacking on the following morning, the 12th; but the next morning he found our intrenchments, which were very strong, fully manned. he at once commenced to retreat, wright following. there is no telling how much this result was contributed to by general lew wallace's leading what might well be considered almost a forlorn hope. if early had been but one day earlier he might have entered the capital before the arrival of the reinforcements i had sent. whether the delay caused by the battle amounted to a day or not, general wallace contributed on this occasion, by the defeat of the troops under him a greater benefit to the cause than often falls to the lot of a commander of an equal force to render by means of a victory. farther west also the troubles were threatening. some time before, forrest had met sturgis in command of some of our cavalry in mississippi and handled him very roughly, gaining a very great victory over him. this left forrest free to go almost where he pleased, and to cut the roads in rear of sherman who was then advancing. sherman was abundantly able to look after the army that he was immediately with, and all of his military division so long as he could communicate with it; but it was my place to see that he had the means with which to hold his rear. two divisions under a. j. smith had been sent to banks in louisiana some months before. sherman ordered these back, with directions to attack forrest. smith met and defeated him very badly. i then directed that smith should hang to forrest and not let him go; and to prevent by all means his getting upon the memphis and nashville railroad. sherman had anticipated me in this matter, and given the same orders in substance; but receiving my directions for this order to smith, he repeated it. on the 25th of june general burnside had commenced running a mine from about the centre of his front under the confederate works confronting him. he was induced to do this by colonel pleasants, of the pennsylvania volunteers, whose regiment was mostly composed of miners, and who was himself a practical miner. burnside had submitted the scheme to meade and myself, and we both approved of it, as a means of keeping the men occupied. his position was very favorable for carrying on this work, but not so favorable for the operations to follow its completion. the position of the two lines at that point were only about a hundred yards apart with a comparatively deep ravine intervening. in the bottom of this ravine the work commenced. the position was unfavorable in this particular: that the enemy's line at that point was re-entering, so that its front was commanded by their own lines both to the right and left. then, too, the ground was sloping upward back of the confederate line for a considerable distance, and it was presumable that the enemy had, at least, a detached work on this highest point. the work progressed, and on the 23d of july the mine was finished ready for charging; but i had this work of charging deferred until we were ready for it. on the 17th of july several deserters came in and said that there was great consternation in richmond, and that lee was coming out to make an attack upon us the object being to put us on the defensive so that he might detach troops to go to georgia where the army sherman was operating against was said to be in great trouble. i put the army commanders, meade and butler, on the lookout, but the attack was not made. i concluded, then, a few days later, to do something in the way of offensive movement myself, having in view something of the same object that lee had had. wright's and emory's corps were in washington, and with this reduction of my force lee might very readily have spared some troops from the defences to send west. i had other objects in view, however, besides keeping lee where he was. the mine was constructed and ready to be exploded, and i wanted to take that occasion to carry petersburg if i could. it was the object, therefore, to get as many of lee's troops away from the south side of the james river as possible. accordingly, on the 26th, we commenced a movement with hancock's corps and sheridan's cavalry to the north side by the way of deep bottom, where butler had a pontoon bridge laid. the plan, in the main, was to let the cavalry cut loose and, joining with kautz's cavalry of the army of the james, get by lee's lines and destroy as much as they could of the virginia central railroad, while, in the mean time, the infantry was to move out so as to protect their rear and cover their retreat back when they should have got through with their work. we were successful in drawing the enemy's troops to the north side of the james as i expected. the mine was ordered to be charged, and the morning of the 30th of july was the time fixed for its explosion. i gave meade minute orders (*38) on the 24th directing how i wanted the assault conducted, which orders he amplified into general instructions for the guidance of the troops that were to be engaged. meade's instructions, which i, of course, approved most heartily, were all that i can see now was necessary. the only further precaution which he could have taken, and which he could not foresee, would have been to have different men to execute them. the gallery to the mine was over five hundred feet long from where it entered the ground to the point where it was under the enemy's works, and with a cross gallery of something over eighty feet running under their lines. eight chambers had been left, requiring a ton of powder each to charge them. all was ready by the time i had prescribed; and on the 29th hancock and sheridan were brought back near the james river with their troops. under cover of night they started to recross the bridge at deep bottom, and to march directly for that part of our lines in front of the mine. warren was to hold his line of intrenchments with a sufficient number of men and concentrate the balance on the right next to burnside's corps, while ord, now commanding the 18th corps, temporarily under meade, was to form in the rear of burnside to support him when he went in. all were to clear off the parapets and the _abatis_ in their front so as to leave the space as open as possible, and be able to charge the moment the mine had been sprung and burnside had taken possession. burnside's corps was not to stop in the crater at all but push on to the top of the hill, supported on the right and left by ord's and warren's corps. warren and ord fulfilled their instructions perfectly so far as making ready was concerned. burnside seemed to have paid no attention whatever to the instructions, and left all the obstruction in his own front for his troops to get over in the best way they could. the four divisions of his corps were commanded by generals potter, willcox, ledlie and ferrero. the last was a colored division; and burnside selected it to make the assault. meade interfered with this. burnside then took ledlie's division--a worse selection than the first could have been. in fact, potter and willcox were the only division commanders burnside had who were equal to the occasion. ledlie besides being otherwise inefficient, proved also to possess disqualification less common among soldiers. there was some delay about the explosion of the mine so that it did not go off until about five o'clock in the morning. when it did explode it was very successful, making a crater twenty feet deep and something like a hundred feet in length. instantly one hundred and ten cannon and fifty mortars, which had been placed in the most commanding positions covering the ground to the right and left of where the troops were to enter the enemy's lines, commenced playing. ledlie's division marched into the crater immediately on the explosion, but most of the men stopped there in the absence of any one to give directions; their commander having found some safe retreat to get into before they started. there was some delay on the left and right in advancing, but some of the troops did get in and turn to the right and left, carrying the rifle-pits as i expected they would do. there had been great consternation in petersburg, as we were well aware, about a rumored mine that we were going to explode. they knew we were mining, and they had failed to cut our mine off by countermining, though beauregard had taken the precaution to run up a line of intrenchments to the rear of that part of their line fronting where they could see that our men were at work. we had learned through deserters who had come in that the people had very wild rumors about what was going on on our side. they said that we had undermined the whole of petersburg; that they were resting upon a slumbering volcano and did not know at what moment they might expect an eruption. i somewhat based my calculations upon this state of feeling, and expected that when the mine was exploded the troops to the right and left would flee in all directions, and that our troops, if they moved promptly, could get in and strengthen themselves before the enemy had come to a realization of the true situation. it was just as i expected it would be. we could see the men running without any apparent object except to get away. it was half an hour before musketry firing, to amount to anything, was opened upon our men in the crater. it was an hour before the enemy got artillery up to play upon them; and it was nine o'clock before lee got up reinforcements from his right to join in expelling our troops. the effort was a stupendous failure. it cost us about four thousand men, mostly, however, captured; and all due to inefficiency on the part of the corps commander and the incompetency of the division commander who was sent to lead the assault. after being fully assured of the failure of the mine, and finding that most of that part of lee's army which had been drawn north of the james river were still there, i gave meade directions to send a corps of infantry and the cavalry next morning, before lee could get his forces back, to destroy fifteen or twenty miles of the weldon railroad. but misfortunes never come singly. i learned during that same afternoon that wright's pursuit of early was feeble because of the constant and contrary orders he had been receiving from washington, while i was cut off from immediate communication by reason of our cable across chesapeake bay being broken. early, however, was not aware of the fact that wright was not pursuing until he had reached strasburg. finding that he was not pursued he turned back to winchester, where crook was stationed with a small force, and drove him out. he then pushed north until he had reached the potomac, then he sent mccausland across to chambersburg, pa., to destroy that town. chambersburg was a purely defenceless town with no garrison whatever, and no fortifications; yet mccausland, under early's orders, burned the place and left about three hundred families houseless. this occurred on the 30th of july. i rescinded my orders for the troops to go out to destroy the weldon railroad, and directed them to embark for washington city. after burning chambersburg mccausland retreated, pursued by our cavalry, towards cumberland. they were met and defeated by general kelley and driven into virginia. the shenandoah valley was very important to the confederates, because it was the principal storehouse they now had for feeding their armies about richmond. it was well known that they would make a desperate struggle to maintain it. it had been the source of a great deal of trouble to us heretofore to guard that outlet to the north, partly because of the incompetency of some of the commanders, but chiefly because of interference from washington. it seemed to be the policy of general halleck and secretary stanton to keep any force sent there, in pursuit of the invading army, moving right and left so as to keep between the enemy and our capital; and, generally speaking, they pursued this policy until all knowledge of the whereabouts of the enemy was lost. they were left, therefore, free to supply themselves with horses, beef cattle, and such provisions as they could carry away from western maryland and pennsylvania. i determined to put a stop to this. i started sheridan at once for that field of operation, and on the following day sent another division of his cavalry. i had previously asked to have sheridan assigned to that command, but mr. stanton objected, on the ground that he was too young for so important a command. on the 1st of august when i sent reinforcements for the protection of washington, i sent the following orders: city point, va., august 1, 1864, 11.30 a.m. major-general halleck, washington d. c. i am sending general sheridan for temporary duty whilst the enemy is being expelled from the border. unless general hunter is in the field in person, i want sheridan put in command of all the troops in the field, with instructions to put himself south of the enemy and follow him to the death. wherever the enemy goes let our troops go also. once started up the valley they ought to be followed until we get possession of the virginia central railroad. if general hunter is in the field, give sheridan direct command of the 6th corps and cavalry division. all the cavalry, i presume, will reach washington in the course of to-morrow. u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. the president in some way or other got to see this dispatch of mine directing certain instructions to be given to the commanders in the field, operating against early, and sent me the following very characteristic dispatch: office u. s. military telegraph, war department, washington, d. c., august 3, 1864. cypher. 6 p.m., lt. general grant, city point, va. i have seen your despatch in which you say, "i want sheridan put in command of all the troops in the field, with instructions to put himself south of the enemy, and follow him to the death. wherever the enemy goes, let our troops go also." this, i think, is exactly right, as to how our forces should move. but please look over the despatches you may have received from here, even since you made that order, and discover, if you can, that there is any idea in the head of any one here, of "putting our army south of the enemy," or of "following him to the death" in any direction. i repeat to you it will neither be done nor attempted unless you watch it every day, and hour, and force it. a. lincoln. i replied to this that "i would start in two hours for washington," and soon got off, going directly to the monocacy without stopping at washington on my way. i found general hunter's army encamped there, scattered over the fields along the banks of the monocacy, with many hundreds of cars and locomotives, belonging to the baltimore and ohio railroad, which he had taken the precaution to bring back and collect at that point. i asked the general where the enemy was. he replied that he did not know. he said the fact was, that he was so embarrassed with orders from washington moving him first to the right and then to the left that he had lost all trace of the enemy. i then told the general that i would find out where the enemy was, and at once ordered steam got up and trains made up, giving directions to push for halltown, some four miles above harper's ferry, in the shenandoah valley. the cavalry and the wagon trains were to march, but all the troops that could be transported by the cars were to go in that way. i knew that the valley was of such importance to the enemy that, no matter how much he was scattered at that time, he would in a very short time be found in front of our troops moving south. i then wrote out general hunter's instructions. (*39) i told him that sheridan was in washington, and still another division was on its way; and suggested that he establish the headquarters of the department at any point that would suit him best, cumberland, baltimore, or elsewhere, and give sheridan command of the troops in the field. the general replied to this, that he thought he had better be relieved entirely. he said that general halleck seemed so much to distrust his fitness for the position he was in that he thought somebody else ought to be there. he did not want, in any way, to embarrass the cause; thus showing a patriotism that was none too common in the army. there were not many major-generals who would voluntarily have asked to have the command of a department taken from them on the supposition that for some particular reason, or for any reason, the service would be better performed. i told him, "very well then," and telegraphed at once for sheridan to come to the monocacy, and suggested that i would wait and meet him there. sheridan came at once by special train, but reached there after the troops were all off. i went to the station and remained there until he arrived. myself and one or two of my staff were about all the union people, except general hunter and his staff, who were left at the monocacy when sheridan arrived. i hastily told sheridan what had been done and what i wanted him to do, giving him, at the same time, the written instructions which had been prepared for general hunter and directed to that officer. sheridan now had about 30,000 men to move with, 8,000 of them being cavalry. early had about the same number, but the superior ability of the national commander over the confederate commander was so great that all the latter's advantage of being on the defensive was more than counterbalanced by this circumstance. as i had predicted, early was soon found in front of sheridan in the valley, and pennsylvania and maryland were speedily freed from the invaders. the importance of the valley was so great to the confederates that lee reinforced early, but not to the extent that we thought and feared he would. to prevent as much as possible these reinforcements from being sent out from richmond, i had to do something to compel lee to retain his forces about his capital. i therefore gave orders for another move to the north side of the james river, to threaten richmond. hancock's corps, part of the 10th corps under birney, and gregg's division of cavalry were crossed to the north side of the james during the night of the 13th-14th of august. a threatening position was maintained for a number of days, with more or less skirmishing, and some tolerably hard fighting; although it was my object and my instructions that anything like a battle should be avoided, unless opportunities should present themselves which would insure great success. general meade was left in command of the few troops around petersburg, strongly intrenched; and was instructed to keep a close watch upon the enemy in that quarter, and himself to take advantage of any weakening that might occur through an effort on the part of the enemy to reinforce the north side. there was no particular victory gained on either side; but during that time no more reinforcements were sent to the valley. i informed sheridan of what had been done to prevent reinforcements being sent from richmond against him, and also that the efforts we had made had proven that one of the divisions which we supposed had gone to the valley was still at richmond, because we had captured six or seven hundred prisoners from that division, each of its four brigades having contributed to our list of captures. i also informed him that but one division had gone, and it was possible that i should be able to prevent the going of any more. to add to my embarrassment at this time sherman, who was now near atlanta, wanted reinforcements. he was perfectly willing to take the raw troops then being raised in the north-west, saying that he could teach them more soldiering in one day among his troops than they would learn in a week in a camp of instruction. i therefore asked that all troops in camps of instruction in the north-west be sent to him. sherman also wanted to be assured that no eastern troops were moving out against him. i informed him of what i had done and assured him that i would hold all the troops there that it was possible for me to hold, and that up to that time none had gone. i also informed him that his real danger was from kirby smith, who commanded the trans-mississippi department. if smith should escape steele, and get across the mississippi river, he might move against him. i had, therefore, asked to have an expedition ready to move from new orleans against mobile in case kirby smith should get across. this would have a tendency to draw him to the defence of that place, instead of going against sherman. right in the midst of all these embarrassments halleck informed me that there was an organized scheme on foot in the north to resist the draft, and suggested that it might become necessary to draw troops from the field to put it down. he also advised taking in sail, and not going too fast. the troops were withdrawn from the north side of the james river on the night of the 20th. before they were withdrawn, however, and while most of lee's force was on that side of the river, warren had been sent with most of the 5th corps to capture the weldon railroad. he took up his line of march well back to the rear, south of the enemy, while the troops remaining in the trenches extended so as to cover that part of the line which he had vacated by moving out. from our left, near the old line, it was about three miles to the weldon railroad. a division was ordered from the right of the petersburg line to reinforce warren, while a division was brought back from the north side of the james river to take its place. this road was very important to the enemy. the limits from which his supplies had been drawn were already very much contracted, and i knew that he must fight desperately to protect it. warren carried the road, though with heavy loss on both sides. he fortified his new position, and our trenches were then extended from the left of our main line to connect with his new one. lee made repeated attempts to dislodge warren's corps, but without success, and with heavy loss. as soon as warren was fortified and reinforcements reached him, troops were sent south to destroy the bridges on the weldon railroad; and with such success that the enemy had to draw in wagons, for a distance of about thirty miles, all the supplies they got thereafter from that source. it was on the 21st that lee seemed to have given up the weldon railroad as having been lost to him; but along about the 24th or 25th he made renewed attempts to recapture it; again he failed and with very heavy losses to him as compared with ours. on the night of the 20th our troops on the north side of the james were withdrawn, and hancock and gregg were sent south to destroy the weldon railroad. they were attacked on the 25th at reams's station, and after desperate fighting a part of our line gave way, losing five pieces of artillery. but the weldon railroad never went out of our possession from the 18th of august to the close of the war. chapter lviii. sheridan's advance--visit to sheridan--sheridan's victory in the shenandoah--sheridan's ride to winchester--close of the campaign for the winter. we had our troops on the weldon railroad contending against a large force that regarded this road of so much importance that they could afford to expend many lives in retaking it; sherman just getting through to atlanta with great losses of men from casualties, discharges and detachments left along as guards to occupy and hold the road in rear of him; washington threatened but a short time before, and now early being strengthened in the valley so as, probably, to renew that attempt. it kept me pretty active in looking after all these points. on the 10th of august sheridan had advanced on early up the shenandoah valley, early falling back to strasburg. on the 12th i learned that lee had sent twenty pieces of artillery, two divisions of infantry and a considerable cavalry force to strengthen early. it was important that sheridan should be informed of this, so i sent the information to washington by telegraph, and directed a courier to be sent from there to get the message to sheridan at all hazards, giving him the information. the messenger, an officer of the army, pushed through with great energy and reached sheridan just in time. the officer went through by way of snicker's gap, escorted by some cavalry. he found sheridan just making his preparations to attack early in his chosen position. now, however, he was thrown back on the defensive. on the 15th of september i started to visit general sheridan in the shenandoah valley. my purpose was to have him attack early, or drive him out of the valley and destroy that source of supplies for lee's army. i knew it was impossible for me to get orders through washington to sheridan to make a move, because they would be stopped there and such orders as halleck's caution (and that of the secretary of war) would suggest would be given instead, and would, no doubt, be contradictory to mine. i therefore, without stopping at washington, went directly through to charlestown, some ten miles above harper's ferry, and waited there to see general sheridan, having sent a courier in advance to inform him where to meet me. when sheridan arrived i asked him if he had a map showing the positions of his army and that of the enemy. he at once drew one out of his side pocket, showing all roads and streams, and the camps of the two armies. he said that if he had permission he would move so and so (pointing out how) against the confederates, and that he could "whip them." before starting i had drawn up a plan of campaign for sheridan, which i had brought with me; but, seeing that he was so clear and so positive in his views and so confident of success, i said nothing about this and did not take it out of my pocket. sheridan's wagon trains were kept at harper's ferry, where all of his stores were. by keeping the teams at that place, their forage did not have to be hauled to them. as supplies of ammunition, provisions and rations for the men were wanted, trains would be made up to deliver the stores to the commissaries and quartermasters encamped at winchester. knowing that he, in making preparations to move at a given day, would have to bring up wagons trains from harper's ferry, i asked him if he could be ready to get off by the following tuesday. this was on friday. "o yes," he said, he "could be off before daylight on monday." i told him then to make the attack at that time and according to his own plan; and i immediately started to return to the army about richmond. after visiting baltimore and burlington, new jersey, i arrived at city point on the 19th. on the way out to harper's ferry i had met mr. robert garrett, president of the baltimore and ohio railroad. he seemed very anxious to know when workmen might be put upon the road again so as to make repairs and put it in shape for running. it was a large piece of property to have standing idle. i told him i could not answer then positively but would try and inform him before a great while. on my return mr. garrett met me again with the same and i told him i thought that by the wednesday he might send his workmen out on his road. i gave him no further information however, and he had no suspicion of how i expected to have the road cleared for his workmen. sheridan moved at the time he had fixed upon. he met early at the crossing of opequon creek, and won a most decisive victory--one which electrified the country. early had invited this attack himself by his bad generalship and made the victory easy. he had sent g. t. anderson's division east of the blue ridge before i went to harper's ferry; and about the time i arrived there he started other divisions (leaving but two in their camps) to march to martinsburg for the purpose destroying the baltimore and ohio railroad at that point. early here learned that i had been with sheridan and, supposing there was some movement on foot, started back as soon as he got the information. but his forces were separated and, as i have said, he was very badly defeated. he fell back to fisher's hill, sheridan following. the valley is narrow at that point, and early made another stand there, behind works which extended across. but sheridan turned both his flanks and again sent him speeding up the valley, following in hot pursuit. the pursuit was continued up the valley to mount jackson and new market. sheridan captured about eleven hundred prisoners and sixteen guns. the houses which he passed all along the route were found to be filled with early's wounded, and the country swarmed with his deserters. finally, on the 25th, early turned from the valley eastward, leaving sheridan at harrisonburg in undisputed possession. now one of the main objects of the expedition began to be accomplished. sheridan went to work with his command, gathering in the crops, cattle, and everything in the upper part of the valley required by our troops; and especially taking what might be of use to the enemy. what he could not take away he destroyed, so that the enemy would not be invited to come back there. i congratulated sheridan upon his recent great victory and had a salute of a hundred guns fired in honor of it, the guns being aimed at the enemy around petersburg. i also notified the other commanders throughout the country, who also fired salutes in honor of his victory. i had reason to believe that the administration was a little afraid to have a decisive battle at that time, for fear it might go against us and have a bad effect on the november elections. the convention which had met and made its nomination of the democratic candidate for the presidency had declared the war a failure. treason was talked as boldly in chicago at that convention as ever been in charleston. it was a question whether the government would then have had the power to make arrests and punish those who talked treason. but this decisive victory was the most effective campaign argument made in the canvass. sheridan, in his pursuit, got beyond where they could hear from him in washington, and the president became very much frightened about him. he was afraid that the hot pursuit had been a little like that of general cass was said to have been, in one of our indian wars, when he was an officer of army. cass was pursuing the indians so closely that the first thing he knew he found himself in front, and the indians pursuing him. the president was afraid that sheridan had got on the other side of early and that early was in behind him. he was afraid that sheridan was getting so far away that reinforcements would be sent out from richmond to enable early to beat him. i replied to the president that i had taken steps to prevent lee from sending reinforcements to early, by attacking the former where he was. on the 28th of september, to retain lee in his position, i sent ord with the 18th corps and birney with the 10th corps to make an advance on richmond, to threaten it. ord moved with the left wing up to chaffin's bluff; birney with the 10th corps took a road farther north; while kautz with the cavalry took the darby road, still farther to the north. they got across the river by the next morning, and made an effort to surprise the enemy. in that, however, they were unsuccessful. the enemy's lines were very strong and very intricate. stannard's division of the 18th corps with general burnham's brigade leading, tried an assault against fort harrison and captured it with sixteen guns and a good many prisoners. burnham was killed in the assault. colonel stevens who succeeded him was badly wounded; and his successor also fell in the same way. some works to the right and left were also carried with the guns in them--six in number--and a few more prisoners. birney's troops to the right captured the enemy's intrenched picket-lines, but were unsuccessful in their efforts upon the main line. our troops fortified their new position, bringing fort harrison into the new line and extending it to the river. this brought us pretty close to the enemy on the north side of the james, and the two opposing lines maintained their relative positions to the close of the siege. in the afternoon a further attempt was made to advance, but it failed. ord fell badly wounded, and had to be relieved; the command devolved upon general heckman, and later general weitzel was assigned to the command of the 18th corps. during the night lee reinforced his troops about fort gilmer, which was at the right of fort harrison, by eight additional brigades from petersburg, and attempted to retake the works which we had captured by concentrating ten brigades against them. all their efforts failed, their attacks being all repulsed with very heavy loss. in one of these assaults upon us general stannard, a gallant officer who was defending fort harrison, lost an arm. our casualties during these operations amounted to 394 killed, i,554 wounded and 324 missing. whilst this was going on general meade was instructed to keep up an appearance of moving troops to our extreme left. parke and warren were kept with two divisions, each under arms, ready to move leaving their enclosed batteries manned, with a scattering line on the other intrenchments. the object of this was to prevent reinforcements from going to the north side of the river. meade was instructed to watch the enemy closely and, if lee weakened his lines, to make an attack. on the 30th these troops moved out, under warren, and captured an advanced intrenched camp at peeble's farm, driving the enemy back to the main line. our troops followed and made an attack in the hope of carrying the enemy's main line; but in this they were unsuccessful and lost a large number of men, mostly captured. the number of killed and wounded was not large. the next day our troops advanced again and established themselves, intrenching a new line about a mile in front of the enemy. this advanced warren's position on the weldon railroad very considerably. sheridan having driven the enemy out of the valley, and taken the productions of the valley so that instead of going there for supplies the enemy would have to bring his provisions with him if he again entered it, recommended a reduction of his own force, the surplus to be sent where it could be of more use. i approved of his suggestion, and ordered him to send wright's corps back to the james river. i further directed him to repair the railroad up the shenandoah valley towards the advanced position which we would hold with a small force. the troops were to be sent to washington by the way of culpeper, in order to watch the east side of the blue ridge, and prevent the enemy from getting into the rear of sheridan while he was still doing his work of destruction. the valley was so very important, however, to the confederate army that, contrary to our expectations, they determined to make one more strike, and save it if possible before the supplies should be all destroyed. reinforcements were sent therefore to early, and this before any of our troops had been withdrawn. early prepared to strike sheridan at harrisonburg; but the latter had not remained there. on the 6th of october sheridan commenced retiring down the valley, taking or destroying all the food and forage and driving the cattle before him, early following. at fisher's hill sheridan turned his cavalry back on that of early, which, under the lead of rosser, was pursuing closely, and routed it most completely, capturing eleven guns and a large number of prisoners. sheridan lost only about sixty men. his cavalry pursued the enemy back some twenty-five miles. on the 10th of october the march down the valley was again resumed, early again following. i now ordered sheridan to halt, and to improve the opportunity if afforded by the enemy's having been sufficiently weakened, to move back again and cut the james river canal and virginia central railroad. but this order had to go through washington where it was intercepted; and when sheridan received what purported to be a statement of what i wanted him to do it was something entirely different. halleck informed sheridan that it was my wish for him to hold a forward position as a base from which to act against charlottesville and gordonsville; that he should fortify this position and provision it. sheridan objected to this most decidedly; and i was impelled to telegraph him, on the 14th, as follows: city point, va., october 14, 1864.--12.30 p.m. major-general sheridan, cedar creek, va. what i want is for you to threaten the virginia central railroad and canal in the manner your judgment tells you is best, holding yourself ready to advance, if the enemy draw off their forces. if you make the enemy hold a force equal to your own for the protection of those thoroughfares, it will accomplish nearly as much as their destruction. if you cannot do this, then the next best thing to do is to send here all the force you can. i deem a good cavalry force necessary for your offensive, as well as defensive operations. you need not therefore send here more than one division of cavalry. u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. sheridan having been summoned to washington city, started on the 15th leaving wright in command. his army was then at cedar creek, some twenty miles south of winchester. the next morning while at front royal, sheridan received a dispatch from wright, saying that a dispatch from longstreet to early had been intercepted. it directed the latter to be ready to move and to crush sheridan as soon as he, longstreet, arrived. on the receipt of this news sheridan ordered the cavalry up the valley to join wright. on the 18th of october early was ready to move, and during the night succeeded in getting his troops in the rear of our left flank, which fled precipitately and in great confusion down the valley, losing eighteen pieces of artillery and a thousand or more prisoners. the right under general getty maintained a firm and steady front, falling back to middletown where it took a position and made a stand. the cavalry went to the rear, seized the roads leading to winchester and held them for the use of our troops in falling back, general wright having ordered a retreat back to that place. sheridan having left washington on the 18th, reached winchester that night. the following morning he started to join his command. he had scarcely got out of town, when he met his men returning in panic from the front and also heard heavy firing to the south. he immediately ordered the cavalry at winchester to be deployed across the valley to stop the stragglers. leaving members of his staff to take care of winchester and the public property there, he set out with a small escort directly for the scene of battle. as he met the fugitives he ordered them to turn back, reminding them that they were going the wrong way. his presence soon restored confidence. finding themselves worse frightened than hurt the men did halt and turn back. many of those who had run ten miles got back in time to redeem their reputation as gallant soldiers before night. when sheridan got to the front he found getty and custer still holding their ground firmly between the confederates and our retreating troops. everything in the rear was now ordered up. sheridan at once proceeded to intrench his position; and he awaited an assault from the enemy. this was made with vigor, and was directed principally against emory's corps, which had sustained the principal loss in the first attack. by one o'clock the attack was repulsed. early was so badly damaged that he seemed disinclined to make another attack, but went to work to intrench himself with a view to holding the position he had already gained. he thought, no doubt, that sheridan would be glad enough to leave him unmolested; but in this he was mistaken. about the middle of the afternoon sheridan advanced. he sent his cavalry by both flanks, and they penetrated to the enemy's rear. the contest was close for a time, but at length the left of the enemy broke, and disintegration along the whole line soon followed. early tried to rally his men, but they were followed so closely that they had to give way very quickly every time they attempted to make a stand. our cavalry, having pushed on and got in the rear of the confederates, captured twenty-four pieces of artillery, besides retaking what had been lost in the morning. this victory pretty much closed the campaigning in the valley of virginia. all the confederate troops were sent back to richmond with the exception of one division of infantry and a little cavalry. wright's corps was ordered back to the army of the potomac, and two other divisions were withdrawn from the valley. early had lost more men in killed, wounded and captured in the valley than sheridan had commanded from first to last. on more than one occasion in these engagements general r. b. hayes, who succeeded me as president of the united states, bore a very honorable part. his conduct on the field was marked by conspicuous gallantry as well as the display of qualities of a higher order than that of mere personal daring. this might well have been expected of one who could write at the time he is said to have done so: "any officer fit for duty who at this crisis would abandon his post to electioneer for a seat in congress, ought to be scalped." having entered the army as a major of volunteers at the beginning of the war, general hayes attained by meritorious service the rank of brevet major-general before its close. on the north side of the james river the enemy attacked kautz's cavalry on the 7th of october, and drove it back with heavy loss in killed, wounded and prisoners, and the loss of all the artillery. this was followed up by an attack on our intrenched infantry line, but was repulsed with severe slaughter. on the 13th a reconnoissance was sent out by general butler, with a view to drive the enemy from some new works he was constructing, which resulted in heavy loss to us. on the 24th i ordered general meade to attempt to get possession of the south side railroad, and for that purpose to advance on the 27th. the attempt proved a failure, however, the most advanced of our troops not getting nearer than within six miles of the point aimed for. seeing the impossibility of its accomplishment i ordered the troops to withdraw, and they were all back in their former positions the next day. butler, by my directions, also made a demonstration on the north side of the james river in order to support this move, by detaining there the confederate troops who were on that side. he succeeded in this, but failed of further results by not marching past the enemy's left before turning in on the darby road and by reason of simply coming up against their lines in place. this closed active operations around richmond for the winter. of course there was frequent skirmishing between pickets, but no serious battle was fought near either petersburg or richmond. it would prolong this work to give a detailed account of all that took place from day to day around petersburg and at other parts of my command, and it would not interest the general reader if given. all these details can be found by the military student in a series of books published by the scribners, badeau's history of my campaigns, and also in the publications of the war department, including both the national and confederate reports. in the latter part of november general hancock was relieved from the command of the 2d corps by the secretary of war and ordered to washington, to organize and command a corps of veteran troops to be designated the 1st corps. it was expected that this would give him a large command to co-operate with in the spring. it was my expectation, at the time, that in the final operations hancock should move either up the valley, or else east of the blue ridge to lynchburg; the idea being to make the spring campaign the close of the war. i expected, with sherman coming up from the south, meade south of petersburg and around richmond, and thomas's command in tennessee with depots of supplies established in the eastern part of that state, to move from the direction of washington or the valley towards lynchburg. we would then have lee so surrounded that his supplies would be cut off entirely, making it impossible for him to support his army. general humphreys, chief-of-staff of the army of the potomac, was assigned to the command of the 2d corps, to succeed hancock. chapter lix. the campaign in georgia--sherman's march to the sea--war anecdotes--the march on savannah--investment of savannah--capture of savannah. let us now return to the operations in the military division of the mississippi, and accompany sherman in his march to the sea. the possession of atlanta by us narrowed the territory of the enemy very materially and cut off one of his two remaining lines of roads from east to west. a short time after the fall of atlanta mr. davis visited palmetto and macon and made speeches at each place. he spoke at palmetto on the 20th of september, and at macon on the 22d. inasmuch as he had relieved johnston and appointed hood, and hood had immediately taken the initiative, it is natural to suppose that mr. davis was disappointed with general johnston's policy. my own judgment is that johnston acted very wisely: he husbanded his men and saved as much of his territory as he could, without fighting decisive battles in which all might be lost. as sherman advanced, as i have show, his army became spread out, until, if this had been continued, it would have been easy to destroy it in detail. i know that both sherman and i were rejoiced when we heard of the change. hood was unquestionably a brave, gallant soldier and not destitute of ability; but unfortunately his policy was to fight the enemy wherever he saw him, without thinking much of the consequences of defeat. in his speeches mr. davis denounced governor brown, of georgia, and general johnston in unmeasured terms, even insinuating that their loyalty to the southern cause was doubtful. so far as general johnston is concerned, i think davis did him a great injustice in this particular. i had know the general before the war and strongly believed it would be impossible for him to accept a high commission for the purpose of betraying the cause he had espoused. there, as i have said, i think that his policy was the best one that could have been pursued by the whole south--protract the war, which was all that was necessary to enable them to gain recognition in the end. the north was already growing weary, as the south evidently was also, but with this difference. in the north the people governed, and could stop hostilities whenever they chose to stop supplies. the south was a military camp, controlled absolutely by the government with soldiers to back it, and the war could have been protracted, no matter to what extent the discontent reached, up to the point of open mutiny of the soldiers themselves. mr. davis's speeches were frank appeals to the people of georgia and that portion of the south to come to their relief. he tried to assure his frightened hearers that the yankees were rapidly digging their own graves; that measures were already being taken to cut them off from supplies from the north; and that with a force in front, and cut off from the rear, they must soon starve in the midst of a hostile people. papers containing reports of these speeches immediately reached the northern states, and they were republished. of course, that caused no alarm so long as telegraphic communication was kept up with sherman. when hood was forced to retreat from atlanta he moved to the south-west and was followed by a portion of sherman's army. he soon appeared upon the railroad in sherman's rear, and with his whole army began destroying the road. at the same time also the work was begun in tennessee and kentucky which mr. davis had assured his hearers at palmetto and macon would take place. he ordered forrest (about the ablest cavalry general in the south) north for this purpose; and forrest and wheeler carried out their orders with more or less destruction, occasionally picking up a garrison. forrest indeed performed the very remarkable feat of capturing, with cavalry, two gunboats and a number of transports, something the accomplishment of which is very hard to account for. hood's army had been weakened by governor brown's withdrawing the georgia state troops for the purpose of gathering in the season's crops for the use of the people and for the use of the army. this not only depleted hood's forces but it served a most excellent purpose in gathering in supplies of food and forage for the use of our army in its subsequent march. sherman was obliged to push on with his force and go himself with portions of it hither and thither, until it was clearly demonstrated to him that with the army he then had it would be impossible to hold the line from atlanta back and leave him any force whatever with which to take the offensive. had that plan been adhered to, very large reinforcements would have been necessary; and mr. davis's prediction of the destruction of the army would have been realized, or else sherman would have been obliged to make a successful retreat, which mr. davis said in his speeches would prove more disastrous than napoleon's retreat from moscow. these speeches of mr. davis were not long in reaching sherman. he took advantage of the information they gave, and made all the preparation possible for him to make to meet what now became expected, attempts to break his communications. something else had to be done: and to sherman's sensible and soldierly mind the idea was not long in dawning upon him, not only that something else had to be done, but what that something else should be. on september 10th i telegraphed sherman as follows: city point, va., sept. 10, 1864. major-general sherman, atlanta, georgia. so soon as your men are sufficiently rested, and preparations can be made, it is desirable that another campaign should be commenced. we want to keep the enemy constantly pressed to the end of the war. if we give him no peace whilst the war lasts, the end cannot be distant. now that we have all of mobile bay that is valuable, i do not know but it will be the best move to transfer canby's troops to act upon savannah, whilst you move on augusta. i should like to hear from you, however, in this matter. u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. sherman replied promptly: "if i could be sure of finding provisions and ammunition at augusta, or columbus, georgia, i can march to milledgeville, and compel hood to give up augusta or macon, and then turn on the other. * * * if you can manage to take the savannah river as high up as augusta, or the chattahoochee as far up as columbus, i can sweep the whole state of georgia." on the 12th i sent a special messenger, one of my own staff, with a letter inviting sherman's views about the next campaign. city point, va., sept. 12, 1864. major-general w. t. sherman, commanding mill division of the mississippi. i send lieutenant-colonel porter, of my staff, with this. colonel porter will explain to you the exact condition of affairs here better than i can do in the limits of a letter. although i feel myself strong enough for offensive operations, i am holding on quietly to get advantage of recruits and convalescents, who are coming forward very rapidly. my lines are necessarily very long, extending from deep bottom north of the james across the peninsula formed by the appomattox and the james, and south of the appomattox to the weldon road. this line is very strongly fortified, and can be held with comparatively few men, but from its great length takes many in the aggregate. i propose, when i do move, to extend my left so as to control what is known as the south side, or lynchburg and petersburg road, then if possible to keep the danville road cut. at the same time this move is made, i want to send a force of from six to ten thousand men against wilmington. the way i propose to do this is to land the men north of fort fisher, and hold that point. at the same time a large naval fleet will be assembled there, and the iron-clads will run the batteries as they did at mobile. this will give us the same control of the harbor of wilmington that we now have of the harbor of mobile. what you are to do with the forces at your command, i do not see. the difficulties of supplying your army, except when you are constantly moving, beyond where you are, i plainly see. if it had not been for price's movements canby would have sent twelve thousand more men to mobile. from your command on the mississippi an equal number could have been taken. with these forces my idea would have been to divide them, sending one half to mobile and the other half to savannah. you could then move as proposed in your telegram, so as to threaten macon and augusta equally. whichever was abandoned by the enemy you could take and open up a new base of supplies. my object now in sending a staff officer is not so much to suggest operations for you, as to get your views and have plans matured by the time everything can be got ready. it will probably be the 5th of october before any of the plans herein indicated will be executed. if you have any promotions to recommend, send the names forward and i will approve them. * * * u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. this reached sherman on september 20th. on the 25th of september sherman reported to washington that hood's troops were in his rear. he had provided against this by sending a division to chattanooga and a division to rome, georgia, which was in the rear of hood, supposing that hood would fall back in the direction from which he had come to reach the railroad. at the same time sherman and hood kept up a correspondence relative to the exchange of prisoners, the treatment of citizens, and other matters suitable to be arranged between hostile commanders in the field. on the 27th of september i telegraphed sherman as follows: city point, va., september 27, 1864--10.30 a.m. major-general sherman: i have directed all recruits and new troops from the western states to be sent to nashville, to receive their further orders from you. * * * u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. on the 29th sherman sent thomas back to chattanooga, and afterwards to nashville, with another division (morgan's) of the advanced army. sherman then suggested that, when he was prepared, his movements should take place against milledgeville and then to savannah. his expectation at that time was, to make this movement as soon as he could get up his supplies. hood was moving in his own country, and was moving light so that he could make two miles to sherman's one. he depended upon the country to gather his supplies, and so was not affected by delays. as i have said, until this unexpected state of affairs happened, mobile had been looked upon as the objective point of sherman's army. it had been a favorite move of mine from 1862, when i first suggested to the then commander-in-chief that the troops in louisiana, instead of frittering away their time in the trans-mississippi, should move against mobile. i recommended this from time to time until i came into command of the army, the last of march 1864. having the power in my own hands, i now ordered the concentration of supplies, stores and troops, in the department of the gulf about new orleans, with a view to a move against mobile, in support of, and in conjunction with, the other armies operating in the field. before i came into command, these troops had been scattered over the trans-mississippi department in such a way that they could not be, or were not, gotten back in time to take any part in the original movement; hence the consideration, which had caused mobile to be selected as the objective point for sherman's army to find his next base of supplies after having cut loose from atlanta, no longer existed. general g. m. dodge, an exceedingly efficient officer, having been badly wounded, had to leave the army about the first of october. he was in command of two divisions of the 16th corps, consolidated into one. sherman then divided his army into the right and left wings the right commanded by general o. o. howard and the left by general slocum. general dodge's two divisions were assigned, one to each of these wings. howard's command embraced the 15th and 17th corps, and slocum's the 14th and 20th corps, commanded by generals jeff. c. davis and a. s. williams. generals logan and blair commanded the two corps composing the right wing. about this time they left to take part in the presidential election, which took place that year, leaving their corps to osterhaus and ransom. i have no doubt that their leaving was at the earnest solicitation of the war department. general blair got back in time to resume his command and to proceed with it throughout the march to the sea and back to the grand review at washington. general logan did not return to his command until after it reached savannah. logan felt very much aggrieved at the transfer of general howard from that portion of the army of the potomac which was then with the western army, to the command of the army of the tennessee, with which army general logan had served from the battle of belmont to the fall of atlanta--having passed successively through all grades from colonel commanding a regiment to general commanding a brigade, division and army corps, until upon the death of mcpherson the command of the entire army of the tennessee devolved upon him in the midst of a hotly contested battle. he conceived that he had done his full duty as commander in that engagement; and i can bear testimony, from personal observation, that he had proved himself fully equal to all the lower positions which he had occupied as a soldier. i will not pretend to question the motive which actuated sherman in taking an officer from another army to supersede general logan. i have no doubt, whatever, that he did this for what he considered would be to the good of the service, which was more important than that the personal feelings of any individual should not be aggrieved; though i doubt whether he had an officer with him who could have filled the place as logan would have done. differences of opinion must exist between the best of friends as to policies in war, and of judgment as to men's fitness. the officer who has the command, however, should be allowed to judge of the fitness of the officers under him, unless he is very manifestly wrong. sherman's army, after all the depletions, numbered about sixty thousand effective men. all weak men had been left to hold the rear, and those remaining were not only well men, but strong and hardy, so that he had sixty thousand as good soldiers as ever trod the earth; better than any european soldiers, because they not only worked like a machine but the machine thought. european armies know very little what they are fighting for, and care less. included in these sixty thousand troops, there were two small divisions of cavalry, numbering altogether about four thousand men. hood had about thirty-five to forty thousand men, independent of forrest, whose forces were operating in tennessee and kentucky, as mr. davis had promised they should. this part of mr. davis's military plan was admirable, and promised the best results of anything he could have done, according to my judgment. i say this because i have criticised his military judgment in the removal of johnston, and also in the appointment of hood. i am aware, however, that there was high feeling existing at that time between davis and his subordinate, whom i regarded as one of his ablest lieutenants. on the 5th of october the railroad back from atlanta was again very badly broken, hood having got on the track with his army. sherman saw after night, from a high point, the road burning for miles. the defence of the railroad by our troops was very gallant, but they could not hold points between their intrenched positions against hood's whole army; in fact they made no attempt to do so; but generally the intrenched positions were held, as well as important bridges, and store located at them. allatoona, for instance, was defended by a small force of men under the command of general corse, one of the very able and efficient volunteer officers produced by the war. he, with a small force, was cut off from the remainder of the national army and was attacked with great vigor by many times his own number. sherman from his high position could see the battle raging, with the confederate troops between him and his subordinate. he sent men, of course, to raise the temporary siege, but the time that would be necessarily consumed in reaching corse, would be so great that all occupying the intrenchments might be dead. corse was a man who would never surrender. from a high position some of sherman's signal corps discovered a signal flag waving from a hole in the block house at allatoona. it was from corse. he had been shot through the face, but he signalled to his chief a message which left no doubt of his determination to hold his post at all hazards. it was at this point probably, that sherman first realized that with the forces at his disposal, the keeping open of his line of communication with the north would be impossible if he expected to retain any force with which to operate offensively beyond atlanta. he proposed, therefore, to destroy the roads back to chattanooga, when all ready to move, and leave the latter place garrisoned. yet, before abandoning the railroad, it was necessary that he should repair damages already done, and hold the road until he could get forward such supplies, ordnance stores and small rations, as he wanted to carry with him on his proposed march, and to return to the north his surplus artillery; his object being to move light and to have no more artillery than could be used to advantage on the field. sherman thought hood would follow him, though he proposed to prepare for the contingency of the latter moving the other way while he was moving south, by making thomas strong enough to hold tennessee and kentucky. i, myself, was thoroughly satisfied that hood would go north, as he did. on the 2d of november i telegraphed sherman authorizing him definitely to move according to the plan he had proposed: that is, cutting loose from his base, giving up atlanta and the railroad back to chattanooga. to strengthen thomas he sent stanley (4th corps) back, and also ordered schofield, commanding the army of the ohio, twelve thousand strong, to report to him. in addition to this, a. j. smith, who, with two divisions of sherman's army, was in missouri aiding rosecrans in driving the enemy from that state, was under orders to return to thomas and, under the most unfavorable circumstances, might be expected to arrive there long before hood could reach nashville. in addition to this, the new levies of troops that were being raised in the north-west went to thomas as rapidly as enrolled and equipped. thomas, without any of these additions spoken of, had a garrison at chattanooga which had been strengthened by one division and garrisons at bridgeport, stevenson, decatur, murfreesboro, and florence. there were already with him in nashville ten thousand soldiers in round numbers, and many thousands of employees in the quartermaster's and other departments who could be put in the intrenchments in front of nashville, for its defence. also, wilson was there with ten thousand dismounted cavalrymen, who were being equipped for the field. thomas had at this time about forty-five thousand men without any of the reinforcements here above enumerated. these reinforcements gave him altogether about seventy thousand men, without counting what might be added by the new levies already spoken of. about this time beauregard arrived upon the field, not to supersede hood in command, but to take general charge over the entire district in which hood and sherman were, or might be, operating. he made the most frantic appeals to the citizens for assistance to be rendered in every way: by sending reinforcements, by destroying supplies on the line of march of the invaders, by destroying the bridges over which they would have to cross, and by, in every way, obstructing the roads to their front. but it was hard to convince the people of the propriety of destroying supplies which were so much needed by themselves, and each one hoped that his own possessions might escape. hood soon started north, and went into camp near decatur, alabama, where he remained until the 29th of october, but without making an attack on the garrison of that place. the tennessee river was patrolled by gunboats, from muscle shoals east; and, also, below the second shoals out to the ohio river. these, with the troops that might be concentrated from the garrisons along the river at any point where hood might choose to attempt to cross, made it impossible for him to cross the tennessee at any place where it was navigable. but muscle shoals is not navigable, and below them again is another shoal which also obstructs navigation. hood therefore moved down to a point nearly opposite florence, alabama, crossed over and remained there for some time, collecting supplies of food, forage and ammunition. all of these had to come from a considerable distance south, because the region in which he was then situated was mountainous, with small valleys which produced but little, and what they had produced had long since been exhausted. on the 1st of november i suggested to sherman, and also asked his views thereon, the propriety of destroying hood before he started on his campaign. on the 2d of november, as stated, i approved definitely his making his proposed campaign through georgia, leaving hood behind to the tender mercy of thomas and the troops in his command. sherman fixed the 10th of november as the day of starting. sherman started on that day to get back to atlanta, and on the 15th the real march to the sea commenced. the right wing, under howard, and the cavalry went to jonesboro, milledgeville, then the capital of georgia, being sherman's objective or stopping place on the way to savannah. the left wing moved to stone mountain, along roads much farther east than those taken by the right wing. slocum was in command, and threatened augusta as the point to which he was moving, but he was to turn off and meet the right wing at milledgeville. atlanta was destroyed so far as to render it worthless for military purposes before starting, sherman himself remaining over a day to superintend the work, and see that it was well done. sherman's orders for this campaign were perfect. before starting, he had sent back all sick, disabled and weak men, retaining nothing but the hardy, well-inured soldiers to accompany him on his long march in prospect. his artillery was reduced to sixty-five guns. the ammunition carried with them was two hundred rounds for musket and gun. small rations were taken in a small wagon train, which was loaded to its capacity for rapid movement. the army was expected to live on the country, and to always keep the wagons full of forage and provisions against a possible delay of a few days. the troops, both of the right and left wings, made most of their advance along the line of railroads, which they destroyed. the method adopted to perform this work, was to burn and destroy all the bridges and culverts, and for a long distance, at places, to tear up the track and bend the rails. soldiers to do this rapidly would form a line along one side of the road with crowbars and poles, place these under the rails and, hoisting all at once, turn over many rods of road at one time. the ties would then be placed in piles, and the rails, as they were loosened, would be carried and put across these log heaps. when a sufficient number of rails were placed upon a pile of ties it would be set on fire. this would heat the rails very much more in the middle, that being over the main part of the fire, than at the ends, so that they would naturally bend of their own weight; but the soldiers, to increase the damage, would take tongs and, one or two men at each end of the rail, carry it with force against the nearest tree and twist it around, thus leaving rails forming bands to ornament the forest trees of georgia. all this work was going on at the same time, there being a sufficient number of men detailed for that purpose. some piled the logs and built the fire; some put the rails upon the fire; while others would bend those that were sufficiently heated: so that, by the time the last bit of road was torn up, that it was designed to destroy at a certain place, the rails previously taken up were already destroyed. the organization for supplying the army was very complete. each brigade furnished a company to gather supplies of forage and provisions for the command to which they belonged. strict injunctions were issued against pillaging, or otherwise unnecessarily annoying the people; but everything in shape of food for man and forage for beast was taken. the supplies were turned over to the brigade commissary and quartermaster, and were issued by them to their respective commands precisely the same as if they had been purchased. the captures consisted largely of cattle, sheep, poultry, some bacon, cornmeal, often molasses, and occasionally coffee or other small rations. the skill of these men, called by themselves and the army "bummers," in collecting their loads and getting back to their respective commands, was marvellous. when they started out in the morning, they were always on foot; but scarcely one of them returned in the evening without being mounted on a horse or mule. these would be turned in for the general use of the army, and the next day these men would start out afoot and return again in the evening mounted. many of the exploits of these men would fall under the head of romance; indeed, i am afraid that in telling some of their experiences, the romance got the better of the truth upon which the story was founded, and that, in the way many of these anecdotes are told, very little of the foundation is left. i suspect that most of them consist chiefly of the fiction added to make the stories better. in one instance it was reported that a few men of sherman's army passed a house where they discovered some chickens under the dwelling. they immediately proceeded to capture them, to add to the army's supplies. the lady of the house, who happened to be at home, made piteous appeals to have these spared, saying they were a few she had put away to save by permission of other parties who had preceded and who had taken all the others that she had. the soldiers seemed moved at her appeal; but looking at the chickens again they were tempted and one of them replied: "the rebellion must be suppressed if it takes the last chicken in the confederacy," and proceeded to appropriate the last one. another anecdote characteristic of these times has been told. the south, prior to the rebellion, kept bloodhounds to pursue runaway slaves who took refuge in the neighboring swamps, and also to hunt convicts. orders were issued to kill all these animals as they were met with. on one occasion a soldier picked up a poodle, the favorite pet of its mistress, and was carrying it off to execution when the lady made a strong appeal to him to spare it. the soldier replied, "madam, our orders are to kill every bloodhound." "but this is not a bloodhound," said the lady. "well, madam, we cannot tell what it will grow into if we leave it behind," said the soldier as he went off with it. notwithstanding these anecdotes, and the necessary hardship they would seem to imply, i do not believe there was much unwarrantable pillaging considering that we were in the enemy's territory and without any supplies except such as the country afforded. on the 23d sherman, with the left wing, reached milledgeville. the right wing was not far off: but proceeded on its way towards savannah destroying the road as it went. the troops at milledgeville remained over a day to destroy factories, buildings used for military purposes, etc., before resuming its march. the governor, who had been almost defying mr. davis before this, now fled precipitately, as did the legislature of the state and all the state officers. the governor, sherman says, was careful to carry away even his garden vegetables, while he left the archives of the state to fall into our hands. the only military force that was opposed to sherman's forward march was the georgia militia, a division under the command of general g. w. smith, and a battalion under harry wayne. neither the quality of the forces nor their numbers was sufficient to even retard the progress of sherman's army. the people at the south became so frantic at this time at the successful invasion of georgia that they took the cadets from the military college and added them to the ranks of the militia. they even liberated the state convicts under promise from them that they would serve in the army. i have but little doubt that the worst acts that were attributed to sherman's army were committed by these convicts, and by other southern people who ought to have been under sentence--such people as could be found in every community, north and south--who took advantage of their country being invaded to commit crime. they were in but little danger of detection, or of arrest even if detected. the southern papers in commenting upon sherman's movements pictured him as in the most deplorable condition: stating that his men were starving, that they were demoralized and wandering about almost without object, aiming only to reach the sea coast and get under the protection of our navy. these papers got to the north and had more or less effect upon the minds of the people, causing much distress to all loyal persons particularly to those who had husbands, sons or brothers with sherman. mr. lincoln seeing these accounts, had a letter written asking me if i could give him anything that he could say to the loyal people that would comfort them. i told him there was not the slightest occasion for alarm; that with 60,000 such men as sherman had with him, such a commanding officer as he was could not be cut off in the open country. he might possibly be prevented from reaching the point he had started out to reach, but he would get through somewhere and would finally get to his chosen destination: and even if worst came to worst he could return north. i heard afterwards of mr. lincoln's saying, to those who would inquire of him as to what he thought about the safety of sherman's army, that sherman was all right: "grant says they are safe with such a general, and that if they cannot get out where they want to, they can crawl back by the hole they went in at." while at milledgeville the soldiers met at the state house, organized a legislature, and proceeded to business precisely as if they were the legislative body belonging to the state of georgia. the debates were exciting, and were upon the subject of the situation the south was in at that time, particularly the state of georgia. they went so far as to repeal, after a spirited and acrimonious debate, the ordinance of secession. the next day (24th) sherman continued his march, going by the way of waynesboro and louisville, millen being the next objective and where the two columns (the right and left wings) were to meet. the left wing moved to the left of the direct road, and the cavalry still farther off so as to make it look as though augusta was the point they were aiming for. they moved on all the roads they could find leading in that direction. the cavalry was sent to make a rapid march in hope of surprising millen before the union prisoners could be carried away; but they failed in this. the distance from milledgeville to millen was about one hundred miles. at this point wheeler, who had been ordered from tennessee, arrived and swelled the numbers and efficiency of the troops confronting sherman. hardee, a native of georgia, also came, but brought no troops with him. it was intended that he should raise as large an army as possible with which to intercept sherman's march. he did succeed in raising some troops, and with these and those under the command of wheeler and wayne, had an army sufficient to cause some annoyance but no great detention. our cavalry and wheeler's had a pretty severe engagement, in which wheeler was driven towards augusta, thus giving the idea that sherman was probably making for that point. millen was reached on the 3d of december, and the march was resumed the following day for savannah, the final objective. bragg had now been sent to augusta with some troops. wade hampton was there also trying to raise cavalry sufficient to destroy sherman's army. if he ever raised a force it was too late to do the work expected of it. hardee's whole force probably numbered less than ten thousand men. from millen to savannah the country is sandy and poor, and affords but very little forage other than rice straw, which was then growing. this answered a very good purpose as forage, and the rice grain was an addition to the soldier's rations. no further resistance worthy of note was met with, until within a few miles of savannah. this place was found to be intrenched and garrisoned. sherman proceeded at once on his arrival to invest the place, and found that the enemy had placed torpedoes in the ground, which were to explode when stepped on by man or beast. one of these exploded under an officer's horse, blowing the animal to pieces and tearing one of the legs of the officer so badly that it had to be amputated. sherman at once ordered his prisoners to the front, moving them in a compact body in advance, to either explode the torpedoes or dig them up. no further explosion took place. on the 10th of december the siege of savannah commenced. sherman then, before proceeding any further with operations for the capture of the place, started with some troops to open communication with our fleet, which he expected to find in the lower harbor or as near by as the forts of the enemy would permit. in marching to the coast he encountered fort mcallister, which it was necessary to reduce before the supplies he might find on shipboard could be made available. fort mcallister was soon captured by an assault made by general hazen's division. communication was then established with the fleet. the capture of savannah then only occupied a few days, and involved no great loss of life. the garrison, however, as we shall see, was enabled to escape by crossing the river and moving eastward. when sherman had opened communication with the fleet he found there a steamer, which i had forwarded to him, carrying the accumulated mails for his army, also supplies which i supposed he would be in need of. general j. g. foster, who commanded all the troops south of north carolina on the atlantic sea-board, visited general sherman before he had opened communication with the fleet, with the view of ascertaining what assistance he could be to him. foster returned immediately to his own headquarters at hilton head, for the purpose of sending sherman siege guns, and also if he should find he had them to spare, supplies of clothing, hard bread, etc., thinking that these articles might not be found outside. the mail on the steamer which i sent down, had been collected by colonel a. h. markland of the post office department, who went in charge of it. on this same vessel i sent an officer of my staff (lieutenant dunn) with the following letter to general sherman: city point, va., dec. 3, 1864. major-general w. t. sherman, commanding armies near savannah, ga. the little information gleaned from the southern press, indicating no great obstacle to your progress, i have directed your mails (which had been previously collected at baltimore by colonel markland, special agent of the post office department) to be sent as far as the blockading squadron off savannah, to be forwarded to you as soon as heard from on the coast. not liking to rejoice before the victory is assured, i abstain from congratulating you and those under your command, until bottom has been struck. i have never had a fear, however, for the result. since you left atlanta, no very great progress has been made here. the enemy has been closely watched though, and prevented from detaching against you. i think not one man has gone from here, except some twelve or fifteen hundred dismounted cavalry. bragg has gone from wilmington. i am trying to take advantage of his absence to get possession of that place. owing to some preparations admiral porter and general butler are making to blow up fort fisher (which, while hoping for the best, i do not believe a particle in), there is a delay in getting this expedition off. i hope they will be ready to start by the 7th, and that bragg will not have started back by that time. in this letter i do not intend to give you anything like directions for future action, but will state a general idea i have, and will get your views after you have established yourself on the sea-coast. with your veteran army i hope to get control of the only two through routes from east to west possessed by the enemy before the fall of atlanta. the condition will be filled by holding savannah and augusta, or by holding any other port to the east of savannah and branchville. if wilmington falls, a force from there can co-operate with you. thomas has got back into the defences of nashville, with hood close upon him. decatur has been abandoned, and so have all the roads except the main one leading to chattanooga. part of this falling back was undoubtedly necessary and all of it may have been. it did not look so, however, to me. in my opinion, thomas far outnumbers hood in infantry. in cavalry, hood has the advantage in morale and numbers. i hope yet that hood will be badly crippled if not destroyed. the general news you will learn from the papers better than i could give it. after all becomes quiet, and roads become so bad up here that there is likely to be a week or two when nothing can be done, i will run down the coast to see you. if you desire it, i will ask mrs. sherman to go with me. yours truly, u. s. grant, lieutenant-general i quote this letter because it gives the reader a full knowledge of the events of that period. sherman now (the 15th) returned to savannah to complete its investment and insure the surrender of the garrison. the country about savannah is low and marshy, and the city was well intrenched from the river above to the river below; and assaults could not be made except along a comparatively narrow causeway. for this reason assaults must have resulted in serious destruction of life to the union troops, with the chance of failing altogether. sherman therefore decided upon a complete investment of the place. when he believed this investment completed, he summoned the garrison to surrender. general hardee, who was in command, replied in substance that the condition of affairs was not such as sherman had described. he said he was in full communication with his department and was receiving supplies constantly. hardee, however, was cut off entirely from all communication with the west side of the river, and by the river itself to the north and south. on the south carolina side the country was all rice fields, through which it would have been impossible to bring supplies so that hardee had no possible communication with the outside world except by a dilapidated plank road starting from the west bank of the river. sherman, receiving this reply, proceeded in person to a point on the coast, where general foster had troops stationed under general hatch, for the purpose of making arrangements with the latter officer to go through by one of the numerous channels running inland along that part of the coast of south carolina, to the plank road which general hardee still possessed, and thus to cut him off from the last means he had of getting supplies, if not of communication. while arranging for this movement, and before the attempt to execute the plan had been commenced, sherman received information through one of his staff officers that the enemy had evacuated savannah the night before. this was the night of the 21st of december. before evacuating the place hardee had blown up the navy yard. some iron-clads had been destroyed, as well as other property that might have been valuable to us; but he left an immense amount of stores untouched, consisting of cotton, railroad cars, workshops, numerous pieces of artillery, and several thousand stands of small arms. a little incident occurred, soon after the fall of savannah, which sherman relates in his memoirs, and which is worthy of repetition. savannah was one of the points where blockade runners entered. shortly after the city fell into our possession, a blockade runner came sailing up serenely, not doubting but the confederates were still in possession. it was not molested, and the captain did not find out his mistake until he had tied up and gone to the custom house, where he found a new occupant of the building, and made a less profitable disposition of his vessel and cargo than he had expected. as there was some discussion as to the authorship of sherman's march to the sea, by critics of his book when it appeared before the public, i want to state here that no question upon that subject was ever raised between general sherman and myself. circumstances made the plan on which sherman expected to act impracticable, as as commander of the forces he necessarily had to devise a new on which would give more promise of success: consequently he recommended the destruction of the railroad back to chattanooga, and that he should be authorized then to move, as he did, from atlanta forward. his suggestions were finally approved, although they did not immediately find favor in washington. even when it came to the time of starting, the greatest apprehension, as to the propriety of the campaign he was about commence, filled the mind of the president, induced no doubt by his advisers. this went so far as to move the president to ask me to suspend sherman's march for a day or two until i could think the matter over. my recollection is, though i find no record to show it, that out of deference to the president's wish i did send a dispatch to sherman asking him to wait a day or two, or else the connections between us were already cut so that i could not do so. however this may be, the question of who devised the plan of march from atlanta to savannah is easily answered: it was clearly sherman, and to him also belongs the credit of its brilliant execution. it was hardly possible that any one else than those on the spot could have devised a new plan of campaign to supersede one that did not promise success. (*40) i was in favor of sherman's plan from the time it was first submitted to me. my chief of staff, however, was very bitterly opposed to it and, as i learned subsequently, finding that he could not move me, he appealed to the authorities at washington to stop it. chapter lx. the battle of franklin--the battle of nashville. as we have seen, hood succeeded in crossing the tennessee river between muscle shoals and the lower shoals at the end of october, 1864. thomas sent schofield with the 4th and 23d corps, together with three brigades of wilson's cavalry to pulaski to watch him. on the 17th of november hood started and moved in such a manner as to avoid schofield, thereby turning his position. hood had with him three infantry corps, commanded respectively by stephen d. lee, stewart and cheatham. these, with his cavalry, numbered about forty-five thousand men. schofield had, of all arms, about thirty thousand. thomas's orders were, therefore, for schofield to watch the movements of the enemy, but not to fight a battle if he could avoid it; but to fall back in case of an advance on nashville, and to fight the enemy, as he fell back, so as to retard the enemy's movements until he could be reinforced by thomas himself. as soon as schofield saw this movement of hood's, he sent his trains to the rear, but did not fall back himself until the 21st, and then only to columbia. at columbia there was a slight skirmish but no battle. from this place schofield then retreated to franklin. he had sent his wagons in advance, and stanley had gone with them with two divisions to protect them. cheatham's corps of hood's army pursued the wagon train and went into camp at spring hill, for the night of the 29th. schofield retreating from columbia on the 29th, passed spring hill, where cheatham was bivouacked, during the night without molestation, though within half a mile of where the confederates were encamped. on the morning of the 30th he had arrived at franklin. hood followed closely and reached franklin in time to make an attack the same day. the fight was very desperate and sanguinary. the confederate generals led their men in the repeated charges, and the loss among them was of unusual proportions. this fighting continued with great severity until long after the night closed in, when the confederates drew off. general stanley, who commanded two divisions of the union troops, and whose troops bore the brunt of the battle, was wounded in the fight, but maintained his position. the enemy's loss at franklin, according to thomas's report, was 1,750 buried upon the field by our troops, 3,800 in the hospital, and 702 prisoners besides. schofield's loss, as officially reported, was 189 killed, 1,033 wounded, and 1,104 captured and missing. thomas made no effort to reinforce schofield at franklin, as it seemed to me at the time he should have done, and fight out the battle there. he simply ordered schofield to continue his retreat to nashville, which the latter did during that night and the next day. thomas, in the meantime, was making his preparations to receive hood. the road to chattanooga was still well guarded with strong garrisons at murfreesboro, stevenson, bridgeport and chattanooga. thomas had previously given up decatur and had been reinforced by a. j. smith's two divisions just returned from missouri. he also had steedman's division and r. s. granger's, which he had drawn from the front. his quartermaster's men, about ten thousand in number, had been organized and armed under the command of the chief quartermaster, general j. l. donaldson, and placed in the fortifications under the general supervision of general z. b. tower, of the united states engineers. hood was allowed to move upon nashville, and to invest that place almost without interference. thomas was strongly fortified in his position, so that he would have been safe against the attack of hood. he had troops enough even to annihilate him in the open field. to me his delay was unaccountable--sitting there and permitting himself to be invested, so that, in the end, to raise the siege he would have to fight the enemy strongly posted behind fortifications. it is true the weather was very bad. the rain was falling and freezing as it fell, so that the ground was covered with a sheet of ice, that made it very difficult to move. but i was afraid that the enemy would find means of moving, elude thomas and manage to get north of the cumberland river. if he did this, i apprehended most serious results from the campaign in the north, and was afraid we might even have to send troops from the east to head him off if he got there, general thomas's movements being always so deliberate and so slow, though effective in defence. i consequently urged thomas in frequent dispatches sent from city point(*41) to make the attack at once. the country was alarmed, the administration was alarmed, and i was alarmed lest the very thing would take place which i have just described that is, hood would get north. it was all without avail further than to elicit dispatches from thomas saying that he was getting ready to move as soon as he could, that he was making preparations, etc. at last i had to say to general thomas that i should be obliged to remove him unless he acted promptly. he replied that he was very sorry, but he would move as soon as he could. general logan happening to visit city point about that time, and knowing him as a prompt, gallant and efficient officer, i gave him an order to proceed to nashville to relieve thomas. i directed him, however, not to deliver the order or publish it until he reached there, and if thomas had moved, then not to deliver it at all, but communicate with me by telegraph. after logan started, in thinking over the situation, i became restless, and concluded to go myself. i went as far as washington city, when a dispatch was received from general thomas announcing his readiness at last to move, and designating the time of his movement. i concluded to wait until that time. he did move, and was successful from the start. this was on the 15th of december. general logan was at louisville at the time this movement was made, and telegraphed the fact to washington, and proceeded no farther himself. the battle during the 15th was severe, but favorable to the union troops, and continued until night closed in upon the combat. the next day the battle was renewed. after a successful assault upon hood's men in their intrenchments the enemy fled in disorder, routed and broken, leaving their dead, their artillery and small arms in great numbers on the field, besides the wounded that were captured. our cavalry had fought on foot as infantry, and had not their horses with them; so that they were not ready to join in the pursuit the moment the enemy retreated. they sent back, however, for their horses, and endeavored to get to franklin ahead of hood's broken army by the granny white road, but too much time was consumed in getting started. they had got but a few miles beyond the scene of the battle when they found the enemy's cavalry dismounted and behind intrenchments covering the road on which they were advancing. here another battle ensued, our men dismounting and fighting on foot, in which the confederates were again routed and driven in great disorder. our cavalry then went into bivouac, and renewed the pursuit on the following morning. they were too late. the enemy already had possession of franklin, and was beyond them. it now became a chase in which the confederates had the lead. our troops continued the pursuit to within a few miles of columbia, where they found the rebels had destroyed the railroad bridge as well as all other bridges over duck river. the heavy rains of a few days before had swelled the stream into a mad torrent, impassable except on bridges. unfortunately, either through a mistake in the wording of the order or otherwise, the pontoon bridge which was to have been sent by rail out to franklin, to be taken thence with the pursuing column, had gone toward chattanooga. there was, consequently, a delay of some four days in building bridges out of the remains of the old railroad bridge. of course hood got such a start in this time that farther pursuit was useless, although it was continued for some distance, but without coming upon him again. chapter lxi. expedition against fort fisher--attack on the fort--failure of the expedition--second expedition against the fort--capture of fort fisher. up to january, 1865, the enemy occupied fort fisher, at the mouth of cape fear river and below the city of wilmington. this port was of immense importance to the confederates, because it formed their principal inlet for blockade runners by means of which they brought in from abroad such supplies and munitions of war as they could not produce at home. it was equally important to us to get possession of it, not only because it was desirable to cut off their supplies so as to insure a speedy termination of the war, but also because foreign governments, particularly the british government, were constantly threatening that unless ours could maintain the blockade of that coast they should cease to recognize any blockade. for these reasons i determined, with the concurrence of the navy department, in december, to send an expedition against fort fisher for the purpose of capturing it. to show the difficulty experienced in maintaining the blockade, i will mention a circumstance that took place at fort fisher after its fall. two english blockade runners came in at night. their commanders, not supposing the fort had fallen, worked their way through all our fleet and got into the river unobserved. they then signalled the fort, announcing their arrival. there was a colored man in the fort who had been there before and who understood these signals. he informed general terry what reply he should make to have them come in, and terry did as he advised. the vessels came in, their officers entirely unconscious that they were falling into the hands of the union forces. even after they were brought in to the fort they were entertained in conversation for some little time before suspecting that the union troops were occupying the fort. they were finally informed that their vessels and cargoes were prizes. i selected general weitzel, of the army of the james, to go with the expedition, but gave instructions through general butler. he commanded the department within whose geographical limits fort fisher was situated, as well as beaufort and other points on that coast held by our troops; he was, therefore, entitled to the right of fitting out the expedition against fort fisher. general butler conceived the idea that if a steamer loaded heavily with powder could be run up to near the shore under the fort and exploded, it would create great havoc and make the capture an easy matter. admiral porter, who was to command the naval squadron, seemed to fall in with the idea, and it was not disapproved of in washington; the navy was therefore given the task of preparing the steamer for this purpose. i had no confidence in the success of the scheme, and so expressed myself; but as no serious harm could come of the experiment, and the authorities at washington seemed desirous to have it tried, i permitted it. the steamer was sent to beaufort, north carolina, and was there loaded with powder and prepared for the part she was to play in the reduction of fort fisher. general butler chose to go in command of the expedition himself, and was all ready to sail by the 9th of december (1864). very heavy storms prevailed, however, at that time along that part of the sea-coast, and prevented him from getting off until the 13th or 14th. his advance arrived off fort fisher on the 15th. the naval force had been already assembled, or was assembling, but they were obliged to run into beaufort for munitions, coal, etc.; then, too, the powder-boat was not yet fully prepared. the fleet was ready to proceed on the 18th; but butler, who had remained outside from the 15th up to that time, now found himself out of coal, fresh water, etc., and had to put into beaufort to replenish. another storm overtook him, and several days more were lost before the army and navy were both ready at the same time to co-operate. on the night of the 23d the powder-boat was towed in by a gunboat as near to the fort as it was safe to run. she was then propelled by her own machinery to within about five hundred yards of the shore. there the clockwork, which was to explode her within a certain length of time, was set and she was abandoned. everybody left, and even the vessels put out to sea to prevent the effect of the explosion upon them. at two o'clock in the morning the explosion took place--and produced no more effect on the fort, or anything else on land, than the bursting of a boiler anywhere on the atlantic ocean would have done. indeed when the troops in fort fisher heard the explosion they supposed it was the bursting of a boiler in one of the yankee gunboats. fort fisher was situated upon a low, flat peninsula north of cape fear river. the soil is sandy. back a little the peninsula is very heavily wooded, and covered with fresh-water swamps. the fort ran across this peninsula, about five hundred yards in width, and extended along the sea coast about thirteen hundred yards. the fort had an armament of 21 guns and 3 mortars on the land side, and 24 guns on the sea front. at that time it was only garrisoned by four companies of infantry, one light battery and the gunners at the heavy guns less than seven hundred men with a reserve of less than a thousand men five miles up the peninsula. general whiting of the confederate army was in command, and general bragg was in command of the force at wilmington. both commenced calling for reinforcements the moment they saw our troops landing. the governor of north carolina called for everybody who could stand behind a parapet and shoot a gun, to join them. in this way they got two or three hundred additional men into fort fisher; and hoke's division, five or six thousand strong, was sent down from richmond. a few of these troops arrived the very day that butler was ready to advance. on the 24th the fleet formed for an attack in arcs of concentric circles, their heavy iron-clads going in very close range, being nearest the shore, and leaving intervals or spaces so that the outer vessels could fire between them. porter was thus enabled to throw one hundred and fifteen shells per minute. the damage done to the fort by these shells was very slight, only two or three cannon being disabled in the fort. but the firing silenced all the guns by making it too hot for the men to maintain their positions about them and compelling them to seek shelter in the bomb-proofs. on the next day part of butler's troops under general adelbert ames effected a landing out of range of the fort without difficulty. this was accomplished under the protection of gunboats sent for the purpose, and under cover of a renewed attack upon the fort by the fleet. they formed a line across the peninsula and advanced, part going north and part toward the fort, covering themselves as they did so. curtis pushed forward and came near to fort fisher, capturing the small garrison at what was called the flag pond battery. weitzel accompanied him to within a half a mile of the works. here he saw that the fort had not been injured, and so reported to butler, advising against an assault. ames, who had gone north in his advance, captured 228 of the reserves. these prisoners reported to butler that sixteen hundred of hoke's division of six thousand from richmond had already arrived and the rest would soon be in his rear. upon these reports butler determined to withdraw his troops from the peninsula and return to the fleet. at that time there had not been a man on our side injured except by one of the shells from the fleet. curtis had got within a few yards of the works. some of his men had snatched a flag from the parapet of the fort, and others had taken a horse from the inside of the stockade. at night butler informed porter of his withdrawal, giving the reasons above stated, and announced his purpose as soon as his men could embark to start for hampton roads. porter represented to him that he had sent to beaufort for more ammunition. he could fire much faster than he had been doing, and would keep the enemy from showing himself until our men were within twenty yards of the fort, and he begged that butler would leave some brave fellows like those who had snatched the flag from the parapet and taken the horse from the fort. butler was unchangeable. he got all his troops aboard, except curtis's brigade, and started back. in doing this, butler made a fearful mistake. my instructions to him, or to the officer who went in command of the expedition, were explicit in the statement that to effect a landing would be of itself a great victory, and if one should be effected, the foothold must not be relinquished; on the contrary, a regular siege of the fort must be commenced and, to guard against interference by reason of storms, supplies of provisions must be laid in as soon as they could be got on shore. but general butler seems to have lost sight of this part of his instructions, and was back at fort monroe on the 28th. i telegraphed to the president as follows: city point, va., dec. 28, 1864.--8.30 p.m. the wilmington expedition has proven a gross and culpable failure. many of the troops are back here. delays and free talk of the object of the expedition enabled the enemy to move troops to wilmington to defeat it. after the expedition sailed from fort monroe, three days of fine weather were squandered, during which the enemy was without a force to protect himself. who is to blame will, i hope, be known. u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. porter sent dispatches to the navy department in which he complained bitterly of having been abandoned by the army just when the fort was nearly in our possession, and begged that our troops might be sent back again to cooperate, but with a different commander. as soon as i heard this i sent a messenger to porter with a letter asking him to hold on. i assured him that i fully sympathized with him in his disappointment, and that i would send the same troops back with a different commander, with some reinforcements to offset those which the enemy had received. i told him it would take some little time to get transportation for the additional troops; but as soon as it could be had the men should be on their way to him, and there would be no delay on my part. i selected a. h. terry to command. it was the 6th of january before the transports could be got ready and the troops aboard. they sailed from fortress monroe on that day. the object and destination of the second expedition were at the time kept a secret to all except a few in the navy department and in the army to whom it was necessary to impart the information. general terry had not the slightest idea of where he was going or what he was to do. he simply knew that he was going to sea and that he had his orders with him, which were to be opened when out at sea. he was instructed to communicate freely with porter and have entire harmony between army and navy, because the work before them would require the best efforts of both arms of service. they arrived off beaufort on the 8th. a heavy storm, however, prevented a landing at fort fisher until the 13th. the navy prepared itself for attack about as before, and the same time assisted the army in landing, this time five miles away. only iron-clads fired at first; the object being to draw the fire of the enemy's guns so as to ascertain their positions. this object being accomplished, they then let in their shots thick and fast. very soon the guns were all silenced, and the fort showed evident signs of being much injured. terry deployed his men across the peninsula as had been done before, and at two o'clock on the following morning was up within two miles of the fort with a respectable _abatis_ in front of his line. his artillery was all landed on that day, the 14th. again curtis's brigade of ame's division had the lead. by noon they had carried an unfinished work less than a half mile from the fort, and turned it so as to face the other way. terry now saw porter and arranged for an assault on the following day. the two commanders arranged their signals so that they could communicate with each other from time to time as they might have occasion. at day light the fleet commenced its firing. the time agreed upon for the assault was the middle of the afternoon, and ames who commanded the assaulting column moved at 3.30. porter landed a force of sailors and marines to move against the sea-front in co-operation with ames's assault. they were under commander breese of the navy. these sailors and marines had worked their way up to within a couple of hundred yards of the fort before the assault. the signal was given and the assault was made; but the poor sailors and marines were repulsed and very badly handled by the enemy, losing 280 killed and wounded out of their number. curtis's brigade charged successfully though met by a heavy fire, some of the men having to wade through the swamp up to their waists to reach the fort. many were wounded, of course, and some killed; but they soon reached the palisades. these they cut away, and pushed on through. the other troops then came up, pennypacker's following curtis, and bell, who commanded the 3d brigade of ames's division, following pennypacker. but the fort was not yet captured though the parapet was gained. the works were very extensive. the large parapet around the work would have been but very little protection to those inside except when they were close up under it. traverses had, therefore, been run until really the work was a succession of small forts enclosed by a large one. the rebels made a desperate effort to hold the fort, and had to be driven from these traverses one by one. the fight continued till long after night. our troops gained first one traverse and then another, and by 10 o'clock at night the place was carried. during this engagement the sailors, who had been repulsed in their assault on the bastion, rendered the best service they could by reinforcing terry's northern line--thus enabling him to send a detachment to the assistance of ames. the fleet kept up a continuous fire upon that part of the fort which was still occupied by the enemy. by means of signals they could be informed where to direct their shots. during the succeeding nights the enemy blew up fort caswell on the opposite side of cape fear river, and abandoned two extensive works on smith's island in the river. our captures in all amounted to 169 guns, besides small-arms, with full supplies of ammunition, and 2,083 prisoners. in addition to these, there were about 700 dead and wounded left there. we had lost 110 killed and 536 wounded. in this assault on fort fisher, bell, one of the brigade commanders, was killed, and two, curtis and pennypacker, were badly wounded. secretary stanton, who was on his way back from savannah, arrived off fort fisher soon after it fell. when he heard the good news he promoted all the officers of any considerable rank for their conspicuous gallantry. terry had been nominated for major-general, but had not been confirmed. this confirmed him; and soon after i recommended him for a brigadier-generalcy in the regular army, and it was given to him for this victory. chapter lxii. sherman's march north--sheridan ordered to lynchburg--canby ordered to move against mobile--movements of schofield and thomas--capture of columbia, south carolina--sherman in the carolinas. when news of sherman being in possession of savannah reached the north, distinguished statesmen and visitors began to pour in to see him. among others who went was the secretary of war, who seemed much pleased at the result of his campaign. mr. draper, the collector of customs of new york, who was with mr. stanton's party, was put in charge of the public property that had been abandoned and captured. savannah was then turned over to general foster's command to hold, so that sherman might have his own entire army free to operate as might be decided upon in the future. i sent the chief engineer of the army of the potomac (general barnard) with letters to general sherman. he remained some time with the general, and when he returned brought back letters, one of which contained suggestions from sherman as to what ought to be done in co-operation with him, when he should have started upon his march northward. i must not neglect to state here the fact that i had no idea originally of having sherman march from savannah to richmond, or even to north carolina. the season was bad, the roads impassable for anything except such an army as he had, and i should not have thought of ordering such a move. i had, therefore, made preparations to collect transports to carry sherman and his army around to the james river by water, and so informed him. on receiving this letter he went to work immediately to prepare for the move, but seeing that it would require a long time to collect the transports, he suggested the idea then of marching up north through the carolinas. i was only too happy to approve this; for if successful, it promised every advantage. his march through georgia had thoroughly destroyed all lines of transportation in that state, and had completely cut the enemy off from all sources of supply to the west of it. if north and south carolina were rendered helpless so far as capacity for feeding lee's army was concerned, the confederate garrison at richmond would be reduced in territory, from which to draw supplies, to very narrow limits in the state of virginia; and, although that section of the country was fertile, it was already well exhausted of both forage and food. i approved sherman's suggestion therefore at once. the work of preparation was tedious, because supplies, to load the wagons for the march, had to be brought from a long distance. sherman would now have to march through a country furnishing fewer provisions than that he had previously been operating in during his march to the sea. besides, he was confronting, or marching toward, a force of the enemy vastly superior to any his troops had encountered on their previous march; and the territory through which he had to pass had now become of such vast importance to the very existence of the confederate army, that the most desperate efforts were to be expected in order to save it. sherman, therefore, while collecting the necessary supplies to start with, made arrangements with admiral dahlgren, who commanded that part of the navy on the south carolina and georgia coast, and general foster, commanding the troops, to take positions, and hold a few points on the sea coast, which he (sherman) designated, in the neighborhood of charleston. this provision was made to enable him to fall back upon the sea coast, in case he should encounter a force sufficient to stop his onward progress. he also wrote me a letter, making suggestions as to what he would like to have done in support of his movement farther north. this letter was brought to city point by general barnard at a time when i happened to be going to washington city, where i arrived on the 21st of january. i cannot tell the provision i had already made to co-operate with sherman, in anticipation of his expected movement, better than by giving my reply to this letter. headquarters armies of the united states, washington, d. c., jan. 21, 1865. major-general w. t. sherman, commanding mill div. of the mississippi. general:--your letters brought by general barnard were received at city point, and read with interest. not having them with me, however, i cannot say that in this i will be able to satisfy you on all points of recommendation. as i arrived here at one p.m., and must leave at six p.m., having in the meantime spent over three hours with the secretary and general halleck, i must be brief. before your last request to have thomas make a campaign into the heart of alabama, i had ordered schofield to annapolis, md., with his corps. the advance (six thousand) will reach the seaboard by the 23d, the remainder following as rapidly as railroad transportation can be procured from cincinnati. the corps numbers over twenty-one thousand men. i was induced to do this because i did not believe thomas could possibly be got off before spring. his pursuit of hood indicated a sluggishness that satisfied me that he would never do to conduct one of your campaigns. the command of the advance of the pursuit was left to subordinates, whilst thomas followed far behind. when hood had crossed the tennessee, and those in pursuit had reached it, thomas had not much more than half crossed the state, from whence he returned to nashville to take steamer for eastport. he is possessed of excellent judgment, great coolness and honesty, but he is not good on a pursuit. he also reported his troops fagged, and that it was necessary to equip up. this report and a determination to give the enemy no rest determined me to use his surplus troops elsewhere. thomas is still left with a sufficient force surplus to go to selma under an energetic leader. he has been telegraphed to, to know whether he could go, and, if so, which of the several routes he would select. no reply is yet received. canby has been ordered to act offensively from the sea-coast to the interior, towards montgomery and selma. thomas's forces will move from the north at an early day, or some of his troops will be sent to canby. without further reinforcements canby will have a moving column of twenty thousand men. fort fisher, you are aware, has been captured. we have a force there of eight thousand effective. at new bern about half the number. it is rumored, through deserters, that wilmington also has fallen. i am inclined to believe the rumor, because on the 17th we knew the enemy were blowing up their works about fort caswell, and that on the 18th terry moved on wilmington. if wilmington is captured, schofield will go there. if not, he will be sent to new bern. in either event, all the surplus forces at the two points will move to the interior toward goldsboro' in co-operation with your movements. from either point, railroad communications can be run out, there being here abundance of rolling-stock suited to the gauge of those roads. there have been about sixteen thousand men sent from lee's army south. of these, you will have fourteen thousand against you, if wilmington is not held by the enemy, casualties at fort fisher having overtaken about two thousand. all these troops are subject to your orders as you come in communication with them. they will be so instructed. from about richmond i will watch lee closely, and if he detaches much more, or attempts to evacuate, will pitch in. in the meantime, should you be brought to a halt anywhere, i can send two corps of thirty thousand effective men to your support, from the troops about richmond. to resume: canby is ordered to operate to the interior from the gulf. a. j. smith may go from the north, but i think it doubtful. a force of twenty-eight or thirty thousand will co-operate with you from new bern or wilmington, or both. you can call for reinforcements. this will be handed you by captain hudson, of my staff, who will return with any message you may have for me. if there is anything i can do for you in the way of having supplies on ship-board, at any point on the sea-coast, ready for you, let me know it. yours truly, u. s. grant, lieut.-general. i had written on the 18th of january to general sherman, giving him the news of the battle of nashville. he was much pleased at the result, although, like myself, he had been very much disappointed at thomas for permitting hood to cross the tennessee river and nearly the whole state of tennessee, and come to nashville to be attacked there. he, however, as i had done, sent thomas a warm congratulatory letter. on the 10th of january, 1865, the resolutions of thanks to sherman and his army passed by congress were approved. sherman, after the capture, at once had the debris cleared up, commencing the work by removing the piling and torpedoes from the river, and taking up all obstructions. he had then intrenched the city, so that it could be held by a small garrison. by the middle of january all his work was done, except the accumulation of supplies to commence his movement with. he proposed to move in two columns, one from savannah, going along by the river of the same name, and the other by roads farther east, threatening charleston. he commenced the advance by moving his right wing to beaufort, south carolina, then to pocotaligo by water. this column, in moving north, threatened charleston, and, indeed, it was not determined at first that they would have a force visit charleston. south carolina had done so much to prepare the public mind of the south for secession, and had been so active in precipitating the decision of the question before the south was fully prepared to meet it, that there was, at that time, a feeling throughout the north and also largely entertained by people of the south, that the state of south carolina, and charleston, the hot-bed of secession in particular, ought to have a heavy hand laid upon them. in fact, nothing but the decisive results that followed, deterred the radical portion of the people from condemning the movement, because charleston had been left out. to pass into the interior would, however, be to insure the evacuation of the city, and its possession by the navy and foster's troops. it is so situated between two formidable rivers that a small garrison could have held it against all odds as long as their supplies would hold out. sherman therefore passed it by. by the first of february all preparations were completed for the final march, columbia, south carolina, being the first objective; fayetteville, north carolina, the second; and goldsboro, or neighborhood, the final one, unless something further should be determined upon. the right wing went from pocotaligo, and the left from about hardeeville on the savannah river, both columns taking a pretty direct route for columbia. the cavalry, however, were to threaten charleston on the right, and augusta on the left. on the 15th of january fort fisher had fallen, news of which sherman had received before starting out on his march. we already had new bern and had soon wilmington, whose fall followed that of fort fisher; as did other points on the sea coast, where the national troops were now in readiness to co-operate with sherman's advance when he had passed fayetteville. on the 18th of january i ordered canby, in command at new orleans, to move against mobile, montgomery and selma, alabama, for the purpose of destroying roads, machine shops, etc. on the 8th of february i ordered sheridan, who was in the valley of virginia, to push forward as soon as the weather would permit and strike the canal west of richmond at or about lynchburg; and on the 20th i made the order to go to lynchburg as soon as the roads would permit, saying: "as soon as it is possible to travel, i think you will have no difficulty about reaching lynchburg with a cavalry force alone. from there you could destroy the railroad and canal in every direction, so as to be of no further use to the rebellion. * * * this additional raid, with one starting from east tennessee under stoneman, numbering about four or five thousand cavalry; one from eastport, mississippi, ten thousand cavalry; canby, from mobile bay, with about eighteen thousand mixed troops--these three latter pushing for tuscaloosa, selma and montgomery; and sherman with a large army eating out the vitals of south carolina--is all that will be wanted to leave nothing for the rebellion to stand upon. i would advise you to overcome great obstacles to accomplish this. charleston was evacuated on tuesday last." on the 27th of february, more than a month after canby had received his orders, i again wrote to him, saying that i was extremely anxious to hear of his being in alabama. i notified him, also, that i had sent grierson to take command of his cavalry, he being a very efficient officer. i further suggested that forrest was probably in mississippi, and if he was there, he would find him an officer of great courage and capacity whom it would be difficult to get by. i still further informed him that thomas had been ordered to start a cavalry force into mississippi on the 20th of february, or as soon as possible thereafter. this force did not get off however. all these movements were designed to be in support of sherman's march, the object being to keep the confederate troops in the west from leaving there. but neither canby nor thomas could be got off in time. i had some time before depleted thomas's army to reinforce canby, for the reason that thomas had failed to start an expedition which he had been ordered to send out, and to have the troops where they might do something. canby seemed to be equally deliberate in all of his movements. i ordered him to go in person; but he prepared to send a detachment under another officer. general granger had got down to new orleans, in some way or other, and i wrote canby that he must not put him in command of troops. in spite of this he asked the war department to assign granger to the command of a corps. almost in despair of having adequate service rendered to the cause in that quarter, i said to canby: "i am in receipt of a dispatch * * * informing me that you have made requisitions for a construction corps and material to build seventy miles of railroad. i have directed that none be sent. thomas's army has been depleted to send a force to you that they might be where they could act in winter, and at least detain the force the enemy had in the west. if there had been any idea of repairing railroads, it could have been done much better from the north, where we already had the troops. i expected your movements to be co-operative with sherman's last. this has now entirely failed. i wrote to you long ago, urging you to push promptly and to live upon the country, and destroy railroads, machine shops, etc., not to build them. take mobile and hold it, and push your forces to the interior--to montgomery and to selma. destroy railroads, rolling stock, and everything useful for carrying on war, and, when you have done this, take such positions as can be supplied by water. by this means alone you can occupy positions from which the enemy's roads in the interior can be kept broken." most of these expeditions got off finally, but too late to render any service in the direction for which they were designed. the enemy, ready to intercept his advance, consisted of hardee's troops and wheeler's cavalry, perhaps less than fifteen thousand men in all; but frantic efforts were being made in richmond, as i was sure would be the case, to retard sherman's movements. everything possible was being done to raise troops in the south. lee dispatched against sherman the troops which had been sent to relieve fort fisher, which, including those of the other defences of the harbor and its neighborhood, amounted, after deducting the two thousand killed, wounded and captured, to fourteen thousand men. after thomas's victory at nashville what remained, of hood's army were gathered together and forwarded as rapidly as possible to the east to co-operate with these forces; and, finally, general joseph e. johnston, one of the ablest commanders of the south though not in favor with the administration (or at least with mr. davis), was put in command of all the troops in north and south carolina. schofield arrived at annapolis in the latter part of january, but before sending his troops to north carolina i went with him down the coast to see the situation of affairs, as i could give fuller directions after being on the ground than i could very well have given without. we soon returned, and the troops were sent by sea to cape fear river. both new bern and wilmington are connected with raleigh by railroads which unite at goldsboro. schofield was to land troops at smithville, near the mouth of the cape fear river on the west side, and move up to secure the wilmington and charlotteville railroad. this column took their pontoon bridges with them, to enable them to cross over to the island south of the city of wilmington. a large body was sent by the north side to co-operate with them. they succeeded in taking the city on the 22d of february. i took the precaution to provide for sherman's army, in case he should be forced to turn in toward the sea coast before reaching north carolina, by forwarding supplies to every place where he was liable to have to make such a deflection from his projected march. i also sent railroad rolling stock, of which we had a great abundance, now that we were not operating the roads in virginia. the gauge of the north carolina railroads being the same as the virginia railroads had been altered too; these cars and locomotives were ready for use there without any change. on the 31st of january i countermanded the orders given to thomas to move south to alabama and georgia. (i had previously reduced his force by sending a portion of it to terry.) i directed in lieu of this movement, that he should send stoneman through east tennessee, and push him well down toward columbia, south carolina, in support of sherman. thomas did not get stoneman off in time, but, on the contrary, when i had supposed he was on his march in support of sherman i heard of his being in louisville, kentucky. i immediately changed the order, and directed thomas to send him toward lynchburg. finally, however, on the 12th of march, he did push down through the north-western end of south carolina, creating some consternation. i also ordered thomas to send the 4th corps (stanley's) to bull gap and to destroy no more roads east of that. i also directed him to concentrate supplies at knoxville, with a view to a probable movement of his army through that way toward lynchburg. goldsboro is four hundred and twenty-five miles from savannah. sherman's march was without much incident until he entered columbia, on the 17th of february. he was detained in his progress by having to repair and corduroy the roads, and rebuild the bridges. there was constant skirmishing and fighting between the cavalry of the two armies, but this did not retard the advance of the infantry. four days, also, were lost in making complete the destruction of the most important railroads south of columbia; there was also some delay caused by the high water, and the destruction of the bridges on the line of the road. a formidable river had to be crossed near columbia, and that in the face of a small garrison under general wade hampton. there was but little delay, however, further than that caused by high water in the stream. hampton left as sherman approached, and the city was found to be on fire. there has since been a great deal of acrimony displayed in discussions of the question as to who set columbia on fire. sherman denies it on the part of his troops, and hampton denies it on the part of the confederates. one thing is certain: as soon as our troops took possession, they at once proceeded to extinguish the flames to the best of their ability with the limited means at hand. in any case, the example set by the confederates in burning the village of chambersburg, pa., a town which was not garrisoned, would seem to make a defence of the act of firing the seat of government of the state most responsible for the conflict then raging, not imperative. the confederate troops having vacated the city, the mayor took possession, and sallied forth to meet the commander of the national forces for the purpose of surrendering the town, making terms for the protection of property, etc. sherman paid no attention at all to the overture, but pushed forward and took the town without making any conditions whatever with its citizens. he then, however, co-operated with the mayor in extinguishing the flames and providing for the people who were rendered destitute by this destruction of their homes. when he left there he even gave the mayor five hundred head of cattle to be distributed among the citizens, to tide them over until some arrangement could be made for their future supplies. he remained in columbia until the roads, public buildings, workshops and everything that could be useful to the enemy were destroyed. while at columbia, sherman learned for the first time that what remained of hood's army was confronting him, under the command of general beauregard. charleston was evacuated on the 18th of february, and foster garrisoned the place. wilmington was captured on the 22d. columbia and cheraw farther north, were regarded as so secure from invasion that the wealthy people of charleston and augusta had sent much of their valuable property to these two points to be stored. among the goods sent there were valuable carpets, tons of old madeira, silverware, and furniture. i am afraid much of these goods fell into the hands of our troops. there was found at columbia a large amount of powder, some artillery, small-arms and fixed ammunition. these, of course were among the articles destroyed. while here, sherman also learned of johnston's restoration to command. the latter was given, as already stated, all troops in north and south carolina. after the completion of the destruction of public property about columbia, sherman proceeded on his march and reached cheraw without any special opposition and without incident to relate. the railroads, of course, were thoroughly destroyed on the way. sherman remained a day or two at cheraw; and, finally, on the 6th of march crossed his troops over the pedee and advanced straight for fayetteville. hardee and hampton were there, and barely escaped. sherman reached fayetteville on the 11th of march. he had dispatched scouts from cheraw with letters to general terry, at wilmington, asking him to send a steamer with some supplies of bread, clothing and other articles which he enumerated. the scouts got through successfully, and a boat was sent with the mail and such articles for which sherman had asked as were in store at wilmington; unfortunately, however, those stores did not contain clothing. four days later, on the 15th, sherman left fayetteville for goldsboro. the march, now, had to be made with great caution, for he was approaching lee's army and nearing the country that still remained open to the enemy. besides, he was confronting all that he had had to confront in his previous march up to that point, reinforced by the garrisons along the road and by what remained of hood's army. frantic appeals were made to the people to come in voluntarily and swell the ranks of our foe. i presume, however, that johnston did not have in all over 35,000 or 40,000 men. the people had grown tired of the war, and desertions from the confederate army were much more numerous than the voluntary accessions. there was some fighting at averysboro on the 16th between johnston's troops and sherman's, with some loss; and at bentonville on the 19th and 21st of march, but johnston withdrew from the contest before the morning of the 22d. sherman's loss in these last engagements in killed, wounded, and missing, was about sixteen hundred. sherman's troops at last reached goldsboro on the 23d of the month and went into bivouac; and there his men were destined to have a long rest. schofield was there to meet him with the troops which had been sent to wilmington. sherman was no longer in danger. he had johnston confronting him; but with an army much inferior to his own, both in numbers and morale. he had lee to the north of him with a force largely superior; but i was holding lee with a still greater force, and had he made his escape and gotten down to reinforce johnston, sherman, with the reinforcements he now had from schofield and terry, would have been able to hold the confederates at bay for an indefinite period. he was near the sea-shore with his back to it, and our navy occupied the harbors. he had a railroad to both wilmington and new bern, and his flanks were thoroughly protected by streams, which intersect that part of the country and deepen as they approach the sea. then, too, sherman knew that if lee should escape me i would be on his heels, and he and johnson together would be crushed in one blow if they attempted to make a stand. with the loss of their capital, it is doubtful whether lee's army would have amounted to much as an army when it reached north carolina. johnston's army was demoralized by constant defeat and would hardly have made an offensive movement, even if they could have been induced to remain on duty. the men of both lee's and johnston's armies were, like their brethren of the north, as brave as men can be; but no man is so brave that he may not meet such defeats and disasters as to discourage him and dampen his ardor for any cause, no matter how just he deems it. chapter lxiii. arrival of the peace commissioners--lincoln and the peace commissioners --an anecdote of lincoln--the winter before petersburg--sheridan destroys the railroad--gordon carries the picket line--parke recaptures the line --the line of battle of white oak road. on the last of january, 1865, peace commissioners from the so-called confederate states presented themselves on our lines around petersburg, and were immediately conducted to my headquarters at city point. they proved to be alexander h. stephens, vice-president of the confederacy, judge campbell, assistant-secretary of war, and r. m. t. hunt, formerly united states senator and then a member of the confederate senate. it was about dark when they reached my headquarters, and i at once conducted them to the steam mary martin, a hudson river boat which was very comfortably fitted up for the use of passengers. i at once communicated by telegraph with washington and informed the secretary of war and the president of the arrival of these commissioners and that their object was to negotiate terms of peace between the united states and, as they termed it, the confederate government. i was instructed to retain them at city point, until the president, or some one whom he would designate, should come to meet them. they remained several days as guests on board the boat. i saw them quite frequently, though i have no recollection of having had any conversation whatever with them on the subject of their mission. it was something i had nothing to do with, and i therefore did not wish to express any views on the subject. for my own part i never had admitted, and never was ready to admit, that they were the representatives of a government. there had been too great a waste of blood and treasure to concede anything of the kind. as long as they remained there, however, our relations were pleasant and i found them all very agreeable gentlemen. i directed the captain to furnish them with the best the boat afforded, and to administer to their comfort in every way possible. no guard was placed over them and no restriction was put upon their movements; nor was there any pledge asked that they would not abuse the privileges extended to them. they were permitted to leave the boat when they felt like it, and did so, coming up on the bank and visiting me at my headquarters. i had never met either of these gentlemen before the war, but knew them well by reputation and through their public services, and i had been a particular admirer of mr. stephens. i had always supposed that he was a very small man, but when i saw him in the dusk of the evening i was very much surprised to find so large a man as he seemed to be. when he got down on to the boat i found that he was wearing a coarse gray woollen overcoat, a manufacture that had been introduced into the south during the rebellion. the cloth was thicker than anything of the kind i had ever seen, even in canada. the overcoat extended nearly to his feet, and was so large that it gave him the appearance of being an average-sized man. he took this off when he reached the cabin of the boat, and i was struck with the apparent change in size, in the coat and out of it. after a few days, about the 2d of february, i received a dispatch from washington, directing me to send the commissioners to hampton roads to meet the president and a member of the cabinet. mr. lincoln met them there and had an interview of short duration. it was not a great while after they met that the president visited me at city point. he spoke of his having met the commissioners, and said he had told them that there would be no use in entering into any negotiations unless they would recognize, first: that the union as a whole must be forever preserved, and second: that slavery must be abolished. if they were willing to concede these two points, then he was ready to enter into negotiations and was almost willing to hand them a blank sheet of paper with his signature attached for them to fill in the terms upon which they were willing to live with us in the union and be one people. he always showed a generous and kindly spirit toward the southern people, and i never heard him abuse an enemy. some of the cruel things said about president lincoln, particularly in the north, used to pierce him to the heart; but never in my presence did he evince a revengeful disposition and i saw a great deal of him at city point, for he seemed glad to get away from the cares and anxieties of the capital. right here i might relate an anecdote of mr. lincoln. it was on the occasion of his visit to me just after he had talked with the peace commissioners at hampton roads. after a little conversation, he asked me if i had seen that overcoat of stephens's. i replied that i had. "well," said he, "did you see him take it off?" i said yes. "well," said he, "didn't you think it was the biggest shuck and the littlest ear that ever you did see?" long afterwards i told this story to the confederate general j. b. gordon, at the time a member of the senate. he repeated it to stephens, and, as i heard afterwards, stephens laughed immoderately at the simile of mr. lincoln. the rest of the winter, after the departure of the peace commissioners, passed off quietly and uneventfully, except for two or three little incidents. on one occasion during this period, while i was visiting washington city for the purpose of conferring with the administration, the enemy's cavalry under general wade hampton, passing our extreme left and then going to the south, got in east of us. before their presence was known, they had driven off a large number of beef cattle that were grazing in that section. it was a fair capture, and they were sufficiently needed by the confederates. it was only retaliating for what we had done, sometimes for many weeks at a time, when out of supplies taking what the confederate army otherwise would have gotten. as appears in this book, on one single occasion we captured five thousand head of cattle which were crossing the mississippi river near port hudson on their way from texas to supply the confederate army in the east. one of the most anxious periods of my experience during the rebellion was the last few weeks before petersburg. i felt that the situation of the confederate army was such that they would try to make an escape at the earliest practicable moment, and i was afraid, every morning, that i would awake from my sleep to hear that lee had gone, and that nothing was left but a picket line. he had his railroad by the way of danville south, and i was afraid that he was running off his men and all stores and ordnance except such as it would be necessary to carry with him for his immediate defence. i knew he could move much more lightly and more rapidly than i, and that, if he got the start, he would leave me behind so that we would have the same army to fight again farther south and the war might be prolonged another year. i was led to this fear by the fact that i could not see how it was possible for the confederates to hold out much longer where they were. there is no doubt that richmond would have been evacuated much sooner than it was, if it had not been that it was the capital of the so-called confederacy, and the fact of evacuating the capital would, of course, have had a very demoralizing effect upon the confederate army. when it was evacuated (as we shall see further on), the confederacy at once began to crumble and fade away. then, too, desertions were taking place, not only among those who were with general lee in the neighborhood of their capital, but throughout the whole confederacy. i remember that in a conversation with me on one occasion long prior to this, general butler remarked that the confederates would find great difficulty in getting more men for their army; possibly adding, though i am not certain as to this, "unless they should arm the slave." the south, as we all knew, were conscripting every able-bodied man between the ages of eighteen and forty-five; and now they had passed a law for the further conscription of boys from fourteen to eighteen, calling them the junior reserves, and men from forty-five to sixty to be called the senior reserves. the latter were to hold the necessary points not in immediate danger, and especially those in the rear. general butler, in alluding to this conscription, remarked that they were thus "robbing both the cradle and the grave," an expression which i afterwards used in writing a letter to mr. washburn. it was my belief that while the enemy could get no more recruits they were losing at least a regiment a day, taking it throughout the entire army, by desertions alone. then by casualties of war, sickness, and other natural causes, their losses were much heavier. it was a mere question of arithmetic to calculate how long they could hold out while that rate of depletion was going on. of course long before their army would be thus reduced to nothing the army which we had in the field would have been able to capture theirs. then too i knew from the great number of desertions, that the men who had fought so bravely, so gallantly and so long for the cause which they believed in--and as earnestly, i take it, as our men believed in the cause for which they were fighting--had lost hope and become despondent. many of them were making application to be sent north where they might get employment until the war was over, when they could return to their southern homes. for these and other reasons i was naturally very impatient for the time to come when i could commence the spring campaign, which i thoroughly believed would close the war. there were two considerations i had to observe, however, and which detained me. one was the fact that the winter had been one of heavy rains, and the roads were impassable for artillery and teams. it was necessary to wait until they had dried sufficiently to enable us to move the wagon trains and artillery necessary to the efficiency of an army operating in the enemy's country. the other consideration was that general sheridan with the cavalry of the army of the potomac was operating on the north side of the james river, having come down from the shenandoah. it was necessary that i should have his cavalry with me, and i was therefore obliged to wait until he could join me south of the james river. let us now take account of what he was doing. on the 5th of march i had heard from sheridan. he had met early between staunton and charlottesville and defeated him, capturing nearly his entire command. early and some of his officers escaped by finding refuge in the neighboring houses or in the woods. on the 12th i heard from him again. he had turned east, to come to white house. he could not go to lynchburg as ordered, because the rains had been so very heavy and the streams were so very much swollen. he had a pontoon train with him, but it would not reach half way across some of the streams, at their then stage of water, which he would have to get over in going south as first ordered. i had supplies sent around to white house for him, and kept the depot there open until he arrived. we had intended to abandon it because the james river had now become our base of supplies. sheridan had about ten thousand cavalry with him, divided into two divisions commanded respectively by custer and devin. general merritt was acting as chief of cavalry. sheridan moved very light, carrying only four days' provisions with him, with a larger supply of coffee, salt and other small rations, and a very little else besides ammunition. they stopped at charlottesville and commenced tearing up the railroad back toward lynchburg. he also sent a division along the james river canal to destroy locks, culverts etc. all mills and factories along the lines of march of his troops were destroyed also. sheridan had in this way consumed so much time that his making a march to white house was now somewhat hazardous. he determined therefore to fight his way along the railroad and canal till he was as near to richmond as it was possible to get, or until attacked. he did this, destroying the canal as far as goochland, and the railroad to a point as near richmond as he could get. on the 10th he was at columbia. negroes had joined his column to the number of two thousand or more, and they assisted considerably in the work of destroying the railroads and the canal. his cavalry was in as fine a condition as when he started, because he had been able to find plenty of forage. he had captured most of early's horses and picked up a good many others on the road. when he reached ashland he was assailed by the enemy in force. he resisted their assault with part of his command, moved quickly across the south and north anna, going north, and reached white house safely on the 19th. the time for sherman to move had to be fixed with reference to the time he could get away from goldsboro where he then was. supplies had to be got up to him which would last him through a long march, as there would probably not be much to be obtained in the country through which he would pass. i had to arrange, therefore, that he should start from where he was, in the neighborhood of goldsboro on the 18th of april, the earliest day at which he supposed he could be ready. sherman was anxious that i should wait where i was until he could come up, and make a sure thing of it; but i had determined to move as soon as the roads and weather would admit of my doing so. i had been tied down somewhat in the matter of fixing any time at my pleasure for starting, until sheridan, who was on his way from the shenandoah valley to join me, should arrive, as both his presence and that of his cavalry were necessary to the execution of the plans which i had in mind. however, having arrived at white house on the 19th of march, i was enabled to make my plans. prompted by my anxiety lest lee should get away some night before i was aware of it, and having the lead of me, push into north carolina to join with johnston in attempting to crush out sherman, i had, as early as the 1st of the month of march, given instructions to the troops around petersburg to keep a sharp lookout to see that such a movement should not escape their notice, and to be ready strike at once if it was undertaken. it is now known that early in the month of march mr. davis and general lee had a consultation about the situation of affairs in and about and petersburg, and they both agreed places were no longer tenable for them, and that they must get away as soon as possible. they, too, were waiting for dry roads, or a condition of the roads which would make it possible to move. general lee, in aid of his plan of escape, and to secure a wider opening to enable them to reach the danville road with greater security than he would have in the way the two armies were situated, determined upon an assault upon the right of our lines around petersburg. the night of the 24th of march was fixed upon for this assault, and general gordon was assigned to the execution of the plan. the point between fort stedman and battery no. 10, where our lines were closest together, was selected as the point of his attack. the attack was to be made at night, and the troops were to get possession of the higher ground in the rear where they supposed we had intrenchments, then sweep to the right and left, create a panic in the lines of our army, and force me to contract my lines. lee hoped this would detain me a few days longer and give him an opportunity of escape. the plan was well conceived and the execution of it very well done indeed, up to the point of carrying a portion of our line. gordon assembled his troops under the cover of night, at the point at which they were to make their charge, and got possession of our picket-line, entirely without the knowledge of the troops inside of our main line of intrenchments; this reduced the distance he would have to charge over to not much more than fifty yards. for some time before the deserters had been coming in with great frequency, often bringing their arms with them, and this the confederate general knew. taking advantage of this knowledge he sent his pickets, with their arms, creeping through to ours as if to desert. when they got to our lines they at once took possession and sent our pickets to the rear as prisoners. in the main line our men were sleeping serenely, as if in great security. this plan was to have been executed and much damage done before daylight; but the troops that were to reinforce gordon had to be brought from the north side of the james river and, by some accident on the railroad on their way over, they were detained for a considerable time; so that it got to be nearly daylight before they were ready to make the charge. the charge, however, was successful and almost without loss, the enemy passing through our lines between fort stedman and battery no. 10. then turning to the right and left they captured the fort and the battery, with all the arms and troops in them. continuing the charge, they also carried batteries eleven and twelve to our left, which they turned toward city point. meade happened to be at city point that night, and this break in his line cut him off from all communication with his headquarters. parke, however, commanding the 9th corps when this breach took place, telegraphed the facts to meade's headquarters, and learning that the general was away, assumed command himself and with commendable promptitude made all preparations to drive the enemy back. general tidball gathered a large number of pieces of artillery and planted them in rear of the captured works so as to sweep the narrow space of ground between the lines very thoroughly. hartranft was soon out with his division, as also was willcox. hartranft to the right of the breach headed the rebels off in that direction and rapidly drove them back into fort stedman. on the other side they were driven back into the intrenchments which they had captured, and batteries eleven and twelve were retaken by willcox early in the morning. parke then threw a line around outside of the captured fort and batteries, and communication was once more established. the artillery fire was kept up so continuously that it was impossible for the confederates to retreat, and equally impossible for reinforcements to join them. they all, therefore, fell captives into our hands. this effort of lee's cost him about four thousand men, and resulted in their killing, wounding and capturing about two thousand of ours. after the recapture of the batteries taken by the confederates, our troops made a charge and carried the enemy's intrenched picket line, which they strengthened and held. this, in turn, gave us but a short distance to charge over when our attack came to be made a few days later. the day that gordon was making dispositions for this attack (24th of march) i issued my orders for the movement to commence on the 29th. ord, with three divisions of infantry and mackenzie's cavalry, was to move in advance on the night of the 27th, from the north side of the james river and take his place on our extreme left, thirty miles away. he left weitzel with the rest of the army of the james to hold bermuda hundred and the north of the james river. the engineer brigade was to be left at city point, and parke's corps in the lines about petersburg. (*42) ord was at his place promptly. humphreys and warren were then on our extreme left with the 2d and 5th corps. they were directed on the arrival of ord, and on his getting into position in their places, to cross hatcher's run and extend out west toward five forks, the object being to get into a position from which we could strike the south side railroad and ultimately the danville railroad. there was considerable fighting in taking up these new positions for the 2d and 5th corps, in which the army of the james had also to participate somewhat, and the losses were quite severe. this was what was known as the battle of white oak road. chapter lxiv. interview with sheridan--grand movement of the army of the potomac --sheridan's advance on five forks--battle of five forks--parke and wright storm the enemy's line--battles before petersburg. sheridan reached city point on the 26th day of march. his horses, of course, were jaded and many of them had lost their shoes. a few days of rest were necessary to recuperate the animals and also to have them shod and put in condition for moving. immediately on general sheridan's arrival at city point i prepared his instructions for the move which i had decided upon. the movement was to commence on the 29th of the month. after reading the instructions i had given him, sheridan walked out of my tent, and i followed to have some conversation with him by himself --not in the presence of anybody else, even of a member of my staff. in preparing his instructions i contemplated just what took place; that is to say, capturing five forks, driving the enemy from petersburg and richmond and terminating the contest before separating from the enemy. but the nation had already become restless and discouraged at the prolongation of the war, and many believed that it would never terminate except by compromise. knowing that unless my plan proved an entire success it would be interpreted as a disastrous defeat, i provided in these instructions that in a certain event he was to cut loose from the army of the potomac and his base of supplies, and living upon the country proceed south by the way of the danville railroad, or near it, across the roanoke, get in the rear of johnston, who was guarding that road, and cooperate with sherman in destroying johnston; then with these combined forces to help carry out the instructions which sherman already had received, to act in cooperation with the armies around petersburg and richmond. i saw that after sheridan had read his instructions he seemed somewhat disappointed at the idea, possibly, of having to cut loose again from the army of the potomac, and place himself between the two main armies of the enemy. i said to him: "general, this portion of your instructions i have put in merely as a blind;" and gave him the reason for doing so, heretofore described. i told him that, as a matter of fact, i intended to close the war right here, with this movement, and that he should go no farther. his face at once brightened up, and slapping his hand on his leg he said: "i am glad to hear it, and we can do it." sheridan was not however to make his movement against five forks until he got further instructions from me. one day, after the movement i am about to describe had commenced, and when his cavalry was on our extreme left and far to the rear, south, sheridan rode up to where my headquarters were then established, at dabney's mills. he met some of my staff officers outside, and was highly jubilant over the prospects of success, giving reasons why he believed this would prove the final and successful effort. although my chief-of-staff had urged very strongly that we return to our position about city point and in the lines around petersburg, he asked sheridan to come in to see me and say to me what he had been saying to them. sheridan felt a little modest about giving his advice where it had not been asked; so one of my staff came in and told me that sheridan had what they considered important news, and suggested that i send for him. i did so, and was glad to see the spirit of confidence with which he was imbued. knowing as i did from experience, of what great value that feeling of confidence by a commander was, i determined to make a movement at once, although on account of the rains which had fallen after i had started out the roads were still very heavy. orders were given accordingly. finally the 29th of march came, and fortunately there having been a few days free from rain, the surface of the ground was dry, giving indications that the time had come when we could move. on that date i moved out with all the army available after leaving sufficient force to hold the line about petersburg. it soon set in raining again however, and in a very short time the roads became practically impassable for teams, and almost so for cavalry. sometimes a horse or mule would be standing apparently on firm ground, when all at once one foot would sink, and as he commenced scrambling to catch himself all his feet would sink and he would have to be drawn by hand out of the quicksands so common in that part of virginia and other southern states. it became necessary therefore to build corduroy roads every foot of the way as we advanced, to move our artillery upon. the army had become so accustomed to this kind of work, and were so well prepared for it, that it was done very rapidly. the next day, march 30th, we had made sufficient progress to the south-west to warrant me in starting sheridan with his cavalry over by dinwiddie with instructions to then come up by the road leading north-west to five forks, thus menacing the right of lee's line. this movement was made for the purpose of extending our lines to the west as far as practicable towards the enemy's extreme right, or five forks. the column moving detached from the army still in the trenches was, excluding the cavalry, very small. the forces in the trenches were themselves extending to the left flank. warren was on the extreme left when the extension began, but humphreys was marched around later and thrown into line between him and five forks. my hope was that sheridan would be able to carry five forks, get on the enemy's right flank and rear, and force them to weaken their centre to protect their right so that an assault in the centre might be successfully made. general wright's corps had been designated to make this assault, which i intended to order as soon as information reached me of sheridan's success. he was to move under cover as close to the enemy as he could get. it is natural to suppose that lee would understand my design to be to get up to the south side and ultimately to the danville railroad, as soon as he had heard of the movement commenced on the 29th. these roads were so important to his very existence while he remained in richmond and petersburg, and of such vital importance to him even in case of retreat, that naturally he would make most strenuous efforts to defend them. he did on the 30th send pickett with five brigades to reinforce five forks. he also sent around to the right of his army some two or three other divisions, besides directing that other troops be held in readiness on the north side of the james river to come over on call. he came over himself to superintend in person the defence of his right flank. sheridan moved back to dinwiddie court-house on the night of the 30th, and then took a road leading north-west to five forks. he had only his cavalry with him. soon encountering the rebel cavalry he met with a very stout resistance. he gradually drove them back however until in the neighborhood of five forks. here he had to encounter other troops besides those he had been contending with, and was forced to give way. in this condition of affairs he notified me of what had taken place and stated that he was falling back toward dinwiddie gradually and slowly, and asked me to send wright's corps to his assistance. i replied to him that it was impossible to send wright's corps because that corps was already in line close up to the enemy, where we should want to assault when the proper time came, and was besides a long distance from him; but the 2d (humphreys's) and 5th (warren's) corps were on our extreme left and a little to the rear of it in a position to threaten the left flank of the enemy at five forks, and that i would send warren. accordingly orders were sent to warren to move at once that night (the 31st) to dinwiddie court house and put himself in communication with sheridan as soon as possible, and report to him. he was very slow in moving, some of his troops not starting until after 5 o'clock next morning. when he did move it was done very deliberately, and on arriving at gravelly run he found the stream swollen from the recent rains so that he regarded it as not fordable. sheridan of course knew of his coming, and being impatient to get the troops up as soon as possible, sent orders to him to hasten. he was also hastened or at least ordered to move up rapidly by general meade. he now felt that he could not cross that creek without bridges, and his orders were changed to move so as to strike the pursuing enemy in flank or get in their rear; but he was so late in getting up that sheridan determined to move forward without him. however, ayres's division of warren's corps reached him in time to be in the fight all day, most of the time separated from the remainder of the 5th corps and fighting directly under sheridan. warren reported to sheridan about 11 o'clock on the 1st, but the whole of his troops were not up so as to be much engaged until late in the afternoon. griffin's division in backing to get out of the way of a severe cross fire of the enemy was found marching away from the fighting. this did not continue long, however; the division was brought back and with ayres's division did most excellent service during the day. crawford's division of the same corps had backed still farther off, and although orders were sent repeatedly to bring it up, it was late before it finally got to where it could be of material assistance. once there it did very excellent service. sheridan succeeded by the middle of the afternoon or a little later, in advancing up to the point from which to make his designed assault upon five forks itself. he was very impatient to make the assault and have it all over before night, because the ground he occupied would be untenable for him in bivouac during the night. unless the assault was made and was successful, he would be obliged to return to dinwiddie court-house, or even further than that for the night. it was at this junction of affairs that sheridan wanted to get crawford's division in hand, and he also wanted warren. he sent staff officer after staff officer in search of warren, directing that general to report to him, but they were unable to find him. at all events sheridan was unable to get that officer to him. finally he went himself. he issued an order relieving warren and assigning griffin to the command of the 5th corps. the troops were then brought up and the assault successfully made. i was so much dissatisfied with warren's dilatory movements in the battle of white oak road and in his failure to reach sheridan in time, that i was very much afraid that at the last moment he would fail sheridan. he was a man of fine intelligence, great earnestness, quick perception, and could make his dispositions as quickly as any officer, under difficulties where he was forced to act. but i had before discovered a defect which was beyond his control, that was very prejudicial to his usefulness in emergencies like the one just before us. he could see every danger at a glance before he had encountered it. he would not only make preparations to meet the danger which might occur, but he would inform his commanding officer what others should do while he was executing his move. i had sent a staff officer to general sheridan to call his attention to these defects, and to say that as much as i liked general warren, now was not a time when we could let our personal feelings for any one stand in the way of success; and if his removal was necessary to success, not to hesitate. it was upon that authorization that sheridan removed warren. i was very sorry that it had been done, and regretted still more that i had not long before taken occasion to assign him to another field of duty. it was dusk when our troops under sheridan went over the parapets of the enemy. the two armies were mingled together there for a time in such manner that it was almost a question which one was going to demand the surrender of the other. soon, however, the enemy broke and ran in every direction; some six thousand prisoners, besides artillery and small-arms in large quantities, falling into our hands. the flying troops were pursued in different directions, the cavalry and 5th corps under sheridan pursuing the larger body which moved north-west. this pursuit continued until about nine o'clock at night, when sheridan halted his troops, and knowing the importance to him of the part of the enemy's line which had been captured, returned, sending the 5th corps across hatcher's run to just south-west of petersburg, and facing them toward it. merritt, with the cavalry, stopped and bivouacked west of five forks. this was the condition which affairs were in on the night of the 1st of april. i then issued orders for an assault by wright and parke at four o'clock on the morning of the 2d. i also ordered the 2d corps, general humphreys, and general ord with the army of the james, on the left, to hold themselves in readiness to take any advantage that could be taken from weakening in their front. i notified mr. lincoln at city point of the success of the day; in fact i had reported to him during the day and evening as i got news, because he was so much interested in the movements taking place that i wanted to relieve his mind as much as i could. i notified weitzel on the north side of the james river, directing him, also, to keep close up to the enemy, and take advantage of the withdrawal of troops from there to promptly enter the city of richmond. i was afraid that lee would regard the possession of five forks as of so much importance that he would make a last desperate effort to retake it, risking everything upon the cast of a single die. it was for this reason that i had ordered the assault to take place at once, as soon as i had received the news of the capture of five forks. the corps commanders, however, reported that it was so dark that the men could not see to move, and it would be impossible to make the assault then. but we kept up a continuous artillery fire upon the enemy around the whole line including that north of the james river, until it was light enough to move, which was about a quarter to five in the morning. at that hour parke's and wright's corps moved out as directed, brushed the _abatis_ from their front as they advanced under a heavy fire of musketry and artillery, and went without flinching directly on till they mounted the parapets and threw themselves inside of the enemy's line. parke, who was on the right, swept down to the right and captured a very considerable length of line in that direction, but at that point the outer was so near the inner line which closely enveloped the city of petersburg that he could make no advance forward and, in fact, had a very serious task to turn the lines which he had captured to the defence of his own troops and to hold them; but he succeeded in this. wright swung around to his left and moved to hatcher's run, sweeping everything before him. the enemy had traverses in rear of his captured line, under cover of which he made something of a stand, from one to another, as wright moved on; but the latter met no serious obstacle. as you proceed to the left the outer line becomes gradually much farther from the inner one, and along about hatcher's run they must be nearly two miles apart. both parke and wright captured a considerable amount of artillery and some prisoners--wright about three thousand of them. in the meantime ord and humphreys, in obedience to the instructions they had received, had succeeded by daylight, or very early in the morning, in capturing the intrenched picket-lines in their front; and before wright got up to that point, ord had also succeeded in getting inside of the enemy's intrenchments. the second corps soon followed; and the outer works of petersburg were in the hands of the national troops, never to be wrenched from them again. when wright reached hatcher's run, he sent a regiment to destroy the south side railroad just outside of the city. my headquarters were still at dabney's saw-mills. as soon as i received the news of wright's success, i sent dispatches announcing the fact to all points around the line, including the troops at bermuda hundred and those on the north side of the james, and to the president at city point. further dispatches kept coming in, and as they did i sent the additional news to these points. finding at length that they were all in, i mounted my horse to join the troops who were inside the works. when i arrived there i rode my horse over the parapet just as wright's three thousand prisoners were coming out. i was soon joined inside by general meade and his staff. lee made frantic efforts to recover at least part of the lost ground. parke on our right was repeatedly assaulted, but repulsed every effort. before noon longstreet was ordered up from the north side of the james river thus bringing the bulk of lee's army around to the support of his extreme right. as soon as i learned this i notified weitzel and directed him to keep up close to the enemy and to have hartsuff, commanding the bermuda hundred front, to do the same thing, and if they found any break to go in; hartsuff especially should do so, for this would separate richmond and petersburg. sheridan, after he had returned to five forks, swept down to petersburg, coming in on our left. this gave us a continuous line from the appomattox river below the city to the same river above. at eleven o'clock, not having heard from sheridan, i reinforced parke with two brigades from city point. with this additional force he completed his captured works for better defence, and built back from his right, so as to protect his flank. he also carried in and made an _abatis_ between himself and the enemy. lee brought additional troops and artillery against parke even after this was done, and made several assaults with very heavy losses. the enemy had in addition to their intrenched line close up to petersburg, two enclosed works outside of it, fort gregg and fort whitworth. we thought it had now become necessary to carry them by assault. about one o'clock in the day, fort gregg was assaulted by foster's division of the 24th corps (gibbon's), supported by two brigades from ord's command. the battle was desperate and the national troops were repulsed several times; but it was finally carried, and immediately the troops in fort whitworth evacuated the place. the guns of fort gregg were turned upon the retreating enemy, and the commanding officer with some sixty of the men of fort whitworth surrendered. i had ordered miles in the morning to report to sheridan. in moving to execute this order he came upon the enemy at the intersection of the white oak road and the claiborne road. the enemy fell back to sutherland station on the south side road and were followed by miles. this position, naturally a strong and defensible one, was also strongly intrenched. sheridan now came up and miles asked permission from him to make the assault, which sheridan gave. by this time humphreys had got through the outer works in his front, and came up also and assumed command over miles, who commanded a division in his corps. i had sent an order to humphreys to turn to his right and move towards petersburg. this order he now got, and started off, thus leaving miles alone. the latter made two assaults, both of which failed, and he had to fall back a few hundred yards. hearing that miles had been left in this position, i directed humphreys to send a division back to his relief. he went himself. sheridan before starting to sweep down to petersburg had sent merritt with his cavalry to the west to attack some confederate cavalry that had assembled there. merritt drove them north to the appomattox river. sheridan then took the enemy at sutherland station on the reverse side from where miles was, and the two together captured the place, with a large number of prisoners and some pieces of artillery, and put the remainder, portions of three confederate corps, to flight. sheridan followed, and drove them until night, when further pursuit was stopped. miles bivouacked for the night on the ground which he with sheridan had carried so handsomely by assault. i cannot explain the situation here better than by giving my dispatch to city point that evening: boydton road, near petersburg, april 2, 1865.--4.40 p.m. colonel t. s. bowers, city point. we are now up and have a continuous line of troops, and in a few hours will be intrenched from the appomattox below petersburg to the river above. heth's and wilcox's divisions, such part of them as were not captured, were cut off from town, either designedly on their part or because they could not help it. sheridan with the cavalry and 5th corps is above them. miles's division, 2d corps, was sent from the white oak road to sutherland station on the south side railroad, where he met them, and at last accounts was engaged with them. not knowing whether sheridan would get up in time, general humphreys was sent with another division from here. the whole captures since the army started out gunning will amount to not less than twelve thousand men, and probably fifty pieces of artillery. i do not know the number of men and guns accurately however. * * * i think the president might come out and pay us a visit tomorrow. u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. during the night of april 2d our line was intrenched from the river above to the river below. i ordered a bombardment to be commenced the next morning at five a.m., to be followed by an assault at six o'clock; but the enemy evacuated petersburg early in the morning. chapter lxv. the capture of petersburg--meeting president lincoln in petersburg--the capture of richmond--pursuing the enemy--visit to sheridan and meade. general meade and i entered petersburg on the morning of the 3d and took a position under cover of a house which protected us from the enemy's musketry which was flying thick and fast there. as we would occasionally look around the corner we could see the streets and the appomattox bottom, presumably near the bridge, packed with the confederate army. i did not have artillery brought up, because i was sure lee was trying to make his escape, and i wanted to push immediately in pursuit. at all events i had not the heart to turn the artillery upon such a mass of defeated and fleeing men, and i hoped to capture them soon. soon after the enemy had entirely evacuated petersburg, a man came in who represented himself to be an engineer of the army of northern virginia. he said that lee had for some time been at work preparing a strong enclosed intrenchment, into which he would throw himself when forced out of petersburg, and fight his final battle there; that he was actually at that time drawing his troops from richmond, and falling back into this prepared work. this statement was made to general meade and myself when we were together. i had already given orders for the movement up the south side of the appomattox for the purpose of heading off lee; but meade was so much impressed by this man's story that he thought we ought to cross the appomattox there at once and move against lee in his new position. i knew that lee was no fool, as he would have been to have put himself and his army between two formidable streams like the james and appomattox rivers, and between two such armies as those of the potomac and the james. then these streams coming together as they did to the east of him, it would be only necessary to close up in the west to have him thoroughly cut off from all supplies or possibility of reinforcement. it would only have been a question of days, and not many of them, if he had taken the position assigned to him by the so-called engineer, when he would have been obliged to surrender his army. such is one of the ruses resorted to in war to deceive your antagonist. my judgment was that lee would necessarily have to evacuate richmond, and that the only course for him to pursue would be to follow the danville road. accordingly my object was to secure a point on that road south of lee, and i told meade this. he suggested that if lee was going that way we would follow him. my reply was that we did not want to follow him; we wanted to get ahead of him and cut him off, and if he would only stay in the position he (meade) believed him to be in at that time, i wanted nothing better; that when we got in possession of the danville railroad, at its crossing of the appomattox river, if we still found him between the two rivers, all we had to do was to move eastward and close him up. that we would then have all the advantage we could possibly have by moving directly against him from petersburg, even if he remained in the position assigned him by the engineer officer. i had held most of the command aloof from the intrenchments, so as to start them out on the danville road early in the morning, supposing that lee would be gone during the night. during the night i strengthened sheridan by sending him humphreys's corps. lee, as we now know, had advised the authorities at richmond, during the day, of the condition of affairs, and told them it would be impossible for him to hold out longer than night, if he could hold out that long. davis was at church when he received lee's dispatch. the congregation was dismissed with the notice that there would be no evening service. the rebel government left richmond about two o'clock in the afternoon of the 2d. at night lee ordered his troops to assemble at amelia court house, his object being to get away, join johnston if possible, and to try to crush sherman before i could get there. as soon as i was sure of this i notified sheridan and directed him to move out on the danville railroad to the south side of the appomattox river as speedily as possible. he replied that he already had some of his command nine miles out. i then ordered the rest of the army of the potomac under meade to follow the same road in the morning. parke's corps followed by the same road, and the army of the james was directed to follow the road which ran alongside of the south side railroad to burke's station, and to repair the railroad and telegraph as they proceeded. that road was a 5 feet gauge, while our rolling stock was all of the 4 feet 8 1/2 inches gauge; consequently the rail on one side of the track had to be taken up throughout the whole length and relaid so as to conform to the gauge of our cars and locomotives. mr. lincoln was at city point at the time, and had been for some days. i would have let him know what i contemplated doing, only while i felt a strong conviction that the move was going to be successful, yet it might not prove so; and then i would have only added another to the many disappointments he had been suffering for the past three years. but when we started out he saw that we were moving for a purpose, and bidding us godspeed, remained there to hear the result. the next morning after the capture of petersburg, i telegraphed mr. lincoln asking him to ride out there and see me, while i would await his arrival. i had started all the troops out early in the morning, so that after the national army left petersburg there was not a soul to be seen, not even an animal in the streets. there was absolutely no one there, except my staff officers and, possibly, a small escort of cavalry. we had selected the piazza of a deserted house, and occupied it until the president arrived. about the first thing that mr. lincoln said to me, after warm congratulations for the victory, and thanks both to myself and to the army which had accomplished it, was: "do you know, general, that i have had a sort of a sneaking idea for some days that you intended to do something like this." our movements having been successful up to this point, i no longer had any object in concealing from the president all my movements, and the objects i had in view. he remained for some days near city point, and i communicated with him frequently and fully by telegraph. mr. lincoln knew that it had been arranged for sherman to join me at a fixed time, to co-operate in the destruction of lee's army. i told him that i had been very anxious to have the eastern armies vanquish their old enemy who had so long resisted all their repeated and gallant attempts to subdue them or drive them from their capital. the western armies had been in the main successful until they had conquered all the territory from the mississippi river to the state of north carolina, and were now almost ready to knock at the back door of richmond, asking admittance. i said to him that if the western armies should be even upon the field, operating against richmond and lee, the credit would be given to them for the capture, by politicians and non-combatants from the section of country which those troops hailed from. it might lead to disagreeable bickerings between members of congress of the east and those of the west in some of their debates. western members might be throwing it up to the members of the east that in the suppression of the rebellion they were not able to capture an army, or to accomplish much in the way of contributing toward that end, but had to wait until the western armies had conquered all the territory south and west of them, and then come on to help them capture the only army they had been engaged with. mr. lincoln said he saw that now, but had never thought of it before, because his anxiety was so great that he did not care where the aid came from so the work was done. the army of the potomac has every reason to be proud of its four years' record in the suppression of the rebellion. the army it had to fight was the protection to the capital of a people which was attempting to found a nation upon the territory of the united states. its loss would be the loss of the cause. every energy, therefore, was put forth by the confederacy to protect and maintain their capital. everything else would go if it went. lee's army had to be strengthened to enable it to maintain its position, no matter what territory was wrested from the south in another quarter. i never expected any such bickering as i have indicated, between the soldiers of the two sections; and, fortunately, there has been none between the politicians. possibly i am the only one who thought of the liability of such a state of things in advance. when our conversation was at an end mr. lincoln mounted his horse and started on his return to city point, while i and my staff started to join the army, now a good many miles in advance. up to this time i had not received the report of the capture of richmond. soon after i left president lincoln i received a dispatch from general weitzel which notified me that he had taken possession of richmond at about 8.15 o'clock in the morning of that day, the 3d, and that he had found the city on fire in two places. the city was in the most utter confusion. the authorities had taken the precaution to empty all the liquor into the gutter, and to throw out the provisions which the confederate government had left, for the people to gather up. the city had been deserted by the authorities, civil and military, without any notice whatever that they were about to leave. in fact, up to the very hour of the evacuation the people had been led to believe that lee had gained an important victory somewhere around petersburg. weitzel's command found evidence of great demoralization in lee's army, there being still a great many men and even officers in the town. the city was on fire. our troops were directed to extinguish the flames, which they finally succeeded in doing. the fire had been started by some one connected with the retreating army. all authorities deny that it was authorized, and i presume it was the work of excited men who were leaving what they regarded as their capital and may have felt that it was better to destroy it than have it fall into the hands of their enemy. be that as it may, the national troops found the city in flames, and used every effort to extinguish them. the troops that had formed lee's right, a great many of them, were cut off from getting back into petersburg, and were pursued by our cavalry so hotly and closely that they threw away caissons, ammunition, clothing, and almost everything to lighten their loads, and pushed along up the appomattox river until finally they took water and crossed over. i left mr. lincoln and started, as i have already said, to join the command, which halted at sutherland station, about nine miles out. we had still time to march as much farther, and time was an object; but the roads were bad and the trains belonging to the advance corps had blocked up the road so that it was impossible to get on. then, again, our cavalry had struck some of the enemy and were pursuing them; and the orders were that the roads should be given up to the cavalry whenever they appeared. this caused further delay. general wright, who was in command of one of the corps which were left back, thought to gain time by letting his men go into bivouac and trying to get up some rations for them, and clearing out the road, so that when they did start they would be uninterrupted. humphreys, who was far ahead, was also out of rations. they did not succeed in getting them up through the night; but the army of the potomac, officers and men, were so elated by the reflection that at last they were following up a victory to its end, that they preferred marching without rations to running a possible risk of letting the enemy elude them. so the march was resumed at three o'clock in the morning. merritt's cavalry had struck the enemy at deep creek, and driven them north to the appomattox, where, i presume, most of them were forced to cross. on the morning of the 4th i learned that lee had ordered rations up from danville for his famishing army, and that they were to meet him at farmville. this showed that lee had already abandoned the idea of following the railroad down to danville, but had determined to go farther west, by the way of farmville. i notified sheridan of this and directed him to get possession of the road before the supplies could reach lee. he responded that he had already sent crook's division to get upon the road between burkesville and jetersville, then to face north and march along the road upon the latter place; and he thought crook must be there now. the bulk of the army moved directly for jetersville by two roads. after i had received the dispatch from sheridan saying that crook was on the danville road, i immediately ordered meade to make a forced march with the army of the potomac, and to send parke's corps across from the road they were on to the south side railroad, to fall in the rear of the army of the james and to protect the railroad which that army was repairing as it went along. our troops took possession of jetersville and in the telegraph office, they found a dispatch from lee, ordering two hundred thousand rations from danville. the dispatch had not been sent, but sheridan sent a special messenger with it to burkesville and had it forwarded from there. in the meantime, however, dispatches from other sources had reached danville, and they knew there that our army was on the line of the road; so that they sent no further supplies from that quarter. at this time merritt and mackenzie, with the cavalry, were off between the road which the army of the potomac was marching on and the appomattox river, and were attacking the enemy in flank. they picked up a great many prisoners and forced the abandonment of some property. lee intrenched himself at amelia court house, and also his advance north of jetersville, and sent his troops out to collect forage. the country was very poor and afforded but very little. his foragers scattered a great deal; many of them were picked up by our men, and many others never returned to the army of northern virginia. griffin's corps was intrenched across the railroad south of jetersville, and sheridan notified me of the situation. i again ordered meade up with all dispatch, sheridan having but the one corps of infantry with a little cavalry confronting lee's entire army. meade, always prompt in obeying orders, now pushed forward with great energy, although he was himself sick and hardly able to be out of bed. humphreys moved at two, and wright at three o'clock in the morning, without rations, as i have said, the wagons being far in the rear. i stayed that night at wilson's station on the south side railroad. on the morning of the 5th i sent word to sheridan of the progress meade was making, and suggested that he might now attack lee. we had now no other objective than the confederate armies, and i was anxious to close the thing up at once. on the 5th i marched again with ord's command until within about ten miles of burkesville, where i stopped to let his army pass. i then received from sheridan the following dispatch: "the whole of lee's army is at or near amelia court house, and on this side of it. general davies, whom i sent out to painesville on their right flank, has just captured six pieces of artillery and some wagons. we can capture the army of northern virginia if force enough can be thrown to this point, and then advance upon it. my cavalry was at burkesville yesterday, and six miles beyond, on the danville road, last night. general lee is at amelia court house in person. they are out of rations, or nearly so. they were advancing up the railroad towards burkesville yesterday, when we intercepted them at this point." it now became a life and death struggle with lee to get south to his provisions. sheridan, thinking the enemy might turn off immediately towards farmville, moved davies's brigade of cavalry out to watch him. davies found the movement had already commenced. he attacked and drove away their cavalry which was escorting wagons to the west, capturing and burning 180 wagons. he also captured five pieces of artillery. the confederate infantry then moved against him and probably would have handled him very roughly, but sheridan had sent two more brigades of cavalry to follow davies, and they came to his relief in time. a sharp engagement took place between these three brigades of cavalry and the enemy's infantry, but the latter was repulsed. meade himself reached jetersville about two o'clock in the afternoon, but in advance of all his troops. the head of humphreys's corps followed in about an hour afterwards. sheridan stationed the troops as they came up, at meade's request, the latter still being very sick. he extended two divisions of this corps off to the west of the road to the left of griffin's corps, and one division to the right. the cavalry by this time had also come up, and they were put still farther off to the left, sheridan feeling certain that there lay the route by which the enemy intended to escape. he wanted to attack, feeling that if time was given, the enemy would get away; but meade prevented this, preferring to wait till his troops were all up. at this juncture sheridan sent me a letter which had been handed to him by a colored man, with a note from himself saying that he wished i was there myself. the letter was dated amelia court house, april 5th, and signed by colonel taylor. it was to his mother, and showed the demoralization of the confederate army. sheridan's note also gave me the information as here related of the movements of that day. i received a second message from sheridan on the 5th, in which he urged more emphatically the importance of my presence. this was brought to me by a scout in gray uniform. it was written on tissue paper, and wrapped up in tin-foil such as chewing tobacco is folded in. this was a precaution taken so that if the scout should be captured he could take this tin-foil out of his pocket and putting it into his mouth, chew it. it would cause no surprise at all to see a confederate soldier chewing tobacco. it was nearly night when this letter was received. i gave ord directions to continue his march to burkesville and there intrench himself for the night, and in the morning to move west to cut off all the roads between there and farmville. i then started with a few of my staff and a very small escort of cavalry, going directly through the woods, to join meade's army. the distance was about sixteen miles; but the night being dark our progress was slow through the woods in the absence of direct roads. however, we got to the outposts about ten o'clock in the evening, and after some little parley convinced the sentinels of our identity and were conducted in to where sheridan was bivouacked. we talked over the situation for some little time, sheridan explaining to me what he thought lee was trying to do, and that meade's orders, if carried out, moving to the right flank, would give him the coveted opportunity of escaping us and putting us in rear of him. we then together visited meade, reaching his headquarters about midnight. i explained to meade that we did not want to follow the enemy; we wanted to get ahead of him, and that his orders would allow the enemy to escape, and besides that, i had no doubt that lee was moving right then. meade changed his orders at once. they were now given for an advance on amelia court house, at an early hour in the morning, as the army then lay; that is, the infantry being across the railroad, most of it to the west of the road, with the cavalry swung out still farther to the left. chapter lxvi. battle of sailor's creek--engagement at farmville--correspondence with general lee--sheridan intercepts the enemy. the appomattox, going westward, takes a long sweep to the south-west from the neighborhood of the richmond and danville railroad bridge, and then trends north-westerly. sailor's creek, an insignificant stream, running northward, empties into the appomattox between the high bridge and jetersville. near the high bridge the stage road from petersburg to lynchburg crosses the appomattox river, also on a bridge. the railroad runs on the north side of the river to farmville, a few miles west, and from there, recrossing, continues on the south side of it. the roads coming up from the south-east to farmville cross the appomattox river there on a bridge and run on the north side, leaving the lynchburg and petersburg railroad well to the left. lee, in pushing out from amelia court house, availed himself of all the roads between the danville road and appomattox river to move upon, and never permitted the head of his columns to stop because of any fighting that might be going on in his rear. in this way he came very near succeeding in getting to his provision trains and eluding us with at least part of his army. as expected, lee's troops had moved during the night before, and our army in moving upon amelia court house soon encountered them. there was a good deal of fighting before sailor's creek was reached. our cavalry charged in upon a body of theirs which was escorting a wagon train in order to get it past our left. a severe engagement ensued, in which we captured many prisoners, and many men also were killed and wounded. there was as much gallantry displayed by some of the confederates in these little engagements as was displayed at any time during the war, notwithstanding the sad defeats of the past week. the armies finally met on sailor's creek, when a heavy engagement took place, in which infantry, artillery and cavalry were all brought into action. our men on the right, as they were brought in against the enemy, came in on higher ground, and upon his flank, giving us every advantage to be derived from the lay of the country. our firing was also very much more rapid, because the enemy commenced his retreat westward and in firing as he retreated had to turn around every time he fired. the enemy's loss was very heavy, as well in killed and wounded as in captures. some six general officers fell into our hands in this engagement, and seven thousand men were made prisoners. this engagement was commenced in the middle of the afternoon of the 6th, and the retreat and pursuit were continued until nightfall, when the armies bivouacked upon the ground where the night had overtaken them. when the move towards amelia court house had commenced that morning, i ordered wright's corps, which was on the extreme right, to be moved to the left past the whole army, to take the place of griffin's, and ordered the latter at the same time to move by and place itself on the right. the object of this movement was to get the 6th corps, wright's, next to the cavalry, with which they had formerly served so harmoniously and so efficiently in the valley of virginia. the 6th corps now remained with the cavalry and under sheridan's direct command until after the surrender. ord had been directed to take possession of all the roads southward between burkesville and the high bridge. on the morning of the 6th he sent colonel washburn with two infantry regiments with instructions to destroy high bridge and to return rapidly to burkesville station; and he prepared himself to resist the enemy there. soon after washburn had started ord became a little alarmed as to his safety and sent colonel read, of his staff, with about eighty cavalrymen, to overtake him and bring him back. very shortly after this he heard that the head of lee's column had got up to the road between him and where washburn now was, and attempted to send reinforcements, but the reinforcements could not get through. read, however, had got through ahead of the enemy. he rode on to farmville and was on his way back again when he found his return cut off, and washburn confronting apparently the advance of lee's army. read drew his men up into line of battle, his force now consisting of less than six hundred men, infantry and cavalry, and rode along their front, making a speech to his men to inspire them with the same enthusiasm that he himself felt. he then gave the order to charge. this little band made several charges, of course unsuccessful ones, but inflicted a loss upon the enemy more than equal to their own entire number. colonel read fell mortally wounded, and then washburn; and at the close of the conflict nearly every officer of the command and most of the rank and file had been either killed or wounded. the remainder then surrendered. the confederates took this to be only the advance of a larger column which had headed them off, and so stopped to intrench; so that this gallant band of six hundred had checked the progress of a strong detachment of the confederate army. this stoppage of lee's column no doubt saved to us the trains following. lee himself pushed on and crossed the wagon road bridge near the high bridge, and attempted to destroy it. he did set fire to it, but the flames had made but little headway when humphreys came up with his corps and drove away the rear-guard which had been left to protect it while it was being burned up. humphreys forced his way across with some loss, and followed lee to the intersection of the road crossing at farmville with the one from petersburg. here lee held a position which was very strong, naturally, besides being intrenched. humphreys was alone, confronting him all through the day, and in a very hazardous position. he put on a bold face, however, and assaulted with some loss, but was not assaulted in return. our cavalry had gone farther south by the way of prince edward's court house, along with the 5th corps (griffin's), ord falling in between griffin and the appomattox. crook's division of cavalry and wright's corps pushed on west of farmville. when the cavalry reached farmville they found that some of the confederates were in ahead of them, and had already got their trains of provisions back to that point; but our troops were in time to prevent them from securing anything to eat, although they succeeded in again running the trains off, so that we did not get them for some time. these troops retreated to the north side of the appomattox to join lee, and succeeded in destroying the bridge after them. considerable fighting ensued there between wright's corps and a portion of our cavalry and the confederates, but finally the cavalry forded the stream and drove them away. wright built a foot-bridge for his men to march over on and then marched out to the junction of the roads to relieve humphreys, arriving there that night. i had stopped the night before at burkesville junction. our troops were then pretty much all out of the place, but we had a field hospital there, and ord's command was extended from that point towards farmville. here i met dr. smith, a virginian and an officer of the regular army, who told me that in a conversation with general ewell, one of the prisoners and a relative of his, ewell had said that when we had got across the james river he knew their cause was lost, and it was the duty of their authorities to make the best terms they could while they still had a right to claim concessions. the authorities thought differently, however. now the cause was lost and they had no right to claim anything. he said further, that for every man that was killed after this in the war somebody is responsible, and it would be but very little better than murder. he was not sure that lee would consent to surrender his army without being able to consult with the president, but he hoped he would. i rode in to farmville on the 7th, arriving there early in the day. sheridan and ord were pushing through, away to the south. meade was back towards the high bridge, and humphreys confronting lee as before stated. after having gone into bivouac at prince edward's court house, sheridan learned that seven trains of provisions and forage were at appomattox, and determined to start at once and capture them; and a forced march was necessary in order to get there before lee's army could secure them. he wrote me a note telling me this. this fact, together with the incident related the night before by dr. smith, gave me the idea of opening correspondence with general lee on the subject of the surrender of his army. i therefore wrote to him on this day, as follows: headquarters armies of the u. s., 5 p.m., april 7, 1865. general r. e. lee commanding c. s. a. the result of the last week must convince you of the hopelessness of further resistance on the part of the army of northern virginia in this struggle. i feel that it is so, and regard it as my duty to shift from myself the responsibility of any further effusion of blood, by asking of you the surrender of that portion of the confederate states army known as the army of northern virginia. u. s. grant, lieut.-general. lee replied on the evening of the same day as follows: april 7, 1865. general: i have received your note of this day. though not entertaining the opinion you express on the hopelessness of further resistance on the part of the army of northern virginia, i reciprocate your desire to avoid useless effusion of blood, and therefore before considering your proposition, ask the terms you will offer on condition of its surrender. r. e. lee, general. lieut.-general u. s. grant, commanding armies of the u. s. this was not satisfactory, but i regarded it as deserving another letter and wrote him as follows: april 8, 1865. general r. e. lee, commanding c. s. a. your note of last evening in reply to mine of same date, asking the condition on which i will accept the surrender of the army of northern virginia is just received. in reply i would say that, peace being my great desire, there is but one condition i would insist upon, namely: that the men and officers surrendered shall be disqualified for taking up arms again against the government of the united states until properly exchanged. i will meet you, or will designate officers to meet any officers you may name for the same purpose, at any point agreeable to you, for the purpose of arranging definitely the terms upon which the surrender of the army of northern virginia will be received. u. s. grant, lieut.-general. lee's army was rapidly crumbling. many of his soldiers had enlisted from that part of the state where they now were, and were continually dropping out of the ranks and going to their homes. i know that i occupied a hotel almost destitute of furniture at farmville, which had probably been used as a confederate hospital. the next morning when i came out i found a confederate colonel there, who reported to me and said that he was the proprietor of that house, and that he was a colonel of a regiment that had been raised in that neighborhood. he said that when he came along past home, he found that he was the only man of the regiment remaining with lee's army, so he just dropped out, and now wanted to surrender himself. i told him to stay there and he would not be molested. that was one regiment which had been eliminated from lee's force by this crumbling process. although sheridan had been marching all day, his troops moved with alacrity and without any straggling. they began to see the end of what they had been fighting four years for. nothing seemed to fatigue them. they were ready to move without rations and travel without rest until the end. straggling had entirely ceased, and every man was now a rival for the front. the infantry marched about as rapidly as the cavalry could. sheridan sent custer with his division to move south of appomattox station, which is about five miles south-west of the court house, to get west of the trains and destroy the roads to the rear. they got there the night of the 8th, and succeeded partially; but some of the train men had just discovered the movement of our troops and succeeded in running off three of the trains. the other four were held by custer. the head of lee's column came marching up there on the morning of the 9th, not dreaming, i suppose, that there were any union soldiers near. the confederates were surprised to find our cavalry had possession of the trains. however, they were desperate and at once assaulted, hoping to recover them. in the melee that ensued they succeeded in burning one of the trains, but not in getting anything from it. custer then ordered the other trains run back on the road towards farmville, and the fight continued. so far, only our cavalry and the advance of lee's army were engaged. soon, however, lee's men were brought up from the rear, no doubt expecting they had nothing to meet but our cavalry. but our infantry had pushed forward so rapidly that by the time the enemy got up they found griffin's corps and the army of the james confronting them. a sharp engagement ensued, but lee quickly set up a white flag. chapter lxvii. negotiations at appomattox--interview with lee at mclean's house--the terms of surrender--lee's surrender--interview with lee after the surrender. on the 8th i had followed the army of the potomac in rear of lee. i was suffering very severely with a sick headache, and stopped at a farmhouse on the road some distance in rear of the main body of the army. i spent the night in bathing my feet in hot water and mustard, and putting mustard plasters on my wrists and the back part of my neck, hoping to be cured by morning. during the night i received lee's answer to my letter of the 8th, inviting an interview between the lines on the following morning. (*43) but it was for a different purpose from that of surrendering his army, and i answered him as follows: headquarters armies of the u. s., april 9, 1865. general r. e. lee, commanding c. s. a. your note of yesterday is received. as i have no authority to treat on the subject of peace, the meeting proposed for ten a.m. to-day could lead to no good. i will state, however, general, that i am equally anxious for peace with yourself, and the whole north entertains the same feeling. the terms upon which peace can be had are well understood. by the south laying down their arms they will hasten that most desirable event, save thousands of human lives and hundreds of millions of property not yet destroyed. sincerely hoping that all our difficulties may be settled without the loss of another life, i subscribe myself, etc., u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. i proceeded at an early hour in the morning, still suffering with the headache, to get to the head of the column. i was not more than two or three miles from appomattox court house at the time, but to go direct i would have to pass through lee's army, or a portion of it. i had therefore to move south in order to get upon a road coming up from another direction. when the white flag was put out by lee, as already described, i was in this way moving towards appomattox court house, and consequently could not be communicated with immediately, and be informed of what lee had done. lee, therefore, sent a flag to the rear to advise meade and one to the front to sheridan, saying that he had sent a message to me for the purpose of having a meeting to consult about the surrender of his army, and asked for a suspension of hostilities until i could be communicated with. as they had heard nothing of this until the fighting had got to be severe and all going against lee, both of these commanders hesitated very considerably about suspending hostilities at all. they were afraid it was not in good faith, and we had the army of northern virginia where it could not escape except by some deception. they, however, finally consented to a suspension of hostilities for two hours to give an opportunity of communicating with me in that time, if possible. it was found that, from the route i had taken, they would probably not be able to communicate with me and get an answer back within the time fixed unless the messenger should pass through the rebel lines. lee, therefore, sent an escort with the officer bearing this message through his lines to me. april 9, 1865. general: i received your note of this morning on the picket-line whither i had come to meet you and ascertain definitely what terms were embraced in your proposal of yesterday with reference to the surrender of this army. i now request an interview in accordance with the offer contained in your letter of yesterday for that purpose. r. e. lee, general. lieutenant-general u. s. grant commanding u. s. armies. when the officer reached me i was still suffering with the sick headache, but the instant i saw the contents of the note i was cured. i wrote the following note in reply and hastened on: april 9, 1865. general r. e. lee, commanding c. s. armies. your note of this date is but this moment (11.50 a.m.) received, in consequence of my having passed from the richmond and lynchburg road to the farmville and lynchburg road. i am at this writing about four miles west of walker's church and will push forward to the front for the purpose of meeting you. notice sent to me on this road where you wish the interview to take place will meet me. u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. i was conducted at once to where sheridan was located with his troops drawn up in line of battle facing the confederate army near by. they were very much excited, and expressed their view that this was all a ruse employed to enable the confederates to get away. they said they believed that johnston was marching up from north carolina now, and lee was moving to join him; and they would whip the rebels where they now were in five minutes if i would only let them go in. but i had no doubt about the good faith of lee, and pretty soon was conducted to where he was. i found him at the house of a mr. mclean, at appomattox court house, with colonel marshall, one of his staff officers, awaiting my arrival. the head of his column was occupying a hill, on a portion of which was an apple orchard, beyond a little valley which separated it from that on the crest of which sheridan's forces were drawn up in line of battle to the south. before stating what took place between general lee and myself, i will give all there is of the story of the famous apple tree. wars produce many stories of fiction, some of which are told until they are believed to be true. the war of the rebellion was no exception to this rule, and the story of the apple tree is one of those fictions based on a slight foundation of fact. as i have said, there was an apple orchard on the side of the hill occupied by the confederate forces. running diagonally up the hill was a wagon road, which, at one point, ran very near one of the trees, so that the wheels of vehicles had, on that side, cut off the roots of this tree, leaving a little embankment. general babcock, of my staff, reported to me that when he first met general lee he was sitting upon this embankment with his feet in the road below and his back resting against the tree. the story had no other foundation than that. like many other stories, it would be very good if it was only true. i had known general lee in the old army, and had served with him in the mexican war; but did not suppose, owing to the difference in our age and rank, that he would remember me, while i would more naturally remember him distinctly, because he was the chief of staff of general scott in the mexican war. when i had left camp that morning i had not expected so soon the result that was then taking place, and consequently was in rough garb. i was without a sword, as i usually was when on horseback on the field, and wore a soldier's blouse for a coat, with the shoulder straps of my rank to indicate to the army who i was. when i went into the house i found general lee. we greeted each other, and after shaking hands took our seats. i had my staff with me, a good portion of whom were in the room during the whole of the interview. what general lee's feelings were i do not know. as he was a man of much dignity, with an impassible face, it was impossible to say whether he felt inwardly glad that the end had finally come, or felt sad over the result, and was too manly to show it. whatever his feelings, they were entirely concealed from my observation; but my own feelings, which had been quite jubilant on the receipt of his letter, were sad and depressed. i felt like anything rather than rejoicing at the downfall of a foe who had fought so long and valiantly, and had suffered so much for a cause, though that cause was, i believe, one of the worst for which a people ever fought, and one for which there was the least excuse. i do not question, however, the sincerity of the great mass of those who were opposed to us. general lee was dressed in a full uniform which was entirely new, and was wearing a sword of considerable value, very likely the sword which had been presented by the state of virginia; at all events, it was an entirely different sword from the one that would ordinarily be worn in the field. in my rough traveling suit, the uniform of a private with the straps of a lieutenant-general, i must have contrasted very strangely with a man so handsomely dressed, six feet high and of faultless form. but this was not a matter that i thought of until afterwards. we soon fell into a conversation about old army times. he remarked that he remembered me very well in the old army; and i told him that as a matter of course i remembered him perfectly, but from the difference in our rank and years (there being about sixteen years' difference in our ages), i had thought it very likely that i had not attracted his attention sufficiently to be remembered by him after such a long interval. our conversation grew so pleasant that i almost forgot the object of our meeting. after the conversation had run on in this style for some time, general lee called my attention to the object of our meeting, and said that he had asked for this interview for the purpose of getting from me the terms i proposed to give his army. i said that i meant merely that his army should lay down their arms, not to take them up again during the continuance of the war unless duly and properly exchanged. he said that he had so understood my letter. then we gradually fell off again into conversation about matters foreign to the subject which had brought us together. this continued for some little time, when general lee again interrupted the course of the conversation by suggesting that the terms i proposed to give his army ought to be written out. i called to general parker, secretary on my staff, for writing materials, and commenced writing out the following terms: appomattox c. h., va., ap 19th, 1865. gen. r. e. lee, comd'g c. s. a. gen: in accordance with the substance of my letter to you of the 8th inst., i propose to receive the surrender of the army of n. va. on the following terms, to wit: rolls of all the officers and men to be made in duplicate. one copy to be given to an officer designated by me, the other to be retained by such officer or officers as you may designate. the officers to give their individual paroles not to take up arms against the government of the united states until properly exchanged, and each company or regimental commander sign a like parole for the men of their commands. the arms, artillery and public property to be parked and stacked, and turned over to the officer appointed by me to receive them. this will not embrace the side-arms of the officers, nor their private horses or baggage. this done, each officer and man will be allowed to return to their homes, not to be disturbed by united states authority so long as they observe their paroles and the laws in force where they may reside. very respectfully, u. s. grant, lt. gen. when i put my pen to the paper i did not know the first word that i should make use of in writing the terms. i only knew what was in my mind, and i wished to express it clearly, so that there could be no mistaking it. as i wrote on, the thought occurred to me that the officers had their own private horses and effects, which were important to them, but of no value to us; also that it would be an unnecessary humiliation to call upon them to deliver their side arms. no conversation, not one word, passed between general lee and myself, either about private property, side arms, or kindred subjects. he appeared to have no objections to the terms first proposed; or if he had a point to make against them he wished to wait until they were in writing to make it. when he read over that part of the terms about side arms, horses and private property of the officers, he remarked, with some feeling, i thought, that this would have a happy effect upon his army. then, after a little further conversation, general lee remarked to me again that their army was organized a little differently from the army of the united states (still maintaining by implication that we were two countries); that in their army the cavalrymen and artillerists owned their own horses; and he asked if he was to understand that the men who so owned their horses were to be permitted to retain them. i told him that as the terms were written they would not; that only the officers were permitted to take their private property. he then, after reading over the terms a second time, remarked that that was clear. i then said to him that i thought this would be about the last battle of the war--i sincerely hoped so; and i said further i took it that most of the men in the ranks were small farmers. the whole country had been so raided by the two armies that it was doubtful whether they would be able to put in a crop to carry themselves and their families through the next winter without the aid of the horses they were then riding. the united states did not want them and i would, therefore, instruct the officers i left behind to receive the paroles of his troops to let every man of the confederate army who claimed to own a horse or mule take the animal to his home. lee remarked again that this would have a happy effect. he then sat down and wrote out the following letter: headquarters army of northern virginia, april 9, 1865. general:--i received your letter of this date containing the terms of the surrender of the army of northern virginia as proposed by you. as they are substantially the same as those expressed in your letter of the 8th inst., they are accepted. i will proceed to designate the proper officers to carry the stipulations into effect. r. e. lee, general. lieut.-general u. s. grant. while duplicates of the two letters were being made, the union generals present were severally presented to general lee. the much talked of surrendering of lee's sword and my handing it back, this and much more that has been said about it is the purest romance. the word sword or side arms was not mentioned by either of us until i wrote it in the terms. there was no premeditation, and it did not occur to me until the moment i wrote it down. if i had happened to omit it, and general lee had called my attention to it, i should have put it in the terms precisely as i acceded to the provision about the soldiers retaining their horses. general lee, after all was completed and before taking his leave, remarked that his army was in a very bad condition for want of food, and that they were without forage; that his men had been living for some days on parched corn exclusively, and that he would have to ask me for rations and forage. i told him "certainly," and asked for how many men he wanted rations. his answer was "about twenty-five thousand;" and i authorized him to send his own commissary and quartermaster to appomattox station, two or three miles away, where he could have, out of the trains we had stopped, all the provisions wanted. as for forage, we had ourselves depended almost entirely upon the country for that. generals gibbon, griffin and merritt were designated by me to carry into effect the paroling of lee's troops before they should start for their homes--general lee leaving generals longstreet, gordon and pendleton for them to confer with in order to facilitate this work. lee and i then separated as cordially as we had met, he returning to his own lines, and all went into bivouac for the night at appomattox. soon after lee's departure i telegraphed to washington as follows: headquarters appomattox c. h., va., april 9th, 1865, 4.30 p.m. hon. e. m. stanton, secretary of war, washington. general lee surrendered the army of northern virginia this afternoon on terms proposed by myself. the accompanying additional correspondence will show the conditions fully. u. s. grant, lieut.-general. when news of the surrender first reached our lines our men commenced firing a salute of a hundred guns in honor of the victory. i at once sent word, however, to have it stopped. the confederates were now our prisoners, and we did not want to exult over their downfall. i determined to return to washington at once, with a view to putting a stop to the purchase of supplies, and what i now deemed other useless outlay of money. before leaving, however, i thought i (*44) would like to see general lee again; so next morning i rode out beyond our lines towards his headquarters, preceded by a bugler and a staff-officer carrying a white flag. lee soon mounted his horse, seeing who it was, and met me. we had there between the lines, sitting on horseback, a very pleasant conversation of over half an hour, in the course of which lee said to me that the south was a big country and that we might have to march over it three or four times before the war entirely ended, but that we would now be able to do it as they could no longer resist us. he expressed it as his earnest hope, however, that we would not be called upon to cause more loss and sacrifice of life; but he could not foretell the result. i then suggested to general lee that there was not a man in the confederacy whose influence with the soldiery and the whole people was as great as his, and that if he would now advise the surrender of all the armies i had no doubt his advice would be followed with alacrity. but lee said, that he could not do that without consulting the president first. i knew there was no use to urge him to do anything against his ideas of what was right. i was accompanied by my staff and other officers, some of whom seemed to have a great desire to go inside the confederate lines. they finally asked permission of lee to do so for the purpose of seeing some of their old army friends, and the permission was granted. they went over, had a very pleasant time with their old friends, and brought some of them back with them when they returned. when lee and i separated he went back to his lines and i returned to the house of mr. mclean. here the officers of both armies came in great numbers, and seemed to enjoy the meeting as much as though they had been friends separated for a long time while fighting battles under the same flag. for the time being it looked very much as if all thought of the war had escaped their minds. after an hour pleasantly passed in this way i set out on horseback, accompanied by my staff and a small escort, for burkesville junction, up to which point the railroad had by this time been repaired. chapter lxviii. morale of the two armies--relative conditions of the north and south --president lincoln visits richmond--arrival at washington--president lincoln's assassination--president johnson's policy. after the fall of petersburg, and when the armies of the potomac and the james were in motion to head off lee's army, the morale of the national troops had greatly improved. there was no more straggling, no more rear guards. the men who in former times had been falling back, were now, as i have already stated, striving to get to the front. for the first time in four weary years they felt that they were now nearing the time when they could return to their homes with their country saved. on the other hand, the confederates were more than correspondingly depressed. their despondency increased with each returning day, and especially after the battle of sailor's creek. they threw away their arms in constantly increasing numbers, dropping out of the ranks and betaking themselves to the woods in the hope of reaching their homes. i have already instanced the case of the entire disintegration of a regiment whose colonel i met at farmville. as a result of these and other influences, when lee finally surrendered at appomattox, there were only 28,356 officers and men left to be paroled, and many of these were without arms. it was probably this latter fact which gave rise to the statement sometimes made, north and south, that lee surrendered a smaller number of men than what the official figures show. as a matter of official record, and in addition to the number paroled as given above, we captured between march 29th and the date of surrender 19,132 confederates, to say nothing of lee's other losses, killed, wounded and missing, during the series of desperate conflicts which marked his headlong and determined flight. the same record shows the number of cannon, including those at appomattox, to have been 689 between the dates named. there has always been a great conflict of opinion as to the number of troops engaged in every battle, or all important battles, fought between the sections, the south magnifying the number of union troops engaged and belittling their own. northern writers have fallen, in many instances, into the same error. i have often heard gentlemen, who were thoroughly loyal to the union, speak of what a splendid fight the south had made and successfully continued for four years before yielding, with their twelve million of people against our twenty, and of the twelve four being colored slaves, non-combatants. i will add to their argument. we had many regiments of brave and loyal men who volunteered under great difficulty from the twelve million belonging to the south. but the south had rebelled against the national government. it was not bound by any constitutional restrictions. the whole south was a military camp. the occupation of the colored people was to furnish supplies for the army. conscription was resorted to early, and embraced every male from the age of eighteen to forty-five, excluding only those physically unfit to serve in the field, and the necessary number of civil officers of state and intended national government. the old and physically disabled furnished a good portion of these. the slaves, the non-combatants, one-third of the whole, were required to work in the field without regard to sex, and almost without regard to age. children from the age of eight years could and did handle the hoe; they were not much older when they began to hold the plough. the four million of colored non-combatants were equal to more than three times their number in the north, age for age and sex for sex, in supplying food from the soil to support armies. women did not work in the fields in the north, and children attended school. the arts of peace were carried on in the north. towns and cities grew during the war. inventions were made in all kinds of machinery to increase the products of a day's labor in the shop, and in the field. in the south no opposition was allowed to the government which had been set up and which would have become real and respected if the rebellion had been successful. no rear had to be protected. all the troops in service could be brought to the front to contest every inch of ground threatened with invasion. the press of the south, like the people who remained at home, were loyal to the southern cause. in the north, the country, the towns and the cities presented about the same appearance they do in time of peace. the furnace was in blast, the shops were filled with workmen, the fields were cultivated, not only to supply the population of the north and the troops invading the south, but to ship abroad to pay a part of the expense of the war. in the north the press was free up to the point of open treason. the citizen could entertain his views and express them. troops were necessary in the northern states to prevent prisoners from the southern army being released by outside force, armed and set at large to destroy by fire our northern cities. plans were formed by northern and southern citizens to burn our cities, to poison the water supplying them, to spread infection by importing clothing from infected regions, to blow up our river and lake steamers--regardless of the destruction of innocent lives. the copperhead disreputable portion of the press magnified rebel successes, and belittled those of the union army. it was, with a large following, an auxiliary to the confederate army. the north would have been much stronger with a hundred thousand of these men in the confederate ranks and the rest of their kind thoroughly subdued, as the union sentiment was in the south, than we were as the battle was fought. as i have said, the whole south was a military camp. the colored people, four million in number, were submissive, and worked in the field and took care of the families while the able-bodied white men were at the front fighting for a cause destined to defeat. the cause was popular, and was enthusiastically supported by the young men. the conscription took all of them. before the war was over, further conscriptions took those between fourteen and eighteen years of age as junior reserves, and those between forty-five and sixty as senior reserves. it would have been an offence, directly after the war, and perhaps it would be now, to ask any able-bodied man in the south, who was between the ages of fourteen and sixty at any time during the war, whether he had been in the confederate army. he would assert that he had, or account for his absence from the ranks. under such circumstances it is hard to conceive how the north showed such a superiority of force in every battle fought. i know they did not. during 1862 and '3, john h. morgan, a partisan officer, of no military education, but possessed of courage and endurance, operated in the rear of the army of the ohio in kentucky and tennessee. he had no base of supplies to protect, but was at home wherever he went. the army operating against the south, on the contrary, had to protect its lines of communication with the north, from which all supplies had to come to the front. every foot of road had to be guarded by troops stationed at convenient distances apart. these guards could not render assistance beyond the points where stationed. morgan was foot-loose and could operate where, his information--always correct--led him to believe he could do the greatest damage. during the time he was operating in this way he killed, wounded and captured several times the number he ever had under his command at any one time. he destroyed many millions of property in addition. places he did not attack had to be guarded as if threatened by him. forrest, an abler soldier, operated farther west, and held from the national front quite as many men as could be spared for offensive operations. it is safe to say that more than half the national army was engaged in guarding lines of supplies, or were on leave, sick in hospital or on detail which prevented their bearing arms. then, again, large forces were employed where no confederate army confronted them. i deem it safe to say that there were no large engagements where the national numbers compensated for the advantage of position and intrenchment occupied by the enemy. while i was in pursuit of general lee, the president went to richmond in company with admiral porter, and on board his flagship. he found the people of that city in great consternation. the leading citizens among the people who had remained at home surrounded him, anxious that something should be done to relieve them from suspense. general weitzel was not then in the city, having taken offices in one of the neighboring villages after his troops had succeeded in subduing the conflagration which they had found in progress on entering the confederate capital. the president sent for him, and, on his arrival, a short interview was had on board the vessel, admiral porter and a leading citizen of virginia being also present. after this interview the president wrote an order in about these words, which i quote from memory: "general weitzel is authorized to permit the body calling itself the legislature of virginia to meet for the purpose of recalling the virginia troops from the confederate armies." immediately some of the gentlemen composing that body wrote out a call for a meeting and had it published in their papers. this call, however, went very much further than mr. lincoln had contemplated, as he did not say the "legislature of virginia" but "the body which called itself the legislature of virginia." mr. stanton saw the call as published in the northern papers the very next issue and took the liberty of countermanding the order authorizing any meeting of the legislature, or any other body, and this notwithstanding the fact that the president was nearer the spot than he was. this was characteristic of mr. stanton. he was a man who never questioned his own authority, and who always did in war time what he wanted to do. he was an able constitutional lawyer and jurist; but the constitution was not an impediment to him while the war lasted. in this latter particular i entirely agree with the view he evidently held. the constitution was not framed with a view to any such rebellion as that of 1861-5. while it did not authorize rebellion it made no provision against it. yet the right to resist or suppress rebellion is as inherent as the right of self-defence, and as natural as the right of an individual to preserve his life when in jeopardy. the constitution was therefore in abeyance for the time being, so far as it in any way affected the progress and termination of the war. those in rebellion against the government of the united states were not restricted by constitutional provisions, or any other, except the acts of their congress, which was loyal and devoted to the cause for which the south was then fighting. it would be a hard case when one-third of a nation, united in rebellion against the national authority, is entirely untrammeled, that the other two-thirds, in their efforts to maintain the union intact, should be restrained by a constitution prepared by our ancestors for the express purpose of insuring the permanency of the confederation of the states. after i left general lee at appomattox station, i went with my staff and a few others directly to burkesville station on my way to washington. the road from burkesville back having been newly repaired and the ground being soft, the train got off the track frequently, and, as a result, it was after midnight of the second day when i reached city point. as soon as possible i took a dispatch-boat thence to washington city. while in washington i was very busy for a time in preparing the necessary orders for the new state of affairs; communicating with my different commanders of separate departments, bodies of troops, etc. but by the 14th i was pretty well through with this work, so as to be able to visit my children, who were then in burlington, new jersey, attending school. mrs. grant was with me in washington at the time, and we were invited by president and mrs. lincoln to accompany them to the theatre on the evening of that day. i replied to the president's verbal invitation to the effect, that if we were in the city we would take great pleasure in accompanying them; but that i was very anxious to get away and visit my children, and if i could get through my work during the day i should do so. i did get through and started by the evening train on the 14th, sending mr. lincoln word, of course, that i would not be at the theatre. at that time the railroad to new york entered philadelphia on broad street; passengers were conveyed in ambulances to the delaware river, and then ferried to camden, at which point they took the cars again. when i reached the ferry, on the east side of the city of philadelphia, i found people awaiting my arrival there; and also dispatches informing me of the assassination of the president and mr. seward, and of the probable assassination of the vice president, mr. johnson, and requesting my immediate return. it would be impossible for me to describe the feeling that overcame me at the news of these assassinations, more especially the assassination of the president. i knew his goodness of heart, his generosity, his yielding disposition, his desire to have everybody happy, and above all his desire to see all the people of the united states enter again upon the full privileges of citizenship with equality among all. i knew also the feeling that mr. johnson had expressed in speeches and conversation against the southern people, and i feared that his course towards them would be such as to repel, and make them unwilling citizens; and if they became such they would remain so for a long while. i felt that reconstruction had been set back, no telling how far. i immediately arranged for getting a train to take me back to washington city; but mrs. grant was with me; it was after midnight and burlington was but an hour away. finding that i could accompany her to our house and return about as soon as they would be ready to take me from the philadelphia station, i went up with her and returned immediately by the same special train. the joy that i had witnessed among the people in the street and in public places in washington when i left there, had been turned to grief; the city was in reality a city of mourning. i have stated what i believed then the effect of this would be, and my judgment now is that i was right. i believe the south would have been saved from very much of the hardness of feeling that was engendered by mr. johnson's course towards them during the first few months of his administration. be this as it may, mr. lincoln's assassination was particularly unfortunate for the entire nation. mr. johnson's course towards the south did engender bitterness of feeling. his denunciations of treason and his ever-ready remark, "treason is a crime and must be made odious," was repeated to all those men of the south who came to him to get some assurances of safety so that they might go to work at something with the feeling that what they obtained would be secure to them. he uttered his denunciations with great vehemence, and as they were accompanied with no assurances of safety, many southerners were driven to a point almost beyond endurance. the president of the united states is, in a large degree, or ought to be, a representative of the feeling, wishes and judgment of those over whom he presides; and the southerners who read the denunciations of themselves and their people must have come to the conclusion that he uttered the sentiments of the northern people; whereas, as a matter of fact, but for the assassination of mr. lincoln, i believe the great majority of the northern people, and the soldiers unanimously, would have been in favor of a speedy reconstruction on terms that would be the least humiliating to the people who had rebelled against their government. they believed, i have no doubt, as i did, that besides being the mildest, it was also the wisest, policy. the people who had been in rebellion must necessarily come back into the union, and be incorporated as an integral part of the nation. naturally the nearer they were placed to an equality with the people who had not rebelled, the more reconciled they would feel with their old antagonists, and the better citizens they would be from the beginning. they surely would not make good citizens if they felt that they had a yoke around their necks. i do not believe that the majority of the northern people at that time were in favor of negro suffrage. they supposed that it would naturally follow the freedom of the negro, but that there would be a time of probation, in which the ex-slaves could prepare themselves for the privileges of citizenship before the full right would be conferred; but mr. johnson, after a complete revolution of sentiment, seemed to regard the south not only as an oppressed people, but as the people best entitled to consideration of any of our citizens. this was more than the people who had secured to us the perpetuation of the union were prepared for, and they became more radical in their views. the southerners had the most power in the executive branch, mr. johnson having gone to their side; and with a compact south, and such sympathy and support as they could get from the north, they felt that they would be able to control the nation at once, and already many of them acted as if they thought they were entitled to do so. thus mr. johnson, fighting congress on the one hand, and receiving the support of the south on the other, drove congress, which was overwhelmingly republican, to the passing of first one measure and then another to restrict his power. there being a solid south on one side that was in accord with the political party in the north which had sympathized with the rebellion, it finally, in the judgment of congress and of the majority of the legislatures of the states, became necessary to enfranchise the negro, in all his ignorance. in this work, i shall not discuss the question of how far the policy of congress in this particular proved a wise one. it became an absolute necessity, however, because of the foolhardiness of the president and the blindness of the southern people to their own interest. as to myself, while strongly favoring the course that would be the least humiliating to the people who had been in rebellion, i gradually worked up to the point where, with the majority of the people, i favored immediate enfranchisement. chapter lxix. sherman and johnston--johnston's surrender to sherman--capture of mobile--wilson's expedition--capture of jefferson davis--general thomas's qualities--estimate of general canby. when i left appomattox i ordered general meade to proceed leisurely back to burkesville station with the army of the potomac and the army of the james, and to go into camp there until further orders from me. general johnston, as has been stated before, was in north carolina confronting general sherman. it could not be known positively, of course, whether johnston would surrender on the news of lee's surrender, though i supposed he would; and if he did not, burkesville station was the natural point from which to move to attack him. the army which i could have sent against him was superior to his, and that with which sherman confronted him was also superior; and between the two he would necessarily have been crushed, or driven away. with the loss of their capital and the army of northern virginia it was doubtful whether johnston's men would have the spirit to stand. my belief was that he would make no such attempt; but i adopted this course as a precaution against what might happen, however improbable. simultaneously with my starting from city point, i sent a messenger to north carolina by boat with dispatches to general sherman, informing him of the surrender of lee and his army; also of the terms which i had given him; and i authorized sherman to give the same terms to johnston if the latter chose to accept them. the country is familiar with the terms that sherman agreed to conditionally, because they embraced a political question as well as a military one and he would therefore have to confer with the government before agreeing to them definitely. general sherman had met mr. lincoln at city point while visiting there to confer with me about our final movement, and knew what mr. lincoln had said to the peace commissioners when he met them at hampton roads, viz.: that before he could enter into negotiations with them they would have to agree to two points: one being that the union should be preserved, and the other that slavery should be abolished; and if they were ready to concede these two points he was almost ready to sign his name to a blank piece of paper and permit them to fill out the balance of the terms upon which we would live together. he had also seen notices in the newspapers of mr. lincoln's visit to richmond, and had read in the same papers that while there he had authorized the convening of the legislature of virginia. sherman thought, no doubt, in adding to the terms that i had made with general lee, that he was but carrying out the wishes of the president of the united states. but seeing that he was going beyond his authority, he made it a point that the terms were only conditional. they signed them with this understanding, and agreed to a truce until the terms could be sent to washington for approval; if approved by the proper authorities there, they would then be final; if not approved, then he would give due notice, before resuming hostilities. as the world knows, sherman, from being one of the most popular generals of the land (congress having even gone so far as to propose a bill providing for a second lieutenant-general for the purpose of advancing him to that grade), was denounced by the president and secretary of war in very bitter terms. some people went so far as to denounce him as a traitor --a most preposterous term to apply to a man who had rendered so much service as he had, even supposing he had made a mistake in granting such terms as he did to johnston and his army. if sherman had taken authority to send johnston with his army home, with their arms to be put in the arsenals of their own states, without submitting the question to the authorities at washington, the suspicions against him might have some foundation. but the feeling against sherman died out very rapidly, and it was not many weeks before he was restored to the fullest confidence of the american people. when, some days after my return to washington, president johnson and the secretary of war received the terms which general sherman had forwarded for approval, a cabinet meeting was immediately called and i was sent for. there seemed to be the greatest consternation, lest sherman would commit the government to terms which they were not willing to accede to and which he had no right to grant. a message went out directing the troops in the south not to obey general sherman. i was ordered to proceed at once to north carolina and take charge of matter there myself. of course i started without delay, and reached there as soon as possible. i repaired to raleigh, where sherman was, as quietly as possible, hoping to see him without even his army learning of my presence. when i arrived i went to sherman's headquarters, and we were at once closeted together. i showed him the instruction and orders under which i visited him. i told him that i wanted him to notify general johnston that the terms which they had conditionally agreed upon had not been approved in washington, and that he was authorized to offer the same terms i had given general lee. i sent sherman to do this himself. i did not wish the knowledge of my presence to be known to the army generally; so i left it to sherman to negotiate the terms of the surrender solely by himself, and without the enemy knowing that i was anywhere near the field. as soon as possible i started to get away, to leave sherman quite free and untrammelled. at goldsboro', on my way back, i met a mail, containing the last newspapers, and i found in them indications of great excitement in the north over the terms sherman had given johnston; and harsh orders that had been promulgated by the president and secretary of war. i knew that sherman must see these papers, and i fully realized what great indignation they would cause him, though i do not think his feelings could have been more excited than were my own. but like the true and loyal soldier that he was, he carried out the instructions i had given him, obtained the surrender of johnston's army, and settled down in his camp about raleigh, to await final orders. there were still a few expeditions out in the south that could not be communicated with, and had to be left to act according to the judgment of their respective commanders. with these it was impossible to tell how the news of the surrender of lee and johnston, of which they must have heard, might affect their judgment as to what was best to do. the three expeditions which i had tried so hard to get off from the commands of thomas and canby did finally get off: one under canby himself, against mobile, late in march; that under stoneman from east tennessee on the 20th; and the one under wilson, starting from eastport, mississippi, on the 22d of march. they were all eminently successful, but without any good result. indeed much valuable property was destroyed and many lives lost at a time when we would have liked to spare them. the war was practically over before their victories were gained. they were so late in commencing operations, that they did not hold any troops away that otherwise would have been operating against the armies which were gradually forcing the confederate armies to a surrender. the only possible good that we may have experienced from these raids was by stoneman's getting near lynchburg about the time the armies of the potomac and the james were closing in on lee at appomattox. stoneman entered north carolina and then pushed north to strike the virginia and tennessee railroad. he got upon that road, destroyed its bridges at different places and rendered the road useless to the enemy up to within a few miles of lynchburg. his approach caused the evacuation of that city about the time we were at appomattox, and was the cause of a commotion we heard of there. he then pushed south, and was operating in the rear of johnston's army about the time the negotiations were going on between sherman and johnston for the latter's surrender. in this raid stoneman captured and destroyed a large amount of stores, while fourteen guns and nearly two thousand prisoners were the trophies of his success. canby appeared before mobile on the 27th of march. the city of mobile was protected by two forts, besides other intrenchments--spanish fort, on the east side of the bay, and fort blakely, north of the city. these forts were invested. on the night of the 8th of april, the national troops having carried the enemy's works at one point, spanish fort was evacuated; and on the 9th, the very day of lee's surrender, blakely was carried by assault, with a considerable loss to us. on the 11th the city was evacuated. i had tried for more than two years to have an expedition sent against mobile when its possession by us would have been of great advantage. it finally cost lives to take it when its possession was of no importance, and when, if left alone, it would within a few days have fallen into our hands without any bloodshed whatever. wilson moved out with full 12,000 men, well equipped and well armed. he was an energetic officer and accomplished his work rapidly. forrest was in his front, but with neither his old-time army nor his old-time prestige. he now had principally conscripts. his conscripts were generally old men and boys. he had a few thousand regular cavalry left, but not enough to even retard materially the progress of wilson's cavalry. selma fell on the 2d of april, with a large number of prisoners and a large quantity of war material, machine shops, etc., to be disposed of by the victors. tuscaloosa, montgomery and west point fell in quick succession. these were all important points to the enemy by reason of their railroad connections, as depots of supplies, and because of their manufactories of war material. they were fortified or intrenched, and there was considerable fighting before they were captured. macon surrendered on the 21st of april. here news was received of the negotiations for the surrender of johnston's army. wilson belonged to the military division commanded by sherman, and of course was bound by his terms. this stopped all fighting. general richard taylor had now become the senior confederate officer still at liberty east of the mississippi river, and on the 4th of may he surrendered everything within the limits of this extensive command. general e. kirby smith surrendered the trans-mississippi department on the 26th of may, leaving no other confederate army at liberty to continue the war. wilson's raid resulted in the capture of the fugitive president of the defunct confederacy before he got out of the country. this occurred at irwinsville, georgia, on the 11th of may. for myself, and i believe mr. lincoln shared the feeling, i would have been very glad to have seen mr. davis succeed in escaping, but for one reason: i feared that if not captured, he might get into the trans-mississippi region and there set up a more contracted confederacy. the young men now out of homes and out of employment might have rallied under his standard and protracted the war yet another year. the northern people were tired of the war, they were tired of piling up a debt which would be a further mortgage upon their homes. mr. lincoln, i believe, wanted mr. davis to escape, because he did not wish to deal with the matter of his punishment. he knew there would be people clamoring for the punishment of the ex-confederate president, for high treason. he thought blood enough had already been spilled to atone for our wickedness as a nation. at all events he did not wish to be the judge to decide whether more should be shed or not. but his own life was sacrificed at the hands of an assassin before the ex-president of the confederacy was a prisoner in the hands of the government which he had lent all his talent and all his energies to destroy. all things are said to be wisely directed, and for the best interest of all concerned. this reflection does not, however, abate in the slightest our sense of bereavement in the untimely loss of so good and great a man as abraham lincoln. he would have proven the best friend the south could have had, and saved much of the wrangling and bitterness of feeling brought out by reconstruction under a president who at first wished to revenge himself upon southern men of better social standing than himself, but who still sought their recognition, and in a short time conceived the idea and advanced the proposition to become their moses to lead them triumphantly out of all their difficulties. the story of the legislation enacted during the reconstruction period to stay the hands of the president is too fresh in the minds of the people to be told now. much of it, no doubt, was unconstitutional; but it was hoped that the laws enacted would serve their purpose before the question of constitutionality could be submitted to the judiciary and a decision obtained. these laws did serve their purpose, and now remain "a dead letter" upon the statute books of the united states, no one taking interest enough in them to give them a passing thought. much was said at the time about the garb mr. davis was wearing when he was captured. i cannot settle this question from personal knowledge of the facts; but i have been under the belief, from information given to me by general wilson shortly after the event, that when mr. davis learned that he was surrounded by our cavalry he was in his tent dressed in a gentleman's dressing gown. naturally enough, mr. davis wanted to escape, and would not reflect much how this should be accomplished provided it might be done successfully. if captured, he would be no ordinary prisoner. he represented all there was of that hostility to the government which had caused four years of the bloodiest war--and the most costly in other respects of which history makes any record. every one supposed he would be tried for treason if captured, and that he would be executed. had he succeeded in making his escape in any disguise it would have been adjudged a good thing afterwards by his admirers. as my official letters on file in the war department, as well as my remarks in this book, reflect upon general thomas by dwelling somewhat upon his tardiness, it is due to myself, as well as to him, that i give my estimate of him as a soldier. the same remark will apply also in the case of general canby. i had been at west point with thomas one year, and had known him later in the old army. he was a man of commanding appearance, slow and deliberate in speech and action; sensible, honest and brave. he possessed valuable soldierly qualities in an eminent degree. he gained the confidence of all who served under him, and almost their love. this implies a very valuable quality. it is a quality which calls out the most efficient services of the troops serving under the commander possessing it. thomas's dispositions were deliberately made, and always good. he could not be driven from a point he was given to hold. he was not as good, however, in pursuit as he was in action. i do not believe that he could ever have conducted sherman's army from chattanooga to atlanta against the defences and the commander guarding that line in 1864. on the other hand, if it had been given him to hold the line which johnston tried to hold, neither that general nor sherman, nor any other officer could have done it better. thomas was a valuable officer, who richly deserved, as he has received, the plaudits of his countrymen for the part he played in the great tragedy of 1861-5. general canby was an officer of great merit. he was naturally studious, and inclined to the law. there have been in the army but very few, if any, officers who took as much interest in reading and digesting every act of congress and every regulation for the government of the army as he. his knowledge gained in this way made him a most valuable staff officer, a capacity in which almost all his army services were rendered up to the time of his being assigned to the military division of the gulf. he was an exceedingly modest officer, though of great talent and learning. i presume his feelings when first called upon to command a large army against a fortified city, were somewhat like my own when marching a regiment against general thomas harris in missouri in 1861. neither of us would have felt the slightest trepidation in going into battle with some one else commanding. had canby been in other engagements afterwards, he would, i have no doubt, have advanced without any fear arising from a sense of the responsibility. he was afterwards killed in the lava beds of southern oregon, while in pursuit of the hostile modoc indians. his character was as pure as his talent and learning were great. his services were valuable during the war, but principally as a bureau officer. i have no idea that it was from choice that his services were rendered in an office, but because of his superior efficiency there. chapter lxx. the end of the war--the march to washington--one of lincoln's anecdotes --grand review at washington--characteristics of lincoln and stanton --estimate of the different corps commanders. things began to quiet down, and as the certainty that there would be no more armed resistance became clearer, the troops in north carolina and virginia were ordered to march immediately to the capital, and go into camp there until mustered out. suitable garrisons were left at the prominent places throughout the south to insure obedience to the laws that might be enacted for the government of the several states, and to insure security to the lives and property of all classes. i do not know how far this was necessary, but i deemed it necessary, at that time, that such a course should be pursued. i think now that these garrisons were continued after they ceased to be absolutely required; but it is not to be expected that such a rebellion as was fought between the sections from 1861 to 1865 could terminate without leaving many serious apprehensions in the mind of the people as to what should be done. sherman marched his troops from goldsboro, up to manchester, on the south side of the james river, opposite richmond, and there put them in camp, while he went back to savannah to see what the situation was there. it was during this trip that the last outrage was committed upon him. halleck had been sent to richmond to command virginia, and had issued orders prohibiting even sherman's own troops from obeying his, sherman's, orders. sherman met the papers on his return, containing this order of halleck, and very justly felt indignant at the outrage. on his arrival at fortress monroe returning from savannah, sherman received an invitation from halleck to come to richmond and be his guest. this he indignantly refused, and informed halleck, furthermore, that he had seen his order. he also stated that he was coming up to take command of his troops, and as he marched through it would probably be as well for halleck not to show himself, because he (sherman) would not be responsible for what some rash person might do through indignation for the treatment he had received. very soon after that, sherman received orders from me to proceed to washington city, and to go into camp on the south side of the city pending the mustering-out of the troops. there was no incident worth noting in the march northward from goldsboro, to richmond, or in that from richmond to washington city. the army, however, commanded by sherman, which had been engaged in all the battles of the west and had marched from the mississippi through the southern states to the sea, from there to goldsboro, and thence to washington city, had passed over many of the battle-fields of the army of the potomac, thus having seen, to a greater extent than any other body of troops, the entire theatre of the four years' war for the preservation of the union. the march of sherman's army from atlanta to the sea and north to goldsboro, while it was not accompanied with the danger that was anticipated, yet was magnificent in its results, and equally magnificent in the way it was conducted. it had an important bearing, in various ways, upon the great object we had in view, that of closing the war. all the states east of the mississippi river up to the state of georgia, had felt the hardships of the war. georgia, and south carolina, and almost all of north carolina, up to this time, had been exempt from invasion by the northern armies, except upon their immediate sea coasts. their newspapers had given such an account of confederate success, that the people who remained at home had been convinced that the yankees had been whipped from first to last, and driven from pillar to post, and that now they could hardly be holding out for any other purpose than to find a way out of the war with honor to themselves. even during this march of sherman's the newspapers in his front were proclaiming daily that his army was nothing better than a mob of men who were frightened out of their wits and hastening, panic-stricken, to try to get under the cover of our navy for protection against the southern people. as the army was seen marching on triumphantly, however, the minds of the people became disabused and they saw the true state of affairs. in turn they became disheartened, and would have been glad to submit without compromise. another great advantage resulting from this march, and which was calculated to hasten the end, was the fact that the great storehouse of georgia was entirely cut off from the confederate armies. as the troops advanced north from savannah, the destruction of the railroads in south carolina and the southern part of north carolina, further cut off their resources and left the armies still in virginia and north carolina dependent for supplies upon a very small area of country, already very much exhausted of food and forage. in due time the two armies, one from burkesville junction and the other from the neighborhood of raleigh, north carolina, arrived and went into camp near the capital, as directed. the troops were hardy, being inured to fatigue, and they appeared in their respective camps as ready and fit for duty as they had ever been in their lives. i doubt whether an equal body of men of any nation, take them man for man, officer for officer, was ever gotten together that would have proved their equal in a great battle. the armies of europe are machines; the men are brave and the officers capable; but the majority of the soldiers in most of the nations of europe are taken from a class of people who are not very intelligent and who have very little interest in the contest in which they are called upon to take part. our armies were composed of men who were able to read, men who knew what they were fighting for, and could not be induced to serve as soldiers, except in an emergency when the safety of the nation was involved, and so necessarily must have been more than equal to men who fought merely because they were brave and because they were thoroughly drilled and inured to hardships. there was nothing of particular importance occurred during the time these troops were in camp before starting north. i remember one little incident which i will relate as an anecdote characteristic of mr. lincoln. it occurred a day after i reached washington, and about the time general meade reached burkesville with the army. governor smith of virginia had left richmond with the confederate states government, and had gone to danville. supposing i was necessarily with the army at burkesville, he addressed a letter to me there informing me that, as governor of the commonwealth of the state of virginia, he had temporarily removed the state capital from richmond to danville, and asking if he would be permitted to perform the functions of his office there without molestation by the federal authorities. i give this letter only in substance. he also inquired of me whether in case he was not allowed to perform the duties of his office, he with a few others might not be permitted to leave the country and go abroad without interference. general meade being informed that a flag of truce was outside his pickets with a letter to me, at once sent out and had the letter brought in without informing the officer who brought it that i was not present. he read the letter and telegraphed me its contents. meeting mr. lincoln shortly after receiving this dispatch, i repeated its contents to him. mr. lincoln, supposing i was asking for instructions, said, in reply to that part of governor smith's letter which inquired whether he with a few friends would be permitted to leave the country unmolested, that his position was like that of a certain irishman (giving the name) he knew in springfield who was very popular with the people, a man of considerable promise, and very much liked. unfortunately he had acquired the habit of drinking, and his friends could see that the habit was growing on him. these friends determined to make an effort to save him, and to do this they drew up a pledge to abstain from all alcoholic drinks. they asked pat to join them in signing the pledge, and he consented. he had been so long out of the habit of using plain water as a beverage that he resorted to soda-water as a substitute. after a few days this began to grow distasteful to him. so holding the glass behind him, he said: "doctor, couldn't you drop a bit of brandy in that unbeknownst to myself." i do not remember what the instructions were the president gave me, but i know that governor smith was not permitted to perform the duties of his office. i also know that if mr. lincoln had been spared, there would have been no efforts made to prevent any one from leaving the country who desired to do so. he would have been equally willing to permit the return of the same expatriated citizens after they had time to repent of their choice. on the 18th of may orders were issued by the adjutant-general for a grand review by the president and his cabinet of sherman's and meade's armies. the review commenced on the 23d and lasted two days. meade's army occupied over six hours of the first day in passing the grand stand which had been erected in front of the president's house. sherman witnessed this review from the grand stand which was occupied by the president and his cabinet. here he showed his resentment for the cruel and harsh treatment that had unnecessarily been inflicted upon him by the secretary of war, by refusing to take his extended hand. sherman's troops had been in camp on the south side of the potomac. during the night of the 23d he crossed over and bivouacked not far from the capitol. promptly at ten o'clock on the morning of the 24th, his troops commenced to pass in review. sherman's army made a different appearance from that of the army of the potomac. the latter had been operating where they received directly from the north full supplies of food and clothing regularly: the review of this army therefore was the review of a body of 65,000 well-drilled, well-disciplined and orderly soldiers inured to hardship and fit for any duty, but without the experience of gathering their own food and supplies in an enemy's country, and of being ever on the watch. sherman's army was not so well-dressed as the army of the potomac, but their marching could not be excelled; they gave the appearance of men who had been thoroughly drilled to endure hardships, either by long and continuous marches or through exposure to any climate, without the ordinary shelter of a camp. they exhibited also some of the order of march through georgia where the "sweet potatoes sprung up from the ground" as sherman's army went marching through. in the rear of a company there would be a captured horse or mule loaded with small cooking utensils, captured chickens and other food picked up for the use of the men. negro families who had followed the army would sometimes come along in the rear of a company, with three or four children packed upon a single mule, and the mother leading it. the sight was varied and grand: nearly all day for two successive days, from the capitol to the treasury building, could be seen a mass of orderly soldiers marching in columns of companies. the national flag was flying from almost every house and store; the windows were filled with spectators; the door-steps and side-walks were crowded with colored people and poor whites who did not succeed in securing better quarters from which to get a view of the grand armies. the city was about as full of strangers who had come to see the sights as it usually is on inauguration day when a new president takes his seat. it may not be out of place to again allude to president lincoln and the secretary of war, mr. stanton, who were the great conspicuous figures in the executive branch of the government. there is no great difference of opinion now, in the public mind, as to the characteristics of the president. with mr. stanton the case is different. they were the very opposite of each other in almost every particular, except that each possessed great ability. mr. lincoln gained influence over men by making them feel that it was a pleasure to serve him. he preferred yielding his own wish to gratify others, rather than to insist upon having his own way. it distressed him to disappoint others. in matters of public duty, however, he had what he wished, but in the least offensive way. mr. stanton never questioned his own authority to command, unless resisted. he cared nothing for the feeling of others. in fact it seemed to be pleasanter to him to disappoint than to gratify. he felt no hesitation in assuming the functions of the executive, or in acting without advising with him. if his act was not sustained, he would change it--if he saw the matter would be followed up until he did so. it was generally supposed that these two officials formed the complement of each other. the secretary was required to prevent the president's being imposed upon. the president was required in the more responsible place of seeing that injustice was not done to others. i do not know that this view of these two men is still entertained by the majority of the people. it is not a correct view, however, in my estimation. mr. lincoln did not require a guardian to aid him in the fulfilment of a public trust. mr. lincoln was not timid, and he was willing to trust his generals in making and executing their plans. the secretary was very timid, and it was impossible for him to avoid interfering with the armies covering the capital when it was sought to defend it by an offensive movement against the army guarding the confederate capital. he could see our weakness, but he could not see that the enemy was in danger. the enemy would not have been in danger if mr. stanton had been in the field. these characteristics of the two officials were clearly shown shortly after early came so near getting into the capital. among the army and corps commanders who served with me during the war between the states, and who attracted much public attention, but of whose ability as soldiers i have not yet given any estimate, are meade, hancock, sedgwick, burnside, terry and hooker. there were others of great merit, such as griffin, humphreys, wright and mackenzie. of those first named, burnside at one time had command of the army of the potomac, and later of the army of the ohio. hooker also commanded the army of the potomac for a short time. general meade was an officer of great merit, with drawbacks to his usefulness that were beyond his control. he had been an officer of the engineer corps before the war, and consequently had never served with troops until he was over forty-six years of age. he never had, i believe, a command of less than a brigade. he saw clearly and distinctly the position of the enemy, and the topography of the country in front of his own position. his first idea was to take advantage of the lay of the ground, sometimes without reference to the direction we wanted to move afterwards. he was subordinate to his superiors in rank to the extent that he could execute an order which changed his own plans with the same zeal he would have displayed if the plan had been his own. he was brave and conscientious, and commanded the respect of all who knew him. he was unfortunately of a temper that would get beyond his control, at times, and make him speak to officers of high rank in the most offensive manner. no one saw this fault more plainly than he himself, and no one regretted it more. this made it unpleasant at times, even in battle, for those around him to approach him even with information. in spite of this defect he was a most valuable officer and deserves a high place in the annals of his country. general burnside was an officer who was generally liked and respected. he was not, however, fitted to command an army. no one knew this better than himself. he always admitted his blunders, and extenuated those of officers under him beyond what they were entitled to. it was hardly his fault that he was ever assigned to a separate command. of hooker i saw but little during the war. i had known him very well before, however. where i did see him, at chattanooga, his achievement in bringing his command around the point of lookout mountain and into chattanooga valley was brilliant. i nevertheless regarded him as a dangerous man. he was not subordinate to his superiors. he was ambitious to the extent of caring nothing for the rights of others. his disposition was, when engaged in battle, to get detached from the main body of the army and exercise a separate command, gathering to his standard all he could of his juniors. hancock stands the most conspicuous figure of all the general officers who did not exercise a separate command. he commanded a corps longer than any other one, and his name was never mentioned as having committed in battle a blunder for which he was responsible. he was a man of very conspicuous personal appearance. tall, well-formed and, at the time of which i now write, young and fresh-looking, he presented an appearance that would attract the attention of an army as he passed. his genial disposition made him friends, and his personal courage and his presence with his command in the thickest of the fight won for him the confidence of troops serving under him. no matter how hard the fight, the 2d corps always felt that their commander was looking after them. sedgwick was killed at spottsylvania before i had an opportunity of forming an estimate of his qualifications as a soldier from personal observation. i had known him in mexico when both of us were lieutenants, and when our service gave no indication that either of us would ever be equal to the command of a brigade. he stood very high in the army, however, as an officer and a man. he was brave and conscientious. his ambition was not great, and he seemed to dread responsibility. he was willing to do any amount of battling, but always wanted some one else to direct. he declined the command of the army of the potomac once, if not oftener. general alfred h. terry came into the army as a volunteer without a military education. his way was won without political influence up to an important separate command--the expedition against fort fisher, in january, 1865. his success there was most brilliant, and won for him the rank of brigadier-general in the regular army and of major-general of volunteers. he is a man who makes friends of those under him by his consideration of their wants and their dues. as a commander, he won their confidence by his coolness in action and by his clearness of perception in taking in the situation under which he was placed at any given time. griffin, humphreys, and mackenzie were good corps commanders, but came into that position so near to the close of the war as not to attract public attention. all three served as such, in the last campaign of the armies of the potomac and the james, which culminated at appomattox court house, on the 9th of april, 1865. the sudden collapse of the rebellion monopolized attention to the exclusion of almost everything else. i regarded mackenzie as the most promising young officer in the army. graduating at west point, as he did, during the second year of the war, he had won his way up to the command of a corps before its close. this he did upon his own merit and without influence. conclusion. the cause of the great war of the rebellion against the united status will have to be attributed to slavery. for some years before the war began it was a trite saying among some politicians that "a state half slave and half free cannot exist." all must become slave or all free, or the state will go down. i took no part myself in any such view of the case at the time, but since the war is over, reviewing the whole question, i have come to the conclusion that the saying is quite true. slavery was an institution that required unusual guarantees for its security wherever it existed; and in a country like ours where the larger portion of it was free territory inhabited by an intelligent and well-to-do population, the people would naturally have but little sympathy with demands upon them for its protection. hence the people of the south were dependent upon keeping control of the general government to secure the perpetuation of their favorite institution. they were enabled to maintain this control long after the states where slavery existed had ceased to have the controlling power, through the assistance they received from odd men here and there throughout the northern states. they saw their power waning, and this led them to encroach upon the prerogatives and independence of the northern states by enacting such laws as the fugitive slave law. by this law every northern man was obliged, when properly summoned, to turn out and help apprehend the runaway slave of a southern man. northern marshals became slave-catchers, and northern courts had to contribute to the support and protection of the institution. this was a degradation which the north would not permit any longer than until they could get the power to expunge such laws from the statute books. prior to the time of these encroachments the great majority of the people of the north had no particular quarrel with slavery, so long as they were not forced to have it themselves. but they were not willing to play the role of police for the south in the protection of this particular institution. in the early days of the country, before we had railroads, telegraphs and steamboats--in a word, rapid transit of any sort--the states were each almost a separate nationality. at that time the subject of slavery caused but little or no disturbance to the public mind. but the country grew, rapid transit was established, and trade and commerce between the states got to be so much greater than before, that the power of the national government became more felt and recognized and, therefore, had to be enlisted in the cause of this institution. it is probably well that we had the war when we did. we are better off now than we would have been without it, and have made more rapid progress than we otherwise should have made. the civilized nations of europe have been stimulated into unusual activity, so that commerce, trade, travel, and thorough acquaintance among people of different nationalities, has become common; whereas, before, it was but the few who had ever had the privilege of going beyond the limits of their own country or who knew anything about other people. then, too, our republican institutions were regarded as experiments up to the breaking out of the rebellion, and monarchical europe generally believed that our republic was a rope of sand that would part the moment the slightest strain was brought upon it. now it has shown itself capable of dealing with one of the greatest wars that was ever made, and our people have proven themselves to be the most formidable in war of any nationality. but this war was a fearful lesson, and should teach us the necessity of avoiding wars in the future. the conduct of some of the european states during our troubles shows the lack of conscience of communities where the responsibility does not come upon a single individual. seeing a nation that extended from ocean to ocean, embracing the better part of a continent, growing as we were growing in population, wealth and intelligence, the european nations thought it would be well to give us a check. we might, possibly, after a while threaten their peace, or, at least, the perpetuity of their institutions. hence, england was constantly finding fault with the administration at washington because we were not able to keep up an effective blockade. she also joined, at first, with france and spain in setting up an austrian prince upon the throne in mexico, totally disregarding any rights or claims that mexico had of being treated as an independent power. it is true they trumped up grievances as a pretext, but they were only pretexts which can always be found when wanted. mexico, in her various revolutions, had been unable to give that protection to the subjects of foreign nations which she would have liked to give, and some of her revolutionary leaders had forced loans from them. under pretence of protecting their citizens, these nations seized upon mexico as a foothold for establishing a european monarchy upon our continent, thus threatening our peace at home. i, myself, regarded this as a direct act of war against the united states by the powers engaged, and supposed as a matter of course that the united states would treat it as such when their hands were free to strike. i often spoke of the matter to mr. lincoln and the secretary of war, but never heard any special views from them to enable me to judge what they thought or felt about it. i inferred that they felt a good deal as i did, but were unwilling to commit themselves while we had our own troubles upon our hands. all of the powers except france very soon withdrew from the armed intervention for the establishment of an austrian prince upon the throne of mexico; but the governing people of these countries continued to the close of the war to throw obstacles in our way. after the surrender of lee, therefore, entertaining the opinion here expressed, i sent sheridan with a corps to the rio grande to have him where he might aid juarez in expelling the french from mexico. these troops got off before they could be stopped; and went to the rio grande, where sheridan distributed them up and down the river, much to the consternation of the troops in the quarter of mexico bordering on that stream. this soon led to a request from france that we should withdraw our troops from the rio grande and to negotiations for the withdrawal of theirs. finally bazaine was withdrawn from mexico by order of the french government. from that day the empire began to totter. mexico was then able to maintain her independence without aid from us. france is the traditional ally and friend of the united states. i did not blame france for her part in the scheme to erect a monarchy upon the ruins of the mexican republic. that was the scheme of one man, an imitator without genius or merit. he had succeeded in stealing the government of his country, and made a change in its form against the wishes and instincts of his people. he tried to play the part of the first napoleon, without the ability to sustain that role. he sought by new conquests to add to his empire and his glory; but the signal failure of his scheme of conquest was the precursor of his own overthrow. like our own war between the states, the franco-prussian war was an expensive one; but it was worth to france all it cost her people. it was the completion of the downfall of napoleon iii. the beginning was when he landed troops on this continent. failing here, the prestige of his name--all the prestige he ever had--was gone. he must achieve a success or fall. he tried to strike down his neighbor, prussia--and fell. i never admired the character of the first napoleon; but i recognize his great genius. his work, too, has left its impress for good on the face of europe. the third napoleon could have no claim to having done a good or just act. to maintain peace in the future it is necessary to be prepared for war. there can scarcely be a possible chance of a conflict, such as the last one, occurring among our own people again; but, growing as we are, in population, wealth and military power, we may become the envy of nations which led us in all these particulars only a few years ago; and unless we are prepared for it we may be in danger of a combined movement being some day made to crush us out. now, scarcely twenty years after the war, we seem to have forgotten the lessons it taught, and are going on as if in the greatest security, without the power to resist an invasion by the fleets of fourth-rate european powers for a time until we could prepare for them. we should have a good navy, and our sea-coast defences should be put in the finest possible condition. neither of these cost much when it is considered where the money goes, and what we get in return. money expended in a fine navy, not only adds to our security and tends to prevent war in the future, but is very material aid to our commerce with foreign nations in the meantime. money spent upon sea-coast defences is spent among our own people, and all goes back again among the people. the work accomplished, too, like that of the navy, gives us a feeling of security. england's course towards the united states during the rebellion exasperated the people of this country very much against the mother country. i regretted it. england and the united states are natural allies, and should be the best of friends. they speak one language, and are related by blood and other ties. we together, or even either separately, are better qualified than any other people to establish commerce between all the nationalities of the world. england governs her own colonies, and particularly those embracing the people of different races from her own, better than any other nation. she is just to the conquered, but rigid. she makes them self-supporting, but gives the benefit of labor to the laborer. she does not seem to look upon the colonies as outside possessions which she is at liberty to work for the support and aggrandizement of the home government. the hostility of england to the united states during our rebellion was not so much real as it was apparent. it was the hostility of the leaders of one political party. i am told that there was no time during the civil war when they were able to get up in england a demonstration in favor of secession, while these were constantly being gotten up in favor of the union, or, as they called it, in favor of the north. even in manchester, which suffered so fearfully by having the cotton cut off from her mills, they had a monster demonstration in favor of the north at the very time when their workmen were almost famishing. it is possible that the question of a conflict between races may come up in the future, as did that between freedom and slavery before. the condition of the colored man within our borders may become a source of anxiety, to say the least. but he was brought to our shores by compulsion, and he now should be considered as having as good a right to remain here as any other class of our citizens. it was looking to a settlement of this question that led me to urge the annexation of santo domingo during the time i was president of the united states. santo domingo was freely offered to us, not only by the administration, but by all the people, almost without price. the island is upon our shores, is very fertile, and is capable of supporting fifteen millions of people. the products of the soil are so valuable that labor in her fields would be so compensated as to enable those who wished to go there to quickly repay the cost of their passage. i took it that the colored people would go there in great numbers, so as to have independent states governed by their own race. they would still be states of the union, and under the protection of the general government; but the citizens would be almost wholly colored. by the war with mexico, we had acquired, as we have seen, territory almost equal in extent to that we already possessed. it was seen that the volunteers of the mexican war largely composed the pioneers to settle up the pacific coast country. their numbers, however, were scarcely sufficient to be a nucleus for the population of the important points of the territory acquired by that war. after our rebellion, when so many young men were at liberty to return to their homes, they found they were not satisfied with the farm, the store, or the work-shop of the villages, but wanted larger fields. the mines of the mountains first attracted them; but afterwards they found that rich valleys and productive grazing and farming lands were there. this territory, the geography of which was not known to us at the close of the rebellion, is now as well mapped as any portion of our country. railroads traverse it in every direction, north, south, east, and west. the mines are worked. the high lands are used for grazing purposes, and rich agricultural lands are found in many of the valleys. this is the work of the volunteer. it is probable that the indians would have had control of these lands for a century yet but for the war. we must conclude, therefore, that wars are not always evils unmixed with some good. prior to the rebellion the great mass of the people were satisfied to remain near the scenes of their birth. in fact an immense majority of the whole people did not feel secure against coming to want should they move among entire strangers. so much was the country divided into small communities that localized idioms had grown up, so that you could almost tell what section a person was from by hearing him speak. before, new territories were settled by a "class"; people who shunned contact with others; people who, when the country began to settle up around them, would push out farther from civilization. their guns furnished meat, and the cultivation of a very limited amount of the soil, their bread and vegetables. all the streams abounded with fish. trapping would furnish pelts to be brought into the states once a year, to pay for necessary articles which they could not raise--powder, lead, whiskey, tobacco and some store goods. occasionally some little articles of luxury would enter into these purchases--a quarter of a pound of tea, two or three pounds of coffee, more of sugar, some playing cards, and if anything was left over of the proceeds of the sale, more whiskey. little was known of the topography of the country beyond the settlements of these frontiersmen. this is all changed now. the war begot a spirit of independence and enterprise. the feeling now is, that a youth must cut loose from his old surroundings to enable him to get up in the world. there is now such a commingling of the people that particular idioms and pronunciation are no longer localized to any great extent; the country has filled up "from the centre all around to the sea"; railroads connect the two oceans and all parts of the interior; maps, nearly perfect, of every part of the country are now furnished the student of geography. the war has made us a nation of great power and intelligence. we have but little to do to preserve peace, happiness and prosperity at home, and the respect of other nations. our experience ought to teach us the necessity of the first; our power secures the latter. i feel that we are on the eve of a new era, when there is to be great harmony between the federal and confederate. i cannot stay to be a living witness to the correctness of this prophecy; but i feel it within me that it is to be so. the universally kind feeling expressed for me at a time when it was supposed that each day would prove my last, seemed to me the beginning of the answer to "let us have peace." the expression of these kindly feelings were not restricted to a section of the country, nor to a division of the people. they came from individual citizens of all nationalities; from all denominations--the protestant, the catholic, and the jew; and from the various societies of the land--scientific, educational, religious or otherwise. politics did not enter into the matter at all. i am not egotist enough to suppose all this significance should be given because i was the object of it. but the war between the states was a very bloody and a very costly war. one side or the other had to yield principles they deemed dearer than life before it could be brought to an end. i commanded the whole of the mighty host engaged on the victorious side. i was, no matter whether deservedly so or not, a representative of that side of the controversy. it is a significant and gratifying fact that confederates should have joined heartily in this spontaneous move. i hope the good feeling inaugurated may continue to the end. appendix. report of lieutenant-general u. s. grant, of the united states armies 1864-65. headquarters armies of the united states, washington, d. c., july 22, 1865. hon. e. m. stanton, secretary of war. sir: i have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of the armies of the united states from the date of my appointment to command the same. from an early period in the rebellion i had been impressed with the idea that active and continuous operations of all the troops that could be brought into the field, regardless of season and weather, were necessary to a speedy termination of the war. the resources of the enemy and his numerical strength were far inferior to ours; but as an offset to this, we had a vast territory, with a population hostile to the government, to garrison, and long lines of river and railroad communications to protect, to enable us to supply the operating armies. the armies in the east and west acted independently and without concert, like a balky team, no two ever pulling together, enabling the enemy to use to great advantage his interior lines of communication for transporting troops from east to west, reinforcing the army most vigorously pressed, and to furlough large numbers, during seasons of inactivity on our part, to go to their homes and do the work of producing, for the support of their armies. it was a question whether our numerical strength and resources were not more than balanced by these disadvantages and the enemy's superior position. from the first, i was firm in the conviction that no peace could be had that would be stable and conducive to the happiness of the people, both north and south, until the military power of the rebellion was entirely broken. i therefore determined, first, to use the greatest number of troops practicable against the armed force of the enemy; preventing him from using the same force at different seasons against first one and then another of our armies, and the possibility of repose for refitting and producing necessary supplies for carrying on resistance. second, to hammer continuously against the armed force of the enemy and his resources, until by mere attrition, if in no other way, there should be nothing left to him but an equal submission with the loyal section of our common country to the constitution and laws of the land. these views have been kept constantly in mind, and orders given and campaigns made to carry them out. whether they might have been better in conception and execution is for the people, who mourn the loss of friends fallen, and who have to pay the pecuniary cost, to say. all i can say is, that what i have done has been done conscientiously, to the best of my ability, and in what i conceived to be for the best interests of the whole country. at the date when this report begins, the situation of the contending forces was about as follows: the mississippi river was strongly garrisoned by federal troops, from st. louis, missouri, to its mouth. the line of the arkansas was also held, thus giving us armed possession of all west of the mississippi, north of that stream. a few points in southern louisiana, not remote from the river, were held by us, together with a small garrison at and near the mouth of the rio grande. all the balance of the vast territory of arkansas, louisiana, and texas was in the almost undisputed possession of the enemy, with an army of probably not less than eighty thousand effective men, that could have been brought into the field had there been sufficient opposition to have brought them out. the let-alone policy had demoralized this force so that probably but little more than one-half of it was ever present in garrison at any one time. but the one-half, or forty thousand men, with the bands of guerillas scattered through missouri, arkansas, and along the mississippi river, and the disloyal character of much of the population, compelled the use of a large number of troops to keep navigation open on the river, and to protect the loyal people to the west of it. to the east of the mississippi we held substantially with the line of the tennessee and holston rivers, running eastward to include nearly all of the state of tennessee. south of chattanooga, a small foothold had been obtained in georgia, sufficient to protect east tennessee from incursions from the enemy's force at dalton, georgia. west virginia was substantially within our lines. virginia, with the exception of the northern border, the potomac river, a small area about the mouth of james river, covered by the troops at norfolk and fort monroe, and the territory covered by the army of the potomac lying along the rapidan, was in the possession of the enemy. along the sea-coast footholds had been obtained at plymouth, washington, and new bern, in north carolina; beaufort, folly and morris islands, hilton head, fort pulaski, and port royal, in south carolina; fernandina and st. augustine, in florida. key west and pensacola were also in our possession, while all the important ports were blockaded by the navy. the accompanying map, a copy of which was sent to general sherman and other commanders in march, 1864, shows by red lines the territory occupied by us at the beginning of the rebellion, and at the opening of the campaign of 1864, while those in blue are the lines which it was proposed to occupy. behind the union lines there were many bands of guerillas and a large population disloyal to the government, making it necessary to guard every foot of road or river used in supplying our armies. in the south, a reign of military despotism prevailed, which made every man and boy capable of bearing arms a soldier; and those who could not bear arms in the field acted as provosts for collecting deserters and returning them. this enabled the enemy to bring almost his entire strength into the field. the enemy had concentrated the bulk of his forces east of the mississippi into two armies, commanded by generals r. e. lee and j. e. johnston, his ablest and best generals. the army commanded by lee occupied the south bank of the rapidan, extending from mine run westward, strongly intrenched, covering and defending richmond, the rebel capital, against the army of the potomac. the army under johnston occupied a strongly intrenched position at dalton, georgia, covering and defending atlanta, georgia, a place of great importance as a railroad centre, against the armies under major-general w. t. sherman. in addition to these armies he had a large cavalry force under forrest, in north-east mississippi; a considerable force, of all arms, in the shenandoah valley, and in the western part of virginia and extreme eastern part of tennessee; and also confronting our sea-coast garrisons, and holding blockaded ports where we had no foothold upon land. these two armies, and the cities covered and defended by them, were the main objective points of the campaign. major-general w. t. sherman, who was appointed to the command of the military division of the mississippi, embracing all the armies and territory east of the mississippi river to the alleghanies and the department of arkansas, west of the mississippi, had the immediate command of the armies operating against johnston. major-general george g. meade had the immediate command of the army of the potomac, from where i exercised general supervision of the movements of all our armies. general sherman was instructed to move against johnston's army, to break it up, and to go into the interior of the enemy's country as far as he could, inflicting all the damage he could upon their war resources. if the enemy in his front showed signs of joining lee, to follow him up to the full extent of his ability, while i would prevent the concentration of lee upon him, if it was in the power of the army of the potomac to do so. more specific written instructions were not given, for the reason that i had talked over with him the plans of the campaign, and was satisfied that he understood them and would execute them to the fullest extent possible. major-general n. p. banks, then on an expedition up red river against shreveport, louisiana (which had been organized previous to my appointment to command), was notified by me on the 15th of march, of the importance it was that shreveport should be taken at the earliest possible day, and that if he found that the taking of it would occupy from ten to fifteen days' more time than general sherman had given his troops to be absent from their command, he would send them back at the time specified by general sherman, even if it led to the abandonment of the main object of the red river expedition, for this force was necessary to movements east of the mississippi; that should his expedition prove successful, he would hold shreveport and the red river with such force as he might deem necessary, and return the balance of his troops to the neighborhood of new orleans, commencing no move for the further acquisition of territory, unless it was to make that then held by him more easily held; that it might be a part of the spring campaign to move against mobile; that it certainly would be, if troops enough could be obtained to make it without embarrassing other movements; that new orleans would be the point of departure for such an expedition; also, that i had directed general steele to make a real move from arkansas, as suggested by him (general banks), instead of a demonstration, as steele thought advisable. on the 31st of march, in addition to the foregoing notification and directions, he was instructed as follows: "1st. if successful in your expedition against shreveport, that you turn over the defence of the red river to general steele and the navy. "2d. that you abandon texas entirely, with the exception of your hold upon the rio grande. this can be held with four thousand men, if they will turn their attention immediately to fortifying their positions. at least one-half of the force required for this service might be taken from the colored troops. "3d. by properly fortifying on the mississippi river, the force to guard it from port hudson to new orleans can be reduced to ten thousand men, if not to a less number. six thousand more would then hold all the rest of the territory necessary to hold until active operations can again be resumed west of the river. according to your last return, this would give you a force of over thirty thousand effective men with which to move against mobile. to this i expect to add five thousand men from missouri. if however, you think the force here stated too small to hold the territory regarded as necessary to hold possession of, i would say concentrate at least twenty-five thousand men of your present command for operations against mobile. with these and such additions as i can give you from elsewhere, lose no time in making a demonstration, to be followed by an attack upon mobile. two or more iron-clads will be ordered to report to admiral farragut. this gives him a strong naval fleet with which to co-operate. you can make your own arrangements with the admiral for his co-operation, and select your own line of approach. my own idea of the matter is that pascagoula should be your base; but, from your long service in the gulf department, you will know best about the matter. it is intended that your movements shall be co-operative with movements elsewhere, and you cannot now start too soon. all i would now add is, that you commence the concentration of your forces at once. preserve a profound secrecy of what you intend doing, and start at the earliest possible moment. "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "major-general n. p. banks." major-general meade was instructed that lee's army would be his objective point; that wherever lee went he would go also. for his movement two plans presented themselves: one to cross the rapidan below lee, moving by his right flank; the other above, moving by his left. each presented advantages over the other, with corresponding objections. by crossing above, lee would be cut off from all chance of ignoring richmond or going north on a raid. but if we took this route, all we did would have to be done whilst the rations we started with held out; besides, it separated us from butler, so that he could not be directed how to cooperate. if we took the other route, brandy station could be used as a base of supplies until another was secured on the york or james rivers. of these, however, it was decided to take the lower route. the following letter of instruction was addressed to major-general b. f. butler: "fort monroe, virginia, april 2, 1864. "general:-in the spring campaign, which it is desirable shall commence at as early a day as practicable, it is proposed to have cooperative action of all the armies in the field, as far as this object can be accomplished. "it will not be possible to unite our armies into two or three large ones to act as so many units, owing to the absolute necessity of holding on to the territory already taken from the enemy. but, generally speaking, concentration can be practically effected by armies moving to the interior of the enemy's country from the territory they have to guard. by such movement, they interpose themselves between the enemy and the country to be guarded, thereby reducing the number necessary to guard important points, or at least occupy the attention of a part of the enemy's force, if no greater object is gained. lee's army and richmond being the greater objects towards which our attention must be directed in the next campaign, it is desirable to unite all the force we can against them. the necessity of covering washington with the army of the potomac, and of covering your department with your army, makes it impossible to unite these forces at the beginning of any move. i propose, therefore, what comes nearest this of anything that seems practicable: the army of the potomac will act from its present base, lee's army being the objective point. you will collect all the forces from your command that can be spared from garrison duty--i should say not less than twenty thousand effective men--to operate on the south side of james river, richmond being your objective point. to the force you already have will be added about ten thousand men from south carolina, under major-general gillmore, who will command them in person. major-general w. f. smith is ordered to report to you, to command the troops sent into the field from your own department. "general gillmore will be ordered to report to you at fortress monroe, with all the troops on transports, by the 18th instant, or as soon thereafter as practicable. should you not receive notice by that time to move, you will make such disposition of them and your other forces as you may deem best calculated to deceive the enemy as to the real move to be made. "when you are notified to move, take city point with as much force as possible. fortify, or rather intrench, at once, and concentrate all your troops for the field there as rapidly as you can. from city point directions cannot be given at this time for your further movements. "the fact that has already been stated--that is, that richmond is to be your objective point, and that there is to be co-operation between your force and the army of the potomac--must be your guide. this indicates the necessity of your holding close to the south bank of the james river as you advance. then, should the enemy be forced into his intrenchments in richmond, the army of the potomac would follow, and by means of transports the two armies would become a unit. "all the minor details of your advance are left entirely to your direction. if, however, you think it practicable to use your cavalry south of you, so as to cut the railroad about hicksford, about the time of the general advance, it would be of immense advantage. "you will please forward for my information, at the earliest practicable day, all orders, details, and instructions you may give for the execution of this order. "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "major-general b. f. butler." on the 16th these instructions were substantially reiterated. on the 19th, in order to secure full co-operation between his army and that of general meade, he was informed that i expected him to move from fort monroe the same day that general meade moved from culpeper. the exact time i was to telegraph him as soon as it was fixed, and that it would not be earlier than the 27th of april; that it was my intention to fight lee between culpeper and richmond, if he would stand. should he, however, fall back into richmond, i would follow up and make a junction with his (general butler's) army on the james river; that, could i be certain he would be able to invest richmond on the south side, so as to have his left resting on the james, above the city, i would form the junction there; that circumstances might make this course advisable anyhow; that he should use every exertion to secure footing as far up the south side of the river as he could, and as soon as possible after the receipt of orders to move; that if he could not carry the city, he should at least detain as large a force there as possible. in co-operation with the main movements against lee and johnston, i was desirous of using all other troops necessarily kept in departments remote from the fields of immediate operations, and also those kept in the background for the protection of our extended lines between the loyal states and the armies operating against them. a very considerable force, under command of major-general sigel, was so held for the protection of west virginia, and the frontiers of maryland and pennsylvania. whilst these troops could not be withdrawn to distant fields without exposing the north to invasion by comparatively small bodies of the enemy, they could act directly to their front, and give better protection than if lying idle in garrison. by such a movement they would either compel the enemy to detach largely for the protection of his supplies and lines of communication, or he would lose them. general sigel was therefore directed to organize all his available force into two expeditions, to move from beverly and charleston, under command of generals ord and crook, against the east tennessee and virginia railroad. subsequently, general ord having been relieved at his own request, general sigel was instructed at his own suggestion, to give up the expedition by beverly, and to form two columns, one under general crook, on the kanawha, numbering about ten thousand men, and one on the shenandoah, numbering about seven thousand men. the one on the shenandoah to assemble between cumberland and the shenandoah, and the infantry and artillery advanced to cedar creek with such cavalry as could be made available at the moment, to threaten the enemy in the shenandoah valley, and advance as far as possible; while general crook would take possession of lewisburg with part of his force and move down the tennessee railroad, doing as much damage as he could, destroying the new river bridge and the salt-works, at saltville, va. owing to the weather and bad condition of the roads, operations were delayed until the 1st of may, when, everything being in readiness and the roads favorable, orders were given for a general movement of all the armies not later than the 4th of may. my first object being to break the military power of the rebellion, and capture the enemy's important strongholds, made me desirous that general butler should succeed in his movement against richmond, as that would tend more than anything else, unless it were the capture of lee's army, to accomplish this desired result in the east. if he failed, it was my determination, by hard fighting, either to compel lee to retreat, or to so cripple him that he could not detach a large force to go north, and still retain enough for the defence of richmond. it was well understood, by both generals butler and meade, before starting on the campaign, that it was my intention to put both their armies south of the james river, in case of failure to destroy lee without it. before giving general butler his instructions, i visited him at fort monroe, and in conversation pointed out the apparent importance of getting possession of petersburg, and destroying railroad communication as far south as possible. believing, however, in the practicability of capturing richmond unless it was reinforced, i made that the objective point of his operations. as the army of the potomac was to move simultaneously with him, lee could not detach from his army with safety, and the enemy did not have troops elsewhere to bring to the defence of the city in time to meet a rapid movement from the north of james river. i may here state that, commanding all the armies as i did, i tried, as far as possible, to leave general meade in independent command of the army of the potomac. my instructions for that army were all through him, and were general in their nature, leaving all the details and the execution to him. the campaigns that followed proved him to be the right man in the right place. his commanding always in the presence of an officer superior to him in rank, has drawn from him much of that public attention that his zeal and ability entitle him to, and which he would otherwise have received. the movement of the army of the potomac commenced early on the morning of the 4th of may, under the immediate direction and orders of major-general meade, pursuant to instructions. before night, the whole army was across the rapidan (the fifth and sixth corps crossing at germania ford, and the second corps at ely's ford, the cavalry, under major-general sheridan, moving in advance,) with the greater part of its trains, numbering about four thousand wagons, meeting with but slight opposition. the average distance travelled by the troops that day was about twelve miles. this i regarded as a great success, and it removed from my mind the most serious apprehensions i had entertained, that of crossing the river in the face of an active, large, well-appointed, and ably commanded army, and how so large a train was to be carried through a hostile country, and protected. early on the 5th, the advance corps (the fifth, major-general g. k. warren commanding) met and engaged the enemy outside his intrenchments near mine run. the battle raged furiously all day, the whole army being brought into the fight as fast as the corps could be got upon the field, which, considering the density of the forest and narrowness of the roads, was done with commendable promptness. general burnside, with the ninth corps, was, at the time the army of the potomac moved, left with the bulk of his corps at the crossing of the rappahannock river and alexandria railroad, holding the road back to bull run, with instructions not to move until he received notice that a crossing of the rapidan was secured, but to move promptly as soon as such notice was received. this crossing he was apprised of on the afternoon of the 4th. by six o'clock of the morning of the 6th he was leading his corps into action near the wilderness tavern, some of his troops having marched a distance of over thirty miles, crossing both the rappahannock and rapidan rivers. considering that a large proportion, probably two-thirds of his command, was composed of new troops, unaccustomed to marches, and carrying the accoutrements of a soldier, this was a remarkable march. the battle of the wilderness was renewed by us at five o'clock on the morning of the 6th, and continued with unabated fury until darkness set in, each army holding substantially the same position that they had on the evening of the 5th. after dark, the enemy made a feeble attempt to turn our right flank, capturing several hundred prisoners and creating considerable confusion. but the promptness of general sedgwick, who was personally present and commanded that part of our line, soon reformed it and restored order. on the morning of the 7th, reconnoissances showed that the enemy had fallen behind his intrenched lines, with pickets to the front, covering a part of the battle-field. from this it was evident to my mind that the two days' fighting had satisfied him of his inability to further maintain the contest in the open field, notwithstanding his advantage of position, and that he would wait an attack behind his works. i therefore determined to push on and put my whole force between him and richmond; and orders were at once issued for a movement by his right flank. on the night of the 7th, the march was commenced towards spottsylvania court house, the fifth corps moving on the most direct road. but the enemy having become apprised of our movement, and having the shorter line, was enabled to reach there first. on the 8th, general warren met a force of the enemy, which had been sent out to oppose and delay his advance, to gain time to fortify the line taken up at spottsylvania. this force was steadily driven back on the main force, within the recently constructed works, after considerable fighting, resulting in severe loss to both sides. on the morning of the 9th, general sheridan started on a raid against the enemy's lines of communication with richmond. the 9th, 10th, and 11th were spent in manoeuvring and fighting, without decisive results. among the killed on the 9th was that able and distinguished soldier major-general john sedgwick, commanding the sixth army corps. major-general h. g. wright succeeded him in command. early on the morning of the 12th a general attack was made on the enemy in position. the second corps, major-general hancock commanding, carried a salient of his line, capturing most of johnson's division of ewell's corps and twenty pieces of artillery. but the resistance was so obstinate that the advantage gained did not prove decisive. the 13th, 14th, 15th, 16th, 17th, and 18th, were consumed in manoeuvring and awaiting the arrival of reinforcements from washington. deeming it impracticable to make any further attack upon the enemy at spottsylvania court house, orders were issued on the 15th with a view to a movement to the north anna, to commence at twelve o'clock on the night of the 19th. late in the afternoon of the 19th, ewell's corps came out of its works on our extreme right flank; but the attack was promptly repulsed, with heavy loss. this delayed the movement to the north anna until the night of the 21st, when it was commenced. but the enemy again, having the shorter line, and being in possession of the main roads, was enabled to reach the north anna in advance of us, and took position behind it. the fifth corps reached the north anna on the afternoon of the 23d, closely followed by the sixth corps. the second and ninth corps got up about the same time, the second holding the railroad bridge, and the ninth lying between that and jericho ford. general warren effected a crossing the same afternoon, and got a position without much opposition. soon after getting into position he was violently attacked, but repulsed the enemy with great slaughter. on the 25th, general sheridan rejoined the army of the potomac from the raid on which he started from spottsylvania, having destroyed the depots at beaver dam and ashland stations, four trains of cars, large supplies of rations, and many miles of railroad-track; recaptured about four hundred of our men on their way to richmond as prisoners of war; met and defeated the enemy's cavalry at yellow tavern; carried the first line of works around richmond (but finding the second line too strong to be carried by assault), recrossed to the north bank of the chickahominy at meadow bridge under heavy fire, and moved by a detour to haxall's landing, on the james river, where he communicated with general butler. this raid had the effect of drawing off the whole of the enemy's cavalry force, making it comparatively easy to guard our trains. general butler moved his main force up the james river, in pursuance of instructions, on the 4th of may, general gillmore having joined him with the tenth corps. at the same time he sent a force of one thousand eight hundred cavalry, by way of west point, to form a junction with him wherever he might get a foothold, and a force of three thousand cavalry, under general kautz, from suffolk, to operate against the road south of petersburg and richmond. on the 5th, he occupied, without opposition, both city point and bermuda hundred, his movement being a complete surprise. on the 6th, he was in position with his main army, and commenced intrenching. on the 7th he made a reconnoissance against the petersburg and richmond railroad, destroying a portion of it after some fighting. on the 9th he telegraphed as follows: "headquarters, near bermuda landing, may 9, 1864. "hon. e. m. stanton, secretary of war. "our operations may be summed up in a few words. with one thousand seven hundred cavalry we have advanced up the peninsula, forced the chickahominy, and have safely, brought them to their present position. these were colored cavalry, and are now holding our advance pickets towards richmond. "general kautz, with three thousand cavalry from suffolk, on the same day with our movement up james river, forced the black water, burned the railroad bridge at stony creek, below petersburg, cutting into beauregard's force at that point. "we have landed here, intrenched ourselves, destroyed many miles of railroad, and got a position which, with proper supplies, we can hold out against the whole of lee's army. i have ordered up the supplies. "beauregard, with a large portion of his force, was left south by the cutting of the railroads by kautz. that portion which reached petersburg under hill i have whipped to-day, killing and wounding many, and taking many prisoners, after a severe and well-contested fight. "general grant will not be troubled with any further reinforcements to lee from beauregard's force. "benj. f. butler, major-general." on the evening of the 13th and morning of the 14th he carried a portion of the enemy's first line of defences at drury's bluff, or fort darling, with small loss. the time thus consumed from the 6th lost to us the benefit of the surprise and capture of richmond and petersburg, enabling, as it did, beauregard to collect his loose forces in north and south carolina, and bring them to the defence of those places. on the 16th, the enemy attacked general butler in his position in front of drury's bluff. he was forced back, or drew back, into his intrenchments between the forks of the james and appomattox rivers, the enemy intrenching strongly in his front, thus covering his railroads, the city, and all that was valuable to him. his army, therefore, though in a position of great security, was as completely shut off from further operations directly against richmond as if it had been in a bottle strongly corked. it required but a comparatively small force of the enemy to hold it there. on the 12th, general kautz, with his cavalry, was started on a raid against the danville railroad, which he struck at coalfield, powhatan, and chula stations, destroying them, the railroad-track, two freight trains, and one locomotive, together with large quantities of commissary and other stores; thence, crossing to the south side road, struck it at wilson's, wellsville, and black's and white's stations, destroying the road and station-houses; thence he proceeded to city point, which he reached on the 18th. on the 19th of april, and prior to the movement of general butler, the enemy, with a land force under general hoke and an iron-clad ram, attacked plymouth, n. c., commanded by general h. w. wessells, and our gunboats there, and, after severe fighting, the place was carried by assault, and the entire garrison and armament captured. the gunboat smithfield was sunk, and the miami disabled. the army sent to operate against richmond having hermetically sealed itself up at bermuda hundred, the enemy was enabled to bring the most, if not all, the reinforcements brought from the south by beauregard against the army of the potomac. in addition to this reinforcement, a very considerable one, probably not less than fifteen thousand men, was obtained by calling in the scattered troops under breckinridge from the western part of virginia. the position of bermuda hundred was as easy to defend as it was difficult to operate from against the enemy. i determined, therefore, to bring from it all available forces, leaving enough only to secure what had been gained; and accordingly, on the 22d, i directed that they be sent forward, under command of major-general w. f. smith, to join the army of the potomac. on the 24th of may, the 9th army corps, commanded by major-general a. e. burnside, was assigned to the army of the potomac, and from this time forward constituted a portion of major-general meade's command. finding the enemy's position on the north anna stronger than either of his previous ones, i withdrew on the night of the 26th to the north bank of the north anna, and moved via hanover town to turn the enemy's position by his right. generals torbert's and merritt's divisions of cavalry, under sheridan, and the 6th corps, led the advance, crossed the pamunkey river at hanover town, after considerable fighting, and on the 28th the two divisions of cavalry had a severe, but successful engagement with the enemy at hawes's shop. on the 29th and 30th we advanced, with heavy skirmishing, to the hanover court house and cold harbor road, and developed the enemy's position north of the chickahominy. late on the evening of the last day the enemy came out and attacked our left, but was repulsed with very considerable loss. an attack was immediately ordered by general meade, along his whole line, which resulted in driving the enemy from a part of his intrenched skirmish line. on the 31st, general wilson's division of cavalry destroyed the railroad bridges over the south anna river, after defeating the enemy's cavalry. general sheridan, on the same day, reached cold harbor, and held it until relieved by the 6th corps and general smith's command, which had just arrived, via white house, from general butler's army. on the 1st day of june an attack was made at five p.m. by the 6th corps and the troops under general smith, the other corps being held in readiness to advance on the receipt of orders. this resulted in our carrying and holding the enemy's first line of works in front of the right of the 6th corps, and in front of general smith. during the attack the enemy made repeated assaults on each of the corps not engaged in the main attack, but was repulsed with heavy loss in every instance. that night he made several assaults to regain what he had lost in the day, but failed. the 2d was spent in getting troops into position for an attack on the 3d. on the 3d of june we again assaulted the enemy's works, in the hope of driving him from his position. in this attempt our loss was heavy, while that of the enemy, i have reason to believe, was comparatively light. it was the only general attack made from the rapidan to the james which did not inflict upon the enemy losses to compensate for our own losses. i would not be understood as saying that all previous attacks resulted in victories to our arms, or accomplished as much as i had hoped from them; but they inflicted upon the enemy severe losses, which tended, in the end, to the complete overthrow of the rebellion. from the proximity of the enemy to his defences around richmond, it was impossible, by any flank movement, to interpose between him and the city. i was still in a condition to either move by his left flank, and invest richmond from the north side, or continue my move by his right flank to the south side of the james. while the former might have been better as a covering for washington, yet a full survey of all the ground satisfied me that it would be impracticable to hold a line north and east of richmond that would protect the fredericksburg railroad, a long, vulnerable line, which would exhaust much of our strength to guard, and that would have to be protected to supply the army, and would leave open to the enemy all his lines of communication on the south side of the james. my idea, from the start, had been to beat lee's army north of richmond, if possible. then, after destroying his lines of communication north of the james river, to transfer the army to the south side, and besiege lee in richmond, or follow him south if he should retreat. after the battle of the wilderness, it was evident that the enemy deemed it of the first importance to run no risks with the army he then had. he acted purely on the defensive, behind breastworks, or feebly on the offensive immediately in front of them, and where, in case of repulse, he could easily retire behind them. without a greater sacrifice of life than i was willing to make, all could not be accomplished that i had designed north of richmond. i therefore determined to continue to hold substantially the ground we then occupied, taking advantage of any favorable circumstances that might present themselves, until the cavalry could be sent to charlottesville and gordonsville to effectually break up the railroad connection between richmond and the shenandoah valley and lynchburg; and when the cavalry got well off, to move the army to the south side of the james river, by the enemy's right flank, where i felt i could cut off all his sources of supply, except by the canal. on the 7th, two divisions of cavalry, under general sheridan, got off on the expedition against the virginia central railroad, with instructions to hunter, whom i hoped he would meet near charlottesville, to join his forces to sheridan's, and after the work laid out for them was thoroughly done, to join the army of the potomac by the route laid down in sheridan's instructions. on the 10th of june, general butler sent a force of infantry, under general gillmore, and of cavalry under general kautz, to capture petersburg, if possible, and destroy the railroad and common bridges across the appomattox. the cavalry carried the works on the south side, and penetrated well in towards the town, but were forced to retire. general gillmore, finding the works which he approached very strong, and deeming an assault impracticable, returned to bermuda hundred without attempting one. attaching great importance to the possession of petersburg, i sent back to bermuda hundred and city point, general smith's command by water, via the white house, to reach there in advance of the army of the potomac. this was for the express purpose of securing petersburg before the enemy, becoming aware of our intention, could reinforce the place. the movement from cold harbor commenced after dark on the evening of the 12th. one division of cavalry, under general wilson, and the 5th corps, crossed the chickahominy at long bridge, and moved out to white oak swamp, to cover the crossings of the other corps. the advance corps reached james river, at wilcox's landing and charles city court house, on the night of the 13th. during three long years the armies of the potomac and northern virginia had been confronting each other. in that time they had fought more desperate battles than it probably ever before fell to the lot of two armies to fight, without materially changing the vantage ground of either. the southern press and people, with more shrewdness than was displayed in the north, finding that they had failed to capture washington and march on to new york, as they had boasted they would do, assumed that they only defended their capital and southern territory. hence, antietam, gettysburg, and all the other battles that had been fought, were by them set down as failures on our part, and victories for them. their army believed this. it produced a morale which could only be overcome by desperate and continuous hard fighting. the battles of the wilderness, spottsylvania, north anna and cold harbor, bloody and terrible as they were on our side, were even more damaging to the enemy, and so crippled him as to make him wary ever after of taking the offensive. his losses in men were probably not so great, owing to the fact that we were, save in the wilderness, almost invariably the attacking party; and when he did attack, it was in the open field. the details of these battles, which for endurance and bravery on the part of the soldiery, have rarely been surpassed, are given in the report of major-general meade, and the subordinate reports accompanying it. during the campaign of forty-three days, from the rapidan to the james river, the army had to be supplied from an ever-shifting base, by wagons, over narrow roads, through a densely wooded country, with a lack of wharves at each new base from which to conveniently discharge vessels. too much credit cannot, therefore, be awarded to the quartermaster and commissary departments for the zeal and efficiency displayed by them. under the general supervision of the chief quartermaster, brigadier-general r. ingalls, the trains were made to occupy all the available roads between the army and our water-base, and but little difficulty was experienced in protecting them. the movement in the kanawha and shenandoah valleys, under general sigel, commenced on the 1st of may. general crook, who had the immediate command of the kanawha expedition, divided his forces into two columns, giving one, composed of cavalry, to general averell. they crossed the mountains by separate routes. averell struck the tennessee and virginia railroad, near wytheville, on the 10th, and proceeding to new river and christiansburg, destroyed the road, several important bridges and depots, including new river bridge, forming a junction with crook at union on the 15th. general sigel moved up the shenandoah valley, met the enemy at new market on the 15th, and, after a severe engagement, was defeated with heavy loss, and retired behind cedar creek. not regarding the operations of general sigel as satisfactory, i asked his removal from command, and major-general hunter appointed to supersede him. his instructions were embraced in the following dispatches to major-general h. w. halleck, chief of staff of the army: "near spottsylvania court house, va. "may 20, 1864. * * * * * * * "the enemy are evidently relying for supplies greatly on such as are brought over the branch road running through staunton. on the whole, therefore, i think it would be better for general hunter to move in that direction; reach staunton and gordonsville or charlottesville, if he does not meet too much opposition. if he can hold at bay a force equal to his own, he will be doing good service. * * * "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "major-general h. w. halleck." "jericho ford, va., may 25, 1864. "if hunter can possibly get to charlottesville and lynchburg, he should do so, living on the country. the railroads and canal should be destroyed beyond possibility of repairs for weeks. completing this, he could find his way back to his original base, or from about gordonsville join this army. "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "major-general h. w. halleck." general hunter immediately took up the offensive, and, moving up the shenandoah valley, met the enemy on the 5th of june at piedmont, and, after a battle of ten hours, routed and defeated him, capturing on the field of battle one thousand five hundred men, three pieces of artillery, and three hundred stand of small arms. on the 8th of the same month he formed a junction with crook and averell at staunton, from which place he moved direct on lynchburg, via lexington, which place he reached and invested on the 16th day of june. up to this time he was very successful; and but for the difficulty of taking with him sufficient ordnance stores over so long a march, through a hostile country, he would, no doubt, have captured that, to the enemy important, point. the destruction of the enemy's supplies and manufactories was very great. to meet this movement under general hunter, general lee sent a force, perhaps equal to a corps, a part of which reached lynchburg a short time before hunter. after some skirmishing on the 17th and 18th, general hunter, owing to a want of ammunition to give battle, retired from before the place. unfortunately, this want of ammunition left him no choice of route for his return but by way of kanawha. this lost to us the use of his troops for several weeks from the defence of the north. had general hunter moved by way of charlottesville, instead of lexington, as his instructions contemplated, he would have been in a position to have covered the shenandoah valley against the enemy, should the force he met have seemed to endanger it. if it did not, he would have been within easy distance of the james river canal, on the main line of communication between lynchburg and the force sent for its defence. i have never taken exception to the operations of general hunter, and am not now disposed to find fault with him, for i have no doubt he acted within what he conceived to be the spirit of his instructions and the interests of the service. the promptitude of his movements and his gallantry should entitle him to the commendation of his country. to return to the army of the potomac: the 2d corps commenced crossing the james river on the morning of the 14th by ferry-boats at wilcox's landing. the laying of the pontoon-bridge was completed about midnight of the 14th, and the crossing of the balance of the army was rapidly pushed forward by both bridge and ferry. after the crossing had commenced, i proceeded by steamer to bermuda hundred to give the necessary orders for the immediate capture of petersburg. the instructions to general butler were verbal, and were for him to send general smith immediately, that night, with all the troops he could give him without sacrificing the position he then held. i told him that i would return at once to the army of the potomac, hasten its crossing and throw it forward to petersburg by divisions as rapidly as it could be done, that we could reinforce our armies more rapidly there than the enemy could bring troops against us. general smith got off as directed, and confronted the enemy's pickets near petersburg before daylight next morning, but for some reason that i have never been able to satisfactorily understand, did not get ready to assault his main lines until near sundown. then, with a part of his command only, he made the assault, and carried the lines north-east of petersburg from the appomattox river, for a distance of over two and a half miles, capturing fifteen pieces of artillery and three hundred prisoners. this was about seven p.m. between the line thus captured and petersburg there were no other works, and there was no evidence that the enemy had reinforced petersburg with a single brigade from any source. the night was clear the moon shining brightly and favorable to further operations. general hancock, with two divisions of the 2d corps, reached general smith just after dark, and offered the service of these troops as he (smith) might wish, waiving rank to the named commander, who he naturally supposed knew best the position of affairs, and what to do with the troops. but instead of taking these troops and pushing at once into petersburg, he requested general hancock to relieve a part of his line in the captured works, which was done before midnight. by the time i arrived the next morning the enemy was in force. an attack was ordered to be made at six o'clock that evening by the troops under smith and the 2d and 9th corps. it required until that time for the 9th corps to get up and into position. the attack was made as ordered, and the fighting continued with but little intermission until six o'clock the next morning, and resulted in our carrying the advance and some of the main works of the enemy to the right (our left) of those previously captured by general smith, several pieces of artillery, and over four hundred prisoners. the 5th corps having got up, the attacks were renewed and persisted in with great vigor on the 17th and 18th, but only resulted in forcing the enemy into an interior line, from which he could not be dislodged. the advantages of position gained by us were very great. the army then proceeded to envelop petersburg towards the south side railroad as far as possible without attacking fortifications. on the 16th the enemy, to reinforce petersburg, withdrew from a part of his intrenchment in front of bermuda hundred, expecting, no doubt, to get troops from north of the james to take the place of those withdrawn before we could discover it. general butler, taking advantage of this, at once moved a force on the railroad between petersburg and richmond. as soon as i was apprised of the advantage thus gained, to retain it i ordered two divisions of the 6th corps, general wright commanding, that were embarking at wilcox's landing, under orders for city point, to report to general butler at bermuda hundred, of which general butler was notified, and the importance of holding a position in advance of his present line urged upon him. about two o'clock in the afternoon general butler was forced back to the line the enemy had withdrawn from in the morning. general wright, with his two divisions, joined general butler on the forenoon of the 17th, the latter still holding with a strong picket-line the enemy's works. but instead of putting these divisions into the enemy's works to hold them, he permitted them to halt and rest some distance in the rear of his own line. between four and five o'clock in the afternoon the enemy attacked and drove in his pickets and re-occupied his old line. on the night of the 20th and morning of the 21st a lodgment was effected by general butler, with one brigade of infantry, on the north bank of the james, at deep bottom, and connected by pontoon-bridge with bermuda hundred. on the 19th, general sheridan, on his return from his expedition against the virginia central railroad, arrived at the white house just as the enemy's cavalry was about to attack it, and compelled it to retire. the result of this expedition was, that general sheridan met the enemy's cavalry near trevilian station, on the morning of the 11th of june, whom he attacked, and after an obstinate contest drove from the field in complete rout. he left his dead and nearly all his wounded in our hands, and about four hundred prisoners and several hundred horses. on the 12th he destroyed the railroad from trevilian station to louisa court house. this occupied until three o'clock p.m., when he advanced in the direction of gordonsville. he found the enemy reinforced by infantry, behind well-constructed rifle-pits, about five miles from the latter place and too strong to successfully assault. on the extreme right, however, his reserve brigade carried the enemy's works twice, and was twice driven therefrom by infantry. night closed the contest. not having sufficient ammunition to continue the engagement, and his animals being without forage (the country furnishing but inferior grazing), and hearing nothing from general hunter, he withdrew his command to the north side of the north anna, and commenced his return march, reaching white house at the time before stated. after breaking up the depot at that place, he moved to the james river, which he reached safely after heavy fighting. he commenced crossing on the 25th, near fort powhatan, without further molestation, and rejoined the army of the potomac. on the 22d, general wilson, with his own division of cavalry of the army of the potomac, and general kautz's division of cavalry of the army of the james moved against the enemy's railroads south of richmond. striking the weldon railroad at reams's station, destroying the depot and several miles of the road, and the south side road about fifteen miles from petersburg, to near nottoway station, where he met and defeated a force of the enemy's cavalry. he reached burkesville station on the afternoon of the 23d, and from there destroyed the danville railroad to roanoke bridge, a distance of twenty-five miles, where he found the enemy in force, and in a position from which he could not dislodge him. he then commenced his return march, and on the 28th met the enemy's cavalry in force at the weldon railroad crossing of stony creek, where he had a severe but not decisive engagement. thence he made a detour from his left with a view of reaching reams's station (supposing it to be in our possession). at this place he was met by the enemy's cavalry, supported by infantry, and forced to retire, with the loss of his artillery and trains. in this last encounter, general kautz, with a part of his command, became separated, and made his way into our lines. general wilson, with the remainder of his force, succeeded in crossing the nottoway river and coming in safely on our left and rear. the damage to the enemy in this expedition more than compensated for the losses we sustained. it severed all connection by railroad with richmond for several weeks. with a view of cutting the enemy's railroad from near richmond to the anna rivers, and making him wary of the situation of his army in the shenandoah, and, in the event of failure in this, to take advantage of his necessary withdrawal of troops from petersburg, to explode a mine that had been prepared in front of the 9th corps and assault the enemy's lines at that place, on the night of the 26th of july the 2d corps and two divisions of the cavalry corps and kautz's cavalry were crossed to the north bank of the james river and joined the force general butler had there. on the 27th the enemy was driven from his intrenched position, with the loss of four pieces of artillery. on the 28th our lines were extended from deep bottom to new market road, but in getting this position were attacked by the enemy in heavy force. the fighting lasted for several hours, resulting in considerable loss to both sides. the first object of this move having failed, by reason of the very large force thrown there by the enemy, i determined to take advantage of the diversion made, by assaulting petersburg before he could get his force back there. one division of the 2d corps was withdrawn on the night of the 28th, and moved during the night to the rear of the 18th corps, to relieve that corps in the line, that it might be foot-loose in the assault to be made. the other two divisions of the 2d corps and sheridan's cavalry were crossed over on the night of the 29th and moved in front of petersburg. on the morning of the 30th, between four and five o'clock, the mine was sprung, blowing up a battery and most of a regiment, and the advance of the assaulting column, formed of the 9th corps, immediately took possession of the crater made by the explosion, and the line for some distance to the right and left of it, and a detached line in front of it, but for some cause failed to advance promptly to the ridge beyond. had they done this, i have every reason to believe that petersburg would have fallen. other troops were immediately pushed forward, but the time consumed in getting them up enabled the enemy to rally from his surprise (which had been complete), and get forces to this point for its defence. the captured line thus held being untenable, and of no advantage to us, the troops were withdrawn, but not without heavy loss. thus terminated in disaster what promised to be the most successful assault of the campaign. immediately upon the enemy's ascertaining that general hunter was retreating from lynchburg by way of the kanawha river, thus laying the shenandoah valley open for raid into maryland and pennsylvania, he returned northward and moved down that valley. as soon as this movement of the enemy was ascertained, general hunter, who had reached the kanawha river, was directed to move his troops without delay, by river and railroad, to harper's ferry; but owing to the difficulty of navigation by reason of low water and breaks in the railroad, great delay was experienced in getting there. it became necessary, therefore, to find other troops to check this movement of the enemy. for this purpose the 6th corps was taken from the armies operating against richmond, to which was added the 19th corps, then fortunately beginning to arrive in hampton roads from the gulf department, under orders issued immediately after the ascertainment of the result of the red river expedition. the garrisons of baltimore and washington were at this time made up of heavy-artillery regiments, hundred days' men, and detachments from the invalid corps. one division under command of general ricketts, of the 6th corps, was sent to baltimore, and the remaining two divisions of the 6th corps, under general wright, were subsequently sent to washington. on the 3d of july the enemy approached martinsburg. general sigel, who was in command of our forces there, retreated across the potomac at shepherdtown; and general weber, commanding at harper's ferry, crossed the occupied hagerstown, moving a strong column towards frederick city. general wallace, with rickett's division and his own command, the latter mostly new and undisciplined troops, pushed out from baltimore with great promptness, and met the enemy in force on the monocacy, near the crossing of the railroad bridge. his force was not sufficient to insure success, but he fought the enemy nevertheless, and although it resulted in a defeat to our arms, yet it detained the enemy, and thereby served to enable general wright to reach washington with two division of the 6th corps, and the advance of the 19th corps, before him. from monocacy the enemy moved on washington, his cavalry advance reaching rockville on the evening of the 10th. on the 12th a reconnoissance was thrown out in front of fort stevens, to ascertain the enemy's position and force. a severe skirmish ensued, in which we lost about two hundred and eighty in killed and wounded. the enemy's loss was probably greater. he commenced retreating during the night. learning the exact condition of affairs at washington, i requested by telegraph, at forty-five minutes past eleven p.m., on the 12th, the assignment of major-general h. g. wright to the command of all the troops that could be made available to operate in the field against the enemy, and directed that he should get outside of the trenches with all the force he could, and push early to the last moment. general wright commenced the pursuit on the 13th; on the 18th the enemy was overtaken at snicker's ferry, on the shenandoah, when a sharp skirmish occurred; and on the 20th, general averell encountered and defeated a portion of the rebel army at winchester, capturing four pieces of artillery and several hundred prisoners. learning that early was retreating south towards lynchburg or richmond, i directed that the 6th and 19th corps be got back to the armies operating against richmond, so that they might be used in a movement against lee before the return of the troops sent by him into the valley; and that hunter should remain in the shenandoah valley, keeping between any force of the enemy and washington, acting on the defensive as much as possible. i felt that if the enemy had any notion of returning, the fact would be developed before the 6th and 19th corps could leave washington. subsequently, the 19th corps was excepted form the order to return to the james. about the 25th it became evident that the enemy was again advancing upon maryland and pennsylvania, and the 6th corps, then at washington, was ordered back to the vicinity of harper's ferry. the rebel force moved down the valley, and sent a raiding party into pennsylvania which on the 30th burned chambersburg, and then retreated, pursued by our cavalry, towards cumberland. they were met and defeated by general kelley, and with diminished numbers escaped into the mountains of west virginia. from the time of the first raid the telegraph wires were frequently down between washington and city point, making it necessary to transmit messages a part of the way by boat. it took from twenty-four to thirty-six hours to get dispatches through and return answers would be received showing a different state of facts from those on which they were based, causing confusion and apparent contradiction of orders that must have considerably embarrassed those who had to execute them, and rendered operations against the enemy less effective than they otherwise would have been. to remedy this evil, it was evident to my mind that some person should have the supreme command of all the forces in the department of west virginia, washington, susquehanna, and the middle department, and i so recommended. on the 2d of august, i ordered general sheridan to report in person to major-general halleck, chief of staff, at washington, with a view to his assignment to the command of all the forces against early. at this time the enemy was concentrated in the neighborhood of winchester, while our forces, under general hunter, were concentrated on the monocacy, at the crossing of the baltimore and ohio railroad, leaving open to the enemy western maryland and southern pennsylvania. from where i was, i hesitated to give positive orders for the movement of our forces at monocacy, lest by so doing i should expose washington. therefore, on the 4th, i left city point to visit hunter's command, and determine for myself what was best to be done. on arrival there, and after consultation with general hunter, i issued to him the following instructions: "monocacy bridge, maryland, august 5, 1864--8 p.m. "general:--concentrate all your available force without delay in the vicinity of harper's ferry, leaving only such railroad guards and garrisons for public property as may be necessary. use, in this concentrating, the railroad, if by so doing time can be saved. from harper's ferry, if it is found that the enemy has moved north of the potomac in large force, push north, following him and attacking him wherever found; follow him, if driven south of the potomac, as long as it is safe to do so. if it is ascertained that the enemy has but a small force north of the potomac, then push south with the main force, detaching under a competent commander, a sufficient force to look after the raiders, and drive them to their homes. in detaching such a force, the brigade of the cavalry now en route from washington via rockville may be taken into account. "there are now on their way to join you three other brigades of the best cavalry, numbering at least five thousand men and horses. these will be instructed, in the absence of further orders, to join you by the south side of the potomac. one brigade will probably start to-morrow. in pushing up the shenandoah valley, where it is expected you will have to go first or last, it is desirable that nothing should be left to invite the enemy to return. take all provisions, forage, and stock wanted for the use of your command; such as cannot be consumed, destroy. it is not desirable that the buildings should be destroyed--they should rather be protected; but the people should be informed that, so long as an army can subsist among them, recurrence of theses raids must be expected, and we are determined to stop them at all hazards. "bear in mind, the object is to drive the enemy south; and to do this you want to keep him always in sight. be guided in your course by the course he takes. "make your own arrangements for supplies of all kinds, giving regular vouchers for such as may be taken from loyal citizens in the country through which you march. "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "major-general d. hunter." the troops were immediately put in motion, and the advance reached halltown that night. general hunter having, in our conversation, expressed a willingness to be relieved from command, i telegraphed to have general sheridan, then at washington, sent to harper's ferry by the morning train, with orders to take general command of all the troops in the field, and to call on general hunter at monocacy, who would turn over to him my letter of instructions. i remained at monocacy until general sheridan arrived, on the morning of the 6th, and, after a conference with him in relation to military affairs in that vicinity, i returned to city point by way of washington. on the 7th of august, the middle department, and the departments of west virginia, washington, and susquehanna, were constituted into the "middle military division," and major-general sheridan was assigned to temporary command of the same. two divisions of cavalry, commanded by generals torbert and wilson, were sent to sheridan from the army of the potomac. the first reached him at harper's ferry about the 11th of august. his operations during the month of august and the fore part of september were both of an offensive and defensive character, resulting in many severe skirmishes, principally by the cavalry, in which we were generally successful, but no general engagement took place. the two armies lay in such a position--the enemy on the west bank of the opequon creek covering winchester, and our forces in front of berryville--that either could bring on a battle at any time. defeat to us would lay open to the enemy the states of maryland and pennsylvania for long distances before another army could be interposed to check him. under these circumstances i hesitated about allowing the initiative to be taken. finally, the use of the baltimore and ohio railroad, and the chesapeake and ohio canal, which were both obstructed by the enemy, became so indispensably necessary to us, and the importance of relieving pennsylvania and maryland from continuously threatened invasion so great, that i determined the risk should be taken. but fearing to telegraph the order for an attack without knowing more than i did of general sheridan's feelings as to what would be the probable result, i left city point on the 15th of september to visit him at his headquarters, to decide, after conference with him, what should be done. i met him at charlestown, and he pointed out so distinctly how each army lay; what he could do the moment he was authorized, and expressed such confidence of success, that i saw there were but two words of instructions necessary--go in! for the conveniences of forage, the teams for supplying the army were kept at harper's ferry. i asked him if he could get out his teams and supplies in time to make an attack on the ensuing tuesday morning. his reply was, that he could before daylight on monday. he was off promptly to time, and i may here add, that the result was such that i have never since deemed it necessary to visit general sheridan before giving him orders. early on the morning of the 19th, general sheridan attacked general early at the crossing on the opequon creek, and after a most sanguinary and bloody battle, lasting until five o'clock in the evening, defeated him with heavy loss, carrying his entire position from opequon creek to winchester, capturing several thousand prisoners and five pieces of artillery. the enemy rallied, and made a stand in a strong position at fisher's hill, where he was attacked, and again defeated with heavy loss on the 20th [22d]. sheridan pursued him with great energy through harrisonburg, staunton, and the gaps of the blue ridge. after stripping the upper valley of most of the supplies and provisions for the rebel army, he returned to strasburg, and took position on the north side of cedar creek. having received considerable reinforcements, general early again returned to the valley, and, on the 9th of october, his cavalry encountered ours near strasburg, where the rebels were defeated, with the loss of eleven pieces of artillery and three hundred and fifty prisoners. on the night of the 18th, the enemy crossed the mountains which separate the branches of the shenandoah, forded the north fork, and early on the morning of the 19th, under cover of the darkness and the fog, surprised and turned our left flank, and captured the batteries which enfiladed our whole line. our troops fell back with heavy loss and in much confusion, but were finally rallied between middletown and newtown. at this juncture, general sheridan, who was at winchester when the battle commenced arrived on the field, arranged his lines just in time to repulse a heavy attack of the enemy, and immediately assuming the offensive, he attacked in turn with great vigor. the enemy was defeated with great slaughter, and the loss of most of his artillery and trains, and the trophies he had captured in the morning. the wreck of his army escaped during the night, and fled in the direction of staunton and lynchburg. pursuit was made to mount jackson. thus ended this, the enemy's last attempt to invade the north via the shenandoah valley. i was now enabled to return the 6th corps to the army of the potomac, and to send one division from sheridan's army to the army of the james, and another to savannah, georgia, to hold sherman's new acquisitions on the sea-coast, and thus enable him to move without detaching from his force for that purpose. reports from various sources led me to believe that the enemy had detached three divisions from petersburg to reinforce early in the shenandoah valley. i therefore sent the 2d corps and gregg's division of cavalry, of the army of the potomac, and a force of general butler's army, on the night of the 13th of august, to threaten richmond from the north side of the james, to prevent him from sending troops away, and, if possible, to draw back those sent. in this move we captured six pieces of artillery and several hundred prisoners, detained troops that were under marching orders, and ascertained that but one division (kershaw's), of the three reputed detached, had gone. the enemy having withdrawn heavily from petersburg to resist this movement, the 5th corps, general warren commanding, was moved out on the 18th, and took possession of the weldon railroad. during the day he had considerable fighting. to regain possession of the road, the enemy made repeated and desperate assaults, but was each time repulsed with great loss. on the night of the 20th, the troops on the north side of the james were withdrawn, and hancock and gregg returned to the front at petersburg. on the 25th, the 2d corps and gregg's division of cavalry, while at reams's station destroying the railroad, were attacked, and after desperate fighting, a part of our line gave way, and five pieces of artillery fell into the hands of the enemy. by the 12th of september, a branch railroad was completed from the city point and petersburg railroad to the weldon railroad, enabling us to supply, without difficulty, in all weather, the army in front of petersburg. the extension of our lines across the weldon railroad compelled the enemy to so extend his, that it seemed he could have but few troops north of the james for the defence of richmond. on the night of the 28th, the 10th corps, major-general birney, and the 18th corps, major-general ord commanding, of general butler's army, were crossed to the north side of the james, and advanced on the morning of the 29th, carrying the very strong fortifications and intrenchments below chaffin's farm, known as fort harrison, capturing fifteen pieces of artillery, and the new market road and intrenchments. this success was followed up by a gallant assault upon fort gilmer, immediately in front of the chaffin farm fortifications, in which we were repulsed with heavy loss. kautz's cavalry was pushed forward on the road to the right of this, supported by infantry, and reached the enemy's inner line, but was unable to get further. the position captured from the enemy was so threatening to richmond, that i determined to hold it. the enemy made several desperate attempts to dislodge us, all of which were unsuccessful, and for which he paid dearly. on the morning of the 30th, general meade sent out a reconnoissance with a view to attacking the enemy's line, if it was found sufficiently weakened by withdrawal of troops to the north side. in this reconnoissance we captured and held the enemy's works near poplar spring church. in the afternoon, troops moving to get to the left of the point gained were attacked by the enemy in heavy force, and compelled to fall back until supported by the forces holding the captured works. our cavalry under gregg was also attacked, but repulsed the enemy with great loss. on the 7th of october, the enemy attacked kautz's cavalry north of the james, and drove it back with heavy loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners, and the loss of all the artillery eight or nine pieces. this he followed up by an attack on our intrenched infantry line, but was repulsed with severe slaughter. on the 13th, a reconnoissance was sent out by general butler, with a view to drive the enemy from some new works he was constructing, which resulted in very heavy loss to us. on the 27th, the army of the potomac, leaving only sufficient men to hold its fortified line, moved by the enemy's right flank. the 2d corps, followed by two divisions of the 5th corps, with the cavalry in advance and covering our left flank, forced a passage of hatcher's run, and moved up the south side of it towards the south side railroad, until the 2d corps and part of the cavalry reached the boydton plank road where it crosses hatcher's run. at this point we were six miles distant from the south side railroad, which i had hoped by this movement to reach and hold. but finding that we had not reached the end of the enemy's fortifications, and no place presenting itself for a successful assault by which he might be doubled up and shortened, i determined to withdraw to within our fortified line. orders were given accordingly. immediately upon receiving a report that general warren had connected with general hancock, i returned to my headquarters. soon after i left the enemy moved out across hatcher's run, in the gap between generals hancock and warren, which was not closed as reported, and made a desperate attack on general hancock's right and rear. general hancock immediately faced his corps to meet it, and after a bloody combat drove the enemy within his works, and withdrew that night to his old position. in support of this movement, general butler made a demonstration on the north side of the james, and attacked the enemy on the williamsburg road, and also on the york river railroad. in the former he was unsuccessful; in the latter he succeeded in carrying a work which was afterwards abandoned, and his forces withdrawn to their former positions. from this time forward the operations in front of petersburg and richmond, until the spring campaign of 1865, were confined to the defence and extension of our lines, and to offensive movements for crippling the enemy's lines of communication, and to prevent his detaching any considerable force to send south. by the 7th of february, our lines were extended to hatcher's run, and the weldon railroad had been destroyed to hicksford. general sherman moved from chattanooga on the 6th of may, with the armies of the cumberland, tennessee, and ohio, commanded, respectively, by generals thomas mcpherson, and schofield, upon johnston's army at dalton; but finding the enemy's position at buzzard's roost, covering dalton, too strong to be assaulted, general mcpherson was sent through snake gap to turn it, while generals thomas and schofield threatened it in front and on the north. this movement was successful. johnston, finding his retreat likely to be cut off, fell back to his fortified position at resaca, where he was attacked on the afternoon of may 15th. a heavy battle ensued. during the night the enemy retreated south. late on the 17th, his rear-guard was overtaken near adairsville, and heavy skirmishing followed. the next morning, however, he had again disappeared. he was vigorously pursued, and was overtaken at cassville on the 19th, but during the ensuing night retreated across the etowah. while these operations were going on, general jefferson c. davis's division of thomas's army was sent to rome, capturing it with its forts and artillery, and its valuable mills and foundries. general sherman, having give his army a few days' rest at this point, again put it in motion on the 23d, for dallas, with a view of turning the difficult pass at allatoona. on the afternoon of the 25th, the advance, under general hooker, had a severe battle with the enemy, driving him back to new hope church, near dallas. several sharp encounters occurred at this point. the most important was on the 28th, when the enemy assaulted general mcpherson at dallas, but received a terrible and bloody repulse. on the 4th of june, johnston abandoned his intrenched position at new hope church, and retreated to the strong positions of kenesaw, pine, and lost mountains. he was forced to yield the two last-named places, and concentrate his army on kenesaw, where, on the 27th, generals thomas and mcpherson made a determined but unsuccessful assault. on the night of the 2d of july, sherman commenced moving his army by the right flank, and on the morning of the 3d, found that the enemy, in consequence of this movement, had abandoned kenesaw and retreated across the chattahoochee. general sherman remained on the chattahoochee to give his men rest and get up stores until the 17th of july, when he resumed his operations, crossed the chattahoochee, destroyed a large portion of the railroad to augusta, and drove the enemy back to atlanta. at this place general hood succeeded general johnston in command of the rebel army, and assuming the offensive-defensive policy, made several severe attacks upon sherman in the vicinity of atlanta, the most desperate and determined of which was on the 22d of july. about one p.m. of this day the brave, accomplished, and noble-hearted mcpherson was killed. general logan succeeded him, and commanded the army of the tennessee through this desperate battle, and until he was superseded by major-general howard, on the 26th, with the same success and ability that had characterized him in the command of a corps or division. in all these attacks the enemy was repulsed with great loss. finding it impossible to entirely invest the place, general sherman, after securing his line of communications across the chattahoochee, moved his main force round by the enemy's left flank upon the montgomery and macon roads, to draw the enemy from his fortifications. in this he succeeded, and after defeating the enemy near rough-and-ready, jonesboro, and lovejoy's, forcing him to retreat to the south, on the 2d of september occupied atlanta, the objective point of his campaign. about the time of this move, the rebel cavalry, under wheeler, attempted to cut his communications in the rear, but was repulsed at dalton, and driven into east tennessee, whence it proceeded west to mcminnville, murfreesboro, and franklin, and was finally driven south of the tennessee. the damage done by this raid was repaired in a few days. during the partial investment of atlanta, general rousseau joined general sherman with a force of cavalry from decatur, having made a successful raid upon the atlanta and montgomery railroad, and its branches near opelika. cavalry raids were also made by generals mccook, garrard, and stoneman, to cut the remaining railroad communication with atlanta. the first two were successful the latter, disastrous. general sherman's movement from chattanooga to atlanta was prompt, skilful, and brilliant. the history of his flank movements and battles during that memorable campaign will ever be read with an interest unsurpassed by anything in history. his own report, and those of his subordinate commanders, accompanying it, give the details of that most successful campaign. he was dependent for the supply of his armies upon a single-track railroad from nashville to the point where he was operating. this passed the entire distance through a hostile country, and every foot of it had to be protected by troops. the cavalry force of the enemy under forrest, in northern mississippi, was evidently waiting for sherman to advance far enough into the mountains of georgia, to make a retreat disastrous, to get upon this line and destroy it beyond the possibility of further use. to guard against this danger, sherman left what he supposed to be a sufficient force to operate against forrest in west tennessee. he directed general washburn, who commanded there, to send brigadier-general s. d. sturgis in command of this force to attack him. on the morning of the 10th of june, general sturgis met the enemy near guntown, mississippi, was badly beaten, and driven back in utter rout and confusion to memphis, a distance of about one hundred miles, hotly pursued by the enemy. by this, however, the enemy was defeated in his designs upon sherman's line of communications. the persistency with which he followed up this success exhausted him, and made a season for rest and repairs necessary. in the meantime, major-general a. j. smith, with the troops of the army of the tennessee that had been sent by general sherman to general banks, arrived at memphis on their return from red river, where they had done most excellent service. he was directed by general sherman to immediately take the offensive against forrest. this he did with the promptness and effect which has characterized his whole military career. on the 14th of july, he met the enemy at tupelo, mississippi, and whipped him badly. the fighting continued through three days. our loss was small compared with that of the enemy. having accomplished the object of his expedition, general smith returned to memphis. during the months of march and april this same force under forrest annoyed us considerably. on the 24th of march it captured union city, kentucky, and its garrison, and on the 24th attacked paducah, commanded by colonel s. g. hicks, 40th illinois volunteers. colonel h., having but a small force, withdrew to the forts near the river, from where he repulsed the enemy and drove him from the place. on the 13th of april, part of this force, under the rebel general buford, summoned the garrison of columbus, kentucky, to surrender, but received for reply from colonel lawrence, 34th new jersey volunteers, that being placed there by his government with adequate force to hold his post and repel all enemies from it, surrender was out of the question. on the morning of the same day forrest attacked fort pillow, tennessee, garrisoned by a detachment of tennessee cavalry and the 1st regiment alabama colored troops, commanded by major booth. the garrison fought bravely until about three o'clock in the afternoon, when the enemy carried the works by assault; and, after our men threw down their arms, proceeded to an inhuman and merciless massacre of the garrison. on the 14th, general buford, having failed at columbus, appeared before paducah, but was again driven off. guerillas and raiders, seemingly emboldened by forrest's operations, were also very active in kentucky. the most noted of these was morgan. with a force of from two to three thousand cavalry, he entered the state through pound gap in the latter part of may. on the 11th of june they attacked and captured cynthiana, with its entire garrison. on the 12th he was overtaken by general burbridge, and completely routed with heavy loss, and was finally driven out of the state. this notorious guerilla was afterwards surprised and killed near greenville, tennessee, and his command captured and dispersed by general gillem. in the absence of official reports of the commencement of the red river expedition, except so far as relates to the movements of the troops sent by general sherman under general a. j. smith, i am unable to give the date of its starting. the troops under general smith, comprising two divisions of the 16th and a detachment of the 17th army corps, left vicksburg on the 10th of march, and reached the designated point on red river one day earlier than that appointed by general banks. the rebel forces at fort de russy, thinking to defeat him, left the fort on the 14th to give him battle in the open field; but, while occupying the enemy with skirmishing and demonstrations, smith pushed forward to fort de russy, which had been left with a weak garrison, and captured it with its garrison about three hundred and fifty men, eleven pieces of artillery, and many small-arms. our loss was but slight. on the 15th he pushed forward to alexandria, which place he reached on the 18th. on the 21st he had an engagement with the enemy at henderson's hill, in which he defeated him, capturing two hundred and ten prisoners and four pieces of artillery. on the 28th, he again attacked and defeated the enemy under the rebel general taylor, at cane river. by the 26th, general banks had assembled his whole army at alexandria, and pushed forward to grand ecore. on the morning of april 6th he moved from grand ecore. on the afternoon of the 7th, he advanced and met the enemy near pleasant hill, and drove him from the field. on the same afternoon the enemy made a stand eight miles beyond pleasant hill, but was again compelled to retreat. on the 8th, at sabine cross roads and peach hill, the enemy attacked and defeated his advance, capturing nineteen pieces of artillery and an immense amount of transportation and stores. during the night, general banks fell back to pleasant hill, where another battle was fought on the 9th, and the enemy repulsed with great loss. during the night, general banks continued his retrograde movement to grand ecore, and thence to alexandria, which he reached on the 27th of april. here a serious difficulty arose in getting admiral porter's fleet which accompanied the expedition, over the rapids, the water having fallen so much since they passed up as to prevent their return. at the suggestion of colonel (now brigadier-general) bailey, and under his superintendence, wing-dams were constructed, by which the channel was contracted so that the fleet passed down the rapids in safety. the army evacuated alexandria on the 14th of may, after considerable skirmishing with the enemy's advance, and reached morganzia and point coupee near the end of the month. the disastrous termination of this expedition, and the lateness of the season, rendered impracticable the carrying out of my plans of a movement in force sufficient to insure the capture of mobile. on the 23d of march, major-general steele left little rock with the 7th army corps, to cooperate with general banks's expedition on the red river, and reached arkadelphia on the 28th. on the 16th of april, after driving the enemy before him, he was joined, near elkin's ferry, in washita county, by general thayer, who had marched from fort smith. after several severe skirmishes, in which the enemy was defeated, general steele reached camden, which he occupied about the middle of april. on learning the defeat and consequent retreat of general banks on red river, and the loss of one of his own trains at mark's mill, in dallas county, general steele determined to fall back to the arkansas river. he left camden on the 26th of april, and reached little rock on the 2d of may. on the 30th of april, the enemy attacked him while crossing saline river at jenkins's ferry, but was repulsed with considerable loss. our loss was about six hundred in killed, wounded and prisoners. major-general canby, who had been assigned to the command of the "military division of the west mississippi," was therefore directed to send the 19th army corps to join the armies operating against richmond, and to limit the remainder of his command to such operations as might be necessary to hold the positions and lines of communications he then occupied. before starting general a. j. smith's troops back to sherman, general canby sent a part of it to disperse a force of the enemy that was collecting near the mississippi river. general smith met and defeated this force near lake chicot on the 5th of june. our loss was about forty killed and seventy wounded. in the latter part of july, general canby sent major-general gordon granger, with such forces as he could collect, to co-operate with admiral farragut against the defences of mobile bay. on the 8th of august, fort gaines surrendered to the combined naval and land forces. fort powell was blown up and abandoned. on the 9th, fort morgan was invested, and, after a severe bombardment, surrendered on the 23d. the total captures amounted to one thousand four hundred and sixty-four prisoners, and one hundred and four pieces of artillery. about the last of august, it being reported that the rebel general price, with a force of about ten thousand men, had reached jacksonport, on his way to invade missouri, general a. j. smith's command, then en route from memphis to join sherman, was ordered to missouri. a cavalry force was also, at the same time, sent from memphis, under command of colonel winslow. this made general rosecrans's forces superior to those of price, and no doubt was entertained he would be able to check price and drive him back; while the forces under general steele, in arkansas, would cut off his retreat. on the 26th day of september, price attacked pilot knob and forced the garrison to retreat, and thence moved north to the missouri river, and continued up that river towards kansas. general curtis, commanding department of kansas, immediately collected such forces as he could to repel the invasion of kansas, while general rosecrans's cavalry was operating in his rear. the enemy was brought to battle on the big blue and defeated, with the loss of nearly all his artillery and trains and a large number of prisoners. he made a precipitate retreat to northern arkansas. the impunity with which price was enabled to roam over the state of missouri for a long time, and the incalculable mischief done by him, show to how little purpose a superior force may be used. there is no reason why general rosecrans should not have concentrated his forces, and beaten and driven price before the latter reached pilot knob. september 20th, the enemy's cavalry, under forrest, crossed the tennessee near waterloo, alabama, and on the 23d attacked the garrison at athens, consisting of six hundred men, which capitulated on the 24th. soon after the surrender two regiments of reinforcements arrived, and after a severe fight were compelled to surrender. forrest destroyed the railroad westward, captured the garrison at sulphur branch trestle, skirmished with the garrison at pulaski on the 27th, and on the same day cut the nashville and chattanooga railroad near tullahoma and dechard. on the morning of the 30th, one column of forrest's command, under buford, appeared before huntsville, and summoned the surrender of the garrison. receiving an answer in the negative, he remained in the vicinity of the place until next morning, when he again summoned its surrender, and received the same reply as on the night before. he withdrew in the direction of athens which place had been regarrisoned, and attacked it on the afternoon of the 1st of october, but without success. on the morning of the 2d he renewed his attack, but was handsomely repulsed. another column under forrest appeared before columbia on the morning of the 1st, but did not make an attack. on the morning of the 3d he moved towards mount pleasant. while these operations were going on, every exertion was made by general thomas to destroy the forces under forrest before he could recross the tennessee, but was unable to prevent his escape to corinth, mississippi. in september, an expedition under general burbridge was sent to destroy the saltworks at saltville, virginia. he met the enemy on the 2d of october, about three miles and a half from saltville, and drove him into his strongly intrenched position around the salt-works, from which he was unable to dislodge him. during the night he withdrew his command and returned to kentucky. general sherman, immediately after the fall of atlanta, put his armies in camp in and about the place, and made all preparations for refitting and supplying them for future service. the great length of road from atlanta to the cumberland river, however, which had to be guarded, allowed the troops but little rest. during this time jefferson davis made a speech in macon, georgia, which was reported in the papers of the south, and soon became known to the whole country, disclosing the plans of the enemy, thus enabling general sherman to fully meet them. he exhibited the weakness of supposing that an army that had been beaten and fearfully decimated in a vain attempt at the defensive, could successfully undertake the offensive against the army that had so often defeated it. in execution of this plan, hood, with this army, was soon reported to the south-west of atlanta. moving far to sherman's right, he succeeded in reaching the railroad about big shanty, and moved north on it. general sherman, leaving a force to hold atlanta, with the remainder of his army fell upon him and drove him to gadsden, alabama. seeing the constant annoyance he would have with the roads to his rear if he attempted to hold atlanta, general sherman proposed the abandonment and destruction of that place, with all the railroads leading to it, and telegraphed me as follows: "centreville, georgia", october 10--noon. "dispatch about wilson just received. hood is now crossing coosa river, twelve miles below rome, bound west. if he passes over the mobile and ohio road, had i not better execute the plan of my letter sent by colonel porter, and leave general thomas with the troops now in tennessee to defend the state? he will have an ample force when the reinforcements ordered reach nashville. "w. t. sherman, major-general. "lieutenant-general grant." for a full understanding of the plan referred to in this dispatch, i quote from the letter sent by colonel porter: "i will therefore give my opinion, that your army and canby's should be reinforced to the maximum; that after you get wilmington, you strike for savannah and the river; that canby be instructed to hold the mississippi river, and send a force to get columbus, georgia, either by the way of the alabama or the appalachicola, and that i keep hood employed and put my army in final order for a march on augusta, columbia, and charleston, to be ready as soon as wilmington is sealed as to commerce and the city of savannah is in our possession." this was in reply to a letter of mine of date september 12th, in answer to a dispatch of his containing substantially the same proposition, and in which i informed him of a proposed movement against wilmington, and of the situation in virginia, etc. "city point, virginia, "october 11, 1864--11 a.m. "your dispatch of october 10th received. does it not look as if hood was going to attempt the invasion of middle tennessee, using the mobile and ohio and memphis and charleston roads to supply his base on the tennessee river, about florence or decatur? if he does this, he ought to be met and prevented from getting north of the tennessee river. if you were to cut loose, i do not believe you would meet hood's army, but would be bushwhacked by all the old men and little boys, and such railroad guards as are still left at home. hood would probably strike for nashville, thinking that by going north he could inflict greater damage upon us than we could upon the rebels by going south. if there is any way of getting at hood's army, i would prefer that, but i must trust to your own judgment. i find i shall not be able to send a force from here to act with you on savannah. your movements, therefore, will be independent of mine; at least until the fall of richmond takes place. i am afraid thomas, with such lines of road as he has to protect, could not prevent hood from going north. with wilson turned loose, with all your cavalry, you will find the rebels put much more on the defensive than heretofore. "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "major-general w. t. sherman." "kingston, georgia, "october 11--11 a.m. "hood moved his army from palmetto station across by dallas and cedartown, and is now on the coosa river, south of rome. he threw one corps on my road at acworth, and i was forced to follow. i hold atlanta with the 20th corps, and have strong detachments along my line. this reduces my active force to a comparatively small army. we cannot remain here on the defensive. with the twenty-five thousand men, and the bold cavalry he has, he can constantly break my roads. i would infinitely prefer to make a wreck of the road, and of the country from chattanooga to atlanta including the latter city send back all my wounded and worthless, and with my effective army, move through georgia, smashing things, to the sea. hood may turn into tennessee and kentucky, but i believe he will be forced to follow me. instead of my being on the defensive, i would be on the offensive; instead of guessing at what he means to do, he would have to guess at my plans. the difference in war is full twenty-five per cent. i can make savannah, charleston, or the mouth of the chattahoochee. "answer quick, as i know we will not have the telegraph long. "w. t. sherman, major-general. "lieutenant-general grant." "city point, virginia, "october 11,1864--11.30 p.m. "your dispatch of to-day received. if you are satisfied the trip to the sea-coast can be made, holding the line of the tennessee river firmly, you may make it, destroying all the railroad south of dalton or chattanooga, as you think best. "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "major-general w. t. sherman." it was the original design to hold atlanta, and by getting through to the coast, with a garrison left on the southern railroads, leading east and west, through georgia, to effectually sever the east from the west. in other words, cut the would-be confederacy in two again, as it had been cut once by our gaining possession of the mississippi river. general sherman's plan virtually effected this object. general sherman commenced at once his preparations for his proposed movement, keeping his army in position in the meantime to watch hood. becoming satisfied that hood had moved westward from gadsden across sand mountain, general sherman sent the 4th corps, major-general stanley commanding, and the 23d corps, major-general schofield commanding, back to chattanooga to report to major-general thomas, at nashville, whom he had placed in command of all the troops of his military division, save the four army corps and cavalry division he designed to move with through georgia. with the troops thus left at his disposal, there was little doubt that general thomas could hold the line of the tennessee, or, in the event hood should force it, would be able to concentrate and beat him in battle. it was therefore readily consented to that sherman should start for the sea-coast. having concentrated his troops at atlanta by the 14th of november, he commenced his march, threatening both augusta and macon. his coming-out point could not be definitely fixed. having to gather his subsistence as he marched through the country, it was not impossible that a force inferior to his own might compel him to head for such point as he could reach, instead of such as he might prefer. the blindness of the enemy, however, in ignoring his movement, and sending hood's army, the only considerable force he had west of richmond and east of the mississippi river, northward on an offensive campaign, left the whole country open, and sherman's route to his own choice. how that campaign was conducted, how little opposition was met with, the condition of the country through which the armies passed, the capture of fort mcallister, on the savannah river, and the occupation of savannah on the 21st of december, are all clearly set forth in general sherman's admirable report. soon after general sherman commenced his march from atlanta, two expeditions, one from baton rouge, louisiana, and one from vicksburg, mississippi, were started by general canby to cut the enemy's lines of communication with mobile and detain troops in that field. general foster, commanding department of the south, also sent an expedition, via broad river, to destroy the railroad between charleston and savannah. the expedition from vicksburg, under command of brevet brigadier-general e. d. osband (colonel 3d united states colored cavalry), captured, on the 27th of november, and destroyed the mississippi central railroad bridge and trestle-work over big black river, near canton, thirty miles of the road, and two locomotives, besides large amounts of stores. the expedition from baton rouge was without favorable results. the expedition from the department of the south, under the immediate command of brigadier-general john p. hatch, consisting of about five thousand men of all arms, including a brigade from the navy, proceeded up broad river and debarked at boyd's neck on the 29th of november, from where it moved to strike the railroad at grahamsville. at honey hill, about three miles from grahamsville, the enemy was found and attacked in a strongly fortified position, which resulted, after severe fighting, in our repulse with a loss of seven hundred and forty-six in killed, wounded, and missing. during the night general hatch withdrew. on the 6th of december general foster obtained a position covering the charleston and savannah railroad, between the coosawhatchie and tulifinny rivers. hood, instead of following sherman, continued his move northward, which seemed to me to be leading to his certain doom. at all events, had i had the power to command both armies, i should not have changed the orders under which he seemed to be acting. on the 26th of october, the advance of hood's army attacked the garrison at decatur, alabama, but failing to carry the place, withdrew towards courtland, and succeeded, in the face of our cavalry, in effecting a lodgment on the north side of the tennessee river, near florence. on the 28th, forrest reached the tennessee, at fort heiman, and captured a gunboat and three transports. on the 2d of november he planted batteries above and below johnsonville, on the opposite side of the river, isolating three gunboats and eight transports. on the 4th the enemy opened his batteries upon the place, and was replied to from the gunboats and the garrison. the gunboats becoming disabled were set on fire, as also were the transports, to prevent their falling into the hands of the enemy. about a million and a half dollars' worth of store and property on the levee and in storehouses was consumed by fire. on the 5th the enemy disappeared and crossed to the north side of the tennessee river, above johnsonville, moving towards clifton, and subsequently joined hood. on the night of the 5th, general schofield, with the advance of the 23d corps, reached johnsonville, but finding the enemy gone, was ordered to pulaski, and was put in command of all the troopers there, with instruction to watch the movements of hood and retard his advance, but not to risk a general engagement until the arrival of general a. j. smith's command from missouri, and until general wilson could get his cavalry remounted. on the 19th, general hood continued his advance. general thomas, retarding him as much as possible, fell back towards nashville for the purpose of concentrating his command and gaining time for the arrival of reinforcements. the enemy coming up with our main force, commanded by general schofield, at franklin, on the 30th, assaulted our works repeatedly during the afternoon until late at night, but were in every instance repulsed. his loss in this battle was one thousand seven hundred and fifty killed, seven hundred and two prisoners, and three thousand eight hundred wounded. among his losses were six general officers killed, six wounded, and one captured. our entire loss was two thousand three hundred. this was the first serious opposition the enemy met with, and i am satisfied was the fatal blow to all his expectations. during the night, general schofield fell back towards nashville. this left the field to the enemy--not lost by battle, but voluntarily abandoned--so that general thomas's whole force might be brought together. the enemy followed up and commenced the establishment of his line in front of nashville on the 2d of december. as soon as it was ascertained that hood was crossing the tennessee river, and that price was going out of missouri, general rosecrans was ordered to send to general thomas the troops of general a. j. smith's command, and such other troops as he could spare. the advance of this reinforcement reached nashville on the 30th of november. on the morning of the 15th december, general thomas attacked hood in position, and, in a battle lasting two days, defeated and drove him from the field in the utmost confusion, leaving in our hand most of his artillery and many thousand prisoners, including four general officers. before the battle of nashville i grew very impatient over, as it appeared to me, the unnecessary delay. this impatience was increased upon learning that the enemy had sent a force of cavalry across the cumberland into kentucky. i feared hood would cross his whole army and give us great trouble there. after urging upon general thomas the necessity of immediately assuming the offensive, i started west to superintend matters there in person. reaching washington city, i received general thomas's dispatch announcing his attack upon the enemy, and the result as far as the battle had progressed. i was delighted. all fears and apprehensions were dispelled. i am not yet satisfied but that general thomas, immediately upon the appearance of hood before nashville, and before he had time to fortify, should have moved out with his whole force and given him battle, instead of waiting to remount his cavalry, which delayed him until the inclemency of the weather made it impracticable to attack earlier than he did. but his final defeat of hood was so complete, that it will be accepted as a vindication of that distinguished officer's judgment. after hood's defeat at nashville he retreated, closely pursued by cavalry and infantry, to the tennessee river, being forced to abandon many pieces of artillery and most of his transportation. on the 28th of december our advanced forces ascertained that he had made good his escape to the south side of the river. about this time, the rains having set in heavily in tennessee and north alabama, making it difficult to move army transportation and artillery, general thomas stopped the pursuit by his main force at the tennessee river. a small force of cavalry, under colonel w. j. palmer, 15th pennsylvania volunteers, continued to follow hood for some distance, capturing considerable transportation and all the enemy's pontoon-bridge. the details of these operations will be found clearly set forth in general thomas's report. a cavalry expedition, under brevet major-general grierson, started from memphis on the 21st of december. on the 25th he surprised and captured forrest's dismounted camp at verona, mississippi, on the mobile and ohio railroad, destroyed the railroad, sixteen cars loaded with wagons and pontoons for hood's army, four thousand new english carbines, and large amounts of public stores. on the morning of the 28th he attacked and captured a force of the enemy at egypt, and destroyed a train of fourteen cars; thence turning to the south-west, he struck the mississippi central railroad at winona, destroyed the factories and large amounts of stores at bankston, and the machine-shops and public property at grenada, arriving at vicksburg january 5th. during the operations in middle tennessee, the enemy, with a force under general breckinridge, entered east tennessee. on the 13th of november he attacked general gillem, near morristown, capturing his artillery and several hundred prisoners. gillem, with what was left of his command, retreated to knoxville. following up his success, breckinridge moved to near knoxville, but withdrew on the 18th, followed by general ammen. under the directions of general thomas, general stoneman concentrated the commands of generals burbridge and gillem near bean's station to operate against breckinridge, and destroy or drive him into virginia --destroy the salt-works at saltville, and the railroad into virginia as far as he could go without endangering his command. on the 12th of december he commenced his movement, capturing and dispersing the enemy's forces wherever he met them. on the 16th he struck the enemy, under vaughn, at marion, completely routing and pursuing him to wytheville, capturing all his artillery, trains, and one hundred and ninety-eight prisoners; and destroyed wytheville, with its stores and supplies, and the extensive lead-works near there. returning to marion, he met a force under breckinridge, consisting, among other troops, of the garrison of saltville, that had started in pursuit. he at once made arrangements to attack it the next morning; but morning found breckinridge gone. he then moved directly to saltville, and destroyed the extensive salt-works at that place, a large amount of stores, and captured eight pieces of artillery. having thus successfully executed his instructions, he returned general burbridge to lexington and general gillem to knoxville. wilmington, north carolina, was the most important sea-coast port left to the enemy through which to get supplies from abroad, and send cotton and other products out by blockade-runners, besides being a place of great strategic value. the navy had been making strenuous exertions to seal the harbor of wilmington, but with only partial effect. the nature of the outlet of cape fear river was such, that it required watching for so great a distance that, without possession of the land north of new inlet, or fort fisher, it was impossible for the navy to entirely close the harbor against the entrance of blockade-runners. to secure the possession of this land required the co-operation of a land force, which i agreed to furnish. immediately commenced the assemblage in hampton roads, under admiral d. d. porter, of the most formidable armada ever collected for concentration upon one given point. this necessarily attracted the attention of the enemy, as well as that of the loyal north; and through the imprudence of the public press, and very likely of officers of both branches of service, the exact object of the expedition became a subject of common discussion in the newspapers both north and south. the enemy, thus warned, prepared to meet it. this caused a postponement of the expedition until the later part of november, when, being again called upon by hon. g. v. fox, assistant secretary of the navy, i agreed to furnish the men required at once, and went myself, in company with major-general butler, to hampton roads, where we had a conference with admiral porter as to the force required and the time of starting. a force of six thousand five hundred men was regarded as sufficient. the time of starting was not definitely arranged, but it was thought all would be ready by the 6th of december, if not before. learning, on the 30th of november, that bragg had gone to georgia, taking with him most of the forces about wilmington, i deemed it of the utmost importance that the expedition should reach its destination before the return of bragg, and directed general butler to make all arrangements for the departure of major-general weitzel, who had been designated to command the land forces, so that the navy might not be detained one moment. on the 6th of december, the following instructions were given: "city point, virginia, december 6, 1864. "general: the first object of the expedition under general weitzel is to close to the enemy the port of wilmington. if successful in this, the second will be to capture wilmington itself. there are reasonable grounds to hope for success, if advantage can be taken of the absence of the greater part of the enemy's forces now looking after sherman in georgia. the directions you have given for the numbers and equipment of the expedition are all right, except in the unimportant matter of where they embark and the amount of intrenching tools to be taken. the object of the expedition will be gained by effecting a landing on the main land between cape fear river and the atlantic, north of the north entrance to the river. should such landing be effected while the enemy still holds fort fisher and the batteries guarding the entrance to the river, then the troops should intrench themselves, and, by co-operating with the navy, effect the reduction and capture of those places. these in our hands, the navy could enter the harbor, and the port of wilmington would be sealed. should fort fisher and the point of land on which it is built fall into the hands of our troops immediately on landing, then it will be worth the attempt to capture wilmington by a forced march and surprise. if time is consumed in gaining the first object of the expedition, the second will become a matter of after consideration. "the details for execution are intrusted to you and the officer immediately in command of the troops. "should the troops under general weitzel fail to effect a landing at or near fort fisher, they will be returned to the armies operating against richmond without delay. "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "major-general b. f. butler." general butler commanding the army from which the troops were taken for this enterprise, and the territory within which they were to operate, military courtesy required that all orders and instructions should go through him. they were so sent, but general weitzel has since officially informed me that he never received the foregoing instructions, nor was he aware of their existence, until he read general butler's published official report of the fort fisher failure, with my indorsement and papers accompanying it. i had no idea of general butler's accompanying the expedition until the evening before it got off from bermuda hundred, and then did not dream but that general weitzel had received all the instructions, and would be in command. i rather formed the idea that general butler was actuated by a desire to witness the effect of the explosion of the powder-boat. the expedition was detained several days at hampton roads, awaiting the loading of the powder-boat. the importance of getting the wilmington expedition off without any delay, with or without the powder-boat, had been urged upon general butler, and he advised to so notify admiral porter. the expedition finally got off on the 13th of december, and arrived at the place of rendezvous, off new inlet, near fort fisher, on the evening of the 15th. admiral porter arrived on the evening of the 18th, having put in at beaufort to get ammunition for the monitors. the sea becoming rough, making it difficult to land troops, and the supply of water and coal being about exhausted, the transport fleet put back to beaufort to replenish; this, with the state of the weather, delayed the return to the place of rendezvous until the 24th. the powder-boat was exploded on the morning of the 24th, before the return of general butler from beaufort; but it would seem, from the notice taken of it in the southern newspapers, that the enemy were never enlightened as to the object of the explosion until they were informed by the northern press. on the 25th a landing was effected without opposition, and a reconnoissance, under brevet brigadier-general curtis, pushed up towards the fort. but before receiving a full report of the result of this reconnoissance, general butler, in direct violation of the instructions given, ordered the re-embarkation of the troops and the return of the expedition. the re-embarkation was accomplished by the morning of the 27th. on the return of the expedition officers and men among them brevet major-general (then brevet brigadier-general) n. m. curtis, first-lieutenant g. w. ross, 117th regiment new york volunteers, first-lieutenant william h. walling, and second-lieutenant george simpson, 142d new york volunteers voluntarily reported to me that when recalled they were nearly into the fort, and, in their opinion, it could have been taken without much loss. soon after the return of the expedition, i received a dispatch from the secretary of the navy, and a letter from admiral porter, informing me that the fleet was still off fort fisher, and expressing the conviction that, under a proper leader, the place could be taken. the natural supposition with me was, that when the troops abandoned the expedition, the navy would do so also. finding it had not, however, i answered on the 30th of december, advising admiral porter to hold on, and that i would send a force and make another attempt to take the place. this time i selected brevet major-general (now major-general) a. h. terry to command the expedition. the troops composing it consisted of the same that composed the former, with the addition of a small brigade, numbering about one thousand five hundred, and a small siege train. the latter it was never found necessary to land. i communicated direct to the commander of the expedition the following instructions: "city point, virginia, january 3, 1865. "general: the expedition intrusted to your command has been fitted out to renew the attempt to capture fort fisher, n. c., and wilmington ultimately, if the fort falls. you will then proceed with as little delay as possible to the naval fleet lying off cape fear river, and report the arrival of yourself and command to admiral d. d. porter, commanding north atlantic blockading squadron. "it is exceedingly desirable that the most complete understanding should exist between yourself and the naval commander. i suggest, therefore, that you consult with admiral porter freely, and get from him the part to be performed by each branch of the public service, so that there may be unity of action. it would be well to have the whole programme laid down in writing. i have served with admiral porter, and know that you can rely on his judgment and his nerve to undertake what he proposes. i would, therefore, defer to him as much as is consistent with your own responsibilities. the first object to be attained is to get a firm position on the spit of land on which fort fisher is built, from which you can operate against that fort. you want to look to the practicability of receiving your supplies, and to defending yourself against superior forces sent against you by any of the avenues left open to the enemy. if such a position can be obtained, the siege of fort fisher will not be abandoned until its reduction is accomplished, or another plan of campaign is ordered from these headquarters. "my own views are, that if you effect a landing, the navy ought to run a portion of their fleet into cape fear river, while the balance of it operates on the outside. land forces cannot invest fort fisher, or cut it off from supplies or reinforcements, while the river is in possession of the enemy. "a siege-train will be loaded on vessels and sent to fort monroe, in readiness to be sent to you if required. all other supplies can be drawn from beaufort as you need them. "keep the fleet of vessels with you until your position is assured. when you find they can be spared, order them back, or such of them as you can spare, to fort monroe, to report for orders. "in case of failure to effect a landing, bring your command back to beaufort, and report to these headquarters for further instructions. you will not debark at beaufort until so directed. "general sheridan has been ordered to send a division of troops to baltimore and place them on sea-going vessels. these troops will be brought to fort monroe and kept there on the vessels until you are heard from. should you require them, they will be sent to you. "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "brevet major-general a. h. terry." lieutenant-colonel c. b. comstock, aide-de-camp (now brevet brigadier-general), who accompanied the former expedition, was assigned, in orders, as chief-engineer to this. it will be seen that these instructions did not differ materially from those given for the first expedition, and that in neither instance was there an order to assault fort fisher. this was a matter left entirely to the discretion of the commanding officer. the expedition sailed from fort monroe on the morning of the 6th, arriving at the rendezvous, off beaufort, on the 8th, where, owing to the difficulties of the weather, it lay until the morning of the 12th, when it got under way and reached its destination that evening. under cover of the fleet, the disembarkation of the troops commenced on the morning of the 13th, and by three o'clock p.m. was completed without loss. on the 14th a reconnoissance was pushed to within five hundred yards of fort fisher, and a small advance work taken possession of and turned into a defensive line against any attempt that might be made from the fort. this reconnoissance disclosed the fact that the front of the work had been seriously injured by the navy fire. in the afternoon of the 15th the fort was assaulted, and after most desperate fighting was captured, with its entire garrison and armament. thus was secured, by the combined efforts of the navy and army, one of the most important successes of the war. our loss was: killed, one hundred and ten; wounded, five hundred and thirty-six. on the 16th and the 17th the enemy abandoned and blew up fort caswell and the works on smith's island, which were immediately occupied by us. this gave us entire control of the mouth of the cape fear river. at my request, mayor-general b. f. butler was relieved, and major-general e. o. c. ord assigned to the department of virginia and north carolina. the defence of the line of the tennessee no longer requiring the force which had beaten and nearly destroyed the only army now threatening it, i determined to find other fields of operation for general thomas's surplus troops--fields from which they would co-operate with other movements. general thomas was therefore directed to collect all troops, not essential to hold his communications at eastport, in readiness for orders. on the 7th of january, general thomas was directed, if he was assured of the departure of hood south from corinth, to send general schofield with his corps east with as little delay as possible. this direction was promptly complied with, and the advance of the corps reached washington on the 23d of the same month, whence it was sent to fort fisher and new bern. on the 26th he was directed to send general a. j. smith's command and a division of cavalry to report to general canby. by the 7th of february the whole force was en route for its destination. the state of north carolina was constituted into a military department, and general schofield assigned to command, and placed under the orders of major-general sherman. the following instructions were given him: "city point, va., january 31, 1865. "general:-* * * your movements are intended as co-operative with sherman's through the states of south and north carolina. the first point to be attained is to secure wilmington. goldsboro' will then be your objective point, moving either from wilmington or new bern, or both, as you deem best. should you not be able to reach goldsboro', you will advance on the line or lines of railway connecting that place with the sea-coast--as near to it as you can, building the road behind you. the enterprise under you has two objects: the first is to give general sherman material aid, if needed, in his march north; the second, to open a base of supplies for him on his line of march. as soon, therefore, as you can determine which of the two points, wilmington or new bern, you can best use for throwing supplies from, to the interior, you will commence the accumulation of twenty days' rations and forage for sixty thousand men and twenty thousand animals. you will get of these as many as you can house and protect to such point in the interior as you may be able to occupy. i believe general palmer has received some instructions direct from general sherman on the subject of securing supplies for his army. you will learn what steps he has taken, and be governed in your requisitions accordingly. a supply of ordnance stores will also be necessary. "make all requisitions upon the chiefs of their respective departments in the field with me at city point. communicate with me by every opportunity, and should you deem it necessary at any time, send a special boat to fortress monroe, from which point you can communicate by telegraph. "the supplies referred to in these instructions are exclusive of those required for your own command. "the movements of the enemy may justify, or even make it your imperative duty, to cut loose from your base, and strike for the interior to aid sherman. in such case you will act on your own judgment without waiting for instructions. you will report, however, what you purpose doing. the details for carrying out these instructions are necessarily left to you. i would urge, however, if i did not know that you are already fully alive to the importance of it, prompt action. sherman may be looked for in the neighborhood of goldsboro' any time from the 22d to the 28th of february; this limits your time very materially. "if rolling-stock is not secured in the capture of wilmington, it can be supplied from washington. a large force of railroad men have already been sent to beaufort, and other mechanics will go to fort fisher in a day or two. on this point i have informed you by telegraph. "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "major-general j. m. schofield." previous to giving these instructions i had visited fort fisher, accompanied by general schofield, for the purpose of seeing for myself the condition of things, and personally conferring with general terry and admiral porter as to what was best to be done. anticipating the arrival of general sherman at savannah his army entirely foot-loose, hood being then before nashville, tennessee, the southern railroads destroyed, so that it would take several months to re-establish a through line from west to east, and regarding the capture of lee's army as the most important operation towards closing the rebellion--i sent orders to general sherman on the 6th of december, that after establishing a base on the sea-coast, with necessary garrison, to include all his artillery and cavalry, to come by water to city point with the balance of his command. on the 18th of december, having received information of the defeat and utter rout of hood's army by general thomas, and that, owing to the great difficulty of procuring ocean transportation, it would take over two months to transport sherman's army, and doubting whether he might not contribute as much towards the desired result by operating from where he was, i wrote to him to that effect, and asked him for his views as to what would be best to do. a few days after this i received a communication from general sherman, of date 16th december, acknowledging the receipt of my order of the 6th, and informing me of his preparations to carry it into effect as soon as he could get transportation. also that he had expected, upon reducing savannah, instantly to march to columbia, south carolina, thence to raleigh, and thence to report to me; but that this would consume about six weeks' time after the fall of savannah, whereas by sea he could probably reach me by the middle of january. the confidence he manifested in this letter of being able to march up and join me pleased me, and, without waiting for a reply to my letter of the 18th, i directed him, on the 28th of december, to make preparations to start as he proposed, without delay, to break up the railroads in north and south carolina, and join the armies operating against richmond as soon as he could. on the 21st of january i informed general sherman that i had ordered the 23d corps, major-general schofield commanding, east; that it numbered about twenty-one thousand men; that we had at fort fisher, about eight thousand men; at new bern, about four thousand; that if wilmington was captured, general schofield would go there; if not, he would be sent to new bern; that, in either event, all the surplus force at both points would move to the interior towards goldsboro', in co-operation with his movement; that from either point railroad communication could be run out; and that all these troops would be subject to his orders as he came into communication with them. in obedience to his instructions, general schofield proceeded to reduce wilmington, north carolina, in co-operation with the navy under admiral porter, moving his forces up both sides of the cape fear river. fort anderson, the enemy's main defence on the west bank of the river, was occupied on the morning of the 19th, the enemy having evacuated it after our appearance before it. after fighting on 20th and 21st, our troops entered wilmington on the morning of the 22d, the enemy having retreated towards goldsboro' during the night. preparations were at once made for a movement on goldsboro' in two columns--one from wilmington, and the other from new bern--and to repair the railroad leading there from each place, as well as to supply general sherman by cape fear river, towards fayetteville, if it became necessary. the column from new bern was attacked on the 8th of march, at wise's forks, and driven back with the loss of several hundred prisoners. on the 11th the enemy renewed his attack upon our intrenched position, but was repulsed with severe loss, and fell back during the night. on the 14th the neuse river was crossed and kinston occupied, and on the 21st goldsboro' was entered. the column from wilmington reached cox's bridge, on the neuse river, ten miles above goldsboro', on the 22d. by the 1st of february, general sherman's whole army was in motion from savannah. he captured columbia, south carolina, on the 17th; thence moved on goldsboro', north carolina, via fayetteville, reaching the latter place on the 12th of march, opening up communication with general schofield by way of cape fear river. on the 15th he resumed his march on goldsboro'. he met a force of the enemy at averysboro', and after a severe fight defeated and compelled it to retreat. our loss in this engagement was about six hundred. the enemy's loss was much greater. on the 18th the combined forces of the enemy, under joe johnston, attacked his advance at bentonville, capturing three guns and driving it back upon the main body. general slocum, who was in the advance ascertaining that the whole of johnston's army was in the front, arranged his troops on the defensive, intrenched himself and awaited reinforcements, which were pushed forward. on the night of the 21st the enemy retreated to smithfield, leaving his dead and wounded in our hands. from there sherman continued to goldsboro', which place had been occupied by general schofield on the 21st (crossing the neuse river ten miles above there, at cox's bridge, where general terry had got possession and thrown a pontoon-bridge on the 22d), thus forming a junction with the columns from new bern and wilmington. among the important fruits of this campaign was the fall of charleston, south carolina. it was evacuated by the enemy on the night of the 17th of february, and occupied by our forces on the 18th. on the morning of the 31st of january, general thomas was directed to send a cavalry expedition, under general stoneman, from east tennessee, to penetrate south carolina well down towards columbia, to destroy the railroads and military resources of the country, and return, if he was able, to east tennessee by way of salisbury, north carolina, releasing our prisoners there, if possible. of the feasibility of this latter, however, general stoneman was to judge. sherman's movements, i had no doubt, would attract the attention of all the force the enemy could collect, and facilitate the execution of this. general stoneman was so late in making his start on this expedition (and sherman having passed out of the state of south carolina), on the 27th of february i directed general thomas to change his course, and order him to repeat his raid of last fall, destroying the railroad towards lynchburg as far as he could. this would keep him between our garrisons in east tennessee and the enemy. i regarded it not impossible that in the event of the enemy being driven from richmond, he might fall back to lynchburg and attempt a raid north through east tennessee. on the 14th of february the following communication was sent to general thomas: "city point, va., february 14, 1865. "general canby is preparing a movement from mobile bay against mobile and the interior of alabama. his force will consist of about twenty thousand men, besides a. j. smith's command. the cavalry you have sent to canby will be debarked at vicksburg. it, with the available cavalry already in that section, will move from there eastward, in co-operation. hood's army has been terribly reduced by the severe punishment you gave it in tennessee, by desertion consequent upon their defeat, and now by the withdrawal of many of them to oppose sherman. (i take it a large portion of the infantry has been so withdrawn. it is so asserted in the richmond papers, and a member of the rebel congress said a few days since in a speech, that one-half of it had been brought to south carolina to oppose sherman.) this being true, or even if it is not true, canby's movement will attract all the attention of the enemy, and leave the advance from your standpoint easy. i think it advisable, therefore, that you prepare as much of a cavalry force as you can spare, and hold it in readiness to go south. the object would be threefold: first, to attract as much of the enemy's force as possible, to insure success to canby; second, to destroy the enemy's line of communications and military resources; third, to destroy or capture their forces brought into the field. tuscaloosa and selma would probably be the points to direct the expedition against. this, however, would not be so important as the mere fact of penetrating deep into alabama. discretion should be left to the officer commanding the expedition to go where, according to the information he may receive, he will best secure the objects named above. "now that your force has been so much depleted, i do not know what number of men you can put into the field. if not more than five thousand men, however, all cavalry, i think it will be sufficient. it is not desirable that you should start this expedition until the one leaving vicksburg has been three or four days out, or even a week. i do not know when it will start, but will inform you by telegraph as soon as i learn. if you should hear through other sources before hearing from me, you can act on the information received. "to insure success your cavalry should go with as little wagon-train as possible, relying upon the country for supplies. i would also reduce the number of guns to a battery, or the number of batteries, and put the extra teams to the guns taken. no guns or caissons should be taken with less than eight horses. "please inform me by telegraph, on receipt of this, what force you think you will be able to send under these directions. "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "major-general g. h. thomas." on the 15th, he was directed to start the expedition as soon after the 20th as he could get it off. i deemed it of the utmost importance, before a general movement of the armies operating against richmond, that all communications with the city, north of james river, should be cut off. the enemy having withdrawn the bulk of his force from the shenandoah valley and sent it south, or replaced troops sent from richmond, and desiring to reinforce sherman, if practicable, whose cavalry was greatly inferior in numbers to that of the enemy, i determined to make a move from the shenandoah, which, if successful, would accomplish the first at least, and possibly the latter of the objects. i therefore telegraphed general sheridan as follows: "city point, va., february 20, 1865--1 p.m. "general:--as soon as it is possible to travel, i think you will have no difficulty about reaching lynchburg with a cavalry force alone. from there you could destroy the railroad and canal in every direction, so as to be of no further use to the rebellion. sufficient cavalry should be left behind to look after mosby's gang. from lynchburg, if information you might get there would justify it, you will strike south, heading the streams in virgina to the westward of danville, and push on and join general sherman. this additional raid, with one now about starting from east tennessee under stoneman, numbering four or give thousand cavalry, one from vicksburg, numbering seven or eight thousand cavalry, one from eastport, mississippi, then thousand cavalry, canby from mobile bay, with about thirty-eight thousand mixed troops, these three latter pushing for tuscaloosa, selma, and montgomery, and sherman with a large army eating out the vitals of south carolina, is all that will be wanted to leave nothing for the rebellion to stand upon. i would advise you to overcome great obstacles to accomplish this. charleston was evacuated on tuesday 1st. "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "major-general p. h. sheridan." on the 25th i received a dispatch from general sheridan, inquiring where sherman was aiming for, and if i could give him definite information as to the points he might be expected to move on, this side of charlotte, north carolina. in answer, the following telegram was sent him: "city point, va., february 25, 1865. "general:--sherman's movements will depend on the amount of opposition he meets with from the enemy. if strongly opposed, he may possibly have to fall back to georgetown, s. c., and fit out for a new start. i think, however, all danger for the necessity of going to that point has passed. i believe he has passed charlotte. he may take fayetteville on his way to goldsboro'. if you reach lynchburg, you will have to be guided in your after movements by the information you obtain. before you could possibly reach sherman, i think you would find him moving from goldsboro' towards raleigh, or engaging the enemy strongly posted at one or the other of these places, with railroad communications opened from his army to wilmington or new bern. "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "major-general p. h. sheridan." general sheridan moved from winchester on the 27th of february, with two divisions of cavalry, numbering about five thousand each. on the 1st of march he secured the bridge, which the enemy attempted to destroy, across the middle fork of the shenandoah, at mount crawford, and entered staunton on the 2d, the enemy having retreated to waynesboro'. thence he pushed on to waynesboro', where he found the enemy in force in an intrenched position, under general early. without stopping to make a reconnoissance, an immediate attack was made, the position was carried, and sixteen hundred prisoners, eleven pieces of artillery, with horses and caissons complete, two hundred wagons and teams loaded with subsistence, and seventeen battle-flags, were captured. the prisoners, under an escort of fifteen hundred men, were sent back to winchester. thence he marched on charlottesville, destroying effectually the railroad and bridges as he went, which place he reached on the 3d. here he remained two days, destroying the railroad towards richmond and lynchburg, including the large iron bridges over the north and south forks of the rivanna river and awaited the arrival of his trains. this necessary delay caused him to abandon the idea of capturing lynchburg. on the morning of the 6th, dividing his force into two columns, he sent one to scottsville, whence it marched up the james river canal to new market, destroying every lock, and in many places the bank of the canal. from here a force was pushed out from this column to duiguidsville, to obtain possession of the bridge across the james river at that place, but failed. the enemy burned it on our approach. the enemy also burned the bridge across the river at hardwicksville. the other column moved down the railroad towards lynchburg, destroying it as far as amherst court house, sixteen miles from lynchburg; thence across the country, uniting with the column at new market. the river being very high, his pontoons would not reach across it; and the enemy having destroyed the bridges by which he had hoped to cross the river and get on the south side railroad about farmville, and destroy it to appomattox court house, the only thing left for him was to return to winchester or strike a base at the white house. fortunately, he chose the latter. from new market he took up his line of march, following the canal towards richmond, destroying every lock upon it and cutting the banks wherever practicable, to a point eight miles east of goochland, concentrating the whole force at columbia on the 10th. here he rested one day, and sent through by scouts information of his whereabouts and purposes, and a request for supplies to meet him at white house, which reached me on the night of the 12th. an infantry force was immediately sent to get possession of white house, and supplies were forwarded. moving from columbia in a direction to threaten richmond, to near ashland station, he crossed the annas, and after having destroyed all the bridges and many miles of the railroad, proceeded down the north bank of the pamunkey to white house, which place he reached on the 19th. previous to this the following communication was sent to general thomas: "city point, virginia, march 7, 1865--9.30 a.m. "general:--i think it will be advisable now for you to repair the railroad in east tennessee, and throw a good force up to bull's gap and fortify there. supplies at knoxville could always be got forward as required. with bull's gap fortified, you can occupy as outposts about all of east tennessee, and be prepared, if it should be required of you in the spring, to make a campaign towards lynchburg, or into north carolina. i do not think stoneman should break the road until he gets into virginia, unless it should be to cut off rolling-stock that may be caught west of that. "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "major-general g. h. thomas." thus it will be seen that in march, 1865, general canby was moving an adequate force against mobile and the army defending it under general dick taylor; thomas was pushing out two large and well-appointed cavalry expeditions--one from middle tennessee under brevet major-general wilson against the enemy's vital points in alabama, the other from east tennessee, under major-general stoneman, towards lynchburg--and assembling the remainder of his available forces, preparatory to commence offensive operations from east tennessee; general sheridan's cavalry was at white house; the armies of the potomac and james were confronting the enemy, under lee, in his defences of richmond and petersburg; general sherman with his armies, reinforced by that of general schofield, was at goldsboro'; general pope was making preparations for a spring campaign against the enemy under kirby smith and price, west of the mississippi; and general hancock was concentrating a force in the vicinity of winchester, virginia, to guard against invasion or to operate offensively, as might prove necessary. after the long march by general sheridan's cavalry over winter roads, it was necessary to rest and refit at white house. at this time the greatest source of uneasiness to me was the fear that the enemy would leave his strong lines about petersburg and richmond for the purpose of uniting with johnston, and before he was driven from them by battle, or i was prepared to make an effectual pursuit. on the 24th of march, general sheridan moved from white house, crossed the james river at jones's landing, and formed a junction with the army of the potomac in front of petersburg on the 27th. during this move, general ord sent forces to cover the crossings of the chickahominy. on the 24th of march the following instructions for a general movement of the armies operating against richmond were issued: "city point, virginia, march 24, 1865. "general: on the 29th instant the armies operating against richmond will be moved by our left, for the double purpose of turning the enemy out of his present position around petersburg, and to insure the success of the cavalry under general sheridan, which will start at the same time, in its efforts to reach and destroy the south side and danville railroads. two corps of the army of the potomac will be moved at first in two columns, taking the two roads crossing hatcher's run, nearest where the present line held by us strikes that stream, both moving towards dinwiddie court house. "the cavalry under general sheridan, joined by the division now under general davies, will move at the same time by the weldon road and the jerusalem plank road, turning west from the latter before crossing the nottoway, and west with the whole column before reaching stony creek. general sheridan will then move independently, under other instructions which will be given him. all dismounted cavalry belonging to the army of the potomac, and the dismounted cavalry from the middle military division not required for guarding property belonging to their arm of service, will report to brigadier-general benham, to be added to the defences of city point. major-general parke will be left in command of all the army left for holding the lines about petersburg and city point, subject of course to orders from the commander of the army of the potomac. the 9th army corps will be left intact, to hold the present line of works so long as the whole line now occupied by us is held. if, however, the troops to the left of the 9th corps are withdrawn, then the left of the corps may be thrown back so as to occupy the position held by the army prior to the capture of the weldon road. all troops to the left of the 9th corps will be held in readiness to move at the shortest notice by such route as may be designated when the order is given. "general ord will detach three divisions, two white and one colored, or so much of them as he can, and hold his present lines, and march for the present left of the army of the potomac. in the absence of further orders, or until further orders are given, the white divisions will follow the left column of the army of the potomac, and the colored division the right column. during the movement major-general weitzel will be left in command of all the forces remaining behind from the army of the james. "the movement of troops from the army of the james will commence on the night of the 27th instant. general ord will leave behind the minimum number of cavalry necessary for picket duty, in the absence of the main army. a cavalry expedition, from general ord's command, will also be started from suffolk, to leave there on saturday, the 1st of april, under colonel sumner, for the purpose of cutting the railroad about hicksford. this, if accomplished, will have to be a surprise, and therefore from three to five hundred men will be sufficient. they should, however, be supported by all the infantry that can be spared from norfolk and portsmouth, as far out as to where the cavalry crosses the blackwater. the crossing should probably be at uniten. should colonel sumner succeed in reaching the weldon road, he will be instructed to do all the damage possible to the triangle of roads between hicksford, weldon, and gaston. the railroad bridge at weldon being fitted up for the passage of carriages, it might be practicable to destroy any accumulation of supplies the enemy may have collected south of the roanoke. all the troops will move with four days' rations in haversacks and eight days' in wagons. to avoid as much hauling as possible, and to give the army of the james the same number of days' supplies with the army of the potomac, general ord will direct his commissary and quartermaster to have sufficient supplies delivered at the terminus of the road to fill up in passing. sixty rounds of ammunition per man will be taken in wagons, and as much grain as the transportation on hand will carry, after taking the specified amount of other supplies. the densely wooded country in which the army has to operate making the use of much artillery impracticable, the amount taken with the army will be reduced to six or eight guns to each division, at the option of the army commanders. "all necessary preparations for carrying these directions into operation may be commenced at once. the reserves of the 9th corps should be massed as much as possible. while i would not now order an unconditional attack on the enemy's line by them, they should be ready and should make the attack if the enemy weakens his line in their front, without waiting for orders. in case they carry the line, then the whole of the 9th corps could follow up so as to join or co-operate with the balance of the army. to prepare for this, the 9th corps will have rations issued to them, same as the balance of the army. general weitzel will keep vigilant watch upon his front, and if found at all practicable to break through at any point, he will do so. a success north of the james should be followed up with great promptness. an attack will not be feasible unless it is found that the enemy has detached largely. in that case it may be regarded as evident that the enemy are relying upon their local reserves principally for the defence of richmond. preparations may be made for abandoning all the line north of the james, except inclosed works only to be abandoned, however, after a break is made in the lines of the enemy. "by these instructions a large part of the armies operating against richmond is left behind. the enemy, knowing this, may, as an only chance, strip their lines to the merest skeleton, in the hope of advantage not being taken of it, while they hurl everything against the moving column, and return. it cannot be impressed too strongly upon commanders of troops left in the trenches not to allow this to occur without taking advantage of it. the very fact of the enemy coming out to attack, if he does so, might be regarded as almost conclusive evidence of such a weakening of his lines. i would have it particularly enjoined upon corps commanders that, in case of an attack from the enemy, those not attacked are not to wait for orders from the commanding officer of the army to which they belong, but that they will move promptly, and notify the commander of their action. i would also enjoin the same action on the part of division commanders when other parts of their corps are engaged. in like manner, i would urge the importance of following up a repulse of the enemy. "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "major-generals meade, ord, and sheridan." early on the morning of the 25th the enemy assaulted our lines in front of the 9th corps (which held from the appomattox river towards our left), and carried fort stedman, and a part of the line to the right and left of it, established themselves and turned the guns of the fort against us, but our troops on either flank held their ground until the reserves were brought up, when the enemy was driven back with a heavy loss in killed and wounded, and one thousand nine hundred prisoners. our loss was sixty-eight killed, three hundred and thirty-seven wounded, and five hundred and six missing. general meade at once ordered the other corps to advance and feel the enemy in their respective fronts. pushing forward, they captured and held the enemy's strongly intrenched picket-line in front of the 2d and 6th corps, and eight hundred and thirty-four prisoners. the enemy made desperate attempts to retake this line, but without success. our loss in front of these was fifty-two killed, eight hundred and sixty-four wounded, and two hundred and seven missing. the enemy's loss in killed and wounded was far greater. general sherman having got his troops all quietly in camp about goldsboro', and his preparations for furnishing supplies to them perfected, visited me at city point on the 27th of march, and stated that he would be ready to move, as he had previously written me, by the 10th of april, fully equipped and rationed for twenty days, if it should become necessary to bring his command to bear against lee's army, in co-operation with our forces in front of richmond and petersburg. general sherman proposed in this movement to threaten raleigh, and then, by turning suddenly to the right, reach the roanoke at gaston or thereabouts, whence he could move on to the richmond and danville railroad, striking it in the vicinity of burkesville, or join the armies operating against richmond, as might be deemed best. this plan he was directed to carry into execution, if he received no further directions in the meantime. i explained to him the movement i had ordered to commence on the 29th of march. that if it should not prove as entirely successful as i hoped, i would cut the cavalry loose to destroy the danville and south side railroads, and thus deprive the enemy of further supplies, and also to prevent the rapid concentration of lee's and johnston's armies. i had spent days of anxiety lest each morning should bring the report that the enemy had retreated the night before. i was firmly convinced that sherman's crossing the roanoke would be the signal for lee to leave. with johnston and him combined, a long, tedious, and expensive campaign, consuming most of the summer, might become necessary. by moving out i would put the army in better condition for pursuit, and would at least, by the destruction of the danville road, retard the concentration of the two armies of lee and johnston, and cause the enemy to abandon much material that he might otherwise save. i therefore determined not to delay the movement ordered. on the night of the 27th, major-general ord, with two divisions of the 24th corps, major-general gibbon commanding, and one division of the 25th corps, brigadier-general birney commanding, and mackenzie's cavalry, took up his line of march in pursuance of the foregoing instructions, and reached the position assigned him near hatcher's run on the morning of the 29th. on the 28th the following instructions were given to general sheridan: "city point, va., march 28, 1865. "general:--the 5th army corps will move by the vaughn road at three a.m. to-morrow morning. the 2d moves at about nine a.m., having but about three miles to march to reach the point designated for it to take on the right of the 5th corps, after the latter reaching dinwiddie court house. move your cavalry at as early an hour as you can, and without being confined to any particular road or roads. you may go out by the nearest roads in rear of the 5th corps, pass by its left, and passing near to or through dinwiddie, reach the right and rear of the enemy as soon as you can. it is not the intention to attack the enemy in his intrenched position, but to force him out, if possible. should he come out and attack us, or get himself where he can be attacked, move in with your entire force in your own way, and with the full reliance that the army will engage or follow, as circumstances will dictate. i shall be on the field, and will probably be able to communicate with you. should i not do so, and you find that the enemy keeps within his main intrenched line, you may cut loose and push for the danville road. if you find it practicable, i would like you to cross the south side road, between petersburg and burkesville, and destroy it to some extent. i would not advise much detention, however, until you reach the danville road, which i would like you to strike as near to the appomattox as possible. make your destruction on that road as complete as possible. you can then pass on to the south side road, west of burkesville, and destroy that in like manner. "after having accomplished the destruction of the two railroads, which are now the only avenues of supply to lee's army, you may return to this army, selecting your road further south, or you may go on into north carolina and join general sherman. should you select the latter course, get the information to me as early as possible, so that i may send orders to meet you at goldsboro'. "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "major-general p. h. sheridan." on the morning of the 29th the movement commenced. at night the cavalry was at dinwiddie court house, and the left of our infantry line extended to the quaker road, near its intersection with the boydton plank road. the position of the troops from left to right was as follows: sheridan, warren, humphreys, ord, wright, parke. everything looked favorable to the defeat of the enemy and the capture of petersburg and richmond, if the proper effort was made. i therefore addressed the following communication to general sheridan, having previously informed him verbally not to cut loose for the raid contemplated in his orders until he received notice from me to do so: "gravelly creek, march 29, 1865. "general:--our line is now unbroken from the appomattox to dinwiddie. we are all ready, however, to give up all, from the jerusalem plank road to hatcher's run, whenever the forces can be used advantageously. after getting into line south of hatcher's, we pushed forward to find the enemy's position. general griffin was attacked near where the quaker road intersects the boydton road, but repulsed it easily, capturing about one hundred men. humphreys reached dabney's mill, and was pushing on when last heard from. "i now feel like ending the matter, if it is possible to do so, before going back. i do not want you, therefore, to cut loose and go after the enemy's roads at present. in the morning push around the enemy, if you can, and get on to his right rear. the movements of the enemy's cavalry may, of course, modify your action. we will act all together as one army here, until it is seen what can be done with the enemy. the signal-officer at cobb's hill reported, at half-past eleven a.m., that a cavalry column had passed that point from richmond towards petersburg, taking forty minutes to pass. "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "major-general p. h. sheridan." from the night of the 29th to the morning of the 31st the rain fell in such torrents as to make it impossible to move a wheeled vehicle, except as corduroy roads were laid in front of them. during the 30th, sheridan advanced from dinwiddie court house towards five forks, where he found the enemy in full force. general warren advanced and extended his line across the boydton plank road to near the white oak road, with a view of getting across the latter; but, finding the enemy strong in his front and extending beyond his left, was directed to hold on where he was, and fortify. general humphreys drove the enemy from his front into his main line on the hatcher, near burgess's mills. generals ord, wright, and parke made examinations in their fronts to determine the feasibility of an assault on the enemy's lines. the two latter reported favorably. the enemy confronting us as he did, at every point from richmond to our extreme left, i conceived his lines must be weakly held, and could be penetrated if my estimate of his forces was correct. i determined, therefore, to extend our line no farther, but to reinforce general sheridan with a corps of infantry, and thus enable him to cut loose and turn the enemy's right flank, and with the other corps assault the enemy's lines. the result of the offensive effort of the enemy the week before, when he assaulted fort stedman, particularly favored this. the enemy's intrenched picket-line captured by us at that time threw the lines occupied by the belligerents so close together at some points that it was but a moment's run from one to the other. preparations were at once made to relieve general humphreys's corps, to report to general sheridan; but the condition of the roads prevented immediate movement. on the morning of the 31st, general warren reported favorably to getting possession of the white oak road, and was directed to do so. to accomplish this, he moved with one division, instead of his whole corps, which was attacked by the enemy in superior force and driven back on the 2d division before it had time to form, and it, in turn, forced back upon the 3d division, when the enemy was checked. a division of the 2d corps was immediately sent to his support, the enemy driven back with heavy loss, and possession of the white oak road gained. sheridan advanced, and with a portion of his cavalry got possession of the five forks; but the enemy, after the affair with the 5th corps, reinforced the rebel cavalry, defending that point with infantry, and forced him back towards dinwiddie court house. here general sheridan displayed great generalship. instead of retreating with his whole command on the main army, to tell the story of superior forces encountered, he deployed his cavalry on foot, leaving only mounted men enough to take charge of the horses. this compelled the enemy to deploy over a vast extent of wooded and broken country, and made his progress slow. at this juncture he dispatched to me what had taken place, and that he was dropping back slowly on dinwiddie court house. general mackenzie's cavalry and one division of the 5th corps were immediately ordered to his assistance. soon after receiving a report from general meade that humphreys could hold our position on the boydton road, and that the other two divisions of the 5th corps could go to sheridan, they were so ordered at once. thus the operations of the day necessitated the sending of warren, because of his accessibility, instead of humphreys, as was intended, and precipitated intended movements. on the morning of the 1st of april, general sheridan, reinforced by general warren, drove the enemy back on five forks, where, late in the evening, he assaulted and carried his strongly fortified position, capturing all his artillery and between five and six thousand prisoners. about the close of this battle, brevet major-general charles griffin relieved major-general warren in command of the 5th corps. the report of this reached me after nightfall. some apprehensions filled my mind lest the enemy might desert his lines during the night, and by falling upon general sheridan before assistance could reach him, drive him from his position and open the way for retreat. to guard against this, general miles's division of humphreys's corps was sent to reinforce him, and a bombardment was commenced and kept up until four o'clock in the morning (april 2), when an assault was ordered on the enemy's lines. general wright penetrated the lines with his whole corps, sweeping everything before him, and to his left towards hatcher's run, capturing many guns and several thousand prisoners. he was closely followed by two divisions of general ord's command, until he met the other division of general ord's that had succeeded in forcing the enemy's lines near hatcher's run. generals wright and ord immediately swung to the right, and closed all of the enemy on that side of them in petersburg, while general humphreys pushed forward with two divisions and joined general wright on the left. general parke succeeded in carrying the enemy's main line, capturing guns and prisoners, but was unable to carry his inner line. general sheridan being advised of the condition of affairs, returned general miles to his proper command. on reaching the enemy's lines immediately surrounding petersburg, a portion of general gibbon's corps, by a most gallant charge, captured two strong inclosed works--the most salient and commanding south of petersburg--thus materially shortening the line of investment necessary for taking in the city. the enemy south of hatcher's run retreated westward to sutherland's station, where they were overtaken by miles's division. a severe engagement ensued, and lasted until both his right and left flanks were threatened by the approach of general sheridan, who was moving from ford's station towards petersburg, and a division sent by general meade from the front of petersburg, when he broke in the utmost confusion, leaving in our hands his guns and many prisoners. this force retreated by the main road along the appomattox river. during the night of the 2d the enemy evacuated petersburg and richmond, and retreated towards danville. on the morning of the 3d pursuit was commenced. general sheridan pushed for the danville road, keeping near the appomattox, followed by general meade with the 2d and 6th corps, while general ord moved for burkesville, along the south side road; the 9th corps stretched along that road behind him. on the 4th, general sheridan struck the danville road near jetersville, where he learned that lee was at amelia court house. he immediately intrenched himself and awaited the arrival of general meade, who reached there the next day. general ord reached burkesville on the evening of the 5th. on the morning of the 5th, i addressed major-general sherman the following communication: "wilson's station, april 5, 1865. "general: all indications now are that lee will attempt to reach danville with the remnant of his force. sheridan, who was up with him last night, reports all that is left, horse, foot, and dragoons, at twenty thousand, much demoralized. we hope to reduce this number one-half. i shall push on to burkesville, and if a stand is made at danville, will in a very few days go there. if you can possibly do so, push on from where you are, and let us see if we cannot finish the job with lee's and johnston's armies. whether it will be better for you to strike for greensboro', or nearer to danville, you will be better able to judge when you receive this. rebel armies now are the only strategic points to strike at. "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "major-general w. t. sherman." on the morning of the 6th, it was found that general lee was moving west of jetersville, towards danville. general sheridan moved with his cavalry (the 5th corps having been returned to general meade on his reaching jetersville) to strike his flank, followed by the 6th corps, while the 2d and 5th corps pressed hard after, forcing him to abandon several hundred wagons and several pieces of artillery. general ord advanced from burkesville towards farmville, sending two regiments of infantry and a squadron of cavalry, under brevet brigadier-general theodore read, to reach and destroy the bridges. this advance met the head of lee's column near farmville, which it heroically attacked and detained until general read was killed and his small force overpowered. this caused a delay in the enemy's movements, and enabled general ord to get well up with the remainder of his force, on meeting which, the enemy immediately intrenched himself. in the afternoon, general sheridan struck the enemy south of sailors' creek, captured sixteen pieces of artillery and about four hundred wagons, and detained him until the 6th corps got up, when a general attack of infantry and cavalry was made, which resulted in the capture of six or seven thousand prisoners, among whom were many general officers. the movements of the 2d corps and general ord's command contributed greatly to the day's success. on the morning of the 7th the pursuit was renewed, the cavalry, except one division, and the 5th corps moving by prince edward's court house; the 6th corps, general ord's command, and one division of cavalry, on farmville; and the 2d corps by the high bridge road. it was soon found that the enemy had crossed to the north side of the appomattox; but so close was the pursuit, that the 2d corps got possession of the common bridge at high bridge before the enemy could destroy it, and immediately crossed over. the 6th corps and a division of cavalry crossed at farmville to its support. feeling now that general lee's chance of escape was utterly hopeless, i addressed him the following communication from farmville: "april 7, 1865. "general--the result of the last week must convince you of the hopelessness of further resistance on the part of the army of northern virginia in this struggle. i feel that it is so, and regard it as my duty to shift from myself the responsibility of any further effusion of blood, by asking of you the surrender of that portion of the confederate states army known as the army of northern virginia. "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "general r. e. lee." early on the morning of the 8th, before leaving, i received at farmville the following: "april 7, 1865. "general: i have received your note of this date. though not entertaining the opinion you express on the hopelessness of further resistance on the part of the army of northern virginia, i reciprocate your desire to avoid useless effusion of blood, and therefore, before considering your proposition, ask the terms you will offer on condition of its surrender. "r. e. lee, general. "lieutenant-general u. s. grant." to this i immediately replied: "april 8, 1865. "general:--your note of last evening, in reply to mine of same date, asking the condition on which i will accept the surrender of the army of northern virginia, is just received. in reply, i would say, that peace being my great desire, there is but one condition i would insist upon --namely, that the men and officers surrendered shall be disqualified for taking up arms again against the government of the united states until properly exchanged. i will meet you, or will designate officers to meet any officers you may name for the same purpose, at any point agreeable to you, for the purpose of arranging definitely the terms upon which the surrender of the army of the northern virginia will be received. "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "general r. e. lee." early on the morning of the 8th the pursuit was resumed. general meade followed north of the appomattox, and general sheridan, with all the cavalry, pushed straight ahead for appomattox station, followed by general ord's command and the 5th corps. during the day general meade's advance had considerable fighting with the enemy's rear-guard, but was unable to bring on a general engagement. late in the evening general sheridan struck the railroad at appomattox station, drove the enemy from there, and captured twenty-five pieces of artillery, a hospital train, and four trains of cars loaded with supplies for lee's army. during this day i accompanied general meade's column, and about midnight received the following communication from general lee: april 8, 1865. "general:--i received, at a late hour, your note of to-day. in mine of yesterday i did not intend to propose the surrender of the army of northern virginia, but to ask the terms of your proposition. to be frank, i do not think the emergency has arisen to call for the surrender of this army; but as the restoration of peace should be the sole object of all, i desired to know whether your proposals would lead to that end. i cannot, therefore, meet you with a view to the surrender of the army of northern virginia; but as far as your proposal may affect the confederate states forces under my command, and tend to the restoration of peace, i should be pleased to meet you at ten a.m. to-morrow on the old stage-road to richmond, between the picket-lines of the two armies. "r. e. lee, general. "lieutenant-general u. s. grant." early on the morning of the 9th i returned him an answer as follows, and immediately started to join the column south of the appomattox: "april 9, 1865. "general:--your note of yesterday is received. i have no authority to treat on the subject of peace; the meeting proposed for ten a.m. to-day could lead to no good. i will state, however, general, that i am equally anxious for peace with yourself, and the whole north entertains the same feeling. the terms upon which peace can be had are well understood. by the south laying down their arms they will hasten that most desirable event, save thousands of human lives, and hundreds of millions of property not yet destroyed. seriously hoping that all our difficulties may be settled without the loss of another life, i subscribe myself, etc. "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "general r. e. lee." on this morning of the 9th, general ord's command and the 5th corps reached appomattox station just as the enemy was making a desperate effort to break through our cavalry. the infantry was at once thrown in. soon after a white flag was received, requesting a suspension of hostilities pending negotiations for a surrender. before reaching general sheridan's headquarters, i received the following from general lee: "april 9, 1865. "general:--i received your note of this morning on the picket-line, whither i had come to meet you, and ascertain definitely what terms were embraced in your proposal of yesterday with reference to the surrender of this army. i now ask an interview, in accordance with the offer contained in your letter of yesterday, for that purpose. "r. e. lee, general. "lieutenant-general u. s. grant." the interview was held at appomattox court-house, the result of which is set forth in the following correspondence: appomattox court-house, virginia, april 9, 1865. "general: in accordance with the substance of my letter to you of the 8th instant, i propose to receive the surrender of the army of northern virginia on the following terms, to wit: rolls of all the officers and men to be made in duplicate, one copy to be given to an officer to be designated by me, the other to be retained by such officer or officers as you may designate. the officers to give their individual paroles not to take up arms against the government of the united states until properly exchanged; and each company or regimental commander sign a like parole for the men of their commands. the arms, artillery, and public property to be parked and stacked, and turned over to the officers appointed by me to receive them. this will not embrace the side-arms of the officers, nor their private horses or baggage. this done, each officer and man will be allowed to return to his home, not to be disturbed by united states authority so long as they observe their paroles and the laws in force where they may reside. "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "general r. e. lee." "headquarters army of northern virginia, april 9, 1865. "general: i have received your letter of this date containing the terms of surrender of the army of northern virginia as proposed by you. as they are substantially the same as those expressed in your letter of the 8th instant, they are accepted. i will proceed to designate the proper officers to carry the stipulations into effect. "r. e. lee, general. "lieutenant-general u. s. grant." the command of major-general gibbon, the 5th army corps under griffin, and mackenzie's cavalry, were designated to remain at appomattox court-house until the paroling of the surrendered army was completed, and to take charge of the public property. the remainder of the army immediately returned to the vicinity of burkesville. general lee's great influence throughout the whole south caused his example to be followed, and to-day the result is that the armies lately under his leadership are at their homes, desiring peace and quiet, and their arms are in the hands of our ordnance officers. on the receipt of my letter of the 5th, general sherman moved directly against joe johnston, who retreated rapidly on and through raleigh, which place general sherman occupied on the morning of the 13th. the day preceding, news of the surrender of general lee reached him at smithfield. on the 14th a correspondence was opened between general sherman and general johnston, which resulted on the 18th in an agreement for a suspension of hostilities, and a memorandum or basis for peace, subject to the approval of the president. this agreement was disapproved by the president on the 21st, which disapproval, together with your instructions, was communicated to general sherman by me in person on the morning of the 24th, at raleigh, north carolina, in obedience to your orders. notice was at once given by him to general johnston for the termination of the truce that had been entered into. on the 25th another meeting between them was agreed upon, to take place on the 26th, which terminated in the surrender and disbandment of johnston's army upon substantially the same terms as were given to general lee. the expedition under general stoneman from east tennessee got off on the 20th of march, moving by way of boone, north carolina, and struck the railroad at wytheville, chambersburg, and big lick. the force striking it at big lick pushed on to within a few miles of lynchburg, destroying the important bridges, while with the main force he effectually destroyed it between new river and big lick, and then turned for greensboro', on the north carolina railroad; struck that road and destroyed the bridges between danville and greensboro', and between greensboro' and the yadkin, together with the depots of supplies along it, and captured four hundred prisoners. at salisbury he attacked and defeated a force of the enemy under general gardiner, capturing fourteen pieces of artillery and one thousand three hundred and sixty-four prisoners, and destroyed large amounts of army stores. at this place he destroyed fifteen miles of railroad and the bridges towards charlotte. thence he moved to slatersville. general canby, who had been directed in january to make preparations for a movement from mobile bay against mobile and the interior of alabama, commenced his movement on the 20th of march. the 16th corps, major-general a. j. smith commanding, moved from fort gaines by water to fish river; the 13th corps, under major-general gordon granger, moved from fort morgan and joined the 16th corps on fish river, both moving thence on spanish fort and investing it on the 27th; while major-general steele's command moved from pensacola, cut the railroad leading from tensas to montgomery, effected a junction with them, and partially invested fort blakely. after a severe bombardment of spanish fort, a part of its line was carried on the 8th of april. during the night the enemy evacuated the fort. fort blakely was carried by assault on the 9th, and many prisoners captured; our loss was considerable. these successes practically opened to us the alabama river, and enabled us to approach mobile from the north. on the night of the 11th the city was evacuated, and was taken possession of by our forces on the morning of the 12th. the expedition under command of brevet major-general wilson, consisting of twelve thousand five hundred mounted men, was delayed by rains until march 22d, when it moved from chickasaw, alabama. on the 1st of april, general wilson encountered the enemy in force under forrest near ebenezer church, drove him in confusion, captured three hundred prisoners and three guns, and destroyed the central bridge over the cahawba river. on the 2d he attacked and captured the fortified city of selma, defended by forrest, with seven thousand men and thirty-two guns, destroyed the arsenal, armory, naval foundry, machine-shops, vast quantities of stores, and captured three thousand prisoners. on the 4th he captured and destroyed tuscaloosa. on the 10th he crossed the alabama river, and after sending information of his operations to general canby, marched on montgomery, which place he occupied on the 14th, the enemy having abandoned it. at this place many stores and five steamboats fell into our hands. thence a force marched direct on columbus, and another on west point, both of which places were assaulted and captured on the 16th. at the former place we got one thousand five hundred prisoners and fifty-two field-guns, destroyed two gunboats, the navy yard, foundries, arsenal, many factories, and much other public property. at the latter place we got three hundred prisoners, four guns, and destroyed nineteen locomotives and three hundred cars. on the 20th he took possession of macon, georgia, with sixty field-guns, one thousand two hundred militia, and five generals, surrendered by general howell cobb. general wilson, hearing that jeff. davis was trying to make his escape, sent forces in pursuit and succeeded in capturing him on the morning of may 11th. on the 4th day of may, general dick taylor surrendered to general canby all the remaining rebel forces east of the mississippi. a force sufficient to insure an easy triumph over the enemy under kirby smith, west of the mississippi, was immediately put in motion for texas, and major-general sheridan designated for its immediate command; but on the 26th day of may, and before they reached their destination, general kirby smith surrendered his entire command to major-general canby. this surrender did not take place, however, until after the capture of the rebel president and vice-president; and the bad faith was exhibited of first disbanding most of his army and permitting an indiscriminate plunder of public property. owing to the report that many of those lately in arms against the government had taken refuge upon the soil of mexico, carrying with them arms rightfully belonging to the united states, which had been surrendered to us by agreement among them some of the leaders who had surrendered in person and the disturbed condition of affairs on the rio grande, the orders for troops to proceed to texas were not changed. there have been severe combats, raids, expeditions, and movements to defeat the designs and purposes of the enemy, most of them reflecting great credit on our arms, and which contributed greatly to our final triumph, that i have not mentioned. many of these will be found clearly set forth in the reports herewith submitted; some in the telegrams and brief dispatches announcing them, and others, i regret to say, have not as yet been officially reported. for information touching our indian difficulties, i would respectfully refer to the reports of the commanders of departments in which they have occurred. it has been my fortune to see the armies of both the west and the east fight battles, and from what i have seen i know there is no difference in their fighting qualities. all that it was possible for men to do in battle they have done. the western armies commenced their battles in the mississippi valley, and received the final surrender of the remnant of the principal army opposed to them in north carolina. the armies of the east commenced their battles on the river from which the army of the potomac derived its name, and received the final surrender of their old antagonists at appomattox court house, virginia. the splendid achievements of each have nationalized our victories removed all sectional jealousies (of which we have unfortunately experienced too much), and the cause of crimination and recrimination that might have followed had either section failed in its duty. all have a proud record, and all sections can well congratulate themselves and each other for having done their full share in restoring the supremacy of law over every foot of territory belonging to the united states. let them hope for perpetual peace and harmony with that enemy, whose manhood, however mistaken the cause, drew forth such herculean deeds of valor. i have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant, u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. the end __________ footnotes (*1) afterwards general gardner, c.s.a. (*2) general garland expressed a wish to get a message back to general twiggs, his division commander, or general taylor, to the effect that he was nearly out of ammunition and must have more sent to him, or otherwise be reinforced. deeming the return dangerous he did not like to order any one to carry it, so he called for a volunteer. lieutenant grant offered his services, which were accepted.--publishers. (*3) mentioned in the reports of major lee, colonel garland and general worth.--publishers. (*4) note.--it had been a favorite idea with general scott for a great many years before the mexican war to have established in the united states a soldiers' home, patterned after something of the kind abroad, particularly, i believe, in france. he recommended this uniformly, or at least frequently, in his annual reports to the secretary of war, but never got any hearing. now, as he had conquered the state, he made assessments upon the different large towns and cities occupied by our troops, in proportion to their capacity to pay, and appointed officers to receive the money. in addition to the sum thus realized he had derived, through capture at cerro gordo, sales of captured government tobacco, etc., sums which swelled the fund to a total of about $220,000. portions of this fund were distributed among the rank and file, given to the wounded in hospital, or applied in other ways, leaving a balance of some $118,000 remaining unapplied at the close of the war. after the war was over and the troops all home, general scott applied to have this money, which had never been turned into the treasury of the united states, expended in establishing such homes as he had previously recommended. this fund was the foundation of the soldiers' home at washington city, and also one at harrodsburgh, kentucky. the latter went into disuse many years ago. in fact it never had many soldiers in it, and was, i believe, finally sold. (*5) the mexican war made three presidential candidates, scott, taylor and pierce--and any number of aspirants for that high office. it made also governors of states, members of the cabinet, foreign ministers and other officers of high rank both in state and nation. the rebellion, which contained more war in a single day, at some critical periods, than the whole mexican war in two years, has not been so fruitful of political results to those engaged on the union side. on the other side, the side of the south, nearly every man who holds office of any sort whatever, either in the state or in the nation, was a confederate soldier, but this is easily accounted for from the fact that the south was a military camp, and there were very few people of a suitable age to be in the army who were not in it. (*6) c. b. lagow, the others not yet having joined me. (*7) note.--since writing this chapter i have received from mrs. w. h. l. wallace, widow of the gallant general who was killed in the first day's fight on the field of shiloh, a letter from general lew. wallace to him dated the morning of the 5th. at the date of this letter it was well known that the confederates had troops out along the mobile & ohio railroad west of crump's landing and pittsburg landing, and were also collecting near shiloh. this letter shows that at that time general lew. wallace was making preparations for the emergency that might happen for the passing of reinforcements between shiloh and his position, extending from crump's landing westward, and he sends it over the road running from adamsville to the pittsburg landing and purdy road. these two roads intersect nearly a mile west of the crossing of the latter over owl creek, where our right rested. in this letter general lew. wallace advises general w. h. l. wallace that he will send "to-morrow" (and his letter also says "april 5th," which is the same day the letter was dated and which, therefore, must have been written on the 4th) some cavalry to report to him at his headquarters, and suggesting the propriety of general w. h. l. wallace's sending a company back with them for the purpose of having the cavalry at the two landings familiarize themselves with the road so that they could "act promptly in case of emergency as guides to and from the different camps." this modifies very materially what i have said, and what has been said by others, of the conduct of general lew. wallace at the battle of shiloh. it shows that he naturally, with no more experience than he had at the time in the profession of arms, would take the particular road that he did start upon in the absence of orders to move by a different road. the mistake he made, and which probably caused his apparent dilatoriness, was that of advancing some distance after he found that the firing, which would be at first directly to his front and then off to the left, had fallen back until it had got very much in rear of the position of his advance. this falling back had taken place before i sent general wallace orders to move up to pittsburg landing and, naturally, my order was to follow the road nearest the river. but my order was verbal, and to a staff officer who was to deliver it to general wallace, so that i am not competent to say just what order the general actually received. general wallace's division was stationed, the first brigade at crump's landing, the second out two miles, and the third two and a half miles out. hearing the sounds of battle general wallace early ordered his first and third brigades to concentrate on the second. if the position of our front had not changed, the road which wallace took would have been somewhat shorter to our right than the river road. u. s. grant. mount macgregor, new york, june 21, 1885. (*8) note: in an article on the battle of shiloh which i wrote for the century magazine, i stated that general a. mcd. mccook, who commanded a division of buell's army, expressed some unwillingness to pursue the enemy on monday, april 7th, because of the condition of his troops. general badeau, in his history, also makes the same statement, on my authority. out of justice to general mccook and his command, i must say that they left a point twenty-two miles east of savannah on the morning of the 6th. from the heavy rains of a few days previous and the passage of trains and artillery, the roads were necessarily deep in mud, which made marching slow. the division had not only marched through this mud the day before, but it had been in the rain all night without rest. it was engaged in the battle of the second day and did as good service as its position allowed. in fact an opportunity occurred for it to perform a conspicuous act of gallantry which elicited the highest commendation from division commanders in the army of the tennessee. general sherman both in his memoirs and report makes mention of this fact. general mccook himself belongs to a family which furnished many volunteers to the army. i refer to these circumstances with minuteness because i did general mccook injustice in my article in the century, though not to the extent one would suppose from the public press. i am not willing to do any one an injustice, and if convinced that i have done one, i am always willing to make the fullest admission. (*9) note.--for gallantry in the various engagements, from the time i was left in command down to 26th of october and on my recommendation, generals mcpherson and c. s. hamilton were promoted to be major-generals, and colonels c. c. marsh, 20th illinois, m. m. crocker, 13th iowa j. a. mower, 11th missouri, m. d. leggett, 78th ohio, j. d. stevenson, 7th missouri, and john e. smith, 45th illinois, to be brigadiers. (*10) colonel ellet reported having attacked a confederate battery on the red river two days before with one of his boats, the de soto. running aground, he was obliged to abandon his vessel. however, he reported that he set fire to her and blew her up. twenty of his men fell into the hands of the enemy. with the balance he escaped on the small captured steamer, the new era, and succeeded in passing the batteries at grand gulf and reaching the vicinity of vicksburg. (*11) one of colonel ellet's vessels which had run the blockade on february the 2d and been sunk in the red river. (*12) note.--on this occasion governor richard yates, of illinois, happened to be on a visit to the army and accompanied me to carthage. i furnished an ambulance for his use and that of some of the state officers who accompanied him. (*13) note.--when general sherman first learned of the move i proposed to make, he called to see me about it. i recollect that i had transferred my headquarters from a boat in the river to a house a short distance back from the levee. i was seated on the piazza engaged in conversation with my staff when sherman came up. after a few moments' conversation he said that he would like to see me alone. we passed into the house together and shut the door after us. sherman then expressed his alarm at the move i had ordered, saying that i was putting myself in a position voluntarily which an enemy would be glad to manoeuvre a year--or a long time--to get me in. i was going into the enemy's country, with a large river behind me and the enemy holding points strongly fortified above and below. he said that it was an axiom in war that when any great body of troops moved against an enemy they should do so from a base of supplies, which they would guard as they would the apple of the eye, etc. he pointed out all the difficulties that might be encountered in the campaign proposed, and stated in turn what would be the true campaign to make. this was, in substance, to go back until high ground could be reached on the east bank of the river; fortify there and establish a depot of supplies, and move from there, being always prepared to fall back upon it in case of disaster. i said this would take us back to memphis. sherman then said that was the very place he would go to, and would move by railroad from memphis to grenada, repairing the road as we advanced. to this i replied, the country is already disheartened over the lack of success on the part of our armies; the last election went against the vigorous prosecution of the war, voluntary enlistments had ceased throughout most of the north and conscription was already resorted to, and if we went back so far as memphis it would discourage the people so much that bases of supplies would be of no use: neither men to hold them nor supplies to put in them would be furnished. the problem for us was to move forward to a decisive victory, or our cause was lost. no progress was being made in any other field, and we had to go on. sherman wrote to my adjutant general, colonel j. a. rawlins, embodying his views of the campaign that should be made, and asking him to advise me to at least get the views of my generals upon the subject. colonel rawlins showed me the letter, but i did not see any reason for changing my plans. the letter was not answered and the subject was not subsequently mentioned between sherman and myself to the end of the war, that i remember of. i did not regard the letter as official, and consequently did not preserve it. general sherman furnished a copy himself to general badeau, who printed it in his history of my campaigns. i did not regard either the conversation between us or the letter to my adjutant-general as protests, but simply friendly advice which the relations between us fully justified. sherman gave the same energy to make the campaign a success that he would or could have done if it had been ordered by himself. i make this statement here to correct an impression which was circulated at the close of the war to sherman's prejudice, and for which there was no fair foundation. (*14) meant edward's station. (*15) chattanooga, november 18, 1863. major-general w. t. sherman: enclosed herewith i send you copy of instructions to major-general thomas. you having been over the ground in person, and having heard the whole matter discussed, further instructions will not be necessary for you. it is particularly desirable that a force should be got through to the railroad between cleveland and dalton, and longstreet thus cut off from communication with the south, but being confronted by a large force here, strongly located, it is not easy to tell how this is to be effected until the result of our first effort is known. i will add, however, what is not shown in my instructions to thomas, that a brigade of cavalry has been ordered here which, if it arrives in time, will be thrown across the tennessee above chickamauga, and may be able to make the trip to cleveland or thereabouts. u. s. grant maj.-gen'l. chattanooga, november 18, 1863. major-general geo. h. thomas, chattanooga: all preparations should be made for attacking the enemy's position on missionary ridge by saturday at daylight. not being provided with a map giving names of roads, spurs of the mountains, and other places, such definite instructions cannot be given as might be desirable. however, the general plan, you understand, is for sherman, with the force brought with him strengthened by a division from your command, to effect a crossing of the tennessee river just below the mouth of chickamauga; his crossing to be protected by artillery from the heights on the north bank of the river (to be located by your chief of artillery), and to secure the heights on the northern extremity to about the railroad tunnel before the enemy can concentrate against him. you will co-operate with sherman. the troops in chattanooga valley should be well concentrated on your left flank, leaving only the necessary force to defend fortifications on the right and centre, and a movable column of one division in readiness to move wherever ordered. this division should show itself as threateningly as possible on the most practicable line for making an attack up the valley. your effort then will be to form a junction with sherman, making your advance well towards the northern end of missionary ridge, and moving as near simultaneously with him as possible. the junction once formed and the ridge carried, communications will be at once established between the two armies by roads on the south bank of the river. further movements will then depend on those of the enemy. lookout valley, i think, will be easily held by geary's division and what troops you may still have there belonging to the old army of the cumberland. howard's corps can then be held in readiness to act either with you at chattanooga or with sherman. it should be marched on friday night to a position on the north side of the river, not lower down than the first pontoon-bridge, and there held in readiness for such orders as may become necessary. all these troops will be provided with two days' cooked rations in haversacks, and one hundred rounds of ammunition on the person of each infantry soldier. special care should be taken by all officers to see that ammunition is not wasted or unnecessarily fired away. you will call on the engineer department for such preparations as you may deem necessary for carrying your infantry and artillery over the creek. u. s. grant, major-general. (*16) in this order authority was given for the troops to reform after taking the first line of rifle-pits preparatory to carrying the ridge. (*17) chattanooga, november 24,1863. major-general. ceo. h. thomas, chattanooga general sherman carried missionary ridge as far as the tunnel with only slight skirmishing. his right now rests at the tunnel and on top of the hill, his left at chickamauga creek. i have instructed general sherman to advance as soon as it is light in the morning, and your attack, which will be simultaneous, will be in cooperation. your command will either carry the rifle-pits and ridge directly in front of them, or move to the left, as the presence of the enemy may require. if hooker's position on the mountain [cannot be maintained] with a small force, and it is found impracticable to carry the top from where he is, it would be advisable for him to move up the valley with all the force he can spare, and ascend by the first practicable road. u. s. grant, major-general. (*18) washington, d. c., december 8, 1863, 10.2 a.m. maj.-general u. s. grant: understanding that your lodgment at knoxville and at chattanooga is now secure, i wish to tender you, and all under your command, my more than thanks, my profoundest gratitude for the skill, courage, and perseverance with which you and they, over so great difficulties, have effected that important object. god bless you all, a. lincoln, president u. s. (*19) general john g. foster. (*20) during this winter the citizens of jo davies county, ill., subscribed for and had a diamond-hilled sword made for general grant, which was always known as the chattanooga sword. the scabbard was of gold, and was ornamented with a scroll running nearly its entire length, displaying in engraved letters the names of the battles in which general grant had participated. congress also gave him a vote of thanks for the victories at chattanooga, and voted him a gold medal for vicksburg and chattanooga. all such things are now in the possession of the government at washington. (*21) washington, d. c. december 29, 1863. maj.-general u. s. grant: general foster has asked to be relieved from his command on account of disability from old wounds. should his request be granted, who would you like as his successor? it is possible that schofield will be sent to your command. h. w. halleck general-in-chief. (official.) (*22) see letter to banks, in general grant's report, appendix. (*23) [private and confidential.] headquarters armies of the united states, washington, d. c., april 4, 1864. major-general w. t. sherman, commanding military division of the mississippi. general:--it is my design, if the enemy keep quiet and allow me to take the initiative in the spring campaign, to work all parts of the army together, and somewhat towards a common centre. for your information i now write you my programme, as at present determined upon. i have sent orders to banks, by private messenger, to finish up his present expedition against shreveport with all dispatch; to turn over the defence of red river to general steele and the navy and to return your troops to you and his own to new orleans; to abandon all of texas, except the rio grande, and to hold that with not to exceed four thousand men; to reduce the number of troops on the mississippi to the lowest number necessary to hold it, and to collect from his command not less than twenty-five thousand men. to this i will add five thousand men from missouri. with this force he is to commence operations against mobile as soon as he can. it will be impossible for him to commence too early. gillmore joins butler with ten thousand men, and the two operate against richmond from the south side of the james river. this will give butler thirty-three thousand men to operate with, w. f. smith commanding the right wing of his forces and gillmore the left wing. i will stay with the army of the potomac, increased by burnside's corps of not less than twenty-five thousand effective men, and operate directly against lee's army, wherever it may be found. sigel collects all his available force in two columns, one, under ord and averell, to start from beverly, virginia, and the other, under crook, to start from charleston on the kanawha, to move against the virginia and tennessee railroad. crook will have all cavalry, and will endeavor to get in about saltville, and move east from there to join ord. his force will be all cavalry, while ord will have from ten to twelve thousand men of all arms. you i propose to move against johnston's army, to break it up and to get into the interior of the enemy's country as far as you can, inflicting all the damage you can against their war resources. i do not propose to lay down for you a plan of campaign, but simply lay down the work it is desirable to have done and leave you free to execute it in your own way. submit to me, however, as early as you can, your plan of operations. as stated, banks is ordered to commence operations as soon as he can. gillmore is ordered to report at fortress monroe by the 18th inst., or as soon thereafter as practicable. sigel is concentrating now. none will move from their places of rendezvous until i direct, except banks. i want to be ready to move by the 25th inst., if possible. but all i can now direct is that you get ready as soon as possible. i know you will have difficulties to encounter in getting through the mountains to where supplies are abundant, but i believe you will accomplish it. from the expedition from the department of west virginia i do not calculate on very great results; but it is the only way i can take troops from there. with the long line of railroad sigel has to protect, he can spare no troops except to move directly to his front. in this way he must get through to inflict great damage on the enemy, or the enemy must detach from one of his armies a large force to prevent it. in other words, if sigel can't skin himself he can hold a leg while some one else skins. i am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant, u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. (*24) see instructions to butler, in general grant's report, appendix. (*25) in field, culpeper c. h., va., april 9, 1864. maj.-general geo. g. meade com'd'g army of the potomac. for information and as instruction to govern your preparations for the coming campaign, the following is communicated confidentially for your own perusal alone. so far as practicable all the armies are to move together, and towards one common centre. banks has been instructed to turn over the guarding of the red river to general steele and the navy, to abandon texas with the exception of the rio grande, and to concentrate all the force he can, not less than 25,000 men, to move on mobile. this he is to do without reference to other movements. from the scattered condition of his command, however, he cannot possibly get it together to leave new orleans before the 1st of may, if so soon. sherman will move at the same time you do, or two or three days in advance, jo. johnston's army being his objective point, and the heart of georgia his ultimate aim. if successful he will secure the line from chattanooga to mobile with the aid of banks. sigel cannot spare troops from his army to reinforce either of the great armies, but he can aid them by moving directly to his front. this he has been directed to do, and is now making preparations for it. two columns of his command will make south at the same time with the general move; one from beverly, from ten to twelve thousand strong, under major-general ord; the other from charleston, va., principally cavalry, under brig.-general crook. the former of these will endeavor to reach the tennessee and virginia railroad, about south of covington, and if found practicable will work eastward to lynchburg and return to its base by way of the shenandoah valley, or join you. the other will strike at saltville, va., and come eastward to join ord. the cavalry from ord's command will try tributaries which would furnish us an easy line over which to bring all supplies to within easy hauling distance of every position the army could occupy from the rapidan to the james river. but lee could, if he chose, detach or move his whole army north on a line rather interior to the one i would have to take in following. a movement by his left--our right--would obviate this; but all that was done would have to be done with the supplies and ammunition we started with. all idea of adopting this latter plan was abandoned when the limited quantity of supplies possible to take with us was considered. the country over which we would have to pass was so exhausted of all food or forage that we would be obliged to carry everything with us. while these preparations were going on the enemy was not entirely idle. in the west forrest made a raid in west tennessee up to the northern border, capturing the garrison of four or five hundred men at union city, and followed it up by an attack on paducah, kentucky, on the banks of the ohio. while he was able to enter the city he failed to capture the forts or any part of the garrison. on the first intelligence of forrest's raid i telegraphed sherman to send all his cavalry against him, and not to let him get out of the trap he had put himself into. sherman had anticipated me by sending troops against him before he got my order. forrest, however, fell back rapidly, and attacked the troops at fort pillow, a station for the protection of the navigation of the mississippi river. the garrison to force a passage southward, if they are successful in reaching the virginia and tennessee railroad, to cut the main lines of the road connecting richmond with all the south and south-west. gillmore will join butler with about 10,000 men from south carolina. butler can reduce his garrison so as to take 23,000 men into the field directly to his front. the force will be commanded by maj.-general w. f. smith. with smith and gillmore, butler will seize city point, and operate against richmond from the south side of the river. his movement will be simultaneous with yours. lee's army will be your objective point. wherever lee goes, there you will go also. the only point upon which i am now in doubt is, whether it will be better to cross the rapidan above or below him. each plan presents great advantages over the other with corresponding objections. by crossing above, lee is cut off from all chance of ignoring richmond and going north on a raid. but if we take this route, all we do must be done whilst the rations we start with hold out. we separate from butler so that he cannot be directed how to co-operate. by the other route brandy station can be used as a base of supplies until another is secured on the york or james rivers. these advantages and objections i will talk over with you more fully than i can write them. burnside with a force of probably 25,000 men will reinforce you. immediately upon his arrival, which will be shortly after the 20th inst., i will give him the defence of the road from bull run as far south as we wish to hold it. this will enable you to collect all your strength about brandy station and to the front. there will be naval co-operation on the james river, and transports and ferries will be provided so that should lee fall back into his intrenchments at richmond, butler's force and yours will be a unit, or at least can be made to act as such. what i would direct then, is that you commence at once reducing baggage to the very lowest possible standard. two wagons to a regiment of five hundred men is the greatest number that should be allowed, for all baggage, exclusive of subsistence stores and ordnance stores. one wagon to brigade and one to division headquarters is sufficient and about two to corps headquarters. should by lee's right flank be our route, you will want to make arrangements for having supplies of all sorts promptly forwarded to white house on the pamunkey. your estimates for this contingency should be made at once. if not wanted there, there is every probability they will be wanted on the james river or elsewhere. if lee's left is turned, large provision will have to be made for ordnance stores. i would say not much short of five hundred rounds of infantry ammunition would do. by the other, half the amount would be sufficient. u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. (*26) general john a. logan, upon whom devolved the command of the army of the tennessee during this battle, in his report gave our total loss in killed, wounded and missing at 3,521; and estimated that of the enemy to be not less than 10,000: and general g. m. dodge, graphically describing to general sherman the enemy's attack, the full weight of which fell first upon and was broken by his depleted command, remarks: "the disparity of forces can be seen from the fact that in the charge made by my two brigades under fuller and mersy they took 351 prisoners, representing forty-nine different regiments, eight brigades and three divisions; and brought back eight battle flags from the enemy." (*27) union army on the rapidan, may 5, 1864. [compiled.] lieutenant-general u. s. grant, commander-in-chief. major-general george g. meade, commanding army of the potomac. maj.-gen. w. s. hancock, commanding second army corps. first division, brig.-gen. francis c. barlow. first brigade, col. nelson a. miles. second brigade, col. thomas a. smyth. third brigade, col. paul frank. fourth brigade, col. john r. brooke. second division, brig.-gen. john gibbon. first brigade, brig.-gen. alex. s. webb. second brigade, brig.-gen. joshua t. owen. third brigade, col. samuel s. carroll. third division, maj.-gen. david b. birney. first brigade, brig.-gen. j. h. h. ward. second brigade, brig.-gen. alexander hays. fourth divisin, brig.-gen. gershom mott. first brigade, col. robert mcallister. second brigade, col. wm. r. brewster. artillery brigade, col. john c. tidball. maj.-gen. g. k. warren, commanding fifth army corps. first division, brig.-gen. charles griffin. first brigade, brig.-gen. romeyn b. ayres. second brigade, col. jacob b. sweitzer. third brigade, brig.-gen. j. j. bartlett. second division, brig.-gen. john c. robinson. first brigade, col. samuel h. leonard. second brigade, brig.-gen. henry baxter. third brigade, col. andrew w. denison. third division, brig.-gen. samuel w. crawford. first brigade, col. wm mccandless. third brigade, col. joseph w. fisher. fourth division, brig.-gen. james s. wadsworth. first brigade, brig.-gen. lysander cutler. second brigade brig.-gen. james c. rice. third brigade, col. roy stone artillery brigade, col. s. s. wainwright. maj.-gen. john sedgwick, commanding sixth army corps. first division, brig.-gen. h. g. wright. first brigade, col. henry w. brown. second brigade, col. emory upton. third brigade, brig.-gen. d. a. russell. fourth brigade, brig.-gen. alexander shaler. second division, brig.-gen. george w. getty. first brigade, brig.-gen. frank wheaton. second brigade, col. lewis a. grant. third brigade, brig.-gen. thos. h. neill. fourth brigade, brig.-gen. henry l. eustis. third division, brig.-gen. james ricketts. first brigade, brig.-gen. wm. h. morris. second brigade, brig.-gen. t. seymour. artillery brigade, col. c. h. tompkins maj.-gen. p. h. sheridan, commanding cavalry corps. first division, brig.-gen. a. t. a. torbert. first brigade, brig.-gen. g. a. custer. second brigade, col. thos. c. devin. reserve brigade, brig.-gen. wesley merritt second division, brig.-gen. d. mcm. gregg. first brigade, brig.-gen. henry e. davies, jr. second brigade, col. j. irvin gregg. third division, brig.-gen. j. h. wilson. first brigade, col. t. m. bryan, jr. second brigade, col. geo. h. chapman. maj.-gen. a. e. burnside, commanding ninth army corps. first division, brig.-gen. t. g. stevenson. first brigade, col. sumner carruth. second brigade, col. daniel leasure. second division, brig.-gen. robert b. potter. first brigade, col. zenas r. bliss. second brigade, col. simon g. griffin. third division, brig.-gen. orlando willcox. first brigade, col. john f. hartranft. second brigade, col. benj. c. christ. fourth division, brig.-gen. edward ferrero. first brigade, col. joshua k. sigfried. second brigade, col. henry g. thomas. provisional brigade, col. elisha g. marshall. brig.-gen. henry j. hunt, commanding artillery. reserve, col. h. s. burton. first brigade, col. j. h. kitching. second brigade, maj. j. a. tompkins. first brig. horse art., capt. j. m. robertson. second brigade, horse art., capt. d. r. ransom. third brigade, maj. r. h. fitzhugh. general headquarters....... provost guard, brig.-gen. m. r. patrick. volunteer engineers, brig.-gen. h. w. benham. confederate army. organization of the army of northern virginia, commanded by general robert e. lee, august 31st, 1834. first army corps: lieut.-gen. r. h. anderson, commanding. maj.-gen. geo. e. pickett's division. brig.-gen. seth m. barton's brigade. (a) brig.-gen. m. d. corse's " " eppa hunton's " " wm. r. terry's " maj.-gen. c. w. field's division. (b) brig.-gen. g. t. anderson's brigade " e. m. law's (c) " " john bratton's " maj.-gen. j. b. kershaw's division. (d) brig.-gen. w. t. wofford's brigade " b. g. humphreys' " " goode bryan's " " kershaw's (old) " second army corps: major-general jubal a. early, commanding maj.-gen. john b. gordon's division. brig.-gen. h. t. hays' brigade. (e) " john pegram 's " (f) " gordon's " (g) brig.-gen. r. f. hoke's " maj.-gen. edward johnson's division. stonewall brig. (brig.-gen. j. a. walker). (h) brig.-gen. j m jones' brigade. (h) " geo h. stewart's " (h) " l. a. stafford's " (e) maj.-gen. r. e. rodes' division. brig.-gen. j. daniel's brigade. (i) " geo. dole's " (k) " s. d. ramseur's brigade. " c. a. battle's " " r. d. johnston's " (f) third army corps: lieut.-gen. a. p. hill, commanding. maj.-gen. wm. mahone's division. (l) brig.-gen. j. c. c. sanders' brigade. mahone's " brig.-gen. n. h. harris's " (m) " a. r. wright's " " joseph finegan's " maj.-gen. c. m. wilcox's division. brig.-gen. e. l. thomas's brigade (n) " james h. lane's " " sam'l mccowan's " " alfred m. scale's " maj.-gen. h. heth's division. (o) brig.-gen. j. r. davis's brigade. " john r. cooke's " " d. mcrae's " " j. j. archer's " " h. h. walker's " _unattached_: 5th alabama battalion. cavalry corps: lieutenant-general wade hampton, commanding.(p) maj.-gen. fitzhugh lee's division brig.-gen. w. c. wickham's brigade " l. l. lomax's " maj.-gen. m. c. butler's division. brig.-gen. john dunovant's brigade. " p. m. b. young's " " thomas l. rosser's " maj.-gen. w. h. f. lee's division. brig.-gen. rufus barringer's brigade. " j. r. chambliss's " artillery reserve: brig.-gen. w. n. pendleton, commanding. brig.-gen. e. p. alexander's division.* cabell's battalion. manly's battery. 1st co. richmond howitzers. carleton's battery. calloway's battery. haskell's battalion. branch's battery. nelson's " garden's " rowan " huger's battalion. smith's battery. moody " woolfolk " parker's " taylor's " fickling's " martin's " gibb's battalion. davidson's battery. dickenson's " otey's " brig.-gen. a. l. long's division. braxton's battalion. lee battery. 1st md. artillery. stafford " alleghany " cutshaw's battalion. charlotteville artillery. staunton " courtney " carter's battalion. morris artillery. orange " king william artillery. jeff davis " nelson's battalion. amherst artillery. milledge " fluvauna " brown's battalion. powhatan artillery. 2d richmond howitzers. 3d " " rockbridge artillery. salem flying artillery. col r. l.walker's division. cutt's battalion. ross's battery. patterson's battery. irwin artillery. richardson's battalion. lewis artillery. donaldsonville artillery. norfolk light " huger " mclntosh 's battalion. johnson's battery. hardaway artillery. danville " 2d rockbridge artillery. pegram's battalion. peedee artillery. fredericksburg artillery. letcher " purcell battery. crenshaw's battery. poague's battalion. madison artillery. albemarle " brooke " charlotte " note. (a) col. w. r. aylett was in command aug. 29th, and probably at above date. (b) inspection report of this division shows that it also contained benning's and gregg's brigades. (c) commanded by colonel p. d. bowles. (d) only two brigadier-generals reported for duty; names not indicated. organization of the army of the valley district. (e) constituting york's brigade. (f) in ramseur's division. (g) evan's brigade, colonel e. n. atkinson commanding, and containing 12th georgia battalion. (h) the virginia regiments constituted terry's brigade, gordon's division. (i) grimes' brigade. (k) cook's " (l) returns report but one general officer present for duty; name not indicated. (m) colonel joseph m. jayne, commanding. (n) colonel thomas j. simmons, commanding. (o) four brigadier-generals reported present for duty; names not indicated. (p) on face of returns appears to have consisted of hampton's, fitz-lee's, and w. h. f. lee's division, and dearing's brigade. *but one general officer reported present for duty in the artillery, and alexander's name not on the original. (*28) headquarters armies u. s., may ii, 1864.--3 p.m. major-general meade, commanding army of the potomac. move three divisions of the 2d corps by the rear of the 5th and 6th corps, under cover of night, so as to join the 9th corps in a vigorous assault on the enemy at four o'clock a.m. to-morrow. will send one or two staff officers over to-night to stay with burnside, and impress him with the importance of a prompt and vigorous attack. warren and wright should hold their corps as close to the enemy as possible, to take advantage of any diversion caused by this attack, and to push in if any opportunity presents itself. there is but little doubt in my mind that the assault last evening would have proved entirely successful if it had commenced one hour earlier and had been heartily entered into by mott's division and the 9th corps. u. s. grant, lieut.-general. (*29) headquarters, armies u. s., may 11, 1864.-4 p.m. major-general a. e. burnside, commanding 9th army corps. major-general hancock has been ordered to move his corps under cover of night to join you in a vigorous attack against the enemy at 4 o'clock a.m. to-morrow. you will move against the enemy with your entire force promptly and with all possible vigor at precisely 4 o'clock a.m. to-morrow the 12th inst. let your preparations for this attack be conducted with the utmost secrecy and veiled entirely from the enemy. i send two of my staff officers, colonels comstock and babcock, in whom i have great confidence and who are acquainted with the direction the attack is to be made from here, to remain with you and general hancock with instructions to render you every assistance in their power. generals warren and wright will hold their corps as close to the enemy as possible, to take advantage of any diversion caused by yours and hancock's attack, and will push in their whole force if any opportunity presents itself. u. s. grant, lieut.-general. (*30) headquarters armies u. s., may 12, 1864, 6.30 p.m. major-general halleck, washington, d. c. the eighth day of the battle closes, leaving between three and four thousand prisoners in our hands for the day's work, including two general officers, and over thirty pieces of artillery. the enemy are obstinate, and seem to have found the last ditch. we have lost no organizations, not even that of a company, whilst we have destroyed and captured one division (johnson's), one brigade (doles'), and one regiment entire from the enemy. u. s. grant, lieut.-general. (*31) spottsylvania c. h., may 13, 1864. hon e. m. stanton, secretary of war, washington, d. c. i beg leave to recommend the following promotions be made for gallant and distinguished services in the last eight days' battles, to wit: brigadier-general h. g. wright and brigadier-general john gibbon to be major-generals; colonel s. s. carroll, 8th ohio volunteers colonel e. upton, 121st new york volunteers; colonel william mccandless, 2d pennsylvania reserves, to be brigadier-generals. i would also recommend major-general w. s. hancock for brigadier-general in the regular army. his services and qualifications are eminently deserving of this recognition. in making these recommendations i do not wish the claims of general g. m. dodge for promotion forgotten, but recommend his name to be sent in at the same time. i would also ask to have general wright assigned to the command of the sixth army corps. i would further ask the confirmation of general humphreys to the rank of major-general. general meade has more than met my most sanguine expectations. he and sherman are the fittest officers for large commands i have come in contact with. if their services can be rewarded by promotion to the rank of major-generals in the regular army the honor would be worthily bestowed, and i would feel personally gratified. i would not like to see one of these promotions at this time without seeing both. u. s. grant, lieut.-general. (*32) quarles' mills, va., may 26, 1864. major-general halleck, washington, d. c. the relative position of the two armies is now as follows: lee's right rests on a swamp east of the richmond and fredericksburg road and south of the north anna, his centre on the river at ox ford, and his left at little river with the crossings of little river guarded as far up as we have gone. hancock with his corps and one division of the 9th corps crossed at chesterfield ford and covers the right wing of lee's army. one division of the 9th corps is on the north bank of the anna at ox ford, with bridges above and below at points nearest to it where both banks are held by us, so that it could reinforce either wing of our army with equal facility. the 5th and 6th corps with one division of the 9th corps run from the south bank of the anna from a short distance above ox ford to little river, and parallel with and near to the enemy. to make a direct attack from either wing would cause a slaughter of our men that even success would not justify. to turn the enemy by his right, between the two annas is impossible on account of the swamp upon which his right rests. to turn him by the left leaves little river, new found river and south anna river, all of them streams presenting considerable obstacles to the movement of our army, to be crossed. i have determined therefore to turn the enemy's right by crossing at or near hanover town. this crosses all three streams at once, and leaves us still where we can draw supplies. during the last night the teams and artillery not in position, belonging to the right wing of our army, and one division of that wing were quietly withdrawn to the north bank of the river and moved down to the rear of the left. as soon as it is dark this division with most of the cavalry will commence a forced march for hanover town to seize and hold the crossings. the balance of the right wing will withdraw at the same hour, and follow as rapidly as possible. the left wing will also withdraw from the south bank of the river to-night and follow in rear of the right wing. lee's army is really whipped. the prisoners we now take show it, and the action of his army shows it unmistakably. a battle with them outside of intrenchments cannot be had. our men feel that they have gained the morale over the enemy, and attack him with confidence. i may be mistaken, but i feel that our success over lee's army is already assured. the promptness and rapidity with which you have forwarded reinforcements has contributed largely to the feeling of confidence inspired in our men, and to break down that of the enemy. we are destroying all the rails we can on the central and fredericksburg roads. i want to leave a gap on the roads north of richmond so big that to get a single track they will have to import rail from elsewhere. even if a crossing is not effected at hanover town it will probably be necessary for us to move on down the pamunkey until a crossing is effected. i think it advisable therefore to change our base of supplies from port royal to the white house. i wish you would direct this change at once, and also direct smith to put the railroad bridge there in condition for crossing troops and artillery and leave men to hold it. u. s. grant, lieut.-general. (*33) near cold harbor, june 3, 1864, 7 a.m. major-general meade, commanding a. p. the moment it becomes certain that an assault cannot succeed, suspend the offensive; but when one does succeed, push it vigorously and if necessary pile in troops at the successful point from wherever they can be taken. i shall go to where you are in the course of an hour. u. s. grant, lieut.-general. (*34) cold harbor, june 5,1864. major-general halleck, chief of staff of the army, washington, d. c. a full survey of all the ground satisfies me that it would be impracticable to hold a line north-east of richmond that would protect the fredericksburg railroad to enable us to use that road for supplying the army. to do so would give us a long vulnerable line of road to protect, exhausting much of our strength to guard it, and would leave open to the enemy all of his lines of communication on the south side of the james. my idea from the start has been to beat lee's army if possible north of richmond; then after destroying his lines of communication on the north side of the james river to transfer the army to the south side and besiege lee in richmond, or follow him south if he should retreat. i now find, after over thirty days of trial, the enemy deems it of the first importance to run no risks with the armies they now have. they act purely on the defensive behind breastworks, or feebly on the offensive immediately in front of them, and where in case of repulse they can instantly retire behind them. without a greater sacrifice of human life than i am willing to make all cannot be accomplished that i had designed outside of the city. i have therefore resolved upon the following plan: i will continue to hold substantially the ground now occupied by the army of the potomac, taking advantage of any favorable circumstance that may present itself until the cavalry can be sent west to destroy the virginia central railroad from about beaver dam for some twenty-five or thirty miles west. when this is effected i will move the army to the south side of the james river, either by crossing the chickahominy and marching near to city point, or by going to the mouth of the chickahominy on north side and crossing there. to provide for this last and most possible contingency, several ferry-boats of the largest class ought to be immediately provided. once on the south side of the james river, i can cut off all sources of supply to the enemy except what is furnished by the canal. if hunter succeeds in reaching lynchburg, that will be lost to him also. should hunter not succeed, i will still make the effort to destroy the canal by sending cavalry up the south side of the river with a pontoon train to cross wherever they can. the feeling of the two armies now seems to be that the rebels can protect themselves only by strong intrenchments, whilst our army is not only confident of protecting itself without intrenchments, but that it can beat and drive the enemy wherever and whenever he can be found without this protection. u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. (*35) cold harbor, va., june 6, 1864. major-general d. hunter commanding dept. w. va. general sheridan leaves here to-morrow morning, with instructions to proceed to charlottesville, va., and to commence there the destruction of the va. cen. r. r., destroying this way as much as possible. the complete destruction of this road and of the canal on james river is of great importance to us. according to the instructions i sent to general halleck for your guidance, you were to proceed to lynchburg and commence there. it would be of great value to us to get possession of lynchburg for a single day. but that point is of so much importance to the enemy, that in attempting to get it such resistance may be met as to defeat your getting onto the road or canal at all. i see, in looking over the letter to general halleck on the subject of your instructions, that it rather indicates that your route should be from staunton via charlottesville. if you have so understood it, you will be doing just what i want. the direction i would now give is, that if this letter reaches you in the valley between staunton and lynchburg, you immediately turn east by the most practicable road. from thence move eastward along the line of the road, destroying it completely and thoroughly, until you join general sheridan. after the work laid out for general sheridan and yourself is thoroughly done, proceed to join the army of the potomac by the route laid out in general sheridan's instructions. if any portion of your force, especially your cavalry, is needed back in your department, you are authorized to send it back. if on receipt of this you should be near to lynchburg and deem it practicable to detach a cavalry force to destroy the canal. lose no opportunity to destroy the canal. u. s. grant, lieut.-general. (*36) from a statement of losses compiled in the adjutant-general's office. field of action and date. | killed. | wounded. | missing. | aggregate. | wilderness, may 5th to 7th | 2,261 | 8,785 | 2,902 |13,948 | spottsylvania, may 8th to 21st | 2,271 | 9,360 | 1,970 | 13,601| north anna, may 23d to 27th | 186 | 792 | 165 | 1,143 | totopotomoy, may 27th to 31st | 99 | 358 | 52 | 509 | cold harbor, may 31st to june 12th | 1,769 | 6,752 | 1,537 |10,058 | total ................ | 6,586 | 26,047 | 6,626 | 39,259 | (*37) city point, va., june 17, 1864. 11 a.m. major-gen. halleck, washington, d. c. * * * * * * * the enemy in their endeavor to reinforce petersburg abandoned their intrenchments in front of bermuda hundred. they no doubt expected troops from north of the james river to take their place before we discovered it. general butler took advantage of this and moved a force at once upon the railroad and plank road between richmond and petersburg, which i hope to retain possession of. too much credit cannot be given to the troops and their commanders for the energy and fortitude displayed during the last five days. day and night has been all the same, no delays being allowed on any account. u. s. grant, lieut.-general. (*38) city point, va., july 24, 1864. major-general meade, commanding, etc. the engineer officers who made a survey of the front from bermuda hundred report against the probability of success from an attack there. the chances they think will be better on burnside's front. if this is attempted it will be necessary to concentrate all the force possible at the point in the enemy's line we expect to penetrate. all officers should be fully impressed with the absolute necessity of pushing entirely beyond the enemy's present line, if they should succeed in penetrating it, and of getting back to their present line promptly if they should not succeed in breaking through. to the right and left of the point of assault all the artillery possible should be brought to play upon the enemy in front during the assault. their lines would be sufficient for the support of the artillery, and all the reserves could be brought on the flanks of their commands nearest to the point of assault, ready to follow in if successful. the field artillery and infantry held in the lines during the first assault should be in readiness to move at a moment's notice either to their front or to follow the main assault, as they should receive orders. one thing, however, should be impressed on corps commanders. if they see the enemy giving away on their front or moving from it to reinforce a heavily assaulted portion of their line, they should take advantage of such knowledge and act promptly without waiting for orders from army commanders. general ord can co-operate with his corps in this movement, and about five thousand troops from bermuda hundred can be sent to reinforce you or can be used to threaten an assault between the appomattox and james rivers, as may be deemed best. this should be done by tuesday morning, if done at all. if not attempted, we will then start at the date indicated to destroy the railroad as far as hicksford at least, and to weldon if possible. * * * * * * * whether we send an expedition on the road or assault at petersburg, burnside's mine will be blown up.... u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. (*39) see letter, august 5th, appendix. (*40) see appendix, letters of oct. 11th. (*41) city point, va., december 2,1864. major-general thomas, nashville tenn. if hood is permitted to remain quietly about nashville, you will lose all the road back to chattanooga and possibly have to abandon the line of the tennessee. should he attack you it is all well, but if he does not you should attack him before he fortifies. arm and put in the trenches your quartermaster employees, citizens, etc. u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. city point, va., december 2, 1864.--1.30 p.m. major-general thomas, nashville, tenn. with your citizen employees armed, you can move out of nashville with all your army and force the enemy to retire or fight upon ground of your own choosing. after the repulse of hood at franklin, it looks to me that instead of falling back to nashville we should have taken the offensive against the enemy where he was. at this distance, however, i may err as to the best method of dealing with the enemy. you will now suffer incalculable injury upon your railroads if hood is not speedily disposed of. put forth therefore every possible exertion to attain this end. should you get him to retreating give him no peace. u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. city point, va., december 5, 1864. major-general thomas, nashville, tenn. is there not danger of forrest moving down the cumberland to where he can cross it? it seems to me whilst you should be getting up your cavalry as rapidly as possible to look after forrest, hood should be attacked where he is. time strengthens him in all possibility as much as it does you. u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. city point, va., december 6, 1864--4 p.m. major-general thomas, nashville, tenn. attack hood at once and wait no longer for a remnant of your cavalry. there is great danger of delay resulting in a campaign back to the ohio river. u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. city point, va., december 8, 1864.--8.30 p.m. major-general thomas, nashville, tenn. your dispatch of yesterday received. it looks to me evident the enemy are trying to cross the cumberland river, and are scattered. why not attack at once? by all means avoid the contingency of a foot race to see which, you or hood, can beat to the ohio. if you think necessary call on the governors of states to send a force into louisville to meet the enemy if he should cross the river. you clearly never should cross except in rear of the enemy. now is one of the finest opportunities ever presented of destroying one of the three armies of the enemy. if destroyed he never can replace it. use the means at your command, and you can do this and cause a rejoicing that will resound from one end of the land to the other. u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. city point, va., december 11, 1864.--4 p.m. major-general thomas, nashville, tenn. if you delay attack longer the mortifying spectacle will be witnessed of a rebel army moving for the ohio river, and you will be forced to act, accepting such weather as you find. let there be no further delay. hood cannot even stand a drawn battle so far from his supplies of ordnance stores. if he retreats and you follow, he must lose his material and much of his army. i am in hopes of receiving a dispatch from you to-day announcing that you have moved. delay no longer for weather or reinforcements. u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. washington, d. c., december 15, 1864. major-general thomas, nashville, tenn. i was just on my way to nashville, but receiving a dispatch from van duzer detailing your splendid success of to-day, i shall go no further. push the enemy now and give him no rest until he is entirely destroyed. your army will cheerfully suffer many privations to break up hood's army and render it useless for future operations. do not stop for trains or supplies, but take them from the country as the enemy have done. much is now expected. u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. (*42) see orders to major-general meade, ord, and sheridan, march 24th, appendix. (*43) see appendix. (*44) note.--the fac-simile of the terms of lee's surrender inserted at this place, was copied from the original document furnished the publishers through the courtesy of general ely s. parker, military secretary on general grant's staff at the time of the surrender. three pages of paper were prepared in general grant's manifold order book on which he wrote the terms, and the interlineations and erasures were added by general parker at the suggestion of general grant. after such alteration it was handed to general lee, who put on his glasses, read it, and handed it back to general grant. the original was then transcribed by general parker upon official headed paper and a copy furnished general lee. the fac-simile herewith shows the color of the paper of the original document and all interlineations and erasures. there is a popular error to the effect that generals grant and lee each signed the articles of surrender. the document in the form of a letter was signed only by general grant, in the parlor of mclean's house while general lee was sitting in the room, and general lee immediately wrote a letter accepting the terms and handed it to general grant.